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www.argument-journal.eu ARGUMENT Vol. 3 (1/2013) pp. 217–224 N OT Y / N OT E S Bogdan BANASIAK, Andrzej KUCNER, Piotr WASYLUK (red.), Demokracja, tolerancja, oświecenie Olsztyn: Instytut Filozofii UWM, 2012 (seria „Festiwal Filozofii", t. 4), 259 s., ISBN 978-83-60636-21-3 [oprawa miękka] Demokracja, tolerancja, oświecenie jest zbiorem tekstów najciekawszych wystąpień uczestników czwartej edycji „Festiwalu Filozofii", który odbył się w dniach 12–17 września 2011 roku w Białymstoku, w Wyższej Szkole Administracji Publicznej im. Stanisława Staszica. Celem festiwalu była filozoficzna refleksja nad ideami i wartościami okresu Oświecenia w kontekście współcześnie zachodzących przemian. Artykuły zostały podzielone na trzy grupy tematyczne, odpowiadające tytułowym hasłom. W części poświęconej demokracji znajdują się teksty: Jacka Seradzana, Jadwigi Mizińskiej, Stanisława Łojka, Jana Wadowskiego, Marii Kostyszak. Wymienieni autorzy sięgają do kolebki kultury europejskiej - greckiej tradycji filozoficznej. Przypominają, że idee demokratyczne były poddawane krytycznej analizie już w antycznej polis. W epoce Oświecenia zyskały one nowy polityczny wyraz oraz nowe ugruntowanie filozoficzne. Współczesny ustrój społeczeństw zachodnich mierzy się zatem z powracającymi w odmiennej formie tradycyjnymi problemami filozofii polityki. Temat tolerancji podejmują: Ewa Starzyńska-Kościuszko, Andrzej L. Zachariasz i Bogdan Banasiak. W obliczu narastających dziś napięć na tle kulturowym, religijnym, etnicznym i światopoglądowym próbują oni ponownie rozważyć kwestię granic i form tolerancji. Technologia cyfrowa, dynamiczna sytuacja geopolityczna i ciągły rozwój wielu tradycji kulturowych tworzą świat, w którym filozofowie muszą wciąż od nowa szukać odpowiedzi na podstawowe pytania ludzkiego życia. Z kolei uwaga Pawła Pieniążka, Tomasza Załuskiego, Piotra Wasyluka, Agaty Janaszczyk, Andrzeja Kucnera, Artura Lewandowskiego, Aleksandra Gemela, Mikołaja Ratajczaka i Łukasza Atowskiego skupia się wokół pojęcia „Oświecenie". Autorzy szukają źródeł kryzysu cywilizacji naukowo-technicznej. Współ218 Noty / Notes czesny pesymizm konfrontują z optymistycznym nastawieniem panującym w „epoce rozumu". Podkreślają, że wpływ idei Oświecenia na rozwój cywilizacji zachodniej był wielowątkowy i spotyka się dziś z niejednoznacznymi ocenami. Michał Piekarz Michał PIEKARZ, Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny w Krakowie. E-mail: [email protected]

TEMES Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural 15/2012: 111-135 ISSN: 1139-0158 THE POLITICS OF ABSTRACT ART: FORMA 1 AND THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, 1947-1951 Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez Universidad de Sevilla RESUM. Este artículo examina el papel del grupo de artistas abstractos Forma 1 en relación con la política cultural del Partido Comunista Italiano durante la posguerra, como ejemplo de los intentos de superar la dicotomía establecida en Italia entre arte abstracto y realismo socialista y producir una alternativa a la confrontación entre ambos discursos estéticos. Mientras los artistas realistas socialistas subrayaban la necesidad de expresar contenidos políticos explícitos con un estilo que asegurase su máxima legibilidad para una audiencia de masas, los artistas de Forma 1 argumentaban que la abstracción significaba una crítica de la representación pictórica que podía contribuir a la crítica de la ideología burguesa, armonizando de este modo el marxismo con los desarrollos artísticos más avanzados. El PCI, por su parte, basaba su política artística en amplias alianzas de artistas e intelectuales antifascistas, que cada vez eran más difíciles de mantener en el clima de creciente confrontación política y cultural que siguió a la II Guerra Mundial. PARAULES CLAU. Historia del arte, política, Italia, siglo XX, Forma 1, Abstracción, realismo, estudios culturales, Partido Comunista Italiano, comunismo. ABSTRACT. This paper discusses the role of the Forma 1 group of abstract artists within the cultural politics of the Italian Communist Party during the Post-war period, as an example of the attempts carried out in Italy to overcome the established dichotomy between abstract and socialist realist art, and produce an alternative to conflicting post-war aesthetic discourses. Socialist realist artists stressed the need for unambiguous political contents and easy readability. In turn, the Forma 1 artists argued that abstract art meant a critique of pictorial Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 112 representation that could contribute to a critique of bourgeois ideology, harmonising Marxism with advanced technical developments in the field of art. The PCI, for its part, pursued a policy of wide alliances of anti-fascist artists and intellectuals, which was increasingly difficult to hold in the climate of growing political and cultural confrontation in Italy that followed the War. KEY WORDS. History of Art, politics, Italy, 20th Century, Forma 1, Abstract art, Realism, Cultural Studies, Italian Communist Party, Antifascism, Communism. After fascism was defeated in 1944, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) pursued a wide and progressive social alliance based on the common experience of the war and the Resistance. The PCI policy towards the arts was tailored to this end and the party supported associations of artists for anti-fascist political purposes. In 1947, the Fronte nuovo delle arti, a group that was the artistic counterpart of the political left, was established. It included artists from most modern trends active in Italy, on the basis of a broad social and political commitment. Nevertheless, Italian politics became increasingly polarised as the post-war period went on. The communists were expelled from the christiandemocrat-led government in 1947 and faced successive electoral defeats in 1946 and 1948. As a consequence, many PCI members started questioning the policy of alliances and openness pursued by the party thus far. Culture became dominated by a Stalinist, anti-modern trend and the need to produce easily readable works with «non vague, but specific subject-matter linked to the communist fight» was stressed.1 These changes were bound to clash with the artistic experimental effervescence of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Although no official statements on the form in which a communist content should be presented were issued in Italy, the imperative of «readablility» linked left wing, socially committed art with a concept of «realism», while artistic freedom was equated with abstract art. 1 Emilio SERENI, Relazione sui lavori dell'ufficio per il lavoro culturale, Rome, 14-15 June 1949, Documents of the Central Committee Cultural Commission, Gramsci Institute Archive, Rome, p. 1 Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 113 The debate on modern art: cubism and the Italian left In the 1930s Italian isolationism had detached younger artists from the regime and signalled the exhaustion of the project of intellectual fascism that had earlier gained Mussolini a wide support. These young artists welcomed every novelty from Europe but it was, perhaps, expressionism that best reflected the horror of living under a dictatorship with no short-term perspective of change. After the war, however, confidence in social and personal reconstruction returned and cubism became the main subject of discussion, while expressionism began to be perceived as too attached to individualism, as an immediate retreat to personal feelings which was not in keeping with the times. In particular, Pablo Picasso in the 1930s became one of the symbols for the post-war generation of Italian artists with works such as Guernica and Dreams and Lies of Franco. The social protest of these works favoured the image of an engaged Picasso, fully immersed in the world events, while their formal novelty was also seen to exemplify a scientific, rationalist Picasso, who critically distanced himself from these events. From 1944 left-wing artists and critics such as Ennio Morlotti, Ernesto Treccani, Renato Guttuso and Giulio Carlo Argan promoted a reading of cubism as the starting point of a new socialist period in the arts and for humanity in general. Reflecting upon the significance of Picasso's Guernica to Italian left-wing art in the immediate post-war period, Achille Bonito Oliva has described the painting as an example of «socialist cubism». In Guernica, «as in advertising, the image at the service of the message prevails over the design». For these reasons, Picasso was celebrated in Italy as «the standard bearer of a dialectical and revolutionary culture, always aligned [...] with the democratic and popular forces».2 This was not, however, the only interpretation of Picasso that circulated in the post-war Italian artistic milieu. In contrast to political readings, art critic Lionello Venturi emphasised cubism's ethically neutral attitude. Venturi argued, in respect to Picasso, that he did not promote any politics or world-view, but presented the viewer with open fields for the 2 Achille BONITO OLIVA, «Come Picasso realizzò la diretta», La repubblica, 26 April 2000, p. 44 Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 114 working of the mind and the eye: «The dissection of objects into parts and their cubist arrangement are attempts to suggest view of every part of the object. The result is, of course, that the perception of the object is missing, and an interpretation by the imagination becomes necessary».3 Venturi wrote these lines in 1946. Nevertheless, by 1948, Picasso's work was included in the first post-war Venice Biennale with a catalogue written by his comrade Guttuso. Braque, in turn, was awarded the first prize.4 When commenting on the Biennale, Venturi distinguished revolutionary Picassoism from cubism as understood by Braque, ie., as a genuine artistic concern about technical development, «Picasso is a gifted adventurer, [whereas] Braque is a quiet French bourgeois who has worked all his life to develop himself as an artist», he argued then.5 These two interpretations of cubism led critics such as Leonardo Borghese to write in Il corriere della sera that Italian painting was «divided in two».6 From 1947 there followed a period of more intense engagement by the Communists in art matters. Their electoral setbacks in the late 1940s and the failure of the governments of national unity that followed the war had caused their policies to strengthen in all fields, including culture. And then controversy was set off in 1948 by Palmiro Togliatti s unexpected attack on the Fronte artists, launched in the Rinascita journal on the occasion of an exhibition organised by the –left-wingAlleanza della cultura at Bologna's Re Enzo Palace. There, several well-known «modernistic» works were exhibited by Giulio Turcato, Emilio Vedova, Armando Pizzinato, Renato Birolli and Guttuso, works which had already been shown in the Biennale. No communist official had intervened then, but now Togliatti felt that it was his right to do so as the Alleanza was a Communist-sponsored organisation and Bologna was one of the party's 3 Lionello VENTURI, «Considerazioni sull'arte astratta», Domus, XVIII, January 1946, p. 3435. 4 There were also one man shows of Miró, Harp, Ernst, Klee, Arp, Marini, Giacometti, Mondrian, Douanier Rousseau, the fauves and the futurist. Peggy Guggenheim's collection occupied the Greek pavilion with works by Calder, Moore, Pollock, Matta, etc. For an account of the 1948 Biennale see Peggy GUGGENHEIM, Out of this Century. Confessions of an Art Addict, New York, Universe Books, 1979, pp. 325-332. 5 Lionello VENTURI, «Terribile confessore Pablo Picasso ci parla dei mali del nostro tempo», La gazzetta, Livorno, 16 September 1948. 6 Leonardo BORGHESE, «Divisa in due la pittura italiana», Corriere della sera, Milan, 6 June 1949. Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 115 showpiece cities: It is a huddle of monstrous things: reproductions of so-called paintings, drawings and sculptures, organised by the 'Alleanza della Cultura' of Bologna, have been exhibited in that city in a 'First National Exhibition of Contemporary Art'. How can this be called art and, what is more, 'new art'; and how is it possible that they were able to find in Bologna, a city of such rich cultural and artistic tradition, so many brilliant people ready to pass this off as an artistic event. These people have used their authority to put before the public this exhibition of horrors and imbecilities. Let's tell the truth: these brilliant people agree with us; none of them believes that any of this foolishness is art, but they think, perhaps, that, to look like 'men of culture', it is necessary [...] to pretend to be super-experts and supermen and pile up nonsensical sentences. Go ahead! Be brave! Do as the little boy in Andersen's tale did: say that the king is naked and that foolishness is foolishness. You will gain because you will be sincere and the artists, or the so-called artists, will get angry in the beginning but, then, it will do them good.7 This statement signalled a major point of friction between the PCI and the Fronte nuovo delle arti. It seemed as if Togliatti intended a sort of purge of the Fronte, to provoke a split by which cultural «fellow travellers» were left politically deactivated; and a more cohesive group of communist artists could be organised. For Togliatti, there was, indeed, a contradiction between the artists' means of expression and the social commitment that inspired the exhibition. He underlined that the artists should consider the characteristics of their public, so that an effective communication could be ensured. Even though the show was aimed at a working class public, the paintings exhibited were not easily understandable by the workers. Togliatti was suspicious of the uncritical rush to assimilate international languages and feared that the artists' «snobbery» in relation to international modern art could infect his constituency. If events such as the Re Enzo exhibition were to signal the paradigm for left-wing cultural activity, this meant that the rank-and-file might end up «liking» modern art just because highly respected artists, who happened to be their comrades, had told them to do 7 Roderigo di CASTIGLIA (Togliatti's pseudonym), «Segnalazione», Rinascita, October 1948, p. 470. All further references are abbreviated to S Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 116 so. Togliatti argued that the cultural level of the average Italian was still very low and, therefore, events such as the Re Enzo exhibition could only produce mechanical equations of modern and politically progressive art in the workers' minds, which would, in turn, prevent a deep rapport between art and the proletarian public: «Serious damage would be done if we did not fight such a spiritual state of the public, and particularly amongst our public».8 The Re Enzo exhibition was not, for Togliatti, a mere artistic event, but an act of hierarchic cultural politics.'9 The «artists with a party card»10 who had exhibited in Bologna, immediately reacted and published an article in the following issue of Rinascita in which they made a claim for artistic freedom and stated the main outlines of their politically engaged art: firstly, internationalism and modernism were essential for the de-fascistisation of Italian culture. They argued that: [...] The characteristics of Italian bourgeois reactionaries deny intellectuals the avant-garde positions they held in countries where the bourgeoisie played a more vital role. Instead, [the Italian bourgeoisie] has isolated intellectuals. Fascism produced a theory of such isolation and blocked the intellectuals in cultural autarky. The role of Italian intellectuals in these years consisted in becoming conscious of their objective historical isolation and included speeding up the assimilation of artistic expressions produced in other countries. However, such a rush to catch up prevented a deep critical judgement of these tendencies, although this does not mean that [Italian artists] assimilated them merely in a mechanical and passive way.10 These artists argued that such a process of de-fascistisation was not free from the risk of falling into snobbery or superficiality, but they lamented Togliatti's sweeping criticism «because, despite being justified, it does not bear in mind that all young progressive Italian artists and ourselves, as party members, are already engaged in this issue; we fight to 8 R. di CASTIGLIA, 'S', p. 470. 9 Ibídem. 10 Pietro Consagra, Renato Guttuso, Aldo Natili, Paolo Ricci, Mario Mafai, Giulio Turcato, Ninio Franchina, Leoncillo Leonardi, Mario Penelope, Saro Mirabella, G. Vittorio Parisi, Giuseppe Mazzullo, Concetto Maugeri, Paolo Bracaglia Morante. Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 117 transform contemporary art».11 Secondly, they criticised Togliatti's ignorance of contemporary artistic practice, and hinted that he was overstepping the limits of his competence as the head of the PCI: Moreover, the Rinascita article makes indiscriminate judgements on an exhibition which was aimed at showing the different tendencies in Italian modern art, seeing a whole series of dissimilar works and artistic values as «monstrous things». [...] We know that we ought to free ourselves from intellectualist positions, that is: from an art which is detached from the world and reality as it develops, [and] which objectively [works] at the service of the ruling class [...] However, we cannot proceed according to the principle of «tabulae rasae» [...] Instead, we want to enrich the expressive possibilities of a kind of art which is able to merge with the struggle of the working class; and also with recent [artistic] experiences. Such an art can only come into being and spur our fight if it is truly art; and not merely naturalistic illustration [...].11 Finally, the artists emphasised that the show had been warmly welcomed by Bologna's workers: «The fact that the Emilian co-operatives have helped the Italian artists [in the organisation of the exhibition] is a very relevant cultural fact [...] Initiatives such as this tend to create new "consumers" in place of the old ruling class, which is already unable to absorb the new products of modern culture».12 Modernism and engagement Neither of these contending perspectives was illegitimate as such. Nevertheless, the controversies between communist artists and politicians led to the practical impossibility of a broad left-wing Fronte of artists able to reconcile social engagement with cultural breadth. Between 1944 and 1947, however, many anti-fascist and communist artists and critics had set out to achieve a compromise between the two sides and reflected upon how the artist or writer could participate in politics without renouncing his independence. In the Secondo manifesto di pittori e scultori (1944), also 11 Various Authors, «Per una nostra "segnalazione"», Rinascita, October 1948, pp. 469-70. All further references are abbreviated to NS 12 Various Authors, NS, p. 470 Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 118 called Oltre Guernica, painters Ennio Morlotti and Ernesto Treccani developed a philosophy of the history of art, from the Renaissance to the Twentieth Century, that conceived communist political engagement as the culmination of a long period of crisis. They argued that the emotional state of the intellectual in the face of the schism in taste and outlook between masses and elite (which mirrored the extreme division of labour under the conditions of capitalism), could be taken as the starting point of a process towards communist art. For them, such art was not the result of a mere personal adhesion to the revolution. Neither did they believe that it should be born out of the liquidation of modernism, as was the case with Soviet socialist realism. Rather, the new art would constitute the logical and historical consequence of modernism: Until Raphael Sanzio we have art as a social product expressed by the individual [...] Henceforth, the crisis between man and society opened up; that is, the individual claims to overcome society. He becomes exasperated and critical: there is exasperation in Michelangelo, Caravaggio, Delacroix, Van Gogh, Modigliani and the «fauves» [...] After them, the crisis became even more exacerbated and gave rise to alienation, disorientation, and mysticism (in the surrealists, dadaism and metaphysical painting). Therefore artists have to confront once more the question of the individual in society [...] Picasso reproduced decadence in himself. Eventually however, the Twentieth Century learned from cubism and, with its new means, was able to express the crisis of a faltering bourgeois society. Picasso [...] simultaneously closes the crisis period and shows the way forward in the visual arts, to a Proletarian society.13 Morlotti and Treccani presented themselves as members of a politicised 'post-avant-garde', insofar as they conceived the avant-garde as a concluded historical episode characterised by the artists' detachment from social life. To them, Guernica represented the turning point from the individualism of preceding artists or, rather, a new stage of modern art in which the contradictions between artistic and political freedom had been blurred. With this painting Picasso had joined the anti-fascist cause both as 13 E. MORLOTTI, and E. TRECCANI, «Secondo manifesto di pittori e sculttori», 1944, in P. BAROCCHI (ed.) Storia moderna dell'arte in Italia, Turin, Einaudi, 1992, p. 42. All further references are abbreviated to SMAI and are to this edition. Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 119 an artist and as a citizen, not just because of any rejection of his «bourgeois» past as a modernist, but, rather, as the result of his artistic evolution from modernist premises. Oltre Guernica provided the theoretical basis for a politically conscious art that would develop into organised groups of artists over the following years. In 1947, Renato Birolli, Giuseppe Santomaso Bruno Cassinari, Vedova, Giuseppe Marchiori, Giovanni Cavicchioli and Alberto Rossi issued the Manifesto della Nuova secessione Italiana, with the support of Venturi, Michelangelo Maschiotta, Umbro Apollonio, Marco Valsecchi, Argan, Corrado Maltese, Luigi Ferrandi, Antonio Banfi, Mario Mafai and Marino Marini. In this manifesto they stated that their contrasting styles would eventually converge on ethical and political basis: Eleven Italian artists, substituting an aesthetic of forms for a dialectic of forms, intend to make their apparently contrasting tendencies converge in a synthesis only recognisable in their future works. This clearly contrasts with the preceding syntheses, which have been the result of theoretical and apriori determinations [...] [These artists] intend to reach an essential basis of moral necessity by means of their singular affirmations in the world of images, their observations, accumulating them as acts of life. Painting and sculpture, thereby converted into instruments of declaration and free exploration of the world, will become increasingly in tune with reality. Art is not the conventional depiction of history, but history itself, which cannot ignore men.14 Also in 1947, Guttuso and Argan proposed to rename the group Fronte nuovo delle arti; and emphasised the need to address concrete historical subject-matters. Even though they stressed the instrumental character of art in social processes, they made it clear that these artists were not exclusively pursuing any single artistic programme. The realist character of their works would be apprehended as a result of the experience of the works themselves. Their value would reside in the extent to which the artists had undertaken a direct treatment of the object, and not in the extent to which they conformed to pre-determined aesthetic rules or a given subject-matter. Thus the Fronte artists rejected the production of a common 14 Various Authors, «Manifesto della Nuova secessione Italiana», 1947, in P. BAROCCHI, SMAI, p. 53 Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 120 style, but they were committed to democratising art and to working for a mass public. This audience, however, was perceived to be politically progressive but also aesthetically conservative and in need of some preliminary artistic education. Artists knew that they could only reach this audience by both taking art down to their intellectual level and counting on the Italian Communist Party, since this was the only post-war party with a consolidated mass organisation and a programme which catered for both cultural and social renewal. If politicians had always needed artists to illustrate their programmes, it was artists now who needed politicians in order to bring their intellectual dynamics to a conclusion. 1. Renato Guttuso, Occupazione delle terre incolte (Marsigliese contadina), 1947, watercolour, tempera, ink and pencil on paper, 70 x 90 cm., Galleria Nuovo Segno, Forlí. (Picture: J. J. Gómez) This strategy of critically recovering the achievements of international modern art and linking them to political revolution was quite distinct from the anti-modernism of Soviet-inspired aesthetics which, since 1934, had developed separately from the main course of Twentieth-Century Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 121 art, although sharing with it a commitment to realism. Italian left-wing artists acknowledged that the expressive means produced in the TwentiethCentury were also valuable for the depiction of contemporary life, so long as they were employed to represent reality more accurately. The main reference for communist-inspired art was Guttuso, who had set out to produce «a grand popular painting [...] in which the influences of Delacroix and Picasso were mixed».15 (Illustration 1) The reaction against realism: Forma 1 The idea of the autonomy of art was viewed by the majority of communist artists and politicians as neglect of art's social duties, but there did exist the possibility of another reading of abstract art, from a left-wing perspective. In 1947 the Forma 1 journal was established in Rome as the mouthpiece of formalist Marxist art. It grouped together Turcato, Concetto Maugeri, Achile Perilli, Carla Accardi, Ugo Attardi, Mino Guerrini, Antonio Sanfilippo, Piero Dorazio and Pietro Consagra. These artists vindicated formalism as the only way to free contemporary painting from tendencies that subordinated the arts to alien intellectual disciplines. Their manifesto declared: We hereby proclaim ourselves 'formalists' and 'Marxists', convinced as we are that the terms Marxism and formalism are not 'irreconcilable', especially today, when the progressive elements of our society must maintain a 'revolutionary' and 'avant-garde' position instead of settling into the mistake of a spent and conformist realism that in its most recent experiences in painting and sculpture has shown what a limited and narrow road it really is. Forma 1 contemplated a technical renewal of Italian art inspired by the developments of European abstract art. But they also intended to problematise artistic trends based on «traditional practices» and the «illustration» of ethical or political values. In their manifesto, they went on to assert that: 1. In art, the traditional, inventive reality of pure form is all that exists. 15 R. GUTTUSO, «Un marinaio ammanetatto, come diventò comunista Renato Guttuso», Vie nuove, 25 December 1949, p. 12. Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 122 2. We recognise formalism as the only means to avoid decadent, psychological and expressionistic influences. 3. Painting and Sculpture have as their means of expression: colour, draughtsmanship, plastic masses and, as their goal a harmony of pure forms. 4. Form is a means and an end; painting must also be able to function as a decorative complement to a bare wall and sculpture as a furnishing in a room -the goal of a work of art is usefulness, harmonious beauty, weightlessness. 5. In our work, we use the forms of objective reality as the means to attain objective abstract forms; we are interested in the form of the lemon, and not the lemon. They also explicitly rejected: 1. Every tendency aimed at inserting human details in the free creation of art, by the use of deformations, psychologisms, and other contrivances; the human is determined through the form created by man as artist and not by his a posteriori preoccupations with contact with other men. Our humanity is realised through the act of life, and not through the act of art. 2. Artistic creation that posits nature, sentimentally understood, as the starting point. 3. Everything not of interest to the goals of our work. Every assertion of ours originates from the need to divide artists into two categories: those positive, who are of interest to us, and those negative, who are not of interest to us. 4. The arbitrary, the apparent, the approximate, sensitivity, false emotionality, psychologisms, as spurious elements that compromise free creation. Rome, 15 March 1947. Accardi, Attardi, Consagra, Dorazio, Guerrini, Perilli, Sanfilippo, Turcato.16 Forma 1's reading of modern art was thoroughly different from 1930s abstract rationalism or any other antecedent of Italian non-figurative art. Take, for instance, the 1930s Lombardy group of abstract artists with headquarters at Milan's Galleria del Millione. They produced a nationalist 16 Various Authors, «Forma 1 Manifesto», Rome, 15 March 1947, in P. BAROCCHI, SMAI, pp. 65-66. The English translation is taken from The Italian Metamorphosis, edited by G. CELANT, New York, Guggenheim Museum, 1994, appendix. Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 123 version of abstract art and functional architecture stripped of any decoration which was inspired by the Quattrocento and Mediterranean classicism. In the case of Forma 1, on the contrary, there were no attempts to link their art with the national heritage, in the search for the a priori conditions of aesthetic experience. Forma 1 did not conceive abstraction as the contemporary and historic form of social perception, but as the standardbearer of artistic freedom; and as an antidote against ideology -which they intended to connect, albeit controversially, with the cultural politics of the communist party. They were interested «in the form of the lemon, and not the lemon»;17 postulating that the pictorial sign has an arbitrary relationship with the referent. Form was presented as human production, and not as naturally linked to the object. As Argan explained in the Ulisse journal, «[the new abstract art] [...] aims to put "ab ovo" the problem of art as an activity of the spirit, that is, to formulate a new aesthetics».18 In this way, even though stress was put upon aesthetics, in Forma 1 art was conceived both in an anti-metaphysical yet at the same time universalist sense. In this case, universalism was achieved by means of the rejection of both melodramatic calls to action and expressionist psychologicism induced by contingent individual or historical needs. In Argan's words: It would be a mistake to consider abstract art as mere aestheticism, as art for art's sake. On the contrary, the common programmatic motif of the different abstract trends is the justification of the artistic event as a social event [...] In answering the undoubtedly legitimate question of how the explicit, destructive historicism of abstract art can be combined with the undoubtedly positive scope of its social interests, it can be argued that this art does not constitute itself as an achieved social end (which indubitably supposes a full consciousness of history). Rather it intends to define the condition of the man's social consciousness, his way of being in reality and the limit of his horizon. In its detachment from all interest, it acknowledges [...] the condition of a kind of life that is «engaged» and «involved», instead of detached and merely reflective.19 17 Various Authors, «Forma 1 Manifesto», in P. BAROCCHI, SMAI, p. 66. 18 G. C. ARGAN, «L'arte astratta», Ulisse, II, 1948, in P. BAROCCHI, SMAI, p. 72. 19 G. C. ARGAN, «L'arte astratta», in P. BAROCCHI, SMAI, pp. 73-75 Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 124 Forma 1's reflection upon the historic limits of human perception of being-in-the-world postulated that society and the self are constructed and controlled by systems of representations. The artists conceived their commitment as a liberating diagnosis and revelation of the manner in which these representational systems operated. In this way, they thought, Marxism and modernism would become harmonised. Accordingly, artists did not transmit edifying examples of existence through picturing. Instead, by means of art's autonomy, art acted upon the viewers' psyche, questioning their schemes of perception and predisposing them to a more lucid experience. 2. Achille Perilli, Praga (Prague), 1947, oil on canvas, 57 x 47 cm., Galleria Comunale d'Arte Moderna, Rome. (Picture: J. J. Gómez) Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 125 In this respect their argument was, indeed, on the very foundations of the Oltre Guernica's thesis on the 1930s Picasso as the frontier artist between modernist criticism and socialist construction. The Forma 1 artists looked rather at the works produced by the cubists in the early years of the century, as well as Italian exponents of divisionist scientific explanations of the constructed character of figures, such as Giuseppe Pellizza Da Volpedo and their later development in the futurists Balla and Boccioni. In Forma 1, however, the complexity of analytic cubism is reduced to the minimum, and the artists tended to use indicative titles, in the search of a maximum of economy and readability. A representative work in this sense is Perilli's Praga (1947), where he reflects on the problems of the translation onto a flat surface of the spatial articulation of a three-dimensional urban landscape. He argues that the conventionally figurative structure of painting, according to Renaissance perspective, has resulted from an automatic process; it has metamorphosed from a tool for the knowledge of reality to a hierarchical entity that fixed the standards of «adequate» representation. This limited the collective power of imagination and corresponded to the contemporary repressive social structure. Perilli showed how it worked by dismantling it. Sharp triangles, which were evocative of Prague towers, are superimposed on the canvas, with mixed, impure colours on a grey background which still handled, albeit evocatively, the idea of a unified landscape. (Illustration 2) Dorazio undertook an investigation into the constructed character of the idea of pictorial unity in Petit poème socialiste (1948), a painting defined by art historian Paola Serra Zanetti as «the anatomy of routine».20 In it, Dorazio produced a rhythmical repetition of countless groups of lines and tonal harmonies, painted on the occasion of the Prague Youth Festival, which was intended to reproduce the structure of optimistic socialist rhetorics. Other works by Perilli and Maugeri, such as Ferrovia RomaVetelli (1947) and Filobus no 1 (1950), respectively, seem to look closer at Balla's futurist research into the connection between the movement and the fragmentation of the figure, questioning the validity of a chronological discourse. (Illustrations 3-4) 20 P. SERRA ZANETTI, Arte astratta e informale in Italia (1946-1963), Bologna, CLUEB, 1995, p. 39 Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 126 3. Achille Perilli, Ferrovia Roma-Vetelli (Rome-Vetelli Railway), 1947, oil on canvas, 52 x 42.5 cm., private collection, Todi. (Picture: J. J. Gómez) Turcato, in turn, attempted to synthesise a «cubistic» attention to form with the communist commitment to a «realist» subjectmatter. The result can be seen in works such as the 1949-50 series of Rovine di Varsavia, produced after a trip to Poland in 1948. The paintings sought a suitably modernised «abstracted» representation of the ruined walls of Warsaw buildings after the nazi repression of the August 1944 uprising. Although the events told are immediately recognisable, they are treated as a series of visual impressions deprived of the emotiveness that the subject-matter could convey in the immediate post-war period. There is no narrative, but 4. Concetto Maugeri, Filobus no 1, 1950, oil on canvas, 59 x 66 cm., Maria Grazia Maugeri collection, Arzignano. (Picture: J. J. Gómez) Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 127 impressions of colour and rhythm. Thus, in this case, the relationship that Turcato establishes between content and the means of expression prevents the works from becoming mere decoration but they cannot become instrumental to any specific political programme either. They do not provoke any direct sympathetic response but rather they invite the viewer to reflect upon the way in which such subjects were commonly represented. (Illustration 5) 5. Giulio Turcato, Rovine di Varsavia (Ruins of Warsaw), 1948, oil on canvas, 48 x 71 cm., Galleria Comunale d'Arte Moderna, Rome. (Picture: J. J. Gómez) The detachment, rationalism and anti-expressionism that characterised the work of the majority of the Forma 1 artists contrasted clearly with Consagra's dramatism as shown in works such as Totem della liberazione (1947). This sculpture is conceived as a symbol of an epoch of uncertainty. Concrete and iron, industrial materials, transmit a strong feeling of historic contemporaneity. These elements are left uncovered in Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 128 order to achieve «a higher dramatic effect»21 and they are also arranged in enigmatic forms, organised according to an interplay of masses and voids. The arbitrary relationship between the Liberation, the precise geometric composition and the semantic inscrutability of the metallic construction puts forward a political statement: despite all expectations to the contrary, it is impossible to find a widely shared language capable of securing a reference to the contemporary social and political situation. (Illustration 6) The Rupture with the PCI Like Consagra, Perilli declared in 1977 that «art is abstract today because all values and conservative constructions have collapsed for good in the last two crises that have shaken the world».22 In an interview with Nadja Perilli, Lucio Manisco added that: «The philosophical perspective consisted of the rejection of bourgeois society, because it no longer had any valid content. We needed to move towards abstract art because there was nothing to represent in that society».23 With the division of the country and the world into opposed factions supported by powerful mass propaganda apparatuses, ideology came to be perceived as a social feature of the epoch rather than as a distinctive trait of capitalism. Under such circunstances, Forma 1 artists 21 P. Consagra, interview with G. di Milla on June 1964, in Giovanna BONASEGALE and Simonetta LUX (curated by), Forma 1 e i suoi artisti, 1947-1997 (exhibition catalogue), RomaPrague, Galleria comunale d'arte moderna e contemporanea-Obrazárna Pražského hradu, Àrgos, 1998, p. 120. 22 Forma 1 e i suoi artisti..., ob. cit., p. 77. 23 Ibídem. 6. Pietro Consagra, Totem della liberazione, 1947, painted iron, 210 x 43 x 64 cm., artist's collection, Rome. (Picture: Juan José Gómez) Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 129 opted for a committed, active and deconstructive nihilism as the In sum, it was acknowledged that art should intervene in society with its own weapons. Under capitalism there was the problem of art itself since the very foundations of modern art research, particularly abstract art, were established upon the unavoidable return to form. Form was supposed to be alive, to be the powerful agent that could generate vivid social consciousness upon any viewer. Hence, the objective of a kind of art that aimed to represent the «form of the phenomenon»24 was the discovery of sociality and commitment in themselves. And the goal was to justify them in the present, rather than to simply assume them because of pre-ordered party directives. Dorazio pointed out that their manifesto also involved an explicit reaction against Stalinist art25 because, as Argan explains, socialist realist artists «gave up their own autonomous research and expression because they had already achieved their moral freedom, when they made their ideological choices».26 From the point of view of the Forma 1 members, the socialist realists had ceased to be artists in order to become party officials. Further, they made it clear that it was impossible to be a socialist artist if one is was not an artist at all; that was, somebody primarily concerned with aesthetic issues. To the question «why has the PCI always fought Forma 1?» Manisco replied to Nadja Perilli that «It was the period of Stalinist culture; and art was required to serve the party. (N.P.) And why could not abstract art do so? (L.M) because they wanted art to be propaganda, to support the social struggles of the PCI. That's why Guttuso was so esteemed».27 However, it is an indication of the openness of the Italian situation that, despite these differences, the Forma 1 manifesto was actually produced in Guttuso's studio at 48 via Margutta in Rome. Moreover, at one point Guttuso was able to obtain PCI sponsorship for Forma 1 when he convinced the party to give Maugeri, Consagra, Turcato, Accardi and Sanfilippo a grant to travel to Paris.28 Guttusso's studio was a major centre 24 G.C. ARGAN, «Walter Gropius e la Bauhaus», 1951, in BARROCHI, SMAI, p.75. 25 P. DORAZIO, «Per Salvatore Scarpitta» in Luigi SANSONE (ed.), Scarpitta, Milan, Mazzotta, 1999, p. 31. 26 G.C. ARGAN, L'arte moderna 1770-1970, Florence, Sonsoni, 1970, p. 633 27 Forma 1 e i suoi artisti..., ob. cit., p. 77 28 Their relationship with the PCI also allowed Forma 1 to display their works at an Young Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 130 of Rome's artistic life. In Consagra's words: «Both the new and old ones were welcomed. Some of them popped in to find out what was boiling in the party's pot and have peace of mind. Some of them went to find relief from their little sins in the Fascist times. It was like a "baptistery" of Bottega Oscura29 where one could visit for a glass of wine and a hug»30. Guttuso, who established a «fraternal friendship» with the young Consagra, «both strived for reinforcing his relationship with the party [along the lines of popular, realistic art art], while integrating with Picassian culture».31 But Forma 1's visit to Paris had signalled a turning point and they began to question Guttuso's leadership in the Roman artistic milieu. From then on, young abstract artists and Guttusian realists would take separate ways: «we were the generation opened to Europe. Guttuso's problems were not our problems any more».32 In spite of Forma 1's principled insistence on being framed within the left, their arguments took, at times, the form of an indiscriminate attack on any other left-wing artists. Then, polemics with the PCI began, and controversies with In November 1947 they published a letter in L'Unità in which post-war engaged figurative painting as a whole was treated as: A return to an antiquated and academicist realism, even near 19th Century verism. They [the realists] have returned to the 19th Century because they did not understand that [...] a revolution in content is only possible if it goes hand in hand with a formal language dialectically evolved out of the preceding one [...] The commitment to new forms and social renewal meant a dangerous dualism that brought some people to expressionism and some others to illustrative cubism. In this obscure situation [...], painters who clearly followed abstract tendencies appeared. [...] Italian Art Exhibition organised by the Czechoslovak National Youth Front on the occasion of the First World Youth Festival (Prague, 1947). 29 The PCI Headquarters were in Bottega Oscura street. 30 P. CONSAGRA, Vita mia, Milan, Universale Economica Feltrinelli, 1980, p. 46 31 Ibídem. 32 Ibídem., p. 48 Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 131 We let the public and the critics judge which one is the really progressive perspective.33 The communist official and art critic Antonello Trombadori's reply was published alongside the letter. For him Forma 1 members lived «in a chaos of theoretical improvisation, grammatical incapacity and ignorance of the elementary principles of figurative language». He denied the possibility of a kind of painting purely concerned with form, and stressed that criticism of the conventional Renaissance perspective posed, in fact, a geometrical question which could itself be considered as providing a distinct subject-matter: «[Abstract expressions] with theoretical foundations in non-Euclidean geometry treat a series of mathematical questions which belong to contemporary culture».34 Realism, understood as the explicit representation of reality, was a cornerstone of post-war Marxist aesthetics. A concern with form in its own right was viewed as impossible. However Perilli retrospectively argued in 1974 that the form of reality was not the result of the mechanical activity of the eye, but consisted of complex historically definable processes of memory and imagination whose workings had to be unveiled. Forma 1 artists had intended to produce a critique of narration and linguistic codes, that is: «to break our visual routine and mental habits. This is a logicalrational way of using the irrational to activate a complex form of communication. Geometry is not an optical tool for perceiving a true space; but a "machine" used in the mysterious process of human imagination».35 The Forma 1 article and Trombadori's response created an atmosphere of confrontation that prevented progress from these competing positions. The abstract artists' rejection of figurative engaged painting as a whole suited communist critics' claims that Forma 1 was, in fact, merely making «second hand» futurism with the aim of pleasing «American snobs».36 Only Turcato tried to relate both traditions, or at least he did so if we look at it from the perspective of the established stylistic debate between abstract and realist art. That conventional distinction was in fact 33 Accardi, Attardi, Consagra, Dorazio, Guerrini, Manisco, Maugeri, Mirabella, Peirce, Perilli, Sanfilippo, Turcato, «Gli astrattisti», L'Unità, 13 November 1947, p. 3. 34 A. TROMBADORI, «Gli astrattisti», L'Unità, 13 November 1947, p. 3 35 A. PERILLI, «Teoria dell'irrazionale geometrico» Forma 1 e i suoi artisti..., ob. cit., 159. 36 33 A. Del GUERCIO, «Inglesi e astratti», L'Unità, 23 December 1947, p. 3. Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 132 overridden by the objectives he set out to accomplish: initially to stimulate the audience to criticism, and then to fully engage them in political struggle. He argued that critical painting was «intended to disrupt conventional "veristic" visual perception. This is what abstract painting does. At other times, however, a dynamic figurative painting can do it too».37 Despite the controversies, Turcato, Accardi and Sanfilippo were still included in the Fronte's room at the 1948 Venice Biennale; Consagra, Attardi and Turcato continued to take part in left-wing initiatives; while Dorazio, Guerrini and Perilli became increasingly involved with Staterelated Italian modern culture. As Rachele Ferrrario puts it, «for these young people, to choose [abstract art] was an ethical question. There were, on one side, the figurative artist -who followed Picasso and Guttuso, and were supported by the communist and protected by Trombadori. On the other side, the young abstract artists [...], who eventually found approval and support from the State's National Gallery of Modern Art».38 Indeed, the catalogue for their 1949 show at Rome's Chiurazzi Gallery was introduced by the Gallery's director, Palma Buccarelli. In it, Buccarelli stressed the social dimension of their painting. There was no explicit reference to Marxism, but politically correct statements of social engagement were voiced: «This art claims to be "social", that is: opposed to individualism. It rejects humanism in the Renaissance sense [...] It wants to be a collective anonymous and utilitarian art useful for everybody».39 However, these very same artists still kept trying to promote left-wing art in polemical opposition to Stalinism in Italy. In 1950, for example, they organised an exhibition at Rome's Age d'or bookshop40 entitled Civil abstract Art in Czechoslovakia, showing works by dissident 1920s constructivists, including Karel Teige, Josef Istler and Jan Smetana. Faced with a range of conflicting demands and pressures, Forma 1 37 G. Turcato, interview with G. Dalla Chiesa, March 1986, in Forma 1 e i suoi artisti..., ob. cit., p. 223. 38 See Rachele FERRARIO, Regina di quadri. Vita e passioni di Palma Buccarelli Milan, Mondadori, 2010, p. 126. Buccarelli followed Venturi's approach to modern art and opposed communist-sponsored social realism. In politics, she supported the Partito socialista dei lavoratori italiani, a fraction of the Socialist Party that rejected communist alliances. 39 P. BUCCARELLI, «Catalogue of the Dorazio, Guerrini and Perilli exhibition at the Chiurazzi Gallery», in «Cronaca di Forma 1, 1946/1951», (Various Authors, 68) 40 A bookshop and gallery run by Dorazio, Guerrini and Perilli Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 133 dissolved in 1951. Thereafter, its members would go their own separate ways: Turcato joined the Venturi-sponsored Gruppo degli Otto in 1952, alongside artists who had somehow been related to the PCI but were now also somehow «disenchanted» with the communists.41 Turcato, however, was still a PCI member. For their part, Accardi gave up politics and Attardi shifted to engaged, politically explicit figurative painting; finally, Dorazio, Guerrini and Perilli joined Gillo Dorfles, Mario Balloco, Gianni Monet, Munari and Atanasio Soldati in establishing in Milan the Movimento d'arte concreta (MAC). From the point of view of the communist party, the fact that these artists had dropped the term «Marxist» from their manifestos, after Forma 1 dissolved, was proof of their theoretical confusion and evidence that they had come to a dead end. To the communists, Marxism was a matter of politics, and not of culture. Although there was an ethical attitude in Forma 1, the movement lacked proper revolutionary agency, and a politically constructive dimension was missing from their programme. As Corrado Maltese wrote in L'Unità, «abstract art intends to reject so-called bourgeois content and ends up rejecting every content, and it is not even able to communicate its feeling of revolt».42 Besides, since Culture was part of the wider activity of the party, the PCI was reluctant to accept any definitions of Marxist art issued by individual manifestos rather than produced by collective party debate. The questions raised by PCI cultural policies were deeply felt by artists in the period of post-fascism and post-war reconstruction. The Secondo manifesto dei pittori e scultori, or the Manifesto della nuova secessione italiana, which were characteristic texts of the Italian artistic situation in the mid-1940s, were issued in a climate of anti-fascist fervour in which the way to integrate these questions seemed clear and straightforward. Nevertheless, it soon became evident that not all artists who had joined anti-fascism and the left-wing parties at the end of World War II could succeed in harmonising their art with long-term communist 41 The «Gruppo degli otto» was composed by Birolli, Morlotti, Antonio Corpora, Afro Basaldella, Santomaso, Turcato, Mattia Moreni and Emilio Vedova. See L. VENTURI, «Otto pittori italiani», Rome, 1952, quoted in M. De MICHELI, «Realism and the post-War Debate' in Emily BRAUN (ed.) Italian Art of the 20th Century. Painting and Sculpture 1900-1988, Munich and London, Prestel-Verlag and Royal Academy of Arts, 1989, p. 287. 42 C. MALTESE, ,L'Unità, 16 February 1949, 3 Cercles. Revista d'Història Cultural, ISSN: 1139-0158, núm. 15, 2012, pàgs. 111-135 134 politics, and accordingly transform themselves as easily as they had supported the anti-fascist struggle. The main limitation of the PCI's cultural politics was the party's failure to reconcile the claims of these artists with its own political programme as the immediate post-war period went on. Italian communist artists had regarded Picasso's Guernica as the first example of their new art. The painting had been a fairly successful attempt to reconcile modernist aesthetics and left-wing political concerns. Oltre Guernica, the funding manifesto of the Fronte of artists, intended to go beyond it and substitute Guernica's sense of outrage with the complete articulation of art with the communists' political programme. Yet this ambitious project of producing a great work of art beyond Guernica was never achieved. Instead, most communist artists and critics tended to fall into regressive aesthetic positions. In practice, political concerns prevailed in them; the consequence of the party's need to maintain links with its uneducated constituency was a need for an «understandable» art. However Forma 1 conceived revolutionary art as anti-ideology, that is, as criticism of conservative ways of thinking, examining nodal key problems between knowledge, ideology and reality. In this case, the resulting stress on formal radicalism circumscribed their questions within the exclusively artistic field. Their main weakness therefore became a political one linked to the question of popularity. One might argue that an art that surprises and consciously and controversially frustrates established expectations cannot be popular, but that it, nonetheless, remains a revolutionary and avant-garde art; and that its unpopularity is not its fault. Rather, it was the result of it taking place in a society ruled by conventions and not by freethinking. The Forma 1 artists accordingly rejected «familiarity» in art. But, for communist culture and in the conditions of any 1940s left-wing political movement, «familiarity» was precisely the condition for an effective rapport with the workers and the only means by which they could establish a relationship with aesthetic products. Achieving a possitive rapport between «high culture» and the working class was a cornerstone of the PCI's cultural politics. Yet, in practice, most realist communist artists exchanged aesthetic quality for political quantity, while modern artists disregarded large parts of their potential working class audience, in the name of intellectual sophistication. The questions of popularity and avant-gardism in Italian post-war Juan José Gómez Gutiérrez. The politics of abstract art... 135 culture were beset by a series of historical dilemmas which were never properly resolved. Rather, they were overtaken by social changes which affected the composition of the working class. After the immediate postwar period, the spread of urban life and the increase of white collar workers, who were far more educated than conventional blue-collar workers and peasants, largely placed the question of popularity into the background of debates about the relationship of art and politics. Once the immediate post-war period of reconstruction had passed, and social modernisation had really begun to have an effect in Italy, the ground of cultural-political struggle shifted. In the new mass culture arguments about the rights and wrongs of «high art» lost much of their political raison d'être. The Italian projects for a politically conscious fine art passed into history.

http://ppe.sagepub.com/ Politics, Philosophy & Economics http://ppe.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/04/15/1470594X13483466 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/1470594X13483466 published online 15 April 2013Politics Philosophy Economics Jeppe von Platz Are economic liberties basic rights? Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: The Murphy Institute of Political Economy can be found at:Politics, Philosophy & EconomicsAdditional services and information for http://ppe.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: http://ppe.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: What is This? Apr 15, 2013OnlineFirst Version of Record >> at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from Article Are economic liberties basic rights? Jeppe von Platz Suffolk University, USA Abstract In this essay I discuss a powerful challenge to high-liberalism: the challenge presented by neoclassical liberals that the high-liberal assumptions and values imply that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. If the claim is true, then the high-liberal road from ideals of democracy and democratic citizenship to left-liberal institutions is blocked. Indeed, in that case the high-liberal is committed to an institutional scheme more along the lines of laissez-faire capitalism than property-owning democracy. To present and discuss this challenge, I let John Rawls represent the high-liberal argument that only a narrow range of economic liberties are basic rights and John Tomasi represent the neoclassical liberal argument that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. I show that Rawls's argument is inadequate, but also that Tomasi's argument fails. I thus conclude that high-liberalism is in a precarious situation, but is not yet undone by the neoclassical liberal challenge. Keywords Liberalism, liberty, rights, economic liberties, economic rights, John Rawls, John Tomasi, Samuel Freeman Introduction This essay is about one of the more divisive political issues of our time: whether economic liberties are basic rights. Corresponding author: Jeppe von Platz, Department of Philosophy, College of Arts and Sciences, Suffolk University, 8 Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108, USA. Email: [email protected] Politics, Philosophy & Economics 1–22 a The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1470594X13483466 ppe.sagepub.com at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from At issue is not merely whether economic liberties are basic rights, but how considerations of distributive justice, efficiency, and other social values may legitimately inform democratic legislation: the wider the range of basic economic rights, the narrower is the range of issues subject to democratic authority. If the full range of economic liberties are basic rights, then the activities of economic agency should be regulated only to secure basic rights. If only a narrow range of economic liberties are basic rights, then the activities of economic agency may be regulated for the sake of other social goods, such as equality of opportunity or to secure a fair and efficient distribution of income and wealth among the members of society. More concretely, I suspect that a number of current political disagreements are really disagreements about whether economic liberties are basic rights: disagreements about the justice of taxing income, inheritance, and bequests, about whether a democracy legitimately can legislate a minimum wage, mandate decent working conditions, mandate provisions for health-care or retirement savings, and so on. Until recently there were three main camps in the debate about the status of economic liberties: classical liberalism, libertarianism, and high-liberalism.1 Classical liberals and libertarians agree that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights, but offer different arguments for this conclusion. Libertarians argue that individuals have basic natural rights and that these include or entail the economic liberties.2 Classical liberals defend the economic liberties by the consequentialist argument that the economic liberties are necessary to maximize productive output and protect happy and productive living.3 High-liberals, by contrast, understand justice in terms of the principles of reciprocity and fairness proper to the democratic idea(l) of society as a system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens.4 High-liberals argue from the ideals of democratic society and citizenship to the conclusion that only a narrow range of economic liberties are basic rights. Since classical liberals, libertarians, and high-liberals proceed from different views of the nature of justice, neither camp has made much headway in persuading its opponents. Even so, the high-liberal camp is often viewed as occupying the higher ground (hence the flattering name), presumably because it proceeds from an attractive view of democracy and citizenship that carries a minimum of questionable commitments. However, there is a new kid on the block – neoclassical liberalism.5 Neoclassical liberalism upsets the debate about the status of economic liberties. On one hand, neoclassical liberals accept the high-liberal view of the nature of justice and therefore reject the classical liberal and libertarian arguments. On the other hand, neoclassical liberals argue that the high-liberal view of justice implies that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. In this essay I discuss the neoclassical liberal argument that the high-liberal view of justice implies that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. To focus the discussion I take John Rawls to represent the high-liberal position and John Tomasi to represent the neoclassical liberal position. I proceed as follows. First, I articulate what the disagreement is about (the second and third sections). Next, I present Rawls's theory of basic liberties and his argument that only a narrow range of economic liberties are basic rights (the fourth and fifth sections). I then present and discuss Tomasi's argument that Rawls and like-minded high-liberals should include the full range of economic liberties on the list of basic rights (the sixth to ninth sections). I conclude that, although 2 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from Rawls's argument is lacking, Tomasi's argument falls short of establishing that more than a narrow range of economic liberties are basic rights. What are basic rights? Basic rights are liberties or entitlements that must be respected and protected by democratic legislation under (almost) any circumstances. Basic rights are not absolute in the sense that they cannot be regulated. Rather, a basic right can only be regulated for the sake of securing equal basic rights for all, and so cannot be regulated to secure other social values, such as equality of opportunity, distributive justice, or efficiency. Nonbasic rights, by contrast, are liberties or entitlements that may or may not be protected and respected by democratic legislation. Whether or not to protect a non-basic right can be decided by democratic procedures in light of other social values. So, basic rights determine necessary limits and ends of democratic legislation. The limiting requirement is clear enough: the scheme of basic rights delineates the space wherein democratic legislation is authoritative. There is more controversy about the positive requirement, that is, about what it takes to protect and secure that basic rights are enjoyed by all citizens. Socialist critics of liberal democracy have, for example, argued that protecting formal rights falls short of justice, since access to wealth and opportunities determines the value of these rights –without the means needed to exercise a liberty the protection it offers is of little worth.6 A socialist might, therefore, argue that the norm of equal liberty implies an egalitarian principle of distributive justice. In light of this criticism, Rawls and others have argued that, with the exception of the political liberties, the equal worth of liberties is not a requirement of justice. Instead, the worth of liberties can be dealt with by securing that all have adequate means for exercising their liberties and that inequalities in material resources are fair (cf. Rawls, 1996: 324–331; 2001a: 148–150). What are economic liberties? Economic liberties are liberties of the citizen as an economic agent. Abstractly speaking, we can identify four categories of economic liberties (following Nickel, 2000: 156–157): 1. Liberties of working (of the person as laborer): liberties to employ one's body, time, and mind in productive activities of one's choice and according to the terms one has freely consented to (e.g. to donate, sell, trade, and buy labor); 2. Liberties of transacting (of the person as entrepreneur): liberties to engage in economic activities, to manage one's own affairs, to buy and sell goods, to save and invest, to start, run, and close a commercial enterprise, such as a business or farm, and to engage in the activities of running such an enterprise: to hire workers, buy and use land, display, advertise, and sell one's products or services; 3. Liberties of holding property (of the person as owner): liberties of acquisition, holding, and transfer of property (whether personal or productive), of using and developing one's property for commercial and productive purposes, to bequest, sell, trade, and invest one's property; Platz 3 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from 4. Liberties of using property (of the person as consumer): liberties to buy, use, consume, destroy, or otherwise do as one pleases with one's goods, resources, and services. So, the questions of this essay are whether, which, and why these liberties are basic rights that must be respected and protected by the constitution and laws of society. Rawls on economic rights By his own admission, Rawls's discussion of the basic liberties and their priority in A Theory of Justice was inadequate (Rawls, 1996: Lecture VIII; 2001a: sections 13 & 32). In A Theory of Justice Rawls defended the following as first principle of justice: ''Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.'' (1971: 302). Rawls further argued that this principle should have priority over the second principle, which requires fair equality of opportunity and that inequalities in income and wealth are to the advantage of the least well off (Rawls, 1996: 294–299; 1971: sections 39, 46; 2001a: section 30). Hart (1973) criticized Rawls's discussion of liberty on three grounds: firstly, it is unclear whether Rawls's first principle is about liberty or liberties; secondly, Rawls fails to explain why the parties in the original position adopt the first principle and its priority; and, thirdly, Rawls fails to explain how we are to specify the basic liberties and weigh them against one another at the constitutional and legislative stages. In his reply to Hart, Rawls explains that he did not mean for the first principle to be about liberty as such, but about a list or scheme of liberties, and he retracts the idea7 that there is a scheme of equal liberties that should be maximized (Rawls, 1996: 291–293). Instead, what is required is an adequate scheme of equal basic liberties. Rawls, accordingly, changes the first principle of justice to: ''Each person is to have an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.'' (1996: 5, 291). Adequate to what? The answer is: adequate to the development and exercise of the two moral powers (Rawls, 1996: 292–293; 2001a: 45, 112–113). These moral powers are the capacity to offer and abide by fair terms of social cooperation and the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. Thus, according to Rawls, the basic liberties are all and the only protections necessary to ensure for all citizens the social conditions essential for the adequate development and the full and informed exercise of the two moral powers (1996: 74, 187, 293, 308, 325; 1999: xii; 2001a: 45, 112, 169). The grounding relation between liberties, moral powers, and basic rights has a complex modal structure: a basic right is a liberty necessary for the adequate development and full exercise of the moral powers. Below I look more closely at how we should understand ''necessary'' and ''adequate'', but I want to straightaway clarify two aspects of this relation. First ''full exercise'' does not indicate a maximizing modality of the grounding relation between liberties, moral powers, and basic rights. By ''full exercise'' we should understand exercise in the central cases that are to offer and abide by fair terms of social cooperation and to devise, revise, and pursue a determinate conception 4 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from of the good.8 Second a liberty is a basic right if it is necessary for the adequate development and exercise of either moral power – it need not be necessary for both.9 We can, accordingly, restate the grounding relation: a basic right is a liberty, the protection of which is necessary for the adequate development and exercise of one of the two moral powers. There are, accordingly, three different groups of basic rights (Rawls, 1996: 310–324, 409–419; 2001a: 45, 112–113):10 1. A liberty is a basic right if it is necessary to adequately develop and exercise the sense of justice. Rawls thinks that the political liberties (and their fair value) and liberties of thought and speech are justified on this ground. 2. A liberty is a basic right if it is necessary to adequately develop and exercise the capacity for a conception of the good. Rawls thinks that liberty of conscience and freedom of association are justified on this ground. 3. Thirdly, a liberty is a basic right if it is necessary for guaranteeing any of the liberties immediately necessary for the development and exercise of one of the moral powers (i.e. for securing one of the liberties established as basic rights by 1 or 2). Rawls thinks that liberty and integrity of the person, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law, rights of privacy, rights to hold personal property, and freedom of occupation are justified in this mediate manner. If a liberty is not necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers in one of these three ways, then it is not a basic right. What about the economic liberties? Rawls argues that only two categories of economic liberties satisfy any of the three conditions (Rawls, 1971: 42, 43, 82; 1996: 228, 232, 298, 335, 338, 363; 2001a: 114): first, the right to hold and have exclusive use of personal property. Rawls suggests that this right is justified by its necessity for the adequate development and exercise of both moral powers. It is easiest to see how this right is presupposed by the demands raised by the second moral power: it is hard to imagine how persons can be secure and independent without rights of personal property. Second, freedom of occupation is required by freedom of association and in general for the adequate exercise of the second moral power.11 Apart from these two, Rawls thinks that the scheme of economic rights that a society should provide should be determined by reference to realizing the fair value of political liberties, equality of opportunity, and a fair distribution of income and wealth. Unfortunately, Rawls does not say much about why the other economic liberties are not basic. In general, his argument must be that they are not necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers (cf. Rawls, 1996: 298; 2001a: 114). However, the details of this argument are, I think, unclear – in part because it is unclear what it means for a scheme of liberties to be necessary for the adequate development of the two moral powers. So, Rawls's argument leaves some questions unanswered: How, exactly, should we understand the requirement to provide the scheme of liberties necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers? In what sense necessary? In what sense adequate? And, why are the economic liberties not in the scheme of basic rights? In the sixth to ninth sections I discuss these questions. Firstly, however, it will be helpful Platz 5 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from to present an overview of how those who disagree with Rawls might argue that the economic liberties are basic rights. How to argue that the economic liberties are basic rights The general form of Rawls's argument that only a few economic liberties are basic is that: 1. A liberty is a basic right if and only if it is necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers; 2. Only a few economic liberties are necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers. 3. Thus, only these few economic liberties are basic. In this section I identify the main strategies for rejecting this argument. A way to reject Rawls's argument is to reject the idea that the basic liberties are tied to the development and exercise of the two moral powers. Such rejection is not the topic of this essay. Assuming that the basic liberties are grounded in the two moral powers, there are four general strategies for rejecting Rawls's conclusion that only a narrow range of economic liberties are basic. The first two strategies target the modalities of the first premise of Rawls's argument: Rawls argues that the basic liberties are necessary for the adequate development of the two moral powers, and we might reject either of these modalities. So, the first way to reject Rawls's argument is to reject the modality of necessity. Instead one might argue that the basic liberties are protections that are conducive to or promote the development and exercise of the two moral powers. It is easier to show that the economic liberties are conducive to the development and exercise of the moral powers than to show that they are necessary. Note that necessity does not imply universality: it may be that protecting a liberty is necessary for some but not all, members of society to develop and exercise their two moral powers. Rawls is, I think, committed to allow for this possibility. If general facts about human nature and sociology imply that a liberty is necessary for some group of members of society to develop and exercise their moral powers, then this liberty is in the scheme of basic rights. If, for example, reproductive rights are necessary for women to adequately develop and exercise their moral powers, then reproductive rights are basic. The second strategy is to challenge the modality of adequacy. Instead one might argue that the basic liberties are the protections necessary to secure the full or maximum development and exercise of the two moral powers. Since more is required by a maximizing than a satisficing reading of this modality, this change of modality would make it easier to argue that the economic liberties are basic rights. A third way to reject Rawls's argument would be to reject his interpretation of the moral powers. If one rejects Rawls's interpretation of the two moral powers, then the road is open for a new argument that a wide range of economic liberties are necessary for their adequate development and exercise. 6 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from Finally, even if we accept Rawls's modalities and understanding of the two moral powers, it might still be argued that a wide range of economic liberties are in fact necessary for the adequate development of the two moral powers, as Rawls understands these. Tomasi's charge Tomasi accepts Rawls's idea of society as a system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens and Rawls's argument from this idea to the two principles of justice and their priority rules. However, Tomasi rejects Rawls's interpretation of the two principles. Most importantly, Tomasi argues that democratic legitimacy requires that the full range of economic liberties are protected as basic rights and as such can be restricted only for the sake of securing an adequate scheme of equal basic rights for all. Accordingly, the scope of legitimate laws that can be enacted in the pursuit of the second principle is limited. So, institutionally Tomasi defends laissez-faire capitalism or democratic limited government against Rawls's favored market socialism or property-owning democracy.12 If Tomasi's argument succeeds, it shows that the ideals and values that high-liberals thought supported left-liberal conclusions and institutions really support the conclusions and institutions of their right-liberal foes. Tomasi's main criticism of Rawls is a charge of unjustified exceptionalism: that the reasons Rawls offers for including other liberties on the list of basic rights apply equally to the full range of economic liberties.13 However, the exact character of Tomasi's argument is hard to pin down, perhaps because Rawls was not too clear on the modalities at work in his argument. In the following I disentangle and discuss Tomasi's arguments in light of the strategies identified in the previous section. Shifting modalities One way to argue that Rawls's list of liberties is too narrow is to change the first modal operator from necessity to conduciveness: if the basic liberties are the protections conducive to the development and exercise of the two moral powers, then the list of basic liberties would expand, and it would be more likely that the full range of economic liberties would be on the list. It seems clear that ''conduciveness'' is the wrong modality: it would expand the list of basic rights to include every protection that can serve to develop and exercise the moral powers and just about any protection we can think of could be thus justified. In addition, it is clear that Rawls worked with necessity, not conduciveness. Tomasi would, I think, agree; his argument is that ''a thick conception of economic liberty is a necessary condition of responsible self-authorship.''14 – Responsible self-authorship is Tomasi's term for the two moral powers: ''the capacity people have to become responsible authors of their own lives, along with their capacity to recognize their fellow citizens as responsible self-authors.'' (2012a: 88). So far, then, I think Tomasi's argument is true to his claim that he follows Rawls's assumptions and that his choice of outer modality is the right one. Not so for the second modality. Rawls, again, argues that the basic rights are the protections necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers. A second way to show that Platz 7 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from Rawls's list of basic rights is too short is to challenge this satisficing modality: if the basic rights are those necessary for the full, complete, or maximum accessible development and exercise of the two moral powers, then it is more likely that the economic liberties are on the list of basic rights, since more is necessary to reach the maximum development and exercise than to reach some threshold below the maximum. Tomasi pursues this strategy. There are times where Tomasi affirms the satisficing modality of adequacy; he says, for example, that the economic liberties together with the other basic rights function ''as a fully adequate scheme of rights and liberties'' (2012a: 90). However, these are exceptions. Tomasi's general line of argument is that the basic rights are those liberties the protection of which is necessary for the full, complete, or maximum development and exercise of the two moral powers and that the economic liberties are so necessary. Here are some passages that indicate Tomasi's shift in modality (respectively, 2012a: 76, 76, 82, 82; my emphases): . . . the imperative to create a social world in which the moral powers of citizens can be fully developed is a requirement of legitimacy. . . . high-liberals claim that some forms of independent economic activity must be protected if people are fully to develop and exercise their moral powers, while other aspects of personal economic freedom need not be so protected. In seeking the most appropriate specification of the basic rights and liberties, we seek the specification that most fully allows citizens to develop themselves as responsible self-authors. . . . [high-liberals] owe us a moral explanation of how any [ . . . ] narrowing of private economic liberty enhances the status of persons as responsible self-authors. More significant than these passages is how Tomasi's charge of unjustified exceptionalism relies on the maximizing modality. Firstly, in defending that the liberties of working are basic rights, Tomasi argues that Rawls's argument that freedom of occupation is a basic right applies equally to the other liberties of working. According to Tomasi, Rawls argues that freedom of occupation is protected as a basic liberty, since our choice of occupation expresses who we are and thus serves as part of what it is to develop and exercise our moral powers: ''by choosing which occupation to pursue, we express our values.'' (Tomasi, 2012a: 77). Tomasi claims that this argument applies equally to the other liberties of working: If the freedom to choose an occupation is essential to the development of the moral powers, the freedom to sell, trade, and donate one's labor looks equally essential for the same reasons. After all, one is defined by one's workplace experience not simply by what profession one pursues. One is also defined by where one chooses to work, by the terms that one seeks and accepts for one's work, by the number of hours that one devotes to one's work, and much more besides. (2012a: 77) So, a society that does not protect the freedoms of working as basic rights allows legislation that limits the possibilities for citizens to realize their powers of responsible selfownership: ''A society that denied individuals the right to make decisions regarding 8 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from those aspects of their working experience would truncate the ability of those people to be responsible authors of their own lives.'' (2012a: 77). Tomasi's argument that the economic liberties of holding property are basic rights follows a parallel path. According to Tomasi, Rawls argues that the right to personal property is a basic right, because ownership in personal property provides for personal security, expresses the identity of persons, and is necessary to meet basic needs. Tomasi then charges Rawls with unjustified exceptionalism, since ownership of means of production has many of the same features and benefits as personal property: it too provides security, can serve as a means to express who we are, to secure independence, and so on: [F]or many people the ownership of productive property plays a profound role in the formation and maintenance of self-authored lives. [ . . . ] Societies that protect the private ownership of productive property as a basic right increase the range of projects, and the forms of economic relationships, that are available to citizens. Such societies broaden the evaluative horizons of citizens. The economic liberties make it possible for citizens with diverse values and interests to more fully develop and exercise the powers they have as responsible selfauthors. (2012a: 78–79) The claim, then, is that the economic rights of ownership can serve to promote and expand the evaluative horizons of citizens and that a society that protects these as basic rights, therefore, provides for a fuller or more complete development and exercise of the two moral powers than a society that does not. Thus, Tomasi concludes that a society that permits restrictions of economic liberties: ''thereby diminishes the capacity of citizens to become fully responsible and independent agents. [ . . . and] creates social conditions in which the moral powers of citizens can be exercised and developed in only a stunted way.'' (2012a: 81). Yet, even if it is true that the economic liberties expand the possibilities for developing and exercising the two moral powers, this does not justify the conclusion that these liberties are basic rights. The implicit premise needed to go from the claim that these allow for a fuller development and exercise of the moral powers to the conclusion that these liberties are basic rights, is that basic rights are those protections necessary to secure a full (or the most fully accessible) development and exercise of the two moral powers. Roughly speaking, there are two problems with Tomasi's argument as a charge of unjustified exceptionalism: it is wrong in the specifics and it is wrong in general. That is, Tomasi's interpretation of why Rawls affirms freedom of occupation and the right to hold personal property as basic rights is wrong, as is his general claim that Rawls maintains that the basic liberties are those necessary to secure the full or maximum development and exercise of the two moral powers. Firstly, Rawls did not, as Tomasi suggests, argue that free choice of occupation and the right to personal property are immediately necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers, since they are necessary to secure access to the fullest range of options for individual life-plans. Recall that Rawls identifies three kinds of basic rights: the first two are the basic rights that are immediately necessary for the development and exercise of each of the moral powers, the third kind are those that are Platz 9 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from necessary to secure the rights that are immediately necessary – this third type of right is thus only mediately necessary for the development and exercise of the moral powers. The right to free choice of occupation and to hold personal property are of this third kind: Rawls argues that unless these are protected, we cannot be secure in the basic liberties established by the two fundamental cases (Rawls, 1996: 298, 308, 335, 338; 2001a: 114, 138).15 That these liberties are only mediately basic does not affect their weight – they are equal members of the scheme of basic rights. However, it shows that Tomasi's charge of unjustified exceptionalism via Rawls's endorsement of these liberties is a tad too quick: Tomasi argues that the other economic liberties are important for independence, broaden the evaluative horizons, and increase the life-options of citizens; however, Rawls's argument was not from the breadth of evaluative horizons or the range of available life-options, but from the necessity of protecting these liberties in order to secure the basic liberties immediately necessary for the development and exercise of the moral powers. Moving on to Tomasi's general assumption that Rawls maintains that the basic liberties are those necessary for the full or maximum development of the two moral powers: Tomasi is mistaken to read Rawls's argument as working with such a maximizing modality. In his reply to Hart, Rawls explicitly rejected that the basic liberties are those necessary for maximizing moral powers or evaluative horizons or anything like that: ''the scheme of basic liberties is not drawn up so as to maximize anything, and, in particular, not the development and exercise of the moral powers.'' (Rawls, 1996: 332).16 The modality of the grounding relation in Rawls's argument is satisficing: the basic liberties are the protections necessary for reaching the threshold of an adequate, the ''minimum requisite degree'' (Rawls, 1996: 19, 74, 106, 302) of development and exercise of the two moral powers. Why does Rawls adopt the satisficing rather than the maximizing modality? Rawls provides two reasons. The first is that, given what the moral powers are and why they are significant, we have no coherent notion of what could be maximized: We cannot maximize the development and exercise of the two moral powers at once. And how could we maximize the development of either power by itself? [ . . . ] [W]e have no notion of the maximum development of these powers. What we do have is a conception of a well-ordered society with certain general features and certain basic institutions. Given this conception, we form the notion of the development and exercise of these powers which is adequate and full relative to the two fundamental cases. (Rawls, 1996: 333) The second reason is that ''the two moral powers do not exhaust the person, for persons also have a determinate conception of the good.'' (Rawls, 1996: 333). The point is that the good of a person is not that she develops and exercises her moral powers, even less that she develops and exercises these to some full or maximum extent: the good of a person is her determinate conception of the good, which may require some degree of development and exercise of the moral powers.17 This relation between the moral powers and determinate conceptions of the good is brought out by the interests of the parties in the original position. The parties in the original position care for the development and exercise of the moral powers only insofar as 10 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from they deem their development and exercise necessary for those they represent to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good, whatever they are. The parties find that for this purpose, they want all members of society to develop and exercise a sufficiently effective sense of justice to secure stability, self-respect, and that society can serve as a ''social union of social unions'' (see Rawls, 1996: 315–324). However, the parties have no interest in aiming for a ''more full'' development and exercise of the sense of justice, even less in the maximum development and exercise of the sense of justice, for there is no reason to assume that such a development and exercise would serve the determinate conception of the good of those they represent (nor is it easy to imagine what a more full development and exercise of the sense of justice would be). So, from the perspective of the parties in the original position, the target and cut-off point of their interest in the development of the sense of justice is the point at which the members of society are able to offer and abide by fair terms of social cooperation. This target defines the adequate development and exercise of this moral power. The basic liberties that are immediately or mediately grounded in this moral power are those (and only those) necessary to reach this target. Matters are a bit more complex for the second moral power, the capacity for developing, revising, and pursuing a conception of the good. The development and exercise of this moral power is not merely instrumentally valuable. Since a determinate conception of the good must be endorsed as one's own, the capacity to develop and revise one's conception of the good is itself ingredient in the determinate conceptions of the good of members of society (Rawls, 1996: 313–314). So, the parties in the original position take an interest in the development and exercise of this moral power both instrumentally and as an end in itself. In addition, this dual interest makes it harder to identify the target that defines what it is to adequately develop and exercise this moral power: the instrumental interest dictates that the adequate development and exercise of this moral power is when the capacity is sufficiently developed for persons to develop, revise, and pursue conceptions of the good. This target presents a satisficing requirement. Yet, it is less clear that there is a target and cut-off point when the development and exercise of this moral power is taken as an end in itself. Why not think that when this moral power is part of determinate conceptions of the good, what counts is the fullest possible development? The answer that Rawls suggests (1996: 314) is that this moral power is an end in itself and part of determinate conceptions of the good only because having this moral power is necessary to freely develop and endorse one's determinate conception of the good as one's own. So, the target presented by this moral power taken as an end in itself is the development and exercise sufficient to develop and exercise a determinate conception of the good – and this target is the same measure of adequacy as that provided by the instrumental value. In this manner, the target that defines ''adequate'' in ''necessary to adequately develop and exercise'' can be identified for each of the moral powers (Rawls was not entirely clear about this part of his argument): relative to the moral power that is the capacity for a sense of justice, ''adequate'' means sufficient to offer and abide by fair terms of social cooperation; relative to the moral power that is a capacity for a conception of the good, ''adequate'' means sufficient to freely devise, revise, and pursue a determinate conception of the good. Platz 11 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from The discussion has showed that Tomasi's argument for the claim that Rawls engages in unjustified exceptionalism rests on a misinterpretation of Rawls's position: Rawls leaves the majority of economic liberties off the list of basic rights, because he believes that these, by contrast with the liberties he includes on the list, are not necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the moral powers, so Tomasi's argument that the economic liberties are necessary for the full or maximum development and exercise of the moral powers is not to the point. However, even if Rawls does not engage in unjustified exceptionalism of the kind Tomasi alleges, Tomasi might be correct in either of two important respects: firstly, it may be that we should use the maximizing modality of the grounding relation between liberties, moral powers, and basic rights. Secondly, even if the satisficing modality is the right one, it may still be that Rawls engages in unjustified exceptionalism – but if so, we need a different argument for this charge than the one discussed above. In the following section I discuss the first of these issues in light of Tomasi's interpretation of the two moral powers in terms of responsible self-authorship. In the ninth section I turn to the second issue of whether Tomasi might still have an argument that Rawls engages in unjustified exceptionalism. A different interpretation of the two moral powers The moral powers are capacities for realizing an ideal of moral personality. For Rawls, this ideal is the ideal of free and equal citizenship. For Tomasi it is the ideal of responsible self-authorship.18 At first, the difference between Rawls's and Tomasi's interpretations of the moral powers looks superficial. However, there is a real difference in why and how Rawls and Tomasi think that the development and exercise of the moral powers is a concern of justice. Tomasi expresses this difference in terms of a difference in foci: where Rawls's focus is on securing the status of citizens as ''free equals'', Tomasi's focus is on the agency of persons; on what they do as ''equally free'' (Tomasi, 2012a: 304). According to Tomasi, what matters is not merely the relational status of equal citizenship, but rather ''what citizens choose to do as responsible independent agents'' (2012a: 193). There is a substantial difference between Rawls and Tomasi here. For Rawls, the moral powers are capacities for free and equal citizenship: free in that one has and pursues one's own determinate conception of the good; equal in that one does so with the rights and duties of equal citizenship. From the standpoint of justice, the development and exercise of the moral powers that matters is the realization of this potential for free and equal citizenship, and this defines what their adequate development is and explains the satisficing interpretation of the modality of the relation between moral powers and basic rights. For Tomasi, by contrast, the moral powers are the capacities for responsible self-authorship and what matters from the standpoint of justice is the realization of responsible self-authorship. The ideal of responsible self-authorship is open-ended; it is an ideal that is realized to the extent that a person's decisions are her own. So, where Rawls claims that the moral powers are sufficiently realized when a person is able to offer and abide by fair terms of social cooperation and to devise and pursue a determinate conception of the good, for Tomasi the moral powers are realized to the extent that a 12 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from person achieves responsible self-authorship.19 So, where the ideal behind the moral powers in Rawls's theory is an ideal realized by some threshold development and exercise of the moral powers, the ideal behind the moral powers in Tomasi's theory is the full or complete realization of the moral powers. On Tomasi's interpretation, then, there ''is no natural limit'' (Tomasi, 2012a: 194) to the development and exercise of the two moral powers, no target or threshold of adequacy, and so Tomasi's ideal does not define such a target or measure of adequacy, but supports a maximizing interpretation. Tomasi's argument for why the economic liberties of transaction and of using property are basic illustrates how his understanding of the ideal implied by the moral powers differs from Rawls's: Many people define themselves by the financial decisions they make for themselves and their families. [ . . . ] Such decisions require that people assess their most basic values and, in light of that assessment, to set themselves on a course of life that is their own. Economic liberty protects these important aspects of responsible self-authorship. Indeed, among the most important protections needed by responsible self-authors are those that empower individuals to act and to make decisions about the economic aspects of their lives. (Tomasi, 2012a: 79–80) Economic liberties expand the sphere of decisions where persons decide on their own what types of lives to lead. By narrowing the sphere in which persons are subjected to democratic authority, the sphere of responsible self-authorship is expanded: For many people, independent economic activity is an essential, ongoing part of a well-lived life. This is why market democracy sees private economic liberty as a requirement of political autonomy. For many productive citizens, it is not enough merely to know that the ones they love live well. It is also important to such people that they be the visible cause of that state of affairs. (Tomasi, 2012a: 183–184) Tomasi illustrates the value of the economic liberties for expanding the sphere of selfdetermination by contrasting a European ''social democratic'' model that restricts economic liberties to provide a social safety net with an idealized American ''market democratic'' model where economic liberties are basic rights. According to Tomasi, the European model undermines the responsible self-authorship of citizens: ''by insulating people from economic risks, the European model denies ordinary citizens opportunities to feel the special sense that they have done something genuinely important with their lives. The material benefits of social democracies come with a moral opportunity cost.'' (Tomasi, 2012a: 80). Borrowing an example from Murray (2009), Tomasi imagines a janitor that supports her family to draw out the difference: in the American system of economic liberty the janitor should experience self-respect and be respected by the community; in the European system, the bases of (self-)respect are absent: ''If those same persons lived under a system in which they were heavily insulated from economic risks [ . . . ] then that status goes away [ . . . ] The experience of risk seems to be an essential precondition of the sort of self-respect that liberals value.'' (Tomasi, 2012a: 80). Platz 13 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from I am not sure that Tomasi's contrast is fortunate. Tomasi suggests that the European janitor is less of a responsible self-author than an American janitor, since she faces a lesser risk of social disaster. However, it is unclear why we should accept the assumption that there is less self-authorship involved in pursuing one's conception of the good in the absence than in the presence of risk of social disaster. Moreover, risks materialize, so the American janitor might succeed in providing for her family, but if she does so in a risky environment, presumably some other persons fail to provide for their families. If so, the argument implies that there in the American system are children that are not taken care of by their parents. I am not sure who will be taking care of them. In addition, I do not see why it is preferable to have a system where parents fail and the children are then helped rather than a system where parents are protected from failing. More to the point, perhaps, Tomasi's argument that the economic liberties of transaction and using property are basic illustrates how he departs from Rawls's understanding of what it means to develop and exercise the two moral powers. Tomasi's argument works from an ideal of self-authorship, where the moral powers are developed and exercised to the extent that persons are the causes of how they fare in life, in control of the decisions by which they define and pursue their conception of the good life. The economic liberties are basic rights, because restricting the economic liberties limits the responsible self-authorship of persons. If this interpretation is correct, the disagreement between Rawls and Tomasi boils down to a disagreement about the nature of justice. Rawls tries to articulate the theory of justice best suited to the liberal democratic ideal of society as a system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens. Although Tomasi claims to work from the same ideal, his vision of the just society is the society that best guarantees for the members the resources and opportunities of responsible self-authorship consistent with equal opportunities for all. Or, the short version, Tomasi's first principle of justice is: promote responsible self-authorship.20 ''Promote responsible self-authorship'' is not a bad principle of justice – indeed, Kant and Mill can be said to affirm it. (Kant, 1996; Mill, 1989) However, it is not Rawls's. In addition, if I am right that this is a basic disagreement, then Tomasi's attempt to ground the economic liberties in Rawlsian assumptions and values has failed. In the end, then, I think that Tomasi's argument for why the economic liberties are basic rights is that restricting them hinders responsible self-authorship. Rawls would allow that this is a reason for not restricting them, but not that this shows that they are basic rights. To show that they are basic rights, we have to show that they are necessary for the adequate development of the moral powers. In the following section I look at this option. Economic liberties as requirements of democratic legitimacy I have defended two claims: first, that Tomasi's charge of unjustified exceptionalism relies on Rawls using a maximizing modality of the relation between moral powers and basic rights, whereas Rawls relies on a satisficing modality. Second I reconstructed what I think is Tomasi's argument for why we should go with the maximizing modality: that justice requires the conditions that best serve responsible self-authorship. I did not discuss this principle except to note that taking this principle as basic amounts to a rejection 14 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from of basic assumptions of Rawls's theory of justice, wherefore Tomasi cannot both rely on this principle and claim to work from assumptions that Rawls shares. So, the charge of unjustified exceptionalism fails. Tomasi might be unimpressed. True, he uses the vocabulary of maximizing when he says that a system with basic economic liberties would serve the ''full'',''more full'', or ''most full'' development and exercise of the moral powers and that a system that restricts the economic liberties ''diminishes'', ''stunts'', or ''truncates'' the development and exercise of the moral powers, but his position can be restated as satisficing, so that ''full'' means ''full enough'' or ''adequate to reach the threshold'', and ''diminishes'', ''truncates'', and so on means ''hinders the development and exercise of the moral powers to the degree that some citizens cannot reach the threshold''. Thus restated, the previous discussion leaves untouched Tomasi's charge of unjustified exceptionalism: the charge of unjustified exceptionalism is that the full range of economic liberties are as necessary as the other basic liberties for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers as Rawls understands them. I am not sure that the argument thus restated coheres with Tomasi's discussion of the moral powers and why we should care about their development and exercise that I outlined above. Leaving that aside, the restated charge of unjustified exceptionalism works if, firstly, Rawls provides insufficient reason for excluding the economic liberties from the list of basic rights, and, secondly, Tomasi shows that there are good Rawlsian reasons for including them. So, our first question is: Does Rawls provide a persuasive argument that the economic liberties are not necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the moral powers? The answer is that he does not. There is a troubling lacuna in Rawls's argument: Rawls does not show that all and only the liberties he includes on the list of basic rights belong there. Rawls exemplifies the argument for including a liberty on the list with discussions of liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, and the fair value of the political liberties. However, he does not provide similar arguments for the other liberties. Even worse, he provides no argument to the effect that other liberties are not on the list of basic rights. This lacuna is troubling, since the requirements of the first principle of justice and the legislation that can be enacted in pursuit of other social values vary dramatically with variations in the list of basic liberties. The problem is especially grave with regard to the economic liberties: leaving the economic liberties off the list of basic rights allows a comparatively wide sphere of legislative authority; including them on the list would, as neoclassical liberals argue, limit the reach of legislative authority. Can we construct an argument on behalf of Rawls? Samuel Freeman (2007a: 58; 2011: 30–35, 52–55) suggests the following argument: instituting the full range of economic liberties as basic rights would make it very hard for some members of society to achieve economic independence and enjoy income and wealth adequate to pursue a wide range of reasonable plans of life and so would make it hard or even impossible for some members of society to adequately develop their two moral powers. We should, therefore, only protect a narrow range of economic liberties as basic rights. Alas, Freeman's suggested argument slips between liberty and the worth of liberty and overlooks how economic liberties would belong in a scheme of basic rights. Platz 15 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from Firstly, Freeman's suggested argument can be restated as the claim that if we take the full range of economic liberties as basic, then the worth of liberties would be lessened for some members of society. Freeman does not give an argument for this claim, but it seems plausible that it will be harder to secure fair equality of opportunity in a system where the economic liberties are basic, since, for example, such a system would have limited authority to impose anti-discriminatory laws or tax inheritance and bequests. In addition, it might also be true that the least well off members would be less well off if there can be no regulation of minimum wage, working conditions, or mandatory schemes for health or retirement benefits. However, there is a problem with this argument: the scheme of basic rights is determined independently of considerations of the worth of this scheme. Whether the economic liberties are in the scheme of basic rights depends on whether they are necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers, and this question is prior to and independent of questions about the worth of the scheme of liberties. If the neoclassical liberal argument is correct, we ought to secure the worth of the economic liberties as much as any other (non-political) basic liberty.21 Secondly, Freeman might reply that the problem is not merely that the worth of liberties is lessened if the full range of economic liberties are basic rights, but that their worth is lessened to the point where some members cannot adequately develop and exercise their moral powers. This suggestion is worrying: if some liberties are necessary for some members to adequately develop and exercise their moral powers, but protecting them would make it impossible for some members to develop and exercise their moral powers, then the situation is tragic; in that case it is impossible to provide a scheme of rights that is adequate for all. Fortunately, we do not have to embrace this conclusion. Freeman's claim is that ''[u]nregulated economic liberties render practically impossible many persons' adequate development of their moral powers'' (Freeman, 2007: 58), but no one suggested that the economic liberties should be unregulated. The challenge to Rawls is not that the economic liberties should be unregulated, but that they are basic and so should be regulated only for the sake of providing an adequate scheme of equal rights to all. Even if we take the economic liberties as basic rights they can and should be regulated when doing so is necessary to provide equally to all a scheme of rights adequate for the development and exercise of the moral powers. So, Freeman's suggested argument does not work. Alas, I am not sure I see a better alternative. Since Rawls does not provide an adequate argument that the economic liberties are not basic rights, the road is clear for Tomasi. So, our second question is: Does Tomasi offer an argument that the economic liberties are necessary for adequate development and exercise of the moral powers as Rawls understands them? The answer is yes, but it is not persuasive. Tomasi's argument is the following: treating citizens as free and equal requires respecting the liberal principle of legitimacy, that ''the use of political coercion is legitimate only if that coercion is conducted on the basis of principles that can be endorsed by the people subject to that coercion.'' (Tomasi, 2012a: 74). Citizens can only assess and endorse these principles if they are ''free to exercise and develop their two moral powers.'' (Tomasi, 2012a: 75). Since the basic liberties are the protections that are necessary to develop and exercise the two moral powers, it follows that the ''basic rights are requirements of democratic legitimacy.'' (Tomasi, 2012a: 75–76). 16 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from Tomasi then argues that the economic liberties are necessary to adequately develop and exercise the moral powers needed to assess and endorse the principles of political authority. It follows that taking the economic liberties as basic rights is a requirement of democratic legitimacy.22 Thus reconstructed, Tomasi's argument is not so much a rejection or revision of Rawls's assumptions, as it adds an apparently missing piece to these: where Rawls left it unclear what ties the basic rights to democratic legitimacy, Tomasi suggests that the basic rights are tied to democratic legitimacy via the idea that citizens must be capable of assessing and endorsing the laws to which they are subject. Moreover, the capacity to assess and endorse is plausibly constructed as a threshold concept, so this argument avoids the temptation to endorse a principle of maximizing responsible self-authorship. I do not think that Rawls understood the relation between moral powers, basic rights, and democratic legitimacy in terms of the powers of assessment and endorsement. However, Tomasi does not and need not claim that it is a correct interpretation. High-liberals are committed to the principle of legitimacy that Tomasi relies on, so if Tomasi shows that the economic liberties are necessary for democratic legitimacy in the suggested manner, then high-liberals should embrace the conclusion that the economic liberties are basic rights, no matter what Rawls did or might say about it. So, our question is whether the economic liberties are truly necessary for citizens to adequately assess and endorse the laws of society. Unfortunately, I see no reason to agree that they are. The problem can be presented as a dilemma: either Tomasi claims that the basic rights are all and only those rights grounded in democratic legitimacy, because they are necessary to develop the powers to assess and endorse the laws of society, or he claims that some basic rights are grounded in democratic legitimacy in the suggested manner, while others have a different grounding. The first claim is implausible. The reason we care about freedom of religion, the integrity of the person, or the right to choose whom to marry is not that these rights protect activities necessary to assess and endorse the laws of society, but that they protect activities that are necessary to freely develop and pursue a conception of the good. In addition, the reason we care about the capacity to develop and pursue a determinate conception of the good is that we care about having and pursuing a determinate conception of the good – not because developing it is necessary to assess and endorse the laws of society. The second claim is more plausible, but it does not support the needed conclusion: the political rights, freedom of speech, and whatever rights necessary to protect these are feasibly constructed as requirements of democratic legitimacy in the sense suggested by Tomasi. So, we might welcome Tomasi's suggestion as an elaboration of why we should protect the liberties immediately or mediately grounded in the sense of justice. Yet, it is a strange stretch to ground the economic liberties – the liberties of the person as laborer, producer, owner, and entrepreneur – in the sense of justice. Freedom of contract, rights of ownership, and so on are like freedom of religion and the integrity of the person in that they protect activities that are part of the development and exercise of the conception of the good. More concretely, I do not see how legislating a minimum wage, mandating savings for retirement, or taxing inheritance and bequest for the sake of securing equality of opportunity can be construed as truncating or stunting the capacity of citizens to assess and endorse the laws of society. In short, the activities of economic agency are part of our development and exercise of Platz 17 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from the capacity for a conception of the good and are, as such, not well grounded in the powers of assessment and endorsement needed to secure democratic legitimacy. So, I do not think that the reconstructed argument from democratic legitimacy to the conclusion that the economic liberties are basic rights works. If the economic liberties are basic rights, it is because protecting them is mediately or immediately necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the moral power that is a capacity for a conception of the good. The result of this section is a sort of stalemate. Rawls provides insufficient reason that the economic liberties are not basic rights. Tomasi provides insufficient reason that they are basic rights. Even so, there is a constructive outcome of this section in that we have identified the main question: whether the economic liberties are basic rights will depend on whether the activities of economic agency are mediately or immediately necessary for the adequate development or exercise of the capacity for a conception of the good. How to answer that question is a topic for another essay. Conclusion I have discussed a powerful challenge to high-liberalism: the neoclassical liberal challenge that the high-liberal ideals of democracy and democratic citizenship support the conclusion that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. To discuss this challenge, I presented and assessed Tomasi's charge that Rawls engages in unjustified exceptionalism, since the full range economic liberties are as necessary as the other basic rights for the development and exercise of the powers of moral personality. I showed how Tomasi's argument relies on a mischaracterization of the modality of the relation between moral powers, liberties, and basic rights: where Tomasi relies on a maximizing relation, Rawls's argument relies on a satisficing relation. I further indicated that Tomasi's argument could be defended by the principle that institutions are just to the extent that they protect and promote responsible self-authorship, but that this principle departs from the high-liberal view of justice. I then discussed and found wanting Tomasi's attempt to tie ground economic liberties in the principle of democratic legitimacy. I also acknowledged that Rawls offers no satisfactory argument for his claim that the economic liberties are not basic. So, although Tomasi fails to show that the economic liberties are basic rights, Rawls fails to show that the economic liberties are not basic rights. Two further conclusions are suggested by the argument of this essay. First, that if we want to ground the basic rights in the powers of moral personality, then we should work with a satisficing interpretation of the relation between moral powers and basic rights. Secondly, that the question about whether the economic liberties are basic rights should be restated in terms of the relation between the economic liberties and the adequate development of the capacity for a conception of the good; the test of whether the economic liberties are basic rights is whether these liberties are necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the capacity for a conception of the good. The burden of proof is on neoclassical liberals to establish this claim and they have yet to carry this burden. Thus, although high-liberalism is in a precarious situation, it is not yet undone by the neoclassical liberal challenge. 18 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from Acknowledgements I am grateful to Corey Brettschneider, David Estlund, Samuel Freeman, Alex Gourevitch, Javier Hidalgo, Sharon Krause, Ryan Muldoon, Doug Paletta, John Tomasi, Kevin Vallier and to the members of the Political Philosophy Workshop at Brown University for comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I am especially grateful to John Tomasi though critical, I hope this essay also shows my respect and admiration for John and his work. Funding This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Notes 1. I owe this way of drawing the distinction between classical liberalism, high-liberalism, and libertarianism to Samuel Freeman (2005, see Tomasi and Brennan, 2012). 2. Varieties of libertarianism are provided by Nozick (1974), Narveson (1988), and Rothbard (2006). 3. Adam Smith (1982), Hayek (1978), Epstein (1998), and Friedman (2002) offer varieties of classical liberalism. 4. High-liberals include Rawls (1996, 1999), Nagel (1991), Scheffler (2010), Joshua Cohen (2010), and Samuel Freeman (2007b). 5. Neoclassical liberalism is a relatively new movement. Amongst its members I would include Gaus, Tomasi, Brennan, and Nickel. Nickel (2000) was one of the first to defend economic liberties along neoclassical lines. More systematic defenses of neoclassical liberalism are offered by Gaus (2007, 2010a, 2010b) and Tomasi (2012a, 2012b). 6. Thus, Anatole France's famous quip: ''How noble the law, in its majestic equality, that both the rich and poor are equally prohibited from peeing in the streets, sleeping under bridges, and stealing bread!'' 7. Suggested by passages like this one: ''Taking the two principles together, the basic structure is to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all. This defines the end of social justice.'' (Rawls, 1999: 179). 8. Which explains why Rawls sometimes omits ''full'' (e.g. Rawls, 2001b: 366). 9. An additional wrinkle is that the conjunction in ''development and exercise'' is really an inclusive disjunct, so that a liberty is a basic right if it is necessary for the adequate development or exercise of either of the two moral powers. This wrinkle does not affect the argument of this essay. 10. At times Rawls includes freedom of movement as one of the liberties justified in the second manner, but at times he places it outside of the category of basic rights (e.g. 1996: 228). 11. Notably, most often free choice of occupation is not included amongst the basic liberties in the list of primary goods (cf. Rawls, 1996: 181, 308; 2001b: 362). 12. Tomasi also defends these institutional schemes in light of different interpretations of the second principle, but I cannot in this essay go into this part of Tomasi's argument. 13. Tomasi at times restricts the charge to economic liberties, so that ''the same reasons that highliberals offer in support of their preferred economic liberties apply with at least as much force to the aspects of economic freedom they wish to exclude.'' (2012a: 76). Platz 19 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from 14. Rawls (2012a: 98), my emphasis. There are exceptions, for example: ''Even if people in such a society acquiesced to these restrictions on their liberty, they would not be in position to endorse the rules of their society in anything like a full or robust manner. Freedom of labor, and to use labor in production, is an essential aspect of a social world that encourages citizens to develop and exercise their moral powers of responsible self-authorship.'' (2012a: 77–78; my emphasis). 15. Note also that the right to own personal property and freedom of occupation are not always included in the list of basic liberties, indeed, in ''Kantian Constructivism'' and in ''Social Unity and Primary Goods'' Rawls places free choice of occupation together with freedom of movement in a distinct category of primary goods (2001b: 362, 366; 2001c: 313–314; see also Rawls, 1996: 227–230). 16. This clarifies the statement made in A Theory of Justice that ''these rights are assigned to fulfill the principles of cooperation that citizens would acknowledge when each is fairly represented as a moral person. The conception defined by these principles is not that of maximizing anything, except in the vacuous sense of best meeting the requirements of justice, all things considered.'' (Rawls, 1999: 185rev.). 17. This claim simplifies Rawls's argument and disregards how his ideas developed via Kantian constructivism. In Kantian constructivism, the development of the two moral powers is in the highest-order interests of persons and is seen as such by the parties in the original position (cf. 2001b: 365; 2001c: 312–313; see also Rawls, 1996: 73–74). 18. The capacities of responsible self-authorship are, firstly, corresponding to Rawls's conception of the good, the capacity: to assess one's options, set standards for a way of life one finds worth living, and pursue this way of life; secondly, corresponding to Rawls's sense of justice, the moral power to recognize and respect one's fellow citizens as equal self-authors (cf. Tomasi, 2012a: 40–41, 74–75; 2012b: 65–66). 19. In other words, for Rawls what matters from the standpoint of justice is that the moral powers are realized to some threshold level whereas for Tomasi what matters is the degree to which persons are responsible self-authors – compare the discussion of the basis of equality in A Theory of Justice, section 77. 20. I am inclined to think that ''responsible'' does little work here, since interpersonal consistency is implied by maximization, but there is an aggregation/distribution wrinkle that I do not want to iron here. 21. Another problem is that Freeman's argument relies on the possibility of ranking the worth of different schemes of liberty: the claim is that the scheme that includes economic liberties is of significantly lesser worth than those that do not include them. However, it seems conceptually confused to rank the worth of different schemes of liberties. The worth of a scheme of liberty varies according to the means available to the members of society. However, worth is always the worth of one particular scheme of liberties and so cannot be compared with the worth of another scheme. 22. In conversations, Tomasi has suggested that this is his main argument. The centrality of assessment and endorsement is brought out more clearly in Tomasi's ''Democratic Legitimacy and Economic Liberty'' than in Free Market Fairness. References Brettschneider C (2010) Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 20 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from Cohen J (2010) The Arc of the Moral Universe and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Epstein RA (1998) Principles for a Free Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty with the Common Good. Reading, MA: Perseus Books. Freeman S (2005) ''Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View''. Philosophy and Public Affairs 30(2): 105–151. Freeman S (2007a) Rawls. London: Routledge. 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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mill JS On Liberty and Other Writings. Collini S. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Murray C (2009) ''The Happiness of the People''. Speech given at the American Enterprise Institute, 11 March, 2009. Nagel T (1999) Equality and Partiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Narveson J (1988) The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Nickel J (2000) ''Economic Liberties''. In Davion V. and Wolf C. (eds.) The Idea of Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice.Cambridge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls J (1999) A Theory of Justice Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls J (1996) Political Liberalism: Second Paperback Edition. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls J (2001a) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls J (2001b) ''Social Unity and Primary Goods''. In Freeman S (ed.) John Rawls: Collected Papers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls J (2001c) ''Kantian Constructivism''. In Freeman S (ed.) John Rawls: Collected Papers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rothbard MN (2011) For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc. Scheffler S (2010) Equality & Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith A (1982) An Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in 2 vols. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc. Platz 21 at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from Tomasi J and Brennan J (2012) ''Classical Liberalism''. In Estlund D (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tomasi J (2012a) Free Market Fairness. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tomasi J (2012b) ''Democratic Legitimacy and Economic Liberty''. Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1): 50–80. About the author Jeppe von Platz has a PhD in Philosophy from University of Pennsylvania. He is now Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Suffolk University in Boston. Before he went to Suffolk he was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Political Theory Project at Brown University. 22 Politics, Philosophy & Economics at SUFFOLK UNIV on April 23, 2013ppe.sagepub.comDownloaded from

The following is the established format for referencing this article: Pigliucci, M. (2004) Natural selection and its limits: Where ecology meets evolution. In: Casagrandi, R. & Melià, P. (Eds.) Ecologia. Atti del XIII Congresso Nazionale della Società Italiana di Ecologia (Como, 8-10 settembre 2003). Aracne, Roma, p. 29-34. [online] URL: http://www.xiiicongresso.societaitalianaecologia.org/articles/Pigliucci.pdf Natural selection and its limits: Where ecology meets evolution Massimo Pigliucci Depts. of Botany and of Ecology & Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996. Phone 1-865-974-6221, email [email protected], URL www.genotypebyenvironment.org Abstract: Natural selection [Darwin 1859] is perhaps the most important component of evolutionary theory, since it is the only known process that can bring about the adaptation of living organisms to their environments [Gould 2002]. And yet, its study is conceptually and methodologically complex, and much attention needs to be paid to a variety of phenomena that can limit the efficacy of selection [Antonovics 1976; Pigliucci and Kaplan 2000]. In this essay, I will use examples of recent work carried out in my laboratory to illustrate basic research on natural selection as conducted using a variety of approaches, including field work, laboratory experiments, and molecular genetics. I also discuss the application of this array of tools to questions pertinent to conservation biology, and in particular to the all-important problem of what makes invasive species so good at creating the sort of problems they are infamous for [Lee 2002]. The evident complexity and specificity of living organisms has always generated curiosity and a search for explanations to account for it. During the early 19th century, William Paley [1831] proposed a close analogy between structures such as the human eye and artifacts such as watches, concluding that living organisms must have been intelligently designed. Paley's was the last historically significant attempt at explaining the natural world in theological terms, in the tradition of what at the time was appropriately known as "natural theology". David Hume [1779] had already dealt a mortal philosophical blow to the argument from design during the 18th century, essentially pointing out that natural theology actually provided no explanation at all: to invoke a mysterious and unknowable designer to "explain" nature was an unnecessarily fancy way of admitting our ignorance in the matter. However, Hume did not actually have an alternative explanation available, and the dispute remained unsettled until the work of Charles Darwin [1859]. He was the first one to propose a reasonable alternative explanation for what we now call adaptation: the action of natural selection. Darwin reasoned that the natural tendency of populations to increase exponentially in number, had to clash with the obviously limited resources available at any particular time and place (something first noted by Thomas Malthus). Since living organisms are different from each other, and some of these differences are heritable from one generation to the next, Darwin expected those variants that had the highest fitness to leave more offspring because of competition for the available resources. This was, in essence, the principle of natural selection. In the reminder of this essay, I will explore the idea that the study of alleged adaptations is in part a historical question and in part an experimental one [Pigliucci and Kaplan 2000], and represents one of the best examples of convergence between the disciplines of ecology and evolutionary biology. In this area, hypothesis testing must be conducted by the combination of a series of approaches, each one of which by itself may not be sufficient to shed light on any particular case of interest. Members of my laboratory use this varied toolbox during their investigations, though additional ones are obviously available to evolutionary biologists in general [Freeman and Herron 2001]. 1. HETEROPHYLLY IN AQUATIC PLANTS: MEASURING NATURAL SELECTION IN THE FIELD I will illustrate the historical-experimental study of adaptations and their limits by way of four examples of recent or ongoing research in my laboratory. The first instance involves a classic case of allegedly adaptive phenotypic plasticity 29 M. Pigliucci 30 (the response of genotypes to changing environmental conditions: Pigliucci 2001): heterophylly in semi-aquatic plants [Cook and Johnson 1968]. This is work that I conducted with Carolyn Wells [Wells and Pigliucci 2000]. If one considers the gradient across a shoreline (say, of a lake or pond), one moves from completely aquatic plants to completely terrestrial ones, with an intermediate zone populated by plants that have to be able to live alternatively under and above water, depending on the season. Some species seem to be able to cope with these changing conditions by altering the structure and shape of their leaves so that the underwater ones have a much higher surface/volume ratio, and are therefore better adapted to the slow gas diffusion typical of their environmental conditions. We identified a convenient system to study heterophylly: three very closely related species of the genus Proserpinaca occasionally live in the same pond and show variation from a high degree of heterophylly (P. palustris) to no change in leaf shape (P. pectinata), through the existence of intermediate hybrids (P. intermedia). These hybrids can also be produced in the laboratory, thus allowing genetic research to be conducted. While heterophylly is usually considered an adaptation to changing water conditions [Cook and Johnson 1968; Wells and Pigliucci 2000], there have been very few instances of actual quantitative measurement of natural selection acting in natural populations to maintain plasticity for leaf shape in response to water levels. Indeed, one of these few exceptions has failed to detect any selection on heterophylly, although the particular system used was not a semi-aquatic plant [Winn 1999]. We therefore set out to measure the type and intensity of natural selection for heterophylly in Proserpinaca using the standard quantitative approach proposed by Lande and Arnold [1983], which uses multiple regression analysis of the relationship between phenotypic traits and measures of fitness. The results of two field seasons were indeed consistent with the hypothesis that heterophylly in this system is maintained by natural selection [Wells and Pigliucci, in prep.]. Using several transects, we showed that plants with high degrees of heterophylly do have a significantly higher vegetative (growth rate) and reproductive (flower and fruit production) fitness than plants with lower levels of divergence in leaf morphology (Figure 1). Figure 1. Combined data from several transects in a field study of heterophylly in Proserpinaca [Wells and Pigliucci, in prep.]. Each segment represents an individual. Notice how vegetative fitness (measured as biomass production) is highest for plants with the maximum level of heterophylly. These findings, however, have spurred an additional question: if heterophylly is advantageous under the conditions experienced by all three species of Proserpinaca, why is it that one of them shows no change in leaf shape while the season progresses? A partial answer may be provided by the fact that P. pectinata (the nonheterophyllous species) may have adopted alternative means to facilitate gas exchange underwater, since we found that these plants collapse many of the cell walls inside their roots when compared to the closely related P. palustris. This phenomenon is known to aid several aquatic species in their gas exchange underwater, and it is a particular illustration of the general principle that living organisms can achieve a better fit with their environment in a variety of not necessarily mutually exclusive ways. They can alter their external morphology, as in the case of heterophylly, but also their internal anatomy, or even their physiology. Which particular path is taken may depend as much on chance (the sort of genetic variation that happens to be available at a particular time) as on the specific selection pressures experienced by a population. 2. LIMITS TO SELECTION IMPOSED BY THE GENETIC ARCHITECTURE The second example that I wish to briefly present deals with potential limits to selection, in this case imposed by the genetic variance-covariance (G) structure underlying a set of traits [Steppan et al. 2002]. G is a mathematical construct that Natural selection and its limits: Where ecology meets evolution quantifies the set of genetic variances of a given number of characters, together with the genetic covariances connecting each pair of characters. In theory [but see Houle 1991], G can be used to quantify the ability of certain traits to respond to selection (which depends on their genetic variance), as well as how much each trait affects the evolution of other ones (through their covariances). Mark Camara and I [Camara and Pigliucci 1999; Camara et al. 2000] were interested in empirical investigations of the role of G, within the general theory of evolutionary quantitative genetics. Studying G is not easy because of both theoretical and logistical problems. To complicate things further, Gunter Wagner [Wagner and Altenberg 1996] has proposed that we should really be concerned not just with G, which is a snapshot of the genetic architecture of a population at a given time, but with what he referred to as the M-matrix. This is an extension of G that incorporates information about new genetic variation (via mutation and recombination) that may appear over a given (usually unspecified) temporal horizon. The idea is that the apparent constraints on evolution inferred from G may not be as strong if one considers M, which is supposed to be characterized by higher degrees of genetic variance and lower degrees of genetic covariance. Camara and I wished to approach this problem experimentally, by carrying out selection along and against an observable genetic constraint in natural and mutagenized (i.e., characterized by augmented genetic variation) populations of the weed Arabidopsis thaliana. The results (Figure 2) showed that a set of replicated base and mutagenized populations did not move in phenotypic space if left to their own devices, as expected from quantitative genetics theory. On the other hand, the same populations responded very rapidly to directional selection along the genetic correlation, again following expectations. Indeed, the mutagenized populations responded much more quickly and went farther than the non-mutagenized populations, presumably because of the increased genetic variation for the selected characters. This confirms Wagner's intuition that M may speed up evolution when compared to G. However, selection away from the constraint proved completely unsuccessful: after an initial strong response, all populations bounced back and behaved essentially as the unselected controls. The constraint relating the two traits is apparently difficult to overcome, despite the addition of fresh mutations to the base population. And yet, the constraint between leaf production and flowering time is most certainly not universal, since species closely related to A. thaliana do not show it. Therefore, we are currently investigating the genetic architecture of close relatives of A. thaliana to address the question of how the constraint evolved to begin with (since molecular genetics and phylogenetics tell us that the constrained A. thaliana are a recent result of evolution in this group: Simpson and Dean 2002). Figure 2. Results of a selection experiment conducted by Camara and Pigliucci [in prep.] showing the effect of standing and new genetic variation and covariation on the ability of two traits to respond to selection in Arabidopsis thaliana (see text for details). 3. SELECTION IN ARABIDOPSIS: THE COMPLICATIONS OF REAL ECOLOGY A third example of multiple approaches to the study of adaptation comes from research I have done with Courtney Murren [in prep.] and Hilary Callahan [Callahan and Pigliucci 2002], again on flowering time and related traits in Arabidopsis. 31 M. Pigliucci 32 When we conducted two years of field studies at two different localities, we were able to show strong and consistent natural selection favoring early flowering in two natural populations by conducting a reciprocal transplant experiment. This is consistent with the idea that A. thaliana, not being a good competitor, would be selected for a short life cycle. However, a separate experiment in a different year and location yielded completely different results, suggesting instead the action of strong stabilizing selection for flowering time. We were able to figure out what was going on because of constant checking of the plants in the field: our experimental plot got hit by two waves of herbivores (fungus gnats and aphids) at the beginning and end of the flowering season, which selected for plants that flowered in the middle of the two herbivores' invasions. This is a good example of how intensive field monitoring is necessary to make sense of patterns of selection that may otherwise be suggestive but difficult to interpret. As a follow-up on that study, we are now analyzing Quantitative Trait Loci data [Murren and Pigliucci, in prep.] relative to the population that experienced herbivory. This will allow us to pinpoint some of the genomic regions involved in the selective episode, and possibly to match some of them with known candidate genes affecting flowering time in this species [Stratton 1998]. In order to test adaptive hypotheses one also has to have information about the historical (genetic) relationships among populations [Templeton et al. 2000; Martins et al. 2002], since there is always the possibility of phylogenetic "constraints" (though the latter represent a rather heterogeneous category, which may include the historical outcome of past selection as well). To this end, together with Mitch Cruzan and Heidi Pollard [Pollard et al. 2001; Pigliucci et al. 2003], I have began working out the intra-specific "network" phylogenies of populations of A. thaliana. The idea is to use network (as opposed to standard bifurcating ones, more appropriate for interspecific studies) phylogenies as a baseline to track the evolution of ecologically interesting traits and their co-evolution with other characters, as it is shown in Figure 3. Here, the height of the bars is proportional to the average phenotypic value of each trait (leaf number and flowering time) in each population. While the analysis can be carried out statistically, it is clear that some closely related populations have very similar trait values (e.g., the two Norwegian accessions, as well as Denmark 1220 and Sweden 1430). It is also clear that the two traits (the same that we have shown so far to be genetically correlated to each other) tend to coevolve across this phylogenetic network. (Note that the phylogenies were derived with a variety of algorithms, which yielded essentially congruent results, and are based on chloroplast DNA sequences.) Research in my laboratory is currently being conducted to expand this approach to several dozens populations collected from a large longitudinal span in the natural habitat of Arabidopsis in Europe. The goal is not only to reconstruct the intraspecific phylogeny of these accessions-which will be of great value to the entire Arabidopsis community for comparative studies-but to test specific hypotheses about the evolution of responses to photoperiod and other environmental conditions. Figure 3. Co-evolution of leaf number and flowering time in a set of Arabidopsis thaliana Scandinavian populations connected by a network phylogeny (numbers on the network indicate genetic differences; Pigliucci et al. 2003). Natural selection and its limits: Where ecology meets evolution 4. APPLYING EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY: INVASIVE SPECIES The final example to be briefly considered here concerns research that I am conducting with Norris Muth on the role of phenotypic plasticity in invasions [Muth and Pigliucci, in prep.]. We are taking again a comparative phylogenetic approach, this time to compare pairs of invasive and noninvasive species belonging to two distinct but relatively closely related genera of Asteraceae, Centaurea and Crepis. The preliminary results are exciting because they clearly show that traits can be grouped into two broad categories. On the one hand, all invasives in our group seem to behave similarly (and distinctly from the respective non-invasives) for certain traits, like branching and inflorescence production. This is regardless of the phylogenetic relationship of the different species, so that if one combines the data from all species the general pattern still holds. However, a second group of traits (e.g., biomass and plant size) behave very differently between the two genera of invasives, reflecting their peculiarities in life history and growth habit. In this sense, it appears that not all invasives are created equal, and our research points out that the quest for elusive universal hallmarks of "invasiveness" may have to be rethought [Lee 2002]. Similarly, at the multivariate (i.e., many traits simultaneously) level of analysis, a relative simple picture of the "perfect invasive" that would emerge if one were to pool data regardless of the phylogenetic relationships of the different species, turns out to be misleading. The reality is that different genera of invasives are characterized by their own unique combination of traits that aid their reproductive fitness and-indirectly-their ability to invade. 5. CONCLUSIONS Getting now back to the "big picture," what I tried to convey is the idea that the study of adaptations and their limits is a fascinating mix of historical and experimental work, which has a lot in common with the activities of a detective. Historical events (such as the process of adaptation) leave incomplete traces, rarely a clearcut "smoking gun" [Cleland 2002]. As a result, the best approach is to attack the problem from a variety of perspectives simultaneously, hoping for a "consilience" [Whewell 1840] of different results, i.e. a convergence toward the same conclusion. We are clearly far from a complete understanding of the mechanisms and limits of natural selection in natural populations, despite the fact that Darwin [1859] formulated the basic idea more than 140 years ago. Yet, tremendous progress has been achieved during the last few decades, thanks to both conceptual and technical advances in evolutionary ecology. There is no reason to think that our progress will not continue in the immediate future, benefiting from a unique convergence of biological disciplines to elicit the fundamental mechanism that creates the apparent fit between organisms and environments. 6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank all the people that have worked in my laboratory over the past few years, most of whom are mentioned in this essay. I also thank the National Science Foundation for continuous financial support, which has made our research possible, as well as Marino Gatto and Paolo Menozzi for inviting me to the 2003 meeting of the Italian Society of Ecology, where these ideas were first presented. 7. REFERENCES Antonovics, J. 1976. The nature of limits to natural selection. Annals of the Missouri Botanical Gardens 63:224-247. Callahan, H., and M. Pigliucci. 2002. Shadeinduced plasticity and its ecological significance in wild populations of Arabidopsis thaliana. Ecology 83:1965-1980. Camara, M., and M. Pigliucci. 1999. Mutational contributions to genetic variance/covariance matrices: an experimental approach using induced mutations in Arabidopsis thaliana. Evolution 53:1692-1703. Camara, M. D., C. A. Ancell, and M. Pigliucci. 2000. Induced mutations: a novel tool to study phenotypic integration and evolutionary constraints in Arabidopsis thaliana. Evolutionary Ecology Research 2:1009-1029. Cleland, C. E. 2002. Methodological and epistemic differences between historical science and experimental science. Philosophy of Science 69:474-496. Cook, S. A., and M. P. Johnson. 1968. Adaptation to heterogenous environments. I. Variation in heterophylly in Ranunculus flammula L. Evolution 22:496-516. 33 M. Pigliucci Darwin, C. 1859. The origin of species by means of natural selection: or, the preservation of favored races in the struggle for life. A.L. Burt (1910), New York, NY. Freeman, S., and J. C. Herron. 2001. Evolutionary Analysis, 2nd edition. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Gould, S. J. 2002. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Houle, D. 1991. Genetic covariance of fitness correlates: what genetic correlations are made of and why it matters. Evolution 45:630-648. Hume, D. 1779. Dialogues concerning natural religion. Gilbert Elliot, Edimburgh. Lande, R., and S. J. Arnold. 1983. The measurement of selection on correlated characters. Evolution 37:1210-1226. Lee, C. E. 2002. Evolutionary genetics of invasive species. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 17:386-390. Martins, E. P., J. A. F. Diniz-Filho, and E. A. Hoursworth. 2002. Adaptive constraints and the phylogenetic comparative method: a computer simulation test. Evolution 56:1-13. Paley, W. 1831. Natural theology: or, Evidences of the existence and attributes of the Deity, collected from the appearances of nature. Gould, Kendall, and Lincoln, Boston, MA. Pigliucci, M. 2001. Phenotypic Plasticity: Beyond Nature and Nurture. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD. Pigliucci, M., and J. Kaplan. 2000. The fall and rise of Dr. Pangloss: adaptationism and the Spandrels paper 20 years later. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 15:66-70. Pigliucci, M., H. Pollard, and M. Cruzan. 2003. Comparative studies of evolutionary responses to light environments in Arabidopsis. American Naturalist 161:68-82. Pollard, H., M. Cruzan, and M. Pigliucci. 2001. Comparative studies of reaction norms in Arabidopsis. I. Evolution of response to daylength. Evolutionary Ecology Research 3:129-155. Simpson, G. G., and C. Dean. 2002. Arabidopsis, the Rosetta Stone of flowering time? Science 296:285-289. Steppan, S. J., P. C. Phillips, and D. Houle. 2002. Comparative quantitative genetics: evolution of the G matrix. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 17:320-327. Stratton, D. A. 1998. Reaction norm functions and QTL-flowering interactions for flowering time in Arabidopsis thaliana. Heredity 81:144-155. Templeton, A. R., S. D. Maskas, and M. B. Cruzan. 2000. Gene trees: a powerful tool for exploring the evolutionary biology of species and speciation. Plant Species Biology 15:211222. Wagner, G. P., and L. Altenberg. 1996. Complex adaptations and the evolution of evolvability. Evolution 50:967-976. Wells, C., and M. Pigliucci. 2000. Heterophylly in aquatic plants: considering the evidence for adaptive plasticity. Perspectives in Plant Ecology Evolution and Systematics 3:1-18. Whewell, W. 1840. The philosophy of the inductive sciences, founded upon their history. J.W. Parker, London. Winn, A. A. 1999. Is seasonal variation in leaf traits adaptive for the annual plant Dicerandra linearifolia? Journal of Evolutionary Biology 12:306-313.

ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 12 Facerea lumii și a omului. Sinteză de Teologie Dogmatică (Creation of the world and man. Synthesis of Dogmatic Theology) PhD. Bugiulescu Marin Scientific Researcher, Faculty of Theology and Sciences of Education of the Valahia University of Târgovişte, ROMANIA, E-mail: [email protected]. ABSTRACT English Abstract: This articles presents the creation of the world and of man, and especially the relation between God and His creation. In the act of creation, God Shows His love for man. The man is the companion of God and the continuer of creation.This article presents the creation of man and alienation from God by sin and has the following themes: The image of God and man's relationship with God, Man's ikeness to God. Man was created as being different from the angels and animals, Man's fall into sin and the consequences of sin. We can see the following aspects of the sin: origin, universality and consequences of original sin: alteration of the image of God, which means the darkening of the mind, weakening the will and hardning of feeling. The state of man as the slave of sin and of passions has a sole consequence: death. Romanian Abstract: Acest articol prezintă crearea lumii și a omului, și mai ales relația dintre Dumnezeu și creație. În actul creației, Dumnezeu descoperă iubirea Lui față de om. Omul este partener al lui Dumnezeu și continuator al creației. Acest articol prezintă în continuare, crearea omului dar și înstrăinare de Dumnezeu prin căderea în păcat, tratând următoarele teme: Chipul lui Dumnezeu și relația omului cu Dumnezeu, Omul a fost creat ca fiind diferit de îngeri și animale, căderea omului în păcat consecințele păcatului. De asemenea următoarele aspecte ale păcatului: origine, universalitatea și consecințele păcatului strămoșesc: alterarea chipul lui Dumnezeu, ceea ce înseamnă întunecarea minții, slăbirea voinței și împitrirea sentimentelor, starea omului de rob al păcatului și patimilor are drept consecință: moartea. Keywords: creation, hardness, passions, ikeness, image of God Introducere Sfânta Scriptură, de la primele versete ale cărţii Facerii, revelează faptul că Dumnezeu e Creatorul lumii, atât celei văzute cât şi celei nevăzute. „La început a făcut Dumnezeu cerul şi pământul" (Facere 1,1). Prin crearea lumii apare manifestată în istorie iubirea infinită a Tatălui către Fiul în Duhul Sfânt care seactualizeză în mod concret în afara Sfintei Treimi (ad extra) prin actul de voinţă şi iubire creatoare a Tatălui ceresc. Lumea a fost gândită de Dumnezeu din veci. Sfatul cel veşnic al lui Dumnezeu, cuprinde în sine crearea lumii şi a omului, însă nu dintr-o necesitate, ci numai din iubire pentru că: „la Domnul voinţa e în acelaşi timp şi putere, aşa că oricâte făpturi au fost concepute de El a fi aduse la viaţă, toate au fost chemate la existenţă, aşa cum au fost gândite; De aceea toate câte sunt în Dumnezeu sunt cugetate în acelaşi timp, stând la temelia creării tuturor făpturilor, atât Voinţa cât şi înţelepciunea şi puterea Domnului..."[1]. Din primul moment al actului creator al Lui Dumnezeu lumea este o dovadă a iubirii Lui revărsate în afara Ființei Sale Treimice. 1. Crearea lumii din nimic ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 13 Crearea lumii din nimic e rezultatul unui Creator Atotputernic, care nu e dependent de o materie pe care s-o prelucreze. Dintre argumentele scripturistice ce susţin facerea lumii din nimic amintim:  Macabei 7,88: „Uită-te copile la cer şi la pământ căutând şi văzând toate cele ce sunt intr-ansele, să cunoşti ca din cele ce n-au fost le-a făcut pe ele Dumnezeu"  Evrei 11,3: „Prin credinţa, înţelegem că s-au întemeiat veacurile, prin cuvântul lui Dumnezeu şi toate cele ce se văd s-au făcut din nimic". Prin urmare conform revelaţiei divine, lumea nu e o emanaţie din Fiinţa divină şi nici nu e modelată dintr-o materie preexistenta, aşa cum susţinea Platon. În concepţia panteistă Dumnezeu se confundă cu lumea, divinitatea fiind, prin urmare, concepută în termeni impersonali. Dacă Dumnezeu nu e o existență persoanală, atunci nici omul creat nu are același statut de ființă persoanală, ci poate fi „ceva" care în urma unui şir de reâncarnări, va atinge nirvana contopirea în Marele Tot, ca în concețiile religioase asiatice. Acest fapt se opune pe de o parte oricărui efort omenesc de a se ridica la Dumnezeu (de vreme ce nevoit său voit omul se reîncarnează, pentru că în cele din urmă să atingă nirvana) iar pe de alta exclude libertate lui de vreme ce e predestinat la contopire cu universul. De asemenea teoria preexistenţei materiei care limitează atotputernicia lui Dumnezeu, este combătută de revelaţia divină. Dacă Dumnezeu ar fi avut nevoie de o materie din care să creeze, El nu este atotputernic şi liber ci slab şi limitat. Acceptarea teoriilor materialist-dualiste ăn care primează existenţa a două principii (Dumnezeu şi materia) e contradictorie și inadmisibilă, pentru că s-ar ajunge la o limitare reciprocă a celor două realităţi cu următoarele consecinţe:  Dumnezeu nu mai e infinit (supraspațial, supratemporal) și în consecință undeva s-ar sfârşi Dumnezeu şi ar începe materia  materia ar fi absorbită de Dumnezeu sau ar emana din El (şi atunci ne punem întrebarea de ce nu e lumea perfectă?)  Dumnezeu ar fi circumscris de materie (adică materia l-ar limita şi înghiţi pe Dumnezeu, şi, în consecinţă, Dumnezeu ar fi materie) DAR pe baza gâdirii logice cu argumente scripturistice Dumnezeu este :  Fiinţă pură absolută nu se confundă cu materia, care prin energiile harice necreate este transcendent şi imanent  Atotputernic creează din nimic  Supraspaţial nu poate aşeza un infinit lângă Sine, căci l-ar limita  Supratemporal nu pot exista două realităţi din veşnicie, căci s-ar limita reciproc  Libernesupus nici unei constrângeri sau necesitaţi . Biserica Ortodoxă afirma atât transcedenta lui Dumnezeu, cât şi imanenta Să, argumentând că: * Dumnezeu e transcedent după Fiinţa Să, aşa încât nu se poate ajunge la a confunda pe Dumnezeu cu creaţia ca în panteism; * Dumnezeu e imanent, coborându-Se în creaţie prin energiile Sale divine necreate, susţinând-o din interior şi conducând-o în calitate de Proniator spre scopul pentru care a fost adusă la existenţa: starea veșnicăîmpărăția cerească. 2. Raţionalitatea creaţiei Potrivit credinţei noastre, lumea şi omul se află în starea de mișcare, de transfigurare pentru că tind spre o ţintă desăvârşita pe care nu o au în ei. Faptul că se mişca înseamnă că încă nu au ajuns la desăvârşire. Sfântul Atanasie cel Mare în „Cuvânt către elini"[2] scoate în evidenţă că datorită puterii de a se mişca, creaţia poate înainta spre ţelul ei final: ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 14 desăvârşirea. Tot calitatea de a se putea mişca a făcut posibilă cădereaîn păcat. E esenţială înţelegerea faptului că la origine lumea nu e imuabilă şi statică, ci dinamică și vie. În Apus, Origen, influenţat de sistemele dualiste (materia şi Dumnezeu), şi de filosofia lui Platon (preexistenta materiei), comite eroarea de a gândi o lume imuabilă şi statică la origine (o lume eternă a intelectelor), ce a trecut spre existenţa diversificată şi materială ca o consecinţa a păcatului. Schema lui Origen ar fi următoarea:  STAREA de MIŞCARE , MIŞCAREA , CREAŢIA . Aducerea la existenţă a lumii văzute nu e pentru Origen un „ început" propriu-zis, ci doar manifestarea în timp a unei existenţe eterne şi statice. Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul inversează triada origenistă făcând-o să arate astfel: CREAŢIE, MIŞCARE, STARE de STABILITATE. El afirma următoarele: „Începutul a toată mişcarea naturală e crearea fiinţelor puse în mişcare, iar începutul facerii fiinţelor care se mişca e Dumnezeu în calitatea Lui de Creator. Starea de stabilitate e scopul mişcării naturale a fiinţelor create. Dumnezeu e începutul şi sfârşitul a toată facerea şi a toată mişcarea fiinţelor: de la El vin şi către El se îndreaptă şi în El îşi vor găsi odihna"[3]. După Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul existenţa reală a raţiunilor creaţiei este exprimată în diversitatea lor ce se actualizează în unitate, unitate susţinută în Hristos ca Logos: „...Raţiunea este multe raţiuni, şi raţiunile cele multe sunt o Raţiune..."[4]; astfel bunătatea divină este infuzată prin har în raţiunea creaţiei, dar cu toate acestea creaţia nu poate fi cu adevărat bună decât dacă raţiunile sale (logoi), care au preexistat ca gânduri sau voiri ale lui Dumnezeu, sunt stabilite în El şi păstrează legătura cu Logos-ul creator. Aşa cum arată Sfântul Maxim, făpturile nu există decât ca potenţe, iar existenţa lor actuală se face în timp, însă existenţa lor temporală nu este autonomă, ci teonomă, el numeşte pe cele din urmă, cele actualizate, logos, iar pe cele dintâi noemă, cele aflate în potenţă: „...paradoxal, făpturile sunt una în Logos-ul cel Unu, care, însă este suprafiinţial şi mai presus de participare. Astfel raţiunile (logoi) nu sunt identice nici cu fiinţa lui Dumnezeu, nici cu existenţa lucrurilor din lumea creată ..."[5]. Mântuitorul Iisus Hristos spune: „Eu sunt Alfa şi Omega, Începutul şi Sfârşitul"(Apocalipsă 21,6). Adică lumea vine de la Dumnezeu, e opera Lui de Creator, are în ea imprimată mişcarea spre scopul ei –desăvârşirea, şi se întoarce la Dumnezeu în calitate de „cer nou şi pământ nou"Apocalipsă 21,1). Așadar creaţia întregă e opera iubirii divine. Sfânta Treime e structura supremei iubiri. Iubirea se manifestă plenar la nivelul Persoanelor Treimice. Dumnezeu nu creează lumea din necesitatea dea fi iubit sau pentru ca făptura să-L iubească şi să-L slăvească, ci această e o consecinţăa faptului că omul îl descoperă pe Făcătorul atoate cele bune şi nu are cum să nu-l iubească atunci când L-a descoperit. Dumnezeu creează lumea din iubire pentru a Se bucura şi alte făpturi create de toate ale Sale, și în special omul care participa la atributele divine. Dumnezeu creează o lume în diversitate, dar şi în unitate. Diversitatea exprima bogăţia lui Dumnezeu de aceea: nimic nu se repetă, fiecare e unic. Unitatea arată că toate raţiunile din lume îşi au originea şi se regăsesc în Raţiunea supremă: Logosul divin (Ioan 17: „Mă rog, Părinte, ca toţi să fie Una"). Ca motiv unic şi suprem al facerii lumii prezentat în Sfânta Scriptură este bunătatea şi iubirea lui Dumnezeu. 3. Interpretarea referatului biblic al facerii lumii Referatul biblic nu propune o cronologie, ci o perspectivă concentrică funcţională, de aceea cartea facerii nu trebuie privită ca un manual de geologie sau cosmologie. Ordinea zilelor creației e logică, urmărind să afirme planul şi implicarea directă a lui Dumnezeu în aducerea la existenta şi în organizarea creaţiei. ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 15 Succesiunea zilelor indicate în Cartea Facerii capitolul 1, indică dezvoltarea în timp sau în istorie a creaţiei, fiecare treaptă constituindu-se în premisa necesară celei următoare, fiecare zi fiind o etapă din procesul crației. Lumea gândită de Dumnezeu, a fost făcută prin cuvânt din nimic. Dumnezeu porunceşte prin Cuvântul, prin a cărui putere creează. La sfârşit, CreatorulDumnezeu evaluează opera Sa ca fiind „bună foarte" şi „frumoasă". Fiecare creație primeşte un nume, adică i se arată sensul şi funcţia. Expresia „şi a fost seară şi a fost dimineaţa" sugerează dinamica dezvoltării universului conform planului dumnezeiesc elaborat mai înainte de a fi lumea. Ziua întâi a creaţiei (Facere 1,2-5) prezintă întocmirea pământului „căci pământul era netocmit şi gol şi Duhul lui Dumnezeu se purtă pe deasupra apelor" (1, 2). În această primă zi ni se relatează cum Creatorul pune în lucrare planul său cel veşnic cu privire la lume, ea apare ca actualizare a gândirii Lui: „...(Dumnezeu) în timp ce gândeşte, creează, iar gândul se face lucru, realizându-se prin Cuvânt (Hristos) şi desăvârşindu-se prin Duh..."[6]. Faptul că pământul era netocmit şi gol, arată că era nevoie de un Creator înţelept care să-i dea frumuseţe şi strălucire ca reflectare a slavei Lui, care să înlăture adâncimea apei şi goliciunea, să o umple cu bucuria Sa, adică Duhul Sfânt, de aceea:„... Duhul este fin ca apa, pentru că şi apa e fină, Duhul peste ape hrănea apa..., (iar apa) pătrunde şi hrăneşte pământul, îi dă puterea de germinare – aşa cum arată Fericitul Augustin– Duhul peste ape nu se odihnea..."[7]. Prin El era purtată pe deasupra voinţa nestricăcioasă a Tatălui care dă viaţă, aşteptând lumina. Sfântul Vasile cel Mare, redând acest citat în Hexaimeron-ul său zice că Duhul vivifica apele, sau făcea ca cele din starea latentă, potenţiale să devină actuale. Sfântul Ioan Gură de Aur mărturisește de asemenea cî în apă era prezentă: „o energie plină de viaţă; şi nu era o simplă apă stătătoare şi nemişcătoare, căci ceea ce e nemişcat este negreşit nefolositor"[8]. În acest adânc de ape, apare lumina ( Facere 1, 3,4), apare ziua şi noaptea. 3.a. Crearea lumii nevăzute Dumnezeu a numit ziua ca sfârşit al nopţii ca să fie o ordine şi un şir în cele văzute. În legătură cu lumina ni se prezintă în întreagă Sfânta Scriptură, lumina nevăzută a îngerilor care locuiesc în cer, sau în cerul cerurilor, cum spune David. Crearea lumii nevăzute şi implicit a îngerilor a avut loc înainte de crearea lumii văzute materiale. Sfânta Scriptură prin cuvintele: „La început a făcut Dumnezeu cerul..."(Facere 1,1) întâietatea în actele creaţiei. Prin lumea cerească se înţelege crearea îngerilor, lumea nevăzută.Îngerii sunt fiinţe spirituale şi netrupeşti în comparaţie cu firea noastră, ei îndeplinesc pururea voia lui Dumnezeu şi se bucură veşnic de lumina Lui: „...Îngerul are o fire raţională, spirituală, liberă şi schimbătoare... nu este nemuritor prin fire, ci prin har..."[9]. 3.b. Crearea lumii văzute În ziua a doua, Dumnezeu a făcut tăria, adică bolta cerească, despărţind apele cele de sus de cele de jos, prin care începe organizarea materiei. În ziua a treia Dumnezeu a despărţit apele de uscat, făcând să apară oceanele, mările, fluviile şi pământul cu tot felul de plante după felul lor. „Nu s-a apus despre apă că a făcut-o Dumnezeu; dar a spus că pământul era nevăzut... nu pentru că putea să-l acopere focul sau aerul – zice Sfântul Vasile cel Mare -, ci pentru că materia lichidă nu fusese încă la locul său...pământul, avea însă dureri de naştere ,pentru naşterea tuturor, datorită puterii pusă în el de Creator şi aştepta doar timpul rânduit, ca, la porunca Lui, să scoată la lumină pe cele zămislite..."[10]. Ziua a patra a creaţiei ( Facere 1, 13 –19 ) prezintă facerea luminătorilor mari şi mici (soare, lună stele ), şi aşezarea lor pe tăria cerului, ca să lumineze pământul ziua şi noaptea. În ziua a cincia a creaţiei, Dumnezeu a făcut vieţuitoarele din apă şi păsările din aer, fiecare după felul lor, binecuvântându-le spre creştere şi înmulţire (Facere 1, 20 –23). ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 16 În ziua a şasea, Dumnezeu a făcut toate animalele mari, târâtoarele, fiarele sălbatice, animalele domestice, toate după felul lor, iar la urmă pe om ( Facere 1, 24–31). Sfinţii Părinţi prin învăţătura lor au pus în evidenţă superioritatea omului faţă de celelalte creaţii pe care o rezumăm astfel:  omul e creat după chipul lui Dumnezeu  omul are o demitate împărătească: faptul că omul a fost adus la existenţă după ce toate celelalte au fost create, precum unui fiu de împărat îi sunt pregătite mai dinainte toate, pentru ca el să domnească peste ele.  verticalitatea, omul e „ antropos" , adică cel care priveşte de sus, spre Dumnezeu  spiritualitatea lui, omul este o fiinţă psiho-fizică Parte a întregului şi sinteză în mic a lumii (microcosmos), de aceeaşi fire cu cele create, omul e însă chemat să le unifice pe toate în urcuşul spre Dumnezeu. Omul nu poate fi conceput în afara naturii şi nici natura fără om, căci lumea a fost făcuta pentru om şi omul pentru Dumnezeu. ZIUA a VII – a, „Dumnezeu s-a odihnit". Odihna lui Dumnezeu nu presupune încetarea lucrării divine, ci doar faptul că Dumnezeu nu mai creează nimic. E un alt mod al prezenţei active a lui Dumnezeu în lume. Dumnezeu se manifesta prin energiile Sale necreate ca Pantocrator al lumii. În plus nu se poate concepe absenţa lui Dumnezeu atunci când apare pe lume o nouă viaţă, căci Dumnezeu e prezent permanent în creaţia Să. 4. Lumea ca dar al Lui Dumnezeu pentru om Crearea lumii este un act de iubire şi voinţă ce se poate cunoaşte numai prin credinţă, prin harul Duhului Sfânt, pentru că: „fără credinţă este cu neputinţă să fim bine plăcuţi lui Dumnezeu"(Evrei 11,6). Lumea ca act divin este concretizarea „sfatului cel veşnic" al lui Dumnezeu în timp şi spaţiu ce o prezintă ca o creaţie în stadiul de creaţie, însă nu în sensul evoluţionist ci în sensul unei deveniri în înnoire, sau ca un lucru „bun foarte" ce tinde spre bunătatea absolută – Sfinţenia. Potrivit credinţei creştine, lumea a fost creată de Dumnezeu ca dar pentru oameni. Faţă de darul primit omul devine responsabil şi se poartă cu grijă, preţuind atât darul, cât şi Dăruitorul. Cel mai mare dar pe care cineva îl poate face lui Dumnezeu e darul vieţii sale însăşi, dar nu prin anularea ei, ci prinjerfă, asemenea lui Hristos.„Lumea apare pentru om ca un mijloc de creştere spirituală realizată prin relaţia de comuniune şi iubire, lumea nu reprezintă pentru om un bun în sine la care trebuie să se oprească, ci „mediul" în care locuieşte Dumnezeu, pentru ca omul să-L poată contempla în mod imediat. Raţiunea divină se revarsă în afara Fiinţei Sale creând lumea din iubire, căci raţiunea perfectă dacă rămâne închisă în sine nu poate manifesta iubirea, iar dacă nu poate, înseamnă că nu este perfectă" [11]. 5. Referatul biblic al creării omului a. Trupul Referatul biblic relatează modul creării omului: „Luând Domnul Dumnezeu ţărâna din pământ a făcut pe om şi a suflat asupra lui suflare de viaţă şi s-a făcut omul fiinţa vie"(Fac. 2,7). Trupul lui Adam, înainte de cădere, nu era un trup grosier, ci unul de lumină, asemenea Mântuitorului de după Înviere. Părintele Dumitru Stăniloae defineşte trupul ca fiind şi el raţiune divină plasticizată. În trupul omenesc, afirmă el, „raţionaliţatea plasticizată îşi atinge maxima complexitate"[12], iar această stare deplină o reveleză trupul înviat, sfinţit de Hristos prin jertfa Sa.Prin trup omul creat de Dumnezeu este o cunună a întregii creaţii, înrudit atât cu lumea materială cât şi cu cea spirituală. ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 17 b. SUFLETUL Sufletul e adus la existenţă odată cu trupul. Sufletul e imaterial, dar e o imaterialitate relativă, nu asemenea celei lui Dumnezeu şi nici cele specifice îngerilor, pentru ca modul existenţei angelice e netrupesc, în timp ce sufletul uman e prin raţiune, în trup. Sufletul şi trupul alcătuiesc împreună firea umană, omul ca persoană. Sufletul este nemuritor. Nemurirea sufletului e dată de participarea la Dumnezeu şi motivată de dragostea Lui, dragoste ce a creat persoana umană pentru relaţia cu El în lume şi-n veşnicie. În acest sens, Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul afirma că sufletul nu e nemuritor prin sine, ci e nemuritor numai întrucât Dumnezeu îl susţine în existenţa prin energiile necreate. Dihotomia structurii umane e o afirmaţie împotriva concepţiilor trihotomiste ( Platon, Plotin, eretici apolinaristi) care împart omul în:  Trup  Suflet  Spirit În concepţia Sfinţilor Părinţi, sufletul omului e atât principiu de viaţă, cât şi principiu noetic (raţional). Chipul divin din om se întemeiază pe întreaga natură umană, fiind datul natural care face ca sufletul raţional prin libertate, discernământ, voinţă şi acţiune, să imprime în trup asemănarea Creatorului. Demnitatea persoanei umane rezultă tocmai din faptul că omul, prin chip, conduce şi sfinţeşte creaţia: „ pentru că a fost făcut de Dumnezeu din bunătatea Lui, din suflet şi trup, pentru ca sufletul raţional şi mintal dat lui, fiind după chipul celui care l-a făcut pe el, prin dorinţă... să tindă... să se îndumnezeiască prin asemănare; iar prin grijă sufletul să se facă trupului ceea ce este Dumnezeu sufletului" [13]. Harul insuflat omului de către Dumnezeu prin „suflare de viaţă" face din sufletul biologic un suflet viu. „Suflarea de viaţă" îl face pe om capabil de dialog cu Dumnezeu, un dialog menit să dureze continuu.Sfântul Grigore de Nyssa fundamentează rudenia omului cu Dumnezeu, pe afinitatea realizată între chip şi Model, pe părtăşia omului la viaţa divină în care se bucură de infinitatea şi luminarea simplităţii lui Dumnezeu. Părtăşia cu Dumnezeu, implică pe de o parte originea lui Dumnezeiască, dar şi necesitatea fiinţială de a gusta din frumuseţea şi dragostea incomensurabilă a Creatorului, care realizează unirea desăvârşită cu umanitatea prin persoana Fiului întrupat. Chipul omului îi conferă un statut special împărătesc: „faptul că omul poartă în sine chipul celui care stăpâneşte peste toate făpturile, nu vrea să însemne altceva decât că de la început firea omului a fost destinată să fie regină...fiind astfel că un tablou viu, care are în comun cu modelul său atât vrednicia cât şi numele... . Omul îmbrăcat în haina virtuţii... se sprijină pe fericirea nemuririi fiind un adevărat împărat ca unul ce se aseamănă aidoma frumuseţii modelului..."[14]. 6. Crearea omului. Învăţătura despre chip şi asemănare în antropologia ortodoxă Referatul biblic al facerii prezintă omul ca fiinţa făcută de Dumnezeu după chipul Său: „Şi a zis Dumnezeu Să facem om după chipul şi asemănarea Noastră... Şi a făcut Dumnezeu pe om după chipul Său" (Fac. 1 , 26-27). Părintele Dumitru Popescu afirmă în acest sens că de vreme ce omul e o icoană vie a lui Dumnezeu, existenţa lui reală nu e determinată de elementul creeat din care e făcută icoană, ci de Arhetipul ei necreat. „A treia relatare a referatului biblic (Facere 2, 4-25), este mai puţin sistematică şi cronologică şi este centrată asupra omului. Omul apare în istorie, printr-un act expres al lui Dumnezeu, el este opera directă a divinităţii. La crearea sa participă întreaga Sfânta Treime: „ Şi a zis Dumnezeu Să Facem om după chipul şi după asemănarea Noastră, ca să stăpânească peştii mării...şi tot pământul ( Facere 1, 27 ). Dintre toate făpturile, numai pe om îl creează Dumnezeu în mod special, el nu este rezultatul ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 18 poruncii divine, căci pământul nu era în stare să producă o fiinţă înzestrată cu raţiune, libertate, conştiinţă şi voinţă, ci numai Dumnezeu, prin marea Sa putere şi iubire, creându-l după chipul Slavei Sale, dându-i asemănarea la care trebuie să ajungă prin propria lucrare" [15]. Analizând textul scripturistic, observăm distincţia dintre singular „ şi a zis" şi pluralul „Să Facem", om ( singular ) ,după chipul şi asemănarea (singular) Noastră (plural); şi ajungem la concluzia că omul este un reflex al chipului treimic, sau mai bine zis poartă în sine pecetea Celui ce e Chipul „Dumnezeului nevăzut" (Coloseni 1,15), fiind creat după chipul lui Hristos Întrupat. Dumnezeu cel unul în Fiinţă şi întreit în Persoane (Să Facem), creează întrega fire umană ca un om, arătând adevăratul ei sens şi raţiunea ei, ce trebuie să trăiască în unitate, unitate primită prin unirea cu Hristos, Arhetipul după care a fost creat omul ( Galateni 3,28 ;2,20 ). Tradiţia răsăriteană, încercând să definească adevărata fire a omului, porneşte de la chipul lui Dumnezeu după care a fost creat omul. Primul capitol al Epistolei către Coloseni conţine structurată această idee paulină: „Acesta este chipul lui Dumnezeu celui nevăzut, mai întâi născut din toată făptura. Pentru că întru El au fost făcute toate, cele din ceruri şi cele de pe pământ, cele văzute şi cele nevăzute, fie tronuri, fie domnii, fie începătorii, fie stăpânii. Toate s-au făcut prin El şi pentru El. El este mai înainte de toate şi toate prin El sunt aşezate. Şi El este capul trupului, al Bisericii, El este începutul, întâiul născut din morţi ca să fie El cel dintâi dintre toate (Col. I, 15-18). Chipul nu poate fi redus la vreo parte a fiinţei umane, cu toate că, uneori, se atribuie caracterul de chip al lui Dumnezeu demnităţii împărăteşti a omului, superiorităţii sale în lumea sensibilă (microcosmos= cel ce însemnează toate elementele creaţiei); alteori, se vrea văzut în firea să duhovnicească, în suflet, sau în partea principală şi conducătoare a fiinţei sale, în minte (νους), în raţiune (λογος) sau în libertatea omului ca facultate de a se determina din interior, de a decide asupra faptelor sale ; alteori chipul lui Dumnezeu e asimilat cu o calitate a sufletului –simplitatea, nemurirea, puterea de cunoaştere şi participare la Dumnezeu. 7. Funcţiile chipului Creat după chipul lui Dumnezeu, omul e o fiinţa personală ce tinde spre Arhetipul Său divin. Funcţiile persoanei sunt diverse şi se pot rezuma la : 1.RAŢIUNE 2.VOINŢA 3.SENTIMENT RAŢIUNEA e puterea cognitivă prin care omul se gândeşte pe sine, lumea înconjurătoare, sensul existenţei. Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul distinge două nivele ale puterii cognitive: a) logosul (raţiunea propriu-zisă): are funcţiune anlitică b)nousul (mintea): are funcţie sintetică. Raţiunea preia datele furnizate de simţuri şi le procesează;cercetându-le, descriindule, le transmite minţii care le înţelege (actul intelectiv presupune raportarea acestor date la sensul lor; orice înţelegere are un rost, un sens). În ceea ce priveşte VOINŢA, Sfântul Maxim Marturisitorul distinge între voinţa firii ( cea fizică) şi voinţa gnomică. Voinţa firii e prin structura teocentrica şi reprezintă voinţa de a exista. Voinţa gnomică e liberă libertatea. Voinţa gnomică are două posibilităţi de activare: 1. poate urma pe cea fizică, orientându-se spre Dumnezeu; 2. i se poate opune, refuzând comuniunea cu Dumnezeu. Sfântul Ioan Gură de Aur, prezintă pe omul creat după chipul lui Dumnezeu îmbrăcat în purpură de împărat, coroana creaţiei, inel de legătură între îmanent şi transcendent: „ ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 19 ...omul e mai de cinste decât toate fiinţele create, pentru el au fost zidite toate..."[16], el fiind chipul Celui care stăpâneşte toate în libertate. Căderea omului în păcat produce conflict între voinţa firii şi cea gnomică, omul tinzând de cele mai multe ori către ceea ce e potrivnic firii. AFECTIVITATEA e puterea de relaţie. Omul e creat de Dumnezeu ca persoană. Acest lucru presupune că e deschis relaţiei, comuniunii. Această putere a relaţiei îl scoate pe om din individualismul propriu, deschizându-l comuniunii. În starea paradisiacă, puterea cognitivă a omului se activa teocentric. Omul ştia că nu se poate cunoaşte pe sine şi nici lumea, decât în şi perspectiva lui Dumnezeu. Această capacitate duhovnicească se manifesta pentru că omul era orientat spre Dumnezeu. 8. Omul în starea paradisiacă În starea paradisiacă, omul trăia continuu epectasic, ieşind iubitor din sine spre Dumnezeu, spre celălalt (Eva), spre creaţie, dorind să fie cu toate şi prin toate cu Dumnezeu. Înrudirea omului cu Dumnezeu prin chip îl pune într-o legătură apropiată cu Arhetipul său, prin care se împărtăşeşte de toată comuniunea divină. Faptul că Adam intra în relaţie directă cu Creatorul său, vorbea cu El, auzea glasul Lui ( Facere 3, 8 ), arată starea de deplină funcţionalitate a chipului, dacă el ar fi persistat în bine, înmulţirea să ar fi fost ca îngerilor şi ar „ fi putut ajunge până la limita rânduită de voinţa Creatorului...Cel ce a chemat toate la viaţă şi a fost în măsură să modeleze pe om cu totul în mod liber după un tipar sau calapod dumnezeiesc..."[17]. Aşa cum mărturisesc Sfinţii Părinţi, înrudirea omului cu Dumnezeu este dată de partea spirituală, raţională din om, nu de partea materială: „ căci înrudirea cu Dumnezeu este firea raţională, care se poate sesiza numai cu mintea; iar lumea materială este cu totul depărtată de El, pentru că ea cade sub simţuri" [18]. Starea lui Adam, creată după chipul lui Dumnezeu, prin raţiune şi libertate avea în sine nepătimirea, nestricăciunea, fiind pură, inocentă, fără grijă: „ nu pentru că ar fi fost incapabil de păcătui, ci pentru că nu avea în sine facultatea de a păcătui, ci mai mult libertatea voinţei era imaculat[19]. Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul spune despre mintea raţiunea lui Adam, că nu era pătrunsă de închipuire, ci chipul şi asemănarea construiau un zid în jurul ei, neîngăduindu-i să se alipească de cele lipsite de raţiune. Astfel libertatea umană îşi exercită adevărata ei stare, mintea primului om fiind în stare de trezvie, căci el nu avea un gând duplicitar, cunoaşterea era cea dată de har, căci trăia învăluit de har, tinzând în mod fiinţial spre asemănarea cu Dumnezeu în virtute. Dacă omul s-ar fi dăruit cu totul lui Dumnezeu, la rândul său şi Dumnezeu s-ar fi dăruit omului, şi ar fi avut prin har tot ce are Dumnezeu prin fiinţa Sa . Starea lui Adam în rai, era o stare de pruncie, chipul fiind legat fiinţial de asemănare, spre care tinde a o realiza prin împărtăşirea din pomul vieţii, având de la început calea deschisă spre Dumnezeu, pe care trebuie să urce, mergând din slavă în slavă, centrându-şi întreaga viaţă în contemplarea infinită a divinităţii. Aşadar calitatea de „chip al lui Dumnezeu" implica tensiunea omului spre îndumnezeire. Omul are o sete după modelul său absolut. El nu-şi poate afla împlinirea decât că asemănarea maximală cu Dumnezeu. Dar asemănarea nu trebuie înţeleasă doar ca stare finală de îndumnzeire, ci reprezintă întreg drumul de dezvoltare a chipului prin voinţa omului în conlucrare cu harul divin. 9. Căderea omului în păcat Omul s-a născut liber, având încă de la început puterea de a se supune sau nu voii lui Dumnezeu. Creatorul a rânduit fiinţelor înţelegătoare pe care le-a creat posibilitatea de a se mişca liber, pentru ca în felul acesta ele să-şi dobândească un bun cu adevărat propriu, bun pe care să-l păstreze prin voinţă proprie. Dar nelucrarea şi nepăsarea faţă de păstrarea binelui ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 20 a dus la căderea în rău pentru că răul nu este altceva decât lipsirea de bine. Aşa se întâmplă că în măsura în care cineva se îndepărtează de bine, în aceeaşi măsură se apropie de rău. În Cartea Facerii, păcatul este conceput ca neascultare de Dumnezeu (Fac. 2,16; 3,11), care se pedepseşte în chip diferit (Fac. 4, 9-16;6, 5-7; 11-13).„A dat apoi Domnul Dumnezeu poruncă lui Adam şi a zis: Din toţi pomii din rai poţi să mănânci, iar din pomul cunoştinţei binelui şi răului să nu mănânci, căci, în ziua în care vei mânca din el vei muri" (Fac. 2, 16-17). Omul primordial putea să nu moară, dar păcătuind, a primit ca răsplată moartea sufletească şi trupească: „Nu zicem că Adam a pierdut totul, că a murit şi a dispărut. El a murit faţă de Dumnezeu, dar trăieşte după firea să"[20]. Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul consideră că primul efect al păcatului este despărţirea dintre voia noastră gnomică (arbitrară) şi voia lui Dumnezeu, ispitire a diavolului, „pe care şarpele cel gândit l-a introdus, înduplecând pe om prin înşelăciune să calce porunca dumnezeiască şi să preţuiască cele vremelnice decât cele veşnice"[21]. Sfânta Scriptură prezintă ispitirea şi căderea omului în păcat ( Facere 3, 1 –24 ), mai întâi femeia gustând din pomul oprit, apoi şi bărbatul; precum şi izgonirea din Rai. Diavolul îi promite omului că va fi ca Dumnezeu, cunoscând binele şi răul ( Facere 3, 5 ). Prin păcat centrul de greutate stabilit în cele inteligibile, este mutat în cele sensibile. Gustarea din pomul oprit, trezeşte în trupul omului, simţurile şi plăcerea (Facere 3,6), prin deschiderea ochilor, ce arată goliciunea primilor oameni. Sfinţii Părinţi consideră că procesul psihologic de zămislire al păcatului este acelasi realizându-se în mai multe etape sau momente[22]. Isihie Monahul numără patru: atacul, însoţirea, consimţirea, fapta sensibilă, iar Sfântul Ioan Damaschin şapte etape: atacul, însoţirea, patimă, lupta, robia, consimţirea, făptuirea. 10. Pomul cunoştiinţei binelui şi răului Esenţa răului constă în ruperea de existenţă de comuniunea cu Dumnezeu, căci răul este o stare potrivnică virtuţii, pentru că exponenţi lui s-au îndepărtat de Dumnezeu. Forma de manifestare a răului îmbracă forma binelui, este travestită în bine, de aceea şi rodul pomului oprit, provoacă plăcere ochiului şi înduplecă pe femeie, care gustă şi simte că e bun, însă în dedesubtul acestei plăceri se ascundea durerea. Sfântul Grigore de Nyssa, vorbind despre pomul cunoştinţei binelui şi răului zice : „ pomul din care culegem o cunoaştere amestecată, face parte din numărul pomilor opriţi. În schimb, rodul lui, al cărui apărător s-a făcut şarpele, e un amestec de contradicţii, poate că din pricină că, potrivit firii sale, răul nu ni se oferă direct şi pe faţă. Căci dacă într-adevăr, răul nu lasă urme atât de nenorocite, n-ar fi fost împodobit cu eticheta bună, pentru ca să trezească pofte în cei pe care i-a înşelat. Aşa se face că, răul a fost înfăţişat în chip învăluit, dar... ascundea, pieirea omului ... el poartă la arătare chipul binelui" [23]. Interpretarea pe care o dă Sfântul Maxim, celor doi pomi din rai, pune în evidenţă faptul că răul, o dată împropriat de firea umană, coboară atenţia omului, spre cele materiale şi sensibile: „întru-cât omul a venit în existenţă, alcătuit din suflet mintal şi din trup înzestrat cu simţuri, după un prim înţeles, pomul vieţii este mintea sufletului, în care îşi are scaun înţelepciunea, iar pomul cunoştinţei binelui şi răului este simţirea trupului, în care este vădit că-şi are imboldul mişcarea iraţională..." [24]. Omul, călcând porunca Creatorului, îşi pătează sufletul său curat, lucrând cele iraţionale, fiind legat de plăcerea senzuală. 11. Urmările căderii în păcat Gravitatea şi urmările păcatului, se văd încă din prima clipă a călcării poruncii divine, care a însemnat şi ruperea comuniunii cu Dumnezeu. Prin căderea în păcat primii oameni au cunoscut cele ce ţin de partea trupească, materială: „ atunci li s-au deschis ochii la amândoi şi au cunoscut că erau goi, şi au cusut frunză de smochin şi şi-au făcut acoperăminte" (Facere 3,7). ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 21 O altă consecinţă directă a păcatului strămoşesc, o constituie schimbarea veşmântului luminos cu hainele sau tunicile de piele. Apoi a făcut Dumnezeu lui Adam şi femeii lui îmbrăcăminte de piele şi i-a îmbrăcat (Facere 3,21). Hainele de piele, în concepţia Sfiiţilor părinţi, reprezintă stricăciunea ce a îmbrăcat-o firea prin păcat, şi i-a făcut pe primii oameni să simtă goliciunea şi ruşinea nespusă ce i-a cuprins, stricăciune prin care moartea a intrat în firea cea frumos împodobită. Cea mai mare consecinţă a păcatului este moartea căci: „plata păcatului este moartea"(Rom. 6,23), pentru că prin păcat omul rupe relaţia cu izvorul vieţi-Dumnezeu , pierzând harul dătător de viaţă, şi astfel primeşte stricăciunea ce alterează strălucirea chipului. Toate aceste consecinţe constituie aspectul material al păcatului strămoşesc. Păcatul adăugat la firea umană devine pentru om o a două fire, de aceea este făcut cu multă uşurinţă, firea fiind aplecată spre păcat, spre cele ce o duc la pieire şi nonexistenţă. Aspectul formal al păcatului strămoşesc şi vina pentru păcat aşează responsabilitatea umană în faţa dreptăţii divine. Transmiterea păcatului strămoşesc: Problema transmiterii păcatului la urmaşii lui Adam, constituie una din temele foarte controversate ale dezbaterilor teologice, fapt pentru care s-au elaborat mai multe teorii, mai mult sau mai puţin satisfăcătoare ca :  teoria imputaţiunii indirecte a păcatului originar; ce se prezintă în firea umană împărtăşită de urmaşii lui Adam, ca dispoziţie spre păcat, însă acestă teorie înlătură conştiinţa şi libertatea umană.  teoria imputaţiuni externe; potrivit căreia urmaşii lui Adam sunt vinovţi prin simplul fapt că descind din el, însă este fără temei pentru că păcatul nu este numai imputat ,ci este real şi personal.  teoria naturalistă; întemeiată pe textul de la (Romani 5,12), potrivit căreia Adam omul universal concentrează în sine întreaga natură omenească, din toate timpurile, însă nici această teorie nu poate fi acceptată deoarece, păcatul ţine de persoana care ipostaziază firea, şi deci responsabilitatea pentru el revine fiecărei persoane.  teoria păcatului strămoşesc, că păcat al naturii; susţine că vina este cuprinsă în natura moştenită, însă nici aceasta nu este întemeiată pentru că din punct de vedere moral responsabilitatea ţine de conştiinţa şi libertatea personală.  teoria aligaţiuniiinventează o hotărâre a Lui Dumnezeu prin care s-ar fi stabilit o legătură morală între păcatul lui Adam şi voinţa urmaşilor săi, însă nu este întemeiată deoarece contrazice libertatea proprie fiecărei persoane umane . Transmiterea păcatului strămoşesc este legată de modul venirii în existenţă, a descendenţilor lui Adam. Căderea în păcat fiind cuprinsă în planul divin al creaţiei, a îngăduit omului, un alt mod de a împărtăşii chipul susţinător de existenţă, adică naşterea. 12. Antropologia, scurtă descriere interconfesională Biserica Romano-Catolică afirmă că păcatul originar constă în pierderea drepturilor supranaturale ale dreptăţii originare, iar urmările lui sunt: disgraţia şi pedeapsa, depărtarea omului de Dumnezeu şi moartea. Prin căderea în păcat omul a pierdut darurile supaadăugate de Creator, acest lucru face ca natura umană de după păcat să rămână intactă, însă aşa cum observă or ce minte sănătoasă opoziţia dintre material şi spiritual dovedeşte că natura umană poartă în şine alteritatea, care are drept cosecinţă logică şi ontologicămoartea. Biserica Romano-Catolică consideră că în om chipul lui Dumnezeu după căderea în păcat nu s-a alterat, omul pierzând doar graţia creată, firea sa fiind însă cea originară. ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 22 Protestantismul se află la polul opus catolicismului, după ei căderea omului în păcat este radicală şi provoacă consecinţe fatale. Chipul lui Dumnezeu în om după căderea în păcat este distrus total iar reabilitarea omului este opera preştiinţei divine. Concluzii Crearea lumii este opera iubirii lui Dumnezeu, iar ca operă a iubirii ea nu poate fi concepută decât ca un „dar", împărtăşit celui pentru care a fost creată, adică omului. De la început marea Înţelepciune a Creatorului leagă raţiunea creaţiei (modul ei de existenţă) de raţiunea umană, ceea ce face ca întreaga cosmologie să fie antropologică, iar antropologia cosmologică, realitate ce se manifestă teonomic, sau mai bine zis hristocentric, ea fiind o reflecţie a Raţiunii Logosului Fiului lui Dumnezeu Întrupat. În mod firesc omul e dator să o iubească pentru că este darul lui Dumnezeu şi să o cinstească deoarece e locul prezenţei Lui, El fiind Creatorul, Proniatorul şi Mântuitorul ei. Referinţe bibliografice: [1]. Sfântul Grigore de Nyssa, Cuvânt apologetic la Hexaimeron, trad. Pr. Prof. T. Bodogae, în P.S.B. nr. 30, edit I.B.M. Bucureşti 1998, p. 96 [2]. Sfântul Atanasie cel Mare , Despre întruparea Cuvântului, II, 2 trad. Pr. Prof. D. Stăniloae în P.S.B. 15 edit. I.B.Mal B.O.R. .Bucureşti 1987 p. 69-78 [3]. Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul, Ambigua trad. Pr. Prof. D. Stăniloae, în P.S.B. 80 edit. I.B.M. Bucureşti 1983, p. 62; 83 [4]. Ibidem, p. 84 [5]. john Mayendorf ,Teologia bizantină ,trad. Pr Prof. Dr. Alexandru I. Stan ,Edit I.B.M. Bucureşti 1996, p. 179 180 [6]. Sfântul Ioan Damaschin, Dogmatica , II, 3 , trad. Pr. D. Feciorul , edit. I.B.M al B.O.R. Bucureşti 2001, p. 52 [7]. Fericitul Augustin, Confesiones, trad. Ion Barbu, ed. a II-a, edit. I.B.M. Bucureşti 1994, p. 395 [8]. Sfântul Ioan Gură de Aur, Omilii la Facere, I; III,1 trad. Pr. D. Feciorul în P.S.B. nr. 17, edit .I.B.M. Bucureşti 1987 p. 94 [9]. Sfântul Ioan Damaschin op.cit. II,3., p. 53 [10]. Sfântul Vasile cel Mare, Omilii la Hexaimeron II, 3 trad. Pr. Prof. D. Feciorul în P.S.B. nr. 17 edit . I.B.M. al BOR. Bucureşti 1986, p.. 7-88 [11]. Bugiulescu Marin, Creaţia darul iubirii lui Dumnezeu, în revista „Biserica Ortodoxă", Anul IX, Nr.2, iulie-decembrie, Editată de Episcopia Alexandriei şi Teleormanului 2007, p.171 [12]. Pr. Prof. Dumitru Stăniloae, Teologia Dogmatică Ortodoxă, vol. I, Editura Institutului Biblic şi de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, Bucureşti, 1996, p. 257 [13]. Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul, Ambigua, trad. Pr. D. Stăniloae în P.S.B. 80, I.B.M. al BOR, Bucureşti 1983, p. 93 [14]. Sfântul Grigore de Nyssa, Despre facerea omului, XI, trad. Pr. T. Bodogae în P.S.B. 30, I.B.M Bucureşti 1980, p. 22-23 [15]. Bugiulescu Marin, Creaţia darul iubirii lui Dumnezeu, în revista „Biserica Ortodoxă", Anul IX, Nr.2, iulie-decembrie, Editată de Episcopia Alexandriei şi Teleormanului 2007, p. 176 [16]. Sfântul Ioan Gură de Aur, Omilii la Facere, VIII, 2, trad. Pr. D. Feciorul în P.S.B. 21,I.B. M., Bucureşti 1987 p. 100 [17]. Sfântul Grigore de Nyssa , Despre facerea omului,XVII, trad. Pr. T. Bodogae în P.S.B. 30, I.B.M Bucureşti 1980,. p 52 ICOANA CREDINȚEI. REVISTA INTERNATIONALA DE CERCETARE ȘTIINȚIFICA INTERDISCIPLINARA, Nr. 2. An. I. Iunie 2015 23 [18]. Sfântul Ioan Damaschin, Dogmatica , XII,, 3 , trad. Pr. D. Feciorul , edit. I.B.M al B.O.R. Bucureşti 2001p. 82 [19]. Ibidem, p. 83 [20]. Sf. Macarie Egipteanul, Omilia a XII-a,în „Scrieri (Omilii duhovniceşti)", trad. de Pr. Prof. Dr. Constantin Corniţescu. în P.S.B.,vol.34, E.I.B.M. al B.O.R.,Bucureşti, 1992, p.142 [21]. Sf. Maxim Mărturisitorul, Epistolele Sf. Maxim Mărturisitorul despre cele două firi ale lui Hristos şi despre viaţa duhovnicească, în „Scrieri", partea a doua, trad., introducere şi note de Pr. Prof. Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, în P.S.B., vol. 82, E.I.B.M., Bucureşti, 1990, p.146 [22]. Pr. D. Stăniloae, Ascetica şi mistica, I,5, I.B.M., Bucureşti 2002, p. 114 [23]. Sfântul Grigore de Nyssa, Despre Facerea omului, XX, ,trad. Pr. T. Bodogae, în P.S.B. 30, I.B.M., Bucureşti 1998, p. 58 [24]. Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul, P.G. 90, 412-413,apud D. Stniloae, Ascetica şi mistica, ed.cit., p.

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=resi20 Download by: [83.255.46.100] Date: 16 December 2017, At: 05:50 Resilience International Policies, Practices and Discourses ISSN: 2169-3293 (Print) 2169-3307 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/resi20 Is resilience a normative concept? Henrik Thorén & Lennart Olsson To cite this article: Henrik Thorén & Lennart Olsson (2017): Is resilience a normative concept?, Resilience, DOI: 10.1080/21693293.2017.1406842 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2017.1406842 Published online: 29 Nov 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 55 View related articles View Crossmark data Resilience, 2017 https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2017.1406842 Is resilience a normative concept? Henrik Thorén and Lennart Olsson lund University centre for sustainability studies, lund, sweden ABSTRACT In this paper, we engage with the question of the normative content of the resilience concept. The issues are approached in two consecutive steps. First, we proceed from a narrow construal of the resilience concept – as the ability of a system to absorb a disturbance – and show that under an analysis of normative concepts as evaluative concepts resilience comes out as descriptive. In the second part of the paper, we argue that (1) for systems of interest (primarily social systems or system with a social component) we seem to have options with respect to how they are described and (2) that this matters for what is to be taken as a sign of resilience as opposed to a sign of the lack of resilience for such systems. We discuss the implications of this for how the concept should be applied in practice and suggest that users of the resilience concept face a choice between versions of the concept that are either ontologically or normatively charged. Introduction In this paper, we shall concern ourselves with the question of whether the concept of resilience – that has now so thoroughly permeated scientific and political discourse on issues ranging from sustainability and climate adaptation to national security and international relations – is a normative concept or not. Or somewhat more broadly put, to what extent (and in what way) its use commits the user to a certain set of values. We will argue that even when assuming a descriptive version of the resilience concept, the application of the concept in practice will in most or all relevant instances involve either far-reaching ontological or normative assumptions about the nature of the underlying system. The issue becomes particularly acute with respect to social systems or systems with social components. We will argue that the way norms and values enter into how systems are construed matters for many applications, and relates closely to the observation that the application of the resilience concept sometimes appears to be curiously unstable (see e.g. Thorén, 2014). Should we understand the migration of a community following a series of severe storms as an adaptation to climate change and hence a reason to think that the community is resilient, or should we think of the dispersion of people as the collapse of the community, thereby understanding the situation as one where that community is not resilient (or not resilient enough) with respect to that particular kind of impact. The concept of resilience, on its own, © 2017 informa UK limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group KEYWORDS Resilience; normativity; concepts CONTACT Henrik Thorén [email protected] D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 2 H. THORÉN AND L. OLSSON says nothing about which way to go. The matter hinges on how the underlying system is understood, and small nuances here imply opposing interpretations of a materially identical situation. If being in a certain physical location (or returning to that location) is considered essential (or a proxy for something essential) then migration equals collapse. On an alternative construal, migration – even permanent migration – can be perceived as an adaptation and hence exemplifying the resilience of the community. For the kinds of systems to which resilience is applied and is thought to be informative about – urban areas, coastal cities, communities, countries, and so on – it is far from obvious how this construal is to be made. The role of values and the normative content of the resilience concept has indeed been subject to much discussion. For some, the descriptive nature of the concept is taken as a given (see Derissen, Quaas, & Baumgärtner, 2011), whereas others have maintained that the concept is normative or at least implicitly normative (Jerneck & Olsson, 2008; Olsson, Jerneck, Thoren, Persson, & O'Byrne, 2015). Brand and Jax (2007) in a frequently cited overview argue that there are many different resilience concepts, some normative, some descriptive, and some a form of hybrid concept that share features from both normative and descriptive versions. Original formulations, such as that found in Holling (1973) are argued to be descriptive, whereas many of the more recent – and often quite different – definitions fall under normative and hybrid categories. The issue is neither scientifically peripheral nor otherwise moot. Operationally it has been taken to be of concern as it constrains admissible analyses of conceptual connections. Derissen et al. (2011), for instance, argue that the equivalence that is sometimes assumed between resilience and sustainability does not hold, precisely because the former is a descriptive concept and the latter is normative. More generally, confusing normative versions of the concept for descriptive ones are misleading, obscuring underlying value judgments and giving them the air of scientific objectivity (c.f. Newton, 2016). Indeed, an important concern, among those who have been critical about the widespread adoption of the resilience concept in science and policy-making, is that it serves specific ideological ends. This concern relates especially to the way the concept of resilience, and the resilience framework, fit with neoliberal discourse and governance (Chandler, 2012; Jerneck & Olsson, 2008; Joseph, 2013; Olsson et al., 2015; Walker & Cooper, 2011; Zebrowski, 2013). The charge gains force from the implicit nature of these assumptions and the way in which resilience discourse is often presented as disengaged and neutral, thereby suggesting little room for intellectual and practical alternatives. Proponents of the concept – to the extent to which they have at all commented on the matter – have maintained that the concept is descriptive, although their target, for the most part, seems to be evaluative rather than ideological uses of it.1 A recurrent point is that resilience is not in itself valuable; whether it is good for something to be resilient depends on what that is (see e.g. Carpenter, Walker, Anderies, & Abel, 2001). In this way resilience theorists perceive themselves as being engaged merely in reporting on the facts, leaving the value issues to others. We will argue in support of two theses. The first is that the common, and arguably most relevant, construal of the concept of resilience is that it is a descriptive notion, at least on a standard understanding of the normative/descriptive distinction. This is not a particularly controversial idea. The second thesis – which is the main focus of this paper – is that values do play an important role in applying the concept in many concrete situations. More specifically, we D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 RESILIENCE 3 argue that (1) what comes out as signalling the resilience of a given system is extremely sensitive to how persistence is understood for that system and (2) for systems that invite contradictory understandings of persistence. What counts as resilience on one construal, comes out as the lack of resilience on the other. We argue that using the resilience concept, in particular for social phenomena, typically demands high sensitivity with respect to how persistence is understood for that particular system, as compared to when discussing natural systems. The reasons for this, we propose, have to do with both the ontology of the systems themselves, and the combination of heterogeneous values surrounding what is important and central about the system in question and/or a lack of conventions surrounding how the underlying system is to be described. Another way to put the point is as follows. Application of an abstract concept like resilience relies on the implicit or explicit presence of a normative or ontological framework that answers questions about what is important or central about the systems to which the concept is applied. Our approach differs from some other analyses of the notion of resilience, in particular those engaged with the broader discourse, such as Joseph (2013), Chandler (2012) or Zebrowski (2013), that seek to relate the resilience concept to broader intellectual and political discourse and historical trends, in order to explain the proliferation of the concept in terms of that fit. We seek to locate where values come into play even under the most 'favourable' conditions. The paper is structured as follows. We will begin by discussing the concept of resilience and give a basic definition from which we will then take our departure in the remainder of the paper. We then move to present an analysis of normative concepts in terms of evaluative concepts and apply this analysis to the concept of resilience arguing that resilience – on this analysis – is a descriptive concept. That is the first part of the paper. The second part of the paper involves first showing that the concept of resilience, even in its descriptive form, is highly sensitive to how the underlying system is construed, and then arguing that for social systems and systems with social components this underlying construal involves an input of values. The many concepts of resilience Several studies that have now appeared have compiled different definitions of resilience in the literature (Brand & Jax, 2007; Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003; Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016; Newton, 2016; see also Strunz, 2012; Thorén, 2014). It is patently clear that there exist not just one but many concepts of resilience. Moreover, it is noteworthy that some current definitions are highly complex making them difficult to subject to proper analysis on their own terms. Folke et al. (2002), for instance, define resilience as 'related to (i) the magnitude of shock that the system can absorb and remain within a given state; (ii) the degree to which the system is capable of self-organisation and (iii) the degree to which the system can build capacity for learning and adaptation' (Folke et al., 2002, p. 438). The definition mixes features that apply to states of systems, with those that apply to systems as a whole, and contain several further notions that are left largely without further development, concepts such as self-organisation, learning and adaptation. Moreover, opinions differ not only on how to approach this plethora of different versions of the concept, but also regarding how it is to be assessed. Klein et al. (2003) conclude in an D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 4 H. THORÉN AND L. OLSSON often cited passage that '[a]fter thirty years of academic analysis and debate, the definition of resilience has become so broad as to render it almost meaningless' (Klein et al., 2003, p. 42). Others, like for instance Strunz (2012), have highlighted the merits of vague concepts. Yet others have suggested that the substance of the concept is beside the point (Joseph, 2013). Those who have adopted the concept, especially perhaps in the discourse located at the intersection of science and policy, care less about the theoretical underpinnings provided that the concept serves certain ends. Our strategy is to target a narrower version of the concept that is (i) true to its origins, (ii) compatible with many later versions of the concept (see Thorén, 2014) and (iii) defensible from the perspective of many of the proponents of the concept. Idealising the concept and its use in this way limits, to some extent, the scope of the conclusions but it also makes it possible to engage with the notion in more detail. The conclusions, we believe, also have bearing on many similar versions of the resilience concept, as well as those that depend on notions like adaptation and persistence. We are going to understand resilience as the ability of a system to absorb a disturbance whilst retaining, through that disturbance, some property or set of properties. For convenience and clarity we will use this definitional schema, borrowed from Thorén (2014, p. 311), which is reproduced here below.2 Definition: Resilience is the ability of a system S to absorb some disturbance D whilst maintaining property I. What it means is the following: a system S is resilient if, and only if, when subjected to some disturbance D, I is maintained through the disturbance. Stability, against which resilience is usually contrasted, as Holling initially construes it (1973), pertains to the return to some reference state after some disturbance and does not involve keeping a given set of variables or a given property fixed through the disturbance. Later Holling was to change his mind and to opt instead for a different terminology, using the terms 'engineering resilience' and 'ecological resilience' (Holling, 1996). The underlying concepts remained the same however.3 The I in the schema may represent the value of a parameter, but also a certain function or structure of a system. It need not be something that should, or even can, be quantified, but may pertain to purely qualitative features. On a broad interpretation the I stands for the identity of the system; if I is maintained the system is the same. However, for the most part, identity in itself is not particularly informative. Further construal is necessary, and in certain situations, operationalisation.4 To specify the I for a given system is to give persistence criteria for that system. A concept of resilience can operate with explicit or implicit persistence criteria.5 It is rare that persistence criteria are given unambiguously, even when they are explicit. Folke et al's definition above, for instance, seems to suggest that it is a matter of staying within a given state, an idea that in many cases will be much too narrow. Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, and Rockström (2005) consider resilience of linked social-ecological systems to be the capacity to 'absorb recurrent disturbances such as hurricanes or floods so as to retain essential structures, processes, and feedbacks' (p. 1036). Here, retaining essential structures, processes and feedbacks are the persistence criteria. If no persistence criteria are given at all, the identity of the underlying system is simply assumed or stipulated at the outset. It is not uncommon to make a leap directly from more abstract and sometimes vague characterisations to measurable proxies (resilience has turned out to be notoriously difficult to operationalise, see Newton, D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 RESILIENCE 5 2016). When analysing the resilience of New Orleans in the context of hurricane Katrina, Burton (2015), for instance, extracts from a wish list of 130 variables potentially linked to resilience, 98 that are actually collected. By analysing the large correlation matrix we can get an idea of what kind of identity (I) the system at hand (New Orleans) would be. A resilient New Orleans should (among many other characteristics) be composed of young, healthy, fit, English speaking, not racially segregated, well-educated people owning their own (not mobile) house and a car. Moving to the D in the schema, it is sometimes useful to think of disturbances, the D in the schema, as having (for lack of a better set of terms) a system-side and a world-side component (not to be confused with the distinction between endogenous and exogenous disturbances). For example, for real systems, it is usually obvious that a given disturbance exists independently of the system which is disturbed and has its own ontology. The hurricane that hits a coastal area, or the drought spell that befalls an agricultural community, can be described on their own terms. But if D is a disturbance of S then it follows from the very meaning of the notion of disturbance that D, in one way or the other, actually impinges on S in some respect. Otherwise, another why talk of a disturbance at all? An office chair is not psychologically resilient to being chastised on social media – even if one gives the chair a facebook account – since they are not affected by that sort of thing in the first place. Hence, if D is a disturbance of S then D has some effect on S. Whether one finds it natural to focus on the system-side or the world-side component of a given disturbance depends on the context.6 For now, two comments are in order. First, it is possible to think of this system-side component as an adaptation to the disturbance, at least on a minimal understanding of that notion. Notably, resilience theorists often highlight precisely this aspect of the concept; resilient systems are flexible, indeed their flexibility is often constitutive of their resilience (see e.g. Folke et al., 2010). In general terms, being flexible in one respect (e.g. for some set of parameters) is what allows a system to keep something else fixed. Consider a variation of a common analogy. Suppose we compare two very rudimentary 'systems'; an egg and a tennis ball. Assume further that for both systems, the I in question is the structural property of having an unbroken outer shell, and the D is some form of unevenly distributed pressure on the outer shell, such as will arise when one squeezes the egg or the tennis ball with two fingers. The tennis ball will be more resilient than the egg in the sense that it will retain its structural integrity under greater pressures.7 The reason is that it has a flexible outer shell. The egg, on the other hand, has a rigid and brittle outer shell. In a sense the tennis ball adapts to the disturbance. Second, if we think of resilience as keeping something fixed through a disturbance, there has to be some separation between that which accounts for the continuity of the system, and that which is disturbed. This is a conceptual prerequisite; it is otherwise not possible to talk about resilience for the system in the given sense.8 For instance, we might be interested in the resilience of a function – i.e. the I is understood as maintaining this function – under structural disturbances or changes. An economy might be deemed resilient if it maintains economic output through shifts from relying on one sector to relying on another. What it means to disturb a system is thus closely related to, or dependent on, what persistence of that system is taken to be. We will return to this in more detail below. Without getting too far ahead of ourselves the point is that there is some room for interpreting and deploying the supporting concepts on which the resilience concept relies in different ways. Broadly speaking, it is hard to give general prescriptions regarding how D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 6 H. THORÉN AND L. OLSSON specific one should be, for instance with respect to formulating persistence criteria. It depends, among other things, on the needs, intentions and interests of those deploying the term; if one is seeking to explain an event, predict the behaviour of some system, compare features of two systems, devise interventions, or merely produce interesting hypotheses, all require different degrees of precision and hence involve different ontological and epistemological commitments. Descriptive and normative concepts Now, we move to a brief discussion of the distinction between normative and descriptive concepts. It is interesting to note that few of those who have commented on the normative or descriptive status of the resilience concept have explained more precisely what they mean by this assertion. Brand and Jax (2007), for example, expand on the substance of this, to them central, distinction, only by noting that '[t]his [the ambiguous uses of the resilience concept] is due to the blending of descriptive aspects, i.e. specifications of what is the case, and normative aspects, i.e. prescriptions [of ] what ought to be the case or is desirable as such' (Brand & Jax, 2007). In this paper, we shall begin by giving a somewhat fuller overview of this distinction. One way of analysing normative concepts is as evaluative concepts. Such concepts are commonly taken to function in the following way: they provide reason for action whilst their correct application does not depend on the world being in any particular state, i.e. evaluative concepts are action guiding but not world-guided (see Williams, 2006). In this category, we find familiar notions such as GOOD and WRONG. What is good or wrong depends on the values of a particular person or group, not on a certain state-of-affairs. To some jogging and early mornings are good, to others this is not so. So whether it is suitable to talk of the good or the wrong just depends on how one feels about these things, not whether they are present or not. Descriptive concepts, on the other hand, function in the opposite way; they provide no reason for action, but their correct application very much depends on how the world is. Again, in the words of Bernard Williams, they are world-guided but not action-guiding. In this category, we find a vast array of concepts such as SMALL and MORNING and ELECTRON. This is the basic distinction. Beyond these two categories there appears to be a further class of concepts that blends the distinctive features of both descriptive and evaluative concepts; i.e. these concepts provide both reasons for action and tell us something about how the world is. Williams calls these concepts thick evaluative concepts, to be contrasted against thin evaluative concepts (i.e. concepts that are purely evaluative). Paradigmatic examples of thick evaluative concepts are COURAGE, CRUELTY or KINDNESS (Williams, 2006, 140–142). In the following, we assume it is possible (contra e.g. Wittgenstein) to distinguish between using a concept as if it were normative, and using a normative concept. The motivation here is mainly methodological – we are not trying to engage immediately in more fundamental theories about the nature of concepts. We are assuming that confusion with respect to the normative content of the resilience concept is not a trivial matter of confusing two identical labels with one another. It is beyond doubt that the resilience concept is indeed sometimes used as if it were a normative concept.9 D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 RESILIENCE 7 In other words, we are going perceive of this concept on its own terms, and for the purpose of the present argument departs from the assumption that definitions and characterisations do matter. This much should be obvious from the extraordinary amount of literature that turns on precisely this and the common complaint that conceptual imprecision is indeed a problem (Klein et al., 2003; Newton, 2016). In this respect, we differ from e.g. Joseph (2013) in his suggestion that any philosophical approach to the concept lends unwarranted legitimacy to underlying ideological assumptions. Resilience as an evaluative concept Is resilience in the sense we have introduced it above normative? On the above analysis of normativity that would mean that it is either a thin or a thick evaluative concept. That it would be a thin evaluative concept is immediately false. Then the concept would have no descriptive content at all. There is, of course, nothing to stop anyone from using the concept as a thin descriptive concept in the same way as there is nothing that stops people from calling war 'peace' or tables 'chairs'. Here, however, we shall disregard those kinds of breaches of basic linguistic conduct. Moving on, the idea of resilience as a thick evaluative concept then seems at least prima facie more enticing and promising. It is nonetheless problematic, for quite obvious reasons. For one, and at least for our narrow conception, whether resilience is good or bad depends on what it is that is resilient. Resilient oppression –> BAD. Resilient democracy –> GOOD. Compared with paradigmatic examples, like courage, the difference becomes clear. To be courageous can never in itself be bad, even if the outcome of some particular person's disposition to be courageous may have detrimental consequences for that person (or others). So, resilience, reasonably, should be considered to be a descriptive concept on this account. For the sake of argument, however, let us examine the resilience concepts that Brand and Jax (2007) file under the normative category in their overview of different resilience concepts. In this more general category, we find two further subcategories: metaphorical definitions and sustainability-related definitions. They offer one example of each of these. These are resilience as flexibility over the long run, and resilience as maintenance of natural capital in the long run, respectively. Let us focus on these. Are such understandings of resilience normative? Well, taken at face value it would seem not. Whether flexibility over the long term is good depends, of course, on what it is that is flexible. As for maintenance of natural capital in the long term, it is probably desirable from a range of perspectives, but there are exceptions. For someone that is expecting the end of the world, then maintenance of natural capital in the long run may be considered wasteful. For cornucopian economists, like Julian Simon (see e.g. Simon, 1996) or Robert Solow (see e.g. Solow, 1993), there are other reasons not to save natural capital (since it can be converted elastically into man-made capital). So, why then, would Brand and Jax think these concepts are normative? Presumably since they are used as if they were evaluative or denoting properties 'viewed as desirable as such' (Brand & Jax, 2007). Here, we can note that flexibility in the long run is a property that happens to be beneficial, with respect to the particular type of system in question, in a wide range of contexts.10 As for the second definition, something similar could be said. Brand and Jax suggest that those who deploy resilience in that way consider that keeping the D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 8 H. THORÉN AND L. OLSSON life-support system of the planet going is a universal good. But this too, as the above examples indicate, is false. To conclude this section, at least for the narrow conception of resilience, it seems fairly straightforward to make the case that it is indeed a descriptive concept, at least in the sense proposed by Bernard Williams. Resilience, on the understanding we have proposed, appears to indicate a property of a system not an evaluative claim about that system. Whether the resilience of S is desirable or not, depends simply on what S is. So are we now just begging the question? We have effectively excluded – by means of stipulation no less – precisely the kinds of concepts that may well be normative. The answer to the question posed in the title of this paper thus comes out in the negative, but it does so for seemingly trivial reasons. Instead of settling here, we are going to take this as a point of departure. In what follows, we shall make the following assumption: the apparent disagreement on the normative status of the resilience concept cannot be resolved by reference to different resilience concepts, some normative and some descriptive. We will then argue that it is in its application to particular kinds of systems that values come into play in ways that may matter. Resilience and persistence Before we circle back to issues of normativity, let us return to the issue of persistence. We have already argued that it is conceptually necessary for the kind of resilience concept we have taken an interest in here. This is hardly news. Persistence has been an important concept in understanding resilience since the beginning; Holling himself even suggested that resilience can be understood as the probability of persistence (Holling, 1973).11 Here is one way to make sense of this relationship. Let us return to the definitional schema above and give some attention to the I in that formula. If I is maintained over a period of time – or if it is a variable that remains constant within some interval – then the system can be considered persistent through that period of time. If there is a disturbance of the system within that time interval and this disturbance does not, or does not sufficiently, affect I, then the system is resilient. However, as argued above, since the system is disturbed something about the system must have changed or been affected somehow. Now, it is notable that persistence, in this sense, is important in analyses that rely on a resilience concept in line with the one we have here adopted. The point is this: unless we have reason to think that whatever it is that we are looking at is indeed the same thing, then the notion of resilience is rendered more or less useless since we cannot adequately differentiate between the system adapting and the system collapsing. Consider two brief examples. The first one is from psychology where the concept of resilience has been important for at least as long as it has been in ecology (Thorén, 2014). It occurs in similar senses and similar conceptual concerns have arisen. When psychologists use the term 'resilience', they sometimes refer to resilience as the ability to maintain normal function during a traumatic event such as the loss of a close friend or relative.12 In this case, normal function serves as the I and the traumatic event as the D in the formula. Now, astonishingly, it has been argued that common, although disruptive responses to such traumatic events, like depression, are not in fact the system collapsing, but are rather to be viewed as adaptations. That is to say, they may well be a sign of the resilience of the individual (its 'price'), rather than the lack of D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 RESILIENCE 9 resilience (Rutter, 1993). Rutter finds this idea objectionable and misleading, but nonetheless, it goes to show that it has not always been apparent how to understand these situations. So one way of construing this apparent disagreement is as a disagreement over what constitutes the I in the formula for the given system. The second example is a little closer to home for sustainability scientists but perfectly analogous with the one just presented. One topic that has been of some interest in the discussions on the resilience of coastal communities is the role of migration as a response to, say, severe floods (Adger, 2000). Now, suppose a given coastal community is hit by a flood resulting in the displacement of that community. Is it resilient or not? That depends on what we consider the continued existence of that community to be constituted by. If persistence is conditioned on the community staying in a certain location, then by all means, the community has collapsed. But if we abandon this particular persistence criterion and opt for something else – say the continued interaction of the individuals within the community, or their well-being – we might think of this case of migration as an adaptation, and thus an indicator of the resilience of the community. Adger attempts to get out of this by differentiating between types of migration; in short, seasonal or circular migration is treated as a sign of resilience, whereas 'population displacement is often an indicator of the breakdown of social resilience' (Adger, 2000, p. 357). Others, however, have argued that even displacement on a massive scale, like the exodus following the Dust Bowl was in fact an adaptation to a changing climate (McLeman & Smit, 2006). We do not mean to suggest that either perspective here is entirely unreasonable generally speaking, but merely mean to highlight that depending on what we consider to be essential to the system, the I in our formula, one and the same thing may come out as either a sign of the presence of resilience or a sign of the absence of resilience. That is to say, the concept of resilience as such is no arbiter here. Along these lines, we can construct examples that appear increasingly, and more obviously, absurd. Is the recent Syrian diaspora an adaptation to a prolonged and brutal civil war or the collapse of civil society? Is desertification an adaptation to a drier and warmer climate or systemic collapse? Two points are due at this juncture. The first is that applying the resilience concept to a system relies on an idea of what persistence in the system is. This sensitivity to how the system is described can be dramatic, as the above examples show. One and the same situation can, depending on how we perceive of the system, be taken to indicate the presence of resilience in the system or the absence of the same. Second, there appear to be relevant cases – for example when we apply the resilience concept to communities, cities, countries and so on – where there are alternative ways of describing a system. Ontology and axiology in the application of the resilience concept First some terminology. A system description is here understood as e.g. establishing or determining system boundaries, driving parameters, etc. One important function that formulating a system description serves is precisely giving (or implying) the persistence criteria for a specific system. An admissible system description here is a description that is valid or true or accurate or helpful, etc.13 Now, to recap. The argument so far is that (1) determining what persistence means for a particular system (providing a system description) has considerable impact on how resilience is to be understood for that system and (2) often we appear to have alternatives that yield D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 10 H. THORÉN AND L. OLSSON understandings of resilience that differ in significant ways. That is, depending on what is deemed to be central to a particular system, different system descriptions (ways of fixing I in the schema) become applicable. The upshot of this argument is that any application of resilience also implies some construal or assumption of what actually constitutes system persistence, or at least an idea that the system is in fact the same. That construal may be muddled, implicit or badly grounded to be sure, but nonetheless is present. The examples we have provided thus far suggest that judgements regarding the identity of a particular system are at least sometimes informed by the interests of the observer (rather than the nature of the system). In the remainder of this section, we shall focus on (2). The reason is that much turns on the idea that there are several admissible descriptions for a given system. If indeed for any system, or at least any system of interest, there is only one admissible description then the whole issue of different perspectives is invalid. Suppose we call this view – i.e. that there is only one admissible description for a given system14 – 'systems monism'. We may then call the view that denies this simple tenet 'systems pluralism'. The foundations of either view are rooted in deeper philosophical concerns and depend on a range of issues, including how admissibility is construed, what a system is, how systems are individuated, how science at large connects to the world it purports to explain, and so on. Here, we simply note that systems monism has substantive epistemological and ontological implications and it is a thesis that is far from obvious. Conceived of as a general proposition; i.e. that all systems are such that they have only one admissible description, it seems far-fetched; the examples provided above suggest as much.15 As a more limited proposition, however, perhaps constrained to apply only to, say, complex adaptive systems for instance, it arguably gains in plausibility. Other problems then arise, however. One is that one is committed to the idea that e.g. social systems are complex adaptive systems and that complex adaptive system make out a genuine (natural) category. This is something that many resilience theorists may well be willing to do (Gunderson & Holling, 2002, Walker & Salt, 2012), but again, if we use the examples above, the mere presence of alternatives appears to indicate that claim is false for at least some of the systems resilience that theorists are interested in.16 At any rate, there is an ontological dimension to take into account. It is at least conceivable that there are systems that conform to the systems monist's expectations. Here, it serves to note that it is not necessary for the observer to know precisely what constitutes persistence in S, it is sufficient to know (or anyway, suspect) that S has persisted. This in itself, however, involves ontological assumptions that will in practice often go beyond what the situation affords. That is, there are plenty of situations where the resilience concept at least prima facie seems serviceable where such ontological commitments are inappropriate. For the monist, then, the resilience concept is descriptive in a deep sense, but the price for this descriptiveness is steep. The pluralist faces a different challenge. Here, the appropriate application of the resilience concept depends on the perspective one takes on the system under scrutiny. This perspective is unavoidably connected to the interests and values from which that perspective departs. One way of construing a system casts the system as resilient and adaptive, another as lacking resilience and fragile. The pluralist is less constrained by some particular ontological framework, or substantive assumptions about the underlying system, but rather relies on a normative or axiological framework that guides the picking of one perspective over another.17 Or, she commits to a substantive and consequential epistemological modesty. There can D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 RESILIENCE 11 always be a different perspectives that re-arranges the pieces of the board. The resilience concept here is only really descriptive if one disregards this underlying framework.18 For the pluralist approach to social systems, it can never be solely about reporting on the facts but also always about highlighting what it is that is important in a broader sense: What kind of society do we want? What is a good or decent life? Herein lies a kind of dilemma; confronting – embracing even – the value ladenness of the resilience concept, or accepting its ontological implications and the potential problems that come with those implications (see e.g. Olsson et al., 2015). Now, assuming a pluralist view of social systems it is notable that what makes this potentially difficult is not merely that several different admissible descriptions are available. There are often many ways of describing a system, even when they are strikingly simple. Notably, putting the resilience concept to use, even within ecology, rests on a range of idealisations and specifications, all of which are far from obvious. To realise this is so one only has to return to Holling's original text and examine the models he relies on (two species predator-prey models), the choice of empirical examples (well-bounded lake ecosystems), and the representations he picks and operationalises the concept over. Even in that case, where the underlying ontology presumably is comparatively clear, the concept only really becomes applicable once all those components have been deployed. Where the world fails to reassert itself, convention can do the job. For social systems, in particular, the lack of stable and broadly acceptable conventions is much more acute and the prospects of ever arriving at such conventions slimmer. The reason is simple, of course: it is not a question for science to sort out what, ultimately, is central or important about social systems. The danger, to our minds, rests in approaching resilience from the monist perspective even when the pluralist proviso would have been more appropriate. Such an error involves both the introduction of unwarranted ontological claims, and the failure to recognise the values that go into construing the underlying systems. A particularly clear example of this can be found in the recent Arctic Resilience Report (Arctic Council, 2016). The Arctic region is one where the effects of climate change will be particularly severe. In many places these effects are already felt. The report contains, among other things, a wealth of case studies of resilient behaviours on the part of various inhabitants of the region. For example, how the Skolt Sámi communities of Näätämö River between Finland and Norway have adapted to pressures from climate change, mining and tourism, or how the 'ability and willingness to move' among the inhabitants of Kiruna, Sweden, as a consequence of the mining operation upon which the town once was built 'demonstrates resilience, despite the economic, technical and social difficulties' (Arctic Council, 2016, p. 103) and so on. It is interesting to note that the report has been subject to popular debate that appears to turn on precisely the kinds of conceptual issues that we have here raised; critics have suggested that the characterisation of the observed responses as adaptations and signs of the resilience of local communities and groups might equally well be viewed as the collapse and subordination of these communities (Reid & Skoglund, 2017). As noted in the introduction, resilience is sometimes criticised as giving scientific legitimacy to neoliberalism. If the nature of the disturbance changes, resilience may also change its normative character. If a social-ecological system, such as the aforementioned Sàmi community, has in the past been highly resilient by adapting to natural disturbances this is usually seen as positive and politically neutral. If the nature of disturbances changes, from natural (e.g. storms, floods, droughts etc.) to social (e.g. mining, wind power, logging, etc), being D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 12 H. THORÉN AND L. OLSSON resilient could become highly political. The second part of the definition of resilience in the Arctic Resilience Report contains 'when necessary transform'. This could be taken as a political message – don't fight for your rights to reindeer rangelands. This ('when necessary, transform') is of course very closely related to the identity (I) of the system, If being Sami is primarily about the pastoral livelihood, then the resilience is low since access to reindeer rangelands has been reduced due to external social and economic interests. If the identity is primarily about speaking the language, the Sami are a resilient ethnic group because the Sami language(s) have been formally recognised by governments, an increasing number of people speak the language, there are an increasing number of courses, etc. So being resilient or not becomes primarily a matter of the willingness to accept a change of identity – which of course is a hugely controversial issue. The underlying values that guide how we think of systems make analyses in terms of resilience vary across the entire spectrum of possibilities, at least if one is willing to go beyond extinction events. To permit ourselves a topical example, let us consider for instance the US election campaign of 2016. The contrast in how the country was presented by the antagonists of that election could not have been sharper. Donald Trump's campaign portrayed the US as under siege, teetering on the verge of collapse, whereas Hillary Clinton offered a picture of a country motoring along under steady (although perhaps too slow) progress. Similarly contrasting narratives were offered by Leave and Remain sides in the Brexit vote. Now, although some of the disagreements that occurred in these elections were about facts, others clearly had to do with differing perceptions of what is central to one's particular nation that bottoms out in a given set of values. On some descriptions collapse seems imminent, on others, persistence reigns. Two final remarks before we close this section. First, one way of understanding the points made above is in terms of the risks – epistemic and otherwise – involved in using the concept of resilience without paying attention to how persistence and adaptation are construed within the system. There are two immediately apparent such risks. One renders the concept, to speak metaphorically, too 'roomy' in specific applications. If the system description is not sufficiently precise there may be ways of construing resilience that will seem ambiguous or even contradictory. The other risk has to do with, perhaps inadvertently (or at least implicitly), committing to a very specific and narrow understanding of persistence. The problem here is that a notion of resilience that relies on a specific, but tacit, understanding of what is important or central in a given system, makes that version of the concept carry very specific implications. In some contexts this can be highly inappropriate. Second, to return to one of our initial questions. How come there is disagreement about the normativity of the resilience concept in the first place? This analysis suggests that one way of disambiguating the apparent disagreement between those who think of the concept of resilience as descriptive and those who suggest it is a normative concept has to do with what one includes in the construal of the concept. For some, the construal of the underlying system is part of the conceptualisation, whereas others do not take that construal into consideration. In the latter case, the concept of resilience appears to be wholly descriptive and scientifically unproblematic. Concluding remarks In summary, if the gist of the above argumentation is accepted, and we return to the issue of whether the concept of resilience is normative or not, the conclusion to be drawn from D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 RESILIENCE 13 this must be that given that the system is fixed (I is determined for a given system S) then resilience is a descriptive concept in the sense that whether or not to apply the term is determined by the nature of the world. For example, if we stipulate that having a sufficient number of members in physical proximity to a certain location is what it means for a particular community to exist, then we can in no uncertain terms discuss that community's resilience to various types of disturbances. Migration is collapse. If the description is fixed, then the appropriate use of the term resilience depends on how that community reacts (with respect to their spatial distribution) to impacts. However, this does not 'save' the concept from value ladenness. The use of the concept hinges on some construal of the underlying system. This construal, in turn, relies on normative and/or ontological assumptions about that system. This is particularly clear with respect to social systems. Another way to phrase this is that the application of the concept to a concrete situation relies on some normative or ontological framework. We have suggested that the resilience theorist is faced with a kind of dilemma; to commit either to far-reaching ontological claims, or to some set of values and norms with respect to the systems under scrutiny. Whether this is ultimately a problem or not depends on both the nature of the systems themselves – the ontological homogeneity of the categories upon which resilience theorists often rely, categories like complex adaptive system – and on the values and interest that go into highlighting some features of our social world at the expense of others. The danger is quite clear and has been highlighted before. The assumption that resilience is a kind of natural property of systems gives the concept a sheen of scientific objectivity that is in certain contexts unwarranted or even outright dangerous, if one takes the policy that may follow into account. A few final remarks. First, we do not mean to suggest that all-out relativism reigns. All system descriptions are not equal, some are more reasonable than others and there are clearly situations where there are no meaningful ontological disputes. We merely want to point to the fact that, even under favourable conditions, there are options that make a great deal of difference as regards how resilience is subsequently to be understood. If one is willing to accept the basic terminology of resilience at the outset, then one will have to settle with a much messier, overlapping and value-charged account of social systems. Second, neither do we suggest that resilience necessarily needs to be scrapped as a concept. In the above given understanding it is under certain conditions a perfectly serviceable notion that can be elucidating, presumably even for social phenomena. What we propose, rather, is an awareness of the values that are often a necessary part of applying the concept to particular cases and a certain degree of epistemological modesty. Here, our pluralist intuitions lead us to think that the many possible ways of thinking of social systems is not going to go away; it is not merely an artefact of our lack of understanding. The resilience theorist, it seems to us, will either have to accept a much thinner concept of resilience, or to embrace fully the ontological and normative implications that inevitably come with more substantive versions. What we mean is that strong ontological commitments are not problematic if they turn out to be correct. Here, a strong, ontologically charged, concept of resilience has deep epistemological implications. For instance, inferences can be made across types of systems (natural to social), and certain types of models and modelling approaches becomes suitable. Weaker notions of resilience founded on a pluralist vision of the underlying systems are more applicable but less productive. D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 14 H. THORÉN AND L. OLSSON Notes 1. Lance Gunderson pointed out, in a recent lecture at Lund University, that the concept is descriptive and took that to imply that it is not a good thing in itself. Otherwise this stance is to a considerable extent implicit in the approach, rather than explicitly defended. The idea seems to be that if resilience is descriptive then resilience theorists are merely engaged in the objective reporting on the facts. So normative conclusions from that process say, to build more resilience, are not believed to be tinted by any particular perspective. 2. The underlying intuition here appears to be rather widely shared, c.f. Carpenter et al. (2001). 3. The basic conceptual distinction is common, although the terms used differ. Schrader-Frechette and McCoy, for instance, prefer the terms 'dynamic balance' and 'persistence' (Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, 1993), Orians (1975) uses the term 'inertia' as a label for what Holling calls 'resilience' and Grimm and Wissel (1997) opts for 'domain of attraction.' This is mostly a matter of terminological preference and the underlying concepts are more or less the same. More important here is the theoretical shift in ecology (and also economics) – spearheaded by ecologists like Holling – from an emphasis on stability and the dynamics of ecosystems close to equilibrium to a focus on dynamics far from equilibrium. An excellent overview of this shift can be found in Zebrowski (2013). 4. This has proved to be difficult with the resilience concept. Stability can easily be operationalised as the speed of return to the reference state, or the distance (with respect to some variable) between the state that is returned to and the reference state (see e.g. Newton, 2016). 5. Resilience theorists do explicitly talk of identities; Walker and Salt write that resilience is 'the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize so as to retain essentially the same function, structure, and feedbacks – to have the same identity' (Walker & Salt, 2012, p. 3). 6. If one is mainly concerned with highly idealised models where disturbances are stipulated to work on only very few variables, all disturbances are, for trivial reasons, qualitatively similar from within the system. For a real system, like a coastal community, however, there is often reason to differentiate between different kinds of disturbances. 7. Note that under alternative descriptions of the system, the tennis ball can be considered stable; for example, if I is not thought of as structural integrity, but its shape. Moreover, what makes the tennis ball resilient under one assignment of I is what makes it stable under another. 8. Notably we do not mean to suggest here that resilience can only be deployed meaningfully to systems that are fundamentally static. Indeed, in most of the literature on resilience the emphasis is on flexibility and change (see e.g. Folke et al., 2010). On a purely conceptual level, it makes no sense to talk of resilience if there is no continuity at all (c.f. Cumming & Collier, 2005). What constitutes continuity for a given system, and how that is best determined given some set of (e.g. epistemological) constraints, is a different question. 9. Again, a good overview can be found in Brand and Jax (2007). 10. We are here taking a stance on these concepts that may appear to be strict to the point of misrepresenting them. The concept of resilience is commonly part of a larger system of ideas and within that larger system of ideas, flexibility in the long run in a very natural or obvious way comes out as something good or desirable. It is by being flexible that complex adaptive systems survive, so from the perspective of the systems themselves (or from within them), being flexible (or having adaptive capacity etc.) is a good thing. This is certainly the case and, without getting too far ahead of ourselves, this is a central part of the point of this paper. The commitment to this particular ontology is not always how the applicability of the concept of resilience is judged, and sometimes this commitment is explicitly downplayed. This is a source of confusion. 11. See also Folke et al. (2010). 12. Garmezy considers resilience to be 'Functional adequacy ... (the maintenance of competent functioning despite interfering emotionality) ... as the benchmark of resilient behaviour under stress' (as quoted in (Olsson, Bond, Burns, Vella-Brodrick, & Sawyer, 2003, p. 3). See also (Rutter, 1993) for a discussion of different definitions of the resilience concept in psychology. D ow nl oa de d by [ 83 .2 55 .4 6. 10 0] a t 0 5: 50 1 6 D ec em be r 20 17 RESILIENCE 15 13. Developing this concept is beyond the scope of this particular paper and what comes out as admissible or not to some extent depends on what fundamental philosophy of science one is inclined to subscribe to. The social constructivist and the naive realist may have rather different intuitions regarding how most systems are. That does not, however, change the fundamental tenets of this paper but merely offers a different way of discussing the matters so that the reader can feel free at this point to attach his or her favourite epistemology. 14. Another possibility here is that there are several admissible descriptions but they are all equivalent with respect to how resilience is construed. For simplicity, we file that category under systems monism. 15. System individuation matters here, although we shall not pursue that particular issue further. In brief, it is perhaps possible to argue that it is not a matter of several descriptions of one system, but rather several descriptions of several systems that just happen to overlap in certain respects. 16. The idea here would be that social-ecological systems are complex adaptive systems, and complex adaptive systems are a natural kind (for an introduction see Bird & Tobin, 2017): a set of entities that share some essential properties. In other words, expanding the resilience framework to apply not only to ecosystems but also to social systems and social-ecological systems involves making a substantive claim about the nature of these systems, and the features they share. Whether or not resilience theorists indeed are of this view is a little uncertain; but it is in no way an implausible reading. Although resilience theorists sometimes emphasise the provisional nature of their framework – it is merely to be viewed as a heuristic device, or a metaphor (see e.g. Carpenter et al., 2001, p. 766; Holling & Gunderson, 2002, p. 49) – the claim that social or social-ecological system just are complex adaptive systems, or self-organising systems, is virtually endemic (see e.g. Walker & Salt, 2012). 17. There is a general epistemological argument to made for pluralism. Representations, such as scientific theories, concepts, and models, are inherently partial (see Kellert, Longino, & Waters, 2006). 18. With pluralism follows epistemological modesty; the good pluralist acknowledges the limits under which he or she operates. It is notable that pluralism with respect to the models deployed by resilience theorists has been advocated before, see e.g. Cumming & Collier, 2005. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Notes on contributors Henrik Thorén holds a PhD in Theoretical Philosophy from Lund University and is currently on a post-doctoral fellowship at LUCSUS, Lund University. His doctoral thesis revolved around the philosophy of interdisciplinarity and interdisciplinary problem solving in sustainability science. Lennart Olsson, professor of Geography at Lund University, was the founding Director of LUCSUS 2000–16. Current research focuses on the politics of climate change in the context of poverty, food insecurity and ill-health in sub-Saharan Africa. 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THE MIND OF GOD AND THE COSMOS by Lascelles James INTRODUCTION The Universe is an orderly mass of disorder created from nothing that was something ~ This paradoxical statement reflects some aspects of arguments that have been proposed in attempts to explain God and the nature and origin of the cosmos. However, this paradox is incapable of capturing the thoughts and arguments of those who devote time and resources to investigate the subject. Instead of the usual dialectics that have now become very familiar to the evolution vs creation polemic it is here suggested that the different views be examined rationally. This eclectic approach will peruse evidence from secular history, cosmology, existential philosophy, systematic theology, and Biblical manuscripts in order to better understand the mind of God and the cosmos. The opening sentences of the Jewish Tanakh or Old Testament of the Christian Bible offer the simplest of explanations for the origin of the heaven and the earth. 1"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. 2 And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. 3 And God said, Let there be light: and there was light" (Genesis 1:1-3). One Bible writer exclaims poetically: "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handywork (Psalm 19:1). Physicist, Stephen Hawking suggests that if we find the answer to why we and the universe exist then we would know the mind of god."1 Some physicists propose that about 15 miillion years ago, a "big bang" brought everything into existence. Time, as well as matter and energy came into existence with the big bang. There was nothing before the big bang. Others assume that the cosmos has neither beginning nor end. 1 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1998), 191. This investigation seeks to collate the information available on the mind of God and the possible origins of the cosmos. Truth-seeking comparisons will be made between the hypotheses that have been posited to explain these concepts.

This article was downloaded by:[Corcoran, John] On: 6 March 2008 Access Details: [subscription number 791298102] Publisher: Taylor & Francis Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK History and Philosophy of Logic Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713812075 What are logical notions? Alfred Tarski a; John Corcoran a a Department of Philosophy, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo,, New York, U.S.A. Online Publication Date: 01 January 1986 To cite this Article: Tarski, Alfred and Corcoran, John (1986) 'What are logical notions?', History and Philosophy of Logic, 7:2, 143 154 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/01445348608837096 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445348608837096 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 7 (1986), 143-154 What are Logical Notions? Edited by JOHN CORCORAN Department of Philosophy, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York 14260, U.S.A. Received 28 August 1986 In this manuscript, published here for the first time, Tarski explores the concept of logical notion. He draws on Klein's Erlanger Programm to locate the logical notions of ordinary geometry as those invariant under all transformations of space. Generalizing, he explicates the concept of logical notion of an arbitrary discipline. 1. Editor's introduction In this article Tarski proposes an explication of the concept of logical notion. His earlier well-known explication of the concept of logical consequence presupposes the distinction between logical and extra-logical constants (which he regarded as problematic at the time). Thus, the article may be regarded as a continuation of previous work. In Section 1 Tarski states the problem and indicates that his proposed explication shares features both with nominal (or normative) definitions and with real (or descriptive) definitions. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that his explication is not arbitrary and that it is not intended to 'catch the platonic idea'. In Section 2, in order to introduce the essential background ideas, Klein's Erlanger Programm for classifying geometrical notions is sketched using three basic examples: (1) the notions of metric geometry are those invariant under the similarity transformations; (2) the notions of descriptive geometry are those invariant under the affine transformations; and (3) the notions of topological geometry (topology) are those invariant under the continuous transformations. This illustrates the fact that as the family of transformations expands not only does the corresponding family of invariant notions contract but also, in a sense, the invariant notions become more 'general'. In Section 3 Tarski considers the limiting case of the notions invariant under all transformations of the space and he proposes that such notions be called 'logical'. Then, generalizing beyond geometry, a notion (individual, set, function, etc) based on a fundamental universe of discourse is said to be logical if and only if it is carried onto itself by each one-one function whose domain and range both coincide with the entire universe of discourse. Tarski then proceeds to test his explication by deducing various historical, mathematical and philosophical consequences. All notions definable in Principia mathematica are logical in the above sense, as are the four basic relations introduced D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 144 Alfred Tarski by Peirce and Schroder in the logic of relations. No individual is logical: all numerical properties of classes are logical, etc. In Section 4 Tarski considers the philosophical question of whether all mathematical notions are logical. He considers two construals of mathematics-the type-theoretic construal due to Whitehead and Russell, and the set-theoretic construal due to Zermelo, von Neumann and others. His conclusion is that mathematical notions are all logical relative to the type-theoretic construal but not relative to the set-theoretic construal. Thus, no answer to the philosophical question of the reducibility of mathematical notions to logic is implied by his explication of the concept of logical notion. 2. Editorial treatment The wording of this article reveals its origin as a lecture. On 16 May 1966 Tarski delivered a lecture of this title at Bedford College, University of London. A taperecording was made and a typescript was developed by Tarski from a transcript of the tape-recording. On 20 April 1973 he delivered a lecture from the typescript as the keynote address to the Conference on the Nature of Logic sponsored by various units of the State University of New York at Buffalo. I made careful notes of this lecture and from them wrote an extended account which was published in the University newspaper (The reporter, 26 April 1973). Copies of the newspaper article were sent to Tarski and others. It was Tarski's intention to polish the typescript and to publish it as a companion piece to his 'Truth and proof' (1969). Over the next few years I had several opportunities to speak with Tarski and to reiterate my interest in having the lecture appear in print. In 1978 I began work on editing the second edition of Tarski's Logic, semantics, metamathematics, which finally appeared in December 1983 shortly after Tarski's death. During the course of my work with Tarski for that project, he said on several occasions that he wanted me to edit 'What are logical notions?', but it was not until 1982 that he gave me the typescript with the injunction that it needed polishing. For the most part my editing consisted in the usual editorial activities of correcting punctuation, sentence structure and grammar. In some locations the typescript was evidently a transcript written by a non-logician. Occasionally there was a minor lapse (e.g. in uniformity of terminology). The bibliography and footnotes were added by me. The only explicit reference in the typescript is in Section 3 where the 1936 article by Lindenbaum and Tarski is mentioned. Of course, the greatest care was taken to guarantee that Tarski's ideas were fully preserved. For further discussion and applications of the main idea of this paper see the book by Tarski and Steven Givant (1987), especially section 3.5 in chapter 3. Alfred Tarski 1 . The title of my lecture is a question; a question of a type which is rather fashionable nowadays. There is another type of question you often hear: what is psychology, what is physics, what is history? Questions of this type are sometimes answered by specialists working in the given science, sometimes by philosophers of D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 What are Logical Notions? 145 science; the opinion of a logician is also asked from time to time as an alleged authority in such matters. Well, let me say that specialists working in a given science are usually the people least qualified to give a good definition of the science. It is a domain where you would normally expect an intelligent discussion from a philosopher of science. And a logician is certainly not an authority-he is not specially qualified to answer questions of this type. His role and influence are rather of a negative character-he offers criticism, he points out how vague a certain formulation is, how indefinite an account of a certain science is. In view of his negative approach to discussing definitions of other sciences, a logician must certainly be especially cautious when he discusses his own science and tries to say what logic is. Answers to the question 'What is logic?' or 'What is such and such science?' may be of very different kinds. In some cases we may give an account of the prevailing usage of the name of the science. Thus in saying what is psychology, you may try to give an account of what most people who use this term normally mean by 'psychology'. In other cases we may be interested in the prevailing usage, not of all people who use a given term, but only of people who are qualified to use it-who are expert in the domain. Here we would be interested in what psychologists understand by the term 'psychology'. In still other cases our answer has a normative character: we make a suggestion that the term be used in a certain way, independent of the way in which it is actually used. Some further answers seem to aim at something very different, but it is very difficult for me to say what it is; people speak of catching the proper, true meaning of a notion, something independent of actual usage, and independent of any normative proposals, something like the platonic idea behind the notion. This last approach is so foreign and strange to me that I shall simply ignore it, for I cannot say anything intelligent on such matters. Let me tell you in advance that in answering the question 'What are logical notions?' what I shall do is make a suggestion or proposal about a possible use of the term 'logical notion'. This suggestion seems to me to be in agreement, if not with all prevailing usage of the term 'logical notion', at least with one usage which actually is encountered in practice. I think the term is used in several different senses and that my suggestion gives an account of one of them.' Moreover, I shall not discuss the general question 'What is logic?' I take logic to be a science, a system of true sentences, and the sentences contain terms denoting certain notions, logical notions. I shall be concerned here with only one aspect of the problem, the problem of logical notions, but not for instance with the problem of logical truths. 2. The idea which will underlie my suggestion goes back to a famous German mathematician, Felix Klein. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Felix Klein did very serious work in the foundations of geometry which exerted a great influence on later investigations in this d ~ m a i n . ~ One problem which interested him was that of distinguishing the notions discussed in various systems of geometry, in various geometrical theories, e.g. ordinary Euclidean geometry, affine geometry, and topo1 It would be instructive to compare these remarks with those that Tarski makes in connection with his explications of truth in his 1935a and of logical consequence in his 1936, especially p. 420. See also Corcoran 1983, especially pp. xx-xxii. 2 See, e.g., Klein 1872. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 146 Alfred Tarski logy. I shall try to extend his method beyond geometry and apply it also to logic. I am inclined to believe that the same idea could also be extended to other sciences. Nobody so far as I know has yet attempted to do it, but perhaps one can formulate using Klein's idea some reasonable suggestions to distinguish among biological, physical, and chemical notions. Now let me try to explain to you very briefly Klein's idea. It is based upon a technical term 'transformation', which is a particular case of another term well known to everyone from high school mathematics-the term 'function'. A function or a functional relation is, as we all know, a binary relation r which has the property that whatever object x we consider there exists at most one object y to which x is in the relation r. Those x's for which such a y actually exists are called 'argument values'. The corresponding y's are called 'function values'. We also write y= r(x); this is the normal function notation. The set of all argument values is called the 'domain of the function', the set of function values is called in Principia Mathernatica the 'counterdomain ', more often 'the range', of the function. So every function has its domain and its range. We often deal in mathematics with functions whose domain and range consist of numbers. However, there are also functions of other types. For instance we may consider functions whose domain and range consist of points. In particular, in geometry we deal with functions whose domain and range both coincide with the whole geometrical space. Such a function is referred to as a 'transformation' of the space onto itself. Moreover we often deal with functions which are one-one functions, with functions which have the property that to any two different argument values the corresponding function values are always different. We say that such a function establishes a one-one correspondence between its domain and its range. So a function whose domain and range both coincide with the whole space and which is one-one is called a one-one transformation of the space onto itself (more briefly, 'a transformation '). I shall now discuss transformations of ordinary geometrical space. Now let us consider normal Euclidean geometry which again we all know from high school. This geometry was originally an empirical science-its purpose was to study the world around us. This world is populated with various physical objects, in particular with rigid bodies, and a characteristic property of rigid bodies is that they do not change shape when they move. Now every motion of such a rigid body corresponds to a certain transformation because a rigid body occupies one position when it starts moving and as a result of this motion occupies another position. Each point occupied by the rigid body at the beginning of the motion corresponds to a point occupied by the same body at the end of the motion. We have a functional relation. It is true that this is not a functional relation whose domain includes all points of the space, but it is known from geometry that it can always be extended to the whole space. Now what is characteristic about this transformation is that the distance between two points does not change. If x and y are at a certain distance and if fix) andfOi) are the final points corresponding to x and y, then the distance between f(x) and f@) is the same as that between x and y. w e say that distance is invariant under this transformation. This is a characteristic property of motions of rigid bodies-if it did not hold, we would not call the body a rigid body. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 What are Logical Notions? 147 As you see, we are naturally led in geometry to consider a special kind of transformation of this space, transformations which do not change the distance between points. Mathematicians have a bad habit of taking a term from other domains-from physics, from anthropology-and ascribing to it a related but different meaning. They have done this with the term 'motion'. They use the term 'motion' in a mathematical sense, in which it means simply a transformation in which distance does not change. So the motion of a particular physical object, a rigid body, results in a certain transformation; but to a mathematician motions are simply transformations which do not change distance. Such transformations are more properly called 'isometric transformations'. Now, Klein points out that all the notions which we discuss in Euclidean geometry are invariant under all motions, that is, under all isometric transformations. Let me say again what we mean when we say that a notion is invariant under certain transformations. I use the term 'notion' in a rather loose and general sense, to mean, roughly speaking, objects of all possible types in some hierarchy of types like that in Principia mathematics. Thus notions include individuals (points in the present context), classes of individuals, relations of individuals, classes of classes of individuals , and so on. What does it mean, for instance, to say that a class of individuals is invariant under a transformation f ? This means that x belongs to this class if and only iff(x) also belongs to this class, in other words, that this class is carried onto itself by the transformation. What does it mean to say that a relation is invariant under a transformation f ? This means that x and y stand in the relation if and only iff(x) and fi) stand in the relation. We can easily extend the notion of invariance in a familiar way to classes of classes, relations between classes, and so on. Now a close analysis of Euclidean geometry shows that all notions which we discuss there are invariant not only under motions, under isometric transformations, but under a wider class of transformations, namely under those transformations which geometers call 'similarity transformations'. These are transformations which do not all preserve distance, but which so to speak increase or decrease the size of a geometrical figure uniformly in all directions. More precisely, some similarity transformations do not preserve distance, but all preserve the ratio of two distances. If you have, for instance, three points, x, y, z, and if the distance from y to z is larger by 25% than the distance from x to y, then the result of a similarity transformation is again three points, Ax), fi), Az), where the distance between fi) and fTz) is 25% larger than the distance between Ax) and fi). In other words, a triangle is transformed into a triangle which is similar to it, with the same angles and whose sides are proportionally larger or smaller. And it turns out that all properties which one discusses in Euclidean geometry are invariant under all possible similarity transformations . This means, incidentally, that we cannot discuss in Euclidean geometry the notion of a unit of measure. We should not ask such a geometer whether from the point of view of his discipline the metric system or a non-metric system is preferable. In Euclidean terms we cannot distinguish a metre from a yard; we cannot even distinguish a centimetre from a yard. Any two segments are "the same", since you can always transform them one into another by means of a similarity transformation. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 ACfred Tarski Every Euclidean property that belongs to one segment belongs to every other segment as well. Now Klein says that invariance under all similarity transformations is the characteristic property of the notions studied in metric g e ~ m e t r y , ~ which is another term for ordinary Euclidean geometry. We can express this as a definition: a metric notion, or a notion of metric geometry, is simply a notion which is invariant under all possible similarity transformations. We could certainly imagine a discipline in which we would be interested in a narrower class of transformations, for instance only in isometric transformations, or only in transformations which preserve the distinction between being to the right and being to the left (a distinction which we are unable to make in our normal geometry), or between a motion which is clockwise from a motion which is counter-clockwise (again a distinction we cannot make in normal Euclidean geometry). But by narrowing down the class of permissible transformations we can make more distinctions, i.e. we widen the class of notions invariant under permissible transformations. The extreme case in this direction in geometry would be to single out four points, give them names, and to consider only those transformations which would leave these four points invariant. This would mean introducing a co-ordinate system, and we would be at a limit of the domain of geometry, i.e. at what is called analysis. Actually in this case there would be no permissible transformations except one "trivial" identity transformation. On the other hand one can go in the opposite direction; instead of narrowing down the class of permissible transformations, and in this way widening the class of invariant notions, we can do the opposite, and widen the class of transformations. We can for instance include also transformations in which distance may change, but what is unchanged is mutual linear position of points. More precisely, if three points are on one line, then their images, after the transformation, are also on one line. If one point is between two other points, then its image is between the images of the two other points. One calls such transformations 'affine transformations'. Collinearity and betweenness are just two of the notions which are invariant under all transformations of this kind. The part of geometry where such notions are used is called affine geometry.' In this geometry we cannot distinguish, for example, one segment from another, indeed we cannot make any distinctions among triangles. Any two triangles are so to speak equal, that is, indistinguishable from the point of view of affine geometry. This means that we cannot point out any property in affine geometry which 3 Terminology in this field is not uniform, and Tarski's usage may not be famlliar to some readers. The present terminology derives from Tarski 19356, where the term 'descriptive geometry' is used to indicate the part of ordinary Euclidean geometry based only on 'point' and 'between' (which Tarski refers to as 'the descriptive primitive'). The term 'metric geometry' is used to indicate all of ordinary Euclidean geometry (which, as Tarski notes, can be taken to be based only on 'point' and 'congruence'-a notion that Tarski calls 'the metric primitive'). In the same article Tarski indicates that descriptive geometry is a proper part of metric geometry in the sense that 'between' is definable from 'point' and 'congruence' while 'congruence' is not definable from 'point' and 'between'. 4 'Affine geometry' is in current use in exactly this sense. What Tarski calls 'affine geometry' here, he called 'descriptive geometry' in 1935b. An affine transformation that is not a similarity can be obtained in plane geometry by a parallel projection of the plane onto a non-perpendicular, intersecting "copy" of itself. Concretely, the image of a suitably placed isosceles right triangle is scalene, but all images of triangles are triangles. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 What are Logical Notions? 149 is possessed by one of the triangles but not by all others. In metric geometry we know many such properties, for example, the property of being equilateral, or of being right-angled. In affine geometry we cannot make any such distinctions. What we can distinguish is a triangle from a quadrangle, because no affine transformation could start with a triangle and lead to a quadrangle. So here we have an example of a wider class of transformations, and as a result of this, a narrower class of notions which are invariant under this wider class of transformations; the notions are fewer, and of a more "general" character. We can go a step further. We can include, for instance, transformations in which even the betweenness relation is not preserved, and even transformations where points which lie on the same straight line are transformed into points lying on different lines. The characteristic thing which is preserved here is, roughly speaking, connectedness or closedness. A connected figure remains connected. A closed curve remains closed. Sometimes it is said, putting things "negatively" so to speak, that these transformations are those which do not "break up" or "tear apart". This is a very imprecise way of formulating it, but some of you probably have guessed what I have in mind; I have in mind the so-called continuous transformations, and the part of geometry, the geometrical discipline which deals with notions invariant under such transformations, is topology. In metric geometry we can distinguish one triangle from another; in affine geometry we cannot do so, but we can still distinguish between a triangle and, let us say, a quadrangle. But in topology we cannot distinguish between two polygons, or even between a polygon and a circle, because given a polygon, if we imagine it to be made of wire, we can always bend it in such a way as to obtain a circle, or any other polygon. Such a transformation will be continuous: we do not separate anything which was connected. What we can distinguish in topology is, for example, one triangle from two triangles. For a triangular wire can be bent into two triangles only if we break it into two parts and form a triangle from each part-and this would not be a continuous transformation. 3. Now suppose we continue this idea, and consider still wider classes of transformations . In the extreme case, we would consider the class of all one-one transformations of the space, or universe of discourse, or 'world', onto itself. What will be the science which deals with the notions invariant under this widest class of transformations ? Here we will have very few notions, all of a very general character. I suggest that they are the logical notions, that we call a notion 'logical' if it is invariant under all possible one-one transformations of the world onto itself.' Such a suggestion perhaps sounds strange-the only way of seeing whether it is a reasonable suggestion is to 5 Apart from Mautner 1946, which Tarski seems not to have known, this is, I believe, the first attempted application in English of Klein's Erlanger Programm to logic. However, in Silva 1945, which is written in Italian, we find applications which anticipate essential elements of later model theory. Keyser (1922, 219) and Weyl (1949, 73) indicate in more or less vague terms the possibility of connections between logic and the Erlanger Programm. Tarski's papers from 1923 to 1938 (collected in Tarski 1983) do not mention Felix Klein. The history of the influence of the Erlanger Programm on the development of logic remains to be written. Also needing investigation is the role of the Erlanger Programm in physics, especially relativity. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 150 Alfred Tarski discuss some of its consequences, to see what it leads to, what we have to believe if we agree to use the term 'logical' in this sense. A natural question is this: consider the notions which are denoted by terms which can be defined within any of the existing systems of logic, for instance Principia mathemutica. Are the notions defined in Principia muthematica logical notions in the sense which I suggest? The answer is yes; this is a rather simple meta-logical result, formulated a long time ago (1936) in a short paper by Lindenbaum and myself. Though this result is simple, I think that it should be included in most logic textbooks, because it shows a characteristic property of what can be expressed by logical means. I am not going to formulate the result in a very exact way, but the essence of it is just what I have said. Every notion defined in Principia mathematica, and for that matter in any other familiar system of logic, is invariant under every one-one transformation of the 'world' or 'universe of discourse' onto itself.' Next we look for examples of logical notions in a systematic way, starting with the simplest semantical categories7 or types, and going on to more and more complicated ones. 'For instance, we can start with individuals, with objects of the lowest type, and ask: What are examples of logical notions among individuals? This means: What are examples of individuals which would be logical in the above sense? And the answer is simple: There are no such examples. There are no logical notions of this type, simply because we can always find a transformation of the world onto itself where one individual is transformed into a different individual. The simple fact that we can always define such a function means that on this level there are no logical notions. If we proceed to the next level, to classes of individuals, we ask: What classes of individuals are logical in this sense? It turns out, again as a result of a simple argument, that there are exactly two classes of individuals which are logical, the universal class and the empty class. Only these two classes are invariant under every transformation of the universe onto itself. If we go still further, and consider binary relations, a simple argument shows that there are only four binary relations which are logical in this sense: the universal relation which always holds between any two objects, the empty relation which never holds, the identity relation which holds only between "two" objects when they are identical, and its opposite, the diversity relation. So the universal relation, the empty relation, identity, and diversity-these are the only logical binary relations between individuals. This is interesting because just these four relations were introduced and discussed in the theory of relations by Peirce, Schroder, and other logicians of the nineteenth century. If you consider ternary relations, quaternary relations, and so on, 6 In his Buffalo lecture Tarski indicated that the present remarks apply to 'notions' taken in the narrow sense of sets, classes of sets, etc. but that the truth-functions, quantifiers, relation-operators, etc. of Principia mathemutica can be construed as notions in the narrow sense and, so construed, the present remarks apply equally to them. For example. construing the truth-values T and F as the universe of discourse and the null set leads immediately to construing truth-functions as (higher-order) notions. Construals of this sort are familiar and natural to mathematicians, but they involve philosophical questions of the sort investigated by contemporary philosophers of logic. 7 In Tarski 1935a, 'The Wahrheitsbegriff', there is an extended discussion of semantical categories (which properly include the 'types' treated by Whitehead and Russell). On p.215 Tarski attributes the concept of semantical categories to Husserl. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 What are Logical Notions? 151 the situation is similar: for each of these you will have a small finite number of logical relations. The situation becomes a little more interesting if you go to the next level, and consider classes of classes. Instead of saying 'classes of classes' we can say 'properties of classes', and ask: What are the properties of classes which are logical? The answer is again simple, even though it is quite difficult to formulate in a precise way. It turns out that the only properties of classes (of individuals) which are logical are properties concerning the number of elements in these classes. That a class consists of three elements, or four elements . . . that it is finite, or infinite-these are logical notions, and are essentially the only logical notions on this level. This result seems to me rather interesting because in the nineteenth century there were discussions about whether our logic is the logic of extensions or the logic of intensions. It was said many times, especially by mathematical logicians, that our logic is really a logic of extension^.^ This means that two notions cannot be logically distinguished if they have the same extension, even if their intensions are different. As it is usually put, we cannot logically distinguish properties from classes. Now in the light of our suggestion it turns out that our logic is even less than a logic of extension, it is a logic of number, of numerical relations. We cannot logically distinguish two classes from each other if each of them has exactly two individuals, because if you have two classes, each of which consists of two individuals, you can always find a transformation of the universe under which one of these classes is transformed into the other. Every logical property which belongs to one class of two individuals belongs to every class containing exactly two individuals. If you turn to more complicated notions, for instance to relations between classes, then the variety of logical notions increases. Here for the first time you come across many important and interesting logical relations, well known to those who have studied the elements of logic. I mean such things as inclusion between classes, disjointness of two classes, overlapping of two classes, and many others; all these are examples of logical relations in the normal sense, and they are also logical in the sense of my suggestion. This gives you some idea of what logical notions are. I have restricted myself to four of the simplest types, and discussed examples of logical notions only within these types. To conclude this discussion, I would like to turn to a question which has probably already occurred to some of you as you listened to my remarks. 4. The question is often asked whether mathematics is a part of logic. Here we are interested in only one aspect of this problem, whether mathematical notions are logical notions, and not, for example, in whether mathematical truths are logical truths, which is outside our domain of discussion. Since it is now well known that the whole of mathematics can be constructed within set t h e ~ r y , ~ or the theory of 8 See Whitehead and Russell 1910, 111 (2). 9 Tarski is using the term 'set theory' here in a vague and general sense in which several distinct concrete theories may all qualify as set theory. In particular, the Whitehead-Russell theory of types and the (first-order) Zermelo-Fraenkel theory both qualify as set theory. It is to the point here to note that Tarski regarded the current variety of 'set theories' as only a small sample of what can usefully be developed in this field. In the Editor's introduction, 'set theory' is used in a narrower sense that contrasts with type theory. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 152 Alfred Tarski classes, the problem reduces to the following one: Are set-theoretical notions logical notions or not? Again, since it is known that all usual set-theoretical notions can be defined in terms of one,'' the notion of belonging, or the membership relation, the final form of our question is whether the membership relation is a logical one in the sense of my suggestion. The answer will seem disappointing. For we can develop set theory, the theory of the membership relation, in such a way that the answer to this question is affirmative, or we can proceed in such a way that the answer is negative. So the answer is: 'As you wish'! You all know that as a result of the antinomies, basically Russell's Antimony, which appeared in set theory at the turn of the century, it was necessary to submit the foundations of set theory to a thorough investigation. One result of this investigation, which is by no means complete at this moment, is that two methods have been developed of constructing what can be saved from set theory after the crushing blow which it had suffered. One method is essentially the method of Principia rnathematica, the method of Whitehead and Russell-the method of types. The second method is the method of people such as Zermelo, von Neumann, and Bernays-the first-order method. Now let us look to our question from the point of view of these two methods.'' Using the method of Principia rnathematica, set theory is simply a part of logic. The method can be roughly described in the following way: we have a fundamental universe of discourse, the universe of individuals, and then we construct out of this universe of individuals certain notions, classes, relations, classes of classes, classes of relations, and so on. However, only the basic universe, the universe of individuals, is fundamental. A transformation is defined on the universe of individuals, and this transformation induces transformations on classes of individuals, relations between individuals, and so on. More precisely, we consider the universal class of the lowest type, and a transformation has this universal class as its domain and range. Then this transformation induces also a transformation whose domain and range is the universal class of the second type, the class of classes of individuals. When we speak of transformations of the 'world' onto itself we mean only transformations of the basic universe of discourse, of the universe of individuals (which we may interpret as the universe of physical objects, although there is nothing in Principia rnathematica which compels us to accept such an interpretation). Using this method, it is clear that the membership relation is certainly a logical notion. It occurs in several types, for 10 This remark presupposes the convention that a given notion can be said to be definable in terms of one fixed notion if there is a definition (of the given notion) which uses no notions other than the following: (i) the one fixed notion, (ii) the universe of discourse, (iii) other notions already accepted as being logical. It is obvious, e.g., that there is no way to define the null set using the membership relation and absolutely nothing else. It should also be noted that Tarski says 'all usual set-theoretic notions' and not 'all set-theoretic relations'; there are uncountably many of the latter but only countably many definitions. I I Tarski takes the first method to involve a higher-order underlying logic and the second method to involve a first-order underlying logic. It is possible of course to reconstrue type theory in a many-sorted first-order underlying logic, but this would be incompatible with the spirit and letter of this lecture. Likewise, it is possible to develop Zermelo's set theory in a higher-order logic. This too is incompatible with the spirit of this lecture-despite the historical fact that Zermelo may have done so himself. Incidentally, the historic papers establishing the two methods were published in the same year, 1908. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 What are Logical Notions? 153 individuals are elements of classes of individuals, classes of individuals are elements of classes of classes of individuals, and so on. And by the very definition of an induced transformation it is invariant under every transformation of the world onto itself. On the other hand, consider the second method of constructing set theory, where we have no hierarchy of types, but only one universe of discourse and the membership relation between its individuals is an undefined relation, a primitive notion. Now it is clear that this membership relation is not a logical notion, because as I mentioned before, there are only four logical relations between individuals, the universal relation, the empty relation, and the identity and diversity relations. The membership relation, if individuals and sets are considered as belonging to the same universe of discourse, is none of these relations; therefore, under this second conception, mathematical notions are not logical notions. This conclusion is interesting, it seems to me, because the two possible answers correspond to two different types of mind. A monistic conception of logic, set theory, and mathematics, where the whole of mathematics would be a part of logic, appeals, I think, to a fundamental tendency of modern philosophers. Mathematicians, on the other hand, would be disappointed to hear that mathematics, which they consider the highest discipline in the world, is a part of something so trivial as logic; and they therefore prefer a development of set theory in which set-theoretical notions are not logical notions. The suggestion which I have made does not, by itself, imply any answer to the question of whether mathematical notions are logical. Editor's acknowledgements I am grateful to Mr. Jonathan Piel, Editor of ScientiJic American, and to the Tarski family, especially Dr. Jan and Mrs. Maria Tarski, respectively Alfred Tarski's son and widow, for concurring with Alfred Tarski's permission to publish an edited form of this article. Professors Stephen Schanuel and Scott Williams of the SUNY/ Buffalo Department of Mathematics gave advice on mathematical matters. Professor Ivor Grattan-Guinness deserves thanks for historical and editorial advice, as does Professor Michael Scanlan of Oregon State University, Ms. Rosemary Yeagle and Mr. Patrick Murphy, both of SUNY/Buffalo. Important refinements resulted from suggestions by Dr. Jan Tarski and by members of the Buffalo Logic Colloquium which devoted its September 1986 meeting to discussion of this paper.My largest debt is to Professor George Weaver, Chairman of the Philosophy Department of Bryn Mawr College, for substantial help in every phase of this work. Editor's bibliography Corcoran, J. 1983 'Editor's introduction to the revised edition', in Tarski 1983, xvi-xxvii. Keyser, C. J. I922 Mathematical philosophy, New York. Klein, F. 1872 'A comparative review of recent researches in geometry', English trans. by Haskell, M. W., Bulletin of the New York Mathematical Society, 2 (1892-93), 215-249. Lindenbaum, A. and Tarski, A. 1936 'On the limitations of the means of expression of deductive theones', in Tarski 1983, 384-392. Mautner, F. 1. 1946 'An extension of Klein's Erlanger Programm: logic as an invariant theory', Amer. j. maths., 68 (1946), 345-384. D ow nl oa de d B y: [C or co ra n, J oh n] A t: 20 :1 8 6 M ar ch 2 00 8 154 What ure Logical Notions? Silva, J. S. I945 'On automorphisms of arbitrary mathematical systems', English trans. by de Oliveira, A. J . F . History andphilosophy of logic, 6 (1985), 91-1 16. Tarski, A. 19350 'The concept of truth in formalized languages', in Tarski 1983, 152-278. 19356 'Some methodological investigations on the definability of concepts', in Tarski 1983, 296-319. 1936 'On the concept of logical consequence', in Tarski 1983, 409420. ---1969 'Truth and proof', Scientific American 220, no. 6, 63-77. --1983 Logic, semantics, metamathematics, 2nd ed. (ed. Corcoran, J.), Indianapolis. [lst ed. (ed. and trans. Woodger, J. H.), Oxford, 1956.1 Tarski, A. and Givant, S. 1987 A formalization ofset theory without variables. Providence (Rhode Island). Weyl, H. 1949 Philosophy of mathematics arzd natural science, Princeton. Whitehead, A. and Russell, B. 1910 Principia mathematica, vol. 1, Cambridge.

in Viejos y nuevos pensamientos editado por J.J. Acero, L. Flores e A. Flórez Granada Editorial Comares 2003: 117-32 Denotación y uso Paolo Leonardi* Università degli Studi di Bologna Las palabras atraen nuestra atención sobre las cosas. Consiguen este efecto, en un principio porque reestructuran figuralmente el contexto, y posteriormente porque son usadas de nuevo para reestructurar un contesto o porque conducen, por medio de la memoria, a los contextos que han reestructurado. Con 'cosa' aludo indiferentemente a objetos, propiedades, relaciones, estados de cosas, acontecimientos, operaciones, planos, mapas, frases, etc., y por lo tanto, también a cosas que están constituidas por símbolos. La expresión en la que queda huella de una cosa, se dice, clásicamente, que la significa, se refiere a ella, la denota. No me detendré ilustrando lo que pienso sobre cómo se enlazan palabras y cosas. Mi punto de vista está bastante cerca de los que Wittgenstein critica al inicio de las Investigaciones Filosóficas, y es de esta crítica de lo que quiero tratar aquí.1 Se dice que en las secciones 1-64 de la Parte I de las Investigaciones, Wittgenstein rechaza la concepción descriptiva o pictográfica del lenguaje y del significado. Wittgenstein observa, no exactamente en este orden, que (i) no todas las palabras denotan – uso denotar para tener un objeto como significado; (ii) fijar la denotación de una palabra, si la palabra tiene una, es una operación preliminar que adquiere un valor sólo cuando se sabe cómo usar una palabra dotada de denotación; (iii) la definición ostensiva, que es el medio con el que se suele introducir la denotación de una palabra, se puede interpretar de varias maneras; ** [email protected] 1 Muchos han rebatido defendiendo uno u otro aspecto del modelo de Agustín. Una argumentación que a mí no me interesa aquí es, por ejemplo, la de Fodor 1975 (p.64). Una más cercana a mi punto de vista es la de Bloom 2000 (p. 60-61). 2 (iv) no todas las palabras que tienen una denotación pueden ser introducidas por medio de una definición ostensiva; (v) hay que distinguir entre significado del nombre y lo que lleva este nombre; Además, sostiene que: (vi) las palabras del lenguaje ordinario no denotan simples; (vii) no existe un análisis fundamental de una expresión lingüística; (viii) la conexión entre palabra y denotado no requiere que el denotado sea indestructible y que se adjunte, por así decirlo, a la lengua, ni que se recuerde exactamente el denotado, ni que cada vez surja en nuestra mente una imagen del denotado. Wittgenstein, ocasionalmente pero varias veces, habla más bien de un paradigma – por ejemplo, una definición ostensiva lo es. Probablemente Wittgenstein llama paradigmático un uso al que se atribuye una función gramatical, es decir al que se alude para justificar, explicar, etc. algo distinto2. Finalmente, (ix) describir no es la única función del lenguaje. A través de todos estos pasos, Wittgenstein intenta sustituir el modelo denotativo con otro modelo para mirar al significado de una palabra. El significado de una palabra sería su uso en el lenguaje (Investigaciones Filosóficas, Parte I § 43).3 Estas observaciones, incluso cuando son convergentes, son distintas. Un primer ejemplo. Una concepción pictográfica del significado no requiere definiciones ostensivas; y en el Tractatus, en efecto, no hay definiciones de este tipo4. De todos 2 Lo que corresponde al nombre, y sin lo cual el nombre no tendría ningún significado, es, por ejemplo, un paradigma que en el juego lingüístico se usa en conexión con el nombre. (Parte I § 55). 3 Estos temas se encuentran tratados de modo incompleto y entremezclados con otros al inicio del Quaderno blu y del Quaderno marrone. En el primero, en la p.5 de la edición original, Wittgenstein escribe: «Il segno (l'enunciato) ricava il proprio significato dal sistema di segni, dalla lingua cui appartiene». 4 Lo cual no impide que muchos hayan pensado que la forma de una proposición elemental pudiera ser "Esto es rojo". "Ese es Ernesto", etc. En la ontología del Tractatus hay objetos simples, y en el lenguaje del Tractatus hay nombres que están en lugar de esos objetos. Pero los objetos subsisten solo como elementos de estados de cosas y los nombres son expresiones lingüísticas solo como partes de enunciados, y la conexión entre nombres y objetos se da en el enunciado que describe un estado de cosas. Ese enunciado expresa directamente ese estado de cosas, y por lo tanto los nombres que aparecen en el enunciado están en lugar de los objetos que están implicados. En cambio, la definición ostensiva querría poner en contacto directo un nombre y un objeto. Usando los términos del Tractatus, se podría decir que un enunciado puede mostrar este contacto pero no puede decirlo, es decir no puede convertirlo en objeto de predicación. Usando los términos de las Investigaciones la definición ostensiva convierte el objeto demostrado en un elemento del lenguaje – pero esta no es una posibilidad abierta en el Tractatus. Cfr. Stenius 1960, Acero 1999. Este último trabajo, por un lado polemiza justamente con la lectura relativista de las observaciones de Wittgenstein en estas secciones propuesta por Baker y Hacker 1980. Por otra parte, Acero parece 3 modos es posible que un lenguaje denotativo no se pueda introducir totalmente por medio de definiciones ostensivas – en estas secciones Wittgenstein muestra, en efecto, como "Esto" o "Ese" no pueden ser definidos de este modo. Un segundo ejemplo. Si bien la idea de que no todas las palabras denotan y la de que no todas las frases son descriptivas sean congruentes, una lengua podría al mismo tiempo ser completamente denotativa y tener frases capaces de realizar funciones lingüísticas distintas, desde las aserciones hasta las expresiones augurales y las peticiones. Contrariamente, de hecho, a lo que escribe Wittgenstein, en el § 26, agua en «¡Agua!», como en «¿Agua?» y en «Agua.» denota el agua, o nada impide que la denote, pero en el primer caso expresa deseo o sorpresa mientras que en el segundo es el tema de una pregunta y en el tercero el objeto de una aserción. Las funciones lingüísticas, como ya había notado Frege, pertenecen a otro nivel semántico. Al igual que 'agua' denota el agua y aparece denotativamente en frases que realizan funciones lingüísticas distintas, del mismo modo si lo bello no expresa una cualidad objetiva, no la expresa en «Bello.» ni en «¡Bello!». La cuestión de la denotación, en fin, es indiferente a la cuestión de las funciones lingüísticas. Las observaciones de Wittgenstein constituyen, de cualquier modo, un telón de fondo al que remitirse para rechazar puntos de vista como el mío. Algunas de las ideas que presentan han tenido gran éxito, a menudo al margen de las páginas de Wittgenstein. Las varias funciones de la lengua han sido elaboradas con gran sofisticación por Austin entre los años 45 y 60, y han sido un tema muy vivo durante otros 15 años. La subdeterminación de la referencia es una de las tesis más discutidas a partir de la formulación de Quine en 1951. Ha tenido especial éxito la idea de prescindir de la ontología de los significados – que es algo sobre lo que todos más o menos están de acuerdo en los últimos cincuenta años– y casi el mismo éxito ha tenido la de reducirlos que acepta la lectura a definición ostensiva, para el Wittgenstein del Tractatus, de enunciados como "Esto es rojo" o "Ese es Ernesto" – una lectura que no comparto. 4 al uso idea que ha dominado los últimos 30 años de la filosofía del lenguaje del siglo pasado. Algunos vínculos aparentes, que Wittgenstein discute, se han disuelto sin dejar residuos, como la idea del absolutamente simple y la del análisis fundamental de las expresiones de la lengua. Las mismas extravagancias de la teoría de los nombres lógicamente propios de Russell han sido abandonadas como si no existieran y justo esa teoría ha sido utilizada como modelo para la relación referencial (Donellan 1966). Aquí, específicamente, negaré que una serie de problemas, propuestos por Wittgenstein, constituyan verdaderamente dificultades para la concepción denotativa del significado. Me concentraré en cuatro puntos más uno: (a) lo erróneo de imaginar que todas las palabras denotan; (b) si fijar una denotación es preliminar a hablar una lengua; (c) la presunta subdeterminación de la definición ostensiva; (d) el uso como noción más dúctil para dar cuenta del significado. Además, (e), me detendré en el punto (viii). Si Wittgenstein, al afirmar lo que he intentado resumir con este último punto, quiere decir que no hay nada que garantice la conexión entre una palabra y de lo que ella habla, toca un punto esencial. Trataré estos puntos uno por uno, en el orden indicado. Si todas las palabras denotan. No todas las palabras denotan. "No", "cinco", "número" son algunos de los ejemplos de Wittgenstein de palabras que no denotan. (1) Una observación preliminar. ¿Alguien ha pensado realmente que todas las palabras tienen un denotado? Al igual que es extremada la posición que considera que ninguna palabra denota, del mismo modo es extremada la posición que afirma que todas las palabras denotan. Pero, si alguien ha sostenido que ninguna 5 palabra denota,5 en cambio, nadie, ni siquiera el autor del Tractatus, ha afirmado que todas las palabras denotan. (2) Un argumento general en contra. Wittgenstein defiende una forma de pluralismo semántico. Las palabras funcionan de distintas maneras, no hay una manera de funcionar que sirva para todas. Supongamos, por un momento, que todas las palabras tengan una denotación. Esto, al contrario de lo que parece pensar Wittgenstein, no es suficiente para asimilarlas, porque podrían ser distintas en cuanto podrían estar en lugar de objetos de distinto tipo ontológico. Hoy, en general las especies y las sustancias naturales son consideradas individuos. Pero, sin duda, una especie es un individuo muy distinto de un elemento de la especie. En esta pluralidad de tipos pensaba antes cuando especificaba lo que quiero decir con el término 'cosa' – objetos, propiedades, relaciones, estados de cosas, acontecimientos, operaciones, planos, mapas, frases, etc., donde 'estados de cosas, acontecimientos, etc.' pueden ser todos ellos considerados objetos. Bajo este aspecto además de los objetos en sentido estricto, de las propiedades y de las relaciones, también un conectivo, como la conjunción o la negación, pueden ser consideradas cosas, como intentaré demostrar a continuación – si bien la negación presenta especiales dificultades. Los números pueden ser considerados cosas, si por ejemplo son operaciones como sostiene Wittgenstein en el Tractatus. Entonces cada numeral designaría la operación a la que corresponde. Pero se puede defender la idea de que '5' denota 5, sin adherir a la filosofía de la matemática del Tractatus, al igual que se puede defenderla sin suscribir la filosofía de los Fondamenti dell'aritmetica de Frege, que concebía los números como objetos lógicos, y por tanto proponía inmediatamente los numerales como palabras que denotan objetos. Casos aparentemente más difíciles pero no imposibles son «¡Fuera!» o «¡Ay!». 5 Baker y Hacker 1980, por ejemplo. 6 Si fijar una denotación es un preliminar de hablar una lengua. Fijar la denotación de una palabra, cuando esta tiene una, es una operación que adquiere un valor sólo cuando se sabe como usar una palabra dotada de denotación. Imaginemos que existe un estadio en el cual hay palabras aisladas que denotan sin que haya todavía una gramática, e imaginemos que nos encontramos exactamente en ese estadio. Imaginemos también que podemos introducir libremente nuevas palabras, otorgándoles una denotación. En una situación de este tipo, conseguiríamos atraer la atención sobre una cosa, al proferir una palabra, la palabra que denota la cosa. Por tanto, en una situación de este tipo tendríamos a todos los efectos una lengua y no solo palabras. En realidad, también en este estado primordial habría una gramática, aunque mínima. Podríamos, de hecho, producir expresiones compuestas. Si fuera el caso, podríamos atraer la atención sobre más objetos simplemente pronunciando más palabras, porque cada una de estas apuntaría a su propio denotado. Por ejemplo, al usar una palabra para una cosa y otra palabra para otra cosa, atraeríamos la atención hacia ambas cosas, o sea, sobre una y sobre otra.6 No hay , en fin, un estadio lógico-conceptual en el que se introducen nombres, y un estadio sucesivo en el que los nombres se usan – siendo el segundo el momento en el que se constituye una lengua y los nombres llegan a ser tales a todos los efectos. La introducción de un nombre constituye inmediatamente una lengua, y gracias a la simple contigüidad es inmediatamente posible producir una estructura compleja. 6 Si en un estadio primordial fuera posible usar palabras asertiva e imperativamente, simplemente profiriéndolas con tonos apropiados, sería en cambio difícil distinguir una contigüidad conjuntiva de una disyuntiva. Pero en contextos idóneos una petición conjuntiva podría ser diferenciada de una disyuntiva, sencillamente porque una petición conjuntiva quedaría satisfecha solo si se pasaran todos los objetos requeridos, mientras que con una disyuntiva no se requeriría tanto. Antes de llegar a introducir otros conectivos, emergería la negación. Una réplica al uso imperativo de una palabra podría dejar insatisfecho al demandante que podría rechazar lo que se le ofrece o repetir su petición. Un estadio lingüístico desarrollado tiene marcadores que explicitan la estructura gramatical, léxicas, morfológicos o posicionales. De cualquier modo, en cuanto hubiéramos producido conjuntamente palabras, tendríamos una estructura de palabras a la que dar un nombre, "conjunción". 7 Se podría volver a formular así la situación. Cada lengua contiene sus propias versiones pidgin, con poquísima morfología y una sintaxis cercana a la pura contigüidad. Así como cada lengua tiene marcadores que explicitan la sintaxis de la frase. Evidentemente, ya que imaginamos una situación primordial la lengua se parece más a una propia versión pidgin. Pero no es un auténtico pidgin porque no coge el léxico de una lengua completamente desarrollada a la que acercarse. Sobre la definición ostensiva. La definición ostensiva, que es el medio con el que se suele introducir la denotación de una palabra, es subdeterminada. En Wittgenstein la subdeterminación tiene la forma específica de la posibilidad de otras interpretaciones. A pesar de esto, Wittgenstein sostiene que si hay (innumerables) interpretaciones hay también una manera de comprender que no es una interpretación. La gramática de la expresión muestra cuál es esta manera de entenderla. El lector de Wittgenstein tiene sin embargo la sensación de que no hay razones para que haya una gramática en vez de otra, y por lo tanto tiende a pensar que, dada una gramática, se podría adoptar otra. Maliciosamente, se querría decir que se podría reconocer un estatuto gramatical a una cualquiera de las (innumerables) interpretaciones. Pero una línea aparentemente distinta surge, por ejemplo, en una frase en la que Wittgenstein sostiene que preguntar el nombre y il suo correlato, la definizione ostensiva, costituiscono, potremmo dire, un gioco linguistico a sé. (Ricerche filosofiche, Parte I § 27) Como veremos, se trata de una encrucijada muy complicada en la que Wittgenstein intenta enfrentarse correctamente, por decirlo así, con una cuestión que en otros aspectos no piensa que se pueda proponer. Para discutir sobre este punto querría en primer lugar presentar tres citas más: 8 Si può definire ostensivamente il nome di una persona, il nome di un colore, di una sostanza, di un numero, il nome di un punto cardinale, ecc. La definizione del numero due: «Questo si chiama 'due'» – e così dicendo si indicano due noci – è perfettamente esatta. – Ma come è possibile definire il due in questo modo? Colui al quale si dà la definizione non sa che cosa si voglia denominare con «due»; supporrà che tu denomini questo gruppo di noci! –––– Può supporlo; ma forse non lo suppone. Al contrario, se voglio attribuire un nome a questo gruppo di noci, l'altro potrebbe anche scambiarlo per un numerale. E allo stesso modo colui al quale do una definizione ostensiva del nome di una persona potrebbe interpretarlo come il nome di un colore, come la designazione di una razza o addirittura come il nome di un punto cardinale. Ciò vuol dire che la definizione ostensiva può in ogni caso essere interpretata in questo e in altri modi. (Ricerche filosofiche, Parte I §28) ... E allora in che cosa consiste – 'l'indicare la forma', 'l'indicare il colore'? Indica un pezzo di carta! E ora indica la sua forma, – ora il suo colore, – ora il suo numero (questo suona strano)! – Ebbene, come hai fatto? – Dirai che coll'indicare hai 'inteso', ogni volta, qualcosa di diverso. E se ti chiedo come ciò avvenga, dirai che di volta in volta hai concentrato la tua attenzione sul colore, sulla forma ecc. Ma ora ti chiedo di nuovo come ciò avvenga. ... (Ricerche filosofiche, Parte I § 33) Che cosa succede quando si intendono le parole «Questo è blu», una volta come un enunciato sull'oggetto che si indica – un'altra volta come una definizione della parola «blu»? (Ricerche filosofiche, Parte I, nota p. 30.) Un ejemplo. Alguien me pregunta qué punto de rojo es el magenta. Miro a mi alrededor y tengo suerte porque en la habitación hay un libro con una portada de colores que contiene entre otras cosas un rombo con una esquina magenta, lo cojo en la mano y respondo «Esto es magenta». Normalmente hago esto, y funciona. Wittgenstein se pregunta lo que en sí parece una cuestión imposible: cómo funciona. ¿Es un juego lingüístico especial? (Investigaciones Filosóficas, Parte I § 27). En la superficie no hay nada que sugiera que se entienda la demostración como La esquina de arriba de este rombo es magenta una demostración del color más bien que de la forma o de la posición espacial o del material, etc. (Investigaciones 9 Filosóficas, Parte I § 28) Ni las cosas mejoran si se considera lo que pasa dentro de nosotros – las intenciones que tenemos. (Investigaciones Filosóficas, Parte I § 33, y la nota p. 30) El § 27 parece que presenta una primera solución del problema dada por Wittgenstein: la ostensión es un comportamiento lingüístico especial. Dicho de manera más general, la solución es: la ostensión funciona así, es decir, esta es su gramática, y ella tiene, para algunas expresiones, una función gramatical, es decir, el paradigma de cómo estas funcionan. Esta es una respuesta posible, según Wittgenstein, y por lo tanto la cuestión entendida como algo a lo que responde esta respuesta, es una cuestión en resumidas cuentas posible. Pero muchos a partir de aquí propenderían a preguntar: ¿cómo se comprende correctamente un paradigma? A esta ulterior cuestión Wittgenstein contestaría que lo correcto es un parámetro introducido por el paradigma, y que, en un sentido parcialmente por precisar, no hay respuesta a la pregunta: ¿Cómo se comprende el paradigma de esta manera? Entendida de esta manera, en conclusión, la cuestión sería de verdad imposible. Antes de sustituir esta lectura imposible de la cuestión por la otra, me preguntaba si nuestra gramática podría ser distinta. ¿No podríamos adoptar como regla la que es, por el momento, una interpretación engañosa? Una primera respuesta a estas preguntas ulteriores queda bloqueada por el hecho de que la gramática (nuestra) es esta. Tener en cuenta esas preguntas ulteriores, si no fuese imposible proponerlo, sería ocioso. Una respuesta, ligeramente distinta, la da Wittgenstein en la sección xii de la Parte II de las Investigaciones. Wittgenstein parece que no tiene nada que decir respecto a esto, pero parece que duda entre considerar imposibles o, por el contrario, posibles gramáticas alternativas. Se la formazione dei concetti può essere spiegata ricorrendo a fatti naturali, allora, invece che alla grammatica, non dovremmo interessarci a ciò che, in natura, sta alla sua base? – Certamente ci interessa anche la corrispondenza dei concetti con fatti molto generali della natura. (Tali che per lo più non ci sorprendono a 10 causa della loro generalità.) Ma il nostro interesse non ricade su queste possibili cause della formazione dei concetti; noi non facciamo scienza naturale, e neanche facciamo storia naturale, – perché, per i nostri scopi, una storia naturale potremmo anche inventarla. Non dico: Se questi e questi altri fatti naturali fossero diversi da quelli che sono gli uomini avrebbero concetti diversi (nel senso di un'ipotesi). Ma: Chi crede che certi concetti siano senz'altro quelli giusti e che colui che ne possedesse altri non renderebbe conto di quello di cui ci rendiamo conto noi, – potrebbe immaginare certi fatti generalissimi della natura in modo diverso da quello in cui noi siamo soliti immaginarli; e formazioni di concetti diverse da quelle abituali gli diventerebbero comprensibili. Confronta un concetto con uno stile pittorico: anche il nostro stile pittorico è arbitrario? Possiamo sceglierne uno a nostro piacimento? (Per esempio, lo stile egizio.) Oppure qui si tratta unicamente di bello e di brutto? (Ricerche filosofiche, Parte II sez. xii) Pensamos de esta manera porque somos de esta manera. A un científico le interesarán las causas naturales de la formación de los conceptos, pero a un filósofo no, o por lo menos, según Wittgenstein no en cuanto filósofo. Los hechos naturales, parece, se tienen que considerar por lo que son, pero en filosofía son tomados en consideración solo por el papel gramatical que desarrollan. Si imaginamos hechos naturales distintos, concebimos gramáticas distintas, o al menos su posibilidad. Estas dos afirmaciones son discutibles. La primera. Si nuestros conceptos son formaciones naturales, desde el punto de vista filosófico hay una gran diferencia. Un inciso: además, si son formaciones de este tipo, una investigación naturalista puede hacer que las comprendamos más allá de una caracterización impresionista. La segunda afirmación. Si nuestros conceptos son formaciones naturales, inventarse ese tipo de formaciones, aparte los aspectos novelescos, es de alguna manera instrumental para llegar a hacerse una imagen de cuales son los conceptos que exactamente nos hemos formado. Al igual que una regla y sus interpretaciones no están en el mismo plano, del mismo modo imaginarse una formación natural y detectar una no son cosas que están en el mismo plano. 11 Tomemos en consideración específicamente la ostensión. ¿No es diferente indicar objetos en lugar de imaginar que se hace? ¿Cuáles son los vínculos cognitivos efectivos a los que el hecho de indicar objetos subyace? ¿Un tipo cualquiera de condicionamiento puede en efecto llevarme a definir ostensivamente cualidades en vez de objetos, sumas mereológicas en vez de objetos – la suma de Ana hasta el momento t y María desde el momento t en adelante en vez de Ana – etc.? Cuando Wittgenstein escribe que una historia natural podría incluso inventársela, sugiere, entre otras cosas, que a un filósofo le interesa simplemente la posibilidad y no la realidad (la verdad, entender cómo están en realidad las cosas). La observación naturalista nos dice que una indicación interviene en una escena perceptiva, y altera los relieves. En una escena perceptiva son relevantes sobre todo los objetos porque tienen propiedades perceptivas especiales. Un objeto, según Koffka 1935, tiene perceptivamente, propiedades especiales, especificamente propiedades dinámicas además de un contorno y constancia de forma, color y dimensión.7 Por tanto, si indicamos una parte del espacio donde se encuentra un objeto de un determinado color, con una determinada forma, etc., nuestra indicación, por default, es decir, a falta de señales especiales, se "apoyará" en el objeto, mejor que en el color o en la forma. Por consiguiente, cuando se quiere indicar el color o la forma de algo se dice preferentemente "El color de..." o "La forma de...", para aclarar que la situación no es la de default. Por lo tanto, desde un punto de vista naturalista, no parece posible llevarnos a percibir la suma de Ana hasta el momento t y María desde el momento t en adelante en vez de Ana, y por esto no parece posible llegar a mostrar esa suma mereológica en lugar de este objeto. La observación naturalista, además, nos muestra una cosa que Wittgenstein pasa por alto, es decir que el proferimiento de la 7 Los criterios de Koffka se vuelven a encontrar en una versión mucho más sofisticada en Marr 1982. 12 palabra no es acompañado por, sino que es parte de la ostensión, no es por tanto algo que la indicación apoya en una cosa en lugar de en otra, sino que es algo que al igual que la indicación atrae la atención sobre una cosa en lugar de sobre otra. ¿Podemos inventarnos hechos naturales distintos? Podemos imaginar que tenemos un sistema perceptivo distinto – por ejemplo, podemos imaginar que percibimos otro intervalo de frecuencia de las ondas luminosas – o un sistema empobrecido – por ejemplo, que percibimos un intervalo más restringido de las ondas luminosas. (Además sabemos que algunos animales perciben justamente gamas distintas de ondas luminosas.) Pero es arduo imaginar un modo de percibir sin distinguir objetos, y es difícil imaginar qué propiedades y relaciones pueden tener las cualidades perceptivas de los objetos y estos no tenerlas. Alguna otra cita y algún comentario. Ahora alguna otra cita, para puntualizar unos detalles: ... Per essere in grado di chiedere il nome di una cosa si deve già sapere (o saper fare) qualcosa. Ma che cosa si deve sapere? (Ricerche filosofiche, § 30) [Nel § 32, Wittgenstein dice che Agostino descrive l'apprendimento della propria lingua come descriveremmo l'apprendimento di una lingua straniera – quando spesso si usano definizioni ostensive – cioè come se il bambino conoscesse un'altra lingua, prima della sua lingua materna.] Posso, con la parola «bububu», intendere: «Se non piove andrò a passeggio?» – Soltanto in un linguaggio posso intendere qualcosa con qualcos'altro. (Ricerche filosofiche, nota p. 30.) ... questa 'interpretazione' può anche consistere nel modo in cui ora fa uso della parola definita; per esempio in quello che indica quando riceve l'ordine «Indica un circolo!» – Infatti né l'espressione «intendere la definizione così e così», né quella «interpretare la definizione così e così», designano un processo che accompagna il dare e l'ascoltare la definizione. (Ricerche filosofiche, § 34) Los primeros dos pasos de esta segunda serie de citas muestran algo a lo que ya he aludido, cuando anteriormente me preguntaba cómo se puede comprender correctamente un paradigma. Al igual que una regla matemática no es, para Wittgenstein, lo que es 13 cierto, sino aquello cuya asunción puede hacer que estemos seguros en el desarrollo de un razonamiento matemático, de la misma manera no es por haber conferido sentido a una expresión por lo que esta se puede introducir en una lengua, sino, al contrario, es incluir una expresión en una lengua lo que le confiere un sentido. ¿Pero en qué podría diferenciarse de la nuestra una gramática alternativa? ¿Una lengua podría no hablar de cosas? ¿Podría no denotarlas? No, no podría. Al igual que denotar no es preliminar a hablar una lengua, hablar una lengua no lo es a denotar. Uno de los aspectos constituyentes de una lengua es su capacidad de dirigir nuestra atención hacia las cosas, esto es de denotarlas. El tercer paso aclara los dos primeros. Lo que hay que saber, o saber hacer, para comprender una palabra es saberla usar es decir, saber hablar la lengua a la que pertenece. Al mismo tiempo, Wittgenstein niega que esta competencia corresponda a un proceso mental que acompaña la comparación con la definición. De alguna manera, se querría decir, la competencia se muestra hablando y escuchando sin dificultad. Probablemente, el proceso mental al que se apunta aquí es un proceso al que se tiene o se puede tener acceso consciente. Existe, en primer lugar, sin embargo, la posibilidad de que saber usar una expresión requiera un proceso del que no somos conscientes y además la posibilidad de que prevea que se sepan dar, si son solicitadas, unas explicaciones, que es justo lo que podría servir cuando hay dificultades. Pero si se acepta una explicación naturalista, el «interpretar la definición así y así» coincide exactamente con un proceso concomitante, por ejemplo con un proceso cerebral. Del mismo modo que el que yo te haya explicado dónde está la droguería consiste en el proceso concomitante de que yo te haya dicho: «La segunda tienda a la derecha, a la vuelta de la esquina». Si esto es suficiente para que llegues a la droguería, ¿por qué el proceso cerebral no sería suficiente para conectar un nombre a las cosas que nombra? La mente consiste en la capacidad de producir objetos naturales y especializarlos para 14 manipular y organizar las circunstancias en las que nos encontramos. No consiste en la capacidad de producir objetos especiales, que no sabríamos decir cómo podrían actuar en esas mismas circunstancias.8 Un inciso: aunque el cuadro general haya cambiado bastante entre el Tractatus y las Investigaciones, ya en el Tractatus, como se ve en las dos citas, Wittgenstein había afirmado que el signo independiente, el nombre, no es cognitivamente independiente. El significado como uso. Ahora querría tomar en consideración un tema que niega la prioridad del uso sobre la representación en la competencia lingüística. Una aclaración previa. Hay un sentido en el que para mí está claro que el lenguaje tiene su origen en el hacer, y por lo tanto sería justificable defender la prioridad del uso. Hablar es una forma de actuar, y las palabras son efectos de acciones que cambian las circunstancias en las que son producidas. Estas mismas acciones se vuelven representaciones de las cosas sobre las que actúan. Un comportamiento lingüístico requiere representaciones. Imaginemos que produzco un comportamiento lingüístico. Categorizaré las circunstancias, incluido lo que haya sido dicho por los otros, como algo de un cierto tipo; consideraré las circunstancias de este tipo como circunstancias que se pueden conectar con otras, y cuanto digo tendrá el objetivo de producir un determinado paso sucesivo, o una determinada gama de pasos sucesivos, en lugar de otras. Considerar circunstancias como de un tipo, es contemplar una propiedad suya abstracta que generalmente las aúna con situaciones que no se dan. Considerar un paso sucesivo es tener en cuenta circunstancias que no se dan 8 Wittgenstein afirma explícitamente, en la sección 40, que no se tiene que «scambiare il significato del nome con il portatore del nome». De hecho, observa, un nombre no pierde significado si el que lo lleva deja de existir. Esto se opondría aúna concepción del significado como denotación. Pero no es así. El significado de un nombre puede ser el objeto que él denota, y la relación permanece incluso cuando uno de los referentes deja de existir. Soy hijo de mi padre, aunque mi padre haya muerto. 15 todavía y que quizás no se darán. Ambas cosas requieren que me represente circunstancias. No es posible ver, de otra manera, cómo lo que no se da y lo que no se da todavía, es decir, los inexistentes, podrían influir en lo que se da. En conclusión, la categorización de las circunstancias y de los pasos sucesivos es un elemento que depende de la información lateral – de lo que es representado sin estar inmediatamente presente. La información lateral, junto con la inmediatamente disponible, categoriza las circunstancias y las conecta con las posibles consecuencias, llevándome a elegir un comportamiento lingüístico en lugar de otro. La información lateral y la interacción con ella es propiamente lo que acompaña al uso lingüístico, y que se podría también calificar de proceso, en el que están implicadas la memoria y la imaginación. Por tanto, no solo podemos adoptar un modelo denotativo para el significado proporcionando diferencias de significado por medio de diferencias de tipo en los objetos significados, sino que no podemos proporcionar estas diferencias a través de usos distintos sin implicar representaciones. Dejemos a un lado lo que acabo de decir, esto es que el uso requiere representaciones, y consideremos una situación en la que el significado sea el uso. Imaginemos un caso extremo, en el que no haya instrucciones sobre cómo usar las expresiones de la lengua, sino que el uso dependa inmediatamente de cómo somos. A la petición «¡Pásame una laja!» respondo pasando la laja, al igual que, cuando bebo vino segrego las encimas para digerirlo. ¿Las cosas no podrían funcionar así? En primer lugar, si fuera así, podríamos considerar la manera en la que somos, o mejor una parte de cómo somos, una representación de 'Te paso una laja'. Pero, y este es el punto, sobre todo no somos así: a la petición «¡Pásame una laja!» podemos no responder, no porque no la hayamos oído, sino que podemos replicar que no pensamos hacerlo. Por otra parte, parece bastante inverosímil que los españoles sean así, y que los alemanes sean de una manera tal que repliquen a 'Reich mir eine Platte zu' pasando una laja mientras 16 que los españoles sean de una manera que la pasen para replicar a 'Pásame una laja'. Uno de los motivos por los cuales tiene éxito la idea de que el significado es el uso es que nos libra de una ontología de los significados. En el cuadro aquí presentado, los significados están reducidos a cosas totalmente normales, como palabras u objetos corrientes. Por tanto, también este cuadro nos libra de una ontología de los significados. La contingencia del significado. Para acabar querría detenerme en un punto que Wittgenstein considera y, al mismo tiempo, pasa por alto, y que he resumido anteriormente en el punto (viii), de esta manera: la conexión entre palabra y denotado tal vez consiste en un paradigma, pero no requiere que el denotado sea indestructible y que se adjunte, por así decirlo, a la lengua, ni que se recuerde exactamente el denotado, ni que cada vez surja en nuestra mente una imagen de él. El problema tiene dos aspectos, uno cognitivo y uno epistémico. El aspecto cognitivo. Una vez que se tome en consideración una explicación naturalista de los mecanismos cognitivos, se presentará como obvio que a veces estos mecanismos pueden funcionar mejor o peor de lo que lo hacen habitualmente, y por tanto también que ocasionalmente pueden no funcionar. Tomemos un caso extremo. Si estoy bajo los efectos de las drogas, mi nivel de consciencia es inadecuado, y mi comportamiento lingüístico puede ser inapropiado. En una situación de este tipo, las palabras que usamos para orientar nuestra atención y la de los demás pueden no alcanzar el objetivo. De alguna manera, los efectos de las drogas representan solo una situación especialmente dramática. Disfunciones, ruidos, etc. los hay en cada caso. Además los mismos mecanismos de la percepción y de la atención son de tal modo que las señales repetidas pierden eficacia, y por lo tanto la repetición de una señal, puede 17 hacerla menos eficaz, porque en ese caso será en parte desatendida. Tengo sin embargo dudas sobre el hecho de que cuando se habla de algo no sea necesario que surja en nuestra mente una imagen de ello. Pensamos en algo sólo si nuestros estados cerebrales cambian su configuración respecto a cuando no pensamos en ello. Por tanto, si al hablar de una cosa, nuestros estados cerebrales no cambian, no pensamos realmente en esta cosa, y por consiguiente no hablamos de ella ni siquiera de verdad. Es sin embargo verdad que no es obligatorio que tenga que surgir en nuestra mente una imagen de ella, o que la imagen de la que nos hacemos de esta manera conscientes tenga que ser distinta de la percepción de la palabra con la que hablamos de la cosa, que en efecto la representa. El aspecto epistémico. Los argumentos epistémicos no pueden funcionar mejor que los mecanismos cognitivos sobre los que giran. Pero tienen un límite ulterior. Pueden girar en el vacío. Se pueden, de hecho, hacer construcciones epistémicas a cualquier nivel de sofisticación, que estarán infundadas si no se llega a conocer la situación a nivel cognitivo.9 Lo que no excluye que a veces estas construcciones sean fructíferas, y que constituyan el objetivo más alto de nuestras construcciones cognitivas.10 Referencias bibliográficas J.J. Acero 1999 "Wittgenstein, la definición ostensiva y los límites del lenguaje" (Teorema 18, 5-17). G.P. Baker e P.M.S. Hacker 1980 Wittgenstein/Meaning and Understanding (Oxford Blackwell). P. Bloom 2000 How Children Learn he Meanings of Words (Cambridge MA Mit Press/Bradford Books). K. Donnellan 1966 "Reference and Definite Descriptions" (Philosophical Review 75, 281304). 9 «Non costituisce un'obiezione contro tale modo di definizione il dire che è ambiguo. Ogni definizione può essere fraintesa.» (Parte I, nota en p. 25). 10 Este estudio de investigación ha sido posible realizarlo gracias a la finaciación conjunta del Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca Scientifica Tecnologica (MURST) y de la Università di Bologna. El proyecto nacional tiene el título "Conocenza e cognizione" y está coordinado por Paolo Parrini, de la Università di Firenze, el proyecto local tiene el título "Teoria naturale dell'interpretazione" y está coordinado por mí. 18 J. Fodor 1975 The Language of Thought (Cambridge MA Harvard UP). K. Koffka 1935 Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York Harcourt Brace; tr. it. Principi di psicologia della forma, Torino Boringhieri 1970). D. Marr 1982 Vision (New York Freeman). W.V.O. Quine 1951 "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (Philosophical Review 60, 20-43; tr. it. di E. Mistretta in Il problema del significato Roma Ubaldini 1966). E. Stenius 1964 Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Oxford Blackwell). L. Wittgenstein 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (titolo originale Logischphilosophische Abhandlung, Londra Routledge & Kegan Paul; tr. it. di A.G. Conte Torino Einaudi 1964). L. Wittgenstein 1953 Philoophisces Untersuchungen (Oxford Blackwell; tr. it. di R. Piovesan e M. Trinchero Ricerche filosofiche Torino Einaudi 1967). L. Wittgenstein 1958 The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford Blackwell; tr. it. di A.G. Conte Quaderno blu e quaderno marrone Torino Einaudi 20002).

This is a pre-print. Please cite to final, published version: Rubel, A., & Jones, K. M. L. (2020). The temptation of data-enabled surveillance: Are universities the next cautionary tale? Communications of the ACM, 63(4), 22–24.https://doi.org/10.1145/3382741. The Temptation of Data-enabled Surveillance: Are Universities the Next Cautionary Tale? Alan Rubel Information School Center for Law, Society & Justice University of Wisconsin-Madison [email protected] Kyle M. L. Jones School of Informatics and Computing, Department of Library and Information Science Indiana University-Indianapolis (IUPUI) [email protected] I. Intro There is increasing concern about "surveillance capitalism," whereby for-profit companies generate value from data, while individuals are unable to resist (Zuboff 2019). Non-profits using data-enabled surveillance receive less attention. Higher education institutions (HEIs) have embraced data analytics, but the wide latitude that private, profit-oriented enterprises have to collect data is inappropriate. HEIs have a fiduciary relationship to students, not a narrowly transactional one (see Jones et al, forthcoming). They are responsible for facets of student life beyond education. In addition to classrooms, learning management systems, and libraries, HEIs manage dormitories, gyms, dining halls, health facilities, career advising, police departments, and student employment. HEIs collect and use student data in all of these domains, ostensibly to understand learner behaviors and contexts, improve learning outcomes, and increase institutional efficiency through "learning analytics" (LA). ID card swipes and Wi-Fi log-ins can track student location, class attendance, use of campus facilities, eating habits, and friend groups. Course management systems capture how students interact with readings, video lectures, and discussion boards. Application materials provide demographic information. These data are used to identify students needing support, predict enrollment demands, and target recruiting efforts. These are laudable aims. However, current LA practices may be inconsistent with HEIs' fiduciary responsibilities. HEIs often justify LA as advancing student interests, but some projects advance primarily organizational welfare and institutional interests. Moreover, LA advances a narrow conception of student interests while discounting privacy and autonomy. Students are generally unaware of the information collected, do not provide meaningful consent, and express discomfort This is a pre-print. Please cite to final, published version: Rubel, A., & Jones, K. M. L. (2020). The temptation of data-enabled surveillance: Are universities the next cautionary tale? Communications of the ACM, 63(4), 22–24.https://doi.org/10.1145/3382741. and resigned acceptance about HEI data practices, especially for non-academic data (see Jones et al. forthcoming). The breadth and depth of student information available, combined with their fiduciary responsibility, create a duty that HEIs exercise substantial restraint and rigorous evaluation in data collection and use. Consider several recent examples. II. Three cases (1) Movement tracking. Based on student ID card swipes, a university researcher mapped student movements and social networks and built student retention models. It plans to use Wi-Fi router data to form even more detailed understandings and to share this information with advisors (Blue 2018). It is unclear whether students are aware that their data is collected, have opted in, or provided informed consent. To act in students' interests, this HEI could have provided substantial information before the study started (including its rationale), the ability for students to easily opt-out, and a clear policy about collection and use of movement tracking data. This university is one of many engaging in intensive student tracking, either by dedicated beacons, Wi-Fi check-ins, or phone apps (Harwell 2019). (2) Third-parties. In April 2018, researchers from Pearson publishing revealed that they had conducted an experiment by incorporating encouraging, "growth mindset" messages into a learning software interface and testing (without students' knowledge or consent) whether they affected students' performance (Herold 2018). This demonstrates the value of student information to third parties for non-educational goals, including corporate profit. Similarly, Piazza, maker of a popular question-and-answer app required by many instructors, has sold student data based on students "opting-in" through a pre-checked box on the app sign-up page. Acting in students', rather than vendors' interests demands that HEIs develop stronger controls to protect students and avoid learner data becoming part of surveillance capitalism. At the beginning of the relationship with vendors, HEIs should require that edTech companies make opting-in difficult. If the data collection involves interventions or data sales, HEIs should re-evaluate the relationship, and perhaps require that the companies compensate students for their data. (3) Intensive advising. Like many HEIs, Georgia State University (GSU) has struggled to ensure that students (in particular those from underrepresented backgrounds) complete their degrees. In 2011, GSU developed a system tracking academic and financial information that alerts advisors about risk factors (e.g., an unsatisfactory grade in a key course). GSU's six-year graduation rate rose from 48% in 2011 to 55% in 2018 (Hefling 2019). Moreover, students of color, Pell-eligible, and first-generation students now graduate at higher rates than the student body overall (Ekowo and Palmer 2016). The GSU case is often described as a LA success. However, GSU simultaneously hired dozens of new advisors and substantially increased student advising. Hence, it is not just an analytics program; it is an advising program informed by data. Certainly, the improved student outcomes are important, but it is not clear how much is due to LA, exactly what GSU's advising interventions actually are, and whether they provide the best outcomes for each student or just for GSU. Do they steer students away from challenging courses, reducing agency and potential for excellence, or provide tutoring services for at-risk students-increasing their agency and capabilities? It is unclear that the increased student surveillance improved social good, or that GSU considered all of the relevant moral trade-offs. It is crucial to ensure that we don't learn the This is a pre-print. Please cite to final, published version: Rubel, A., & Jones, K. M. L. (2020). The temptation of data-enabled surveillance: Are universities the next cautionary tale? Communications of the ACM, 63(4), 22–24.https://doi.org/10.1145/3382741. wrong lesson and retain the analytics at the expense of the advising. Acting in students' best interests would require a robust, ongoing evaluation. III. Doing it differently The above cases illustrate a range of issues in LA, and each demonstrates how HEIs can better fulfill their responsibilities to advance student interests. HEIs have responsibilities before developing LA programs, while student data is collected and analyzed (especially by third parties), and after analytics have been incorporated. Here, we make explicit some of the specific responsibilities of HEIs have as information fiduciaries that can guide their actions. (1) Diverging interests. Fiduciaries have a responsibility to act in the best interests of their clients, although not necessarily to act only to advance client interest. Data analytics may provide insights for HEIs, and help them fulfill their responsibilities to educate students and marshal resources effectively. However, it is an open question whether LA will live up to that promise or that primarily student interests motivate LA research. The tracking and third-party data use cases do not advance student interests. Moreover, universities collect and use data somewhat indiscriminately because it is potentially relevant to their educational and custodial missions. Yet this "relevance condition" is insufficient to justify data collection, analysis, and use (see Rubel and Jones 2016). Any student data is potentially relevant to educational objectives and it is impossible to tell a priori which will actually be useful. Hence, a collection principle based solely on potential relevance is no limitation at all. (2) Fostering trust and trustworthiness. Students attend HEIs believing they are trustworthy, will respect students as individuals, and will not implement systems that subordinate student rights and interests for the sake of institutional or third-party goals. Yet systems currently being built and deployed create opportunities for greater privacy intrusions (the tracking case) and for institutional benefit (movement tracking, third party use). Students have little knowledge of how they are surveilled, typically have no ability to opt out, are uneasy about data collection by HEIs, and cannot control use of their data. It is worth asking whether their trust is misplaced, or whether they must simply acquiesce because of the social and economic value of a college education (see Harwell 2019). (3) The right benefits. The benefits of LA may be quite limited. The exemplary LA system (GSU) rests substantially on advising resources, not data, with small increases in student success. It is unclear whether success stems from funneling students into easier courses or from collecting and analyzing troves of student data. HEIs do have obligations to advance the educational interests of at-risk students. However, it does not follow that HEIs should subordinate students' privacy and autonomy interests for the sake of (speculative) retention and achievement rates. Student support (social, advising, tutoring, financial, mental health) should come first, and long before impinging on other interests. (4) Full account of student interests. We should also be wary of narrowly construing student interests. The above cases focus on student academic achievement, but students have other interests as well, including privacy. They should not have to forego that interest for a marginal (and speculative) return in academic achievement. This should seem familiar to professionals who bristle at overweening surveillance by supervisors. (5) Full range of higher education's aims. Higher education has a number of aims, including developing communication, critical thinking, understanding and appreciation of diversity, and This is a pre-print. Please cite to final, published version: Rubel, A., & Jones, K. M. L. (2020). The temptation of data-enabled surveillance: Are universities the next cautionary tale? Communications of the ACM, 63(4), 22–24.https://doi.org/10.1145/3382741. development of rewarding employment and careers (see Bok 2006). These are fostered by helping students develop their autonomy. Yet close monitoring of student movement, social networks, and daily habits is an imposition on student privacy, a key element in developing and exercising individual autonomy. If we value student autonomy, we ought to curtail student surveillance (Rubel and Jones, 2016). (6) Third parties. Students' social networks, their travel around campus, their health, political, and religious activities are inferable from movements. If that information is valuable for HEIs, it will be of interest to others: potential employers, the FBI (pursuant to business records requests under Patriot Act section 215), software vendors, and more. Student privacy protections under FERPA are limited. Moreover, the more student data collected the greater the risk for data breaches. Hence, LA carries risks that we should consider in determining whether it advances student interests overall. IV. Conclusion To be clear, we are not opposed to LA tout court. Some student data collection will advance legitimate educational and custodial goals while respecting student privacy and fostering autonomy. However, LA and data-enabled surveillance can begin as tools for social good but slide into morally suspect territory, especially in immersive institutions with fiduciary responsibilities like HEIs. Institutional interests and student interests are not identical, and we should not assume that they align. Governments, corporations, and HEIs should avoid data collection and analysis as a matter of convenience and for specious reasons. When HEIs aim to advance student educational interests, they should primarily do so in ways that are consistent with interests in privacy and autonomy. In short, HEIs should conduct LA in ways that justify the substantial trust that students place in them. That will require restraint and evaluation at the beginning, during, and at the end of LA projects. References Blue, A. (2018, March 7). Researcher looks at 'digital traces' to help students. University of Arizona News. Retrieved from https://uanews.arizona.edu/story/researcher-looks-digital-traces-helpstudents Bok, D. C. 2006. Our underachieving colleges: A candid look at how much students learn and why they should be learning More. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ekowo, E. & Palmer, I. (2016, Oct. 24) The Promise and Peril of Predictive Analytics in Higher Education: A Landscape Analysis, New America). Harwell, D. (2019, December 24). Colleges are turning students' phones into surveillance machines, tracking the locations of hundreds of thousands. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/24/colleges-are-turning-students-phonesinto-surveillance-machines-tracking-locations-hundreds-thousands/ Hefling, K. (2019, January 16). The 'Moneyball' solution for higher education. Politico. Herold, B. (2018, April 17). Pearson tested 'social-psychological' messages in learning software, with mixed results. Education Week. Retrieved from http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/DigitalEducation/2018/04/pearson_growth_mindset_software.ht ml This is a pre-print. Please cite to final, published version: Rubel, A., & Jones, K. M. L. (2020). The temptation of data-enabled surveillance: Are universities the next cautionary tale? Communications of the ACM, 63(4), 22–24.https://doi.org/10.1145/3382741. Jones, K. M. L., Rubel, A., & LeClere, E. (forthcoming). A matter of trust: Higher education institutions as information fiduciaries in an age of educational data mining and learning analytics. Journal of the Association for Information Science & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.24327 Rubel, A. & Jones, K. M. L. (2016). Student privacy in learning analytics: An information ethics perspective. The Information Society, 32(2), 143–159. doi: 10.1080/01972243.2016.1130502 Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. New York, NY: PublicAffairs.

Do Gestalt Effects Show that We Perceive High-Level Aesthetic Properties? Raamy Majeed Draft: December 2017 [email protected] ABSTRACT: Whether we perceive high-level properties is presently a source of controversy. A promising test case for whether we do is aesthetic perception. Aesthetic properties are distinct from low-level properties, like shape and colour. Moreover, some of them, e.g. being serene and being handsome, are properties we appear to perceive. Aesthetic perception also shares a similarity with gestalt effects, e.g. seeing-as, in that aesthetic properties, like gestalt phenomena, appear to 'emerge' from low-level properties. Gestalts effects, of course, are widely observed, which raises the question: do gestalt effects make it plausible that we (sometimes) perceive high-level aesthetic properties? Contra Stokes (forthcoming), this paper argues that they don't. This is interesting in its own right, but it also points to a more general lesson, namely we should resist the temptation to appeal to gestalt effects to argue for high-level perception. KEYWORDS: High-Level Properties; Aesthetic properties; Rich Content; Liberal Content; Gestalt Psychology; Seeing-as Whether we perceptually experience high-level properties is presently a source of controversy. A good, though neglected, test case for whether we do is aesthetic perception. Both common sense and dominant traditions in art criticism appear to treat aesthetic properties as perceptible. Moreover, these tend to pass as high-level properties on major ways of drawing the high-level vs. low-level distinction. For instance, they are properties which we can be aware of only via the neural processing of low-level properties (Lyons 2005). The ethereal quality of a Casorati painting, say, cannot be perceived without processing its shapes and colours. It appears, then, that there are prima facie reasons for taking seriously the thesis we perceive high-level aesthetic properties. If this thesis actually turns out true, it would not only be a significant result, but a cause for surprise for many philosophers of mind sceptical of high-level perception. !1 Stokes (forthcoming) argues it is true, and does so by appealing to the occurrence of gestalt effects, e.g. seeing-as. Gestalt effects are often employed in discussions of aesthetic experience, e.g. Sibley (1959), Walton (1970) and Arnheim (1974). They are also sometimes alluded to in discussions of high-level perception, e.g. Block (2014) and Helton (2016). However, aside from Stokes, there is a conspicuous absence of any discussion of the idea that lessons for high-level perception might be drawn from the analogy between perceiving aesthetic properties and gestalt effects. Stokes's paper is significant precisely because it offers the only articulation of this idea to date. The present paper aims to explore this idea further, and does so by raising scepticism about Stokes's proposal. In what follows, I outline Stokes's argument (§I), highlight an important distinction between types of gestalt effects (§II), and draw on this distinction to explain why the argument doesn't work (§III). I conclude by drawing the opposite lesson to the one presently available: gestalt effects do not make it plausible that we perceive high-level aesthetic properties. I. The Argument from Seeing-As Stokes defends the thesis that we (sometimes) perceive high-level aesthetic properties by appealing to the following argument: 1. Seeing-as, e.g. seeing an image as a duck vs. seeing it as a rabbit, involves the representation of high-level properties. 2. Plausibly, the two overall experiences involved in seeing-as, e.g. seeing an image as a duck vs. seeing it as a rabbit, differ in phenomenology. 3. The most natural explanation for (2) is that seeing-as involves a difference in visual representation. 4. Therefore, seeing-as involves the visual representation of high-level properties. ---------------------------------------- 5. Aesthetic properties, like being serene and being impressionist, are high-level properties. 6. Perceiving such aesthetic properties involves the same kind of perceptual gestalts as seeing-as. 7. Therefore, perceiving such aesthetic properties involves the visual representation of high-level properties. !2 The argument is an inference to the best explanation, and attempts to make plausible the conclusion, "aesthetic reaction sometimes involves perceptual representation of high-level properties" (pg. 14-5). One may take issue with any number of its premises, but the point of interest for us is the part of the argument which exploits the similarity between gestalt effects and our aesthetic reactions. In other words, what concerns us is premise (6). As we shall see, this premise, as well as (1) and (4), are called into question on account of different ways of understanding gestalt phenomena. II. Types of Gestalt Effects Stokes's exposition of gestalt effects relies on the notion of seeing-as, which he takes to be exemplified by our experiences of the duck-rabbit (figure. 1) and the Rubin goblet (figure. 2). These examples are misleading. Nevertheless, explaining why they are so helps identify the precise way in which our aesthetic reactions are supposed to involve the same kind of perceptual gestalts as those involved in seeing-as. The examples are misleading for the following reason. The phenomenon of seeing-as, exemplified by these examples, is a gestalt shift. All gestalt shifts are gestalt effects, but not all gestalt effects are gestalt shifts. The problem is gestalt shifts count as gestalt effects in two ways, which in turn obscures the precise feature they have in common with aesthetic reaction. (What such reaction has in common with gestalt effects, I shall argue, is a feature that is not particular to gestalt shifts). Some background helps bring this out. The term 'gestalt' literally means shape or form, while Gestalt psychology is a theory premised on the primacy of perceiving the whole over its parts. As von der Heydt et al. observe, "structured wholes or Gestalten, rather than sensations, are the primary units of mental life. This was the key idea of the new and revolutionary Gestalt theory, developed by Wertheimer and his colleagues in Berlin" (2012: 1173). This idea is often spelt out by explaining how certain demonstrable visual effects conform to gestalt principles to do with perceptual grouping and figure-ground organisation. Stokes's argument does not rely on Gestalt psychology being true, but simply the occurrence of certain gestalt effects. The theory, nonetheless, helps inform what counts as a gestalt effect. Such an effect is an effect that conforms to one or more gestalt principles; principles concerning figure-ground organisation and perceptual grouping. Gestalt shifts, as exemplified by our experiences of the duck- !3 rabbit and the Rubin goblet, conform to two such principles. The obvious one is 'multistability'. This principle concerns how ambiguous figures, i.e. figures that can be seen as more than one image, cannot be viewed simultaneously, but rather shift back and forth between the various images. This holds true for our experiences of the duck-rabbit and the Rubin goblet, as well as our experiences of simpler images, like the Necker cube (figure 3.). In the latter case, we see the image of a cube either as one where the bottom left square appears in the foreground while the top right one appears in the background, or vice versa. We cannot, however, see the image as one where both the bottom left and top right squares appear in the foreground; nor as one where both appear in the background. The image shifts back and forth between either square being in the foreground or the background. This is why effects such as these are described as gestalt shifts. These examples also conform to another principle, viz. 'emergence'. According to this principle, we often see images primarily as a whole, as opposed to constructing them out of parts which we have to see first. For instance, in the duck-rabbit case, we see either an image of a duck or of a rabbit, but crucially, for whichever image we see, we appear to see it as a whole. That is, in contrast to first seeing the individual colours and shapes that compose the image, and then piecing together the image from such experiences. This principle goes to the very heart of gestalt psychology. But what's more, this principle is satisfied by visual effects that don't involve gestalt shifts. In other words, visual effects can conform to this principle without also conforming to the principle of multistability. Consider the zebra image (figure. 4) by way of demonstration. When perceiving the image, we do not first see its parts, i.e. the various vertical and horizontal black lines, individually and then infer the whole, i.e. the zebra-shape, from these parts. Rather, the zebra-shape appears all at once. Our experience of the image, then, conforms to the principle of emergence. Nevertheless, it does so without conforming to the principle of multistability, as the figure is not ambiguous between two or more images. This distinction between types of gestalt effects - based on the particular gestalt principles to which they conform - proves significant for how we are to understand (6). The premise states perceiving aesthetic properties, e.g. being serene and being impressionist, involves the same kind of perceptual gestalts as seeing-as. We now see that this could mean aesthetic perception conforms to the principe of !4 emergence, the principle of multistability or both. An examination of aesthetic experience, nevertheless, reveals the relevant principle to be emergence. In his exposition of (6), Stokes claims it is "natural" to describe a case where a child acquires the capacity to reliably attribute 'impressionist' to paintings "in terms of a gestalt, even if that gestalt cannot be defined in rigorous terms" (pg. 6). Though a child's visual experiences of paintings before and after she learns how to discriminate impressionist paintings can (figuratively) be said to undergo a gestalt shift, her experience of any given painting doesn't have the feature of multistability. Looking at a Monet doesn't involve our experiences switching back and forth between two ambiguous figures, one that has the property being impressionist, the other which doesn't; or likewise, one that has the property being serene, the other which doesn't. A charitable reading has it that the gestalt feature in common between seeing the duck-rabbit and seeing a Monet as impressionist is not multistability but something else. The following passage lends a clue: What [sensory perception] can represent, and more or less accurately, is the way basic features of an object are organized. This is the phenomenal character that pops out when one shifts from seeing-as a duck to seeing-as a rabbit, and perhaps it is what pops out when one learns to recognize pine trees. (pg. 27) 1 This suggests a child's visual experience of a painting when she acquires the capacity to reliably attribute 'impressionist' to paintings has the following characteristic: the way basic features of the painting are organised 'pop out' at her. The principle of gestalt theory most suitable to describe this effect is emergence. When she sees the painting, she does not piece together the organised whole from its basic features; rather, she perceives the whole all at once. Plausibly, a gestalt effect, then, still occurs, even though it isn't literally a gestalt shift. Moreover, it does so precisely because there is a feature, viz. emergence, which this and other aesthetic reactions have in common with instances of seeing-as. This point is significant, as we now see the suitability of The mention of recognising pine trees is a reference to Siegel (2006), who argues that a difference in visual ex1 perience is brought about when one learns how to discriminate pine trees. !5 comparing aesthetic reactions with gestalt effects (by way of arguing for high-level aesthetic perception) rests on both exhibiting the feature of emergence. III. Why the Argument Doesn't Work Stokes's argument appeals to a similarity between gestalt effects and aesthetic reaction to argue we can perceive high-level aesthetic properties. We now see the relevant similarity to be emergence. This focus on emergence helps us identify two distinct ways of disambiguating the phenomenon of seeing-as, both of which ultimately render the argument implausible. The difference has to do with what is supposed to emerge as the relevant gestalten. On a modest reading, the gestalten which emerge or 'pop out' are certain organised shape properties. For example, in the duck-rabbit case, what emerge are the shape-properties being organised like a duck and being organised like a rabbit. By contrast, on an immodest reading, what emerge are something above and beyond organised shape properties. They might be artificial kind properties, e.g. being a duck image and being a rabbit image, or being a duck representation and being a rabbit representation. To be clear, the above distinction rests not on the shifting nature of the gestalten, but the kinds of gestalten at issue. On the modest interpretation, the gestalten are organised shapes, whereas in the immodest case, they are something else. How to articulate what emerges in this case is hard to say. This, in part, is due to the difference between the two interpretations being typically obscured in discussions of seeing-as, especially those which employ the duck-rabbit image as an example. The difference can be brought out by comparing this to the Necker cube. In the latter case, what emerges are just the organised shape properties. We see the image as one of a cube, in particular a cube that oscillates between one where either the left or right square is in the foreground. Crucially, the gestalten that appear are only organised shape properties. By comparison, in the duck-rabbit case, while the two gestalten that emerge in the first instance are organised shape properties, i.e. being organised like a duck and being organised like a rabbit, it also arguably involves two further gestalten, e.g. being a duck representation and being a rabbit representation. !6 A way to illustrate this is to claim seeing organised shape properties doesn't require conceptpossession, whereas seeing properties of the latter kind does. One can, for instance, see the shape, 2 which happens to be the shape of a goblet, without recognising that this shape is the shape of a goblet. One can't, however, see that this shape is the shape of a goblet without possessing the concept of a goblet. Of course, any claims about concept-possession are bound to be contentious. But this example is merely illustrative, and is by no means required to make the distinction between the two types of gestalten which might be at play in some cases of seeing-as, e.g. the duck-rabbit image. In what follows, I treat this as a distinction between seeing organised shape properties and seeing certain artificial kind properties - though I assume the ensuing points can also be made on other ways of capturing this distinction. The advantage of the modest reading of seeing-as, where the gestalten are (only) organised shape properties, is that such effects are widely observed. Whether these effects conform exactly to gestalt principles, as they have been described by various gestalt theorists, is open to dispute. However, that these effects occur, I take it, isn't. This means insofar as the perception of aesthetic properties involves the same kind of perceptual gestalts as seeing-as, we have good grounds to suppose that we do, genuinely, perceive aesthetic properties. The problem with this reading is twofold. First, it threatens the role (6) is supposed to play in the argument. Simply put, it is contentious whether organised shape properties can be described as high-level properties. This makes (1) - that seeing-as involves the representation of high-level properties - contentious. But it also means even if (6) were true, it won't, subsequently, help establish that we can perceive high-level aesthetic properties - at least not in an uncontroversial manner. To elaborate, organised shape properties are dependent on low-level (non-organised) shape properties, and thereby count as high-level properties in one sense. But shape properties are paradigm examples of low-level properties, and so even organised shape properties count as low-level properties in another sense. For the purposes of this paper, I wish to bypass the thorny issue of whether organ3 This is orthogonal to the thesis that all perception involves some sort of conceptual content.2 Following Brogaard and Chomanaski (2015), my preference is to treat the high-level vs. low-level distinction as 3 a relative notion, where the organised shape properties are at a higher-level than the shape properties on which they depend. !7 ised shape properties count as high-level properties. This is because adjudicating the matter will prove difficult given that how we ought to understand the high-level vs. low-level distinction will depend on your theoretical concerns. What is worth noting is one of the concerns here is to understand the distinction in a way that respects the present controversy over whether we perceive high-level properties. I doubt those who deny rich perceptual content wish to also deny the occurrence of gestalt effects concerning perceptual grouping and figure-ground organisation. So the present controversy doesn't seem to be one about whether we can perceive high-level properties, where paradigm examples of such properties include organised shape properties. The overall consequence of the modest reading, then, is that (6) being true would, at best, only lend contentious support for the thesis that we can perceive highlevel aesthetic properties. The second problem is more damning, as here we find the modest reading actually also renders (6) implausible. How it precisely does so will depend on the aesthetic properties at issue. Stokes provides two examples of aesthetic properties, being serene and being impressionist. These properties aren't on a par. The dominant tradition in aesthetics is to treat aesthetic properties as those properties picked out by aesthetic terms, where these terms, following Sibley (1959), are viewed as terms which require perceptiveness in order for their application. Sibley's own list includes lifeless, serene, somber, dynamic, delicate, moving, trite, sentimental, tragic, handsome, and garish. Style properties, e.g. being impressionist and being fauvist, aren't paradigm aesthetic properties. They have to do with how we categorise artworks, as opposed to how we might describe them. Contra Stokes, this makes them artificial kind properties. But note, they are a special class of such properties, for their detection seems to require perceptiveness. For this reason, we may, following Stokes, also classify them as aesthetic properties. The labels don't really matter. What does is there being a difference between style properties and paradigmatic aesthetic properties; a difference which proves significant when assessing the plausibility of (6). One of the aesthetic properties mentioned, i.e. being impressionist, is an artificial kind property. This is the kind of property ruled out from being gestalten on the modest reading of seeing-as. So on this reading, we can't claim seeing aesthetic properties, qua properties such as being impressionist, involves the same kind of perceptual gestalts as seeing-as. Premise (6), it turns out, is implausible from the getgo. !8 A different challenge to (6) presents itself when we focus on paradigm examples of aesthetic properties, e.g. being serene. Like style properties, paradigm aesthetic properties, insofar as they are highlevel properties, are properties that depend on low-level properties, e.g. shape and colour. The exact nature of this dependence is a matter of dispute. Nevertheless, the fact that we posit high-level properties, for ontological or theoretical reasons, is demonstrative that they aren't properties identical with the low-level properties on which they depend. Or, if they are thus identical, these identities aren't obvious. They require the mastery of concepts, or something similar. Sibley for instance, in his discussion of aesthetic concepts, argues aesthetic judgements require the exercise of taste. Regardless of how we fill in the details, the point is, insofar as aesthetic properties are high-level properties, any inference from perceiving low-level properties, e.g. shape and colour, even organised shape properties, to perceiving high-level aesthetic properties, e.g. being serene, isn't justified; at least, not without further qualification. What is required is some further set of conditions that would license such inferences. Such conditions aren't hard to come by. They might involve acquiring the relevant concepts. Or gaining familiarity with artworks of a certain type such that we are able to recognise certain similar patterns in them even though they might differ dramatically in shape and colour, e.g. consider the differences between the works of Monet and Pissarro despite both being impressionist and often serene. But how we fill in the details here will prove crucial to the plausibility of whether we actually see high-level aesthetic properties. The condition of concept possession, for instance, makes it easy to deny high-level perception because the sceptic can argue even though we make aesthetic judgements concerning high-level properties, such judgements are really post-perceptual judgements we make on the basis of (only) seeing low-level properties. Likewise, if the condition is one of, say, familiarity, the sceptic could argue the patterns one sees are only patterns concerning low-level properties, e.g. certain similarities in organised patterns of shape and colour. The whole point of comparing aesthetic reaction to visual gestalts was that we are supposed to pre-empt such sceptical responses on the basis of the plausibility of the latter. But if the relevant inferences from gestalt effects to aesthetic reaction can only be made by stipulating further conditions, conditions which make room for well-known sceptical responses, we lose the incentive for making the comparison as means to argue for high-level aesthetic perception. !9 The immodest reading of seeing-as bypasses these worries because the gestalten in some cases are found to be high-level properties, e.g. artificial kind properties like being a duck representation. The advantage of this reading is since the perception of high-level properties is a feature of some visual gestalts, inferences from such visual gestalts to perceiving high-level aesthetic properties is licensed on the basis that both experiences are of the same kind. For instance, if we can actually see the property being a goblet representation from organised patterns of shape and colour in the Rubin goblet, insofar as aesthetic reaction is literally a form of perceptual gestalt, we can also, plausibly, perceive properties like being serene and being impressionist. The problem with this is whether visual gestalts actually involve the perception of high-level properties is very much open to dispute. In other words, (4) is contentious. Visual gestalts are demonstrable. However, what isn't is whether these effects involve merely the perception of organised patterns of shape and colour, or something above and beyond this. The duck-rabbit gestalt effect, for example, is widely reported, but it remains unclear whether this effect is to be interpreted as one where we actually see the property being a duck representation over and above the organised shape property being organised like a duck. All the reasons for being sceptical of high-level perception will motivate scepticism about such an interpretation. Subsequently, this reading of seeing-as is as controversial as the central controversy over whether we can see high-level properties. Though this paper concerns the use of gestalt effects to argue for the perception of high-level aesthetic properties, the above point also speaks to possible attempts to employ gestalt effects to argue for high-level perception more broadly. The central worry is any interpretation of gestalt effects, which would lend support for the thesis that we perceive high-level properties, would be as controversial as the thesis itself. To reiterate, this is because arguments that tell against the thesis also tell against such an interpretation. Hence, though gestalt effects are common, it is doubtful that high-level theorists can further their cause by appealing to them. In summary, premise (6) states that perceiving some aesthetic properties involves the same kind of perceptual gestalts as seeing-as. This is a premise in Stokes's argument for the thesis that we sometimes perceive high-level aesthetic properties. In this paper, we saw there are two readings of seeing-as. First, a modest reading which is plausible in and of itself, but which makes (6) implausible, and thereby !10 doesn't lend any additional credibility to the aforementioned thesis. Second, a less modest reading, one that makes (6) plausible, but which is controversial itself, and thus ultimately won't make the thesis any more plausible either. The upshot is we reach a negative verdict: gestalt effects do not make it plausible that we perceive high-level aesthetic properties. This is interesting in its own right, but this paper also hints at a more general take-home message, namely we should resist the temptation to appeal to gestalt effects to argue for high-level perception. REFERENCES Arnheim, R. (1974). Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Critical Eye The New Version. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. Block, N. (2014). 'Seeing-As in the Light of Vision Science'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572. Brogaard, B.& Chomanski, B. (2015). 'Cognitive Penetrability and High‐Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena?' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):469-486. Helton, G. (2016). 'Recent Issues in High-Level Perception'. Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862. Lyons, J. (2005). 'Clades, Capgras, and Perceptual Kinds'. Philosophical Topics 33(1): 185–206. Sibley, F. (1959). 'Aesthetic concepts'. Philosophical Review 68 (4):421-450. Siegel, S. (2006). 'Which Properties Are Represented in Perception?' In T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stokes, D. (forthcoming). 'Rich Perceptual Content and Aesthetic Properties'. In A. Bergqvist & R. Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Online version: https://philpapers.org/archive/STORPC.pdf von der Heydt, R. et. al. (2012). 'A Century of Gestalt Psychology in Visual Perception: I. Perceptual Grouping and Figure-Ground Organization'. Psychological Bulletin: American Psychological Association Vol. 138 (6): 1172-1217. Walton, K. (1970). 'Categories of Art'. Philosophical Review 79: 334-67. !11 ! Figure 1. ! Figure 2. Figure 3. Figure 4. !

摘要 這篇哲學論文是對約翰.麥克道爾(John McDowell)對「主體性」(subjectivity)看 法的一個探究。這個計畫由兩部分所組成。一方面,我將討論麥克道爾如何理解 並回應他所處理的諸多議題;另一方面,我將藉由考慮主體性的不同面向來進行 相關的討論:一個主體是一個存在世界中的知覺者、知識者、思想者、說話者、 行動者、具人格者(person)、以及(自我)意識者。我藉由指出並消解一個出自於「理 性動物」這個概念的緊張關係來開始這個探究:人類是自然的,卻也同時是理性 的。稍後這個探究藉由考慮麥克道爾的「第二自然∕天性」(second nature)概念 如何使我們成為具有多重面貌的人類主體來推進。透過細究麥克道爾的診斷與回 應,現代與當代哲學中的兩個中心錯誤–狹窄的自然觀以及「笛卡兒式的內在空 間」(Cartesian inner space)–將被指出並且拒斥。 在導論章裡我首先建議我們應該為某個對「世界」的看法留下空間。我進一 步論證「心靈性」(mentality)具有許多面向,而了解這些面向便是去了解人類主 體的多重面貌。在第一章裡,我解釋為了消解「理性動物」這個概念所產生的緊 張關係,亞里斯多德(Aristotle)的「第二自然∕天性」概念如何被引進。其後我 回應一些對這個策略的擔憂,包括萊特(Crispin Wright)及其它哲學家的批評。高 達美(Hans-Georg Gadamer)的「世界∕環境」區分也被引介並關聯到麥克道爾的 思想。第二章討論知覺與知識;麥克道爾的主要標的–笛卡兒式的內在空間–被 引進並批評。我也對史卓(Barry Stroud)與布雷克本(Simon Blackburn)的相關立場 進行評價。稍後我把心靈與世界(Mind and World)的主題和現有的脈絡關聯起 來;具體來說,我討論麥克道爾對戴維森(Donald Davidson)與康德(Immanuel Kant) 的引用與延伸。然後我討論一個常被提及的「觀念論」指控,以及布蘭登(Robert Brandom)的「殘餘笛卡兒主義」(residual Cartesianism)批評。第三章專注於庫律 普基(Saul Kripke)的維根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein),指出在規則依循背後的一個 主要論題是內在空間模型的一個版本,而且庫律普基的維根斯坦其實並不是真正 的維根斯坦。我回應來自庫許 (Martin Kusch)的許多批評;達美特 (Michael Dummett)對化約論的要求也被駁斥。其後,我考慮戴維森的「無語言」宣稱, 並討論麥克道爾在多大的程度上同意他。第四章我衡量來自德雷弗斯(Hubert Dreyfus)關於行動和行動者的批評。我討論麥克道爾如何論證德雷弗斯與梅洛龐 蒂(Maurice Merleau-Ponty)都犯了「無身體的智性主體迷思」(the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect)。討論當中也回應了艾爾斯(Michael Ayers)的智性主義指 控。其後我引入麥克道爾對帕菲特(Derek Parfit)人格看法、以及對戴維森對心物 關聯說法的批評。在第五章我專注於意識和自我意識。麥克道爾將他對帕菲特的 論證應用在康德身上,但基尼斯弗(Maximilian de Gaynesford)認為麥克道爾誤讀 了康德。我為麥克道爾回應這些批評。我進一步把這個討論關聯到麥克道爾對「概 念架構–內容二元論」(scheme-content dualism)的攻擊。這把我們帶領到麥克道 爾式看法對「感質」(qualia)的拒斥,並進一步到錯覺論證脈絡下「意向主義」 (intentionalism)和「選言主義」(disjunctivism)的爭論。我批評克瑞(Tim Crane)設 想意向主義以及錯覺論證的方式。我也討論了許多版本的選言主義。在結論章 裡,我表達了對麥克道爾「自我決定主體性」(self-determining subjectivity)這個 概念的疑慮。根據麥克道爾,人類的自由為「理由空間中的因果關係」(causations in the space of reasons)所構成,但如同賈斯金(Richard Gaskin)所指出,對它的一 個完整說明尚未被提供。我以一些關於要如何填滿這個麥克道爾式圖像的約略想 法來作結。 Abstract This essay is an inquiry into John McDowell's thinking on 'subjectivity.' The project consists in two parts. On the one hand, I will discuss how McDowell understands and responds to the various issues he is tackling; on the other, I will approach relevant issues concerning subjectivity by considering different aspects of it: a subject as a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person and (self-) conscious being in the world. The inquiry begins by identifying and resolving a tension generated by the very idea of 'rational animal': human beings are at the same time natural and rational. Later the inquiry proceeds by considering how McDowell's notion of 'second nature' enables us to be human subjects with many faces. By going through the diagnoses and responses of McDowell, two central problems in modern and contemporary philosophy – the narrow conception of nature and the Cartesian inner space model – are identified and repelled. In Episode N I first urge that we should leave room for a certain notion of 'world.' I further argue that mentality has many aspects, and to understand those aspects is to understand the many faces of human subject. In Episode I the Aristotelian notion of 'second nature' is discussed in order to resolve the tension in the very idea of 'rational animal.' Later I reply to some worries about this maneuver, including the objection from Crispin Wright. Hans-Georg Gadamer's distinction between world and environment is introduced and related to McDowell's thinking. Episode II discusses perception and knowledge; McDowell's main target – the Cartesian inner space – is introduced and criticized. Barry Stroud's and Simon Blackburn's positions are evaluated. Later I connect the main theme of Mind and World to the present context; in particular, I discuss McDowell's invocation of Donald Davidson and Immanuel Kant. And then I discuss a common accusation of idealism, and Robert Brandom's accusation of 'residual individualism.' Episode III concentrates on Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein, arguing that the master thesis behind the rule-following paradox is a version of the inner space model, and that Kripke's Wittgenstein is not Wittgenstein. Martin Kusch's objections are answered; Michael Dummett's demand of reductionism is rebutted. After this, I turn to Davidson's 'no language' claim, and discuss to what extent McDowell agrees with him. In Episode IV I evaluate objections from Hubert Dreyfus concerning action and agency. I discuss how Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty commit 'the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect' identified by McDowell. I answer Michael Ayer's charge of intellectualism in passing. Later I bring in McDowell's objections to Derek Parfit on personhood and to Davidson on the mind-body relation. In Episode V I focus on consciousness and self-consciousness. McDowell applies his argument against Parfit to Kant, but Maximilian de Gaynesford dissents. I reply to his objections on McDowell's behalf. I further connect this to McDowell's attacks on the dualism of scheme and content. This leads to my McDowellian rejection to the existence of qualia, and further brings me to the debate between intentionalism and disjunctivism in the context of the argument from illusion. I argue against Tim Crane's ways of conceiving issues about intentionalism and the argument from illusion. Varieties of disjunctivism are also discussed. In my Epilogue, I express my worry about McDowell's notion of 'self-determining subjectivity.' According to McDowell, human freedom consists in causations in the space of reason, but as Richard Gaskin points out, a satisfying story of it is yet to be provided. I close this essay with some rough ideas about how to fill in the details of the McDowellian picture. World and Subject With John McDowell Conference on McDowell's Philosophy March 2006 W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T ‧‧‧ Themes from McDowell ‧‧‧ Huei Ying (Tony) Cheng N A T I O N A L C H E N G – C H I U N I V E R S I T Y Department of Philosophy Taipei, Taiwan With My Parents Their 23rd Wedding Anniversary October 2003 獻給我的父母, 鄭松茂 張艾蓉 Contents Analytical Contents ix Preface (in Chinese) xix Preface xxv Episode N. The Many Faces of Human Subject 1 Episode I. Cogito and Homo sapiens 10 Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 23 Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 47 Episode IV. Agent and Person 72 Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 98 Epilogue. Self-Determining Subjectivity 126 Bibliography 133 Analytical Contents Episode N. The Many Faces of Human Subject World 1. I introduce the main theme of this essay, distinguishing my leading concern – human subject and its place in the world – from the one in philosophy of mind in the narrow sense, i.e. about the mind and its place in nature. The notion of 'nature' will be pivotal throughout the essay, so I intend to have a more careful treatment of it. 2. I discuss why my title starts with 'world' rather than 'subject.' In doing this, the central thesis of the essay – the world and minded human subject are constitutively interdependent – is anticipated. A neutral attitude towards the notion of 'world' is recommended through considering the traditional way of conceiving the problem of perception: metaphysics first (realism or not), and then epistemology (directness or not). A. D. Smith, who exemplifies this way of thinking, assumes that we have the world at the beginning. I argue that the methodology behind this way of thinking is metaphysically biased. A similar failure, though with the opposite direction, is attributed to René Descartes, in particular his 'method of doubt.' In Descartes' case, the world is 'bracket' at the starting point. Subject 1. Here I mainly argue for two points. First, the problems about mentality and those about human subject should be tackled together, for to think otherwise is to separate 'mind' and 'self.' Second, to understand human subject is to understand various aspects of it, for a self is always a functioning self. I also distinguish 'subject' from 'self' in the course of discussion, arguing that only the former is broad enough for my purpose. Analytical Contents x 2. John McDowell, my main figure, is introduced at this point. I note that his style of philosophizing creates difficulties for his commentators. In particular, we need to balance between the question-oriented and the figure-centered styles. I emphasis more on the latter because I hope to provide a more systematic investigation of McDowell's philosophy as an integrated whole and its place in the philosophical map. 3. I identify two strands of my project. The first one is about the tension between the rational and the natural; the second one is about how the biological-rooted rational capacities enable us to be perceivers, knowers, thinkers, speakers, agents, persons, and (self-) conscious subjects. I emphasize the latter strand. And I summarize McDowell's engagements with other philosophers, including Aristotle, Robert Brandom, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Crispin Wright, Saul Kripke, Michael Dummett, Donald Davidson, Hubert Dreyfus, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Derek Parfit, and Immanuel Kant, among others. I also say why I need an epilogue on self-determining subjectivity. Episode I. Cogito and Homo sapiens Nature 1. The tension between reason and nature (conceived with scientific terms) is characterized, and the fact that to have a satisfying self-image is to relieve this putative tension is noted. 2. Wilfrid Sellars's remark is quoted here to pave the way for distinguishing 'the space of reasons' and 'the realm of law,' corresponding to Sellars's 'manifest image' and 'scientific image.' I introduce two ways of confronting this distinction – bald naturalism and rampant platonism – and discuss why McDowell thinks both of them are unsatisfying. Nurture 1. McDowell's alternative picture – a naturalism of second nature, or naturalized platonism – is described as a middle course between bald naturalism and rampant platonism. I then briefly discuss the notion of 'second nature' in Aristotle. The naturalistic credential of 'phronesis' is urged by relating it to the notion of Bildung in German philosophy. And then I discuss how McDowell invokes these resources to argue against a factorizing understanding of Aristotle's thought that humans are rational animals. 2. Two lines of objection are described and answered. They concern the contrast between the space of reasons and the realm of law, and the differences between naturalized and rampant platonism. Two key points are argued; first, there are two Analytical Contents xi kinds of causality according to McDowell, and second, McDowell never attempts to knock rampant platonism down. 3. McDowell's view on mere animals is illustrated by the distinction between world and environment from Hans-Georg Gadamer. The notion of 'world' is connected to 'language,' 'freedom,' and 'openness.' I explain how this distinction helps us avoid two strands in the Cartesian thinking, that mere animals are automata, and humans are immaterial souls. 4. Brandom's accusation of residual individualism is partially answered by considering McDowell's criticism to Davidson's 'triangulation,' and a reservation of McDowell's presentation of Davidson – that is, triangulation is between 'self-standing subjects' – is made. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower Primeness 1. I invoke Timothy Williamson's two notions 'broadness' and 'primeness' to illustrate the differences between internalism and weak / strong externalism: internalism rejects both, weak externalism accepts broadness but rejects primeness, and strong externalism accepts both. 2. How Cartesian 'method of doubt' results in the 'inner space model' is discussed. McDowell's objection to skepticism is distinguished from others' ones, for example Barry Stroud's objection to the KK principle. The case of perception is identified as a prominent example of the inner space model. I discuss the debate between the common kind theory and disjunctivism, and relate this to the traditional debate about the analysis of knowledge raised by Edmund Gettier. Later an objection from Simon Blackburn is discussed and answered. 3. McDowell argues that the inner space model makes intentionality unavailable to us, because on that model we are never in touch with the world. Two motivations of the inner space model – from modern science and first-person authority – are damped: the former unjustly eliminates the space of reasons, and the latter renders our authority excessive. A stronger argument from the Fregean sense is answered by introducing the correct understanding of the notion of 'the cognitive realm.' 4. I go back to the parallel story in epistemology. The relation between justification and epistemic luck is strengthened in McDowell's picture. And then I discuss how McDowell's argument against the 'interiorization of the space of reasons' works against the traditional hybrid view of knowledge. According to him, the traditional view cannot make sense of our critical reasons and epistemic lucks, and it is ad hoc as far as skepticism is concerned. Traditionalist' argument from BIV is also answered by Analytical Contents xii noting the distinction between justification and exculpation. Openness 1. Primeness naturally leads to openness. I discuss how McDowell combines Kant's discursivity thesis and Davidson's objection with the dualism of scheme and content. The dialectic between coherentism and the Myth of the Given is characterized, with McDowell's 'seesaw' metaphor: we need external as well as rational constraint, but the seesaw seems to show that we cannot have it both ways. Bald naturalism appears here as a possible way of dismounting the seesaw through repudiating the sui generis character of the space of reasons. And then I introduce McDowell's central claim in his Locke Lecture that experiences are passively conceptual all the way out. 2. McDowell's central transcendental argument concerning how intentionality is possible is discussed. And his denial of 'the ontological gap' is explained. I then turn to the charge of idealism against the 'unboundedness of the conceptual' and how McDowell uses the act / content distinction to reply. 3. Brandom argues against McDowell's emphasis on 'experience,' and thinks that the emphasis betrays a 'residual individualism.' I reply to this by clarifying the notion of 'experience' adopted by McDowell; the significance of this is reflected by the fact that the same misreading seems to occur in other philosophers' thoughts, notably Michael Ayers. This leads to the question about how McDowell conceives the social elements of intentionality. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker Custom 1. I investigate McDowell's conception of the social elements of intentionality by considering his criticisms to Kripke's Wittgensteinian skeptical paradox. Kripke's skeptical doubt from 'the infinite regress of interpretation' and his corresponding skeptical solution are characterized. 2. Wittgenstein's remarks in PI §201 are referred to indicate a way to say no to the skeptic. I then explain why we should see Wittgenstein as distancing himself from reductionism about meaning. McDowell's various citations from Wittgenstein are interpreted, and Kripke's ways of pressing the skeptical challenge are discussed. In answering the challenge, I introduce Wittgenstein's notion of 'bedrock.' 3. I contrast McDowell's way of understanding 'communal' practices with Kripke's and Wright's ones; the former respects Wittgenstein's notion of 'custom,' while the latter renders a group of people 'a wooden community.' It turns out that Brandom's picture has a similar problem. I connect the wooden picture to the inner space model Analytical Contents xiii introduced before. 4. Kripke's objections to McDowell's so-called 'primitivism' are discussed. I put the emphasis on objections raised by Martin Kusch. Kusch argues that dispositionalism does not rely on the infinite regress of interpretation, and McDowell's view is similar to dispositionalism. I dispute both of these. In addition, I rebut Kusch's insistence that Kripke's picture is essentially social. I also disagree with his way of connecting the indeterminacy of meaning to reductionism. Finally, I briefly argue that McDowell advocates a delicate version of realism about meaning. 5. I trace the source of Kripke's and Wright's conviction in reductionism to the traditional dichotomy between the Cartesian and the Rylean, between psychologism and behaviorism. Quine is also responsible for this dichotomy. I discuss Dummett's effort to avoid the problem and McDowell's criticisms to it. Dummett distinguishes between 'full-blooded' and 'modest' theory of meaning, and thinks the latter unavoidably collapses into psychologism. I explain how McDowell invokes his conception of 'membership' to sustain the claim that in conversations we 'hear someone else's meaning in his words.' I then shift from McDowell's emphasis on custom and in turn on language to Davidson's claim that 'there is no such a thing as a language.' Bildung 1. I introduce Davidson's target – the conventional view of communication – and his putative counterexamples from malapropism. Although McDowell agrees on this, he nevertheless dissent to Davidson's 'leap,' that a public language plays no role in the constitution of subjectivity. This reflects their different conceptions of 'language games.' 2. I argue that McDowell sides with Davidson that we should not participate the rule-following discussions generated by Kripke's celebrated work on Wittgenstein. This involves giving up the conviction that communication is constituted by shared rules or conventions. The relevance of Bildung is also indicated. Episode IV. Agent and Person Embodiment 1. I start the argumentation by deepen my characterization of conceptualism, which has been introduced in the context of 'openness.' I emphasize McDowell's distinction between 'responsiveness to reasons' and 'responsiveness to reasons as such.' This concerns the relation he draws between conceptuality and rationality. Another crucial distinction about the way conceptual capacities enters the picture – between 'exercise' Analytical Contents xiv and 'operative' – is also explained. I then consider Ayers's objection that the picture recommended by McDowell makes our experiences 'quasi-linguistic.' This is a misunderstanding based on the dualism of the sensory and the intellectual. I then show that McDowell has a parallel story for 'action,' indicating that the locus of the disagreement between him and Dreyfus is the very idea of 'passivity' in perceptions and actions. 2. I note that Dreyfus launches his objections by contrasting McDowell with Samuel Todes's Body and World. Dreyfus first introduces his general framework between 'detached rule-following' and 'situation-specific way of coping.' I argue that actually McDowell regards conceptual capacities as situation-specific, and we can see this in his objections to Kripke's 'infinite regress of interpretation.' 3. Dreyfus improves his framework by replacing the original distinction with the one between 'subjectivity' and 'absorption.' However, I argue that his example from the baseball player Chuck Knoblauch betrays his confusion of 'conceptual mindedness' and 'attention.' I then argue that McDowell never regards attention as central in his picture. And I explain why Dreyfus's conception of self-awareness is problematic and how McDowell argues that Dreyfus and sometimes Maurice Merleau-Ponty lapse into 'the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect.' 4. I argue that Dreyfus conflates the Myth of the Given and foundationalism, and thereby unwittingly falls into the former: his notion of 'solicitation' belongs to the realm of law, but it is used by him to do the 'base-providing' work. I then note that Dreyfus is ambivalent about the status of human body: sometimes it is distinctively human-like, but sometimes it is like an automaton. 5. I remind my readers that the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect is in effect a version of the inner space model. And I connect McDowell's talks about 'I' to his conception of 'personhood.' Embedment 1. Derek Parfit's reductive approach to develop John Locke's general picture about self-consciousness is introduced. Against this, McDowell elaborates Gareth Evans's argument based on 'identification-freedom.' Parfit's thinking is faulty because in responding to the identification-freedom in the first person case, he implicitly holds the so-called 'narrow assumption.' 2. Since the trouble is due to the narrow assumption, McDowell's argument against it is from the notion of 'broadness'; in this context, this amounts to the emphasis on the third-person perspective. McDowell's diagnosis of Parfit is that the latter, as well as many others, mistakenly thought the root of the Cartesian is immaterialism. I then explain how McDowell reconciles Locke's insight with 'animalism.' Later I discuss Analytical Contents xv McDowell's argument that any account based on the notion of 'quasi-memory' – first introduced by Sydney Shoemaker and endorsed by Parfit – nevertheless commits the factorizing way of conceiving memory. 3. In talking about personhood, McDowell seems to oblige himself to take a stance towards the mind-body problem. I envisage what McDowell would say by discussing his criticisms against Davidson's anomalous monism. Two motivations – the unity of science and avoidance of Cartesian dualism – are dislodged. I explain why McDowell thinks that the premise to be renounced is 'the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality.' Furthermore, McDowell argues that Davidson's position leads to epiphenomenalism. Finally, McDowell's own position 'event dualism' is sketched but without elaborations. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens Objectivity 1. The Evans-Strawson argument based on 'identification-freedom' is applied to Kant's thinking about 'apperception.' McDowell argues that the interdependence of self-consciousness and consciousness of the world argued by Kant in Transcendental Deduction would be more satisfying if it can accommodate the fact that humans are 'bodily presences in the world.' Unlike Parfit, Kant is not attracted by reductionism; instead he argues that the 'I think' must be a merely formal condition. Nevertheless, McDowell's argument against Parfit works in Kant's case as well. 2. Here I consider Maximilian De Gaynesford's objections that McDowell's Kant is not Kant. His reconstruction of McDowell's argument, however, is problematic at many points. For example, he thinks that McDowell's argument relies crucially on the notion of 'reference,' and that McDowell mistakenly attributes the anti-immaterialism premise and the narrow assumption to Kant, and so on. I dispute all of these. 3. I argue that McDowell's argument against Kant's formal 'I think' is an example of his general denial of 'scheme-content dualism.' Davidson's initial introduction to this dualism is discussed. I concentrate on McDowell's construal of it, discussing several applications of his criticisms, including anti-interiorization of the space of reasons, the conceptuality of experience, a novel reading of the private language argument, and his repudiation of 'Nomological Character of Causality,' the fourth dogma of empiricism. McDowell's thought is that we can retain real objectivity only if we firmly reject forms of scheme-content dualism. Subjectivity 1. The narrow sense of 'subjectivity' – the 'what it is like' respect – is the main Analytical Contents xvi theme here. I start with Ned Block's claim that the great chasm in philosophy of mind is between the qualia theory and representationalism. The essential features of 'qualia' are identified as 'non-cognitive' and 'intrinsic.' I argue that McDowell case against them can be found in his holism of the mental and his objections to scheme-content dualism. As a result, McDowell is a representationalist in philosophy of mind. 2. 'Representationalism' and 'intentionalism' are often interchangeable terms, so I need to address Tim Crane's claim that intentionalism and disjunctivism are incompatible. In order to engage with this point, I investigate versions of McDowell's disjunctivism. According to my interpretation, McDowell commits state, reason, content, and (weak) phenomenal disjunctivism (the 'state' and 'reason' ones are my own terminology). I take issue with Alex Byrne and Heather Logue concerning McDowell's commitment to metaphysical (in my term, 'state') disjunctivism. 3. Since the issues between disjunctivism and intentionalism originally arise from the argument from illusion / hallucination, I introduce a version of the argument and identify two crucial features of it, arguing that we can anchor the debate with either of them, but Crane's framework corresponds to neither. I prefer one of the framework since it reflects nowadays' heated debate between disjunctivism and the 'common kind theory.' This framework helps us to see the essential claim of intentionalism. And I further relate the present discussion to the internalism / externalism debate. I thereby argue that the 'disjunctive versus factorizing framework' proposed by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne is not fine-grained enough. 4. I suggest that we should not use 'representationalism' and 'intentionalism' interchangeably. The former is a theory in philosophy of mind in general, claiming that 'all' mental facts are representational facts; the latter is a theory in philosophy of perception in particular, claiming that 'intentional object' is a better explanation than sense-datum. I also find fault in Crane's assimilation of the adverbial theory and the qualia theory. The failure to distinguish representationalism from intentionalism is due to a misunderstanding of the transparency (if any) of experience and a misreading of the main aim of the argument from illusion, I submit. I tentatively conclude that in philosophy of mind McDowell is an inter-model weak representationalist, and in philosophy of perception he is a disjunctive intentionalist. Epilogue. Self-Determining Subjectivity Freedom 1. McDowell identifies 'the space of reasons' with 'the realm of freedom,' which is closely related to our 'self-determining subjectivity.' To understand this, we need to have an intelligible notion of 'the space of reasons causation.' I agree with Richard Analytical Contents xvii Gaskin that McDowell has not provided a fully satisfying conception of it. However. I think McDowell's transcendental argument for the existence of that kind of causality is convincing. Besides, I suggest that though providing a satisfying explanation of this kind of causality does not lie in the heart of McDowell's philosophical outlook, still it would be better if we have a deeper understanding of it. 2. I note the fact that McDowell says a lot about self-determining subjectivity in the context of German Idealism, but those efforts do not directly improve the situation. My own suggestion is that self-determining subjectivity is socially real, but the details of this sketchy picture have not been wrought out. Wisdom 1. I remind that the same considerations about self-determining subjectivity apply to McDowell's thinking about practical wisdom. I suggest that philosophers of science should leave open the possibility of the naturalism of second nature, so that they can help us to understand more about causality in the space of reasons, if any. 2. I close the essay by relating McDowell's emphasis on wisdom to the familiar hierarchy of understanding from data, information, knowledge, to wisdom. McDowell provides a fruitful way for us to reconsider the importance of wisdom. I then rehearse my main theme that practical wisdom initiates us into the space of reasons, and this second nature endows each of us a cogito, which can be a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and (self-) conscious being in the world. 前言 在我的學習生涯中,支持我的人們,包括父母、親人、以及諸多師長和朋友都是 以中文為主要語言的,因此在這裡我要以我們共同的母語來表達對他們的感謝。 而因為上了大學以後,開始有了許多以英文為母語或不諳中文的師長以及朋友, 所以在後面我會有一個以英文書寫的前言。這兩段前言的內容不是重覆的。 首先最要感謝的是我的父母,鄭松茂與張艾蓉。他們除了總是給我最完善的 心理上、物質上的支持,也總是在各方面賦予我最好的培養與最大的自由。所謂 最好的培養,包括父親以耳濡目染的方式加強我的推理能力及自發態度,以及母 親透過身教以及為我挑選好的教育環境來養成我的寫作與其它基本能力。而最大 的自由是指,雖然他們都對我的發展盡心盡力,卻從未替我未來的路做出任何選 擇,而總是以輔助者的角色來陪伴我。一路走來從高中、大學的志願、碩士班、 甚至到未來的博士學位,他們對我都只有支持與鼓勵。沒有如此堅毅且貼心的父 母,就不會有今天的我。其中特別值得一提的是,父親年輕時便對哲學很有興趣, 但無奈於當時的家庭考量,使得他未能朝這個方向發展。不過他一直保持對這方 面的興趣與閱讀,並在我大學推薦甄選時,建議我選填哲學系,並給我一些相關 的基本概念。雖然後來自己所走的領域和當初理解的部分差距甚遠,但進來了這 個系所讓我發現了完完全全符合自己志向的事業,這樣的幸運都得感謝父親的判 斷,以及母親的鼓勵。此外我的所有親人們也都全力支持我,為我驕傲;他們也 同樣是我很重要的動力來源。 接下來我必需感謝我的指導老師林從一教授。我大一時林老師也剛進政大不 久,同樣是新鮮人的我們都很有決心在這個環境努力。林老師是我的哲學啟蒙老 師,他的哲學概論對我影響深遠。在這門課中不論是議題內容還是思考分析的方 式,都深深吸引著我。後來大二的語言哲學、大三的心靈哲學,讓我更加確定對 這條路的熱愛。其後透過哲學論文寫作指導這門課,我在林老師的幫助之下寫了 我的學士論文「程式運轉與人格」;這是我第一次學習寫專業的學術論文,在過 前言 xx 程中林老師給了我許多幫助。後來在他的分析哲學課上,我第一次嘗試以英文寫 期末報告,也很受他的鼓勵。大四開始旁聽林老師的研究所課程,也讓我更進一 步了解學術研究的諸多面向。這七年來我與林老師的學術互動無法以幾段話就帶 過,其中的進展與快樂是只有我自己能了解的。此外,由於我生性較為拘謹,林 老師特有的幽默也為我的學術生活增添了一些愉快。在今年的布蘭登哲學研討會 上,我們首次合寫一篇文章;我十分期待在我學成歸國後,能繼續和林老師有各 種的互動與合作。對他的啟蒙與提拔之恩,我會永遠銘記在心。 接下來我要感謝的這位十分特別;他是說中文時間和我幾乎一樣長的美籍教 授藍亭(Timothy Lane)。大四那一年我旁聽了藍老師在研究所開設的心靈哲學 課;當時上課的同學不多,老師鼓勵我們每次準備問題積極討論。在這門課裡, 我第一次學到如何把自己的想法用比較完整的方法表達出來,也確立了自己在心 靈哲學這方面的興趣。藍老師的課堂是我待過最多的,我們的學術互動也總是良 好且具啟發性。在課堂外,藍老師是我很好的朋友,即使後來因為彼此忙碌而較 少見面,我們還是會偶而聚會、打球;藍老師開玩笑說我們成了酒肉朋友。雖然 後來我因現實考量而並未在論文中採用藍老師所提倡的經驗科學研究方式,但我 謹記在心他所強調的嚴謹分析和實事求是態度。每當有外國學者訪問時,他也總 是盡力為我引薦,我因而受益良多。他可說是我的另一位啟蒙老師,而我也十分 希望未來可以與他有更進一步的合作。 再來我要感謝我口試委員方萬全教授。在我大學時期,中央研究院歐美所在 數年間辦理了「新實用主義哲學研討會」,在這個場合我對方老師印象深刻。方 老師犀利的分析和嚴謹的治學,都是身為後輩的我的最好榜樣。後來有幸在東吳 大學上了一整年方老師的兼任課程,更令我受益良多。此外,我也常透過方老師 借閱到最新的書籍,這也對我的研究很有幫助。特別值得一提的是在新實用主義 的場合裡我也結識了鄧育仁教授與何志青教授,他們在各個會議的表現也讓我學 習不少。在當鄧老師的兼任助理一學期的一段日子,每週都有機會與他討論;我 們對哲學的許多看法都不相近,因此也總是有最刺激的辯論。與何老師的學術接 觸雖然比較不直接,但這幾年下來也聽過數次他的演講,在他身上學到不少思 考。自己在學生時代就可以從中央研究院受益如此良多,也是我始料未及的。 我的另一位口試委員鄭凱元教授也同樣影響我多年。自大學時代的台灣哲學 學會以及其它許多場合,都看得到鄭老師的身影。雖然因為地緣關係使得我沒有 機會參與鄭老師的課堂,但我們在會議上和私底下也都常交換意見。鄭老師與我 年紀相對接近,也使得我們亦師亦友的情誼更為特別。在討論的過程中,鄭老師 總是對我充滿鼓勵,我期許自己以後也能以這樣正面積極的態度來面對後輩們。 在此我要特別感謝德籍教授文哲(Christian Wenzel);我與文哲老師很早就常 在研討會上碰面,但一直到我進入碩士階段才真正與他結識。在文哲老師於本所 兼課期間,我們隔週五早上碰面,下午討論這兩週大家各自的進展。我和文哲老 師分享許多哲學興趣與處事態度,即使因地緣關係而較少碰面,卻常以電子郵件 保持聯繫。我期許自己在未來能學好德文,以閱讀他的德文作品,並與他更深入 前言 xxi 討論德國哲學。這是個很困難的任務,但在他的鼓勵之下我會盡力去嘗試。 在研究的具體內容方面,影響我最深的是梁益堉教授。在梁老師的帶領之 下,我讀了 McDowell 的 Mind and World 的前半兩次,以及 A. D. Smith 的 The Problem of Perception 兩次。其中前者幾乎決定了我現在以及未來的哲學走向, 而後者奠定了我對知覺相關議題的基本想法。此外,除了內容本身,梁老師細緻 的讀書與討論方式對我也有很大幫助。可惜我碩士的後兩年梁老師因個人規劃而 暫時未在研究所開課,不過我很期待將來有更多機會與梁老師在課堂與其它場合 討論,想必屆時也會如以往一般,有十分豐富的收穫。 關於課堂上的學習,林正弘教授是另一位讓我受益良多的老師。林老師是台 灣哲學界的老前輩,雖然他本人總是過於謙虛,但其實他的重要性與貢獻是整個 社群有目共睹的。在這樣的狀況下,他卻總是和學生沒有距離,以最淺顯易懂的 方式來教導我們。在林老師的課堂上,我常不太說話,靜靜地聽老師的講解,還 有笑話。比較遺憾的是我因為時間分配的關係,上的課集中於林老師知識論方面 的課程,希望將來有機會可以和林老師學習科學哲學的部分;也希望這位可敬的 長者長保身體健康,做更多後輩的榜樣。 我也在米建國教授的課堂上學習很多。米老師與學生打成一片,也十分熱衷 於舉辦活動;我除了要感謝他在課堂上的指導外,更要謝謝他總是努力籌辦富有 意義的活動,包括迷你課程與許多大型研討會。去年我在東吳的國際分析哲學會 議上發表文章,也是米老師提供的機會。那是我第一次以英文在許多西方學者面 前發表,是很好的經驗。未來我也會以米老師為榜樣,為哲學社群盡一己之力。 在碩士生涯的初期,透過趙之振教授的讀書會我研讀了 Sellars 的'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind',對我後來了解 McDowell 的想法很有幫助。趙老師 細膩的分析讓我印象深刻,在會議上的發表也總讓我很有收穫。趙老師也十分關 心學生,即使我們分屬不同學校,我仍受到他許多照顧;很期待今後有更多機會 向他學習。與趙老師同在清大的吳瑞媛教授也同樣對我照顧有加。在大學時,我 就對吳老師犀利的提問以及對哲學的熱忱印象深刻。吳老師也對舉辦活動很有熱 情,清大的當代哲學家系列便是由她及其同事共同努力創辦並維持至今。透過這 個活動,我有更多機會去了解 Davidson、Peacocke、McDowell、Brandom 的思想。 在最近的這一次,吳老師讓我有機會與林從一老師合寫文章與 Brandom 本人討 論,對我是很重要的經驗。未來我也會積極參與這個活動,共同延續這個重要且 美好的傳統。 我也曾上過兩次陳瑞麟教授的課程;陳老師因聽力受損,求學與研究過程一 路都比我們艱辛許多,然而在他身上我總看到堅毅與樂觀。在課堂研討會上,陳 老師不厭其煩地透過紙筆來與他人溝通,其中對學術的熱愛深深感動我。在去年 國際分析哲學會議後,我與陳老師及師母帶著學者一同前往阿里山及附近景點健 行,老師與師母對我非常照顧,那短短幾天帶給我很美好的回憶。 彭孟堯教授近年來在研究所較少開課,但我在他大學部的心靈哲學課程中受 益良多。彭老師專長的心靈哲學部分與我的興趣重疊,討論起來特別有意思。很 前言 xxii 期待以後有機會能在彭老師的研究所課堂上,更深入討論彼此都有興趣的議題。 看到彭老師的時候,通常也是看到王文方教授的時候。因為時間安排關係,我還 沒有機會在王老師的課堂上學習。王老師為人風趣,在聚會中常是話題的焦點, 加上酒量奇佳,身邊總是很熱鬧。透過王老師,我也和來自 Iowa 哲學系的老師 聊了更多有趣的事;在學術圈內能有如此快樂的記憶,讓我很珍惜。 楊金穆教授也是我很早便認識的師長之一;楊老師因為採用英式的師徒制, 我未能有機會在課堂上接受他的教導。不過楊老師常在研討會出現,此外我們也 在誠品書店遇見數次,因此也有不少交流機會。楊老師為人好客,我也被他招待 過很多次;希望未來成為同事後,能與他有更多實質的學術交流。 雖然領域不盡相同,這幾年我和苑舉正教授常因研討會而有機會碰面。苑老 師對學術充滿熱情,總是精力飽滿地在討論場合中發問。他也很喜歡和我聊學術 圈內的事,一起彼此勉勵。苑老師的專長科學哲學也是我需要加強的部分,希望 以後有機會能和苑老師多學習。 侯維之教授也是近年來常在研討會遇見的老師。侯老師發表時清晰有力,下 了台後卻總是一派輕鬆,令我印象深刻。每次在會間或會後的空檔時間,我們總 少不了有趣的話題。侯老師是另一位我因地緣關係而無法多接觸的老師,同樣也 只能寄望於將來,能夠與他有更密切的學術互動。 剛步入職業生涯的鄭喜恆教授是我去清大參加活動時總會遇到的老師;雖然 我比較少看到他發表文章的場合,但他在會中的提問常引發我更多思考。鄭老師 主要研究的實用主義以及相關的早期分析哲學也是我很有興趣的部分,將來想必 也有許多需要向他請益之處。 雖然到目前為止交流不多,與蔡政宏教授的互動也值得一記。蔡老師是林正 弘老師的學生,以前偶有機會碰面,也在林老師的課堂討論過幾次。蔡老師剛加 入東吳的哲學團隊,我不僅為他們的學生高興,也為自己以後比較有機會和他討 論而高興。蔡老師剛步入職業生涯,學術表現就令人讚賞,是後輩的最佳榜樣。 我也必需感謝帶領我進入康德哲學的張鼎國教授。大二的一整年我修習了張 老師的康德哲學,對我有深遠的影響;這門課和林從一老師的語言哲學同樣讓我 對哲學產生了無比的熱忱,而這也解釋了為什麼至今我還是繼續接觸康德及其它 德國哲學。此外我也上過張老師的德國觀念論和詮釋學,雖然都是大學部的課, 但對我後來對德國哲學的自修奠下良好的基礎。 在大學時代,蔡美麗教授也給了我很大的幫助。剛進哲學系的頭兩年,聽不 懂的課比懂的多得多,而蔡老師的課程總是淺顯易懂而不失深度,對那時的我有 很大學業上以及心理上的幫助。上研究所後,我旁聽了蔡老師討論康德第三批判 的課堂;雖然當時因為時間安排而未能完整參與,但我還是從中學習許多,蔡老 師即將退休,未來或許沒有機會在課堂上再交流,但我仍期盼能在其它場合見面。 在碩士的最後階段認識了羅麗君教授也是一件很令人高興的事。羅老師待學 生親切,上課認真並清楚,讓我對現象學有了初步的認識。在跨領域的狀況能有 那麼好的討論,讓我很珍惜。至今對現象學粗淺的了解,也讓我在意識學會的期 前言 xxiii 刊 Psyche 出版了第一篇書評。希望今後有更多機會透過羅老師對現象學有更進 一步的理解。 最後我想感謝的是謝世民教授。謝老師與我領域不同,但他對於參與活動和 討論孜孜不倦,因此在研討會上常聽到他的想法與評論。在西方學者面前,謝老 師總會很熱心地把我介紹給他們。相信未來也還是能夠常在活動中見到謝老師的 身影,也希望以後能夠有領域間合作的機會。 在學長姊方面,特別感謝大一時帶我走過西洋哲學史的王靈康學長、大二時 帶康德讀書會的蔡幸芝學姊、還有因領域相近而常保聯絡的張卜文學長。祝福你 們各自的學業順利,也期待以後與你們當同事的日子。 同學的部分我要特別感謝翟君剛。我們從大一就認識,並常常一起閒晃,走 過快樂的大學生活。他比我早開始對哲學有興趣,而在我也決定更投入以後,我 們便總是一起去參加各種活動,從一開始的台哲會、中研院的新實用主義研討 會、清大的當代哲學家系列,到後來東吳的迷你課程、北京的中英澳康德哲學暑 期班、倫敦的 Sellars 會議、還有為時一學期的 U. C. Berkeley 訪問學生、以及兩 次美國哲學學會的年會;期間的中小型活動更是不計其數。我相信我們創下的學 術活動參與紀錄是不會被打破的。在這些活動中,我們都學到很多很多,從一開 始幾乎類似的背景,到現在漸漸區分出彼此的差異,但卻仍保持重疊的研究領 域,真的很難能可貴。透過參與這些活動,我們也有很多機會一起旅遊,也因此 一起體驗了哲學以外的人生面向。他對於旅遊以及許多生活上的事都比我有研 究,我不僅常受到他的照顧,也從他身上學習了很多。此外他也總是人群中歡笑 的來源,透過他我和其它朋友也有了更多的互動,這樣的體驗真的很難得也很重 要。近年我們都要申請美國的博士班,我祝福他順利進入心目中的學校就讀,並 希望像以前一樣,與我在人生的路上一起努力、一起成長、一起分享。 我也要感謝和翟君剛與我常玩在一起的蘇郁庭。他因為家住較遠,大學一開 始不太常參與活動,但後來因為住宿的關係,我們得以更常碰面;他特別喜歡玩 一些男生的東西,我們也因此保留了中學時代青少年的一面。碩二時我們在翟君 剛的介紹下一起去補習 GRE,三人一起準備考試;其中的歡笑遠遠大於辛苦。 後來我們也一起出國考試,並參加康德暑期班。雖然蘇郁庭與我們的領域不同, 但我們還是常一同討論,是很好的學術伙伴。今後我們三人也會是很好的同事。 政大的學術伙伴還包括一起組成康德讀書會的吳晉緯、陳鳴諍、林正昊、李 政國、以及薛明立等人。晉緯與政國為討論帶入現象學的成份,鳴諍與正昊則是 康德專業,常提點我們必要的相關知識。明立是一路和我一起努力的學弟,從大 學時代的懵懂,到現在已漸有能力做獨立研究;雖然還是帶著一點傻氣,但其間 的進步讓我倍感欣慰。期許大家都勇敢朝哲學之路繼續邁進。 台大的伙伴李國揚和梁慧川與東吳的伙伴呂柏駒總是讓討論更加豐富,而私 下我們也都是好朋友。東吳的學弟妹高寬蓉、徐國益、鄭俊憲、康立孝、德龍也 給我許多幫助與陪伴。這幾年下來,政大以及其它學校有太多朋友以各種方式支 持我,實在無法一一致謝;我會記得以往與你們走過的日子,並期待以後繼續和 前言 xxiv 你們分享的時光。 碩士生涯最後的一兩年我常待在系上,和許多好友們度過難忘的校園生活; 以下只能就記憶所及列出最常見面的幾位,他們是熊、小招、柏安、小玉、老談、 蔣盃、沈汪、對不起、周大為、阿金、瑞清、small 君、小花、連媽媽、小天、 李伊、何追星、孝儀、安琪、鈺娟、亞筠、雅倩、士奇、以及小蘭學姊和阿仁學 長。很謝謝你們還有很多我一時遺漏的人們,你們都是我碩士生涯的快樂來源。 在康德暑期班認識的潘潘、倩、小詣、拉風、曉旭;在 Berkeley 認識的 Andy、 Inas、Jess、Justin、Leo、Pius,都是我的對岸好友。在兩岸問題還沒解決之前, 我已經在那裡找到了很多同伴。現在大家四散各地,期待有一天再聚首。 雖然這本碩士論文只是很小的成就,但我希望藉此前言記錄下充實我校園生 活的人們,希望他們也和我一樣快樂、希望我們以後還是可以一起快樂。 Preface In my academic life I am indebted to many people who can read my gratitude only through English, so I have this preface for them. I cannot list all of them and expatiate on my indebtedness, to be sure. My preceding preface in Chinese contains things I want to say to my families, teachers, and friends, and I shall not repeat them here. Since 2006, I have had more chances to meet western people, and those experiences are very important. In what follows I shall identify those who help me most. I would like to express my highest gratitude to Professor John McDowell. I first met him at 'Conference on McDowell's Philosophy' held by National Tsing-Hua University in March 2006, Taipei. During the three-day conference, McDowell gave his 'Intention in Action' lectures, and paid much attention to queries and criticisms from philosophers in Taiwan. At the time I talked to him during the panel discussions and meals. Although I did not understand most of what he said due to my inability in real-life English, he was very nice to me and to everyone else at that occasion. After he went back to Pittsburgh I wrote emails to him for some questions, and he kindly replied me in details. Three months later, I met him again at 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind after 50 Years: Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Sellars's Lectures in the University of London.' And the latest meeting between us was at the Eastern APA annual meeting at Washington D. C., December 2006. There we had a coffee, with my best friend Wesley Chai, and we discussed my paper 'Towards a Conceptualist Account of Action: Answering Phenomenological Considerations.' McDowell read the paper carefully and told what he thought about it. The paper have evolved into a new piece 'Self, Action, and Passivity,' which is currently under review. After that I keep him posted about my progress, sometimes with questions, and he always replies me with warm helps. In this essay I venture to defend and sometimes Preface xxvi elaborate his views, and in my final episode I express my misgivings about his project: though I myself is all for the project, I do not think we McDowellians have provided the last word about relevant issues. Maybe he will not happy with what I say about him, but I hope he will understand that my reservations are due to my hope to improve the project. Anyway, I will keep trying and I really appreciate his good will. I could not imagine that I can have so much help from a person like him. At the Sellars conference I also met Professor Robert Brandom, Paul Coates, Tim Crane, Willem deVries, M. G. F. Martin, James O'Shea, Jay Rosenberg, Johanna Seibt, Paul Snowdon, Meredith Williams, and Michael Williams; all of them are very nice to me. That conference influences me permanently, so I would like to especially thank the director of Institute of Philosophy, Tim Crane, who helped me about the trip and had some discussions with me during the conference. Although I express my dissatisfactions about his various thoughts on perception, I respect him personally and expect good discussions between us in the future. I have incessant email correspondences with Paul Coates, Willem deVries, and Jay Rosenberg. I haven't had chance to peruse Coates's book The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism, but I hope I can read it as soon as possible, maybe during my military service. I always benefit from exchanges with deVries; he is one among those who really care about students; in particular he comments on my 'Openness and the Social Initiation into the Space of Reasons,' co-authored with my supervisor Lin, presented at 'Conference on Brandom's Philosophy.' I draw some of the materials from that paper in my first and second episodes here. Brandom offers many opinions about the paper, and we discussed a lot during his trip to Taiwan; my history of meeting Brandom in this or that conference is too long, so let me skip it and just express my special thanks to him. And I am really sorry about Jay; he was always nice to me and he brought happiness to wherever he was. Although I am not a dualist, I hope he knows my appreciation and how he has influenced me on my works. I want to say thanks again to everyone I listed above; this conference means a lot to me. After the Sellars conference, Wesley and I flew to Beijing for 'Philosophy Summer School in China, 2006 Session: Kant's Philosophy.' We had Professor Sebastian Gardner, Onora O'Neill, Thomas Pogge, and Garrath Williams as our speakers. I was in Williams's seminar 'Kant's Concept of Reason in the First Critique.' He always elegantly put what he wanted to get across. I also talked a lot to Pogge and Gardner during the open discussion cessions. I thank all of them for their patience. My term paper '"Refutation of Idealism" Reconsidered' earns a distinction ranked 6th. I met Pogge again during his trip in Taiwan in March 2008, and we had a good time. I hope I can learn more about Kant from them in the future. Preface xxvii Right after that, Wesley and I visited U. C. Berkeley as visiting students in fall 2006. We enrolled in three seminars: Professor Hubert Dreyfus's and Hannah Ginsborg's 'McDowell and Merleau-Ponty,' Barry Stroud's 'Meaning, Understanding, and the Attribution of Attitudes,' and Brandon Fitelson's and Sherrilyn Roush's 'Knowledge and Its Limits.' In Dreyfus's and Ginsborg's seminar we discussed McDowell's Mind and World and part of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. I have become a McDowellian before the seminar, so I decided to defend McDowell against phenomenological considerations, and my major opponent was Dreyfus, one of the instructors. He kindly accepted my challenges, though never really convinced by me; we become good friends and I hope to learn more from him. I gained much help from Ginsborg during her office hours; she was always nice to me and took my writings seriously. The term paper now evolves into 'Self, Action, and Passivity,' as mentioned above. And it constitutes my main arguments of the fourth episode here. By the way, I would like to thank J. C. Berendzen for sending me his draft on Dreyfus's criticisms against McDowell. Joseph Rouse also helps me at this point, through emails and his paper 'Mind, Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language'; he is extremely patient to reply me and I really appreciate this. In Stroud's seminar we focused on Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, and I also benefited a lot from his office hours. The term paper, 'Between the Cartesian and the Rylean: Lessons from Kripke's Semantic Skepticism,' has evolved into 'The Skeptical Paradox and the Nature of Self,' which has been published in Aurora 2; it constitutes the main part of my third episode here. In Fitelson's and Roush's seminar we wrought on Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits. The book itself is highly challenging, and the members of the seminar made the situation even harder for us: they were just too good; I shall mention Kenny Easwaran, Mike Titelbaum, and Professor Jonathan Vogel from U. C. Davies. But I still managed to develop my own thoughts in my term paper 'A Subjective Notion of "Evidence",' and its descendent 'Evaluating Williamson's Anti-Skepticism' has been published in Sorites 21. I am not good at this kind of epistemology, but I took the seminar very seriously. I thank both Fitelson and Roush for their help and patience. Timothy Williamson also presented in the seminar once as a guest, and I thank him for answering my premature questions. I was also an audience of Professor John Campbell's 'Theory of Meaning,' Alva Noë's 'Nature of Mind,' and John Searle's 'Philosophy of Mind.' Campbell's humor made the lecture extremely interesting, Noë's eloquence made the lecture highly productive, and Searle's rigor made the lecture very exciting. Besides, I learned a lot from all of their office hours. Finally, let me express my special thanks to Professor John MacFarlane and Marga Vega. Wesley and I met MacFarlane at the conference 'Logic and Cognition' at Guanzhou, summer Preface xxviii 2005. He was very nice to us and he later helped us apply for the status of visiting student of U. C. Berkeley. I am sorry for myself that at that time I was not in his seminars or lectures for practical reasons, and I hope I can learn more from him in the future. I also met Henry Jackman at that conference, and I met him again at the Eastern APA 2006. I thank him for discussing with me both in person and in emails, in particular on my piece 'Openness and the Social Initiation into the Space of Reasons.' Marga was a teaching assistant of Searle's lecture, and I was in her tutorial group. We talked a lot during the cessions and we had coffee together from time to time. She encouraged me a lot and that was very important for me: people in the philosophy department there were just too good, and I was sort of terrified. Anyway I express my gratitude to all of the people I met there. Life in Berkeley is just wonderful. 2006 was really a long year. Before the Sellars's conference, I met Professor Gregory Landini, David McCarty, and Danielle Macbeth in Taipei. McCarty and Landini were the instructors of 'Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Early Analytic Philosophy,' and Macbeth was the instructor of 'Frege's Logic.' The two courses were held by the philosophy department of Soochow University. All of them were very nice to me, and I keep in touch with them through emails. In particular, Macbeth helped me with my paper 'Openness and the Social Initiation into the Space of Reasons.' Later I met all of them again at 'Soochow International Conference on Analytic Philosophy' in June 2007. There I presented 'The Skeptical Paradox and the Nature of Self,' and I was indebted to Professor Richard Fumerton, Edwin Mares, Francesco Orilia, Christopher Pincock, Scott Soames, and Kenneth Williford for helpful comments. In particular, Fumerton spent an afternoon with me for discussing some of my thoughts, and that indirectly influenced what I say in this essay. 2008 is another fruitful year. In May, I met Professor Alan Hájek at 'Workshop of Research Method in Philosophy,' again held by Soochow University. There I learned much about research and academic writing from him. More importantly, I discuss with him my draft 'Disjunctivism, Intentionalism, and the Argument from Illusion,' which is extracted from my fifth episode. Hájek carefully went through much of the draft and commented on various points. The piece is still under revision, and Hájek's suggestions on the structure of it are well taken. Professor Ernest Sosa is the other one who helps me greatly about the draft I am working on. We first met each other in 2006, at the conference 'Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science,' still another activity held by Soochow. Sosa visited again in 2008 for the first 'Soochow Lecture in Philosophy,' titled 'The Nature and Scope of Human Knowledge.' I learned much from this highly original lecture, and I also benefited from my discussion with Sosa on the draft I mentioned above. His philosophical as well as editorial suggestions are extremely helpful. I hope Preface xxix I can engage his thinking further in the future. After the Soochow Lecture, I participated the 12th annual meeting of 'Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness,' held in Taipei. There I talked to many people, but I shall only mention a few. At that occasion I met Professor Ned Block again. I first met him at 'Consciousness and Concept' in 2005, where we also had Susan Carey, Stan Dehaene, Susan Hurley, Victor Lamme, and Alva Noë. Block is very nice to me, and all of his talks are clear and solid. He also spends some time on my draft; I appreciate his good will very much. I also want to give my very special thanks to Professor David Rosenthal. He is extremely friendly, and we spent few days together for discussing various things, including this essay. I am also indebted to Tim Bayne, Andrew Brook, Thomas Metzinger, Kristina Musholt, and Patrick Wilken. My interactions with them during the four days are intensive, but the most important part for me is their encouragements. At the present stage I am really wondering about my academic future, but after this meeting I feel more confident with myself. I am truly grateful for all of them. There are just too many thanks to say. Because there are just too many, let me mention those who also helped me at some points without identifying the details. They are Professor Henry Allison, José Luis Bermúdez, Bill Brewer, Nicholas Bunnin, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Murray Clarke, Jonathan Dancy, Jerry Fodor, James Genone, Roger Gibson, Ronald Giere, Patrick Hawley, Benj Hellie, Matthew Kennedy, Hilary Kornblith, Heikki Koskinen, Ernest Lepore, Lilian Alweissl, Michael Luntley, Fiona Macpherson, Marie McGinn, Adam Morton, Timothy O'Connor, Scott Sturgeon, Daniel Whiting, and Allen Wood. Not all of them help me about this essay directly, and I think many of them don't even remember me, but what they said to me, even only in emails, shape my thinking in one way or another. I hope they will feel fine if one day they find that their names are mentioned in a master thesis, written by a nobody. Finally I hope to express my gratitude to Professor Donald Davidson, whom I never have a chance to talk to. I met him when he came to Taiwan in 2002 for 'Conference on Davidson's Philosophy,' held by Tsing-Hua University. I was an undergraduate sophomore at that time, and I was too shy to talk to him. But since then I read a lot from him, especially papers in his Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. His thinking paves a way for me to access McDowell's thinking. And my use of 'episode' instead of 'chapter' in this essay is inspired by him, for I spent plenty of efforts envisaging the structure of the essay, and I hope I can finally have 'a nice arrangement of episodes' for it. Besides, sometimes respect is transitive, and in the present case my respect extends to Professor W. V. O. Quine. Although the present essay is not Quinean in any significant sense, this big name nevertheless influences me throughout my earliest days in philosophy; I dedicate my title 'World and Subject' to him. World and Subject T H E E P I S O D E S E P I S O D E N The Many Faces of Human Subject Know thyself. – Plato, The First Alcibiades, quotes Socrates and The Delphian Inscription The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious. – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks World 1. The present essay is an attempt to understand human subject and its place in the world through explicating John McDowell's philosophy. This attempt includes the question part and the thinker part, and I shall explain them in turn. The way I put the question makes it sound like the leading question in contemporary philosophy of mind, that is, 'what is the mind's place in nature?' This question is theory-laden, for often the notion of 'nature' involved is 'physical nature,' the domain of physical laws. This implication is neutral between reductive and non-reductive physicalism: even those who regard 'supervenience' as the key notion of their theories use 'nature' as an abbreviation for 'physical nature.' Indeed, 'naturalism' and 'physicalism' are often, if not always, interchangeable terms. 1 I intend to avoid this implication in the formulation of my leading question. The notion of 'world' is also theory-laden, to be sure, but it will become clear that the implication I choose to avoid is a much more relevant one. 1 'Materialism' is also their kin, but it has become less popular since few decades ago, mainly for non-philosophical reasons, I believe. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 2 2. Through a quick browse of my table of contents, or indeed a glimpse of the title of this introduction, readers would notice that what I focus is the subjective, as opposed to the objective side. A natural query suggests itself: why I initiate my discussion with the title 'world,' rather than 'subject'? To answer this I must anticipate part of the dénouement: the world and minded human subject are constitutively interdependent. This statement is extremely vague or even empty before further elaborations, but I shall leave it for my later episodes and concentrate here on how it justifies my writing strategy. The query states that why I start with 'world,' and the reply 'the world and minded human subject are constitutively interdependent' is at best incomplete. Now obviously a writer needs to start somewhere, and given that for the writer 'world' and 'subject' have the same importance, theoretically speaking it is up to him to start with one among them randomly. It follows that I choose to start with 'world' for practical concerns. Recall the familiar leading question in philosophy of mind, about the mind and its place in nature. As I said, the notion of nature here is heavily theory-laden, and even if I try to avoid this by substituting it with 'world,' it is still quite possible for the implication and some related thoughts to slip in. Besides, the notion of 'world' also has different implications for different philosophers. The best way to cure this, I believe, is to start my discussion with some clarifications of this objective side. But there is a theoretical obstacle here: if 'world' and 'subject' are interdependent in some significant sense, how can I say anything substantial about one of them without also saying something substantial about the other? Now I think I can dodge this if in what follows I only give my readers some reminders of neutrality: do not take the absolute independence of the world for granted; it should be regarded as one of the central issues in the present essay, and it is controversial. Almost everyone agrees that we need to retain some important kind of independence for the world, but whether it is independence simplicier is an issue to be discussed. To see what is at stake, consider the traditional way of conceiving the problem of perceptual directness: do we (at least sometimes) enjoy direct contacts with the world through perceptions? The territory is often divided by direct realism, indirect realism, and idealism. First one decides her metaphysical position: if for her the world is mind-dependent, she is an idealist; if she thinks the world is mind-independent, then she needs to choose from direct and indirect realism. In The Problem of Perception, which is arguably the most important book on this topic during the last decade, A. D. Smith writes: [T]he topic of this work in the philosophical position known as 'Direct Realism' – a position that combines this issue of directness with a Realism about the physical Episode N. The Many Faces of Human Subject 3 world. Such Realism holds that the physical world has an existence that is not in any way dependent upon its being 'cognized'...[And it] is opposed to Idealism: the view that whatever seems to be physical is either reducible to, or at least supervenient upon, cognitive states of consciousness.2 Here Smith implies that the metaphysical part of one's position can be determined independent of, and therefore prior to, the epistemic part. This is exactly the thought I want to resist. But as I said, to argue against this I need to say more about both the subjective and the objective sides, and of course I cannot do this in this introduction. What I can do here is just to ask my readers stay neutral about whether we can reasonably conceive the situation in this factorized way; in other words, let's not take this 'divide-and-conquer' way of thinking for granted, pace Smith and many others. Whether this way of thinking is justified is an important issue to be evaluated, not the self-evident starting point. This is, unfortunately, not recognized by most philosophers in the analytic tradition, probably because of the persisting negative attitude towards the notorious 'German Idealism.' To divide the question into the metaphysical and the epistemic part reflects, at least partially, the ideal of division of labor. This methodology as such is innocent, but it doesn't follow that it won't cause any problem in certain contexts. In our case, the thing to be remembered is that epistemology is a relation to the world: notions like 'knowing' and 'seeing' are factive ones. So if we want to understand how, for example, perceptual directness is possible, we need to be careful about both poles of this epistemic relation, that is, the world and the epistemic subject. Perhaps it will turn out that Smith and many others get things right, but that needs arguments. To assume otherwise is to beg the question against some other positions. The point of division of labor is well taken, for if all philosophers start their reflections from refuting global skepticism, or vindicating free will, the intellectual progresses of the whole community will be stagnant. So I think Smith, and indeed all of us, are justified to restrict ourselves to some extent. What I would like to stress is that he restricts too much. To rule out idealism temporarily is fine, but to characterize the world as he does is excessive. What he should do is to insist that in what he is going to do in the book is to neglect the view that refuses to acknowledge the independence of the world in any sense. To do this, there is still room to contemplate upon the sense in which the world is independent. I cannot here argue that Smith's way of dividing the territory is indeed problematic, but I invite my readers to take an adventure with me, and indeed, with McDowell, to see if we were in fact too naïve 2 The Problem of Perception (Harvard University Press, 2002), p.1-2, my italics. This will be more relevant when I discuss how McDowell replies to the charge of idealism. See my second episode, footnote 70. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 4 about what the world is like. The situation discussed above is an example that methodology infects ontology. Another relevant example goes the opposite direction. Smith and many others assume the absolute independence of the world; the opposite example refuses to acknowledge the independence of the world altogether. The notable representative of this is René Descartes. To be sure, Descartes' contempt against the world is only methodological, indicated by the label the 'Method of Doubt.' But this method assumes that the constitution of the mind is totally independent of the world. Although with different directions, this strategy and Smith's one are in effect of the same spirit. The philosophers in question are well aware that they shouldn't assume metaphysical theses before they start their argumentations, and that's why they painstakingly emphasize the methodological nature of their presuppositions. But this line of reasoning assumes that methodological considerations are irrelevant to ontological propositions anyway, and this is what I want to resist. If one thinks he needs to have a full understanding of human being before he goes on to understand gender, he assumes a false ontology of human being in his methodology. Almost no one would commit this kind of mistake here, for in this case the falsity is obvious. In our case, by contrast, the truth or falsity of the metaphysics is far from obvious, so many people have wrongly thought that their methodologies are metaphysically innocent. Again, I invite my readers to bracket the sense in which the world is independent, to see whether we are really right about the world in our daily lives and philosophical inquiries. The Cartesian Method of Doubt will be a central target throughout the essay, but we should also bear Smith's case in mind in our investigations. Subject 1. To repeat, the leading question in this essay concerns human subject and its place in the world. A human subject is a Homo sapiens with a Cogito; that is, a human animal with mentality. So to understand human subject is to understand mentally equipped human animal. Mentality has different aspects, and to understand mentality is to understand the nature of those aspects. A human subject exhibits their mentality when it perceives, knows, thinks, speaks, acts, and feels; in this essay I venture to understand these varieties of mentality by explicating McDowell's thinking. Again, let me focus on questions and phenomena before saying more about the philosopher. In a recent article, Eric Olson proposes various relevant questions that 'are typically not about "the self" at all.'3 His examples include personal identity, first-person reference, 3 'There is No Problem of the Self,' in Brie Gertler and Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing about the Mind (Routledge, 2007), pp.262-77, at p.274. Episode N. The Many Faces of Human Subject 5 the unity of consciousness, moral agency, reflexive thought, and self-knowledge. This is of course, as he himself acknowledges, not an exhaustive list. The underlying thought is that there is no single, well-defined problem of the self. I cannot agree more. Since I was new to philosophy, I have always been confused by the fact that there is a philosophical question under the title 'the problem of the self.' It is not identical to the mind-body problem, though the two are definitely related. It looks like the problem of personal identity, but they are still different. The problem of consciousness is obviously relevant, but again they are not one and the same. I came to think that there is no problem of the self as such; instead, there are problems concerning the functioning self: the self functions as a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and (self-) conscious subject, among others. In the following episodes I investigate these aspects respectively.4 Some readers might notice that I begin this section by talking about 'mentality,' but soon the key concept became 'self' or 'subject.' Do I change the subject matter? Yes and no. Yes, because as a matter of fact, the questions concerning the self, notably personal identity and free agency, are only a portion of philosophy of mind. No, because I do not think issues concerning mentality and those concerning the self should be studied separately. Like the problem of the self, the problem of mentality can also be divided into various different sub-questions, such as perception, knowledge, thought, language, action, (self-) consciousness, among others. Now it would be highly unnatural to think that we can, say, investigate perceiving without also investigating perceiver. To think we can is to imply a three-fold picture: world, mind, and self. I do not think we can make any good sense of this.5 Philosophers of mind often talk about propositional attitudes, constituted by mental states (attitudes) and mental contents (propositions), but we need to remember that every propositional attitude goes with a self, functions as a perceiver, knower, or others. It doesn't make good sense to confine the problems concerning the self in a corner of philosophy of mind. To be sure, there can be certain branches concentrating on those problems in particular, but it does not follow that in most regions of philosophy of mind we can just forget about the self. Again, division of labor seems to be the trouble maker, though the method as such is innocent. The two points I just argued can be put in this way: there is no sharp line between the problems about mentality and those about the self or subject, and the problems of 4 Professor Christian Wenzel once asked me why I am so interested in topics surrounding self and subjectivity. At that time I couldn't come up with a satisfying answer; now I hope the present paragraph can serve to be an improvement: I have very broad interests in mentality; I am curious about perception, knowledge, thought, language, action, and consciousness, and I have come to think that all these phenomena should be understood together with the functioning self. So my special interest in self and subjectivity is actually derived from my broad interests in various mental aspects. 5 And I think this echoes what McDowell identifies the 'inner space' model, to be discussed especially in my second episode. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 6 the self or subject should be approached by understanding the nature of perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and (self-) conscious being, among others. This expels a possible wrong impression that in focusing on 'subject,' I confine myself in a small region of philosophy of mind. By investigating various aspects of the self or subject, I hope to have a more comprehensive understanding of human mentality. A remaining question to be answered is this. So far I use the notions of 'self' and 'subject' interchangeably; does this mean that I do not think there is any distinction between them? Grammatically speaking, 'self' is a reflexive pronoun. This implies that questions under this title may be primarily about higher-order mentality.6 It should be clear that I am not only discussing that kind of mentality, however. That's why I use 'subject' exclusively in my later discussions. I also use 'self' in this section because in bringing out my points I invoked Olson's discussions, and what he uses is the notion of 'self,' though he does not intend to confine himself with higher-order mentality. His usage is understandable, for his opponents often conduct their discussions with 'self,' rather than 'subject.' In any case, I believe only the notion of 'subject' is broad enough to accommodate the aspects I would like to investigate in the present essay. Therefore throughout the discussions I will talk about human subject, as a perceiver when it perceives, a knower when it knows, and so on and so forth. 2. I said that I will conduct my discussions through explicating John McDowell's philosophy, so I shall say something very general about him here. In late 60's, McDowell started his career in Oxford. At that time he concentrated on Greek ethics and epistemology, including Aristotle's and Plato's thinking. Later he spent lots of time and energy doing philosophy of language, under Gareth Evans's 'non-stop barrage of intellectual barrage of intellectual stimulation.'7 He has also been highly influenced by P. F. Strawson's inspiring interpretation of Kant's first critique and his own descriptive metaphysics8, by Donald Davidson's thinking on action, meaning, and rationality9, and by Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.'10 6 Some use it to capture the crucial difference between oneself and others, for example Thomas Nagel asks, 'how can it be the case that one of the people in the world is me?' See 'The Incompleteness of Objective Reality,' in Arguing about the Mind, pp.36-49, at p.36. Professor Timothy Lane does not think that this question makes good sense, but I am not determined about my own attitude. 7 Mind and World (Harvard University Press, 1996), p.viii. 8 The Bounds of Sense (Methuen, London, 1966); Individuals: an Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Methuen, London, 1959), respectively. 9 I will refer to particular papers of Davidson when I discuss McDowell's engagements with him in my later episodes. 10 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,' in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1 (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1956), pp.253-329. Episode N. The Many Faces of Human Subject 7 Later in 80's he moved to Pittsburgh, where he met his colleague Robert Brandom. He has been influenced by Brandom through both writings and conversations, notably his exposition of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Brandom's famous teacher, Richard Rorty, also shapes McDowell's thinking through his best-known work. 11 These contemporaries' influence on McDowell is acknowledged in the preface of his Locke Lecture, Mind and World. Like those who have influenced him, McDowell does not restrict himself to one or two branches in philosophy. His works range from history of philosophy, ethics, philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. This may partially explain why he is often skeptical about the 'division of labor' methodology discussed above. In addition to these contemporary influences, McDowell also invokes resources from important thinkers in the history of western philosophy. As we shall see in later episodes, he adopts Aristotelian notion of 'second nature,' Kantian conception of the discursivity of experience, Hegelian absolute idealism, Wittgensteinian notion of 'form of life', and Gadamerian distinction between 'world' and 'environment,' and so on. In response to critics from other backgrounds, he also discusses Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. This makes it extraordinarily difficult to approach McDowell's thinking. In the present essay I will restrict myself not to get into exegeses of those abstruse materials, though I still need to say something about them from time to time. The nature of McDowell's philosophy poses a serious challenge to anyone who is willing to conduct a large-scale exposition of his thinking: given that he touches so many divergent issues in various branches of philosophy and so many unfathomable thoughts of various important philosophers in a highly systematic way, either the question-oriented way or the figure-centered way of exposition will very likely be unsatisfying. If one chooses the former, it will be very hard for one to give due weight to the convoluted relations between issues and those big names; if one adopts the latter, one will probably neglect detailed objections and replies in specific issues. Either way, the exposition is open to objections about its writing strategy.12 Although these two styles do not strictly exclude each other, still it is quite challenging for commentators to reach equilibrium. 11 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979). 12 Anthologies aside, to my notice nowadays there are three introductory books exclusively on McDowell's philosophy. The first is John McDowell (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004) by Tim Thornton. This one is very question-oriented, taking care of different areas of McDowell's thinking in a detailed fashion. In the same year, John McDowell (Polity Press, 2004) by Maximilian de Gaynesford was also published. This one is question-oriented too, but the author concentrates more on McDowell's own thinking. The third one, On Thinking and the World: John McDowell's Mind and World (Ashgate Publishing, 2005) by Sandra M. Dingli, emphasizes the relations between McDowell and other important thinkers, like Kant, Heidegger, and Davidson. All of them try to strike a balance between the question-oriented approach and the figure-centered one. The distinctiveness of my interpretation is that I focus on the very idea of 'subjectivity,' which is relatively absent in extant interpretations. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 8 So obviously I need to make a choice. In the present essay I tend to structure my argumentations with the figure-centered approach. The principal reason is that McDowell's philosophy, as an interconnected system, has not been well understood. This is of course a highly vague and bold verdict, but I will not defend it here. In any case, I think we should understand how he integrates miscellaneous elements from divergent areas and thinkers into a unified whole before going deeper in specific questions. Besides, at different stages of the essay, I will evaluate debates between McDowell and other important contemporary philosophers, in order to bring out McDowell's place in contemporary philosophy. Let me illustrate my approach with an example. In discussing McDowell's view on perceptual experience, I will concentrate on how his view in this area connects to his broader concern about the nature of the world and human subject, and how he confronts his important contemporaries, notably Robert Brandom, but won't get into how he responses to, say, some experiments in psychology concerning the discursivity of experience. It is not that psychological experiments or criticisms from less important people are valueless or irrelevant; it is just that they do not fit my present purpose. To recapitulate, in this essay I am closer to the figure-centered approach; 'figure' here includes McDowell and his important contemporaries. I take this stance because I hope to offer a more comprehensive exposition of McDowell's thinking, and further I want to place McDowell's thinking as a whole on the map of contemporary philosophy, and this requires me to focus mainly on other 'big names.' This does not mean that I will only scratch the surface, but I can prove this only through carrying my project out. 3. Let me connect these abstract considerations about the essay structure to my actual contents. The main theme, to repeat, is to understand human subject and its place in the world. There are two strands in this project: first, how does a Homo sapiens, an animal, can nevertheless be a Cogito, i.e., having the capacities to be responsive to reasons? Second, how does this minded human animal be a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and (self-) conscious being in the world? The former question pinpoints the tension between our animal, biological nature and spiritual capacities, and the latter concerns how our biologically-rooted spiritual capacities enable us to navigate in the world through varieties of our mentality. In this essay I start with the tension but concentrate on the applications. In my first episode I introduce the tension and discuss how McDowell manages to dissolve it and thereby find a place in the world for minded human subject. From the second to the fifth episodes, I discuss how McDowell's resolution to the putative tension applies to various mentalities, including perceiver and knower, thinker and speaker, agent and person, conscious and self-conscious subject; I discuss how McDowell avoids Episode N. The Many Faces of Human Subject 9 Brandom's charge of residual individualism, how he criticizes Kripke's Cartesian way of construing the skeptical paradox, how he objects to Dummett's 'full-blooded conception of theory of meaning,' how he finds Davidson's and Brandom's 'I-thou' conception of the publicity of intentionality unsatisfying, how he replies to Dreyfus's accusation of 'the Myth of the Mental,' how he discerns a Cartesian line of thought in Parfit's view of personal identity, and how he thinks Kant unwittingly lapses into the 'narrow assumption,' and so on. In my epilogue, I will discuss the root of those varieties of mentality, that is, our self-determining subjectivity. As we shall see, McDowell thinks human subject is special in the sense that it lives in the logical space of reasons, and this space is exhausted by conceptual connectedness, and finally, this space of rational-conceptual connectedness is identical with the realm of freedom. So arguably the heart of McDowell's thinking is his elaboration of this self-determining subjectivity. As the closing episode of my essay, it can hardly provide a full-fledged construction of that important notion, but I shall try to gesture at possible directions for us to think about. A few words about McDowell's 'quietism.' This Wittgensteinian component of his thinking is often understood as a refusal of offering positive or systematic accounts. So conceived, my present project is at odds with this attitude. However, quietism should not be understood that way. It is a reminder about our ways of seeing issues; it says that before engaging in substantial discussions, one should slow down and see whether there is any compulsory reason for us to accept the challenge in question. 'Quietism' itself is a big issue, especially when one takes it to be a discussion about Wittgenstein scholarship. However, in this essay I adopt a rather weak understanding of it, as just briefly characterized above. Therefore, I will not go into this in the rest of the essay.13 13 Here I am indebted to my committee member Cheng Kai Yuan for reminding me about relevant qualifications. E P I S O D E I Cogito and Homo sapiens Just as nature developed itself as a whole from the original act of self-consciousness, a second nature will emerge...from free self-determination. – F. W. J. Schelling, The System of Transcendental Philosophy ...man (the worker) feels that he is acting freely only in his animal functions – eating, drinking, and procreating, or at most in his dwelling and adornment – while in his human functions, he is nothing more than animal. – Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 Nature 1. We are human beings. This plain fact indicates, at least implicitly, that we are at the same time rational and natural. This may seduce us 'to see ourselves as peculiarly bifurcated, with a foothold in the animal kingdom and a mysterious separate involvement in an extra-natural world of rational connections,'1 John McDowell observes. We do not need reductive physicalism to ensure that we are Homo sapiens, and we do not need substance dualism to maintain that each of us is, or has, a Cogito. The trouble is that it is hard to see how we can be both natural and rational: if we conceive 'nature' as the domain exhausted by scientific investigations narrowly construed, it seems obvious that there is no room for the notion of 'reason.' But we cannot have a satisfying self-image without accommodating the element that makes us properly human. 1 Mind and World, p.78. Episode I. Cogito and Homo sapiens 11 2. Wilfrid Sellars once remarked: '[i]n characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.'2 Relations in the space of reasons are rational, normative ones; they can be evaluated as correct or incorrect. McDowell contrasts the space of reasons with 'the realm of law,' which is demarcated by natural science.3 The Sellars-McDowell line of thought is that the two spaces are sui generis (i.e. different in kind)4. That is to say, if one attempts to reconstruct the intelligibility of the space of reasons from the resources of the realm of law, one '[falls] into a naturalistic fallacy.'5 Furthermore, the sui generis nature should not be secured by 'picturing the space of reasons as an autonomous structure – autonomous in that it is constituted independently of anything specifically human (the idea of the human is the idea of what pertains to a certain species of animals)...'6 This pair of thoughts serves to respect our commonsense that we are rational animals, without committing ourselves a presumably mystical 'supernaturalism' – a thought that renounces our status as natural beings.7 But things are not so simple. If the space of reasons is of its own kind, evading the net of natural sciences, how can we understand it without the notion of 'supernatural'? And if we are to avoid unpalatable supernaturalism, how can we preserve the idea that human beings are properly human precisely because we live in the space of reasons? The predicament is well characterized by a Sellarsian metaphor 'the clash of the images,' introduced by James O'Shea.8 The two images – the manifest image and the scientific image – clash because of the sui generis thesis, and supernaturalism seems to be the inescapable result of the clash. The Sellarsian task, which is taken up by McDowell as well as other Sellarsians, is to 'fuse the images,' put by Jay Rosenberg, 2 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,' pp. 298-9. 3 Mind and World, p.xv. Notice that the realm of law should not be understood as the space of 'causal relations to objects,' as Rorty does in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.157. McDowell offers two reasons for this. First, following Russell's 'On the Notion of Cause,' in his Mysticism and Logic (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1917), pp.132-51, McDowell thinks that 'the idea of causation should be replaced, in the role of basic organizing principle for the world as viewed by natural science, with something like the idea of law-governed processes' (Mind and World, p.71, n.2). Second, 'it is also disputable in its implication that the idea of causal connections is restricted to thinking that is not framed by the space of reasons' (ibid., same footnote). Reasons can be causes; causations that figure in the space of reasons are called the 'space of reason causations' by Richard Gaskin, in his Experience and the World's Own Language (Oxford University Press, USA, 2006), p.28. This qualification will become important when we later consider some objections against McDowell's position. 4 Mind and World, p.xix. 5 Ibid., p.xiv. 6 Ibid., p.77. 7 Ibid., p.78. 8 Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn (Polity Press, 2007), p.10. The metaphor is based on Sellars's classic paper 'Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,' in Robert Colodny (ed.), Frontiers of Science and Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), pp.35-78. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 12 O'Shea's teacher.9 But not everyone is Sellarsian. There are two main strands in response to the dilemma presented above. One is to '[deny] that the spontaneity of the understanding is sui generis in the way suggested by the link to the idea of freedom.'10 This is called 'bald naturalism.' It is 'bald' because it erases what is distinctively human. McDowell has no intention to argue that bald naturalism is false; he only suggests that the view is 'a less satisfying way to [solve the philosophical puzzlement in question] than [his] alternative,'11 which will emerge later. The other way is to regard 'the structure of the space of reasons' as 'simply extra-natural...as if we had a foothold outside the animal kingdom, in a splendidly non-human realm of identity.'12 This is called 'rampant platonism.' It is 'rampant' because it overemphasizes what is distinctively human. Here again, McDowell does not, and cannot knock it down. After all, though the view is indeed mysterious, it does not follow that it cannot be true in a mysterious way. What McDowell (and indeed everyone who opposes to it) can do is to elaborate one or another more satisfying way to understand human being.13 Nurture 1. The view McDowell recommends 'is a naturalism of second nature,' and it 'can equally see it as a naturalized platonism.'14 In order to understand this, first we need to learn more about the notion of 'second nature.' Recall that when the notion of the realm of law is introduced, it is supposed to be contrasted with the space of reasons. The realm of law is coextensive with, and indeed defined by, the domain of natural sciences. A natural, and indeed seemingly unavoidable thought followed from this is that nature is exhausted by the realm of law. This line of though is neutral with regard to the disagreement between bald naturalism and rampant platonism, for what they disagree is whether the space of reasons is sui 9 Wilfrid Sellars: Fusing the Images (Oxford University Press, USA, 2007). I first met Jay and Jim at the conference in memoriam of Sellars 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,' summer 2006, held by University College London. Although we did not discuss anything specific about Sellars at that occasion, still I am indebted to them very much, both through casual conversations and subsequent email correspondences. Jay passed away couple of weeks before I started to write this essay. I regret that I cannot dedicate the piece to him in person. To say that the task in question is a Sellarsian one is not to say that it is exclusively Sellarsian. Actually, many so-called 'naturalistic' philosophers aim to show that the mind depends on, and therefore is compatible with, natural phenomena, given that nature is understood as the realm of law. I say 'many' because there are also many other 'reductive naturalists' who repudiate the space of reason altogether. I will come back to this presently. 10 Mind and World, p.67. 11 Ibid., p.xxi. 12 Ibid., p.88. 13 I will say more about this later in this episode when I discuss Crispin Wright's objection. 14 Ibid., p.91, my italics. Episode I. Cogito and Homo sapiens 13 generis; their common ground is the equation between nature and the realm of law. McDowell manages to steer a middle course between the two by introducing the notion of 'second nature': the realm of nature includes both the realm of law and the space of reasons, so the thesis that the space of reasons is sui generis is compatible with the insistence that human beings are fully natural beings. To identify nature with the realm of law is distinctively modern; the development of this thought has often been called 'disenchantment.'15 In order to motivate his broader understanding of nature, McDowell goes back to the era before enlightenment, in particular ancient Greek. Let me quote him a bit: Virtue of character properly so called [by Aristotle] includes a specifically shaped state of the practical intellect: 'practical wisdom,' in the standard English translation. This is a responsiveness to some of the demands of reason...The picture is that ethics involves requirements of reason that are there whether we know it or not, and our eyes are opened to them by the acquisition of 'practical wisdom.'16 In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's word for 'practical wisdom' is 'phronesis.' I emphasize 'are there' in this passage to indicate the objective character of ethical demands conceived by McDowell. Now he intends this 'to serve as a model for the understanding, the faculty that enables us to recognize and create the kind of intelligibility that is a matter of placement in the space of reasons.'17 A further and crucial question is how this line of thought can help us out of the stalemate between bald naturalism and rampant platonism. As indicated above, the gambit is to develop a satisfying notion of second nature. So what we need are reasons for thinking that Aristotelian practical wisdom deserves to be called second 'nature.' McDowell suggests that '[we] are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities. When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons.'18 In saying this, what McDowell has in mind 'is what figures in German philosophy as Bildung.'19 Now this can be recognized as genuine nature because '[our] Bildung actualizes some of the potentialities we are born with'20: what we are born with is our animal first nature, which is not different in kind from those which are possessed by other animals. What is distinctively human is that our animal 15 Ibid., p.70. Correspondingly, McDowell calls his own position 'a partial reenchantment of nature' at p.97. 16 Ibid., p.79, my italics. 17 Ibid., p.79. 18 Ibid., p.82, my italics. 19 Ibid., p.84. 20 Ibid., p.88, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 14 first nature includes miscellaneous complex potentialities suitable for fostering the space of reasons. We have extraordinary complicated brains and sense organs, and these powerful resources help us, say, begin to parse strings of sounds emitted from other's mouths. McDowell, an empiricist to be sure, does not need to reject Chomskian innate faculties in this respect. Our second nature is what makes us special, but our remarkable first nature is also crucial for our rational animal lives. We can see that the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality is at work here: our potentialities relevant to the initiation into the space of reasons are our animal first nature, but when proper upbringing kicks in, those potentialities are actualized (or realized) as the capacities to be responsive to reasons.21 In this way, we gain a satisfying self-image 'without offering to reinstate the idea that the movement of the planets, or the fall of a sparrow, is rightly approached in the sort of way we approach a text or an utterance or some other kind of action.'22 What McDowell rejects is 'an intelligible distortion undergone by the Aristotelian idea that normal human beings are rational animals.'23 The root of this distortion is to conceive 'an animal endowed with reason [as] metaphysically split'24: we are natural because we are confined in the realm of law, but we are also supernatural because we are responsive to reasons. This distortion can be set straight by recognizing that for Aristotle, responsiveness to reasons is our second nature, which is realized by our first nature potentialities under suitable upbringing. We should recognize that 'rationality is integrally part of [human beings'] animal nature.'25 Our animal nature includes first and second natures, and this does justice to both the thought that our rational capacities are natural, and the thought that we share something with other animals. In accommodating the latter, we do not need to reject the idea that rationality is intrinsic to our animal nature. In the context of the conceptuality of experiences, McDowell says that 'it is not compulsory to attempt to accommodate the combination of something in common and a striking difference in [a] factorizing way: to suppose our perceptual lives include a core that we can also recognize in the perceptual life of a mere animal, and an extra ingredient in addition.'26 Although the contexts are 21 Part of this paragraph is appropriated from 'Openness and the Social Initiation into the Space of sistence that the meaningfulness of the world is different from that of he notion of 'factorization' is supposed to be contrasted with 'integration.' Reasons,' a piece I co-author with Professor Chung I Lin, my thesis supervisor. It was presented at the Conference on Brandom's Philosophy, held by Tsing Hua University, March 2008. I am indebted to Brandom for helpful comments. 22 Mind and World, p.72. This in the text will be important in my fourth episode, when I consider how McDowell replies to objections from Michael Ayers and Arthur Collins. 23 Ibid., p.108, my italics. 24 Ibid., p.108, my italics. 25 Ibid., p.109, my italics. 26 Ibid., p.64, my italics. T To say that AB can be factorized into A and B is to say that the individuation conditions of them respectively are independent of each others. Episode I. Cogito and Homo sapiens 15 ent, the general lesson should apply here too. one.'34 The distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law, by contrast, differ 2. As we have seen, second nature is supposed to '[give] human reason enough of a foothold in the realm of law to satisfy any proper respect for modern natural science.'27 I shall discuss two objections that run at the opposite direction. The first maintains that in order to secure the foothold in the realm of law, second nature must be located in both the space of reasons and the realm of law, but this nonetheless leads to incoherence. The second maintains that the foothold in the realm of law cannot be secured anyway; that is, the insistence on second 'nature' leads to supernaturalism come what may. The first line of objection is taken by Paul Bartha and Steven Savitt (henceforth B&S).28 They assert that McDowell's position is 'simply untenable.'29 The general principle underlying their argument is that 'there is no way to account for an interactive relationship between [two wholly separate worlds] without undercutting the point of maintaining their separateness.'30 The main trouble of Cartesian dualism nicely illustrates this: if res cogitan and res extensia are different in kind, the putative interactions between them become unintelligible. And if one insists that there must be a bridge, this supposed bridge must thereby belong to both realms at the same time, but this violates the premise that the two realms are different in kind.31 They first notice, rightly, that second nature belongs to the space of reasons, for it is supposed to account for spontaneity. But they argue that it belongs to the realm of law either, for it 'must involve interaction with the natural environment.'32 If so, the sui generis character of the space of reasons collapses, given the lesson drawn from Cartesian dualism, and according to B&S, Passmore. No one, McDowell included, can sensibly deny that 'human perception (and therefore human reason) is also conditioned by the physical processes that govern the interaction between our sensory apparatus and our environment – processes that belong to the realm of law.'33 But the inference from this to the conclusion that second nature is also an inhabitant of the realm of law is a non sequitur. The sense of 'conditioning' here should be 'an enabling question,' as opposed to 'a constitutive ssing Second Nature,' Analysis 58 (1998), pp.252-63. John Passmore's Philosophical Reasoning (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961), ' p.258. of Perceptual Experience,' The Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994), pp.190-205; 27 Ibid., p.84. 28 'Second-Gue 29 Ibid., p.254. 30 Ibid., p.257. 31 B & S quotes p.44 at this point, but I think this is quite redundant, given that we are so familiar with the trouble instantiated by Cartesian dualism. 32 'Second-Guessing Second Nature, 33 Ibid., p.258. 34 'The Content W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 16 is obviously a constitutive matter. One can claim that perception and reason nevertheless belong to the realm of law, but that needs arguments, and the above non sequitur can do nothing about it. And that is not McDowell's position anyway.35 B&S thought that McDowell commits that second nature belongs to both the space n is proposed by Crispin Wright. 36 Wright thinks that (i) that the correctness of ethical judgment is constrained by 'contingencies of eds only an ordinary, unmysterious ethical education to initiate y within reach' of our ethical As I see it, only (ii) deserves our attention here, for (i) and (iii) are more like of reasons and the realm of law, and this is a straightforward misinterpretation. This misunderstanding is understandable, however, given that it seems to be a natural interpretation of the thought that reasons can be causes: if second nature is ultimately natural, it must be in the causal network, which means it must be in the realm of law as well. The falsity of this inference should now be clear: as I discussed in the third footnote, McDowell warns us that the opposite of the space of reasons should not be the space of causes, for if it is so, it follows that there is no causal relation in the space of reasons, and therefore reasons cannot be causes. B&S are nevertheless indifferent about this reminder, regarding the realm of law as the space of causes (and thereby unwittingly committing that reasons cannot be causes), and thinking that if McDowell is willing to do justice to the fact that reasons can be causes, he has to admit that second nature belongs to both the space of reasons and the realm of law, and the sui generis claim collapses. Their objection is based on a misunderstanding of the distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law, as we have seen. McDowell would say that if we see the crucial contrast as between the space of reasons and the space of causes, it is 'too late' to insist that spontaneity belongs to both. And additionally, that position leads to incoherence, as B&S's rehearsal of the Cartesian trouble shows. The opposite objectio McDowell hasn't done enough work to exclude rampant platonism. He identifies and criticizes three criteria allegedly proposed by McDowell: our life'; (ii) that it ne people into 'the rational demands of ethics'; (iii) that correct ethical judgment is 'essentiall thinking.37 reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.341-58, at p.352, my italics. 35 B&S also cites the above paper from McDowell, but for another purpose. It is striking that they didn't notice the enabling / constitutive distinction in the very same paper. 36 'Human Nature?' in Nicholas H. Smith (ed.), Reading McDowell: on Mind and World (Routledge, 2002), pp.140-59. 37 Ibid., p.153. Episode I. Cogito and Homo sapiens 7 1 descriptions of McDowell's picture. I shall therefore focus on (ii). The point I am find any difficulty in the idea that it takes only an ordinary training to trigger the exercise of the social non-natural epistemic capacities H onism; he inks, rightly in my view, that McDowell's invocation of Bildung and related . In the case of rampant platonism, as I said in the previous do is to urge us to accept a much more going to argue, however, applies to (i) and (iii) as well, for the point is that McDowell never attempt to provide any criterion to distinguish naturalized platonism from its rampant relatives. In discussing (ii), Wright asks: Why should Rampant Platonists in which they believe? What exactly is the problem in that combination?38 ere Wright is pointing out the compatibility of Bildung and rampant plat th considerations does not exclude rampant platonism. But why is this compatibility a problem for McDowell? We need to bear in mind that McDowell never attempts to knock rampant platonism and bald naturalism down section, though 'the view is indeed mysterious, it does not follow that it cannot be true in a mysterious way.' Rampant platonism, by its nature, is irrefutable given the sui generis thesis; it asserts that the space of reasons is autonomous simplicier, which means it is wholly (holily?) independent of other kinds of intelligibility. Therefore the only way to repel rampant platonism is to refute the sui generis thesis, that is, to embrace bald naturalism. So the charge from Wright is unfair: rampant platonism is a thesis that can only be repelled by bald naturalism, but McDowell is clearly not a bald naturalist. It is understandable, nevertheless, why Wright has this demanding task in mind: he himself is a dedicated bald naturalist.39 But he had better remember that not everyone shares his metaphysical position. McDowell is well aware that given his anti-bald naturalism, he cannot refute rampant platonism. What he can sensibly moderate position, naturalized platonism, by elaborating a sensible notion of 'second nature.' Of course a rampant platonist can always say that given the sui generis thesis, he can accommodate whatever we say. But why should this matter? Consider the case of radical skepticism. Nowadays most people recognize that such a radical thesis is not refutable, so what we non-skeptics can do is to argue, in one way or another, that we have no good reason to believe in radical skepticism, or we have good reasons to believe otherwise. The situation is quite similar when it comes to rampant platonism. 38 Ibid., p.154, my italics. 39 To my knowledge, Wright never explicitly identifies himself as a bald naturalist, but his identity is clear in the context of the theory of meaning: he sides with his teacher Dummett in holding that a theory of meaning should be 'full-blooded.' I will say more about this in my third episode. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 18 Although bald naturalism is indeed incompatible with that version of platonism, the latter can always insists that the physicalist reduction in question is not successful, for there is no common ground for evaluating the success of reduction. So what we can hopefully have is something like McDowell's picture: provided a reasonable story about how human beings can become responsive to reasons – in his case, through Bildung, custom, and language – we have good reasons to believe in a naturalized platonism. Why needs more? 3. Now, given McDowell's demanding conception of human being, the question bout the status of mere animals becomes urgent. This can be fully answered only ugh] the concept of environment was first used for the purely human world...this concept can be used to comprehend all the conditions on which a living H s possession of languages: [on] the fact that man has a world at all. The world as world exists for man as for on other A between human beings' openness to the world and mere nimals' embedment in the environment is the very idea of 'freedom': the world is characterized by freedom from environment. This freedom implies the linguistic a after we say more about McDowell's view of experience, conceptual capacities, rationality, and self-consciousness, but I can here sketch a general picture with Hans-Georg Gadamer's distinction between 'world' and 'environment.'40 Gadamer writes: [Altho creature depends. But it is thus clear that man, unlike all other living creatures, has a 'world,' for other creatures do not in the same sense have a relationship to the world, but are, as it were, embedded in their environment.41 e further relates this openness to the world to human' Language is not just one of man's possessions in the world; rather, on it depends creature that is in the world. But this world is verbal in nature...that language is originarily human means at the same time that man's being in the world is primordially linguistic.42 nd the crucial difference a Moreover, unlike all other living creatures, man's relationship to 40 See Truth and Method (Continuum Publishing Group, 2004; rev. trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall), pp.438-56. 41 Ibid., p.441. 42 Ibid., p.440. Episode I. Cogito and Homo sapiens 19 ere is not the place to defend Gadamer's distinction; I introduce it at this point only ds constitution of the world. Both belong together.43 H because it helps us to understand McDowell's general picture of mere animals.44 McDowell says that for his purpose, the point of the distinction 'is that it shows in some detail how we can acknowledge what is common between human beings and brutes, while preserving the difference that the Kantian thesis forces on us.'45 What is in common between us and them is that both, as living creatures, embed in and cope with our immediate environments; as animals, all of us are structured by our 'immediate biological imperatives.'46 '[A] merely animal life,' however, 'is shaped by goals whose control of the animal's behaviour at a given moment is an immediate outcome of biological forces. A mere animal does not weigh reasons and decide what to do.'47 In the case of human being, by contrast, we can say that '[to] acquire the spontaneity of the understanding is to become able, as Gadamer puts it, to "rise above the pressure of what impinges on us from the world" (Truth and Method, p.444) – that succession of problems and opportunities constituted as such by biological imperatives – into a "free, distanced orientation" (p.445).'48 In a word, human beings enjoy 'full-fledged subjectivity,' as opposed to mere animals' 'proto-subjectivity.'49 Thus, we can avoid a 'peculiarly bifurcated' ontology, exemplified by two stran of the Cartesian thoughts.50 On the one hand, the Cartesians maintain a position more radical than bald naturalism in their treatment of mere animals, regarding them as zombic automata. On the other hand, they insist on a position more radical than rampant platonism in the case of human being, seeing them as having immaterial mental substances. This strange two-fold view is more radical than bald naturalism, for in holding this naturalism one does not need to regard mere animals as zombies: the zombie thesis is far stronger than the idea that mere animals are locked in the realm of law. And this view is more radical than rampant platonism, for in urging this platonism one does not thereby commit the idea that human beings have, or are immaterial souls: the soul thesis is far stronger than the idea that human beings can 43 Ibid., p.441. 44 I will say more about this in my episode three, where I evaluate the debate between McDowell and Donald Davidson whether a public language plays any significant role in constituting the human intellect. 45 Mind and World, p.115. 46 Ibid., p.115. 47 Ibid., p.115. 48 Ibid., pp.115-6. 49 Ibid., pp.116-7. 50 Here I do not refer to Descartes in particular. Indeed, terms like 'platonism' and 'Cartesian' figured in McDowell's texts only serve to illustrate different ways of thinking vividly. On the contrary, he does refer to particular philosophers when he elaborates the relation between concept and intuition, the role of second nature, and the distinction between world and environment. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 20 reach a mysterious, non-animal space of reasons. Against both of these, McDowell urges that 'exercises of spontaneity belong to our way of actualizing ourselves as animal.'51 There might be some worries about McDowell's two presuppositions. One is that . I begin my exposition of McDowell's philosophy with the issues concerning In order to introduce the attractions of a relaxed naturalism, I have exploited his vital passage appears in his Lecture V, and therefore is, unfortunately, often human beings really enjoy freedom of the will; the other is that mere animals are non-rational. McDowell himself seems to be confident with both of them, but I think it is reasonable to formulate the essence of his thinking by conditionals: given that we humans do enjoy freedom of will, and given that mere animals are indeed non-rational, or at least do not possess rationality in the sense that they can respond to reasons as such,52 then the view McDowell recommends is much more satisfying than both bald naturalism and rampant platonism, since his picture reconciles two important facts about us: we are denizens of the animal kingdom, and we are rational beings.53 4 human beings' place in nature. I adopt this approach because I regard the following remarks of McDowell as quintessential: philosophical difficulties about perceptual experience. But this focus was not essential; the difficulties exemplify a type...Now the difficulty concerns not the passivity of experience as such, but its naturalness. The problem is that operations of sensibility are actualizations of a potentiality that is part of our nature. When we take sensing to be a way of being acted on by the world, we are thinking of it as a natural phenomenon, and then we have trouble seeing how a sui generis spontaneity could be anything but externally related to it. But passivity is not part of the very idea of what it is for a natural potentiality to be actualized. So we should be able to construct a train of thought about actualization of active natural powers, duplicating the difficulties I have exploited in the case of passive natural powers.54 T overlooked by philosophers in the analytic tradition. Even his colleague Robert Brandom complains that '[t]he social nature of spontaneity and the space of reasons is acknowledged, but only belatedly, in the discussion of the need for knowers and 51 Ibid., p.78, my italics. 52 The distinction between responsiveness to reasons and responsiveness to reasons as such will be important when it comes to the disagreements between McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus, but I shall leave the nuance in my fourth episode; for now I just want to stress that we are subjects who are in the games of giving and asking for reasons. 53 McDowell's presupposition about freedom will be briefly discussed in my epilogue. 54 Ibid., p.89, my italics. Episode I. Cogito and Homo sapiens 21 In recent work, Davidson has undertaken to build the concept of objectivity out of a seems to me that McDowell does not present Davidson's position accurately, for troduce the tension between reason and nature, and discuss how agents to be properly brought up in order to be sensitive to various sorts of norms.'55 He sees this as a ground for arguing that McDowell's overall picture is a 'residual individualism.'56 This line of criticism assumes that McDowell's writing strategy reveals his view about the conceptual order, which means he does not assign the conceptual priority to the social elements. But the fact is quite to the contrary. McDowell is the philosopher who insists on the conceptual priority for the social. He even finds fault in the picture depicted by Donald Davidson, who painstakingly stresses the essential importance of the social elements: 'triangulation' between these self-standing subjects, pairwise engaged in mutual interpretation. This comes into conflict with the Kantian thesis of interdependence that I consider in Lecture V, §5, and reconsider in Lecture VI, §4. By my lights, if subjects are already in place, it is too late to set about catering for the constitution of the concept of objectivity.57 It Davidson doesn't try to derive objectivity from 'self-standing subjects.' Rather, he makes clear that his aim is to show that knowing our own minds, knowing others' minds, and knowing the external world 'form a tripod; if any leg were lost, no part would stand.'58 But this mismatch is understandable, for McDowell's Locke Lecture was given in 1991, while most of Davidson's papers explicit on this topic were written after that. My purpose here is not to take part in the debate; what I would like to stress is that McDowell often finds other philosophers' do not give due weight to the priority of the social, so it is uncharitable to think that he himself does not acknowledge that priority. It is possible to argue that McDowell's 'too late' argument applies to himself after all, but anyway we should recognize that in McDowell's picture, the social elements plays constitutive roles in social initiation into the space of reasons; conceptually speaking, his invocation of 'Bildung' and 'second nature' does not come into the picture 'only belatedly,' as Brandom and many others mistakenly suppose. In this episode, I in McDowell manages to ease the tension without canceling the sui generis character of 55 'Perception and Rational Constraint,' in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1996), pp. 241-59, at p.256, my italics. 56 Ibid., p.258. I argue against this line of thought in my 'Openness and the Social Initiation into the Space of Reasons,' co-authored with Lin. 57 Mind and World, p.186, my italics. 58 'Three Varieties of Knowledge,' in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.) A. J. Ayer Memorial Essays: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30 (Cambridge University Press, 1991), reprinted in Davidson's Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001), pp.205-20, at p.220. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 22 the space of reasons. To be sure, I do not offer a wholesale defense of second nature and other related notions. My main theme in this essay, as I said in my introduction, is the applications of second nature – how a creature with second nature can be a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and (self-) conscious subject – as opposed to second nature per se. There are a lot more to be said about this Aristotelian notion, but I would like to leave it to some other occasions. E P I S O D E II Perceiver and Knower That the objective world would exist even if there existed no knowing being at all, naturally seems at the first onset to be sure and certain, because it can be thought in the abstract...But if we try to realize this abstract thought...and if accordingly we attempt to imagine an objective world without a knowing subject, then we become aware that what we are imagining at that moment is in truth the opposite of what we intended...that is to say, precisely that which we had sought to exclude. – Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol.II. This phenomenologically necessary concept of receptivity is in no way exclusively opposed to that of the activity of the ego, under which all acts proceeding in a specific way from the ego-pole are to be included. On the contrary, receptivity must be regarded as the lowest level of activity. – Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment Primeness 1. In my previous episode, I concentrate on how McDowell responds to the difficult question: how can we be both rational and natural? His proposal is 'a naturalism of second nature,' or 'naturalized platonism.' The take home message is that we can legitimately regard the space of reasons as part of nature. Now, an ensuing question concerns how the operations of the space of reasons enable our minds directly contact with the world. This big question can be divided into some more specific ones. The W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 24 present episode takes up the following one: how does our second nature enable us to have perceptual, or more general, epistemic contact with the world? Let me introduce two notions before starting the exposition. They are 'broadness' and 'primeness.' A mental state is broad if and only if its individuation condition involves external factors; a mental state is prime if and only if it cannot be analyzed by more primitive states. 1 I shall begin with broadness. Its opposite notion is 'narrowness,' which says that the individuation condition of a mental state only involve internal factors; here 'internal' can be glossed by 'in the skull' or at least 'in the body.' To insist on the narrowness of mental states is to commit one 'internalism' about the mental.2 By contrast, to think that mental states are generally broad is to hold 'externalism.' Now, there are generally two versions of externalism, weak and strong. Weak externalism holds that the mental state in question can be de-composed into internal and external factors; that is, the identity of the internal / external factors can be independently specified. By contrast, strong externalism maintains that the internal and external factors are interdependent in a strong sense; theoretically or conceptually we can talk about internal or external factors, but empirically there is no such distinction. This strong externalism commits broadness as well as primeness: the latter entails the former, but not vise versa. So we can understand weak externalism as subscribing broadness without primeness; the independently-specified internal factor is often called 'narrow content.' The motivations for committing narrow content include considerations about self-knowledge and mental causation, among others, but for my purpose we do not need to go through the details here. So much has been said for the terminological matter. As we shall see, McDowell commits both primeness and broadness; that is, he is a strong externalist. The main theme of the present episode is primeness; I will leave broadness for episode four. In this section I shall first identify the relevant target and the basic shape of McDowell's criticisms, and more about his positive thinking will be discussed in the next section. 2. McDowell introduces his target in the context of Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions. 3 He discerns a Cartesian strand in Russell's overall thinking and characterizes it as follows: 1 I notice the relevance of these notions to the present discussion by reading Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000). I do not make explicit reference to his work because his context is slightly different from mine, and it takes unnecessary effort to appropriate his wordings. I discuss the relation between his invocation of the notions of broadness / primeness and his anti-skepticism in my 'Evaluating Williamson's Anti-Skepticism,' Sorites 21 (2008). 2 Here I bypass the distinction between state and content, for it does not make significant difference in the present discussion. 3 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,' in Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), pp. 137-68; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1998), pp.228-59. I refer to the later version. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 25 In a fully Cartesian picture, the inner life takes place in an autonomous realm, transparent to the introspective awareness of its subject; the access of subjectivity to the rest of the world becomes correspondingly problematic, in a way that has familiar manifestations in the mainstream of post-Cartesian epistemology...[this inner space is] a locus of configurations that are self-standing, not beholden to external conditions...4 Here McDowell does not refer to Descartes' texts, but we can reasonably conjecture that what he has in mind here is the 'Method of Doubt': in order to ensure the certainty or purity of our analyses, we should first only consider factors internal to the subject.5 The gist of McDowell's negative point here is that there is a harmful metaphysical assumption lurking in this seemingly innocent methodological consideration. The assumption is that there is an autonomous inner space metaphysically speaking. This metaphysics implies a disastrous epistemic loss of the world. McDowell first mentions Barry Stroud's argument against this epistemic disaster6: Barry Stroud, for instance, plausibly traces the Cartesian threat of losing the world to this principle: one can acquire worldly knowledge by using one's senses only if one can know, at the time of the supposed acquisition of knowledge, that one is not dreaming. This sets a requirement that Stroud argues cannot be met; no proposed test or procedure for establishing that one is not dreaming would do the trick, since by a parallel principle one would need to know that one was not dreaming that one was applying the test or procedure and obtaining a satisfactory result. So Stroud suggests that if we accept the requirement we cannot escape losing the world.7 What Stroud identifies is the so-called 'KK principle' in traditional internalist epistemology: in order to know something, I need to know that I know that thing; that is, I need to know that I am not dreaming. If one subscribes the Method of Doubt and the Dreaming argument, one thereby commits certain variety of the KK principle. But it should be clear that the principle invites a vicious infinite regress, as described in the quotation. Now McDowell thinks that this diagnosis is plausible but not the end of 4 Ibid., pp.236-7. As before, the term 'Cartesian' is not invoked to make explicit reference to the philosopher Descartes (McDowell might disagrees with this). 'The inner space model' may be a more neutral label. Also see my third footnote in the introduction. 5 'Reductionism and the First Person,' in Jonathan Dancy (ed.) Reading Parfit (Blackwell, Oxford, 1997), pp.230-50; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.359-82. Recall my remarks about how methodologies can infect ontology in my introduction. 6 The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), chap. 1. 7 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,' p.238. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 26 the story.8 As we shall see, though lots of contemporary philosophers reject, at least implicitly, the KK principle, many of them still accept the inner space model. One of McDowell's main tasks is to show that this model is responsible for our philosophical anxiety concerning perception, knowledge, thought, language, action, personal identity, and self-consciousness. McDowell then proposes two sources for the distinctiveness of the inner space model. The first is that the inner space theorist 'extends the range of truth and knowability to the appearances on the basis of which we naively think we know about the ordinary world.' The motivation of this is that '[this] permits a novel response to arguments that conclude that we know nothing from the fact that we are fallible about the external world.' 9 Recall that the inner space theorist's skepticism is only methodological; his ultimate concern is to bring knowledge back to us. Therefore he adopts the above maneuver so that 'we can retreat to the newly recognized inner reality, and refute the claim that we know nothing...'10 But this cannot be the whole story. The above move allows the truth predicates to apply to our subjective states, but this looks like a piece of commonsense; we do this all the time when we say something like 'it appears to me that such and such is the case.' Of course we can apply the truth predicates to this kind of talk: it is true whenever the subject reports sincerely. So there must be something more contentious that explains the distinctiveness of the inner space model. The explanation is 'a picture of subjectivity as a region of reality whose layout is transparent accessible through and through to the capacity for knowledge that is newly recognized when appearances are brought within the range of truth and knowability.'11 The infallibility here implies 'not world-involving.' Combined with what has been said above, the inner space model amounts to this: items in the inner space are autonomous, self-standing, which is to say that their relations to the external world are extrinsic. It follows that a given subject has immediate and unproblematic grasps of his mental items. Even in the case of deceptive experiences, the subject can readily grasp his own 'seeming' states. But isn't this just an outmoded straw man? McDowell does not cite specific passages from Descartes, and nowadays many philosophers admit that there are limits 8 In these paragraphs McDowell, following M. F. Burnyeat, ventures an interpretation concerning the crucial difference between ancient skepticism and Descartes' more radical version. Since I have distanced myself from exegesis here (see footnote 4), in what follows I will characterize McDowell's understanding of the Cartesian inner space without evaluating it. What interests me here is how the inner space model renders the idea of direct contact with the world unintelligible, and how we manage to avoid this unpalatable result. I am interested in the real history too, but that will take us too far. From now on I will simply call the target 'the inner space model.' I am indebted to Professor Christian Wenzel about this. 9 Ibid., p.238. 10 Ibid., p.239. 11 Ibid., p.240. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 7 2 of self-knowledge. Who on earth will fall into the category characterized in this way? As I said above, McDowell aims to show that this model functions in many domains. Concerning the issues of perception and knowledge, the model appears in the guise of the so-called 'highest common factor' theory.12 According to this line of thought, veridical and deceptive experiences are fundamentally of the same kind; because items in the inner space only have extrinsic relations to the external world, we can have complete grasp of them regardless the experience is veridical or not. As for knowledge, true empirical beliefs and deceptive ones (consider the evil demon or the brain-in-a-vat case) are fundamentally of the same kind; for similar reasons in the case of perception, the inner items have the justificatory power they do regardless the empirical belief is true or not. This line of thought can be elaborated further. Let me start with perception. Normally we can gain correct information through perception, but things do not always go well. In illusion or hallucination, it seems that we still perceive something: some non-existent properties or objects. Now a natural question is that what instantiates the non-existent properties or objects perceived in deceptive cases? Here we have many complications: some philosophers think that what instantiates those perceived properties or objects are non-intentional sense-data; some denies this and think that those properties or objects are represented by our experiences. There are many entangling puzzles here, and the relevant literature goes very wild.13 For our purpose here, we only need to notice that both sense-datum theory and representationalism (or intentionalism), no matter how the details go in different versions, regard veridical experiences and deceptive ones as fundamentally of the same kind.14 The argument most frequently cited for this view is the one from phenomenal indistinguishability: since subjectively indistinguishable illusion / hallucination are possible, and 'experience' is essentially a subjective notion, there is a common factor shared by illusion, hallucination, and veridical experience. A veridical experience is constituted by this inner common factor plus external conditions; metaphysically speaking, the inner component is individuated without any reference to external situations, for it is something shared by veridical experiences and deceptive ones. We can call this the 'conjunctive' view of perception.15 12 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge,' Proceedings of British Academy 68 (1982), pp.455-79; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality (Harvard University Press, 1998), pp.369-94, at p.386. 13 I have a lot to say about relevant matters in my fifth episode. 14 In the fifth episode, I shall argue that we should not use 'intentionalism' and 'representationalism' interchangeably, and the former should be used in the context of perception; besides, the common kind assumption introduced here is not built in the very idea of intentionalism. But we do not need all these qualifications now. 15 The terminology here is suggested by the introductory episode of Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.) Perceptual Experience (Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp.1-30. In my fifth episode I will W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 28 Simon Blackburn is one of those who find the above argument compelling. He writes that in the thought experiment involving phenomenal indistinguishability, everything is the same from the subject's point of view. This is a legitimate thought-experiment. Hence there is a legitimate category of things that are the same in these cases; notably experience and awareness.16 Although other philosophers in this camp may have different formulations, the general shape of the argumentation is the same. I will come back to this later. Here goes the epistemological version. Traditionally, the notion of 'knowledge' is analyzed into 'belief,' 'truth,' and 'justification.' Edmund Gettier's short classics crashed our faith in this simply analysis, but most of us believe that either we can supplement the original analysis with a fourth condition, or we can revise the 'justification' element in one way or another, to accommodate those putative counterexamples. On a widespread understanding, the 'truth' element is undoubtedly external, and both the 'belief' and the 'justification' elements are internal. After the rise of externalism in both philosophy of mind and epistemology, the claim about belief and justification has long been shaky. In the case of justification, however, the internalist intuition stands firm. Consider the brain-in-a-vat case (BIV for short). If I were a brain envatted in a scientist's lab, presumably I would have perceptual phenomenology indistinguishable from the phenomenology owned by normal subjects. Now I form a belief that I am in a noisy café, based on my auditory phenomenology. Obviously this belief does not constitute knowledge, for actually I (if any) am in a scientist's lab. But it seems unfair to say that I am not justified in believing that I am in a noisy café because I am not in a position to know that I am in a bad case. Recall the KK principle. It requires a meta-knowledge for every bits of knowledge, which is unreasonably strong. Now even for those who subscribe this principle, to demand that I have knowledge about my overall situation before I can have justification about the café belief is far too strong. Why think that I, as a brain in a vat, am not justified in believing that I am in a noisy café, given that I do have the relevant phenomenology cause by the electronic device? If this line of thought is accepted, the justification element is internal after all, for a brain in a vat or a subject deceived by the evil demon can have justification about empirical beliefs. This is also a 'conjunctive' view, for knowledge is (at least) composed by internal justification element and external truth element. The conjunctive view about perception and knowledge is in effect the inner space argue that this way of carving the battle field is defective because it leaves out weak externalism, which accepts broadness but rejects primeness. This does not matter in the present theme. 16 Spreading the Word (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983), p.324. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 29 model: on this view, there is a common factor shared by subjects in the good case and in the bad case.17 This implies that the common factor is 'self-standing, not beholden to external conditions,' for if it were not, it cannot present in the bad case, where external condition is absent. With this picture at hand, nonetheless, we juxtapose our direct contact with world: if the inner element is present anyway, regardless our real situations, doesn't it constitute a veil that blocks our access to the world? In the case of perception, McDowell responses to this predicament this way: Of facts to the effect that things seems thus and so to one, we might say, some are cases of things being thus and so within the reach of one's subjective access to the external world, whereas others are mere appearances. In a given case the answer to the question 'Which?' would state a further fact about the disposition of things in the inner realm...since this further fact is not independent of the outer realm, we are compelled to picture the inner and outer realms as interpenetrating, not separated from one another by the characteristically Cartesian divide.18 In the picture McDowell recommends, the 'conjunction' presents in the inner space picture is replace by a 'disjunction.' There is no inner common factor shared by veridical experiences and deceptive ones, so there is no inner factor to be conjunctive with external conditions. In the good case, by contrast, perceptual experiences involve external situations essentially, which means that the relation between perception and deception is disjunctive: either a perceptible aspect of the world, or a mere appearance, is presented. Now a possible objection is that on this picture, we have no idea about whether we are in the good case or not. Given our refusal of the KK principle, this objection is irrelevant. We can shrug our shoulder and reply to the skeptic: why do I have to know about whether I am in the good case in order for me to be in genuine perceptual contact with the world? Now we are in a position to evaluate Blackburn's remarks quoted above. McDowell says: '[t]he uncontentiously legitimate category of things that are the same across the different cases is the category of how things seem to the subject.'19 Phenomenal indistinguishability does imply there is something in common, but this 'something' is only seeming; after all, what guarantees it is phenomenal indistinguishability. And we have seen that for McDowell, this seeming should be taken disjunctively. 3. The problem of perceptual contact is in an important sense more fundamental than any problem in epistemology, for: 17 The good / bad case talk is appropriate from Knowledge and Its Limits. 18 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,' p.241. 19 Ibid., p.248, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 30 [o]nce we are gripped by the idea of self-contained subjective realm, in which things are as they are independently of external reality (if any), it is too late...[O]ur problem is not now that our contact with the external world seems too shaky to count as knowledgeable, but that our picture seems to represent us as out of touch with the world altogether.20 The inner space model insulates us from the external world, so the deepest problem is that we do not have any contact with the world at all if we are locked in the inner space. A reaction to the dreaming argument is to retreat from the outer realm to the inner, as the inner space theorist does, but the price it pays is obviously too high; in order to meet the challenge posed by the unreasonable KK principle, the inner space theorist loses the world altogether. McDowell's disjunctive conception of experience leaves the plausible part of the inner space model intact: I approached this fully Cartesian picture of subjectivity by way of the thought, innocent in itself, that how things seem to one can be a fact, and is knowable in a way that is immune to familiar skeptical challenges. Short of the fully Cartesian picture, the infallibly knowable fact its seeming to one that things are thus and so – can be taken disjunctively, as constituted either by the fact that things are manifestly thus and so or by the fact that that merely seems to be the case.21 But if we insulate ourselves in the inner space, then the innocent part is spoiled too, for if we never enjoy perceptual contact with the world, it soon becomes 'quite unclear that the fully Cartesian picture in entitled to characterize its inner facts in content-involving terms in terms of its seeming to one that things are thus and so – at all.'22 On this miserable picture, subjectivity is 'blank or blind,'23 which does not deserve to be called 'subjectivity' indeed. Apart from the considerations about the dreaming argument, the inner space model might well be motivated by the rise of modern science, for '[i]t seems scarcely more than common sense that a science of the way organisms relate to their environment should look for states of the organisms whose intrinsic nature can be described independently of the environment.'24 Worse still, 20 Ibid., p.242. 21 Ibid., p.242. I will say more about this 'disjunctivism' in my fifth lecture, when I discuss how McDowell conceives the conscious aspect of our human lives. 22 Ibid., pp.242-3, my italics. 23 Ibid., p243. 24 Ibid., p.243. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 31 this intellectual impulse is gratified also in a modern way of purportedly bringing the mind within the scope of theory, in which the interiority of the inner realm is literally spatial; the autonomous explanatory states are in ultimate fact states of the nervous system, although, in order to protect the claim that the explanations they figure in are psychological, they are envisaged as conceptualized by theories of mind in something like functionalist terms. This conception of mind shares what I have suggested we should regard as the fundamental motivation of the classically Cartesian conception; and I think this is much more significant than the difference between them.25 McDowell does not render his reply to this argument from science explicit, but what he would say is clear: we have good reasons for thinking that the mind as such should not be incorporated by any branch of natural science, for it lives in the space of reason, a domain cannot be reduced by natural sciences. If this is so, this motivation for the inner space model should be discarded from the very beginning. Sciences can help us to understand the enabling conditions of various mental capacities, to be sure, but this should be distinguished from the constitutive questions of the mind. Another possible motivation of the inner space model is to secure our first-person authority. In general cases, we know ourselves better than an outsider. The inner space model is sometimes thought to be a good explanation of this, for according to it the subject' introspection 'becomes the idea of an inner vision, scanning a region of reality that is wholly available to its gaze...'26 But notice that what first-person authority says is that generally we ourselves have better knowledge; it does not say that we ourselves always know everything. However, what the inner space model delivers is the latter, which is blatantly too strong.27 Moreover, the model 'puts in question the possibility of access to the inner realm from outside.'28 If all of us are 'beetles in the box,' how can we have any knowledge about other subjects' mental state? As McDowell asks, how can we 'perceive, in another person's facial expression or his behaviour, that he is...in pain[?]'29 This motivation for the inner space model is 25 Ibid., p.244. 26 Ibid., p.245. 27 M. G. F. Martin seems to develop this line of thought in a more detailed way. See his 'The Limits of Self-Awareness,' Philosophical Studies 120 (2004), pp.37-89, especially pp.47-51. 28 Ibid., p.245. 29 'On "The Reality of the Past",' in Christopher Hookway and Philip Pettit (eds.), Action and Interpretation: Studies in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978), pp.127-44; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, pp.295-313, at p.305. The topic of the epistemology of other mind is the main theme of his 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.' W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 32 ill-grounded, either.30 A possible rejoinder runs like this. The inner space theorist might concede that the argument from self-knowledge does not work, and somehow render the picture and moderate (as opposed to omniscient) self-knowledge compatible. Now, 'subjectivity' may be taken as the next candidate for argument: 'the internal component of the composite picture...irresistibly attracts the attributes that intuitively characterize the domain of subjectivity.' And here goes the alleged Fregean: It is in the internal component that we have to locate the difference Frege's constraint requires us to mark between pairs of (say) beliefs that in the full composite story would be described as involving the attribution of the same property to the same object, but that have to be distinguished because someone may without irrationality have one and not the other...Frege's notion of a mode of presentation is supposed to have its use in characterizing the configurations of the interior...31 This argument has some initial plausibility. Frege famously distinguishes between sense and reference, and presumably 'reference' should be located in the external world. Therefore, it is natural to identify 'sense' with the internal component. This line of thought is strengthened by the fact that sense is often seen as the constituent of the cognitive realm. Unfortunately, the 'difficulty is palpable': how can we be expected to acknowledge that our subjective way of being in the world is properly captured by this picture, when it portrays the domain of our subjectivity – our cognitive world – in such a way that, considered from its own point of view, that world has to be conceived as letting in no light from outside? The representational content apparently present in the composite story comes too late to meet the point.32 So the argument from subjectivity fails either. If we regard subjectivity as something 'inner,' we cannot make sense of the fact that we are beings in the world: not only our bodies, but ourselves, are objective presences in the world. I shall come back to this in my episode four and five. 4. Let's turn to McDowell's parallel story concerning knowledge, or more 30 McDowell discusses self-knowledge and related issues in his diagnosis of Cartesian immaterialism He attempts to argue that immaterialism is not the deepest problem with the Cartesian way of thinking. I appropriate his remarks there for my own purpose, namely to show the weakness of the inner space model. 31 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,' p.251. 32 Ibid., p.251. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 33 specifically, justification. Here McDowell begins with Sellars's thought that 'knowledge – at least as enjoyed by rational animals – is a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons.'33 McDowell aims to disabuse a particular 'deformation' of the Sellarsian idea, namely 'an interiorization of the space of the reasons, a withdrawal of it from the external world.'34 This putative 'deformation' is natural enough: 'reason' is often, if not always, treated as something 'subjective' and therefore 'internal.' But as we have seen in the above discussion, this seemingly natural thought is not really natural when thought through: if subjectivity belongs to the allegedly internal factor, the very idea of subjectivity as the cognitive space becomes unintelligible. Since the general lesson in the case in epistemology is the same with that of perception, I shall concentrate on issues concerning justification specifically. To begin with, consider a traditional notion concerning knowledge – 'epistemic luck.' It is commonsensical that for something to be knowledge, it must at least be a true belief, and it is also commonsensical that this is not enough.35 Not enough, because the two conditions do not rule out the possibility that a subject happens to have a true belief. This should be ruled out because we think that to have a piece of knowledge is to be in a normative status, and a true belief by luck does not give us this. The notion of 'justification' serves to bridge the normative gap: a subject has a piece of knowledge if and only if she holds the true belief in question with good reasons. Justification is thought to be a truth-conducive property; it is supposed to be something that excludes epistemic luck. The Gettier-style counterexamples end the good old days. The moral of those cases is that epistemic luck is unavoidable; the subjects in the examples have fairly good reasons to hold the beliefs in question, but those beliefs fail to be knowledge. The literatures in epistemology became a mess during the following few decades. It is not that there was no insightful proposal; the trouble is that it seems to become a dead issue before damping the relevant misgivings: if some notion of 'justification' or some other conditions cannot preclude epistemic luck, then how is knowledge possible? Now, a typical McDowellian move is to consider why a given question looks so urgent. Why, we should ask ourselves, do we think that knowledge requires the possessors of it manage to rule out epistemic luck completely? To answer this, imagine that somehow we do accomplish that flawless epistemic standing. It soon becomes clear that the picture is a version of the inner space model: the mental items are transparent through and through for the subject, for those items are self-standing, 33 'Knowledge and the Internal,' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995), pp.877-93; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, pp.395-413, at p.395. 34 Ibid., p.395. 35 The vague term 'something' is supposed to leave open various questions concerning the notion of 'knowledge.' W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 34 not beholden to any external conditions. Again, the fear about epistemic luck can be traced back to the argument from illusion, broadly construed. Consider the crucial step of it: If things are indeed thus and so when they seem to be, the world is doing me a favour. So if I want to restrict myself to standings in the space of reasons whose flawlessness I can ensure with external help, I must go no further than taking it that it looks to me as if things are thus and so.36 The metaphor 'the world's favor' denotes epistemic luck. No one, including those who are faithful to traditional epistemology, can sensibly deny that they exist. The crucial question is that what follows from this. The inner space model theorist thinks that we should 'restrict ourselves' to the inner space, for he assumes that epistemic luck are something to be avoided in order for us to have knowledge. This is the assumption McDowell disputes. McDowell first lays out the desideratum – human subjects' critical reason. 'If it turns out to be an effect of interiorizing the space of reasons that we become unable to make sense of this critical function of reason, we ought to conclude that the very idea of the space of reasons has become unrecognizable.'37 The strategy is to assume the inner space model for the sake of argument, and to see whether we can still make good sense of the very idea of the space of reasons. An obvious response is skepticism, which holds that in order to fulfill the demand of 'risk-free,' we have to stay in the inner realm. But this means, at the same time, that we will never break the inner circle, hence skepticism. McDowell does not regard skepticism as the main opponent in the paper now I am concentrating on, but we have seen above how he responds to it: if we never have perceptual contact with the world, there is no reason to think that we can characterize the inner space with content-involving terms. Another response is to insist 'that there must be policies or habits of basing belief on appearance that are utterly risk-free.'38 As McDowell points out, this looks attractive 'in the context of the threat of scepticism,' but it is clear that it only 'express a rather touching a priori faith in the power of human reason to devise fully effective protections against the deceptive capacities of appearance.'39 This response is ad hoc, for it clings on the original three-fold analysis of knowledge, and insists that they must be jointly sufficient for knowledge. Without any substantial argument for this position, we do not need to take it seriously. 36 Ibid., p.396. 37 Ibid., p.398. 38 Ibid., p.399. 39 Ibid., p.399-400. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 35 The response McDowell considers in details is again the composite, or conjunctive, conception. In the context of knowledge, it goes like this: At least for rational animals, a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons is a necessary condition for knowledge. But since the positions one can reach by blameless moves in the space of reasons are not factive, as epistemically satisfactory positions are, a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons cannot be what knowledge is.40 What does knowledge require in addition to a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons, according to the traditional picture? It is 'the familiar truth requirement for knowledge...[conceived] as a necessary extra condition for knowledge, over and above the best one can have in the way of reliability in a policy or habit of basing belief on appearance.'41 The notion of 'reliability' figures in the picture as the internal component, as opposed to its role in 'full-blown externalism,' which 'reject[s] the Sellarsian idea'42 shared by all parties considered above. Thus the composite picture can be seen as combining internal reliability (blamelessness) with external truth. To separate reliability and truth is the source of the problem, McDowell argues. On the one hand, the inner space theorist interiorizes the space of reason, which means 'standings in the space [cannot] consist in a cognitive purchase on an objective fact...' But if that is so, then 'how can reason have the resources it would need in order to evaluate the reliability of belief-forming policies or habits?'43 The 'interiorized Fregean sense' is unintelligible, as we have seen in the case of perception. The epistemological version of the inner space model faces an additional challenge. Consider the reason why 'justification' is introduced in the first place. A true belief held by a subject accidentally does not count as knowledge, for knowledge requires reasons. Now we have a subject in the good case, the other in the subjectively indistinguishable bad case; one has knowledge, the other does not. McDowell then asks: 'if its being so is external to her operations in the space of reasons, how can it not be outside the reach of her rational powers?' 44 Epistemologists introduce 'justification' in order to account for the rational element of knowledge, but when we consider the good case and the bad case with the inner space model, we realize that it is epistemic luck that make the difference. The subject in the good case had knowledge not because he has a better standing in the space of reasons, but because 40 Ibid., p.400. 41 Ibid., p.400. 42 Ibid., p.401. 43 Ibid., pp.402-3. 44 Ibid., p.403. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 36 he is lucky. This is where the Gettier-style counterexamples come in. Epistemic luck do exist, but '[t]he hybrid view's concession to luck, tagged on to a picture of reason as self-sufficient within its own proper province, comes too late.' 45 What the existence of epistemic luck shows is not that we should confine ourselves in the flawless inner space and try to work out our ways to knowledge, but that our rational power has its limits. As a result, justification is closer to the external world than we originally envisage. The space of reasons incorporates the worldly facts as its constituents: When someone enjoys such a position [of knowing], that involves, if you like, a stroke of good fortune, a kindness from the world; even so, the position is, in its own right, a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons, not a composite in which such a standing is combined with a condition external to the space of reasons. Whether we like it or not, we have to rely on favours from the world: not just that it presents us with appearances...but that on occasion it actually is the way it appears to be.46 In sum, we need to 'learn to live with'47 the fact that we are subject to epistemic luck, that is, our rational power has its limits. The inner space model strives to preserve the fantasy of human reason, but the resulting picture is quite implausible. Why is it so tempting to lapse into that picture then? Again, consider the good case and the bad case. Intuitively, the BIV or the victim of the evil demon seems to have the same epistemic standing with normal subjects, for subjectively there is no difference. 'How can we blame the BIV for not having knowledge?' One might ask. But consider a parallel case in action. Someone may unintentionally kill others in a car accident. Now it maybe true that he shouldn't be blamed, but is what he has done thereby justified? It seems clear that the answer is negative. By the same token, the BIV is not to be blamed epistemically, but he is not justified in holding those empirical beliefs either. To be in a satisfying standing in the space of reasons, blamelessness is not enough. Justification is indeed an epistemically positive notion, while 'exculpation' is only negative.48 I open this section with the notion of 'primeness.' It says that both perception and knowledge cannot be factorized into simpler elements; both of them involve external conditions essentially. Against the mainstream epistemology, primeness says that what 45 Ibid., p.405. 46 Ibid., p.406 47 Ibid., p.408. 48 The distinction between exculpation and justification is used by McDowell to criticize the Myth of the Given (Mind and World, p.8), which will be discussed presently. Although the context is different right now, the distinction nicely uncovers the central motivation of the interiorization of the space of reasons. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 7 3 the Gettier-style counterexamples show is not that we should engage further analyses for knowledge, but that knowledge is unanalyzable. I shall do some reprise before closing this section. In both the case of perception and knowledge, the (Cartesian) inner space model is motivated by phenomenal indistinguishability. From this indistinguishability, it is argued that there is a common internal factor – 'experience' for perception and 'justification' for knowledge – shared by the good case and the bad case. Since the factor is also present in the bad case, its relations to the external world must be extrinsic. They are free-floating items in the self-sustaining inner space. There are many problems with this picture, but the deepest one is that it makes cognition and rationality unintelligible: in order to account for subjectivity, the inner space theorist renders it as purely inner, but this makes the very idea of subjectivity unrecognizable: as our commonsense tells us, subjectivity is 'a vantage point on the external world.'49 Openness 1. We have seen how McDowell establishes the primeness claim. According to this view, the external world is incorporated in the space of reasons; the space of reasons has no outer boundary. This naturally brings us to the further stage of the argumentation: our 'openness' to the world. The openness claim is the main theme of McDowell's Locke Lecture. His overall topic there, as himself makes clear, 'is the way concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world.'50 As the previous section shows, the world is embraced by the space of reasons; now McDowell's further claim is that the space of reasons is the space of concepts. It follows that the world is in the space of concept, hence the title of his second lecture, 'The Unboundedness of the Conceptual.'51 McDowell situates his discussion in the Kantian-Davidsonian background. Kant famously remarks that 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.'52 He glosses this with Davidson's attack on scheme-content dualism.53 'Scheme' means 'conceptual scheme'; the opposite means 'nonconceptual 49 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,' p.241. 50 Mind and World, p.3. 51 Ibid., p.24. 52 Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1998), A51/B75. 53 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,' in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47 (1974); reprinted in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001), pp.183-198. Following McDowell, I shall not go into the details of Davidson's criticisms and his disagreements with Davidson in the present context. The details and disagreements are important, but for my purpose all these issues will be postponed towards the end of the whole thesis. The reason for postponing those matters is that in Mind and World McDowell emphasizes his agreements with Davidson, while in other contexts, he insists on his own distinct way W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 38 content' or 'given.' When one uses the term nonconceptual 'content,' she probably concerns the issues generated by the 'fineness-of-grained' argument and the argument from human infant and mere animals; this is the main theme of McDowell's third lecture. For our purpose, the term nonconceptual 'given' is better. What 'given' signifies is passivity, as opposed to scheme's active operations. From now on I will use 'dualism of scheme and Given'54 to denote McDowell's target. McDowell mentions that in the Kantian framework, 'the space of reasons is the realm of freedom.'55 However, '[t]he more we play up the connection between reason and freedom, the more we risk losing our grip on how exercises of concepts can constitute warranted judgements about the world.'56 The point is that we need 'external constraint on our freedom,' otherwise our mentality will collapse into a 'self-contained game.'57 The idea of the Given is supposed to undertake this external constraint. On this view, nonconceptual given can nevertheless serve as reasons, as McDowell describes, 'the space of reasons is made out to be more extensive than the space of concepts.'58 Notice that the dialectics is primarily semantic; '[e]mpirical judgements in general...had better have content of a sort that admits of empirical justification...'59 This is shown by the fact that McDowell never uses the label 'foundationalism' to identify his target. Start with the recognition that there are close relations between reason and freedom, one is prone to accept coherentism, and if one also recognizes the need of external constraint, one tends to embrace the idea of the Given: the thought is that there must be something given from outside, in order for our thoughts to have directedness. In what I just said above, there is nothing directly concerns epistemological foundationalism.60 McDowell adumbrates the debate between coherentism and the Given as follows: It can be difficult to accept that the Myth of Given is a myth. It can seem that if we reject the Given, we merely reopen ourselves to the threat to which the idea of the Given is a response, the threat that our picture does not accommodate any external constraint on our activity in empirical thought and judgement...If our activity in empirical thought and judgement is to be recognizable as bearing on reality at all, there must be external constraint....Realizing this, we come under pressure to recoil back into the Given, only to see all over again that it cannot help. There is a danger of understanding the dualism. This deserves a separate section. 54 Mind and World, p.4. 55 Ibid., p.5. 56 Ibid., p.5. 57 Ibid., p.6, p.5 respectively. 58 Ibid., p.6. 59 Ibid., p.6, my italics. 60 This will prove to be important when we consider Dreyfus's objections in he fourth episode. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 39 of falling into an interminable oscillation.61 McDowell's metaphor for the situation is an oscillating 'seesaw.'62 We can appreciate this more by comparing another position, 'bald naturalism.' As we have seen in my introductory episode, bald naturalism denies 'that the spontaneity of the understanding is sui generis in the way suggested by the link to the idea of freedom'; it 'opt[s] out of this area of philosophy altogether.'63 The way bald naturalism dismounts from the seesaw is to reduce the space of reasons, to erase what is distinctively human. Coherentism and the Given are on the seesaw precisely because both of them recognize the sui generis character of the space of reasons. In addition, they (and bald naturalism) share the assumption that 'experience' is to be put on the Given side, as dualistically opposed to the scheme side, on the ground that experience is 'passive.'64 For coherentism, since experiences are passive and hence confined in the realm of law, it cannot have rational relations with beliefs and judgments, which are denizens in the space of reasons. For the Given, though experiences are passive and hence confined in the realm of law, there must be rational relations between beliefs and judgments on the one hand, and experiences on the other, on pain of 'a frictionless spinning in a void.'65 For bald naturalism, though experiences are passive and hence confined in the realm of law, there can be rational relations between beliefs / judgments and experiences, for beliefs and judgments are in the realm of law either. Thus, we get a clearer sense of the dialectical situations surrounding the seesaw metaphor. Now we are in a position to understand McDowell's Kantian solution. We have seen that coherentism, the Given, and bald naturalism all assume that because experiences are passive, they are inhabitants of the realm of law. McDowell's key move is to argue that the inference here is a non sequitur: The original Kantian thought was that empirical knowledge results from a co-operation between receptivity and spontaneity. (Here 'spontaneity' can be simply a label for the involvement of conceptual capacities.) We can dismount from the seesaw if we can achieve a firm grip on this thought: receptivity does not make an even notionally separable contribution to the co-operation. The relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity...It is not that they are exercised on an extra-conceptual deliverance of receptivity...In experience one takes in, for instance sees, that things are thus and so. That is the sort of thing one 61 Ibid., p.8-9. 62 Ibid., p.9. 63 Ibid., p.67. 64 Ibid., p.10. 65 Ibid., p.11. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 40 can also, for instance, judge.66 The passivity of experiences is a plain fact; indeed, this passivity is what distinguishes experiences from judgments. 'In experience one finds oneself saddled with content,'67 McDowell admits. It doesn't follow, however, that experiences are not inhabitants of the space of reasons: experiences can be at the same time conceptual and passive. In judgments, we exercise conceptual capacities; in experiences, conceptual capacities are operative.68 2. An immediate doubt is that if conceptual capacities are operative only passively in experiences, how can we ensure that they are conceptual? After all, conceptual capacities are often seen as constituents of judgments, and judgments are active if anything is. McDowell agrees that '[the putative conceptual capacities] would not be recognizable as conceptual capacities at all unless they could also be exercised in active thinking...'69 Judgments are indeed the paradigmatic locus for conceptual capacities, but it doesn't mean that they cannot be operative in other cases. Recall how McDowell reaches his Kantian conclusion: if we think experiences are not in the space of reasons, we will face quandary illustrated by the stalemate between coherentism, the Myth of the Given, and bald naturalism. The quandary is that all of the three positions make intentionality unintelligible. So we should uncover and reject the ungrounded assumption shared by them. The assumption in question is the thought that experiences are in the realm of law because they are passive. McDowell's conclusion that experiences are participants of the space of reasons follows from the rejection of that assumption. This is a transcendental argument: intentionality in general requires that the space of reasons incorporate experiences, and intentionality does present in human activities, therefore experiences are in the space of reasons. To say that it is hard to conceive passively operative conceptual capacities does not touch the transcendental argument at all. But there is still a gap between the conclusion of the transcendental argument and McDowell's actual conclusion, namely that conceptual capacities are operative all the way out in experiences, for one might hold that the space of reasons are not exhausted by conceptual capacities. Many philosophers think that there are nonconceptual content in play in our experiences, but this doesn't relegate experiences out of the 66 Ibid., p.9. 67 Ibid., p.10. 68 For more on this, see 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' in Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität: 2005 Congress of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Philosophie, pp. 1065-79. Elsewhere, McDowell also uses 'actualization' in 'The Woodbridge Lecture 1997: Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality,' Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998), pp.431-91. Dreyfus disagrees with McDowell at this point; I shall come back to this in my fourth episode. 69 Mind and World, p.11. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 41 space of reasons. They maintain this position for many different reasons, notably the fineness-of-grained / richness argument, the argument from human infant and mere animals, and the argument from concept-formation, among others. This is the main theme of McDowell's third lecture, but for our purpose we can bypass this for the moment: what concerns us in this essay is how McDowell identifies a model of subjectivity that responsible for various puzzlements concerning human subject as perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and (self-) conscious animal, and further, how he manages to develop a positive account that makes our direct contact with the world intelligible. For this purpose, the discursivity of experience is relevant, but by far not in the main thread.70 So let's cling on the main thread. The primeness claim, as discussed in my previous section, has it that the space of reasons incorporates the external world: in the case of knowledge and veridical experience, the worldly facts themselves are unfactorizable part of the states. This repels the composite picture, which regards the worldly facts as only extrinsically related to the states in question even in the case of knowledge and veridical perception, which means that there is a common inner factor shared by the good case and the bad case. The primeness claim goes with the disjunctive conception and the composite / conjunctive claim goes with the common factor conception. Now McDowell takes up this aspect of his thought again in Mind and World: I insist...that when we acknowledge the possibility of being misled, we do not deprive ourselves of 'taking in how things are' as a description of what happens when one is not misled...That things are thus and so is the content of the [veridical] experience, and it can also be the content of a judgment...So it is conceptual content. But that things are thus and so is also, if one is not misled, as aspect of the layout of the world: it is how things are. Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of receptivity puts us in a position to speak of experience as openness to the layout of reality. Experience enables the layout of reality itself to exert a rational influence on what a subject thinks.71 In this passage, McDowell combines the primeness claim and the conceptuality thesis: the worldly facts that figure in the content of experience are characterized by 'that things are thus and so.' 'That things are thus and so' is both the conceptual content of veridical experiences and an aspect of the layout of reality. This radically changes the traditional picture: on the traditional, composite picture, the conceptual content of experiences is 'in the head,' or at least 'in the subject,' and that inner conceptual 70 I will nevertheless say more about this in my later episode on agent and person. 71 Ibid., p.26. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 42 content 'represents' outer, worldly facts. On McDowell's openness view, by contrast, the conceptual content of experience is identical with an aspect of the world. The following passage is another expression of the same line of thought: [T]here is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case. So since the world is everything that is the case...there is no gap between thought, as such, and the world.72 As McDowell himself notices, nevertheless, an obvious and strong objection to this 'unboundedness of the conceptual' is the charge of 'idealism.'73 The line of thought is quite simple: concepts are mental, so if the conceptual has no outer boundary, then the 'external' world becomes mental. How does McDowell respond to this fairly straightforward argument? McDowell invokes the act / content distinction in reply: 'Thought' can mean the act of thinking; but it can also mean the content of a piece of thinking: what someone thinks. Now if we are to give due acknowledgement to the independence of reality, what we need is a constraint from outside thinking and judging, our exercises of spontaneity. The constraint does not need to be from outside thinkable contents.74 The identity McDowell commits is between thinkable contents, i.e. what one thinks, and worldly facts. Read like this, it becomes a tautology. As Wittgenstein says, the openness claim 'has the form of a truism,' quoted by McDowell.75 But if it is indeed a truism, what's the point of insisting it? The answer should be clear when we consider the inner space model. On this view, there are self-standing items populated in the mental inner space, and these items somehow 'represent' outer states of affairs. The items function as inner representations that are distinct from aspects of the outer world. Since this inner space model is very popular in contemporary philosophy, as I will try to show in this essay, McDowell's insistence on that truism has a real point. 72 Ibid., p.27. 73 Ibid., p.25.-6 74 Ibid., p.28. Recall my quotation of A. D. Smith at the early stage of the introduction. He thinks 'Realism' and 'Idealism' constitutes a dichotomy, and notices that in formulating this he uses terms like 'cognized' and 'states,' which belong to the 'act' side in the act / content distinction. Smith's formulation leaves open the possibility that we can have a reasonable idealism formulated in terms of 'content.' I will say more about this in the fourth episode, where I explain that McDowell does propose certain version of idealism. 75 Ibid., p.27. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 43 3. I almost finish my exposition of McDowell's conception of perceiver and knower. Before closing this episode, however, I would like to consider a larger objection to McDowell's overall position. In arguing for primeness cum openness, the notion of 'experience' plays a crucial role for McDowell. This reflects his 'minimal empiricism: the idea that experience must constitute a tribunal, mediating the way our thinking is answerable to how things are...'76 But not everyone accepts this claim. Recall that coherentism, in recognizing that the Given is a myth, only acknowledges experiences' causal role. In repudiating scheme-content dualism, the third dogma of empiricism, Davidson asserts that 'if we give it up it is not clear that there is anything distinctive left to call empiricism.'77 Robert Brandom follows this and writes: [W]hen we are properly wired up and trained, and favorable circumstances, the perceptible facts wring from us perceptual judgments. In order to explain how this is possible – quite a different enterprise from justifying the resulting judgments – we postulate the existence of something like sense impressions, whose properties systematically covary with the contents of the judgments they causally elicit from us. But these sense impressions are features of the physiology of perception. They are not something we are aware of, and they do not themselves have conceptual content.78 Similar line of thought can also be found in other authors who take experience more seriously, for example Charles Travis and Anil Gupta.79 I shall confine myself to the criticisms raised by Brandom, for his principal argument is from the social, public character of intentionality, which is very important throughout my essay.80 In his positive project, Brandom elaborates '[a] social, linguistic account of intentionality.' 81 He complains that '[t]he social nature of spontaneity...is acknowledged [by McDowell], but only belatedly, in the discussion of the need for knowers and agents to be properly brought up in order to be sensitive to various sorts of norms.'82 In short, Brandom argues that McDowell's emphasis on experience betrays a 'residual individualism.'83 In what follows I shall argue the otherwise. No one will deny that experiences in some way mediate the relations between mind 76 Ibid., xii, my italics. 77 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,' pp.189-90. 78 'Perception and Rational Constraint,' p.253-4. 79 For the Former, see 'The Silence of Senses,' Mind 113 (2004), pp.57-94; for the latter, see Empiricism and Experience (Oxford University Press, USA, 2006). 80 Some of the materials below are drawn from 'Openness and the Social Initiation into the Space of Reasons,' which I co-author with Professor Lin. 81 Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Harvard University Press, 1994), p.xv, my italics. 82 'Perception and Rational Constraint,' p.256. 83 Ibid., p.258. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 44 and world, but McDowell and Brandom have very different view about the way in question. For McDowell, experiences have both semantic and causal roles to play; for Brandom, experiences are like sense impressions in old empiricism's sense. Before evaluating these two views, it would be helpful to know more about their conceptions of the world and the mind-world relation generally. Brandom urges, in a Fregean vein, that 'facts are just true claims.' 84 'Fact' presumably refers to a constituent of 'world.' He further distinguishes 'what is claimed' and 'the claiming of it.'85 'To say that facts are just true claims does not commit one to treating the facts as somehow dependent on our claimings; it does not, for instance, have the consequence that had there never been any claimers, there would have been no facts...Talk of facts as what makes claims true is confused if it is thought of as relating two distinct things – a true claim and the fact in virtue of which it is true...'86 For Brandom, facts are true contents, not truth-makers. In other words, Brandom also accepts the openness thesis that the world is in the realm of the conceptual.87 The only discernable difference between him and McDowell in this context is that where Brandom uses 'claimings,' McDowell uses 'experience.'88 As I have said, Brandom avoids 'experience' because he thinks that implies individualism, which has it that social elements are not essential to the constitution of intentionality in general. In principle, a normal individual will do, so to speak. Does McDowell unwittingly commit this implausible picture? Brandom quotes McDowell: 'The world itself must exert a rational constraint on our thinking,'89 and goes on to argue that 'in his positive suggestions, McDowell looks to rational constraint, not by the facts, but by experience of the facts.'90 Brandom then makes two claims: first, what McDowell really has in mind here is 'experience,' but his insistence on 'the need for conceptually structured pre-judgmental experiences that warrant our perceptual judgment is a non sequitur.'91 Second, as we just briefly described, 'the aetiology of [McDowell's] blindness to alternatives should be traced to a residual individualism...[which is] a systematic underestimation of the significance of the fact that talk of the space of reasons is an abstraction from concrete, essential social practices of giving and asking for licit, p.327. PI for short; trans. G.E.M. king It Explicit, p.333 and Mind and World, p.27. d Rational Constraint,' p.253. 84 Making It Exp 85 Ibid., p.327 86 Ibid., p.328. 87 And both of them express their faithfulness to Wittgenstein's remark: '[w]hen we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we – and our meaning – do not stop anywhere short of the facts; but we mean: this-is-so' (Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell Publishing, 2001, Anscombe, §195). See Ma 88 Mind and World, p.26. 89 'Perception an 90 Ibid., p.253. 91 Ibid., p.255. Episode II. Perceiver and Knower 45 reasons.92 Against this, I shall argue that actually McDowell never slide from world to experience, and his talk of experience by no means commits him individualism. Brandom is not alone in noticing McDowell's putative oscillation between experience and world. Hannah Ginsborg, for example, questions: If the streets are wet and, recognizing that fact, I come to believe that it has rained, is my reason for believing that it has rained my belief that the streets are wet or the fact that the streets are wet? If, as some philosophers hold, the right answer in these cases is that it is the fact rather than the belief which serves as a reason, then Davidson [and McDowell are] mistaken about something more fundamental...93 Their worry seems to be this: McDowell is not determinate (or worse, consistent) about the ultimate step in his picture; sometimes he thinks it is the world that fits the bill, but in other occasions he retreats that claim and let experience play the role. Brandom, in particular, provides a diagnosis for this oscillation: he thinks in regarding experience as the final step for both intentionality and justification, McDowell betrays his residual individualism, which is inherited from his 'predecessor' C. I. Lewis.94 The correctness of this diagnosis aside, Brandom's move shows that he thinks individualism and the emphasis on the role of experience goes hand in hand. To be sure, he does not claim that there is any implicative connection between the two, but at least he takes the emphasis on experience as a symptom of individualism. Granting this point for the sake of argument, I would like to suggest that the above doubt cast by Brandom, Ginsborg, and Ayers (see footnote 87) presupposes a gap firmly and reasonably rejected by McDowell: the gap between experiences and the facts they take in. 'Experience enables the layout of reality itself to exert a rational influence on what a subject thinks,'95 McDowell remarks; he makes clear that it is the layout of reality itself, rather than our experiences of it, that serves the rational constraint required. 'But if that is so,' one might ask, 'why does McDowell sometimes talk as if it is experiences that do the trick?' Recall the act / content distinction discussed above. The distinction is invoked to explicate the openness of thought, but for McDowell, this can 92 Ibid., p.258. 93 'Reasons for Belief,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006), pp.286-318, at p.287. The quotation is appropriated for encompassing both Davidson and McDowell. According to Ginsborg, this debate between the two is in some sense only a family quarrel, for there is a more fundamental issue concerning the status of psychological states as reasons in general. Michael Ayers raises a similar consideration in 'Sense Experience, Concepts, and Content – Objections to Davidson and McDowell,' in Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present (Paderborn, 2004), pp.239-62. 94 'Perception and Rational Constraint,' p.256. 95 Mind and World, p.26, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 46 uld be exempt from the kind of charge made by des the fact it takes in. d Donald Davidson, both of whom stress the social aspects of language painstakingly. be naturally generalized to the openness of experience. The 'act' of experience is what makes facts available to us; the 'content' of experience is the fact itself when we are not misled. There is no extra item for McDowell to 'lapse into': the act is not a 'thing' that can exert the rational constraint; it is a way to make the true content available to us and therefore able to exert constraint on us; the content, when veridical, is the fact itself, which exerts rational constraint. Individualism won't strike back in McDowell's picture, for he does not commit the existence of a thing called 'experience' whose individuation condition excludes the world. Brandom's worry applies only to the picture McDowell objects to: if one postulates mental representations representing the world, he does need to make a choice between 'experience' and the world. McDowell, in repudiating this picture, sho Brandom, Ginsborg, and Ayers. In defense of Davidson's claim that 'nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief'96 against Ayers' charge, McDowell writes: 'Davidson's claim is obviously not that one bases a belief on one's believing something else...It is what one believes, not one's believing it, that is one's reason in the sense Davidson is concerned with.'97 There is no problem for Davidson and McDowell here; what justifies our beliefs is a given fact, not its 'psychological surrogate.'98 But we need some way to make the fact available to us, hence the crucial role of experience, conceived as an act: '[i]t is not...that the fact itself, as opposed to the fact that one experiences its obtaining, is one's reason for believing what one believes.'99 This looks like a 'narrow content' theory only on the assumption that experience is something internal and whose individuation condition exclu This is in no way McDowell's conception of 'experience.'100 This is not the end of the story between McDowell and Brandom, to be sure, but for my purpose this should be enough. Brandom's argument from social elements against McDowell's use of experience fails. But one might still tend to think that McDowell does not take social elements or publicity seriously enough. In the next episode I will spell out this aspect of McDowell's philosophy by considering his view of thinker and speaker. The main interlocutors are Saul Kripke an 96 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,' in Kant oder Hegel? (1983); reprinted in his Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001), pp.137-153, at p.141. 97 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' p.1073. 98 'Reply to Dancy,' in Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald (eds.), McDowell and His Critics (Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp.134-41, at p.135. 99 Ibid., p.135. 100 I discuss more about the differences between McDowell and Brandom in 'Openness and the Social Initiation into the Space of Reasons.' McDowell further argues that Brandom commits the composite picture in his account of knowledge; I bypass this for that will take us too far. See his 'Knowledge and the Internal Revisited,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002), pp.97-105. E P I S O D E III Thinker and Speaker In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. – Martin Heidegger, Being and Time ...language maintains a kind of independent life vis-à-vis the individual member of a linguistic community; and as he grows into it, it introduces him into a particular orientation and relationship to the world as well. – Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method Custom 1. In his preface of the celebrated Word and Object, Quine says, 'Language is a social art.'1 Most, if not all, contemporary analytic philosophers regard the publicity of meaning as basically uncontroversial. Even Searle, as a dedicated 'internalist,' says that '[l]anguage is indeed public...'2 Other key players like Davidson, Putnam, Burge, among others, have their own ways to conceive the crucial social elements. The idea often traces back to Wittgenstein, in particular his notion of 'custom.'3 How this notion is relevant to McDowell's conception of thinker and speaker will become clear later on. 1 Word and Object (MIT Press, 1960), p.ix. 2 'Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person,' Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987), pp.123-46; reprinted in his Consciousness and Language (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.226-50, at p.250. 3 Philosophical Investigations, §198. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 48 The guiding question in the present episode is this: how does McDowell conceive the social / public elements of intentionality, and how does this conception connect to his diagnosis and treatment of the inner space model, as discussed in the previous episode? I answer this question by considering McDowell's criticisms against Saul Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein.4 As we shall see, in formulating the 'skeptical paradox' of meaning, Kripke tacitly presupposes the inner space model. This may be somewhat surprising, for Kripke is often read as a critic of our residual Cartesianism about meaning, as we shall see. One of McDowell's main tasks here is to persuade us that Kripke's anti-Cartesianism does not go to the root. So here goes Kripke's Wittgenstein, or 'Kripkenstein.'5 Kripke attempts to shed light on the issue about meaning by discussing and elaborating Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'rule-following considerations.' We normally think that our linguistic behaviors are rule-governed: a concept is a rule; when we use it we need to follow the rule given by its content. This is where normativity comes in. The rule determines correct and incorrect uses of the concept in question. The Kripkenstein paradox challenges this conception of language. Kripke summarizes the paradox as follows: The Skeptic doubts whether any instructions I gave myself in the past compel (or justify) the answer '125' rather than 5.' He puts the challenge in terms of a skeptical hypothesis about a change in my usage. Perhaps when I used the term 'plus' in the past, I always mean quus: by hypothesis I never gave myself any explicit directions that were incompatible with such a hypothesis.6 The problem is this: one's past performances are finite, and we can always fit them into more than one rule, however deviant they might be. But if that is so, then the normativity vanishes, for it goes with rules. Given a set of past behaviors or intentions, including linguistic ones, the skeptic claims that we can always interpret them as confirming infinitely different rules. There is no principle to prevent him from doing so. Kripke goes on to envisage a reply to the skeptic: [S]uppose we wish to add x and y. Take a huge bunch of marbles. First count out x marbles in one hip. Then count out y marbles in another. Put the two heaps together and count out the number of marbles in the union thus formed. The result is x + y. This set of directions, I may suppose, I explicitly gave myself at some earlier time. It 4 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard University Press, 1982). 5 Part of the following paragraphs are drawn from my 'The Skeptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self,' which has been published by Aurora 2. 6 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, p.13. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 49 is engraved on my mind as on a slate. It is incompatible with the hypothesis that I mean quus. It is this set of directions, not the finite list of particular additions I performed in the past, that justifies and determines my present response.7 And Kripke launches a Wittgensteinian rejoinder to this reply: True, if 'count,' as I used the word in the past, referred to the act of counting..., then 'plus' must have stood for addition. But I applied 'count,' like 'plus,' to only finitely many past cases. Thus the Skeptic can question my present interpretation of my past usage of 'count' as he did with 'plus.' In particular, he can claim that by 'count' I formerly meant quount, where to 'quount' a heap is to count it in the ordinary sense, unless the heap was formed as the union of two heaps, one of which has 57 or more items, in which case one must automatically give the answer '5.'8 Here Kripke is applying again the infinite regress of interpreting rules. This time the regress is not within a single symbol, say '+,' but between different symbols. The basic insight, if any, is the same: a rule is never self-interpreting; we can always assign infinite interpretations to it, and if we attempt to interpret it with other rules, the series of interpretation are also infinite. Hence the paradox.9 Let me now briefly introduce Kripke's 'skeptical solution.' He says this kind of solution 'begins on the contrary by conceding that the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswerable. Nevertheless our ordinary practice or belief is justified because...it need not require the justification the sceptic has shown to be untenable.'10 He goes on to say that 'Wittgenstein proposes a picture of language based, not on truth conditions, but on assertability conditions or justification conditions: under what circumstances are we allowed to make a given assertion?'11 He then concludes by saying that '[t]he success of the practices...depends on the brute empirical fact that we agree with each other in our responses.'12 This is the general guise of Kripke's skeptical solution.13 7 Ibid., p.15-6. 8 Ibid., p.16. 9 David McCarty reminds me that 'infinity' is not always a problem, especially when we notice examples form mathematics. I think the infinity in the present context is indeed a problem because it violates the normativity of meaning; it prevents us from deciding non-arbitrarily which interpretation is correct. 10 Ibid., p.66. 11 Ibid., p.74. 12 Ibid., p.109, my italics. 13 Some readers might have noticed that I do not have any surprising interpretation of Kripke. One thing to be noted, however, is that I do not accept George Wilson's reductio interpretation of the paradox, which is supposed to cast doubt on the standard interpretation I adopt. See his 'Kripke on Wittgenstein on Normativity,' in Peter A. French and Howard Wettstein (eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994), pp.366-90; reprinted in Alexander Miller and Crispin Wright (eds.), Rule-Following and Meaning (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), pp.234-59. I side with Miller W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 50 2. As we have seen, the first principle of the Kripkenstein paradox is the infinite regress of interpreting rule. We can equally interpret the '+' sign to mean 'plus' or 'quus,' and if we attempt to determine the its meaning by invoking another notion, say 'count,' the skeptic can still interpret it as 'quount,' which again is a deviant interpretation. This infinite regress seems to be the hardstand of the paradox. But is it well-grounded? In the early stage of his argumentation, Kripke identifies the skeptical paradox with the first paragraph of Philosophical Investigations §201: This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.14 But as McDowell notices, '§201 goes on with a passage for which Kripke's reading makes no room'15: It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases.16 The problem identified in the first paragraph is the 'infinite regress of interpretations,' which is even clearer in PI §198: 'any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support.'17 Now a natural way to respond to the regress is this: What one wants to say is: 'Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning in thinking that Wilson's interpretation violates Kripke's distinction between the straight solution and the skeptical solution, which seems to me perfectly legitimate. See his introduction in the volume, pp.1-15. Obviously, this should not be regarded as a sweeping objection to Wilson, whose discussions are abundant and delicate. I temporarily ignore his interpretation because that will lead me too far away from my central concern. This remark applies to all other different interpretations to Kripke. 14 Philosophical Investigations, §201. Kripke quotes this in his p.7. 15 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' Synthesis 58 (1984); reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.221-62, at p.229. 16 Philosophical Investigations, §201. 17 Ibid., §198. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 51 mustn't be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.'18 But it should be crystally clear that this won't work, for if we let the chain of interpretations get started, on what ground we are entitled to stop it at any point? To simply insist that there will be 'the last interpretation' is ad hoc and dogmatic. McDowell's metaphor for this is 'a super-rigid yet (or perhaps we should say 'hence') ethereal machine.'19 It is super-rigid because it sustains all other interpretations without being itself interpretable; it is therefore ('hence') ethereal because actually it cannot sustain anything: if every interpretation itself can be further interpreted but the supposed 'last' interpretation cannot, it is disqualified as 'interpretation' anyway. The way Wittgenstein confronts the paradox is not, pace Kripke, to be acquiesce to the 'paradox' introduced in the first paragraph of PI §201; on the contrary, he asserts that 'there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation...' Although so far we have no idea about the general shape of solution, we can be sure that for Wittgenstein, it won't be a Humean 'skeptical solution,' which 'begins...by conceding that the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswerable.'20 But does it follow that what Wittgenstein has in mind is a 'straight solution'? It depends on how we conceive the straightness. Kripke first introduces the notion of a straight solution like this: 'a straight solution...shows that on closer examination the scepticism proves to be unwarranted...'21, but he later adds that a straight solution 'point[s] out to the silly sceptic a hidden fact he overlooked, a condition in the world which constitutes my meaning addition by 'plus.'22 If we stick to the earlier formulation, Wittgenstein's solution is indeed a straight one, for he attempts to show that 'the scepticism proves to be unwarranted' by elaborating how there can be 'a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.' If we adopt the later qualification, however, it is not clear that Wittgenstein would admit that he is providing a straight solution, for the second formulation presupposes certain reductionism about meaning and understanding: as Jerry Fodor famously declares, '[i]f aboutness is real, it must be really something else.'23 Maybe we can accept the supervenience thesis about meaning, but to ask us 'cite the fact' is asking something more than that. 'Supervenience' is an ontological thesis; it does not further require that we are able to cite the very fact. I cannot go into the reductionism debate here, but it seems plausible to reply to the skeptic that the requirement of 'citing the fact' commits reductionism, and we have no reason to accept it without further arguments from the skeptic. What's important for our present 18 The Blue and Brown Books (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), p.34. 19 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.230. 20 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, p.66. 21 Ibid., p.66. 22 Ibid., p.69. 23 Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (MIT Press, 1989), p.97. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 52 purpose is to recognize that though Wittgenstein is not offering a skeptical solution here, he is not offering a straight solution either, understood in the second formulation. As we shall see, he does not cite a fact and identify it with meaning; his talks about 'customs' and other related notion are not like that.24 Before going into the positive account, McDowell further quotes Wittgenstein for his denial of the thought that understanding is always a matter of interpretation: How can the word 'Slab' indicate what I have to do, when after all I can bring any action into accord with any interpretation? How can I follow a rule, when after all whatever I do can be interpreted as following it?25 If we accept McDowell's suggestion to read Wittgenstein as arguing against the thought that understanding is always interpretation, the question '[h]ow can there be a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation?' becomes urgent.26 McDowell submits that we should turn to Wittgenstein's notion of 'practice' for the answer: And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.27 The ground for regarding the notion of practice as the answer is the 'hence also' in the first line of the above quotation: 'we have to realize that obeying a rule is a practice if we are to find it intelligible that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.'28 The same line of thought goes further: 'Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?' – Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule – say a sign-post – got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here? – Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. 'But that is only to give a causal connexion: to tell how it has come about that we go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the sign really consists in.' – On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as 24 Here I am indebted to Scott Soames; we discussed this when I presented a version of 'The Skeptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self' at 2007 Soochow International Conference on Analytic Philosophy. 25 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978), VI-38. McDowell goes on to cite many other passages from PI; I am not going to repeat all of them here. 26 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.238. 27 Philosophical Investigations, §202, my italics. 28 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.238, my italics. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 53 there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.29 When one goes by a sign-post in normal cases, what guides her is not an interpretation of the sign; she just does it in the way the relevant customs dictate. Consider PI §506: '[t]he absent-minded man who at the order "Right turn!" turns left, and then, clutching his forehead, says "Oh! Right turn" and does a right turn. What has struck him? An interpretation?'30 It seems clear that there is no interpretation in play here. True, we do from time to time interpret man-made or natural signs, but that's not the general case.31 Normally, we just do it in the way we trained. A natural objection, anticipated by Wittgenstein, is that this answer is also a 'causal explanation'32; or worse, a behavioristic explanation. In response, McDowell reminds us that for Wittgenstein, 'the training in question is initiation into a custom.'33 If the subject being trained is not a human being, but instead a mere animal, we would not say that in the training it has been initiated into a custom. The crucial difference is whether one has a language or not; I shall come back to this later. Let's consider some of Kripke's remarks in details. The skeptics asks, '[h]ow do I know that '68 + 57,' as I meant 'plus' in the past, should denote 125?'34 He goes on to ask that 'why I now believe that by 'plus' in the past, I meant addition rather than quaddition?'35 A page later he asks, '[b]ut I can doubt that my past usage of 'plus' denoted plus.'36 An assumption underlying all these queries is that we need to offer justifications here, but why should we think so? 'That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life,'37 Wittgenstein writes. If what in play here are opinions, it might be reasonable to ask for justifications, but 'what is at issue here is below that level – the "bedrock" where "I have exhausted the justifications" and "my spade is turned" (PI §217).'38 Also see this passage: Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain proposition' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.39 29 Philosophical Investigations, §198, my italics. 30 Ibid., §506. 31 Wittgenstein and McDowell never make this qualification, but I think we should we them as saying that in general cases, understanding is not interpretation. To read them as holding the universal claim is uncharitable. 32 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.239. 33 Ibid., p.239. 34 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, p.12. 35 Ibid., p.12. 36 Ibid., p.13. Also, 'no matter what is in my mind at a given time, I am free in the future to interpret it in different ways,' p.107. 37 Philosophical Investigations, §241. 38 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.240. 39 On Certainty (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969), §204. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 54 We can appreciate this move by comparing this with the debate about the structure of empirical knowledge. Foundationalism is one of the responses to the infinite regress of justification; it attempts to stop the regress by postulating so-called 'basic beliefs,' beliefs with certain special status. Now many have cast doubt on the cogency of this response, for after all, basic beliefs are beliefs. If they are beliefs, it is hard to see how they can be exempted from being in need of justification in one way or another. Now in our context, if what sustain all the understandings are themselves opinions or propositions, there seems to be little reason for thinking that they are not themselves in need of justifications. So the notion of customs and the like are not to be conceived as explicitly codified articles; instead, they are our forms of life pertaining to our language-games. At the level of 'bedrock,'40 we just carry out actions without a justification, but 'without a justification does not mean...without right.'41 In introducing the notion of 'bedrock,' Wittgenstein is not embracing one horn of the dilemma, i.e. 'the last interpretation.' Rather, he is trying 'to steer a course between a Scylla and a Charybdis. Scylla is the idea that understanding is always interpretation,' but if we avoid this by insisting that at the 'bedrock' level, no justification is needed, 'then we risk steering on to Charybdis – the picture of a basic level at which there are no norms.'42 But as McDowell warns, '[u]ntil more is said about how exactly the appeal to communal practice makes the middle course available, this is only a programme for a solution to Wittgenstein's problem.'43 3. One might wonder why the practices in question have to be communal ones. Can't an individual form her own form of life so as to sustain linguistic abilities?44 To this McDowell replies that 'one must search one's conscience to be sure that what one has in mind is not really, after all, the picture of a private interpretation...[one is] resigning oneself to Scylla...'45 McDowell's remarks here are not very clear; I understand him as say this: how can an individual carry out actions with normativity, all by one's own? It appears that all one can do here is to launch one interpretation after another; as Kripke points out to us, this does not work. But if McDowell's Wittgenstein invokes communal practice to the rescue, what distinguishes this picture from Kripkenstein's one? Recall that at the outset of this episode, I said that almost all analytic philosophers nowadays regard the social 40 Philosophical Investigations, §217. 41 Ibid., §289. 42 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.242. 43 Ibid., p.242. 44 This line of thinking is pursued by Simon Blackburn, 'The Individual Strikes Back,' Synthesis 58 (1984), pp.281-301. 45 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.246. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 55 elements as essential to or at least important for intentionality. 'But it makes a difference how we conceive the requirement of publicity to emerge.'46 McDowell argues that Kripke (and Crispin Wright) Picture a community as a collection of individuals presenting to one another exteriors that match in certain respects. They hope to humanize this bleak picture by claiming that what meaning consists in lies on those exteriors as they conceive them. But...if regularities in the verbal behaviour of an isolated individual, described in norm-free terms, do not add up to meaning, it is quite obscure how it could somehow make all the difference if there are several individuals with matching regularities. The picture of a linguistic community degenerates...into a picture of a mere aggregate of individuals whom we have no convincing reason not to conceive as opaque to one another.47 The picture McDowell recommends, by contrast, is that shared membership in a linguistic community is not just a matter of matching in aspects of an exterior that we present to anyone whatever, but equips us to make our minds available to one another, by confronting one another with a different exterior from that which we present to outsiders...[S]hared command of a language equips us to know one another's meaning without needing to arrive at that knowledge by interpretation, because it equips us to hear someone else's meaning in his words...[A] linguistic community is conceived as bound together, not by a match in mere externals (facts accessible to just anyone), but by a capacity for a meeting of minds.48 The above two passages convey one and the same thought from opposite angles. The negative part says that community in the relevant sense is not just aggregations of individual: there is no reason why quantity can explain the emergence of meaning. The positive part invokes the notion of membership, means that individuals need to be initiated into customs. The second line mentions 'anyone.' If we don't consider the 'membership' of the individuals, then meaning is available to 'anyone.' This collapses into behaviorism, or to use Simon Blackburn's phrase, 'a wooden picture of the use of language.'49 Without the constraint of membership, anyone can access the meaning 46 Ibid., p.243. 47 Ibid., pp.252-3. 48 Ibid., p.253. 49 'Rule-Following and Moral Realism,' in Steven Holtzman and Christopher Leich (eds.) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981), pp.163-87, at p.183. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 56 fact, but what is available to anyone regardless their customs? Answer: behaviors. But this is obvious not what Wittgenstein has in mind, and not a good picture to have anyway. Recall that in my previous episode, I discussed Brandom's accusation of residual individualism in McDowell's picture. Now it is interesting to learn that McDowell's counterargument against Brandom echoes his criticisms to Kripke and Wright: Within the putative observer's perspective, as opposed to the interpreter's, the fact is not in view as calling for a rational response. It is not in view as something to be taken into account in building a picture of the world. But that seems indistinguishable from saying it is not in view as the fact that it is...How could multiplying what are, considered by themselves, blind responses, to include blind responses to how the blind responses of one's fellows are related to the circumstances to which they are blind responses, somehow bring it about that the responses are after all not blind?50 McDowell's thought here is connected to his view about the other-mind problem. He argues that we can 'literally perceive, in another person's facial expression or his behaviour, that he is...in pain...'51 We are mind-readers, but in knowing others' minds, we are not conducting interpretations in normal cases; rather, we just see that they are in pain or other mental states. A general tendency of analytic philosophy is to start with meaningless noises and behaviors, and try to regain meaningfulness from those dead building blocks. The gist of McDowell's interpretation of Wittgenstein is that we need to start in the midst of meaning, or what we get is only aggregate of individuals.52 Those who read Wittgenstein as a reductionist ignore the following remark from him: '[h]earing a word in a particular sense. How queer that there should be such a thing!'53 I suppose that the cogency of McDowell case against the assimilation of understanding to interpretation has been generally established. But even my readers agree with this, one might still wonder what the relation between this reflection from rule-following considerations and the inner space model is. McDowell provides the connection in another work on Wittgenstein: 50 'Reply to Commentators,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998), pp.403-31, at pp.408-9, my italics. 51 'On "The Reality of the Past",' at p.305. 52 McDowell says more in the following two articles. 'Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding,' in Herman Parret and Jacques Bouveresse (eds.) Meaning and Understanding (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1981), pp.225-48; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, pp.314-43. And 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.' I would like to leave this related issue for my readers. 53 Philosophical Investigations, §534. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 7 5 The conception is one according to which such regions of reality are populated exclusively with items that, considered in themselves, do not sort things out side the mind, including specifically bits of behaviour, into those that are correct or incorrect in the light of those items. According to this conception, the contents of minds are items that, considered in themselves, just 'stand there like a sign-post,' as Wittgenstein puts it (PI §85). Consider in itself, a sign-post is just a board or something similar, perhaps bearing an inscription, on a post...What does sort behaviour into what counts as following the sign-post and what does not is not an inscribed board affixed to a post, considered in itself, but such an object under a certain interpretation...54 The first half of the passage is a characterization of the inner space, which is populated by inert, self-standing items that only extrinsically relate to external states of affairs. The second half is to connect the assimilation of understanding to interpretation (the 'master thesis'55) to the inner space model: self-standing items need to be interpreted to be about something else; considered in themselves, they are 'normatively inert.'56 In constructing the skeptical paradox, Kripke seldom talks about the mind directly, but his assimilation of understanding to interpretation betrays that he implicitly commits the inner space model. But if we abandon that way of conceiving ourselves, the regress of interpretations cannot get off the ground, and we can thereby shrug our shoulders to the meaning skeptics.57 Kripke does talk about the mind at the early stage of his discussions. He says that a set of directions 'is engraved on my mind as on a slate.'58 Not many people think there is anything crucial around, but I think Kripke's metaphor here is indeed disastrous: to conceive our minds as slates is to distance ourselves to our mental items, treat them as objects, so as to make room for deviant interpretations. The picture Kripke offers suggests that when someone entertains a thought, she need to consult her own past intentions in using that symbol. The falsity of this way of thinking is that this makes ownership (or 'first-person character') of thoughts a myth. If one needs to consult her mental history whenever she entertains relevant thoughts, the difference 54 'Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy,' Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 17: The Wittgenstein Legacy (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1993), pp.40-52; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.263-78, at pp.264-5. I encourage readers who are new to McDowell's philosophy to start with this later paper; it is much more user-friendly than the dense 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.' In what follows I won't say much about this later paper, for most of the contents relevant to my purpose have been discussed when I concentrated on the earlier, denser paper. 55 Ibid., p.270. 56 Ibid., p.265. 57 In 'The Skeptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self,' I further connect the inner space model to the homunculus fallacy in philosophy of mind. This will burden Kripke's skeptic as well. 58 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, p.15. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 58 between spontaneously entertaining one's own thoughts and attributing thoughts to our fellow speakers vanishes. This doesn't seem right.59 And again we can see the rebuttal of this in Wittgenstein: We are tempted to think that the action of language consists of two parts; an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an organic part, which we may call understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting them, thinking.60 It is helpful to think this in John Searle's terms. Sometimes interpretations do constitute meanings, but that kind of intentionality is merely 'derivative,' i.e. 'observer-relative.' I am not here defending Searle's distinction between original and derivative intentionality, but it is quite clear that to think that human intentionality is universally derivative is straightforwardly wrong.61 4. I shall turn to some objections to McDowell's position.62 Actually Kripke himself anticipates and comments on this kind of position: Perhaps we may try to recoup, by arguing that meaning addition by 'plus' is a state even more sui generic than we have argued before. Perhaps it is simply a primitive state, not to be assimilated to sensations or headaches or any 'qualitative' states, nor 59 Barry Stroud reminds me of this way of putting the matter. This paragraph is drawn from 'The Skeptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self.' I talk about 'ownership' here; what I mean is the asymmetry between first-person and third-person knowledge. To invoke the asymmetry is sometimes thought to be a Cartesian move, but I don't think there is anything Cartesian in the present case. See 'The Skeptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self,' where I evaluate the relevant debate between Colin McGinn and Crispin Wright. 60 The Blue and Brown Books, p.3, my italics. Crispin Wright, in his 'Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention' (presented at an American Philosophical Association symposium on Wittgenstein on December 30, 1989), also notices and criticizes the Cartesian 'walled garden.' Although this sounds congenial to McDowell's attack on the inner space, actually their views are quite different. Wright finds fault in the notion of 'inner observation,' but McDowell insists that what's at fault should be the 'sign-post' conception of mental items, not 'observation' per se. McDowell is 'not defending the model of inner observation,' but only 'insist[ing] that the observational model of self-knowledge is not in play here.' We should recognize that '[observational] model is merely a natural form for the epistemology of self-knowledge to take if the [inner space] framework is in place': if mental items are self-standing, normatively inert objects before the mind, we do need to observe and interpret them. See McDowell's 'Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein,' Klaus Puhl (ed.) Meaning Scepticism (De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1991), pp.148-69; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.297-321; at p.315, 319, 321, respectively. Also see his 'Response to Crispin Wright,' in Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), pp. 47-62. 61 Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1983). I do not refer to specific passages of it, for I do not want to get into the details of the distinction per se. McDowell offers an interesting example to illustrate the point; see 'Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy,' pp.270-1. In my 'On Meaning Skeptics' Cartesian Model,' I compare Kripke's position with Quine's. Quine presses his indeterminacy of translation even to the first-person case, and I suspect that the inner space model is also in play in his thinking. 62 Some of the following paragraphs are drawn from my 'An Initial Defense of Semantic Primitivism.' Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 59 to be assimilated to dispositions, but a state of a unique kind of its own.63 And he goes on to criticize this unclear approach right away: Such a move may in a sense be irrefutable, and if it is taken in an appropriate way Wittgenstein may even accept it. But it seems desperate: it leaves the nature of this postulated primitive state...completely mysterious. It is not supposed to be an introspectible state, yet we supposedly are aware of it with some fair degree of certainty whenever it occurs.64 Kripke does not spell out in what sense it is irrefutable, and the word 'irrefutable' is ambiguous. Sometimes it is taken to be a positive word, but in philosophy and science most of the time it is a dirty word. Since Kripke leaves the meaning of the word totally undetermined, I will simply bypass this remark. The same problem plagues the following sentence. What does he mean by 'appropriate'? This is especially important because if we spell it out, the opponent here may succeed in answering the paradox. Disappointedly enough, Kripke does not say anything specific here. I think we can think of McDowell's view as an attempt to find this appropriate way. Kripke then says that this approach is 'desperate,' for it leaves the nature of this kind of state 'mysterious.' Indeed, given the characterizations in the above quotation, the nature of the state is mysterious so the proponents of it do make a desperate move. But notice that Kripke does not even try to give a fair construal to this position, as I argued above. What is really mysterious is why Kripke picks an empty opponent to belabor. Thus there are some latitudes for anti-skeptics to freely envisage varieties of possibility here. Kripke thinks this sort of state is not supposed to be introspectible, but this description is unmotivated. Maybe he thinks only experiential states which he previously considered are introspectible, but this is not true. I can introspect to my beliefs, though most of my beliefs do not give me any qualitative feels. Kripke has another line of objection. He thinks there is a logical difficulty inherited in primitivism, and again he attributes this view to Wittgenstein: Even more important is the logical difficulty implicit in Wittgenstein's sceptical argument...Such a state would have to be a finite object, contains in our finite minds...Can we conceive of a finite state which could not be interpreted in a quus-like way?65 63 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, p.51. 64 Ibid., p.51. 65 Ibid., p.51-2. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 60 The problem of infinite deviant interpretations strikes back, but since we have rejected the model generating the regress, it should be seen as an innocuous remark now. Another thing to be said is that the infinity can be explained by compositionality. The 'plus' sigh is a piece of language, so it can be used in infinite different way thanks to compositionality. I cannot see why there is any puzzle about it. Besides, the infinity objection is not particular for the present proposal anyway: anti-skeptics are finding certain fact to sustain meaning, and supposedly all most facts are finite – maybe dispositions are not, if they turn out to be relevant facts. So even if this is indeed a problem, this is not a particular problem for primitivism. The logical difficulty amounts to nothing. Kripke's own objections to primitivism are not very impressive; in what follows I shall consider objections raised by one of his major followers, Martin Kusch, who recently published a systematic defense of Kripke's Wittgenstein.66 Kusch is skeptical about McDowell's starting point, that is, Kripke's skeptical case utterly relies on the infinite regress of interpretation. He argues: In all these cases, the meaning sceptic counters the proposal with the observation that the proposed items (past behaviours, formulae, qualia, intentions and Fregean ideas) can be interpreted in many different ways. In all these cases Kripke does indeed work with the regress of interpretations. Note, however, that the same is not true in the case of reductive dispositionalism. It seems as though the dispositionalist is, in a way, doing precisely what McDowell's Wittgenstein urges us to do: get rid of any mental items that just 'stand there like sign-post.' Moreover, the arguments that Kripke marshals against dispositionalism on Wittgenstein's behalf – the normativity considerations, the finitude objection, the mistake objection – do not make use of the regress of interpretations. Given the central place of dispositionalism in Episode 2 of WRPL this should make us cautious about McDowell's reading of the book.67 Kusch attempts to show that Kripke's objections to dispositionalism do not rely on the infinite regress of interpretation. However, McDowell's criticisms against Kripke presuppose that the regress is the backbone of Kripke's whole argumentations. It follows that McDowell's reading of Kripke is biased. Furthermore, this shows that McDowell's view is more like dispositionalism. Even if Kusch is right about Kripke's objections against dispositionalism – which I will later show that it is not – it is not clear why this should be a reason for 66 A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006). 67 Ibid., p.225-6. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 61 assimilating McDowell's position to dispositionalism. Given Kusch's interpretation, maybe they are coextensive – both of them have no regress problem – but that does not mean they are in any significant sense similar to each other. Whether dispositionalism succeeds in preserving normativity, it does not incorporate this property in its starting point; it starts rather with the finitude problem. McDowell, on the contrary, starts with normativity. We can see this in his insistence on membership. Dispositionalism and McDowell's position are just different. And Kripke's objections to dispositionalism include the infinite regress of interpretation anyway. The regress problem implicitly resides in the finitude objection. Kripke gives a rejoinder to dispositionalist's attempt to overcome the finitude problem: The dispositional theory attempts to avoid the problem of finiteness of my actual past performance by appealing to a disposition. But in doing so, it ignores an obvious fact: not only my actual performance, but also the totality of my dispositions, is finite...Let 'quaddition' be redefined so as to be a function which agrees with addition thereafter (say, it is 5). Then, just as the sceptic previously proposed the hypothesis that I meant quaddition in the old sense, now he proposes the hypothesis that I meant quaddition in the new sense. A dispositional account will be impotent to refute him. As before, there are infinitely many candidates the sceptic can propose for the role of quaddition.68 Now we should ask why finitude would be a problem at the very beginning. We non-skeptics want some way to get a determined rule from past behaviors, but we fail if we let the infinite regress of interpretation get going. No matter how many past intentions or behaviors we have, since they are finite, the skeptic can always find some ways to give deviant interpretations. Finitude is a problem precisely because it generates vicious infinite regress. The regress nightmare is with dispositionalism anyway, at least according to Kripke. Kusch then says actually Kripke can accommodate McDowell's concern: [T]here is also reason to doubt McDowell's claim according to which Kripke's fails to recognize Wittgenstein's crucial third position: a primitivism about meaning and rules that is centred around the ideas of training, acting blindly, agreement, custom, practice and institution.69 68 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, p.26-7. 69 A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules, p.226. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 62 He then goes on to give plenty of textual evidence from Kripke to support his complaint here. First thing to be noted is that Kusch seems to contradict himself here, for he formerly says that McDowell's position is rather like dispositionalism. Now he commits himself the thought that Kripke's skeptical solution is similar to dispositionalism. I don't think he will buy this, but let's turn to Kusch's concern here, that Kripke's solution can accommodate what McDowell is driving at. We can resist this assimilation by the distinction between the 'insulated-individuals conception' and the 'intimate-individuals conception'; the former refers to the position shared by Kripke, Wright, and Brandom; the later refers to McDowell and McDowell's Wittgenstein. There is no denying that Kripke's solution does have some Wittgensteinian flavor. This is recognized by McDowell in the very paper Kusch is considering: Wittgenstein's point is that we have to situate our conception of meaning and understanding within a framework of communal practice. Kripke's reading credits Wittgenstein with the thesis that the notion of meaning something by one's word is 'inapplicable to a single person considered in isolation (p.79). The upshot is similar, then; and it cannot be denied that the insistence on publicity in Kripke's reading corresponds broadly with a Wittgensteinian thought. But it makes a difference how we conceive the requirement of publicity to emerge.70 Indeed, who can sensibly deny that Kripke's picture is in a sense social, and it incorporates Wittgenstein's insistence on the importance of practice and custom? The problem is, to repeat, his conception of a community is only an aggregation of individuals, regardless their memberships. The fact that Kripke also underscores the importance of practice and custom does not justify Kusch's attempted assimilation. Another attempt to assimilate McDowell with Kripke can be found in another passage from Kusch: McDowell's Wittgenstein's opposition to 'constructive philosophical accounts' is really an opposition to, and 'diagnostic deconstruction' of, all forms of reductivism. Kripke's Wittgenstein would obviously sympathize. His only proviso would be that reductionism is not the only candidate for 'diagnostic deconstruction.' Semantic and intentional reductivism is a natural upshot of meaning determinism, and unless we cure ourselves of the latter, we can never be sure that we are free of the inclination to be tempted by the former.71 70 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.243. 71 A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules, p.227. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 63 This passage is striking for me. I cannot see why Kripke's Wittgenstein would oppose to reductionism, let alone 'obviously' does so. Kusch does not give any justification as far as I can tell. Moreover, it is not true that there is a close relation between meaning determinism and reductionism. When Kripke demands us to find some fact to sustain meaning, he constrains us with a reductive requirement. Quine is another prominent example of reductionism about meaning, but he is the last one who will accept meaning determinism.72 The above quotation is really confusing. The last objection from Kusch is not very clear. He seems to say that McDowell's position is not a stable one: Can we read McDowell differently? Can we perhaps read him as proposing an improved version of meaning determinism: meaning determinism without the master thesis? I doubt that this reading can be squared with McDowell's commitments. McDowell's position questions or rejects almost all meaning-determinist assumptions...This rules out immediate knowledge, privacy, and the individualistic contractual of semantic normativity...As far as objectivity goes, McDowell seeks to find a middle way between 'platonistic autonomy' and 'ratification dependence'...This is weaker than the meaning determinist's objectivity, which seems to be precisely a form of the autonomy thesis. Finally, McDowell does not advocate full-blown classical realism with its inflationary factualism.73 McDowell is obviously not an indeterminist, and he rejects Kripke's master thesis, that understanding is a species of interpretation. Therefore, to read him as proposing a version of meaning determinism without the master thesis is definitely a natural reading. Kusch nevertheless thinks this is a 'different' reading of McDowell, which shows that he misunderstands McDowell from the very beginning, though I am not sure at what point. What's more, all the above descriptions of McDowell's position just show that his determinism is quite unique, without traditional determinisms' assumptions. McDowell's overall philosophical concern is to make meaning and understanding unproblematic, so he is no doubt a determinist, though with various delicate provisos. 5. Why do Kripke and Wright (probably not Brandom) want a picture that starts 72 Quine elaborates his indeterminacy thesis in various places, but see his Word and Object for a classic presentation. My supervisor Lin Chung I reminds me that there are issues about whether Quine is a reductionist, as opposed to an eliminativist. I understand this concern, but I need to bypass it in order to keep my main line. 73 A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules, p.227-8. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 64 from meaningless noises and behaviors? To answer this diagnostic question, I shall turn to the well-known dichotomy between psychologism and behaviorism, between the Cartesian and the Rylean.74 Kripke starts with a Cartesian model in formulating the paradox, and that makes mental states idle with respect to meaning. This leads him to end up with a Rylean conception of meaning and understanding. His solution is Rylean in the sense that he does not have a place for membership in his picture. The insulated-individuals conception of community does not allow people make contact with one another's meaning. The source of the paradox, then, is that he cannot get rid of the dichotomy between psychologism and behaviorism. The dichotomy is deeply-rooted in the analytic tradition. Traditional empiricisms and rationalisms share the psychologistic conception of language, and from early 20th century the behavioristic atmosphere took over. Philosophers struggle between the two seemingly mutually exhaustive options. Kripke is not alone in the framework between the Cartesian and the Rylean. In Word and Object, Quine notices this dichotomy and happily endorses behaviorism. Quine writes: One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano's, is the second.75 I am not here attacking behaviorism; I just want to stress that the dichotomy is often seen in important philosophers' thinking. Many of them never question the dichotomy, however. Now Kripke's case is more complicated. On the one hand, one of his main points is to challenge a version of Cartesianism: he argues that one's confidence about one's own meaning – one's self-knowledge – is an illusion. On the other, he explicitly distances himself from behaviorism.76 He seems to be aware of the predicament followed from the dichotomy, but nevertheless end up with a Rylean picture unintentionally. Now Michael Dummett also wants to find a middle course between the two extremes. McDowell argues that Dummett commits similar mistake in the sense that he is also too close to behaviorism. This debate between Dummett and McDowell is not in the context of rule-following, so I shall briefly describe it and relate it to the present discussion.77 74 As usual, I am not using these adjectives of philosophers' names in a very strict way. 75 Word and Object, p.221. Daniel Dennett follows him in The Intentional Stance (MIT Press, 1987), p.175. 76 See Kripke's attitude toward Quine in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, pp.14-5, 55-8. 77 The reason I bring this debate in is that it is about what a theory of meaning should be like, e.g. should we accept reductionism? McDowell's thought is that the puzzle about meaning that makes Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 65 The locus of their disagreement is Davidson's truth-theoretic view of meaning. Details aside, the main question here is about what we should expect in our theory of meaning. Dummett thinks that our meaning theory should be 'full-blooded': intensional notions are 'of no use in giving an account of the language as from the outside.'78 McDowell, by contrast, thinks that our theory of meaning should be modest. This is a debate between reductionism and non-reductionism, which is highly relevant to the main topic of the present episode. Kripke imposes reductionist's requirement when he demands anti-skeptics to cite facts that does not themselves involve meaning, and primitivism is a version of non-reductionism, for it insists on the sui generis character of meaning. Dummett thinks, following Quine, that modesty is inevitably psychologistic.79 McDowell summarizes this as follows: Now one strand in Dummett's objection to modesty is the view that modesty necessarily involves this conception of language as a code [that is, psychologism.]... [A modest theory] is intelligible only on the supposition that adherents of modesty imagine the task...delegated to a prior and independent theory of thought.80 And Dummett thinks psychologism is objectionable: [I]f communication is to be possible, that in which our understanding of the language we speak consists must 'lie open to view, as Frege maintained that it does, in our use of the language, in our participation in a common practice.'81 We should credit Dummett in insisting that meaning should not be considered as lying behind behaviors. But the question is how he can achieve this given his requirement of full-bloodedness. 'How, then can a description of the practice of speaking a language "as from outside" content succeed in registering the role of mind? How can it be more than a mere description of outward behaviour, with the mental (inner) aspect of language use left out of account?'82 philosophers oscillate back and forth between psychologism and behaviorism, and Kripke does not succeed in developing a stable position. In his objections to Dummett, McDowell explicitly discusses this oscillation, so I think it is helpful to relate it to the rule-following issue. For this reason, I will only discuss Dummett's oscillation and McDowell's way out. Issues surrounded Davidson will be omitted. 78 'Frege and Wittgenstein,' in Irving Block (ed.) Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Blackwell, Oxford, 1981), at p.40. 79 See the quotation from Word and Object above. 80 'In Defense of Modesty,' in Barry Taylor (ed.) Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987), pp.59-80; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, pp.87-107, at pp.93-4. 81 Ibid., p.94. 82 Ibid., p.94. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 66 Now one particular objection from McDowell is especially relevant. It is about Dummett's example of attribution of the concept square. McDowell argues: Can implicit knowledge that that is how square things are to be treated be manifested in behaviour, characterized 'as from outside' content? It may seem that nothing could be simpler: the manifestation would be someone's treating a square thing in whatever way is in question. But any such performance would be an equally good manifestation of any of an indefinite number of different pieces of such implicit knowledge...If we assume a stable propensity, guided by an unchanging piece of implicit knowledge, we can use further behaviour to rule out some of these competing candidates. But no finite set of performances would eliminate them all; and finite sets of performances are all we get.83 Under this construal, Dummett's position is strikingly similar to Quine's.84 Both of them think modesty – non-reductionism – goes hand in hand with psychologism. Both of them think somehow behaviors or dispositions of behavior can manifest meaning (if any.) Quine famously shows that meaning is underdetermined with respect to behaviors. If we combine this with reductive behaviorism, indeterminacy is home and dry. Now, Dummett rejects this and attempt to steer between psychologism and behaviorism. However, his insistence on full-bloodedness commits him the Quinean line of reasoning. It's not clear how he can block this route given the requirement of full-bloodedness. Now how does McDowell steer the middle course? Since psychologism is not desirable, our mindedness must somehow manifest in our behaviors. But if we insist that the characterization must be 'as from outside,' we fall in the trap of behaviorism, and thereby commit Quinean indeterminacy. The solution is to insist that meaning does manifest in behaviors, but characterizations of them must be modest: we should not expect we can characterize behaviors in meaning-free terms. McDowell writes: Steering that middle course requires the difficult idea that competence in a language is an ability to embody one's mind – the cast of one's thoughts – in words that one speaks, and to hear others' thoughts in their words... [W]e have to entitle ourselves to the idea that acquiring a first language is, not learning a behavioural outlet for antecedent states of mind, but becoming minded in ways that the language is anyway able to express. We have to equip ourselves to see how our ability to have dealings with content can be, not a mere natural endowment (something we can take for 83 Ibid., p.96. 84 I leave open whether McDowell's interpretation of Dummett is fair. This goes far beyond the purposes of mine. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 7 6 granted), but an achievement, which an individual attains by acquiring membership in a linguistic community.85 The talk about 'membership' ensures that McDowell has the same thing in mind when he takes issue with Kripke and Dummett. To further confirm this, recall that in discussing rule-following, McDowell says that 'shared command of a language equips us to know one another's meaning without needing to arrive at that knowledge by interpretation, because it equips us to hear someone else's meaning in his words.'86 Thus, his debate with Dummett on modesty can be regarded as a suitable diagnosis of Kripke's skeptic. We have seen that in the picture McDowell recommends, the notion of 'custom' plays an indispensably crucial role: to be a genuine thinker, one has to be initiated into relevant customs. And to be initiated into customs is to acquire a language: Now it is not even clearly intelligible to suppose a creature might be born at home in the space of reasons. Human beings are not: they are born mere animals, and they are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents in the course of coming to maturity. This transformation risks looking mysterious. But we can take it in our stride if, in our conception of the Bildung that is a central element in the normal maturation of human beings, we give pride of place to the learning of language. In being initiated into a language, a human being is introduced into something that already embodies putatively rational linkages between concepts, putatively constitutive of the layout of the space of reasons, before she comes on the scene.87 So the notion of 'a language' is indeed vital for McDowell's overall picture. Given this, it is interested to learn that Donald Davidson famously remarks that 'there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed.'88 A more intimate relation can be found in Davidson's negative attitude towards Kripkenstein's ways of thinking: What would matter [for communication]...is that we should each provide the other with something understandable as a language. This is an intention speakers must have; but carrying out this intention...does not involve following shared rules or 85 Ibid., pp.104-5. 86 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.253. 87 Mind and World, p.125, my italics. 88 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,' in Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner (eds.) Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 1986); reprinted in his Truth, Language, and History (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005), pp.89-107, at p.107, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 68 conventions.89 If Davidson is right, then the whole discussion of rule-following is misguided. Is this also a knock-down objection to McDowell's proposal? I shall respond to this concern in my next section. Bildung 1. When he first tackles the relevant issues, Davidson formulates the question like this: 'could there be communication by language without convention?'90 His main opponent Dummett also regards 'communication' as one of the principal functions of language.91 Given this common ground, the debate is about the primary status of a shared language, as Davidson puts: '[w]hich is conceptually primary, the idiolect or the language?'92 His opts for the former: in learning a language, a person acquires the ability to operate in accord with a precise and specifiable set of syntactic and semantic rules; verbal communication depends on speaker and hearer sharing such an ability, and it requires no more than this. I argued that sharing such a previously mastered ability was neither necessary nor sufficient for successful linguistic communication.93 On the face of it, Davidson's main argument for his case is based on counterexamples, notably malapropism.94 A malapropism is a wrong use of one world instead of another because they sound similar to each other, and what's interesting is that the occurrences of malapropism often do not prevent successful communication. One of Davidson's examples is between 'a nice arrangement of epithets' and 'a nice derangement of 89 'The Second Person,' in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17: The Wittgenstein Legacy (Indianapolis: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); reprinted in his Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001), pp.107-21, at p.114, my italics. In a footnote in the next page Davidson reminds his readers that his point there is related to the point he argues in 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' that 'communication does not demand that language be shared.' 90 'Communication and Convention,' Synthesis 59 (1984), pp.3-17; reprinted in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), pp.265-80, at p.265, my italics. Here Davidson invokes the notion of 'convention,' but it is interchangeable with 'rule' and 'regularities' in his context. 91 'Language and Communication,' in Alexander George (ed.) Reflections on Chomsky (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989), pp.192-212. The other principal function is 'vehicle of thought.' 92 'The Social Aspect of Language,' in B. F. McGuinness and Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.) The Philosophy of Michael Dummett (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), pp.1-16; reprinted in his Truth, Language, and History (Clarendon Press, Oxford,, 2005), pp.109-25, at p.109. 93 Ibid., p.110. 94 To be sure, Davidson's claim here is supported by his view about linguistic meaning as a whole. By 'the main argument' I mean the most direct argument. To investigate Davidson's entire argumentations will obviously take us too far. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 69 epitaphs.'95 Davidson's thinks that in this kind of case, speaker and hearer can understand each other without sharing any common understanding of the contingent usages of the words involved. If this is right, to approach the issues of linguistic meaning with the rule-following considerations is wrongheaded, for linguistic behaviors are not essentially rule-governed practices; 'shared linguistic practice' has merely practical utility.'96 McDowell does not dispute this; as he says, '[m]alapropisms provide clear counterexamples – cases where understanding is not disrupted by mismatches between speaker and hearer in respect of anything we might see as rules to which they conform their linguistic behavior.'97 Where Davidson denies 'portable interpreting machine,'98 Gadamer contemns 'method.' What McDowell objects to is the following inference: Now to make a leap. There seems to me to be no reason, in theory at least, why speakers who understand each other ever need to speak, or to have spoken, as anyone else speaks, much less as each other speaks.99 This is indeed a 'leap,' for cases like malapropisms (or 'two monoglot survivors' scenario100) do not warrant a 'perfective' claim. Davidson of course knows this, so his ground for the further claim is not those examples, but the argument from 'absence of negative reason.' McDowell's response to this challenge is in effect providing a reason against that perfective claim. He writes, Davidson's claims commit him to denying that one needs to learn to speak as others do, in the ordinary sense, in order to become a human subject, a potential party to an encounter with another that leads to mutual understanding, at all.101 McDowell doubts that 'Davidson ever considers the thought that shared languages might matter for the constitution of subjects of understanding,' for '[h]is target is always the conception of a sharing that would suffice of itself for communication,'102 as we have seen at the beginning of this section. But if McDowell is right about the 95 'A nice Derangement of Epitaphs,' p.103. 96 'Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism,' in Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (eds.) Gadamer's Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer (MIT Press, 2002), pp.173-93, at p182. 97 'Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism,' pp.181-2, my italics. 98 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,' p.107. 99 'The Social Aspect of Language,' p.115, my italics. 100 'Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism,' p.183. 101 Ibid., p.183, my italics. 102 Ibid., p.184, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 70 rule-following discussions, as discussed in my previous section, then to be a thinker is to be initiated into relevant customs, and to start the initiation is to be a speaker. A shared language is indispensable not because linguistic practices are essentially rule-following behaviors – they are not, as shown by malapropisms and the like – but because it is responsible for the constitution of a genuine thinker. Davidson makes the unfortunate leap, for he overlooks the possibility McDowell argues for in the context of the rule-following considerations.103 McDowell agrees with Davidson that 'familiarity with a human way of life [is] surely not just aids to arriving at understanding,' but he adds that a form of life is 'conditions for being potential subjects of understanding at all.' 104 Relatedly, Davidson is hostile to the idea of 'non-linguistic institution,'105 and to this McDowell replies: A 'language-game' cannot be confined to bursts of speech. It is a whole in which verbal behavior is integrated into a form of life, including practices that if considered on their own would have to be counted as nonlinguistic.106 2. It is helpful to take stock before I close the present episode. The discussions of rule-following have been very heated for about twenty-five years, since the publication of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Most participants don't accept Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein, including the 'paradox' part and the 'solution' part. Nevertheless, most (if not all) of them assume with Kripke that linguistic behaviors are essentially rule-following practices. Now as we have seen, Davidson is skeptical about this idea; he attempts to resolve the debate by arguing against the essentialist claim. Now McDowell concurs with Davidson at this point, but he refuses to accept Davidson's further 'leap,' namely the 'perfective' claim. So we can say that Davidson gestures the right direction but unfortunately goes too far. Therefore it is potentially misleading to regard McDowell as a player in the rule-following battlefield: though he rejects Davidson's excessive move, he nonetheless sides with Davidson in thinking that the 'rule-following considerations' generated by Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein is misguided, philosophically speaking. Communication per se does not, contra many philosophers' convictions, involve shared rules essentially, but being able to understanding does, pace Davidson. In my introductory episode, I said something about how McDowell's Locke 103 McDowell invokes Brandom's distinction between 'I-thou sociality' and 'I-we sociality' to conduct further discussions. See Making It Explicit, p.659, for citing Davidson with approval. Through this, we can see that McDowell's requirement of publicity is more demanding than Davidson and Brandom. 104 Ibid., p.184-5. 105 'The Social Aspect of Language,' p.119. 106 'Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism,' p.185. Episode III. Thinker and Speaker 71 Lecture relies on Gadamer's thinking about Bildung. Now we see more intimate connections between this notion and a central issue in analytic philosophy. 'The idea of inheriting a tradition helps us to understand what is involved in possessing conceptual capacities...'107 Through a careful reading of Wittgenstein's notions of 'custom' and 'form of life,' McDowell shows us how the resources from continental thinkers can after all shed light on central concerns in the analytic tradition. I shall finally conclude this episode with the following passage: Human beings mature into being at home in the space of reasons or, what comes to the same thing, living their lives in the world; we can make sense of that by noticing that the language into which a human being is first initiated stands over against her as a prior embodiment of mindedness, of the possibility of an orientation to the world.108 107 Ibid., p.173, my italics. 108 Mind and World, p.125, my italics. E P I S O D E IV Agent and Person If habit is neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, what then is it? It is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort. – Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception The environment can act on the subject only to the exact extent that he comprehends it; that is, transforms it into a situation. – Sean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness Embodiment 1. In the quotation at the end of my previous episode, McDowell uses the notion of 'mindedness' in passing. Presumably, this is to prevent the reification of our mental phenomena. Same consideration appears in the replacement of 'meaning' with 'meaningfulness' in the literatures of philosophy of language. For McDowell, mindedness is 'conceptual mindedness.'1 As I briefly mentioned in episode one, this claim is very controversial and there are many negative arguments from different considerations. In the present episode I take up this debate in the context of action and agency. In particular, the debate between McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus will be considered in details. But before that, let me say more about McDowell's conceptualism, especially its application to action. In talking about conceptual capacities, McDowell relates it to the idea of rationality. 1 'What Myth?' Inquiry 50 (2007), pp.338-51, at p.345, my italics. Episode IV. Agent and Person 73 He writes: The notion of rationality I mean to invoke here is the notion exploited in a traditional line of thought to make a special place in the animal kingdom for rational animals. It is a notion of responsiveness to reasons as such.2 As McDowell immediately says, this 'wording leaves room for responsiveness to reasons...on the other side of the division drawn by this notion of rationality between rational animals and animals that are not rational.'3 For example, when we observe a dog fleeing from potential dangerous, we are justified in saying that he is responsive to dangerous as a reason to flee, without attributing him a belief that he is in danger, i.e., the reason as such. Things are quite different in the case of human being. As McDowell says, we have the ability to 'step back from an inclination to flee, elicited from her by an apparent danger, and raise the question whether she should be so inclined – whether the apparent danger is, here and now, a sufficient reason for fleeing.'4 If she then decides to act on the reason, her action exhibit 'self-determining' subjectivity.5 Recall that when in experiences, conceptual capacities are 'operative,' rather than exercised, for we do not normally actively decide which concepts to apply, contrary to the case of judgments.6 Similarly, in the case of actions we do not usually pay attention to what we are doing or going to do, but if we can regard them as intentional actions, we need to connect it to the idea of rationality. McDowell reminds: Acting for a reason, which one is responding to as such, does not require that one reflects about whether some consideration is a sufficient rational warrant for something it seems to recommend. It is enough that one could.7 This is the way McDowell conceives the relation between conceptual capacities and rationality. This by the way responses to a usual query: how can McDowell put a 2 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' p.1066. I start my exposition of this episode from this piece because it is also what Dreyfus has in mind when he gave his presidential address and later responses. Unfortunately he never cites this paper from McDowell explicitly. 3 Ibid., p.1066. 4 Ibid., p.1066. 5 Ibid., p.1066. I think the distinction here can be understood together with McDowell's invocation of Gadamer's distinction between 'world' and 'environment,' discussed in my first episode. With this new distinction, McDowell reinforce the point the discriminatory capacities do not qualified as conceptual capacities in his sense; see p.1067. This point is very important when he debates with varieties of nonconceptualism. 6 I say 'normally,' because we do sometimes conduct top-down inferences in perceiving things. Consider the case in which an expert is in a better position to see something almost invisible from a vulgar's point of view. The same consideration applies to action. 7 Ibid., p.1066. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 74 heavy weight on the notion of 'conceptual capacities' without saying anything about the metaphysics of concept? To this McDowell would reply that his invocation of the notion of 'concept' is a matter of 'stipulation: conceptual capacities in the relevant sense belong essentially to their possessor's rationality in the sense I am working with, responsiveness to reasons as such.'8 He further works out this stipulation with his interpretation of Fregean sense.9 But in any case, he can leave open the nature of concept, as long as we do not regard it as normatively inert items populated in the inner space. There is another important point about the exercise / operative distinction. In the case of judgments, we exercise conceptual capacities through conducting inferences; in experiences it is not the case. As McDowell explains, '[t]he content that the explanation attributes to the experience is the same as the content of the belief explained, not a premise from which it would make sense to think of the subject as having reached the belief by an inferential step.'10 And something analogue can be said about action. After setting the stage, McDowell then offers his case for conceptualism: [I]f our notion of an experience is to be capable of playing the role it plays when we explain perceptually based beliefs as manifestations of rationality, we must understand having such an experience – being in possession of such an entitlement – as itself, already, an actualization of the conceptual capacities that would be exercised by someone who explicitly adopted a belief with that content.11 Again, something parallel can be said about actions. Simply put, the thought is that human experiences and actions are integral parts of human rationality, so given McDowell's stipulation of conceptual capacities, the 'pervasiveness of conceptual rationality' follows.12 Notice that in the above stipulation, McDowell says nothing about language. It is definitely McDowell's view that language is a crucial precondition of rationality, as he puts it, 'the ability to step back from considerations and raise the question whether they constitute reasons for action or belief...is coeval with command of a language,'13 but he never argues that conceptual capacities are linguistic or 'quasi-linguistic'14 in Michael Ayers's term – whatever that means. This makes room for the thought that 8 Ibid., p.1067. John Searle says something similar when he declares that what he is doing is 'logical analyses.' 9 See Mind and World, p.107. 10 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' p.1068, my italics. 11 Ibid., p.1068. 12 'What Myth?' p. 349, my italics. 13 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' p.1071. 14 'Sense Experience, Concepts, and Content – Objections to Davidson and McDowell,' at p.249. Episode IV. Agent and Person 75 'experience as actualization of conceptual capacities in sensory consciousness.'15 This damps a similar worry raised by Arthur Collins, that McDowell is 'committ[ing] to a picture in which our experience comes as it were with subtitles.'16 This is important in the present context, for if the sense of the conceptual is indeed 'quasi-linguistic,' the Ayers-Collins line of objection will appear again. To be sure, so far McDowell does not say anything positive about the sensory aspect of experience, but the objection was that McDowell cannot make room for that. It is enough for now to say that the room has been made, though the accommodation hasn't been prepared. As usual, McDowell has a diagnosis for the misfire. Here it goes: In disallowing my proposal that actualizations of conceptual capacities can present things in a sensory way, Ayers assumes a sharp separation between the sensory and the intellectual, as I shall put it to avoid that tendentious implication.17 The dualism of intellect and sensory is only assumed, without any argument. And McDowell's argument for conceptualism above provides some reason for not believing it. As acknowledged above, he does not have positive account about the way the conceptual and the sensory can merge together, but at least he depicts a way to understand the conceptual without precluding the sensory. Again, we can draw a parallel for actions. Experiences are of course sensory; actions are of course bodily. But without arguments, we should not simply assume that the sensory and the bodily are incompatible with the conceptual. Later we will see that Dreyfus is attempting to provide arguments for the dualism in question, but I shall complete my exposition of McDowell before evaluating Dreyfus's case. For McDowell, conceptual capacities, freedom, and self-determining subjectivity come in the same package.18 But we should not forget that we are not unconditionally free, both in experiences and in actions.19 As McDowell say, 'there is a sense in which perceptual experience can compel belief,'20 there is also a sense in which the world, together with affordances and solicitations, can compel actions.21 The passivity in perceptions and actions is of course acknowledged. The issue is how we should understand the relations between freedom and passivity. Again, this is the focal 15 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' p.1071. 16 Ibid., p.1071. See Arthur Collins, 'Beastly Experience,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998), pp. 375-80. 17 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' p.1072. 18 I will say more about this in my epilogue. 19 See also Mind and World, p.96. 20 Ibid., p.1074. 21 The former concept is introduced by J. J. Gibson: '"affordance": all action possibilities latent in the environment, objectively measurable, and independent of the individual's ability to recognize these possibilities,' The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Houghton Mifflin, 1979). The latter concept will be characterized and discussed when I introduce Dreyfus's thoughts later. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 76 disagreement between McDowell and Dreyfus. Let me adumbrate what I have said before getting into the debate. McDowell first stipulates the sense in which rational animals possess conceptual capacities. This is the capacity to be responsive to reasons as such. He then rehearses a distinction between exercised and operative conceptual capacities. In experiences, the capacities are passively at work. The main argument for the conceptuality is that experiences are integrated into the larger framework of rationality, and this (together with other thoughts not presenting here) implies that experiences are conceptual through and through. This does not, contra many critics, mean that experiences are quasi-linguistic. To think otherwise is to embrace the dualism of intellect and sensory, without arguments. Experiences belong to the realm of self-determining subjectivity, but there is indeed a sense in which perceptions can compel beliefs, for it is in a significant sense passive. Now, everything said above has a place in the parallel story of actions. In actions, conceptual capacities are passively at work. They are conceptual because they are integral parts of the larger framework of rationality. They are passive because we are constrained by affordances, solicitations, and the world. We should not, however, conceive the conceptual and the passive aspects of action with the dualism of intellect and bodily.22 This is the general McDowellian picture.23 Like experiences, actions also mediate mind and world, though with different 'directions of fit.' 24 Perceptions reflect the world, actions change the world; perceptions sustain beliefs, actions carry out intentions. To expect a parallel story for actions is not unnatural at least. In his Locke Lecture, McDowell claims that 'intentions without overt activity are idle, and movements of limbs without concepts are mere happenings, not expressions of agency.25' And some philosophers start to envisage what McDowell would say, or should say, about action, Jonathan Dancy for example. 26 Some other philosophers go even further to criticize the envisaged McDowellian account of action; as mentioned, Hubert Dreyfus is one among them.27 In presenting his picture, as we have seen, McDowell invokes plenty of resources from the mighty deads, including Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Gadamer.28 A blatant feature of this list is that phenomenologists are absent: Husserl, 22 McDowell's own term for this is 'dualism of embodiment and mindedness.' 'Response to Dreyfus,' o touches the issue of y. onality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, p.7. , McDowell and Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in Inquiry 50 (2007), pp.366-70, at p.369. 23 Most of the following materials are drawn from my 'Self, Action, and Passivity,' under review. I take issues with Dreyfus in great details because his debate with McDowell als conceptuality and the Myth of the Given, two of my main themes in this essa 24 See John Searle, Intenti 25 Mind and World, p.89. 26 'Acting in the Light of the Appearances,' in C. MacDonald and G. MacDonald (eds.) His Critics, pp. 121-34, and McDowell's reply to it, pp. 134-41 in the same anthology. 27 Dreyfus has a series of objections and modifications, so I will refer to specific pieces in due course. 28 However, McDowell opposes to his colleague Brandom's attitude towards those big names, indicated by the title of Brandom's historical anthology, Tales of the Episode IV. Agent and Person 7 7 Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty are not in the list. Dreyfus suggests that McDowell's position is defective exactly in this respect.29 2. In considering Dreyfus's objections, McDowell adumbrates his relevant thoughts I have urged that our perceptual relation to the world is conceptual all the way out to e will see that McDowell and Dreyfus have very different notions of the main Neither Davidson nor McDowell tries to describe perceptual objects as they are in as follows: the world's impacts on our receptive capacities. The idea of the conceptual that I mean to be invoking is to be understood in close connection with the idea of rationality, in the sense that is in play in the traditional separation of mature human beings, as rational animals, from the rest of the animal kingdom. Conceptual capacities are capacities that belong to their subject's rationality. So another way of putting my claim is to say that our perceptual experience is permeated with rationality. I have also suggested, in passing, that something parallel should be said about our agency.30 W concepts appeared in the above passage, such as 'perception,' 'concept,' 'receptive capacities,' 'rationality,' 'animals,' and 'agency.'31 But first let's go back to where the story began. In his editorial introduction to Samuel Todes's Body and World, Dreyfus briefly took issue with McDowell. He writes: themselves and how they become the objects of thought. By calling attention to the structure of nonconceptual, practical perception and showing how its judgments can be transformed into the judgments of detached thought, Todes is able to provide a framework in which to explain how the content of perception, while not itself the Metaphysics of Intentionality (Harvard University Press, 2002). 29 Husserl is an exception. Dreyfus is also hostile to Husserl's thoughts, so he regards his objections to McDowell as both Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontyan. Indeed, McDowell's notion of 'passive actualization of conceptual capacities in experiences' is very congenial to Husserl notion of 'passive synthesis,' as pointed out by Lilian Alweissl in 'The Myth of the Given,' in János Boros (ed.) Mind in World (Brambauer Pécs), pp.39-65. See also Husserl's Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic (Springer, 2001). 30 'What Myth?' pp.338-9. The familiar voice of this passage confirms that in this debate what Dreyfus and McDowell in minds is McDowell's earlier paper 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception.' This is important, because for some reasons unbeknownst to me, neither of them refers to that piece explicitly, but this is not good for readers. 31 McDowell himself, in his replies to Dreyfus, has attempted to clarify his relevant notions, and Dreyfus concedes that he misunderstood McDowell at some points. But his concessions are piecemeal, and there are still some significant misunderstandings lurking in Dreyfus's final response. What I will do here is to correct the misunderstandings in a systematic way, and through this I hope the lurking misunderstandings would thereby be dislodged. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 78 conceptual, can provide the basis for conception. Thus, Todes's Body and World can be read as a significant anticipatory response to McDowell's Mind and World.32 Here Dreyfus separates perception from conception. He thinks that there is something called 'perception as they are in themselves, independent of conception.' This seems to beg the question against McDowell, but I think Dreyfus is unblamable at this point, for what he did there is to introduce Todes's seminal work, situating it into certain philosophical contexts by contrasting it with McDowell's thoughts. Although it will be better if he provides substantive arguments for the claim, I think we can be more charitable here.33 What I mainly concern here is a series of debates where Dreyfus and McDowell engage with each other seriously. A few words about my strategy: the debate between McDowell and Dreyfus appears like continuous conversations: Dreyfus's Presidential Address was responding to McDowell's earlier works, and later on Inquiry they respond to each other for twice. In addition, Dreyfus does not reach his stable framework until the final response. Therefore, it would be onerous and ineffective for us to go through the discussions with the original sequence. Hence I shall offer a two-stage presentation of Dreyfus's objections. First it's general structure, and then its details. This means that sometimes I will fit Dreyfus's earlier points and examples into his later, stable framework. The motivation is to present Dreyfus at his best. In what follows I will discuss how Dreyfus reaches his stable framework first. Dreyfus seriously argues against McDowell in his 2005 APA Presidential Address. He starts his argumentation by posing this rhetoric question: '[c]an we accept McDowell's Sellarsian claim that perception is conceptual "all the way out," thereby denying the more basic perceptual capacities we seem to share with prelinguistic infants and higher animal?'34 The positive statement of the position goes like this: 'in assuming that all intelligibility, even perception and skillful coping, must be, at least implicitly, conceptual...Sellars and McDowell join Kant in endorsing what we might call the Myth of the Mental.'35 In supporting this claim, he brings in a distinction that is crucial to his argumentations: 32 'Todes's Account of Nonconceptual Perceptual Knowledge and Its Relation to Thought,' in Body and World (MIT Press, 2001), pp.xv-xxvii, at p.xvi, my italics. 33 For a detailed discussion concerning the relations between Todes, Dreyfus, and McDowell, see Joseph Rouse, 'Mind, Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language,' Inquiry 48 (2005), pp.36-61. 34 'Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise' (APA Pacific Division Presidential Address 2005, later published in Topoi 25 (2006), pp.43-49), p.1; my reference to the electronic version available here: http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/pdf/Dreyfus%20APA%20Address%20%2010.22.05%20.pdf 35 Ibid., p.7, italics altered by me. Episode IV. Agent and Person 79 The actual phenomenon [i.e. expertise] suggests that to become experts we must switch from detached rule-following to a more involved and situation specific way of coping...Such emotional involvement seems to be necessary to facilitate the switchover from detached, analytical rule following to an entirely different engaged, holistic mode of experience...36 Dreyfus uses some other distinctions to supplement this one, including detached theoretical perspective / engaged situation in the world,37 calculate / involve,38 and knowing-that / knowing-how.39 I shall focus on the one appeared in the quotation. Dreyfus assumes that McDowell regards actions as detached rule-following, but he never tells us why he thinks that. Moreover, we have positive reasons to think otherwise. Recall that McDowell painstakingly disabuses this detached conception of rule-following in his critique of Kripke's Wittgenstein, as discussed in my previous episode. For example, he writes: [Kripke's] line of interpretation gets off on the wrong foot, when it credits Wittgenstein with acceptance of a 'skeptical paradox'... the reasoning that would lead to this 'skeptical paradox' starts with something Wittgenstein aims to show up as a mistake: the assumption, in this case, that the understanding on which I act when I obey an order must be an interpretation.40 To rehearse, Kripke conceives understanding as a species of interpretation, so whenever I use the 'plus' function, I can interpret my past usages of it so as to conform other deviant functions, hence the paradox. McDowell urges that the source of the paradox is the detached conception of rule-following: we need to do interpretation when our understanding is functioning. The problematic inner space model has it that there are some freestanding mental items that have no intrinsic normative relations with the external world, so we need interpretations to build up these relations. It is this detached picture, McDowell submits, that generates the skeptical paradox. He further connects his critique to Wittgenstein's notions of 'practice,' 'custom,' and 'form of life'; I shall not here repeat the discussions of my previous episode. It is not clear, then, why Dreyfus does not regard McDowell as an ally at least in this respect. The distinction between detached rule-following and involved skillful coping seems 36 Ibid., p.7-8, my italics. 37 Ibid., p.3. 38 Ibid., p.15. 39 Ibid., p.17. 40 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' p.236. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 80 to be dubious; moreover, it is precisely what McDowell disagrees with when he writes that '[w]e find ourselves always already engaging with the world.'41 Dreyfus's distinction is actually congenial to McDowell. Dreyfus admits this misunderstanding in his reply: 'I did assume, accepting the traditional understanding, that McDowell understood rationality and conceptuality as general. I should have known better. I'm sorry that I attributed to McDowell the view of rationality he explicitly rejects in his papers on Aristotle.'42 Unfortunately, Dreyfus lapses again, ten pages later, when he contrasts 'detached conceptual intentionality' with 'involved motor intentionality.'43 I am puzzled by this: Dreyfus first claims, rightly, that he and McDowell agree that conceptuality is situation-dependent; that is, not general or detached. But after that he, in the very same paper, describes conceptual intentionality as detached. I don't know how to make of this. In his rejoinder, McDowell observes: Dreyfus acknowledges that he was wrong to think practical intelligence, as I conceive it, is situation-independent. But he still thinks my view of mindedness can be characterized in terms of 'detached conceptual intentionality.'44 Here McDowell writes as if Dreyfus only admits that practical intelligence is situation-dependent in McDowell's sense, but in fact, he confesses that he should not understand McDowell's notions of 'rationality,' 'conceptuality,' and related notions as situation-independent. Therefore, I cannot see any decisive progress in Dreyfus's first reply. I am not saying that there is no progress at all, but Dreyfus still preserves the general structure from his Presidential Address. It can be dubbed the 'detachment / involvement' distinction. Dreyfus replaces this structure with a new one in his second reply. Now the crucial distinction is constituted by 'subjectivity' and 'absorption': [There is] a deep issue dividing us – an issue that is obscured by my failure to distinguish explicitly absorption and involvement. I should have argued that subjectivity (not detachment) is the lingering ghost of 41 Mind and World, p.34, my italics. 42 'The Return of the Myth of the Mental," Inquiry 50 (2007), pp.352-65, at p.353. An earlier version of it is 'Detachment, Involvement, and Rationality: are We Essentially Rational Animals?' a talk given in Harvard. We can clearly see the disagreement between McDowell and Dreyfus in this title. Dreyfus mentions Aristotle because he and McDowell conduct the discussion by focusing on Aristotle's notion of 'phronesis,' which has been discussed in my first episode. Since they have reached agreement at this point, I shall not talk more about it here. I relate the discussion to Kripke and Wittgenstein instead, for the connection is relevant but missed in their exchanges. As to the relation between phronesis to demonstrative thoughts, see 'What Myth?' p.342. 43 Ibid., p.363, and notice my italics in the passage I just quoted. 44 'Response to Dreyfus,' p.366. Episode IV. Agent and Person 81 the mental...45 In this final response, Dreyfus realizes that it is inappropriate to saddle McDowell with the notion of 'detachment,' and he proposes that it is 'subjectivity,' which he means the operation of 'subject' or 'agent,' that is at fault. Besides, realizing that McDowell can accommodate the phenomena of 'involvement,' Dreyfus submits that it is 'absorption,' that is, 'involved coping at its best'46, that shows the falsity of conceptualism.47 This completes my characterization of Dreyfus's stable framework. Now I turn to the details of his objections. 3. The final version of the general framework is the 'subjectivity / absorption' distinction. By 'subjectivity' Dreyfus means 'agency,' which is 'the lingering ghost of the mental'48 according to him. As to 'absorption,' he writes that '[i]n fully absorbed coping, there is no immersed ego, not even an implicit one.'49 He further adds that 'in attentive, deliberate...action an ego is always involved.'50 Notice that before Dreyfus reaches this final version, the notion of 'attention' and the like has occupied a central place in his objections, including his favorite example from Chuck Knoblauch: As second baseman for the New York Yankees, Knoblauch was so successful he was voted best infielder of the year, but one day, rather than simply fielding a hit and throwing the ball to first base, it seems he stepped back and took up a 'free, distanced orientation' towards the ball and how he was throwing it – to the mechanics of it, as he put it. After that, he couldn't recover his former absorption and often – though not always – threw the ball to first base erratically – once into the face of a spectator. Interestingly, even after he seemed unable to resist stepping back and being mindful, Knoblauch could still play brilliant baseball in difficult situations – catching a hard-hit ground ball and throwing it to first faster than thought. What he couldn't do was field an easy routine grounder directly to second base, because that gave him time to think before throwing to first.51 The notion of 'attention' and the like play a heavy role in Dreyfus's objections 45 'Response to McDowell,' Inquiry 50 (2007), pp.371-77, p.373, my italics. 46 Ibid., p.373, my italics. 47 This remark suggests that what Dreyfus is describing here is a distinction, not a dichotomy: the differences between attentive, involved, and absorbed actions are a matter of degree. This will become important latter in my discussion. 48 Ibid., p.373. 49 Ibid., p.374, my italics. 50 Ibid., p.374, my italics. 51 'The Return of the Myth of the Mental,' p.354. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 82 through out the whole debate. Here is another example: [We] are only part-time rational animals. We can, when necessary, step back and put ourselves into a free-distanced relation to the world. We can also monitor our activity while performing it...But monitoring what we are doing as we are doing it...leads to performance which is at best competent.52 This line of argumentation, nevertheless, is both uncharitable as an interpretation and ungrounded as a thesis. Consider the passage McDowell first invokes the notion of 'stepping back': Consider someone following a marked trail, who at a crossing of paths goes to the right in response to a signpost pointing that way. It would be absurd to say that for going to the right to be a rational response to the signpost, it must issue from the subject's making an explicit determination that the way the signpost points gives her a reason for going to the right. What matters is just that she acts as she does because (this is a reason-introducing 'because') the signpost points to the right. (This explanation competes with, for instance, supposing she goes to the right at random, without noticing the signpost, or noticing it but not understanding it.) What shows that she goes to the right in rational response to the way the signpost points might be just that she can afterwards answer the question why she went to the right – a request for her reason for doing that – by saying 'There was a signpost pointing to the right.' She need not have adverted to that reason and decided on that basis to go to the right.53 First of all, notice that the subject in this scenario steps back and reflects on her reason for the action retrospectively, as opposed to Dreyfus's subject who steps back and reflects on his mechanics of the action when he is carrying out the action. So the fact that the stepping-back screws up the expertise is simply irrelevant. Secondly, it is clear that 'mindedness' never means 'attention' in McDowell's writings54: it would be insane to hold that our perceptual experiences (and actions) are attentive all the way out; if that were the claim, Mind and World would be easily refuted. Dreyfus's reading of McDowell strikes me as uncharitable. Dreyfus reminds us that absorbed coping is involved coping at its best. He should 52 Ibid., p.354-5, my italics. See also p.354-55, 363. 53 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' p.1066. I did not quote this example when I characterized McDowell's position, for I want to leave it here to compare with the Knoblauch example from Dreyfus. 54 And McDowell never uses the notion of 'mindful.' Although 'mindful' and 'minded' are almost interchangeable according to many dictionaries, 'minded' is supposed to capture the passivity of the mind. This thought is not available for Dreyfus for he always identifies mind with attention etc. Episode IV. Agent and Person 83 have acknowledged that, by similar considerations, attention, deliberation, and monitoring are mindedness at its best. This means that mindedness is not exhausted by attention and the like. To claim otherwise, Dreyfus needs to establish that attention is the mark of the mental. I see every reason to oppose to this proposition.55 McDowell never claims that there is an immersed or implicit self in actions, if we understand self with attention and the like. Self does accompany intentional actions in a weaker sense that actions are within the realm of the conceptual or the rational. But Dreyfus disagrees. He urges that cases like chess Grandmaster show that absorbed coping is in no sense rational.56 I suggest we compare that case with the case like alien hand or reflexive behaviors. Dreyfus is not willing to identify absorbed coping with mere reflexive behaviors57, so presumably it still has to do with our agency. Dreyfus is hostile to this idea, for he persistently confines mindedness to the realm of the attentive. But as I just said, McDowell never claims that, and the claim itself is simply wrong: when you are not paying attention to one of your beliefs, that doesn't disqualify that belief's status as a mental state. To concentrate on the notion of 'attention' is a red herring of the whole discussion. In identifying mindedness with the attentive, Dreyfus cannot make sense of McDowell's proposal: This pervasiveness claim, however, seems to be based on a category mistake. Capacities are exercised on occasion, but that does not allow one to conclude that, even when they are not exercised, they are, nonetheless, 'operative' and thus pervade all our activities.58 We are not allowed to make that conclusion, according to Dreyfus, for to claim that conceptuality is operative involves a category mistake. But that is not so. To say that conceptuality or mindedness is operative is to insist that conceptual capacities can be activated passively. This may sound strange for Dreyfus or some others, but they need to tell us why that's incoherent or at least problematic. McDowell offers reasons for this claim is his Locke Lecture, as we have seen above. Dreyfus acknowledges that 'mindedness' is a technical term on McDowell part59, but he doesn't really respect this point: he opens his response to McDowell by classifying 'conceptuality' and 'mindedness' as mentalist notions.60 'Mentalism' is a 55 It may be more plausible to view attention as the mark of the conscious, but even this is not settled. There is a symposium on this in ASSC 12; speakers include Ned Block and Kristof Koch. 56 'Response to McDowell,' p.374. 57 He mentions Homer at this point; see ibid., p.374. 58 Ibid., p.372, my italics. 59 Ibid., p.374. 60 Ibid., p.371. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 84 very vague term, to be sure, but to my knowledge none of its meanings fits McDowell's usage. If McDowell uses 'conceptuality' mentalistically, how can he manage to answer the charge that his position is idealistic in Berkeley's sense? Dreyfus would presumably press this question: 'if mindedness is not identical to a monitoring self, then what is it?' To this McDowell has an answer: It is a matter of an 'I do'...Conceiving action in terms of the 'I do' is a way of registering the essential first-person character of the realization of practical rational capacities that acting is.61 Dreyfus objects to this, but again on the false assumption that this first-person character is attention etc.62 What McDowell does mean, however, is that our absorbed coping, involved coping at its best, is not like cases like alien hands. By contrast, in repudiating this first-person character, it is unclear how Dreyfus can leave room for the crucial distinction between absorbed coping and mere reflexive behaviors. Dreyfus sets a dilemma between 'a meaninglessly bodily movement' and 'an action done by a subject for a reason' to McDowell.63 McDowell would escape this dilemma by insisting that (intentional) bodily movements are meaningful. Dreyfus would agree on this point, but it should be clear that this 'motor intentionality' can be appropriately understood only by those who respect the distinction between absorbed coping and mere reflexive behaviors. About this ownership consideration, Dreyfus says: Of course, the coping going on is mine in the sense that the coping can be interrupted at any moment by a transformation that results in an experience of stepping back from the flow of current coping. I then retrospectively attach an 'I think' to the coping and take responsibility for my actions.64 McDowell's explanation of this is the pervasiveness claim, but Dreyfus's is not convinced. His alternative explanation is, surprisingly enough, purely physiological.65 But this is problematic. For one thing, this physiological claim is compatible with all camps in this debate; for another, if it is the whole story for Dreyfus, then how can the notion of 'responsibility' mentioned in the quotation above be explained? Later Dreyfus seems to radicalize his answer. In describing McDowell's view he 61 'Response to Dreyfus,' p.367, my italics. 62 'Response to McDowell,' p.375. 63 Ibid., p.374. 64 'The Return of the Myth of the Mental,' p.356. Here he recognizes that the stepping back at issue is retrospective, but he lapsed earlier in discussing Knoblauch's case. 65 'Response to McDowell,' p.374. Episode IV. Agent and Person 85 disagrees with; he writes that: 'to the question "who act?" [McDowell] responds: "the answer is 'I do'".'66 But if this is an answer Dreyfus objects to, he seems to have no alternative but commit that the answer is 'this body does.' That's why McDowell argues that '[t]he real myth in this neighborhood is...the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect.'67 Dreyfus replies that this Myth is more like Gadamer's and McDowell's view, for '[i]t assumes that human beings are defined by their capacity to distance themselves from their involved coping.'68 This doesn't seem right to me. Even if one holds this definition of human beings, it does not follow immediately that our mindedness is disembodied. Dreyfus rejects this because he mistakenly identifies mindedness with attention or deliberation. And McDowell attributes that Myth to Dreyfus because '[i]f you distinguish me from my body, and give my body that person-like character, you have too many person-like things in the picture...'69 That is to say, if both the self and 'this body' are person-like things and the self is not this body, than it must be a disembodied person. Dreyfus does not address this objection at all. Dreyfus thinks our animal nature has no philosophically interesting differences from other animals. This is backed up by what McDowell identifies as the 'quick argument': from the premise that we share basic perceptual capacities and embodied coping skills to the conclusion that 'those capacities and skills, as we have them, cannot be permeated with rationality, since other animals are not rational.'70 'But the quick argument does not work.' McDowell continues, [t]he claim that the capacities and skills are shared comes to no more that this: there are descriptions of things we can do that apply also to things other animals can do...But the truth about a human being's exercise of competence in making her around, in a performance that can be described like that, need not be exhausted by the match with what can be said about, say, a cat's correspondingly describable response to a corresponding affordance. The human being's response is, if you like, indistinguishable from the cat's response qua response to an affordance describable in those terms. But it does not follow that the human being's response cannot be unlike the cat's response in being the human being's rationality at work.71 66 Ibid., p.373. 67 'What Myth?' p.349, my italics. Recall the dualism of intellect and sensory / bodily criticized at the earlier stage of this episode. 68 'The Return of the Myth of the Mental,' p.355. 69 'Response to Dreyfus,' p.369. 70 'What Myth?' p.343. 71 Ibid., p.343. If McDowell is right here, affordances can be 'data for [one's] rationality' (Ibid., p.344). Also see pp.343, 348-9 for the example of going through a hole. In this case, 'the fact that a hole in the wall if of a certain size will be a solicitation' ('Response to Dreyfus,' p.369, my italics). W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 86 This reflects a central thought of McDowell's thinking: when two phenomena share something, we are not forced to regard this 'something' as a discrete thing, 'a core' shared by these two phenomena. 'It is not compulsory,' as he likes to put it. And he further argues that 'if we do take this line, there is no satisfactory way to understand the role of the supposed core in our perceptual lives.'72 Here 'perceptual lives' is of course just an example. This central thought is two-staged: first, the factorizing way is not compulsory, and second, it will lead to in principle irresolvable quandary. In the case of passivity, the devastating problem is the infamous Myth of the Given. I have discussed this in my second episode, but since it is highly relevant to the present debate between McDowell and Dreyfus, I shall enter into this again, though with a different angle.73 4. 'The Myth of the Given,' to rehearse, was introduced and criticized by Wilfrid Sellars in his celebrated 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.' Most contemporary philosophers identify the myth with indubitability, but that's not Sellars's original formulation.74 Dreyfus is not aware of this: Given its structural similarity to empiricism, we need to make clear that existential phenomenology does not assume an indubitable Given on which to base empirical certainties. As with all forms of intentionality, solicitations can be misleading and in responding to such solicitations one can be misled.75 Notice that Dreyfus distances himself from the Myth of the Given by stressing that the foundations in his picture are not indubitable, but this does not respond to the mystical part of the Given identified by McDowell. Notice that when McDowell diagnoses the oscillating seesaw in modern philosophy, he never mentions 'foundationalism.' Foundationalism, at least in its stronger form, often implies indubitability, but that's not the problem McDowell (and Sellars) is identifying. The McDowellian problematic is constituted by coherentism and the Myth of the Given, not foundationalism. The worse thing is that later Dreyfus says something exactly fall prey to the Myth of the Given: 72 Mind and World, p.64. 73 In the context of the difference between human being and mere animals, McDowell invokes the distinction between 'being open to the world' and 'merely inhabiting an environment' ('What Myth?' p.343-4). What McDowell insists is that our coping with the environment and animals' case are different in kind. After entering the space of reasons, we cannot 'unlearn.' 74 Willem deVries and Timm Triplett make an admirable effort to gloss this formidable piece. In page xxii and xxiii, they point out that Sellars did not identify the myth with incorrigibility (indubitability). See Willem deVries and Timm Triplett, Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: Reading Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000). 75 'The Return of the Myth of the Mental,' p.362, my italics. Episode IV. Agent and Person 7 8 The world of solicitations, then, is not foundational in the sense that it is indubitable and grounds our empirical claims, but it is the self-sufficient, constant, and pervasive background that provides the base for our dependent, intermittent, activity of stepping back, subjecting our activity to rational scrutiny, and spelling out the objective world's rational structure.76 It is not clear that what the 'base-providing' claim amounts to, but obviously Dreyfus thinks solicitations have to do with our rational structures. Now how does he characterize solicitations as such? In the figure that he invokes to contrast McDowell's notion of 'world' with Merleau-Ponty's one, he writes that for phenomenologists the world is '[s]olicitations to act; [a] web of attractions and repulsions.'77 Later in contrasting with 'affordance,' he binds solicitations with the notion of 'drawing.'78 Now solicitations sound like something in the realm of law: in this realm there is no freedom; we are just drawn into these or those movements of limbs, or 'expertise' in Dreyfus sense. Freedom kicks in when we step back and reflect, so it does not belong to solicitations, in Dreyfus's sense. Dreyfus says that solicitations 'can be misled'79, and this makes Merleau-Pontyan world 'normative.'80 But solicitations in this sense are just attractions and repulsions constituted by relations between objects and our bodies, which subject to the realm of law, so 'being misled' can be only a metaphor. By contrast, McDowell's world deserves to be called 'normative,' for he argues that the world is encompassed by the realm of the conceptual, and conceptual relations are normative connectedness. In this way, Dreyfus unwittingly commits a version of the Myth of the Given: solicitations are inhabitants in the realm of law, but they are supposed to 'provide the base' for the space of reasons: '[t]hese solicitations have a systematic order that...works in the background to make rationality possible.'81 Given that Dreyfus is not a bald naturalist, who are willing to bite the bullet of reducing the space of reasons to the realm of law, his picture is ultimately fall prey to the Myth of the Given. I find Dreyfus's notion of the body peculiar. On the one hand, he attributes the body person-like characters; on the other, the body responds to only solicitations conceived as inhabitants in the realm of law. I see no way to reconcile these two elements in his picture. Dreyfus recognizes a problem similar to the one we are discussing: '[the existential 76 Ibid., p.363. 77 Ibid., p.357. 78 Ibid., p.361. 79 Ibid., p.362. 80 Ibid., p.357. 81 Ibid., p.358, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 88 phenomenologist] owes an account of how our absorbed, situated experience comes to be transformed so that we experience context-free, self-sufficient substances with detachable properties...'82 But the problem is much more serious than this. Given that Dreyfus presumably accepts the sui generis character of the space of reasons, and given that his understanding of solicitations commits him to putting them in the realm of law, the 'owing an account' acknowledgement does not touch the real and deep problem. He goes on to accuse that 'the conceptualists can't give an account of how we are absorbed in the world...'83 But this is not so. Given that McDowell never identify conceptuality and mindedness with a monitoring self, cases like Knoblauch and Grandmaster are simply irrelevant. Dreyfus prefers the phenomenological approach because it 'accepts the challenge of relating the preconceptual world to the conceptual world...'84, but what we should say is that the phenomenologist accepts the challenge before he really appreciates it. On the contrary, while the conceptualist also accepts the sui generis character of the space of reasons, he puts solicitations in the realm of the conceptual, and this avoids the Myth of the Given and intellectualism at the same time (since conceptuality is not in the realm of law, and is not identical to a monitoring self either). 5. If what I have said so far is correct in general outlines, I side with McDowell that many of Heidegger's, Merleau-Ponty's, and Dreyfus's thoughts should be regard as supplementations, as opposed to corrections, to the conceptualist picture.85 Although the cases of Knoblauch and Grandmaster are compatible with McDowell's view, more can be, and should be said on these or other interesting cases. I conclude that though Dreyfus's objections raise interesting questions for us to think, his case against McDowell nevertheless cuts no ice. Before closing this section, I want to remind my readers about the relation between Dreyfus's picture criticized by McDowell and the inner space model. According to McDowell, Dreyfus unwittingly commits the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect in depicting his picture of agency. This Myth, as I mentioned in passing, is parallel to the dualism of intellect and sensory lurking in Michael Ayers's thinking. Now we should further recognize that the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect is a special version of the inner space model. Originally, the inner space is defined by a self as an inner eye directing at self-standing mental items. Now in the context of bodily agency, the self-standing mental items are replaced by automaton-like bodily movements, independent of a detached self. There is a distance between the intellect and mindless 82 ibid., p.364, my italics. 83 Ibid., p.364. 84 Ibid., p.364. 85 'What Myth?' p.349. Episode IV. Agent and Person 89 bodily movements; with this picture at hand, 'it is too late to try to fix things by talking about the former merging into the latter.'86 Dreyfus fiercely argues against any detached conception of embodied agency, but his unconscious commitment of the inner space model makes the very idea of 'embodiment' unavailable to him. Consequently, McDowell's own position binds the subject and its bodily capacities together: The fact is that there is nothing for me to mean by 'I,' even though what I mean by 'I' is correctly specified as the thinking thing I am, except the very thing I would be reefing to (a bit strangely) if I said 'this body'...87 And McDowell identifies 'I' with 'person.'88 It seems to follow that person is identical with its living body. This raises important issues about personhood. In the next section I discuss how McDowell conceives personhood and the mind-body relation. Embedment 1. McDowell starts with John Locke's definition of personhood: a person is 'a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and consider itself as itself, the same thinking being, in different time and places.'89 The crux here is a person's '"inner angle" on its own persistence.'90 Locke's sketchy characterization permits different ways of development. Derek Parfit thinks the only legitimate way to cash out this Lockean idea is to accept a version of 'reductionism.'91 According to McDowell, Parfit's line of thinking presupposes a dubious dualism between 'purely mental' and 'purely material,' the assumption 'that there is no alternative to reduce except to commit ourselves to continuants whose persistence through time would consist in nothing but the continuity of "consciousness" itself.'92 In another word, 'Locke's phenomenon must be understood in isolation.'93 McDowell introduces Gareth Evans's discussions of 'identification-freedom' at this point. McDowell comments: 86 Ibid., p.350. 87 Ibid., p.350. 88 'Response to Dreyfus,' p.369. 89 Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.), An Essay concerning Human Understanding (Oxford University Press, USA, 1999) , 3.27.9. 90 'Reductionism and the First Person,' p.359. 91 Reasons and Persons (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984). 92 'Reductionism and the First Person,' p.360. From the context we can see that by 'consciousness' Locke means 'self-consciousness.' 93 Ibid., p.361. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 90 In continuity of 'consciousness,' there is what appears to be knowledge of an identity, the persistence of the same subject through time, without any need to take care that attention stays fixed on the same thing. Contrast keeping one's thought focused on an ordinary object of perception over a period; this requires a skill, the ability to keep track of something, whose exercise we can conceive as a practical substitute for the explicit allocation of a criterion of identity. Continuity of 'consciousness' involves no analogue to this – no keeping track of the persisting self that nevertheless seems to figure in its content.94 So far, the description is pretty innocent indeed. But there is a common Cartesian response to it.95 The response assumes that: the content of that awareness must be provided for completely within the flow of 'consciousness'; and to conclude, from the fact that no criteria for persistence through time are in play in the field to which that assumption restricts us, that what continuing to exist consists in for the continuant in question must be peculiarly simple, something that does not go beyond the flow of 'consciousness' itself. In particular, this line of thought rules out the idea that the continuant in question might be a human being.96 This condensed passage cries out for exposition. I think here the argument contains two premises; one is the 'narrow assumption' (within the flow of 'consciousness')97, and the other is the 'identification-freedom.' However, it is not at all obvious that they can jointly imply the conclusion that the constituent is 'simple,' in particular, not a human being. First of all, it is not clear that what 'simple' is supposed to mean, so I am going to focus on the notion of 'human being.' In the context of personal identity, 'human being' usually means human animal. So the conclusion is saying that the conception of the subject ('person' in this context) is at odd with a human animal. This partially explains McDowell's usage of 'simple': a human animal is constitutive 94 Ibid., pp.361-2. McDowell refers to Evans's The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982), in particular pp.326-7. 95 As usual, the term 'Cartesian' only signifies a way of thinking, but later I will justify of my (and McDowell's) usage of this label to some extent. 96 Ibid., p.362. 97 The term 'narrow assumption' is from Maximilian De Gaynesford's paper 'Kant and Strawson on the Firs Person,' in Hans-Johann Glock (ed.) Strawson and Kant (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2003), pp.155-67, at p.157. The notion of 'narrow' comes presumably from the notion of 'narrow content.' In this context, 'narrow' means 'irrelevant to external, wider conditions.' De Gaynesford criticizes McDowell's argument against Kant's thesis that the transcendental apperception is only a 'formal' condition; I will say something on McDowell's behalf in my next episode. Episode IV. Agent and Person 91 of divergent parts, so it is by no means simple.98 Now, what does the combination of the narrow assumption and the identification-freedom amount to? I begin with the later. If we can keep track with the persistence of a given object without any effort, it follows that the object does not have 'hidden aspect,' that is, simple. It seems to follow that we, as human animals, cannot have this power of identification-freedom. The role of the narrow assumption, however, is just to ensure this power: if all we are considering is 'within the flow of "consciousness",' which 'can hold [things] together in a single survey seem to figure within its purview,'99 then the trouble maker identification-freedom is forced on us. But this does not sit well with the fact that we are human beings. This is of course unacceptable from a naturalist point of view. According to McDowell, this motivates Parfit's reductionist response:100 this line of thought purports to force on us...to revise our view of the content of the flow of 'consciousness' in a Reductionist direction: to conclude that 'consciousness' does not, after all, present the temporally separated states and occurrences over which it plays as belonging to the career of a single continuant, but rather as linked by a conceptually simpler relation of serial co-consciousness, which might subsequently enter into the construction of a derivative notion of a persisting subject if such a notion seems called for.101 This reductionism preserves both the identification-freedom and the narrow assumption, but avoids the conclusion by deflating the notion of 'consciousness' involved in the narrow assumption. Since the two premises can deduce the Cartesian-flavor ego only on the assumption of the ego theory, Parfit purports to avoid the unpalatable conclusion by replacing the ego theory with the bundle theory.102 2. Rather than arguing against this reductionism immediately, McDowell proposes another line of thought in respond to the original argument. The alternative is to leave in place the idea that continuity of 'consciousness' constitutes awareness of an identity through time, but reject the assumption that that 98 This will be clearer when we see that McDowell applies the same argument to Kant; see my next episode. 99 'Reductionism and the First Person,' p.361. 100 We can see this in Reasons and Persons, pp.204-5. My emphasis is on the Evans-McDowell line of thought, however. 101 Ibid., p.363. 102 McDowell does not proceed with these terms, but I think this is a good way to understand the issue. The exact formulation of the ego / bundle theory distinction is a big topic on its own, but I think the characterization provided by McDowell is sufficient for our purpose. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 92 fact needs to be provided for within a self-contained conception of the continuity of 'consciousness.' On the contrary, we can say: continuous 'consciousness' is intelligible (even 'from within') only as a subjective angle on something that has more to it than the subjective angle reveals, namely the career of an objective continuant with which the subject of the continuous 'consciousness' identifies itself. The subjective angle does not contain within itself any analogue to keeping track of something...this is thanks to its being situated in a wider context, which provides for an understanding that the persisting referent is also a third person, something whose career is substantially traceable continuity in the objective world.103 Again, the remarks here are not crystally clear. I shall understand it with the above framework. The key point here is to situate the subjective angle in a wider context, to insist that the persisting referent is also a third person. This amounts to renounce the narrow assumption. Now how does this move discard the 'purely mental' stuff? Recall the identification-freedom condition. This condition implies that the object in question is simple, i.e. with no hidden aspects. But this is incompatible with the fact that we are human beings. We can avoid this, McDowell proposes, by recognizing that the freedom of identification in question is not freedom simplicier: a subject is embedded in a wider context, as a third person. With this recognition, the identification-freedom does not imply the purely mental stuff. Now we have two pictures competing with each other, and McDowell says that 'it should seem doubtful that Reductionism deserves respect on the ground of its opposition to Cartesian philosophy.'104 Notice that reductionism is in effect 'bald naturalism' in McDowell's phrase, and McDowell's stance towards it is always to dislodge its motivation and to provide a more satisfying alternative. What he tries to point out is that Parfit's reasoning is driven by the purely mental / purely material dichotomy. But as McDowell shows, there is a way to avoid Cartesian purely mental stuff without reducing 'consciousness': to recognize that the identification-freedom condition does not imply the unpalatable conclusion, for a subjective angle is also a third person, embedded in a wider context. One might wonder that in what respect McDowell's picture is a more satisfying one. Indeed, many people may prefer Parfit's solution, for reductionism seems to be a straightforward consequence of the scientific worldview. To see how McDowell promotes his position, recall that the main motivation of Parfit's position is its 'anti-Cartesian credentials.'105 So if it turns out that Parfit's anti-Cartesianism does not go to the root, its plausibility will thereby be debased. According to Parfit, and 103 Ibid., p.363. 104 Ibid., p.363. 105 Ibid., p.361. Episode IV. Agent and Person 93 indeed many others106, the ultimate goal here is to avoid Cartesian immaterialism. Now of course McDowell does not accept the immaterialism, but that doesn't mean that there is no deeper mistake to be avoided. As we have seen in the second episode, the deepest Cartesian mistake is the commitment to the inner space model. This is Cartesian because it asserts that our inner realms can be 'stripped of all objective context[s] by the Method of Doubt.' 107 This method presupposes the absolute metaphysical independence of the inner realm, and this presupposition generates all kinds of problems concerning human subject. If the immaterialism is the deeper problem, its renunciation should give us peace in philosophy. But it doesn't. Blackburn, Kripke, and Parfit reject immaterialism, but their pictures still make intentionality and other kinds of mentality unavailable to us. The deepest Cartesian mistake, to repeat, is the inner space model, which is intimately connected to the narrow assumption. We should notice that the narrow assumption is even stronger than the inner space model, for the former can be refuted by the broadness claim, which is weaker than primeness.108 In urging reductionism, Parfit retains the real root of Cartesianism, the narrow assumption. McDowell thinks Locke sometimes lapses into the Cartesian problem too, when he divides a human being 'into merely animal functions on the one hand and operations of "consciousness" on the other,'109 though he 'carefully distances himself from Descartes.'110 Against this, McDowell thinks that we should not '[disallow] any help in understanding personal identity from the continuity of human (or, if you like, dolphin or Martian) life.'111 The parenthesis is crucial. It means that here by 'human' McDowell means human animal. This classifies McDowell into the 'animalism' camp, but McDowell is obsessed about the label: My so-called 'animalism' in nothing but the Lockean conception of what a person is, freed from Locke's extra assumption so that the continuation of a certain individual life can emerge as a condition for a person to continue to exist.112 Normally, the label 'animalism' is for the thought that repudiates psychological continuity altogether; hence the sub-title Eric Olson's famous book.113 McDowell's 106 McDowell mentions G.E.M. Anscombe in this context, but this applies to everyone who rejects Cartesian immaterialism but nevertheless commit the inner space model. I will say more about this later. 107 Ibid., p.365. 108 See my opening of the second episode. 109 Ibid., p.367. See Locke's 3.27.27. 110 Ibid, p.369. See Locke's 3.27.10-14. 111 Ibid., p.369. 112 'Response to Carol Rovane,' in McDowell and His Critics, pp.114-20, at p.115. 113 The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (Oxford University Press, USA, 1999). W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 94 position, by contrast, regards Locke's basic thinking as central, with the proviso that the 'consciousness' can also be instantiated by a human animal. Therefore his position is also been called 'the hybrid view' or 'the compatibilist position.'114 When we get away from the narrow assumption, we find a way to see how a subjective angel with 'identification-freedom' can be a human being.115 'The capacity to think, considered as including the capacity to consider oneself as oneself, [is not separable] from the capacities whose actualization constitutes a human life.'116 McDowell deepens his diagnosis by focusing on 'memory,' 'the capacity to retain knowledge of one's own past.'117 Clearly, this is a notion reductionism cannot make use of, so their espousers need to construct a similar but 'more innocent' (from their point of view) notion. The most popular version of their Ersatz memory is called 'quasi-memory.'118 'The only difference,' between real memory and this Ersatz one, 'is that there is no requirement that the remembering subject is identical with the subject from whose point of view the past occurrences are recaptured.'119 Given this definition, it follows that 'ordinary memories are quasi-memories that satisfy that extra condition.'120 This appears to be innocuous, but we need to dig deeper. In science fictions, we see scenarios in which memory-copy is often. We need to notice that in those cases the copied memories are merely quasi-memories, for they do not 'constitute knowledge'; in effect, quasi-memories are 'illusions of ordinary memory.'121 Memories are knowledge, for they are factive. Quasi-memories have 'epistemic potential,' but 'using [them] as a basis for knowledge would require 'consciousness' to draw explicitly on information extraneous to its own contents.' In this sense, 'quasi-memory is intelligible only derivatively.'122 After these elaborations, the problem behind the notion of 'quasi-memory' should be clear: given that memory is a species of knowledge, quasi-memory is the corresponding species of illusion (or even hallucination). The basic spirit of Parfit's maneuver here is the same as that of 'the Argument from Illusion.'123 As McDowell 114 Harold W. Noonan, Personal Identity (Routledge, 2003, second edition), p.205, and Jens Johansson, 'What is Animalism?' Ratio 20 (2007), pp.194-205, respectively. 115 In McDowell's own word, 'to maintain a firm and integrated conception of ourselves as rational animals,' p.382. 116 'Response to Carol Rovane,' p.114. 117 'Reductionism and the First Person,' p.370. This characterization should be qualified, as McDowell says, memory 'of the appropriate sort.' 118 This is first devised by Sydney Shoemaker, in 'Persons and Their Past,' American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970), pp. 269-85. Also see Parfit's Reasons and Persons, pp.220.2. 119 'Reductionism and the First Person,' p.370. 120 Ibid., p.370. 121 Ibid., p.372, the later italics is mine. 122 Ibid., pp.372-3. 123 After recognizing this, we can compare situations here with my discussions in the second episode. Parfit's commitment to the narrow assumption brings in the inner space model, and thereby brings in the trouble discussed earlier. McDowell says more about this in p.381. Episode IV. Agent and Person 95 observes, 'we may be tempted to think, the concept with fewer requirements must be simpler and therefore independently graspable.'124 He continues, Well, there is no reason to assume that what is left when the requirement is dropped will stand on its own as an adequate explication of a concept. That need not be so, even though the result is admitted to be a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept's application. It takes more than an arithmetic of subtracting necessary conditions to guarantee us an autonomously intelligible concept.125 Again, this is a warning against the temptation to factorize things into simpler components. In understanding a given phenomenon, analysis is a good, if not the only, method, but that doesn't follow that every component after breaking down can stand on its own, ontological speaking. To start with quasi-memory, reductionists need to face the challenge parallel to the one posed by the Gettier-style counterexamples. In a word, '[r]eductionism is wrong, not because personal identity is a further fact, but because there is no conceptually simpler substratum for personal identity to be further to.'126 McDowell illustrates this with an example: Not that a person should be identified with his brain and (the rest of) his body, anymore than a house should be identified with the bricks, and so forth, of which it is composed; but there is no commitment to some peculiar extra ingredient, which would ensure determinateness of identity, in a person's make-up.127 There are some delicacies here. I think McDowell is quite right in urging that personal identity, like house, is not a further entity, and this does not mean that it can be identified with its components. I am hesitant, however, to conclude with McDowell that there is no further fact. Consider the house example; is it wrong to say that being a house is a further fact, further than being composed by those bricks? This concerns our views on the nature of social reality, and I believe considerations in the case of house can shed light on our reflections of personhood. But I shall stop myself at this point.128 The investigations on personal identity help us give a more satisfying answer to Dreyfus's challenge. I am this living body, but the 'am' here does not stand for strict identity. 'I' is not a further entity, like Cartesian soul, but it is not a disembodied 124 Ibid., P.373. 125 Ibid., p.374. 126 Ibid., p.378. 127 Ibid., pp.378-9. 128 I will say more about this in my concluding episode. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 96 intellect either. The satisfying picture should deliver the consequence that we are human animals, not, as Dreyfus's one does, that our bodies are intentional automata. 3. The above discussions bring us into 'the midst of the philosophy of mind.'129 One might wonder where McDowell's place in the mind-body problem is. He never devotes to this issue in full length, but I shall connect those suggestive remarks to the present context.130 A natural impression is that McDowell's position here is pretty close to Davidson's anomalous monism. McDowell admires Davidson's insistence on the 'constitutive ideal of rationality,' which implies the anomalism of the mental. And this is also congenial to McDowell's insistence on the distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law. Nevertheless, it should be clear that McDowell would not agree on everything in Davidson's picture, for anomalous monism is a version of mind-brain token identity theory. As the above discussions show, McDowell opposes to strict identity between mind and brain. But now the problem arises: Davidson's version of the identity theory is already a relaxed naturalism. How can McDowell further relax it without lapsing into bad versions of dualism? The question is reminiscent of the leading question dealt with in my first episode. Here that deep question reappears in the context of the mind-body problem. To understand McDowell's own position, it is helpful to see how he distinguishes himself from Davidson. McDowell has three lines of objection to Davidson's monism; the first is to question the theoretical motivations, the second is to deny one of the premises of Davidson's principal argument, and the third is to point out the problem of the conclusion. McDowell first identifies two motivations, 'the ideal of the unity of science' and 'avoidance of Cartesian dualism.' 131 The first is not available to Davidson, for '[a]nomalism itself, or what sustains it, neutralizes' this putative motivation.'132 And Cartesian dualism is irrelevant: since it is not events but substances that are composed of stuff, one can refuse to accept that all the events there are can be described in 'physical' terms, without thereby committing oneself to a non-'physical' stuff, or compromising the thesis that persons are composed of nothing but matter.133 129 Mind, Value, and Reality, p.viii. 130 See Mind and World, pp.74-6, and also 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism,' in Ernest Lepore and Brian McLaughlin (eds.) Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, Oxford, 1985), pp.387-98; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.325-40. 131 Ibid., p.339. 132 Ibid., p.339. 133 Ibid., p.339. McDowell acknowledges his indebtedness to Jennifer Hornsby's 'Which Physical Events are Mental Events?' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1980-1), pp.73-92; reprinted in her Simple Mindedness: in Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind (Harvard University Press, 1997), pp.63-97. Episode IV. Agent and Person 97 Now to the argument itself. For our purpose, we can focus solely on the premise McDowell aims to dispute, namely 'the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality.'134 It says that any causal relation is an instantiation of a strict law.135 This understanding of causality is distinctively Humean, and Hume's argument was that 'since singular causal relations are not given in experience, there is nothing for causation to consist in but a suitable kind of generality.'136 McDowell rejects this, for he has a much richer conception of experience. He concludes that the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality is a 'fourth dogma of empiricism.'137 Without this dogma, Davidson's event monism does not follow. Finally, McDowell objects to the intelligibility of the conclusion itself. As I briefly say in my footnote 135, Davidson secures the psycho-physical interactions by locating the causal relations in the physical world. But if we take this idea seriously, we find that mental properties become epiphenomena, for according to the nomological view, they are not in the realm of causality. As McDowell alludes to, '[a]ccording to the ontological thesis, the items that instantiate the sui generis spontaneity-related concepts have a location in the realm of law. But the concepts are sui generis precisely in that it is not by virtue of their location in the realm of law that things instantiate those concepts.'138 That is, according to Davidson, mental properties, qua mental, are epiphenomena, for qua mental they are not in the realm of law. This is contrary to Davidson's own insistence on the psycho-physical interactions. In pointing out the irrelevance of the avoidance Cartesian dualism, together with the inadequacy of Davidson's event monism, as we have seen, McDowell seems to accept substance monism cum event dualism: mental events are causally effective, for they enjoys sui generis 'space of reasons causations.' It is not difficult to understand why he would say this, but I am not in a position to defend it in this essay.139 134 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism,' p.340. 135 Although I do not go into the details of Davidson's argument, the basic shape is as follows: any causal relation is under a strict law, but given the anomalism of the mental, there is no psycho-physical strict law. It seems to follow that the mind-body interaction is impossible. To avoid this, Davidson says that physical events can sustain mental properties, and strict laws in the physical realm are not problematic. Hence his event monism cum property dualism. 136 Ibid., p.340. 137 Ibid., p.340. Also see the first chapter of Hornsby's book. McDowell's further reason to repudiate this conception of causality is that it commits a form of scheme-content dualism, which is under forceful attacks by Davidson himself. I shall postpone this to my next episode. 138 Mind and World, pp.75-6. 139 My inability to dig deeper here is due to the fact that the issues here involve a large-scale revolution in philosophy of science. It seems to me that Paul Pietroski defends a version of this view. See his Causing Actions (Oxford University Press, 2000), especially chapter 5, 'Personal Dualism.' E P I S O D E V Apperceiver and Homo sentiens Those who believe in the forms came to this belief because they became convinced of the truth of the Heracleitean view that all sense-perceptible things are always flowing. So that if there is to be explanatory knowledge and wisdom about anything, there must be certain other natures...the Platonists [thereby] make them separate, and such beings they called 'ideas.' – Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book XIII Self-Consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.' – G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit Objectivity 1. Earlier in the previous episode, we have seen that how the embedment of subjectivity can set us straight about the very idea of 'the subjective angle.' Now we shall see another application of the same argument – the application on Kant's thinking about the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. After this, I will introduce McDowell's criticisms against the dualism of scheme and content, connecting it to the present topic, and to many previous discussions in my previous episodes. McDowell begins by venturing an interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction. Following Strawson, he thinks that in the Deduction, Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 99 Kant seems to offer a thesis on these lines: the possibility of understanding experiences, 'from within,' as glimpses of objective reality is interdependent with the subject's being able to ascribe experiences to herself; hence, with the subject's being self-conscious.1 McDowell is not aiming to argue for the legitimacy of the interpretation here; instead, he argues that other parts of Kant's thinking render the interdependence thesis not satisfying. Here it goes: When he introduces the self-consciousness that he argues to be correlative with awareness of objective reality, he writes of the 'I think' that must be able 'to accompany all my representations.' In the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, he claims that if we credit this 'I' with a persisting referent, the relevant idea of identity through time is only formal.2 Kant uses 'I think' and 'apperception' interchangeably. 'Apperception' is a term coined by Leibniz. 3 He defines apperception as 'consciousness or reflective knowledge of this inner state itself and which is not given to all souls or to any souls all of the time.'4 Although with complications, Kant's usage of this notion is basically the same. We can simply understand it as 'self-consciousness' for our purpose. I shall illustrate this with an example. Suppose that I think that the present essay won't have a great success. Now I can hold this without consciously entertaining the thought all the time. But if I say to someone, or even myself, 'I think that the present essay won't have a great success,' I have a piece of 'reflective knowledge' concerning the thought. So Kant's 'I think' and Locke's 'consciousness' are generally the same notion; this is, of course, not to dent that they have extremely different theories behind their notions. According to McDowell, Kant supplements this with an unhappy thought that the 'I think' is only 'formal.' How does Kant arrive at this dim conclusion? The situations are somewhat complicated, for this involves how Kant conceives the reasoning of Descartes. I shall quote McDowell first and explain: Kant's point in the Paralogisms is that the flow of what Locke calls 'consciousness' does not involve applying, or otherwise ensuring conformity with, a criterion of identity...when a subject makes this application of the idea of persistence, she needs 1 Mind and World, p.99. 2 Ibid., p.99. Critique of Pure Reason, B131 and A363, respectively. 3 Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (trans.) New Essays on Human Understanding (Cambridge University Press, 1981). 4 Nicholas Rescher (trans.) Monadology (London, Routledge, 1991), p.637. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 100 no effort to ensure that her attention stays fixed on the same thing. For a contrast, consider keeping one's thought focused on an ordinary object of perception over a period. That requires the ability to keep track of things, a skill whose exercise we can conceive as a practical substitute for the explicit application of a criterion of identity.5 This is essentially the same line of thought as the one applies to Parfit. But here the player is Descartes: If the topic of the thought is a substantial continuant, what its continuing to exist consists in must be peculiarly simple. The notion of persistence applies itself effortlessly; there is nothing to it except the flow of 'consciousness' itself. This looks like a recipe for arriving at the conception, or supposed conception, of the referent of 'I' that figures in Descartes.6 We have seen that Parfit avoids this reasoning by reducing 'consciousness' to a series of co-consciousness. This is a way to deflate the very idea of self-consciousness. Now Kant does not share the reductionist agenda, so he attempts to deflate 'consciousness' in another way, as McDowell observes, 'it can easily seem that we had better draw Kant's conclusion: the idea of persistence that figures in the flow of "consciousness" had better be only formal.'7 McDowell's response here, again, is virtually the same as his treatment to Parfit's problem: It is true that the continuity within the subjective take does not involve keeping track of a persisting thing, but this effortless does not require us to agree with Kant that the idea of identity here is only formal. Even 'from within,' the subjective take is understood as situated in a wider context; so there can be more content to the idea of persistence it embodies. The wider context makes it possible to understand that the first person, the continuing referent of the 'I' in the 'I think' that can 'accompany all my representations,' is also a third person, something whose career is a substantial continuity in the objective world: something such that other modes of continuing thought about it would indeed require keeping track of it.8 Although this argument has been explained in my previous episode, let me say something more in line with the present context. The 'identification-freedom' is the 5 Mind and World, p.100. 6 Ibid., p.101. 7 Ibid., p.101. 8 Ibid., pp.101-2, my italics. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 101 shared starting point of all camps. The Cartesian explains this by substance dualism: within this realm of mental substance, everything is transparent, so one does not need to keep track of her mental phenomena. Kant resists this reasoning by insisting that the 'I think,' apperception, is only formal: the fact that we enjoy effortless when it comes to our own mental phenomena implies that the 'I think' is only formal, that is, does not have any hidden aspect. But McDowell points out that this argument doesn't go through, for it involves two different senses of effortless. What the 'accompanying' idea implies is 'first-person effortless,' but what implies the 'formal' idea is 'effortless simplicier': if we get effortless all the way out, then the subject matter in question is indeed insubstantial. But we need to remember that from a third-person point of view, any 'I think' need to be kept track if the idea of persistence is to be applied. Every 'I think' is also a third person, embedded in the objective world. After pinpointing the faulty of Kant's argument, McDowell goes on to explain why Kant's picture is unsatisfying. First the characterization: The result of Kant's move is that the subjective continuity he appeals to, as part of what it is for experience to bear on objective reality, cannot be equated with the continuing life of a perceiving animal. It shrinks, as I said, to the continuity of a mere point of view: something that need not have anything to do with a body, so far as the claim of interdependence is concerned.9 And then the criticism: If we begin with a free-standing notion of an experiential route through objective reality, a temporally extended point of view that might be bodiless so far as the connection between subjectivity and objectivity goes, there seems to be no prospect of building up from there to the notion of a substantial presence in the world. If something starts out conceiving itself as a merely formal referent of 'I' (which is already a peculiar notion), how could it come to appropriate a body, so that it might identify itself with a particular living thing?10 The argument here is that it comes too late to do justice to the fact that every one of us, 'the subject of its experience, as a bodily element in objective reality – as a bodily presence in the world.'11 It is too late, because 9 Ibid., p.102. 10 Ibid., pp.102-3. 11 Ibid., p.103, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 102 it leaves us with what look like descendants of those problems [i.e. the familiar Cartesian problems about the relation between a peculiar substance and the rest of reality]. If we start from a putative sense of self as at most geometrically in the world, how can we work up from there to the sense of self we actually have, as a bodily presence in the world?12 The general thought is this. It is a fact that we are bodily presences in the objective world; we are subjects, to be sure, but we are also objects. It is not the case that only our bodies, our behaviors, are objects in the world, objects of other subjects' experiences. What we should say is that it is we, not our bodies and behaviors conceived in behavioristic terms, are objects in the objective world. We are not mere points of view in the geometrical realm. Any conception of subjectivity has to respect this, but obviously Kant's picture fails exactly at this point. The acceptance of the narrow assumption betrays Kant's residual Cartesianism. Kant is always hostile to the Cartesian philosophy, so officially he rejects the narrow assumption – 'I think is thus the sole text of rational psychology, from which it is to develop its entire wisdom.' 13 – pointing out that it is not warranted by 'first-person effortless'; however, his failure to distinguish between 'first-person effortless' and 'effortless simplicier' betrays his unwitting commitment to that very assumption, as in Parfit case. 2. The issue about 'identification-freedom' is itself a big topic, and here is not the place to get involved too much. However, since McDowell's argument is aiming at Kant, I must take care of this exegesis aspect to some extent. My way of doing this is to consider objections from Maximilian De Gaynesford, who thinks McDowell's, and indeed Strawson's, presentation of Kant's argument is unfair.14 De Gaynesford first reconstructs McDowell's argument as follows: (1) The I of the 'I think' refers. (2) There is no Cartesian ego (rational psychologism's immaterial substance) for the I of the 'I think' to refer to. (3) The narrow assumption holds for the 'I think.' 12 Ibid., p.104. 13 Critique of Pure Reason, A343 / B401. 14 There have been many objections against McDowell at this point, but de Gaynesford's objections are based on a thorough reconstruction and evaluations. For other dissent voices, see for example Graham Bird, 'McDowell's Kant: Mind and World,' Philosophy 71 (1996), pp.219-43; Truls Wyller, 'Kant on I, Apperception, and Imagination,' in Audun Fsti, Peter Ulrich, and Truls Wyller (eds.) Indexicality and Idealism (Mentis Publishing, 2000), pp.89-99. De Gaynesford has a paper exclusively on the plausibility of the 'identification-freedom' itself: 'On Referring to Oneself,' Theoria 70 (2004), pp.121-61. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 103 (4) Criterionless self-ascription holds for the 'I think.' (5) So the referent of the I of the 'I think' must be merely formal (if it were a substantial subject, then it could only be an immaterial one, pace (2); for only so could the idea of its persistence be provided for in accord with (3) and (4) – i.e. effortlessly and entirely from within the flow of self-consciousness).15 I disagree with many points in this reconstruction, but I shall present them in replying to De Gaynesford's particular objections. The only thing I want to say before going into the details is that in the above reconstruction De Gaynesford never refers to specific passages from McDowell, and this makes it hard to take issue with this detailed reconstruction. Even before the reconstruction, De Gaynesford refers to Mind and World only seldom. Generally, I think his reconstruction over-complicates the matter, but let me show this with De Gaynesford's framework. The first objection from him is about (1) and (5) that 'Kant is careful not to commit himself to the claim that the I of the 'I think' refers.'16 We can agree on this to some extent, but with a proviso: though Strawson, Evans and McDowell frame the issue with terms like 'reference,' we need to remember that Kant was not doing philosophy of language in the contemporary sense, and Strawson et al. certainly know this. I believe a charitable understanding of their interpretation of Kant should recognize this, and try to understand their interpretation without regarding those terms in philosophy of language as central. Now I think my way of reconstructing the argument is better in this respect; to rehearse: Kant points out that the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations, which implies the effortless in our own case, and this effortless in turn implies that the 'I think' must be a formal condition. Nothing in this line of reasoning, as far as I can tell, invokes notions like 'reference.' So I think this first objection can be answered by pointing out that notions from philosophy of language in the contemporary sense are not essential to interpretations offered by Strawson et al. The second objection is against (2). De Gaynesford argues that 'Kant does not reject the rational psychologist's conception of the ego as one of his premises in the Paralogisms.'17 As he reminds, the falsity of a given paralogism is due to its form 'whatever its content may otherwise be.'18 Indeed, everyone who is familiar to the First Critique to some extent knows that in Paralogisms Kant's aim is to expose bad reasoning, not bad theses. Now how could McDowell miss this? Or better, how could De Gaynesford think that McDowell misses this? Again, McDowell's reconstruction 15 'Kant and Strawson on the First Person,' p.158. 16 Ibid., p.158. 17 Ibid., p.159. 18 Critique of Pure Reason, A341 / B399. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 104 of Kant's argument is from the 'accompanying' idea to the 'effortless' and finally to the 'formal condition.' Nothing here involves a blank rejection of Cartesian substance dualism. That's why what McDowell says is that 'it can easily seem that we had better draw Kant's conclusion.'19 McDowell of course notices that Kant is pointing out that rational psychologist's inference is not compulsory. The third objection is also not difficult to answer. 'The narrow assumption is Kant's target in the Paralogisms, not his tenet,' 20pace (3). As I have said earlier, the residual Cartesianism accusation is that Kant tacitly assumes a central Cartesian assumption, not that he happily endorses that. In failing to distinguish first-person effortless and effortless simplicier, Kant's argument for his own position nevertheless involves the narrow assumption. De Gaynesford quotes Kant's declaration of the denial, but he does not notice that without the narrow assumption, Kant's original argument cannot go through. The following two objections from De Gaynesford are closely related, so I shall answer them together. Against (4), he argues that the 'criterionless self-ascription' may be correct, but 'Strawson fails to show that Kant held it,' and 'it would be oddly inconsistent for Kant to hold it.'21 De Gaynesford first points out that Strawson and McDowell are 'almost alone among Kant's commentators in even mentioning the thesis...in relation to Kant,' and they do 'not cite texts where the thesis is adopted by Kant, either explicitly or implicitly.'22 And he further presents how Kant himself conceives the situation. This raises important exegetic issues, but I tend to think that we can say Kant implicitly adopts that thesis in connecting his positive and negative thoughts: his claim that I of the apperception must be able to accompany all one's representations, and that rational psychologist's reasoning to the substantial Cogito is a non sequitur. To make sense of the relation between the Transcendental Deduction and Paralogisms, it seems reasonable to say that Kant commits the 'criterionless of self-ascription' tacitly. The thesis as such is harmless; the trouble lies rather in the narrow assumption. De Gaynesford's presentation of Kant's relevant texts is helpful, but it does not undermine the Strawson-McDowell diagnosis. The issue concerning McDowell's interpretation of Kant is enormous, and to give a satisfying defense is definitely transcend my ability. But I hope my discussions of the above objections from De Gaynesford can at least damp some initial worries about the exegetic aspect of McDowell's thinking. 19 Mind and World, p.101, my italics. 20 'Kant and Strawson on the First Person,' p.159. 21 Ibid., p.159, 160. I omit De Gaynesford's final objection, that 'Strawson's argument for it seems to be indebted not to Kant but to Wittgenstein,' especially his Blue Book, for here our main concern is not the latter. Notice that though De Gaynesford refers only to Strawson here, his arguments can be generated to McDowell also. 22 Ibid., pp.159-60. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 105 3. At this stage I would like to connect the present discussion to a larger concern of McDowell, that is, his attacks on the dualism of scheme and content. I want to do so because that larger concern also underlies most, if not all, of McDowell's thinking, which has been discussed throughout the essay. Let me start with the very idea of that dualism.23 'Scheme-content dualism' was first introduced by Donald Davidson as a critical target.24 In a later paper he comments that '[t]his picture of mind and its place in nature has defined many of the problems modern philosophy has thought it had to solve.'25 This theme was subsequently taken up by McDowell in various writings, as we shall see. Both of them are hostile to this dualism, but they also find each other's characterization of it problematic: both of them present the dualism as a conception of the relation between mind and world, but while Davidson construes it in evidential terms, McDowell thinks it does not go to the root of the problem and present his version in intentional terms. Let me start with Davidson. The opening paragraph of his 1974 paper goes like this: Philosophers of many persuasions are prone to talk of conceptual schemes. Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures or periods survey the passing scene. There may be no translation from one scheme to another, in which case the beliefs, desires, hopes, and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no true counterparts for the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another.26 Here we can see that the dualism itself has many faces and to a large extent metaphorical, but we can see that in characterizing it, Davidson uses 'translation,' a semantic notion. So one would not be surprised when Davidson says this in response to McDowell: I was clear from the start that unconceptualized 'experience,' sense data, sensations, Hume's impressions and ideas, could not coherently serve as evidence for beliefs: 23 In what follows I draw materials from my 'Scheme-Content Dualism, Experience, and Self,' unpublished. 24 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.' 25 'The Myth of the Subjective,' in Michael Benedikt and Rudolf Berger (eds.) Bewusstein, Sprache und die Kunst (Edition S. Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1988) reprinted in his Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, pp.39-52, at p.41. 26 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,' p.183, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 106 only something with propositional content could do this.27 For Davidson, the target to be criticized is conceptual relativism, as he makes clear at the beginning of the 1974 paper. And for A to be relative to B, both of them must be contentful in the first place. Now, given that both of them are contentful, 'evidence' is the only thing that can determine whether they are commensurable or not. So it seems natural for Davidson to grant contents to the alleged conceptual schemes and to focus on the notion of 'evidence.' McDowell objects to this. He thinks Davidson grants too much to the opponent. He writes: The dualism, on my reading, generates a much more radical anxiety about whether we are in touch with reality. Within the dualism, it becomes unintelligible that we have a world view at all.28 McDowell further argues that on the one hand, his understanding and diagnosis of the dualism are more basic, since Davidson leaves the contentfulness of the conceptual scheme unquestioned; on the other hand, Davidson gives up too much when he renounces 'minimal empiricism,' the idea that experiences constitute the tribunal for human rationality. But I shall leave this aside and turn to McDowell's analysis of the dualism. McDowell's main thought is that since it is a kind of dualism, the two elements must be 'dualistically set over against' each other.29 Thus, the content side should be 'non-conceptual content,' and the scheme side 'non-contentful scheme.' But this generates a problem immediately: If abstracting it from content leave a scheme empty, what can be the point of identifying this side of the dualism as the conceptual? It is not a routine idea that concepts and their exercises, considered in themselves, are empty, and it is not obvious why it should seem that we can abstract them away from what makes the embracing of beliefs or theories non-empty, but still have concepts and their exercises – what they essentially are – in view.30 The problem is this: scheme-content dualism is supposed to be an extraordinarily tempting view, for it sets out the agenda of modern philosophy, both Davidson and 27 'Reply to John McDowell,' in Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.) The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Open Court, 1999), pp.105-08, at p.105. 28 'Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism,' in Philosophy of Donald Davidson, pp.87-104, at p.92. 29 Mind and World, p.3. 30 'Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism,' p.88. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 7 10 McDowell argue. But if the scheme side denotes 'non-contentful scheme,' or more annoyingly, 'non-contentful concept,' it is not clear that this dualism has any initial plausibility at all. McDowell damps this doubt in this way: First, that the linkage between concepts that constitute the shape, so to speak, of a conceptual scheme are linkages that pertain to what is a reason for what. Second, that if matter, in this application of the form-matter contrast, is supplied by the deliverances of the sense, then the structure of reason must lie on the other side of the matter-form contrast, and hence must be formal; reason is set over against the senses.31 As McDowell understands it, the scheme side should be understood as 'reason,' or more precisely, 'pure reason,' as opposed to 'empirical content.' It is our rational structure, as opposed to sense content. This, I believe, makes the dualism more plausible. And this looks like Kant's insistence that the I of apperception is only 'formal,' so as to be able to 'accompany all one's representations.' We have seen how McDowell criticizes Kant's argument for this position, and now I suggest that this can be further related to McDowell's denial of the dualism. As we shall see presently, McDowell applies his diagnosis of this dualism to many issues, and I will take care of them one by one. In the present case, we can see the dualism as an instantiation of the inner space model, constituted by the formal I and its representations. This model is a nonstarter, for it makes intentionality unavailable to us. And given Kant's thesis of the interdependence between self-consciousness and consciousness of the world, the model also makes apperception unavailable. We can also see the connection between scheme-content dualism and the inner space model in the context of knowledge. In my second episode, we have seen that McDowell thinks epistemology in twentieth century suffers the 'interiorization of the space of reasons.' After identifying the space of reasons with the space of concepts, he suggests that [W]e can see the interiorization of the space of reasons as a form of a familiar tendency in philosophy: the tendency to picture the objective world as set over against a 'conceptual scheme' that has withdrawn into a kind of self-sufficiency The fantasy of a sphere within which reason is in full autonomous control is one element in the complex aetiology of this dualism. The dualism yields a picture in which the realm of matter, which is, in so far as it impinges on us, the Given, confronts the realm of forms, which is the realm of thought, the realm in which subjectivity has its 31 Ibid., p.88. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 108 being.32 McDowell also calls this dualism the 'dualism of subjective and objective – or inner and outer.'33 Once we conceive our inner world as under full autonomous control, our reach to the external world becomes problematic. A related discussion can be found in the relation between German Idealism and the inner world conceived by Wittgenstein. German idealism gives up the 'in itself' talk, arguing that 'world and thought are constitutively made for one another.'34 In this context, one may want to rebut this by saying that 'in the inner life the "in itself," brutely alien to concepts, insistently makes its presence felt. The inner world is a lived refutation of idealism.'35 But as we have seen, the retreat from the external world makes the external world totally unavailable to us. Another prominent example is the conceptuality of experience. In the opening of his Locke Lecture, McDowell mentions Kant's famous slogan: 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.'36 This can be read with the dualism of scheme and content, that is, frictionless scheme and nonconceptual given. If one recognizes that nonconceptual given cannot bring us intentionality and justification, one in prone to accept coherentism; if by contrast, one insists on the crucial role of nonconceptual, experiential intake, one commits the Myth of the Given.37 We have seen the inadequacy of both positions in my second episode, and McDowell's alternative, as I discussed in my previous episode, is that experiences are conceptual all the way down; scheme and content do not dualistically opposed to each other. In this way, McDowell applies the diagnosis of scheme-content dualism to the topic of 'experience.' This can also be related to the inner space model: 'pure' empirical content, 'uncontaminated' by reasons, can serve to sustain intentionality. This does not work, for 'experiences' so conceived just 'stand there like a sign-post.'38 This normatively inert thing cannot do any work for intentionality. In addition, though we often concentrate on 'outer' experience, 'the dualism ought to be equally wrong about purely "inner" experiences: pains, tickles, and the like.'39 He xplains further: e 32 'Knowledge and the Internal,' p.408. 33 Ibid., p.409 34 'Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein,' pp.306-7. 35 Ibid., p.307. 36 Critique of Pure Reason, A51 / B75. 37 According to McDowell, though Davidson is definitely hostile to this dualism, he nevertheless falls into coherentism, for his formulation of the dualism does not quite go to the root. 38 Philosophical Investigations, §85. Also see McDowell's discussions in 'Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy.' 39 'One Strand in the Private Language Argument,' Grazer Philosophische Studien 33/34 (1989), pp.285-303; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.279-96, at p.279. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 109 e in the cat's, or infant's, consciousness, barring only the ability to talk...40 se in this domain, we should hold firm to the lessons we have .' This is, nevertheless, accepted by Davison and most contemporary vidson's exact formulation of the dualism, he efinitely agrees with Davidson that the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinion true or false.42 enetration of the subjective and the objective,'43 contra most philosophical utlooks. What is essential is to avoid the temptation to suppose that when, say, a cat, or a human infant, is in pain, what constitutes the relevant kind of episode in our inner lives is all ther Here McDowell connects scheme-content dualism to the factorization approach: it is tempting to think of animals' or human infants' inner experiences in a factorized way, but that generates hopeless problems as we have seen in other cases. Although it is easiest for us to lap learned elsewhere. The final example I want to discuss is McDowell case against Hume's conception of causality, briefly discussed at the end of my previous episode. For Hume, 'singular causal relations are not given in experience,' and 'this recommendation seems inextricably bound up with a "dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized..."'41 For Hume and his followers, experience is unorganized, but this falls into the guilty dualism. As mentioned earlier, this 'Nomological Character of Causality' is accused by McDowell as 'the fourth dogma of empiricism empiricists. Although McDowell disputes Da d In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with And the recapitulation above shows how this repudiation of the dualism can be done in different regions of philosophy. If we want real objectivity, we must acknowledge the 'interp o Subjectivity 1. My title for the essay is World and Subject, and the title for the introductory 40 Ibid., p.294. 41 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism,' p.340. 42 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,' p.198. 43 Recall my discussions of 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space' in the second episode. For interesting connections between scheme-content dualism, conceptual relativism, Davidson, and Gadamer, see 'Gadamer and Davidson on understanding and Relativism.' W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 110 episode is 'The Many Faces of Human Subject.' So far I have been exploring aspects of subject through discussing McDowell's philosophy, and my working hypothesis, as I said in the introduction, is that the best way to understand subjectivity is to understand various aspects of it. Now I come close to the core of this project, that is, subjectivity per se. By this I mean the narrow sense of subjectivity – the 'what it is like' aspect. Any conception of subjectivity should not content itself if it doesn't offer y something not directly about McDowell, but the digression will prove he I shall begin by an observation from Ned Block: goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive, and the functional believe in qualia.44 any account of consciousness. However, 'consciousness' is never a main theme of McDowell's thinking. He does talk about it from time to time, but always only in passing. The reason is that what he concerns is the direct contact between mind and world, and the problem of sentience is hardly central relative to this goal. Therefore, in this section I need to elaborate, as opposed to merely interpret and evaluate, McDowell's line of thought. This requires me to sa lpful. The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind – maybe even all of philosophy – divides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive, and the functional...Those who think that the phenomenal character of conscious experience Let me explain. Almost everyone agrees that there are two main aspects of the mental, the phenomenal and the intentional. The former refers to the 'what it is like' aspect; the latter refers to 'what it is about.' Some mental states sustain both aspects, like perception, some others sustain only one of them, like pain (phenomenal) and belief (intentional).45 What's at issue is that whether the phenomenal 'goes beyond' the intentional, as Block puts. Those who hold the positive answer commit the existence of 'qualia.' 'Qualia' is the plural of 'quale,' which has been heavily theory-laden, but we can learn its essential traits by considering the positions that deny its existence. As Block succinctly summarizes above, qualia is non-intentional, non-functional, and non-cognitive qualities of experience. I slightly change Block's order, for we can understand 'non-intentional' and 'non-functional' with the notion of 'non-relational,' 44 'Mental Paint,' in his Consciousness, Function, and Representation (MIT Press, 2007), pp. 533-70, at p.533. Tim Crane disputes this observation in 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' in Perceptual Experience, pp.126-46. I will discuss this later, and that will bring us back to McDowell's disjunctive conception of appearance. 45 All examples here are controversial, but for our purpose we do not need to go into them. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 111 e through and through. I tentionalism.49 Let me begin by McDowell's own words: t immediate judgements of experience as possible elements in a world-view.50 ards qualia, it is reasonable to conjecture that he holds a version of that is, 'intrinsic.' 46 Therefore, we can identify qualia as 'non-cognitive' and 'intrinsic' qualities of experience.47 Now those who think intentional properties exhaust phenomenal characters deny the existence of any 'non-cognitive,' 'intrinsic' quality of experience. This denial of qualia has been called the 'intentional theory of consciousness,' or simply 'intentionalism.'48 Intentionalism maintains that there is no intrinsic quality of experience, and experiences are cognitiv shall argue that McDowell holds a form of in I urge that we could not recognize capacities operative in experience as conceptual at all were it not for the way they are integrated into a rationally organized network of capacities for active adjustment of one's thinking to the deliverances of experience. That is what a repertoire of empirical concepts is. The integration serves to place even the mos He extends this claim even to 'concepts of secondary qualities,' though they are only 'minimally integrated into the active business of accommodating one's thinking to the continuing deliverances of experience...'51 The main reason for this, not surprisingly, is transcendental: intentionality and rational entitlement are possible only if every bit of mentality is integrated into a cognitive net. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that I am struck by a bunch of blue qualia. By definition, it follows that I am struck by a bunch of blue non-cognitive qualities of experience. Now how could these qualities, given that they are non-cognitive, have any intentional and rational bearings with my thoughts? How can I, for example, refer to my non-cognitive blue qualia to justify my experiential judgments? Philosophers who commit the existence of qualia seldom address, or even recognize, this puzzle. Although McDowell never makes clear about his attitude tow 46 Again, details are pretty complicated. The relation between intentionalism and functionalism is itself a big issue, but for our purpose, we only need to remember that the contrast between them and the qualia theory is that the later commits intrinsic qualities of experience. Block's version is rather a special case, for he thinks qualia are physically reducible, therefore not intrinsic. 47 Dennett identifies four characteristics of qualia; they are 'ineffability,' 'intrinsicality,' 'privacy,' and 'immediate apprehensibility'; see his 'Quining Qualia,' in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, (eds.), Consciousness in Modern Science (Oxford University Press, 1988); most philosophers agree that 'intrinsicality' is essential to the notion of qualia. Although other properties are often regarded as characteristics of qualia as well, I will focus on only 'intrinsicality. Dennett's paper has been reprinted in many places; for a recent version, see David Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.226-46. 48 The situation here is parallel to that of the qualia theory. Here I will keep complication to minimal. 49 Although later I will argue that we should use the term 'representationalism' in the present context. 50 Mind and World, p.29, my italics. 51 Ibid., pp.29-30, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 112 intentionalism. A similar consideration is from his rebuttal of the dualism of scheme and content. The scheme side is constituted by rational connectedness; the content side is thereby populated by items that do not have any rational relations with each other. It seems esented above by McDowell, the two essential traits of qualia are ereby rejected. It should be clear, then, that McDowell is an intentionalist about nd the needed clarifications will be ngthy. I will explain why these two views seem to be incompatible at the first blush, ich contains the most recalcitrant problems of perception. The major theories of perception in contemporary analytic s not very significant at all...It may be that in other parts of philosophy of mind...the existence of qualia is a chasm-creating question. (Actually, clear that the qualia theory is a variant of scheme-content dualism, and we have also seen why we should resist it. So far I have concentrated on the 'non-cognitive' aspect, but the argument can be naturally extended to 'intrinsicality': the cognitive net in constituted by rational relations, so 'non-cognitive' and 'intrinsic' go hand in hand. If we accept the two lines of argument pr th consciousness. 2. Since the present essay is not primarily about consciousness, I have omitted lots of complications surrounding this heated topic. However, there is one issue that I must deal with: the issue about the compatibility between intentionalism and disjunctivism. I cannot ignore this concern because my goal in this essay is to present McDowell's philosophy, and consistency is arguably the minimal requirement. Readers shall find that the situation is extremely convoluted, a le but first consider this passage from Tim Crane: I [argue] that there is a large chasm in the philosophy of perception, but that is created by the dispute about whether experience is relational. It is this dispute – between 'intentionalists' and 'disjunctivists' – wh philosophy line up on either side of this dispute.52 In saying this, Crane has Block in mind as his main opponent: I [argue] that as far as the philosophy of perception is concerned, the dispute over the existence of qualia i I doubt this too...)53 In his footnote, Crane says that Chalmers and Block 'express the problem of 52 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.128. 53 Ibid., p.127. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 113 ew sentences, but since here our consciousness in terms of the notion of qualia,' but 'their dispute is not over the existence of qualia, but over whether they can be physicalistically explained.'54 Crane's choice of example strikes me as gerrymandering, for often the debate between Block and Chalmers is seen as a family quarrel between qualia theories. A better example is the debate between Block and Dennett; see Dennett's paper referred above. I cannot of course defend Block's claim with these f topic is perception, I shall leave this to my readers, with a reminder that choosing a right pair of competitors is important in this context. Crane claims that the debate between intentionalism and disjunctivism creates the chasm in philosophy of perception. If this is so, my attribution of intentionalism to McDowell is problematic, for he is a self-deemed disjunctivist. I will argue, however, that Crane chasm-creating claim is based on a false conception of issues concerning perception, and that there is a much deeper problem concerning the notion of 'intentionalism' accepted by Crane and many others. Without these two failures, one can consistently hold intentionalism and disjunctivism at the same time. But before that, I need to say something more about disjunctivism, and McDowell's version of it. According to Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, disjunctivism about perception can be roughly divided into three versions. They are J. M. Hinton's and Paul Snowdon's 'experiential disjunctivism,' John McDowell's 'epistemological disjunctivism,' and M. G. F. Martin's 'phenomenal disjunctivism.'55 The experiential version is about 'the nature of experience,' 56 more precisely, about perceptual 'state.'57 Therefore I suggest that we call this version 'state disjunctivism,' in order to highlight its difference from the phenomenal version. The epistemological version is about 'the epistemic warrant'58 provided by experiences. The phenomenal version concerns 'experience's phenomenal character.'59 There might be another version of disjunctivism, which maintains that 'a veridical experience shares no content with its corresponding hallucination.'60 I shall call this 'content disjunctivism.' Haddock and Macpherson regard state (experiential) and phenomenal disjunctivism as 'two sub-varieties of metaphysical disjunctivism,' 61 as opposed to McDowell's epistemological version. I find this way of putting things potentially misleading: presumably, phenomenal disjunctivism can be seen as a kind of metaphysical 54 Ibid., p.127. 55 'Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism,' in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, and Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-24. They also discuss disjunctivism about action, but we do not need to enter that in the present context. 56 Ibid., p.1. 57 See Snowdon, 'Perception, Vision, and Causation,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1980-1), pp.175-92. 58 'Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism,' p.1. 59 Ibid., p.1. 60 Alex Byrne, 'Intentionalism Defended,' The Philosophical Review 110 (2001), pp.199-240, at p.202. 61 'Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism,' p.21, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 114 disjunctivism because it is about the nature, the metaphysics of phenomenal character. By the same token, state and content disjunctivism are metaphysical in the sense that they are about the nature, the metaphysics of state and content, respectively. But if so, the so called 'epistemological' disjunctivism is metaphysical in the same sense, for it is about the nature, the metaphysics, as opposed to the epistemology of reason. So I suggest that we replace the label 'epistemological disjunctivism' with 'reason disjunctivism': it is not the case that we have the same reason in subjectively indistinguishable veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart; instead, in the good case we have an indefeasible reason, which is absent in the bad case. So according to my way of labeling, we have four versions of disjunctivism about epistemology McDowell argues for the reason version of disjunctivism; it is perception: Hinton's and Snowdon's state version, McDowell's reason version, Martin's phenomenal version, and Byrne's content version.62 What version(s) of disjunctivism does Crane have in mind when he makes the chasm-creating claim? There he mentions most representatives, including Hinton, Snowdon, McDowell, Martin, Putnam, and Williamson, so we cannot find out the answer through the player list. Fortunately, later he says that disjunctivism '[denies] that the hallucination and the subjectively indistinguishable perception are states of the same fundamental psychological kind.'63 Therefore we can reasonably think that he locates the battlefield within the 'state' view. Now a quick argument on McDowell's behalf might be suggested: since McDowell's disjunctivism is the reason view, the putative inconsistency between state disjunctivism and intentionalism is simply irrelevant. This does not work, unfortunately, because according to my interpretation McDowell also holds state disjunctivism. Consider McDowell's main target in his overall thinking, the inner space model. This putative inner space is constituted by self-standing mental items. Items are things, and McDowell's alternative is that mental things – mental states – are prime, that is, inextricably involved external conditions.64 The inner space is a metaphysical position, and McDowell's anti-Cartesian alternative, i.e. disjunctivism, must have some metaphysical flavor too. In particular, the inner space theory is wrong about the nature of mental states, i.e. as free-floating items, so its opponent disjunctivism should be about mental states either.65 This is not to fly in the face to the obvious fact that in his papers on just that in responding to different challenges, he defends different versions of the 62 In his paper, Byrne does not explicitly commit this disjunctivism, but since here what I am doing is classification, I shall leave open whether he subscribes content disjunctivism. 63 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.139, my italics. 64 To rehearse, the 'inextricability' stands for 'primeness,' which implies 'broadness,' signified by 'externality.' 65 Also consider McDowell's criticisms against Kripke's 'master thesis.' Kripke's 'common kind assumption' is definitely not about reason and justification. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 115 ms in the 'singular thought' paper, they would have realized that McDowell doctrine. What's the relation between the state and the reason version of disjunctivism? In their co-authored paper, Alex Byrne and Heather Logue argue that the former implies the latter, but not vise versa.66 I shall not take issue with this claim, but dispute their claim that McDowell denies state disjunctivism. They offer two textual evidences, from 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge' and 'The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument' respectively.67 First, '[i]t "look[s] to one exactly as if things [are] a certain way" (p.385) in the good case and the illusory cases, and there is the strong suggestion that this is a perfectly proper mental respect of similarity.'68 I do not understand. Here McDowell only says 'it looks to one exactly as if...,' but this is no more than a description of subjective indistinguishability. Maybe by this remark McDowell rejects strong phenomenal disjunctivism, as I shall explain presently, but that is irrelevant to state disjunctivism. Let's turn to the second quotation. There McDowell says that the 'difference in epistemic significance is of course consistent with all sorts of commonalities between the disjuncts. For instance, on both sides of the disjunction it appears to one that, say, there is a red cube in front of one.'69 Again, I do not see how the quoted remarks help establish their point. For one thing, 'it appears to one that...' is again phenomenal70; for another, to say that the difference in epistemic significance is consistent with all sorts of commonalities is not to say that other forms of disjunctivism are precluded. It is just that reason disjunctivism does not expel the common kind theory in other domains. Byrne and Logue's case for the claim that McDowell refuses to accept state disjunctivism fails. Indeed, if they noticed that McDowell argues against self-standing mental ite himself argues for state disjunctivism. They does cite the paper, but for some other purpose. So we need to respond to Crane's challenge after all, given that McDowell is a state disjunctivist. But again before this, I hope to say more about McDowell's relations to other two versions of disjunctivism. Sometimes McDowell writes as if he thinks a veridical experience and it deceptive counterpart can share the same content, for example he says that 'a kind of actualization of conceptual capacities [are operative in] cases of perceiving, or at least seeming to perceive, that things are thus and so'71 But I 66 'Either / Or,' in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, pp.57-94. Their terminologies are 'metaphysical / epistemological disjunctivism,' and I have said why I prefer my own way of labeling. 67 The later paper appears in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, pp.376-89. 68 'Either / Or,' p.67. 69 'The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument.' 70 Their failure here may also be reflected in the fact that they lump Martin with Hinton together under the label 'metaphysical disjunctivism.' 71 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' p.1068. In private occasions he also says perceivings and seemings can share the same content. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 116 think it is better to say that he also holds content disjunctivism, which says that in the good case and in the bad case there is no shared content in play. Let me explain. There is a sense in which there is one and the same content shared by a veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart: that both of them can be characterized by 'that things are thus and so.' I think this is what McDowell insists on. But in a more important sense, those episodes do not share the same content, for in the good case the contents of experience are facts, and facts do not present in the bad case. We can say that those episodes share the same content, 'that things are thus and so,' and in the good case the content is true, in the bad case the content is false. This is plain, but we need to remember that for McDowell, true contents are facts. When the content is true, the nature of this very content has been transformed from 'mere appearance'72 to 'fact.' For McDowell, we cannot factorize facts into truth value and contents. So I think it is better to say that McDowell is a content disjunctivist, with the proviso that he does respectively.75 Just how this can be done exactly is not clear. But I think it is safe to not deny that a veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart can have the same propositional structure, 'that things are thus and so.' How about phenomenal disjunctivism? This version of disjunctivism itself comes with two sub-versions. The weak one leaves subjective indistinguishability in place, but argues that the explanations of the phenomenal characters in veridical experiences and deceptive ones are different.73 The strong one challenges the indistinguishability itself.74 Now we have seen that McDowell always starts his argumentation against the inner space with the acknowledgement of subjective indistinguishability; maybe he does this for the sake of argument, but anyway there is no reason to saddle him with strong phenomenal disjunctivism. How about the weak version? This weaker one says that though a veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart can share the same phenomenal characters, we need to have different explanations for the good case and the bad case respectively. Since McDowell is an intentionalist, he would invoke the intentional part of experience to explain its phenomenology. And since for him in the good case and in the bad case we do not have the same content, we can have different explanations for phenomenal characters in the good case and in the bad case 72 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge,' p.386. 73 M. G. F. Martin, 'The Transparency of Experience,' Mind and Language 17 (2002), pp.376-425, at ce,' in Brian Leiter (ed.) The Future for Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. p.402. 74 M. G. F. Martin, 'On Being Alienated,' in Perceptual Experience, pp.354-410, at pp.366-72. 75 In recent terminology, McDowell holds 'weak intentionalism,' which claims that the phenomenal supervenes on the intentional, for the same phenomenology in different cases is explained by different contents. By contrast, 'strong intentionalism' holds that the relation between the phenomenal and the intentional is identity. I use 'intentional part' to stay neutral between so-called 'pure' and 'impure' versions of intentionalism. For details of these matters, see Crane's 'Intentionalism,' forthcoming in Ansgar Beckermann and Brian McLaughlin (eds.) Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Also see David Chalmers, 'The Representational Character of Experien Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 7 11 say that McDowell is a weak phenomenal disjunctivist: as a philosopher who abandons the Cartesian inner / outer divide by externalizing reasons, mental states, and mental contents, there seems to be no reason for him to stop in the case of phenomenology.76 However, I must admit that so far I see no clue to pursue this line. I shall leave this to other occasions, and back to Crane's challenge that the controversy between disjunctivism and intentionalism creates a large chasm in philosophy of erception. e problems.'79 To see this, we must consider the argument from Here I adopt A. D. Smith's formulation. Schematically, it runs as follows: tum Inference P4. The Generalizing Step p 3. Philosophy of perception, like other philosophical enterprises, consists in plenty of intertwined questions. But most if not all practitioners agree that arguably the most central question is our perceptual contact with the world, challenged by the argument from illusion and from hallucination, among others.77 Crane echoes this point by saying that '[w]ithout challenges like this [i.e. those which are raised by the argument from illusion and related arguments], it is somewhat hard to see why we would need a philosophical theory of perception at all.'78 I agree with this, but I disagree with Crane's claim that he has shown 'how the main theories of perception are best seen as responding to thes illusion as such.80 P1. The Possibility of Illusion P2. The Sense-Da P3. Leibniz Law P1 is true because 'any sense involves the functioning of sense receptors that can, in principle, malfunction.'81 And we are entitled to ask if illusions do occur, what do we perceive in those cases? This is a question concerning the object of experience. P2 says that 'whenever something perceptually appears to have a feature when it actually does not, we are aware of something that does actually possess that feature.'82 And we orld, pp.123-39. In his reply, McDowell says nothing against this; see the prehensive and profound discussion of these matters, see A. D. Smith, The Problem of rceptual Relation?' p.142. pose, we do not need to note the differences between this argument and the one from tion, p.25. 153-81. 76 Gregory McCulloch takes a similar line in his 'Phenomenological Externalism,' in Reading McDowell: on Mind and W same volume, pp.284-86. 77 For a com Perception. 78 'Is There a Pe 79 Ibid., p.142. 80 For our pur hallucination. 81 The Problem of Percep 82 Ibid., p.25, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 118 introduce 'sense-datum' as a name for these perceived objects.83 P3 is an application of Leibniz Law, saying that 'since the appearing physical object does not possess that feature which...we are immediately aware of in the illusory situation, it is not the physical object of which we are aware in such a situation.'84 Now one has established that sense-data are objects of perception in the illusory cases. P4 is served to extend this conclusion to normal perceptions. A usual reason for this is that 'being aware of a sense-datum is exactly like perceiving a normal object.'85 If we accept this, then the sense-datum theory follows. Here is not the place for me to peruse the details of this argument (Smith devotes more than two hundred and fifty pages for this), but I shall argue that Crane's way of conceiving extant theories of perception does not reflect the real structure of this argument. Furthermore, I will offer my alternative of conceiving those theories, arguing that with this right framework we can see that there is no inner tension between McDowell's intentionalism and disjunctivism, and that we can have a better understanding of complicated issues concerning perception only if we respect xperience is relational.'86 He then lassifies the 'three dominant theories' as follows: theory of perception in effect denies that perceptual experience is a relation at all.87 the agenda set by the argument from illusion. To repeat, Crane thinks that 'there is a large chasm in the philosophy of perception, [and] that is created by the dispute about whether e c [T]he sense-data theorist and the disjunctivist say that there is a perceptual relation, but while the sense-data theorist says that in cases of illusion and hallucination the relatum is not an ordinary mind-independent object, the disjunctivist says that genuine perception is a relation to ordinary mind-independent objects, but that there is no common fundamental kind of state – 'perceptual experience' – present in cases of genuine perception, which is a relation to a mind-independent object, and illusion and hallucination, which are not. The intentionalist According to Crane, the sense-datum theory and disjunctivism belong to the relational view, and intentionalism belongs to the non-relational view. Notice that among the relational view, disjunctivism further objects to the 'common kind assumption.' This is true, to be sure, but one should wonder why this important thesis is relegated to a sub-category within the relational view. And it becomes fishier if we notice that often 83 As an intentionalist, Smith thinks that P2 'is the heart of' the argument from illusion, and he devotes 'all of the Part I' of his book to 'consideration of this claim and to attempting to see a way around it.' See p.25. This will proved to be important in my objections to Crane. 84 Ibid., p.25. 85 Ibid. p.26. 86 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.128. 87 Ibid., p.134-5, my italics. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 119 Crane agrees with most others that the onceiving the debate. We can see this by noting that the sense-datum theory is a version of the common kind theory: it is by virtue of this thesis that the generalizing step can be accepted. Besides, intentionalism characterized by Crane is also a common kind theory, for what defines disjunctivism is its rejection of the common kind assumption (it wears this on its sleeve), and intentionalism in Crane's sense is outright incompatible with disjunctivism. Whether the common kind assumption is true is crucial for the argument from illusion, for it determines one's attitude towards the generalizing step. On the contrary, relationality has no place in the argument from illusion. As we have seen, argument from illusion is our starting point, so he cannot propose a criterion that does not reflect the real structure of that argument. The argument from illusion consists in four steps: the possibility of illusion, the sense-datum inference, Leibniz Law, and the generalizing step. No one disputes the possibility of illusion and the application of Leibniz Law, so virtually we have two ways to carve the battlefield. On the one hand, we can anchor the discussion with the sense-datum inference, saying that the crucial divide is between those who admit this inference, like the sense-datum theory, and those who refuse it, like intentionalism and the adverbial theory.88 On the other hand, we can anchor the discussion with the generalizing step, saying that the crucial divide is between those who admit the step, like the sense-datum theory, and those who refuse it, like disjunctivism.89 Neither corresponds to Crane's way of c neither of them groups disjunctivism and the sense-datum theory together, pace the framework proposed by Crane. Now I prefer the latter framework, though in fact they are equally legitimate. At the early stage of this debate, philosophers were divided into the sense-datum theorists and those who objected to it. Therefore the former way of carving the battlefield – anchoring the debate through the sense-datum inference – may be preferable. But nowadays the core of the relevant debates has been shifted to whether any form of disjunctivism is true, and the defining feature of disjunctivism is the rejection of the generalizing step. In other words, now the central stage has been taken over by the debate between disjunctivism and the common kind theory. It is not that the older core issue has been solved; of course not: the question about whether we can introduce things like sense-data is still controversial. What I would like to stress is that the 88 I will say more about the adverbial theory presently. I do not mention disjunctivism here because it is not necessary to reject the sense-datum inference for being a disjunctivist. For example, Austinian disjunctivism accepts the inference but rejects the generalizing step. See Alex Byrne and Heather Logue, 'Either / Or,' pp.63-5. 89 I do not mention intentionalism and the adverbial theory here because the defining feature of them is the rejection of the sense-datum inference. They often do not object to the generalizing step, but we need to keep clear about what is essential for being a certain theory. Actually we should not mention the sense-datum theory either, for though it almost always accepts the generalizing step, this step is not part of its definition. Again, consider Austinian disjunctivism. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 120 relative importance of the two crucial moves has been changed: at the early stage, most people focused on the sense-datum inference (Austin seems to be an importance exception), but now more and more people are interested in whether there is a common kind – mental state, reason, phenomenology, or content – shared by veridical experiences and their deceptive counterparts. Therefore it is preferable to invoke this latter framework. Besides, our present purpose is to understand McDowell's intentionalism(s) and whether it is (they are) compatible with his disjunctivism(s), so the former framework based on the sense-datum inference is in effect of no use for us. Let me say something about the adverbial theory. It appeared in the mid-twentieth century, by C. J. Ducasse and Roderick Chisholm.90 The adverbial theorists hold that 'we should think of [the experienced] qualities as modifications of the experience itself.'91 'Experience' here is understood as an act, which is modified by an adverbial; 'perceiving brownly' for example. One of its defining features is its rejection of the sense-datum inference. This theory does not occupy a central place in the present and explaining the good case and the bad case with different intentional nature, for instance the distinction between context, but we should remember that there is nothing about the generalizing step in the very idea of the adverbial theory. We have reconceived the spirit of the argument from illusion, concentrating on the debate between disjunctivism and the common kind theory.92 Now it should be clear that as far as the argument from illusion is concerned, there is no inconsistency between disjunctivism and intentionalism, and indeed, between disjunctivism and the sense-datum theory / the adverbial theory, for there is nothing about the generalizing step in the very ideas of the sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory, and crucially, intentionalism: the controversies between these three theories are located by the first framework, which concerns the sense-datum inference. Although those three theories are almost always associated with the common kind theory, conceptually they need not be. In particular, intentionalism can be a common kind theory if it holds that one and the same representation can occur in a veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart, but this is a further claim. As a disjunctivist, McDowell can subscribe intentionalism by rejecting the sense-datum inference 'presentation' and 'representation,' as Crane notices.93 90 C. J. Ducasse, 'Moore's Refutation of Idealism, ' in Arthur Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Northwestern University Press, Chicago, 1942), pp.225-51. Roderick Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Cornell University Press). 91 Tim Crane, 'The Problem of Perception,' in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See its section 3.2. 92 In 'On Being Alienated,' p.357, Martin also proposes this framework, but he doesn't find fault in Crane's chasm-creating claim. In addition, he places the sense-datum theory into the common kind theory, but in effect the existence of sense-datum is compatible with disjunctivism, as Austinian disjunctivism shows. 93 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.140. There he mentions Searle's Intentionality, p.45-6, and Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 121 Crane plays down the importance of externalism in the disagreement between disjunctivism and intentionalism, but I disagree.94 According to my framework, if one wants a version of intentionalism incompatible with disjunctivism, he needs to supplement intentionalism with the common kind thesis. The outcome is to hold that there is a common 'representation' in the good case and in the bad case, regardless the presence of the worldly objects. But this is a version of internalism, which holds that the nature of representation is irrelevant to the directed external objects. By contrast, disjunctivism is a version of externalism, saying that the presence of the directed objects changes the nature of (re)presentation. This amounts to the broadness claim discussed in my second episode. A disjunctivist can further commit the primeness claim, insisting that the way the directed objects change the nature of the mental states is constitution, as opposed to causation. McDowell holds this prime disjunctivism. This recognition of the relevance of the internalism / externalism debate helps us to see that the framework provided by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne is also in trouble.95 They claim that there are two opposing 'analytical projects,' 'factorizing accounts' and 'disjunctive accounts.'96 This is pretty close to truth, for the common kind theory does belongs to the factorizing camp: it factorizes the good case into a representation shared by the bad case and the representation's directed objects. But it flies in the face of the fact that the disjunctivism can be rendered compatible with the factoring approach, for it can claim that though the directed objects change the nature of the (re)presentation, the way they change it is one of causation, which means the directed objects themselves are not part of the mental states. The distinction between the factorizing / conjunctive view and the disjunctive view does not carve the issue at its joints either. Crane's insistence on the importance of relationality is not well-placed. He declares that his understanding of intentionalism is Brentano's one: intentionalism is 'the McDowell's comments on this in 'The Content of Perceptual Experience.' Frank Jackson, who converted into an intentionalist, draws a relevant distinction between 'instantiated properties' and 'intensional properties.' This distinction seems to be incompatible with the common kind thesis, for if ationary reading, suggested by Byrne and Logue, in : Perceptual Experience,' in Perceptual Experience, pp.1-30. there is a single 'representation' shared by a veridical experience and its deceptive counterparts, how can it be that in one case it (re)presents instantiated properties and in the other it represents intensional properties? See his 'Mind and Illusion,' in Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar (eds.) There is Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (MIT Press, 2004), pp.421-42, especially pp.427-30. Notice that he uses 'intensionalism-with-a-s' instead of 'intentionalism-with-a-t,' see pp.430-1. I think there are something important in this, but we do not need to go into this. Also notice that in his forthcoming 'Intentionalism,' Crane says that in illusion and hallucination what are represented are 'mere intentional objects,' and he leaves open the question how this should be explained. However, it is quite reasonable to assume that he prefers a deflationary reading of this. If this is so, we can combine this with McDowell's 'mere appearance,' also under a defl 'Either / Or,' p.66. But again this is another story. 94 See 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.135 and p.137. 95 'Introduction 96 Ibid., p.21. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 122 non-relational, representational conception of experience...' 97 But this begs the question against another way of developing intentionalism, suggested by Terence Parsons, that intentional objects are in a significant sense real.98 If this inflationary construal of intentionalism turns out to be true, then perceptions are relations even in the bad case. In his forthcoming paper Crane says that he does 'not attempt to explain [the nature of intentional objects],' but he forgets this claim of neutrality when he claims that intentionalism is by definition a non-relational view. Relationality does matter, but it does not create a large chasm in philosophy of perception, but rather gures in one of the family quarrels within intentionalism.99 In fact, Brentano himself relational here, and not, rather, with something somewhat similar to something relational in a certain ut in the good case there is a relation between the mental tate and its directed external objects. Relationality just isn't one of the joints of the fi is not so determined about this: The terminus of the so-called relation does not need to exist in reality at all. For this reason, one could doubt whether we really are dealing with something respect, which might, therefore, better be called 'quasi-relational.'100 Here Brentano expresses skepticism about the prospect of developing intentionalism in the inflationary way, but he is extremely ambivalent. Relationality is not part of the definition of intentionalism, and even if it turns out that non-relational intentionalism is true, intentionalism is still compatible with disjunctivism, for a disjunctivist can hold that in the bad case there is no relation between representation and the relevant mere intentional objects, b s argument from illusion.101 4. To rehearse, disjunctivism and intentionalism are compatible because their defining characters lie at different levels: the former is at the level of the generalizing step, and the latter is at the sense-datum inference. This brings us to the further distinction between intentionalism in philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception. It is widely, if not universally, assumed that intentionalism in these two areas is one and the same theory. For example, Crane takes issue with Block's 97 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.135, my italics. 98 Non-Existent Objects (Yale University Press, 1980). 99 If one holds non-relational intentionalism, relationality becomes a family quarrel within the common kind theory, for the sense-datum theory holds that perceptions are relations between a subject and her sense-data. See Martin, 'On Being Alienated,' p.357. 100 See his Appendix to the 1911 edition of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1874/1911/1973). 101 A further trouble with relationality is that it is not clear that whether it is compatible with prime disjunctivism, for the notion of relation seems to imply that two relata are distinct. Fortunately, the framework constituted by disjunctivism and the common kind theory does not make use of the notion of relationality. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 123 ) in philosophy of mind. This view has a place in philosophy of ience, which will be chasm-creating claim in the context of philosophy of perception, but the claim is made in the context of qualia. This is wrong, for the core tenet of intentionalism in philosophy of mind is that 'all mental facts are representational facts;'102 its opponent, the qualia theory, says that there are some mental facts that are non-representational, that is, intrinsic. So intentionalism in philosophy of mind is about the scope of the intentional. However, intentionalism in philosophy of perception is defined by the denial of the sense-datum inference, and offering its explanation with the notion of 'intentional object.' It does not make any claim about the scope of the intentional at all. I suggest that we reserve the term 'representationalism' for philosophy of mind, for as Block notices, the debate between it and the qualia theory can be nicely captured by asking 'is experiencing just representing?' 103 And the term 'intentionalism' should be invoked in philosophy of perception, for the key claim of it is that in deceptive cases we perceive mere intentional objects, rather than sense-data. 'Representationalism' and 'Intentionalism' are often interchangeable in the literatures.104 This can be innocuous, but we need to remember that there is no single theory which is called 'intentionalism' or 'representationalism' occurs in philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception. Crane argues that the qualia theory is not central in philosophy of perception, and I agree with him (though I do not accept his argument for this based on relationality), but he should have noticed that if the qualia theory is not central for perception, so is its opponent representationalism (or intentionalism perception only because of its claim about intentional objects, not because its rejection of qualia.105 A few words about qualia. Crane tends to align the qualia theory with the adverbial theory, for the latter 'explains the phenomenal character of experience in terms of its intrinsic qualities.'106 But this doesn't seem right, for while the adverbial theory conceives experiences as acts, the qualia theory tends to treat experiences as things: while the former uses adverbials to characterize experiences, the latter uses adjectives. Moreover, the qualia theory is not a response to the argument from illusion, so we are not obliged to give it a central place in philosophy of perception. It has some place, to be sure, like in the discussions concerning transparency of exper 102 Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind (MIT Press, 1995), p.xiii, my italics. 103 'Is Experiencing Just Representing?' in Consciousness, Function, and Representation, pp.603-10, my italics. 104 Although philosophers have their own idiosyncratic preference, for example Michael Tye prefers 'representationalism,' Crane prefers 'intentionalism,' and Block uses 'representationism.' 105 Crane insists that the qualia theory 'is not simply the denial of representationalism...' in 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.131. His reason for this is that there is room for the view that uses 'intentional mode' and other intentional factors to explain phenomenal characters (p.143); this is his 'impure intentionalism' (see his forthcoming paper). But this is useless, for impure intentionalism is representationalism after all; it holds that experiencing is just representing. 106 'The Problem of Perception,' section 3.2.1, my italics. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 124 explained shortly, but this is far from central if we respect the thought that the central issues we are dealing with arise from the argument from illusion. If I am right about the distinction between representationalism and intentionalism in my sense, the failure of distinguishing them is striking. What can possibly explain this? I propose two reasons. First, one line of argument for representationalism is the so-called 'transparency of experience.' Generally, it says that when we pay attention to our perceptual experiences, we are only aware of properties of external objects, as opposed to properties of experiences. If this is correct, the qualia theory is falsified, for transparency shows that all properties present in perceptual experiences are not intrinsic to experiences. Philosophers like Tye use this to rebut the qualia theory. But notice that transparency (if any) is a phenomenon about perceptual experiences, not experience in general. Maybe transparency does show that in perceptual experiences, there is no intrinsic quality of experiences, but this is not the conclusion about the scope of the representational at the general level. In using transparency as an argument against the qualia theory, representationalists shift their topics to perception, a particular kind of experience. The second reason is that intentionalists like Crane read the argument from illusion as a phenomenological argument, for example he says that '[t]he adverbial theory explains the phenomenal character of experience in terms of its intrinsic qualities,' as quoted above (I add italics for this time), and that disjunctivism holds that 'the phenomenal character of a genuinely perceptual experience depends upon these [mind-independent] objects.'107 Phenomenology to an important extent underlies the sense-datum inference and the generalizing step, to be sure, but phenomenology itself is not the very thing for those theories to debate; rather, those theories disagree with one another principally about the object of perception. They also disagree about phenomenology, but those are not the objective of responding to the argument from illusion. In reading the argument in the phenomenological sense, philosophers are led to think that intentionalism here is the same theory as the one in philosophy of mind. Crane's colleague Martin also reads the argument in this way; that's why his disjunctivism is the phenomenal one. It is of course legitimate to urge phenomenal disjunctivism, but we should not, pace Martin, regard it as a direct response to the argument from illusion. To sum up, McDowell is a representationalist in the sense that he rejects the existence of qualia, and he seems to be an intentionalist disjunctivist, for his talk about 'mere appearances' can be read as 'mere intentional objects,' in the deflationary sense of course, and his commitment to the distinction between presentation and representation seems to allow him to say that perception is a form of intentionality without buying the common kind thesis. What's more, he seems to be a disjunctivist 107 Ibid., section 3.4, my italics. Episode V. Apperceiver and Homo sentiens 125 least the weak version), onalism, the qualia theory, intentionalism, and disjunctivism. lthough this detour is far from satisfying, at least it fits well with the following But they are not two simply different problem areas: we get into trouble over sentience because we And explaining sentience is one of the most central projects for the followers of McDowell, or so I shall urge.110 about state, reason, content, and phenomenal character (at with the primeness reading. In this way, he can be an intentionalist without the narrow assumption that associated with the common kind version.108 As I mentioned in the beginning of this section, McDowell does not say much about sentience per se. I attempt to say something about it for him by clarifying the issues about representati A remarks by McDowell: Not, of course, that we cannot distinguish sapience from sentience. misconceive the role of sapience in constituting our sentient life.109 108 I argue that representationalism is a theory about philosophy of mind, not about perception. But I acknowledge that there are some relations between representationalism and disjunctivism. For example, in my footnote 62 I mentioned Byrne's suggestion; his view seems to be that content disjunctivism is consistent with weak representationalism, which explains qualia with the relation of supervenience. They are compatible because weak representationalism allows that different contents determine the same phenomenology. See also Tye, 'Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content,' in John Hawthorne (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 21 (Northridge: Ridgeview Publishing, 2007), pp.589-613. The distinction between pure / impure representationalism may also be relevant: weak representationalism seems to encourage pureness, for it has allowed for different contents, and there seems to be no reason to complicate the issue by saying that the modes are also different. Besides, intentional modes may generate additional problems here, for perceiving and seeming to perceive are presumably different modes, but it seems clear that different phenomenal characters are not due to the difference between modes. But these issues deserve further considerations, for example, in his forthcoming paper Crane identifies the impure version with the 'inter-modal' version, but this seems to be falsified by the fact that, say, seeing and seeming to see are different modes (I suspect that he thinks they are the same mode, given his common kind assumption). If we distinguish the impure from the inter-modal, maybe we can hold the latter without committing the former. I myself tentatively maintain inter-modal weak representationalism cum disjunctive intentionalism. 109 'One Strand in the Private Language Argument,' p.296. 110 Part of this episode is extracted as 'Disjunctivism, Intentionalism, and the Argument from Illusion.' I have made various revisions there, but since it has not been stable, I shall not revise the materials in the present episode. E P I L O G U E Self-Determining Subjectivity When I say: I think, I act, etc., then either the word 'I' is used falsely or I am free. Were I not free, I could not say: I do it, but rather I would have to say: I feel a desire in me to do, which someone has aroused in me. But when I say: I do it, that means spontaneity in the transcendental sense. – Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics, L1 The I shall be a self-determined I. – J. G. Fichte, Fichtes Werke, IV Freedom 1. When McDowell introduces the notion of 'the space of reasons,' he identifies it with 'the realm of freedom.' His project is to show how human beings' standings in the space of reasons can be natural, and how this second nature endows each of us a Cogito, being a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and conscious / self-conscious subject. In my previous episodes, I have tried to describe and evaluate this project of McDowell. Since 'the space of reasons' and 'the realm of freedom' are virtually the same, we need to understand how McDowell understands the very notion of 'freedom' and how this understanding fits his thinking about the space of reasons as described above. The situation, however, is rather dim. To be free, a subject must initiate its thinking and actions by itself; the causes of its thinking and actions must be part of the very idea of that subject. And by hypothesis, human freedom is located in the space of reasons. It follows that to understand human Epilogue. Self-Determining Subjectivity 7 12 freedom, human 'self-determining subjectivity,' we need to have an intelligible notion of 'causation in the space of reasons.'1 As I mentioned in my first episode, footnote 3, the notion of 'cause' can present in both the space of reasons and the realm of law. The reason for this, to rehearse, is that reasons can be causes, and to say we are free agencies is not to say that we live in a causeless world. Freedom is not random. As inhabitants in the space of reasons, we enjoy 'space of reason causations.' This is at odds with the scientific understanding of the world, but as we have seen, McDowell objects to this scientific hijacking of the concept of causality, according to which the concept is taken to have its primary role in articulating the partial world-view that is characteristic of the physical sciences, so that all other causal thinking needs to be based on causal relations characterizable in physical terms.2 But as Gaskin notices, 'this merely negative elucidation of the notion of space of reason causation cannot be regarded as satisfactory.'3 We learn that causality should not be restricted in the realm of law, and that the space of reasons is constitutively sui generis, i.e., not a special case of the realm of law. But one wants to know more about its positive features. To be sure, McDowell does say a lot about the space of reasons, and I myself think most of the relevant remarks make good sense. The trouble is that there seems to be something still left out after McDowell's efforts. As I discussed in the first episode, Paul Bartha and Steven Savitt mistakenly think McDowell is willing to let the same kind of causality occupy both the space of reasons and the realm of law, but their misunderstanding is reasonable to some extent because McDowell does says less than he needs to say about causality in the space of reasons. In particular, philosophers of science try hard to understand causality and related notions in the realm of law, and for most of them that kind of causality is the only kind. To rebut this, McDowell and his followers need to at least say more about extant understandings of causality and in which respects they need to be improved. We can say something on McDowell's behalf. For him, the urgent task is to find a way of thinking that exempts us from the anxiety characteristic of our modern conception of the world. In doing this, one only needs to undermine the assumptions that generate the anxiety in question. And McDowell does exactly this. Nonetheless, one might still want to know more about the nature of self-determining subjectivity 1 Richard Gaskin, Experience and the World's Own Language, p.28. 2 'Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism,' p.178. For similar line of thought, see 'Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind,' in Mario de Caro and David Macarthur, (eds.) Naturalism in Question (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp.91-105. 3 Experience and the World's Own Language, p. 31. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 128 and causality in the space of reasons, for philosophy is not restricted to diagnoses. McDowell is quite right that we should stop and reflect our seemingly-unproblematic assumptions, but it shouldn't prevent us from trying to understand the nature of things. To understand more does not amount to engage in constructive philosophy. 2. In recent years, McDowell spends more time writing about self-determining subjectivity, especially in the context of German Idealism. As he says, '[a] stress on self-determining subjectivity is characteristic of German Idealism in general.'4 This descends the main theme of Mind and World: to have an appropriate understanding of subjectivity, we need a satisfying conception of external and rational constraint. In the paper I just quoted and another piece on Hegel5, McDowell further elaborates his thoughts about the shape of this crucial external constraint. In a piece on apperception in Kant and Hegel, McDowell talks about constraint from otherness.6 None of these, however, says directly how self-determining subjectivity per se is to be understood. We hear familiar McDowellian voice like the following: One is responsible for how one's mind is made up. To judge is to engage in free cognitive activity, as contrasted with having something merely happen in one's life, outside one's control. So freedom is central to Kant's picture of conceptual capacities.7 My italics points to many interrelated notions that need to be understood together, and indeed McDowell has done a lot to shed light on those relations. But we hope to know more about exactly how reasons can be causes, what causality in the space of reasons looks like. To this McDowell might reply that we demand too much here, for maybe there are some 'reductive' impulses lurking in this kind of query. I am not sure. Self-Determining Subjectivity defines 'I,' and as discussed in my fourth episode, McDowell thinks that 'there is no commitment to some peculiar extra ingredient, which would ensure determinateness of identity, in a person's make-up.'8 I said that I am hesitant to think with McDowell that 'there is no further fact.' Although I have not come up with any satisfying answer to this, I venture to put my very tentative thought 4 'Self-Determining Subjectivity and External Constraint,' in Karl Ameriks and Jürgen Stolzenberg (eds.) International Yearbook of German Idealism 2005: German Idealism and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy (Walter De Gruyter Inc, 2005), pp.21-37, at p.21. Cf. my opening quotation from Fichte. 5 'Hegel and the Myth of the Given,' in Wolfgang Welsch and Klaus Vieweg (eds.), Das Interesse des Denkens: Hegel aus heutiger Sicht (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003), pp. 75-88. 6 'The Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self: Towards a Heterodox Reading of "Lordship and Bondage" in Hegel's Phenomenology,' Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 47/48 (2003), pp. 1-16. Notice that McDowell insists that 'Hegel is not here talking about multiple human beings' (p.9), so 'otherness' has a rather special meaning in McDowell's context. 7 'Hegel and the Myth of the Given,' p.79. 8 'Reductionism and the First Person,' pp.378-9. Epilogue. Self-Determining Subjectivity 129 like the following: there are further facts about the 'I' and its self-determining subjectivity, that is, they are socially, as opposed to physically, real. This is not to say that they are social constructs. Quite the contrary. They are as real as any physical phenomenon. It is just that their realities are constituted by social interactions, or in McDowell's term from Wittgenstein, by forms of life. Our task is to understand how those social institutions enable us to be 'us,' to be equipped self-determining subjectivity, through the space of reasons causations.9 I think this is central for any development in McDowell's vein, for what makes us distinctively human is the fact that we live in the realm of freedom. Furthermore, this makes the topic discussed in my previous episode more important, for the 'idea that we sometimes exercise freedom without being aware of it is at best awkward.'10 Wisdom 1. To reflect on our self-determining subjectivity is to touch the root of McDowell's overall project, and we shall remember that the root of the project is his use of the Aristotelian notion 'second nature.' It should be clear that the notion is essentially ethical and practical, though I do not pursue this line in the present essay. Consider this passage: The practical intellect's coming to be as it ought to be is the acquisition of a second nature, involving the moulding of motivational and evaluative propensities: a process that takes place in nature. The practical intellect does not dictate to one's formed character – one's nature as it has become – from outside. One's formed practical intellect – which is operative in one's character-revealing behavior – just is an aspect of one's nature as it has become.11 In this final section, I do not intend to reopen the discussion about second nature. All I would like to do here is to remind that perhaps we can find some resources in this practical notion, since wisdom and freedom constitute the dual cores of McDowell's naturalism. In understanding and evaluating McDowell's thoughts in this practical domain, we shall bear the concerns and perhaps misgivings discussed in my previous section in mind: we know that he thinks our second nature endow us the ability to exercise the space of reasons causations, in both practical and theoretical domains; the 9 Here I am inspired by Robert Brandom. During the conference in Taipei I asked a question about the self, and he says something in this line. Of course he holds no responsibility of my thoughts here. 10 'Hegel and the Myth of the Given,' p.80. 11 'Two Sorts of Naturalism,' in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (eds.) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996), pp.149-79; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.167-97; at p.185. W O R L D A N D S U B J E C T 130 concern is that how that is supposed to get a foothold in our animal nature, given that before gaining abilities to be responsive to reasons, we are mere animals. It seems that in this practical domain the same challenge arises for McDowell and his followers. This needs cooperation. As mentioned above, the notion of causality is a big topic in philosophy of science, but most of the people in that discipline, I presume, advocate bald naturalism. Bald naturalism may turn out to be true, but before that can be demonstrated, we need to leave room for the possibility of naturalism of second nature. Experts in philosophy of science need to have that possibility in view; otherwise, we cannot have the best players in the relevant field to work out the details about how reasons can be causes. Davidson offers a possible, and to some extent plausible, way for us to think about, but as evaluated towards the end of the fourth episode, that proposal tends to result in epiphenomenalism, to put it mildly. Most of McDowell's arguments for causality in the space of reasons are transcendental, but even for those who have accepted its ontology, how that is supposed to work is an independently interesting and important question. One of the merits of McDowell's works is that it arouses more attentions to an important alternative: instead of simply pointing to a conceptual possibility, he offers a strong case for that alternative. But we need more attentions, especially from those who specialize in the problem of causality and that of freedom of the will. Younger generations should take more responsibilities, for they (we) grow up in a century that heavily under McDowell's influence, in a very good way. 2. The western tradition has it that the hierarchy of understanding starts from data, information, knowledge and finally to wisdom. This reflects the atomist intuition, and even nowadays the intuition is still widespread and deep-rooted. If data means sub-sentential contents, the data-information order has been reversed by Frege. The order between information and knowledge is fine; as McDowell notices, the problem (if any) about intentionality is always conceptually prior to that about knowledge. But McDowell also reverses the knowledge-wisdom order: by his light, we need to be initiated into a tradition, understood in terms of 'practical wisdom,' in order to have thoughts and knowledge. This is compatible with the commonsense that we can learn most wisdom only after we are equipped with plenty of information and knowledge; McDowell's revolutionary move is that information and knowledge are constitutively dependent on wisdom, in the sense we have discussed throughout the essay: practical wisdom is what brings us from mere lower animals to mature human beings, from proto-subjectivity to genuine perceivers, knowers, thinkers, speakers, agents, persons, and (self-) conscious beings in the world. I hope the plausibility of this general picture has been reinforced by my essay to some extent, and I hope the remaining question I Epilogue. Self-Determining Subjectivity 131 tried to point out in this final episode is sensible and positive. 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(1995) Naturalizing the Mind, MIT Press Dreyfus, H. (2001) 'Todes's Account of Nonconceptual Perceptual Knowledge and Its Relation to Thought,' in Body and World, MIT Press, pp.xv-xxvii Dreyfus, H. (2006) 'Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise,' in Topoi 25, pp.43-49; also Bibliography 136 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/pdf/Dreyfus%20APA%20Address%20%2010. 22.05%20.pdf Dreyfus, H. (2007a) 'The Return of the Myth of the Mental," Inquiry 50, pp.352-65 Dreyfus, H. (2007b) 'Response to McDowell,' Inquiry 50, pp.371-77 Ducasse, C. J. (1942) Moore's Refutation of Idealism, ' in Arthur Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Northwestern University Press, Chicago, pp.225-51 Dummett, M. (1981) 'Frege and Wittgenstein,' in Irving Block (ed.) Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Blackwell, Oxford Dummett, M. (1989) 'Language and Communication,' in Alexander George (ed.) Reflections on Chomsky, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp.192-212 Fodor, J. (1989) Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, MIT Press Gadamer, H-G. (2004) Truth and Method, Continuum Publishing Group, (rev. trans.) Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall Gaskin, R. (2006) Experience and the World's Own Language, Oxford University Press, USA Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. 'Introduction: Perceptual Experience,' in Perceptual Experience, pp.1-30. Gibson, J. J. (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Houghton Mifflin Ginsborg, H. (2006) 'Reasons for Belief,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72, pp.286-318 Gupta, A. (2006) Empiricism and Experience, Oxford University Press, USA Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. (2008) 'Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism,' their (eds.) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, and Knowledge, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-24 Hornsby, J. (1980-1) 'Which Physical Events are Mental Events?' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81, pp.73-92; reprinted in her Simple Mindedness: in Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind (1997), Harvard University Press, pp.63-97 Husserl, E. (2001) Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Springer Jackson, F. (2004) 'Mind and Illusion,' in Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar (eds.) There is Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, MIT Press, pp.421-42 Johansson, J. (2007) 'What is Animalism?' Ratio 20, pp.194-205 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (trans.), Cambridge University Press Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard University Bibliography 137 Press Kusch, M. (2006) A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein, McGill-Queen's University Press Leibniz, G. W. (1991) Monadology, Nicholas Rescher (trans.), London, Routledge Leibniz, G. W. (1999) New Essays on Human Understanding, Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (trans.), Cambridge University Press Locke, J. (1999) An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.), Oxford University Press, USA McCulloch, G. (2002) 'Phenomenological Externalism,' in Nicholas H. Smith (ed.) Reading McDowell: on Mind and World, Routledge, pp.123-39 McDowell, J. (1978) 'On "The Reality of the Past",' in Christopher Hookway and Philip Pettit (eds.), Action and Interpretation: Studies in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.127-44; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality (1998), Harvard University Press, pp.295-313 McDowell, J. (1981) 'Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding,' in Herman Parret and Jacques Bouveresse (eds.) Meaning and Understanding, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp.225-48; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, pp.314-43 McDowell, J. (1982) 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge,' Proceedings of British Academy 68, pp.455-79; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, pp.369-94 McDowell, J. (1984) 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,' Synthesis 58; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality (1998), Harvard University Press, pp.221-62 McDowell, J. (1985) 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism,' in Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin (eds.) Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Blackwell, Oxford, pp.387-98; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.325-40 McDowell, J. (1986) 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,' in Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 137-68; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, pp.228-59 McDowell, J. (1987) 'In Defense of Modesty,' in Barry Taylor (ed.) Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, pp.59-80; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, pp.87-107 McDowell, J. (1989) 'One Strand in the Private Language Argument,' Grazer Philosophische Studien 33/34, pp.285-303; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.279-96 McDowell, J. (1991) 'Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein,' Klaus Puhl (ed.) Meaning Scepticism, De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, pp.148-69; reprinted in his Bibliography 138 Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.297-321 McDowell, J. (1993) 'Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy,' Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 17: The Wittgenstein Legacy, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, pp.40-52; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.263-78 McDowell, J. (1994) 'The Content of Perceptual Experience,' The Philosophical Quarterly 44, pp.190-205; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.341-58 McDowell, J. (1995) 'Knowledge and the Internal,' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, pp.877-93; reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, pp.395-413 McDowell, J. (1996a) Mind and World, Harvard University Press McDowell, J. (1996b) 'Two Sorts of Naturalism,' in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (eds.) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp.149-79; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.167-97 McDowell, J. (1997) 'Reductionism and the First Person,' in Jonathan Dancy (ed.) Reading Parfit, Blackwell, Oxford, pp.230-50; reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, pp.359-82 McDowell, J. (1998a) 'Response to Crispin Wright,' in Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 47-62 McDowell, J. (1998b) 'Reply to Commentators,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, pp.403-31 McDowell, J. (1998c) 'The Woodbridge Lecture 1997: Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality,' Journal of Philosophy 95, pp.431-91 McDowell, J. (1999) 'Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism,' in Philosophy of Donald Davidson, pp.87-104 McDowell, J. (2002a) 'Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism,' in Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (eds.) Gadamer's Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, MIT Press, pp.173-93 McDowell, J. (2002b) 'Responses,' in Reading McDowell: on Mind and World, pp.269-305 McDowell, J. (2002c) 'Knowledge and the Internal Revisited,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64, pp.97-105 McDowell, J. (2003a) The Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self: Towards a Heterodox Reading of "Lordship and Bondage" in Hegel's Phenomenology,' Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 47/48, pp. 1-16 McDowell, J. (2003b) 'Hegel and the Myth of the Given,' in Wolfgang Welsch and Bibliography 139 Klaus Vieweg (eds.), Das Interesse des Denkens: Hegel aus heutiger Sicht, München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, pp. 75-88 McDowell, J. (2004) Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind,' in Mario de Caro and David Macarthur, (eds.) Naturalism in Question, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, pp.91-105 McDowell, J. (2005a) Self-Determining Subjectivity and External Constraint,' in Karl Ameriks and Jürgen Stolzenberg (eds.) International Yearbook of German Idealism 2005: German Idealism and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Walter De Gruyter Inc, pp.21-37 McDowell, J. (2005b) 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' in Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität: 2005 Congress of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Philosophie, pp. 1065-79 McDowell, J. (2006a) 'Response to Rovane,' in McDowell and His Critics, pp.114-20 McDowell, J. (2006b) 'Response to Dancy,' in McDowell and His Critics, pp.134-41 McDowell, J. (2007a) 'What Myth?' Inquiry 50, pp.338-51 McDowell, J. (2007b) 'Response to Dreyfus,' Inquiry 50, pp.366-70 McDowell, J. (2008) 'The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument,' in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, and Knowledge, pp.376-89 Martin, M. G. F. (2002) 'The Transparency of Experience,' Mind and Language 17, pp.376-425 Martin, M. G. F. (2004) 'The Limits of Self-Awareness,' Philosophical Studies 120, pp.37-89 Martin. M. G. F. (2006) 'On Being Alienated,' in Perceptual Experience, pp.354-410 Miller, A. (2002) 'Introduction,' in Alexander Miller and Crispin Wright (eds.) Rule-Following and Meaning, McGill-Queen's University Press, pp.1-15 Nagel, T. (2007) 'The Incompleteness of Objective Reality,' in Brie Gertler and Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing about the Mind, Routledge, pp.36-49 Noonan, H. (2003) Personal Identity, Routledge, second edition Olson, E. (1999) The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology, Oxford University Press, USA Olson, E. (2007) 'There is No Problem of the Self,' in Brie Gertler and Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing about the Mind, Routledge, pp.262-77 O'Shea, J. (2007) Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn, Polity Press Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford Parsons, C. (1980) Non-Existent Objects, Yale University Press Passmore, J. (1961) Philosophical Reasoning, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons Pietroski, P. (2000) Causing Actions, Oxford University Press Bibliography 140 Quine, W. V. O. (1960) Word and Object, MIT Press Rorty, R. (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press, Princeton Rosenberg, J. (2007) Wilfrid Sellars: Fusing the Images, Oxford University Press, USA Rouse, J. (2005) 'Mind, Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language,' Inquiry 48, pp.36-61 Russell, B. (1917) 'On the Notion of Cause,' in his Mysticism and Logic, George Allen and Unwin, London, pp.132-51 Searle, J. (1983) Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press Searle, J. (1987) 'Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person,' Journal of Philosophy 84, pp.123-46; reprinted in his Consciousness and Language (2002), Cambridge University Press, pp.226-50 Sellars, W. (1956) 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,' in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp.253-329 Sellars, W. (1962) 'Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,' in Robert Colodny (ed.), Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp.35-78 Shoemaker, S. (1970) 'Persons and Their Past,' American Philosophical Quarterly 7, pp. 269-85 Smith, A. D. (2002) The Problem of Perception, Harvard University Press Snowdon, P. (1980-1) 'Perception, Vision, and Causation,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81, pp.175-92 Strawson, P. F. (1959) Individuals: an Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Methuen, London Strawson, P. F. (1966) The Bounds of Sense, Methuen, London Stroud, B. (1984) The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Clarendon Press, Oxford Thornton, T. (2004) John McDowell, McGill-Queen's University Press Todes, S. (2001) Body and World, MIT Press Travis, C. (2004) 'The Silence of Senses,' Mind 113, pp.57-94 Tye, M. (2007) 'Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content,' in John Hawthorne (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 21, Northridge: Ridgeview Publishing, pp.589-613 Williamson, T. (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford University Press Wilson, G. (1994) 'Kripke on Wittgenstein on Normativity,' in Peter A. French and Bibliography 141 Howard Wettstein (eds.) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19, pp.366-90; reprinted in Rule-Following and Meaning, pp.234-59 Wittgenstein, L. (1958) The Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford Wittgenstein, L. (1969) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford Wittgenstein, L. (1978) Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford Wittgenstein, L. (2001) Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Blackwell Publishing Wright. C. (1989) 'Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention', presented at an American Philosophical Association symposium on Wittgenstein on December 30, 1989 Wright, C. (2002) 'Human Nature?' in Reading McDowell: on Mind and World, pp.140-59 Wyller, T. (2000) 'Kant on I, Apperception, and Imagination,' in Audun Fsti, Peter Ulrich, and Truls Wyller (eds.) Indexicality and Idealism, Mentis Publishing, pp.89-99 Many philosophers find it difficult to have a comprehensive and thoroughgoing understanding of John McDowell's philosophy. McDowell's thinking ranges from ancient philosophy, ethics, philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and German Idealism. Besides, his way of putting things is often not very straightforward. Pitfalls and difficulties await anyone who tries to articulate McDowell's overall position. In his Master Thesis, Huei-Ying Cheng embarks on this daunting task by concentrating on aspects of subjectivity as McDowell conceives them. The working hypothesis of this exposition is that different portions of McDowell's thinking form a systematic whole, which requires us to understand it in a systematic manner. Huei-Ying Cheng is a master student of philosophy at National Cheng-Chi University, Taiwan. N A T I O N A L C H E N G – C H I U N I V E R S I T Y Department of Philosophy Taipei, Taiwan Design by Huei-Ying Cheng Cover Image: Photo of John McDowell, Howison Lectures in Philosophy at U. C. Berkeley, April 25, 2006 Back Image: Photo of the Author, at Soochow University, June 23,

Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2004 HEIDEGGER AND METAPHYSICAL AESTHETICS RUFUS DUITS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON Heidegger's most precise and extensive treatment of art is to be found in his 1935 essay The Origin of the Artwork.1 This is, however, no work of aesthetics as traditionally conceived. The aim of this paper is to bring to light some of the fundamental differences between Heidegger's approach to art and the traditional approach, and to do so within the context of Heidegger's project of what he calls "overcoming metaphysics". As Heidegger sees it, traditional aesthetics is metaphysical in essence. Therefore a part indeed, a crucial part of the project of overcoming metaphysics is the development of a non-metaphysical and hence non-aesthetic approach to art. What does Heidegger mean by "metaphysics"? Put briefly, Heidegger uses this word to refer to, on the one hand, the particular, and still current, historical epoch of the Western world which began with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece, and, on the other, the particular way of thinking that fundamentally defines and determines this epoch. This way of thinking is characterised by a particular conception of truth, and by the failure to raise what Heidegger calls "the question of being". We shall not investigate Heidegger's reasons for attempting to overcome metaphysics in this paper, and we shall be concerned with this attempt only insofar as it manifests itself in Heidegger's approach to art. Fundamentally, claims Heidegger, metaphysics, in failing to philosophically thematise being as such, has failed to understand what it is to be a being. Artworks, whatever else they might be, are beings. The crucial failure of aesthetics, then, according to Heidegger, has to do with the understanding of what it is to be a being in the sense of an artwork. 1 Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger, ed. David Farrell Krell (Routledge: 1993). RUFUS DUITS 19 This is to say that aesthetics has misunderstood the essence of the artwork. It is for this reason that Heidegger's consideration of the essence of art orients itself around the question of what he calls "the origin of the artwork". How does aesthetics misunderstand the essence of the artwork? This question can be answered only once it is clear in what way metaphysics has misunderstood the essence of beings of the type of which the artwork is. Artworks might in the first case be called things. What is a thing? Heidegger distinguishes three types of thing and three understandings of what it is to be a thing. The three types of things he distinguishes are (i) works, (ii) equipment, and (iii) "mere" things, the latter being lifeless beings of nature (stones, clods of earth, etc.). The three different understandings of what it is to be a thing are (i') the thing as the bearer of traits (expressed in the Latin categories substantia and accidens), (ii') the thing as the unity of a manifold of sensations, and (iii') the thing as the conjunction of matter and form. For our purposes, only a consideration of the third of these understandings is necessary. Heidegger claims that 'The distinction of matter and form is the conceptual schema which is used, in the greatest variety of ways, quite generally for all art theory and aesthetics.'2 However, it stems, he claims, from a consideration of things foreign to art, namely, from the way of being of equipment. A piece of equipment is fabricated by the shaping of particular matter into a particular form. The particular matter and particular form are prescribed beforehand by the use to which the piece of equipment is to be put. It is in regard to the concept of usefulness that the being of equipment is defined. However, Heidegger asserts that historically this thing-concept the thing as formed matter has stepped beyond its essential relation to equipmental things and has attained a priority as the standard metaphysical understanding of the being of all things. At least one reason for this is the Judeo-Christian interpretation of the totality of all things as the work of a creative, purposeful god. More importantly, however, this understanding of the essence of the thing is grounded in the very essence of metaphysical thinking itself. In this regard only two considerations can be mentioned here. The first is as follows. It was part of the task of Being and Time 2 Ibid., 153. RUFUS DUITS 20 to show that equipment ontologically lies closer to man than any other type of being since the way of being of man is such that beings are primarily disclosed with regard to a purpose of his being, that is, with regard to possible usefulness. Indeed, Heidegger claims here that beings can only be disclosed in the first place within an existential framework to which the categories of usefulness and purposefulness essentially belong. Is it not inevitable, then, that the things that set the standard for the interpretation of what it is to be a thing are equipmental in essence? The second consideration is this: Heidegger claims that of the three types of thing mentioned above, equipmental things, insofar as they are essentially determined by a conjunction of the characteristics of the other two types of thing, occupy an intermediate position between the other two types of thing. What he presumably means is that whilst equipment is fabricated, just like the artwork, it retains the "self-contained-ness" that is characteristic of "mere" things, and which the artwork, insofar as it is considered as a work, does not have, since it suggests some sort of reference beyond itself, either to the artist, or to the viewer, or to what it represents. The implication that Heidegger wishes to draw is that the categories proper to the being of equipment are therefore projected on to the interpretations of the other types of thing. This appears at first to be a highly objectionable claim. More sense can be made of it perhaps if, against the background of the first consideration, it is suggested that, since the very disclosure of beings grounds a fundamental priority of equipment in the thematisation of what it is to be a thing, it must be in reference to equipment that nonequipmental things such as artworks and "mere" things are to be understood. What needs to be explained here is precisely the non-equipmental nature of "mere" things and of artworks. This is straightforward in the case of "mere" things for they are simply given with the individuation that is afforded by the mere fact of disclosure. The case of artworks, however, is different: they are created. In what sense could artworks, conceived as non-equipmental things, be a creative possibility of man when the horizon for the understanding of things as such is equipmental in essence? But perhaps the artwork is not to be conceived as a non-equipmental thing in this sense at all. The dominant, that is, metaphysical, interpretation of things in terms of matter and form is grounded in the existential nature of the disclosure of beings. Aesthetics is one RUFUS DUITS 21 mode in which metaphysical thinking expresses itself. It should be expected then that aesthetics interprets the artwork, as regards its "thingly" character, in terms of the schema of matter and form. Insofar as it is a thing, the artwork is matter formed according to some aesthetic value extrinsic to the work's "thingly" character. Heidegger wants to say not simply that since this is not the understanding of "thingliness" that is applicable to artworks, this understanding of the artwork must be wrong. Rather, he wants to take the further step to the claim that, given the metaphysical understanding of the thing, any interpretation of the artwork that begins by interpreting it as a thing has already gone astray, for it implicitly thereby attributes the character of equipmentality to it. Thus, he writes: 'As soon as we look for such a thingly substructure in the work, we have unwittingly taken the work as equipment, to which we then also ascribe a superstructure supposed to contain its artistic quality.'3 But this way of approaching the artwork is, he claims, 'the formulation native to aesthetics.' The attempt to overcome aesthetics thus involves the attempt to confront the artwork apart from the characterisation of it as a thing. Instead we are to ask after the character of the artwork insofar as it is a work, that is, we are to ask after its work-being . This is the turn away from aesthetics. Fundamentally, it consists in the attempt to consider the artwork along the horizon of the being of beings. What does this involve? In the artwork, claims Heidegger, there is a happening of truth. It is the happening of truth in the work that defines the artwork as a work. Truth, for Heidegger, stands in an essential relation to being. Consideration of the artwork as the happening of truth is thus determined on the horizon of the being of beings, and is therefore no longer metaphysical. But in what sense is there a happening of truth in the artwork? What is truth on Heidegger's account? Metaphysics conceives of truth as the relationship of correctness between intellect and object. Heidegger points out that this conception of truth presupposes the prior disclosure or unconcealment of the object. It is in terms of this original unconcealment of beings that Heidegger understands truth. Truth is unconcealment. This accords the concept with the etymological meaning of the corresponding Greek word: aletheia. To the essence of truth as unconcealment, however, belongs the basic possibility of 3 Ibid., 164. RUFUS DUITS 22 concealment. The reverse holds as well: only on the presupposition of unconcealment can there be concealment. This pair of mutually implicatory concepts form the structural dynamic within which beings are first disclosed at all, that is, come to take a stand in that which Heidegger calls the "clearing". The clearing is "won", Heidegger tells us, as the result of the "primal strife" between concealment and unconcealment. Beings are able to be disclosed at all only insofar as the clearing in which they presence is constituted out of the opposition of concealment and unconcealment. Truth is this dynamic opposition, and truth as the unconcealment of beings is constituted out of this dynamic opposition. Truth as unconcealment is in this sense self-grounding for Heidegger. What is the relation of this concept of truth to the artwork? Heidegger tells us that the artwork is a "site" of the happening of truth. This could be taken to mean either one of two things: on the one hand, it could mean merely that the artwork in some sense unconceals particular beings; on the other hand, it could mean that the artwork itself instigates "strife" between unconcealment and concealment. Heidegger does not disambiguate these two meanings, and it is not clear whether the ambiguity is not essential to what he is trying to say about the artwork. In what follows we shall only go some way towards disambiguating them. To make the discussion clearer we shall borrow the somewhat paradigmatic example that Heidegger himself uses as illustration: a Greek temple. What is it that the temple unconceals? The temple does not portray anything. But it is also not without "reference" of some kind. It "refers" to the world of the Greeks: to its employment in the worship of gods, to the role it played in a society; it "refers" to that which the Greeks held in the highest esteem and to that which they derided, to the development of a great civilisation and its decline; it "refers" also to the labour and care which erected it in the first place. In this character of "reference", a world is unconcealed. Heidegger calls this aspect of the being of the temple the opening or "setting-up" of a world. A world is not all that the artwork unconceals. The simple standing there of the temple reveals the solidity, strength and endurance of the stone from which it is made, it reveals the location in which it is situated, the valley or hill-top, and throws into relief the qualities of its environment: the movement of the sea, the clemency or inclemency of the weather, the firmness of the rock on which it stands. The temple illuminates or "setsRUFUS DUITS 23 forth" that which Heidegger calls earth. The essential character of world is openness. World is the openness the "open relational context" that first grants the possibility of directions for decision. It is something historical and is related to Heidegger's existential concept of freedom. The essential character of earth, on the other hand, is closedness, or what Heidegger calls "self-seclusion" [Sichverschliessen]. Earth is the impenetrable facticity on which a world is grounded and is connected to the notion of finitude that recurs throughout Heidegger's philosophy. The relation or opposition of world and earth is strife the strife of openness and seclusion, that is, the strife between unconcealment and concealment. Insofar as the artwork instigates the strife between unconcealment and concealment in the setting up and setting-forth of world and earth it is a site of the happening, or "setting-into-work" of truth. Despite this brief exposition, we have insufficiently developed Heidegger's claims and concepts here to be able to evaluate them fairly; nor is it our concern to search for counter-examples to his analysis of the artwork in terms of world, earth and truth, although there are no doubt many. The claim that the artwork is the site of the happening of truth also remains ambiguous, although it should have become clearer in what this ambiguity consists. The important question for our purposes concerns the way in which this interpretation of the artwork offers an analysis that is demonstrably non-metaphysical and therefore non-aesthetic in essence. The metaphysical concept of the artwork is grounded, as we saw, in a particular conception of what it is to be a thing. This conception is rooted in the mode of being of equipment. Since an artwork is something different from equipment, it is subsequently attributed with an extra artistic quality or value. Accounting for the nature and possibility of this extra quality or value is the task of aesthetics. Heidegger claims that this approach misunderstands the essence of the artwork from the outset. For the artwork, insofar as it is a work, is never a thing in this sense at all. Rather, the essence of the artwork is to be discovered in its work-being, that is, in regard to its being as an artwork . The metaphysical approach had neglected to ask after the being of the artwork. This revealed itself in terms of the happening, or setting-into-work of truth in the characterisation of which, an important ambiguity was retained. Consistent with this new account, RUFUS DUITS 24 Heidegger subsequently comes to conceive of the process of artistic creation as the "bringing forth" of unconcealment, and of the individual's encounter with the work in terms of the "preservation" of the truth set in to it. Insofar as this approach to the artwork enquires, at the outset, after the being of the artwork rather than after its "thingly" character, and insofar as it is premised upon a conception of truth as unconcealment, it is according to Heidegger's own definition essentially non-metaphysical in nature. If, however, aesthetics is understood to be essentially metaphysical in nature, then it is also non-aesthetic. It can perhaps be best described, in accordance with the general project of overcoming metaphysics, as a phenomenological fundamental ontology of the artwork.

THE REEMERGENCE OF SPINOZA'S CONATUS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE* Evan D. Roane I. Introduction If any one position can be maintained as the central thesis of Benedictus de Spinoza's philosophy, it is his commitment to naturalism.1 This position is foundational to Spinoza's system because through it he establishes his system of metaphysics, psychology, and ethics. In his Ethics, Spinoza derives a form of psychological egoism from his metaphysics of substance monism. Counter to Michael Della Rocca's understanding of Spinoza's psychology and ethics, I show how Spinoza's psychological egoism and rational egoism contribute to a community-oriented striving based on Spinoza's own claims found in his Ethics. Spinoza's formulation of egoism, derived from the laws of Nature, allows him to develop a coherent account of why individuals help one another in communities that is consistent with his naturalism. II. Spinoza's Conatus and Egoism In examining Spinoza's account of communities, we must first examine some of his relevant metaphysical positions pertaining to his views on human psychology. In what follows, I consider the relationship between the power of God and the essence of humans. For Spinoza, the single substance in which all things exist is identified as God or Nature (EIV Pref.). God's essence is described in two ways in Book I of the Ethics. One passage states, "God's existence and essence are one and the same" and later, "God's power [to act] is his essence itself"(EIP34). If the preceding two claims are united in a hypothetical syllogism, it yields the conclusion that God's existence is identical with his power, but the relation is better explained as expression: God's existence is characterized by the expression of his power in the essences of all things, both finite and infinite.2 The Infinite power of God is expressed as striving (conatus) in singular things (res singulars). According to Spinoza, "each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to preserve its being" (EIIIP6). The striving that Spinoza describes in EIIIP6 also applies to the fundamental drive of human life, which has no external telos beyond its self-preservation. In the following proposition, Spinoza continues, "the power, or striving, [potentia sive conatus] by which it [viz., each singular thing or res singulars] strives to persevere in its being, is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing itself"(EIIIP7 and EIIIP7D). Here one observes that the power of expression emanating from singular things *Advance copy of "The Reemergence of Spinoza's Conatus in the Political Sphere." to appear in Southwest Philosophical Studies, 33, (2011). 1 This commitment seems most evident from the following: "...nothing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any defect in it, for Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same, that is, the laws and rules of nature, according to which all things happen, and change from one form to another, are always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same, namely, through the universal laws and rules of Nature." Benedictus De Spinoza, EIII Pref. 2 Or, as EIP34D states, "God's power, by which he and all things are and act, is his essence." Evan D. Roane is identical with the essence of each singular thing. In this way, each striving thing is an expression of God's infinite power to act. Singular things include both complex beings such as humans and also relatively simple beings such as stones. For Spinoza, humans and stones do not differ in their essence, although humans are freer to shape the manner in which they continue to exist. In the following section, I examine the conditions that make human freedom (such as it is) possible. III. Freedom within Necessitarian Causality In order to illuminate this activity of striving (conatus) in singular things, we should note the difference between a singular thing considered in its essence and the set of things that flow from its essence, versus the total state of a singular thing. The total state of a singular thing may be, and in almost every case is, constituted by additional properties that are not caused by the essence of that singular thing alone. For example, a person might have scar tissue on his or her skin as a result of a growth spurt during adolescence. In such a case, the scar tissue comes about as a result of the essential striving of that person's effort to continue existing. But, if the scar tissue came about as the result of an injury from, say, broken glass, the scar tissue comes about as the result of the external factor rather than the essence of the individual in question. For Spinoza, those things caused by the essence of the thing alone cannot interfere with its persisting in existence. Thus, only a thing that is influenced by forces greater than and outside of itself can be destroyed. Spinoza offers his definition of a free thing and, conversely, of one that is compelled: That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. But a thing is called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to produce an effect in a certain and determinate manner. (E1D7) One implication of this definition is that complete freedom is impossible for humans in an arbitrary sense since the essence of human beings, eternal or actual, is ultimately dependent on God and cannot be or be conceived without God. Spinoza defines an adequate cause as one "whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But [a cause is] partial, or inadequate, if its effect cannot be understood through it alone" (E3D1). From this second definition, it becomes more apparent that only God can truly be said to be free since God is causa sui and is conceived through himself alone and he alone determines his activity by the laws of his nature. Spinoza's etiological epistemology is dependent on recognizing God as the adequate cause of all things. Humans, on the other hand, are rarely the adequate causes of their actions. In fact, the only time that a human approximates being the adequate cause of his or her own actions is when God is the sole cause of that person's actions-a condition that is never fully The Reemergence of Spinoza's Conatus in the Political Sphere obtained.3 The most common condition for humans is what Spinoza calls "bondage" which is a general state of being constrained to produce particular actions because of the external causes that act upon an individual. To use another example, we might imagine a person's freedom limited by being surrounded by broken glass and lacking adequate protection. In such a case the person is, at such a moment, constrained by forces outside of his or her control. However, Spinoza aptly focuses not simply on the external causes of a person's affective states, but on the affective states themselves. Affective states impact individuals in a number of ways. In examining the causal influences on humans, it is necessary to distinguish between their quality, quantity, and degree. First, a person may be affected bodily by the direct actions of another object (e.g., a piece of broken glass) including emotional factors (e.g., the fear of being injured by the broken glass) without a direct presence of an external cause. Secondly, the number of causal factors determining a person to act will compel him or her more so with a greater number, or less so with fewer factors (e.g., a single piece of broken glass versus many shards of glass). Finally, individual factors vary by degree (e.g., the fear of broken glass versus the fear of an irritable tiger). Spinoza explains, "the greater the sadness, the greater is the part of the man's power of acting to which it is necessarily opposed" (E3P37D). Thus, if a particular affect is stronger by degree, it proportionally affects a person with a stronger influence. Below I reproduce a diagram from Joel Friedman's essay in order to illustrate how causal factors affect a person's freedom for Spinoza (70). Although this model is helpful for visualizing my descriptions of Spinoza's theory of freedom, it is limited insofar as it does not account for degrees of power within a particular affect. A relatively free person A relatively constrained person The circled actions in {a} and {b} are actions that the persons above may take as the adequate cause of those actions. P1 is the adequate cause of a2-4, and P2 can only be the adequate cause of b2 and b3. The diagram also illustrates a cause (z1) that is unrelated to a person's affects, but only the outcome of a particular action (a5). 3 This is certainly the case when considering the knowledge reason grants. However, I do not consider the freedom that the intellectual love of God (amor Dei intellectualis) grants in this present work. Evan D. Roane Moving beyond the adequate and inadequate causes of a person's actions, we now consider the role of the passions, which aids my analysis of the foundation of Spinoza's political theory in the following section. Consider that w1 which influences P1 can be seen as an emotional state influencing the outcome of a1. For Spinoza, since the person in question does not cause w1, it is a passion and as such is not an adequate idea (EIIID3). Further, assume that w1 is specifically a passion that involves either hope, which Spinoza defines as "an inconstant joy, born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt" (EIII Def. Aff. XII) or fear, which is defined as "an inconstant sadness, born of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt" (EIII Def. Aff. XIV). From these definitions, one sees that the inadequate idea has a causal effect on a person's action to the extent that the person is not the adequate cause of that act. Spinoza's definitions of hope and fear include references to the future, which involve beliefs in possible or contingent events. Since ideas containing possibility or contingency cannot be adequate ideas (EIID4 and EIIP44D2), a person is not fully free under the weight of such ideas. Friedman rightly observes, '"adequate causation' is extensionally equivalent to 'having adequate ideas'" (71), so to be free a person must act on the basis of reason. Since one type of inadequate idea consists in thoughts containing possibility or contingency, a person seeking freedom must strive not to rely on such ideas. Thus, Spinoza's deterministic theory of freedom shows that a human's actions are determined by past and present causal factors, but not by a future goal. Spinoza's "wise man" relies only on adequate ideas, but it seems that even Spinoza's ideally active individual is not completely impervious to hope and fear. IV. Spinoza's Explanation of Community-Oriented Striving In Spinoza's system, humans are finite modes and are only free to act according to their nature, especially in the interest of self-preservation. Thinking and acting in the interest of one's continued existence leads a person to develop prudential concerns aiding his or her continual survival. Though, all humans are unable to meet some of their own prudential desires. Thus, out of such concerns, individuals must help one another. For the most part, Spinoza's analysis of the factors that draw individuals together in communities is intuitive. However, in consequence to his metaphysical doctrines, Spinoza is faced with a number of positions that stand in opposition to common sense explanations of human behavior. Michael Della Rocca, in his essay "Spinoza's Metaphysical Psychology," develops two common sense descriptions of behavior that he calls "future directed striving" (FDS) and "other directed striving" (ODS) which he maintains are necessary for Spinoza to hold in order to offer a coherent, naturalistic account of why humans help one another and form communities. His main criticisms of Spinoza's psychology come from his judgment that Spinoza fails to advance such positions in a way that is consistent with naturalism. Della Rocca formulates two observations about Spinoza that are relevant to my analysis. First, in response to Spinoza's failure to develop an account of FDS, he claims that Spinoza holds to a "primacy of the immediate," which amounts to the claim that "the immediate outcomes of an action play a more direct role in the explanation of a desire to The Reemergence of Spinoza's Conatus in the Political Sphere perform that action" (233) than consequences that are not immediate. Secondly, he also observes what he calls the "primacy of the self" in response to Spinoza's failure to develop ODS. Here, Della Rocca observes that benefits to oneself "play a more direct role in the explanation of one's desire to perform that action" (233) than for another person's benefit. Despite finding these positions in Spinoza, Della Rocca claims "there is no logical connection between the primacy of the immediate and the primacy of the self" (233). While such a connection is not present in Della Rocca's understanding of Spinoza's psychology, finding a link between human motivation and human communities is essential to understanding Spinoza's naturalistic ethics. In order to illustrate why he thinks that Spinoza denies FDS, Della Rocca compares a stone's conatus with that of a person. He judges that Spinoza would in fact deny that the conatus of a stone and person differ (226) in order to maintain Spinoza's rigorous goal of dealing with human nature in the same way as "a question of lines, planes, and bodies" (EIII Pref.). Della Rocca formulates FDS as follows: (FDS) It is possible for an object x to strive to do G immediately (at t1), not because doing G would increase x's power of acting at t1 or offset a decrease in that power at t1; but because such an action would increase x's power of acting at t2 or offset a decrease in that power at t2. (225) Della Rocca claims that prudential desires oriented toward a future time are a species of FDS (225). He observes that Spinoza does not view humans as essentially different from stones on account of their ability to think; rather, Spinoza holds that stones and humans are both essentially disposed toward preserving their existence in the same sense (226). At this point, Della Rocca goes no further in his consideration of the essences of stones and humans. While Della Rocca is correct in that humans and stones do not engage in FDS, Spinoza does affirm that the human being is essentially social.4 Additionally, Spinoza makes no objection to Aristotle's definition of humans as essentially social beings (EIVP35S).5 Like Aristotle, Spinoza finds a close connection between ethics and politics. They agree that the highest good for the individual person is the good of the state, since humans necessarily require the presence and help of other humans to exist and persist in existence. While Spinoza does not endorse FDS, he is able to account for the same behavior that FDS seeks to explain according to his own system. It is conceivable for a person to act in a way similar to FDS in response to a passion. The closest concept in Spinoza's system to FDS is his understanding of hope. So, if a person hopes that by taking a pill at t1 that he or she will receive the benefit of pain relief at t2, it is not necessarily the case that taking the pill will relieve pain at t2, owing to factors beyond the intention of the person taking 4 "...[It] follows that we can never bring it about that we require nothing outside ourselves to preserve our being, nor that we live without having dealings with things outside us" (EIVP18S). 5 cf. Aristotle's Politics 1253a. Evan D. Roane the pill. However, what is not in question is that it is possible for a person to hold such a belief in Spinoza's framework. Such a belief is still not an adequate idea. Nonetheless, Spinoza can account for the desire to take a pill to ward off future pain in terms of adequate ideas. He claims, "To every action which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can be determined by reason, without that affect" (EIVP59). From this line of thought, it is conceivable for a person to take the pill at t1 in the interest of warding off pain at t2 because that person possess adequate ideas that exert affective qualities producing a desire to act in the interest of future needs. First, one must know that one will experience pain because the present state of affairs will necessarily bring about pain. Secondly, one must know that the pill has the ability to relieve pain and will do so necessarily. Such knowledge of what is necessarily the case motivates the person to a stronger degree than "toward a thing we imagine as possible or contingent" (EIVP11). Spinoza's stipulation that an adequate idea is necessary for a person to act without passion relies on his psychological premise that when "the mind conceives things from the dictate of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea is of a future or past thing, or of a present one" (EIVP62). In this way, a rational understanding of a situation in the future grants a person an affect from adequate knowledge influencing them presently. A person obviously need not be aware of these adequate ideas in taking the pill to relieve pain. But, such ideas are necessary, according to Spinoza, for a person to act from reason to take the pill. An adequate idea concerning this medication might well result in confidence, a "joy born of the idea of a future or past thing concerning which the cause of doubting has been removed" (EIII Def. Aff. 14). Despite the tedious epistemic requirements for a person to have adequate ideas in relation to taking the pill, the implications of having adequate ideas for prudential desires in a community are further reaching. For Spinoza, the passions of hope and fear, as motivators for social cohesion, are unstable and can quickly become violent. It follows then that a political state founded on hope and fear is necessarily violent and does not promote true freedom. Thus, with more at stake in the case of a community's peace, this same process of sublimating the "primacy of the immediate" into the effort to preserve a community is necessary. While Della Rocca rejects the primacy of the immediate, I argue in what follows that this psychological principle assists Spinoza's account for how individuals act in the future interest of communities. Outside the confines of Spinoza's metaphysics, FDS is methodologically naturalistic;6 that is, we observe humans engaging in FDS. However, for Spinoza to remain consistent with his naturalism and his rationalistic deductive method, he must deny FDS and retain his affirmation of the "primacy of the immediate" as a psychological principle. The "primacy of the immediate" need not be eliminated from a reconstruction of Spinoza's thought, but rather must be understood as oriented toward a different object of desire in the context of a community. When an individual has been joined to a community, the highest good for that individual is no longer his or her self-preservation, but the maintenance of the community, and himself or herself secondarily. The sublimation of 6 cf. Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality 3-6 for a discussion of the different senses of what is meant by "naturalism." The Reemergence of Spinoza's Conatus in the Political Sphere self-referential desires into community-oriented desires is dealt with in the remainder of this section. Della Rocca proposes that helping others is contrary to Spinoza's psychological egoism (derived from EIIIP6) in that "such a desire would threaten Spinoza's naturalism" (231). Della Rocca formulates, in Spinozistic terms, what "other directed striving" amounts to: (ODS) It is possible for an object x to strive to do F, not because such an action would increase x's power of acting or offset a decrease in x's power of acting, but because such an action would increase another individual's (y's) power of acting or offset a decrease in y's power of acting. (231) Della Rocca objects to Spinoza's account of helping others because ODS seems to be a capability of human beings alone which would make humans "a dominion within a dominion"(EIII Pref.). At this point, Della Rocca rightly points out that Spinoza denies any purely altruistic desire by implication when he states, "No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of anything else" (EIVP25). To illustrate two aspects to Spinoza's general denial of ODS, Della Rocca first asks us to consider Spinoza's definition of pity "which we can define as sadness which has arisen from the injury to another" (EIIIP22Schol.). If a person is motivated to help another from pity, then that person is acting not just to relieve the suffering of the other person, but primarily to reduce the sadness that has arisen in that person because of the awareness he or she has of the other person's suffering (owing to the "primacy of the immediate"). Secondly, Della Rocca points out that a person might have the desire to instill in others a love for reason and teach them how to live in accordance with reason.7 But, this educational striving, as with the person who helps others out of pity, is performed primarily to reduce the sadness that others cause the agent if he or she does not effectively teach others to live according to the guidance of reason. Della Rocca rightly judges both of these cases of helping others are "ultimately beneficial to that individual" (233). The problem of how to integrate egoistic psychological dispositions into a social context remains. Hope and fear must be kept at bay to protect the community from violence. Altruism is a common-sense description of behavior that is often posited as a major factor in maintaining social cohesion. The basic criterion for altruism is that a person acts without regard for his or her interests, but solely for the benefit of another.8 In Spinoza's account, actions benefiting others are performed because acting for another's benefit increases one's own power to act. As noted above, Spinoza denies the general definition of altruism in EIVP25. However, if when Spinoza states "no one" (nemo), we 7 "...[W]e necessarily strive to bring it about that men live according to the guidance of reason" (EIVP37). 8 Edward O. Wilson employs an especially strong definition of altruism: "self-destructive behavior performed for the benefit of others" 578. Evan D. Roane may interpret him as equivalently referring to no singular thing, it then becomes clear that, according to his definition of a singular thing, it is possible for an individual human to strive for the perseverance of a community of individuals.9 Two of Spinoza's commitments help us resolve the threat ODS poses to his naturalism. First, his definition of a singular thing, and secondly, his claim that human beings must seek to preserve their existence by means of communities. "Singular thing" as defined in EIID7 is interchangeable with "mode," since it is impossible that a singular thing be an attribute or a substance. If a mode (community) consisting of many things (persons) mutually gives rise to one effect (social harmony), then the striving for that effect is the essence of that communal body (EIID7). Humans and human communities are necessarily finite and limited in power, so the drive to preserve one's being must resonate with the drives of others to do the same. Since all individuals exist in finitude, the striving (conatus) of any individual for his or her own survival is limited. Spinoza's view of the psychological activity of striving seems antithetical to helping others, but when considered in this way, it appears that an individual's striving is futile without involving others at least as mediate ends for selfpreservation. Spinoza, in fact, explicitly describes a collective striving of multiple individuals directed toward a single effect: Man, I say, can wish for nothing more helpful to the preservation of his being than that all should so agree in all things that the minds and bodies of all would compose, as it were, one mind and one body; that all should strive together, as far as they can,10 to preserve their being; and that all, together, should seek for themselves the common advantage of all. (EIVP18Schol.) Spinoza maintains that the communal striving, like an individual's striving, follows from the whole order of nature. Thus by implication, the endeavor to preserve communities is necessary for humans in the same sense that "God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself" (EIP25Schol.). The activity of conatus in individuals is the expression of God's power in them, but for individuals, the expression of power is impeded by the influence of affects such as hope and fear. While Spinoza maintains that the essential nature of individuals causes them to act out of self-interest, he also maintains that egoistic striving necessarily involves operations that benefit a human community. Let us suppose that the individuals "x" and "y" from Della Rocca's formulation of ODS must by the nature of their being exist in some basic community (C). Since each 9 "By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. And if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together they are the cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent one singular thing" (EIID7). 10 The Latin, "quantum possunt" that Curley renders "as far as they can" can be alternatively rendered "as far as it is according to their power." Curley's word choice is similar to how he renders "quantum in se est" as "as far as it can by its own power." The Reemergence of Spinoza's Conatus in the Political Sphere human being cannot live independently, both x and y must inhere11 in C. Individuals x and y depend on the existence of C in order to preserve their own being. The striving of each to maintain and strengthen C constitutes their common nature and the common effect that allows them to be part of the same singular thing C. So, rather than x striving to do F because such an action would increase another individual's (y's) power of acting, x will strive to do F because when doing F helps y, then C is benefited. Consequently, when C is strengthened, so is x. Person y is only being helped as a mediate end when x strives to do F. So, x is not acting out of the "primacy of the immediate" since x is not doing F to help y; x is doing F because doing F helps C. But insofar as doing F ultimately increases x's power to act and persevere in x's being, doing F is always performed out of x's "primacy of the self" (the benefits to x have a more direct role in explaining x's behavior to do F). So, as an alternative to ODS, I propose we look at what I will call community-oriented striving (COS): (COS) It is possible for a person x to strive to do F, not because an action would directly increase y's power of acting, but because such an action would increase x's ability to preserve itself insofar as it is a part of community C. Person y also benefits from action F, in that by doing F, x increases the ability of C to endure. When x does F, y also benefits since y is a part of C. Furthermore both x and y have a common nature insofar as x and y both belong to community C and both x and y strive to preserve C. COS is a form of rational egoism, the view that it is most rational and prudent to preserve one's being, which satisfies Spinoza's requirement that "Since reason demands nothing contrary to Nature, it demands that everyone love himself, seek his own advantage [...] that everyone should strive to preserve his own being as far as he can" (EIVP18Schol.). For humans, a part of striving to preserve one's being always includes more than oneself. V. Conclusion Spinoza's eschewal of common sense explanations of beneficial behavior in the case of pity, as well as FDS and ODS, indicates not only a thorough commitment to his metaphysical system and the psychological principles derived from it but also a commitment to understanding human nature though a rigorously naturalistic method. While Della Rocca's analysis of Spinoza's psychology is thought-provoking, a thoroughgoing critique of it would be better served by discharging Spinoza's metaphysical assumptions rather than their consequences. Moreover, Spinoza's ethical thought produces valuable conclusions regardless of any objections one might have to his philosophy. The congruency between Spinoza's psychology and his normative theory teaches his reader that hate,12 when reciprocated, increases hate that damages and reduces the 11 cf. Garrett, "Spinoza's Conatus Argument" 12 "Hate is a sadness, accompanied by the idea of an external cause" (EIII Def. Aff. VII). Evan D. Roane freedom of both parties by damaging the community. A useful example to illustrate Spinoza's psychological egoism is the activity of helping others as a response to pity. If a person acts to alleviate pain in another because of the pain the other person arouses in him, then he or she is acting out of sadness, or even hate, toward the pitied person because of the suffering that the pitied person causes him. Because of the negative affective states aroused by directly giving aid to another due to one's pity, Spinoza cannot advocate pity as a positive moral emotion. Helping others out of pity multiplies suffering. Spinoza appeals to the fact that "to bring aid to everyone in need far surpasses the powers and advantage of a private person [...]. So the care of the poor falls upon society as a whole, and concerns only the general advantage" (EIV App. XVII). Just as COS is directed at the community, the community in turn must act generously to further the general advantage by helping those who do not have all they need. The primacy of the immediate can only be sublimated into a rational primacy of the self if the individuals in the community recognize themselves as parts of the community. Self-determination is not only in keeping with Spinoza's psychological understanding of conatus, but also maintains the project of making individuals active and truly free. Spinoza is surely not helping anyone become free if he commands his readers that they must do such a thing and in such a way. Acting morally, ultimately, arises from the conative nature of a person's being. Emotions such as pity, hope, and fear disrupt the peace and harmony of the mind and are disruptive of interactions with others, since these emotions prevent individuals from inhering in themselves and inhering in their communities. WORKS CITED Aristotle. "Politics," The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984. Della Rocca, Michael. "Spinoza's Metaphysical Psychology," The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Ed. Don Garrett. New York: Cambridge UP, 1995. 192-266. Friedman, Joel. "Spinoza's Denial of Free Will in God and Man," Spinoza's philosophy of man: proceedings of the Scandinavian Spinoza symposium 1977. Ed. Jon Wetlesen. Oslo: Universitetsforl, 1978. 51-84. Garrett, Don. "Spinoza's Conatus Argument," Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Ed. Olli I. Koistinen and John I. Biro. Oxford UP, 2002 Leiter, Brian. Routledge Guidebook to Neitzsche on Morality. NY: Routledge, 2002 Spinoza, Benedictus De. Ethics, The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. 1. Trans. and ed. E. M. Curley. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1985. Wilson, Edward O. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1975.

Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 1 The Many Encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French Epistemology Massimiliano SIMONS1 The reactions provoked by Thomas Kuhn's book, The structure of scientific revolutions [...] would provide high-quality experimental material for an empirical analysis of the ideologies of science and their relationship with their authors' positions in the scientific field. (Bourdieu, 1975: 38) 1. Introduction It is an often stated fact that philosophy of science changed with the publication of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) in 1962. This book has been considered the start of a 'historical turn' in philosophy of science. Followed by authors such as Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, the message was that, in order to do philosophy of science, one also needs to do history of science. This was the case in Anglo-American philosophy of science, but in Continental Europe the situation was quite different.2 Especially in France, SSR was not seen as a revolution, but rather as a confirmation of what was already known. As Gary Gutting states, the "French could hardly share the excitement of what they rightly saw as old news." (Gutting, 2003: 46) Similarly, Ian Hacking claims that "Kuhn was a sensation for us, but rather old hat in France." (Hacking, 2002: 93) A historical approach, indeed, is the norm in French philosophy of science or 'French epistemology'.3 This is mainly due to the specific educational institutions in France, where history and philosophy of science were always closely linked, and students of philosophy were encouraged to combine the study of philosophy with that of a specific science (see Chimisso, 2008). Thus, authors such as Gaston Bachelard or Georges Canguilhem were already doing something very similar to Kuhn, namely trying to understand physics or biology by examining their specific historical developments. 1 KU Leuven, Institute of Philosophy (HIW), KU Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, Box 3200, 3000 Leuven, Belgium Received 15 September 2016, Revised 17 December 2016, Accepted 13 January 2017, Available online 7 February 2017. [email protected] 2 For the reception of SSR in Anglo-American philosophy, see Kindi & Arabatzis (2012) and Richards & Daston (2016). 3 In France the term 'epistemology' refers to philosophy of science. The term French epistemology is used here to distinguish it from 'historical epistemology,' which also includes authors such as Lorraine Daston or Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (see Hacking, 2002; Rheinberger, 2010). Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 2 In this sense, one could claim that we are witnessing a synthesis between Continental and Anglo-American philosophy of science. Kuhn himself, for instance, states that I suspect that anyone who believes that history may have deep philosophical import will have to learn to bridge the longstanding divide between the Continental and English-language philosophical traditions. (Kuhn, 1977: xv) More recently, Anastasios Brenner has pointed at such a unification, first of all because Anglo-American philosophy has become more historical. "They reject the continuism [within the history of science] of the logical positivists, just as Bachelard and Koyré have rejected that of their predecessors." (Brenner, 2006: 115)4 Brenner speaks of a movement of 'postpositivism' within analytic philosophy, which "could be seen as moving closer to historical epistemology." (Brenner, 2015: 210)5 At the same time, he notices how French epistemology has become more analytic and logical. Authors such as Jules Vuillemin or Gilles-Gaston Granger actively discussed, introduced and translated the work of authors such as Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and W.V.O. Quine.6 Recent authors such as Hacking or HansJörg Rheinberger embody for Brenner this unification by actively combining both traditions. Brenner argues that the divergence was historically caused by a cultural barrier, referring to such things as language or institutions (Brenner, 2015). Both traditions, according to him, share the same intellectual roots in discussions around the conventionalism of authors such as Henri Poincaré, who influenced both French epistemology and the Vienna Circle (Brenner, 2003). But since both sides are discovering one another, the dichotomy is disappearing. Rather we "may combine both methods: logically reconstructing the reasoning behind historical explanation, and submitting logic to historical inquiry." (Brenner, 2015: 211) Nevertheless, the situation is too complex to be described merely in terms of a cultural barrier. By focusing on the cultural differences, one tends to overlook the argumentative differences. Although there are signs of both traditions coming closer together, there are clear tensions as well. This article illustrates this tension by mapping the specific link between the work of 4 All French quotations are translated by the author, unless when referring to existing translations. 5 For a different history of 'post-positivism,' see Zammito (2004). Zammito is very critical of contemporary post-positivist programs within science studies, which were inspired by Quine and Kuhn, but resulted in indefensible postmodernism. However, he ignores this French tradition of post-positivism, which might offer a more viable alternative. 6 Other (and earlier) examples that Brenner does not mention are Robert Blanché, Jean Largeault or François Russo. Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 3 Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology, paying particular attention to his book SSR. This link will be explored in both directions. The first part will briefly examine the extent to which Kuhn was inspired by French epistemology. It will be argued that there is a connection here, but not with the most famous French epistemologists, such as Bachelard or Canguilhem. More interesting and less explored is the influence in the opposite direction. The second part will therefore focus on how French epistemologists had discussed and evaluated SSR, focusing on authors such as Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault, Bourdieu and Althusser. There are three reasons why these reactions might be revealing. First of all, they can clarify the often debated and unclear position of Kuhn himself. Secondly, they give us a unique insight into the different approaches to philosophy of science. Finally, they can show the differences among French philosophers themselves. This will be done by confronting French epistemology with the work of more recent French authors, such as Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers. Based on these specific appreciations of SSR I will briefly suggest a typology of the different positions in philosophy of science. 2. Was Kuhn inspired by French Epistemology? The influence of French epistemology on Kuhn has been the subject of previous studies. Garry Gutting, for instance, states that the "one movement in twentieth-century European thought that has substantive affinities with Kuhn's work is the French tradition of philosophy of science." (Gutting, 2003: 45) According to Gutting, Bachelard proposed a discontinuist reading of the history of science akin to Kuhn's and, similarly, Bachelard claimed that a scientific revolution results in a new worldview and new scientific norms (e.g. Bachelard, 2002). For Gutting, these authors cannot only be seen as a source of inspiration, but also as a possible correction of Kuhn's problems with relativism and incommensurability. Bachelard, in fact, proposed a philosophy which combines discontinuity and rationality, and thus evades certain forms of relativism. Nevertheless, Kuhn himself rarely mentions Bachelard. In fact Kuhn mentions him only once, referring to Bachelard's thesis study on heat (Kuhn, 1977: 219n63; Bachelard, 1927). Only in a few interviews did he highlight his relation to Bachelard,stating for instance that "I did read some Bachelard. But it was so close to my own thought that I did not feel I had to read lots and lots more." (Kuhn, 1994: 160) In another, posthumous published interview, Kuhn recalls meeting Bachelard in Paris around 1950, an encounter that turned into a failure. With a letter of recommendation from Alexandre Koyré, he visited the apartment of Bachelard. "A large burly man in his undershirt came to the door, invited me in; I said, 'My French is bad, may we Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 4 talk English?' No, he made me talk French. Well, this all didn't last very long." (Kuhn, 2000: 285)7 Although he thought that there were interesting similarities, and later read more of his work, Kuhn merely states that the framework of Bachelard is too constraining and too systematic. Therefore, the claim of any influence of French epistemology on Kuhn becomes problematic. This assertion , however, is not only based on similarities in themes and ideas, but also on remarks by Kuhn himself. For instance, Kuhn states that "the early models of the sort of history that has so influenced me and my historical colleagues is the product of a postKantian European tradition which I and my philosophical colleagues continue to find opaque." (Kuhn, 1977: xv) But what authors did he have in mind? Besides Ernst Cassirer, he mainly mentions French epistemologists, but not Bachelard or Canguilhem. In the preface of SSR, for example, he refers to Alexandre Koyré, Émile Meyerson and Hélène Metzger. "More clearly than most other recent scholars, this group has shown what it was like to think scientifically in a period when the canons of scientific thought were very different from those current today." (Kuhn, 1970a: vi)8 However, as the quotation above indicates, he sees these authors mainly as an inspiration for writing history of science, and not for their philosophical positions: There have been philosophers of science, usually those with a vaguely neo-Kantian cast, from whom historians can still learn a great deal. I do urge my students to read Emile Meyerson and sometimes Léon Brunschvicg. But I recommend these authors for what they saw in historical materials not for their philosophies, which I join most of my contemporaries in rejecting. (Kuhn, 1977: 11) Thus, the lessons for the new historiography of science did not arise from scientists nor historians. "Instead, they have come from philosophy, though mostly like Koyré, from Continental schools where the divide between history and philosophy is by no means so deep as in the English-speaking world." (Ibid.: 135) Indeed, for Kuhn Koyré deserves special credit as "the man who, more than any other historian, has been my maître" (Ibid.: 21) and whose 7 Kuhn also states that the "only thing of his I'd read [at that moment] was that Esquisse d'une Probleme Physique, I think it's called." (Kuhn, 2000: 284) The editors wrongly refer to the book La philosophie du non. 8 Other non-French authors he mentions are Butterfield, Cavell, Crombie, Dijksterhuis, Fleck, Lovejoy, Maier and Polanyi. I have, however, excluded them here from the discussion. The comparison with Fleck is made often, including by Kuhn himself. For a discussion, see Braunstein, (2003) and Mössner (2011). Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 5 work "provide[d] the models which historians of science increasingly aimed to emulate. More than any other single scholar, Koyré was responsible for the first stage of the historiographical revolution." (Kuhn, 1970b: 67) Illuminating in this context is an encyclopedic article that Kuhn wrote about the history of science. Here he claims that there has been a historiographical revolution which, as stated above, he partly attributes to Koyré. In this article, however, he offers other reasons as well. First of all, he claims that historians of science have drawn lessons from the history of philosophy. Although he acknowledges the role of authors such as Cassirer, he states that partly it was learned from a small group of neo-Kantian epistemologists, particularly Brunschvicg and Meyerson, whose search for quasi-absolute categories of thought in older scientific ideas produced brilliant genetic analyses of concepts which the main tradition in the history of science has misunderstood or dismissed. (Kuhn, 1977: 108) The new approach their work implied was that, rather than seeing the work of outdated science as irrational or deficient, they ascribe to it a different form of rationality, based on different categories of thought. Again, Koyré served as the perfect example for Kuhn. According to Koyré, one could only fully understand the scientific work of Galileo if one dived into the past and the context of the author. "That task, Koyré felt, could not be done without immersion in an entire corpus, that of Galileo and those of his immediate predecessors, contemporaries, and successors." (Kuhn, 1970b: 67) In very similar terms he speaks of the work of Meyerson: I didn't like the philosophy at all. But, boy, did I like the sorts of things he saw in historical material. He went into those briefly and I mean he didn't do it as a historian but he was getting it right in ways that were different from the ways that history of science was being written. (Kuhn, 2000: 287)9 Secondly, he attributes great importance to the work of the French epistemologist Pierre Duhem, which showed that one could not ignore medieval physics to understand Galileo's contributions. Finally, the failed attempts of authors such as Paul Tannery and George Sarton 9 According to Steve Fuller, it was the encounter with Meyerson that has "left the most indelible impression in Kuhn's intellectual orientation." (Fuller, 2000: 392) He argues that Meyerson and Kuhn share the idea that science is an autonomous practice with intrinsic ends, enclosed in its own paradigm. But the link Fuller tries to make is merely based on superficial resemblances and rather serves the goal of his book, namely showing how Kuhn made every critique on science impossible. Fuller makes similar debatable interpretations of the link with Koyré (60-70) and Bachelard (344), resulting in attempts to unmask their hidden agendas rather than attempts to understand the philosophical links. Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 6 to constitute a general history of science had shown, according to Kuhn, that it is untenable to attribute contemporary distinctions to the past (Kuhn, 1977: 108-109). However, this does not mean that Kuhn just repeated the work of French epistemologists. As stated above, he was very critical of their philosophical claims. Besides that, he also disagreed on numerous historiographical points. Kuhn was, for instance, critical of Koyré's "primacy of theoretical imagination over experience" (Kuhn, 1970b: 69). For Koyré, what was essential in the work of Galileo was not the experiments he did, but rather a completely new way of looking at the world, inspired by Platonism rather than Aristotelianism. Koyré rejected socioeconomical explanations of scientific change and the role of instruments. And although this might work for the case of Galileo, Kuhn thought that "it would have been a disaster" for cases such as chemistry or magnetism, because it would ignore "the learned world's new concern with the crafts, technology, and instrumentation." (Ibid.) A range of other differences are pointed out by Brendan Lavror (2003). He states that Koyré starts from a stronger unity of thought: while for Koyré scientific theories are linked with contemporary philosophical and theological ideas, such as Platonism, for Kuhn the sciences are more independent of cultural history (see Kuhn, 1977: 118-119). Also, in the case of Koyré, just as for Bachelard or Brunschvicg, there is clear progress within the history of science, mainly because the history of science embodies a rational development. Kuhn, on the other hand, is far more reluctant to speak of progress between scientific paradigms.10 In relation to the problem of theoretical primacy, it is interesting to refer to the French epistemologist Hélène Metzger (see Melhado, 1990). She was a historian of science deeply influenced by Meyerson and Koyré. But in contrast with them, she mainly focused on the emergence of new scientific disciplines, such as chemistry during the 18th and 19th centuries, rather than on revolutions within 'old' sciences such as astronomy in the 17th century (see Chimisso, 2001). Kuhn discovered Metzger's work when he was in France, around the time he met Bachelard (Kuhn, 2000: 287). She influenced Kuhn in several ways, including his claim that Stahl's chemistry is a mature scientific paradigm, rather than a form of prescience (see Metzger, 1974). Kuhn's critique of the theoretical primacy in Koyré seems to follow the work of Metzger, who focuses more on the role of institutions and techniques in the 19th century. However, 10 This might explain why he only rarely mentions Brunschvicg, whose work centers around the idea that there is clear progress within the history of science (e.g. Brunschvicg, 1912). Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 7 such a distinction is not found in the work of Kuhn. At least in SSR there is no clear distinction between the mechanism responsible for a revolution within a mature science (Koyré) and that responsible for the creation of a paradigm (Metzger) within a scientific field (although see Kuhn, 1976). Kuhn only focusses on mature sciences, while the process of maturation is hardly described. In this sense, he can be criticized for the same reason that he criticized Koyré: his model might work for some historical cases, but is rather problematic for others. Based on this comparison, the relation between Kuhn and French epistemology is not very clear, since he has great reservations about their philosophies and there are some significant differences. Moreover, the main French epistemologists that he discussed are not the often mentioned Bachelard or Canguilhem, but lesser known figures such as Koyré or Metzger. The relation to the better known brands of French epistemology remains unclear. However, not only did Kuhn refer to French epistemologists; they also referred to him. Several French epistemologists, indeed, reacted to the publication of SSR. These reactions can tell us something more about the specific similarities and differences between them. 3. How French epistemologists read Kuhn SSR was published in 1962 and republished in 1970 with an important postscript; only in 1972 was it translated into French. While it was still mainly ignored in the 1960s, it was this translation that sparked reactions in France. Although many of the more prominent French epistemologists reacted to SSR, the reaction was overall very negative. Authors such as Meyerson, Brunschvicg or Metzger had died several decades before its publication, but the tradition was still well-represented by authors such as Koyré, Bachelard, Canguilhem, Althusser or Foucault. It is helpful to look at what their perspective on Kuhn was.11 Koyré died in 1964, but apparently read the book in the final months of his life. Kuhn states that Koyré was very positive about the book and that he "reported from his sick-bed his pleasure in reading a book that seemed 'to fill the gap between the history of science as such and the social history that till now were miles apart'." (Kuhn, 1970b: 69) Only in later texts does Kuhn state that the book that Koyré had referred to was SSR (e.g. Kuhn, 2000: 286). Koyré rejected attempts to explain the progress of science through socioeconomic factors, but for him SSR opened the road for a reconciliation between internalist and externalist 11 Since we are interested in how Kuhn was perceived within French epistemology, we will leave aside attempts to nuance their critiques and defend Kuhn's perspective. Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 8 perspectives due to the intermediary notion of the paradigm. Socioeconomic elements might play a role in the history of science, but not as a direct influence on scientists. Rather they have an indirect effect through the formation of paradigms, while the development of science can simultaneously be a product of internal developments within the paradigm. We can infer this much on the basis of anecdotes that Kuhn recorded on several occasions, but the question remains of whether this faithfully represents Koyré's own perspective. 3.1. BACHELARD AND HIS STUDENTS In the secondary literature parallels are often made between Bachelard and Kuhn (e.g. Danny, 1999). The main similarity is that of a discontinuist reading of the history of science, respectively conceptualized as an epistemological rupture or as a series of paradigm shifts. Bachelard himself died in 1962 and he did not live long enough to respond to Kuhn, but several of his students did. Authors such as Jean Largeault, Gilles-Gaston Granger and Jean Ladrière were, in contrast with such parallels, rather critical of SSR. Largeault is very positive in his work about what he calls the 'idealism' of French epistemology, namely the idea that scientific facts are never mere brute facts, but are always marked by theory and rationality. However, authors such as Kuhn and Feyerabend "have turned this idealism into a nihilism" (Largeault, 1988: 14) due to the idea of the incommensurability of paradigms, which completely negates the rationality that was implied in this idealism. Incommensurability might be a good precaution for the individual historian to avoid anachronism, but it is inapplicable to scientific progress in its totality. "Incommensurability is valuable for individuals, but not for theories." Rather he calls it "at best a provocative paradox, perhaps a farce by epistemologists." (Largeault, 1984: 16-17) Largeault also states that SSR does not work for logic or mathematics, where there is no form of incommensurability (Largeault, 1980: 121-122). It might work for physics, and he might accept that facts are not independent from theory but, apart from that, Largeault could not believe in radical breaks between paradigms because "the problem solved by every grand physical theory consists of the destruction of incompatibilities (between electromagnetism and mechanics : RR ; between RR and Newtonian gravity: RG ; between RG and quantum mechanics : etc.)." (Largeault, 1984: 17n41) The same critique is present in the work of Granger and Ladrière. Both try to correct SSR by making a distinction between two forms of discontinuity. For instance, the Belgian philosopher Jean Ladrière, in his conclusion of a colloquium on SSR in 1973, offers some Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 9 criticisms of the book.12 First of all, Ladrière argues that Kuhn overgeneralizes his schemes, as if there is only one structure for all scientific revolutions. Ladrière makes the analogy with biology: although one could state that all organisms follow biological laws, there is still a huge difference "between a starfish and a chimpanzee." (Ladrière, 1974: 175) Applied to the history of science this means that there is a difference between the structure of, for example, Galilean physics and quantum mechanics. Secondly, SRR lacks the distinction "between two sorts of crises: on the one hand crises of constitution on the other hand crises of restructuration." (Ibid.) A crisis of constitution refers to the case which is discontinuous because one is faced with a completely new and different system: The meaning of a crisis of constitution is in fact that, through it, thought succeeds for the first time in a certain domain to break with the living experience [du vécu] and to create a conceptual system capable of operating by itself and, if we may say, on itself. We are dealing here with an operation of detachment with relation to that which, in a certain vocabulary, can be called the natural experience. (Ibid.: 176) On the other hand, the crisis of restructuration refers to a change due to logical problems or relations to other systems, both scientific and otherwise, around it. Because science in this case already surpassed natural or ordinary experience, there is no real discontinuity. There is rather a continuity of certain principles throughout these scientific changes. "One can say that once a science is really constituted, its development should be interpreted no longer by following a discontinuist scheme, but rather through a dialectical scheme." (Ibid.: 177) Echoing Ladrière, Granger distinguishes between external and internal discontinuities. An external discontinuity refers to the shift from pre-science to science, in which "the theme of incommensurability has meaning" (Granger, 1993: 107). However, Kuhn also applies this to internal discontinuities between paradigms within science. These internal variations, which Granger calls subparadigms (sous-paradigmes), are "products of internal discontinuities posterior to the formation of a common paradigm of all the scientific thought of the same object." (Ibid.) In this case there is no incommensurability, but rather a form of continuity. In this, both authors are clearly following Bachelard. Not only in the sense that they believe in scientific progress, but also when it comes to the double meaning of discontinuity. For 12 In general Ladrière, however, tends to be very positive about the work of Kuhn. In this he seems to be an exception within French epistemology, a tradition to which he is also only partly linked. Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 10 Bachelard, an epistemological rupture does not only refer to historical breaks between different stages of science, but also to the break between ordinary and scientific thought. According to Bachelard, the mind is naturally tempted by certain images, such as seeing heat as a hidden substance in the object (cf. Bachelard, 1927). Science can only progress by breaking with them. For Bachelard "it must therefore be accepted that there is a very real break between sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge." (Bachelard, 2002: 237) It is this form of discontinuity that French epistemologists may call incommensurable, but discontinuities between mature scientific theories will always show some form of continuity. 3.2. CANGUILHEM AND FOUCAULT Perhaps with the exception of Bachelard, the most popular parallel within secondary literature is that between Kuhn and Foucault (e.g. Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Both French and foreign authors, indeed, make this parallel (e.g. Piaget, 1974: 122).13 On the other hand, several authors have criticized these parallels stating that there are clear differences (e.g. Kusch, 1991: 86-109). Giorgio Agamben, for example, states that "this proximity was not the effect of an actual affinity but the result of a certain confusion" in the early works of Foucault (Agamben, 2009: 14). Foucault himself rarely discusses the work of Kuhn and appears to have actively distanced himself from it.14 However, when George Steiner, in a review of Foucault, asked the French author why he did not refer to SSR in spite of the clear similarities between the two of them, Foucault responded: Mr. Steiner believes that I should have cited Kuhn. It is true that I hold Kuhn's work to be admirable and definitive. [...] When I read Kuhn's book during the winter of 196364 (I believe it was a year after its publication), I had just finished writing The Order of Things. I thus did not cite Kuhn, but quoted instead from the historian of science who shaped and inspired his thoughts: G. Canguilhem. (Foucault, 1971: 60) It is indeed only in the introduction to the English translation of The normal and the pathological of Canguilhem that Foucault mentions Kuhn again. Here Foucault tries to 13 Piaget is an interesting case, because Kuhn was inspired by Piaget, whom he discovered in a footnote in the work of R.K. Merton (Kuhn, 2000: 279). 14 The same goes for the relation the other way around. Kuhn rarely refers to Foucault, for instance only in a footnote (Kuhn, 2000: 14). Kuhn, however, also criticizes Foucault because he "is scarcely interested in the processes by which [the] system [he describes] is led to transform itself" (quoted in Delaporte, 1998: 296; see also Kuhn, 1994: 160-161). Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 11 distance Canguilhem from Kuhn by claiming that, in French epistemology, there is a certain normativity within the history of science and this norm cannot be identified with a theoretical structure or an actual paradigm because today's scientific truth is only an episode of it – let us say provisionally at most. It is not, by depending on a 'normal science' in T.S. Kuhn's sense that one can return to the past and validly trace its history: it is in rediscovering the 'norm' process, the actual knowledge of which is only one moment of it, without one being able, save for prophesying, to predict the future. (Foucault, 1989: xv) The claim that the history and philosophy of science requires a specific normativity is indeed present in the work of Canguilhem, and also in his own critique of Kuhn. For Canguilhem there is a clear difference between Bachelard and Kuhn, stating that "Kuhn is mistaken about the nature of scientific rationality as such." (Canguilhem, 1988: 13) The ground for Canguilhem's critique is the normativity towards which Foucault hints. For Canguilhem, Kuhn is still confused by the legacy of logical positivism and unable to "join the rationalist camp". The concepts of paradigm and normal science presuppose intentionality and regulation, and as such they imply the possibility of a break with established rules and procedures. Kuhn would have them play this role without granting them the means to do so, for he regards them as simple cultural facts. For him, a paradigm is the result of a choice by its users. Normal science is defined by the practice in a given period of a group of specialists in a university research setting. Instead of concepts of philosophical critique, we are dealing with mere social psychology. (Ibid.: 13) In the case of Bachelard or Jean Cavaillès, in contrast, it is always a question of normed science, and not normal science. There is a rational regulation of scientific discontinuity that Kuhn is unable to conceptualize. However, Canguilhem is very brief in his critique and hardly refers to Kuhn in his other work. Instead, he attributes his critique to someone else, namely the forgotten French epistemologist François Russo, who similarly argues that "Kuhn [...] minimizes the role of rationality in the progress of science. This is one of the principle weaknesses of his work." (Russo, 1974a: 626n13) Russo was a student of Bachelard and Canguilhem, and wrote several studies on the history and philosophy of science, in which he criticized Kuhn. Russo's starting point is the idea that the history of science must be complemented by a historical epistemology. While 'phenomenological' history of science might focus on historical facts, the epistemological branch must focus on the underlying attitudes, Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 12 motivations and reasons of scientific progress (Russo, 1974a: 621). This epistemological point of view is itself inspired by Bachelard and Canguilhem, namely by the principle that one should start from the norms of contemporary science to evaluate how the history of science is still scientifically relevant for present science. Or, as Canguilhem states, "one should place oneself in a normative point of view if one wants to judge the efficacy of a thought." (Canguilhem, 1968: 178) For Russo SSR is clearly part of the first discipline, and it therefore lacks an eye for the epistemological questions (Russo, 1974b: 347). In his work, Russo makes many of the same critiques as earlier discussed authors, such as the lack of a distinction between the formation of a first paradigm and a scientific revolution within a scientific discipline (Russo, 1983: 95). However, he also adds some new elements. Firstly, he makes the distinction between epistemological paradigms, which concern their object of study, and methodological paradigms, which concern the instruments and methods of science (Russo, 1974b: 355); and a related distinction between simple and complex paradigms, e.g. the principle of inertia versus Newtonian mechanics. Such complex paradigms, then, consist of a range of simple paradigms, although they are more than the sum of their parts (Russo, 1983: 97). Secondly, he criticizes SSR for not making a clear distinction between the different stages of a scientific revolution, namely between the negative and the positive moment. The negative moment refers to the abandonment of a paradigm, while the positive moment implies both the creation of a new paradigm and the creation of new knowledge within itself (Russo, 1974b: 359-360). Such a distinction allows for claims such as the claim that the creation of Newton's paradigm did not destroy the paradigm of Descartes, and that the two might exist next to each other (Russo, 1983: 99). Thirdly, he warns that a fixation on scientific revolutions creates a blind eye for other forms of knowledge production, for instance the construction of a paradigm itself. But one also forgets "the emergence of new horizons, outside of the scope of normal science, but of which the knowledge that they bring forth appear to be compatible with normal science, at least for a certain time." (Russo, 1974b: 352) As examples he refers to the fields opened by microscopes, x-rays or radioactivity. Finally, he criticizes SSR for seeing paradigms as independent of each other and of their object. Every paradigm is for Russo always related to a specific field of phenomena, e.g. that of electricity, mechanics, etc. (Russo, 1974b: 352n2). Canguilhem borrows this critique when he warns that Bachelard's notion of an epistemological rupture originated in a specific Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 13 context, namely that of mathematics and contemporary chemistry. Kuhn makes the mistake of extending it "to other areas of the history of science without a good deal of reflection about the specific nature of the area to be studied." (Canguilhem, 1988: 14) Besides these corrections on SSR, Russo also claims that Kuhn lacks a theory of how existing knowledge gets integrated within a new paradigm. In this sense Russo is very critical towards the notion of incommensurability, because for him there are clear elements of continuity as well (Russo, 1974a: 640n33). This continuity possesses a structure that Kuhn ignores. "Contrary to its title, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the work of Kuhn does not pay attention to the structure of new knowledge connections" between successive paradigms (Russo, 1974b: 362n1). As an example he gives the 'astronomical revolution', which implied a whole range of paradigm shifts that are linked together: the shift from geocentrism to heliocentrism, the abandonment of the idea that planets are incorruptible, the abandonment of circles for ellipses (Kepler), and finally the idea of general attraction (Newton). Moreover, there are several different forms of paradigm shifts: one paradigm might fight off the old one, or they may both be rejected for, or even integrated in, a third one (e.g. wave and particle theories). Paradigms, thus, cannot be considered as completely separate from each other, but are rationally and normatively linked. This normativity is, according to Russo and Canguilhem, impossible to grasp in Kuhn's terminology. 3.3. BOURDIEU AND ALTHUSSER As already illustrated by the case of Foucault, the influence of Bachelard and Canguilhem is also present in the work of various political philosophers, including Pierre Bourdieu or Louis Althusser. In the case of Bourdieu it is mainly within his sociology of the scientific field, in which Bourdieu situates himself, that Kuhn is mentioned and contrasted with French epistemology: : And I did not cease to look to Bachelard and the French tradition of epistemology, in my effort to found an epistemology of the social sciences on a constructivist philosophy of science (which anticipated Kuhn but without turning purely and simply into the relativism of the postmodernists), as much as in my analysis of the scientific field. (Bourdieu, 2004: 106) Bourdieu thus wants to avoid any form of relativism, while defending a clear idea of progress and objectivity for science, by focusing on "the problem posed by the historical genesis of supposedly trans-historical truths" (Ibid.: 1). In this context, he sharply criticizes other philosophies and sociologies of science, such as SSR. He recognizes that Kuhn has introduced Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 14 the idea of discontinuity in the Anglo-American context as well as the notion that science is a collective endeavor, based on a paradigm (Ibid.: 14). Kuhn is described as a scholar who discovers the idea of the Kantian a priori, but in a relativized way. In this sense SSR is a book "whose theses contain little that is radically new, at least for readers of Bachelard, who was the object of similar manoeuvres at much the same time, in a different tradition." (Bourdieu, 1975: 46n53) Although Kuhn makes these analogous claims, he is still heavily criticized by Bourdieu, both from his Marxist and from his epistemological perspective. The 'functionalism' Kuhn shares with authors such as R.K. Merton is unacceptable for Bourdieu: Kuhn sees the scientific field as focused around a range of shared norms and rules, the paradigm, that scientists impose on themselves. The problem is that, because of this, there is no consideration for the role of struggle and competition, and therefore Kuhn lacks "a coherent model for exploring change" (Bourdieu, 2004: 15).Bourdieu's proposal is that we see the scientific field as a permanent struggle for field-specific capital, e.g. citations and recognition by other actors within the field. In this sense the scientific field is relatively autonomous from the rest of society, but not free from struggle: If we are not to fall back into the idealist philosophy which credits science with the power to develop in accordance with its immanent logic (as Kuhn still does when he suggests that 'scientific revolutions' occur only as a result of exhaustion of the 'paradigms') we must posit that investments are organized by reference to – conscious or unconscious – anticipation of the average chances of profit." (Bourdieu, 1975: 22) It is this social dimension that creates a dynamic of the scientific field that eventually leads to objectivity. Not because of some specific norms or a priori method, but rather because the new actors entering the field tend to be their "most rigorous and vigorous competitors, the most competent and the most critical, those therefore most inclined and most able to give their critique full force" (Bourdieu, 2004: 54). In this sense, the objectivity of scientific truth is almost a mere side-effect of this internal logic. The same goes for scientific revolutions. Rather than following a "strictly internalist representation of change" (Ibid.: 16) as in SSR, Bourdieu sees revolutions as a product of actors in the field refusing to follow the existing cycles of recognition. Instead they create new cycles which open the path for accumulating new forms of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1975: 24). In the case of Bourdieu there are some clearly Marxist elements mixed in the critique addressed to Kuhn, but this is even more clear in the Althusserian school. Althusser was a Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 15 student of Bachelard, who borrowed his concept of an epistemological break and applyied it to Marx (Althusser, 1965). The comparison between Althusser and Kuhn is therefore often made in secondary literature (e.g. Smith, 1984). However, Althusser himself never discussed Kuhn. Students of him, such as Étienne Balibar and Dominique Lecourt, on the other hand, do criticize SSR extensively. It is interesting to note that both Balibar and Lecourt only discuss Kuhn in their texts about the relation between Althusser and Bachelard. Both start from the fact that several "commentators have seen a 'convergence' if not an identity pure and simple of the epistemological positions defended by Althusser and by Kuhn." (Lecourt, 1975: 9 ; Balibar, 1991: 34-35) Preceding the reflections by Brenner by 40 years, Lecourt wonders whether this can be read as a sign of a "postponed encounter" between "two parallel epistemological traditions: have they not both, from either side, reached results which coincide, at least in part, in their latest representatives?" For Lecourt, there are indeed some clear similarities: both propose discontinuist readings of the history of science, both pay attention to the role of "the scientific division of labour and its material instances: books, manuals, scientific instruments, the constitution of groups of investigators, etc.", and both speak about the role of norms (Lecourt, 1975: 10). However, Lecourt's answer to that proposed view is firmly negative: there is no encounter between Althusser and Kuhn. All the above mentioned similarities are merely superficial: a common discontinuist perspective is not enough, it matters what kind of discontinuity one has in mind to determine one's position within the field of history of science. Or as Balibar states: Kuhn does only break, in appearance, with the idea of a history of progressive accumulation, a pure 'quantitative' history, to confirm it massively in the framework of what he calls 'normal science', of which he says that it is the essential object of his work (Balibar, 1991: 54). According to Balibar, Kuhn only uses his notion of discontinuity to affirm at the same time a conservative image of science as solving puzzles within strict rules. In a way similar to Ladrière, he states that SSR sticks with a fixed structure of scientific revolutions which stays invariant, while Althusser and Bachelard are more open to changes within the structure of this transition, depending on the specific context and science (Ibid.: 35). The second problem they address is similar to Canguilhem's. The notion of 'normal' science seems to imply a form of normativity, which is however unclear. For Kuhn, normal science seems to refer to a range of shared beliefs and practices by a group of scientists who will also Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 16 defend them. Furthermore, Lecourt asks, to "what normativity does normal science conform?" (Lecourt, 1975: 16) At first sight it seems to refer to a choice made by the scientists between the different paradigms, but echoing the critiques made by Feyerabend or Watkins, this does not distinguish science from criminal gangs or theology (see Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). The analogy of the Gestalt switch, which Kuhn uses in this context, is also deeply problematic according to Lecourt. For a Gestalt switch is not a choice, but is forced upon us, so the question of what drives scientific change remains unanswered. If such a switch is no analogy, then it is a mere image or a claim of identity. If it is an image, it should be refuted for being unclear, and if it is a claim that scientific change works in an identical way, then the history of science becomes an object for psychology. According to Lecourt, such a view would lead to a theory of fixed categories of the human mind. In this sense, what looked like a conventionalism of Kantian categories is actually some form of apriorism. "Scratch a conventionalist and you will find an apriorist." (Lecourt, 1975: 18) We thus see that, for Lecourt, the question of scientific change remains open. And it is exactly around this question of scientific change that the critique of many of these French epistemologists centers. Similarly to Largeault, Granger and Ladrière, Balibar and Lecourt have a different form of discontinuity in mind, namely a rational one. For Balibar this is linked with the notion of irreversibility: for authors such as Bachelard, discontinuities imply a point of no return. For Kuhn, on the other hand, paradigms seem completely separate from each other, without any connection or even displaying a relation of incommensurability (Balibar, 1991: 56). French epistemology tries to develop a form of discontinuity or historical change that remains rational. Many French epistemologists subscribe to a claim by Jean Cavaillès in his most famous work, stating that one of the essential problems of the doctrine of science is that, in fact, progress itself may not be augmentation of volume by juxtaposition, in which the prior subsists with the new, but a continuous revision of contents by deepening and eradication. What comes after is more than what existed before, not because it contains it or even because it prolongs it, but because it necessarily departs from it and carries in its content, every time in a unique way, the mark of its superiority. There is more consciousness in it and it is not the same consciousness. (Cavaillès, 1960: 78) This is what Largeault had in mind when he praises the 'idealism' of French epistemology, Bourdieu when he speaks of the historical genesis of trans-historical truths, or Balibar when Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 17 he states that his perspective goes "beyond the alternative between history and truth: it is true in its own history" (Balibar, 1994: 159). However, it is not always clear what such a rational discontinuity entails . Within French epistemology this is often linked with the claim that it is not the individual that is the subject of this rational progress, but rather the dialectics of the concept or the scientific field. For them the rationality within science can only be guaranteed if it lies on something that escapes the vagaries of the individual subject. And even if this specific paradox between history and rationality is not yet fully elaborated within the work of French epistemologists, "they at least make this ultimate paradox formulable with which the [epistemological] break confronts us." (Ibid.: 161) What they understand as Kuhn's thesis of incommensurable paradigms negates this paradoxical nature of science, and must therefore be dismissed. 4. A new wave of French philosophy of science To grasp the difference between Kuhn and French epistemology, it is also helpful to refer to an article by Geof Bowker and Bruno Latour (1987) that aims to contrast French epistemology with sociology of science. They argue that, although both traditions start from a critique of positivism and empiricism, they do so on completely different grounds. Facts on their own can never be enough, but what must be added differs for both traditions. Starting from the idea of underdetermination associated with authors such as Quine and Duhem, in sociology of science this was seen "as a proof that we must turn to society; whereas in French epistemology Duhem's argument has been taken as proof of the need to turn to theory" (Ibid.: 722). Societal norms, class interest or political ideologies cannot explain why certain scientific facts are accepted, but rather the theories that frame these facts and the normativity of its progress. According to the authors it was Koyré who "vaccinated a generation of French historians against social explanations of science: by making them accept the influence of philosophy and theology on science, he prevented infection from the influence of society." (Ibid.: 723) Nevertheless, French epistemologists are not proponents of a form of Whiggish history, where the history of science is seen as one accumulating struggle towards more rationality and truth. This is shown clearly by their focus on the discontinuity in the history of science and their explicit criticism, as is also the case for Kuhn (e.g. Kuhn, 1970b). However, at the same time French epistemologists are not merely anti-Whiggish, because science is still seen as a rational practice, and any attempt to debunk the rationality of science is fiercely criticized by them. In this sense, the authors describe French epistemology as anti-anti-Whiggish, because Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 18 they still "seek to ensure that mere historians do not water down the radical newness of science." (Bowker & Latour, 1987: 725) This can then be applied to the case of Kuhn: many saw similarities due to common ideas such as the existence of scientific ruptures or the thesis that facts can never decide by themselves, but need something more. French epistemologists, however, might see Kuhn not as part of traditional analytic philosophy of science nor as one of their own, but as part of sociology of science. It is indeed true that sociologists of science were the early adaptors of Kuhn's work (e.g. Barnes, 1982) and that analytic philosophers criticized him for reducing philosophy of science to sociology and psychology (see Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). Therefore his work is seen as separated from the search for the rationality of science and must be criticized. That this distinction is at stake is also shown by contrasting the reception of SSR by French epistemology with that of more recent French philosophers of science, who actively distance themselves from authors such as Bachelard or Canguilhem. One such example is mentioned by Bowker & Latour (1987: 730), namely that of Michel Serres. It is indeed telling that Serres uses Kuhn's work in a rather positive way (e.g. Serres, 1980: 86, 138, 145). The only echo within his work of the earlier mentioned critiques is that Kuhn's perspective was not so new, but "was rather almost contemporary to the birth of this discipline called the history of science", namely in the work of Auguste Comte (Serres, 1977: 127). 4.1. LATOUR AND STENGERS Other representatives are Latour himself and Isabelle Stengers. Latour's own view on Kuhn is ambiguous, in the sense that he tends to be positive and negative about Kuhn for the same reasons. He praises Kuhn's concept of paradigm because it bridges the gap between the cognitive and the social, the explicit and the implicit aspects of science (Callon & Latour, 1991: 18). However, when he speaks about the case of Ludwik Fleck, who he sees as a predecessor of his own approach, he diagnoses SSR as a relapse in all the old errors of the externalist point of view and as a misinterpretation of Fleck (Latour, 2002). Yet this critique has nothing in common with that of French epistemology. Latour's ambiguity is rather a product of a similar ambiguity that he demonstrates towards sociology of science in general. Although he situates himself in the sociological camp, he criticizes sociology of science for reducing everything to the social. For Latour, external and internal explanations are two sides of the same coin and have to be rejected in order to open the path for a third position that avoids the pitfalls of both (see Latour, 1992). Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 19 This is also the case for Isabelle Stengers. Similarly to Serres, she is rather positive about SSR and uses its insights occasionally (e.g. Stengers, 1997: 109-120). Nevertheless, Stengers has some criticisms. For instance, she states that Kuhn sees this structure of scientific revolutions as something natural, rather than as a specific historical way to do science. "To describe the life of the sciences as a natural phenomenon is to say that there is only one choice, either to hamper them or to give them the means to continue." (Stengers, 2000: 53) As authors such as Ladrière or Balibar already suggested, this structure of science is a contingent historical fact, not a necessity. But for Stengers this is not only a question of a wrong interpretation of the past, but also of the future. In her work with Ilya Prigogine, she states that by generalizing this scheme one implicitly favors one type of science over others: In this view the driving force behind scientific innovation is the intensely conservative behavior of scientific communities, which stubbornly apply to nature the same techniques, the same concepts, and always end up by encountering on equally stubborn resistance from nature. [....] Thus scientists have to deal with crises imposed upon them against their will. (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984: 309) They themselves want to stress other aspects of science. For the aim of Prigogine was to conceptualize a different way of doing physics yet this was not based on a specific crisis nor against his will. Rather "the recent history of science is also characterized by a series of problems that are the consequences of deliberative and lucid questions asked by scientists who knew that the questions had both scientific and philosophical aspects." (Ibid.) Scientists are not doomed to be puzzle solving sleepwalkers within normal science. Stengers' main interest in Kuhn, however, arises from the observation that many scientists reacted positively to SSR, while for many philosophers it was a scandal. According to Stengers, there are two reasons for Kuhn's popularity among the scientists. First of all, SSR preserves "the autonomy of the scientific community in relation to its political and social environment." (Stengers, 2000: 6) In this sense the picture is drawn that science can only work if one leaves the internal working of the paradigm alone, otherwise one would be killing the goose with the golden eggs. The second reason is that Kuhn also constructs an intrinsic link "between this autonomy and the impossibility of reducing the paradigm to a sociological or psychological reading." (Ibid.: 49) Thus for her, contrary to the critiques of analytic philosophy and French epistemology, Kuhn actually shows that a paradigm is something that could not be reduced to social psychology. However, at the same time, echoing this third Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 20 position of Latour, she contradicts the interpretation of the sociologists, since they tend to reduce a paradigm to social categories. It all depends on how one interprets the notion of a paradigm. For Stengers, but also for Latour (2006: 27-30), a paradigm, first and foremost, is of a practical order. What is transmitted is not a vision of the world but a way of doing, a way not only of judging phenomena, of giving them a theoretical signification, but also of intervening. (Stengers, 2000: 49) The idea is that a paradigm enables scientists to create a new type of relation with the world itself, which does not leave the world unchanged. Rather it intervenes within the world and gives it a new mode of existence, namely as a scientific fact, i.e. a fact that can be clearly defined and reproduced before colleagues. This is why Kuhn speaks about puzzles and why for Kuhn "science is not made of ideas" (Latour, 2006: 29). The creation of such a relation is not pre-given nor a pure psychological decision, but rather the product of an inexplicable 'event', when scientist and phenomena succeed in changing their behavior in a form they can both agree on. What this implies is clear when one contrasts Kuhn's perspective with that of Lakatos. For Stengers Lakatos' perspective "inspires the idea of a gathering of facts that can be defined independently of the theory, so that one can then compare and negotiate between the facts and the theory." (Stengers, 2000: 49) Kuhn opposes this perspective with his notion of incommensurability. The core of this notion, for Stengers, is not that it implies that scientists are chained by their paradigm to interpret the same facts in different ways. "This misunderstanding stems from the fact that the notion of the paradigm corresponds not to a new version of the 'impregnation' of facts by theories, but to the notion of the invention of facts." (Ibid: 50) One should abandon the idea of a brute fact, and realize that the main definition of a fact "is not to be observable but to constitute active productions of observability, which requires and presuppose the paradigmatic language." (Ibid) What Kuhn does in SSR is to show that the history of science is not about a search for more facts with which we should create a relation of knowledge. Rather, his core idea is that the relations to the objects have a history as well. 5. Conclusion This article sketched the many encounters between French epistemology and Thomas Kuhn. From this it is clear that the relation between the two is far more complex than is often portrayed. The first part made clear that although he was inspired by French epistemology, Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 21 Kuhn seldom referred to its most prominent authors. Rather he took his inspiration from lesser known figures, such as Meyerson or Metzger. Secondly, even in relation to these authors he remained very critical, especially concerning their philosophical positions. The second, and more extensive part of this article showed that many French epistemologists replied to SSR in a highly critical way. Not only famous philosophers such as Foucault, Canguilhem or Bourdieu were examined, but also lesser known ones, such as Ladrière, Russo or Lecourt. In their work there was a clear consensus about Kuhn. SRR has a similarity with their work because it problematizes the traditional analytic philosophy of science that aims for an a-temporal criteria for science. However, at the same time, they fundamentally disagreed with what they saw as Kuhn's alternative for this. This indicates that French epistemology starts from a specific view on science. Their problem with SSR is related to two aspects. Firstly, the idea of discontinuity and incommensurability. Many French epistemologists rejected the incommensurability thesis, at least for discontinuities within mature science, while accepting it for the discontinuity between ordinary and scientific knowledge. Secondly, they disagreed on the element of normativity and rationality. In this sense, they came close to authors such as Popper or Lakatos. Nevertheless there is a crucial difference. Rather than stating that there is an a-temporal norm for sciencificity, for French epistemology the rationality and normativity of science lies within its historical process. This is the central paradox of many of their reflections, namely how to combine a science that is both rational and has a history and thus novelty. French epistemologists associated Kuhn with a third position, namely that of a sociological approach or what can be called social constructivism. Such a reading is itself problematized by a new generation of French philosophers of science, such as Latour or Stengers. They are far more positive about Kuhn, but mainly by claiming that his work can be seen as something that is neither the position of traditional analytic philosophy of science, nor French epistemology, nor social constructivism. They develop another perspective, which can be called 'French neoconstructivism'. This perspective draws its lessons from social constructivism, but also actively distances itself from it. Although paradigms are related to socioeconomic factors, they cannot be reduced to them or must at least be understood in a completely different way. In this sense it sees itself as a correction of social constructivism and it mobilizes Kuhn for this purpose. He is praised to the extent that he transcended the other positions, but criticized for elements that still come close to it. Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 22 However, Kuhn's position in this story is very unclear and he seems to be the victim of several approaches trying to mobilize or criticize him for their own gain. Often this problem is framed as the choice between him being either a follower of analytic philosophy, similar to Lakatos or Larry Laudan, or part of a more social constructivist program (e.g. Zammito, 2004). Taking this French tradition into account, however, adds a new dimension to this discussion. Kuhn's work can, in fact, be used to distill the typology of the different positions sketched above: analytic philosophy of science, French epistemology, social constructivism and French neoconstructivism. In which category Kuhn falls is unclear: the first two positions tend to distance themselves from his work, while the latter two tend to recruit him. In the context of this article, this leads to two final reflections. One the one hand we can ask to what extent Kuhn is really marked by a sociological approach, as seems to follow from the perspective of Bowker & Latour (1987). Can he really be recruited for social constructivism or is there rather a fundamental affinity to French philosophy of science? If so, this opens to path for Kuhn's SSR being part of a third path, neither seeking for absolute, a-temporal rationalist criteria nor giving a purely sociological account of science. And secondly, if Kuhn was born in France, would his terminology or his claims have been different? Is he really an adversary for French epistemology or rather a misunderstood friend? Funding This work was supported by the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO). Acknowledgements I have to acknowledge Paul Cortois for the many discussions and feedback about earlier drafts of this article. 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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 25 Lavror, B. (2003). Why did Kuhn's Structure of scientific revolutions cause a fuss? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 34(2), 369-390. Latour, B. (1992). One More Turn after the Social Turn : Easing Science Studies into the Non-Modern World. In McMullin, E. The Social Dimensions of Science (pp. 272-292). Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press. Latour, B. (2002). Transmettre la syphilis, partager l'objectivité. In Fleck, L. (2005). Genèse et développement d'un fait scientifique. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Latour, B. (2006). Chroniques d'un amateur de sciences. Paris: Presses de Mines. Lecourt, D. (1975). Marxism and epistemology : Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault. London: NLB. Melhado, Evan M. (1990). Metzger, Kuhn, and eighteenth-century disciplinary history. In Freudenthal, G.. Etudes sur Hélène Metzger/Studies on Hélène Metzger (pp. 111-134). Leiden: Brill. Metzger, H. (1974). Newton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la doctrine chimique. Paris: Blanchard. Mössner, N. (2011). Thought styles and paradigms-a comparative study of Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42(2), 362-371. Piaget, J. (1974). Le structuralisme. Paris: PUF. Prigogine, I. & Stengers, I. (1984). Order out of chaos : Man's new dialogue with nature. London: Fontana paperbacks. Richards, R. & Daston, L. (2016). Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions at fifty: Reflections on a science classic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rheinberger, H.-J. (2010). On historicizing epistemology: An essay. Stanford: Stanford university press. Russo, F. (1974a). Epistémologie et histoire des sciences. Archives de philosophie, 37(4), 617-657. Russo, F. (1974b). Typologie du progrès des connaissances scientifiques. Première Partie. Revue des questions scientifiques, 315-363. Russo, F. (1983). Nature et méthode de l'histoire des sciences. Paris: Blanchard. Serres, M. (1977). Hermès. IV : La distribution. Paris: Ed. de Minuit. Serres, M. (1980). Hermès. V : Le passage du nord-ouest. Paris: Ed. de Minuit. Smith, S. (1984). Reading Althusser : An essay on structural marxism. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell university press. Published as Simons, M. (2017). The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.004 26 Stengers, I. (1997). Power and invention: situating science. Minneapolis (Minn.): University of Minnesota press. Stengers, I. (2000). The invention of modern science. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press. Zammito, J. (2004). A nice derangement of epistemes: Post-positivism in the study of science from Quine to Latour. Chicago (Ill.): University of Chicago press.

Sokratisk dialog som pedagogisk metod1 Sokrates var inte bara en filosofisk nydanare. Genom sitt sätt att involvera sina samtalspartners i den filosofiska processen var han också i hög utsträckning en pedagogisk nydanare. Hans pedagogiska grundidé var den så kallade majeutiska metoden – det vill säga "barnmorskemetoden". Med det menade han att han överförde inte sina egna färdiga tankar till den han talade med utan han hjälpte sin samtalspartner att föda sina egna tankar. I Sokrates fall var den här idén grundad på en väldigt speciell världsbild enligt vilken all kunskap fanns i oss från början och "bara" behövde plockas fram – eller födas fram. I dag ser man ju inte längre på kunskap på det sättet varför en sokratisk dialog i sin moderna form skiljer sig en del från Sokrates dialoger vad gäller både teoretisk grundval och praktiskt utförande. Kärnan är dock precis som hos Sokrates att läraren inte sitter och berättar "hur det är", utan snarare hjälper studenterna att själv producera ett svar. I sin moderna form förutsätter den sokratiska dialogen alltså inte att all kunskap är medfödd, utan snarare att den information man har mottagit under kursen – eller varför inte livet – behöver processas på något sätt för att bli till kunskap och internaliseras i studentens världsbild. Den sokratiska dialogen passar alltså väldigt bra in i det moderna synsättet att kunskap (åtminstone viss kunskap) är något som konstrueras av studenten snarare än något som kan serveras studenterna fixt och färdigt. Utifrån denna utgångspunkt är idealet att studenterna själv processar informationen istället för att bara bli matade med färdigtuggad kunskap från läraren. En sokratisk dialog är ett effektivt sätt att genomföra den processen i grupp. Den moderna formen av sokratisk dialog är ett relativt nytt verktyg i den filosofiska verktygslådan och utvecklades egentligen som en metod för praktisk begreppsanalys i grupp. Metoden har använts framgångsrikt i den rollen bl.a. i Tyskland, Holland, USA, och Norge. Vad jag har gjort är att med relativt små modifieringar omvandla den till ett pedagogiskt verktyg. Jag har själv använt den flitigt i min undervisning under de senaste åren med mycket gott resultat. Studenterna har nästan uteslutande varit mycket nöjda och deras förståelse av de begrepp som avhandlats har höjts avsevärt. 1 Texten bygger på följande material: 1. Saran, Rene (ed) & Neisser, Barbara (ed): Enquiring minds Trentham books 2004, 2. Pia Hverven Axell: Socratic Dialogue as a tool for developing moral awareness in Business Ethics – föredrag vid VIIth International Conference on Philosophical Practice, Köpenhamn 3-6 augusti 2004, 3. Personlig kommunikation med Maria Ekman och Roger Larsen, samt 4. Mina egna erfarenheter av metoden. 2 Hur lång tid som behövs för att genomföra en dialog skiftar. Dels beror det på antalet deltagare. Dels har det att göra med vad man vill uppnå (vill man hitta den enda ultimata definitionen tar det längre tid än om man är nöjd med att ha identifierat ett antal möjliga definitioner). Dels hänger det på hur diskussionen utvecklas under övningen. I undervisningssammanhang har jag själv använt 2-4 timmar. Två timmar får betraktas som ett minimum. Den längsta dialog jag personligen har hållit varade två dygn (med uppehåll för mat, sömn och bensträckare). Det var utanför universitetet men gav en mycket bra diskussion. Min erfarenhet är att idealstorleken på en grupp ligger runt 10 personer. Då är de tillräckligt många för att uppnå en "kritisk massa" men inte fler än att alla har möjlighet att delta aktivt i hela övningen. Färre än 5 och fler än 20 personer är förmodligen inte fruktbart. Genomförandet av en sokratisk dialog kan delas in i 5 steg (varav det sista är iterativt). Det första steget handlar om att exemplifiera det begrepp som dialogen skall handla om. Alla deltagare i dialogen ombeds presentera ett exempel så konkret som möjligt. Om syftet är att analysera begreppet 'utveckling' så skall deltagarna presentera var sitt konkret exempel på utveckling. Övningsledaren eller en assistent skriver kortfattat upp exemplen på tavlan – eller ännu hellre på en dator kopplad till en projektor. Att använda dator har två fördelar. Dels blir det ganska mycket att skriva i de senare stegen och tavlan tenderar snabbt att bli full. Dels kan det vara önskvärt att bevara hela processen för studenterna – och läraren – att gå tillbaka till i efterhand. I det andra steget skall gruppen tillsammans välja ut det exempel som bäst illustrerar fenomenet i fråga. Det är viktigt att vara noga med att det skall vara just det exempel som bäst illustrerar fenomenet, inte det exempel som är bäst ur något annat perspektiv. Om man skall diskutera begreppet 'konst' skall man alltså välja det exempel som bäst illustrerar begreppet 'konst' – vilket inte nödvändigtvis är detsamma som det exempel som behandlar det bästa konstverket. Valet kan gå till på olika sätt men ett konsensusbeslut är bäst eftersom alla deltagarna sedan skall använda det valda exemplet som utgångspunkt för diskussionen. Om det inte går att hitta ett exempel som alla tycker är bäst är det därför bättre att välja ett exempel som alla är överens om är ett bra exempel än att t.ex. välja det exempel som flest tycker är bäst medan några inte alls tycker att det är ett bra exempel. Det viktigaste är dock själva diskussionen som föregår valet. Exemplet skall bara användas som utgångspunkt och kommer att få successivt mindre betydelse längre fram i processen medan erfarenheten har visat att diskussionen i det här steget är väldigt viktig för resten av övningen. 3 Ett syfte med steg ett och två är att få en konkret bas som avstamp för diskussionen vilket har visat sig underlätta en hel del för att få igång diskussionen i själva igångsättningsskedet. Att deltagarna själv tänker ut exempel tycks vara viktigt här. Man är förmodligen mer motiverad om diskussionen har koppling till något man själv har föreslagit eller åtminstone varit med och beslutat. Ett annat syfte med konkreta exempel är att hjälpa studenten se att det finns en koppling mellan den praktiska användningen av begreppet och de abstrakta diskussioner som sedan följer. Här tas steget från det konkreta till det abstrakta på ett naturligt sätt. Redan i dessa diskussioner läggs grunden för de mer abstrakta diskussionerna senare i processen. Det tredje steget går ut på att formulera vad hos det valda exemplet som gör det till en bra illustration av fenomenet ifråga. I det här steget liksom i steg 1 skall helst varje deltagare producera ett eget förslag. Dessa förslag skrivs sedan upp på tavlan/datorn och utgör grund för nästa steg. Här handlar det inte om någon diskussion utan varje deltagare formulerar i tur och ordning sitt förslag. I detta steg tas ytterligare ett litet steg från det konkreta till det abstrakta. Genom att dela in processen i flera små steg blir varje steg enklare att ta. Dessutom blir processen tydligare för de inblandade. I steg 4 går man igenom och diskuterar ingående förslagen från steg 3 – ett efter ett – med avseende på deras användbarhet i en kommande definition (det är alltså viktigt att understryka att det här liksom i de andra stegen bara är studenterna som diskuterar medan läraren tar rollen som moderator/sekreterare). Under diskussionens gång börjar man också att formulera tentativa definitioner. Man kan t.ex. efter varje genomgång av en formulering från punkt 3 fråga deltagarna om de är beredda att komma med ett förslag på definition. I de förslag som ges brukar man direkt kunna se att de föregående diskussionerna haft en positiv effekt på deltagarnas förståelse av begreppet (ett tips är att låta studenterna komma med inledande förslag på definitioner innan övningen för att kunna jämföra dem med det som produceras under övningen). I och med detta steg kommer man naturligt in på skillnaden mellan nödvändiga, tillräckliga och kontingenta egenskaper. Deltagarna – även de som är ovana vid att diskutera på en hög abstraktionsnivå – hamnar ofta i diskussioner om t.ex. huruvida en viss egenskap bara råkade finnas med i exemplet eller om den skall betraktas som nödvändig eller tillräcklig – eller om man kan tänka sig en definition som innehåller disjunktioner (d.v.s. om det är tillräckligt att en företeelse har någon av ett urval egenskaper för att vara ett exempel på fenomenet ifråga). 4 I steg 5 går man igenom de tentativa definitioner man åstadkom i steg 4 på samma sätt som man i steg 4 gick igenom de formuleringar man kom fram till i steg 3. Det vill säga man skärskådar varje definitionsförslag för sig och diskuterar dess förresp. nackdelar. När man har diskuterat igenom ett förslag frågar man deltagarna om någon har ett förslag på en bättre definition. Det kan antingen vara en putsning av det förslag man just har gått igenom, eller ett helt nytt förslag som någon har kommit på under diskussionen. I vissa fall kanske man tycker att det förslag man diskuterar är bra nog för att "gå vidare" i oförändrat skick till nästa omgång. Då flyttas den helt enkelt till listan över de nya förslagen. Diskussionen i steg 5 brukar pendla mellan små detaljer som enstaka ord, tempus eller komman å ena sidan, och stora övergripande funderingar å den andra. Vid det här laget har vi nått en nivå på diskussionen som ofta ligger långt över vad man brukar få uppleva i gruppdiskussioner. När man har gått igenom alla förslag från steg 4 har man – genom de nya förslag som framförts – fått fram en ny lista på definitionsförslag som tack vare diskussionerna bör ligga på en högre nivå än förslagen i den lista vi just har gått igenom. Den nya listan kan vara längre eller kortare än den förra. Steg 5 upprepas sedan för varje ny lista med definitionsförslag. När övningen är över har man antingen åstadkommit en definition som alla är överens om eller – vilket är betydligt vanligare – en uppsättning olika definitioner. Att komma fram till en uppsättning olika definitioner kan oftast vara väl så intressant som att komma fram till en gemensam definition. Att kunna sätta fingret på hur och varför olika personer ser på eller använder ett begrepp på olika sätt är en viktig insikt. Att komma fram till det genom att själv delta i en definitionsprocess är också mycket mer givande än att bara få det berättat för sig. Dels är det mer inspirerande för deltagarna. Dels påverkar det deras förståelse – inte bara förståelsen av begreppet utan av hela kontexten i vilken det används – på ett mycket mer genomgripande sätt. Dels kommer de inblandade förmodligen att minnas den filosofiska dialogen mycket bättre än en färdigserverad definition. Det senare betyder dock enligt min erfarenhet inte att deltagarna bara kommer att minnas den definition eller de definitioner de själv kommer fram till i den sokratiska dialogen. När läraren sedan går igenom standarddefinitionen eller de användningar av begreppet som förekommer i kurslitteraturen kan studenterna snabbt sätta den/dessa i relation till sin egen diskussion och både komma ihåg och förstå den/dem bättre än de annars hade gjort. Man kan även föra in denna/dessa definitioner som jokrar i steg 5 och se hur de klarar sig i jämförelse med de definitioner studenterna har föreslagit. 5 Sokratisk dialog som undervisningsmetod har visat sig fungera bra för alla typer av studenter – inte bara filosofistudenter. Jag har bl.a. använt den på LTH och på SLU Alnarp, och även utanför universitetet. I de allra flesta fall har resultatet blivit väldigt imponerande. Även studenterna själv har tenderat att bli imponerade över sin egen insats, vilket torde gagna både deras eget självförtroende, och deras förtroende för undervisningen. En bättre förståelse av centrala begrepp inom ämnet torde också vara av stor betydelse för förståelsen av ämnet generellt. Två av de största fördelarna med metoden kan sammanfattas i ordet 'genomskinlighet' – dels metodens egen genomskinlighet, och dels att den gör begrepp genomskinliga. Det är lätt för deltagarna att följa processen och att i efterhand uppskatta sina framsteg. Begrepp som från början ter sig konstiga och ogenomträngbara – eller självklara och därför oanalyserbara – kan i några enkla steg bli föremål för en diskussion på hög nivå och en integrerad del av studentens förståelse av ämnet. En annan stor fördel är att diskussionen sällan avstannar bara för att övningen är slut. Det brukar förekomma diskussioner kring det aktuella begreppet i korridorerna eller på kursens webforum långt efter övningen. Nackdelarna med metoden är att den är ganska tidskrävande och att den bara fungerar i relativt små grupper. Min erfarenhet är dock att fördelarna klart uppväger nackdelarna.

Disputatio, Vol. IX, No. 44, May 2017 Received: 29/07/2016 Revised: 14/12/2016 Accepted: 22/12/2016 The Problem of the Rock and the Grammar of Consciousness Lajos Brons Nihon University and Lakeland University BIBLID [0873-626X (2017) 44; pp. 5–12] Abstract The "Problem of the Rock" (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness. According to PoR, the HO theorists' claim that a mental state is conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it implies that a rock is also conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it. In this paper I show that this argument confuses two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness, and that if the consequent equivocation fallacy is avoided, PoR is either a straw man argument or has an unproblematic conclusion. Keywords Consciousness, higher-order theories of consciousness, the problem of the rock, the generality problem, ambitransitivity. According to so-called Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious if and only if there is a suitable higher-order mental state (either a thought or a perception) about it. One of the best known objections to HO theories was first put forward by Alvin Goldman over two decades ago: A rock does not become conscious when someone has a belief about it. Why should a first-order psychological state become conscious simply by having a belief about it? (Goldman 1993: 366) Leopold Stubenberg (1998) called this 'the problem of the rock' (PoR). Robert van Gulick (2000) used the term 'generality problem' for a nearly identical objection, differing mainly in its substitution of a desk lamp for Goldman's rock. HO theorists have responded to PoR in a number of different ways. (See Gennaro 2005 for an overview.) The most obvious response is to deny the validity of the generalization from mental states Lajos Brons6 to rocks (or desk lamps). In this paper I will argue that there is a more fundamental problem for PoR, however: it depends on an equivocation of two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness. Before we can properly assess PoR, there are two minor defects in Goldman's original phrasing of the problem that need to be corrected. Firstly, as Rocco Gennaro (2005) has pointed out before, the term 'belief' is somewhat inappropriate here. HO theories claim that the higher-order state is either a thought (in Higher-Order Thought theories) or a perception (in Higher-Order Perception theories), but not that it is a belief. (On the other hand, if in some HO theory thoughts and/or perceptions are considered to be kinds of beliefs, then for that theory the term 'belief' might be acceptable.) Secondly, it is not entirely clear how 'becoming conscious' should be understood here (i.e. temporally, causally, etc.). The most neutral reading equates it with 'being conscious', and that is probably the most charitable reading as well. Taking these corrections into account, the second sentence of the above quote should be understood as an interrogative version of the claim that: (1) A mental state x is conscious if and only if someone has a thought about/perception of x, which summarizes Goldman's apparent interpretation of HO theories. Whether this interpretation is entirely correct is debatable. At the very least, the word 'suitable' needs to be inserted before 'thought'. Nevertheless, in order to focus on the aforementioned more fundamental problem, I will let it pass and assume that (1) is an acceptable summary of the main claim of HO theories. Goldman's point is that, lacking a good argument to the contrary, we should be able to generalize (1) to: (2) Any x is conscious if and only if someone has a thought about/ perception of x, from which it follows that: (3) A rock is conscious if and only if someone has a thought about/perception of that rock. However, (3) is false because rocks are not conscious, and therefore, 7The Problem of the Rock and the Grammar of Consciousness (1) is false. Or at least, that is-supposedly-what the enthymematic conclusion of PoR should be. In one of the earliest responses to PoR, David Rosenthal (1997) appealed to a distinction between transitive consciousness of something and intransitive being conscious, and charged PoR of being "just a disguised version of the doctrine that being intransitively conscious is an intrinsic property" (1997: 739). Intrinsic properties are non-relational-that is, they do not consist (even partly) in "bearing a relation to something else" (1997: 736). If PoR would indeed presume that intransitive consciousness is intrinsic, then this would be begging the question against HO theories, because those assume consciousness of any kind to be a relational property. However, it has been disputed that PoR depends on this assumption. Alex Byrne (1997), for example, argues that it is more likely to follow from PoR than lead to it. (See also Gennaro 2005.) The distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness, on the other hand, is essential to understanding PoR, but insufficiently fine-grained. The transitive/intransitive distinction is (at least originally) a grammatical distinction between two kinds of verbs. Transitive verbs take two arguments. For example, 'John is eating a steak' and 'Jane opens the door'. Intransitive verbs take only one argument: 'John is eating' and 'the door opens'. The verbs in these examples, 'eating' and 'opening', are really ambitransitive verbs, meaning that they can be both transitive and intransitive. If we bracket 'of' in 'being conscious (of)', then that phrase appears to be similarly ambitransitive. There are (at least) two kinds of ambitransitive verbs, which is illustrated in the two examples in the previous paragraph. The agent of intransitive 'eating' is the agent of transitive 'eating', while the agent of intransitive 'opening' is the patient of transitive 'opening'. For that reason, 'eating' is called an 'agentive ambitransitive' and 'opening' a 'patientive ambitransitive'. Usually, the intransitive form of an ambitransitive verb can have either the agent or the patient of the transitive form as its sole argument, and is thus either an agentive or a patientive ambitransitive, but there are also a few verbs that are doubly ambiguous. Such verbs are ambitransitive, but unlike most ambitransitives, they can take either argument as the sole argument of the intransitive form. For example, transitive 'Linda is flying this plane over Siberia' has two Lajos Brons8 related intransitive sentences: 'Linda is flying over Siberia' and 'this plane is flying over Siberia'. Such verbs appear to be rare, however, but 'being conscious (of)' works (more or less) like such a verb, and this is a source of (potential) confusion. As an illustration, consider the following three sentences: (a) Jake is conscious of his thought about breakfast. (b) Jake is conscious. (c) The [i.e. Jake's] thought about breakfast is conscious. In (a) 'being conscious (of)' is transitive; in (b) and (c) it is intransitive, but while it takes the agent of the transitive form as its argument in (b), the argument of (c) is the patient of the transitive form. In other words, (b) attributes (some kind of) consciousness to an agent, and (c) to a patient. For that reason, I will refer to these two different kinds of intransitive consciousness as agent-consciousness and patient-consciousness, respectively. There is a further complication, however. The transitivity of 'being conscious of' in (a) can be represented symbolically as ⟨1,1⟩ in which the order is ⟨agent,patient⟩ and in which '1' marks presence of an argument and '0' marks omission. In the same notation, the transitivity in (c)-that is, of patientconsciousness-is ⟨0,1⟩. In that sentence, the agent is omitted and the patient is promoted to grammatical subject similar to the passive voice. Analogously, the transitivity in (b) could be interpreted as ⟨1,0⟩ similar to the antipassive voice (which does not exist in English, but that does not matter here), but that is not the only possibility. A genuinely ambitransitive verb is ⟨1,1⟩ in its transitive form and either ⟨1,0⟩ or ⟨0,1⟩ in its intransitive form (the first if its agentive, the second if it is patientive), but there also are quasi-ambitransitive verbs that act like ambitransitive verbs grammatically, but that have ⟨1⟩ intransitive forms that differ subtly in meaning from their transitive forms. The difference between ⟨1,0⟩ and ⟨1⟩ can be illustrated by means of a comparison of 'eating' and 'falling'. If John is eating, then he is eating something, but if the ball falls, then the ball is not falling anything (and neither is anything falling the ball). In other words, the ambitransitive verb 'eating' implies a hidden argument even in its 9The Problem of the Rock and the Grammar of Consciousness intransitive form-that is what the '0' in ⟨1,0⟩ means. But a genuinely intransitive verb-like 'falling'-has no such implication, and should thus be represented as ⟨1⟩. 'Walking' and 'flying' are examples of quasi-ambitransitives. The first can be transitive as in 'Sophie is walking the dog' or 'Hanako is walking a long-distance trail' and intransitive as in 'Margaret is walking', but the last sentence does not imply that Margaret is walking something (i.e. a pet, or some route or path), and therefore, the transitivity of 'walking' in that sentence is ⟨1⟩. The same applies to 'the pilot flies the plane' and 'the bird flies'. Importantly, there are subtle differences in meaning between the transitive and intransitive forms of 'walking' and 'flying'-and there must be, given that the intransitive forms have no implied patients-and perhaps it can be argued for that reason these are not really grammatically different forms of the same verb but closely related homonyms. For the same reason, if agent-consciousness is ⟨1⟩ rather than ⟨1,0⟩, then it does not express the (exact) same concept as transitive consciousness, and is probably not reducible to it. While transitive consciousness and patient-consciousness can be easily characterized as ⟨1,1⟩ and ⟨0,1⟩, respectively, it is not clear- and certainly not uncontroversial-whether agent -consciousness is ⟨1,0⟩ or ⟨1⟩.1 Furthermore, different positions with regards to HO theories most likely also differ in their interpretation of agent-consciousness as either ⟨1⟩ or ⟨1,0⟩. And if that is the case, then there is no non-question-begging definition of agent-consciousness. Nevertheless, even if we cannot uncontroversially define agent-consciousness, there is at least one important feature that follows in either interpretation. Patient-consciousness is ⟨0,1⟩ and is, therefore, defined as in (4). If agent-consciousness is ⟨1,0⟩, then it just omits the other argument and is, therefore, analogously defined as in (5*). (The asterisk marks that (5*) is true only if agent-consciousness is ⟨1,0⟩.) (4) ∀x [x is patient-conscious ↔def. ∃y [y is conscious of x]] 1 My own opinion on the matter is that the notion of ⟨1⟩ intransitive consciousness is confused nonsense (and the main cause of most philosophical problems about consciousness), and thus that any occurrence of intransitive consciousness is either ⟨1,0⟩ or ⟨0,1⟩, but I will not defend this opinion here. Lajos Brons10 (5*) ∀x [x is ⟨1,0⟩agent-conscious ↔def. ∃y [x is conscious of y]] In either case, intransitive consciousness is defined in terms of a primitive concept of transitive consciousness (i.e. 'being conscious of', 'being aware of', etc.). No such definition of agent-consciousness is possible if 'being conscious' in that sense is really ⟨1⟩ intransitive, because in that case, it does not express the (exact) same concept as the transitive variant. However, even in that case there appears to be an uncontroversial conceptual relation with transitive consciousness: it seems undeniable that being agent-conscious at least implies the possibility of being conscious of something: (6) ∀x [x is agent-conscious → ◇ (∃y [x is conscious of y])] If it is accepted that p implies ◇p, then (6) also follows from (5*), and consequently, (6) is true regardless of whether agent-consciousness is ⟨1⟩ or ⟨1,0⟩. (6) obviously implies a restriction to what kinds of things can be agent -conscious, namely things that can be transitively conscious of something, but no similar restriction is implied by (4): anything can be patient-conscious, and something can even be agentand patient conscious at the same time. If two people are having a conversation, they are both simultaneously agentand patient -conscious.2 The first premise of the Problem of the Rock (PoR) is a summary of HO theories, repeated here for convenience: (1) A mental state x is conscious if and only if someone has a thought about/perception of x. PoR is about intransitive consciousness, and therefore, 'is conscious' in (1) is either agent-consciousness or patient-consciousness. Because the subject of (1) is a mental state, 'is conscious' can be agentconsciousness only if mental states are a kind of thing that can be conscious of something (i.e. not just about something, but conscious of that thing). As far as I know, no HO theorist ever claimed that mental states can be conscious agents or can be conscious of things 2 If Jane is conversing with John, then (a) Jane is conscious of John, and therefore (a1) Jane is agent-conscious and (a2) John is patient-conscious; and (b) John is conscious of Jane, and therefore, (b1) John is agent-conscious and (b2) Jane is patient-conscious. 11The Problem of the Rock and the Grammar of Consciousness (in this sense), and therefore, this interpretation would misrepresent HO theories. Furthermore, even if HO theories would claim that mental states can be conscious agents, it would not follow that anything can be a conscious agent as asserted by (2), because (6) implicitly restricts agent-consciousness to particular kinds of things. Consequently, if 'being conscious' in PoR is agent-consciousness, then the argument is not just a straw man (because it misrepresents HO theories), but invalid as well. Alternatively, if 'is conscious' in (1) is patient-consciousness, then from (4) it follows that someone (or something) is conscious of that state, and that appears to be exactly what HO theorists are claiming. Hence, we can disambiguate (1) as follows:3 (7) A mental state x is patient-conscious if and only if someone has a thought about/perception of x. From (4) it follows that the left-hand side of the biconditional in (7) implies that there is some y that is conscious of x, and any sensible interpretation identifies that y with the 'someone' in the right-hand side of (7). Thus: (8) For a mental state x, ∃y [y is conscious of x if and only if y has a thought about/perception of x] , which can be generalized into: (9) ∀x ∃y [y is conscious of x if and only if y has a thought about/ perception of x]. And that-properly understood-is all that (2) means. The rock in (3) is either agent-conscious or patient-conscious. It cannot be the first because (1) and (2) turn out to be about patient-consciousness, so if (3) would be about agent-consciousness, then it would not follow. Therefore, (3)-like (1) and (2)-is about patient-consciousness: (10) A rock is patient-conscious if and only if someone has a thought about/perception of that rock. And from (4) and (10)-or from (9)-it then follows that someone 3 Of course, the acceptability of (7) depends on the acceptability of (1) as a summary of HO theories, and as mentioned above, there are other problems with (1). Lajos Brons12 is conscious of a rock if and only if that person has a thought about/ perception of that rock. If 'consciousness' in (3) is patient-consciousness, then that is all that (3) means. But there is nothing objectionable to (3) understood as such (aside perhaps, from the fact that we usually do not use the adjective 'conscious' in this way in English). The enthymematic conclusion of PoR depends on the suggestion that HO theories imply that rocks are agent-conscious (and thus that rocks have consciousness and can be conscious of things), but that suggestion is based on an equivocation fallacy. If (1) is to be a representation of the central claim of HO theories, then it is about patientconsciousness, and then no conclusion about agent-consciousness can follow. If the equivocation is avoided, then either PoR misrepresents HO theories (and thus is a straw man), or it states (the rather obvious fact) that someone is conscious of a rock if she has a thought about that rock or perceives that rock. Neither is problematic for HO theories. Therefore, there is no Problem of the Rock.4 Lajos Brons Nihon University and Lakeland University [email protected] References Byrne, Alex. 1997. Some like it HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts. Philosophical Studies 86(2): 103–29. Gennaro, Rocco. 2005. The HOT theory of consciousness: between a rock and a hard place? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(2): 3–21. Goldman, Alvin. 1993. Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science. Consciousness and Cognition 2: 364–82. Rosenthal, David. 1997. A theory of consciousness. In The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere. Cambridge: Bradford. 729–53. Stubenberg, Leopold. 1998. Consciousness and Qualia. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Van Gulick, Robert. 2000. Inward and upward: reflection, introspection, and self-awareness. Philosophical Topics 28: 275–305. 4 I would like to thank Rocco Gennaro and two anonymous referees of Disputatio for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Journal of Buddhist Ethics ISSN 1076-9005 http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/ Volume 21, 2014 Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will: Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Beyond Riccardo Repetti Kingsborough College, CUNY Copyright Notice: Digital copies of this work may be made and distributed provided no change is made and no alteration is made to the content. Reproduction in any other format, with the exception of a single copy for private study, requires the written permission of the author. All enquiries to: [email protected]. Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will: Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Beyond Riccardo Repetti 1 Abstract This is the fourth article in a four-article series that examines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with "determinism," the scientific doctrine of universal lawful causation. The first article focused on "early period" scholarship from the 1970's, which was primarily compatibilist, that is, of the view that the Buddhist conception of causation is compatible with free will. The second and third articles examined "middle period" incompatibilist and semicompatibilist scholarship in the remainder of the twentieth century and first part of the twenty-first. The present article examines work published in the past few years. It largely agrees that Buddhism tacitly accepts free will (al- 1 Department of History, Philosophy, and Political Science, Kingsborough College, CUNY. Email: [email protected]. 280 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will though it also explores an ultimate perspective from which the issue appears moot), but mostly divides along compatibilist and incompatibilist lines, mirroring Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhist perspectives, respectively. Of the writers I emphasize, Gier and Kjellberg articulate both perspectives; Federman and Harvey advocate Theravāda compatibilism; and Wallace argues that although determinism and free will are incompatible, subtle complexities of Mahāyāna Buddhist metaphysics circumvent the free will and determinism dichotomy. Although the present article focuses on these writers, as the culminating article in the series it also draws on and summarizes the other articles in the series, and directs the reader to other recent period works that, due to space constraints, cannot be reviewed here.2 Overview and Disclaimer There are few passages, if any, in canonical or authoritative Buddhist texts that explicitly address anything remotely resembling the philosophical problem of free will. This series of four articles is intended as an in-depth guide to the secondary literature on Buddhism and free will, a fairly small and relatively recent body of writings that began roughly within the past half century. Although these four articles appear in this 2 I would like to thank Daniel Cozort, Peter Harvey, and an anonymous reviewer for their many helpful questions, clarifications, objections, and editorial suggestions, and Asaf Federman for his review of the section on his work. The writing of this article was supported in part by my participation in the National Endowment for the Humanities 2012 Summer Institute, "Investigating Consciousness: Buddhist and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives," in Charleston, South Carolina. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 281 journal, the intended audience is not only scholars and students of Buddhist ethics, but also Western philosophers who for the most part have only recently begun to take Buddhism seriously and to try to mine it for ideas, arguments, theories, and alternative ways of knowing. This dual audience complicates matters. On the one hand, many Buddhist scholars are not only unfamiliar with the Western philosophical problem of free will and its many iterations in the hands of soft versus hard determinists, libertarians, compatibilists, incompatibilists, and semi-compatibilists, but are also unfamiliar with what other Buddhist scholars have written about free will. (I will explain these terms below.) Even much of the work of Buddhist ethicists betrays varying degrees of unfamiliarity with relevant doctrinal distinctions pertaining to divergent forms of Buddhism as well as to divergent theoretical perspectives within Western philosophy. On the other hand, Western philosophers who wish to explore what Buddhists think about free will might be significantly unfamiliar with basic Buddhist ideas such as Dharma, dependent origination, and the twelve-linked chain, or classic examples such as the chariot and its parts, not to mention doctrinal differences within the various traditions and schools of Buddhist thought. (I will explain these ideas briefly below.) Some of the work I will review in this article, for example, by Gier and Kjellberg, seems to presuppose an extensive background in Buddhist thought. This is despite the fact that it is contained in an edited collection of otherwise entirely Western analytic philosophical articles on free will, presumably targeting a Western audience. I wrote this series of articles in order to aid scholars on both sides of the Western/Buddhist divide in their attempts to understand the many often confusing if not conflicting claims to be found within the extant secondary literature. 282 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will Review of Earlyand Middle-period Scholarship My analysis of early-period and middle-period scholarship, in the earlier articles in this series,3 supports the idea that the Buddha's teaching is mental-freedom-oriented and rests upon his doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), the general doctrine that every event originates in dependence on multiple simultaneous and/or previous conditions, and the particular application of this generalization to the nidānas (twelve causal links in the chain of suffering). As the Buddha stated, "When that is present, this comes to be; on the arising of that, this arises. When that is absent, this does not come to be; on the cessation of that, this ceases" (MN I 262 ff.; SN II 28). Note that, on its face, this description does not assert that causation is anything more substantive than a conditional relationship: when this condition is satisfied, that condition occurs. For ease of reference, let's call this minimalist description the Buddha's "conditionality formula." Determinism presupposes that a metaphysically maximalist nomological (lawful) necessity-what Jay Garfield describes as the "cement of the universe"4-serves as the truth condition for any instantiations of the conditionality formula. Thus, few Buddhists would be willing to equate minimalistic conditionality with maximalistic determinism; Charles Goodman appears to be one noteworthy exception.5 By way of objection, however, it does not follow that just because instantiations of the minimalist conditionality formula are true that there is no maximalist nomological necessity that accounts for their truth. Reluctance to acknowledge something does not evidence that it 3 Repetti ("Earlier," "Reductionism," and "Hard Determinism"); see, also, Repetti ("Meditation"). 4 Garfield ("Causality"). 5 Goodman ("Resentment"); for a critical review, see Repetti ("Hard Determinism"). Journal of Buddhist Ethics 283 does not exist. What makes it reliably the case that the conditionality formula is true? That it makes sense to ask this question suggests that something stronger than mere coincidence must be in play. Although it is conceivable that everything that appears to involve a substantive causal relationship might amount to no more than a "constant conjunction" between event pairs, as David Hume famously suggested (and thought was all that empirical observation served up, technically),6 it is implausible in the face of the widespread contemporary scientific understanding of causal laws as exceptionless nomological generalizations.7 If nomological necessity does ground conditionality, Buddhist conditionality would ultimately reduce to a partly opaque form of determinism. 6 Hume (Treatise). 7 On the understanding of causation that has the broadest consensus in the Western philosophical and scientific communities (Woodward and Hitchcock, "Generalizations"), laws support an indefinite number of counterfactuals, that is, statements of the form, "had x happened, then y would have happened," and/or subjunctives, statements of the form "were x to happen, then y would happen," both of which imply something stronger than mere Humean constant conjunction insofar as they imply that all past cases that would have satisfied the antecedents of these conditionals would also have satisfied the consequents of these conditionals, that all future cases that satisfy the antecedents of these conditionals will also satisfy the consequents of these conditionals, and that all possible cases that hypothetically satisfy the antecedents of these conditionals also satisfy the consequents of these conditionals. For example, let an instantiation of the subjunctive "were x to happen, then y would happen" be "were a particular grain of salt to be submerged in water, then it would dissolve." This subjunctive conditional is true, and it remains true even if that particular grain of salt is never submerged in water. The scientific understanding of the nomological necessity involved in these counterfactual and/or subjunctive conditionals attributes the solubility of salt to its crystalline atomic structure and the structure of water molecules, in which case the scientific understanding of the causation of salt's solubility and/or its actual dissolving in water requires an interpretation of causation that is not only stronger than Humean constant conjunction, but also stronger than Buddhist conditionality, despite the fact that the counterfactuals and subjunctives involved in the explication of laws are conditionals themselves. 284 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will Early-period scholars clearly resisted equating Buddhist causation (dependent origination) with either a "rigid" determinism or a "chaotic" indeterminism, opting for a "middle way" between both.8 Some middle-period scholars, however, accepted an outright "hard determinism,"9 the view that determinism is true and entails an invariable series of events, entailing that whatever happens is inevitable and that we lack free will.10 Others opted for what is nearly the same view, a "semi-compatibilism" according to which determinism remains "hard" in terms of ruling out agential autonomy at the level of ultimate reality but is "soft" in terms of being compatible with the sort of free will (in the 8 Repetti ("Earlier"). 9 Repetti ("Hard Determinism"). 10 Hard determinism resembles fatalism, but differs from it in one crucial respect. What these doctrines share is that both entail a singular future series of necessary events, no member-event of which is agent-alterable or agent-avoidable. The crucial difference is that determinism explains this necessity causally, such that event Ea causes event Eb, Eb causes Ec, and so on, whereas fatalism simply asserts the acausal necessity of all events Ea, Eb, Ec, . . . , En. Hard determinism seems initially, therefore, to be a more rational doctrine. Ironically, however, some fatalists at least entertain the possibility that agents might actually be able to make (unfortunately futile) different choices and efforts to alter what is fated, whereas hard determinists deny that agents are even able to engage in any deliberations, or make any choices or efforts, other than those that are pre-determined. Some hard determinists concede that determinism alone does not rule out the truth of counterfactual hypotheticals about how an agent could have done otherwise had motivational and related conditions been otherwise, but they insist that because agents cannot bring it about that pre-agential conditions are ever otherwise, agents lack any ability to alter the pre-determined future. That is, they think this "ability" is impotent, null. To my understanding, this is a key point of disagreement that differentiates hard from "soft" determinism, which latter view embraces the idea that certain forms of agential control, although determined, render undesirable outcomes sufficiently evitable for purposes of moral responsibility. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 285 moral-responsibility-entailing sense) that we attribute to persons at the level of conventional reality.11 My own view is that, if we assume that dependent origination is deterministic, then the Buddha's teaching should be characterized as "soft determinism," the view that determinism is true, that free will (in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense) is real, and that determinism does not entail inevitability (because knowledge of volitional causes and effects renders undesirable actions and outcomes avoidable). The Buddha rejected the idea that actions are inevitable, and he rejected fatalism on that ground (DN I 249-253).12 Arguably, the Buddha seems to have tacitly accepted a minimalistic sense of "free will" involving wholesome volitional regulation in connection with progress along the Buddhist path. Because mindful volitional regulation fosters mental freedom and mindless unregulated volition fosters mental bondage, I think the Buddha would consider the only relevant type of free will one that involves volitional regulation, as 11 Repetti ("Reductionism"). The meaning of the Buddhist distinction between "ultimate" and "conventional" reality is disputed among most schools of Buddhist thought (Thakchoe, "Truths"), and thus is itself worthy of at least a book-length treatment. A sketch will suffice for now: The distinction maps loosely on the appearance/reality distinction, such that conventional reality is how things appear to the unenlightened mind, namely, they appear to be substantive and independently existing, whereas ultimate reality is how things are independently of conceptualization altogether, namely, they are insubstantial and exist only dependently. The meaning of this distinction will come into greater focus below. 12 Dīgha Nikāya (DN), "Long Discourses." Goodman ("Resentment") rightfully disagrees with the equation of hard determinism and fatalism, because fatalism is acausal, as I noted earlier. However, Harvey ("Freedom") and Federman ("Buddha") each argue forcefully that hard determinism and fatalism share the implication that actions are inevitable, which I also noted earlier, that the Buddha rejected the idea that actions are inevitable, and thus that the Buddha would have rejected hard determinism. 286 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will opposed to the sort of unregulated volitional expression associated with free will in the West-the freedom to do as one pleases or to express one's volitions spontaneously in actions. Regulated volitional expression may be described as "controlled" will and unregulated volitional expression may be described as "unrestrained" or "free" will, where "free" implies "spontaneous." According to Buddhism, it is regulated will that leads to the central Buddhist goal of liberation or mental freedom- freedom precisely from the sort of mental bondage caused by unregulated will.13 There is a related compatibilist sense of "free" will that consists in the will's being proximately controlled by the agent (such as when choices and actions are voluntary, as opposed to involuntary), and a semi-compatibilist sense of "free" will that consists in the will's being reason-responsive (such as when the agent has a moral reason to refrain from a certain action and does so). But reason-responsiveness grounds the designation "free," not based on considerations about whether the will is regulated or unregulated, but on the Kantian idea that moral responsibility implies free will. That is, it is grounded on the idea that "'ought' implies 'can'": if reason-responsiveness is sufficient for moral responsibility, then there is a minimal sense in which the reasonresponsive agent must be able to behave morally, even if the fact that the agent is reason-responsive is determined and thus the agent cannot be truly autonomous in the sense that full-blooded autonomy requires that the agent's choices not be determined. Proximate agential control over the will and reason-responsiveness are, according to compatibilists and semi-compatibilists, respectively, sufficient for purposes of moral responsibility. 13 This line of thought calls to mind an interesting parallel: between unregulated volitional expression as a chief cause of individual suffering and unregulated consumerism as a chief cause of collective suffering, but that is a topic for another inquiry. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 287 Again, the Buddha would likely only consider the type of free will that is relevant to the Buddhist path-and thus the only form of free will that is worth cultivating-that of regulated will, on the one hand, and he would likely consider that type of free will that consists of unregulated will to be antithetical to the Buddhist path, on the other hand. For this reason, in arguing for what I take to be the most reasonable form of free will that is implicitly relevant to Buddhism, I restrict my focus to the relationship between regulated will and mental freedom, because it is only by reference to liberation that any form of free will-even regulated will-becomes relevant to Buddhism at all. Thus, when I refer to the Buddhist notion of free will, I mean the regulated will that is cultivated on the path to liberation. It must be emphasized that this interpretation and emphasis does not necessarily involve the same conception of free will in play in various Western or Buddhist accounts of the subject, not to suggest that there is a single conception of free will in play in both or either. Rather, it is simply the interpretation that I am arguing for, perhaps on slightly revisionist grounds. I think that both the compatibilist and semicompatibilist senses of free will-for example, the will's being proximately controlled by the agent and its being reason-responsive, respectively-may be accounted for in Buddhist terms along the lines of volitional regulation. Most of us, unfortunately but realistically, possess very little of this sort of free will: control over our own volitions. Buddhist practitioners possess it increasingly, however, covariant with their cultivation of mental freedom, and typically through meditative and related cognitive disciplines.14 My review of earlyand middle-period scholarship supports the following remedial distinctions, then. Buddhism differentiates between 14 See Repetti ("Meditation"). 288 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will the agency of āryas (noble persons), that is, Buddhists with some degree of enlightenment (those at the rank of stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners, and Arhats,15 and/or those well established in the strong insight that leads to each of these), on the one hand, and non-āryas, on the other. For ease of reference, I will refer loosely to the latter group as "worldlings."16 Although there are exceptions, worldlings typically possess varying degrees of relatively minimal or merely potential agency, in light of their habitually unrestricted volitional expression, which strengthens mental-bondage-fostering dispositions; Buddhist practitioners, however, cultivate volitional regulation, which increases mental freedom. Because volitional regulation is consistent with determinism, it does not entail "libertarianism," the view that we have free will and that, because free will and determinism are incompatible, determinism is false. Fully enlightened persons enjoy full mental freedom, and even though they transcend ego-volitional behavior, they possess some sort of 15 Stream-enterers have attained the first of the four stages of enlightenment in significantly recognizing the truth of the Dharma and committing to the Buddhist path, oncereturners have attained the second stage in reaching an initial state of spiritual transformation that entails they will reincarnate once more in human form at most before attaining enlightenment, non-returners have attained the third stage in reaching an advanced state of spiritual transformation that entails that they will not reincarnate again in human form before attaining enlightenment, and Arhats have attained the fourth, final stage of full enlightenment. Christopher Gowans ("Philosophy," 13) coined the neologism, "stream-observer," to identify another relevant category: one who is examining the Dharma to see if Buddhism's main claims and soteriological strategies are credible and worthy of pursuit. For the many Western practitioners of Buddhist meditation who seem to be traveling significantly but not fully along the Buddhist path (as an informal experiment that tests the teachings through direct experience), these categories may be fuzzy or overlap. 16 "Worldlings" is restricted to anyone that has not attained the first stage of realization, whether or not they are Buddhist practitioners. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 289 self-regulative control in that they are masters of volitional regulation, arguably a form of free will.17 If they lack ego-volitions, arguably, they perform no actions attributable to them and therefore they are not determined. Here, the word "they" is ambiguous: one sense involves reference to an ontological agent that doesn't exist or function in actions and the other to a psychological agent that does exist and function in actions. Thus, in the psychological sense, "they" do perform actions, technically, such as advising, teaching, walking, and so on, but their actions are impersonal manifestations of compassion, untainted by ego-based 17 This claim may seem puzzling on its face because if there is no longer any illusion about a genuinely existing ontological self or agent, the idea of self-regulation seems impossible. But what is puzzling about it, arguably, might just be our own association with an ontological self: surely an enlightened being can have a highly functional psychological self-effective agency-with no illusions about its ontological status. Buddhist lore is full of such highly effective Arhats and bodhisattvas. Perhaps the intuition is that absent any ego-based (delusional) volition the Arhat is not the causal nexus of her actions, but rather the universe is, not unlike the way spontaneous action is conceived in Daoism: control or regulation, on this view, is only necessary or even possible when there is a perceived conflict between volitions and/or preferences, but in Arhats there cannot be any such conflict. But this seems to overly idealize enlightenment in a way that ignores real possibilities, such as the one illustrated by the Buddhist story of the Arhat who met a close friend of his deceased father's one day who insisted on the monk's drinking with him, to excess (Rinpoche, Chariots, 22), to use just one example. The idea is that even Arhats can be presented with compelling volitions, their own or others', and despite how typically effortless or spontaneous it may be to navigate them, they still need navigating, and sometimes that navigation might have to be nonspontaneous or deliberative. Conceivably, an Arhat could be drugged, and presented with elaborately compelling pressures that require volitional regulation; or a neuroscientist could kidnap the Arhat and insert a remotely-controlled chip in its brain that generates powerful unwholesome volitions. The point is that an Arhat is arguably capable of exercising volitional regulation, should the need ever arise, even if the need typically never arises. By analogy, salt remains soluble even if it will never be submerged in any liquid. 290 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will volition or any ontological-self illusion, and thus they generate no karma. If we assume that dependent origination is sufficiently deterministic, we can call this model of impersonal enlightened action "virtuallylibertarian-soft-determinism" because in the absence of any ontological self there can be nothing to undermine maximally effective psychological agency, the functional equivalent of a psychological self's autonomy in the absence of belief in any ontological self. Enlightened action provides an analogue of the limit case of autonomy that the libertarian thinks obtains and which implies that determinism is false. But this model is consistent with determinism, hence "soft," and thus only virtually libertarian. Buddhist practitioners are typically relatively-softdetermined-by degree, relative to their degree of regulated volitional development. And worldlings are typically virtually-hard-determined-by degree, relative to their largely unregulated volitional underdevelopment and almost utter lack of volitional control-but capable of being relatively-soft-determined upon hearing the Dharma.18 Some key issues remain open following my review of earlyand middle-period scholarship. One is the interpretation and impact of the anātman (non-self) theory, the Buddhist doctrine about the metaphysical/ontological insubstantiality of the self. Until fairly recently, this was a uniquely Buddhist view: what people take to be a substantial and permanent self-essence to a person actually is a mereological (part/whole) fabrication of the aggregates-of form (matter), sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness-that constitute us and account for all our behavior and experiences. Thus, despite the clarification afforded to the 18 Of course, many worldlings cultivate greater degrees of volition regulation ability for non-Buddhist moral, religious, or spiritual reasons, but to the extent that they do there is likely some overlap with the bases of their behavior and the teachings of Buddhism. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 291 issue by the distinction between the psychological and ontological senses of the self, it remains a puzzling question whether something that is a non-self can exhibit self-regulation (volitional control). Some Buddhist philosophers, such as Charles Goodman,19 patently deny that a non-self can have any abilities at all, much less autonomous control over them. Others, such as Mark Siderits,20 think that the "two truths" doctrine enables Buddhists to both deny that there is a substantive self and to assert that persons ordinarily exhibit free will.21 According to this doctrine, often called upon to address philosophical puzzles in Buddhism, at the conventional reality level free will (possibly in the moralresponsibility-entailing sense, but clearly in the volitional regulation sense) matters, but at the ultimate reality level there is no substantive self and thus no (metaphysically real) "agency." Early-period scholarship mostly shares a neutral, middle-path position between "rigid" (hard) determinism and "chaotic" (libertarian) indeterminism that I call "wiggly-determinism" and which I have argued is unsuccessful.22 Goodman,23 one middle-period scholar, simply embraces hard determinism, whereas Siderits,24 another middle-period scholar, adduces a "paleo-compatibilist" position between hard determinism and libertarian indeterminism by parsing each at different levels of reality 19 See Goodman ("Resentment"); see also a critique in Repetti ("Hard Determinism"). 20 See Siderits ("Paleo-compatibilism"); see also a critique in Repetti ("Reductionism"). 21 The "two truths" is another description for the distinction between ultimate and conventional reality. See Thakchoe ("Truths") for an excellent introduction to the complexities of this doctrine. 22 Repetti ("Earlier"). 23 Goodman ("Resentment"). 24 Siderits ("Paleo-Compatibilism"). 292 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will (where the levels are what are compatible). I have argued that Siderits's position amounts, on analysis, to a form of semi-compatibilism.25 Most earlyand middle-period scholars sought a neutral position that might apply to all Buddhist traditions. Most recent-period scholars endorse more tradition-specific non-neutral positions. Nicholas F. Gier and Paul Kjellberg26 show that the Theravāda tradition tends to be compatibilist whereas the Mahāyāna tradition tends to be significantly incompatibilist. Asaf Federman and Peter Harvey agree that the Theravāda tradition is compatibilist. B. Alan Wallace argues that although determinism is incompatible with free will, the anti-realism of the Mahāyāna perspective transcends the dichotomy of free will versus determinism altogether. Let us begin our review of recent-period scholarship with an analysis of the views of Gier and Kjellberg. Gier and Kjellberg: Pā l i versus Mahāyāna Buddhism27 Gier and Kjellberg's intellectually rich contribution to this discussion ("Buddhism") is challenging for two reasons: 28 first, it attempts to en- 25 Repetti ("Reductionism"). 26 Gier and Kjellberg ("Buddhism"). 27 For Western readers new to scholarly Buddhism, Pāli is the language used to inscribe the original Buddhist canon. The Pāli Canon is the only fully surviving early Canon in an Indic language. Parts of other such canons survive in Chinese and Tibetan translation; later Indian Buddhist texts survive mostly in Sanskrit. Theravāda is the surviving form of Pāli Buddhism. Gier and Kjellberg use the term "Pali" (an Anglicized "Pāli") somewhat ambiguously, sometimes to refer to elements of the Pāli Canon, but other times intending what is normally denoted by the term "Theravāda." Because I quote their usage extensively, I will maintain "Pāli" for their use of the term when reviewing but not quoting their ideas. 28 Gier and Kjellberg ("Buddhism"). Journal of Buddhist Ethics 293 gage a Western philosophical audience, and second, it shows how philosophically complex are the issues connected with free will in light of the divergence between earlier and later Buddhist doctrines. Although it may be overly ambitious, it is an important piece because it largely succeeds. Their article is situated within an edited collection of articles on the problem of free will,29 the others of which approach the problem entirely from a Western analytic philosophical perspective, making no significant mention of Buddhism or even of Asian philosophy. Many of Gier and Kjellberg's ideas are directed toward what other contributors to that volume have said. This dimension of their thought helps explain why they address certain matters that might not seem relevant to a Buddhist audience. Gier and Kjellberg open by paraphrasing the Buddha in a way that highlights the complexity of the Buddhist position on free will and moral responsibility: "There is free action, there is retribution, but I see no agent that passes out of one set of momentary elements into another one, except the [connection] of those elements" (277).30 This quotation supports the idea that the Buddha does not deny the sort of voluntary action typically associated with moral responsibility, but simultaneously expresses the paradox that there could be intentional action without any diachronic (non-momentary) agent. There is a prima facie tension between these ideas, but Gier and Kjellberg do not resolve it. They present divergent Buddhist views without choosing among them. All I hope to achieve here is to analyze, elucidate, and pose problems for selective elements of their overview. Engaging with one Western analytic understanding of free will that rests on the distinction between mere desires and preferences (as 29 Campbell, O'Rourke, and Shier (Determinism). 30 Quoting Stcherbatsky (Logic), 133. 294 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will expressed by Keith Lehrer in the same volume but traceable to Harry Frankfurt),31 Gier and Kjellberg argue that the "Buddhist is an agent of her preferences . . . rather than being just a passive victim of her desires" (283). There is something right about one part of this claim, because through mindfulness and related disciplines Buddhists aim to cultivate detachment from-and to a certain extent control over-certain kinds of desires, some of which, from the perspective of the Buddhist path, may be parsed as preferences.32 However, the other part of this claim seems at odds with the Buddha's denial of an agent (in their opening quote), a problem they will address later on.33 They assert that Buddhist "determinism," unlike standard Western interpretations, is not linear: "Buddhist causality . . . is seen as a cosmic web of causal conditions rather than linear mechanical notions of push-pull causation" (283). To them, non-linearity in causality evades the fatalistic sting of linear determinism, according to which event A necessarily and inevitably causes event B, B necessarily/inevitably causes C, C causes D, and so on, leaving no wiggle room for free will. 31 Lehrer ("Freedom"). Earlier on, Frankfurt ("Freedom") differentiated between baselevel desires and higher-order desires, which comes close to the same thing: if I prefer desire D1 over desire D2, then I have a higher-order desire D3 for D1. 32 See Repetti ("Meditation") for a complex development of this idea. 33 Gier and Kjellberg make a number of incautious generalizations in their introductory section. For example, they claim that "While the issue of free will does not arise in Buddhism, it is indisputable that it embraces a universal determinism" (283), but our discussion about the minimalism of conditionality above stands in opposition to this interpretation. In support of their determinism claim, they say Buddhism asserts that "every effect, without exception, has a cause," but nobody doubts this tautology. They must have meant to say every event has a cause, but that claim is neither obviously true, nor universally agreed upon (for example, in quantum mechanics). And, as they will later on acknowledge, some Buddhists view causation in minimalistic terms as a form of conditionality that does not seem deterministic at all. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 295 However, it is doubtful that non-linear causality circumvents inevitability: if everything co-influences everything else, it seems to make more sense to think that each multi-directional causal arrow remains linear than it does to think that things become metaphysically fuzzy, as in wiggly-determinism. On this interpretation, arguably, there are indefinitely many more linear causal arrows in Buddhist causal interdependence than there are in standard determinism. Causal interdependence simply multiplies and over-determines the inevitability of determinism-yielding a kind of multi-directional Buddhist mega-determinism in which every particle/event is maximally necessitated by every other one, rather than an inchoate wiggly-determinism.34 Gier and Kjellberg invoke the early-period Buddhists' wigglydeterminism conception, however, when they quote the Buddha to say that if there were a one-to-one karmic relationship, liberation would be impossible, adding: "They who know causation . . . know the Dharma" 34 Using simple gravitational attraction as an illustration, compare a simple linear determinism whereby event A causes event B, on the one hand, and a complex, interdependent determinism whereby a single particle P exerts a causal-say, gravitational-force on all other particles in the universe while simultaneously all other particles in the universe exert a counter-gravitational force on particle P, and so on for every particle in the universe with respect to every other one, on the other hand. In the simple case where A causes B, there is a straightforward linear direction of influence from A to B, whereas in the interdependence of mutual gravitational influences, there are linear influences from each particle in the universe to and from each other particle in the universe. Although this is a much more complex structure of influences, within this complex structure it is still possible in principle to discern and map linear connections from and to each particle in the universe. It is in this sense that interdependence does not entail nonlinearity or nondeterminism, but rather is consistent with mega-linearity or mega-determinism. The difference, then, is not between a case of linearity versus nonlinearity, but between singular linearity (a single line of causal influence from one particle to another) and multiple linearity (indefinitely many lines of causal influence from all particles onto each particle). 296 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will (284).35 But this interpretation seems to conflate causation with karma. Some Buddhists-some Yogācāra idealists, for example-might argue, however, that because all conditioned phenomena are mind-dependent, they are volitional and hence karmic. Apart from this minority view,36 however, karma appears prima facie to be a subcategory of causation that the Buddha restricted to the volitional: "Volition, intention, O Bhikkhus, is what I call Kamma" (AN III 415).37 Admittedly, however, nothing in the Buddha's quotation here is inconsistent with the Yogācāra view that everything conditioned is conceptualized and thus intentional, volitional, and thus karmic. Gier and Kjellberg seem to acknowledge the more restricted interpretation when they state: "The definition of karma as volitional action is not only good Pali Buddhism but it is also the position of the great Mahayanist philosopher Vasubandhu: 'karma is will (cetanā) and voluntary action (cetayita karanam).'"38 Of course, nothing in this quotation from Vasubandhu is inconsistent with the Yogācāra view either. I cannot resolve these conflicting interpretations here, but I can provide an analysis that will circumvent the disagreement. Thus, the Yogācāra views in question here are that all conditioned phenomena are conceptualization-dependent and that all that is conceptualized involves mental formations (saṃskāras: volitions). Together, these views ground the Yogācāra equation of karma and causation. Alternately put, if causal relations are conceptually embedded and 35 Quoting DN I 249-253. 36 Peter Harvey deems the question whether causation and karma are identical worthy enough to warrant significant critical discussion of the issue based on canonical sources ("Freedom"). 37 Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN), "Further-factored Discourses." 38 Gier and Kjellberg (301 fn. 16), citing Stcherbatsky (Conception), 32. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 297 all conceptualization involves mental formations (volition), then all conditioned or causal phenomena are karmic. From non-Yogācāra Buddhist perspectives as well as from the Western analytic philosophical perspective, not everything that is intentional or mental is volitional because, for example, simple perceptual experiences, such as one expressed by the statement "that blotch is red," are intentional because they are about something other than themselves (this one is about that blotch). But there is no phenomenological element, nor any conceptual implication, in this sort of color-perception-involving intentionality of any kind of volitional constituent, construed as some form of teleology, conation, desire, want, need, aim, end, goal, purpose, and so on.39 Thus, even though everything volitional is intentional (because everything volitional aims at, and thus is about, some object or experience beyond itself), not everything intentional is volitional.40 39 The Yogācāra advocate might argue that, according to the doctrine of interdependent origination, insofar as every experiential item invokes vedanā (the skandha of "feeling" or "feeling tone": positive, negative, or neutral) and every vedanā invokes saṃskāras (volition), it follows that even simply perceiving a red blotch involves volition. I am not sure, however, that Arhats are subject to this, in which case even if it is true of worldlings that color perception invokes volition, it is not true tout court, and thus there is no entailment from color perception to volition or, put differently, there is no interdependence between color perception and volition. More importantly, "neutral" feeling tone is arguably just the absence of feeling tone. 40 However, there may even be exceptions to the claim that all volitional states are intentional because they aim at something beyond themselves. It seems possible to experience non-intentional volitional states, such as cravings or fears that are unspecific, that is, that lack intentional objects or things at which they aim. Indeed, generalized anxiety disorder ("GAD") seems to be one example that has made it to the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, but there are others. Arguably, even if GAD has no object toward which it aims, it may remain intentional in the weaker sense that it is about something, even if what it is about is opaque. 298 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will Let me suggest a simple way to preserve-and thus circumvent the conflict between-the differences between the Yogācāra conceptions of causation as karmic (volitional), on the one hand, and the nonYogācāra Buddhist and Western analytic conceptions of causation as nonkarmic (nonvolitional), on the other. Let us call "volitionalY" (where the superscripted "Y" designates "Yogācāra") the view that all conditioned phenomena and hence all causal phenomena are conceptiondependent, thus intentional/volitional, and thus karmic. Importantly, whether or not everything is volitionalY, there remains a valid distinction between those phenomena that are intentional/volitional in the non-Yogācāra Buddhist and Western analytic senses and those phenomena that are not intentional/volitional in the non-Yogācāra Buddhist and Western analytic senses, which latter phenomena we can call "volitional~Y" (where the superscripted negated "~Y" refers to "non-Yogācāra," and includes other Buddhist and Western conceptions). This distinction holds regardless of whether the Yogācāra view is correct. That is, if the Yogācāra view is correct, then volitional~Y would just be a subset of volitionalY, because not everything that is volitionalY is volitional~Y, though everything that is volitional~Y would be volitionalY. And if the Yogācāra view is incorrect, volitional~Y obviously remains valid independently of the category of volitionalY because the Yogācāra view is the only reason on offer to think everything seemingly nonmental is mental. Thus, it is a separate, open question whether or not everything conditioned or causal is volitionalY. Whether or not everything conditioned or causal is volitionalY, however, it is clear that not everything conditioned or causal is volitional~Y. Likewise, if we use "karmaY" for the Yogācāra conception of karma, and "karmãY" for the non-Yogācāra Buddhist and/or Western analytic conceptions of karma (volition or volitional action), we can say that whether or not everything causal is Journal of Buddhist Ethics 299 karmicY, it is clear that not everything causal is karmic~Y. (I will only use these superscripted suffixes when the text requires them for clarity of intended meaning.) It may be relevant to note that karma may be wiggly in ways in which causation is not. Western philosophers have argued that volitional~Y determinism does not function one-to-one because non-volitional~Y causes can also affect volitional~Y circumstances, just as non-economic causes can also affect economic circumstances.41 Even within Buddhist thought, volitional~Y actions do not invariably lead to precisely the same kind of result, as the present character of a person doing an action also contributes to an effect (AN I 249-53) and future circumstances may affect how and when karmic~Y results arise or their degree of intensity. For example, someone who has become an ārya can no longer be reborn at less than a human level. But none of this suggests that determinism simpliciter runs afoul of one-to-one causal correspondences. Rather, it just enlarges the set of causal conditions to include volitioñY-extrinsic factors, any set of which together would produce identical-linear, oneto-one-results if collectively repeated.42 Shifting gears, Gier and Kjellberg adduce insightful connections between Aristotle's ideas about the mean with the Buddha's similar ideas about the middle path, apply them to the choices of the mindful versus those of the unmindful, and attribute lack of mindfulness both to ascetic and worldling extremes, extremes that were predominant in the Buddha's milieu. They reason that "the mindful ones are free, while the ones tending to either extreme are not" (284). This insightful observation is in accord with my distinction above between relatively-soft and virtuallyhard determinism, respectively. Further adducing insightful connections 41 Davidson (Actions). 42 See note 35 regarding multiply complex causal conditions remaining deterministic. 300 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will with Western philosophy, Gier and Kjellberg incorporate Keith Lehrer's ideas about meta-preferences,43 adding: We can now define Buddhist free agents as . . . free from ego attachment and craving either for ascetic deficiency or indulgent excess, representing karmic bondage rather than karmic freedom. Free and mindful agents . . . can separate desires from cravings. . . . Buddhists believe in 'free action' but have no conception of 'free will', as a selfdetermining power that moral agents somehow possess. (284-285)44 In applying Lehrer's analysis to mindful volitional cultivation, however, they seem implicitly to accept agents' "self-determining" compatibilist power to form and approve volitions. They will acknowledge, shortly, that this conception is plausible within Pāli Buddhism. Their initial resistance to this interpretation owes to the inflated construal of autonomy they attribute to the European conception: "It is a supreme irony that what European philosophers assumed is necessary for true human freedom is actually the cause of its greatest bondage" (285). They are referring to the Western idea that the source of free will is in the conception of the self-ruling agent, a conception that has dominated Western philosophy until fairly recently. They admit, however, that if "autonomy" means not controlled by craving, then Pāli Buddhists would accept the "concept of agent autonomy, where agents learn to control their cravings and act on their preferences" (285). This volition- 43 Lehrer ("Preference"). 44 It should be noted that their remarks here about Buddhist free agents would only apply to those Buddhists who are fully enlightened: Arhats and Buddhas. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 301 regulating model would suffice for a form of Buddhist compatibilism, as I have argued,45 but they do not develop it. Instead, they revisit wiggly-determinism (285-86). Referring to David Kalupahana, they say: "For him Buddhist conditionality represents a middle way between strict determinism and the destruction of freedom . . . and an equally unacceptable indeterminism" (285). They characterize Buddhist causation as summed up in the Buddha's conditionality formula, "When that is present, this comes to be . . ." (286), which they equate with non-linear interdependence, and they insist that the Buddhist focuses on how to eliminate duḥkha (suffering) by eliminating its conditions-something rather linear in the twelve nidānas. Quoting Edward Conze, they state: "If the total number of conditions is unlimited, and most of them are unknown, it is impossible to say which condition of necessity brings about which event" (287).46 In support of this line of thought, one might ask: How can one condition on its own bring about an effect? It seems always to be the case that several conditions are needed, with some of these being necessary conditions. Often what we mean by "the" cause of something is the last condition to fall into place, or perhaps the most significant one. As Buddhaghosa, speaking on the twelve nidānas (in the Visuddhimagga), says, "there is no single or multiple fruit . . . from a single cause; nor a single fruit from multiple causes. . . . But one representative cause and fruit are given in this way, 'with spiritual ignorance as condition are the constructing activities'" (Vism. XVII 106). Notwithstanding Conze's and Buddhaghosa's intuitive claims, complexity and opacity do not entail non-linearity, as I argued above. 45 Repetti ("Meditation"). 46 Conze (146 fn.). 302 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will Indeed, the most threatening version of hard determinism focuses on maximally-complex world-states, such that the entire world-state W1 at time T1 determines W2 at T2 in accordance with all the laws of the universe (say, L1, L2, L3, . . . Ln), collectively, "L": W1 nomologicallynecessitates (or L-necessitates) W2, W2 L-necessitates W3, and so on, and we are powerless to alter this globally-determined sequence.47 But the nomological elements in global-states do not invalidate the linear sequencings that form those global-states: rather, because global world states and their local constituents are interdependent, the whole "interdependent versus linear" dichotomy is a false dichotomy, easily dismissed by describing interdependence as multi-linear. There is another problem with the issue of the causation of world states. Most Buddhists accept mereological (part/whole) reductionism:48 any apparent whole that decomposes to a partite aggregate (a collection of parts) is a mereological fiction. This is classically illustrated in the Milindapañhā with Nāgasena's chariot example: a chariot is nothing above the configuration of parts designated as such relative to our interests. One may object, therefore, that "global" or "world" are the greatest aggregate-based mereological fictions; and because determinism and interdependent co-origination (conditionality) are both global in scope, from the mereological reductionist perspective to which Buddhism is committed, both determinism and conditionality are, on analysis, mereological fictions! The Pāli material, one might reply, focuses more on a small number of conditions-say, twelve (the twelve nidānas)-for any state, in which case the Pāli theorist might reject the global interpretation of dependent origination. However, both mereological reductionism and 47 See van Inwagen (Essay). 48 Siderits (Persons). Journal of Buddhist Ethics 303 the no-self doctrine extend to all conditioned phenomena, which are thus "empty"-lacking inherent natures, independently existing essences, or ontologically objective lines of demarcation that could individuate entities (parts/wholes) in ultimate reality. Certain Abhidharma atomists who assert that at the ultimate reality level there are impartite psychophysical atoms are an exception.49 However, being able to individuate psychophysical atoms is not the same as being able to block laws about their aggregation-level behavior in the form of world-states (or, on a much smaller scale, in the form of mental states), at least not at the level of ultimate reality, where everything is interdependent. If everything is interdependent, then nothing is independent of anything else, and thus every putative atom is really just an aspect of the globally interconnected totality.50 Nonetheless, suppose we reject "global" but retain the nomological connections between all interdependent conditions (C1, C2, . . . Cn),51 collectively, "C," that jointly constitute the world-aggregate W1 at time T1 and jointly cause event E1 under L at T2. But all events (E1, E2, . . . En), collectively, "E," at T2 that constitute aggregate-W2 are caused by C. So, C produced E (aggregate-W1 caused aggregate-W2), which means C1, C2, and so on, simultaneously produced E1, E2, and so on. Even so, this analysis does not obliterate the linear determinism that obtains between aggregate-W1 and aggregate-W2 (such that it is a law that W1's cause W2's) or 49 For a relevant discussion of Abhidharma atomism, see Siderits (Persons). 50 In fairness, this line of objection ought to be directed more at Buddhism than at Gier and Kjellberg's attempt to articulate it. 51 These may be psychophysically atomic conditions, if Abhidharma is correct, or quantum potentialities, if physics is correct, or both, if both are accurate descriptions of the same phenomena under different modes of presentation, as an East/West convergence metaphysician like B. Alan Wallace might put it (Dimensions). For purposes of the line of reasoning in the text, however, it does not matter which interpretation is correct. 304 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will that might still obtain between each element of C and each element of E (for example, between C1 and E1, C2 and E2, and so on). The same holds for the indefinitely-many cause/effect pairs that constitute any two successive aggregate-world-states,52 even if every psychophysical atom or quantum-energy-unit causes effects in, and is causally affected by, every other psychophysical atom or quantum-energy-unit in the same instant. Thus, interdependence makes possible indefinitely-many more linear causal pairs for determinism-yielding a mega-linear-determinism!53 Moving away from the issue of causation, Gier and Kjellberg turn to the Pāli conception of the self as a process. As we shall see when we turn to our review of the accounts of Asaf Federman and of Peter Harvey, most scholars who see the Pāli conception of the self as a mere process rather than as an entity consider the Pāli conception to be deflationary. However, Gier and Kjellberg's characterization seems somewhat inflated, for they say that the Pāli self is depicted as "a robust personal agent fully capable of maintaining its personal integrity and taking full responsibility for its actions" (289). Their implicit support for this somewhat inflated description seems to contrast with a more minimalistic conception of the self they will describe shortly in connection with Mahāyāna Buddhism. 52 However, recalling the Buddhaghosa quote in the text above, dependent origination is not about one thing, on its own, being the cause of another. For example, although it is said that craving is dependent on feeling, this only applies to unenlightened beings that still have ignorance. Thus, the same putative cause does not have the same effect (in beings at different stages along the path). All things considered, if dependent origination is not deterministic, then there simply is no problem in Buddhism analogous to that posed by determinism for free will in Western philosophy. If dependent origination is either not deterministic or not coextensive with determinism, and determinism is true, then Buddhism simply has to come to grips with it. 53 This criticism, too, is not directed specifically at Gier and Kjellberg, but rather to any Buddhists who embrace a wiggly determinism. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 305 In further dissecting the idea of a free agent, they deny a Buddhist notion of "the will" but emphasize cetanā (volition). They claim the Pāli conception of the person involves a middle-way posit between nihilist (anātman: the negation of the existence of a self) and eternalist (ātman: soul, conceived as eternal) extremes, and they conclude that Pāli Buddhism "falls under the general rubric of compatibilism and 'soft' determinism" (289). I agree with many of their claims, but their supports for these claims are mostly scattered and inexplicit. In the remainder of their analysis, Gier and Kjellberg focus on Mahāyāna sources, mainly Nāgārjuna. After outlining three standard arguments (impermanence, reductionism, and insubstantiality) for the insubstantial view of the self, they paraphrase Nāgārjuna, stating "if we cannot say that the self really exists, by the same token we cannot say that the self really does not exist" (291). They do not explain here why it would be a mistake to assert or deny the self, though in their subsequent discussion they seem to be laying out an understanding of Nāgārjuna's thought on the basis of which the reader may surmise the explanation. Based only on their presentation, however, that understanding is not obvious, although this difficulty likely owes more to Nāgārjuna's ideas than to Gier and Kjellberg's attempts to explicate them. Instead, Gier and Kjellberg problematize the very Pāli/Mahāyāna distinction that is the target of their work: The Pali versus Mahayana distinction is now not very helpful, so henceforth we will distinguish between 'constructive postmodernism' (CPM) and a skeptical 'deconstructive postmodernism' (DPM). . . . CPM is generally realist and supportive of the canons of logic and evidence, while DPM rejects realism and any logocentric methodology. Nagarjuna is a consummate logician and 306 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will never rejects logic as a standard, so this obviously causes problems for any DPM reading of him. (291-292) Although this somewhat anachronistic juxtaposition is insightful, and although these differences promise to be explanatory regarding the Buddhist free will issue, Gier and Kjellberg draw from them no explicit conclusion about Buddhism and free will. This supports my impression, suggested earlier, that they are simply surveying important elements of terrain that need to be charted in order to fully explicate the Buddhist understanding of free will. This seems helpful, as far as it goes.54 On a more interesting note, they suggest "that the phrase 'phenomenal self' be used for the Pali tradition and CPM interpretation while reserving 'conventional' as a placeholder term for the deluded self who thinks it lives in a real world of interdependent things and events" (292).55 This implies that there is a three-truth-levels division consisting of: (1) ultimate; (2) conventional, the relatively deluded perspective of the worldling; and (3) an intermediate reality level, the relatively nondeluded perspective of the ārya.56 After raising this trifurcation, they claim that because Pāli Buddhists have a realist concept of truth, they can embrace compatibilism, but the explanation for this claim, like many 54 Recall that their article was written as the only non-Western piece for an edited collection of otherwise all Western views on free will. 55 Presumably, they meant not "interdependent" but "independent." It should be noted that their use of "conventional" here is somewhat non-representative. 56 This trifurcation resembles the Pudgalavādin (person-affirming) view (Priestly, "Pudgalavāda"), but is arguably equivalent to a two-fold ultimate/conventional parsing where the conventional divides in two; there may be valid or invalid conventional views. It is uncertain how many Pudgalavādins there have been overall, although they constituted roughly a quarter of the Indian Saṅgha (the Buddhist monastic community) around the time of the conventions that led to the inscribing of the Pāli Canon, so the casual dismissal of their interpretation among many contemporary exegetes is not necessarily warranted. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 307 others, is left to the reader to surmise from their subsequent remarks- in this case remarks about Mahāyāna anti-realism that implicitly contrast with Pāli realism. For example, they suggest that if the correct view of self is the Mahāyānist's thoroughly-conventional self (recall, they reserve the term "conventional" for the deluded self),57 "then to ask whether it is free or determined is like asking 'what is the sound of one hand clapping?'" (293). However, not all illusions or falsehoods are equal, nor are they equally mysterious or paradoxical. According to such diverging theorists as Peter Harvey and Mark Siderits,58 the "deluded self" exists as much as anything else, though its deluded projection posits a non-existing thing. Further sketching important elements of terrain, Gier and Kjellberg discuss Nāgārjuna's assertion of the interdependence of agent and action. Nāgārjuna's idea is that there cannot be an agent without an action or a potter without pot-making: the items in these pairs are interdependent and cannot exist independently of their other pair members. 57 Does this mean that to believe in self is a thorough delusion? They do not say, but this is not obviously a pan-Mahāyānist view of the self. 58 Harvey (communication, April 2013); Siderits (Persons). However, as Dan Cozort has emphasized (communication, July 2013), this interpretation is not shared among all Mādhyamikas (followers of Mādhyamaka, the Mahāyāna "middle way" philosophy, first clearly articulated by Nāgārjuna, between the extremes of the eternalism of ātman and the nihilism of anātman). Thus, although Bhavaviveka (a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika) would say that an inherently existent self exists conventionally, Candrakīrti (a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika) and his followers would say that it does not, because such a self has no basis of designation. The example of the rope mistakenly taken for a snake illustrates for Bhavaviveka that the rope-snake exists conventionally, but for Candrakīrti, there is no rope-snake, just a rope mistaken for a snake. Nothing about a rope, on his view, could be the basis of designation for a snake. Given these divergent interpretations that bear importantly on the understanding of the self, there is no "Buddhist view" of the self. 308 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will However, one may object that there is an unequal direction to the interdependence: pot-making does not make the person a potter, even if in the process of pot-making the person expresses or manifests that she is-and, perhaps if for the first time, she thereby becomes-a pot-maker. The person is a potter only when making a pot.59 In concluding this agent/action discussion, Gier and Kjellberg state: "Normally we assume there has to be a self or agent in order for there to be freedom, but this is just the presumption the skeptical Nagarjuna questions" (297). Is this meant to imply that they take Nāgārjuna to solve the free will issue, or to dissolve it? This is an important question, but they do not even raise it explicitly, much less suggest an answer to it. Instead, they simply problematize the issue, raising further complications regarding the self and the no-self views, existence and nonexistence, the four-cornered negation, and so on-all suggestive of but lacking explicit explanation, and all supporting my view that they are simply identifying terrain rich in explanatory potential. For example, Gier and Kjellberg state: "If we cannot call the karmic web free since it lacks a self, by the same token we cannot call it determined, since nothing outside of it is causing it" (297). But the opposite conclusion makes more sense: without agency in the karmic web, the only thing that could explain web-activity is that it is, or its components are, determined. This raises the question whether their reasoning about self-lacking karmic webs applies to enlightened persons, who are in some sense self-lacking. It seems that agentless enlightened persons might still have karmic "webs," even though they are not entangled in 59 This objection resembles a similar objection about the direction of explanation that Socrates pressed on Euthyphro about the latter's idea that piety is whatever is loved by the gods. Socrates seemed to think that an action's being loved by the gods does not explain why the gods love the action, but rather that the gods love the action because it already is pious, even if it is correct that whatever is pious is also thereby loved by the gods. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 309 them and even if "their" past karma continues to unfold; only egovolitional unenlightened beings are web-entangled. One could say that the web of conditions that constitutes an enlightened being lacks a separate self or a deluded sense of one. Because that being/web is in form and all form is conditioned, that being/web is causally determined (karmically or not). But nothing that determines it does so in a freedom-undermining manner, at least not on certain compatibilist models according to which the absence of freedom-undermining influences plays a constitutive role in ascriptions of free will. According to Harry Frankfurt, for example, weakness or failure of will is impossible without a separate meta-volitional system in which there is metavolition/action discord-for example, when the agent identifies with a metavolition to the effect that a particular volition should succeed in governing or leading to action, but the meta-volitionally-approved volition fails to do so.60 My impression of nirvāṇa is that because it entails the extinction of the Arhat's identification with volitions, it arguably eliminates the possibility of meta-volitional/volitional discord. It is not clear that enlightened persons lack volitions altogether, for it seems plausible that they experience physiological states like thirst, aversion to physical pain, and the like, and in their boundless altruism and compassion they seem to intend the welfare of all sentient beings. Presumably, however, they are not attached to any of these intentions. Indeed, as 60 Frankfurt ("Freedom"). Some interpretations of enlightened beings move in the opposite direction. For example, according to Peter Harvey, enlightened beings are said to have a "great" or "developed" self, that is, a strong, calm, self-contained personality. See Harvey (Selfless), chapter 3 and (Buddhism), 62. According to Harvey B. Aronson (Practice), Buddhism denies an ontological self, not a psychological self, and seeks to destroy the delusion of an ontological self while strengthening the psychological self. (I owe this observation to Dan Cozort in a communication, July 2013.) This interpretation resonates well with Harvey's account ("Freedom"), Federman's account ("Buddha"), and my own account ("Meditation"). 310 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will Christopher Gowans has argued, they are not even attached to the Dharma (Philosophy 59-60). Although it is not clear whether Buddhism would accept this possibility, consider for the sake of argument that there are certain unenlightened beings such as insects and other primitive life forms that constitutionally seem to lack any sort of self-sense because they lack sufficiently complex mental states.61 These creatures are completely stimulus/response determined by exogenous conditions impinging upon their endogenous conditions in accordance with natural laws. If there is no self-sense, they must be exogenously determined. Humans, except 61 One reason Buddhists might resist this possibility is that all unenlightened sentient beings are thought to experience hedonic states and to be conditioned by ignorance, attraction, and aversion-primary conditions of the self-sense. It is not clear that the Buddhist conception of the self-sense requires an explicit, conscious, or Cartesian thought of the form "I am," as, perhaps, an anthropocentric animal psychologist might require. Another possible source of resistance might be the widespread Buddhist belief that non-humans lack the sort of full-fledged intentions that define typical human mental states and that are necessary to accumulate karma. My intuitions run counter to this idea because it seems that although instinctive or not-fully-conscious behaviors are possible without intentions, no actions are possible without some intention, and many nonhuman animals engage in what appears to be teleological or goal-oriented and thus intentional behavior-actions. I cannot imagine how animal reincarnation is possible without karma (and all karma-action-is intentional). But it strikes me as though the issue whether nonhumans have volitions is independent of the issue of their having any kind of self-sense whatsoever, as it seems intuitive that there may be some sort of rudimentary sense of self in any sentient beings that are pain-aversive. For evidence and argument in support of the view that all vertebrates and many if not most invertebrates have intentions and rudimentary self-sense, see DeGrazie (Animal), chapters 3 and 4. The point in this line of thought is that although the description of enlightened beings as sentient beings lacking a self-sense presumably picks out something true of enlightened beings, insofar as sentient beings lacking a self-sense conceivably includes unenlightened beings as well, this description is too inclusive and thus inadequate as a definition. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 311 perhaps those who are enlightened, have elaborate self-sense systems.62 Gier and Kjellberg try to explain this asymmetry: To the extent that people identify a self, that self is determined by causes outside of it. The more cultivated they become on the Buddhist model, the less they think this way. The less who think this way? A question that the European philosopher might ask. Nagarjuna's answer is, no one, really. The nonpersonal web of causes and conditions sheds the delusion, or, rather, ceases to give rise to it. (297)63 However, the mystery of how impersonal webs both cause and dissolve delusions needs an explanation. Gesturing toward an explanation, Gier and Kjellberg continue: Thus, you get the seemingly paradoxical lines from, for instance, the Diamond Sutra, that 'even though infinite beings have been saved, none have been saved.' Thus while we would assume that there has to be a self in order 62 The reason for my cautious tone is that if Aronson is right in his claim that enlightened beings do not lack a psychological sense of self but only lack the illusion that this integrated set of psychological functions constitutes, reflects, or manifests an ontological self (Buddhist Practice), however, then the descriptor, sentient beings lacking a selfsense, would not even apply to enlightened beings. 63 However, Gier and Kjellberg are not maintaining their own distinctions, for if, as they say earlier, the "self" they mention in their first sentence in this quote is a delusion, then there is no "it" to be determined. It should be emphasized that although it is a philosophically legitimate question whether animals have intentions, karma, and/or a self-sense, as suggested earlier Buddhists mostly have assumed non-humans do not have the ability to form intention. The Jatakas have many stories of animals performing virtuous acts, but these are standardly taken not literally, but metaphorically. 312 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will for there to be freedom, Nagarjuna would say that there is freedom only to the extent that there is not a self. (297) As astute as is their identification and analysis of this problematic dimension of the issue, it rests on a simplistic equation of the lack of a selfsense with liberation, on the one hand, and it ignores the crucial distinction between psychological and ontological senses of the self, on the other hand. Gier and Kjellberg suggest that the presence of a self-sense is what constitutes bondage, and its absence freedom, but if nobody ultimately exists, who experiences the self-sense? Who is bound? It may be objected that the Diamond Sutra remark states or embraces the wasp/Buddha puzzle, but does not explain or resolve it. Applying Aronson's distinction between psychological and ontological conceptions of self (Practice), I have hinted at a way to explain the Diamond Sutra remark and the wasp/Buddha puzzle by reference to the presence of a delusional sense of an ontological self in the unenlightened and the absence of a delusional sense of an ontological self in the enlightened, together with the presence of a functioning psychological self-the highly-integrated functionality of the five skandhas ("aggregates": form, sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness)-in both the unenlightened and the enlightened, but this is only a sketch. On this interpretation, "the "I am' conceit" is the delusional sense of an ontological self. Nonetheless, this is a deeply puzzling issue, so it is no reflection on Gier and Kjellberg that they do not explicitly resolve the puzzle, but instead simply point toward its solution. The issue may be thought to boil down to an empirical question: whether creatures that only experience pleasure and pain and attraction and aversion thereof, respectively, have "the 'I am' conceit." Arguably, "the 'I am' conceit" requires something on the level of a Cartesian thought, but it is doubtful all merely sentient beings have the requisite Journal of Buddhist Ethics 313 psychological complexity. It is possible that some sentient beings even lack hedonic states at all, despite their ability to detect changes in their organism/environment field. Gier and Kjellberg claim that the principal culprit in suffering is belief in a real self (ātman), which belief "gives rise to desires that are ultimately unsatisfiable precisely because no such self exists" (297). Conceivably, this complex way of conceptualizing the issue might diverge from something much more primitive: there may be a conceptually simple or pre-conceptual form of a delusional sense of self. But belief in a kind of self-nature is a sophisticated psychological achievement, however ill-conceived it may be-an achievement presumably beyond the cognitive scope of many species of sentient beings. This critical line of thought, too, aims more at Buddhism per se than at Gier and Kjellberg's attempts to explain it. Nevertheless, a nonBuddhist might ask, how does a non-entity (like phlogiston) generate beliefs-that it, a nobody, somehow believes-that generate desires that belong only to the non-entity (as opposed to another non-entity such as the Buddha), without an intentional agent, as per Nāgārjuna's insistence about no action without an agent? What may be said on behalf of the Buddhist view here (which Gier and Kjellberg do not articulate) is that there is no real self, but the skandhas-within which the belief arises (and in connection with which there are volitional and related implications and consequences)-are not non-entities. The Buddha's exposition about dependent origination-in particular, about the way the twelve nidānas operate-is meant to suffice here: these ultimately impersonal factors operate in such a way that the illusory self-sense arises, grasps, and so forth. Perhaps implying that the self-issue has been adequately problematized, Gier and Kjellberg shift focus and claim that because the aim of Buddhism is to eliminate the self, the Mahāyānist rejects personal enlightenment because that reifies the self. They elevate the ideal of the 314 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will bodhisattva, one who seeks enlightenment for the sake of others (298). But the links in this line of their reasoning are somewhat cryptic, so let us pause to reflect on the idea of eliminating the self, on one hand, the idea of seeking enlightenment for the sake of others, on the other hand, and on the idea that these are supposed to be related as well. First, let us discuss the idea of eliminating the self. The way Gier and Kjellberg discuss the elimination of the self is somewhat misleading, as we have already seen. In Buddhism a key aim is to directly know that everything is non-self (not a permanent, substantial self), and this insight is taken to lead to the elimination of the deluded view of being such a self, and to the elimination of "the 'I am' conceit" and its effects: selfimportance, self-centeredness, ego-volition, and so on. This differs from the way Gier and Kjellberg speak-as if there is a self and it is to be eliminated. Let us now discuss their bodhisattva claim, and how this relates to their idea of eliminating the self. If bodhisattvas-or āryas or worldlings, for that matter-are ultimately non-autonomous non-entities, a skeptic may ask how can "they" bring it about that they attain or control anything for anyone's sake? Whether one is a worldling, ārya, or bodhisattva doesn't seem to make a difference here. Arguably, paradoxical wisdom implicit in the Diamond Sutra could explain these apparent contradictions, but as presented by Gier and Kjellberg they remain mere hints of transcendent wisdom. Let us try to further spell out what they seem to imply. As Aronson has made clear (Buddhist Practice), Buddhism differentiates between ontological and psychological models of the self, and it denies the existence of a certain type of ontological self, defined in various ways (substantial, inherently existent, unchanging, essence-bearing, independent, and so on), but it does not deny the psychophysical processes that generally constitute us-it does not deny self tout court. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 315 Those ultimately impersonal psychophysical processes-the skandhas- are erroneously taken to be indicative of an ontological self, and it is that false consciousness that vanishes upon enlightenment. The bodhisattva ideal is thought by some to be soteriologically superior insofar as its altruistic orientation renders it less likely to motivate practitioners by a false ontological sense of self that might be engendered by seeking the end of one's own suffering. Most Buddhists who favor both approaches would agree that enlightenment is attained when the false ontological conception of self is eliminated-not when the psychological self is eliminated. Because the crucial difference between enlightened and unenlightened beings is, on my analysis, the absence or presence of belief in a false ontological sense of self, and the object of that belief-the ontological self-does not exist, although beings attain enlightenment when the false ontological sense of self is eliminated, in ultimate reality there are no ontological selves who attain enlightenment. Because actions occur without any ontological selves to author them, there is no contradiction in the idea that practitioners-who are, in ultimate reality, nothing over and above the collection of the skandhas-can "do" things that lead to their enlightenment. Gier and Kjellberg do a fine job of surveying the many problematic and puzzling terrains of Buddhist doctrine and its divergent interpretations that need charting by any cartographer of the Buddhist understanding of free will. They seem to conclude that Pāli Buddhism is compatibilist but naïve, and that Mahāyāna Buddhism transcends the free will issue and linear determinism, and is more plausible; but many of their more detailed claims are sketchy and many of their more pointed arguments are inconclusively suggestive. But they do importantly introduce and emphasize major differences in view among Pāli and Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophers. 316 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will Let us turn now to review how scholars on both sides of the Pāli/Mahāyāna divide interpret the issues Gier and Kjellberg discuss. Let us begin with the earlier, Pāli views, as expressed by Asaf Federman and Peter Harvey, beginning with Federman's account. Federman: The Buddha Taught (Theravādin) Compatibilism? Asaf Federman's article is entitled, "What Kind of Free Will Did the Buddha Teach?"64 Of course, because the Buddha never explicitly discussed "free will" or "determinism," technically he never taught any kind of "free will." Citing many canonical passages, Federman argues that the Buddha had a "deflationary" conception of volition such as is found in the thinking of Daniel Dennett, and he concludes, basically, that Dennett-style compatibilism is "what the Buddha taught." Federman first differentiates "inflated" and "deflated" conceptions of agency. His "inflated" model involves a contracausal, acausal, or transcendent ability that exempts agency from the physical domain and that he considers inconsistent with determinism. The problem with this view, however, is that it makes light the Buddhist acceptance of things nonphysical: the inconsistency is with the physicalism implicit in the standard interpretation of determinism, not with determinism per se, for insofar as Buddhism avers that dependent origination applies to all conditioned phenomena and that some conditioned phenomena are nonphysical, it leaves open the possibility that causality applies to the nonphysical. Federman's "deflated" model involves a natural ability to 64 Published in 2010, but a draft was presented at a 2007 conference. Wallace refers to an online version of the paper as a later version (relative to the conference). I review Federman's 2010 publication prior to Harvey's 2007 or Wallace's 2008 publications because both reference Federman's 2007 draft. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 317 reflect on desires, make intelligent choices, act accordingly, and evade undesirable outcomes, and that he considers consistent with determinism. The problem with this view, conversely, is that it makes light of the Buddhist view of the ultimate insubstantiality of the self or agent and thus, arguably, is not deflated enough. Because Federman is advocating for a Theravāda-based view here, perhaps this is what Gier and Kjellberg had in mind when they stated that the Pāli self is depicted as "a robust personal agent fully capable of maintaining its personal integrity and taking full responsibility for its actions" ("Buddhism" 289). Federman offers two corresponding definitions of free will. The inflated version "defines free will as a power that belongs in the soul, transcends the physical, and has ultimate control over the body" (3).65 Although this sounds very much like libertarianism, Federman does not mention this standard term here. The deflated version "defines free will as the agent's ability to control action in conformity with will, when there are no constraints that limit performance" (3). Although this sounds very much like soft determinism, Federman does not use this standard term either. Let us call these two models of free will "inflated-FW" and "deflated-FW." A problem with Federman's eschewing inflated-FW is that because the Buddha seems committed to the view that non-physical mental factors causally control actions, physical movements and the like, Buddhism would not obviously be required to reject inflated-FW on that ground alone. From a Buddhist perspective, that something is nonphysical does not entail that it exists outside the causal nexus. Buddhism would reject the idea that non-physical mental factors that causally 65 By "transcends the physical," Federman means it is immaterial in the Cartesian sense. However, not all libertarians are dualists or immaterialists. See, for example, Kane ("Pathways"). 318 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will control physical movements and the like inhere in an ontologically substantive, independently existing, essence-possessing soul, but it would be open to accept a deflated or minimalistic conception of the non-physical psychological processes that constitute the psychological self and to attribute to them a causal control over actions and certain bodily behaviors associated with them, which analysis might equate with a minimalistic form of libertarianism or partly-inflated-FW. However, it is difficult for non-Buddhists to take seriously the idea that the nonphysical remains causal. For example, monists reject dualism because it is exceedingly difficult to imagine how anything non-physical like a mind or soul could causally interact with anything physical like a brain or body. A potential problem with endorsing deflated-FW is that very young children and even wild animals appear to have it, for they can choose where to run. Harry Frankfurt characterizes this (deflated-FW) as freedom of action rather than freedom of the will, the latter of which involves volitional regulation ("Freedom"). On his analysis, for example, an animal can run in the direction it desires to run, controlling its action in conformity with its will, but is not an "agent" (in the moral-responsibilityentailing sense at issue in the Western discussion of free will), nor does it exhibit freedom of the will unless it has the sort of will it wants to have- that is, its effective desires (those that succeed in leading to actions) accord with its meta-volitions (its higher-order volitional preferences). Thus, if deflated-FW is mere freedom of action, then it is over-inclusive, too weak. Another problem with deflated-FW involves the no-self doctrine. If there is no such thing as an agent, then Federman's description, "the agent's ability to control action in conformity with will," is too strong. This raises the problematic question whether "impersonal agency" may be explicated coherently under Federman's Theravādin interpretation of Journal of Buddhist Ethics 319 Buddhism. A thermostat is no agent, but it exhibits proximal control over a heating system: set to 72o, the thermostat controls the states of the heating system to maintain 72o, but lacks free will because it is unable to alter its own settings-that is, it is unable to bring about what Frankfurt might describe as having the temperature setting it wants to have (analogous to having the will it wants to have), as opposed to controlling the heating system in accordance with its temperature setting (analogous to Federman's criterion of controlling action in conformity with will). Its setting is not "up to" it, so to speak, but freedom of the will entails that our choosing from among our desires which ones we approve of and act on is "up to" us in some important-even if inchoate-sense. Federman says that the "more accurately one represents reality and imagines possibilities, the more freedom one has" (9), but a Wi-Fi cyborg-thermostat that can detect subtle variances in temperature throughout a sky-riser and analyze online a vast array of possible subroutines regarding the most efficient blend of solar, oil, and gas heating alternatives relative to current and projected market prices would therefore have more "free will" than an ordinary thermostat. In our case more of the command chain is located within our brains (we alter our own settings, in some sense), but in both cases scientists and Buddhists agree that all causal command chains are ultimately exogenous and impersonal, and nothing in our behavioral system exhibits ultimate endogenous control, what might be described as our volitional lives being ultimately up to us. Nonetheless, the snail and the thermostat satisfy deflated-FW. Thus, inflated-FW is too strong, and deflated-FW is too weak. These problematic edges of the discussion aside, Federman's main argument is sound, boiling down to the following four premises, illustrating astute canonical excavation and exegesis: 1. The Buddha rejected the idea that we exist outside the causal nexus (6); 320 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will 2. The Buddha rejected the idea that the will is impotent (9); 3. The Buddha advocated that by making the right choices, we can progress toward enlightenment (10); and 4. The Buddha asserted that everything is dependently originated (11). These four premises lead to Federman's implied conclusion: 5. Therefore, the Buddha taught compatibilism (deflated-FW) (passim). Federman's argument for a Buddhist theory of free will is one of the most plausible among those I have reviewed,66 despite those weaknesses noted above. For instance, assuming the Buddha held 1-4 does not guarantee that he held or "taught" what Federman asserts in 5. To insist that because one holds beliefs P and Q one must also believe that P and Q are compatible is to commit Barnhart's fallacy.67 If 5 were expressed more cautiously, for example, "What the Buddha taught is consistent with compatibilism," then Federman's argument would be much stronger. In his brief review of Mark Siderits's proposals, Federman scrutinizes his two truths approach, stating "Although he argues that in Buddhism personal freedom and psychological determinism relate to each other like 'two ships passing in the night,' he admits that the Buddhist rejection of ātman practically cancels the possibility of free will" (2).68 66 See Repetti ("Early"; "Reductionism"; "Hard Determinism"). 67 Named after Michael Barnhart, who noted (in conversation) that Asian philosophers sometimes exhibit "a blissful maintenance of contradictory beliefs," in which case it is fallacious to assume they believe they are compatible. See Repetti ("Reductionism"). 68 The embedded quote is from Siderits ("Beyond"). See Repetti ("Reductionism") for a critical review of Siderits's complex attempt to use the two truths doctrine to parse Journal of Buddhist Ethics 321 Federman reasons that, "although the Buddhist doctrine of not-soul rejects the idea of ultimate self-control, this does not lead to denying that people control their behavior and choose their actions" (2). However, Siderits does not deny choice, but only that persons exist ultimately. The deflated-FW view-that anyone who makes choices, does what they want to do, and exhibits proximal control over what they do (for instance, they raise their arm when they want to) has free will-appears to be a form of "naïve autonomism," which on analysis very much resembles Frankfurt's freedom of action (as opposed to freedom of the will, the meta-volitional ability to have the will one wants to have).69 Rats, snails, and thermostats exhibit elements of naïve autonomism; therefore, deflated-FW is not sufficiently fine-grained to represent the sort of free will-in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense-that we have in mind in philosophical discussions of free will. In his brief review of Gier and Kjellberg's proposals, Federman says that their work "leads to an unsatisfying conclusion: that Buddhism is silent about free will because its conceptual toolkit is different from the modern toolkit" (2). However, the toolkit claim is only in Gier and Kjellberg's introduction. Federman ignores the bulk of the groundwork they lay for the very Pāli compatibilism he espouses, significant elements of which I have reviewed above. libertarian free will as conventional and determinism as ultimate, claiming that there is no self at the level at which determinism holds. 69 Frankfurt ("Freedom"). Although it is true that Frankfurt is much more well known for his article rejecting hard determinism ("Alternate") than he is for his article sketching his own model of the implied default (compatibilist) position thereafter ("Freedom"), it is, to my lights, a major oversight that few scholars have taken seriously his identification of the relative importance of freedom of the will versus the relative unimportance of freedom of action, as even my few remarks about this distinction here seem to amply illustrate. 322 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will Turning to his own analysis, Federman says that the idea that a Cartesian "non-physical agent imposes freedom on a closed causal system contradicts essential aspects of scientific thought" (5), but he ignores canonical passages that make reference to contracausality, psychic powers, astral worlds, and related Buddhist ideas about the existence of non-physical items (Kalupahana 21-23, 40-44, 114-115) that likewise seem prima facie to run afoul of "a closed causal system" and equally "contradict essential elements of scientific thought."70 The idea that non-physical mental conditions could have causal influences on physical items might violate the physicalist's principle of the closure of the physical domain, but it does not violate any principle of Buddhist thought. Arguably, Buddhism accepts a principle of closure of the psychophysical domain. Thus, the idea that a Cartesian ego-which Federman rightly likens unto an ātman-could influence matter is not antithetical to Buddhism on that ground, but only on the ground that Buddhism rejects the notion of that particular type of non-physical entity. Federman says, "Unlike some libertarian positions that emphasize only the freedom of action, Buddhist liberty primarily refers to the mind being free from what binds it" (10). There is an important distinction between Buddhist mental freedom and freedom of action, but libertarianism does not emphasize freedom of action-rather, on my analysis above, Federman's deflated-FW does. An irony here is that some libertarians believe they possess freedom of the (non-physical) mind from the bonds of (physical) determinism in a way that could be consistent with what I suggested above about the Buddhist acceptance of a principle of 70 Buddhism arguably sees all these as arising according to conditions as well, but whether Buddhism holds that nonphysical conditions are subject to the same sorts of causal laws or mechanisms is not clear, and whether or not this undermines the idea that the doctrine of dependent origination is to be construed as deterministic seems problematic at least, and an remains an open question at best. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 323 closure for the psychophysical domain. When the Buddha converses with celestial beings (SN I 1, I 23-31, II 6, II 17), for example, this suggests mind can operate outside the physical domain. Standard Buddhist arguments against the coherence of the notion of a causally inert ātman ground the idea that there is a distinction in Buddhism between causally potent psychic phenomena, such as saṃskāras, and the causally inert soul. Of course, a Buddhist can claim that dependent origination-however it is to be understood- extends to every dimension of conditioned phenomena, heaven worlds and the like included. But whether it makes sense for non-Buddhists to think that laws determine non-physical things-when our model for laws is that of necessary relations between physical states-is another question. One may object that most of the nidānas (causal links) of dependent origination are mental in nature, but this seems only to highlight the need for an account of the nature of mental causation clear enough to know whether or not it is simultaneously physical and deterministic. Intuitively, it seems not to be, if there are celestial beings, or if reincarnation is not necessarily simultaneous with death, such that beings exist in non-physical (post-mortem, pre-reincarnational) realms. Of course, if all that exists are aggregates of psychophysical atoms, as Abhidharma Buddhism posits, then perhaps they can function equally on a nonphysical level that is nonetheless causal, just as they apparently do on the physical level, given their two-fold natures. Although it is worthwhile to note these problems with Buddhist metaphysics and their possible solutions, we cannot resolve them here. Instead, let's characterize Buddhist mental freedom in negative terms by the absence of mental bondage or constraint, the maximum satisfaction of which is in the enlightened being's liberation in nirvāṇa; let's call this kind of nirvāṇa-based freedom "nirvāṇa-F," in line with our abbreviations 324 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will for deflated free will ("deflated-FW") and inflated free will ("inflatedFW"). Federman discusses the case of the otherwise spiritually evolved bodhisattva-presumably an ārya-who satisfies deflated-FW in deliberately performing an adharmic sacrifice,71 but because he is in the grip of romantic passion, lacks nirvāṇa-F. However, not only the ārya, but also the worldling often satisfies deflated-FW without satisfying nirvāṇa-F, and surely the Buddha actually "taught" nirvāṇa-F and its absence. Federman also advocates wiggly-determinism, supposing "dependent-arising is not a linear causal sequence" (12), and juxtaposes karma and determinism, stating "there are no strict deterministic relations between the act and the result" (13). By in engaging in this line of reasoning, however, Federman seems forgetful of his own resistance to things that violate physical law. Federman correctly notes that determinism and fatalism differ importantly and that their conflation infects the discussion; he describes fatalism as "an ethical stance that states that choice is meaningless" (13), but he is insufficiently clear about the difference. I have differentiated between (hard, soft, and wiggly) determinism, karma, and fatalism above. Federman also rejects the predictive implication of determinism- such that if someone had full knowledge of all laws and conditions operant at any instant, they could in principle perfectly predict every event- on the ground that "all-knowing minds do not exist" (14). Disagreement about the Buddha's omniscience aside, whether anyone attains predictive omniscience is irrelevant. The predictive implication may be demonstrated by switching from the epistemic mode to the entailment mode: Determinism, if true, plus the conditions in the universe ages ago entail the choice one necessarily makes at a certain time as a consequence (regardless of whether anyone knows this particular entailment). This so- 71 A "dharmic" action coheres with the Dharma; an "adharmic" action goes against it. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 325 called "Consequence Argument" for incompatibilism is immune to epistemic limitations.72 Almost all of Federman's arguments about free will are from Dennett (Varieties), ignoring a variety of nuanced compatibilist positions that diverge from Dennett's and better cohere with Federman's account-particularly Frankfurt's ("Freedom"), whose influence on contemporary free will discussions is inestimable.73 Frankfurt analyzes freedom of the will as having the sort of will one wants, an effective metawill. Similarly, the Buddha prescribed the cultivation of a dharmic will through a variety of reflective means that yield an effective meta-will and constitute what he did teach as the path to nirvāṇa-F.74 Federman remarks that nirvāṇa, "the ultimate goal of the path, is referred to as freedom in the compatibilist sense" (9), but this is a hasty interpretation for three reasons: first, because nirvāṇa-F is obviously not the same kind of freedom discussed in connection with freedom of the will (where the question of compatibility pertains to determinism); second, because whether nirvāṇa-F is consistent with determinism is something that should not be assumed; and third, because it is a valid question whether nirvāṇa-F conquers or transcends determinism. Federman says Kalupahana describes nirvāṇa as "absence of constraint," but deflated-FW (as when a rat simply wants to run and does so) and nirvāṇaF share absence of constraint. That deflated-FW and nirvāṇa-F share absence of constraint does not entail that nirvāṇa-F is compatibilist, for inflated-FW also shares absence of constraint, but is incompatibilist. 72 The classical statement of this argument is in van Inwagen (Essay). 73 See note 70 above. 74 This is not to say that the Buddha advocated Frankfurt's type of model of freedom of the will, but rather that what he did advocate presupposes the ability Frankfurt identified and its importance on the Buddhist path. 326 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will Federman's reliance on the Pāli Canon is his prerogative, although it should be noted that from the Mahāyāna perspective he presents an incomplete account. Further, as noted in our discussion of Gier and Kjellberg, even some Pāli Buddhists had a more substantive view of agency than Federman's. Federman finally admits that the "Buddhist treatment of free will has to be extracted from the doctrine, as the doctrine is by no means a systematic philosophical treatise" (15), a keen disclaimer that would be placed more appropriately in his opening paragraph. In his ultimate paragraph he confidently asserts: "The kind of free will the Buddha taught is the acquired ability for clear reflection and wise choice" (15). But, again, although cyborg thermostats reflect on alternatives and make prudent choices, they seem clearly to lack free will in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense. Despite these limitations, Federman's analysis displays a wealth of canonical textual exegesis in support of the claim that the Buddha was implicitly compatibilist. Harvey: More Wiggly (Pā l i) Compatibilism Peter Harvey's paper on the Theravāda Buddhist view of free will ("Freedom") makes arguments very similar to Federman's, minus Barnhart's fallacy, but adds some somewhat tangential but interesting canonical exegesis.75 Thus, to avoid repetition, I only summarize Harvey's argument and call attention to certain issues. Harvey explicitly restricts his analysis to Theravāda (in this paper), and though he has doubts about the sort of free will that can obtain in the ultimately impersonal skandhas, he thinks that Theravāda supports compatibilism. 75 This is not to suggest that Harvey makes no original contribution. He and Federman reference each other's papers. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 327 Basically, Harvey reasons as follows. The Buddha's teachings rest on dependent origination, so it is plausible to think Theravāda Buddhism is determinist, though Harvey is uncertain whether determinism applies to enlightened beings (82-83). Harvey's explicit sensitivity to the elements of these issues that are uncertain is admirably Socratic. According to Harvey, the Buddha rejected fatalism because belief in inevitabilism implies volitional powerlessness over actions (paralysis of the will), and he advocated the importance of will in his prescriptions about dharmic action. Indeed, overall, he tends to see Theravāda Buddhism as more interested in whether people can break out of previous conditioned patterns in a self-directed way than in whether this breaking out is "free" in some philosophical sense.76 This emphasis is not unusual. Most Buddhists who think Buddhism has anything positive to say about anything related to free will tend to see the very notion of a Buddhist theory of free will as involving something like a category or syntax error, or some other kind of conceptual confusion.77 Nonetheless, Harvey has a lot of positive things to say that would count toward a Buddhist theory of free will, were one to attempt its construction. Like Federman, Harvey's account of the relevant elements of Buddhism that bear on the question of free will makes significant reference to the arguments of the Western analytic philosopher, Daniel Dennett, who is a compatibilist. Compatibilists in this debate, we may recall, are those who think it is logically possible both that determinism is true and that we sometimes exhibit free will. Some compatibilists (Dennett included) think that because agents may deliberate about undesired outcomes and choose actions that avoid them, the lack of alternatives 76 For such an attempt, see Repetti ("Meditation"). 77 See, for example, Flanagan ("Quietism") and Garfield ("Mādhyamikas"). 328 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will implied by determinism does not entail inevitability. The Buddha's teachings, on Harvey's interpretation, articulate the same volitional elements that do the explanatory work in Dennett's account, so we may conclude that the Buddha would have accepted wiggly-determinism.78 As Harvey puts it, "the implied position of Theravāda Buddhism on the issue of 'freedom of the will' is a middle way between seeing a person's actions as completely rigidly determined, and seeing them as totally and unconditionally free" (86). Echoing Siderits and Goodman,79 Harvey also thinks the two truths and no-self doctrines imply there is no ultimate free will: "If there is no essential person-entity, 'it' can not be said to be either determined or free" (86). But he offers no explanation here, and his reasoning is analogous to the following (problematic, if not fallacious) claim: 'Shoes' cannot be said either to be made of leather or not made of leather because there are no ultimate shoes. For this critique to be fair, it would have to be formulated in terms of shoe essences, but I think the modified version of the objection, mutatis mutandis, would stand as well.80 Needless to say, some shoes are not made of leather anyway. Harvey's analysis is rich in canonical supports. Here is an illustrative gem Harvey has excavated (40): When someone said to the Buddha that there was no such thing as self-agency (atta-kāra), he replied by emphasizing that there is an "element of initiating (ārabbha-dhātu)" in 78 I think that if he concluded with soft determinism, Harvey's argument would be stronger and more readily understood by Western philosophers. 79 See my reviews of Siderits ("Reductionism") and Goodman ("Hard Determinism"). 80 See Repetti ("Reductionism"). Of course, Buddhist reductionism is as problematic as the free will issue, if not more problematic, so it is not a defect in Harvey's analysis that it makes reference to this doctrine. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 329 people-i.e., some kind of ability to choose-which allows them to initiate and direct actions such as bodily movements. . . . (AN III 337-338) However, Harvey does not put this metaphorical diamond to use as a dialectical cutting tool. Though Federman seeks to weaken the implications of this passage about agency ("Buddha" n. 43), I consider it a diamond because it shows that the Buddha put the causal locus of actionorigination in the individual's (non-inevitable) choice. Their apparent hesitance here is presumably because the very notion of "self-agency" seems to go against the Buddhist doctrine of the insubstantiality of the self, but if the agent/action pair is interdependently arisen (as per our review of Gier and Kjellberg's discussion of Nāgārjuna, above), no such threat arises.81 Harvey's tacit resistance to this line of thought might be due to the fact that the Buddha's reference to this "element of initiating" is illustrated by the possibly-limited ability to control one's movements: "For how can one who comes on his own (sayaṃ abhikkamanto) and returns on his own say 'There is no self-agency, there is no agency on the part of others'" (AN III 338). The ability to control one's movements is arguably what Frankfurt considers mere freedom of action. The question is whether the Buddha would extend this form of self-agency regarding one's actions to self-agency regarding the will-whether he would extend it, that is, from Frankfurt's freedom of action to Frankfurt's freedom of the will, the ability to have the sort of will one wants to have. I have argued that the Buddhist eightfold path outlines eight features of self-agency that enable the ārya to cultivate the sort of dharmic will she wants to have.82 As long as the "self" in this Buddhist sort of "self- 81 See Repetti ("Reductionism"). 82 Repetti ("Meditation"). 330 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will agency" is understood in terms of psychological processes rather than as a metaphysically independent substance, there is no obvious inconsistency with Buddhist doctrine. Some of Harvey's other remarks raise interpretive doubt. For instance, he says: "The Buddha opposed determinism as he saw it as a doctrine that froze a person's will to overcome unwholesome/unskillful (akusala) actions and develop wholesome/skillful (kusala) ones" ("Freedom" 40). Both he and Wallace quote Federman on this point, as if the Buddha discussed "determinism" in his objection to the fatalist view of Makkhali Gosāla (DN I 53-54). Goodman rightly objects to this inference, however, because the fatalism the Buddha rejected is not necessarily deterministic ("Resentment").83 However, this passage arguably does support the Buddha's rejection of hard determinism, by implication, in that hard determinism entails an interpretation of inevitability that undermines the sort of proximal agency the Buddha seemed to be discussing in rejecting fatalism and that is sufficient for moral responsibility. This passage does not support the rejection of the soft determinist's interpretation of evitability, that allows that even though agents cannot alter whatever is determined to happen, the sort of proximal agential control individuals do exert over their own volitions, deliberative processes, choices, and actions is sufficient for purposes of moral responsibility. All recent-period scholars reviewed here quote Dennett, but they all also miss the elementary distinction that defines the debate: hard versus soft determinism, despite the fact that Dennett is a soft determinist. This is analogous to Western philosophers missing the elementary distinction between Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism. 83 Goodman is correct, but thinks Buddhism is hard determinist, and he ignores the fact that hard determinism and fatalism nonetheless share inevitabilism (one causal, one acausal, respectively); see Repetti ("Hard Determinism"). Journal of Buddhist Ethics 331 Harvey quotes Federman in support of what appears to be what I have described as a form of naïve autonomism, but one that is informed significantly neither by Buddhism nor by Western philosophical skepticism. It's as if, for them, "Buddhist free will" just means something weaker and more inchoate than deflated-FW, like "Buddhist who makes choices." Let's call this "naïve-FW," for even rats seem to make choices. (Recall the discussion of the "element of initiating" above, which Harvey suggests might be restricted to bodily movements.) And although he appeals to Federman's and Dennett's accounts for some support, what is needed is an account of why we should think mere choice-making differentiates between hard and soft determinism and supports the latter: hard determinists do not deny we make choices, but that we are free to choose otherwise under identical deterministic conditions.84 Keeping with the metaphor, despite the many dialectical gems Harvey uncovers, he does not sufficiently construct explanatory jewelry. The remainder of Harvey's work revolves around the following panoply of intuitively relevant issues: how Buddhism regards madness and social and biological conditioning; the relationships between karma, the self, dependent-origination and freedom; and the relationships between willing and spiritual ignorance, attention, "the basic radiant purity of the mind," and spiritual freedom. Although much of this exhibits a wealth of meritorious canonical-gem-excavation, most of these points Harvey explores do not straightforwardly support his argument; however, they may be understood to function in a way similar to what 84 The soft determinist thinks we would be free to choose otherwise under slightly different deterministic conditions: if we wanted to choose otherwise; the hard determinist replies we can never want to choose otherwise; the soft determinist counters we could want to choose otherwise if we had different wants; the hard determinist retort is that we can never have different wants; and so on. The debate boils down to whether it is reasonable to consider unactualized possibilities sufficient for purposes of moral responsibility. I argue that it is reasonable (Counterfactual). 332 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will we saw with Gier and Kjellberg's identification of terrain in need of further charting by interpretive cartographers. Harvey devotes significant attention (47-53) to the questions whether only the Buddha or other enlightened beings could be vulnerable to the effects of past karma, whether everything that dependent origination covers is karmic (alternately put, whether karma and dependent origination are coextensive),85 and whether the earliest canonical sources or slightly-later Abhidharma agree on these points. He follows this section with significant attention (54-61) to whether karma is fatalistic (it seems fairly obviously not fatalistic, but it is to his credit that he gives the canonical supports for this view), stating that "karmic results of a particular action are actually seen to vary, so past karma does not inflexibly determine a fixed result, produced in a mechanical-like way" (59)-more wiggly-determinism. Regarding the issue of the self, Harvey reviews the arguments of Siderits, Goodman, and others, and (correctly, I think) complains that there is a two truths equivocation, but he does not specifically identify it. Harvey seems to think the individual is not a "myth" at the conventional level (62) and that its agency is efficacious (autonomous): As the mind is ever-changing, subject to a variety of internal and external conditions, it is seen as good to develop greater guidance over the way it operates, based on wise restraint and an understanding of how it operates. Thus the wayward mind can be controlled, by understanding dawning within it, so that, so to speak, it takes more responsibility for itself and the actions it brings about, such that these are more coherent with the 85 As I argued above, despite some disagreement on this, the Buddha's restriction of the karmic to the volitional seems to count strongly against the equation of the karmic with the causal. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 333 genuine benefit of the overall pattern of mental states. (67) These remarks may be used to support a model of meta-mental volitional regulation and, to the extent that-both within and outside Buddhism-a thing's causal powers count as grounds for its ontological status, they also support a somewhat Pudgalavādin-type view that the Buddhist has intermediate-level functional and/or ontological status (between conventional/ultimate) as a self-regulating (autonomous) agent. Harvey disputes this reading, arguing that all that he discusses in the quotation above may be accounted for as the working of processes within the skandhas.86 I am not claiming that his remarks imply my reading, but only that they may be used to support it. Setting aside the question about the possibility of affording middle-level ontological status to the self-agency-exhibiting psychological processes Harvey's remarks might be used to support, let us focus only on the ability, and call it "Buddhist-FW." Buddhist-FW shares elements of deflated-FW and naïveFW and is consistent with my earlier soft determinist trifurcation: virtually-libertarian, virtually-hard, and relatively-soft. Let me review this distinction. What I describe as virtual libertarianism is only virtually or functionally equivalent to libertarianism, not actually equivalent, because it is still deterministic. Libertarianism is the view that we possess the sort of full-fledged freedom of the will most ordinary folks think they possess when they think their choices originate entirely autonomously and are ultimately fully up to them. But this ability is only virtual if we live in a deterministic world (because for it to be truly ultimately up to us, we would need to live in an indeterministic world in which our choices were not determined long before we were born). Enlightened beings are virtu- 86 Harvey (communication, April 2013). 334 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will ally libertarian because, lacking any self-sense or ego-volitions that could be thwarted, nothing that could undermine their free will determines their behavior. What I describe as virtual hard determinism differs from actual hard determinism, which asserts that because determinism is true, everyone lacks the sort of agency that would count as free will or ground moral responsibility. Virtual hard determinism is only virtual for worldlings who are so exogenously determined by conditions of ignorance and ego-volitions that it is as if they lack any endogenous agency altogether, even the most minimalistic type. What I describe as relative soft determinism differs from soft determinism simpliciter, which asserts only that determinism is true and agents sometimes exhibit free will. Relative soft determinism differs from this simply in terms of acknowledging a full spectrum of graded degrees to which agents are exogenously and/or endogenously determined in ways that are conditioned more or less heavily by ignorance and ego-volitions. This latter category captures the bulk of āryas as well as others who through various efforts have cultivated some sort of agential self-regulative ability, in varying degrees. All three categories are forms of soft determinism. For, they all allow for the truth of determinism and its compatibility with varying degrees of free will, even that of virtual hard determinism, which is not actually hard determinism because virtually hard determined agents nonetheless retain the potential for liberating behavioral changes, say, upon hearing the Dharma. In concluding my review of Harvey's account, I must admit that two points of Harvey's that I have underplayed are the importance he Journal of Buddhist Ethics 335 attaches to the liberating role of attention,87 and that no one thing is ever "the cause" of anything because things arise from particular clusters of conditions. Related to his emphasis on attention is the important fact that mental phenomena are not just what they are, say, like physical things are, but that they are also intentional-that is, they have objects that they are about; their nature opens out onto other things, and how one sees things is a potent mental condition for selfchanges. I think these ideas are rich in theoretical potential, but we cannot develop them here, other than to suggest that they intuitively support Buddhist-FW as well as my own version of a Buddhist theory of free will.88 Lastly, it should be noted that although it is not emphasized in his paper, as regards spiritual freedom Harvey seems to think this is made possible by someone, say, A, becoming spiritually free, teaching B, and B intently listening and acting on this (75-76). This helps others break out of restricting patterns of conditions. This path of breaking out is still a collection of conditioned and conditioning processes, yet what is realized at the culmination of this path, nirvāṇa, is unconditioned. This makes it possible to construe the sort of agency the Buddhist path tacitly 87 See Joerg Tuske ("No-Self") for an attempt to locate an Indian philosophical basis for free will in an analysis of attention. Tuske criticizes an element of my similar view as set forth in Repetti ("Meditation")-not the part of my analysis that emphasizes the centrality of attention, but that part that borrows distinctions from Frankfurt. His objection is a standard objection against Frankfurt's model, but because I do not use the model in the way Frankfurt did, Tuske's objection does not really undermine my account. 88 Repetti ("Meditation") argues basically that a plausible Buddhist conception of free will may be construed as a function of the sort of meta-cognitive and meta-volitional attention-training practices that constitute the Eightfold Buddhist Path. 336 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will endorses minimally, even deterministically, if need be, as simply a function of hearing the Dharma.89 Wallace: Mahāyāna Incompatibilist Free Will? B. Alan Wallace, in "A Buddhist View of Free Will: Beyond Determinism and Indeterminism," describes enlightened behavior as exhibiting a "kind of freedom" such that "one nonconceptually rests in this timeless, pristine awareness, allowing actions to arise spontaneously and effortlessly, aroused by the interplay of one's own wisdom and the needs of sentient beings from moment to moment" (67-68). And whereas Federman and Harvey emphasize the conventional validity of free will, Wallace flatly rejects the compatibilist's deflated-FW conception on the grounds of what he takes to be the obvious truth of the sort of incompatibility between determinism and free will expressed in the Consequence Argument. (Briefly, the Consequence Argument holds that if determinism is true, then all choices are unalterable, necessary "consequences" of prior, nomologically sufficient events functioning as causal conditions, in which case there cannot be free will; that is, determinism and free will are incompatible, so, if determinism is true, it must be hard determinism.) For more subtle reasons he also seems to reject the incompatibilist's inflated-FW, but he apparently accepts other forms of free will, as shall be explained shortly. Wallace makes many interesting claims that may be adopted by an autonomist, about how Buddhist practices like mindfulness meditation decrease bondage, moving the practitioner closer to nirvāṇa-F, as I have also argued ("Meditation"). Because they are similar to those Har- 89 Harvey (communication, April 2013). Journal of Buddhist Ethics 337 vey and Federman made to advocate the opposite (compatibilist) view, I will ignore them here in order to highlight what is distinctive in Wallace's views. Wallace treats determinism as if it must be hard and fatalistic: "Fatalism is the unavoidable implication of determinism as surely as later events are inevitably set in stone by prior conditions" ("View" 65). Because the Buddha rejected fatalism and Wallace sees determinism as implying fatalism, he rejects determinism, despite Goodman's objection against equating them, a considerable literature on soft (non-fatalistic) determinism, and Federman's counter-argument. (Wallace references Federman, so he is presumably aware of these objections.) But he also rejects indeterminism, because both opposing doctrines presuppose a kind of metaphysical realism rejected in Mahāyāna (65). The anti-realist (if not idealist) Mahāyāna idea that Wallace seems to have in mind, simplifying greatly, is that there is no concepttual-construction-independent or independently existing substantive reality, but both deterministic and indeterministic models depict reality as a conceptual-construction-independent, independently existing substantive or objective reality: on the deterministic view, a conceptionindependent reality is constituted by a sequence of discrete events all of which are causally necessitated; on the indeterministic view, a conception-independent reality is constituted by a sequence of discrete events many of which are not causally necessitated. Another important element of Wallace's model is the idea that consciousness is inherently unobstructed, free, boundless, and so on. So, if the Mahāyāna model is correct, as Wallace thinks it is, then that would explain why he would say that if determinism was true, then free will is impossible: because if determinism was true, then consciousness would not seem to be unobstructed, free, boundless, and so on, either. 338 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will What kind of clear understanding can we expect to attain, however, if both determinism and its opposite are equally non-indicative of reality-if reality escapes logical bivalence (the theory that every meaningful proposition is either true or false, but not both)? In developing this view, Wallace makes insightful parallels between an allegedly nonlinear holographic model of interdependent origination, and paradoxical conceptions of time and the like, suggesting a multiply-complex ultimate (non-conventional) metaphysics shared by Mahāyāna and physics that renders the standard approach to free will otiose. But, as noted above, interdependence-holographic or otherwise-arguably implies megalinear-determinism. The evidence Wallace offers for these models, if any, is insufficient to displace determinism, indeterminism, or both. Let us try to unpack some complex Mahāyāna Buddhist ideas Wallace relies on in his attempt to explain his own conception of free will. Although several different terms are employed in that literature, such as "buddha-nature," "brightly shining mind," "mind of clear light," "primordial consciousness," and so on, these are all relatively synonymous. Basically, the idea suggested by these terms is that we are already what enlightened beings realize that we are, although we are obstructed from that realization due to our afflictions. The Buddhist path removes the obstructions. Although we may not realize it, we experience our buddha-nature at times when the afflictions are thoroughly disabled, such as between thoughts, in dreamless sleep, at death, and so forth. It is not obvious from his presentation, but Wallace's argument may be understood as the claim that all sentient beings have, at this presently inaccessible level, complete freedom, understood to include or involve something analogous to if not identical with free will. He seems to argue further that this freedom can be experienced in tantric practice, where, for example, the mind realizing emptiness appears in form as a deity Journal of Buddhist Ethics 339 (Buddha) and when one has divine pride (complete identification with the deity). One then is manifesting enlightened consciousness.90 Wallace refers to the brightly shining substrate consciousness (ālayavijñāna), a way in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition of referring to buddhanature, present at all times, even between attention-engaged moments, in dreamless sleep, at death, and in the bardo (post-mortem) state (for enlightened beings), noting "This realm of consciousness is beyond the scope of the conceptual mind, so its possible influence on the minds of ordinary sentient beings is unimaginable" (63).91 Wallace claims that the substrate consciousness is the same non-dual trans-temporal consciousness that "lies beyond the realm of philosophy" (63), shared by the Buddha and one's own "future" enlightened self (i.e., that one already has it, but it is rarely manifest). In the practice of divine pride (the essence of tantric deity yoga, the strong identification with the deity), "one draws the transformative power of one's future enlightenment into the present moment, with the understanding that the future is not inherently real and separate from the present" (67). So far, this does not suggest reverse temporal causation, but perhaps "positive thinking." Nevertheless, Wallace seems to bite the reverse-causation bullet: "In such practice, based on a realization of emptiness and the Buddha nature of all beings, one is free to enable the future to influence the present" (67). However, to interpret Wallace as accepting reverse tem- 90 I owe some of the interpretive suggestions in this paragraph to Daniel Cozort (communication, December 2013). See Rinpoche (Chariots) for an in-depth explanation of these tantric practices and ideas. 91 It must be noted that this claim bears a resemblance-hopefully, only a superficial one-to the Biblical theodicy to the effect that because God's ways are beyond human comprehension, it is appropriate to suspend doubt in the face of difficulties in comprehending God's intentions relative to the state of affairs God permits in the world. One important difference is that the theodicy seems ad hoc. 340 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will poral causation here would overstate his understanding. Arguably, the idea is that the ability to imaginatively be a Buddha in the future is what can influence the present, and thus can enlighten. However, there is much in the literature Wallace cites and in his many other writings that suggests a conception of time and the external world as mind-dependent in a way that might ground what may be described as titanic psychic abilities. It is not clear, therefore, whether Wallace means to interpret divine pride and related notions in a naturalistic or in a more titanic, supernatural sense. If he intends the latter, however, such a titanic reverse-temporal power far exceeds the non-physical-self model that grounds his own rejection of inflated-FW (59-60). Let's call this robust tantric sort of free will "titanic-FW." If Wallace only associated these titanic-FW powers with enlightened beings, this might not be as implausible. But Wallace claims that the Great Perfection (Dzogchen, Tibetan Buddhist) teaching posits the substrate consciousness as what not only enables "a kind of freedom that transcends the demarcations of past, present, and future," but as what undergirds reincarnation (68)-something to which all unenlightened beings are subject. This is also problematic, if not contradictory, because reincarnation is by definition temporal, and the Buddhist view of the worldling is that he is stuck in the kālachakra (temporal wheel, of rebirth). Further, if substrate consciousness enables reincarnation and reverse-causation, and is ever-present between moments of attentionabsorption and during dreamless sleep, then everyone shares elements of titanic-FW (while deeply asleep or attention-disengaged)-something much more inflated than the inflated-FW Wallace rejects. Naturalistic western libertarians would reject titanic-FW, ironically, as unrealistic. I am not suggesting that these tantric ideas- fantastic as they might appear from a Western perspective-are false, but only pointing out an inconsistency. In fairness, Wallace could Journal of Buddhist Ethics 341 respond that although ordinary folks are thought to possess buddhanature, and even to experience it (without realizing it as such) in certain moments, such as in between thoughts or in dreamless sleep, they are not thought to possess siddhis (psychic powers), even if āryas and advanced masters are thought to attain them under certain circumstances. That counter seems correct, but I doubt it resolves the inconsistencies noted above. It leaves open the possibility that āryas attain a state in which they are exempt from physical laws. Wallace proposes "a modern definition of freedom as the capacity to achieve what is of value in a range of circumstances" as what worldlings have in mind as free will (62), and claims they lack it. (Surely, however, āryas-titanic or not-do not lack it). His "modern definition," however, resembles the sort of freedom of action or naïve-FW discussed above in connection with the accounts of Federman and of Harvey. Wallace seems to contrast nirvāṇa-F with naïve-FW when he says "the Buddhist tradition clearly emphasizes that ordinary sentient beings are not free, for we are constrained by mental afflictions such as craving, hostility, and delusion" (62). Wallace seems to be saying that we lack naïve-FW and nirvāṇa-F, and only advanced Buddhists have a substantive free will: "freedom of will depends on the ability to recognize the various impulses that arise involuntarily in the mind and to choose which among them to accept or reject" (64). This resembles Buddhist-FW. It seems for Wallace that worldlings possess elements of titanic-FW, but not inflated-FW, deflated-FW, naïve-FW, Buddhist-FW, or nirvāṇa-F;92 92 Recall that titanic-FW is the sort possessed by almost mythically supernaturalpowers-possessing āryas and Arhats, illustrated by divine pride's trans-temporal causation. Inflated-FW is the sort libertarians think we possess, such that our choices are entirely autonomous and ultimately up to us, thought to be impossible in a deterministic world and often associated with a non-physical conception of the self or soul. Deflated-FW is the sort of minimalist view that Harvey and others hold, such that the skandhas exhibit certain self-regulative abilities. Naïve-FW is the pre-philosophical view 342 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will āryas possess titanic-FW and Buddhist-FW; and enlightened beings possess nirvāṇa-F (and elements of titanic-FW). But do enlightened beings possess the sort of individual-agent-type volitional regulation found in Buddhist-FW? Wallace's analysis skirts around this agentless-autonomy issue, but this is perhaps the central Buddhist version of the free will problem-how a non-agent can be autonomous in any meaningful sense. Frankfurt's meta-volitional regulation account sounds strikingly "Buddhist" in light of Buddhist-FW and Wallace's related claims that "metacognitive awareness allows for the possibility of freely choosing whether or not to allow a desire to lead to an intention or to let an intention result in verbal or physical action," and that mindfulness "entails directing one's attention to wholesome and unwholesome tendencies and recognizing them as such so that one may cultivate the former and reject the latter" (64). These descriptions also mirror the Theravādin criteria, but Frankfurt's and the Theravādin's accounts are compatibilist. Thus, because the principle of parsimony (or lightness) favors the simpler, less metaphysically risky hypothesis, there seems to be no reason why these compatibilist abilities require any type of incompatibilist indeterminism or any determinism/indeterminism dichotomycircumscribing, bivalenceand conceptuality-transcending stance, apart from the fact that the latter describes Wallace's overall metaphysical stance independently of this particular issue, as may be seen in most of his other works.93 that a being has free will if it makes choices and/or controls its bodily movements in action. Buddhist-FW is the sort of free will āryas possess in varying degrees as they increasingly cultivate the ability to regulate their volitions in accordance with the Dharma. And nirvāṇa-F is the liberation achieved upon attainment of enlightenment. 93 See, for example, Wallace (Dimensions; Training; and Revolution). Journal of Buddhist Ethics 343 Wallace rejects compatibilism on the ground that determinism is fatalistic (59, 61-62, 65), but, as I argued above, soft determinists need more than the allegation of fatalism to displace their dialectical credibility as evitablists, and-although this has apparently escaped his attention-Wallace's own proposal of Buddhist-FW is prima facie determinismfriendly. Wallace rejects indeterminist (libertarian) inflated-FW on the ground that the Buddha rejected pure chance (59-60), but Robert Kane and other libertarians have sophisticated versions of indeterminism that differentiate it from "pure chance."94 Wallace rejects metaphysical realism on the grounds of quantum holographic interdependence and related elements of Mahāyāna metaphysics (65-66), but, as I argued above, interdependence arguably implies mega-linear-determinism, and trans-temporality and other titanic powers implicitly require indeterminism within the realm of conditioned phenomena. He adds the conceptuality-transcending substrate consciousness (67) in place of what he rejects, but because all of these ideas require greater support than determinism or indeterminism, his account begs the question-at least from a non-Mahāyāna or a nonBuddhist vantage. All things considered, and perhaps to his credit, Wallace's concluding position is so complex-it interweaves affirmations and 94 Kane ("Pathways"). "Soft indeterminists" are indeterminists who reject the argument that indeterminism is "hard" (incompatible with free will) on the ground that randomness that undermines agency. They argue that indeterminism could play a useful role, for example, in the generation of a greater number of considerations of alternate possibilities that might become cognitively available to a deliberator than might be available under a deterministic version of that process, but so long as the deliberator selects from among them on the basis of his or her considered values and reasons, the mere presence of the element of chance somewhere in the deliberative process does not entail that the decision is purely random. 344 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will denials of all the forms of freedom discussed, relativized to worldlings, Buddhists, and enlightened beings-as to defy subsumption within any singular standard Western taxonomy, such as "libertarian" or "incompatibilist." But it seems fair to describe most of it as consistent with my trifurcated compatibilist model, because agentless virtuallibertarianism fits enlightened beings who exhibit nirvāṇa-F; relative-soft determinism fits āryas who exhibit Buddhist-FW; and everyone else is virtually-hard-determined, because (contra Wallace) they possess too much of a form of naïve-FW that may be described as unrestricted volitional expression (which fosters mental bondage) and thus they significantly lack deflated-FW, Buddhist-FW, and nirvāṇa-F, and any titanic-FW they might technically satisfy in substrate consciousness is thoroughly unconscious, not voluntarily accessible, and thus presumably causally and/or functionally impotent. Wallace's essay contains many rich and potentially fruitful ideas, but-not unlike the other recent-period scholars reviewed here-he fails to sufficiently scaffold them to support the sort of philosophical weight they are supposed to bear. Despite their interesting character, many of his claims are in greater need of support than, say, plausible versions of soft determinism (such as deflated-FW or Buddhist-FW) or even certain plausible forms of libertarianism (inflated-FW), such as Kane's. I suggest that the missing philosophical supports may be found scattered throughout Wallace's many other exceptional works on the convergence between Buddhism and science, in seed form, waiting to be watered and cultivated. That would certainly be a worthwhile project. It is one that I hope is undertaken in the near future, whether by Wallace or another Mahāyāna philosopher. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 345 Conclusion Recall that this article is the fourth in a four-part series, and that this conclusion will contain reference to the entire series. Thus, review of early-, middle-, and recent-period scholarship reveals that with regard to free will, Buddhist thought is as complex as Western thought. Some of the complexity is the way Western scholars of Buddhism try to tease out implications of passages in Buddhist texts; some is the way Buddhist scholars try to extract elements of thought consistent with Buddhist conceptions from Western philosophical texts. Because Buddhism has only fairly recently begun to articulate conceptions of free will, more sophisticated positions may be expected to emerge. It is a very interesting and pregnant phase of scholarship,95 so it would be misleading, therefore, to seek "the" Buddhist theory of free will, just as it would be to seek "the" Western theory of free will. One conclusion shared by most of the extant Buddhist scholarship, except that of Goodman, is that Buddhism presupposes some sort of free will for the Buddhist aspirant, if not for the worldling. Another shared conclusion, excepting Goodman and Wallace, is that because the Buddha rejected inevitabilism, he would reject the view that determinism is hard (incompatible). That is, because the Buddhist path presupposes volitional dynamics that soft determinists deploy, if the Buddha would have equated determinism with dependent origination, he would have accepted soft determinism; if not, he would have accepted a close second, what may be called "soft dependent origination," the view that dependent origination is compatible with deflated-FW or Buddhist-FW. 95 I am currently working on an edited collection of approximately twenty (mostly) original articles on Buddhism and free will, tentatively titled "Agentless Agency? Classical and Contemporary Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will," as well as a monograph, tentatively titled "Buddhism and Free Will," both currently under review at Routledge. 346 Repetti, Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will Mahāyāna and Theravāda divergence did not play a significant role in earlyand middle-period accounts, but recent-period scholarship mostly supports separate treatments. I say "mostly" because my own recent-period theory is an exception to this doctrinal division.96 Although elements of my own account have appeared throughout my treatment of these three periods of scholarship, I have not directly reviewed it here; but because my view is compatibilist and attempts to be pan-Buddhist syncretic, I see it as consistent with both Theravāda and Mahāyāna. I argue, in short, that Buddhism presupposes free will for the same reasons Harvey and Federman do, but I draw considerable support for this claim from an analysis, largely informed by Frankfurt's metavolitional model,97 of the causal dynamics of cultivating attention to volition presupposed by the Buddhist meditative path. In summary, Mahāyānists' non-realist metaphysics circumvents the determinism/indeterminism dichotomy, but begs the question in the free will debate (insofar as it presents a more complex puzzle as a "solution" to a simpler one), and interdependent origination does not circumvent linear determinism, but suggests mega-linear-determinism. Theravāda Buddhists express what I have described as a form of wigglydeterminism, an attempt to circumvent the implications of hard determinism that ignores the distinction between hard and soft determinism, but on my analysis dependent origination is perfectly consistent with soft determinism, even if the two doctrines are not otherwise identical. The insubstantial-self and reductionist doctrines are more explicit for Mahāyānists and understood more radically by them, but that understanding has not been sufficiently set forth or supported 96 See Repetti ("Meditation"). 97 The Frankfurt-informed causal analysis of free will that is applied to the Buddhist view is the subject of Repetti ("Meditation"), but it is worked out in great, mostly nonBuddhist, detail in Repetti (Counterfactual). Journal of Buddhist Ethics 347 in terms of its implications for the free will question, although no argument presented here suggests that it cannot be set forth. Some of the remaining unresolved central issues are whether dependent origination is determinism, whether it applies to enlightened beings, whether the insubstantial-self doctrine implies there is no autonomy because there is no agent or allows agentless autonomy, and how reductionism applies to free will. Although Buddhism has only begun to articulate its many possible stances on free will, many potentially explanatory dialectical gems have been uncovered. Indeed, Buddhism has only begun to reveal a glimpse of this diverse potential.98 Bibliography Adam, Martin T. "No Self, No Free Will, No Problem: Implications of the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta for a Perennial Philosophical Issue." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33, no. 1 (2011), 239-265. Aronson, Harvey B. Buddhist Practice on Western Ground Reconciling Eastern Ideals and Western Psychology. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, 2004. Conze, Edward. Buddhist Thought in India. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962. Davidson, Donald. Essays on Actions and Events. 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Mixed-Effects Modeling and Non-Reductive Explanation (4975 words) Abstract: This essay considers a mixed-effects modeling practice and its implications for the philosophical debate surrounding reductive explanation. Mixed-effects modeling is a species of the multilevel modeling practice, where a single model incorporates simultaneously two (or even more) levels of explanatory variables to explain a phenomenon of interest. I argue that this practice makes the position of explanatory reductionism held by many philosophers untenable, because it violates two central tenets of explanatory reductionism: single level preference and lower-level obsession. 2 1. Introduction Explanatory reductionism is the position which holds that, given a relatively higher-level phenomenon (or state, event, process, etc.), it can be reductively explained by a relatively lower-level feature (Kaiser 2015, 97; see also Sarkar 1998; Weber 2005; Rosenberg 2006; Waters 2008).1 Though philosophers tend to have slightly different conceptions of the position, two central tenets of the position can still be extracted:2 1 According to Sarkar (1998), explanatory reduction is an epistemological thesis which is distinguished from constitutive (ontological) and theory reductionism theses. Kaiser further distinguishes two sub-types of explanatory reduction: (a) "a relation between a higher-level explanation and a lower-level explanation of the same phenomenon" (2015, 97); (b) individual explanations, i.e., given a relatively higher-level phenomenon, it can be reductively explained by a relatively lowerlevel feature (Ibid., 97). This essay will focus on the second sub-type. Besides, when referring to levels I mean either hierarchical organization such as universities, faculties, departments etc., or functional organization such as organs, tissues, cells etc. When referring to scales I mean spatial or temporal scaling where levels are not so clearly delimited. 2 Similar summary of the position can be found in Sober (1999). 3 Single level preference: a phenomenon of interest can be fully explained by invoking features that reside at a single, well-defined level of analysis (e.g., molecular level in biology). Lower-level obsession: lower-level features always provide the most significant and detailed explanation of the phenomenon in question, so a lower-level explanation is always better than a higher-level explanation. Philosophers sometimes express these two tenets explicitly in their work. For example, Alex Rosenberg holds that "[...] there is a full and complete explanation of every biological fact, state, event, process, trend, or generalization, and that this explanation will cite only the interaction of macromolecules to provide this explanation" (Rosenberg 2006, 12). Marcel Weber expresses a similar idea in his explanatory hegemony thesis, according to which it's always some lower-level physicochemical laws (or principles) that ultimately do the explanatory work in experimental biology (Weber 2005, 18-50). John Bickle attempts to motivate a 'ruthless' reduction of psychological phenomena (e.g., memory) to the molecular level (Bickle 2003). However, many philosophers have questioned the plausibility of the position on the basis of scientific practice (Hull 1972; Craver 2007; Bechtel 2010; Brigandt 2010; Hüttemann and Love 2011; Kaiser 2015). To counter that position, some authors have pointed to the relevance of an important practice that has not received sufficient attention before: multiscale or multilevel modeling or 4 sometimes called integrative modeling approach, where a set of distinct models ranging over multiple levels or scales-including the macro-phenomenon level/scale-are involved in explaining a (often complex) phenomenon of interest (Mitchell 2003, 2009; Craver 2007; Brigandt 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Knuuttila 2011; Batterman 2013; Green 2013; O' Malley et al. 2014; Green and Batterman 2017). Often these models work together by providing diverse constraints on the potential space of representation (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2010; Knuuttila 2011; Green 2013). This multilevel modeling surely casts some doubt on explanatory reductionism, for it seems unclear what reductively explains what-all those facts in the set of models ranging over different levels/scales are involved in doing some explanatory work. However, there is a species of multilevel modeling that has slipped away from most philosophers' sights: mixed-effects modeling (MEM hereafter)-also called multilevel regression modeling, hierarchical linear modeling, etc.-in which a single model incorporating simultaneously two (or even more) levels of variables is used to explain a phenomenon. For a mixedeffects model to explain, features of the so-called reducing and reduced levels must be simultaneously incorporated into the model, that is, they must go hand in hand. MEM deserves special attention because it sheds new light on the reductionism-antireductionism debate by showing that (a) a mixed-effects model violating the two central tenets of explanatory reductionism can provide successful explanation, and (b) a single mixed-effects model without integrating 5 with other epistemic means can also provide such successful explanation. Therefore, MEM first further challenges the explanatory reductionist position, and second offers a novel perspective bolstering the multilevel/multiscale integrative approach discussed by many philosophers. The essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the challenges faced by the traditional single-level modeling approach, and examines the reasons why the MEM approach is preferable in dealing with these challenges. Section 3 describes a MEM practice using a concrete model. Section 4 elaborates on the implications of MEM for the explanatory reductionism debate. Finally, Section 5 considers potential objections to my viewpoint. 2. Challenges to Reductive Explanatory Strategies In many fields (e.g., biological, social and behavioral sciences) scientists find that the data collected show an intrinsically hierarchical or nested feature. Consider a simple example: we might be interested in examining relationships between students' achievement at school (A hereafter) and the time they invest in studying (T).3 In conducting such a research, we might collect data from different classes (say 5 classes in total), with each class providing the same number of samples (say 10 students in each class). The data collected among classes might be taken for granted to be independent. Then we may use certain traditional statistical 3 For scientific studies of this kind, see Schagen (1990), Wang and Hsieh (2012), and Maxwell et al. (2017). 6 techniques such as ordinary least-squares (OLS) to analyze the data and build a linear relationship between A and T. However, this single-level reductive analysis can lead to misleading results, because it ignores the possibility that students within a class may be more similar to each other in important aspects than students from different classes. In other words, each group (class) may have its own features relevant to the relationship between A and T that the other groups lack. Hence, the data collected from the students are in fact not independent, i.e., the subjects are not randomly sampled, because the individuals (students) are clustered within groups (classes). In technical terms, we say our analysis may fall prey to the atomistic fallacy where we base our analysis solely on the individual level-i.e., we reduce all the grouplevel features to the individuals. Therefore, traditional OLS techniques such as multiple regression cannot be employed in this context, because the case under consideration violates a fundamental assumption of these techniques: the independence of observations (Nezlek 2008, 843). Conversely, we may face the same problem the other way around if we fail to consider the inherently nested nature of the data. Consider the studentachievement-at-school case again. We may observe that in classes where the time of study invested by students is very high, the achievements of the students are also very high. Given such an observation, we may reason that students who invest a lot of time in studying would be more likely to get higher achievements at school. However, this inference commits the ecological fallacy, because it attributes the relationship observed at the group-level to the individual-level 7 (Freedman 1999). The individuals may exhibit within-group differences that the single group-level analysis fails to capture. In technical terms, this inference flaws because it reduces the variability in achievement at the individual-level to a group-level variable, and the subsequent analysis is solely based on group's mean achievement results (Heck and Thomas 2015, 3). Again, traditional statistical techniques such as multiple regression cannot be employed in this context. In sum, a single-level modeling approach that disrespects the multilevel data structure can commit either an atomistic or an ecological fallacy. Confronted with these problems, one response is to 'tailor' the traditional statistical techniques by, e.g., adding an effect variable to the model which indicates the grouping of the individuals. However, many have argued that this approach is unpromising because it may give rise to enormous new problems (Luke 2004; Nezlek 2008; Heck and Thomas 2015). Alternatively, scientists have developed a new framework that takes the multilevel data structure into full consideration, i.e., the MEM approach, to which we now turn. 3. Case Study: A Mixed-Effects Model Depending on different conceptual and methodological roots we have two broad categories of MEM approaches: the multilevel regression approach and the structural equation modeling approach. The former usually focuses on direct effects of predictor variables on (typically) a single dependent variable, while the latter usually involves latent variables defined by observed indicators (for details 8 see Heck and Thomas 2015). For the purpose of this essay's arguments, I will concentrate on the first kind. Consider the student-achievement-at-school example again. Since students are typically clustered in different classes, a student's achievement at school may be both influenced by her own features (e.g., time invested in studying) and her class's features (e.g., size of the class). Hence here comes two levels of analysis: the individual-level (level-1) and the group-level (level-2), and individuals (i = 1, 2, ... ,N) are clustered in level-2 groups (j = 1,2, ... , n).4 Now suppose that students' achievements at school are represented as scores they get in the exam. The effect of time invested in studying on scores can be described as follows: Yij = β0j + β1jXij + εij (1) where Yij refers to the score of individual i in the jth group, β0j is a level-1 intercept representing the mean of scores for the jth group, β1j a level-1 slope (i.e., different effects of study time on scores) for the predictor variable Xij, and the residual component (i.e., an error term) εij the deviation of individual i's score from the level-2 mean in the jth group. Equation (1) looks like a multiple regression model; however, the subscript j reveals that there is a group-level incorporated in the model. It can also be seen from this equation that both the 4 Note that, for instructive purposes, our case involves only two levels; however, the MEM approach can in principle be extended to many more levels. 9 intercept β0j and slope β1j can vary across the level-2 units, that is, different groups can have different intercepts and slopes. The most remarkable thing of MEM is that we treat both the intercept and slope at level-1 as dependent variables (i.e., outcomes) of level-2 predictor variables. So here we write the following equations expressing the relationships between the level-1 parameters and level-2 predictors: β0j = γ00 + γ01Wj + u0j (2) and β1j = γ10 + γ11Wj + u1j (3) where β0j refers to the level-1 intercept in level-2 unit j, γ00 denotes the mean value of the level-1 intercept, controlling for the level-2 predictor Wj, γ01 the slope for the level-2 variable Wj, and u0j the error (i.e., the random variability) for unit j. Also, β1j refers to the level-1 slope in level-2 unit j, γ10 the mean value of the level-1 slope controlling for the level-2 predictor Wj, γ11 the effect of the level-2 predictor Wj, and u1j the error for unit j. Equations (2) and (3) have specific meanings and purposes. They express how the level-1 parameters, i.e., intercept or slope, are functions of level-2 predictors and variability. They aim to explain variations in the randomly varying intercepts or slopes by adding one (or more) group-level predictor to the model. These 10 expressions are based on the idea that the group-level characteristics such as group size may impact the strength of the within-group effect of study time on scores. This kind of effect is called a cross-level interaction for it involves the impact of variables at one level of a data hierarchy on relationships at another level. We will discuss this in detail in the next section. Now we combine equations (1), (2) and (3) by substituting the level-2 parts of the model into the level-1 equation. We finally obtain the following equation: Yij = [γ00 + γ10Xij + γ01Wj + γ11XijWj] + [u1jXij + u0j + εij] (4) This equation can be simply understood that Yij is made up of two components: the fixed-effect part expressed by the first four terms and the random-effect part expressed by the last three terms. Note that the term γ11XijWj denotes a crosslevel interaction between level-1 and level-2 variables, which is defined as the impact of a level-2 variable on the relationship between a level-1 predictor and the outcome Yij. We have 7 parameters to estimate in (4), they are four fixed effects: intercept, within-group predictor, between-group predictor and cross-level interaction, two random effects: the randomly varying intercept and slope, and a level-1 residual. Now a mixed-effects model has been built, and the next step is to estimate the parameters of the model. However, we will skip this step and turn to explore the philosophical implications of the modeling practice relevant to the explanatory reductionism debate. 11 4. Implications for the Explanatory Reductionism Debate Looking closely into the MEM practice, we find that a couple of important philosophical implications for the explanatory reductionism debate can be drawn. 4.1. All levels are indispensable The first, and most obvious, feature of MEM is that it routinely involves many levels of analysis in a single model, and all these levels are indispensable to the model in the sense that no level can be reduced to or replaced by the other levels. These levels consist of both the so-called reducing level in the reductionist's terminology, typically a lower-level that attempts to reduce another level, and the reduced level, typically a higher-level to be reduced by the reducing level. In our student-achievement-at-school case, for example, a reductionist may state that the group-level will be regarded as the reduced level whereas the student-level as the reducing level. The indispensability of each level in the model can be understood in two related ways. First, due to the nested nature of data, only when we incorporate different levels of analyses to the model can we avoid either the atomistic or ecological fallacy discussed in Section 2. As discussed in the studentachievement-at-school example where students are clustered in different classes (in the manner that students from the same class may be more similar to each 12 other in important aspects than students from different classes), reducing all the analyses to the level of individual students can simply miss the important information associated with group-level features and thus lead to misleading results. Although it's true that the problem might be partially mitigated by tailoring traditional single-level analytical techniques such as multiple regression, it's also true that this somewhat ad hoc maneuver can simply bring about various new vexing and recalcitrant issues (Luke 2004; Nezlek 2008; Heck and Thomas 2015). Second, the problem can also be viewed from the perspective of identifying explanatory variables. In building a mixed-effects model, the main consideration is often to find a couple of variables that may play the role of explaining the pattern or phenomenon observed in the data. Here a modeler must be clear about how to assign explanatory variables, for instance, she must consider if there are different levels of analyses and, if so, which explanatory variables should be assigned to what levels, and so on. These considerations may come before her model building because of background knowledge, which paves the way for her to develop a conceptual framework for investigating the problem of interest. However, without such a clear and rigorous consideration of identifying and assigning multilevel explanatory variables, an analysis can flaw simply because it confounds variables at different levels. Respecting the multilevel nature of explanatory variables has another advantage: "Through examining the variation in outcomes that exists at different levels of the data hierarchy, we can develop more refined theories about how 13 explanatory variables at each level contribute to variation in outcomes" (Heck and Thomas 2015, 33). In other words, in respecting the multilevel nature of explanatory variables, we get a clear idea of how, and to what degrees, explanatory variables at different levels contribute to variation in outcomes. If these variables do contribute to variation in outcomes, as it always happens in MEM, then the situation suggests an image of explanatory indispensability: all the explanatory variables at different levels are indispensable to explaining the pattern or phenomenon of interest. Given these considerations, therefore, one implication for the explanatory reductionism debate becomes clear: it isn't always the case that, given a relatively higher-level phenomenon it can be reductively explained by a relatively lowerlevel feature. Rather, in cases where the data show a nested structure or, put differently, the phenomenon suggests multilevel explanatory variables, we routinely combine the higher-level with the lower-level in a single (explanatory) model. As a result, one fundamental tenet of explanatory reductionism is violated: single level preference. 4.2. Interactions between levels Another crucial feature of multilevel modeling is its emphasis on a cross-level interaction, which is defined as "The potential effects variables at one level of a data hierarchy have on relationships at another level [...]. Hence, the presence of a cross-level 14 interaction implies that the magnitude of a relationship observed within groups is dependent on contextual or organizational features defined by higher-level units". (Heck and Thomas 2015, 42-43) Remember that there is a term γ11XijWj in our mixed-effects model discussed in Section 3, which indicates the cross-level interaction between the group-level and the individual-level. More specifically, this term can be best construed as the impact of a group-level variable, e.g., group size, upon the individual-level relationship between a predictor, e.g., study time, and the outcome, e.g., students' scores. The cross-level interaction points to the plain fact that an organization or a system can somehow influence its members or components by constraining how they behave within the organization or system. This doesn't necessarily imply top-down causation (Section 5.3 will turn back to this point). Within the context of scientific explanation, however, it does imply that it isn't simply that characteristics at different levels separately contribute to variation in outcomes, but rather that they interact in producing variation in outcomes. In other words, the pattern or phenomenon to be explained can be understood as generated by the interaction between explanatory variables at different levels. Therefore, to properly explain the phenomenon of interest, we need not only have a clear idea of how to assign explanatory variables to different levels but also an unequivocal conception of whether these explanatory variables may interact. 15 Different models can be built depending on different considerations of the cross-level interaction. To see this, consider the student-achievement-at-school example again. In some experiment setting we may assume that there was no cross-level interaction between group-level characteristics and the individuallevel relationship (between study time and scores). In such a situation, we kept the effect of individual study time on scores the same across different classes, i.e., we kept the slope constant across classes. In the meanwhile, we treated another group-level variable (i.e., intercept) as varying across classes, i.e., different classes have different average scores. So, this is a case where we have a clear idea of how to assign explanatory variables but no consideration of the cross-level interaction. Nonetheless, in a different experiment setting we may assume that there existed cross-level interaction, and hence the effect of individual study time on scores can no longer be kept constant across different classes. At the same time, we treated another group-level variable (i.e., intercept) as varying across classes. Hence, this is a case where we have both a clear idea of how to assign explanatory variables and a consideration of the cross-level interaction. Corresponding to these two different scenarios, two different mixed-effects models can be built, as shown below: 16 Figure 1. Two different models showing varying intercepts or varying intercepts and slopes, respectively. Three lines represent three classes. This figure is adapted from Luke (2004, 12). Given such a cross-level interaction, therefore, the explanatory reductionist position has been further challenged. This is because any reductive explanation that privileges one level of analysis-usually the lower-level-over the others falls short of capturing this kind of interaction between levels. If they fail to do so, then they are missing important terms relevant to explaining the phenomenon of interest. As a consequence, a mixed-effects model involving interactions between levels simultaneously violates the two fundamental pillars of explanatory reductionism: first, it violates single level preference because it involves multilevel explanatory variables in explaining phenomena, and second, it violates lower-level obsession because it privileges no levels-all levels are interactively engaged in producing outcomes. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 D ep en d en t v ar ia b le Level-1 predictor Varying in t e r cep t s 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 0 2 4 6 D ep en d en t v ar ia b le Level-1 predictor Varying in t e r cep t s and s lo p es 17 5. Potential Objections This section considers two potential objections. 5.1. In-principle argument One argument that resurfaces all the time in the reductionism-versusantireductionism debate is the in-principle argument, the core of which is that even if reductive explanations in a field of study are not available for the time being, it doesn't follow that we won't obtain them someday (e.g., Sober 1999; Rosenberg 2006). Therefore, according to some reductionists, the gap between current-science and future-science is simply a matter of time, for advancement in techniques, experimentation and data collecting can surely fill in the gap. However, I think the argument flaws. To begin with, advancement in techniques, experimentation and data collecting isn't always followed by reductive explanations. For example, in our MEM discussed in Section 3, even if the data about the individual-level is available and sufficiently detailed, it isn't the case that we explain the phenomenon of interest in terms of the data from the individual-level alone. Consider another example: in dealing with problems associated with complex systems in systems biology, even though large-scale experimentation (e.g., via computational simulation) can be conducted and high throughput data arranging over multiple scales/levels can be collected, a bottomup reductive approach must be integrated with a top-down perspective so as to 18 produce useful explanations or predictions (Green 2013; Green and Batterman 2017; Gross and Green 2017). Nevertheless, reductionists may reply that the situations presented above only constitute an in-practice impediment, for it doesn't undermine the possibility that lower-level reductive explanations, typically provided by some form of 'final science', will be available someday. Let us dwell on the notion of possibility a bit longer. The possibility here may be construed as a logical possibility (Green and Batterman 2017, 21; see also Batterman 2017). Nonetheless, if it's merely logically possible that there will be some final science providing only reductive explanations, then nothing can exclude another logical possibility that there will be some 'mixed-science' providing only multilevel explanations. After all, how can we decide which logical possibility is more possible (or logically more possible)? I doubt that logic alone could provide anything useful in justifying which possibility is more possible, and that appealing to logical possibility could offer anything insightful in helping us understand how science proceeds. As Batterman puts, "Appeals to the possibility of in principle derivations rarely, if ever, come with even the slightest suggestion about how the derivations are supposed to go" (2017, 12; author's emphasis). Another interpretation of possibility may be associated with real possibilities, referring to the actual cases of reductive explanations happening in science. Unfortunately, I don't think the real scenario in science speaks for the reductionist under this interpretation. Though it's impossible to calculate the absolute cases of non-reductive explanations occurring in science, a cursive look at scientific 19 practice can tell that a large portion of scientific explanations proceeds in a nonreductive fashion, as suggested by multilevel modeling (Batterman 2013; Green 2013; O' Malley et al. 2014; Green and Batterman 2017; Mitchell and Gronenborn 2017). Moreover, even in areas such as physics which was regarded as a paradigm for the reductionist stance, progressive explanatory reduction doesn't always happen (Green and Batterman 2017; Batterman 2017). In sum, we have shown that the in-principle argument fails for it neither offers help in understanding how science proceeds if it's construed as implying a logical possibility, nor goes in tune with scientific practice if it's construed as implying real possibilities. 5.2. Top-down causation In Section 3 we have shown that there is a cross-level interaction taking the form that higher-level features may impact lower-level features. A worry arises: Does this imply top-down causation? My answer to this question is twofold. First, it's clear that this short essay isn't aimed to engage in the philosophical debate about whether, and in what sense, there exists top-down causation (see Craver and Bechtel 2007; Kaiser 2015; Bechtel 2017). Second, what we can do now is to show that the cross-level interaction is a clear and well-defined concept in multilevel modeling. It unambiguously means the constraints on the lower-level processes exerted by the higher-level parameters (Green and Batterman 2017). In our multilevel modeling 20 discussed in Section 3, we have shown that group-level features may impact some individual-level features through the way that each group possesses its own feature relevant to explaining the differences at the individual-level across groups. This idea is incorporated into the mixed-effects model by assigning some explanatory variables to the group-level and a cross-level interaction term to the model. The idea of cross-level-interaction-as-constraint is widely accepted in multilevel modeling broadly construed, where constraint is usually expressed in the form of initial and/or boundary conditions. For example, in modeling cardiac rhythms, due to "the influences of initial and boundary conditions on the solutions of the differential equations used to represent the lower level process" (Noble 2012, 55; Cf. Green and Batterman 2017, 32), a model cannot simply narrowly focus on the level of proteins and DNA but must also consider the levels of cell and tissue working as constraints. The same story happens in cancer research, where scientists are advocating the idea that tumor development can be better understood if we consider the varying constraints exerted by tissue (Nelson and Bissel 2006; Shawky and Davidson 2015; Cf. Green and Batterman 2017, 32). 6. conclusion This essay has shown that no-reductive explanations involving many levels predominate in areas where the systems under consideration exhibit a hierarchical structure. These explanations violate the fundamental pillars of explanatory 21 reductionism: single level preference and lower-level obsession. Traditional single-level reductive approaches fall short of capturing systems of this kind because they face the challenges of committing either the atomistic or ecological fallacy. 22 References Batterman, Robert. 2013. 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Masterpieces of Muslim Philosophers Prof. Abdul Jaleel Kadhim Al Wali Professor and Chair of Department of Philosophy CHSS United Arab Emirates University Al Ain, Abu Dhabi, UAE [email protected] [email protected] Abstract- Locating masterpieces by Muslim philosophers in the field of philosophy is a challenge for several reasons: the interconnectedness between human knowledge as a discipline, and that this theme cannot be innovative. In addition, in order to understand the roots of philosophy within the Arab cultural environment and its development it is necessary to examine the history of Arab culture. Arab culture can trace its origins back thousands of years to the Mesopotamian, Pharaonic, and Saba and Himyar Civilizations. Although these civilizations witnessed the birth of streams of thought that can be considered philosophy, the word philosophy itself was not used because it is a Greek word. Despite the fact that philosophy dates to Ancient Greece, it is considered modern in comparison with the civilizations of Mesopotamia and Pharaonic Egypt. Thus, it is more accurate to refer to the beliefs developed by these civilizations as thought and not philosophy. Indeed, the word philosophy only came to be applied to Arab culture with the arrival of Al Kindi (801870 CE). When examining the use of the term philosophy in the context of Arab culture, we will determine the meaning of the word and explain how it was defined in ancient times; specifically, whether the sources that Muslim philosophers relied upon were Greek or other sources. This paper comprises only an introduction, describing the multiple approaches and the achievements conferred upon Muslim philosophers. It will take the form of an encyclopedia style entry to establish a foundation for researchers wishing to explore the achievements of Muslim philosophers. Keywords-Falsafa; Mesopotamia; Translation Movement; Prominent Muslim Philosophers; Classification of Sciences. I. INTRODUCTION Locating masterpieces by Muslim philosophers in the field of philosophy is a challenge for several reasons: the interconnectedness between human knowledge as a discipline, and that this theme cannot be innovative. In addition, in order to understand the roots of philosophy within the Arab cultural environment and its development it is necessary to examine the history of Arab culture. Arab culture can trace its origins back thousands of years to the Mesopotamian, Pharaonic, and Saba and Himyar Civilizations. Although these civilizations witnessed the birth of streams of thought that can be considered philosophy, the word philosophy itself was not used because it is a Greek word. Despite the fact that philosophy dates to Ancient Greece, it is considered modern in comparison with the civilizations of Mesopotamia and Pharaonic Egypt. Thus, it is more accurate to refer to the beliefs developed by these civilizations as thought and not philosophy. Indeed, the word philosophy only came to be applied to Arab culture with the arrival of Al Kindi (801870 CE). When examining the use of the term philosophy in the context of Arab culture, we will determine the meaning of the word and explain how it was defined in ancient times; specifically, whether the sources that Muslim philosophers relied upon were Greek or other sources. This paper comprises only an introduction, describing the multiple approaches and the achievements conferred upon Muslim philosophers. It will take the form of an encyclopedia style entry to establish a foundation for researchers wishing to explore the achievements of Muslim philosophers. II. WHAT IS ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY? A. Nature of Islamic philosophy An interesting feature of Islamic philosophy is that there is no accepted definition for it. However, researchers have posed the following questions, Is it primarily the sort of philosophy produced by Muslims? Can we call Islamic philosophy, any philosophical discourse produced in Arabic? Does Islamic philosophy examine the conceptual features of specifically Islamic issues? Conclusions reached after discussion suggest that Islamic philosophy is best understood as the tradition of philosophy that arose from within the culture of Islam.1 1 Leaman, Oliver,(1998), Concept of Philosophy in Islam, Routledge, London, website http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H006 GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.3 No.1, 2017 ©The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access by the GSTF DOI: 10.5176/2345-7856_3.1.31 1 B. Falsafa and hikma (Wisdom) Traditional Islamic methodologies were emphasized by the use of the term falsafa, an Arabic neologism designed to represent the Greek philosophia. Often, the familiar Arabic hikma was used. Hikma means wisdom and has a much broader meaning than falsafa. A significant proportion of kalam (theology) can be classed as hikma, as would mysticism or Sufism. Whereas, much falsafa is defined as knowledge of existents, and wider conceptions within the discipline tend to use the term hikma. Philosophy as hikma is beneficial in that it refers to a wide range of conceptual issues within Islam. A good example of this conception of philosophy is the controversy over the oriental philosophy (al-Hikmat al-Mashriqiyya) of Ibn Sina (Avicenna)2. Ibn Sina defined wisdom as completing the human spirit with perception, based on belief in theoretical and practical facts according to human capacity3. Al Kindi defined Philosophy as the science of learning about things, according to the capacity of man, where the scientific purpose of the philosopher is to locate and work to bring forth truth.4 Al-Farabi defined philosophy as the knowledge of assets.5 Ibn Rushd affirmed Aristotle's definition of philosophy, stating that it is regards the asset as an asset.6 III. SOURCES OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT The sources of philosophical thought for Muslim philosophers are numerous, and can be summarized as follows. A. Holy Quran The Holy Quran is considered the first source from which Muslim philosophers can derive their philosophy. The word 2 Ibn Sina is well known as a creator of a Peripatetic philosophical system, one which came to have considerable significance within both Islamic and western philosophy. His book Mantiq al-mashriqiyyin (Logic of the Orientals) deals largely with logical differences between him and Aristotle. 3 Ibn Sina, (1980), Letters in wisdom and Physics, An investigation carried out by Abdul Rahman Badawy, Dar Al Kalem, Beirut, p 16. 4 Al Kindi, (1980), Al Kindi Philosophical Letters, An investigation carried out by Abdul Hadi Abu Ridah, Cairo, Egypt, part1, p 37. 5 AlFarabi; (1986) Kitab al-jam baina rayai al-hakimain aflatun al-ilahi wa aristutalis (The Book of Harmony Between the Ideas of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle), an investigation made by Albert Nasry Nader, Al Mashreq House, Beirut, Lebanon, p 80. 6 Ibn Rushed,(1994), Letter on the Metaphysics, An investigation carried bu Gerar Ghami Dr Lebanon Thought, Beirut, p 30. "wisdom" is mentioned in the Holy Quran, meaning the right or faithful science of reflection. The influence of the Holy Quran on philosophizing lies in: • Encouraging Muslims to privilege consideration and contemplation; • Clarifying matters relevant to theology, such as the existence of Allah and His monotheism, resurrection, and the Day of Judgment; and • Addressing spiritual aspects and the requirements of self and bodily discipline, which philosophers apply when discussing the subject of ethics. B. Ancient Civilizations in Arab Context 1) Ancient Egyptian Civilization The most important ideas derived from the Egyptian Civilization are: • The idea of immortality, based on death followed by resurrection; • The notion of reward and punishment and their connection with ethical rules; • The difference between spirit and body, being that the body dies but the spirit remains immortal; and • Achievements in art, architecture and governmental organization. 2) Mesopotamia Civilization The most important ideas and advances derived from the Mesopotamian Civilization are: • The search for the origin of the world and the development of a perception of the ocean or the sea which existed before the knowledge of heaven was given a name and before the earth was known; • The first seed of monotheism in the domain of religion, and the first stone in the foundations of ethics, politics, law, science, mathematics, physics, and the arts; • Invention of cuneiform writing; • Development of the principles of algebra and geometry (they established the method for determining a square root). • They developed the idea of universal nationhood. For Babylonians the universe includes everything that exists: human beings, animals and natural phenomena. All these elements are present in a given nation, and distinguished by measures of power; and • The principles of astronomy. 3) The thought of pre and post-Islam Cultural Schools Many schools of thought spread throughout the ArabMuslim context, both before and after Islam arrived. The cultural modes disseminated by such schools played a significant role in forming the philosophical thought that manifested subsequently. These schools included: GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.3 No.1, 2017 ©The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access by the GSTF 2 • The School of Alexandria; • The school of Antioch in Aleppo; • Edessa and Nusaybin Schools; • Baghdad School; • Jundishapur School; and • Harran School. All these schools were distinguished by their philosophical and religious aspect. They represented a cultural heritage which Muslim philosophers were able to trace to the conquest of the countries in which the schools were located. They learned from this cultural heritage, translating it from Syriac or Greek, into Arabic.7 4) Translation of philosophical texts The translation movement began in the aforementioned cultural schools, as the majority of intellectuals translated philosophy and science from their different source languages into the language used in their schools. The translation of texts into Arabic became popular during the first Abbasid Caliphate, especially in the era of the Caliph al-Mamun. The most famous translators of philosophical texts are as follows: • John Ibn Batriq (? – 815 CE): Translator of the Timaeus dialogue of Plato, Natural History, Heaven and World Book, Book of Animals and parts of the Book of Physics by Aristotle. • Qusta ibn Luqa (820900 CE): Translator of Alexander d'Aphrodisses' Explanation of physics and Alexander's clarification of Aristotle's book of Universe and Corruption. • Abdul Massiah ibn Abdullah Al Naamah Al Hamsi: Translator of "On Sophistical Refutations" by Aristotle, The explanation of Yehai al Nahwy for Physics, Athulogia's Aristotle which is an explanation of the fourth, fifth and sixth Enneads by Plotinus, not Aristotle. • Hunayn ibn Ishaq (810873AC): Appointed by Caliph Al Mamun as head of Wisdom House in Baghdad. He was talented in Persian, Greek, Arabic and Syrian. His translations of Plato included; Politics, Dynamics and Timaeus. His translations of Aristotle included Categories, Alebara, Alquies, the Corruption, and Psyche. 7 More details see; -Osel, Pol Masson (1945) East Philosophy, Translated by Mohammed Yousif Mousa, Egypt, Cairo. Tomlen, O.F. (1980), East Philosophers, Translated by Abdul Halem Salem, Dar AlMarf, Egypt, Cairo. -Saleh, Ahmad Ali, (1983) Iraq in the History, Dar AlHareah, Iraq, Baghdad. -Hamaza, Abdul Kader (1970), Ancient Egyptian History, Egypt, Cairo. • Ishaq Ibn Hunayn: He helped his father to administrate Wisdom House. He translated Plato's Protagoras and Aristotle's the Universe, the Corruption, Psyche and some of the Letters Book. • Thabit ibn Qurra (826-900 CE): Translator of the Explanation of Physics by Aristotle.8 The translators not only translated the philosophers' original texts, but also translated explanations and clarifications written by their devotees. This body of work created a cultural resources for Muslim philosophers seeking to extend their knowledge and thought. IV. THE MOST PROMINENT MUSLIM PHILOSOPHERS • Ya'qub ibn Ishaq Al Kindi (801870 CE) • Abu Nasr Muhammad Al Farabi (870950 CE) • Abu Ali al Husayn ibn Abd Allah ibn Sina (9801037 CE) • Mohammed ibn Mohammad Al Ghazzali (10591111 CE) • Abu Ali ibn Muhammad the famous physician, linguist and historian (? -1030 CE) • Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariya ibn Yehai Al-Razi (865933 CE) • Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Yahya ibn al Sayegh Ibn Bajjah (?1138 CE) • Wali El Din Abdu Rahman bin Muhammad bin Khaldun (13321406 CE) • Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Abd Al Malik ibn Muhammad Ibn Tufail (?1185 CE) • Abu Al-Walid Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Ahamd bin Rushd (11261198 CE) V. ACHIEVEMENTS OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHERS A. Evidence of the Modernity of the world 1) Cosmological proof • It is based on a given phenomenon, such as time and place and endpoint with a justification neither in time nor place. • Looking inward to the universe, degeneration, motion and attaining a conclusion, it is a variable that accepts no change. • Dividing the world into two parts: the world as it is, and the possible world. The entire world is possible in terms of its existence and requires special providence 8 For more details see; Nader, Alber Nasri (1986) His introduction to the (The Book of Harmony Between the Ideas of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle), p46-51. GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.3 No.1, 2017 ©The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access by the GSTF 3 to force it outward from the circle of possibility to that of existence; i.e. from the power to do, to the act of doing. This power is necessitates the existence of Allah. 2) Teleological Proof This is based on the belief that man makes things for a certain purpose, such as a pen, a car, and a house. If we regard the world from this point of view, we suggest that it was created to fulfil a specific aim. Accordingly, there must be a Wise Almighty God who created all these beings and developed the laws by which they function. 3) Ontological Proof This is based on the doctrine that man, as a finite being, has an idea about the existence of infinite being. Therefore, this raises of the question of how this notion entered the mind of man. The answer given is that it must have been Allah, glory to him, who was the source of such idea. If He does not exist, the idea would never have entered the human mind. 4) Consensus Proof This demands an agreement between all nations and peoples, since the very beginning of man's emergence that there is an Almighty Creator. Throughout human history, in all states some people believed in the existence of a god who created and manages this world. 5) Creational Proof This proof is based on the fact that Allah judges between people on the Day of Judgment, rendering rights to individuals according to their deeds in this life. Otherwise, there is a question over the value of man's deeds in this life if there is no reward or punishment for these in the hereafter.9 B. Theory of Knowledge The theory of knowledge was discussed a long time ago, especially by the Greeks; certainly before the emergence of Islamic philosophy. Muslim philosophers, similar to the Greeks, linked knowledge with existence. They considered the right knowledge is knowledge of divine existence. Al Kindi divided knowledge into three types; philosophical knowledge which belongs to the human mind; prophetical knowledge, which depends on revelatory power and absolute knowledge; and knowledge through taste or discovery which is linked with Sufism and is not subject to logical measurements.10 This led Farabi to divide knowledge into two categories: sensory and mental knowledge.11 9 Most of Islamic sources mentioned these are proofs, see; -Sahms Aldean, Ahmed, (1990) AlFarabi, Life and his Philosophy, Dar of Scientific Book, Beirut, Lebanon,p 129. -Al Always, Hosam(1985), AlKindi Philosophy, Dar AlTaleah, Beirut, Lebanon, p 92-153. 10 Al Always, Hosam (1985), AlKindi Philosophy, p 25-64 11 Al-Tewail, Fawzi, (2002) AlFarabi Philosopher of Ideal City, Dar Modern Thought, Beirut, Lebanon, p83-88. Ibn Sina allocated knowledge as either sensory or mental knowledge, or knowledge of taste.12 Al Ghazzali agrees with Ibn Sina on this division of knowledge; creating the designations, sensory knowledge, rational knowledge, and Sufi knowledge.13 Thus, Muslim philosophers' mastery of understanding proceeds from their analysis of knowledge, and the possibility that new items can be added (such as Sufi knowledge), and includes the application of sensory terminology not confining human senses to the usual five senses. They added other senses, which are particularly attributed to Al Kindi; i.e. the internal senses, the maintaining sense and the perceived sense. The maintaining sense describes impressions or sensations derived from what appears. The perceived sense is the interface between the mind and appearance. It takes some aspects from appearance and other aspects from the mind. From substance, it takes the perception of pictures, and from the mind, the realization of images which are semi-holistic. C. Mind Types There is agreement between all Muslim philosophers regarding the types of mind that disagree with Greek philosophers. For example, Aristotle divides the mind as follows: effective mind, material mind, and active mind, while Muslims allocate mind as follows: • Material mind, which is the readiness and capacity of understanding and comprehension. • Active mind which means considering power into deeds as a credible influence of mind arising when pursuing fulfillment. • The beneficiary mind, which means following the transference of influence into action; the mind maintains reliable things that it perceives. Before such maintenance, there were no credible things. Such sound things are built-in, and rationalized through action. • Effective mind: The mind that drives out the human mind from the non-static state to the action state. At which point the material mind becomes an actual and beneficiary mind.14 Therefore we can say that the achievement of Muslim philosophers was the addition of the beneficiary mind, or what is termed the 'apparent mind'. Furthermore, they considered the mind of one type and division as nominal. Accordingly, we 12 Ibn Sina, (1980), Letters in wisdom and Physics, p 17. 13 Al Ghazali,( 1980), Al-Munqidth min-al-Dalal,( Deliverance from Error), An investigation carried out by Abdul Haleem Mahmood, Modern Book House, Egypt , Cairo, p.89. 14 For more details, see; Al-Kindi, Al Kindi Philosophical Letters(Letter on Mind), Al Farabi,( Letter on Mind), Explained by Fawzi Ataewi in his book AlFarabi, p 75-79 GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.3 No.1, 2017 ©The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access by the GSTF 4 present the following table to illuminate the opinions of philosophers regarding the mind. TABLE I. MINDS 1 2 3 4 Alaxandre Effective Material Asset ------- Al Kindi Through deeds and action Through power Soul possession or the exist from power to action The apparent of the spirit or the second or fourth Al Farabi Effective Through power Through action Beneficiary Ibn Sina Effective Material Asset Beneficiary This mind is out of spirit These three minds are located in the Spirit.15 D. Classification of Sciences The classification of science is based on the following: • Determining origin and branch sciences; • Defining connections between sciences; and • The convergence of the scientist's points of view in the context of narrow disciplines to reach an integrative theory. In modern times, August Count classification of sciences transitioned from simple Science to complex science. It was concluded that sociology is among the most complicated sciences, and the importance of classifying sciences resides here. Al Kindi divided science into two segments: the first is religious and revelatory; and the second is divided into the human sciences, i.e. philosophy, which is divided into logic and mathematics. Mathematics include the science of numbers, geometry, astronomy and music. As for second sections, the sciences are required for themselves. There are two types; the theoretical, which includes physics, psychology, and metaphysics, and the practical; e.g. ethics and politics.16 Al Farabi, in the introduction to his book entitled Science Statistics, determined the intention of such classifications as "to count the famous sciences one by one and to learn the sum of what each of them contains and the parts of each of them as well as the total of the parts of each of them"17. Jaber Ibn Hyaan divided science into two forms: the first being the knowledge of religion and the second the science of 15 Al Ahwani, Ahmed Fawed, (1985), AlKindi Arab Philosopher, Egyptian Foundation for Book, Cairo, p 271. 16Al-Kindī , Abu Yūsuf Yaʻqūb ibn ʼIsḥāq aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ(1980) 'Philosophical Letters', An investigation carried out by Abdul Hadi Abu Ridah, part1 ,Cairo, Egypt, ,p37. 17 Al Farabi, (1968), Ehsan Al Elom (Sciences Counting), An investigation carried out by Ethman Amen, Cairo, p.53. life. The knowledge of religion can be divided into scientific law and rational science. Rational science is then divided into letters science and semantics, and semantics is divided into philosophical and divine sciences18. Ibn Sina introduced a definition of philosophy, which divided it into the theoretical and practical. The theoretical links to nature, mathematics, and heavenly science, whereas the practical is primarily concerned with ethics, housekeeping, and politics.19 AlGhazali began with defining science, which he termed positive science. He imposed conditions, such as clearance, distinction, and exposure. 20 This classification of sciences is considered among the achievements of Muslim philosophers, as they underpinned the development of modern sciences. Scholars should study all types of science, and develop a scheme for classifying sciences in the way they are presented by Muslim philosophers. E. Philosophical terms Philosophical terminology of various types was introduced in phases. The first phase was called the Genesis and is represented by Jaber ibn Hyaan and Al-Kindi. The second phase is called the determination and is characterized by alKhwarizmi. The third phase is steadiness as signified by Ibn Sina and Al Ghazzali21. These philosophers developed letters defining borders; i) Letter of limits by Jaber ibn Hyaan, ii) The letter of limits and drawings by Al-Kindi, iii) The letter of philosophical limits by alKhwarizmi, iv) The letter of limits by Ibn Sina, and v) The letter of limits by Al Ghazzali. These letters outline an Arabic philosophical vocabulary, to which each of the listed philosophers contributed over time. Today, we can say that these philosophers formed Arabic philosophy over the centuries during which it was prominent. Their terms are still used today, and function independently of other philosophical terms used in other languages. F. In addition to the achievements mentioned above, additional accomplishments and masterpieces are attributed to Muslim philosophers distinct from the knowledge bestowed by the philosophers of Greece, as summarized below: 18 Jaber Bin Haean,(1984) Terms Letter, An investigation carried out by Al Asam, in his book Philosophical Term in the Arab World, New Thought Library, Iraq , Baghdad, p20. 19 Ibn Sīnā, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh (1985) ' Letters in wisdom and Physics' , Dar Al Arab Albestani, Beirut . 20 Al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad,(1990) 'Faith Sciences' , Dar Alkalm, Lebanon. 21 Al-Aesm, Abdul Amer (1984), Philosophical Term in The Arab World,p.89-90. GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.3 No.1, 2017 ©The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access by the GSTF 5 • Al-Razi disagreed with Aristotle about his suspicions against Galen. Al Razi stated that a vacuum is possible, while Aristotle said it is impossible because it is relates to place, and disagreed with him arguing that motion does not generate time, but reveals its passage. • Arab intellectuals rejected Aristotle's expression of bodily collapse; as he thought that a heavy body would reach the ground within half the time that a light body would take to reach it. Al Khazzen in his book the Balance of Wisdom corrected this mistake affirming that gravity always draws objects to the centre of the earth. • Ibn Sina proved the untruth of the Greek theory of vision; demonstration that vision takes place when a ray of vision comes out from eyes to the things.; demonstrating that vision arises when light reaches the eye. • Ibn AlHaytham challenged Euclid and Ptolemy on vision. • Ibn AlNafis was famous for his criticisms of Galen. • Thabit Ibn Qurra showed the imbalance of Ptolemy's table. • Nasr el-Din Al Tousey, Al Abhari, Al-Tabrizi, and Ibn al Haytham corrected Euclid's sayings about the uniformity of a line parallel with another line. This led to modern Euclidian geometries. • Ibn Bajjah disagreed with Aristotle regarding motion, and developed a new theory that some believe to have made possible Galileo's theories. • Al Kindi argued with Aristotle about the eternality of the world, claiming that the world is neither eternal nor indefinite, as it had a beginning. • Al Farabi argued that non-existence is material and distinguished it from being. Such arguments were refuted in Greek philosophy. • Ibn Sina stated that a portion can always be divided. REFERENCES [1] Al Ahwani, Ahmeed Fawed, (1985), AlKindi Arab Philosopher, Egyptian Foundation for Book, Cairo. [2] Al Alwasi, Hosam(1985), AlKindi Philosophy, Dar AlTaleah, Beirut,Lebanon. [3] Al Aesm, Abdul Amer,(1984), Philosophical Term in the Arab World, Beirut , Lebanon. [4] Al Farabi, (1968), Ehsa Al Elom( Sciences Counting), An investigation carried out by Ethman Amen, Cairo. [5] Al-Farabi; (1986) Kitab al-jam baina rayai al-hakimain aflatun al-ilahi wa aristutalis (The Book of Harmony Between the Ideas of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle), an investigation made by Albert Nasry Nader, Al Mashreq House, Beirut, Lebanon. [6] Al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad,(1990) ,Faith Sciences , Dar Alkalm, Lebanon. [7] Al-Ghazali,( 1980 ), Al-Munqidth min-al-Dalal,( Deliverance from Error), An investigation carried out by Abdul Haleem Mahmood, Modern Book House, Egypt, Cairo. [8] AlKindī , Abu Yūsuf Yaʻqūb ibn ʼIsḥāq aṣṢabbāḥ(1980),Philosophical Letters, An investigation carried out by Abdul Hadi Abu Ridah, part1,Cairo, Egypt. [9] Atewai, Fawezi,( 2002) AlFarabi Philosopher of Ideal City, Dar Modern Thought, Beirut, Lebanon. [10] Hamaza, Abdul Kader, (1970), Ancient Egyptian History, Egypt, Cairo. [11] Ibn Rushed,(1994), Letter on the Metaphysics, An investigation carried by Gerar Ghami , Lebanon Thought, Beirut. [12] Ibn Sina, (1980), Letters in wisdom and Physics, An investigation carried out by Abdul Rahman Badawi, House of Al Kalem, Beirut. [13] Ibn Sīnā, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh (1985), Letters in wisdom and Physics, Dar Al Arab Albestani, Beirut. [14] Jaber Bin Haean,(1984) The Terms Letter, An investigation carried out by Al Asam, in his book Philosophical Term in the Arab World, New Thought Library, Iraq, Baghdad. [15] Leaman, Oliver,(1998), Concept of Philosophy in Islam, Routledge, London, website http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H006 [16] Nader, Alber Nasri,(1986) His introduction to the (The Book of Harmony Between the Ideas of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle). [17] Osel, Pol Masson,(1945)East Philosophy, Translated by Mohammed Yousif Mousa, Egypt, Cairo. [18] Saleh, Ahmaeed Ali,(1983) Iraq in the History, Dar AlHareah, Iraq, Baghdad. [19] Sahms AlDean, Ahmed,( 1990) AlFarabi, Life and his Philosophy, Dar of Scientific Book, Beirut, Lebanon. [20] Tomlen, O.F,(1980), East Philosophers, Translated by AbdulHalem Salem, Dar AlMarf, Egypt, Cairo. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Professor Abduljaleel Alwali listed in 2000 as an Outstanding Intellectual of the 21st century by the International Biographical Center of Cambridge, England. Dr. Alwali works in the areas of Ancient Greek Philosophy, Value Theory, and Intercultural Philosophy. He is the author of nine per-reviewed books and three textbooks as well as numerous journal articles and is a regular contributor to newspapers and magazines. GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.3 No.1, 2017 ©The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access by the GSTF

Ignorance and Epistemic Contextualism* Michael Blome-Tillmann University of Cambridge / McGill University 1. Ignorance and Scepticism In this paper I shall take ignorance with respect to p to consist in the absence of knowledge whether p. If you don't know whether p-that is, if you neither know that p nor that ¬p, then you are ignorant as to whether p. The notion of ignorance can, in other words, be reduced to the notion of knowledge. Scepticism in epistemology is the view that we are ignorant about the external world. According to the sceptic, this ignorance is universal and ubiquitous. Prima facie convincing arguments have been produced in support of scepticism and a lively philosophical debate has emerged ever since Descartes introduced such an argument in his Meditations. This chapter will consider one such argument for our ignorance about the external world and outline how Epistemic Contextualism-a contemporary view about the semantics of 'knowledge'-attributions-aims to resolve the threat posed by the argument. To begin our discussion consider the following argument: Sceptical Argument (i) If I know that I have hands, then I'm in a position to know that I'm not a handless brain in a vat. (ii) I'm not in a position to know that I'm not a handless brain in a vat. (iii) I don't know that I have hands.1 The above argument is valid: if we accept its premises, we must accept its conclusion, too. Moreover, the above sceptical argument leaves us with a philosophical puzzle: its * I am indebted to Martijn Blaauw, Aidan McGlynn, Rik Peels, and René van Woudenberg for discussion and comments on earlier versions of this article. Parts of this paper build on (Blome-Tillmann 2015). This research was generously supported by Marie Curie Actions (PIIF-GA-2012-328969 'Epistemic Vocabulary'). 1 Here is a formalized version of the argument, where 'sh' is shorthand for 'sceptical hypothesis' and where 'op' ranges over ordinary propositions about the external world: (i) Kp → ◊K¬sh. A (ii) ¬◊K¬sh. A (iii) ¬Kp. i, ii MT 2 premises are highly plausible while its conclusion-that we are ignorant with respect to everyday propositions such as the proposition that we have hands-is highly implausible. One way to bring this out in more detail is to consider the negation of its conclusion: (iv) I know that I have hands. The propositions (i), (ii), and (iv) form an inconsistent set, and so at least one of them has to be rejected. However, merely rejecting one of the members of our set doesn't amount to a satisfactory resolution of our puzzle. As Stewart Cohen (1988: 94) has pointed out, an intellectually satisfying resolution of the sceptical puzzle doesn't merely block the argument by identifying the culprit. Rather, a satisfactory resolution of the sceptical puzzle must, in addition, offer us an explanation of why the false member of the set appeared so plausible at first glance (see also Cohen 1999: 63). Why is it that our intuitions about the truth-values of at least one of the propositions at issue are misguided? And what exactly is the mistake we have made when we find ourselves puzzled by the sceptical argument? Epistemic Contextualism (EC) is a recently popular view in epistemology that promises a solution to the puzzle pertaining to our ignorance about the external world. In what follows I shall, in Section 2, begin our discussion by motivating EC independently of the sceptical puzzle. I shall then, in Section 3, consider evidence for EC and elaborate on the question whether ascriptions of 'ignorance' are context-sensitive. In Section 4 I review the Cartesian sceptical argument, sketch the contextualist's response to that argument in Section 5, and discuss objections to EC and its stance towards closure principles for knowledge in Sections 6 and 7. Section 8 is devoted to criticisms of EC while Section 9 summarizes and concludes the paper. 2. What is Epistemic Contextualism? Imagine schoolteacher Jones in the zoo explaining to her class that the animals in the pen are zebras.2 Tom is unconvinced and challenges Jones: "Are you sure those aren't antelopes?" After Jones has explained the difference between antelopes and zebras, Tom assures his classmates: 2 The following example is derived from the zebra case in Dretske (1970). 3 (1) She knows that the animals in the pen are zebras. Has Tom spoken truly? Surely, Jones's epistemic position seems good enough for satisfying the predicate 'knows that the animals in the pen are zebras' (henceforth 'knows Z'): Jones has visual experiences of a black and white striped horse-like animal, she can discriminate reliably between zebras and antelopes, she has read the sign on the pen that reads 'Zebra Pen', etc. Thus, Tom's utterance of (1) seems to be a paradigm case of a true 'knowledge' attribution. Next, imagine a couple, Bill and Kate, walking along. Bill, a would-be postmodernist artist, gives details of his latest ideas: he envisions himself painting mules with white stripes to look like zebras, putting them in the zebra pen of a zoo and thereby fooling visitors. Our couple randomly considers Jones, and Kate claims, at the same time as Tom is asserting (1): (2) She doesn't know that the animals in the pen are zebras. In Kate's mind, for Jones to 'know Z', she must have better evidence or reasons in support of Z than are momentarily available to her. In particular, Kate has it that Jones's evidence must eliminate the possibility that the animals in the pen are painted mules. As long as her evidence, however, is neutral with respect to whether or not the animals are cleverly painted mules, Kate claims, Jones doesn't qualify as 'knowing Z'. What is going on in our little example? According to our intuitions, an utterance of (1) is true in the context of the school class, while an utterance of (2) is true in the context of the artistic couple. Moreover, (2) is the negation of (1): it doesn't differ from (1) except for containing the verbal negation 'doesn't'. And since the personal pronoun 'she' refers in both contexts to Jones, it seems that the schoolteacher satisfies the predicate 'knows Z' in the context of the school class but not so in the context of the artists. How are we to account for these phenomena? Firstly, note again that Tom and Kate are talking about one and the same person-Jones-at exactly the same time. Thus, we cannot resolve the situation by claiming, for instance, that Jones 'knows Z' in one context but not the other because she believes Z in one context but not in the other. Similarly, we cannot plausibly respond that Jones has certain visual experiences in one con4 text that she is lacking in the other, or that she has the ability to discriminate reliably between certain scenarios in one context but not the other, or, finally, that she has read the sign on the zebra pen in one context but not in the other. All factors pertaining to the subject are identical with respect to both contexts, as the speakers in both contexts-Tom and Kate-are talking about one and the same subject at one and the same time.3 Thus, what the above example suggests is that the mentioned factors-Jones's visual experiences, her discriminatory abilities, etc.-are sufficient for her to satisfy 'knows Z' in one context, but not so in the other. And it is this view that epistemic contextualism (EC) takes at face value: how strong one's epistemic position towards p must be for one to satisfy 'know(s) p' may vary with the context of utterance. In the artists' conversational context, Jones needs to be in a stronger epistemic position-she needs more evidence in support of Z-than in the school class's conversational context in order for her to satisfy 'knows Z'. In fact, some contextualists describe the situation by claiming that contexts of utterance are governed by so-called epistemic standards.4 Given this terminology, the epistemic standards in our example are lower in the context of the school class than in the context of the artists' conversation. In fact, in the former context, the standards are low enough for Jones to satisfy 'knows Z', while in the latter they are too high: Jones doesn't, in the artists' context, satisfy 'knows Z' but, rather, satisfies 'doesn't know Z'. Now, the notion of an epistemic standard can be explicated in a number of different ways. On the most popular way, which is inspired by relevant alternatives approaches to contextualism, epistemic standards are said to be higher in the school class's context because, as David Lewis (1996) puts it, satisfying 'knows Z' in that context doesn't require the elimination of the possibility that the animals are painted mules, while this is required in the context of the postmodernist artists: more alternatives must be eliminated in the context with the higher standards than in the context with the lower standards. Given the hypothesized context-sensitivity of the predicate 'know(s) p', it is in general possible that a subject satisfies the predicate in one conversational context but 3 Similarly, it follows that we cannot plausibly explain the phenomena by pointing out that Jones is in a different practical situation (has different practical interests, for instance) with respect to the two contexts: she isn't. This fact about the above example provides problems for so-called Subject-Sensitive Invariantist accounts of knowledge. See, for instance, Fantl and McGrath (2002); Hawthorne (2004); Stanley (2005). 4 Cf. Cohen (1988); DeRose (1995); Lewis (1996). 5 doesn't do so in another, or, in other words, that somebody in a given context speaks truly when uttering a sentence of the form 'x knows p' while somebody in a different context speaks falsely when uttering the very same sentence-even though both speakers are speaking about the same subject x at the same time of utterance t. Epistemic contextualism is, as a consequence, a linguistic or a semantic view-namely, the view that 'knowledge'-ascriptions-sentences of the form 'x knows p'-may express different propositions in different contexts of utterance. According to EC, 'knowledge'-ascriptions are, as Stanley (2005: 17) puts it, context-sensitive in a distinctively epistemological way: the content of a sentence S containing the predicate 'know(s) p' can change with context, independently of whether S contains further indexicals, is ambiguous, or is contextsensitive in any other way. In a first approximation, we can thus define 'epistemic contextualism' as follows: (EC!) Knowledge ascriptions may express different propositions relative to different contexts of utterance, where this difference is traceable to the occurrence of 'know(s) p' and concerns a distinctively epistemic factor. Given semantic compositionality-the view that the content or semantic value of complex expressions is a function of its ultimate constituents and the way in which they are combined-(EC!) entails (EC): (EC) The content of the predicate 'know(s) p' may vary with the context of utterance in a distinctly epistemic way. According to EC, the predicate 'know(s) p' adds context-sensitivity to a sentence it occurs in, and this context-sensitivity is distinctly epistemic-that is, it goes over and above the context-sensitivity that the verb contributes to the sentence by virtue of its tense.5 The exact details as to how to semantically model the context-sensitivity of 'know(s) p' shall not concern us in this article. However, it is worth noting that EC is not a lexical ambiguity theory-that is, it doesn't claim that 'know(s) p' is assigned multiple conventional meanings in English, as are the lexically ambiguous expressions 'bank' or 5 Cf. Schaffer and Szabó (forthcoming) for the above definition of EC. 6 'orange'. On the contrary, contextualists have commonly compared 'know(s) p' to indexical expressions, such as 'I', 'that', and 'today' or to gradable adjectives such as 'flat' and 'empty': these expressions are widely taken to have only one conventional meaning- what Kaplan (1989) calls their 'character'-but different contents or semantic values in suitably different contexts of utterance. While there are several distinct ways to semantically model the context-sensitivity of 'know(s) p', contextualists have often stressed an analogy between the semantics of 'know(s) p' and the semantics of gradable adjectives such as 'flat', 'empty', or 'tall': just as what counts as satisfying 'flat', 'empty', or 'tall' may vary with context, contextualists have argued, what counts as satisfying 'know(s) p' may vary with context, too.6 Given this analogy, EC can be construed as claiming that (1) and (2) in our above example stand in a relation similar to the relation between a basketball coach's utterance of 'MB-T isn't tall' and a jockey coach's utterance of 'MB-T is tall': while the surface syntax of these sentences suggests a contradiction, the propositions expressed are compatible, as the semantic value of 'tall' changes with the context of utterance. Ordinary usage of 'tall' and 'know' seem to be similar: both expressions seem to be context-sensitive.7 Before moving on, consider the question whether the predicate 'is ignorant' in English is context-sensitive. According to what we may call the standard account of ignorance, ignorance with respect to p is the absence of knowledge whether p. Thus, on the standard account, (3) is synonymous with (4): (3) S is ignorant with respect to p. (4) S neither knows that p nor that ¬p. Now, given EC, the truth-conditions of (4) vary with the context of ascription in a specifically epistemic way. If (3) is synonymous with (4), however, it also follows that the truth-conditions of (3) vary with the context of ascription in a specifically epistemic way. Given the standard account of ignorance, contextualism about 'knowledge' entails contextualism about 'ignorance'. 6 For this analogy see Unger (1975); DeRose (1995); Lewis (1996); Cohen (1999, 2004). 7 Not all contextualists endorse the analogy to gradable adjectives (see, for instance, Schaffer et al. [forthcoming]), but it is at this point helpful in illustrating the general concept of context-sensitivity underlying the view. 7 It is noteworthy, however, that the entailment from contextualism about 'knowledge' to contextualism about 'ignorance' does not hold on certain alternative accounts of the semantics of 'ignorance'. According to the absence-of-true-belief account championed by Goldman (1986: 36) and Peels (2010), for instance, 'ignorance'attributions of the form in (3) are to be analyzed as in (5): (5) S doesn't believe truly that p. On this view of the semantics of 'ignorance', the verb 'is ignorant' is not contextsensitive in a specifically epistemic way. Ignorance, on the view at hand, just boils down to the absence of true belief and is, in fact, an entirely non-epistemic notion. Thus, whether 'ignorance'-attributions are context-sensitive in a specifically epistemic way depends partly on their semantic relations to 'knowledge'-attributions. In what follows I shall assume what I have called the standard view about ignorance and sketch the contextualist's response to arguments for our universal ignorance about the external world. 3. Evidence for Contextualism The main evidence for EC derives from our intuitions about the truth-values of 'knowledge'-ascriptions in examples such as the above zebra case. However, there are further, more familiar examples that have been presented in support of EC in the literature. Consider, for instance, Stewart Cohen's (1999: 58) Airport Case: Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a certain flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask a passenger, Smith, if he knows whether the flight stops in Chicago. Smith looks at the flight itinerary he got from the travel agent and responds, "Yes I know-it does stop in Chicago." It turns out that Mary and John have a very important business contact they have to make at the Chicago airport. Mary says, "How reliable is that itinerary? It could contain a misprint. They could have changed the schedule at the last minute." Mary and John agree that Smith doesn't really know that the plane will stop in Chicago. They decide to check with the airline agent. As Cohen's example suggests, the sentence 'Smith knows that the flight stops over in Chicago' seems true as uttered in Smith's context but false as uttered in Mary's and John's context. Moreover, it seems as though the practical interests and goals of the con8 versational participants or how high the stakes are with regard to the proposition that the flight will stop over in Chicago influence the respective contexts' epistemic standards, and thus whether Smith satisfies 'knows': in Smith's own context he satisfies 'knows that the flight will stop over in Chicago', but in Mary's and John's context, where the stakes are significantly higher, he doesn't. Here is another example reinforcing this point-namely, Keith DeRose's (1992) famous Bank Cases, as presented by Stanley (2005: 3–4): Low Stakes Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. It is not important that they do so, as they have no impending bills. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Realizing that it isn't very important that their paychecks are deposited right away, Hannah says, "I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning." High Stakes Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. Since they have an impending bill coming due, and very little in their account, it is very important that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. Hannah notes that she was at the bank two weeks before on a Saturday morning, and it was open. But, as Sarah points out, banks do change their hours. Hannah says, "I guess you're right. I don't know that the bank will be open tomorrow." Similar to Cohen's example, DeRose's case suggests that it is more difficult to satisfy 'knows' in a context in which the stakes are higher: in Low Stakes Hannah satisfies 'knows that the bank will be open tomorrow', whereas in High Stakes she doesn't, even though she is in exactly the same epistemic position in both cases. And, again, the defender of EC argues that the difference in our intuitions in the two bank cases is due to the fact that the relevant 'knowledge'-ascriptions are made in different conversational contexts: in the context of High Stakes, the argument goes, it is considerably more difficult to satisfy 'knows that the bank is open on Saturday' than it is in the context of Low Stakes.8 8 Note that since the relevant 'knowledge'-ascriptions in DeRose's bank cases as presented above are made from the first person perspective-they are so-called self-ascriptions-the data from DeRose's example are 9 The above examples and others like them have attracted a large amount of critical attention in recent years. Note, for instance, that the argument in support of EC emerging from the above data amounts to an inference to the best explanation: in evaluating the support EC receives from the examples, we must therefore compare EC's account of the data with competing explanations of rival theories. Such comparisons of explanatory virtue in philosophy, however, are usually rather difficult and complicated. A further challenge to EC's account of the above data pertains to the data's evidential status: some practitioners of experimental philosophy have, in recent studies, aimed to undermine the contextualists' case by arguing that the professional philosopher's intuitions about the above cases do not coincide with the intuitions of the more general public. While the above issues present interesting and legitimate challenges to EC, we shall, in this article, leave them to one side and focus our attention on a topic that is commonly taken to provide an important philosophical motivation for EC: sceptical puzzles.9 Before moving on to the issue of sceptical puzzles, however, let us briefly consider the question whether examples of the above type can be employed in determining whether ascriptions of 'ignorance' are context-sensitive. One immediate worry with respect to the relevant examples concerns the idiomaticity of 'ignorance'-ascriptions in examples such as High Stakes. It would, I take it, seem somewhat odd for Hannah in High Stakes to assert: (6) I guess you're right. I'm ignorant as to whether the bank will be open tomorrow. Despite the non-idiomaticity of (6), however, it should be noted that (6) doesn't appear outright false as uttered by Hannah in High Stakes. In fact, I take it that our intuitions are rather firmly leaning towards the view that it expresses a truth-despite being somewhat clumsy. Whatever the consequences of these data are for the potential context-sensitivity of 'is ignorant', it should be noted that our amended version of High Stakes spells significant trouble for the absence-of-true-belief account of ignorance mentioned earlier. Re- not suited to support EC over certain rival accounts such as Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI): according to SSI, whether one knows p depends in part on one's own and thus the subject's (as opposed to the ascriber's) epistemic standards (see Hawthorne (2004); Stanley (2005); Fantl and McGrath (2009) for versions of this view). A straightforward subject-sensitive invariantist explanation, however, is not available for Cohen's Airport Case and the Zebra Case in Section 1 of this paper. 9 See DeRose (2011) for a critical discussion of some experimental philosophy papers in the area. 10 member that, according to Goldman (1986: 36) and Peels (2010), one is ignorant with respect to p just in case one doesn't believe truly that p. It then follows that Hannah's utterance of (6) in High Stakes expresses a falsehood, for Hannah believes, we may assume, that the bank won't be open tomorrow.10 But such a verdict is clearly not confirmed by the data. Moreover, note that, given the absence-of-true-belief account of ignorance, Hannah's utterance of (6)'s negation-that is, her utterance of 'I am not ignorant as to whether the bank will be open tomorrow'-shouldn't seem false in High Stakes: according to the absence-of-true-belief account, such an utterances expresses the truth that Hannah believes truly that the bank will be open tomorrow. It is not a trivial task for the defender of the absence-of-true-belief account to explain the datum that Hannah's utterance of (6)'s negation appears false in High Stakes. In summary, it is doubtful whether the absence-of-true-belief account of ignorance is confirmed by the data emerging from amending the above cases to involve ascriptions of 'ignorance'.11 4. Cartesian Sceptical Puzzles We have seen so far that EC receives some prima facie support from certain linguistic data-namely, the examples discussed in the previous sections. Traditionally, however, contextualists have also claimed that besides the above empirical evidence in favour of their views there is also an independent, philosophical motivation for EC. More specifically, contextualists have argued that the context-sensitivity of 'know(s) p' suggested by the above examples provides us with an attractive resolution of sceptical puzzles. To begin our discussion of the contextualist response to scepticism, reconsider the sceptical argument, reproduced here from Section 1: 10 Hannah believes that the bank won't be open tomorrow, even though she doesn't outright believe it: she believes that the bank won't be open tomorrow while at the same time believing that she doesn't know that proposition. Those who disagree that Hannah believes that the bank will be open tomorrow can consider the third person ascription from Section 2 with respect to which there is no doubt that the subject believes the proposition in question. 11 Other troublesome examples for the absence-of-true-belief account include lottery-style examples, in which there is a strong intuition that the subject is ignorant as to whether her ticket is a loser, despite the fact that she truly believes that it is a loser. 11 Sceptical Argument (i) If I know that I have hands, then I'm in a position to know that I'm not a handless brain in a vat. (ii) I'm not in a position to know that I'm not a handless brain in a vat. (iii) I don't know that I have hands. Note again that the argument is valid: if we accept its premises, we must accept its conclusion, too. Moreover, together with the eminently plausible (iv), the argument constitutes a paradox: (iv) I know that I have hands. The propositions (i), (ii), and (iv) form an inconsistent set; and so at least one of them has to be rejected. But which one are we to reject, and on what grounds? What exactly is the mistake we have made when we find ourselves puzzled by the Sceptical Argument? 5. The Contextualist Solution to Sceptical Puzzles The traditional contextualist's response to the sceptical puzzle is to claim that the Sceptical Argument is unsound in conversational contexts that are governed by our moderate everyday epistemic standards but sound in contexts with artificially high, sceptical epistemic standards.12 In everyday contexts, the argument goes, I satisfy 'knows that he isn't a handless brain in a vat' and premise (ii) of the sceptical argument expresses a falsehood: if I satisfy, in ordinary contexts, 'knows that he isn't a handless brain in a vat', then I also satisfy, in ordinary contexts, 'is in a position to know that he's not a handless brain in a vat'. Consequently, the Sceptical Argument is unsound in ordinary contexts, and its conclusion doesn't follow: relative to ordinary contexts, I satisfy 'knows that he has hands' and the conclusion of the sceptical argument expresses a falsehood. However, as indicated already, things are different in so-called sceptical contexts in which we practice epistemology and consider and discuss sceptical scenarios such as the brain-in-a-vat scenario. In such contexts, the argument goes, the epistemic standards 12 The following is a description of standard contextualist views on sceptical puzzles, as it can be found- more or less explicitly-in all major writings of contextualists. See, for instance, DeRose (1995) and Cohen (1999). 12 are considerably higher-in fact, outrageously high-to the effect that premise (ii) expresses a truth in such contexts. For instance, contextualists have argued that because sceptical possibilities are epistemically relevant in sceptical contexts, premise (ii) of the Sceptical Argument expresses a truth: sceptical possibilities are, after all, uneliminated by our evidence, and we therefore do not, in sceptical contexts in which they are relevant, satisfy the predicate 'is in a position to know that s/he is not a handless brain in a vat'. Consequently, when the sceptic asserts, in her sceptical context, 'MB-T doesn't know that he has hands', she asserts a truth. However, it is crucial to emphasize that the truth of the sceptic's assertion does not affect the truth-values of my positive 'knowledge'ascriptions in ordinary contexts. To illustrate this view further, it is worth noting that traditional contextualists aim to resolve the tensions between our anti-sceptical intuitions on the one hand and the intuition that sceptical arguments are sound (and their conclusions, therefore, true) on the other. We can represent these intuitions as follows: Anti-Sceptical Intuition (ASI) People often speak truly when they assert 'I know p'. Sceptical Intuition (SI) People sometimes speak truly when they assert 'Nobody knows p' in contexts in which sceptical arguments are discussed. The traditional contextualist claims that both of these intuitions are correct and only seemingly contradictory: they are correct because the semantic value of 'know(s) p' varies with the context of utterance; so when we claim in everyday contexts that we 'know p', our utterances are not in contradiction to our utterance of 'Nobody knows p' in sceptical contexts. Thus, it is crucial to note that, according to the traditional contextualist, it is not (iv) which is shown to be true or (iii) which is shown to be false. Rather, the traditional contextualist emphasizes that our sceptical and anti-sceptical intuitions are exclusively intuitions about the truth-values of utterance tokens, which are by their very nature situated in particular conversational contexts. Our intuitions are not about the truth-values of sentences as considered more or less in the abstract in a philosophical essay or discus13 sion. Once we appreciate this point and take into account the context-sensitivity of 'knowledge'-attributions, the sceptical puzzle is-the traditional contextualist argues- easily dissolved: the argument is sound in contexts with exceedingly high or sceptical epistemic standards, but unsound in contexts with ordinary or everyday epistemic standards. 6. Error Theory and Contextual Shifts An important question arises at this point: if the semantic value of 'know' can in fact change in a way allowing for both (ASI) and (SI) to be true, why, then, are we initially puzzled by sceptical arguments? Shouldn't we be somehow sensitive to or aware of the context-sensitivity of 'know(s) p' and avoid making the mistake the contextualist ascribes to us? If EC is true, why, in other words, are sceptical arguments puzzling in the first place? To account for the puzzling nature of sceptical arguments, the contextualist is committed to the view that we sometimes lose sight of the context-sensitivity of epistemic terms, and in particular that we do so when confronted with sceptical arguments.13 Therefore, according to the traditional contextualist, we do not recognize that the sceptical conclusion is true in the context of discussions of sceptical arguments while false in everyday contexts. Thus, the traditional contextualist argues that, when we are puzzled by sceptical arguments, we fail to realize that the propositions expressed by the arguments' conclusions are perfectly compatible with the propositions expressed by our everyday 'knowledge'-claims. Contextualists accordingly pair their semantics of 'know(s) p' with the view that we are sometimes unaware of or tend to overlook the context-sensitivity of 'know(s) p'. Stephen Schiffer, in an important paper criticizing this view, aptly calls this element of standard contextualism its error theory (see Schiffer 1996). Ultimately, it is, of course, entirely due to this error theory that EC can claim to be able to account for both the plausibility of sceptical arguments and our intuition that our everyday 'knowledge'-ascriptions express truths. We shall return to the plausibility of EC's error theory later on in this article (in Section 7). In the meantime, however, note that the contextualist's resolution of sceptical 13 Cf. Cohen (1988: 106); DeRose (1995: 40). 14 puzzles makes crucial use of the intuitive notion of a shift in or variation of epistemic standards between contexts. It is important to note at this point, however, that arguing for the context-sensitivity of 'know(s) p' on the basis of the claim that the Bank Case, the Airport Case, and our Zebra Case involve contextual variation of epistemic standards is one thing, while claiming that epistemic standards are 'shifty' in precisely the way required for a resolution of sceptical puzzles is quite a different proposition. In fact, for the contextualist's resolution of sceptical puzzles to be credible, we need to be told more about what exactly the mechanisms underlying contextual shifts and variations are. In other words, we need to be told more about what epistemic standards are and how they are determined by context: why is it that epistemic standards are high in so-called sceptical contexts, and why are they lower in everyday situations? Different contextualists have different stories to tell about what epistemic standards are and about how they shift and vary. But it is fair to say that the original approaches defended by early contextualists (such as DeRose (1995) and Lewis (1996)) are highly problematic and must be refined and amended substantially before we can grant the contextualist that her view offers a resolution of sceptical puzzles. However, a detailed discussion of the more recent literature on epistemic standards is beyond the scope of this article.14 7. Closure Another important aspect of the contextualist resolution of sceptical puzzles to be mentioned here is that the contextualist resolves sceptical puzzles while fully respecting our intuition that one can extend one's knowledge by competent deduction. To see what I have in mind here, consider the following principle, which is familiar under the label Single-Premise Closure: (CL) If x knows p and x knows that p entails q, then x is in a position to know q. 14 Lewis's (1996) "Rule of Attention" and DeRose's (1995) "Rule of Sensitivity" offer accounts of contextual shifts that, on the face of it, are useful for the resolution of sceptical puzzles, but that turn out to be problematic for independent reasons. For criticism of DeRose's approach, see Blome-Tillmann (2009a), and, for a refinement of Lewis's relevant alternatives approach to contextualism that avoids a number of problems, see Blome-Tillmann (2009b, 2014). 15 Here is an instance of (CL) for illustration: if, firstly, I know that the animal outside my window is a fox and if, secondly, I know that its being a fox entails that it's not a cat, then I am also in a position to know that the animal outside my window is not a cat. Of course, I am in a position to know that latter proposition because I can competently deduce it from (i) my knowledge that the animal is a fox and (ii) my knowledge that its being a fox entails that it is not a cat. Single-premise closure captures fairly precisely the intuition that one can extend one's knowledge by means of deductive reasoning. Now, while some epistemologists have argued that giving a response to the sceptic requires us to give up (CL), the contextualist resolution gets by without any such move.15 How does the contextualist avoid rejecting closure? Note that, according to EC, every semantic value that the verb 'knows' can express in a given context is, loosely speaking, closed under 'known' entailment. Here is a more precise and contextualized formulation of the single-premise principle to illustrate the idea: (CLC) If x satisfies 'knows p' in context C and satisfies 'knows that p entails q' in C, then x is in a position to satisfy 'knows q' in C. (CLC) is a meta-linguistic principle. Loosely speaking, (CLC) says that (CL), its noncontextualized cousin, expresses a truth as long as the conversational context is kept fixed.16 Thus, unlike Nozick (1981) and Dretske (1970), who reject (CL) in giving a response to the sceptic, the contextualist, by ascending semantically, merely modifies and clarifies (CL) in a way that respects our intuitions about the validity of the closure principle. Contextualists have traditionally taken this to be a great comparative advantage of their theories over epistemological theories that advocate closure failure. 15 Note also that the sceptic uses (CL) when motivating premise (i) of her argument: she reasons from the assumption that I know that my having a hand entails that I am not a handless brain in a vat to the conclusion that if I know that I have a hand, then I am in a position to know that I am not a handless brain in a vat, i.e., to premise (i) of the Sceptical Argument. The precise reasoning is as follows: Closure Argument for (i) (1) (Kp ∧ K(p → ¬sh)) → ◊K¬sh. from CL (2) K(p → ¬sh) → (Kp → ◊K¬sh). 1 Exp (3) K(p → ¬sh). A (i) Kp → ◊K¬sh. 2, 3 MP Note that there are other ways to motivate (i), but I shall ignore them in this paper (see, for instance, Brueckner (1994)). 16 See DeRose (1995); Lewis (1996); Cohen (1999). 16 8. Criticisms of Contextualism Epistemic contextualism has been criticized for a number of reasons. In this paper, we shall focus on two criticisms of EC that have figured most prominently in the recent literature. Firstly, Ernest Sosa has wondered what the epistemological relevance of contextualism is, given that EC is a linguistic view-that is, a view about the predicate 'know(s) p' and its content rather than about knowledge. Considering the contextualist's resolution of sceptical puzzles sketched above, this worry may appear somewhat surprising. However, Sosa thinks that EC, even though true, has only little epistemological relevance, if any at all: The main thesis of [EC] has considerable plausibility as a thesis in linguistics or in philosophy of language. In applying it to epistemology, however, it is possible to overreach ... (Sosa 2011: 98) What, then, is Sosa's objection? To see what Sosa has in mind, let us introduce some technical language. Let 'KE' express the content of 'know' in everyday contexts and let 'KS' express the content of 'know' in sceptical contexts. Now consider (7), which we derive from (ASI) by disquotation: (7) People often speak truly when they assert that they know p. Depending on whether the epistemic standards of our present context are those of everyday contexts or those of sceptical contexts (7) expresses the content of either (8) or (9): (8) People often speak truly when they assert that they KE p. (9) People often speak truly when they assert that they KS p. Since Sosa assumes that contexts of epistemological enquiry are inevitably sceptical contexts, Sosa thinks that (7), in the context of this article, expresses the proposition expressed by (9). Now, the alleged problem for EC is that (9) is clearly false, for it suggests that people in quotidian contexts assert that they KS p. However, when people in quotidian contexts use the word 'know', its semantic value is always KE rather than KS. Thus, Sosa complains that contextualists convey a falsehood, when they assert (7) in a context of epistemological discussion. 17 How serious an objection is this to EC? The obvious reply to Sosa's objection is, of course, that the contextualist ought to distinguish more carefully between the mention and the use of 'know' and thus only assert (ASI) instead of the disquoted (7): Sosa's objection rests on a conflation of the use/mention-distinction.17 Moreover, it is worthwhile noting that more recent contextualists have developed accounts according to which contexts of philosophical and epistemological enquiry are by no means automatically sceptical contexts.18 On these more moderate views (7), in the context of this paper, expresses the content of (8) rather than that of (9), and I therefore speak truly when, in the context of this paper and the epistemology classroom more generally, asserting (7). As a consequence, there are several ways the contextualist can respond to Sosa's charge that EC is epistemologically irrelevant. Another recently influential type of objection to EC proceeds by highlighting disparities between certain linguistic properties of 'know(s) p' on the one hand and more recognized context-sensitive expressions on the other. Remember that, for instance, contextualists compare 'know(s) p' to gradable adjectives, such as 'flat', 'empty', and 'tall'. However, as Jason Stanley (2005, ch. 2) has pointed out, 'know(s) p' has very different syntactic properties from gradable adjectives: as Stanley shows in great detail, 'know(s) p' is not syntactically gradable and doesn't accept a large number of constructions that gradable adjectives can be felicitously combined with. Similarly, it has been pointed out that our semantic blindness towards the context-sensitivity of 'know(s) p'-discussed above under the label of EC's error theory-is not observed in connection with recognized indexicals such as 'I', 'here', and 'today'. This fact is illustrated by the following principle: (10) If an English speaker E sincerely utters a sentence S of the form 'A knows that p', and the sentence in the that-clause means that p and 'A' is a name or indexical that refers to a, then E believes of a that a knows that p, and expresses that belief by S. 17 See Blome-Tillmann (2007) for more details on this line of reasoning. 18 See Blome-Tillmann (2009b, 2014) and Ichikawa (2011a, 2011b). 18 As John Hawthorne (2004: 101) points out, (10) seems entirely natural. But, of course, (10) is false if 'know(s) p' is context-sensitive: since E's context might be governed by epistemic standards that are different from those operative in this paper, the disquotation of 'knows' in (10) is illegitimate. Since the possibility of an asymmetry between E's and our own epistemic standards is largely hidden from competent speakers, the contextualist must accept that the context-sensitivity of 'knows' is non-obvious: it is not as readily detected by competent speakers as the context-sensitivity of core indexicals. Interestingly, however, similar phenomena are not observed with respect to 'I'. Consider (11), a disquotation principle for 'I': (11) If an English speaker E sincerely utters a sentence S of the form 'I am hungry', then E believes that I am hungry, and expresses that belief by S. Clearly, it is not the case that every English speaker who utters 'I am hungry' believes that I, MB-T, am hungry. What is worth emphasizing in response to Hawthorne's worry, however, is that the gradable adjectives 'flat' and 'empty' display somewhat similar behavior with respect to disquotation. Consider the following disquotation principles for 'flat' and 'empty': (12) If an English speaker E sincerely utters a sentence S of the form 'A is flat', and 'A' is a name or indexical that refers to a, then E believes of a that a is flat, and expresses that belief by S. (13) If an English speaker E sincerely utters a sentence S of the form 'A is empty', and 'A' is a name or indexical that refers to a, then E believes of a that a is empty, and expresses that belief by S. As the intuitive plausibility of (12) and (13) demonstrates, the context-sensitivity of 'flat' and 'empty' is just as non-obvious or hidden from competent speakers as the contextsensitivity of 'knows'. Thus, on the assumption that gradable adjectives are in fact context-sensitive, the context-sensitivity of 'know(s) p' has been shown to be no more puzzling or mysterious than the comparatively humdrum context-sensitivity of 'flat' and 19 'empty'. It is due to data such as these that there is a growing consensus in the literature that the semantic blindness objection is not all that damaging to contextualism. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, even if 'know(s) p' varies in certain linguistic respects-whether semantic, syntactic, or pragmatic-from other recognized contextsensitive expressions, it is not clear whether the contextualist should be worried about such a discovery. For why shouldn't we accept that 'know(s) p' is linguistically exceptional? Let's not forget, after all, that 'know(s) p' combines a number of fairly interesting and unique properties: 'know(s) p' is a factive verb that accepts a sentential complement, and its satisfaction at a context is, arguably, the norm of assertion, practical reasoning, and belief at that context.19 Moreover, 'know(s) p' gives rise to sceptical puzzles, which surely makes the predicate rather unique. This combination of properties is no doubt unique, and we should therefore not expect 'know(s) p' to function in each and every linguistic respect exactly like other context-sensitive expressions. Thus, if EC should in fact commit us to the uniqueness of 'know', then this shouldn't worry us too much, as long as a coherent, illuminating, and systematic account of this uniqueness can be given. 9. Conclusion In summary, epistemic contextualism not only offers an interesting approach to sceptical puzzles but is also motivated by a large set of empirical data. To be sure, the philosophical jury is still out on epistemic contextualism: the view is, after all, still rather contentious and hotly debated in the literature. However, it is undeniable that EC is nowadays rather popular, not only amongst epistemologists but also amongst philosophers more generally.20 And as we begin to achieve an increasingly better understanding of natural language semantics in general and linguistic context-sensitivity in particular, contextualists may hope that EC will someday become one of the progressively more standard views in philosophy. At least to the author's mind, the prospects are rather bright that EC will one day be considered as making a lasting and important contribution to our understanding of scepticism and sceptical puzzles. 19 See Blome-Tillmann (2013, 2014) for a discussion of the knowledge norms in a contextualist account. 20 See Chalmers et al. (2014), whose data suggest that EC is the most widely accepted view in the semantics of 'knowledge'-attributions. 20 10. References Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 2007. 'Contextualism and the Epistemological Enterprise,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 107 (1/3): 387–394. ---. 2009a. 'Contextualism, Safety, and Epistemic Relevance,' Philosophical Studies 143: 383–394. ---. 2009b. 'Knowledge and Presuppositions,' Mind 118 (470): 241–294. ---. 2013. 'Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms,' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94: 89–100. ---. 2014. Knowledge and Presuppositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ---. 2015. 'Skepticism and Contextualism'. In B. Reed and D. Manchuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury. Brueckner, Anthony. 1994. 'The Structure of the Sceptical Argument,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 827–835. Chalmers, David J., and David Bourget. 2014. 'What do philosophers believe?' Philosophical Studies 170 (3): 465-500. Cohen, Stewart. 1988. 'How to Be a Fallibilist,' Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91–123. ---. 1999. 'Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Structure of Reasons,' Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57–89. ---. 2004. 'Contextualism and Unhappy-Face Solutions: Reply to Schiffer,' Philosophical Studies 119: 185–197. DeRose, Keith. 1992. 'Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 913–929. ---. 1995. 'Solving the Sceptical Problem,' The Philosophical Review 104: 1–52. ---. 2011. 'Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys,' Philosophical Studies 156: 81–110. Dretske, Fred. 1970. 'Epistemic Operators,' Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–1023. Fantl, Jeremy, and Matthew McGrath. 2002. 'Evidence, Pragmatics and Justification,' The Philosophical Review 111: 67–94. ---. 2009. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goldman, Alvin I. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ichikawa, Jonathan. 2011a. 'Quantifiers and epistemic contextualism,' Philosophical Studies 155: 383–398. ---. 2011b. 'Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82: 287–313. Kaplan, David. 1989. 'Demonstratives'. In J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, 481–563. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Lewis, David. 1996. 'Elusive Knowledge,' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549– 567. Ludlow, Peter. 2005. 'Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn in Epistemology,' Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning and Truth. G. Preyer and G. Peter (ed.), 11–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peels, Rik. 2010. 'What Is Ignorance?,' Philosophia 38(1): 57-67. 21 Schaffer, Jonathan, and Zoltan G. Szabó. Forthcoming. 'Epistemic Comparativism: A Contextualist Semantics for Knowledge Ascriptions,' Philosophical Studies. Schiffer, Stephen. 1996. 'Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 317–333. Sosa, Ernest. 2011. Kowing Full Well. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stanley, Jason. 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Unger, Peter. 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon.

Defining a Decidability Decider for the Halting Problem When we understand that every potential halt decider must derive a formal mathematical proof from its inputs to its final states previously undiscovered semantic details emerge. When-so-ever the potential halt decider cannot derive a formal proof from its input strings to its final states of Halts or Loops, undecidability has been decided. The formal proof involves tracing the sequence of state transitions of the input TMD as syntactic logical consequence inference steps in the formal language of Turing Machine Descriptions. ∃H ∈ Turing_Machines_Descriptions ∀b ∈ Turing_Machines_Descriptions ∀c ∈ Finite_Strings ~( (b,c) ⊢ H.Halts ∨ (b,c) ⊢ H.Loops ) ↔ H.Pathological-Self-Reference Every element of the infinite set of (b,c) is divided into one of these subsets: (1) H can derive a formal proof from input (b,c) finite strings to H.Halts (2) H can derive a formal proof from input (b,c) finite strings to H.Loops (3) else H.Pathological-Self-Reference(Olcott 2004) This meets the Rice Criteria shown below thereby providing the single valid counter-example required to refute Rice's Theorem. http://kilby.stanford.edu/~rvg/154/handouts/Rice.html Rice's theorem: Any nontrivial property about the language recognized by a Turing machine is undecidable. A property about Turing machines can be represented as the language of all Turing machines, encoded as strings, that satisfy that property. The property P is about the language recognized by Turing machines. https://www.tutorialspoint.com/cgi-bin/printpage.cgi ACCEPTED LANGUAGE & DECIDED LANGUAGE A TM accepts a language if it enters into a final state for any input string w. A language is recursively enumerable if it is accepted by a Turing machine. A TM decides a language if it accepts it and enters into a rejecting state for any input not in the language. A language is recursive if it is decided by a Turing machine. Copyright 2004, 2006, (2012 through 2018) Pete Olcott

Kant e-Prints Revista Internacional de Filosofia Série 2, volume 12, número 1, jan.-abr., 2017 ISSN: 1677-163X Publicação Quadrimestral Universidade Estadual de Campinas – Unicamp Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência – CLE Seção de Campinas da Sociedade Kant Brasileira – SKB SUMÁRIO Artigos 6 Pode um construtivismo moral justificar o respeito por seres humanos? Considerações kantianas Emanuel Lanzini Stobbe 37 ¿Es la filosofía kantiana individualista? Carlos Andrés Duque Acosta Ensaio 56 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Stephen R. Palmquist 56 Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 TRINTA E CINCO ANOS DE PESQUISAS SOBRE KANT: UMA PANORÂMICA EM RETROSPECTIVA* Stephen R. Palmquist Hong Kong Baptist University [email protected] Por conta de o ano de 2018 contar 35 anos da publicação do meu primeiro escrito sobre Kant,1 eu lhes convido a fazer uma viagem em minha trajetória de pesquisa kantiana, uma panorâmica em retrospectiva que deve prover um bom trampolim, o qual impulsione talvez mais trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas fecundas – ou, no entanto, muitos anos mais que me permitam completar a minha pesquisa! Minha carreira como comentador de Kant começou em janeiro de 1983, quando, no meio do meu terceiro ano como doutorando na Universidade de Oxford, eu fiz uma pausa na escrita de minha tese de doutorado sobre natureza humana, a fim de escrever um artigo sobre Kant. Minha ideia inicial era publicar o artigo, de modo que eu pudesse relacioná-lo à minha tese sem colocar nela uma quantidade desordenada de espaço para Kant. Tão logo eu terminei o artigo, eu percebi que ele percorria várias temáticas e precisaria ser dividido em cinco outros artigos, os quais foram todos prontamente aceitos para publicação.2 Próximo ao fim de meu terceiro ano de doutorado (no meio de 1983), eu percebi que, naquele momento, eu tinha um material para uma tese completamente nova, agora focada inteiramente em Kant. Os cinco artigos tornaram-se capítulos da tese, a qual foi publicada (após a minuciosa revisão) como meu primeiro livro: Kant's System of Perspectives (será citada a partir de agora como KSP).3 * O manuscrito original e inédito submetido para a Kant e-Prints por Stephen R. Palmquist, intitulado: Thirty-five Years of Research on Kant: A Retrospective Overview, foi traduzido para o português por José Henrique Alexandre de Azevedo (Doutorando em Filosofia na UNICAMP). 1 O primeiro a ser publicado foi: "Faith as Kant's Key to the Justification of Transcendental Reflection", The Heythrop Journal 25.4 (Outubro 1984), pp. 442-455. 2 Os outros quatro artigos eram: "The Radical Unknowability of Kant's 'Thing in Itself'", Cogito 3.2 (Março 1985), pp. 101-115. "Six Perspectives on the Object in Kant's Theory of Knowledge", Dialectica 40.2 (1986), pp. 121-151. "The Architectonic Form of Kant's Copernican Logic", Metaphilosophy 17.4 (Outubro 1986), pp. 266-288. "Knowledge and Experience-An Examination of the Four Reflective 'Perspectives' in Kant's Critical Philosophy", Kant-Studien 78.2 (1987), pp. 170-200. Antes de deixar Oxford em 1987, eu também publiquei quatro outros artigos que não fizeram parte de minha tese de doutorado. 3 Kant's System of Perspectives: An Architectonic Interpretation of the Critical Philosophy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993). 57 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 O principal argumento de meu primeiro trabalho sobre Kant, incluindo a minha tese, a sua revisão como KSP e a maioria de minhas primeiras publicações, é que a maior parte (talvez todas) das aparentes inconsistências no sistema filosófico de Kant podem ser revistas (reconciled) se nós levarmos a sério a alegação de Kant de que seu sistema é organizado de acordo com um padrão arquitetônico, que a própria razão nos concede. O problema com este tipo de abordagem é que Kant é, notoriamente, obscuro sobre o que, de fato, é este padrão arquitetônico. Postulando que o padrão que Kant tem em mente era precisamente sua tábua das doze categorias e que a forma da sua divisão (em duas séries de distinções diádicas, com cada uma das quatro principais categorias resultantes, sendo dividida em um padrão categorial triplo) é, no mínimo, tão importante, para Kant, quanto seu conteúdo, eu argumentei que quatro distintas "perspectivas" (uma transcendental, uma lógica, uma empirista e uma hipotética) guiam a razão kantiana sempre que ela tentar construir um "sistema". Além disso, o próprio Sistema Crítico segue este padrão: o Sistema, em sua totalidade, adota o Transcendental como sua "Perspectiva" geral; a primeira Crítica adota a perspectiva lógica, visando estabelecer o conhecimento de um ponto de vista teorético; a segunda Crítica adota uma perspectiva hipotética, em vista de determinar a ação de um ponto de vista prático; e a terceira Crítica liga estes dois últimos, por meio da adoção da perspectiva intermediária ou empirista como de um ponto de vista judicativo. KSP traça o argumento principal de cada uma das três Críticas, mostrando como, munido com este mecanismo estrutural arquitetônico, o intérprete pode ver consistência onde muitos intérpretes viram apenas autocontradição e exaustão, onde intérpretes não "perspectivistas" veem apenas transições carentes ou fortuitas. Um dos revisores de KSP recomendou que os três capítulos finais que constavam da versão do texto da tese, os quais concordavam com implicações teológicas das análises precedentes (especialmente aquele contido no extraordinário livro de Kant de 1793/1794, Religião nos Limites da Simples Razão; a partir de agora RL), deveriam ser retirados deste primeiro livro e transformados em um segundo volume. Levando, fortemente, em consideração este conselho, eu pensei de modo mais aprofundado sobre as implicações de minha interpretação arquitetônica e percebi que ela tem implicações não apenas para a religião (e teologia), mas também para a ciência (e filosofia da ciência), assim como para a antropologia (e filosofia política). Eu, em vista disso, 58 Stephen R. Palmquist Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 substitui a série original de três capítulos conclusivos por três novos capítulos, esboçando os conteúdos planejados em vista de um segundo, terceiro e quarto volumes de um projeto completo de Kant's System of Perspectives. Eu passei a maior parte da década de 1990, escrevendo por volta de uma dúzia de artigos que se tornaram capítulos ou apêndices neste referido segundo volume,4 o qual foi publicado em 2000 sob o título de Kant's Critical Religion (daqui em diante: KCR).5 O principal propósito de KCR foi demonstrar que (se interpretado contra o pano de fundo que considera um entendimento coerente e arquitetonicamente atualizado da filosofia Crítica) a visão de Kant sobre Deus e a religião pode ser vista como tendo um essencial impulso afirmativo. A Parte Um é endereçada a algumas questões básicas que dizem respeito ao papel geral da teologia e da religião no sistema filosófico kantiano em geral; na Parte Dois, argumentei que Kant apresenta uma forma rica de teologia simbólica, que não implica em mera redução de toda religião à moralidade, como reclama a mais comum e tradicional chave de leitura. A Parte Três ofereceu uma detalhada descrição do argumento da RL, a partir de três distintos pontos de vistas: um que diz respeito a teologia filosófica, interpretando o que Kant chama de seu "primeiro experimento" (Capítulo VII), um outro que concerne a esta teologia filosófica que conduz ao que corresponde ao chamado "segundo experimento", que interpreta a religião bíblica nos termos do primeiro experimento (Capítulo VIII); e a última que trata de uma hipotética teologia bíblica, que interpreta a filosofia kantiana nos termos da religião bíblica (Capítulo IX). O livro conclui-se na Parte Quatro com uma defesa do argumento de que o completo Sistema filosófico de Kant pode ser considerado como 4 Em 1986, enquanto ainda estava em Oxford, eu escrevi um dos primeiros artigos, o qual intitulei "Can A Christian Be A Kantian?", o qual serviu como um manifesto para o projeto de trabalho fora das implicações religiosas e teológicas de KSP. Este artigo foi posteriormente publicado sob um título que foi revisto por conta da recomendação (mau conselho) do revisor: "Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?", Faith and Philosophy 6.1 (Janeiro 1989), pp. 65-75. O novo título foi um infortúnio, pois ele levou a muitos leitores do meu trabalho a pensar que meu objetivo seria argumentar que o próprio Kant seria um cristão, enquanto, de fato, o objetivo do artigo era mostrar que ser um kantiano e ser um cristão não era conflituoso, contanto que ambos fossem interpretados propriamente. Uma primeira resposta sobre o artigo por Anthony Perovich deu-me a oportunidade de responder a primeira versão deste mal-entendido: Cf. "Triangulating God: A Kantian Rejoinder to Perovich", Faith and Philosophy 11.2 (April 1994), pp. 302-310. Infelizmente, neste primeiro estágio da coisa eu não consegui prever quão sérios poderiam ser alguns dos mal-entendidos sobre o meu trabalho (ver a nota 8). 5 Kant's Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant's System of Perspectives (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000). 59 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 pavimentando o caminho para um novo modo de olhar a experiência religiosa, o qual eu chamo de "Misticismo Crítico".6 Embora algum ímpeto inicial tenha sido estimulado por KCR, na medida em que ajudou a gerar uma nova tendência nos estudos kantianos em língua inglesa, visto RL ser agora levada de modo mais sério como um trabalho que propriamente concerne ao plano sistemático básico de Kant, não sendo, por conseguinte, uma anomalia, mas sim parte do núcleo duro que ele estava tentando alcançar,7 alguns comentadores mal interpretaram-na pensando ser uma defesa da ideia de que o próprio Kant seria um cristão (ver nota 4), enquanto que outros enganaram-se acerca do principal argumento, achando ser este também apenas uma mera confirmação da principal ideia de KSP sobre a arquitetônica kantiana ou defesa de que Kant se via como um místico – este último é, obviamente, falso.8 Devido a uma miscelânea de resultados inesperados sobre a recepção de KCR, eu decidi em 2006 começar a trabalhar sobre um compreensível comentário à RL.9 Eu percebi, que somente ao percorrer o texto de kantiano linha por linha, eu poderia demonstrar, detalhadamente, que meu principal argumento está enraizado no texto de Kant: no qual Kant sustentou uma interpretação não reducionista da relação entre religião e moralidade; também que o texto da RL emprega as mesmas quatro "perspectivas" que podem ser vistas operando nas três Críticas, nas quais Kant assevera uma moderada forma de experiência religiosa, mesmo enquanto critica, severamente, os demasiados comuns modos místicos de ser, os quais confiam, profundamente, na superstição e em uma irreal visão da habilidade do ser humano de conhecer a mente de Deus. Durante a subsequente década, devido ao trabalho neste 6 Eu, recentemente, compilei uma minuciosa versão revisada deste argumento baseado nos capítulos II, X e XII de KCR. Ele está sendo publicado como uma monografia intitulada Baring All in Reason's Light: An Exposition and Defense of Kant's Critical Mysticism (Aurora, CO: Noesis Press, 2017). 7 Veja a coleção de ensaios acadêmicos que eu coeditei com Chris L. Firestone intitulado Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). 8 Chris Firestone e Nathan Jacobs, em seu livro In Defense of Kant's Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, January 2008), enquadraram meu trabalho nos dois últimos argumentos e em um subsequente diálogo publicado na revista Faith and Philosophy 29.2 (April 2012), por conta de uma má leitura horrenda de minha interpretação acerca da teoria kantiana da religião – a qual ignora totalmente muitos dos meus argumentos atuais – Cf. Douglas McGaughey, "Historical and Pure Religion: A Response to Stephen Palmquist", Journal of Religion 93.2 (2013), pp. 151-176. Para aqueles que leram recentemente meu trabalho, a imprecisão do enquadramento de McGaughey acerca de minha posição deve ser óbvio; embora eu pretenda escrever uma resposta detalhada, pontuando muitas assunções incongruentes, CCKR pode ser considerada como uma espécie de resposta. 9 Este fora publicado como Comprehensive Commentary on Kant's Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2016); daqui em diante CCKR. A segunda parte deste artigo oferece uma detalhada retrospectiva deste trabalho. 60 Stephen R. Palmquist Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 projeto, eu escrevi numerosos novos artigos sobre a RL, os quais aprofundaram e expandiram as posições que defendi em KCR e que, no entanto, sabia de antemão, não haveria espaço para incluí-los em CCKR.10 O tempo voltado à escrita tanto de CCKR quanto dos artigos suplementares à obra sobre a filosofia kantiana da religião causou-me um inesperado atraso para completar os volumes que projetei para o meu Kant's System of Perspectives. Eu obtive, no entanto, um bom progresso no Volume Três, intitulado Kant's Critical Science, visto ter escrito vários artigos que se tornarão a base para os capítulos deste livro em sua completude.11 Publicar tanto este trabalho quanto o Volume Quatro, Kant's Critical Anthropology, será o principal foco de minha pesquisa durante a segunda metade de minha carreira acadêmica. Há outros três projetos, os quais estive trabalhando por algum tempo e espero completá-los em uma ou duas décadas. São estes: primeiro, The Geometry of Logic, um livro que introduz e defende (independentemente de sua aplicação a interpretação kantiana) o sistema de mapeamento lógico, que usei em KSP, KCR, e em várias outras publicações no esforço de elucidar as formas lógicas da arquitetura kantiana;12 o segundo, Changing the Changeless, é uma monografia comparando a forma lógica do antigo Yijing (i.e., Book of Changes) chinês com a abordagem kantiana de sua alegada arquitetônica atemporal;13 e, terceiro, The Power of Belief, o qual é um 10 Estes artigos são muito numerosos para que sejam discriminados em uma lista completa aqui, embora eles formem um importante suplemento a CCKR, seguindo seu rasto na medida em que CCKR refere-se repetidamente a eles como posteriores elaborações dos argumentos que estão necessariamente expressos em uma forma fragmentada em um livro que é forçado a seguir a ordem da exposição de Kant. No entanto, as coisas mais significantes nestes artigos são citadas abaixo como parte de minha retrospectiva em CCKR. 11 Cf.: "Kant on Euclid: Geometry in Perspective", Philosophia Mathematica II 5.1/2 (1990), pp. 88-113; "The Kantian Grounding of Einstein's Worldview: (I) The Early Influence of Kant's System of Perspectives", Polish Journal of Philosophy IV.1 (Spring 2010), pp. 45-64; "The Kantian Grounding of Einstein's Worldview: (II) Simultaneity, the Synthetic A Priori and God", Polish Journal of Philosophy V.1 (Spring 2011), pp. 97-116; "Kantian Causality and Quantum Quarks: The Compatibility between Quantum Mechanics and Kant's Phenomenal World", THEORIA: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 28.2 (May 2013), pp. 283-302; and "Bohm's Quantum Causality And Its Parallels In Kant's Ideas Of Reason", in Death And Anti-Death, Volume 13: Sixty Years After Albert Einstein (1879-1955), ed. Charles Tandy (Palo Alto: Ria University Press, 2015), pp. 99-128 (Chapter Eight). 12 Em adição ao Capítulo KSP e em numerosas aplicações ao longo de KSP, KCR, e muitos dos meus artigos, Cf.: "Analysis and Synthesis in the Geometry of Logic", Indian Philosophical Quarterly 19.1 (January 1992), pp. 1-14; "The Geometry of Logic", Chapter 5 of The Tree of Philosophy: A Course of Introductory Lectures for Beginning Students of Philosophy (Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press, 2000 [1992]); and "Emergence, Evolution, and the Geometry of Logic: Causal Leaps and the Myth of Historical Development", Foundations of Science 12.1 (March 2007), pp. 9-37. 13 Cf.: "Kant-Studies in the Hong Kong Philosophical Context", in Hoke Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, vol. I.3 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 61 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 exame da natureza e aplicação da "analítica a posteriori", isto é, a chave da classificação epistemológica que Kant, infelizmente, rejeitou (ou argumentou nesse sentido), mas que provou-se ter sido a ênfase maior no desenvolvimento do pós-kantismo na filosofia.14 Após dez anos trabalhando nestes e em outros projetos, CCKR foi, finalmente, publicado em dezembro de 2015. Por conta de este trabalho ser a culminação do que eu considerei (talvez por tempo demais!) como sendo, meramente, a primeira metade de minha carreira acadêmica, eu me concentrarei ao longo do restante do artigo em um exame detalhado de seu conteúdo. CCKR consiste em dois fios entrelaçados. O primeiro é uma cuidadosa análise do texto completo da RL, o qual eu apresento ao longo da versão revisada da tradução de Werner Pluhar (daqui em diante tal edição será citada como WP) publicada em 2009. Eu citei o texto de Kant por meio de excertos, estendendo-se estes desde uma a até cerca de trinta linhas, a depender de quanto a passagem é requeridamente importante para expressar a ideia completa. Estes blocos de citações são ilustrados por muitas notas de rodapé, comparando minha revisão com o texto original em alemão, com a edição de Pluhar e com outras duas traduções publicadas no século XX: a de George di Giovanni (a partir de agora GG) de 1998 pela Cambridge Edition das obras de Kant; e a de Theodore M. Greene e Hoyt H. Hudson (daqui em diante GH) de 1934. Um longo glossário no fim de CCKR também guia os leitores em direção a um profundo entendimento das nuances e significados da terminologia kantiana, especialmente de seu uso de termos religiosos específicos. O segundo fio consiste de explicação e interpretação, de entre um e três parágrafos, de cada passagem citada da RL. Nestes comentários, eu, concisamente, reitero a(s) principal(is) temáticas de Kant na passagem citada e, assim, discuto várias incertezas interpretativas que surgem na literatura secundária (eu discuto esta última em notas de 1995), pp. 1257-1271; "How 'Chinese' Was Kant?" (abridged version), The Philosopher 84.1 (Spring 1996), pp. 3-9; "The Unity of Architectonic Reasoning in Kant and I Ching", in Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, ed. Stephen R. Palmquist (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), pp. 811-821; "Architectonic Reasoning and Interpretation in Kant and Yijing", Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (December 2011), pp. 569-583; "Mapping Kant's Architectonic onto the Yijing via the Geometry of Logic", Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39 Supplement (December 2012), pp. 68-86; "A Daoist Model for a Kantian Church", Comparative Philosophy 4.1 (January 2013), pp. 67-89; and "Twelve Basic Philosophical Concepts in Kant and the Compound Yijing", Journal of Chinese Philosophy 42.1-2 (March-June 2015), pp. 143-162. 14 Em adição a KSP §§IV. 3-4, cf. "A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (II) Naming, Necessity and the Analytic A Posteriori", The Review of Metaphysics 41.2 (December 1987), pp. 255-282; and "Analytic Aposteriority and its Relevance to Twentieth Century Philosophy", Studia Humana 1.3/4 (2012), pp. 3-16. 62 Stephen R. Palmquist Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 rodapé se a incerteza for secundária). Eu também identifico as fontes de Kant e explico as várias alusões que ele faz tanto aos textos bíblicos quanto as várias ideias e tendências teológicas, políticas ou culturais. Por meio da tecelagem destes dois fios, CCKR oferece um recurso enciclopédico, ao qual leitores podem recorrer para esclarecer qualquer passagem da RL. Em muito sentidos, o segundo fio de CCKR também serve como sumário e síntese de minha pesquisa prévia sobre a filosofia da religião de Kant: devido ao fato de o livro ser já muito extenso, em muitas passagens eu apenas pude sintetizar, de modo breve, os argumentos e as interpretações que defendi com maior extensão em 43 de minhas publicações anteriores citadas em CCKR. A pressuposição básica que perpassou a maior parte de meu trabalho é a de que o sistema filosófico em geral de Kant é perspectivista, e seus dois principais "pontos de vista", o teórico e o prático, requerem uma ponte ou síntese na forma daquilo que chamo de "ponto de vista judicativo." Uma das mais importantes funções da RL, em minha visão, é a de realizar uma conexão, concedendo um lugar à religião, bem além daquele de apenas uma moralidade pura. Eu, com isso, apresento em CCKR uma defesa para além desta da interpretação "afirmativa", que defendi ao longo dos últimos 30 anos, uma posição que em muitos aspectos se opõe a visão tradicional (teologicamente negativa) da filosofia kantiana da religião como tentativa de reduzir toda religião à mera moralidade e, assim, em essência, de destruir, completamente, a religião em sentido histórico. Em contraste a esta última leitura, eu vejo o projeto de Kant na RL como uma tentativa de cultivar a moralidade ao nível da religião, por meio da qual o ser humano sozinho possa realizar sua moral natural básica. Esta elevação da função da religião é a chave para o entendimento do título da RL: o foco de Kant é a "nua" (blossen), e não a "pura" (reinen) razão. No Prefácio à segunda edição, Kant compara a religião racional e a religião histórica a dois círculos concêntricos, estando a religião racional no círculo interno. Em vez de alegar que a razão (ou seja, a moralidade) sozinha seria suficiente, Kant entende a religião racional em si mesma como um mero algo sem roupa (bare), despido – isto é, que necessita de vestimenta (clothing).15 Esta vestimenta vem em forma de crenças, símbolos e rituais 15 Eu, primeiramente, argumentei que se deveria traduzir blossen como "bare" in "Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?", op cit. Embora eu tenha persuadido WP a usar "bare" no título e em alguns contextos aludindo a metáfora da vestimenta, ele conservou a palavra "mere". GG e GH também traduziu blossen como "mere" e GH algumas vezes (tal como no seu título) usa "alone". Mas, estas opções retiram a possibilidade de ver o uso kantiano do termo como uma metáfora, a qual ele faz explicitamente 63 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 religiosos, os quais (se funcionam propriamente) ilustram e guiam a verdades racionais, as quais elas vestem. Tal vestimenta teológica é, essencialmente, teórica, enquanto que o corpo despido da religião é prático; ao mostrar como a religião genuína sintetiza este dois elementos, Kant tenta conectar seus pontos de vista teórico e prático, de modo a preencher, por conseguinte, um espaço que, caso contrário, tornaria incompleto o seu sistema filosófico em geral. Outra maneira de explicar o papel que a RL desempenha no sistema filosófico de Kant é por meio da afirmação de que ela completa sua resposta à questão acerca da esperança racional. Na Crítica da Razão Pura (de agora em diante KrV), Kant colocou a questão: se eu faço ("do") o que devo, fazendo-me (making), então, digno da felicidade, o que me é permitido esperar? Na RL, Kant examina esta questão de um modo que leva em consideração as exigências da situação humana: caso eu tenha estado aquém de meu dever moral (indicando, com isso, que sou radicalmente mal), como posso tornar-me digno da felicidade e, desse modo, ter alguma razão para esperar? RL fornece a resposta de Kant na forma de uma teoria racional da conversão individual a uma "fé prática" em um arquétipo interno de humanidade perfeita e na cooperação comum em uma "comunidade ética", por meio da qual indivíduos unem-se em esforço comum e divinamente guiado para apresentar um "modo de vida" (Lebenswandeln), genuinamente, bom. A exposição de Kant na RL gira em torno de duas "experiências" (RL, 6:12), que correspondem aos dois círculos concêntricos acima mencionados: primeiro, ele delineia o sistema da religião racional; daí, ele compara as doutrinas do Cristianismo a estas do seu sistema racional. Em cada uma das quatro Partes da RL,16 Kant apresenta um aspecto da religião racional (o mal radical, o arquétipo/a graça, a igreja invisível, o em várias passagens do texto: Se a razão é "bare" (mero algo despido de vestimenta) quando consideramos sua habilidade de prover, exclusivamente, uma explicação racional para a religião, isto implica que ela necessita ser vestida, em vista de tornar-se socialmente aceitável (ou decente). WP é a única tradução de RL anterior à CCKR, que está familiarizado com papel desempenhado pela metáfora da vestimenta no texto kantiano, o qual é uma das razões para que eu a tenha usado como base para minha tradução revisada. Mas, em CCKR, eu uso, de forma consequente, o termo "bare" sempre que blossen funciona como um adjetivo e merely" quando sua função é de advérbio. 16 Kant, originariamente, escreveu a RL como quatro artigos, os quais tentou publicar na Berlinische Monatsschrift como uma série de artigos acadêmicos. O primeiro ensaio apareceu em 1792, já o segundo foi censurado pelo departamento de censura em religião. Kant, então, rapidamente, compilou todos os quatro artigos juntos e os publicou como a RL, chamando cada pedaço maior de "Parte" (Stück) – provavelmente uma alusão sutil a controversa história deste trabalho. GG usa a tradução menos literal "part"; mas, isto esconde a referente tentativa de um trabalho original na forma ensaio. 64 Stephen R. Palmquist Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 serviço para com Deus) como a primeira experiência; depois, como segunda experiência, ele compara doutrinas Cristãs relevantes (o pecado original, Jesus/justificação, a igreja/salvação visível, o culto) à religião racional, a fim de ver quão bem as doutrinas históricas se ajustam ao vestirem o corpo despido (bare) da religião racional. Esta vestimenta é necessária, por conta de que uma debilidade na natureza humana (ou seja, nosso corpo encarnado) faz da despida (bare) religião racional algo pouco atraente: sem a instância histórica das despidas doutrinas da religião, nós nos sentiríamos impotentes para melhorar nosso modo de vida. Kant, com isso, permite que as manifestações históricas de tais doutrinas sirvam como representações simbólicas (vestimenta) à despida religião racional, realçando, assim, sua viabilidade para nós. CCKR também assume a posição que defendi em vários de meus primeiros trabalhos, a saber, as quatro Partes que compõem a RL seguem a típica ordenação do sistema de perspectivas da arquitetônica kantiana: tais partes adotam as perspectivas transcendental, lógica, empirista e hipotética, respectivamente. Como já expliquei em algum lugar, nesta abordagem perspectivista da filosofia kantiana: "chamar alguma coisa de 'transcendental'... significa, para Kant, uma preocupação em identificar uma série de limites condicionantes que definem as características necessárias e universais de uma perspectiva; e esta perspectiva é o que faz de um objeto algo 'real', toda vez que ele encontra as condições definidas para tal."17 Na RL, este objeto é a experiência religiosa em si mesma. Ao adotar esta estratégia perspectivista em CCKR, a qual eu desenvolvi em várias publicações prévias que a relaciona com as três Críticas, não somente se forneceu um meio efetivo para resolver várias da aparentes inconsistências que perturbavam os intérpretes da RL, mas também se facilitou um modo plausível para detectar quando Kant está fazendo a transição entre suas duas experiências, a saber, entre a religião racional e sua explícita discussão sobre crenças, símbolos e rituais cristãos. A Primeira Parte adota a perspectiva transcendental, no sentido que argumenta Kant, de existir ali uma propensão para o mal na natureza humana e isto serve como a condição necessária (ou marca limite) para a possibilidade da religião. Eu penso que 17 Cf. meu artigo: "Transcendental Idealism as the Backdrop for Kant's Theory of Religion", in: Palgrave Handbook on German Idealism, ed. Matthew C. Altman (London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2014), p.145. 65 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 Kant emprega um argumento quasi-transcendental para explicar esta propensão ao mal: o argumento procura estabelecer as condições necessárias para o que nós, efetivamente, experimentamos; mas isto não é estritamente a priori, pois depende de características contingentes relacionadas a vontade livre humana.18 Eu penso que os passos do argumento kantiano correspondem aos subtítulos das secções da Primeira Parte: qualquer ser com uma predisposição para o bem (Secção I) precisaria pressupor a existência de uma propensão ao mal, a fim de explicar como as más ações (ou escolhas) seriam possíveis (Secção II); nós observamos más ações (ou escolhas) no mundo (Secção III); daí, seres humanos devem possuir esta propensão que, consequentemente, faz deles radicalmente maus (Secção IV).19 Tendo explicado a origem racional do mal radical na natureza humana, Kant direciona-se ao segundo experimento e examina a doutrina cristã do pecado original; Kant diz que desde que entendamos isto racionalmente (isto é, "como uma característica transcendentalmente ideal da natureza humana"20), em vez de como uma teoria sobre a origem histórica do pecado no tempo, tal doutrina concorda com os ensinamentos da religião racional no que concerne ao mal radical. O resto da RL é a tentativa de Kant de demonstrar como podemos superar nossa natureza má e tornarmo-nos bons. A segunda parte adota uma perspectiva lógica, no sentido que Kant ali estabelece os requisitos para entender e, assim, lidar com as condições transcendentais, de modo a caracterizar o limite do sistema religioso. A perspectiva lógica na RL exprime o modelo kantiano da graça, por meio da qual a exigência para superar o mal é ter fé prática no "logos" (Palavra), descrita por Kant como "das Werde!" uma expressão enigmática, a qual eu traduzi como "the Become!" (RL 6:60; cf. CCKR, pp. 162, 208, 212). O argumento kantiano deve ser entendido como uma ética da graça (não uma teologia da graça)21: Ele argumenta que qualquer 18 Para mais detalhes sobre este ponto vejam meu artigo: "Kant's Quasi-Transcendental Argument for a Necessary and Universal Evil Propensity in Human Nature", The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46.2 (2008), pp. 261-297. 19 Eu ofereci um sumário de meu argumento em: "Transcendental Idealism as the Backdrop", op cit., pp.149-150. Como clarifiquei que (p.151): "a propensão ao mal não é algo real empiricamente constituinte de nossa natureza, mas um limite condicionante transcendentalmente ideal que faz más ações possíveis [...] o argumento completo de Kant na primeira parte é uma (parcialmente escondida) aplicação do idealismo transcendental para a questão de por que seres humanos são religiosos." 20 Ibid., p 152; Cf. RL 6:40. 21 Eu trato sobre este ponto detalhadamente em: "Kant's Ethics of Grace: Perspectival Solutions to the Moral Difficulties with Divine Assistance", The Journal of Religion 90.4 (2010), pp. 530-553. Tal qual coloquei no "Transcendental Idealism as the Backdrop", p 154, meu argumento básico é que, para 66 Stephen R. Palmquist Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 que seja a formulação teológica que possamos adotar, o resultado deve ser algo que nossa interna "convicção" (Gesinnung; veja a nota 27 abaixo) possa ajustar-se ao arquétipo (Urbild) da humanidade moralmente perfeita, o qual encontramos na razão humana. Kant, então, volta-se ao segundo experimento e argumenta que Jesus e as noções Cristãs da graça e da justificação podem ser interpretadas como modos de vestimentas apropriadas para a despida religião da razão.22 Kant está preocupado com a natureza humana em geral ao longo da RL, mas muda seu foco sobre isso na altura da metade livro: as duas primeiras Partes da RL examinam como nossa natureza humana comum influencia o desenvolvimento da moral individual em geral e a procura pela transformação religiosa em particular; na Terceira e Quarta partes, em contrapartida, Kant examina como nossa natureza humana comum impõe sobre nós o dever de trabalhar em conjunto nas comunidades, se estivermos a realizar nossa predeterminação (Bestimmung) moral23. CCKR mostra que na Terceira Parte Kant adota a perspectiva empirista, a fim de resolver as efetivas necessidades para completar o sistema religioso. O foco de Kant na Terceira Parte é, com isso, sobre como formas históricas da religião podem manifestar a religião racional. Em vista do combate ao princípio mal na nossa natureza, os seres humanos devem unir-se para construir uma comunidade ética a qual deve ter a forma de uma igreja, pois seus membros podem estar unidos em um meio não coercitivo somente se todos, mutuamente, recorrerem a ideia de Deus. Kant, desse modo, volta-se ao círculo exterior, comparando as origens e a natureza do Cristianismo histórico à noção racional de igreja (invisível). CCKR demonstra que após Kant apresentar quatro exigências ou "marcas" da verdadeira igreja (invisível) na Terceira Parte, Divisão Um, Secção IV (RL 6:101-102), as próximas quatro secções exploram, em contrapartida, as mais profundas implicações destas quatro condições básicas: Secção V argumenta que crenças históricas alcançam a universalidade somente se fundamentadas em uma pura fé racional; Secção VI diz que a razão prática (moralidade) deve ser a principal intérprete de todas as Escrituras, em vista de proteger a integridade (Lauterkeit) da verdadeira igreja; Secção VII mostra como a Kant, "a graça pode ser, propriamente, entendida apenas quando a interpretamos contra o pano de fundo das limitações do conhecimento humano, que acompanha uma afirmação do idealismo transcendental." 22 Examinei, em detalhes, a visão de Kant sobre Jesus: "Could Kant's Jesus Be God?", International Philosophical Quarterly 52.4 (2012), pp. 421-437. 23 Examinei, em detalhes, a estrutura e as implicações do argumento espacial de Kant em: "Kant's Religious Argument for the Existence of God-The Ultimate Dependence of Human Destiny on Divine Assistance", Faith and Philosophy. 26.1 (2009), pp. 3-22. 67 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 liberdade deve caracterizar a relação entre os membros da igreja, de modo que eles procurem entender doutrinas tais como "fé santificada"; e a Divisão Dois ilustra o modo como estas quatro necessidades devem permanecer imutáveis, se a verdadeira igreja está a evitar ser corrompida.24 Kant declara na KrV, que apenas um idealista transcendental pode ser um realista empírico, daí também o seu sistema de religião racional estabelecer um lugar legítimo (e, além disso, uma necessidade racional) para a religião histórica. Por fim, Kant adota a perspectiva hipotética na Quarta Parte, por meio do exame de como os membros de uma igreja podem tentar servir a Deus de um modo verdadeiro (hipotético/moral) ou um falso (especulativo/supersticioso). Ele argumenta que o verdadeiro serviço para com Deus consiste em atos realizados com a intenção de obedecer a lei moral; atos não morais podem contar com o serviço indireto de Deus, se eles capacitarem as pessoas a tornarem-se melhores moralmente. No entanto, se atos não morais forem elevados ao status de serem, diretamente, agradáveis a Deus, então os rituais da igreja terminam por ir de encontro aos seus próprios propósitos; Kant chama a isto de "falso serviço". Aqui creio que Kant aplica a lógica de sua hipótese copernicana (como introduzida no segundo Prefácio de KrV) ao entendimento próprio do culto religioso: longe de negar a validade das tradições da religião histórica, ele argumenta "que a religião empírica deve ser um meio necessário para propagar a moralidade universal."25 Kant entremeia a discussão de seus dois experimentos ao longo das secções da Parte Quatro, examinando o Cristianismo de modo a mostrar como ele pode promover o verdadeiro serviço para com Deus, que é ensinado pela religião racional (por meio de uma adequada e hipotética interpretação de sua tradição) e como, em vez disso, tal serviço sempre termina por promover um falso serviço (por meio de uma injustificada e especulativa interpretação da sua tradição). Enquanto a abordagem geral de interpretação da RL que apresentei na CCKR não contém nada de radicalmente novo – isto é, as precedentes estratégias e pressupostos serão todas familiares aos leitores de meus livros e artigos anteriores sobre a filosofia kantiana da religião -, CCKR traz um avanço significante sobre o meu trabalho prévio, não apenas trazendo o conjunto de todos estes diversos argumentos em um único texto, 24 Na Parte IV de CCKR, eu ainda demonstrei que as quatro marcas da verdadeira igreja continua a estar no centro da atenção de Kant, visto que ele examina como as igrejas podem as colocar em prática, pois elas selecionam, interpretam e revisam suas crenças particulares, símbolos e rituais em um esforço para propagar a fé racional pura pelo mundo. 25 "Transcendental Idealism as the Backdrop", p. 159. 68 Stephen R. Palmquist Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 mas também em duas outras vias: eu sugiro e defendo novas traduções para cerca de 50 dos mais importantes termos técnicos de Kant; e revelo várias fontes que, provavelmente, influenciaram muitos escritos de Kant em vários momentos. Eu devo concluir esta panorâmica, destacando alguns dos mais significantes exemplos destes dois tipos de novas contribuições. A precedente panorâmica pontua vários termos-chave que retraduzi em CCKR:26 "bare" foi substituído por "alone" (GH) e "mere" (GG) por blossen (ver nota 15); "piece" por "book" (GH) e "part" (GG) por "Stück" (ver nota 16); "lifestyle" expressa melhor as nuances da Lebenswandeln de Kant do que várias outras expressões usadas por outros tradutores, tais como "life-conduct" e "way of life"; quando Bestimmung não carrega seu significado usual, "determining", eu uso "predetermination" em vez de "vocation" (GH, GG, e WP), visto expressar melhor a visão de Kant de que a nossa natureza moral não é algo da qual nós estamos livres para rejeitar ou escolher; para Lauter(keit) eu uso "ingenuous"/"integrity", em vez de "pure"/"purity", evitando, desse modo, uma confusão com reinen; e Gesinnung não se refere nem a uma "disposition" (GH and GG) metafísica, tampouco a uma "attitude" (WP) psicológica, mas sim ao que os religiosos denominam de convicção interna.27 Dentre outras inovações terminológicas de CCKR, quatro exemplos significantes nos chamam atenção. Schwärmerei não se refere a nenhuma forma de "ismo", tal qual "fanaticism" (GH e WP), tampouco a alternativa de GG, "enthusiasm", captura seu potencial de se referir tanto a estados psicológicos negativos quanto a positivos; em vez disso, Schwärmerei é uma forma de distúrbio psicológico (tênue limite antes de uma doença), que consegue ser alegre ou depressivo, estando, assim, melhor traduzida como "delirium". Traduzir Seligmachung e Seligwerdung como "sanctification" clarifica certos clamores teológicos, que, de outro modo, permaneceria obscuro. Gottesdienst significa "liturgy", e não o distante e literal "service of God". E Glaubenslehre significa "dogmatics" no sentido teológico clássico; a usual "doctrine of faith" é também demasiado literal. Eu defendo estes e numerosos outros acordos no glossário de CCKR. Ao traduzir tais termos especiais, e ao revisar a tradução de Pluhar de RL, meus dois primeiros objetivos 26 Nota do tradutor: resolvi não traduzir tais termos, a fim de manter o sentido exato das traduções feitas pelo autor. 27 Ver meu artigo, "What is Kantian Gesinnung? On the Priority of Volition over Metaphysics and Psychology in Kant's Religion", Kantian Review 20.2 (2015), pp. 235-64. 69 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 foram a consistência e a acurácia para capturar o nuançado significado religioso dos termos especiais que Kant emprega na RL. Das várias fontes recém-reveladas na CCKR, de longe as mais significantes descobertas se referem às várias diferenças substantivas entre a primeira edição de RL (1793) e a sua segunda (1794) – um problema que eu (tal como outros comentadores que conheço) negligenciei no meu trabalho anterior sobre a RL. A única exceção é um artigo demonstrando que o crítico anônimo do livro, mencionado perto do final do segundo Prefácio da RL, cuja crítica à primeira edição Kant argumenta "livrar-se" (RL 6:13) com uma breve resposta, fez, na verdade, cinco outras críticas e que em, pelo menos, duas Kant respondeu mudando algumas partes do texto principal.28 Naturalmente, eu também destaquei estes pontos em CCKR. Contudo, uma descoberta completamente nova reportada em CCKR diz respeito ao Segundo Prefácio, no qual Kant também elogia um trabalho em latim datado de 1793 de Gottlob Christian Storr, que se foca inteiramente na filosofia kantiana da religião. Kant escreve como se não houvesse tido tempo para incluir as respostas a Storr; mas, ao analisar cuidadosamente as muitas citações de Storr em específicas páginas de seu trabalho nas quais ele criticou alguns argumentos de Kant na primeira edição de RL, eu demonstrei que a maioria das 26 novas notas de rodapé da segunda edição de RL são respostas diretas às críticas de Storr. Por fim, CCKR dá significante atenção ao papel dos Comentários Gerais sobre o sistema kantiano da religião – o qual Kant chama de "parerga" na segunda edição da RL – de modo a mostrar como tais comentários não são meramente opcionais, mas sim examinam questões cruciais que qualquer pessoa que procura viver um modo religioso deve levar em consideração. Em todo caso, elas representam o risco que Kant procura corrigir ao reinterpretar a natureza da experiência religiosa. Eu argumento que ao longo da RL, especialmente nestes quatro apêndices, Kant desenvolve o que eu chamo de "misticismo Crítico": em vez de relativizar a legitimidade de toda experiência religiosa, ele procura refinar o modo por meio do qual as pessoas religiosas entendem suas mais profundas experiências, de forma que elas não contradigam as limitações do 28 Ver meu artigo (no qual há uma completa tradução da revisão do livro), "The Implied Standpoint of Kant's Religion: An Assessment of Kant's Reply to (and an English Translation of) an Early Book Review of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason", com coautoria de Steven Otterman, Kantian Review 18.1 (2013), pp. 73-97. 70 Stephen R. Palmquist Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 conhecimento estabelecidas na KrV.29 Um ponto importante para se notar aqui é que a segunda edição da RL contém o que parece ser um erro de impressão: na primeira edição, a Primeira Parte não tinha nenhum Comentário Geral; Kant adicionou um (longo) parágrafo do novo material à segunda edição, colocando-o em uma fonte pequena e apenas o inserindo após a Secção V da Primeira Parte. No entanto, de alguma maneira, a Secção V inteira terminou por ser renomeada como Comentário Geral. Este foi, provavelmente, um erro de impressão, pois os argumentos da Secção V são constitutivos do sistema kantiano da religião, enquanto estes do novo parágrafo não são; apenas o último poderia contar como o primeiro Comentário Geral. Este é, no entanto, um dos numerosos exemplos dos novos argumentos sobre o texto da RL, desenvolvidos ao longo de CCKR.30 Embora esta panorâmica de minha pesquisa sobre Kant ao longo dos últimos 35 anos tenha sido, largamente, uma retrospectiva, eu notei também que há ainda muito trabalho a ser feito. Eu estou comprometido em não somente completar os Volumes Três e Quatro de meu Kant's System of Perspectives, mas também (como mencionei acima) em publicar meus textos aguardados há muito tempo, a saber, The Geometry of Logic e The Power of Belief. Igualmente, meu crescente interesse recente em explorar possíveis correlações entre Kant e Yijing deve logo vir a completar-se na forma de uma Changing the Changeless. Além do mais, assim como KCR deu origem a necessidade da CCKR, este último conduzirá, sem dúvida, a futuros estudos sobre a filosofia kantiana da religião, que investigarão ainda mais profundamente a RL, um dos trabalhos mais fascinantes de Kant. Por exemplo, eu estou, atualmente, nos primeiros passos da preparação para traduzir o negligenciado comentário de Gottlob Christian Storr de 1793 sobre a primeira edição de RL,31 o qual deve lançar nova luz sobre as motivações de Kant para escrever uma segunda edição de RL apenas um ano após a primeira edição. Com estes projetos e outros (não mencionados aqui) competindo por minha atenção, eu 29 Após a publicação de CCKR eu desenvolvi este novo argumento em Baring All in Reason's Light, op cit. 30 Eu reconheço com gratidão a ajuda de meu pesquisador assistente, Brandon Love, que coletou notas em um esboço preliminar da segunda metade deste artigo. Obviamente, alguns eventuais erros desta versão final são de minha inteira responsabilidade. 31 Annotationes quaedam theologicae ad philosophicam Kantii de religion doctrinam (Tübingen: Bornium, 1793); Tradução alemã de J.F. Flatt, Bemerkungen über Kants philosophische Religionslehre (Tübingen: J.G. Cottaischen, 1794). 71 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 espero ansiosamente pelas próximas décadas de pesquisa em Kant com grande entusiasmo! Referências FIRESTONE, F; JACOBS, N. (2008) In Defense of Kant's Religion. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. McGAUGHEY, D. (2013) "Historical and Pure Religion: A Response to Stephen Palmquist", Journal of Religion 93.2, pp. 151-176. OTTERMAN, S.; PALMQUIST, S. (2013) "The Implied Standpoint of Kant's Religion: An Assessment of Kant's Reply to (and an English Translation of) an Early Book Review of 'Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason'", Kantian Review 18.1, pp. 73-97. PALMQUIST, S. (1984) "Faith as Kant's Key to the Justification of Transcendental Reflection", The Heythrop Journal 25.4 (Outubro), pp. 442-455. ______. 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(2013) "Kantian Causality and Quantum Quarks: The Compatibility between Quantum Mechanics and Kant's Phenomenal World", THEORIA: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 28.2 (May), pp. 283-302. ______. (2015) "Bohm's Quantum Causality And Its Parallels In Kant's Ideas Of Reason". In: Charles Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 13: Sixty Years After Albert Einstein (1879-1955), (Palo Alto: Ria University Press), pp. 99-128 (Chapter Eight). ______. (1992) "Analysis and Synthesis in the Geometry of Logic", Indian Philosophical Quarterly 19.1 (January), pp. 1-14. ______. (2000 [1992]) "The Geometry of Logic". In: The Tree of Philosophy: A Course of Introductory Lectures for Beginning Students of Philosophy (Chapter 5). Hong Kong: Philopsychy Press. ______. (2007) "Emergence, Evolution, and the Geometry of Logic: Causal Leaps and the Myth of Historical Development", Foundations of Science 12.1 (March), pp. 9-37. ______. (1995) "Kant-Studies in the Hong Kong Philosophical Context". In: Hoke Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, vol. I.3 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press), pp. 1257-1271. ______. (2010) "The Unity of Architectonic Reasoning in Kant and I Ching". In: Stephen R. Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), pp. 811-821. ______. (2011) "Architectonic Reasoning and Interpretation in Kant and Yijing", Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38.4 (December), pp. 569-583. ______. (2012) "Mapping Kant's Architectonic onto the Yijing via the Geometry of Logic", Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39 Supplement (December), pp. 68-86. ______. (2013) "A Daoist Model for a Kantian Church", Comparative Philosophy 4.1 (January), pp. 67-89. 73 Trinta e cinco anos de pesquisas sobre Kant: uma panorâmica em retrospectiva Kant e-Prints, Campinas, Série 2, v. 12, n. 1, pp. 56-73, jan.-abr., 2017 ______. (2015) "Twelve Basic Philosophical Concepts in Kant and the Compound Yijing", Journal of Chinese Philosophy 42.1-2 (March-June), pp. 143-162. ______. (1987) "A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (II) Naming, Necessity and the Analytic A Posteriori", The Review of Metaphysics 41.2 (December), pp. 255-282. ______. (2012) "Analytic Aposteriority and its Relevance to Twentieth Century Philosophy", Studia Humana 1.3/4, pp. 3-16. ______. (2014) "Transcendental Idealism as the Backdrop for Kant's Theory of Religion". In: Matthew C. Altman (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on German Idealism, (London: Palgrave/Macmillan), p.145. ______. (2008) "Kant's Quasi-Transcendental Argument for a Necessary and Universal Evil Propensity in Human Nature", The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46.2, pp. 261297. ______. (2010) "Kant's Ethics of Grace: Perspectival Solutions to the Moral Difficulties with Divine Assistance", The Journal of Religion 90.4, pp. 530-553. ______. 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THE INDEXICAL 'I' SYNTHESE LIBRARY STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PIDLOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Managing Editor: JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University Editors: DIRK V AN DALEN, University 0/ Utrecht, The Netherlands DONALD DAVIDSON, University o/California, Berkeley THEO A.F. KUIPERS, University o/Groningen, The Netherlands PATRICK SUPPES, Stanford University, California JAN WOLEN-SKI, Jagiellonian University, KrakOw, Poland VOLUME 265 INGAR BRINCK Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Lund, Sweden THE INDEXICAL 'I' The First Person in Thought and Language SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 978-90-481-4908-7 ISBN 978-94-015-8871-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-8871-3 Printed on acid-free paper AlI Rights Reserved © 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Origina1ly published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1997 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1997 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. Qu'est-ce que Ie moi? Un homme qui se met a Ia fenetre pour voir Ies passants; si je passe par la, puis-je dire qu'il s'est mis Ia pour me voir? Non; car il ne pense pas a moi en particulier; mais celui qui aime quelqu'un a cause de sa beaute, l'aime-t-iI? Non; car Ia petite verole, qui tuera Ia beaute sans tuer Ia personne, fera qu'il ne I'aimera plus. Et si on m'aime pour mon jugement, pour rna memoire, m'aime-t-on? moi?Non, car je puis perdre ces qualites sans me perdre moi-meme. Oil est donc ce moi, s'il n'est ni dans Ie corps, ni dans l'ame? et comment aimer Ie corps ou I'ame, sinon pour ces qualites, qui ne seront point ce qui fait Ie moi, puisqu'elles sont perissables? car aimerait-on Ia substance de I'ame d'une personne, abstraitement, et quelques qualites qui y fussent? Cela ne se peut, et serait injuste. On n'aime donc jamais personne, mais seulement des qualites. Blaise Pascal Pensees PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I. INTRODUCTION I. I The topic 1.2 'I' TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.3 Why 'I' cannot be replaced by another indexical 1.4 The content 2. 'I' DOES NOT REFER 2. I The non-referential thesis 2.2 Wittgenstein on 'I' 2.3 Anscombe's argument 2.4 Immunity to error through misidentification 2.5 The basis of the immunity 3. 'I' REFERS DIRECTLY 3. I The minimal thesis 3.2 Direct reference 3.3 The semantic theory of direct reference 3-4 Direct reference and rigid designation 3.5 Rigid designation and essentialism 3.6 Objections to the semantic theory of direct reference 3.7 Perry on belief and meaning 3.8 Direct reference, presemantics, and pragmatics 3.9 Attitudes de se 3.10 Acquaintance and direct reference 4. 'I' REFERS INDIRECTLY 4. I Indirect reference and definite descriptions 4.2 Frege on 'I' 4.3 Does the individual concept conflict with publicness? 4.4 Making sense of Frege: concepts and causes 4.5 Making sense of Frege: the individual concept ix Xl 4 6 8 I I II 13 22 32 38 45 45 47 50 52 59 68 75 79 84 86 90 90 96 102 109 115 viii TABLE OF CONTENTS 5. INDEXICALITY AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT 122 5. I The basis of de re senses: non-conceptual content 5.2 Identification-free knowledge and its foundation 5.3 Non-conceptual content and IEM 5-4 Can content be non-conceptual? 5.5 The cognitive role of de re senses 6. CONTEXT-INDEPENDENCE 6. I Speakers and persons 6.2 Transcending the context 6.3 Identity over time 6-4 A view from nowhere? 6.5 Understanding'!': conclusion REFERENCES INDEX 122 12 7 132 136 140 147 147 15 1 155 163 171 175 179 PREFACE The subject of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question concerns what we mean when we say 'J'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'J', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I' -thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in cognition. The purpose is to give a picture of how we think and talk about ourselves in a wide range of circumstances. The topic has been discussed in numerous articles during the last decades, but rarely in the form of a monograph. I felt the need for a book of this kind while working on my dissertation. The manuscript is the result of many years of reflection on the self and indexicals. Some of the theories that I advance have developed as a result of my teaching an undergraduate course in the philosophy of language the last couple of years. In the book, several different issues are brought together in order to give a coherent theory of 'J', pertaining both to the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Among these, the reader will find the immunity to error through misidentification that is exhibited by 'I' in some of its uses, the relation between direct reference, rigid designation, and essentialism, the role that non-conceptual content plays to cognition, and the nature of the unity of consciousness and personal identity. The idea has been rather to give a wide/broad picture of 'I' and 'I'-thoughts than to treat exhaustively every particular issue that is raised. The main thesis is that 'I' refers indirectly through a de re sense to the speaker as presented in the context of utterance. 'I' also expresses a stable individual concept. How the information expressed by the de re sense is gained is explained by a theory of non-conceptual content. Further, it is argued that the concept of a speaker is intertwined with the concept of a person. Persons are such that they can self-ascribe and be ascribed both mental and bodily predicates and that they can think about themselves from both a first-person and a third-person perspective. The book is intended for philosophers in general, especially those interested in matters having to do with the concept of the self or the concept of a person and those with a general interest in the philosophy of language. The text is also accessible to graduate students and advanced undergraduates. ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During my work on this manuscript I have received a great deal of help, of different kinds and from many quarters. I will take the opportunity to express my gratitude to all those without whom this book would not have been possible. First, I would like to thank the participants in the seminar in theoretical philosophy at the Department of Philosophy in Lund, lead by Bengt Hansson, for acute and unexpected comments on the subject. Especially Anna-Sofia Maurin, Johannes Persson, and Fredrik Stjernberg have devoted a lot of time to the manuscript in its various versions. Linus Brostrom struggled through an early version of it. Parts of the manuscript have been presented to audiences at conferences and seminars in other places than Lund, among them Columbia University, Gothenburg University, and Linkoping University, as well as the Conference for Swedish Philosophy in Umea, the loth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Florence, and the Second European Congress for Analytic Philosophy in Leeds. All comments have been most welcome. lowe much to the astute minds of Peter Gardenfors and Sten Lindstrom. My advisor Nils-Eric Sahlin has given me invaluable support in many respects over the years. These people have all, in their own ways, been sources of inspiration for my work. I have benefited from a great number of travel grants from, among others, Crafoordska stiftelsen, Gyllenstiernska Krapperupstiftelsen, and Wallenbergs stiftelse. Several trips have gone to the Centre de Recherche en Epistemologie Appliquee (CREA) in Paris, where I have enjoyed the hospitable and witty atmosphere. I have especially profited from discussions with Frañois Recanati. Knut och Alice Wallenbergs stiftelse made it possible for me to spend a very rewarding year at Columbia University in New York under the supervision of Akeel Bilgrami. I am also grateful for financial support from Erik och Gurli Hultengrens fond for filosofi, Erik Philip Sorensens stiftelse, and Hjalmar Gullbergs och Greta Thotts stipendiefond. Special thanks to Jan Hartman. In spite of that your ardent efforts to tum me into an analytic philosopher have not been completely successful, I hope you are not too disappointed in the result. Thank you for being there. Thanks also for the encouragement and support from all my friends and the people at my department, who have come and gone during the period xi xii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS that I have been working with the manuscript. I mention no one so that no one will feel left out. Finally, I dedicate this book to my mother, Gunvor Brinck-Lindroth, who, being a scholar herself, has stood by me through thick and thin, and without whom this book would not have seen the light.

February 2019 AperTO Archivio Istituzionale Open Access dell'Università di Torino Rosenzweig in prospettiva. Il nuovo pensiero tra vecchia filosofia e filosofia della differenza / L. BERTOLINO. In: ARCHIVIO DI FILOSOFIA. ISSN 0004-0088. 86:1(2018), pp. 221-231. Original Citation: Rosenzweig in prospettiva. Il nuovo pensiero tra vecchia filosofia e filosofia della differenza Published version: DOI:10.19272/201808501023 Terms of use: Open Access (Article begins on next page) Anyone can freely access the full text of works made available as "Open Access". Works made available under a Creative Commons license can be used according to the terms and conditions of said license. Use of all other works requires consent of the right holder (author or publisher) if not exempted from copyright protection by the applicable law. Availability: This is the author's manuscript This version is available http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1689889 since 2019-02-12T08:15:47Z LUCA BERTOLINO ROSENZWEIG IN PROSPETTIVA IL NUOVO PENSIERO TRA VECCHIA FILOSOFIA E FILOSOFIA DELLA DIFFERENZA Con l'invito a leggere oggi Franz Rosenzweig in prospettiva intendo suggerire di assumere il suo «nuovo pensiero»1 come punto di fuga di un duplice sguardo: uno rivolto al passato della «vecchia filosofia»2 e uno rivolto al presente della cultura postmoderna. Da un lato si tratta di tornare una volta ancora, in maniera retrospettiva, sul rapporto che la proposta teoretica rappresentata da Der Stern der Erlösung (La stella della redenzione, 1921) intrattiene con l'idealismo, dall'altro di valutare, in maniera prospettica, quanto essa può dire in relazione alla filosofia della differenza. Il motivo del guardare in queste due direzioni risiede non tanto nel volere gettare archeologicamente ulteriore luce sulle fonti e sui punti di riferimento del pensiero di Rosenzweig, e neppure nel volere indicare in lui il precursore di filosofie successive, quanto nel bisogno di interrogarsi – con umiltà – sul senso del filosofare:3 un senso che avverto messo fortemente in discussione, non ultimo nel momento in cui la filosofia è chiamata a confrontarsi con il tema dell'«intelletto comune», «sano» o «malato» che sia.4 Detto altrimenti: la proposta teoretica dell'autore della Stella della redenzione è ancora attuale? Lo sguardo con cui propongo di osservare la figura della Stella e le domande che lo indirizzano presuppongono consapevolmente una interpretazione in parte riduttiva di Rosenzweig, il cui pensiero esamino attraverso la sola lente di ingrandimento filosofica, per di più posizionata in direzione prevalentemente epistemologica. Userò infatti come chiave di lettura privilegiata la dichiarazione d'intenti di Rosenzweig circa il fatto che il proprio «lavoro della vita» (Lebenswerk)5 è niente più che un sistema di filosofia [...]: di una filosofia [...] che vorrebbe produrre il proprio perfetto rinnova- 1 Questo il titolo del saggio programmatico di FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, Das neue Denken. Einige nachträgliche Bemerkungen zum «Stern der Erlösung» (1925), in IDEM, Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, III, Zweistromland. Kleinere Schriften zu Glauben und Denken, hrsg. von Reinhold und Annemarie Mayer, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1984 (= GS III), pp. 139-161; trad. it. a cura di Gianfranco Bonola, Il nuovo pensiero. Alcune note supplementari a La stella della redenzione, in IDEM, La Scrittura. Saggi dal 1914 al 1929, Roma, Città Nuova, 1991, pp. 257-282 (d'ora in poi: ND, con il numero di pagina del testo tedesco seguito da quello della traduzione italiana). 2 FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, Der Stern der Erlösung (1921), in IDEM, Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, II, Einführung von Reinhold Mayer, Haag, Nijhoff, 19764, p. 116; trad. it. a cura di Gianfranco Bonola, La stella della redenzione, Casale Monferrato, Marietti, 1985, p. 111 (d'ora in poi: SE, con il numero di pagina del testo tedesco seguito da quello della traduzione italiana). 3 Per quanto riguarda il termine 'filosofare' mi riferisco alla lezione di IMMANUEL KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781, 17872), A 837 sgg. / B 865 sgg. 4 Cfr. FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, Das Büchlein vom gesunden und kranken Menschenverstand, hrsg. und eingeleitet von Nahum Norbert Glatzer, Düsseldorf, Melzer, 1964; trad. it. a cura di Gianfranco Bonola, Dell'intelletto comune sano e malato, Trento, Reverdito, 1987 (d'ora in poi: Büchlein, con il numero di pagina del testo tedesco seguito da quello della traduzione italiana). 5 Così nella lettera a Richard Koch del 2 settembre 1928, in FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften, I, Briefe und Tagebücher, hrsg. von Rachel Rosenzweig und Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann unter Mitwirkung von Bernhard Casper, Haag, Nijhoff, 1979 (= GS I), 2, p. 1196. 2 mento, il rinnovamento del pensiero [...]. E il passaggio dalla impostazione consueta dei problemi alla nuova viene compiuto nelle formulazioni, ben presto famigerate, del primo volume [Gli elementi o il pre-mondo perenne].6 Pertanto, sebbene Rosenzweig insista sul fatto che i libri filosofici devono essere letti con impeto, senza indugiare su quanto appare inizialmente non chiaro, e che è peculiare di una sprovvedutezza filosofica aspettarsi da essi una logicità stringente,7 soffermerò l'attenzione sulla sua teoria della conoscenza, così come formulata soprattutto nella prima parte della Stella della redenzione. È infatti vero che il conoscere del nuovo pensiero è un «atto unico e ha metodi propri», ma è altresì indubbio che esso trova negli elementi del pre-mondo quel «primum dell'esperienza» senza il quale non sarebbe coglibile il «postremum della verità»,8 quanto a dire, in maniera metaforica, «l'elenco dei personaggi, il programma teatrale che certo non fa parte del dramma, ma che tuttavia è bene leggere prima».9 1. RETRO-SPETTIVA: VECCHIA FILOSOFIA E NUOVO PENSIERO L'introduzione «Sulla possibilità di conoscere il Tutto» – è noto – si configura come un articolato atto di accusa di Rosenzweig nei confronti dell'intera tradizione filosofica, che si sarebbe sempre caratterizzata, se pure con declinazioni diverse, come «monismus philosophicus»,10 culminando nelle pretese totalitarie del panlogismo hegeliano. Come ho avuto modo di evidenziare altrove,11 in opposizione alla «filosofia del Tutto»12 Rosenzweig indica la necessità di non fuggire la concretezza della morte, ossia di aderire alla vita, afferma il carattere ineliminabile delle soggettività filosofanti, si contrappone alla sovranità del logos criticando metalogicamente l'identità di essere e pensiero, rivendica infine il divenire di Dio nella storia (di Dio che è, non di Dio che diviene – si badi bene), anziché pensare la storia come teodicea.13 È, il suo, un filosofare chiaramente 'antimoderno', intendendo ciò nel senso in cui Andrea Poma ha indicato le diverse istanze culturali europee che a vario titolo, sul finire dell'Ottocento sino alla metà del Novecento, revocarono radicalmente in dubbio la ragione astratta e totalitaria della filosofia, la forma artistica, i fondamenti scientifici, nonché i modelli morali, politici, economici e religiosi della borghesia, presentandosi nonostante ciò, anzi proprio in virtù di questa loro connotazione critico-dissolutoria, come momento ancora intrinseco alla modernità.14 6 ND, 140 sg./258 sg. 7 Cfr. ND, 141 sg./259 sg. 8 ND, 158/279. 9 ND, 147/266. 10 Così nella lettera a Eugen Rosenstock del 12 febbraio 1921, in FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, Die 'Gritli'Briefe. Briefe an Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, hrsg. von Inken Rühle und Reinhold Mayer, mit einem Vorwort von Rafael Rosenzweig, Tübingen, BILAM, 2002 (= GB), p. 730. 11 Cfr. LUCA BERTOLINO, Il nulla e la filosofia. Idealismo critico e esperienza religiosa in Franz Rosenzweig, Torino, Trauben, 20112, spec. pp. 17-144, a cui rinvio per una dettagliata argomentazione di quanto espongo in questo paragrafo. 12 SE, 5/5 e passim. 13 Cfr. anche, a riguardo di quest'ultimo aspetto, la lettera ad Hans Ehrenberg del 26 settembre 1910, in GS I, 1, pp. 112 sg. 14 Cfr. ANDREA POMA, Yearning for Form: Hermann Cohen in Postmodernism, in IDEM, Yearning for Form and Other Essays on Hermann Cohen's Thought, Engl. trans. by John Denton, Dordrecht, Springer, 2006, p. 351; or. it., Sehnsucht della forma. Hermann Cohen nel postmoderno, in IDEM, Cadenze. Note 3 Lo stretto rapporto dialettico che il filosofare antimoderno di Rosenzweig intrattiene con quello moderno, del resto, non è solo testimoniato da un identico modo di argomentare logico, ma è anche confermato dallo stesso Autore nelle proprie «note supplementari a La stella della redenzione» (1925), 15 allorché chiarisce che quanto compare all'inizio dell'opera, specie «il concetto del nulla, [...] non è altro che una reductio ad absurdum e contemporaneamente una riabilitazione della vecchia filosofia».16 Se con la progressiva decostruzione del Tutto idealistico – pars destruens della Stella della redenzione – Rosenzweig perviene infatti a individuare tre elementi non più riconducibili l'uno all'altro, cioè l'uomo «meta-etico», il mondo «meta-logico» e Dio «metafisico»,17 i quali si configurano come tre «fattualità ultime»18 a sé stanti e tra loro irrelate, l'assunzione del nulla a esse relativo gli permette di muovere verso il qualcosa del sapere al loro riguardo, dando così avvio alla pars construens della propria opera. Si tratta, evidentemente, di un nulla diverso da quello che Hegel contrappone, in maniera sterile, al Tutto: non è, insomma, un concetto astratto e generalissimo, che è posto e nello stesso tempo negato, essendo da subito collocato in una dimensione dell'oblio perché l'accento cade sull'essere che è e non può non essere. È, piuttosto, un «nulla del concetto cercato»,19 un «nulla particolare che irrompe[...] fecondamente nelle realtà [Wirklichkeiten]»,20 dunque non un nulla determinato, ma un nulla capace di generare determinazione.21 È, per l'esattezza, il nulla del differenziale matematico, che essendo al contempo = 0 e ≠ 0 costituisce per Rosenzweig l'origine del qualcosa, sia affermando il nonnulla sia negando il nulla. Prendendo esplicitamente le mosse dalla «grande impresa scientifica che è la [...] logica dell'origine»22 di Hermann Cohen, Rosenzweig percorre in questo modo la strada di una vera e propria filosofia del nulla, intesa soprattutto come gnoseologia negativa, perché il nulla particolare simboleggia il «trampolino dal quale si deve fare il salto verso il qualcosa del sapere»,23 ma anche, forse al di là delle sue stesse intenzioni, come meontologia, perché il nulla particolare «sempre include ancora un residuo di positività»,24 una sorta di valenza quidditativa che attiene all'essenza ma non ancora all'esistenza. Il nulla del differenziale consente in definitiva il costituirsi dei tre «fenomeni originari»,25 tanto nel senso della loro determinabilità logica quanto in quello della loro configurazione essenziale, sicché non è un caso che Rosenzweig affermi al loro riguardo che sono dotati sia di inseità ontologica sia di perseità concettuale, cioè di indipendenza sul piano dell'essenza e di autonomia dal punto di vista della conoscibilità, peraltro senza che con ciò si possa dire alcunché circa la loro effettiva esistenza.26 Il confronto, ancorché ridotto ai minimi termini, tra il metodo infinitesimale di Ro- filosofiche per la postmodernità, Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2014, pp. 63 sg. 15 ND, 139/257. 16 ND, 142 sg./261. 17 SE, rispettivamente 11/10, 14/13, 17/17. 18 ND, 147/266. 19 SE, 25/26. 20 SE, 23/22 (trad. it. parzialmente modificata). 21 Cfr. SE, 27/27. 22 SE, 23/22. Il riferimento è a HERMANN COHEN, System der Philosophie. Erster Teil. Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (1902, 19142), in IDEM, Werke, hrsg. vom Hermann-Cohen-Archiv, VI, Einleitung von Helmut Holzhey, Hildesheim-New York, Olms, 1977 (= LrE). 23 SE, 45/44: l'espressione richiama LrE, 93. 24 SE, 63/61. 25 Lettera a Rudolf Stahl del 7 dicembre 1925, in GS I, 2, p. 1071. 26 Cfr. ND, 144 sg./263. 4 senzweig e quello propugnato dal suo maestro Cohen, al quale l'allievo ascrive il merito di avere scoperto per primo nella matematica, specificamente nel nulla del differenziale, un organon del pensare,27 risulta utile a determinare il tratto antimoderno del filosofare che caratterizza la prima parte della Stella della redenzione. In Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte (Il principio del metodo infinitesimale e la sua storia, 1883) il fondatore della scuola di Marburgo suggerisce di intendere la filosofia non già come «teoria della conoscenza» (Erkenntnistheorie), che corre il rischio di essere erroneamente compresa come indagine circa un processo psichico, quanto come «critica della conoscenza» (Erkenntniskritik),28 avente per compito quello di investigare i fatti dell'esperienza scientifica, dai quali deve sempre prendere avvio al fine di individuare le condizioni a priori che rendono possibile la scienza. In tal senso, il differenziale matematico del metodo infinitesimale corrisponde trascendentalmente «a un concetto fondamentale del pensiero puro, alla categoria [qualitativa] della realtà [Realität]»,29 da non confondersi peraltro con la categoria modale dell'esistenza (Dasein) o dell'effettività (Wirklichkeit).30 Il «concetto pienamente moderno»31 di infinitesimale si configura in definitiva come «indispensabile strumento concettuale»32 per la conoscenza, come «pur[o] mezz[o] per la produzione»33 che rende possibile il soddisfacimento del «desideratum» «di porre un elemento in sé e per sé»,34 giacché nel suo approssimarsi alla negazione = 0 costituisce il presupposto di una inestensione che gener[a] tutte le estensioni. Con ciò si ottiene una posizione assoluta con la quale viene fondata positivamente la real tà degl i ogget t i dell'esperienza scientifica.35 Nella Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (1902, 19142) il principio del metodo infinitesimale è inoltre indicato come il fatto della scienza moderna che la logica deve mettere al proprio centro:36 l'infinitesimale assurge così a presupposto della logica dell'origine. Secondo Cohen, infatti, l'origine del qualcosa non può essere colta in un altro qualcosa, ontologicamente ipostatizzato ovvero assolutizzato a principio, poiché si tratterebbe di una spiegazione idem per idem;37 né può essere individuata in un «nulla assoluto»38 quale principio metafisico antitetico all'essere; piuttosto deve essere rintracciata in un nulla che non esclude il qualcosa come suo opposto, in una negazione che non nega un contenuto determinato, ma che solleva, nella sua infinitezza, la questione della determinabilità del contenuto. L'infinitesimale è appunto quel «nulla relativo, orientato su un preciso 27 Cfr. SE, 23/22. 28 Cfr. HERMANN COHEN, Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Erkenntnisskritik (1883), in IDEM, Werke, cit., V/1, Einleitung von Peter Schulthess, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York, Olms, 1984, pp. 5 sg.; trad. it. a cura di Niccolò Argentieri, Il principio del metodo infinitesimale e la sua storia. Un capitolo per la fondazione della critica della conoscenza, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2011, pp. 50-52 (d'ora in poi: PIM, con il numero di pagina del testo tedesco seguito da quello della traduzione italiana). 29 PIM, 23/66. 30 Cfr. PIM, 27 sg./70 sg. 31 PIM, 12/57 (corsivo mio). 32 PIM, 128/167. 33 PIM, 132/171. 34 PIM, 28/71. 35 PIM, 70/111. 36 Cfr. LrE, 34. 37 Cfr. LrE, 84. 38 LrE, 105. 5 cammino di esplorazione»,39 e indica con ciò un metodo di produzione del qualcosa: in quanto niente (Nichts) interamente fissato al proprio ente (Ichts),40 infatti, si presenta come lo «strumento operativo» tramite cui «portare ogni volta il qualcosa, che è in questione, alla sua origine, e solo in questo modo veramente produrlo e determinarlo».41 Così facendo, Cohen porta a realizzazione il proprio programma filosofico di idealismo critico:42 la critica della conoscenza lascia spazio alla logica della conoscenza pura, a sottolineare il carattere produttivo del pensiero, il quale è al contempo «scopo e [...] oggetto della propria attività»43 e si configura come fondazione che diventa fondamento.44 Emerge insomma, in tutta la sua portata, la modernità di un filosofare fortemente convinto delle potenzialità della ragione critica, la quale ultima assume il fatto della scienza come ipotesi e lo fonda, ricercandone le condizioni di possibilità e dando con ciò conto anche di se stessa. L'infinitesimale, vale a dire il nulla come origine, indica per Cohen in maniera eminente e per certi versi fonda il metodo di questa ragione critica, sempre attenta a raggiungere il proprio limite e a trattenersi su di esso. A fronte di ciò, Rosenzweig non ha difficoltà a riconoscere al proprio docente presso il Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judentums a Berlino il merito di avere preso le distanze dall'idealismo di stampo hegeliano, precisamente con la sua interpretazione del nulla del differenziale come condizione della determinabilità del contenuto del pensiero: quest'ultimo può rendere appieno conto di sé, nonché del segno A nel principio formale di identità, solo nel momento in cui indaga la legittimità della propria origine, da individuarsi nel nulla, non già nell'essere. Agli occhi dell'autore della Stella della redenzione, però, Cohen rimane ancora «più hegeliano di quanto volesse ammettere (e quindi proprio tanto "idealista" quanto desiderava)»:45 il pensiero produttivo di Cohen implicherebbe cioè ancora, per Rosenzweig, una concezione sistematica della ragione e soprattutto una unidimensionalità del logos, il quale rischia di annullare le differenze tra gli essenti e risulta incapace di esperire la realtà effettiva di uomo, mondo e Dio. La valenza quidditativa del nulla particolare in Rosenzweig sembra a me confermare, in tal senso, il suo bisogno di salvaguardare, anche a livello di una loro prima determinazione fattuale, la specificità ontologica dei tre elementi originari. Al medesimo tempo, con il proprio filosofare antimoderno, Rosenzweig conduce l'idealismo critico di Cohen al suo «fin-qui-e-non-oltre» (Bishierherundnichtweiter),46 esaurendo la portata moderna di esso e segnalando la necessità di superarlo, in favore di un pensiero rinnovato che renda conto delle relazioni che accadono nel tempo del mondo incessantemente rinnovato, mediante la parola rivolta e la risposta responsabile.47 39 Ibidem. 40 Cfr. LrE, 93. Questa sottolineatura concettuale compare anche in SE 26/26 sg. 41 LrE, 89. 42 Cfr. al riguardo la lettera a Hermann Lewandowsky del 3 ottobre 1870, in HERMANN COHEN, Briefe, ausgewählt und hrsg. von Bertha und Bruno Strauss, Berlin, Schocken, 1938, p. 28. 43 LrE, 29. 44 Cfr. LrE, 94, 116, 305, 428 sg., 528. 45 SE, 23/22. 46 SE, 23/21. 47 Cfr. ND, 151 sg./270 sg. 6 2. PRO-SPETTIVA: NUOVO PENSIERO E FILOSOFIA DELLA DIFFERENZA Volendo soffermarmi sulla prima parte della Stella della redenzione, è opportuno considerare ancora quanto Rosenzweig scrive riassuntivamente in merito a essa nel Nuovo pensiero: all'inizio, prima di tutti i dati di fatto dell'esperienza reale, è immessa l'esperienza della fattualità. Della fattualità che impone al pensiero, in luogo della sua parola "propriamente" (eigentlich), la piccola parola fondamentale in tutte le esperienze, desueta sulla sua bocca, la congiunzione "e". Dio e il mondo e l'uomo.48 Non occorre ricordare, se non per sommi capi, come la polemica di Rosenzweig nei confronti della fallace ricerca filosofica dell'«'in verità' dell'essenza»49 (Eigentlichkeit des Wesens) trovi una vivida ed efficace espressione nel postumo Das Büchlein vom gesunden und kranken Menschenverstand (Dell'intelletto comune sano e malato, scritto nel 1921). La filosofia si discosta secondo Rosenzweig dall'intelletto comune sano per la propria ossessività nel sollevare la domanda «che cos'è?», senza mai accontentarsi di ciò a cui perviene e ricercando sempre l'essenza come se si trattasse di qualcosa di totalmente altro.50 Rosenzweig condanna soprattutto l'impietrirsi dello stupore filosofico di fronte alle «questioni "supreme", "ultime"»,51 non a caso ritenute metafisiche: si tratta di una fissità 'narcisistica' che spinge il filosofo a chiudersi in un «cerchio magico»,52 da sempre bersaglio delle critiche dell'autore della Stella della redenzione, specie nella configurazione di «cerchio del Tutto conoscibile»53 suggerita dall'idealismo.54 La filosofia, in particolare, è responsabile dell'«[a]poplexia philosophica acuta»55 in cui cadono tutti coloro che si lasciano irretire da essa: è colpevole, insomma, di pervertire l'intelletto comune sano, il quale, nel momento in cui cede alla tentazione di filosofare, si ammala di colpo, cadendo paralizzato, disorientato, per così dire cieco, sordo e muto davanti a tutto.56 Gianfranco Bonola, in maniera molto felice, ha descritto ciò come il «disagio della filosofia»:57 essa, del resto, insegna Rosenzweig nel libello postumo, si arresta stupita a pensare, individuando problemi, temi e oggetti, ma non è affatto capace di continuare a pensare; cerca in profondità la sub-stantia, non pensa nella lunghezza del tempo; è interessata al concetto universale o all'idea, non alla realtà particolare che sta di fronte.58 A questo disagio Rosenzweig oppone – ho avuto modo di rilevare in altra 48 ND, 158/279. 49 Büchlein, 31/39. 50 Cfr. ND, 143 sg./261 sg. 51 Büchlein, 28/35. 52 Büchlein, 32/40. 53 SE, 11/10 (trad. it. modificata). 54 Con l'espressione «cerchio magico» Rosenzweig indica l'idealismo di Fichte nel proprio commento a Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus. Ein handschriftlicher Fund (1917), in GS III, p. 33; cfr. inoltre, in riferimento all'intero idealismo, FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, Einleitung in die Akademieausgabe der Jüdischen Schriften Hermann Cohens (1924), in GS III, p. 209; trad. it. a cura di Roberto Bertoldi, Introduzione agli Scritti ebraici di Hermann Cohen editi dall'Accademia per la Scienza dell'Ebraismo di Berlino, in IDEM, Il filosofo è tornato a casa. Scritti su Hermann Cohen, Reggio Emilia, Diabasis, 2003, p. 68. 55 Büchlein, 57/69. 56 Cfr. Büchlein, 34/43 e, per una dettagliata descrizione della caduta in malattia, 37/46 sg. 57 GIANFRANCO BONOLA, Il disagio della filosofia, in FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, Dell'intelletto comune sano e malato, cit., pp. 151-206. 58 Cfr. Büchlein, 29-31/36-38, 39 sg./49 sg. 7 sede59 – l'agio del nuovo pensiero, o detto altrimenti della «filosofia dell'intelletto comune sano»,60 che è capace di esperire appieno la realtà perché il suo conoscere non prescinde mai dalla temporalità. L'aspetto sul quale desidero richiamare l'attenzione, a ogni buon conto, è la triade di elementi tra loro irrelati a cui perviene la conoscenza propria dell'intelletto comune sano e, tramite esso, Rosenzweig nella prima parte della Stella della redenzione, ossia, in termini metaforici, i «tre grandi massicci montuosi [...] in mezzo ai quali si estendono le strade della vita».61 Scrive Rosenzweig a Eugen Rosenstock il 4 settembre 1921: «Dio, anima e mondo» (così dice Goethe) è davvero l'unica triade non-triadica che si dà. Perciò ne ho bisogno. Tutto ciò che è trino è già un po' avviato a essere idealizzato. Questa triade priva di senso e di unità è assolutamente casuale, assolutamente trovata, assolutamente presente.62 Francesco Paolo Ciglia ha scorto nella tripolarità di queste fattualità ultime «un'ontologia della differenza o, ancora più precisamente, [...] un'ontologia della relazione fra le differenze irriducibili».63 È questo, nel suo giudizio, un aspetto postmoderno ante litteram del pensiero di Rosenzweig, oltre al fatto che il pluralismo che lo caratterizza non è soltanto ontologico, ma si riverbera in una complessità di pluralismi – epistemologico, metodologico e linguistico – che rendono possibile accostare la riflessione di Rosenzweig, seppure anacronisticamente, a quanto discusso da Jean-François Lyotard nel manifesto programmatico La condition postmoderne (La condizione postmoderna, 1979). Aggiungo che la prima parte della Stella della redenzione può essere letta come anticipazione della polemica postmoderna, così come formulata da Lyotard, contro le «metanarrazioni», quali grandi racconti universalistici attraverso cui il sapere moderno ha via via preteso di legittimarsi:64 nel caso di Rosenzweig – lo si è constatato – è oggetto di critica la metanarrazione della filosofia del Tutto, con la sua assolutizzazione del soggetto e con la sua pretesa circa la razionalità di un reale capace di includere in sé perfino Dio. Non sembrano in sostanza mancare analogie tra la speculazione di Rosenzweig e alcuni tratti che connotano il pensiero della differenza, intendendo quest'ultima, con una certa generalizzazione semplificante, come il nucleo della filosofia postmoderna. Mi riferisco in particolare, assumendolo come caposaldo del postmoderno, al libro di Gilles Deleuze Différence et répétition (Differenza e ripetizione, 1968), recensendo il quale non a caso Michel Foucault ha avuto significativamente modo di osservare che da una differenza sempre nomade, sempre anarchica, dal segno sempre in eccesso [...], si è prodotta una folgorazione che porterà il nome di Deleuze: ora, un nuovo pensiero è possibile; il pensiero, di nuovo, è possibile [...]. È qui, nelle pagine di Deleuze, e salta, danza al nostro co- 59 Cfr. LUCA BERTOLINO, Unbehagen und Behagen der Philosophie. Über den «gesunden Menschenverstand» bei Franz Rosenzweig, dt. Übers. von Leonie Schröder, «Rosenzweig Jahrbuch / Rosenzweig Yearbook», 2014, 8/9, pp. 152-177. 60 Lettera a Rudolf Hallo del 4 febbraio 1923, in GS I, 2, p. 889. 61 Büchlein, 55/66. 62 GB, p. 766: cfr. JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE, Gott, Gemüth und Welt (1815), Weimarer Ausgabe, I, 2, pp. 213-220. 63 FRANCESCO PAOLO CIGLIA, Franz Rosenzweig fra moderno e postmoderno. Una rilettura «anacronistica» del «nuovo pensiero», «Humanitas», LXII, 2, 2007, p. 353. 64 Cfr. JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1979; trad. it. di Carlo Formenti, La condizione postmoderna. Rapporto sul sapere, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1981; IDEM, Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants, Paris, Galilée, 1986; trad. it. di Alessandro Serra, Il postmoderno spiegato ai bambini, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1987. 8 spetto, fra noi; pensiero genitale, intensivo, affermativo, a-categorico.65 L'autore di Differenza e ripetizione teorizza infatti un pensiero della «differenza in sé», in quanto «stato della determinazione come distinzione unilaterale»: «in luogo di una cosa che si distingue da un'altra,» – scrive – «immaginiamo qualcosa che si distingue, e tuttavia ciò da cui si distingue non si distingua da essa».66 Riconoscere siffatta differenza significa anzitutto opporsi alla sua irreggimentazione nella gerarchia organica del concetto in generale, sottraendola alle pretese della ragione rappresentativa di sottometterla, in quanto elemento finito, al principio delimitante della forma, cioè all'identità del concetto, all'opposizione del predicato, all'analogia del giudizio o alla somiglianza della percezione.67 Anche gli sforzi filosofici di pensare la differenza tramite una «rappresentazione orgiaca, e non più organica»,68 dunque intendendola come elemento infinito (leibnizianamente piccolo o hegelianamente grande), implicano secondo Deleuze una riduzione concettuale di essa a un principio identitario, poiché la mediazione (la «vicedizione» di Leibniz o la «contraddizione» di Hegel) fungerebbe da fondamento (di tipo analitico o sintetico, a seconda dei casi) verso il quale le differenze convergono.69 Per cogliere davvero la radicalità della differenza si tratta allora di pensarla per così dire differenzialmente, nel suo essere assoluta, non deducibile, molteplice, informale, cioè di «mostrare la differenza nell'atto di differire».70 In breve: occorre intendere l'univocità dell'essere non come identità ma come differenza, come essere che si dice «in un solo e stesso senso di tutto ciò di cui si dice, ma ciò di cui si dice differisce».71 In linea con questo indirizzo teoretico è anche la comprensione da parte di Deleuze del calcolo differenziale. Il differenziale preserva appunto «il gioco della differenza»: non è «[n]é reale né fittizio», «né particolare né generale, né finito né infinito»; esprime paradigmaticamente «l'elemento del problematico»,72 vale a dire ciò che non è riducibile all'identità concettuale e alla rappresentazione, organica od orgiaca che sia. L'autore di Differenza e ripetizione si colloca in tal senso consapevolmente nella scia dell'idealismo critico percorsa da Cohen e che si è visto essere elogiata da Rosenzweig: alla reinterpretazione coheniana del kantismo, da lui conosciuta attraverso lo studio di Jules Vuillemin su L'héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne (1954), Deleuze riconosce infatti il merito di avere conferito «pieno valore al principio delle quantità intensive»,73 intese nel loro carattere trascendentale. Se Rosenzweig può essere avvicinato a Deleuze per un similare rifiuto del pensiero dell'identità e del pensiero rappresentativo in favore di un pensiero della differenza, sia quando sostiene la soggettività dei tanti filosofare e la pluridimensionalità della metalogica, sia, soprattutto, quando si sforza di dimostrare tramite il differenziale matematico 65 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Theatrum philosophicum, «Critique», 282, 1970, p. 908; trad. it. di Giuseppe Guglielmi, in GILLES DELEUZE, Differenza e ripetizione, Bologna, il Mulino, 1971, p. XXIV (corsivo mio). 66 GILLES DELEUZE, Différence et répétition, Paris, PUF, 1968, p. 43; trad. it. di Giuseppe Guglielmi, in IDEM, Differenza e ripetizione, cit., p. 53 (d'ora in poi: DR, con il numero di pagina del testo francese seguito da quello della traduzione italiana). 67 Cfr. DR, 44 sg./55, 52/64 e 337/419. 68 DR, 61/76. 69 Cfr. DR, 64-66/78-82. 70 DR, 79/98. 71 DR, 53/66. 72 Tutte le citazioni sono tratte da DR, 231/289. 73 DR, 298/372, con riferimento esplicito a HERMANN COHEN, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, Berlin, Dümmler, 18852, pp. 428 sgg. e a JULES VUILLEMIN, L'héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne. Fichte – Cohen – Heidegger, Paris, PUF, 1954, pp. 183-202. 9 l'inseità ontologica e la perseità concettuale di Dio meta-fisico, mondo meta-logico e uomo meta-etico, non possono però essere sottovalutati evidenti aspetti che distanziano i due filosofi. Su tutti vi è il fatto che Deleuze mira a emanciparsi dal razionalismo: all'«ortodossia razionale»74 del senso comune, inteso come natura retta e buona volontà,75 contrappone il «paradosso» di un «para-senso (nell'accezione in cui il paradosso è in realtà l'opposto del buon senso)»,76 inteso come natura maligna e cattiva volontà;77 ai presupposti oggettivi preferisce quelli soggettivi, «avvolti [...] in un sentimento anziché in un concetto»;78 alla ratio della filosofia oppone il pathos di essa;79 contrasta il governo della razionalità mediante l'anarchia «della stupidità [bêtise] come bestialità [bestialité] propriamente umana»;80 anziché la convergenza conoscitiva delle diverse facoltà persegue la loro divergenza o, al più, il loro «accordo discordante».81 Nel richiamarsi esplicitamente alla nietzscheana «ontologia della differenza [...]: volontà di potenza»82 il filosofo francese propone una declinazione energetica del pensiero, la quale mira a esporre la differenza come pura intensità, sino a «fare del caos un oggetto di affermazione».83 Il pensiero della differenza risulta pertanto alogico, anomico, violento; è mosso da hybris84 ed è perennemente nomade; più che come una filosofia, si configura come una «misosofia»,85 quanto a dire che fa male, tanto a colui che pensa quanto agli altri. Rosenzweig conviene sulla eccedenza di una realtà che non si lascia ridurre alla sola ragione e sulla nocività della filosofia, quantomeno di quella vecchia, ma non potrebbe certo condividere il 'pulsionalismo' antirazionale di Deleuze. La proposta teoretica dell'autore della Stella della redenzione non vuole infatti essere compresa «nel senso, o meglio nel nonsenso, delle tendenze delle "filosofie vitalistiche" o altrimenti "irrazionalistiche"»;86 è apertis verbis rinnovatrice, non già rivoluzionaria; si appella all'intelletto comune sano poiché lo ritiene capace di esperienze indubitabili, non persegue modelli di pensiero guidati dalla cattiva volontà del pensatore: rimane, in definitiva, strettamente legata alla modernità, proprio nella sua opposizione a essa. 3. RETRO-PRO-SPETTIVA: VECCHIA FILOSOFIA E NUOVO PENSIERO E FILOSOFIA DELLA DIFFERENZA Per un aspetto specifico Rosenzweig è decisamente lontano sia dall'idealismo critico sia dalla filosofia della differenza. Egli sostiene infatti che «noi "crediamo" nel mondo con la stessa saldezza con cui crediamo in Dio e nel nostro 'sé'»,87 sicché risulta impossibile 74 DR, 193/241. 75 Cfr. DR, 171/214. 76 DR, 250/313. 77 Cfr. DR, 177/222. 78 DR, 169/211. 79 Cfr. DR, 293/365. 80 DR, 196/244. 81 DR, 190/237. Per il concetto di 'accordo discordante', di matrice eraclitea, Deleuze rinvia a KOSTAS AXELOS, Vers la pensée planétaire. Le devenir-pensée du monde et le devenir-monde de la pensée, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1964 (v. spec. il saggio Introduction a la pensée planétaire, pp. 30 sg). 82 DR, 400/499. 83 DR, 313/390. 84 Cfr. DR, 55/68. 85 DR, 182/227 (corsivo mio). 86 ND, 156/276. 87 SE, 45/44. 10 fare a meno di presupporre questa triplice «credenza» (Glauben), quasi fosse un punto archimedeo che può al massimo essere posto fra parentesi nel momento in cui si intraprende la strada della gnoseologia. Si tratta, per Rosenzweig, di costruire il triplice credo ipoteticamente dalle fondamenta, assumendo il nulla particolare di ogni elemento, al fine di pervenire, al termine della traiettoria della Stella, a una meta in cui «l'ipotetico [deve] capovolgersi nell'anipotetico, nell'assoluto, nell'incondizionato di quella credenza».88 Quanto è teorizzato nella parte su Gli elementi o il pre-mondo perenne, pertanto, non è affatto privo di orientamento, bensì è costantemente indirizzato dalla credenza, quale modalità originale di conoscenza differente dal pensare concettuale,89 ma pur sempre connessa alla ragionevolezza dell'intelletto comune sano. Per un verso la credenza è assunta da Rosenzweig senza rinvenire trascendentalmente alcuna sua ratio, che emerge soltanto a posteriori nelle pagine conclusive dedicate a La stella o la verità eterna, laddove la verità è però valutata in relazione all'esperienza del suo inveramento nella vita, non in base alla coerenza oggettiva del pensiero; per altro verso essa si presenta, con una connotazione teleologica del tutto estranea al 'nomadismo' del pensiero postmoderno, come termine ultimo e come compito del nuovo pensiero. L'importanza della credenza nella prima parte della Stella della redenzione non può che sorprendere chi voglia declinare la filosofia nella sua dimensione rigorosamente concettuale, specie tenendo in considerazione che secondo Rosenzweig le fattualità ultime del pre-mondo rappresentano la «classicità dell'antichità classica» 90 (gli dèi dell'«Olimpo mitico», il «cosmo plastico», l'«eroe tragico»),91 nonché costituiscono gli oggetti della teologia, della cosmologia e della psicologia razionali del tempo di Kant.92 La rilevanza attribuita alla credenza può forse essere compresa allorché gli elementi originari siano assunti non solo come il risultato più maturo che sia stato formulato dalla «filosofia del paganesimo»,93 ma anche come quello più compiuto, poiché l'incapacità di Dio meta-fisico, mondo meta-logico e uomo meta-etico di entrare in relazione reciproca li vincola a un pensiero senza vita, che nulla è in grado di dire circa la loro realtà effettiva. Ma in che modo il pensare concettuale, prescindendo dalla credenza, potrebbe rinvenire un significato e un orientamento nel contesto alogico, anomico, privo di qualsivoglia fine del postmoderno? Può davvero l'essere umano, che la filosofia della differenza vuole «corpo senza organi» attraversato da pulsioni che non hanno né origine né meta e che tanto meno sono ascrivibili a un soggetto,94 dunque che appare essere in crisi di identità, errante senza tregua alcuna, destituito di potere decisionale rispetto agli eventi, oggetto di una rete di flussi più che soggetto di essa, formulare una riflessione filosofica che lo conduca a trascendersi, nel senso dell'apertura sia all'azione nel mondo sia al riconoscimento dell'alterità divina? La prima parte della Stella della redenzione, letta in 88 Ibidem. 89 Al riguardo cfr. spec. STÉPHANE MOSÈS, Système et Révélation. La philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig, préface d'Emmanuel Levinas, Paris, Seuil, 1982, pp. 55-61. 90 ND, 146/265. 91 Cfr. rispettivamente SE, 36-38/36 sg., 56-62/54-60, 83-87/80-84. 92 Cfr. SE, 21/20. 93 ND, 147/265. 94 Cfr. GILLES DELEUZE, FÉLIX GUATTARI, L'Anti-OEdipe. Capitalisme et schizophrénie, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972; trad. it. a cura di Alessandro Fontana, L'anti-Edipo. Capitalismo e schizofrenia, Torino, Einaudi, 1975; IDEM, Mille plateaux. Capitalisme et schizophrénie, Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980; trad. it. di Giorgio Passerone, Mille piani. Capitalismo e schizofrenia, 2 voll., Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1987. 11 retrospettiva e in prospettiva, indica almeno due atteggiamenti metodologici. Il primo è quello della tradizione idealistico-critica, che si sforza di rendere conto dei problemi con cui di volta in volta si confronta, in un continuo approfondimento che, se pure corre il rischio di essere fine a se stesso (ma con ciò anche di essere positivamente disinteressato), insegna comunque ad abitare il limite, quale luogo fecondo che non soltanto include, ma che soprattutto non conclude, che esclude indicando sempre la possibilità di una eccedenza. Il secondo è quello di una piena presa di coscienza circa il fatto che l'essere è differenza, non identità, cosa che invita, se non addirittura costringe, ad abbandonare categorie tradizionali come quelle di 'soggetto', di 'sistema', di 'teleologia', per individuare nuove forme concettuali che pongano in relazione le fattualità pre-mondane. Rosenzweig, forte della propria credenza, indica nell'esperienza religiosa della rivelazione la chiave di volta di un nuovo pensiero; a me sembra che nella «modernità liquida»95 si debba piuttosto coltivare l'anelito per una forma che è presente nella sua assenza.96 Con 'anelito' indico un desiderio, una pulsione patica elevata concettualmente a sentimento: come ogni desiderare, implica la mancanza di ciò che si desidera; a differenza di ogni altro desiderare, non conosce ciò che desidera. È diverso dalla 'nostalgia', dal desiderio di ritornare a qualcosa di assente che si è conosciuto o posseduto lontano nel tempo; parimenti è altro dallo 'struggimento', dal desiderio di desiderare caratteristico del romanticismo quale categoria psicologica:97 l'anelito potrebbe non avere mai quiete, ma si realizza pienamente nel rapporto con l'assenza. Esso è, insomma, proteso verso qualcosa che non si sa come è, ma che nondimeno è presente nella forma della propria assenza. Con questa tensione, che trova il proprio fondamento nel fin-qui-e-nonoltre dell'idealismo critico, e che continuamente si riconfigura in relazione alla differenza pensata ed esperita, siamo chiamati a muoverci noi, che abbiamo – per riprendere Rosenzweig – una visione del mondo,98 che siamo «nome e cognome, [...] polvere e cenere»,99 ma che non sembreremo allora più eroi tragici incapaci di relazione, bensì risulteremo accomunati dal vivere consapevolmente la nostra disparatezza e la nostra dispersione. Università degli Studi di Torino [email protected] 95 ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, Liquid modernity, Cambridge, Polity, 2000; trad. it. di Sergio Minucci, Modernità liquida, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2002. 96 Sono debitore, per la proposta che segue, ad ANDREA POMA, Cadenze, cit., p. 19 e passim, la cui idea di 'Sehnsucht' traduco qui con 'anelito'. 97 Cfr. LADISLAO MITTNER, Storia della letteratura tedesca, II, Dal pietismo al romanticismo (17001820), Torino, Einaudi, 1964, pp. 698-701. 98 Cfr. la lettera a Rudolf Ehrenberg del 1° dicembre 1917, in GS I, 1, p. 485. 99 FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, «Urzelle» des «Stern der Erlösung». Brief an Rudolf Ehrenberg vom 18.11.1917, in GS III, p. 127; trad. it. a cura di Gianfranco Bonola, «Cellula originaria» de La stella della redenzione. Lettera a Rudolf Ehrenberg del 18.XI.1917, in IDEM, La Scrittura, cit., p. 243 (cfr. Gn 18, 27).

www.argument-journal.eu Published online: 25.06.2015 Argument Vol. 4 (2/2014) pp. 299–314 * Adiunkt w Katedrze Filozofii Współczesnej w Instytucie Filozofii i Socjologii uniwer‐ sytetu Pedagogicznego w Krakowie. e ‐mail: [email protected]. Austin i Quine o rozróżnieniu ana l i t yczne/syntet yczne Jan WAWrZYnIAK* ABStrACt Austin and Quine on the an a l y t i c / s yn th e t i c distinction Both John Langshaw Austin and Willard Van Orman Quine were critical of the traditional division of propositions into the two categories: analytic and synthetic. their criticism has, however, a different character. Quine questions the usefulness of the notion of analyticity, whereas Austin does not accept the view that every proposition should be considered either analytic or synthetic. According to Quine, we have to abandon the notion of analyticity because we cannot define it in a satisfactory way. Quine's criticism is based on his conviction that the very notion of meaning is suspicious from the scientific point of view. this general outlook is supported by arguments the point of which is to show that we cannot avoid an indeterminacy of translation. Austin criticises the distinction for different reasons. According to him, it is not the notion of meaning which is suspicious, but a certain model of this notion - a model which is based on false analogies. In my text, I compare these two approaches and point out that they have different metaphilosophical sources. the main difference lies in the fact that, according to Austin, statements about linguistic meaning usually have a descriptive character, whereas Quine claims that linguistic meanings are theoretical entities. In the last part of my article, I discuss the thesis of indeterminacy of translation and assess its credibility, as it plays a key role in Quine's criticism of the notion of meaning. KeYWOrDS John Langshaw Austin; Willard Van Orman Quine; analytic; synthetic; meaning; indetermi‐ nacy of translation 300 Jan WAWRZYNIAK I Wyczerpujące omówienie poglądów Johna Langshawa Austina i Willarda Van Ormana Quine'a dotyczących rozróżnienia anal it yczne/syntet yczne wy‐ magałoby zapewne napisania obszernej monografii. ujęcie tego zagadnienia w ramy artykułu oczywiście prowadzi do tego, że nie wszystkie wątki związane z rozważaną tematyką zostaną omówione, a spora część zostanie jedynie zasy‐ gnalizowana. niemniej jednak - jak sądzę - pewne istotne kwestie dotyczące tego tematu można poruszyć na kilkunastu stronach, co więcej, uważam, że warto choćby szkicowo przedstawić te dwa podejścia do zagadnienia analitycz‐ ności, skonfrontować je ze sobą, wskazać poglądy stojące u ich podstaw oraz zarzuty, na jakie są one narażone. Przeprowadzenie podziału sądów na analityczne i syntetyczne zawdzięczamy Immanuelowi Kantowi. Jednak już gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz i David Hume dokonali podobnych rozróżnień. ten pierwszy dzielił prawdy na faktyczne i ro‐ zumowe, ten drugi odróżniał zdania dotyczące faktów od zdań dotyczących sto‐ sunków pomiędzy ideami. Kant w Krytyce czystego rozumu podaje następujące wyjaśnienie analityczności i syntetyczności: We wszystkich sądach, w których pomyślany jest stosunek podmiotu do orzeczenia [...], stosunek ten jest możliwy w sposób dwojaki. Albo orzeczenie B należy do pod‐ miotu A jako coś, co jest (w sposób ukryty) zawarte w pojęciu A, albo B leży całkiem poza pojęciem A, choć pozostaje w nim związku. W pierwszym przypadku nazywam sąd analitycznym, w drugim syntetycznym (Kant, 2001: A7). W kolejnych fragmentach tekstu swoją charakterystykę sądów analitycznych uzupełnia stwierdzeniem, że sądy analityczne opierają się na zasadzie sprzecz‐ ności (Kant, 2001: B12, B15, B16). można przyjąć, że - wedle Kanta - sądy analityczne to takie, których treść (czyli znaczenie) orzecznika jest zawarta w treści podmiotu. Dlaczego tego typu sądy opierają się na zasadzie sprzeczno‐ ści? Wydaje się, że powodem jest to, iż ich zaprzeczenia są sądami wewnętrznie sprzecznymi, to znaczy sprzecznościami. Wszystkie pozostałe sądy są, zdaniem Kanta, syntetyczne. Zarówno odniesienia do podziału sądów na analityczne i syntetyczne, jak i próby precyzyjnego określenia jego podstaw były i są bardzo liczne. W tym miejscu ograniczę się do przywołania kilku uwag gottloba Fregego i Saula Kripkego1 na ten temat. Wedle Fregego zdania dzielimy na analityczne i synte‐ tyczne ze względu na sposób ich uzasadnienia: 1 Odwołuję się do książki Nazywanie a konieczność, pomimo że pochodzi ona z okresu póź‐ niejszego niż czas, w którym Austin i Quine sformułowali swoje zastrzeżenia wobec podziału zdań na analityczne i syntetyczne, bowiem zawarte w niej uwagi, podobnie jak opinia Fregego Austin i Quine o rozróżnieniu anal i tyczne / synte tyczne 301 Podziały sądów na aprioryczne i aposterioryczne, na syntetyczne i analityczne, dotyczą moim zdaniem nie treści sądów, lecz sposobu ich uzasadniania. gdzie go nie ma, tam nie ma możliwości przeprowadzenia takiego podziału (Frege, 1977a: 11). Analityczność ujmuje on na przykład w następujący sposób: Chodzi wtedy o podanie takiego dowodu, który sięgałby wstecz aż do prawd pierw‐ szych. Prawda będzie analityczna, jeżeli spotkamy na tej drodze tylko prawa ogólno‐ ‐logiczne oraz definicje (Frege, 1977a: 11). Zatem zgodnie z podejściem Fregego podział sądów na analityczne i synte‐ tyczne należy uznać za rozróżnienie o charakterze epistemologicznym. Kripke w wykładach opublikowanych pod tytułem Nazywanie a konieczność stwierdza, że nie należy utożsamiać rozróżnienia a priori / a posteriori z rozróżnieniem ko‐ nieczne/przygodne. to pierwsze należy do epistemologii, drugie zaś do ontologii. Analityczność można scharakteryzować, odwołując się do obu tych podziałów: zdanie analityczne jest, w pewnym sensie, prawdziwe na mocy swojego znaczenia, a jest prawdziwe we wszystkich możliwych światach na mocy swojego znaczenia. Coś, co jest analitycznie prawdziwe, będzie więc zarazem konieczne i aprioryczne (Kripke, 2001: 57). II Zasadniczym powodem, dla którego Austin odnosi się krytycznie do rozróż‐ nienia anal it yczne/syntet yczne, jest to, że bezrefleksyjne wykorzystywanie go w analizach filozoficznych często stoi w sprzeczności z następującym po‐ stulatem metodologicznym: „musimy zwracać uwagę na fakty rzeczywistego języka, na to, co możemy, czego zaś nie możemy powiedzieć, i na to, dlaczego dokładnie tak jest" (Austin, 1993a: 95). na czym polega ta niezgodność? Wedle tradycji podział sądów (zdań) na analityczne i syntetyczne jest zupełny i rozłączny. Zatem wydaje się oczywiste, że zadanie pytania „analityczne czy syntetyczne?" jest stosowne w odniesieniu do każdego sądu (zdania). Być może nie zawsze da się je rozstrzygnąć, ale każdy sąd (zdanie) musi być albo analityczny, albo syntetyczny. Jak wskazuje jednak Austin - wbrew temu tradycyjnemu poglądowi - istnieją takie wypowiedzi, których „nie można uznać ani za «analityczne», ani za «syntetyczne»" (Austin, 1993a: 90). Podaje on kilka przykładów tego typu zdań: „ten dźwięk istnie‐ je", „X jest rozciągłe, lecz nie ma kształtu", „myślę, że x jest dobre, lecz nie na temat omawianego rozróżnienia, wskazują na sprawę zasadniczą - mianowicie na koniecz‐ ność osadzenia tego zagadnienia we właściwym kontekście. 302 Jan WAWRZYNIAK pochwalam tego". Ponadto Austin wskazuje, że można sobie wyobrazić takie sytuacje, w których „słowa nas zawodzą". Załóżmy, że przez cztery lata żyję w harmonii i przyjaźni z kotem, a ten następnie wygłasza filipikę. Zadamy chyba pytanie: „Czy to jest, czy nie jest rzeczywisty kot?" „Albo jest, albo nie jest, ale nie możemy mieć pewności, czy jest, czy nie jest". Otóż tak faktycznie nie jest; ani zdanie: „to jest rzeczywisty kot", ani zdanie: „to nie jest rzeczywisty kot" pod względem semantycznym nie odpowiada faktom. [...] pierwszego nie można wypowiedzieć o czymś, co wygłasza filipiki, drugiego - o czymś, co przez cztery lata zachowywało się jak ów kot (Austin, 1993a: 93). na podstawie powyższego cytatu można wyciągnąć wniosek, że twierdzeń takich jak: „Koty nie wygłaszają filipik" również nie należy zakwalifikować do jednego z tych dwóch rodzajów. Z jednej strony nie istnieje żadna konwencja czy też reguła językowa, która stwierdzałaby, że koty nie wygłaszają filipik2. Z drugiej jednak strony - jak podkreśla Austin - zastosowanie słowa „kot" w odniesieniu do istoty, która wygłasza filipiki, byłoby czymś niewłaściwym „pod względem semantycznym". Wedle filozofa w takich przypadkach należy „przedstawić szczegółowy opis faktów" (Austin, 1993a: 94). Wskazane przez Austina przykłady podważające przekonanie o zupełności dychotomii syntet yczne/anal it yczne różnią się od siebie pod istotnymi względami. Dlatego też szczegółowa analiza jego argumentacji wymagałaby po‐ grupowania tych zdań, a następnie zbadania każdej z tych kategorii. W tym miejscu ograniczę się jednak tylko do kilku uwag na temat tych przykładów. Wydaje się, że wypowiedzi typu: „ten dźwięk istnieje" mogą być odczyty‐ wane dwojako. można je rozumieć albo jako zdania, w których zakres kwan‐ tyfikatora egzystencjalnego jest szeroki, albo jako takie, w których jest wąski. Przyjmując pierwszą interpretację, otrzymujemy twierdzenia o niewątpliwie syntetycznym charakterze - na przykład stwierdzenie posiadające mniej więcej taką treść: istnieje takie x, które jest dźwiękiem o tych a tych własnościach, i x pojawiło się w tym a tym dniu o tej i tej godzinie w tym a tym miejscu. natomiast jeśli takie zdania odczytywalibyśmy zgodnie z drugą interpretacją, to wydaje się, że rezultatem byłyby podstawienia prawa egzystencjalnej gene‐ ralizacji, na przykład twierdzenie, które mówi, iż dla dowolnej osoby x (w tym przypadku nie ma potrzeby relatywizowania do czasu) jeśli pewien obiekt a jest wskazywany przez x i jest dźwiękiem, to istnieje coś, co jest identyczne z a. Zdania takie jak: „myślę, że x jest dobre, lecz nie pochwalam tego" rodzą nieco innego typu trudności, związane ze znaczeniem terminów wartościujących. Au‐ stin, kwestionując analityczność tego twierdzenia, słusznie - jak sądzę - odrzu‐ ca stanowisko metaetyczne zwane preskryptywizmem. nie godząc się natomiast z uznaniem go za syntetyczne, sprzeciwia się także deskryptywizmowi. nastawienie 2 na podobne zjawisko zwraca uwagę Wittgenstein (2000: § 80, 84). Austin i Quine o rozróżnieniu anal i tyczne / synte tyczne 303 Austina wobec tego stwierdzenia polega na tym, że, pomimo iż z grubsza rzecz biorąc, potrafimy pokazać, dlaczego nie powinno się go uznawać ani za analityczne, ani za syntetyczne, nie da się ściśle ustalić, jakie relacje zachodzą pomiędzy po‐ chwalaniem czegoś a uznawaniem tego za dobre. to zaś wynika z przekonania, że „rzeczywisty język ma niewiele, jeśli w ogóle jakieś, wyraźnych konwencji, nie ma żadnych ostrych granic sfer działania reguł" (Austin, 1993a: 94). Do jeszcze innej kategorii należy zaliczyć zdania tego typu, co: „X jest roz‐ ciągłe, lecz nie ma kształtu", „Koty nie wygłaszają filipik". Omawiając tę grupę twierdzeń, warto jest zestawić podejście Austina z ujęciem Hilary'ego Putna‐ ma. to porównanie pozwoli lepiej scharakteryzować tę klasę. Putnam w rozwa‐ żaniach na temat rozróżnienia anal it yczne/syntet yczne bardziej szczegó‐ łowo przedstawia racje przemawiające za tym, by nie stosować owej dychotomii w takich przypadkach. Jego zdaniem głównym powodem, dla którego znaczna ilość zdań nie może zostać uznana ani za analityczne, ani za syntetyczne, jest to, że niektóre słowa użyte w tych zdaniach występują w sformułowaniach wielu praw (Putnam, 1998). Zatem na przykład w przypadku słowa „kot" jego zna‐ czenie jest określane nie przez jedno zdanie, dajmy na to: „Koty nie mówią", lecz przez całą wiązkę praw - praw biologicznych, a być może także innych. Podejście Putnama do omawianego rozróżnienia jest więc do pewnego stopnia zgodne z nastawieniem Austina, lecz trzeba zaznaczyć, że ten pierwszy nie do końca zgodziłby się z następującymi słowami: Język potoczny załamuje się w niezwykłych przypadkach. [...] Otóż nie ulega wątpli‐ wości, że język idealny nie załamałby się niezależnie od tego, co by się zdarzyło. gdy na przykład, uprawiamy fizykę, gdzie naginamy nasz język, by dokładnie i zwięźle opisać przypadki skomplikowane i niezwykłe, przygotowujemy się językowo na najgorsze (Au‐ stin, 1993a: 94). Putnam odrzuciłby sugestię, że uprawiając fizykę, posługujemy się językiem idealnym, który nigdy nie załamuje się. Fizyka także natrafia na problemy, któ‐ rych nie da się rozstrzygnąć, nie rewidując - w danym momencie akceptowa‐ nych - definicji podstawowych wielkości fizycznych. (Przełomowe momenty w historii nauki polegały właśnie na tego typu zmianach). Wedle Putnama język fizyki jest przedłużeniem języka potocznego. tak jak spotkanie z „kotem", który wygłaszałby filipiki, doprowadziłoby do załamania języka potocznego, tak obserwacje dokonane pod koniec wieku XIX i na początku XX doprowadziły do załamania języka fizyki klasycznej. Austin w artykule Znaczenie słowa (1993a) nie tylko podaje przykłady pod‐ ważające tezę o zupełności podziału zdań na analityczne i syntetyczne, lecz także przedstawia diagnozę wyjaśniającą, dlaczego wielu filozofów bezkrytycznie ją akceptuje. teza ta wynika z pewnego sposobu ujmowania znaczenia, nazywane‐ go przez Austina modelem roboczym. Zgodnie z modelem roboczym znaczenia 304 Jan WAWRZYNIAK są „rzeczami rozumianymi w jakimś potocznym sensie" (Austin, 1993a: 94)3. Jeśli tak, to posiadają części. Zatem pytanie: „Czy znaczenie jednego wyrażenia jest częścią znaczenia innego wyrażenia?" jest zawsze zasadne. Stosując ten mo‐ del, łatwo da się wytłumaczyć, na czym polega analityczność zdań podmiotowo‐ ‐orzecznikowych, a także uzasadnić, dlaczego każde takie zdanie jest albo ana‐ lityczne, albo syntetyczne. Zdanie podmiotowo ‐orzecznikowe jest analityczne wtedy i tylko wtedy, gdy znaczenie orzecznika jest zawarte w znaczeniu pod‐ miotu. Zakładając zaś, że każde zdanie proste (atomowe) można ująć jako zda‐ nie podmiotowo ‐orzecznikowe, powyższe określenie analityczności stosuje się do wszystkich zdań prostych (atomowych). Podział zaś jest zupełny, ponieważ znaczenie orzecznika musi albo być zawarte w znaczeniu podmiotu, albo nie być w nim zawarte. Wedle Austina siła tego modelu jest tak wielka, że nawet ci filozofowie, którzy zdecydowanie i otwarcie odrzucają koncepcję znaczenia jako przedmiotu skorelowanego z wyrażeniem, akceptują jako całkowicie jasny pewien będący konsekwencją tego modelu sposób mówienia o znaczeniach. Zdaniem Austina mówienie o częściach znaczeń ma sens tylko pod warunkiem, iż ten model jest słuszny. W przeciwnym przypadku „takie zwroty jak «część znaczenia słowa x» są zupełnie nieokreślone, wiszą w powietrzu i w ogóle nie wiemy, co one znaczą" (Austin, 1993a: 87). Konsekwentne zanegowanie stare‐ go modelu prowadzi do następujących wniosków: a) przekonanie, że każdy sąd jest analityczny bądź syntetyczny jest bezpodstawnym dogmatem; b) nie da się podać ogólnej definicji terminów „analityczny" i „syntetyczny". Austin wskazuje, że w miejsce tej zwodniczej koncepcji znaczenia można przyjąć inną, prowadzącą do równie poważnych błędów: Ale jest równie oczywiste, że nasz nowy model roboczy, rzekomo „idealny" język, jest pod wieloma względami najbardziej nieadekwatnym modelem jakiegokolwiek rzeczy‐ wistego języka: obowiązujące w nim staranne oddzielenie składni od semantyki, listy wyraźnie sformułowanych reguł i konwencji oraz staranne rozgraniczenie ich sfer dzia‐ łania - wszystko to jest mylące. rzeczywisty język ma niewiele, jeśli w ogóle jakieś, wyraźnych konwencji, nie ma żadnych ostrych granic sfer działania reguł, żadnego sztywnego oddzielenia tego, co składniowe, i tego, co semantyczne (Austin, 1993a: 93). Warto zauważyć, że przekonanie, iż język naturalny jest czymś analogicznym do języka rachunku, definiowanego poprzez podanie listy reguł określających: a) interpretację symboli pierwotnych, b) sposoby powiązania tych symboli, rów‐ nież prowadzi do poglądu, że każde zdanie musi być albo analityczne, albo synte‐ tyczne. Przy takim założeniu analityczność w danym języku możemy określić jako prawdziwość bądź fałszywość na mocy reguł interpretacji wyrażeń tego języka. 3 Warto zauważyć, że o sile pewnych zwodniczych modeli i analogii pisali także inni filozofowie, między innymi Bergson oraz Wittgentein; por. Bergson, 1988: 12–13; Wittgen‐ stein, 2000: § 304–308. Austin i Quine o rozróżnieniu anal i tyczne / synte tyczne 305 Skoro zaś reguły interpretacji symboli pierwotnych oraz reguły budowy wyrażeń są sformułowane explicite, definicja taka nie powinna budzić wątpliwości4. mo‐ głoby się zatem wydawać, że Austin, odrzucając również ten nowy model funk‐ cjonowania języka, podważa nie tylko tezę o zupełności i rozłączności podziału zdań na analityczne i syntetyczne, ale także możliwość wyjaśnienia i zrozumienia tych terminów, bowiem jeśli zarówno stary, jak i nowy model są błędne, to nie da się sformułować - ani ogólnej, ani zrelatywizowanej do języka - definicji nor‐ malnej analityczności. Jednak w świetle tego, co zostało do tej pory powiedziane, oraz innych uwag Austina ten wniosek jest niepoprawny. Bardzo często uczymy się znaczenia słowa nie poprzez wyjaśnienia werbalne, lecz poprzez wskazanie: „Sądzę, że filozofowie poświęcali zbyt mało uwagi faktowi, że większość słów w potocznym użyciu definiuje się ostensywnie" (Austin, 1993b: 523). Zatem, jeśli potrafimy wskazać przykłady twierdzeń analitycznych oraz twierdzeń syntetycznych i w większości przypadków nie dochodzi do kontro‐ wersji, to terminy „analityczne" oraz „syntetyczne" posiadają określony sens. Ponadto jeśli „rzeczywisty język ma niewiele [...] wyraźnych konwencji", to być może te terminy - podobnie jak wiele innych - są w pełni zrozumiałe, pomimo iż ich użyciem nie rządzą żadne wyraźne konwencje, na przykład nie posiadają werbalnych definicji (normalnych). Podsumowując podejście Austina do kwestii analityczności, należy stwier‐ dzić, że krytykuje on przede wszystkim przekonanie o zupełności i rozłączności podziału zdań na analityczne i syntetyczne. Źródłem tego poglądu są dwa błędne modele języka i znaczenia. trzeba jednak podkreślić, że odrzucenie tych modeli nie jest ani tożsame z całkowitym odrzuceniem pojęcia analityczności, ani tym bardziej z uznaniem samego pojęcia znaczenia za mętne. Wniosek, jaki płynie z jego rozważań, jest następujący: opis znaczenia słów i zdań jest czymś o wiele bardziej skomplikowanym, niż to się wydaje większości filozofów. Opis ten wymaga między innymi ponownego zbadania takich zwrotów jak: „być częścią znaczenia czegoś", „mieć to samo znaczenie", nie zaś objaśniania ich na pod‐ stawie a priori akceptowanych modeli funkcjonowania języka, ponieważ „jeśli posługujemy się sztywną dychotomią: «to samo znaczenie - różne znaczenia» [...], to gmatwamy po prostu rzecz" (Austin, 1993a: 102). III Opinia Quine'a na temat rozróżnienia anal it yczne/syntet yczne jest zde‐ cydowanie bardziej radykalna. Jego zdaniem przekonanie o istnieniu takiego podziału jest niczym nieuzasadnionym dogmatem. tezę tę wspiera szeregiem 4 Carnap na przykład definiuje pojęcie analityczności za pomocą pojęcia postulatu znacze‐ niowego (Carnap, 2005). 306 Jan WAWRZYNIAK argumentów. Ich zasadniczym celem jest wykazanie, że termin „analityczny" - a tym samym i „syntetyczny" - nie posiada jasno określonego znaczenia. Jego krytyka ma swoje źródło w sceptycznym podejściu do pojęć intensjonalnych, czyli między innymi do pojęcia znaczenia. to pokazuje, że ta argumentacja ma w pewnym sensie paradoksalny charakter - jeśli odrzuciłby on pojęcie znacze‐ nia, to nie mógłby jej sformułować, nie mógłby na przykład stwierdzić, iż sło‐ wo „analityczny" nie ma jasno sprecyzowanego sensu. tytułem wstępu należy dodać, że zainteresowanie kwestią analityczności Quine przejął od jednego ze swoich nauczycieli - mianowicie od rudolfa Carnapa. Dlatego też, rozważając to zagadnienie, odwoływał się przede wszystkim do jego poglądów. Quine w Dwóch dogmatach empiryzmu rozróżnia dwa rodzaje zdań analitycz‐ nych. Pierwszy stanowią „zdania, które można scharakteryzować jako logicznie prawdziwe" (Quine, 2000a: 51). Definicja tego rodzaju zdań analitycznych nie stanowi wedle niego problemu: prawdę logiczną możemy scharakteryzować ogólnie jako zdanie, które jest prawdziwe przy każdej reinterpretacji tych jego składników, które nie są partykułami logicznymi (Quine, 2000a: 51). Kłopotliwe jest ścisłe określenie pozostałych zdań uznawanych za analitycz‐ ne. Quine rozpatruje różne sposoby definiowania tej drugiej klasy i poddaje je krytyce. Ze względu na to, iż Dwa dogmaty empiryzmu są powszechnie zna‐ ne, nie będę szczegółowo referował jego argumentów. Postaram się natomiast uwyraźnić ich najważniejsze punkty, a także wyeksplikować zasady, na których są one oparte. Każda definicja, a zatem definicja analityczności także, musi spełniać nastę‐ pujący warunek: pojęcia występujące w definiensie nie mogą być równie wąt‐ pliwe bądź niejasne co definiendum. Wedle Quine'a pojęcia synonimiczności, konieczności, wewnętrznej sprzeczności oraz reguły semantycznej niestety nie spełniają tego warunku. Dwa pierwsze uznaje on za podejrzane ze względu na to, że mają jawnie intensjonalny charakter. Zastrzeżenia wobec trzeciego są bardzo zdawkowe, natomiast krytyka pojęcia reguły semantycznej opiera się na przekonaniu, iż nie istnieje żadna naturalna zasada podziału zdań na postulaty znaczeniowe i pozostałe zdania. Drugim powodem odrzucenia podziału zdań na analityczne i syntetyczne jest teza o niezdeterminowaniu przekładu. Jeśli przekład jest niezdeterminowany, to nie ma sensu mówić o tożsamości bądź różnicy znaczenia tout court, a zatem i o analityczności tout court. Wedle Qui‐ ne'a istnieją jedynie ersatze tych pojęć - synonimiczność oraz analityczność bodźcowa. Argumentacja przedstawiona przez autora Dwóch dogmatów empiry‐ zmu spotkała się z licznymi krytykami. Po pierwsze, zakwestionowano przeko‐ nanie, że niemożność podania definicji dowodzi całkowitej niejasności danego pojęcia (grice & Strawson, 1956; Searle, 1987, rozdz. 1.2: Opisy językowe), po Austin i Quine o rozróżnieniu anal i tyczne / synte tyczne 307 drugie, zarzucono mu dogmatyzm w podejściu do kontekstów intensjonalnych, po trzecie, wskazywano, iż eksplikacja niektórych najbardziej fundamental‐ nych pojęć może mieć do pewnego stopnia charakter kolisty (Strawson, 1994, rozdz.: Redukcja czy powiązanie? Pojęcia podstawowe), po czwarte, dowodzono, że teza w o niezdeterminowaniu w jej radykalnym ujęciu jest absurdalna (Dum‐ mett, 1978; Zabłudowski, 2009). Jak sądzę, większość z tych skierowanych pod adresem Quine'a uwag krytycznych jest trafna. Poniżej postaram się przede wszystkim pokazać, że Quine nie przedstawia żadnych przekonujących argu‐ mentów na rzecz podrzędności kontekstów intensjonalnych względem eksten‐ sjonalnych, a także uzasadnić, że teza o niezdeterminowaniu przekładu nie tylko jest niezgodna z podstawowymi założeniami jego filozofii, ale nawet nie może zostać sformułowana na jej gruncie. Bardziej szczegółowe omówienie podejścia Quine'a do kwestii analityczności rozpocznę od przedstawienia jego zarzutów wobec pojęcia reguły semantycznej. Quine rozważa dwie możliwości: albo posiadamy ogólne pojęcie reguły seman‐ tycznej, albo potrafimy jedynie wyjaśnić znaczenie zwrotu „reguła semantyczna języka J". gdyby zachodziła pierwsza ewentualność, to dałoby się zdefiniować analityczność. Jednak wedle Quine'a nie ma sensu twierdzić, że pewne zdania ze swej istoty są regułami semantycznymi, inne zaś nie. to, czy jakieś zdanie nazwiemy regułą semantyczną, czy też nie, zależy od naszych zainteresowań: Pojęcie reguły semantycznej jest w tym samym stopniu znaczące, jak pojęcie postulatu, o ile traktuje się je jako względne - w tym wypadku relatywne do danego przed‐ sięwzięcia dydaktycznego, polegającego na nauczeniu pewnych osób wystarczających warunków prawdziwości twierdzeń określonego naturalnego lub sztucznego języka L. Lecz z tego punktu widzenia żadna informacja o prawdziwości zdań języka L należą‐ cych do pewnej klasy nie jest z natury swej w większym stopniu regułą semantyczną niż jakakolwiek inna (Quine, 2000a: 51)5. Powyższa argumentacja zakłada, że gdy rozróżnienie wymaga odwołania się do naszych zainteresowań, to nie jest ono autentyczne. Z tego zaś wynika, iż dystynkcje oparte na rozważaniach pragmatycznych nie mogą należeć do „su‐ rowego schematu", który ma odzwierciedlać „prawdziwą i ostateczną struktu‐ rę rzeczywistości" (Quine, 1999: 253). to założenie - czyli założenie o nie‐ autentyczności takich rozróżnień - jest oczywiście wątpliwe, istnieje bardzo wiele rozróżnień zrelatywizowanych do naszych zainteresowań. to, czy pomiar jakiegoś stołu jest ścisły, czy też nie, zależy od celu, możemy mierzyć mebel, by sprawdzić, czy będzie dobrze pasował do pokoju, albo po to, by określić różnicę pomiędzy różnymi egzemplarzami danego modelu. Podobnie jest 5 W Korzeniach ontologii (Quine, 2006: 135–137) - dziele z późniejszego okresu - Quine nieco modyfikuje swoje podejście do roli procesu nauki języka w wyjaśnianiu pojęcia analityczności. 308 Jan WAWRZYNIAK z odróżnianiem wypowiedzi jasnych od niejasnych. Co więcej, to właśnie Quine twierdzi, że wybór teorii - w ostatecznym rozrachunku - jest podyktowany względami pragmatycznymi: Każdemu człowiekowi dane jest dziedzictwo nauki plus nieprzerwany strumień bodź‐ ców zmysłowych; względy, którymi kieruje się on, naruszając dziedzictwo nauki dla zharmonizowania go ze swymi doznaniami zmysłowymi, mają - o ile są racjonalne - charakter pragmatyczny (Quine, 2000a: 75). Z zupełnie innych powodów Quine odrzuca wyjaśnienie analityczności w ka‐ tegoriach reguł semantycznych określonego języka J. Jak zauważa, podanie ja‐ kiejś listy zdań języka J jest oczywiście możliwe i dopuszczalne. Jednak nazwanie ich regułami semantycznymi owego języka niczego nam nie mówi o tych zda‐ niach, dopóki nie posiadamy ogólnego pojęcia reguły semantycznej. Warto pod‐ kreślić, że wbrew niektórym krytykom Quine'a pojęcie reguły semantycznej nie jest w pełni analogiczne do pojęcia prawdy, pomimo iż oba są zrelatywizowane do języka. W przypadku prawdy mamy ogólny schemat definicji (wedle Alfreda tarskiego (1933) zdanie języka J jest prawdziwe wtedy, gdy jest spełniane przez każdy ciąg przedmiotów w modelu języka J), nie zaś jedynie listę zdań. na istnienie kontekstów nieekstensjonalnych zwrócił uwagę Frege (1977b). można do nich zaliczyć między innymi mowę zależną oraz wyrażenia, w których występują zwroty modalne lub zwroty wyrażające różnego typu nastawienia do treści sądów. Postawa Quine'a wobec intensjonalności jest zdecydowanie ne‐ gatywna (Quine, 2001), nie zaleca on jednak jednej strategii „radzenia" sobie z nią. Z jednej strony postuluje całkowitą eliminację tego typu kontekstów z dyskursu naukowego, z drugiej - przedstawia pewną analizę mowy zależ‐ nej sprowadzającą ją do kontekstu ekstensjonalnego, uzasadniając to podejście praktyczną niezbędnością kontekstów intensjonalnych. Dlaczego Quine uznaje dyskurs, w którym występują konteksty intensjo‐ nalne, za podejrzany? Wydaje się, że zasadnicze powody są następujące: (1) roz‐ ważania dotyczące użycia wyrażeń intensjonalnych prowadzą „do uznania, że terminy w ystępujące w pewnych kontekstach nie odnoszą się [do przedmio‐ tów], podczas gdy te same terminy występujące w innych kontekstach odnoszą się [do przedmiotów]" (Quine, 1969: 17), to zaś z kolei podważa fundamen‐ talną zasadę pozwalającą podstawiać za dowolny termin dowolny inny termin o tym samym odniesieniu, nie zmieniając wartości logicznej całego zdania; (2) a. kwantyfikacja w takich kontekstach zakłada istnienie bytów „bez iden‐ tyczności"; b. zgodnie jednak z zasadą „nie ma bytu bez identyczności" (Quine, 1969: 23) nie jest to możliwe; zatem c. użycie zwrotów intensjonalnych gene‐ ruje błędną ontologię. W odniesieniu do pierwszego punktu mam tylko jedną uwagę. Z faktu, że zasada Leibniza załamuje się w kontekstach intensjonalnych, można albo Austin i Quine o rozróżnieniu anal i tyczne / synte tyczne 309 wyciągnąć taki wniosek, do jakiego dochodzi Quine, albo uznać wyrażenia in‐ tensjonalne za „równouprawnione" z ekstensjonalnymi i pogodzić się z tym, że zakres stosowalności zasady Leibniza jest ograniczony (do kontekstów eksten‐ sjonalnych). Quine, poza swoim bezwarunkowym przywiązaniem do tej zasady, nie podaje żadnego argumentu na rzecz wyboru pierwszego rozwiązania. Drugi argument odwołuje się do dwóch przesłanek. Pierwsza z nich opiera się na słynnej zasadzie Quine'a stwierdzającej, że być to być wartością zmien‐ nej6. ta zasada narażona jest na następujący zarzut: nie da się jej sformułować w notacji, jaką Quine uznaje za kanoniczną7. to znaczy, nie da się jej wyrazić w języku klasycznego rachunku predykatów. mamy tutaj do czynienia z ana‐ logicznym problemem, na jaki natknął się Frege, próbując wyjaśnić różnicę pomiędzy pojęciem (funkcją) a przedmiotem. różnicy tej nie da się stwierdzić za pomocą zdania sformułowanego w Begriffsschrift: Porozumieniu z czytelnikiem staje na przeszkodzie to, że w następstwie osobliwej ko‐ nieczności językowej wypowiedzi moje brane dosłownie rozmijają się niekiedy ze swą intencją (Frege, 1977c: 57). nazw tworów logicznie prostych nie można wprowadzać przez definicje. nie pozostaje więc nic innego, jak naprowadzać czytelnika lub słuchacza przez pośrednie sugestie na to, o co chodzi (Frege, 1977c: 46). Kolejnym słabym punktem argumentacji autora Dwóch dogmatów jest to, że pierwsza z tych zasad wcale nie jest oczywista. można mieć wątpliwości, czy warunkiem prawdziwości zdania: „Prawie w każdej powieści Dostojewskie‐ go istnieją bohaterowie, których zachowanie jest nieprzewidywalne" musi być istnienie takich osób, jak na przykład Kiryłow i Dymitr Karamazow. niektó‐ rzy filozofowie wskazują, że stosowanie tej zasady jest nieuzasadnione nie tyl‐ ko na gruncie dyskursu na temat postaci fikcyjnych, ale także w odniesieniu do matematyki. Zgodnie z dictum „być to być wartością zmiennej", jeśli ogół twierdzeń matematycznych nie może być sformułowany bez kwantyfikowania po pewnego rodzaju obiektach, to matematyka musi założyć istnienie takich obiektów - wedle Quine'a matematyka zakłada istnienie zbiorów, bowiem jest to „najoszczędniejsze" ontologicznie założenie, które pozwala sformułować do‐ wolną teorię matematyczną. Jak jednak trafnie zauważa Putnam, argumentacja Quine'a na rzecz istnienia zbiorów opiera się na dość wątpliwym „założeniu", iż 6 Powiedzenie to jest hasłowym ujęciem następującej myśli: „Być uznanym za przedmiot istniejący to po prostu i tylko tyle, co być zaliczonym do wartości zmiennych" (Quine, 2000b: 41). 7 Wedle Petera t. geacha Quine, twierdząc, że być to być wartością zmiennej, popełnia błąd kategorialny, bowiem o przedmiocie można orzec, że jest wartością zmiennej, ale nie można orzec, iż istnieje. Swoją argumentację geach opiera na przekonaniu - wyrażonym przez Fre‐ gego - że istnienie jest pojęciem drugiego rzędu (geach, 2006: 111). 310 Jan WAWRZYNIAK użycie kwantyfikatorów w twierdzeniach matematycznych zasadniczo nie różni się od ich użycia w zdaniach na temat przedmiotów fizycznych: nie powinniśmy sądzić, że twórcy teorii mnogości odkryli niewyobrażalnie liczne uniwersum niematerialnych przedmiotów - to wszystko stanowi nieporozumienie. różnica pomiędzy użyciem kwantyfikatorów w tym przypadku a ich użyciem, gdy for‐ mułujemy explicite zdania ogólne o przedmiotach, jest zbyt duża (Putnam, 1996: 247). używając Wittgensteinowskiego idiomu, można powiedzieć, że Quine - wbrew swoim antyesencjalistycznym hasłom - ulega mitowi symbolizmu, to znaczy traktuje pewne znaki należące do naszego języka, na przykład: „∃x", „∀x", tak, jakby ich znaczenie było określone w pewnym sensie niezależnie od ich użycia. Wedle Quine'a różnica pomiędzy użyciem kwantyfikatorów w mate‐ matyce a ich użyciem w fizyce jest nieistotna - sądzi on, iż niejako sama istota kwantyfikatorów gwarantuje to, że gdy ktoś kwantyfikuje po krasnoludkach, liczbach i krzesłach, zakłada istnienie krasnoludków, liczb i krzeseł8. Druga zasada, do której odwołuje się Quine, krytykując intensjonalność, mówi, że nie ma bytu bez identyczności. W przypadku bytów intensjonal‐ nych nasze zwykłe kryteria identyczności nie pozwalają nam rozstrzygnąć, czy mowa jest o tym samym czy też o innym obiekcie. na przykład sądy w sensie logicznym są wedle Quine'a bytami „bez identyczności", bowiem wiedza, że sąd A jest materialnie równoważny sądowi B, nie wystarcza, by uznać, że A jest tożsamy z B. Proponowane dodatkowe kryteria odwołują się do niejasnych pojęć takich jak na przykład konieczność, analityczność czy synonimiczność. Wydaje się, że argumentacja Quine'a kwestionująca pojęcia analityczności i syntetyczności ma charakter kolisty: eksplikacja analityczności przy pomocy pojęć intensjonalnych jest wadliwa, ponieważ użycie zwrotów intensjonalnych prowadzi do bezwzględnego naruszenia pewnych podstawowych zasad, na przy‐ kład zasady „nie ma bytu bez identyczności", przy czym to naruszenie jest rze‐ czywiście bezwzględne tylko pod warunkiem, że pojęcia intensjonalne nie mogą być wykorzystane do objaśnienia tego, na czym polega identyczność bytów in‐ tensjonalnych. Zatem, nawet jeśli Quine ma rację, wskazując, że argumentacja zwolenników rozróżnienia anal it yczne/syntet yczne ma charakter kolisty, to słuszność tej uwagi nie przesądza o jego zwycięstwie w tym sporze, bowiem wydaje się, że sam popełnia podobny błąd. 8 Quine oczywiście nie posługuje się terminem „istota". moje sformułowanie jego sta‐ nowiska w kwestii znaczenia kwantyfikatorów nie jest jednak, jak sądzę, nieuzasadnione - następujący fragment z jego książki Słowo i przedmiot wskazuje, iż wierzy on w to, że znak kwantyfikatora posiada niezmienny sens niezależnie od tego, w jakim kontekście się on pojawi: „Parafrazowanie zdania na kanoniczną, kwantyfikatorową notację oznacza, po pierwsze i przede wszystkim, wyraźne sformułowanie jego ontycznej treści, kwantyfikacja jest bowiem narzę‐ dziem, pozwalającym nam mówić w ogóle o przedmiotach" (Quine, 1999: 277). Austin i Quine o rozróżnieniu anal i tyczne / synte tyczne 311 Jak już wspomniałem, drugim kluczowym powodem odrzucenia przez Qui‐ ne'a rozróżnienia anal it yczne/syntet yczne jest akceptacja tezy o niezdeter‐ minowaniu przekładu. Jest ona szeroko dyskutowana (Stroud, 2000; Føllesdal, 1973; Wright, 1997)9 i krytykowana przez licznych filozofów (Dummett, 1978; Zabłudowski, 2009). W swoich rozważaniach nie będę się jednak w zasadzie odwoływał do komentarzy. Oto najprostsze i zarazem najbardziej abstrakcyjne sformułowanie tezy o niezdeterminowaniu przekładu: nieskończony ogół zdań języka używanego przez dowolną osobę można tak permu‐ tować, czyli odwzorować samego na siebie, że (a) ogół dyspozycji użytkownika języka do zachowania werbalnego nie ulega zmianie, lecz (b) wspomniane odwzorowanie nie jest zwykłym skorelowaniem zdań równoważnych, przy dowolnym, choćby najluź‐ niejszym rozumieniu terminu „równoważność". niezliczone zdania mogą różnić się drastycznie od przyporządkowanych im korelatów, jednakże wspomniane rozbieżności mogą w systematyczny sposób tak się wzajemnie niwelować, że zachowa się całościowy wzorzec skojarzeń zdań z innymi zdaniami oraz z pozawerbalnymi bodźcami (Quine, 1999: 40). Zatem przekład - w tym przypadku wewnątrzjęzykowy - może być po‐ prawny, pomimo że zdania skorelowane za pomocą funkcji translacji t (argu‐ mentami i wartościami są zdania tego samego języka) posiadają różne wartości logiczne. Wydaje się, że teza Quine'a prowadzi do konsekwencji sprzecznych z in‐ tuicją. Załóżmy, że osoba A zna funkcję t, lecz nie tezy Quine'a, zaś osoba B nie zna tej funkcji oraz że „t(z)" = „z'", ¬(z ≡ z') i „z" jest prawdą. Załóżmy także, że osoba A przed zapoznaniem się z t przyjmowała takie same postawy (tj. postawy akceptacji, odrzucenia lub wstrzymania się od sądu) wobec zdań ję‐ zyka J, jak osoba B. Jeśli A traktuje to przyporządkowanie jako zwykły przekład, to przy założeniu, że przed tłumaczeniem akceptowała „z" i wstrzymywała się od akceptacji „z'", po jego dokonaniu uzna również „z'" (i najprawdopodobniej tak‐ że „z&z'"). Przekonania B oczywiście nie ulegną zmianie. Zatem użytkownik języka J, po zaznajomieniu się z t - przy założeniu, że nie dowie się, iż prze‐ kład jest niezdeterminowany - będzie akceptował co najmniej jeszcze jedno przekonanie fałszywe10. Jeśli przekład byłby w ten sposób niezdeterminowany, 9 Sam Quine także powracał kilkukrotnie do zagadnienia niezdeterminowania przekładu (Quine, 1970; Quine, 1987). 10 Jak słusznie zauważył anonimowy recenzent, akceptacja jednego przekonania fałszywego powinna skłonić osobę racjonalną do akceptacji nieskończonej ilości przekonań fałszywych, po‐ nieważ konsekwencją logiczną dowolnego zdania jest nieskończona ilość zdań. Anonimowy re‐ cenzent stwierdził także, iż wniosek, jaki formułuję nie musi wynikać z przesłanek, jeśli założymy, że zdanie „¬(z ≡ z')" wyraża negację logicznej równoważności, a nie materialnej równoważności. gdyby tak było, to recenzent miałby oczywiście rację. Sformułowanie Qui ne'a: „wspomnia‐ ne odwzorowanie nie jest zwykłym skorelowaniem zdań równoważnych, przy dowolnym, choćby na j luźnie j sz ym [podkr. - J.W.] rozumieniu terminu «równoważność»" zdaje się 312 Jan WAWRZYNIAK to każda działalność translatorska, nieświadoma tego rodzaju niezdeterminowa‐ nia, byłaby nieracjonalna, bowiem groziłaby akceptacją fałszywych twierdzeń. teza o niezdeterminowaniu przekładu prowadzi jednak do jeszcze poważ‐ niejszych problemów. t jest funkcją, której argumentami i wartościami są zdania języka zinterpretowanego. na czym polega interpretacja wedle seman‐ tyki logicznej? na określeniu modelu danego języka. Jeśli Quine zakładałby, że rozpatrywany język po prostu posiada pewien model, tj. że interpretacja tego języka jest jakoś dana, to należałoby uznać, że taka funkcja, która przyporządko‐ wałaby zdaniom zdania o odmiennej wartości logicznej, nie odpowiada pojęciu przekładu. Za takim rozwiązaniem przemawiałoby to, że w obiektywny sposób dałoby się określić dodatkowe warunki, które ma spełniać translacja. Jeśli nato‐ miast język interpretujemy (bądź częściowo interpretujemy) poprzez określenie wartości logicznych zdań tego języka, to powstaje pytanie, co stanowi podsta‐ wę przypisywania prawdy bądź fałszu. Wydaje się, że wedle Qui ne'a musimy odwołać się do akceptacji bądź odrzucania zdań przez użytkowników danego języka J. nie znaczy to oczywiście, że autor Dwóch dogmatów zrównuje praw‐ dziwość z akceptacją, fałszywość z odrzuceniem. należy więc zastanowić się, czy i jak możemy rozstrzygnąć, które zdanie akceptujemy - to wyjściowe czy też jego korelat. Innymi słowy, czy jeśli t jest funkcją spełniającą warunki podane przez Quine'a i „t(z)" = „z'", to jesteśmy w stanie stwierdzić, że uznajemy na przykład „z", nie zaś „z'". Dopóki nie potrafimy udzielić odpowiedzi na to py‐ tanie, nie jest możliwa nawet częściowa interpretacja naszego języka. Jeśli zaś uznalibyśmy, że osoba A akceptuje „z" i odrzuca „zn" (przy czym „z'" = „zn"), a osoba B akceptuje „z'" i odrzuca „z", to mogłoby to świadczyć, iż A i B inaczej interpretują pewien syntaktycznie rozumiany język. gdy ilość tych rozbieżno‐ ści jest znaczna, należy wyciągnąć wniosek, że mamy do czynienia z dwoma częściowo zinterpretowanymi językami. (Jest tak ze względu na to, że zbiór wszystkich zdań prawdziwych danego języka nie wyznacza pojedynczego mode‐ lu, lecz klasę modeli). Zatem albo język J nie posiada żadnej interpretacji, albo posiada więcej niż jedną, to znaczy istnieją różne równokształtne języki zinter‐ pretowane. to prowadzi do zasadniczej konkluzji mojej argumentacji: stwier‐ dzenie, że „wspomniane odwzorowanie nie jest zwykłym skorelowaniem zdań równoważnych, przy dowolnym, choćby najluźniejszym rozumieniu termi‐ nu «równoważność»", jest nie tyle nieuzasadnione, co nonsensowne. Z punktu widzenia teorii prawdy akceptowanej przez Quine'a, czyli koncepcji tarskiego, następujące ciągi słów: „zdania pewnego nieiznterpretowanego języka mają od‐ mienne wartości logiczne", „zdania należące do dwóch różnych języków - tzn., na przykład, do takich języków tego samego stopnia, które posiadają odmienne modele - są nierównoważne" są pozbawione sensu. jednak sugerować, że Quine odrzuca nie tylko równoważność logiczną, ale także materialną równoważność - taką interpretację prezentuje na przykład michael Dummett (1978: 389). Austin i Quine o rozróżnieniu anal i tyczne / synte tyczne 313 IV Argumenty krytyczne kierowane przez Austina i Quine'a pod adresem roz‐ różnienia anal it yczne/syntet yczne stanowią doskonałą ilustrację tego, jak pojmowali oni naturę i cel filozofii. Zbadanie tego zagadnienia ujawnia - przynajmniej do pewnego stopnia - na czym polega odmienność tych sposobów filozofowania. to znaczy, pomaga nam zrozumieć różnicę pomiędzy ujmowaniem filozofii jako zbioru teorii wyjaśniających różne dziedziny zjawisk (teorii analogicznych do tych, jakie występują w przyrodoznawstwie) a trak‐ towaniem jej jako próby podania przejrzystego opisu tych dziedzin. Z drugiej strony jest jasne, że wedle Quine'a to właśnie ze względu na bezzasadność roz‐ różnienia anal it yczne/syntet yczne trzeba uznać, iż nie istnieje ostra gra‐ nica pomiędzy metafizyką a naukami przyrodniczymi. Wydaje się, że wnioski płynące z rozważań Austina nad zagadnieniem analityczności są również istotne dla jego koncepcji filozofii. Skoro nie każde zdanie jest albo analityczne, albo syntetyczne, to stwierdzenie, że dociekania filozoficzne albo dotyczą faktów, albo mają czysto formalny charakter, może okazać się bezzasadne. BIBLIOgAFIA Austin, J. L. (1993a). Znaczenie słowa. W: J. L. 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ORIGINAL PAPER The Concept of Entrapment Daniel J. Hill1 • Stephen K. McLeod1 • Attila Tanyi2  The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication Abstract Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as (or as deputies of) law-enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare, and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit a crime that possess this neutrality. We point out some problems with the extensional correctness of these definitions and propose a new definition that resolves these problems. We then extend our definition to provide a more general definition of entrapment, encompassing both civil and legal cases. Our definition is, we believe, closer to being extensionally correct and will, we hope, provide a clearer basis for future discussions about the ethics of entrapment than do the definitions upon which it improves. Keywords Civil entrapment  Crime  Entrapment  Intentions  Legal entrapment  Proactive law enforcement 1 Introduction Entrapment involves two main parties: the entrapping party and the party that the entrapping party intends to entrap. We call the first the ''agent'' and the second the ''target''. Let these terms include groups as well as individuals. When the agent is responsible for law enforcement, or (as in the case of an informer asked by the police to & Stephen K. McLeod [email protected]; http://www.liv.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/stephen-mcleod 1 Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, Mulberry Court, Mulberry Street, Liverpool L69 7ZY, UK 2 Department of Philosophy, University of Tromsø, 9037 Tromsø, Norway 123 Crim Law and Philos DOI 10.1007/s11572-017-9436-7 entrap) acting on behalf of someone who is, and is acting (permissibly or otherwise) in the agent's capacity as a law-enforcement agent or as the deputy of a law-enforcement agent, we are dealing with legal entrapment. Legal entrapment may, but need not, be illegal in another sense of the word ''legal''. When the agent is neither acting for, nor acting as, a law-enforcement officer, we are dealing with civil entrapment.1 Civil entrapment is carried out by someone who is either not a law-enforcement officer, or the deputy of such an officer, at all, or who is but is not acting (permissibly or otherwise) in that official capacity. An act of civil entrapment and another of legal entrapment may each involve the temptation to commit a crime of the same type. We believe that it is useful not to restrict the notion of entrapment to cases in which the agent intends that a crime be committed by the target.2 Doing this provides theoretical utility, because like cases can be analysed in like ways (and subsequently-though we do not do so here-ethically evaluated in like ways). Accordingly, we classify acts of entrapment via the two-dimensional matrix provided in Table 1. Type 1 = 1A ? 2A = legal entrapment to commit a crime. Type 2 = 1B ? 2A = civil entrapment to commit a crime.3 Type 3 = 1B ? 2B = civil moral entrapment. Type 4 = 1A ? 2B = legal moral entrapment. We have ordered the types in this list in order of the frequency with which they appear to be discussed in the literature on entrapment, going from most to least frequent. By ''moral entrapment'', we mean entrapment that aims not to tempt the target to commit a crime, but rather to tempt the target to do something that is immoral, embarrassing, or socially frowned upon (measurable in part by the extent to which the target would probably not like the act to be exposed to colleagues, an employer, friends, family, or the public).4 We consider it worth including Types 3 and 4 as genuine cases of entrapment even though they do not aim at tempting the target to commit a crime. Including Type 3, for example, in the list is likely to have theoretical utility, because it will enable like analyses of like cases of legal entrapment to commit a crime by the state and entrapment, by media organizations, of targets into committing embarrassing or immoral, but non-criminal, acts that those organizations seek to expose publicly. Our approach is to recognize the diversity of-or, if you prefer, to be conceptually liberal about-the phenomenon we are studying, but to approach it, in terms of the methodology and category scheme that we employ, in a way that maximizes theoretical utility and underlying analytical unity. For the time being, however, we restrict our attention to entrapment of Type 1 so that we can make some 1 The phrase ''legal entrapment,'' as we use it, is already in currency in the literature. See, e.g., Andrew Altman and Steven Lee, ''Legal Entrapment'', Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 (1) (1983): pp. 51–69. Hock Lai Ho, ''State Entrapment'', Legal Studies 31 (1) (2011): pp. 71–95 calls legal entrapment ''state entrapment'' and, in common with many other authors (e.g., Kate Hofmeyr, ''The Problem of Private Entrapment,'' Criminal Law Review (2006): pp. 319–336), calls civil entrapment ''private entrapment''. Of course, civil or private entrapment may be carried out in a highly public way (e.g., by the media). Gideon Yaffe, '''The Government Beguiled Me': the Entrapment Defense and the Problem of Private Entrapment'', Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 1 (1) (2005): pp. 1–50 calls legal entrapment ''government entrapment''. 2 In Sects. 4 and 5, we make our account of what exactly the agent intends more precise. 3 To qualify footnote 1, by ''private entrapment'', Hofmeyr (2006) appears to mean civil entrapment to commit a crime. 4 Our use of ''moral'' is wide. Ultimately, we think, there is an even wider notion of entrapment, corresponding to a usage of the verb ''entrap'' that we discuss in footnote 30. However, it is cases of the types identified in Table 1 that are of central interest in the literature and here. Crim Law and Philos 123 conceptual headway that we can later apply to all of the types of entrapment included in Table 1. We recognize that the word ''entrapment'' may have pejorative connotations.5 Nevertheless, we do not think that the proper description of an act as one of ''entrapment'' either does, or should, itself settle the question of the act's moral or legal permissibility.6 Moreover, we are at liberty to employ a non-pejorative usage, which we shall later specify in some detail, of the term. For us, to classify a scenario as a case of entrapment is not, of itself, to say anything about its moral or legal legitimacy. (We are concerned with the denotation of the word ''entrapment'', not its connotations.) On an alternative convention, which we are not following, ''entrapment'' is a term that is reserved for ''illegitimate proactive law enforcement''.7 We distinguish three questions. First: Did entrapment occur? Answering this question requires an extensionally adequate definition of entrapment. Second: Did the agent err (morally or legally) in entrapping? To put it another way: When, if at all, is entrapment permissible? Third: Ought the target to be held (morally or legally) responsible for the target's act? That is, under what conditions, if any, is the target properly to be held culpable for the act that the target has been entrapped into committing? Henceforth, we focus exclusively on the definitional question. We believe it must be answered in a rigorous and extensionally adequate manner before the other two questions can best be addressed. For reasons soon to be presented, we take it that some putative answers to this question that have featured in the literature so far have not managed to reach this goal. Our ultimate aim is to provide a definition that encompasses all the types of entrapment that feature in Table 1 and that makes some crucial improvements, in ways we explain as we go along, upon existing definitions (which cover legal entrapment only) from the literature. Table 1 Classification matrix for acts of entrapment A B Is the agent acting (permissibly or otherwise) in the agent's capacity as a law-enforcement agent or as the deputy of a law-enforcement agent? Yes No Is the act that the agent intends the target to commit of a type that is criminal? Yes No 5 Compare Eric Colvin, ''Controlled Operations, Controlled Activities and Entrapment'', Bond Law Review 2 (14) (2002), pp. 227–230, p. 229. Colvin holds that the term is usually pejorative. 6 Compare M.L. Friedland, ''Controlling Entrapment'', University of Toronto Law Journal 32 (1) (1982), pp. 1–30, p. 3; B. Grant Stitt and Gene G. James, ''Entrapment and the Entrapment Defense: Dilemmas for a Democratic Society'', Law and Philosophy 3 (1) (1984): pp. 111–132, pp. 114–115. We do not intend this to prejudge the issue of whether, if a putative act is one of entrapment, the agent might thereby have a reason not to commit it. Also, we leave open the possibility that all acts of entrapment are wrong. 7 This other convention is adopted by, for example, Paul M. Hughes, ''What is Wrong with Entrapment?'', Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1) (2004), pp. 45–60, p. 50, by Neil Levy, ''In Defence of Entrapment in Journalism (and Beyond)'', Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2) (2002), pp. 121–130, p. 122, and by Joseph A. Colquitt, ''Rethinking Entrapment'', American Criminal Law Review 41 (4) (2004): pp. 1389–1437. It is also adopted by Andrew Ashworth, ''What is Wrong with Entrapment?'', Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 293 (2) (1999), pp. 293–317, p. 294. Hughes leaves it open as to whether there are legitimate proactive law-enforcement scenarios, Levy argues that there are, and Ashworth works with the assumption that there are. Crim Law and Philos 123 In Sect. 2, we explain why a normatively thin definition of legal entrapment (of Type 1)-that is, according to our usage, one that, of itself, does not settle the questions of permissibility or culpability-is needed. In Sect. 3, we explain two existing normatively thin definitions of legal entrapment (of Type 1) and we point out some problems with their extensional adequacy. One of the existing definitions includes as a necessary condition of an act's being one of legal entrapment (of Type 1) that the agent arrests the target. The other includes, instead, the condition that the agent is able to observe the target committing the crime. We explain why we consider neither these conditions nor certain weakened versions of them to be necessary conditions of an act's being one of legal entrapment (of Type 1). In Sect. 4, we provide a new definition of legal entrapment (of Type 1) that builds on the previous two but which excises what we take to be the problems with their extensional adequacy. In this definition, we replace the arrest and observability conditions with a new condition, the traceability condition. We explain and justify this condition. We include an additional new condition, which we also explain and justify, relating to the agent's intention to render the target vulnerable to the agent's (or a third party's) power. In Sect. 5, we generalize our new definition of legal entrapment (of Type 1) so as to obtain a definition that encompasses all cases classified under Table 1. In Sect. 6, we spell out some implications of our account. Section 7 includes a brief summary and some concluding remarks. In the headings of Sects. 2, 3 and 4, we use the phrase ''legal entrapment'', as an abbreviation for ''legal entrapment to commit a crime'' (i.e., to cover cases of Type 1). 2 The Need for a Normatively Thin Definition of Legal Entrapment We agree with Andrew Ashworth that the question of ''what, if anything, is wrong with entrapment'' requires that we should first have ''a working definition of entrapment''.8 We differ from Ashworth in that we believe that it is in the interests of analytical clarity, and of a prudent division of philosophical labour, that this working definition should not prejudge the answers to any normative questions about entrapment. To define entrapment, as courts in the USA tend to do, in a way that already incorporates permissibility, impermissibility, culpability, or the lack thereof is akin to defining abortion in a way that incorporates some such normative notion. It is surely one question as to what abortion is and another as to when, if at all, it is permissible. We see no good reason to treat entrapment differently. We think that to treat entrapment in the same way is likely to clarify the normative debates about entrapment and enhance our understanding of the concept. Ashworth and others who employ a normative definition in effect treat the concept of entrapment aswhatwehere call a ''normatively thick'' concept.9 Let us explain this idea briefly. The concept of killing, for example, is normatively thin, for nothing follows merely from the description of an act as one of killing as to its legal or moral permissibility. The concept of 8 Ashworth (1999, p. 295). 9 A normatively thick definition of entrapment is adopted by Thomas J. Micelli, ''Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law'', International Review of Law and Economics 27 (2) (2007): pp. 258–268, p. 259: ''entrapment is defined to be the unlawful arrest of a person who was not 'predisposed' to commit the crime in question''. For coverage of cases in the USA where the court has worked with a normatively thick definition, see Andrew Carlon, ''Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State'', Virginia Law Review 93 (4) (2007): pp. 1081–1134, pp. 1087–1095. Crim Law and Philos 123 murder is normatively thick, for to murder a person is to kill that person unlawfully. As noted earlier, ''entrapment'' might indeed carry a pejorative meaning. To describe an act as one of ''entrapment'' might well suggest that one takes there to be something morally wrong with it. This, however, is certainly not decisive. The question of permissibility should not be settled by simply telling us that entrapment is by definition impermissible. This point does not rule out the possibility that a proper definition of entrapment is non-reductive. We allow for normatively thick terms to be used in the definition-think of ''crime'', which clearly has a normative element that describes an act as illegal.What we seek is a definition that does not foreclose the question of whether entrapment is permissible (whether morally or legally). Such a definition might use unreduced normative terms as well as being descriptively thick.10 While we recognize that some legal jurisdictions treat the concept of entrapment as normatively thick, we consider that it is not in the interests of philosophical inquiry into the concept and into the acceptability or otherwise of acts of entrapment to limit the concept in this way. The underlying difference between Ashworth's approach and ours is this. His attempt to build a working definition is based on how entrapment is defined legally in jurisdictions that have an entrapment defence or in which entrapment can be grounds for stay of legal proceedings against the accused, or for the exclusion of certain evidence. We base our approach on two existing definitions from legal philosophy that have what we take to be the advantage of providing for acts to count as acts of entrapment even when those acts are not committed in jurisdictions in which the concept of entrapment is in legal currency. Their greater generality in this respect, we think, means that they have greater analytical power: that is, they will enable us to understand more than do definitions that adopt the rival, normatively thick, approach to defining entrapment. Ashworth, after concluding that his initial search for a working definition ''has not been successful'', writes that ''we have identified two disparate models, one centred on the conduct of the official and the other centred on the conduct of the defendant''.11 These are called the ''subjective test'' and the ''objective test''. Andrew Carlon observes: The two tests are phrased quite differently, but they share a structural similarity. In both, the first element is typically an essentially identical factual question of causation: Did the police induce the defendant to commit the crime? The next element in each test is a critical hypothetical: in the subjective version, the question is whether the crime would have occurred if this particular defendant had not been encouraged by the police; in the objective version, the question iswhether the crimewould have occurred if the particular encouragement offered by the police had been offered to a non-predisposed person.12 B. Grant Stitt and Gene G. James are right that neither test ''is a test of whether entrapment in fact took place''; rather, they are approaches to answering the question of 10 This last qualification is important because in the ethics literature, the thick/thin distinction is different. There is a well-known distinction, originating from the work of Bernard Williams, between thick and thin ethical concepts whereby an ethical concept is thick if it is descriptively thick, i.e., has dense and rich descriptive content. Virtue and vice concepts, such as the concepts generous, cruel, and tactful are considered ethically thick, whereas concepts such as right, bad, and permissible are taken to be ethically thin. For more on the distinction, see Pekka Väyrynen, ''Thick Ethical Concepts'', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/thickethical-concepts/. Our usage of the terms ''thick'' and ''thin'' is different and refers to the normative aspect, whichwedo not take to foreclose debate onmoral/legal permissibility (which, arguably,many ethically thick as well as thin concepts do).Moreover, we remain neutral onwhether the concept of entrapment is ethically thick. 11 Ashworth (1999, p. 298). 12 Carlon (2007, p. 1092). Crim Law and Philos 123 culpability.13 Thus, neither test should be regarded as a candidate for being a definition of entrapment. The subjective test is a test of whether an entrapment defence can be mounted, while the objective test ''is a proposal for deciding whether a defendant should be tried at all'' or whether, instead, the agent's misconduct was sufficiently bad to merit dismissal of the charges.14 There is an impasse between the advocates of these tests.15 Our approach, which is to define the concept of entrapment independently of these tests and independently of immediate answers to the questions of permissibility and culpability, is normatively thinner than the subjective and objective tests for it does not give such immediate answers. Even for those, unlike us, whose main concern is with the conditions under which the entrapment defence can be justified, or viably adopted, in a jurisdiction in which it is possible, analytical clarity would be enhanced, we take it, by adopting this approach. Moreover, if we are to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate cases of legal entrapment, then we must define legal entrapment in a way that does not prejudge questions of legitimacy.16 Before we proceed, in the next section, to discuss two normatively thin definitions of legal entrapment thatmeet this condition, let us say a littlemore aboutwhatwemeanwhenwe call a definition of legal entrapment ''normatively thin''. We shall do this by taking a distinction made byHockLai Ho and using it to illustrate our conception of normative thinness. Ho holds that, in the context of legal entrapment to commit a crime, the word ''entrapment'' has both a ''neutral or broad sense'' and a ''strict or negative sense''.17 OnHo's account, an act counts as one of legal entrapment to commit a crime in the neutral sense if and only if it meets the following four conditions (which we set out using our terminology of ''agent'' and ''target''): 1. the agent intentionally tempts the target; 2. the agent acts in a covert and deceitful manner; 3. the agent's action is motivated, from the start, by the desire to convict and punish the target; 4. the agent is, or is at least acting on behalf of, a law-enforcement agent.18 Ho considers entrapment in the neutral sense to be neutral because the presence of all four of the features indicated in these conditions does not of itself imply anything about the (im)permissibility of the agent's action. In other words, in our terms, Ho considers conditions (1)–(4) to provide a normatively thin definition of entrapment. It might be contended, though, that the term ''deceitful'' is, like the term ''dishonest'', normatively thick in the sense that one will describe an act as ''deceitful'' only if one disapproves of it morally. We have two responses to this worry. First, as we noted above, the use of a normatively unreduced (ethically thick) term in one's definition of entrapment makes the definition normatively thick only if the use of such terms in the definition forestalls any debate on the moral/legal permissibility of entrapment itself. To see if this is 13 Stitt and James (1984, p. 114). Compare Richard H. McAdams, ''The Political Economy of Entrapment'', Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 96 (1) (2005): pp. 107–186, p. 108; Altman and Lee (1983, p. 53). 14 Stitt and James (1984, p. 114). 15 For references, see Ashworth (1999), Carlon (2007), and Ronald J. Allen, ''Clarifying Entrapment'', Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 89 (2): pp. 407–431. 16 Liat Levanon, ''The Law of Police Entrapment: Critical Evaluation and Policy'', Criminal Law Forum 27 (2016): pp. 35–73 invokes the legitimate/illegitimate distinction. 17 Ho (2011, pp. 72–73); compare Levy (2002, p. 122). 18 Ho (2011, pp. 73–75). Crim Law and Philos 123 so, we can apply an inverted version of G.E. Moore's ''open question'' test.19 For any act, x, and any description of it as an act of V-ing that might be applied to the act, we can ask whether describing x as an act of V-ing renders the question ''Is it necessarily bad/wrong to V?'' redundant. If it does not, then cases in which V-ing is not bad/wrong are not ruled out and the extent to which the description of x as an act of V-ing is normatively thick is limited. This appears to be so with Ho's definition, since it seems that we can meaningfully ask ''Is this deceitful act (of entrapment) bad/wrong?''. Second, even if it is difficult or impossible to define the concept of entrapment in a way that makes use of no concepts that are to some degree normatively thick, one definition can still be normatively thinner than another. Our insistence on the methodological need for a normatively thin definition of entrapment can then be interpreted as saying that we require a definition that keeps the use of concepts that are normatively thick sufficiently minimal that they do not prejudge the questions of permissibility and culpability. Ho specifies legal entrapment to commit a crime ''in the strict or negative sense'' by setting out a fifth, additional, condition that an act must meet for it to count as one of legal entrapment in this sense: 5. the agent's act of intentionally tempting the target caused the target to commit the offence.20 Ho thinks that the causal relationship indicated in condition (5) is what we might call the ''wrong-maker'' for legal entrapment strictly or negatively defined. That is to say, on his account, an act that meets conditions (1)–(4) is not necessarily wrong, but one that meets conditions (1)–(5) is. Now we reach the moral of this story. Ho's strict or negative notion of legal entrapment has in its extension, thinks Ho, only acts that are morally impermissible. This, however, is precisely a point at the level of extension, not at that of intension. It is not merely because the acts meet all five conditions that Ho considers them to be wrong acts. Rather, it is because he has independent moral reasons for considering it wrong for a law-enforcement agent, or the deputy of such an agent, to bring it about, through intentionally tempting a target, that the target commits a crime. There is certainly nothing surprising about this. We follow the standard model of ethical reasoning here, in which an ethical conclusion follows from a premise containing the relevant ethical principle (or, more broadly, the relevant ethical theory, whether principle-based or not) and an account of the ethically relevant- but otherwise ordinary, non-ethical-facts according to the principle (theory).21 Our point is simply that these facts do not, in themselves, give us the ethical conclusion, but do so 19 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), Sect. 13. 20 Ho (2011, p. 75). For now, we are not interested in the pros and cons of Ho's definition, but only in its structure. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that Ho conceives of causation in the following, counterfactual, terms: the target would not have committed a crime of the same type had the agent not put temptation in the target's way. However, there is plenty of room for doubt about whether causality can really be cashed out in terms of counterfactual conditionals. That is, it is doubtful whether the following sentences are really equivalent: ''By intentionally tempting the target, the agent caused the target to commit the (type of) crime''; ''If it had not been for the agent's having intentionally tempted the target, then the target would not have committed the (type of) crime''. However, this doubt is irrelevant to our specific concerns in this article and our own definition of legal entrapment to commit a crime (given in Sect. 4) does not employ the notion of causation. For a survey of counterfactual accounts of causation and objections to them, see Peter Menzies, ''Counterfactual Theories of Causation'', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/causation-counterfactual/. 21 For the standard model, see Torbjörn Tännsjö, Understanding Ethics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2nd edition, 2008), Chapter 1. Crim Law and Philos 123 only in conjunction with the ethical principle (or theory) that designates them as ethically relevant (e.g., wrong-making). Thus, on our account, even Ho's definition is normatively thin. This point is easily brought home. We have just set out all five of Ho's conditions: these are his candidates for ethically relevant facts.22 Only one of the conditions uses a term that is arguably normatively thick (''deceitful'') and, we argued, this in itself does not make the definition of entrapment normatively thick. Moreover, we have not explained, and it is not evident from condition (5), without the introduction of additional normative material (such as an ethical principle), why Ho thinks (5) describes something morally wrong.23 We see, then, that a definition of legal entrapment to commit a crime that includes ''wrong-making'' material can still be normatively thin in the sense that it does not, without the introduction of further normative premises, prejudge questions of permissibility or culpability. 3 Two Definitions of Legal Entrapment According to Stitt and James, entrapment (of Type 1) occurs (in the context of their discussion) whenever the following four conditions are all met: 1. a law-enforcement agent plans a particular crime; 2. the agent induces the target to commit it; 3. the agent arrests the target for having committed it; 4. counterfactual condition: if it were not for the agent's actions, then the token (as opposed to type of) crime would not have been committed by the target.24 On this definition, concealment does not, of itself, amount to entrapment. Concealment occurs when the agent has set up a means of detecting a crime and kept that means hidden from the target. For example, police officers who park their vehicles behind rows of bushes and hide behind trees with speed guns to detect speeding drivers are using concealment. Deceptive methods of proactive law enforcement, such as decoy operations, need not, of themselves, count as entrapment, for they do not necessarily meet the induction condition. If some police officers establish a fictional identity as an easy target for conmen, in the hope that they will catch a gang of local conmen who are preying on easy targets, but they do not do anything actively to direct the conmen to con the fictional easy target, then the officers are engaging in a decoy operation, not entrapment. 22 It is an interesting further complication as to what exactly the status of these facts is. Ho's view that only (5) is wrong-making suggests a particularist picture, as in Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. Chapter 2, on which (1)–(4) serve the roles of what Dancy calls ''enablers'' (and perhaps also the roles of what he calls ''intensifiers''). Others-who adopt the orthodox, mainstream opinion, we might say-would hold that all five facts are of the same kind and serve the same role. 23 Ho (2011, pp. 77–78) provides this additional normative material. It appears ultimately to rest-although he does not say so himself-on the deontological principle that it is wrong to use a person merely as a means, and that an action that meets condition (5), in addition to the other four conditions Ho specifies, will be one in which the agent treats the target as a mere means. Ho (2011, p. 80) thinks that the intrinsic wrongness of legal entrapment ''lies in the state having caused a citizen to commit a type of crime that he or she would otherwise never have done'' but he has something to say about why this is wrong. The explanation of why it is wrong is not part of the definition of the concept of entrapment in Ho's narrow or strict sense. 24 Stitt and James (1984, p. 114). This appeal to the token side of the type/token condition contrasts with Ho's discussion, which appeals to the type side. (See footnote 20.) With Stitt and James, we do not think that it is impossible to entrap a target into committing a token crime of a type that the target was already inclined to commit. On Ho's definition, however, this is impossible. Crim Law and Philos 123 Regarding (2), the induction condition, we understand induction to involve the active suggestion to the target by the agent that the crime be committed. So,merely asking suspected drug dealers whether they have any drugs (rather than actively asking them to sell drugs) does not, on this definition, count as entrapment. There is, we take it, a distinction between presenting a target with an opportunity (e.g., by purposefully leaving a wallet on the pavement) and encouraging the target (whether verbally or otherwise) to use that opportunity (e.g., by saying, with the intention to encourage, ''You could steal that!''). Decoy operations and other deceptivemethods of proactive law enforcement fall in the former category, while legal entrapment belongs to the latter.25 Definitions of entrapment can be unclear about the distinction between presenting someone with an opportunity and encouraging that person to use it. As in Ho's definition earlier or Gerald Dworkin's upcoming definition, they often use ambiguous terms such as ''temptation'' or ''enticement''. Let us consider Dworkin's definition of legal entrapment (of Type 1).26 Dworkin holds that proactive law enforcement occurs whenever a law-enforcement agent (presumably, acting in that agent's official capacity): 1. uses deception; 2. to produce the performance of a crime; 3. in circumstances in which the agent can observe the performance of the crime. Dworkin regards all cases of legal entrapment (of Type 1) as cases of proactive law enforcement that meet the following additional conditions: 4. the agent procures the crime (by solicitation, persuasion, or enticement); 5. counterfactual condition: the target would not have committed the particular crime but for the agent's having procured it.27 As in Ho's definition, Dworkin's definition includes a deception condition. Stitt and James do not include a deception condition. Our own view is that deception is a widespread, but probably contingent, feature of legal entrapment to commit a crime. For example, it is arguable that a plain-clothes detective who approaches a suspect and asks to buy drugs from the suspect is not necessarily deceiving the suspect. A detective may perfectly well solicit a crime in a manner that involves only withholding true information (e.g., that the detective is a detective, rather than a genuine customer), rather than giving false information. If deception involves giving false information, rather than merely withholding relevant true information, then it is arguably inessential to legal entrapment to commit a crime. Even if deception can involve an agent's withholding relevant true information in a context in which the hearer would reasonably expect (as a matter of linguistic pragmatics) to be provided with it, and when the agent's intention is that the hearer will be misled, it would still seem to be inessential to entrapment. We prefer not to dwell here on the nature of deception, which raises philosophical questions that could occupy us for some considerable time and, in Sect. 4, we follow Stitt and James in not including a deception condition in our definition. 25 For more on the distinction between legal entrapment and proactive law enforcement, see Stitt and James (1984, p. 126) and Gerald Dworkin, ''The Serpent Beguiled me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the Creation of Crime'', Law and Philosophy 4 (1) (1985): pp. 17–39. 26 Dworkin (1985). 27 Dworkin (1985, pp. 17, 21). Dworkin, like Stitt and James and unlike Ho, appeals to the token side of the type/token distinction. (See footnotes 20 and 24.) On the distinction between proactive law enforcement and legal entrapment, and on their relationship, compare Ashworth (1999). Crim Law and Philos 123 While Stitt and James work with an arrest condition, Dworkin works with an observability condition. We consider both conditions to be too strong. The arrest condition is too strong because an agent intent on entrapment could succeed in inducing the target to commit the crime and the target could die immediately after, or while, committing it. The failure to arrest would not seem to amount to its not having been the case that entrapment occurred. One might weaken the arrest condition so that it is the agent's having an intention to arrest, rather than actually making an arrest, that counts. Against this, consider a third party who is a law-enforcement agent but who is not party to the satisfaction of conditions (1) and (2) of the definition by Stitt and James. Assume that this third party has no prior knowledge of the situation, including the entrapping agent's role in it and the fact that the target is a target, prior to the crime being committed. Assume further that condition (4) of the definition by Stitt and James is met. If a law-enforcement agent, A, who has a target in mind, merely intends that a third party, B, like the one just described, who is not workingwith A as an entrapping party, should make an arrest, then this does not preclude A's act from counting as one of entrapment. In response, a further weakening would say that is it not the intention to arrest that matters, but the intention that the target be arrested (by someone or other). If, however, a corrupt law-enforcement agent threatens to arrest in order to blackmail, with no intention that any arrest bemade, then, we take it, this does not preclude the act on the part of the corrupt agent that enabled the blackmail from counting as an act of entrapment. (As we noted in Sect. 1, even an illegal act can count as an act of Type 1). Here is a story to show that Dworkin's observability condition is too strong. Suppose that an agent has already deceived the target, planned for the target to commit the crime, induced the target to commit it, and that the agent intends to observe it. While travelling to the intended crime scene, the agent is involved in a car accident. As a result, the agent arrives an hour after the crime happened, and there were no witnesses. Nevertheless, there is evidence that is sufficient to secure the arrest of the target because, while he was running away, fibres from the target's clothing, containing his DNA, were left on a screw that was jutting out of a doorway. The agent had planned that the crime should be detectable, because the agent intended to witness it. While the agent did not intend the manner in which the actual crime was detectable-the snagging of the fibres on the screw was purely an accident-the agent did intend that the crime be detectable. This is clearly a successful case of entrapment, even though no one actually witnessed the crime and, in jurisdictions such as the USA and its constituent states, in which an entrapment defence is in principle possible, an entrapment defence could certainly be mounted by the target's counsel. In a jurisdiction in which there is no entrapment defence but in which entrapment can serve as a reason for stay of legal proceedings, or as a reason to rule inadmissible certain evidence, against a defendant,28 the case could likewise be treated as offering such grounds.29 28 For details and reference to cases, see Mike Redmayne, ''Exploring Entrapment'' in Lucia Zedner and Julian V. Roberts (eds.), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 157–170, pp. 158–159. Picture an identical story to the one just told but in which there is no incriminating evidence. On our account, this is not thereby precluded from being a case of entrapment. Of course, the scenario is not a success from the agent's point of view: the agent, through lack of incriminating evidence, does not obtain the power (either for the agent or for a third party) to press charges against the target. We take it that whether entrapment has occurred is one thing; whether the agent (or anyone) knows that it has is another. 29 Fiona Leverick and Findlay Stark, ''How do You Solve a Problem Like Entrapment? Jones and Doyle v HM Advocate'', Edinburgh Law Review 14 (3) (2010): pp. 467–472, note (p. 467) that: ''The issue of how a claim of entrapment should be dealt with by the criminal courts has divided the international legal community, with different jurisdictions regarding it as a substantive defence, a matter that should lead to a stay in proceedings or a matter that should lead to the exclusion of the evidence obtained''. For further details of Crim Law and Philos 123 Moreover, a law-enforcement agent could entrap a target into committing a crime that the agent does not even intend anyone but the target to observe. Suppose, for example, that the agent has good reason to believe that the target is susceptible to suggestion. The agent encourages the target to take up a criminal opportunity that would not otherwise have been available to the target. The agent does not observe, does not set out to observe, and does not intend that a third party should observe, the crime being committed. What the agent cares about is securing a prosecution and the agent is willing to bet that, when accused of having committed the crime, the target will confess even though there were no witnesses. The upshot of this example is that, in order to entrap a target, a law-enforcement agent must intend that there is either sufficient non-verbal evidence, or sufficient testimony (including, where admissible, the target's own confession), to justify bringing charges against the target. Observation can be a means to this, but neither observation nor intended observation is required. These two cases show that neither a version of the arrest condition nor a version of the observability condition is necessary to entrapment. Instead, they suggest something weaker: that the crime be traceable to the target either, as in the first case, by being detectable (by a party other than the target) or, as in the second case, via testimony (including the target's confession). In short, entrapment requires that the crime be traceable to the target by evidence that would link the target to the act. Certain cases of collusion that have no element of entrapment illustrate a drawback of Dworkin's definition and bring out another crucial feature of legal entrapment (of Type 1). Consider the following story. Officer A is a corrupt police officer who is involved in extorting protection money from local entrepreneurs. He deceives his colleague, Officer B, into believing that the risks of being caught for doing this are far lower than is actually the case. Through this and other procurement techniques, A persuades B to accompany A in approaching the owner of a local business, not previously known to B, to demand protection money. A happens to have no intention to have B exposed, prosecuted, or blackmailed. Here, all five of Dworkin's conditions are met, and A has duped B into committing a crime. The officers have colluded in committing the crime. It is the agent's reasons for acting that mark cases of entrapment out from cases like the action of Officer A. When an agent entraps a target, we suggest, the criminal act is not the crucial trap into which the agent is trying to lure the target. Rather, the crucial trap is for the target to fall into being vulnerable, owing to the target's involvement in the criminal act, to the agent's (or a third party's) power to have the target prosecuted, exposed, or threatened with prosecution or exposure.30 Therefore, when we define legal entrapment in the next section, we include a clause to cover this aspect of entrapment scenarios. Footnote 29 continued this diversity, with references to cases, see Ho (2011, p. 71). We think this diversity provides an additional reason to seek an underlying definition of entrapment that is so normatively thin as to be able to feature neutrally in this debate. 30 The Oxford English Dictionary entry for ''entrap'' includes: ''To catch in or as in a trap. Also transf. and fig. to bring unawares into a position of difficulty or danger; to bring (a person) into one's power by artifice''; ''To beguile, bring by artifice to or into''. (''entrap, v.1''. OED Online. December 2016. Oxford University Press. Accessed February 24, 2017). In this article, it is the agent's bringing the target into the agent's power, by artifice (specifically, by procurement through incitement, solicitation, or persuasion), that is relevant. In a legal context, the point of procuring the crime is to secure the power to press charges against the person committing it. Entrapment merely in the sense of beguiling is what Officer A does to Officer B. While beguiling is not what we are primarily interested in, we say a little more about the distinction between mere beguiling and entrapment (as here understood) in Sect. 5. The entry for ''entrapment'' includes: ''Law. A method of criminal investigation in which the police instigate, initiate, or encourage the commission of a Crim Law and Philos 123 4 Legal Entrapment: A New Definition Legal entrapment to commit a crime occurs whenever: 1. a law-enforcement agent (or the agent's deputy), acting in an official capacity as (or as a deputy of) a law-enforcement agent, plans that the target commit an act; 2. the planned act is of a type that is criminal; 3. the agent procures the act (by solicitation, persuasion, or incitement); 4. the agent intends that the target's act should, in principle, be traceable to the target either by being detectable (by a party other than the target) or via testimony (including the target's confession), that is, by evidence that would link the target to the act; 5. in procuring the act, the agent intends to be enabled, or intends that a third party should be enabled, to prosecute or to expose the target for having committed the act.31 Conditions (1) and (2) adapt the first condition given by Stitt and James and, for our analytical convenience, break it into two conditions. Condition (3) is Dworkin's procurement condition, but with ''enticement'' replaced (due to its vagueness in respect of whether the agent actively suggests to the target that the act be committed) by ''incitement''. While we could say a lot about what solicitation, persuasion, and incitement are, we settle for a few brief comments. We inherit from Dworkin, make explicit, and explain, a restriction on what counts as procurement. Certain types of compulsion, such as inducing a person to commit an act by chemical means, do not fall under condition (3). When an agent procures a criminal act, the agent does not merely influence the target's will: rather, the agent influences the target's will in a certain way. The manner in which the target's will is influenced involves responsiveness to the content of the agent's speech act(s) or other communicative act(s). Unlike chemical induction, solicitation, persuasion, and incitement involve tempting the target, through communicative acts, to commit the criminal act (rather than simply bringing about the criminal act). The first clause of Ho's definition (set out in Sect. 2 above) correctly identifies the agent's intention to tempt the target as an element of acts of entrapment. In order to maintain a distinction between decoy operations and cases of entrapment, we specifically limit the type of temptation involved to active temptation via a communicative act or acts in which the content of the communicative act(s) inclines the target, by its influence upon the target's will, to commit an act of a criminal type. Procurement is distinct from causation. When the agent procures the target's act by persuasion, the agent influences the target's will through reason, rhetoric, or both. Solicitation and incitement leave room for the agent to have exercised less influence on the target's will, because, unlike persuasion, they do not necessarily suggest an initial reluctance or resistance on the part of the target towards committing the criminal act. A separate notable point is that there is a distinction between enabling an act and the stronger notion of the procurement of the act as specified by condition (3). For example, if an agent provides a target with the means to commit an act of a criminal type, such as a weapon, a stash of drugs, or some counterfeiting equipment, but the agent does not solicit, persuade, Footnote 30 continued crime by a suspected offender in order to secure his or her arrest; the result of such action'' (''entrapment, n''. OED Online. December 2016. Oxford University Press. Accessed February 24, 2017). Our main concern is with legal entrapment (of Type 1) and other cases of entrapment that are structurally similar, in ways Sect. 6 makes evident, to it. 31 We intend condition (5) to include blackmail cases in which the agent intends not that the target will be prosecuted or exposed but that the target will be placed under threat of prosecution or exposure. Crim Law and Philos 123 or incite the target to commit the act, then condition (3) has not been met. Conditions (4) and (5) we take to improve upon the arrest condition of Stitt and James, Dworkin's observability condition, and Ho's condition about the agent's desire to convict and punish the target. Condition (4), the intended-traceability condition, is weaker than the arrest condition and the observability condition but-on the assumption that to intend to arrest or observe is, thereby, to intend to have evidence that will link the target to the crime-encompasses both the intention to arrest and the intention to observe. Condition (5) specifies the proper sense of what it is to be trapped as a target in entrapment cases. One might ask whether we indeed need these two conditions to account for cases of entrapment. We think we do. When these two conditions are not fulfilled, what we have is a case of beguiling, or, if you prefer, of entrapment in a wider, colloquial, sense, rather than of the kind of legal entrapment that we are here attempting to define and which is of principal interest to the law (i.e., entrapment of Type 1).32 For example, if an agent merely wants to make the target feel guilty, or to put the target in a position in which the agent has some power over the target other than the power to prosecute, expose, or to threaten to do so, then the act is one of mere beguilement rather than one of the kind of entrapment that mainly interests us. We take it that cases of mere beguilement are philosophically interesting and that they raise similar issues, concerning, for example, the ethics of subjecting others to temptation, as do the cases of entrapment that mainly interest us. We think that our procurement condition renders the inclusion of a counterfactual condition unnecessary. Recall that we construe procurement as the actual influencing, via the content of a communicative act (or series of such acts), of the target's will. On our account, if the target's will was not so influenced, then entrapment has not occurred (whether or not the target actually commits the crime). What matters is not whether the target would have committed the crime had the target not been so influenced, but whether the target actually was so influenced. If the target would have committed the act anyway, e.g., because a seasoned criminal was waiting to procure it and to collude with the target to commit it, but was scared off when seeing the agent approach the target, then, we take it, this does not preclude what actually happened from being a case of entrapment. In contrast, on the counterfactual conditions discussed above, the scenario just described does not count as a case of entrapment because the target would have committed the act even if the agent had not procured it. 5 Entrapment: A New Definition The definitions discussed so far attempt to define only legal entrapment to commit a crime. Entrapment may be defined more generally, to encompass all four types identified in Table 1, by dropping the reference to law-enforcement agents and widening the class of induced acts. Thus, with those amendments to conditions (1) and (2), entrapment occurs whenever: 1. an agent plans that the target commit an act; 2. the planned act is of a type that is criminal, immoral, embarrassing, or socially frowned upon (measurable in part by the extent to which the target would probably not like the act to be exposed to colleagues, an employer, friends, family, or the public); 32 See footnote 30. Crim Law and Philos 123 3. the agent procures the act (by solicitation, persuasion, or incitement); 4. the agent intends that the target's act should, in principle, be traceable to the target either by being detectable (by a party other than the target) or via testimony (including the target's confession), that is, by evidence that would link the target to the act; 5. in procuring the act, the agent intends to be enabled, or intends that a third party should be enabled, to prosecute or to expose the target for having committed the act. As in the case of legal entrapment (of Type 1), it has sometimes been put to us by our discussants that conditions (4) and (5) are unnecessary. Here is a putative counter-example to these conditions. Consider a mafioso who takes a hanger-on out on a kneecapping job, deceiving the hanger-on into thinking that he will just be the lookout, but then manipulating the hanger-on into committing the crime himself. The mafioso may do this with no intention of traceability, but instead intending merely to establish a psychological tie that binds the hanger-on more firmly to the gang. Some of our discussants have regarded this as a case of entrapment. Our response is the same as before. Given that condition (4) is not met (also, in relation to condition (5), that the kind of power the mafioso seeks over the hanger-on is a psychological hold, rather than a power to expose), we have a case that counts as beguilement (or, if you prefer, entrapment as more liberally understood) but not one of entrapment in the sense that is mainly of interest to us and that is most relevant to legal and civil sting operations.33 Here, the aim is not merely to beguile, but to subject the target to prosecution, exposure, or the threat of such. It is the vulnerable position into which the target is put, in respect of the agent's (or a third party's) power to prosecute or expose the target, not the target's act itself, that is the trap. 6 Consequences of Our Account We should like to draw attention to some important consequences, ethical as well as legal, of our new definitions. First, note that on our definition, civil entrapment to commit a crime is a form of, but at the same time distinct from, criminal solicitation: every act of civil entrapment to commit a crime is one of criminal solicitation, but not vice versa.34 Secondly, on our account, whilst legal entrapment to commit a crime can be a means of proactive law enforcement, it need not be. Dworkin considers all cases of legal entrapment to commit a crime to be cases of proactive law enforcement that meet his procurement condition and his counterfactual condition. We speculate that Dworkin does this because he has in his mind scenarios in which an entrapment defence might be mounted in the USA. In such scenarios, the target will indeed have ended up in court as a result of proactive law enforcement. We think that Dworkin has confused a functional role that legal entrapment to commit a crime can perform (namely, as a method of proactive law enforcement) with what legal entrapment to commit a crime is. On our definition, a scenario in which law-enforcement agents intend to blackmail, rather than to enforce the law, can still count as a case of entrapment (including legal entrapment to commit a crime). Accordingly, while all cases of entrapment that are intended to result in the target's being charged with a crime are attempts at proactive law enforcement, not all cases of legal entrapment to commit a crime are cases of proactive law enforcement. 33 If necessary, see again footnote 30. 34 Contrast United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986), which takes ''private entrapment'' and ''criminal solicitation'' to name the same thing. Crim Law and Philos 123 Thirdly, as we noted right at the start, for us, as for Stitt and James and for Dworkin, to classify a scenario as a case of entrapment is not, of itself, to say anything about its moral or legal permissibility. The subjective and objective tests for entrapment are, as Stitt and James note, different accounts not of when entrapment occurs, but of when entrapped persons should be held (criminally) responsible for their offences.35 By the lights of the subjective test, the entrapped person is to be held responsible for the offence only if the offence exhibits the predisposition to commit it. Whether an entrapped person can properly be judged so predisposed will partly be a result of the degree of inducement or enticement that was offered by the law-enforcement agent. Inducement and predisposition are correlated, both in fact and in law. Other things being equal, the greater the degree of inducement or enticement has to be before the person succumbs to temptation and commits the offence, the less the person can properly be held to have been predisposed to commit the offence. According to the objective test, the entrapped person is to be held responsible only if the probability that ''a hypothetical law-abiding citizen'' would, in the circumstances, have committed the crime falls below a certain threshold.36 By the lights of the objective test, the predisposition or otherwise of the target is irrelevant. While the target's observed behaviour is plausibly an index of predisposition, what matters legally is the extent to which the target's observed behaviour diverges from that of the hypothetical lawabiding citizen. We now formulate the two tests in a way that makes them applicable to all of the types of entrapment identified in Table 1. In the case of the objective test, our formulation alludes to the planning and procurement conditions set out above. Subjective test. An entrapped person is (morally or criminally, depending on the case) culpable only if the act that the person has been entrapped into committing exhibits the person's predisposition to perform such acts. Objective test. An entrapped person is (morally or criminally, depending on the case) culpable only if the act that the person has been entrapped into committing is one that a hypothetical ethically upstanding or, in the legal case, law-abiding, person would be unlikely to have been led, in the circumstances of the agent's having planned and attempted to procure the act, to have attempted. The hypothetical ethically upstanding person (and likewise, the hypothetically lawabiding person) cannot be conceived of as a paragon of virtue, as someone with unusually strong powers of resistance to temptation, or as someone who tends towards actions and omissions that are supererogatory (i.e., admirable, but beyond the call of duty). Rather, this person has to be thought of as having (on some measure) about the average degree of virtue either typical of, or expected in, the population. 7 Conclusion We have explained why, in our view, a normatively thin definition of the concept of entrapment is desirable. We have examined two normatively thin definitions of legal entrapment (of Type 1), those of Dworkin and of Stitt and James, and found them wanting. We have also proposed what we take to be a new and improved definition, though we do not say that it is entirely adequate. We have extended this definition to provide a new 35 Stitt and James (1984, p. 114). 36 Dworkin (1985, p. 22). Crim Law and Philos 123 general definition that we intend to cover all the sorts of entrapment that feature in Table 1. Of course, our new general definition does not prejudge the moral issues. We intend to write separate work, using the analytical work we have done here as a foundation for the discussion, to address the question of whether entrapment is ever ethically permissible. Acknowledgements We thank the participants in the conference ''Public Standards, Ethics and Entrapment''. The conference took place at the University of Liverpool on 19th May 2016 with support from the University of Liverpool's Interdisciplinary Networking Fund. We wrote an early version of some of this material for it. We are grateful to members of audiences at the following conferences, at which we have presented some of this material: VIII Braga Meeting on Ethics and Political Philosophy (University of Minho), the Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Conference 2017 (University of Copenhagen) and the Mind Association/Aristotelian Society Joint Session 2017 (University of Edinburgh). For comments on earlier drafts, we thank Thomas Atkinson, Ian Dunbar, Matthew Hart, Douglas Husak, Gregory Miller, Thomas Schramme, and two anonymous referees. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. Crim Law and Philos

Reci bido: 23-02-2013 / Aprobado: 25-03 -2013 pp.15-28 Pawel Tarasiewicz LA UNIVEBSIDAP CATOLICA: ćPoR GUE QATOLICA? ćPoB GUE UNIVERSIDAD? Estimados profesores y estudiantes; seńoras y seńores Para empezar me gustaria expresar mi agradecimiento a la profesora Corina Yoris Villasana por invitarme a participar en este excepcional congreso, asi como a la Universidad Católica Andrós Bello por organizar un encuentro sobre el importantlsimo tema de la universidad catolica. Es mi primera visita a Venezuela; estoy muy feliz de estar aquf y profundamente impresionado por la belleza de este pais. Con esto no me refiero ńnicamente a sus bellezas naturales, sino tambión a la belleza de su gente, tan amigable, hospitalaria y cólida. Muchas gracias por su magnifica hospitalidad, la cual siento a cada paso de mi estancia aqui. La institución universitaria es un logro destacado de la civilización occidental. Ninguna otra civilización puede afirmar que su caracterfstica definitoria es el diólogo; ningón diólogo en ninguna otra civilización puede compararse con el que acaece en las universidades occidentales, pues el espiritu de Occidente es un espiritu de estudio. Su elemento dominante es el logos. Nada debe quedar sin ser discutido. Todos deben expresar sus opiniones. Ninguna proposición debe pasar sin ser examinada. Se considera que el intercambio de ideas es el camino para el progreso de la humanidad. Para acabar con el espiritu de estudio que siempre ha caracterizado a Occidente no es necesario destruir a las universidades. Dejarlas que pierdan su identidad ocasionaria el mismo resultado. Pareciera pues que, si estamos realmente interesados en salvar, preservar o transmitir nuestra tradición occidental, tenemos que hacer que nuestras universidades marchen aparejadas junto con su identidad, la cual no consiste en otra cosa sino en la educación liberal. Mediante esta presentación me gustaria discutir el problema de la identidad de la universidad catolica. Los anólisis se concentrarón en los siguientes temas; la relación entre el hombre y la educación liberal, la conexión lglesia catolica y fundacion de las universidades entre la educación liberal y la universidad y la asociación entre universidad y catolicismo. El hombre y la educación liberal 2auó es la educación liberal? La educación liberal es sinónimo de educación occidental, pues proviene de la comprensión occidental del hombre. De acuerdo con la concepción occidental sobre el hombre, cada ser humano es una persona determinada por su potencialidad y trascendencia. El tórmino "educación" se refiere a la potencialidad humana que caracteriza a la naturaleza humana, abarca las predisposiciones humanas y requiere el desarrollo de estas. El desarrollo de la naturaleza humana consiste en adquirir virtudes (disposiciones) que -por cuanto persiguen la verdad, el bien, la belleza y la santidadpueden ser divididas respectivamente en cuatro 9rUpos: intelectuales (teóricas), morales (prócticas), artisticas (productivas) y religiosas. Puesto que toda la humanidad comparte la misma naturaleza, cada ser humano necesita educación. Porsu parte, el tórmino "liberal" se refiere a la trascendencia humana, que distingue a todos los individuos humanos respecto del reino de la naturaleza y del de la sociedad. La peculiaridad del hombre en el reino de la naturaleza es producida por la cognición humana, la libertad (y la responsabilidad)y el amor. La especificidad del hombre en el reino de la sociedad se basa en su capacidad de agencia respecto de la ley, la soberania de su existencia y la dignidad religiosa. Todos estos parómetros no dicen quó deben ser los seres humanos, sino quó es aquello que debe estar garantizado para vivir la vida humana de forma apropiada.l En otras palabras, la educación liberal (]) se orienta a la excelencia del hombre en cuanto hombre; (2) considera al hombre como un fin, no como un medio; y (3) considera los fines de la vida y los medios para esta.2 iHay algun interós en Ia educación liberal en nuestra ópoca? Pareciera que en estos dias existe un interós muy limitado en la educación liberal, lo cual se debe tanto a dudas externas (1) como internas (2). (Duda No. 1) Las objeciones externas son planteadas por los proponentes del mótodo experimental en la ciencia' Su mótodo ha conquistado victorias tan claras y convincentes que en algunos circulos se le considera no solo como el ónico mótodo para construir conocimiento cientifico, sino tambión como el ónico mótodo para obtener conocimiento de cualquier tipo. Asi, se nos dice con frecuencia que cualquier pregunta que no pueda ser respondida mediante 1 VóasePawe| Tarasiewicz,Osobajakokryteriumbadawcze,'' studiaElckie11 (20O9)l 91-101. 2 Robert lM. Hutchins, Ihe Great Clnversation, in The Great Clnvesatiln. A Reader's Guide t0 Great Bloks 0f the Western Wold (Chicago 2006), p, 49, 18 los mótodos empiricos de la ciencia en realidad no puede responderse en absoluto, o al menos no mediante enunciados significativos y verificables. Pudieran hacerse excepciones respecto de los tipos de preguntas que responden los matemóticos o los logicos mediante sus mótodos. Pero todas las otras preguntas deben ser sometidas a los mótodos de la investigacion experimental o de la investigación empirica. Si no pueden ser respondidas mediante estos mótodos, Se trata del tipo de preguntas que nunca deberfan haberse planteado en primer lugar. En el mejor de los casos, se trata de preguntas que solo podemos responder mediante suposiciones y conjeturas; en el peor, se trata de preguntas carentes de sentido o absurdas. Los problemas genuinamente significativos, en contraste, obtienen su significado en buena medida a partir de las operaciones cientificas de observación, experimentación y medición mediante las que se las puede responder' Se apoyan en hechos. Han sido probadas y estón sujetas a verificación adicional. Se nos dice, ademós, que las mejores respuestas que podemos obtener mediante el mótodo cientffico no son sino meramente probables. Debemos liberarnos, por lo tanto, de la ilusión de que, fuera de las matemóticas y la logica, podemos alcanzar la verdad necesaria y cierta. Los enunciados que no son formulas lógicas o matemóticas pudieran parecer Verdaderos con necesidad o certeza, pero es pura apariencia. En realidad, no pueden ser ni necesarios ni gozar de certeza. Considórense, por ejemplo, los enunciados acerca de la existencia de Dios o la inmortalidad del alma. Son estas respuestas a preguntas que no pueden ser respondidas -de Una u otra formamediante el mótodo experimental. Si ese es el Ónico mótodo mediante el cual puede alcanzarse el conocimiento probable y verificable, quedamos excluidos de la posibilidad de tener conocimiento acerca de la existencia de Dios o de la inmortalidad del alma. Si el hombre, aceptando la concepcion de acuerdo con la cual Ónicamente puede pretender saber lo que puede demostrarse experimentalmente o verificarse mediante investigación empirica, todavia desea creer en estos asuntos, debe reconocer que lo hace con base en la fe religiosa o en el ejercicio de su voluntad de creer; debe entonces estar preparado para que en ciertos circulos se lo considere irremisiblemente supersticioso.3 (Duda No. 2) lncluso los admiradores reales de la educacion liberal pueden considerarla problemótica por, al menos, cuatro razones: a) La primerarazón consiste en que la educación liberal en nuestros tiempos pareciera ser precaria, por cuanto estó pasada de moda. Estó muy lejos de la vida real y de los problemas actuales. Por ejemplo, muchos educadores liberales, como Cicerón yTomós de Aquino, escribieron sus obras cuando los Iglesia catolica y fundacion de las universidades 3 lbidem, p.60. hombres pose[an esclavos, o bien en una etapa precientifica y preindustrial. ;ouó pudieran decirnos a nosotros, ciudadanos democróticos de una era cientifica e industrial? Es este un tipo de determinismo sociológico que sostiene que la actividad intelectual es siempre relativa a una sociedad particular, de modo que si la sociedad cambia de modo importante, aquella resulta irrelevante. Las ideas que se originan en un estado de la sociedad no tienen nada que ver con otro estado de la sociedad. Si pareciera que tienen algo que Ver, se trata Ónicamente de apariencia' Las ideas son las racionalizaciones de las condiciones sociales que existen en cualquier ópoca dada' Si buscamos usar en nuestra propia ópoca las ideas de otra ópoca, nos engańaremos, pues por defin|cion estas ideas no tienen aplicación alguna a ninguna otra ópoca salvo aquella que las produjo. Por supuesto, la historia y el sentido comÓn niegan el determinismo sociológico. Existe en esta tierra algo llamado hombre, que lucha con sus problemaS y trata de resolverlos. Estos problemas cambian de ópoca a ópoca en ciertos respectos; en otros, permanecen iguales. ;ouó es la vida buena? ;Cuól es el estado bueno? iExiste un Dios? aCuóles son la naturaleza y el destino del hombre? Tales preguntas persisten porque persiste el hombre, y aquellas persistirón mientras lo haga este. A lo largo de los tiempos hombres insignes han dejado testimonio escrito de sus discusiones sobre estas preguntas persistentes. aDesdeńaremos la luz que nos ofrecen con base en el hecho de que vivlan en tiempos primitivos y distantes? Como comentara alguien: "los griegos no pudieron televisar la tragedia de Esquilo, pero si pudieron escribirla"a. b) La segun da razón consiste en que, por cuanto las masas fueron admitidas en la actividad politica mediante la democracia, se asumia que, si bien aquellas deben ser educadas, no podian ser educadas de manera liberal. Tenian que aprender a leer el periódico y a redactar una carta, pero acómo podia esperarse que estudiaran a Platón y Aristóteles? Todo lo que necesitaban saber acerca de los grandes educadores liberales podian encontrarlo traducido en textos que no adolecieran de la tara de ser dificiles. Muchos demócratas creen que quienes proponen la educación liberal han de ser antidemocróticos. Dicen "el ideal que usted propone fue promovido por y para aristócratas. Los aristócratas no son demócratas. Por lo tanto, ni usted ni su ideal son democróticos''. Sin embargo, la educación liberal era aristocrótica en el sentido de que era la educación de quienes disfrutaban de ocio y poder politico. Si era la educación apropiada para aquellos que disponfan de tiempo de ocio 4 lbidem, pp.51-52 y de poder politico, entonces es la educación correcta para todos en la actualidad.s (c) El tercer argumento seńaIa que si intentamos proporcionarle una educación liberaI a todos, no lograremos proporcionórsela a nadie. Por cuanto no todos pueden obtener una educación liberal, el intento de proporcionórsela a todos tendró como consecuencia necesaria una educación inferior para todos. El remedio consiste en segregar a los pocos que tienen las capacidades correspondientes respecto de las mayorfas que carecen de aquellas, aseguróndose que los primeros, al menos, reciban una educación liberal. El resto puede ser relegado a la formación vocacional o a cualquier clase de actividad escolar que llegare a interesarles.ó (d) La cuarta razón consiste en que, por cuanto la mayor parte de la humanidad nunca ha tenido la oportunidad de recibir una educación liberal, no puede "probarse" que puedan recibirla. Sin embargo, tampoco puede "probarse" lo contrario.T 1Realmente todos pueden recibir esta educación? Pareciera que la educación liberal no se ajusta a todos. Los estudios universitarios de licenciatura han estado limitados a una ólite. De la misma forma, la educación liberal estaba limitada para una ólite y para los pocos de las clases sumergidas que lograban su prosecución a pesar de las barreras que les imponfa la sociedad. Sin embargo, ńnicamente los que tenian una inteligencia y una disponibilidad de tiempo libre excepcionales podian entender el contenido de la tradición occidental, y solo aquellos que ten[an poder politico ten[an la necesidad de entenderla. Ahora, la situación ha cambiado. En muchos paises la gente tiene poder politico y tiempo libre disponible.s 2Por quó es eficiente la educación liberal? Porque se basa en las artes liberales, las cuales hacen de cada hombre un artista liberal. El artista liberal aprende a leer, escribir, hablar, escuchar, entender y pensar. Aprende a considerar, medir y manipular la materia, la cantidad y el movimiento, a fin de predecią producir e intercambiar. Puesto que vivimos en la tradición occidental, lo sepamos o no, somos todos artistas liberales, lo sepamos o no. Todos practicamos las artes liberales, bien o mal, todo el tiempo todos los dias. Puesto que deberiamos entender nuestra tradición liberal lo mejor que podamos a fin de entendernos, de la misma manera deberiamos ser tan buenos artistas liberales como podamos a fin de sertan plenamente humanos como podamos. lbiden, p. 64 lbidem, p, 65 lbidem, lbidem, p, 51, 5 6 7 B lglesia catolica y fundacion de las universidades Las artes liberales no son meramente indispensables; son inevitables. Nadie puede decidir por si mismo si va a ser un ser humano o no. La ónica cuestión que le queda abierta es si seró un ser humano ignorante y no desarrollado, o si seró un ser humano que ha procurado alcanzar la cota mós alta de la que eS capaz. La cuestión es si seró un artista liberal malo o bueno.9 La educación liberal y la universidad aComo la educación liberal puede determinar la identidad de una persona? Puede determinar la identidad de la universidad, determinando a sus egresados. aouó es, entonces, un egresado universitario? aouó es un hombre educado de manera liberal? El hombre educado de manera liberal entiende que es posible que un problema dado no se resuelva con el mismo mótodo que otro problema, y que el criterio con el que examinaró las soluciones que Se propongan cambia de un problema a otro. El hombre educado en la tradición liberal entiende, al entender las distinciones e interrelaciones de los campos bósicos de un tema, las diferencias y las conexiones entre la poesia y la historia, la ciencia y la filosofia, la ciencia teórica y la ciencia próctica; entiende que no se pueden aplicar los mismos mótodos en todas estas óreas y conoce los mótodos apropiados para cada una de ellas. El hombre educado en la tradicion liberal comprende las ideas que son relevantes para los problemas bósicos y que intervienen en las óreas bósicas del saber. Sabe quó significan alma, estado, Dios, belleza y Ios demós tórminos que son bósicos para la discusión de asuntos fundamentales. Tiene alguna noción de las intuiciones sobre la experiencia humana que, solas o combinadas, proporcionan estas ideas. El hombre educado en la tradición liberal tiene una mente que puede funcionar bien en todas las óreas. Es posible que sea especialista en un órea, pero puede entender cualquier asunto de importancia que se ventile en cualquier otra, asi como ver y usar respecto de si mismo la luz que arroje tal asunto. El hombre educado en la tradición liberal se siente en casa tanto en el mundo de las ideas como en el de los asuntos prócticos, pues entiende la relación entre ambos. Es posible que no se sienta en casa en el mundo de los asuntos prócticos si con esto se entiende el sentir agrado por la vida que le rodea, pero si se sentiró en casa en ese mundo si con esto se entiende el que lo comprende. lncluso, es posible que derive de su educación liberal alguna concepción de la diferencia entre un mundo malo y uno bueno, asi 9 Vease ibidem, pp. 49 50 como alguna noción de las maneras en las que uno de aquellos pudiera convertirse en el otro.lo iLa educación liberal debe identificar Ónicamente a la universidad? 1Por supuesto que no! Se trata de algo mós. łas haberse graduado en la universidad, el hombre educado en la tradición liberal deberia continuaą por su cuenta, una educación en las artes liberales a lo largo de la vida. La educación liberal, pues, ha de identificar tambión al individuo' lncluso si el individuo ha recibido la mejor educación liberal posible durante su ópoca de estudiante, tiene la obligación de proseguir la interminable educación en las artes liberales; no puede pretender acopiar una educación durante su juventud para que le dure toda la vida. Lo que si puede hacer mientras estudia en la universidad es adquirir las disciplinas y hóbitos que le permitirón continuar educóndose toda la vida. Es deprimente y horroroso que todo el proceso de la educación escolar, al cual contribuimos, termine en ocasiones en la trivialización de la vida. Por ejemplo, me cuesta creer que algunos de mis antiguos estudiantes puedan sentirse satisfechos con el consumismo o la recreación chabacana que ocupa actualmente el grueso de su tiempo libre. Siempre me siento obligado a recordarles que, a fin de cuentas, son hombres. El hombre, si bien es un animal, no es totalmente animal. Es racional y no puede vivir de las meras gratificaciones animales; mucho menos de diversiones que los animales tienen suficiente sensatez para evitar. Un hombre debe usar su mente; debe sentir que estó haciendo algo que desarrollaró sus mós altas capacidades y contribuiró al desarrollo de sus congóneres, o dejaró de ser hombre. Las pruebas a las que estó sometido el ciudadano actualmente sobrepasan cualquier cosa que hubieran conocido las generaciones previas. La propaganda prjblica y privada le acosa de la mańana a la noche toda su vida. Si el juicio independiente es el sine qua non de la ciudadania independiente en la democracia, entonces debe admitirse que. ahora mós que nunca, cuesta mantener un juicio asf. Es demasiado ambicioso esperar que una fuerte dosis de educación en la etapa estudiantil pueda inocularle al hombre resistencia contra los ataques a su juicio independiente. Para esto se requiere un estado constante de crecimiento y alerta mentales.ll Entonces 1cuóI es Ia tarea principal de la universidad? Es inculcar en el estudiante el deseo por una educación liberal permanente, por cuanto es la ónica manera de adquirir bienes espirituales. Ciertamente, existen los bienes del cuerpo, tales como la comida y la bebida, el sueńo, la vestimenta y el refugio. Son estos bienes que necesitamos porque son indispensables para 10 W^t 'bbm 11 lbldem, p, 69. Iglesia catóIica y fundacion de las universidades 23 el mantenimiento de la vida. Estar sin ellos en cantidad suficiente implica una privación que pone en riesgo la vida. Sin embargo, tambión existen los bienes del espiritu, tales como la información, el conocimiento, la comprensión y la sabidurfa. Con la educación liberal el hombre busca estos bienes no solo para vivir, sino para vivir bien. El poseerlos lo eleva sobre el plano de la existencia animal, pues estos bienes enaltecen su existencia como ser humano, ademós de proporcionarle deleite y placer. 12 iauó diferencia existe entre información y conocimiento, conocimiento y Comprensión y comprensión y sabiduria? Dicho brevemente, (1)el conocimiento se basa en la información, la cual se refiere a hechos. Por ejemplo, un estudiante puede mejorar su conocimiento recibiendo información plenamente comprensible, o recordando mós y mós información, o comprendiendo hechos a la luz de la información que ya posee. (2) Mientras que el conocimiento es una suerte de "premisa", la comprensión es una suerte de "conclusión". Por ejemplo, un estudiante puede aumentar su comprensión descubriendo relaciones entre elementos particulares de su conocimiento. Lo positivo de la comprensión consiste en que las conclusiones apropiadas requieren conocimiento necesario y suficiente, en lugar de conocimiento exhaustivo. Es decir, no es necesario saber todo acerca de un hecho para entenderlo. Pero lo negativo de la comprensión radica en que se llega a una variedad de conclusiones, a causa del carócter fragmentario de las p'remisas; en otras palabras, diferentes aspectos del conocimiento humano pudieran generar diferentes explicaciones para el mismo hecho. (3) Asi como la comprensión se basa en el conocimiento, de la misma manera la sabidurfa es resultado de la comprensión. El estudiante cruza la linea entre comprensión y sabiduria cuando comienza a evaluar las interpretaciones que se le ofrecen. Al hacerlo, el estudiante, como hombre libre, determina sus errores y aciertos por si mismo. Ciertamente, esto le expone al riesgo de cometer errores, pero la bósqueda de la verdad implica libertad. La libertad convierte al estudiante en un agente moral que sabe la diferencia entre entendimiento (el cual se basa en la explicacion)y la sabiduria (la cual se basa en la justificación). Pues la justificación combina la explicación con la creencia: el estudiante puede decir "entiendo y estoy de acuerdo" o "entiendo, pero no estoy de acuerdo". Participar en la educación liberal significa, pues, algo mós que Ser un espectador, o desempeńar el papel de un erudito; hace del estudiante un buscador de la verdad'que la hace suya tan pronto la ha hallado.l3 La verdad es al error lo que la unidad es a la multiplicidad. La verdad siempre es singular, mientras que los errores que aquella corrige son diversos. lZ li.rl.,t**lldler, The Great Conversation Revisited , en The Great Clnversation, A Readels Guide to Great Books ol the Western Watd (Chtcago 2006), p, 24. 13 lbiden,p,24; MortimerJ.Adler,HowtoReadaBook(NewYork1972),p.7-10,BobertM,Hutchins,op,cit.,p,49. 24 Este hecho, sin embargo, no deberia considerarse una mócula para la valfa de la educacion liberal. Por el contrario, es de una importancia sumamente positiva. Ninguna verdad se entiende bien hasta que, y solo a condición de que, sean igualmente comprendidos todos los errores que quedan corregidos por ella y se resuelvan todas las contradicciones que se hayan encontrado. Es en el contexto de una pluralidad de errores a corregir y de contradicciones a resolver como refulge el brillo de la verdad, iluminando asl a la vida humana.la La universidad y el catolicismo 2Cuól es el punto de contacto entre la universidad y el catolicismo? La universidad y el catolicismo convergen en su profundo asombro ante la dignidad y valor del hombre. El universitario puede pensar acerca de la excelencia humana de dos maneras: (1) La excelencia humana es aquello que existe mediante la educación y puede ser desarrolIado a travós de ella. En este escenario se presupone que el hombre es excelente por naturaleza (a causa de algunos rasgos especificos, por ejemplo, a causa de ser un zoon politicon, "un animal politico"), naturaleza que debe ser desarrollada mediante un mótodo excelente: la educación liberal. Una concepción asi parece ser admisible por cuanto la educación liberal considera al hombre como un fin, no como un medio. Por el contrario, otros tipos de educación o {ormación tratan a los hombres como medios para algón otro fin' (2) La excelencia humana puede alcanzarse mediante la educación. De ser asi, el hombre no es excelente por naturaleza, pero puede llegar a serlo mediante la educación liberal. La excelencia del hombre educado segón la tradicion liberal consistiria en poseer capacidades en un grado excelente. Por ejemplo, un hombre puede hacerse excelente como ciudadano solo si puede entender "la relación entre el problema de la inmortalidad del alma y el problema relativo a la mejor forma de gobierno".ls Por supuesto, la primera interpretación pareciera ser anterior a la segunda, porque si el hombre no fuese excelente por naturaleza, no podria alcanzar excelencia alguna en su cultura: la naturaleza estó presupuesta de forma evidente en la cultura. En cambio, el hombre de la lglesia considera la grandeza humana desde la perspectiva de Jesucristo. Contemplando su misterio. la lglesia sabe con toda la certeza de Ia fe que la Redención, la cual ocurrió con la Crucifixion, muerte y Resurrección, ha restaurado definitivamente la dignidad del hombre, 14 Mortimer J. Adler, op. cit., p.27. 'l5 Robert M, Hutchins, op, cit., p.49, lglesia católica y fundación de las universidades devolvióndole significado a su vida en el mundo, un significado perdido en grado considerable a causa del pecado.1ó 2Se da una mera coexistencia entre universidad y catolicismo, o se trata mós bien de una cooperación? Debido a los problemas que perturban constantemente a la humanidad, su cooperación no solo es posible, sino tambión necesaria. Es posible porque tanto el ethos cientifico como el espiritu cristiano se basan en la misma voluntad de obediencia a la verdad. Y es necesaria, pues para resolver los problemas humanos tienen que unirse la razóny la fe. En consecuencia, no solo ya la filosofia, sino tambión la teologia, encuentra su lugar legitimo en la universidad y participa del diólogo de amplio espectro entre las ciencias, no meramente como disciplina histórica y una de las ciencias humanas, sino precisamente como teologia, como estudio de la racionalidad de la fe. 2Cuól es, pues, la especificidad de la universidad catolica? Es una cooperación, o mós bien complementación, entre razón y fe. Solo asi nos volvemos capaces de ese genuino diólogo de culturas y religiones necesitado con tanta urgencia hoy. Hasta hace poco, en el mundo occidental se creia mayoritariamente que solo la razón positivista era vólida universalmente. Sin embargo' las culturas profundamente religiosas del mundo ven esta exclusión de lo divino respecto de la universalidad de la razón como un ataque a sus convicciones mós profundas. Una razón que es sorda a lo divino y que relega la religión al mundo de la subcultura es incapaz de participar en el diólogo de culturas' La gran tarea de la universidad católica es posibilitar e inspirar un diólogo, entendido como una bÓsqueda colectiva de la verdad'17 iLa universidad catolica tiene algÓn un mensaje atemporal para el hombre ? Creo que hay un mensaje doble: (1)que, con su propio impulso, el hombre puede conocersu trascendencia respecto del universo, asi como experimentar su deseo de felicidad, que es tan fuerte que puede ser reconocido como una inclinación natural hacia Dios (desiderium naturale vivendi Deum);18 (2) que el hombre ha de escoger (o rechazar) a Dios por simismo; pues cada individuo debe tomar esta decisión, que constituye la cóspide de su humanidad, y ningrin mecanismo social o sujeto colectivo puede sustituirlo en esto.le 16 Juan Pablo ll, Bedenptor Honinis, ch, 10, 17 Benedicto XVl, Faik, Reason and ke University. Memories and Reflecllons, Universidad de Regensburg, 12 Septiembre 2006, 1B Vóase JuanPablo '|'Centesinusannłs'ch''13; MieczyslawA'Krapiec"'Czlowiek,"enPowszechnaEncyklopedia Filozofii,vol,2 (ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Lublin 2001), p, 372 y 385, 19 Juan Pablo ll, Centesimus annus, cap, 13, Ciertamente, el catolicismo interpreta que el hombre no puede entenderse a sł mismo sin Cristo; no puede entender quión es, ni cuól es su verdadera dignidad, ni cuól es su vocaciÓn' ni cuól es su finalidad; no puede entender nada de esto sin Cristo (Juan Pabloll, Homilia, Varsovia, 2 Junio1979), 26 2La universidad catolica tiene algÓn mensaje atemporal para el mundo? Ciertamente. La universidad católica proclama la civilización occidental a todo el mundo como un orgullo de Occidente. Por supuesto, parece una trivialidad decir que la civilizacion occidental debe su identidad a la cultura clósica, que incluye la filosofia griega, el derecho romano y la religión cristiana. Sin embargo, tal aserto deja de ser un simple lugar comÓn frente a otros agentes, que tambión se Ven a si mismos como parte de las caracteristicas esenciales del mundo occidental. Dentro de sus fronteras, y en una dinómica de mutua penetración, han estado presentes durante muchos si9los no solo los modelos griego, romano y cristiano, sino tambión los modelos judio, musulmón, celta, alemón, eslavo y otros afines. Entonces ipor quó la civilización occidental no puede encontrar sus raices en patrones no clósicos, a sabeą en recursos que no tengan origen greco-romano y cristiano? La razón es simple, pero de todas formas inusualmente importante. Reside en una diferencia entre comunidades territoriales y espirituales. Si Occidente fuese una unidad solamente en sentido espacio-temporal, entonces todos los eventos históricos pudieran ser vólidamente considerados parte de esa unidad en proporción a la duración de su presencia o al alcance de su influencia' Asi, los ingredientes esenciales de la civilización occidental podrian abarcal por ejemplo, el humanismo renacentista o el universalismo de la llustración, asi como el colonialismo intercontinental o el socialismo internacional. Sin embargo, el nÓcleo esencial de Occidente no involucra ius so/i ni tampoco ius sanguinis, sino un ius personarum especffico. Pues se transmite la grandeza de la civilización occidental al formular los principios reales y universales de la persona humana dentro de la sociedad. Esto quiere decir que para vivir de acuerdo con el espiritu occidental el hombre no tiene que Ser cristiano, ni discipulo de Platón y Aristóteles, ni experto en derecho romano. Sin embargo, si debe respetar su propia dimensión humana, asi como la de los demós, pues invadir la condición de persona de otros equivale a debilitarse a si mismo. Por lo tanto, la civilización occidental no estó limitada a un tiempo o un luga1 entre otros; estó siempre a la vista cuando existe la visión integral del hombre como la base de la vida Social. Esta concepción incluye no solamente a todas y cada una de las personas, sino tambión a su estructura completa, de modo que no tolera ninguna reducción antropológica, ni siquiera aquellas que tienen por propósito el hacer realidad los mós hermosos ideales. Aquella satisface, eventualmente, sus funciones en la cultura al prestar atención a la primacia de la persona sobre la cosa, la ótica sobre la tecnologia, la misericordia sobre la justicia, asi como al amor por "ser mós" por encima de la lucha por "tener mós". Es esta la razón por la que el lglesia catóIicay fundacion de las universidades respeto universal por las dimensiones personales de la vida humana parece una condición clave de la identidad atemporal de la civilización occidental2o. Conclusión Con mi exposición he intentado ventilar el problema de la identidad de la universidad católica. Este tema pareciera relevante no solo para la universidad, como emblema representativo de la civilización occidental, sino tambión para el catolicismo, que usa sus dos alas _fey razón_ a fin de elevar el espiritu humano para la contemplación de la verdad21. Les apostarla una suculenta cena a que todos nosotros estamos totalmente convencidos de la verdad de la afirmación de Epicteto que reza "no debemos creer a esas mayorias que dicen que solo las personas libres deben recibir educación, mós bien debemos creerles a los filósofos, que afirman que solo los que han recibido educación son libres".22 Sin embargo, para representar a la universidad católica, tenemos que admitir que a la luz de las palabras de Jesucristo, "conocerós la verdad, y la verdad te haró libre",23la afirmación de Epicteto adquiere un significado mós profundo, pues parece que las personas realmente libres son ónicamente aquellas educadas en la verdad. loue todos los egresados de la universidad católica sean libres en este sentido! 20 Pawel Tarasiewicz, "Between Politics And Religion ln Search of the Golden Mean," traducido por Jan R, Kobylecki, Studia Gilsoniana 1 (2012): 129-130. 21 Juan Pablo ll, Fides et ratio, prol. 22 DoctorofArtsGreatConversation:IheConerstoneCourse(HarrisonMiddletonUniversity,Tempe20l2),p,90, 23 John B:32,

PREPRINT PLEASE CITE AS: Corcoran, J. 2007. Syntactics, American Philosophy: an Encyclopedia. 2007. Eds. John Lachs and Robert Talisse. New York: Routledge. pp.745-6. Syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics are the three levels of investigation into semiotics, or the comprehensive study of systems of communication, as described in 1938 by the American philosopher Charles Morris (1903-1979). Syntactics studies signs themselves and their interrelations in abstraction from their meanings and from their uses and users. Semantics studies signs in relation to their meanings, but still in abstraction from their uses and users. Pragmatics studies signs as meaningful entities used in various ways by humans. Taking current written English as the system of communication under investigation, it is a matter of syntactics that the two four-character strings 'tact' and 'tics' both occur in the ten-character string 'syntactics'. It is a matter of semantics that the ten-character string 'syntactics' has only one sense and, in that sense, it denotes a branch of semiotics. It is a matter of pragmatics that the ten-character string 'syntactics' was not used as an English word before 1937 and that it is sometimes confused with the much older six-character string 'syntax'. Syntactics is the simplest and most abstract branch of semiotics. At the same time, it is the most basic. Pragmatics presupposes semantics and syntactics; semantics presupposes syntactics. The basic terms of syntactics include the following: 'character' as alphabetic letters, numeric digits, and punctuation marks; 'string' as sign composed of a concatenation of characters; 'occur' as 't' and 'c' both occur twice in 'syntactics'. However, perhaps the most basic terms of syntactics are 'type' and 'token' in the senses introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), America's greatest logician, who could be considered the grandfather of syntactics, if not the father. These are explained below. The basic terms of semantics include 'sense', 'denotation' and 'ambiguous'. The strings 'zero', 'one minus one' and 'three minus zero minus three' have different senses but the same denotation. An ambiguous string has more than one sense. For example, the string 'three minus two minus one' has two senses; in one sense it has the same denotation as 'three minus one', or 'two', and in one sense it has the same denotation as 'one minus one', or 'zero'. The basic terms of pragmatics include the following: 'inscribe', 'assert', 'report', 'ask', 'promise', 'describe', 'repeat' and 'imply'. Peirce's type-token distinction dates from the first few years of the 1900s. Although he made the distinction earlier, his use of the words 'type' and 'token' to express it dates from the 1906 Monist article on pragmaticism, quoted in Ogden-Richards (1923, Appendix D, section 6, esp. 280-281) and reprinted in volume IV of Collected Papers (Paragraph 537).The following is from Peirce's 1906 Monist article (1906, 5045). A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a ... printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty 'thes' on a page, and, of course, they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word 'word,' however, there is but one word 'the' in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page, or be heard in any voice ... 2 Such a ... Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single ... Object ... such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. .... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token, which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type 'the' on a page. I do not know whether Peirce ever supplemented his type-token distinction with the concept of "occurrence" as needed to make the point that, although the type 'the' has only one occurrence of the type 'e', the type 'e' occurs twice in the type 'thee' and it is instantiated, betokened, or embodied (to use Peirce's term) twice in every token of the type 'thee'. In order for two string occurrences in the same or different string-types to be occurrences of one and the same string-type, it is necessary and sufficient for them to be "character-by-character identical", i. e., for them to have the same length, say L, and for the nth character occurrence in one to be an occurrence of the same character-type that the nth character occurrence in the other is an occurrence of, for n between 1 and L. Aside perhaps from Peirce, the most important figure in the history of syntactics was the Polish-American logician Alfred Tarski (1901-1983). Tarski needed an axiomatic syntactics for his axiomatic semantics. More specifically, he needed an axiomatic theory of syntactics as a foundation for an axiomatic treatment of his 1933 semantic theory of truth. One of Tarski's theorems is that the operation of concatenation of strings is associative: given any three strings x, y, z, concatenating x with the result of concatenating y with z is the same as the result of concatenating x with y and then concatenating the result with z. For example, concatenating 'syn' with 'tactics' is the same as concatenating 'syntac' with 'tics'. The mathematical theory of syntactics is called string theory. The history and philosophy of this important subject is dealt with in the article "String Theory" by J. Corcoran, W. Frank, and M. Maloney in the 1974 Journal of Symbolic Logic. References: Corcoran, J., et al. 1974. String theory. The Journal of Symbolic Logic 39: 625-637. Morris, C. 1938. Foundations of the Theory of Signs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I.A. 1923. The Meaning of Meaning. Reprint of eighth edition. Harcourt: New York. Peirce, C. 1906. Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism. Monist 16: 492-546. Peirce, C.S. 1933. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss. Cambridge: Harvard UP. 3 Tarski, A. 1933. The concept of truth in the languages of the deductive sciences (Polish). Prace Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, Wydzial III Nauk Matematyczno-Fizycznych 34, Warsaw; reprinted in Zygmunt 1995, pages 13172; expanded English translation in Tarski 1983, pages 152-278. Tarski, A. 1983. Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, papers from 1923 to 1938. Second ed. Edited with introduction and analytic index by J. Corcoran, Indianapolis: Hackett.

The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too JUSTIN D'AMBROSIO Australian National University The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted views concerning the nature of perception-including both representational and nonrepresentational views-likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the manyproperty problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to the many-property problem, adverbialism and several widely accepted views in the philosophy of perception are on a par, and the problem is solved. 1. Introduction The many-property problem was originally posed as a problem for the adverbial theory of perception, and is often taken to show that the adverbial theory is untenable. Until now, philosophers of perception have taken the problem to be unique to adverbialism. This paper shows that this assumption is mistaken: the problem afflicts any view of the nature of perception-representationalist or otherwise-on which perceptual experience involves a subject bearing a relation to an uninstantiated property or complex of properties.1 Luckily for such views, I provide a general solution to the many-property problem that makes use of a standard, widely-used semantic mechanism. However, this solution is one that can be easily adapted to yield a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Further, this Contact: Justin D'Ambrosio <justin.d'[email protected]> 1As we will see below, this category includes (i) all property representationalist views, (ii) relational views of perception on which we can be perceptually aware of uninstantiated properties, and (iii) views that treat the contents of perception as gappy. 1 2 * Justin D'Ambrosio solution is superior to others in the literature in that it avoids objections to which such proposals are subject, and provides a complete explanation of the systematic entailments that hold between adverbially modified states of sensing. Thus, with respect to the many-property problem, adverbialism and a wide range of standard views in the philosophy of perception are on a par: all of them face, and can solve, the many-property problem. 2. The Many-Property Problem The adverbial theory of perception was originally developed to provide an alternative to the act-object conception of experience: the view that in every perceptual experience, there is an act of awareness and an object of which we are aware. Adverbial theories attempt to provide an alternative to this view by arguing that the structure of perception is not fundamentally relational-for the adverbialist, sensory awareness does not consist in a relation to an object-and they articulate this view of the structure of perception by paraphrasing the complements of direct-object perceptual reports adverbially.2 ,3 The basic adverbialist proposal is that, at least in cases of hallucination, if Mary senses something green, there is not some object which she senses that is green. Rather, Mary senses in a certain way: greenly. The many-property problem is a dilemma forced on the adverbialist when she tries to give an account of the situation described by the following ascription: (1) Mary senses a green square and a red circle.4 2Adverbialism about perception was originally defended by Ducasse [1942] and Chisholm [1956], and then later by Sellars [1975] and Tye [1975, 1984]. For many years, however, most philosophers of perception treated adverbialism as untenable on its own terms, and thought that its benefits were available to other views-typically representationalist views. Recently, however, there has been some renewed discussion of adverbial views of perception and intentionality, for instance, by Kriegel [2007, 2008, 2011], Mendelovici [2018, Ch. 9], Banick [forthcoming], Bourget [forthcoming], and D'Ambrosio [2019]. 3Adverbialism as a theory of perception is importantly distinct from adverbialism concerning other aspects of our mental lives, including qualia, the emotions, and attention. The form of adverbialism with which I am concerned is a view concerning the fundamental nature of perception. 4In what follows, I will uniformly use the verb "senses" in my examples, which I take to express a state of sensory awareness that is present in every instance of perceptual experience. I make this choice because (a) "senses" is the verb used in traditional debates over the manyproperty problem, (b) most views to which my arguments apply hold that we can sense, or The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 3 The adverbialist might paraphrase (1) as follows: (2) Mary senses greenly and squarely and redly and circularly. But this paraphrase fails to distinguish Mary's sensing from one that involves the same properties, but pairs them differently; it fails to distinguish (1) from (3): (3) Mary senses a red square and a green circle. Call this the expressive problem. In order to address this problem, the adverbialist often tries to form complex adverbs, traditionally by paraphrasing (1) in ways such as the following: (4) Mary senses (green-and-square)-ly and (red-and-circular)-ly.5 However, the formation of complex adverbs in this way undermines the status of "green" and "square" and "red" and "circular" as genuine syntactic constituents of the sentence, and so appears to undermine the adverbialist's ability to infer from (3) to its obvious consequences such as (5) and (6): (5) Mary senses a square. (6) Mary senses something green. Call this the inferential problem. The many-property problem is the dilemma formed from the expressive problem and the inferential problem.6 be sensorily aware of, uninstantiated properties, and (c) it meshes well with the view, due to Johnston, that I will use below to illustrate the broader category of views in which I am interested. However, I just as well could have made use of "perceives", "is aware of", "is perceptually aware of", or "is sensorily aware of" to formulate my examples, so long as none of these verbs require the existence of particulars instantiating the relevant properties. 5On this traditional approach to forming complex adverbs, which is roughly the view given in Tye [1975], "(green-and-square)-ly" and (red-and-circular)-ly" are syntactic primitives. This is not a particularly plausible approach to the semantics of adverbial modification, since it is not compositional. Below, in solving the many-property problem, I will present a compositional way of forming such adverbs, but for the moment, in presenting the problem, I will make use of the traditional paraphrases. 6The many-property problem was originally proposed by Frank Jackson [1975]. There have been numerous attempts to respond to it, including by Tye [1975, 1984, 1989], Sellars [1975], and more recently by Kriegel [2007, 2008]. These attempts have met with resistance from Woodling [2016] and Grzankowski [2018], and have even occasioned a strengthening of the original problem due to Dinges [2015]. 4 * Justin D'Ambrosio 3. Uninstantiated Properties in Perception We have seen that adverbialism faces the many-property problem, but in fact, many other theories do too-namely, those that posit that perceptual experience involves a relation between a subject and an uninstantiated property. To see this, it will be helpful to consider a representative view: that of Mark Johnston [2004].7 Johnston holds that the objects of hallucination are sensible profiles, where sensible profiles are complex properties (or: complexes of properties).8 To use Johnston's example, in the case where I hallucinate an Italian greyhound under a desk, I am related to a complex consisting of the property of being an Italian greyhound, the property of being a desk, and perhaps the relation of x being under y.9 Such sensible profiles, on Johnston's view, serve as the objects of sensory awareness whether or not we are hallucinating. When we are hallucinating, such properties will be uninstantiated or partially uninstantiated. When we perceive veridically, such profiles will be instantiated by collections of concrete particulars that have the properties and stand in the relations the sensible profile comprises. Now consider the following perceptual ascription: (7) Mary senses a green square and a red circle. On Johnston's view, the object of Mary's awareness is a complex property-a sensible profile-whose components include the properties of being green, being 7I choose Johnston's view here for definiteness and clarity, but my arguments apply to any view of perception that involves the perceiving subject bearing a relation to an uninstantiated property, whether or not the relation is one of awareness, and whether or not the relation is representational. Such views are numerous. For instance, the view that in hallucinatory perceptual experience, we are aware of uninstantiated properties is held by Bealer [1982], Dretske [1999, 2003], Foster [2000], Forrest [2005], Johnston [2004], and Tye [2014a,b], among others, although Johnston is not a representationalist. The view that in perception, we bear a relation that is not an awareness relation to uninstantiated properties is defended by Pautz [2007]. The arguments also apply to the view that the contents of hallucination are gappy, defended by Tye [2009] and Schellenberg [2013, 2014], among others. 8Johnston moves between these two different phrases. As we will see presently, this equivocation matters. 9It is important to note that sensible profiles can include uninstantiated relations, such as the relation of being under. However, insofar as views such as Johnston's allow uninstantiated relations to figure into the complex properties that we sense, such views also face the so-called "many-relations" problem, posed by Dinges [2015]. As we will see, the solution I provide below solves both the many-property and many-relations problems for both property theories and adverbialism. The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 5 square, being red, and being a circle, and in (7), "senses" expresses a relation to that property. In order to serve as the semantic value of the complement of the verb, the complex property must be derived from the ordinary semantic value of "a green square and a red circle" via a type-shift.10 So far so good. But what distinguishes a sensible profile of a green square and a red circle from a sensible profile of a green circle and a red square? How can we distinguish (7) from (8)? (8) Mary senses a green circle and a red square. In a hallucinatory case, there are no particulars available to instantiate the two pairs of properties, and so something else must distinguish perceptual situations in which they are paired differently. What can achieve such differentiation? Johnston's intention is clearly for sensible profiles to be complex properties: properties that are built up from other properties in a way that mimics patterns of co-instantiation. Thus, the property that Mary is aware of in the hallucinatory case must have structure: Mary must be perceive the property of being (greenand-square) and (red-and-circular). The standard way of forming such properties is to make use of an abstraction operation such as lambda abstraction. Lambda abstraction allows us to construct complex properties that mimic patterns of coinstantiation as follows: (9) λxλy[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)] (10) λxλy[green(x) ∧ circular(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ square(y)] In (9), the bound variables pair the properties of being green and square, and the properties of being red and circular. The logical forms of (7) and (8) are then given by (11) and (12), respectively: (11) sense(Mary, λxλy[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)]) 10A type shift is a change in the type of semantic value that a semantic theory assigns to a particular expression, typically to correct for a mismatch between the argument-type accepted by a verb's denotation and the type of semantic value assigned to its argument. The ordinary semantic value of a complex noun phrase such as "a green square and a red circle" is a generalized quantifier. In a standard Montagovian system, such a quantifier is intensional, and of type 〈s, 〈〈s, 〈e, t〉〉, t〉〉. In extensional theories, generalized quantifiers are of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. We will see below how to shift an object of this type to the type of a property. See Hendriks [1993] for a systematic approach to type-shifting. 6 * Justin D'Ambrosio (12) sense(Mary,λxλy[green(x) ∧ circular(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ square(y)]) Since the properties to which Mary is related in (12) and (11) are distinct, it may appear that lambda abstraction allows Johnston's view to distinguish between (7) and (8), and so solve the many-property problem. But drawing this conclusion would be a mistake. Johnston's view still confronts the inferential problem; his view does not yet have an explanation of why (7) should entail (13) or (14): (13) Mary senses a green square. (14) Mary senses a square. The reason that Johnston's view still faces the inferential problem is that structural relations between properties-like the one between the properties denoted by "a green square" and "a square"-are not, on their own, sufficient to guarantee that relations of entailment hold between states of sensing those properties. Just because one senses P, and P bears a structural relation to Q, such as having Q as a component, it does not-absent further argumentation-follow that one senses Q.11 We can see this by noting that that while "senses" validates inferences such as the one from (13) to (14), and so "distributes" to any subproperty, many other verbs whose complements denote properties do not. Consider the following pair: (15) Mary lacks a comfortable pillow. (16) Mary lacks a pillow. The inference from (15) to (16) is not valid-Mary can lack a comfortable pillow without lacking a pillow, despite the fact that "comfortable" serves as a constituent of "comfortable pillow" in the same way that "green" serves as a constituent of "green square". Moreover, (13) and (15) plausibly have the same logical form; both ascriptions involve intensional transitive verbs whose comple11One way of bringing this out is to notice that despite the fact that (11) and (12) have structured properties as arguments, their logical form, at least in first-order logic, is still that of a simple binary relation; they both have the form V(Mary,P). In order to determine which inferences such sentences underwrite, we need principles that go beyond those in first-order logic: we need principles that tell us how structural relations between properties determine relations between states that relate us to those properties. The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 7 ments denote properties-i.e. both have the form given in (17): (17) V[Mary, λx[P(x) ∧Q(x)]]. But while (13) and (15) have the same logical form, they have different entailments. Thus, the structural relations between the properties to which a subject bears relations are not sufficient to determine entailment relations between states in which those properties figure. To take another example, imagine that John is playing a concerto. Then consider the contrast between (18) and (19): (18) a. John promised a long cadenza. b. John promised a cadenza. (19) a. John omitted a long cadenza. b. John omitted a cadenza. Clearly, (18-a) entails (18-b), but (19-a) does not entail (19-b), even though (18-a) has the same logical form as (19-a), and (18-b) has the same logical form as (19-b).12 In fact, given that (18-a) and (19-b) are a minimal pair-they differ only in the verbs that they contain-the differences in entailment must be traceable to the differing lexical meanings of those verbs. Thus, in order to validate inferences between reports of states of sensing, it is not sufficient to point out that one property is a component of another, or that one property figures in the compositional derivation of a larger property-denoting expression. Rather, what is needed is an additional, verb-specific rule that specifies how relations between properties determine inferential relations between states of sensing those properties. What is required is to specify the monotonicity profile of the verb in question. This is the core of the inferential problem.13 12"Omits" is not the only verb for which such inference patterns fail: they also fail for verbs of resemblance, such as "resemble", "imitate", and "simulate", and for verbs such as "lack". It is a substantive question which intensional verbs validate adjective-drop inferences within their complements. 13This argument begins to show, contra Bourget [2017], that inferences within the complements of intensional ascriptions cannot be purely formal. Which inferences hold within the complement of an intensional verb will depend on the lexical meaning of the verb in question. I will discuss this point further below. However, I agree with Bourget that inferences involving so-called "special quantifiers", such as from "John wants a big dog" to "John wants something" are formal. This may well be due to the distinctive semantic features of "something", which are 8 * Justin D'Ambrosio The result is that views in the philosophy of perception that posit relations to uninstantiated properties are crucially underspecified in exactly the way that adverbialism is underspecified; both can easily handle the expressive horn of the dilemma, but have nothing to say when they encounter the inferential horn. In order to address the inferential problem, Johnston must first make use of the strategy employing lambda abstraction above, and second, must give a rule specifying how the structural relations between properties determine relations of entailment between states of sensing those properties. In short, Johnston and the property-representationalist need a logic of sensible profiles: they need a logic of property perception. But such a logic is exactly what the adverbialist needs as well; they need a logic of adverbial modification. Further, Johnston's view is merely illustrative. Insofar as many views hold that perceptual experience involves or consists in a relation to an uninstantiated property-at least in the hallucinatory case-this problem is very general. Arguments like the ones above can be marshalled against any theory of perception on which subjects can bear perceptual relations to uninstantiated properties, and these arguments hold whatever one's views on the nature of that relation. We can call such views property views. Perhaps the most common property view is property representationalism. Like Johnston, property representationalists typically hold that perceptual experience consists in awareness of a complex property, and hold that when perceptual experience is veridical, that property will be instantiated. However, unlike Johnston, they often claim, as Tye [2014a] does, that the relation the subject bears to the property is one of "predicative representation". Notable defenders of such views are Dretske [1995, 1999, 2003] and Tye [2014a,b], although there are many others as well. Another form of the property view, defended by Pautz [2007, 2010], holds that in hallucination, we bear a theoretically defined relation to a complex uninstantiated property, but this relation is not one of awareness. My arguments apply to these views also-nothing about the arguments above is specific to views on which the relation we bear to an uninstantiated property is one of awareness. Like many property representationalists, Pautz recognizes the need to solve the expressive problem [see Pautz, 2007, pp. 498-499], but likewise fails to address the inferential problem. outlined by Sainsbury [2018, Ch. 2]. Sainsbury argues that "something" is substitutional. The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 9 Finally, the arguments above apply to the view, defended by Susanna Schellenberg [2013, 2014], that the content of a hallucinatory perceptual experience is "gappy". Schellenberg takes gappy contents to be modes of presentation that are associated with certain perceptual capacities. Schellenberg's gappy contents are, in many ways, like properties, albeit very finely individuated ones. But in the case where a subject hallucinates something with multiple properties-for instance, a green square-something must fuse the gappy contents together to account for the features of the unified experience. Once this fusion is accomplished, Schellenberg's view will likewise face the inferential problem. While I acknowledge that there are key differences between Schellenberg and standard property theorists, I will treat "property theorist" as a label applying to her as well.14 The feature that these views share, which makes them subject to the manyproperty problem, is that in cases of hallucination, they require formation of complex properties (or in Schellenberg's case, complex gappy contents) that mimic patterns of coinstantiation. But once they construct these properties, these views face the inferential problem, and are silent about how to solve it.15 4. The Solution: Monotonicity The solution to the many-property problem, for both the property theorist and the adverbialist, is to treat the inferential problem as a problem concerning monotonicity inferences. Monotonicity inferences are ubiquitous in semantics, but most importantly for our purposes, they arise in the context of giving a semantics for intensional transitive verbs such as "seeks".16 14See Schellenberg [2013, p. 304] for a clear statement of the view that illustrates the need for a solution to the many-property problem. 15In what follows, I will continue to use Johnston's view to illustrate my points, while noting that my arguments generalize to all property views. 16Perhaps most basically, monotonicity inferences are the result of quantification; each quantifier has a so-called "monotonicity profile": a distinctive collection of monotonicity inferences that it validates. See van Benthem [1984] for discussion. Propositional attitude verbs underwrite monotonicity inferences because on the standard semantics for such verbs, given by Hintikka [1962], propositional attitudes involve quantification over worlds: propositional attitude verbs are modals. Thus, it is common for semanticists to argue over the monotonicity profiles of intensional verbs. See Forbes [2006], Zimmermann [2006], von Fintel and Heim [Unpublished], and Rubinstein [2017] for discussion. 10 * Justin D'Ambrosio Monotonicity inferences typically arise in the complements of intensional verbs. In the case of intensional transitive verbs, these inferences arise in the direct object position, as we can see by noting that (20) implies (21): (20) John seeks a book by Quine. (21) John seeks a book. Even when we interpret both (20) and (21) nonspecifically, so that John does not seek any particular book, the inference from (20) to (21) is valid. More generally, "seeks" validates the inference patterns in (22) and (23), where F v G iff the extension of F is a subset of the extension of G: (22) a. S seeks an F b. S seeks a G where F v G, (23) a. S seeks an F and a G b. S seeks an F, When a verbal argument position validates inferences of these forms, the verb is monotonic upward in that position.17 The standard semantic explanation for this monotonicity behavior is that "seeks" has a covert modal element that quantifies over worlds in which the search is successful.18 One way of spelling out the behavior of this modal is the Quine-Hintikka Analysis of intensional verbs; it is this analysis that validates upward monotonicity.19 We can illustrate the Quine-Hintikka analysis informally using our example from above. On the Quine-Hintikka analysis, to seek a book 17By considering only these two inference patterns, I am simplifiying the monotonicity problem significantly. The problem for intensional transitive verbs becomes much more complicated once disjunctive and quantified complements are introduced. However, this simplification is justified because these two patterns are the ones relevant to the case of perception, and the ones that form the basis of the traditional inferential problem for adverbialism. For further discussion of the monotonicity profile of intensional verbs, see Forbes [2006] and Sainsbury [2018]. 18Other intensional transitive verbs specify conditions appropriate to the kinds of activities they denote. For instance, desires may have satisfaction-conditions, debts may have discharge conditions, fears may have realization conditions, etc. 19The analysis is called the "Quine-Hintikka Analysis" because it has its roots in Hintikka's semantics for propositional attitude verbs, which validates upward monotonicity for propositional attitudes. Quine then proposed to decompose non-propositional attitude verbs into propositional attitude verbs in a way that would make them susceptible to Hintikka's analysis. The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 11 by Quine is to be the agent of a search such that, in every world in which one's search is successful, one finds a book by Quine. Put schematically, a subject S seeks NP iff in every world where the search is successful, the subject S finds NP. Monotonicity inferences are then validated by considering the systematic relations that hold between the success-conditions of different searches.20 One well-known implementation of the Quine-Hintikka analysis is given by Zimmermann [2006]. Zimmermann treats "seeks" as a relation between an agent and a property, and then uses the Quine-Hintikka analysis to secure upward monotonicity. This implementation has two steps: first, Zimmermann gives a compositional semantics that treats intensional transitive verbs as denoting relations between an agent and a property. Zimmermann then applies the QuineHintikka analysis to show how the property specifies the success-conditions for the event, and validates upward monotonicity. I discuss these two steps in turn. In the compositional component, Zimmermann [2006, p. 736] first shows how to take the the ordinary semantic value of a noun phrase such as "a book by Quine"-which is of generalized quantifier type-and convert it to the type of a property. He does this by employing a type-shifting principle that he calls Existential Lowering: (24) Existential Lowering: From λP[Q(P)] of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉 to (λx[R(x)] of type 〈e, t〉, where R is the restrictor of Q. Zimmermann [2006, p. 736, notation modified]21 This type shift takes the ordinary semantic value of a quantificational nounphrase, a generalized quantifier, and returns the semantic value of its restrictor, which is a property. Zimmermann then employs this type shift in the compositional semantics for sentences such as (25): (25) John seeks a book by Quine. 20This is analogous to inferences that arise in the complements of propositional attitude verbs, except that in the propositional case, instead of success-worlds, we considering worlds at which the proposition in question is true. 21For example, if Q is the quantifier denoted by "some dog", λP∃x[dog(x) ∧ P(x)], the type shift yields the property that serves as Q's restrictor, λx[dog(x)]. 12 * Justin D'Ambrosio (26) John seeks a book by Quine seek′(John′, λx[book′(x) ∧ by-quine′(x)]) t John john′ e seeks a book by quine λx[seek′(x, λx[book′(x) ∧ by-quine′(x)])] e, t seeks λPλx[seek′(x, P)] 〈e, t〉, 〈e, t〉 a book by Quine λx[book′(x) ∧ by-quine′(x)] e, t a book by Quine λP∃x[book′(x) ∧ by-quine′(x) ∧ P(x)] 〈e, t〉, t The principle of Existential Lowering is applied in the boxed portion of the derivation. The principle can be seen as being triggered by a type-mismatch between the verb and the ordinary semantic value of the quantificational noun phrase. The principle shifts the type of the argument, and so corrects the mismatch. The result of the derivation is that (25) says that John stands in the seekrelation to a complex property-the property of being a book by Quine. But this derivation is not yet sufficient to secure upward monotonicity; validating upward-monotonic inferences requires applying the Quine-Hintikka analysis. Zimmermann provides this analysis as follows: (27) Quine + Hintikka Analysis of "seek" (with events) For any property P, individual x, world w, and time t the following holds: seek(P)(x)(w)(t) = 1 iff there is a search act e performed by x in w at t such that the property of being found by x overlaps the extension of P at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′ and times t′ such that (w, t) T (w′, t′). Zimmermann [2006, p. 744] The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 13 Above, the relation T is an accessibility relation that holds between world/time pairs just in case the event that takes place at one world and time is successful at another, and P is a possibly complex property. Thus, the analysis of "seek" formalizes the idea that in any worlds in which the act of searching is successful, x finds an instance of P. The feature of the Quine + Hintikka analysis that allows it to validate upward monotonicity is the quantification over worlds and times in the last clause of the analysis.22 Given this quantification, we can give the following argument to show that upward monotonicity is valid. Suppose, without loss of generality, that John seeks a book by Quine. Any world in which this search is successful is one in which he finds a book by Quine. But any world in which he finds a book by Quine is one in which he finds a book. Therefore, in every world in which John's search is successful, he finds a book. But by the right-to-left direction of the biconditional above, it follows that John seeks a book. So the definition validates inferences such as the one in (22). Similar reasoning yields that (27) validates the inference in (23), except that in this case the properties in question will be conjunctive properties.23 5. Solving the Problem for Property Views The tools used to address the monotonicity inferences that hold in the complements of intensional transitive verbs, illustrated with the case of "seeks" above, can be used to solve the many-property problem for the property theorist. Since Zimmermann treats "seeks" as a relation to a property, with minor modifications, his analysis can be converted into an analysis of the verb that expresses the relation of sensory awareness to an uninstantiated sensible profile. To see this consider our example from above: (28) Mary senses a green square and a red circle. First, we need to provide a compositional semantics on which (28) has the logical 22In fact, Hintikka's original analysis secured upward monotonicity for all propositional attitude verbs, which leads to the problem of logical omniscience. 23On the view proposed by Forbes [2006], validating inferences involving conjunctive NPs in the complements of intensional verbs requires stating an additional postulate governing NPs of this form. I omit this complication here, but refer the reader to Forbes [2006, p. 99]. 14 * Justin D'Ambrosio form of a relation between Mary and a complex property. A slight generalization of Existential Lowering allows us to do just this. The original version of Existential Lowering only applied to simple properties. But a perfectly analogous principle allows us to type-shift the denotations of complex quantificational expressions, such as "a green square and a red circle", to the type of complex properties.24 The generalized form of Existential Lowering takes the ordinary semantic value of a quantified NP and returns the denotation of its restrictor, as in (29): (29) λP∃x∃y[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y) ∧ P(x) ∧ P(y)] of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉 to λxλy[green′(x)∧ square′(x)∧ red′(y)∧ circle′(y)] of type 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉 We can then deploy this type-shift in the boxed portion of the derivation in (30), where Q stands in for λP∃x∃y[green′(x)square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y) ∧ P(x) ∧ P(y)]: 24The only difference here is that λxλy[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y) is of type 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉, as opposed to type 〈e, t〉. This is just a feature of the kind of properties that hold of two distinct objects. The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 15 (30) Mary senses a green square and a red circle sense′(Mary′, λx[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y)]) t Mary mary′ e senses a green square and a red circle λx[sense′(x, λxλy[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y)])] e, t senses λx[sense′(x, P)] 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉, 〈e, t〉 a green square and a red circle λxλy[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y)] e, t a green square and a red circle Q 〈e, t〉, t This derivation yields that (28) has the logical form of a relation between Mary and a complex property. Thus, the result matches the logical forms in (11) and (12) which were suggested by Johnston's theory. With this logical form in hand, we can secure upward monotonicity in the same way we did above: by making use of a lexical analysis. However, the analysis of "seeks" has two distinctive features that must be modified when we consider "senses".25 First, (30) makes use of an accessibility relation that holds between worlds whenever one world makes an event in the other successful. Second, it specifies the success of a search in terms of finding. In order for the analogy to hold, we need to specify what the relevant accessibility relation is in the case of sensing, and what the analogue of finding is for states in which we sense properties. For the case in which we sense visually, I propose the following analogies for 25Again, nothing turns on my choice of the verb "senses". The exact same approach can be applied to "is perceptually aware of", or any other perceptual verb that can express relations to uninstantiated properties. 16 * Justin D'Ambrosio the property theorist: finding is to seeking as seeing is to sensing, where seeing is a relation between a perceiving subject and a particular.26 Further, success is to finding as accuracy is to sensing. Thus, searches are successful when you find what you seek, and states of sensing are accurate when you see (an instance of) what you sense.27 We can then give the following analysis of "senses", where sensing is a relation between a sensing subject and a (complex) property: (31) Quine + Hintikka Analysis of "sense" (with events) For any property P, individual x, world w, and time t the following holds: sense(P)(x)(w)(t) = 1 iff there is an act of sensing e in w at t of which x is the agent such that the property of being seen by x overlaps the extension of P at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′ and times t′ such that (w, t) T (w′, t′). In (31), the complex property P serves to specify the accuracy-conditions of an event of sensing. The event of sensing is accurate only if the agent relationally sees particulars that instantiate P. We can see that this analysis validates upward monotonicity by giving the following schematic argument. Suppose that x senses P. Any world in which a sensing of P is accurate will be one in which x sees a particular instantiating P. But if P v Q, this particular will also instantiate Q. Thus one sees a Q. It then follows from the right-to-left direction of the biconditional in (31) that x senses Q. Therefore, if x senses P, then one also senses Q. But further, the same reasoning also validates conjunction elimination: if x senses P and Q, then x senses P. Returning to our original example, the analysis can be applied as follows. Consider (32): (32) Mary senses a green square and a red circle. (32) has the form given in (33): (33) sense(Mary, λxλy[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)]) 26However, there may also be a disanalogy here: findings temporally succeed, or are perhaps the culminations of, searches, whereas seeings do not seem to temporally succeed visual sensings. 27Of course, the property representationalist might deny this because it treats relational seeing as fundamental in the analysis of perception. An alternative is to adopt a conjunctive analysis, and claim that sensings are accurate when the subject is appropriately causally related to what she senses. Formally, modifying the analysis in this way is trivial. The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 17 We can then apply the analysis above to (33) as follows: (34) sense(λxλy[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)])(Mary)(w)(t) = 1 iff there is an act of sensing e in w at t of which Mary is the agent such that the property of being seen by Mary overlaps the property λxλy[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)] at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′ and times t′ such that (w, t) T (w′, t′). Given this application, we can argue as follows. Suppose that Mary senses a green square and a red circle. By the analysis, every world in which Mary's sensation is accurate is one in which she sees a green square and a red circle. But every such world is one in which she sees a green square. Therefore, every world in which her sensation is accurate is one in which she sees a green square. Therefore, by the right-to-left direction of the analysis, Mary senses a green square. Thus, from the fact that Mary senses a green square and a red circle, we can conclude that Mary senses a a green square. Similar reasoning allows us to conclude that she senses something green. Thus, by specifying accuracy conditions for Mary's sensation, the analysis in (34) shows how structural relationships between properties yield logical relationships between states of sensing those properties, thus validating upward monotonicity, and solving the inferential problem.28 This approach to monotonicity is standard in theorizing about intensional verbs. The semantic value of the complement of an intensional verb is often taken to be an abstract object of some kind (typically a property, generalized quantifier, or proposition), and the truth-conditions of sentences involving such verbs are then specified via the interaction of the verb's modal component with that abstract object. In some cases, such as in the case of propositional attitude verbs, the modal element finds its way into logical form. However, in other cases, such as the case of intensional transitive verbs, it does not.29 28I say that these states are logically related because the analysis serves as an axiom from which the entailment relations between states of sensing can be derived. Here, "logical relations" does not mean relations of structural entailment. 29For instance, in von Fintel and Heim [Unpublished, Ch. 2], the modal component of propositional attitude verbs is present in logical form. By contrast, on many accounts of the semantics of intensional transitive verbs, such as Zimmermann [2006], Forbes [2006], and Moltmann [2008], the modal component does not find its way into logical form, but remains at the lexical level. 18 * Justin D'Ambrosio 6. Solving the Problem for Adverbialism The very same strategy can be employed to solve the many-property problem for adverbialism. Solving the problem requires accomplishing two tasks. First, we need to show how adverbial paraphrases can be given a compositional semantics, and then we need to validate upward monotonic inferences. Consider the adverbial paraphrase of (35), given in (36): (35) Mary senses a green square and a red circle. (36) Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly. Importantly, this adverbial paraphrase is distinct from the paraphrase of (37), given in (38): (37) Mary senses a red square and a green circle. (38) Mary senses (a red square and a green circle)-ly. Given these simple paraphrases, we can think of the semantic value of the objectposition noun phrase as a complex modifier, just as, on the property theorist's view, the complement of "senses" has a complex property as its semantic value. The first step in solving the many-property problem is to show how the semantics of complex modifiers can be derived compositionally. Like on the property view, the complex adverbial modifier can be derived from the ordinary semantic value of "a green square and a red circle"-a generalized quantifier-via a type-shift. Recall that the ordinary semantic value a noun phrase like "a green square and a red circle" is a generalized quantifier, which, in an extensional setting, is of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. The required type shift takes something of this type and returns a modifier, of type 〈〈e, t〉, 〈e, t〉〉. One way of implementing the shift is to let "-ly" denote a function f that carries out the shift. We can define that function as follows: (39) f is a function that takes λP[Q(P)] of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉 to λPλx[Q-P(x)] of type 〈〈e, t〉, 〈e, t〉〉. How does this differ from Existential Lowering? The function denoted by "-ly" takes the same input as Existential Lowering-the denotation of a quantified The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 19 NP-but instead of returning a property that serves as an argument to the verb, it yields a modifier of the verb, denoted by λPλx[Q-P(x)]. This modifier takes as an input a verb-of type 〈e, t〉, and as with modifiers generally, returns something of the same type; in this case, it returns a new, complex verb of type 〈e, t〉. For example, if our verb is "seeks" and our quantified NP is "a unicorn", the type shift converts the denotation of "a unicorn" into a modifier, which, when combined with the denotation of "seeks", yields the denotation of the complex verb "[a unicorn]-seeks", where [a unicorn]-seeking is a more specific kind of seeking. Moreover, this kind of type-shift is fully general and systematic. Just as with Existential Lowering, the type-shift is defined schematically, and so can be applied to any quantified NP whatsoever.30 The hyphenated output of this type-shift may at first seem strange, but it is in fact totally familiar; such hyphenation is used in English to mark a common form of compounding. Consider constructions such as "salmon-fish" or "duckhunt". In these constructions, a nominal is adjoined to the head of the verb with a hyphen, and comes to serve as a modifier that restricts the verb's denotation; salmon-fishing is a particular kind of fishing, and duck-hunting is a particular kind of hunting.31 The modifier λPλx[Q-P(x)] functions exactly like these modifiers: it restricts the denotation of the verb to a more specific kind of activity. Moreover, this is not all that we can say about how the hyphen functions. Just as salmon-fishing is a kind of activity that is successful only if one catches a salmon, and duck-hunting is a kind of activity that is successful only if one catches a duck, [a unicorn]-seeking is a kind of seeking that is successful only if one finds a unicorn-all of these hyphenated constructions denote activities that are directed toward standing in a certain relation to an instance of the kind 30The type-shift just presented, along with its subsequent explanation using the QuineHintikka analysis, is very similar to the analysis given by Forbes [2006, p. 82]. The basic idea is to type-shift an entire quantified NP to the type of a modifier, and then to explain the behavior of the modifier using an "outcome postulate", which employs the quantified NP in the ordinary way. The fact that the behavior of the modifier is ultimately explained in terms of an ordinary use of the quantified NP guarantees compositionality. 31This kind of modification is even more common with noun-phrases: consider, for example, "duck-hunt", "chicken-coop", "three-story building", "one-woman university" and "manysplendoured thing." (The latter three examples come from Forbes [2006, p. 79].) In each of these examples, what was once an argument of a prepositional phrase comes to serve as an attributive adjective that restricts the denotation of the noun. The verbal modifier that is the output of (39) functions exactly analogously, except instead of taking a noun as an input, it takes a verb. Thus, we might call the outputs of our type shift "attributive adverbs." 20 * Justin D'Ambrosio that figures into the modifier. This gloss prefigures our ultimate analysis of the modifiers that are the output of the type-shift above. As we will see below, the Quine-Hintikka analysis can be adapted to such modifiers, and can be treated as a meaning postulate governing their behavior. According to the postulate (46) below, what it is to Q-sense is to be the agent of an event with certain successconditions. With this type-shift in hand, we can provide a compositional semantics for adverbial paraphrases such as (40) by translating each of the lexical items as in (41) and composing them as in (42). (40) Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly (41) a. tr(sense) = λx[sense′(x)] b. tr(a green square and a red circle) = Q = λP∃x∃y[green′(x)square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y) ∧ P(x) ∧ P(y)] c. tr(Mary) = mary′ d. tr(-ly) = f: λP[Q(P)]⇒ λPλx[Q-P(x)] (42) Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly Q-sense′(mary′) t Mary mary′ e sense (a green square and a red circle)-ly Q-sense′(x) e, t sense λx[sense′(x)] e, t (a green square and a red circle)-ly λPλx[Q-P(x)] 〈e, t〉, 〈e, t〉 a green square and a red circle Q 〈e, t〉, t The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 21 In (42), the boxed portion of the derivation illustrates the application of the type-shifter f , whose behavior is specified in (41-d). The function f can be applied to any generalized quantifier denoted by a noun phrase in the complement of "sense": any such quantifier can be shifted to a modifier using (41-d), and then combined with "sense" as in (42). The result is that to sense Q-ly is to Q-sense-these two formulations are notational variants.32 We now need to show how this compositional adverbial semantics validates upward monotonicity; we need to show that the adverbialist can infer from paraphrases such as (36) to paraphrases like (44) and (45): (44) Mary senses (something green)-ly. (45) Mary senses (a square)-ly. The answer is to again employ the Quine-Hintikka analysis, but to adapt it to adverbial modifiers as follows: 32There is another way of deriving the same semantics compositionally without making use of a type-shift. The method is to treat "sense" as semantically incorporating its direct object argument-that is, treat it as on a par with verbs like "salmon-fish" or "duck-hunt". On this method, instead of type-shifting the generalized quantifier that serves as the semantic value of the complement, we can type the incorporating verb so that it has a restrictor argument, as in (43): (43) Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly Q-sense′(mary′) t Mary mary′ e sense a green square and a red circle Q-sense′(x) e, t sense λQλx[Q-sense(x)] 〈〈e, t〉, t〉, 〈e, t〉 a green square and a red circle Q 〈e, t〉, t This semantics is very similar to the one given by Dayal [2011, §6.4] for incorporating verbs in Hindi. We can then apply the Quine-Hintikka analysis to the result of this derivation to explain the behavior of the restrictor, and validate upward monotonicity. I have discussed the connection between semantic incorporation and adverbialism in other work (see Author, 2019b). For further discussion of semantic incorporation, see [Carlson, 2006, Dayal, 2011, Borik and Gehrke, 2015]. 22 * Justin D'Ambrosio (46) Quine + Hintikka Analysis of "sense", adverbial version For any adverb Q-ly, individual x, world w, and time t the following holds: Q-ly(sense)(x)(w)(t) = 1 iff there is an event of sensing e in w at t of which x is the agent such that the property of being seen by x is an element of Q at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′ and times t′ such that (w, t) T (w′, t′). On this view, the adverbial modifier Q-ly serves to specify the success-conditions for the sensory event. For an event of adverbial sensing to be successful, one must see Q, where seeing is a relation between the agent of the event and a particular object, and Q is a quantifier such as "three dogs". Unlike states of sensing on the property view, adverbially modified sensings have no direct objects, and are not relational, but like the property view, the noun-phrases in their object positions contribute type-shifted semantic values to the meanings of sensory ascriptions, and these semantic values specify success-conditions for states of sensing. We can apply the analysis in (46) to (36) as follows. (47) (a green square and a red circle)-ly(sense)(Mary)(w)(t) = 1 iff there is an act of sensing e in w at t of which Mary is the agent such that the property of being seen by Mary is an element of λP[∃x∃y[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circle(y) ∧ P(x) ∧ P(y)] at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′ and times t′ such that (w, t) T (w′, t′). Given this analysis, we can argue as follows. Suppose that Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly. Given the analysis, every world in which Mary's sensing is successful is one in which she sees a green square and a red circle. But every world in which Mary sees a green square and a red circle is one in which she sees a circle. Thus, every world in which her sensing is successful is one in which she sees a circle. But by the right-to-left direction of the biconditional in (47), it follows that she senses (a circle)-ly. Therefore, if Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly, then she senses (a circle)-ly. Since exactly the same reasoning validates conjunction elimination, adverbial perceptual reports such as (36) and (38) validate upward monotonicity for adverbial modifiers. The result is a fully compositional semantics for adverbially paraphrased perceptual reports. The semantics solves the expressive problem by forming comThe Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 23 plex, quantificational modifiers, and solves the inferential problem by means of the Quine-Hintikka analysis given in (46). This analysis serves as a meaningpostulate governing the behavior of the modifiers deployed in the compositional derivation, and likewise validates upward monotonic inferences. Given the fact that adverbial modifiers are derived in a way exactly analogous to the complex properties above, and governed by an exactly analogous meaning-postulate, the adverbial view is not any more of a post-hoc regimentation of sensory reports than the property view; they are simply different views on the argumentstructure of "senses". Thus, the many-property problem is solved. 7. Montonicity Inferences: Structural or Non-Structural? There are often taken to be two approaches to solving the many-property problem- what I will call structural approach and the non-structural approach. The structural approach tries to provide adverbial paraphrases with syntactic or logical structure, and then attempts to use this structure to validate the entailments at issue in the inferential problem.33 This approach, however, has often been seen as incapable of solving the expressive problem, because it has been thought that building distinct, complex adverbial modifiers requires treating such modifiers as syntactic units. The non-structural approach, by contrast, accepts this latter conclusion: it treats complex adverbs as syntactic units, and so gives up on validating the inferences at issue using the structural features of sentences. Instead, it tries to validate such inferences by invoking relations of necessitation between states or propositions. Kriegel [2007, 2008, 2011], for example, takes the non-structural approach: he accepts that complex adverbs are syntactic primitives, but claims that some states of sensing entail others on metaphysical grounds: some states of sensing are determinates of others, and so entail them.34 33What I here call structural and non-structural approaches go by many names. Evans [1976] calls the structural entailment formal entailment, and contrasts it with semantic entailment. I follow Jackson [2007] in calling the former kind of entailment structural entailment, but while he calls the latter form lexical entailment, I call it non-structural entailment. I use the term "non-structural" because it avoids the implication that such entailments must be semantic. Non-structural entailments are relations of necessitation; they need not be lexical. 34There are several different kinds of non-structural entailments that can hold between two states of the world A and B. A may a posteriori entail B, it may a priori entail B, or it may 24 * Justin D'Ambrosio Given this distinction, it seems reasonable to ask: is the solution given above a structural solution or a non-structural solution? Are monotonicity inferences structural or non-structural inferences? Before answering this question, it is important to point out that with respect to the content of the solution just given, little turns on the answer we provide; nothing important in the solution above depends on whether the solution is classified as structural or non-structural. We have seen that standard semantic resources solve the many-property problem. The status of these perfectly general resources turns on a range of deep questions in semantics and the philosophy of language such as: What is logical form? What is the relationship between lexical meaning and logical form? Is there a distinction between linguistic knowledge from worldly knowledge? But nothing about the solution above depends on answers to these questions. However, having said this, we can still go some way toward answering the question of whether monotonicity inferences are structural. First, whether monotonicity inferences count as structural depends on the notion of structure at issue. The monotonicity inferences above are validated by providing a lexical analysis of an intensional verb-in this case "sense". In the analysis, another fully extensional verb that shows up: "see". Thus, the analysis posits a lexical connection between the meanings of "sense" and "see". Such lexical connections are captured using meaning postulates. But often, structural entailments are taken to be entailments that hold independently of meaning postulates linking distinct nonlogical expressions; that is, structural inferences are supposed to be independent of lexical knowledge. Thus, on this definition of what qualifies as a structural inference, monotonicity inferences are not structural. However, the underlying reasoning that allows us to validate monotonicity inferences may, and often will involve stuctural inferences. For example, to show that "Mary senses a red square" entails that "Mary senses a square", we need to infer from the fact that Mary sees a red square at a world to the fact that she sees a square at that world. This is a structural inference from ∃x(red(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ sees(Mary,x)) to ∃x(square(x) ∧ sees(Mary,x)). Thus, if structural inferences are any inferences that involve drawing inferences using first-order logic, then at analytically entail B. Typically, these kinds of entailment are distinguished by the status of the strict conditional A→ B. If the conditional is a posteriori, the entailment is a posteriori. If the conditional is a priori, then the entailment is a priori. If the conditional is analytic, then the entailment is analytic. The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 25 least some of the monotonicity inferences validated by "sense" count as structural. Which monotonicity inferences involve structural reasoning will depend on the particular complements involve in the inferences. For example, the analysis above validates inferences like the one from "John senses a dog" to "John senses a mammal", which is not a structural inference. This inference holds in virtue of the (necessary) subset-superset relationship between the extensions of "dog" and "mammal". We can summarize our conclusions as follows. Monotonicity inferences may count as either structural or non-structural, depending on how we draw the line between structural and non-structural inferences. But what appears to be the case is that, if we rely on an intuitively plausible notion of structure, monotonicity inferences involve both structural and non-structural elements. They first rely on the non-structural, lexical connection between seeing and sensing, but also, in some cases, on the structural relations between properties. These two components, together, solve the inferential problem. 8. Comparisons How does this solution compare to Kriegel's approach to the many-property problem? To use the example we have been discussing, Kriegel's proposal is that sensing (a green circle and a red square)-ly is a determinate of the determinable sensing (a red square)-ly, and so states in which a subject does the former entails states in which she does the latter. The proposal just given is superior to Kriegel's in that it avoids criticisms to which Kriegel's view is subject, and provides a better metaphysical explanation of the relations that hold between states of sensing. To see this, consider the following points. First, Kriegel's response to the inferential problem relies essentially on the relationship between determinables and determinates. Alex Grzankowski [2018] has criticized Kriegel's view on the grounds that invoking the relationship between determinables and determinates has untoward consequences: it entails that perceiving subjects must, for every state of sensing that is determinable, sense in every way that is a determinate of that determinable, and so be in maximally determinate states of sensing. In the terms used above, Grzankowski shows that relying on determinables and determinates validates downward as 26 * Justin D'Ambrosio well as upward monotonicity, and that this leads to absurd consequences. Second, Kriegel claims that sensing (a green circle and a red square)-ly is a determinate of sensing (a red square)-ly, and so entails it. But he also claims that sensing (rabbit)-ly does not entail sensing (undetached rabbit parts)-ly. But these two claims are in tension: why should an entailment hold between the former two states but not the latter? In the absence of a systematic way of determining which entailments hold between adverbially modified states, claiming that one entailment holds while the other fails seems unprincipled. Kriegel may claim that some states are determinables of others, but he does not provide a justification for doing so. Third, as we saw above, different verbs have different inferential profiles within their complements; while "sense" validates upward monotonicity, "fears", "lacks", and many other intensional verbs do not. This indicates that entailments between different representational states systematically depend on both the nature of the state in question and the relations between their adverbial modifiers. But Kriegel's proposal ignores how entailments between states systematically depend on these two factors, instead claiming that entailments between states hold only when one unified state is a determinate of another. Thus, Kriegel's proposal misses a crucial explanatory generalization. The form of adverbialism developed here avoids all of these problems. First, since the proposal just developed does not rely on the relationship between determinables and determinates, and instead employs the Quine-Hintikka analysis, it avoids Grzankowski's criticisms-it validates only upward monotonicity. Second, since the Quine-Hintikka analysis is intensional, it accounts for the intensionality within the complement of "sense", and provides a principled way of distinguishing between adverbially modified states up to necessary equivalence of their modifiers.35 Third, this proposal provides a systematic account of the 35In distinguishing between states of sensing only up to necessary equivalence of adverbial modifiers, this form of adverbialism is not hyperintensional. Accordingly, if a subject senses P-ly, and necessarily, all and only Ps are Qs, then the subject senses Q-ly. Further, it follows from the Quine-Hintikka analysis that if a subject senses anything, the subject senses the property of being self-identical (or any other property that everything has necessarily). These consequences are features of a possible-worlds approach to spelling out success-conditions, and are exactly analogous to the problems occasioned by the Hintikka analysis of propositional attitudes. However, there are well-known ways of addressing these problems. For one approach to hyperintensionality, see Forbes [2006, Ch. 8]. For an attempt to solve the analogue of the logical omniscience problem, see Zimmermann [2006]. The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too * 27 entailment relations between states of sensing that reveals how they depend on both the nature of the state in question and the relations between modifiers of that state. Given a verb V and two adverbs Q-ly and R-ly, it determines whether x Vs Q-ly entails that x Vs R-ly in terms of whether fulfillment of the successconditions specified by Q-ly likewise specify the success-conditions specified by R-ly. The present proposal also has the advantage of being fully compositional. Kriegel himself does not discuss the question of compositionality, but his solution appears to be non-compositional: determinate to determinable inferences rely on our knowledge of the relations between the modifiers denoted by syntactically simple expressions. But given that such modifiers can be arbitrarily complex, it appears that even if certain adverbially modified states of sensing necessitate each other, we could not come to know that they do.36 By contrast, while the view developed here does require some knowledge of relations between lexical items-between the meanings of "sense" and "see"-it is fully compositional, and can thus underwrite our knowledge of entailments between states of sensing that are modified in arbitrarily complex ways. Finally, the solution presented here is based on a mechanism that is totally standard in semantics, and is necessary for purposes other than solving adverbialism's inferential problem. Adopting it subsumes the inferential problem for adverbialism-which has at times appeared intractable-under a much broader semantic problem that is not intractable. On the contrary, it is a problem for which there is a widely accepted solution. As such, there appears to be no reason why those inclined towards Kriegel's adverbialism-or toward other forms of adverbialism-should resist adopting it. 9. Conclusion The foregoing arguments show that with respect to the many-property problem, a range of property views in the philosophy of perception are on a par with adverbialism. Both property views and adverbial views treat the complements of perceptual verbs in nonstandard ways. Property theorists treat them as denoting 36This point has been noted already by Alexander Dinges [2015, p. 233, n. 2]; here I simply reiterate it. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for rightly pointing this out. 28 * Justin D'Ambrosio complex properties, while the adverbialist treats them as denoting complex adverbial modifiers. Further, both of these nonstandard treatments are derived from the ordinary meaning of the direct-object noun phrase via a type-shift. Both views can then make use of the Quine-Hintikka analysis-which shows how the structural relationships between properties determine relationships of entailment between states of sensing-to validate upward monotonic inferences. The resulting form of adverbialism differs from traditional adverbial views in that it involves success-conditions, and these success-conditions are essential to the adverbialist's ability to overcome the many-property problem. Insofar as this form of adverbialism involves success-conditions, and specifies these successconditions in terms of relational seeings, it takes relational seeing as explanatorily fundamental. However, the view is one on which the success-conditions of adverbial perceptual states are specified by adverbial modifiers, and on which in the case of a hallucination, there simply is no object to which the hallucinating subject is related. This captures the main desiderata on an adverbial view of perception. 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dincolo de fiinţă neoPlAToniSMUl Şi APoRiile oRiGinii inefABile dincolo de fiinţă neoPlAToniSMUl Şi APoRiile oRiGinii inefABile ¤ Marilena Vlad Zeta Books, București www.zetabooks.com © 2011 Zeta Books pentru prezenta ediție Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naţionale a României VLAD, MARILENA Dincolo de fiinţă : neoplatonismul şi aporiile originii inefabile / Marilena Vlad. București : Zeta Books, 2011 Bibliogr. iSBn 978-973-1997-69-8 1 ¤ inTRodUceRe exerciţiul filozofic neoplatonic a avut ca scop reconstruirea lumii în acord cu gândirea, cu principiile ei. Realitatea este privită ca un întreg organic care stă sub condiţia fundamentală a inteligibilităţii: fiecare lucru își are locul și rolul său specific pe „scena" lumii, precum și raţiunea sa proprie de a fi. În fiecare lucru supus devenirii, gândirea descoperă urma modelului inteligibil superior, iar lumea în ansamblul ei este reflectarea - corporală, multiplă și temporală - a unei lumi incorporale, unitare și eterne. neoplatonismul vrea să vadă în lumea de aici o lume guvernată de sens, depinzând de o esenţă inteligibilă anterioară. În aceste condiţii, gândirea filozofică are mai multe mize care converg. Prima dintre ele este aceea de a înţelege lucrurile în acordul lor intim cu lumea inteligibilă, la care numai gândirea are acces. o a doua miză este aceea de a descoperi lumea inteligibilă însăși, cu structura și regulile ei proprii de funcţionare, care nu sunt întotdeauna identice cu cele ale gândirii discursive, adică ale gândirii prin care noi suntem deprinși să abordăm lucrurile. Acesta este motivul pentru care lumea inteligibilă nu poate fi descrisă foarte ușor în termenii comuni ai gândirii noastre obișnuite, prinse în sfera discursivităţii, a sensibilităţii și a devenirii. În consecinţă, o a treia miză este aceea de a ridica gândirea noastră la sfera superioară a inteligibilului pur, scoţând-o din preajma ei imediată. Însă, pentru a putea surprinde în mod adecvat realitatea inteligibilă superioară, gândirea noastră trebuie să treacă printr-un proces de purificare și de rafinare. Părăsind regimul corporal, sufletul trebuie să se pregătească pentru contactul cu inteligibilul absolut. neoplatonismul devine astfel un dincolo de fiinȚă6 efort constant de a readuce gândirea la nivelul pur inteligibil. Scoţând gândirea din domeniul sensibilului - unde obiectele propriu-zise ale gândirii sunt amestecate cu substratul corporal -, filozofii neoplatonici încearcă să urmărească modul în care se arată realitatea prin prisma gândirii pure. ei vor să vadă lucrurile așa cum ar apărea ele unei gândiri desprinse de sensibil, precum în experimentul imaginat de Platon în Phaidros1. Totuși, nu aceasta este ţinta ultimă a neoplatonismului. Provocarea cea mai înaltă pe care o aduce această tradiţie filozofică se referă de fapt la ceea ce nu mai poate fi gândit. Problema capitală a gândirii neoplatonice nu privește lumea inteligibilă, ci principiul ei. Se pune întrebarea: de unde provine această lume, care este sursa de la care ea se desfășoară și care este finalitatea ei? nivelul inteligibil are el însuși nevoie de perspectiva înglobatoare a unui principiu unic, simplu și anterior. este vorba despre un principiu care să poată explica natura multiplă a inteligibilului. dar, pentru aceasta, principiul însuși nu mai poate fi tot o fiinţă inteligibilă, ci el va fi sursa unică și unitară pornind de la care se poate constitui realitatea inteligibilă. el devine astfel principiul absolut al întregii realităţi - atât al celei inteligibile, cât și al celei sensibile, pe care o explicăm prin referire la inteligibil. căutarea modelului inteligibil al întregii realităţi este astfel îndreptată spre o căutare și mai înaltă: cea a principiului prim și unic. Așa cum lumea inteligibilă restrânge lumea devenirii la unitatea anterioară a modelului, a gândirii pure, tot astfel, pluralitatea acestei lumi pur inteligibile are nevoie de unitatea anterioară a unui principiu unic. Pentru a gândi în mod adecvat lucrurile, avem nevoie de un model inteligibil. dar, pentru a gândi până la capăt un astfel de model, avem nevoie să „concepem" un principiu care nu mai este propriu-zis conceptibil. lumea inteligibilă ne trimite astfel spre un principiu supra-inteligibil. Un astfel de principiu anterior lumii inteligibile nu mai poate fi el însuși abordat prin mijloacele gândirii - nici măcar prin 1 Platon, Phaidros, 247 c–e; vezi și Republica, 517 b 5. Introducere 7 gândirea cea mai înaltă și mai pură -, ci el este dincolo de gândire și dincolo de tot ceea ce poate deveni obiect al gândirii. Astfel, pe fundalul unei gândiri foarte sistematice și înglobatoare, se inserează întrebarea radicală a ceea ce depășește orice gândire în genere. Totodată, încercarea de a sistematiza sfera fiinţei - atât cea sensibilă cât și cea inteligibilă - conduce spre problema fundamentală a ceea ce precede orice fiinţă. Tentativa de a configura graniţele inteligibilităţii realităţii - și de a surprinde fiinţa pur inteligibilă în ea însăși - se lovește de problema unui principiu radical și unitar, sursă a inteligibilităţii, anterior acesteia. Astfel, problema fundamentală pe care o ridică neoplatonismul este aceea a emergenţei de negânditului în inima a ceea ce gândim: pentru a putea gândi cu adevărat ceva până la capăt, trebuie să ne confruntăm la un moment dat cu ceea ce nu mai poate fi gândit. dar, deși nu mai poate fi gândit, cunoscut și nici măcar numit, nu ne putem lipsi de acest „ceva" inaccesibil, deoarece, în absenţa principiului prim, nimic altceva nu poate exista și nu poate fi gândit. Gândirea noastră este astfel prinsă în sfera de gravitaţie a inexprimabilului, a de negânditului, iar aceasta în două maniere complementare: pe de o parte, încercarea de a gândi realitatea ne conduce în mod necesar la un principiu care se sustrage gândirii; pe de altă parte, întreaga realitate va fi descrisă de neoplatonici în strânsă dependenţă de acest principiu ce scapă gândirii. Astfel, între ceea ce gândim și ceea ce nu mai poate fi gândit există o dublă relaţie: în sens ascendent, gândirea ajunge să descopere necesitatea unui principiu inexprimabil; în sens descendent, inexprimabilul este singurul care poate genera întreaga structură a realităţii, dându-i raţionalitate, dându-i o ordine proprie și, astfel, un sens. ne aflăm în situaţia paradoxală pe care o descrie Platon în prima parte a dialogului Parmenide - „dialog-manifest" pentru neoplatonici. Anume, pentru a putea gândi lucrurile, avem ne voie de ideile lucrurilor, însă ideile însele nu pot fi înţelese ca atare. de asemenea, pentru a gândi lucrurile plurale, avem nevoie de ceea ce dincolo de fiinȚă8 nu este plural, de unu, însă acest unu nu poate fi niciodată gândit în sine, ci în privinţa lui trebuie să ne mulţumim cu concluziile negative: unul nu poate fi cunoscut, definit sau numit1. În același sens, în Republica, 509 b, se afirmă că lucrurile au nevoie de o sursă de la care își primesc fiinţa și faptul de a fi cunoscute, însă această sursă nu mai poate fi ea însăși fiinţă, ci trebuie să fie dincolo de fiinţă. Plotin, Porfir, iamblichos, Proclus și damascius vor aprofunda această intuiţie fundamentală a unei insuficienţe a fiinţei în sine însăși: fiinţa nu poate fi înţeleasă și explicată până la capăt, dacă rămânem în limitele ei, în datele ei precise. În schimb, în ea însăși se întrevăd indiciile unui nivel superior, dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire, pe care neoplatonicii îl vor numi unu absolut și bine suprem - în linia sugestiilor lui Platon. Pentru a gândi în mod deplin realitatea, trebuie să renunţăm la un moment dat la calea sigură și clară a raţiunii stăpâne pe sine și să intrăm în „vârtejul" pe care ni-l provoacă ceea ce nu mai poate fi gândit2. neoplatonismul va fi astfel o tradiţie a înfruntării constante cu acest „ceva" de negândit. confruntarea cu raţiunea care guvernează întreaga realitate este în ultimă instanţă o confruntare cu ceea ce depășește orice raţiune. Scopul cercetării noastre este acela de a pune în lumină articulaţiile acestei teme fundamentale a gândirii neoplatonice: tema unui principiu de dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire. Astfel, vom încerca să trecem încă o dată prin acest punct prin care neoplatonicii invită să trecem, avertizându-ne totodată că drumul este unul „impracticabil și fără ieșire"3, deoarece aici toate modalităţile obișnuite ale gândirii sunt suprimate. Totuși, în această încercare a noastră, vom explica fiecare moment al drumului parcurs de 1 Platon, Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 8. 2 Plotin (Enneade, Vi, 7, 36.18) descrie această apropiere de principiu ca pe o mișcare ascendentă a unui val, care sustrage sufletul din terenul ferm al conceptelor și al explicaţiilor. la damascius (De principiis, R. i, 7), încercarea de apropiere de principiul prim va fi descrisă ca o „răsturnare" a discursului. 3 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 5.17–18. Introducere 9 gândirea neoplatonică, elucidând problemele ce s-au ridicat de fiecare dată. Mai precis, vom urmări modul în care a început și a evoluat meditaţia neoplatonică privitoare la un principiu care precede întreaga realitate și se sustrage oricărei gândiri. ne propunem să descoperim care este fundalul din care s-a născut această problemă, cum anume susţin neoplatonicii ne cesitatea existenţei unui asemenea principiu și care sunt dificultăţile pe care le ridică admiterea lui - dificultăţi de care tradiţia neoplatonică a fost pe deplin conștientă și care explică evoluţia însăși a doctrinei neoplatonice asupra principiului prim. Într-adevăr, deși tema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire a concentrat eforturile celor câteva secole de gândire neo platonică, legând astfel o tradiţie foarte puternică și influentă, totuși, tema însăși și prezenţa ei în gândirea neoplatonică este profund problematică, din mai multe puncte de vedere: atât în privinţa sursei, a constituirii ei ca temă filozofică, cât și în pri vinţa evoluţiei sale. În primul rând, sursa doctrinară a problemei se află în câteva indicaţii platonice - precum cele din Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 8 și Republica, 509 b, amintite mai sus - pe care, însă, Platon nu le explică până la capăt, ci le învăluie de fiecare dată într-un aer de mister. de aceea, prima problemă ce se ridică este cea a continuităţii neoplatonismului în raport cu sursa de la care el se revendică, deoarece această sursă este ea însăși greu de înţeles. Întrebarea care se pune este următoarea: cum se face că o temă atât de izolată și de puţin dezbătută în opera lui Platon - anume tema unui dincolo de fiinţă şi de gândire - devine preocuparea centrală a unei tradiţii filozofice atât de largi și de prolifice precum neoplatonismul? Această întrebare descrie o primă sarcină a cercetării noastre. În al doilea rând, însuși felul în care intervine această problemă în tradiţia neoplatonică ridică anumite probleme. Astfel, dată fiind maniera nedefinită în care apare tema unui dincolo de fiinţă la Platon, reluarea ei în neoplatonism înseamnă de fapt o dincolo de fiinȚă10 nouă instituire tematică. deși se inspiră din indicaţiile platonice, neoplatonismul le depășește cu mult, instituind o nouă paradigmă de gândire. de la indiciile minimale din opera platonică - a căror miză ultimă rămâne în cele din urmă echivocă - este o cale lungă până la principiul prim al neoplatonicilor. Acesta din urmă este lansat ca o problemă în sine, foarte elaborată, cu multiple implicaţii pentru întreaga sferă a fiinţei și a gândirii. Problema existenţei unui principiu prim al întregii realităţi se insinuează de-a lungul tradiţiei neoplatonice, fără însă a fi foarte limpede cum anume ajunge ea să se impună ca temă centrală și de ce este ea atât de importantă. la Plotin, de pildă, gândirea nu urmează o linie ascendentă, de la realitatea plurală înspre principiul de dincolo de fiinţă, ci existenţa principiului prim este presupusă parcă dintotdeauna: gândirea însăși pornește de la această problemă și gravitează în jurul ei. există întotdeauna un fundal problematic presupus, care nu ajunge niciodată să fie el însuși interogat ca atare. Atunci, ne putem întreba: cum apare această problemă în neoplatonism, cum este ea formulată ca problemă centrală și cum argumentează gânditorii neoplatonici necesitatea ei? iată care va fi cea de-a doua interogaţie fundamentală de la care pornește cartea de faţă. În al treilea rând, prezenţa acestei teme de-a lungul tradiţiei este, de asemenea, problematică. Tema nu este acceptată și înţeleasă în același fel de către toţi gânditorii neoplatonici. din contră, ea dă naștere mai multor polemici - fie directe, fie indirecte. deși tema este liantul însuși al tradiţiei neoplatonice, ea leagă de fapt istoria foarte subtilă a unor constante schimbări de perspectivă, a unor răsturnări suprapuse. Pe de o parte, nici unul dintre gânditorii neoplatonici nu a contrazis la nivel doctrinar afirmaţia fundamentală a existenţei unui principiu de dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire. Pe de altă parte, modul în care problema a fost abordată și rezolvată diferă foarte mult de la un autor la altul. Amănuntele și subtilităţile acestei probleme apar pe parcursul discutării ei. Soluţiile oferite dau naștere în continuare unor Introducere 11 noi întrebări și dificultăţi, unor contestări ale vechilor soluţii și unor încercări de depășire sau de nuanţare a acestora. Astfel, pro blema însăși nu este una unitară, ci ea se ţese din soluţiile și dificultăţile care s-au succedat. de aceea, pentru a înţelege această problemă, se impune să parcurgem aceste dificultăţi în ordinea în care ele au fost ridicate. În analiza noastră, vom aprofunda așadar tema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă şi de gândire, urmărind diversele formulări problematice pe care le-a cunoscut de-a lungul tradiţiei neoplatonice. Astfel, tema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă este problematică atât în privinţa sursei sale platonice, în privinţa modului în care această temă este preluată și reformulată în neoplatonism, cât și în privinţa transmiterii sau a evoluţiei sale de-a lungul acestei tradiţii. În plus, în ea însăși, tema se arată a fi paradoxală, deoarece ea presupune a gândi ceva de dincolo de gândire, respectiv a vorbi despre ceea ce nu este nimic anume, ci trece dincolo de fiinţă, dincolo de toate cele ce sunt. dacă problema este în mare măsură configurată de istoria ei, motivul acestui lucru este unul esenţial: este vorba de faptul că a gândi asupra principiului de dincolo de fiinţă şi de gândire înseamnă, de fapt, a merge împotriva avertismentului pe care îl ridică acesta, anume că principiul este de negândit. dar atunci, problema provine tocmai din încercarea de a gândi principiul - în ciuda precauţiilor luate de fiecare autor neoplatonic în parte. Însuși faptul că un autor sau altul vorbește „despre" acest principiu este problematic pentru tema noastră și este o sursă de dificultăţi. Altfel spus, problema nu este una neutră pentru gândirea însăși care „atacă" această problemă. de aceea, în marginea întregii noastre cercetări - care va pune în evidenţă „stadiile" acestei probleme - vom fi confruntaţi în mod constant cu paradoxul cel mai adânc al neoplatonismului: este vorba despre faptul că, în viziunea neoplatonică, gândirea autentic filozofică se poate desfășura numai în orizontul deschis de un principiu care nu poate fi încadrat în nici un orizont noetic și care nu poate fi „prins" în nici un discurs dincolo de fiinȚă12 filozofic. Prin urmare, de-a lungul lucrării, va trebui să desfacem firul gândirii neoplatonice în cel puţin două părţi. Pe de o parte, va trebuie să punem în lumină necesitatea radicală a principiului prim la orice nivel al gândirii noastre - de la cea comună, până la cea mai înaltă gândire speculativă. Pe de altă parte, va trebui să arătăm cum, la fiecare nivel, acest principiu se sustrage unei abordări frontale, fiind împins într-un orizont problematic din ce în ce mai greu de surprins, până la orizontul final al principiului inefabil, care va încheia parcursul nostru și care reprezintă treapta cea mai înaltă a eforturilor neoplatonice de a „gândi" de negânditul. natura și dificultăţile inerente acestei teme impun analizei noastre mai multe stringenţe metodologice. În primul rând, analiza noastră trebuie să recupereze sursele doctrinare ale problemei principiului de dincolo de fiinţă. Vom practica așadar o analiză istorică, punând în evidenţă sursele platonico-aristotelice ale problemei principiului prim. Vom acorda o atenţie deosebită manierei în care diverșii autori neoplatonici preiau și interpretează referinţele platonice ale problemei. doar în felul acesta putem înţelege cum anume se nasc nivelurile problematice ale tradiţiei neoplatonice, toate având însă în spate un același substrat doctrinar fundamental. o a doua stringenţă metodologică este aceea de a pune în oglindă - în mod comparativ - gândirea diverșilor autori neoplatonici în privinţa principiului de dincolo de fiinţă, pentru a vedea cum se ţese această temă din întrepătrunderea unor nuanţe problematice de multe ori greu de identificat. În felul acesta, va ieși în evidenţă sistematicitatea dinamică a problemei noastre, modul în care ea crește înglobând și depășind diversele dificultăţi ridicate de un autor sau altul. Acest tip de ana liză ne va permite să punem în evidenţă gândirea neoplatonică asupra principiului prim ca o serie de trimiteri de la un autor la altul, de la o perspectivă la alta, fie în sensul în care anumite aspecte ale unei gândiri au dat naștere unor dispute sau răsturnări hermeneutice ulterioare, fie în sensul în care un autor Introducere 13 sau altul, pentru a-și susţine propria poziţie, recurge la critici asupra gân dirii filozofilor anteriori - chiar dacă acestea nu sunt întotdeauna explicit formulate sau explicit îndreptate spre cineva anume. o a treia exigenţă a tipului de cercetare pe care vrem să îl întreprindem este analiza filologică a textelor grecești relevante pentru tema noastră. numai prezenţa constantă a universului conceptual originar ne poate permite să recuperăm în mod adecvat rădăcinile unor probleme (precum problema înaintării în vid la damascius), să urmărim cu precizie unele succesiuni problematice (precum problema travaliului, care poate fi examinată filologic de la Platon până la sfârșitul tradiţiei neoplatonice), și să operăm distincţii fine între concepte sau sensuri apropiate, a că ror confundare ar fi cu totul dăunătoare (precum în cazul distin cţiei dintre indicibil și inefabil la damascius). Analiza noastră pornește de la premisa că problema principiului prim de dincolo de fiinţă şi de gândire nu poate fi înţeleasă în mod deplin decât dacă avem în vedere evoluţia ei, începând de la minimele indicaţii platonice și terminând cu analizele extrem de nuanţate și de subtile ale ultimului conducător al școlii neoplatonice din Atena, anume damascius. de-a lungul tradi ţiei, problema capătă formulări diferite, parcurgând astfel o serie de dispute filozofice, de critici suprapuse și de replici ce se nasc unele din altele. de aceea, ea nu poate fi înţeleasă doar din perspectiva unui autor separat de tradiţia însăși, ci integrând fiecare autor în tradiţie, urmărind continuităţile și discontinuităţile faţă de ceilalţi gânditori, atât faţă de cei anteriori, a căror gândire o integrează, eventual, cât și faţă de cei ulteriori, care dau mărturie despre acel autor, judecându-l însă din perspectiva lor, din perspectiva noilor soluţii pe care ei înșiși le-au propus. În felul acesta, problema principiului prim înaintează ca o bucată muzicală, cu trimiteri în urmă la tradiţia deja parcursă, dar și cu trezirea sau anunţarea unor alte probleme, ce vor constitui tradiţia viitoare. Întrebarea sub care se desfășoară analiza noastră este: cum putem admite un principiu prim al întregii realităţi, iar aceasta dincolo de fiinȚă14 în două sensuri: pe de o parte, cum ajungem să admitem acest principiu, care este necesitatea admiterii lui, iar pe de altă parte, cum este cu putinţă să acceptăm și să gândim un astfel de principiu, cum putem să-l afirmăm fie și ca temă filozofică, de vreme ce el depășește gândirea însăși? Întrebarea are așadar două laturi inseparabile: una a „necesităţii" și una a „imposibilităţii" admiterii principiului. de la Plotin la damascius, tradiţia neoplatonică a încercat să demonstreze „necesitatea" și să rezolve sau să nuanţeze „imposibilitatea". cartea noastră este structurată în trei părţi, corespunzătoare raportului dintre aceste două laturi ale problemei. Prima parte urmărește modul în care s-a constituit problema principiului prim în gândirea primului autor neoplatonic: Plotin. Vom vedea cum a impus acesta necesitatea principiului prim, accentuând în același timp imposibilitatea de a-l gândi ca atare, în mod direct. În cea de-a doua parte, vom vedea că necesitatea principiului și imposibilitatea gândirii lui ajung să se confrunte, dând naștere unei serii de paradoxuri, de aporii cărora încearcă să le răspundă pe rând Porfir, iamblichos și Proclus, în căutarea unui echilibru între acestea două. cea de-a treia parte este dedicată lui damascius. el pornește tocmai de la imposibilitatea radicală de a gândi principiul, și deduce de aici necesitatea lui. Prima parte a cărţii se va deschide cu analiza sursei platonice a problemei principiului de dincolo de fiinţă. Vom încerca să refacem cadrul teoretic de la care porneau gânditorii neoplatonici. de asemenea, ne vom întreba cum a receptat neoplatonismul această sursă platonică, ajungând să instituie o paradigmă nouă de gândire. Vom întreprinde apoi o analiză amănunţită a manierei în care Plotin a elaborat problematica unui principiu de dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire, realizând un sistem doctrinar compact având în centru acest principiu. Analiza noastră va urma o direcţie ascendentă, de la lucrurile sensibile la fiinţa inteligibilă și, apoi, la principiul de dincolo de fiinţă. Prima treaptă a acestui parcurs ascendent este cea a unităţii din lucrurile sensibile. la acest ni vel, vom vedea cum Plotin impune anterioritatea unităţii faţă de fiinţa și gândirea Introducere 15 oricărui lucru, respingând în acest sens perspectiva aristotelică și cea stoică. Totuși, vom vedea că Plotin nu se oprește la acest prim nivel al lucrurilor sensibile, ci va căuta sursa unităţii din lucruri mai departe, în lumea inteligibilă. Așa cum lucrurile sensibile își au un corespondent inteligibil, tot astfel Plotin descoperă un corespondent inteligibil al numărului din lucruri, respectiv al unităţii. Pentru a înţelege cum se face această trecere, de la unul sensibil la unul inteligibil, vom discuta mai întâi laborioasa analiză a lui Plotin asupra numărului inteligibil și asupra felului în care se constituie acesta pornind de la unul inteligibil. ne vom concentra apoi asupra unului inteligibil însuși: departe de a fi un simplu atribut al fiinţei inteligibile, unul este condiţia de posibilitate a fiinţei și cel care îi oferă acesteia stabilitatea proprie, făcând-o cu adevărat fiinţă veritabilă, neschimbătoare, inteligibilă. Totuși, acest unu descoperit de Plotin în lumea inteligibilă nu poate fi unul absolut, ci el însuși indică spre un unu încă și mai anterior. de aceea, ultima etapă a gândirii lui Plotin pe care o vom analiza este cea referitoare la unul absolut, anterior fiinţei inteligibile și unităţii specifice acesteia. Acest salt va marca diferenţa radicală a neoplatonismului faţă de gândirea anterioară, mai ales faţă de cea de sorginte aristotelică. Pentru a pune în evidenţă trecerea lui Plotin de la unul intelectului la unul absolut, vom discuta critica sa la adresa lui Aristotel și a tradiţiei aristotelice, care face din intelectul divin principiul prim al întregii realităţi. critica lui Plotin este una dublă: pe de o parte, intelectul divin este mai unitar decât lăsa să se înţeleagă tradiţia aristotelică; pe de altă parte, intelectul poartă încă o urmă de pluralitate, și de aceea nu poate fi admis ca principiu prim - așa cum era în tradiţia aristotelică. dincolo de acest intelect se află unul absolut, principiul prim al întregii realităţi. o dată ajunși în acest punct, va trebui să scoatem la lumină sensul - sau sensurile - anteriorităţii principiului prim faţă de fiinţa inteligibilă. Prima sarcină care se va impune va fi aceea de a identifica indicaţiile trans-noetice și trans-ontologice ale principiului. În dincolo de fiinȚă16 acest sens, există două căi posibile, pentru a înţelege ce înseamnă transcendenţa principiului absolut faţă de fiinţă. Prima dintre acestea recurge la cele două nume tradiţionale acordate principiului prim: unu prim și bine absolut. Vom încer ca să arătăm ce sugerează fiecare dintre aceste nume în privinţa principiului prim. A doua manieră în care vom discuta trans cendenţa principiului absolut constă în a indica anterioritatea lui faţă de fiecare dintre cele trei niveluri ale intelectului divin, adică faţă de triada fiinţă-viaţă-intelect. În urma acestor analize, vom vedea că unul-bine reprezintă pentru Plotin răspunsul la căutarea unei unităţi absolute care fundamentează întreaga realitate. dacă unitatea intelectului divin rămâne relativă la pluralitate, unul absolut este „singur", el este doar unu; el dă fiinţei stabilitatea sa, făcând-o să fie ceea ce este. dincolo de acest unu, orice înaintare este imposibilă. Vom discuta această interdicţie de a trece dincolo de unu, această limită pe care Plotin o impune gândirii, o limită fondatoare pentru întreaga realitate. În urma acestei analize pe straturi a transcendenţei principiului, vom ridica o serie de probleme ce ţin de însăși posibilitatea de a îndrepta gândirea filozofică înspre un principiu de dincolo de gândire. Problema însăși a unui principiu de dincolo de gândire rămâne în esenţa ei paradoxală; de aceea, trebuie să înţelegem care este sensul unor expresii precum „dincolo de fiinţă" și „dincolo de gândire", astfel încât acestea să nu devină auto-contradictorii. Vom vedea cum rezolvă Plotin însuși dificultăţile ce se ridică în acest sens. În a doua parte a cărţii, vom încerca să punem în evidenţă structura reticulară în care se constituie meditaţia neoplatonică despre principiul de dincolo de fiinţă, și anume prin trimiteri repetate, directe sau indirecte, la interpretările gânditorilor anteriori. este vorba despre trimiteri care fie au o intenţie explicit critică, fie schimbă direcţia interpretărilor anterioare. Vom încerca să arătăm că aceste tipuri de referiri critice și reinterpretări ţin de o necesitate interioară a problemei înseși. este vorba despre faptul că principiul este dintru început inaccesibil gândirii Introducere 17 discursive, însă meditaţia filozofică tinde să îl fixeze într-un fel sau altul, chiar dacă pornește de la ideea imposibilităţii de a fixa principiul; în consecinţă, interpretările fiecărui nou filozof intrat în această „vânătoare" a principiului vor juca rolul unor corective, care încearcă să atenueze efectul (sau riscul) fixării principiului într-o gândire sau alta. Gândirea neoplatonică în ansamblul ei balansează astfel între o extremă și alta: pe de o parte, aceea de a stabili locul și funcţia determinată a principiului în sistemul realităţii, iar, pe de altă parte, aceea de a scoate principiul din orice determinaţie de ordin inteligibil. Astfel, vom vedea cum Porfir - pornind de la anumite indicaţii din opera maestrului său, Plotin - încearcă să dea principiului un rol precis în constituirea realităţii și un sens mult mai conturat: principiul va fi descris drept actul pur de a fi, de la care se constituie fiinţa ca act de a fi determinat (inteligibil sau intelectiv). cazul lui Porfir este foarte controversat, datorită unei aparente contradicţii între ceea ce spun mărturiile asupra lui, respectiv anumite pasaje din opera păstrată a lui Porfir însuși. Astfel, Proclus și damascius arată că, pentru Porfir, principiul prim ar cădea la nivelul (cel mai înalt) al intelectului însuși. În schimb, în anumite pasaje ale operei sale, Porfir afirmă existenţa unui principiu necoordonat, de dincolo de fiinţă, care nu poate fi pus în nici o relaţie cu fiinţa inteligibilă. o primă sarcină pe care ne-o asumăm este aceea de a pune în evidenţă modul în care înţelege Porfir principiul prim, anume ca act pur de a fi, anterior fiinţei determinate. În continuare, vom arăta în ce fel gândește Porfir anterioritatea unului faţă de intelect și ce rol acordă el unului în constituirea intelectului. de asemenea, vom arăta că, ceea ce pentru Porfir reprezintă principiul prim - pornind de la care se constituie intelectul, dar care rămâne necoordonat intelectului - nu mai poate juca rolul de principiu absolut necoordonat, în neoplatonismul ulterior. Tocmai de aceea, pentru Proclus și damascius, principiul necoordonat al lui Porfir corespunde vârfului unitar al inteligibilului; în schimb, principiul necoordonat dincolo de fiinȚă18 va fi considerat dincolo de acesta. În felul acesta, credem că se rezolvă aparenta contradicţie care planează asupra lui Porfir. Totuși, se pune întrebarea: cum se face trecerea de la perspectiva lui Porfir la cea a lui Proclus sau damascius? de ce principiul prim, așa cum îl înţelege Porfir, ajunge să fie „depășit" în neoplatonismul ulterior? Vom vedea că această schimbare interpretativă se datorează uneia dintre cele mai redutabile dificultăţi ridicate în tradiţia neoplatonică, și anume din partea lui iamblichos, discipolul, dar nu și continuatorul lui Porfir. Problema radicală pe care o ridică iamblichos este aceea a diferenţei dintre principiul prim ca transcendenţă absolută și principiul drept cauză primă a întregii realităţi. dacă Porfir identifică principiul transcendent cu originea intelectului, iamblichos le separă radical. Vom intra aici pe terenul celei mai mari aporii a gândirii neoplatonice, și anume: cum poate principiul transcendent - care este dincolo de restul realităţii - să aibă vreo legătură cu această realitate, să intre într-o relaţie cauzală cu ea? criticând perspectiva lui Porfir, iamblichos va încerca să sustragă principiul din orice fel de raport cu cele de după el și să îl instituie într-o transcendenţă absolută. Sarcina noastră va fi aceea de a reconstitui gândirea lui iamblichos pornind de la mărturiile ce se păstrează despre el în scrierile lui Proclus și ale lui damascius. Vom vedea că - pe firul criticii la adresa lui Porfir - iamblichos ajunge la problema radicală a imposibilităţii de a uni într-o aceeași ipostază transcendenţa și cauzalitatea principiului. So luţia lui iamblichos la această problemă va fi aceea de a distinge două ipostaze principiale dincolo de fiinţă: principiul-cauză, unit cu inteligibilul, respectiv principiul-transcendent, complet sustras in teligibilului și absolut indicibil. Vom vedea însă că lucrurile nu se opresc nici aici. continuând să descoasă paradoxul principiului de dincolo de fiinţă, Proclus respinge perspectiva lui iamblichos. el încearcă din nou să pună în acord aspectul cauzal și cel absolut transcendent al principiului. Pentru a înţelege cum anume, vom pune mai întâi în evidenţă Introducere 19 maniera în care structurează Proclus fiinţa inteligibilă, ţinând cont de puterea de radiere a celor trei aspecte ale acesteia: fiinţă, viaţă și gândire. Pornind de la această structură ascendentă, Proclus trage concluzia existenţei unui principiu unu, transcendent fiinţei și cauză a fiinţei. Unul este singurul care are o putere de radiere mai mare decât fiinţa, depășind-o în ambele sensuri: atât ca transcendenţă, cât și ca putere cauzală. după aceste prime precizări, vom intra în amănuntele problemei principiului de dincolo de fiinţă la Proclus, discutând pe rând cele două aspecte ale acestuia: transcendenţa și cauzalitatea. Scopul analizei este acela de a descoperi cum rezolvă Proclus antinomia dintre acestea. Pe de o parte, Proclus accentuează transcendenţa principiului, gândindu-l ca pe o nefiinţă prin excelenţă, dincolo de fiinţă. Pe de altă parte, vom vedea că, pentru Proclus, cauzalitatea nu contrazice transcendenţa, nu i se opune; din contră, ea dă transcendenţei sensul ei deplin. Mai precis, dacă transcendenţa principiului este percepută ca negaţie a fiinţei în ansamblul ei, negaţia indică tocmai faptul că toate lucrurile iau naștere de la acest principiu care nu este nimic anume. În felul acesta, transcendenţa este cauzalitate, și invers. dar care este deznodământul acestei căutări a principiului prim? care va fi ultimul cuvânt al tradiţiei în acest sens? Vom afla răspunsul acestei întrebări în partea finală a analizei noastre. damascius, ultimul diadoh platonic, reprezintă momentul de criză și de critică al gândirii neoplatonice, dar, în același timp, el este cel care propune o restructurare și o fundamentare mai profundă a acestei gândiri, pornind tocmai de la aporiile pe care ea le ridică. observând opoziţia dintre principiul-cauză și principiul-transcendenţă, damascius formulează în mod radical problema principiului, întrebându-se dacă acesta este dincolo de totul, adică dincolo de tot ceea ce putem gândi (ca transcendenţă absolută) sau este în totul (ca o cauză primă a totului, ca vârful său cel mai înalt). după o scurtă analiză a situaţiei hermeneutice în care se situează damascius, vom intra în analiza dublei aporii dincolo de fiinȚă20 a principiului prim. Punând faţă în faţă totul și principiul totului, damascius caută o posibilă raportare a celor doi termeni. firele aporiei vor pune în evidenţă imposibilitatea unei astfel de raportări, fie într-o direcţie, fie în alta. definit prin pluralitate, completitudine și limitare, totul nu poate avea un principiu în afara sa. Pe de altă parte, definit ca principiu unic al totului, principiul nu poate fi integrat în totul al cărui principiu este. o primă soluţie oferită acestei duble aporii constă în înţelegerea principiului ca „unul-tot anterior totului", care unește transcendenţa și cauzalitatea. Totuși, analizând modul în care înţelegem noi „unul-tot anterior totului", damascius va observa că chiar și acest principiu sfârșește prin a fi reintegrat în totul, așadar prin a-și pierde calitatea de principiu absolut. o ultimă cale de înaintare spre principiu și de ieșire din aporie constă în a revalorifica aporia însăși. Aporia îi indică lui damascius faptul că avem divinaţia (sau presentimentul) unui principiu absolut necoordonat cu totul. Pornind de aici, se deschide o întreagă gamă de fenomene la limita gândirii, care eliberează drumul înspre principiul absolut necoordonat. Vom discuta mai întâi ce înseamnă divinaţie în acest context de filozofie speculativă, recuperând istoria termenului. este vorba despre faptul că gândirea noastră, fără a mai avea un obiect propriu-zis, simte totuși nevoia de a înainta spre un principiu necoordonat și cunoaște în același timp direcţia unei astfel de înaintări. iar înaintarea nu constă în a determina principiul, ci, din contră, în a suprima orice posibilă determinaţie. Principiul necoordonat nu poate fi conceput, nu poate fi proclamat în nici un fel și nici o supoziţie nu i se potrivește. Mergând pe această cale, gândirea noastră pare să înainteze în vid. Vom vedea însă care este sensul - pozitiv, superior - pe care îl dă damascius acestei înaintări, distingând între nimicul inferior fiinţei și cel de dincolo de fiinţă și chiar de dincolo de unu. În felul acesta, gândirea este angajată într-o încercare constantă de a elibera principiul de orice determinaţie inadecvată lui: este ceea ce damascius va numi „travaliile gândirii". Vom Introducere 21 vedea cum aceste travalii ne conduc spre principiul inefabil, soluţia propriu-zisă a lui damascius la problema principiului absolut. Vom discuta mai întâi felul în care conceptul de inefabil se inserează în istoria filozofiei, fiind preluat din limbajul religios și transformat, la sfârșitul neoplatonismului, în termenul cel mai înalt al gândirii speculative. Vom vedea, de asemenea, că, făcând din inefabil ţinta ultimă a gândirii sale, damascius încearcă să pună în acord propria sa perspectivă cu cea platonică, fondatoare. după această incursiune istorică, vom discuta felul în care damascius introduce inefabilul, punând în evidenţă faptul că, în faţa acestui principiu, gândirea noastră este complet răsturnată. Mai precis, inefabilul scapă gândirii care încearcă să îl cuprindă, iar aceasta ajunge să admită tocmai contrariul a ceea ce vrea să exprime, fiind astfel răsturnată. Vom discuta, de asemenea, modul în care inefabilul se diferenţiază de simplul caracter indicibil pe care principiul l-a avut în întreaga tradiţie neoplatonică. inefabilul nu este nici măcar indicibil, ci iese cu totul din opoziţia dintre dicibil și indicibil. Pornind de la această analiză, ne vom pune întrebarea care este noua structură a principiilor la damascius și cum anume inefabilul influenţează această ierarhie. Vom repune în discuţie o problemă de interpretare a gândirii lui damascius, anume dacă inefabilul reprezintă sau nu o dedublare a principiului tradiţional. Vom argumenta în final că inefabilul iese din aporia principiului prim, depășind opoziţia dintre cauzalitate și transcendenţă. de asemenea, vom arăta că inefabilul nu reprezintă o soluţie sceptică - în care gândirea însăși s-ar bloca, incapabilă să cunoască principiile. din contră, în perspectiva lui damascius, ultima din istoria neoplatonismului grec, gândirea își ia ca sarcină tocmai descoperirea urmelor inefabile din întreaga realitate și experimentarea sau conștientizarea principiului absolut inefabil, complet sustras cunoașterii discursive. PARTeA ÎnTâi PReMiSele şi GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM: PloTin capitolul 1 PRinciPiUl de dincolo de fiinţă. conSTiTUiReA Unei TRAdiţii A. Platon şi depăşirea fiinţei Pentru a putea pătrunde în încrengătura aporetică a principiului de dincolo de fiinţă, trebuie să punem mai întâi în evidenţă acele elemente doctrinare din care s-a dezvoltat această problemă, și care au stat astfel la baza constituirii tradiţiei neo platonice. este vorba mai ales de câteva referinţe din gândirea platonică pe care neoplatonismul le-a reluat și le-a închegat într-o gândire proprie. Acestea joacă rolul unor „seminţe" problematice, din care s-a înălţat filonul tare al gândirii neoplatonice. ele poartă în nucleul lor imaginea concentrată a ceea ce vor gândi filozofii neoplatonici. Totuși - asemenea seminţei -, ele însele nu mai pot fi privite și înţelese în sine, în mod izolat, ci ca atare ele au un caracter neelucidat, parcă voit ascuns, încă de la început. Sunt niște probleme pe care Platon abia le schiţează și a căror rezolvare nu este explicită în dialogurile platonice1. despre ce este vorba? dacă până la Platon, filozofia a fost o căutare a fiinţei veritabile, sustrasă devenirii, la Platon, fiinţa veritabilă devine o lume în sine, cu o structură internă proprie. Totuși, Platon merge mai departe, și ridică problema raţionalităţii acestei lumi - întrebându-se cum anume 1 În articolul „Platonism in late Antiquity" (Soul and Intellect: studies in Plotinus and later Neoplatonism, Aldershot, Variorum, 1993) H. J. Blumenthal arată că unele dintre cele mai importante probleme ale metafizicii plotiniene sunt elaborate pornind nu neapărat de la fondul platonic doctrinar, ci tocmai de la acele puncte doctrinare care au rămas neelucidate în textele platonice (precum problema participaţiei și cea a întinderii sferei fiinţei veritabile), sau care sunt propuse ca exerciţii dialectice (vezi partea a doua din dialogul Parmenide). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM26 trebuie ea înţeleasă și care este sursa ultimă a fiinţei supreme, de la care aceasta își primește caracteristicile sale: anume faptul de a fi și de a fi cunoscută. Astfel, dacă în mod tradiţional gândirea nu se poate desfășura decât în spaţiul fiinţei, iar fiinţa este sfera predilectă a gândirii, Platon ajunge să pună în discuţie posibilitatea a ceva ce depășește gândirea noastră, însă nu în sens inferior - ca nefiinţă absolută1, care parazitează gândirea argumentativă, introducând falsul și sustrăgându-se astfel unui examen riguros din partea raţiunii - ci în sens ascendent, ca un prag superior gândirii, ca un pas dincolo de fiinţă (TMpškeina tÁj oÙs...aj). În acest sens, există două referinţe clasice - pe care gânditorii neoplatonici le vor exploata din plin - în care Platon iese din sfera strictă a fiinţei și a gândirii, punând problema unui „dincolo"2: este vorba despre problema unui bine de dincolo de fiinţă, enunţată în Republica, 509 b 6–10, și de unul care este prezentat în sine, separat de fiinţă - în prima ipoteză din Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 83. Vom discuta pe rând aceste două referinţe capitale pentru neoplatonism. Republica, 509 b 6–10 este un text pe care se cuvine să îl redăm ca atare, deoarece analiza noastră va relua mai multe amănunte ale lui: Tot astfel, se pare că cele cunoscute primesc de la bine nu numai faptul de a fi cunoscute, ci că lor le vine de la acela și faptul de a fi și fiinţa, binele nefiind el însuși fiinţă, ci dincolo de fiinţă, depășind-o ca vârstă și ca putere.4 1 Platon, Sofistul, 238 c 8–11. 2 J. festugière realizează o schemă a locurilor în care Platon atinge tema depășirii fiinţei: Banchetul, 210 e 2–211b 3; Scrisoarea a VII-a, 341 b 7–d 2; 342 a 7–344 c 1, Republica, 509 b, Parmenide, 141e 7–142 a 7 (vezi: La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, iV: Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose, J. Gabalda, Paris, 1954, cap. V: „la transcendance de l'un-bien-beau chez Platon", pp. 79–91). 3 o altă referinţă relevantă în acest sens este Sofistul, 244 e–245 b, în care fiinţa apare ca o unitate relativă, diferită de unul absolut, primindu-și unitatea de la acesta. 4 Traducerile din această lucrare ne aparţin. Capitolul 1: Constituirea unei tradiții 27 Platon compară obiectele cunoașterii cu obiectele vizibile: acestea din urmă primesc lumina - care le face vizibile - de la soare, care este superior domeniului vizibil, deoarece îl face posibil. În același fel, obiectele cunoașterii primesc faptul lor de a fi cognoscibile (tÕ gignèskesqai) - precum și faptul de a fi (tÕ enai) și fiinţa (oÙs...a) - de la ceva superior fiinţei înseși. lucrurile cognoscibile și existente primesc acest fapt de a fi și de a fi cunoscute de la ceva care nu mai este el însuși existent. Acesta este binele de dincolo de fiinţă (TMpškeina tÁj oÙs...aj). Platon însuși nu continuă această linie de gândire, ci, în acest punct al dialogului, discuţia se oprește brusc, ca în faţa unui lucru ce nu trebuia rostit. Personajul Socrate protestează deoarece a fost obligat să vorbească despre un asemenea lucru inexprimabil1. În schimb, vom vedea că neoplatonicii își vor concentra atenţia tocmai asupra unui astfel de punct doctrinar radical, asupra unui orizont care depășește spaţiul fiinţei. A doua referinţă platonică preluată de neoplatonici ca indicaţie a unui principiu anterior fiinţei este prima ipoteză asupra unului (sau ipoteză henologică, de la termenul grecesc ›n: unu) din dialogul Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 8. dialogul începe cu o apologie a necesităţii existenţei unului, o apologie negativă, de fapt, care se bazează pe demonstrarea absurdităţii ce rezultă din suprimarea unului și din admiterea unei pluralităţi pure, lipsite de unitate. dintre demonstraţiile expuse de Zenon, dialogul nu reţine decât una2: anume că, dacă fiinţele (cele ce sunt) sunt plurale (e„ poll£ TMsti t¦ Ônta), atunci ele vor fi și asemenea și neasemenea, ceea ce este absurd, deoarece lucrurile asemenea nu pot fi neasemenea, iar cele neasemenea nu pot fi asemenea3. Partea 1 În Comentariul la Republica, 274.3–9, Proclus va discuta acest refuz de a vorbi despre binele de dincolo de fiinţă. 2 Platon, Parmenide, 127 e 1–5. 3 Argumentul lui Zenon este analizat pe larg de Proclus în Comentariul la Parmenide ii, 721.19–729.38. lucrurile sunt asemenea deoarece toate au caracteristica pluralităţii, dar sunt și neasemenea tocmai pentru că, în măsura în care sunt plurale, ele sunt și distincte unele faţă de altele. Argumentul este PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM28 a doua a dialogului (137 c 4–166 c 5) revine la ipoteza parmenidiană a unului, analizând mai multe situaţii privind existenţa sau inexistenţa unului. Prima dintre acestea este ipoteza radicală a existenţei unului înţeles ca non-plural: dacă unul însuși există, ce urmează în privinţa lui? dar admiterea unului în sine presupune excluderea oricărei forme de pluralitate: dacă este unu, atunci unul nu poate fi ceva plural (e„ ›n TMstin, ¥llo ti oÙk n e‡h poll¦ tÕ ›n)1. dialogul desfășoară în continuare o întreagă serie de negaţii ce se dovedesc necesare, o dată ce admitem unul non-plural. nefiind plural, unul nu poate avea părţi, așadar nu are început, mijloc sau sfârșit. În consecinţă, el nu poate avea o figură (sc»ma) - precum circular sau drept -, nu poate fi nicăieri (căci nu poate fi cuprins nici în ceva diferit, nici în sine) și nu poate fi nici mișcat, nici nemișcat (neavând în ce să se miște sau să stea). dar, dacă nu poate fi situat nici în sine nici în altceva, unul nu poate fi nici identic, nici diferit (cu sine sau cu altceva), așadar nu poate fi nici egal, nici inegal. de aceea, unul nu participă nici la timp (căci cele ce participă la timp sunt egale sau inegale ca vârstă), așadar el nu este, nu a fost și nu va fi (căci acestea sunt părţi ale timpului). Astfel, unul nu participă la fiinţă: el nu este și nu este nici măcar unu. În consecinţă, unul nu poate fi numit ca atare, nu poate fi definit, și despre el nu poate exista știinţă, senzaţie sau opinie. Unul nu poate fi exprimat, cunoscut sau perceput. În concluzie, unul pe care îl admitem ca non-plural nu are fiinţă și nu poate fi cunoscut, numit, gândit (deși în această primă ipoteză l-am numit și l-am gândit deja într-un fel). Unul care a fost afirmat în ipoteză se arată a fi dincolo de gândire - fie că prin gândire înţelegem definiţie, știinţă, opinie sau nume. În prezent și în Teologia platonică, ii, 1, p. 6, 3–18: fiinţele plurale (lipsite de unu) sunt asemenea deoarece toate sunt non-unu. Pe de altă parte, fiind complet lipsite de unu, pluralele nu pot avea un unic caracter comun, de aceea ele nu pot fi asemenea în nici o privinţă, ci vor fi neasemenea. În consecinţă, pluralele vor fi și asemenea și neasemenea sub același raport (anume ca non-unu), ceea ce este absurd. 1 Platon, Parmenide, 137 c 4–5. Capitolul 1: Constituirea unei tradiții 29 plus, se arată că unul nu are fiinţă nici măcar atât cât să poată fi unu (deși în ipoteză s-a admis că unul este). din nou, Platon nu continuă această direcţie, ci o prezintă ca pe o concluzie greu de acceptat, poate chiar imposibilă1, și trece la cea de-a doua ipoteză asupra unului. Acestea sunt cele două deschideri platonice privind existenţa a „ceva" ce depășește spaţiul clasabil al fiinţei și al gândirii, în reciproca lor apartenenţă. desigur, la Platon, cele două referinţe trebuie văzute în mod distinct: pe de o parte, binele este dincolo de fiinţă, rolul lui fiind acela de a explica faptul că ideile au fiinţă și pot fi cunoscute. Pe de altă parte, unul din prima ipoteză este admis ca unu (împotriva ipotezei pluralităţii pure), iar el se dovedește a fi dincolo de fiinţă, în sensul în care toate determinaţiile fiinţei sunt plurale, pe când el este absolut unitar. În acest al doilea caz, fiinţa nu este explicată prin ceva de deasupra ei, ci gândirea ajunge, de fapt, să descopere că, dacă admitem ca atare acest unu - pe care îl gândim într-un fel, care are o oarecare prezenţă în gândirea noastră -, atunci se arată că acesta nu poate avea fiinţă și nici una dintre caracteristicile fiinţei, încât el nici nu mai poate fi gândit (adică numit, cunoscut, definit). Altfel spus, unul - fără de care gândirea se pierde într-o pluralitate absurdă - nu poate fi gândit ca atare, ci admiterea lui duce la concluzii contradictorii faţă de ceea ce am admis în ipoteză: unul nu va avea nici nume, nici știinţă, și el nu va fi nici măcar unu. observăm astfel că, la Platon, problema acestui „dincolo de gândire și de fiinţă" apare de fapt din cadrul însuși al gândirii și al fiinţei: vrând să explice lucrurile, gândirea ajunge să admită ceva pe care ea însăși nu mai poate să îl cuprindă. ceva din spaţiul însuși al gândirii și al fiinţei trimite sau deschide spre un dincolo de fiinţă, respectiv dincolo de gândire: binele care dă fiinţă nu mai poate fi el însuși fiinţă, iar unul - fără de care nu se poate gândi nimic - nu mai poate fi el însuși gândit. Pe de o parte, lucrurile cognoscibile și existente trebuie să aibă faptul de 1 Vezi Parmenide, 142 a 7–8. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM30 a fi și faptul de a fi cognoscibile, de la ceva care nu mai este el însuși cognoscibil și existent. Pe de altă parte, nu putem gândi lucrurile în lipsa unităţii, deoarece riscăm să cădem în absurdul unei pluralităţi nelimitate; totuși, unul de care avem nevoie nu poate fi gândit în sine însuși și nu poate fi admis ca existent. Ambele cazuri ilustrează o limită a gândirii, dincolo de care Platon însuși nu ne spune cum s-ar putea trece, sau cum trebuie să abordăm această limită și să ne situăm faţă de ea. B. Plotin şi structura realităţii În schimb, în neoplatonism, accentul se va muta pe acest dincolo faţă de fiinţă și faţă de gândire. În loc să indice o limită obiectivă a gândirii, acest dincolo va ajunge ţinta propriu-zisă a investigaţiei filozofice. În plus, privind înspre restul realităţii, totul va fi gândit în funcţie de principiul care este dincolo de fiinţă și dincolo de gândire, iar întreaga gândire filozofică depinde de o corectă abordare a acestui principiu. În consecinţă, aceasta va fi problema centrală pe care filozofia neoplatonică o va elabora în mod explicit. dacă la Platon problema unui „dincolo" de fiinţă și de gândire rămâne în stadiul ei aporetic, ca o dificultate care nu poate fi ocolită și căreia nu îi găsim o rezolvare propriu-zisă, în schimb, neoplatonismul debutează printr-o schimbare radicală de perspectivă tocmai asupra acestei probleme. Pentru neoplatonici, textul platonic nu anunţă doar problema, ci el indică în mod implicit „rezolvarea"; în loc să fie citit doar într-o cheie problematică, textul platonic este citit într-o cheie doctrinară. neoplatonicii văd în textul platonic indicaţia unui principiu concret, care îndeplinește condiţia descrisă de aporiile textului. Aporia pe care gândirea nu o mai poate rezolva devine tema explicită a ceva de dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire, iar unul care nu își găsește locul în spaţiul fiinţei devine un principiu efectiv, care depășește și fundamentează fiinţa. Capitolul 1: Constituirea unei tradiții 31 Astfel, Plotin, primul autor neoplatonic, consideră că atât binele de dincolo de fiinţă (din Republica, 509 b 9), cât și unul (din prima ipoteză henologică: Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 8) indică principiul absolut al tuturor lucrurilor, prima ipostază principială. din această identificare a binelui de dincolo de fiinţă cu unul absolut se naște ideea unui „principiu prim" - care va sta în centrul gândirii neoplatonice. dacă la Platon binele de dincolo de fiinţă nu este niciodată tematizat ca atare, iar unul ce se sustrage fiinţei este prezentat în cadrul unui exerciţiu dialectic, așadar într-o ipoteză, în schimb, o dată cu Plotin, unul devine binele însuși, iar unul-bine devine ipostaza principială supremă, care susţine o gândire filozofică foarte bine angrenată, elaborată în cele mai mici detalii. Totuși, identificarea celor două referinţe platonice nu este cu totul surprinzătoare1: observăm o anumită similaritate, în chiar textele platonice, între binele de dincolo de fiinţă și unul absolut: fiecare dintre acestea este adus în discuţie în raport cu pluralitatea fiinţelor, respectiv a gândirii noastre: binele este discutat în raport cu pluralitatea lucrurilor inteligibile (t¦ nooÚmena: 1 există câteva indicii care ne-ar putea lăsa să credem că Platon însuși a avut ideea alăturării unului absolut și a binelui de dincolo de fiinţă. Astfel, Aristoxenus, teoretician al muzicii și discipol al lui Aristotel, spune că, după cum povestea Aristotel, expunerea lui Platon despre bine nu se referea la nici un bine concret (averi, sănătate, etc.), ci la știinţă, numere, geometrie, ajungând în cele din urmă să arate că binele este unu (Óti ¢gaqÒn TMstin ›n) (vezi Aristoxenus, Elementa harmonica, ii, 30) Totuși, contextul nu ne lasă să înţelegem despre care unu sau despre care bine este vorba. În plus, sensul general al pasajului este ironic: ascultătorii lui Platon ar fi fost în cele din urmă dezamăgiţi de cele aflate, deoarece ei nu știau de la început care este scopul expunerii, ci se așteptau la altceva. Vezi de asemenea Aristotel, Metafizica, 1091 b 13, care însă nu se referă direct la Platon, ci la „cei care susţin existenţa substanţelor neschimbătoare": aceștia ar spune că unul este binele însuși (aÙtÕ tÕ žn tÕ ¢gaqÕn aÙtÕ enai), iar substanţa acestuia ar consta în unitatea lui. Vezi și J. M. Rist, „The Parmenides again", Phoenix 16, 1962, pp. 13–14. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM32 Republica, 508 c 1), iar ipoteza unului se opune explicit ipotezei pluralităţii lucrurilor. şi într-un caz și în celălalt, pluralitatea nu poate fi susţinută ca atare, până la capăt, ci ea are nevoie de unitatea anterioară care să o strângă laolaltă. Pe de altă parte, atât unul cât și binele nu mai pot face parte din sfera fiinţei și a gândirii: binele este cel care face ca lucrurile să fie și să fie cunoscute, dar, în acest caz, el însuși trebuie să fie anterior fiinţei și anterior cunoașterii1; unul, la rândul lui, nu are nici fiinţă, nici cunoaștere, nume sau știinţă. Așadar, similaritatea binelui și a unului constă în faptul că ele dau sens fiinţei și gândirii, dar nu mai pot fi gândite în sine, nici nu pot avea fiinţă. Plotin a tras concluziile pe care textele platonice le lăsau deschise. el suprapune cele două aporii platonice: cea a binelui de dincolo de fiinţă și cea a unului care nu este. el suprapune astfel refuzul lui Socrate de a vorbi despre binele de dincolo de fiinţă2 și imposibilitatea - observată de personajul Parmenide - de a admite unul care nu este3. de acum înainte, neoplatonismul își va alege drept cadru al discuţiei aceste două „locuri" dificile, atopice, din gândirea platonică: binele care nu este4 și unul care nu este unu5. filozofii neoplatonici nu vor mai refuza să vorbească despre binele de dincolo de fiinţă, iar pentru ei unul absolut nu mai este o simplă ipoteză, imposibil de admis, ci cele două referinţe platonice vor canaliza întreaga lor gândire. Totuși, Plotin nu reia de la Platon numai indicaţiile despre un principiu de dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire, ci și alte indicaţii 1 Vezi Republica, 509 a 7–8: binele dă adevărul și știinţa (TMpist»mh), însă este deasupra acestora (Øpr taàta). 2 Platon, Republica, 509 c 3–4: „tu ești de vină, spuse, că m-ai obligat să spun ce cred despre el". după această remarcă, Socrate refuză să continue expunerea despre binele de dincolo de fiinţă. 3 Platon, Parmenide, 142 a 6–8: „este oare posibil ca lucrurile să stea așa în privinţa unului? eu nu cred". 4 Platon, Republica, 509 b 8–9: „binele nu este fiinţă" (oÙk oÙs...aj Ôntoj toà ¢gaqoà). 5 Platon, Parmenide, 141 e 10–11: „nu este nici măcar astfel încât să fie unu" (OÙd' ¥ra oÛtwj oestin éste žn enai). Capitolul 1: Constituirea unei tradiții 33 privind nivelurile ulterioare, care compun ansamblul realităţii. el va obţine în felul acesta un sistem complet al realităţii, împărţit în trei niveluri. Schematizând, am putea spune că mesajul general al gândirii lui Plotin este următorul: întreaga realitate este o desfășurare de niveluri succesive, care se depărtează progresiv față de un principiu prim, sursă și cauză absolută; această depărtare se manifestă prin prezenţa tot mai mare a pluralităţii și a distincţiei între lucruri. Astfel, după principiul prim, care este absolut unitar, Plotin plasează nivelul inteligibil, apoi sufletul și, în sfârșit, lumea sensibilă, care este nivelul cel mai depărtat de principiu. În sens invers, ascendent, întreaga realitate are tendinţa de a se reîntoarce spre principiul ei, tinzând, într-un fel sau altul, să se asemene cu acesta. Această tendinţă este cea care conservă lucrurile însele în fiinţa lor. Pentru suflet - care unește într-un fel toate nivelurile realităţii, putând trece de la un nivel altul -, această tendinţă se manifestă printr-o dorinţă constantă de a redescoperi principiul care guvernează întreaga realitate și de a se identifica cu el. În această încercare, sufletul își găsește sensul său cel mai autentic: depărtându-se de lucrurile sensibile și trecând apoi dincolo de lumea complexă a formelor inteligibile, sufletul se concentrează în sine, pentru a descoperi acolo, în propria unitate cu sine însuși, sursa unică și unitară a întregii realităţi. Plotin distinge astfel trei ipostaze principiale, sau trei naturi: unul (›n), intelectul (noàj) și sufletul (yuc»). Prima ipostază este cea a unului, care este atât principiul și sursa primă a fiinţei, cât și scopul ei final. ipostaza secundă este cea a intelectului divin, veșnic prins în contemplarea principiului prim și în gândirea de sine (după modelul intelectului divin al lui Aristotel). el este astfel fiinţa inteligibilă, eternă și incoruptibilă, care manifestă identitatea dintre fiinţa primă și gândirea pură. cuprinzând totalitatea formelor inteligibile, intelectul este modelul inteligibil al întregii realităţi. Ultima dintre cele trei ipostaze - anume sufletul - guvernează lumea sensibilă, imprimându-i formă și PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM34 ordine. Sufletul nu este însă decât o imagine a modelului inteligibil1. fiecare dintre cele trei ipostaze se revendică de la câteva referinţe platonice de maximă importanţă. Textul cel mai elocvent - în care Plotin rezumă referinţele platonice fundamentale pe care se sprijină gândirea sa - este paragraful 8 al tratatului Despre cele trei realităţi primordiale (Enneade, V, 1). Unul, intelectul și sufletul corespund celor trei regi din Scrisoarea a II-a, 312 e2. de asemenea, cele trei ipostaze principiale corespund primelor trei ipoteze din partea a doua a dialogului Parmenide. Acest dialog este de o importanţă capitală pentru gândirea neoplatonică, în mod special a doua parte a lui, care începe la 137c 4, în care Platon analizează mai multe ipoteze asupra unului, considerând posibilele raporturi ce pot fi gândite între unu și fiinţă: dacă unul are sau nu fiinţă, înţeleasă fie în manieră relativă, fie în manieră absolută. Pentru neoplatonici, aceste analize platonice nu mai sunt niște simple ipoteze, ci ele corespund unei ierarhii complete a realităţii, începând de la principiului prim și până la realitatea sensibilă3. Plotin este primul gânditor la care descoperim în mod 1 Pentru relaţia dintre suflet și intelect, vezi articolul lui A. H. Armstrong, „Aristotle in Plotinus: The continuity and discontinuity of Psyche and Nous", în Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, clarendon Press, oxford, 1991, în care autorul argumentează că, deși distinge foarte clar între intelect și suflet - după modelul aristotelic - Plotin nu rupe continuitatea dintre acestea - după modelul platonic din Timaios. 2 Plotin, Enneade, i, 8, 2.27–32; V, 1, 8.1–4; Vi, 7, 42.8–11. Scrisoarea a ii-a este apocrifă, însă în vremea lui Plotin ea era considerată autentică. cf. H. d. Saffrey și l. G. Westerink, Introduction, în Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, ii, pp. XX–liX. 3 dialogul Parmenide va fi pentru neoplatonici o chintesenţă a gândirii filozofice, în acest sens pe care îl dau ei filozofiei, anume acela de a scoate la iveală toate nivelurile realităţii în ordinea firească a decurgerii lor de la principiul prim. Astfel, Proclus va vorbi despre Parmenide ca despre o „știinţă a principiilor prime" (Teologia platonică, i, p. 38.7), sau o „vânătoare a fiinţei" (Teologia platonică, i, p. 40.9–10). În acest cadru al ipotezelor, neoplatonicii vor „vâna" ei înșiși nivelurile principiale, dezvăluindu-le pe rând din sensul ascuns al textului platonic. Capitolul 1: Constituirea unei tradiții 35 explicit această identificare1: unul prim (tÕ prîton ›n) corespunde primei ipoteze (Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 8); intelectul, sau unul secund (deÚteron ›n) corespunde celei de-a doua ipoteze (Parmenide, 142 b 1–155 e 3), cea a unului-plural (žn poll£)2, care este fiinţa unitară, dar cuprinde în același timp pluralitatea ideilor; sufletul, sau al treilea unu (tr...ton ›n), corespunde celei de-a treia ipoteze (Parmenide, 155 e 4–157 b 5), el fiind și unu și plural (žn ka poll£)3. Aceste trei indicaţii sunt abia schiţate în acest context (Enneade, V, 1, 8)4, de altfel singurul în care este vorba despre toate cele trei ipoteze. Plotin nu oferă un comentariu explicit asupra celor trei ipoteze, ci mai degrabă o meditaţie în cadrul oferit de cele trei tipuri de unitate corespunzătoare5. 1 Vezi articolul lui e. R. dodds, „The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the neoplatonic one", The classical Quarterly, 22, 1928, 3–4, pp. 129– 142, care indică pentru prima dată această corespondenţă între ipostazele plotiniene și primele trei ipoteze platonice asupra unului. 2 Vezi de asemenea Enneade, V, 3, 15.11 și 22; V, 4, 1.21; Vi, 2, 15.14–15; Vi, 7, 14.11–12. 3 Această manieră de a indica sufletul apare în Enneade, iV, 2, 2.40 și 53; V, 1, 8.26; Vi, 2, 6.13–14. Singurul loc în care Plotin marchează legătura dintre ipostaza sufletului și a treia ipoteză platonică este pasajul din Enneade, V, 1, 8. 4 ştim însă că se referă la dialogul Parmenide deoarece amintește de „Parmenide cel de la Platon" și preia expresiile din dialog care denumesc primele trei ipoteze asupra unului: unul, unu-plural (Parmenide, 144 e 5); unu și plurale (Parmenide, 155 e 5). Trebuie să remarcăm că Plotin nu pomenește niciodată numele dialogului Parmenide, deși identifică în el schema generală a gândirii sale. Porfir, discipolul lui Plotin, este primul care se referă direct la Parmenide, fiind și primul care elaborează un comentariu explicit la acest dialog. 5 Acest lucru poate întări ipoteza - avansată de e. R. dodds („The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the neoplatonic one", art. cit., p. 137) - conform căreia Plotin ar fi avut deja la îndemână această interpretare a ipotezelor platonice, aceasta fiind formulată de neopitagoricul Moderatus. Textul care ar sprijini o asemenea posibilitate aparţine lui Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria, 230, 35 sq. În La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, cap. ii „l'Un transcendant aux nombres", op. cit., p. 22, n. 3, A. J. festugière pune aceste speculaţii în legătură cu cele trei naturi din Scrisoarea a iii-a - care PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM36 În afară de dialogul Parmenide, Plotin face apel și la alte referinţe platonice, ca sursă pentru cele trei ipostaze principiale ale sale. Astfel, unul prim - identificat cu binele de dincolo de fiinţă (din Republica, 509 b 9) - mai este numit și „tată al cauzei (toà a„t...ou patšra)" (din Scrisori, 323 d 4). Unul secund, sau intelectul, corespunde cauzei (a‡tion) din Philebos, 26 e și 30 c, fiind identificat de asemenea cu demiurgul (dhmiourgÒj) din Timaios, 41 d1; acesta deţine formele inteligibile ale lucrurilor2, fiind identificat cu fiinţa eternă, veritabilă (temă recurentă la Platon). A treia ipostază corespunde sufletului lumii (toà pantÕj yuc») de la Platon (Timaios, 41 d 5 sau 34 b 3), care conduce tot ceea ce există în cer și pe pământ (Legi, 896 e), și are grijă de întregul univers (Legi, 897 c). conform schemei platonice din Timaios, 41 d, intelectul (sau demiurgul) a dat naștere sufletului și l-a însărcinat cu guvernarea lumii sensibile. dacă intelectul este prins în contemplarea principiului prim și în auto-contemplarea formelor inteligibile, în schimb, sufletul este principiul activ care produce întregul univers sensibil și îl ordonează. iată o schemă a corespondenţelor dintre cele trei niveluri ale realităţii la Plotin și referinţele platonice: pare a fi o apocrifă neopitagorică - pentru a întări ideea că sursa celor trei unu ar fi neopitagorică. Totuși, sensul textului pe care se sprijină această ipoteză (Simplicius, In phys. 230, 35) este discutabil. În orice caz, originalitatea lui Plotin constă mai degrabă în sistemul închegat și unitar pe care l-a elaborat pornind de la cei trei unu, indiferent dacă sugestia lor este luată direct de la Platon sau prin intermediere neopitagorică. 1 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, V, 9, 3.26: „intelectul este considerat adevăratul creator și demiurg" (noàn poiht3⁄4n Ôntwj ka dhmiourgÕn tiqšmenoj); vezi și Enneade, ii, 3, 18.15; iV, 4, 10.1–4. 2 Platon, Timaios, 29 a–b. Capitolul 1: Constituirea unei tradiții 37 Unul Intelectul Sufletul Unul (Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 8 Scrisori, 312 e) Unul-plural (Parm., 142 b 1–155 e 3) Unu și plurale (Parm., 155 e 4–157 b 5) Binele de dincolo de fiinţă (Rep., 509 b 9) fiinţa veritabilă (Ôntwj Ôn: Sof., 240 b 3, Tim., 52 c 5) (oÙs...a: Rep., 509 b) Tatăl cauzei (Scrisori, 323 d 4) intelectul, cauza (Philebos, 26 e, 28 c, 30c) Sufletul (Philebos, 30 a–b) demiurgul (Tim., 41 d) Sufletul lumii (Tim., 34 b 3, 41 d 5 Legi, 896 e, 897 c) Această grilă de lectură sistematică a textelor platonice - având în centru cei trei unu corespunzând primelor ipoteze din Parmenide - este actul instaurator al tradiţiei neoplatonice1. elementul central al acestei lecturi este ideea unei structuri unitare a realităţii - atât a celei sensibile, cât și a celei inteligibile - pornind de la o sursă comună, care transcende realitatea însăși. C. Înainte şi după Platon Trebuie să ne punem în primul rând întrebarea următoare: cum ajunge neoplatonismul la o astfel de sistematizare a nivelurilor realităţii, care în filozofia anterioară nu exista, sau era abia 1 Vezi J. Trouillard, „le «Parménide» de Platon et son interprétation néoplatonicienne", Revue de théologie et de philosophie, XXiii, 1973, p. 83. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM38 schiţată la Platon? Altfel spus, de ce și cum preiau neoplatonicii sugestiile încă nedezvoltate (precum cele ale ipotezelor din Parmenide) și fac din ele un sistem închegat, prin care ei încearcă să explice lumea? Răspunsul la această întrebare ar fi că neoplatonismul nu continuă doar niște indicaţii doctrinare prezente în platonism, ci încearcă de fapt să rezolve problemele ultime la care ajunsese această filozofie, dificultăţile în faţa cărora ea se oprise. dar, pentru a face acest lucru, neoplatonismul, începând cu Plotin, a trebuit să iasă din termenii stricţi ai gândirii platonice, și anume să pună accentul tocmai pe acele aspecte doctrinare pe care platonismul nu făcea decât să le sugereze. Acolo unde Platon vedea deja limitele gândirii sale și punea problema unei depășiri a acestei gândiri, tocmai acolo neoplatonicii au găsit un loc fertil pentru gândirea lor, intrând pe acele uși pe care Platon le lăsa deschise. neoplatonismul este astfel un nou platonism, însă un platonism care se așează la marginea doctrinei platonice propriu-zise, așadar unul care începe tocmai acolo unde Platon se oprește. În acest sens, neoplatonicii operează o schimbare radicală a paradigmei de gândire; viziunea lor despre lume este așezată pe alte fundamente decât filozofia anterioară. intuiţia fundamentală pe care se sprijină reflecţia lor va fi aceea a unei origini unice și unitare a întregii realităţi, atât a celei inteligibile, cât și a celei sensibile. filozofia tradiţională se sprijinea pe o paradigmă duală a realităţii; aceasta era împărţită în două niveluri, distincte ca valoare: pe de o parte realitatea plurală, schimbătoare, supusă nașterii și pieirii, iar pe de altă parte o fiinţă privilegiată, care are rang de origine și de principiu1: fie că este vorba despre o fiinţare anume, „materia primă" a celorlalte lucruri, fie că este vorba despre fiinţa în sine, modelul inteligibil al tuturor lucrurilor. Realitatea sensibilă era astfel explicată printr-o fiinţă care are stabilitate, 1 În limba greacă, cele două sensuri se suprapun, fiind exprimate prin același cuvânt: ¢rc». Capitolul 1: Constituirea unei tradiții 39 care nu devine, ci este permanentă: fiinţa eternă (¢e Ôn) sau fiinţa veritabilă (Ôntwj Ôn). expresia cea mai înaltă a acestei perspective este cea platonică, în care fiinţa veritabilă, ne-corporală, se instituie într-un model anterior al întregii realităţi sensibile. fiecare lucru corespunde unui model neschimbător: ideile sau formele inteligibile. Privilegiul ideii faţă de lucrurile participante este acela că ea este una, mereu aceeași, neputând fi înlocuită de alta, dublată, împărţită. dar această manieră de a explica realitatea dă naștere unor probleme greu de depășit: cum se poate trece de la idee - care este una singură, unitară și eternă - la lucrurile plurale care copiază ideea? cum se poate ca ideea unică să fie prezentă într-o pluralitate de indivizi? Platon este pe deplin conștient de aceste probleme, el însuși expunând dificultăţile perspectivei sale, de pildă în prima parte a dialogului Parmenide. În plus, fiinţa inteligibilă constituie ea însăși o lume în sine, la rândul ei plurală (deoarece există o pluralitate de idei), iar aceasta are nevoie să fie explicată printr-un principiu anterior - ceea ce Platon știa deja, așa cum arată în Republica 509 b: aici el se întreabă de unde au ideile însele fiinţa și acest fapt de a fi cunoscute? neoplatonismul deschide în mod radical tocmai aceste probleme de care se lovește, la limită, perspectiva platonică. Meditaţia fundamentală a neoplatonismului se concentrează asupra problemei unităţii care precede și dă sens pluralităţii. Astfel, începând cu Plotin, alături de distincţia dintre realitatea sensibilă și cea inteligibilă, gândirea filozofică neoplatonică adaugă o altă distincţie, mai fundamentală, anume aceea dintre pluralitatea lucrurilor (atât a celor sensibile cât și a celor inteligibile) și o unitate anterioară. distincţia dintre realitatea sensibilă și cea inteligibilă se operează în spaţiul pluralităţii (căci fiinţa, atât cea sensibilă cât și cea inteligibilă, este totuși plurală). dar pluralitatea are nevoie de o unitate anterioară care să îi dea consistenţă, care să o împiedice să se disperseze în infinit. neoplatonicii combină astfel două puncte de vedere, două distincţii: una ontologică și una pe care am putea-o numi henologică. cea ontologică PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM40 este vechea distincţie dintre cele două tipuri de fiinţă: sensibilă și inteligibilă; a doua distincţie, cea henologică, separă pluralitatea fiinţei de o unitate primă, anterioară. Între realitatea sensibilă și cea inteligibilă există deja o diferenţă în privinţa unităţii, anume o diferenţă de grad: fiinţa inteligibilă este mai unitară decât cea sensibilă, deoarece orice idee (din pluralitatea ideilor) este unică și unitară, faţă de lucrurile sensibile ce îi corespund, care sunt multe și compuse. dar neoplatonicii disting în continuare între pluralitatea lucrurilor (fie acestea sensibile sau inteligibile) și unitatea anterioară tuturor lucrurilor. ei fundamentează astfel fiinţa plurală într-un principiu prim, unic și unitar. În felul acesta, problema relaţiei dintre lucrurile sensibile și cele inteligibile este pusă pe un alt fundament: ceea ce leagă cele două lumi - cea a unităţilor în sine de cea a unităţilor determinate (problemă discutată de Platon în Philebos, 15 a) - este tocmai acest caracter unitar, care în cazul ideii înseamnă stabilitate, eternitate, iar în cazul lucrului determinat înseamnă o natură proprie. Acest caracter unitar nu își poate găsi însă explicaţia nici la nivelul lucrurilor sensibile, schimbătoare, nici la nivelul fiinţei inteligibile. filozofia tradiţională ne pune în faţa a două seturi de pluralitate: cea a lucrurilor sensibile și cea a ideilor inteligibile. În schimb, pentru neoplatonici, unitatea trebuie căutată înaintea fiinţei inteligibile, ca o unitate în sine. iar acest în sine va fi reprezentat de principiul prim, unu, pornind de la care neoplatonicii vor gândi atât fiinţa inteligibilă, cât și lucrurile sensibile. Astfel, vechea problemă a unului și multiplului din filozofia tradiţională primește o nouă perspectivă: nu mai este vorba doar de a afla cum se poate ca un lucru unitar să fie prezent în ceva plural, ci se pune întrebarea cum se poate să existe ceva ce este în sine unu; se ridică astfel problema unei unităţi absolute, anterioare tuturor unităţilor determinate, fie ele chiar și de ordin inteligibil. Astfel, neoplatonicii încep meditaţia lor asupra lumii dintr-un punct de vedere radical nou: ei nu mai caută doar fiinţa primă, Capitolul 1: Constituirea unei tradiții 41 inteligibilă, stabilă, care constituie și susţine întregul univers sensibil, ci vor căuta ceea ce dă stabilitate acestei fiinţe prime: anume principiul prim, unu1. faţă de paradigma duală a filozofiei anterioare, neoplatonismul propune o paradigmă triadică: realitatea este împărţită în trei niveluri sau ipostaze principiale: unul (care este principiul prim, absolut unitar), intelectul (care este fiinţa unitară, dar conţine deja pluralitatea formelor) și sufletul (care guvernează universul plural). Această nouă paradigmă reușește să surmonteze anumite probleme din filozofia anterioară, însă, pe de altă parte, ea ridică la rândul ei noi dificultăţi, pe care vom încerca să le evidenţiem în această carte. D. Percepţia neoplatonică asupra tradiţiei În ciuda acestui început radical al neoplatonismului, este surprinzător să observăm că neoplatonicii înșiși nu percep filozofia lor ca pe o inovaţie; ei nu consideră că au modificat în vreun fel datele fundamentale în care se exersa filozofia tradiţională. din contră, ei cred că gândirea lor este în acord cu gândirea filozofică anterioară și că ea scoate la suprafaţă însuși nucleul teoretic al acesteia2. 1 Vezi în acest sens articolul lui P. Aubenque: „Plotin et le dépassement de l'ontologie grecque classique", în Le Néoplatonisme, cnRS, Paris, 1971, pp. 101–109. 2 neoplatonicii considerau că Platon însuși (autoritatea și referinţa lor centrală) intră, de fapt, într-o tradiţie de gândire care a conservat adevărul filozofic ultim, dând la iveală doar anumite părţi ale acestuia. Astfel, Plotin se înscrie singur într-o tradiţie din care fac parte Pitagora, Pherekyde, Heraclit, Parmenide, Anaxagora, empedocle, Platon (vezi Enneade, V, 1, 8–9). iamblichos formulează în mod programatic ideea acordului doctrinar de-a lungul acestei linii de gânditori, la care se adaugă și doctrina revelată a Oracolelor caldeene. Tot acum apare ideea că Platon și Aristotel (pe care Plotin îi punea în opoziţie) au de fapt un acord de fond între ei, că ei spun în esenţă același lucru, chiar și atunci când par să aibă opinii contrare. de la iamblichos, ideea acordului dintre tradiţii este preluată în școala din Atena, și anume chiar de fondatorul acesteia: Plutarh din Atena. o dată cu Syrianus, maestrul lui Proclus, în acest acord este integrată și tradiţia orfică. Syrianus scrie o carte - care nu s-a păstrat - cu titlul Acord între Orfeu, Pitagora, Platon şi Oracolele caldeene. Proclus PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM42 Mai precis, neoplatonicii consideră să filozofii mai vechi aveau deja intuiţia unui principiu absolut unitar și, deci, cunoșteau într-un fel doctrina celor trei naturi, însă nu au reușit să o aducă la o claritate maximă, deși i-au dat diverse expresii. Plotin face o scurtă trecere în revistă a sistemelor de gândire ale filozofilor anteriori, considerând că ceea ce spune el însuși „nu sunt lucruri originale și nu sunt de acum"1. Astfel, doctrina celor trei naturi își găsește expresia cea mai adecvată în gândirea platonică; totuși, Plotin merge și mai departe, arătând că doctrina este și mai veche; pentru aceasta, el ia ca mărturie tocmai dialogurile platonice, și anume faptul că Platon expune această teorie prin intermediul filozofului Parmenide, luat ca personaj. or, Parmenide este cel care identifica gândirea cu fiinţa, considerând-o în sine, fără mișcare exterioară, întocmai cum face Plotin atunci când vorbește despre ipostaza sau natura secundă a intelectului. Totuși, din punctul de vedere al lui Plotin, Parmenide cel istoric pierde din vedere distincţia dintre prima și a doua ipostază, deoarece consideră că fiinţa însăși este unu, identificând astfel - în mod nepermis - ipostaza primă (unul) cu cea secundă (fiinţa inteligibilă). În acest sens, Plotin, ca și ceilalţi autori neoplatonici, consideră că există un salt calitativ între filozoful Parmenide și personajul Parmenide pe care Platon îl pune în scenă în dialogul omonim2. dacă Parmenide identifică unul și fiinţa, în schimb Platon - prin personajul Parmenide - distinge unul de fiinţă și încearcă să descova continua ideea maestrului său, încercând să scoată în evidenţă acordul dintre tradiţii și dintre manierele de revelaţie utilizate: simbolică (orfeu), prin imagini (Pitagora), dialectică (Platon), prin afirmaţii directe, divin inspirate (Oracolele caldeene). cf. Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, 4, p. 20. Vezi H. d. Saffrey, „Accorder entre elles les traditions théologiques: une caractéristique du néoplatonisme athénien", în e.P. Bos și P.A. Meijer (ed.), On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy, Brill, leiden/new York/Köln, 1992, pp. 35–50, care arată că, în şcoala din Atena, metoda predilectă în materie de teologie a fost aceea a comparării tradiţiilor și a căutării acordului dintre ele. 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 1, 8.10–11. 2 Vezi și Enneade, V, 3, 15.10–11. Capitolul 1: Constituirea unei tradiții 43 pere raportul adecvat dintre acestea1, admiţând trei niveluri de unitate, trei „unu": unul propriu-zis, unul secund, care este unuplural și al treilea unu, care este unu și plural. Plotin face de asemenea referinţe destul de sumare la alţi gânditori de dinaintea lui Platon, care, în viziunea lui, s-ar fi apropiat mai mult sau mai puţin de doctrina celor trei naturi: este vorba despre Anaxagora, Heraclit, empedocle, Pitagora și Pherekyde. În schimb, poziţia lui Aristotel este discutată mai pe larg: conform lui Plotin, acesta ar fi prezentat în mod corect principiul prim ca fiind separat2, însă apoi îl face să cadă din demnitatea de principiu prim, deoarece spune că acesta se gândește pe sine. Astfel, principiul prim aristotelic ar fi de fapt un principiu secund, deoarece este dual; mai mult, Aristotel nu rezolvă foarte clar problema pluralităţii inteligibile, ci vorbește despre mai multe fiinţe inteligibile, fără să arate dacă acestea vin de la unu sau sunt mai multe principii inteligibile. În concluzie, Parmenide și Aristotel ajung doar până la nivelul principiului secund (Parmenide identificând principiul prim cu cel secund, iar Aristotel punând principiul secund în locul celui prim), în timp ce Platon ar avea viziunea completă a celor trei niveluri sau ipostaze ale realităţii. Această încercare de a prezenta propria gândire ca având rădăcini adânci în istoria filozofiei nu este cu totul departe de adevăr, în măsura în care neoplatonicii reiau probleme deja prezente în filozofia anterioară, chiar dacă le dau niște soluţii proprii. Totuși, pe de altă parte, miza acestei încercări este și aceea de a oferi filozofiei lor mai multă autoritate, aceasta fiind prezentată ca împlinire sau încununare a unor eforturi și a unor probleme capitale din istoria filozofiei. Astfel, pretenţia neoplatonică de ne-originalitate este în același timp menită să asigure acestei gândiri locul privilegiat al filozofiei autentice, care scoate din umbra timpului și a uitării adevărul esenţial și ultim despre fiinţă și 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 1, 8.14–27. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 1, 9.7–8: cwristÕn mn tÕ prîton. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM44 despre lume1. A fi original este un lucru pe care neoplatonicii îl repudiază, însă ei au un argument foarte bine întemeiat pentru acest lucru, și anume credinţa lor în tradiţia pe care o continuă, credinţa lor în faptul că această tradiţie este purtătoarea adevărului - ceea ce face din gândirea lor o eliberare a adevărului din istoria uitării lui. În acest sens, o gândire originală, novatoare, ar fi o gândire lipsită de tradiţie, lipsită de rădăcini și, astfel, o gândire lipsită de garanţia adevărului. Pretenţia de ne-originalitate nu este semnul unei modestii a exegetului care se situează pe sine sub demnitatea autorului pe care îl explică, ci, din contră, este semnul unei auto-validări, prin aderenţa la o tradiţie recunoscută. la rândul ei, originalitatea nu are sensul pe care i l-am da noi astăzi, ca o capacitate de a spune lucruri noi, de a vedea lucrurile într-o lumină novatoare, fiind astfel superioară unei ne-originalităţi care repetă lucruri deja știute; din contră, originalitatea este o rătăcire în afara adevărului, iar ne-originalitatea este capacitatea de a înţelege și de a expune singurul adevăr valid, pe care puţini sunt în stare să îl vadă și să îl exprime. 1 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, p. 5, 6– 6, 15. capitolul 2 UnUl din lUcRURile indiVidUAle dincolo însă de această problemă a continuităţii sau discontinuităţii dintre cele două spaţii filozofice, este clar că Plotin nu a preluat de la Platon o doctrină deja constituită, închegată, ci a pus cap la cap pentru prima dată în mod sistematic diverse elemente doctrinare prezente într-o formă sau alta înaintea sa1, dându-le o expresie unitară, precum și o miză mult mai mare. Plotin deschide calea neoplatonismului aducând în prim plan problema relaţiei dintre fiinţă și unu, așadar dintre faptul că un lucru este și faptul că lucrul este unitar. Totuși, el imprimă acestei relaţii o direcţie univocă: unul și fiinţa nu stau la același nivel, nu sunt în identitate, ci unul precede fiinţa și o determină2. fiinţa depinde de unu și nu poate exista în lipsa acestuia; de asemenea, nu putem gândi un lucru decât ca unitar. orice fiinţă are nevoie de unu atât pentru a fi, cât și pentru a fi gândită; în consecinţă, unul este anterior atât fiinţei cât și gândirii. Totuși, întrebarea fundamentală care se ridică - și care va constitui subiectul primei părţi a cărţii de faţă - este cum ajunge Plotin să impună un unu absolut, dincolo de orice fiinţă și orice gândire posibilă? cum face el trecerea de la lucrurile determinate - care sunt unitare - la un unu absolut, complet separat de fiinţă, depășind-o pe aceasta? 1 o întreagă discuţie, pe care nu o putem începe în acest context, este aceea a rolului de intermediere jucat de medioplatonism și de neopitagorism în această preluare de către Plotin a unor teme platonice. Vezi articolul lui e. R. dodds, „The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the neoplatonic one", art. cit., pp. 129–142. 2 discuţia despre diferenţa de rang dintre fiinţă și unu va traversa întreaga istorie a neoplatonismului, vezi, de pildă, damascius, Despre primele principii, R. i, 37. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM46 deși admiterea principiului unu este motivată de Plotin prin repetatele sale referinţe la tradiţia platonică, totuși, Plotin însuși nu acceptă această idee ca atare, fără demonstraţie, ci este nevoit să refacă întregul fundal al problemei, argumentând prezenţa necesară a unului, atât la fiecare nivel al realităţii - sensibile sau inteligibile - cât și în sine, dincolo de tot ceea ce există. Argumentului autorităţii - constând în cele câteva referinţe platonice - Plotin îi adaugă o gamă de argumente propriu-zise, de demonstraţii ale necesităţii acestui principiu. numai că această structură argumentativă nu este concentrată într-o unitate discursivă, ci Plotin revine la ea în diverse stadii ale gândirii sale. ceea ce ne propunem noi să facem este să căutăm unitatea acestor demonstraţii, să le urmărim în decurgerea lor ascendentă. Mai precis, vom încerca să arătăm că, pentru a impune principiul absolut unu, Plotin parcurge întregul registru al realităţii prin prisma unităţii, analizând statutul unităţii la nivelul lucrurilor concrete, apoi la nivelul inteligibil. Totuși, de fiecare dată, el se vede obligat să împingă problema mai departe, și să caute sursa ultimă a unităţii tot mai sus: el trece astfel de la unitatea din lucruri la unul inteligibil, iar de la acesta la unul absolut. În analiza noastră, vom reface acest parcurs ascendent, cu cele trei niveluri - lucruri, intelect, principiu - pentru a vedea cum argumentează Plotin anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţă în fiecare dintre aceste cazuri, și pentru a descoperi motivele care îl fac pe Plotin să împingă problema unului tot mai sus, până la principiul absolut, de dincolo de fiinţă. Această structură argumentativă este singura care poate restitui gândirii plotiniene necesitatea și poate îndepărta orice suspiciune privind faptul că admiterea unului de dincolo de fiinţă ar fi doar expresia discursivă a unei experienţe personale, supra-discursivă, de natură religioasă, pe care gândirea n-ar putea să o cuprindă. Plotin pornește de jos, adică de la lucrurile concrete, individuale, și distinge la acest nivel unul lucrului de fiinţa lui, de lucrul însuși. Mai mult, el demonstrează anterioritatea unului faţă Capitolul 2: Unul din lucrurile individuale 47 de fiinţă și gândire la acest nivel. Pentru a înţelege poziţia lui Plotin, trebuie să avem în vedere disputele implicite pe care el le deschide: pe de o parte, cea faţă de Aristotel, care identifică unul lucrului cu lucrul însuși, iar pe de altă parte cea faţă de stoici, care consideră că unul oricărui lucru este impus de gândirea care se oprește asupra acestui lucru. Plotin trece aceste două perspective prin grila platonică, și impune unul ca diferit și anterior atât faţă de lucrul determinat, cât și faţă de gândire. A. Unul este diferit de fiinţă - polemica anti-aristotelică Afirmaţia radicală de la care pornește Plotin este aceea că unul din fiecare lucru este diferit de simpla fiinţă a lucrului respectiv. Prin această afirmaţie, el răstoarnă poziţia lui Aristotel, pentru care fiinţa și unul nu sunt diferite, ci sunt „un singur lucru și o singură natură"1. deși spune mai întâi că ele nu au aceeași definiţie, Aristotel revine apoi și spune că, în fond, am putea să le acordăm aceeași definiţie, căci este același lucru a spune „om", „un om" și „om care este"2. Unul și fiinţa unui lucru nu se disting de lucrul însuși și nu se disting nici între ele, ci Aristotel spune că fiinţa (oÙs...a) este și unu, și „ceea ce este" (Óper Ôn) 1 Aristotel, Metafizica, 1003 b 23 (tÕ ×n ka tÕ žn taÙtÕn ka m...a fÚsij). de asemenea, la 1054 a 13, Aristotel spune că, într-un fel, unul înseamnă același lucru cu fiinţa (taÙtÕ shma...nei pwj tÕ žn ka tÕ Ôn), deoarece el nu intră în nici o categorie anume, ci însoţește fiecare categorie, având în fiecare caz un sens anume, întocmai ca și fiinţa. Unul este, ca și fiinţa, predicatul cel mai universal, care se întinde tot atât cât și fiinţa (Metafizica, 998 b 20). Unul nu poate fi ceva în sine, ci el este întotdeauna și altceva, în fiecare clasă de lucruri: de pildă, în cazul culorilor, rolul unului este jucat de culoarea alb, iar în cazul figurilor, unul este triunghiul, figura cea mai simplă. Astfel, în fiecare caz, a fi unu înseamnă a fi ceva anume (1054 a 18–19). dacă unul aduce totuși ceva în plus faţă de fiinţă, aceasta este, pe de o parte, sensul lui de indivizibilitate, dar care este asociat întotdeauna cu un lucru anume (Metafizica, 1053 b 20), iar, pe de altă parte, sensul lui de măsură al celorlalte lucruri, așa cum în aritmetică unul indivizibil este măsura celorlalte numere (Metafizica, 1088 a 1–16). 2 Aristotel, Metafizica, 1003 b 26. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM48 lucrul respectiv1. Unul nu aduce nici un spor de cunoaștere faţă de lucrul însuși pe care îl gândim. În consecinţă, nu există nici o diferenţă între unu și fiinţă în ceea ce privește cunoașterea lor: există tot atâtea specii de unu câte specii de fiinţă, iar știinţa speciilor de fiinţă este aceeași cu știinţa speciilor de unitate. În plus, cunoașterea unului cade în sfera aceleiași știinţe care cunoaște și pluralitatea, deoarece unul și pluralitatea sunt contrarii, iar contrariile ţin de aceeași știinţă2. Pentru a răsturna această perspectivă, Plotin lărgește planul discuţiei și vorbește nu numai despre unitatea fiecărui lucru, ci și despre numărul asociat lucrurilor, fie că este vorba despre cantitatea unui lucru, despre numărul părţilor sale, sau despre totalitatea caracteristicilor fără de care un anume lucru nu poate fi gândit. Plotin observă că fiecare lucru se manifestă ca o pluralitate specifică. fiinţa are întotdeauna un număr al ei, care o determină ca pluralitate. În schimb, pentru ca această pluralitate să aibă stabilitate și un sens determinat, o subzistenţă propriu-zisă, este nevoie de o unitate anterioară pluralităţii, anterioară numărului, anterioară fiinţei plurale. dar atunci, „unul" unui lucru nu poate fi identic cu lucrul respectiv, ci diferă în mod esenţial de fiinţa în care se află. Astfel, dacă fiinţa unui lucru este plurală, fiind formată din părţi, în schimb, unul lucrului nu poate fi plural3, ci el exprimă tocmai contrariul, anume faptul că, în ciuda pluralităţii sale, lucrul are o unitare proprie4. Astfel, exemplul aristotelic al identităţii dintre „om" și „un om" este întors de Plotin în direcţia opusă: omul este de fapt o pluralitate (el este animal, raţional, etc.), pe când unul din om este cel care leagă toate aceste părţi împreună, dându-le unitate, făcându-le să aibă un sens determinat5. dacă omul ca fiinţă este divizibil, unul 1 Aristotel, Metafizica, 1003 b 32–33. 2 Vezi Metafizica, 1004 a 9–10. 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi , 9, 2.18 (tÕ d žn ¢dÚnaton plÁqoj enai). 4 Vezi Enneade, Vi, 9, 2.17–19. 5 În Philebos, 14 c 11–d 3, este amintită tocmai această opoziţie dintre omul ca unitate respectiv omul ca pluralitate de contrarii (mic și mare, greu și ușor). Capitolul 2: Unul din lucrurile individuale 49 omului este indivizibil, așadar „omul este diferit de unu"1. Unul este cel care împiedică fiinţa să se desfășoare într-o pluralitate infinită, limitând-o la o pluralitate numărabilă2. dar care este fundalul teoretic al gândirii plotiniene în acest context? În argumentul pe care îl aduce - acela că unul nu poate fi o pluralitate -, recunoaștem o referinţă platonică: anume la prima ipoteză din Parmenide, 137 c 4-5: „dacă unul este unu, atunci el nu poate fi plural" (e„ ›n TMstin, ¥llo ti oÙk n e‡h poll¦ tÕ ›n). Plotin trece afirmaţia aristotelică a identităţii dintre unu și fiinţă prin proba platonică a celor două ipoteze prime: în a doua ipoteză, unul apare ca însoţind fiinţa în toate părţile ei, așadar el intră în fiecare firidă a pluralităţii acesteia; în schimb, în prima ipoteză se arată că unul ca atare, luat în sine, nu poate fi plural. În sensul acesta - dar numai în sensul acesta! -, logica aristotelică a identităţii dintre fiinţa lucrului și unitatea sa s-ar situa mai degrabă la nivelul celei de-a doua aporii din Parmenide, aceea în care unul însoţește fiecare parte a fiinţei. Astfel, Aristotel însuși afirma, în contextul discutat mai sus3, că există atâtea specii de unu câte specii de fiinţă. În schimb, ţinta cea mai înaltă a gândirii plotiniene se ridică la nivelul primei ipoteze platonice, cea a unului absolut, în care pluralitatea fiinţei nu mai are loc. el acceptă de fapt ambele puncte de vedere asupra unului, care nu se contrazic deloc, dacă sunt înţelese la niveluri diferite. Unul însoţește într-adevăr fiinţa în fiecare parte a ei - precum în a doua ipoteză platonică - deoarece fiecare fiinţă este unu, având o unitate a ei. Pe de altă parte, pentru ca unul să se regăsească în fiecare fiinţă, el trebuie să existe și înaintea tuturor, în mod absolut, iar ca atare el este anterior fiinţei - precum în ipoteza întâi. Totuși, dacă analizăm lucrurile în amănunt, ne dăm seama că există de fapt o diferenţă fundamentală între perspectiva 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 2.19–21 (¥llo ¥ra ¥nqrwpoj ka ›n). 2 Vezi și Enneade, Vi, 6, 3.2. 3 Aristotel, Metafizica, 1003 b 33–34. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM50 aristotelică și cea a ipotezei platonice secunde, respectiv cea a lui Plotin care se reclamă de la această ipoteză, interpretând-o într-o manieră specifică. Tocmai de aceea spuneam mai sus că logica lui Aristotel ar corespunde ipotezei platonice secunde doar într-un anume sens. Astfel, în timp ce la Aristotel un lucru are și unitate și fiinţă deoarece unul și fiinţa sunt identice, în a doua ipoteză platonică, unul însoţește fiinţa în fiecare parte a ei tocmai pentru că unul însuși este de fapt diferit de fiinţă1. Platon spune explicit că, în această a doua ipoteză, „unul este" înseamnă că „este" diferă de „unu"2. Altfel, dacă nu ar fi distincte, nu am putea face diferenţa dintre „unul este" (›n enai) din a doua ipoteză și „unul este unu" (žn ›n) din prima ipoteză (142 c 1–2). de asemenea, la Plotin - în continuarea ipotezei platonice -, unul care se regăsește în fiecare fiinţă nu este niciodată identificat cu fiinţa însăși3. dar, dacă unul este diferit de fiinţă și dacă, în plus, unul și fiinţa par chiar opuse, cum se pot întâlni ele în fiecare lucru? cum poate o fiinţă să fie plurală, dar în același timp unitară, fără ca unitatea și pluralitatea ei să se contrazică sau să se suprime reciproc? Răspunsul la această întrebare pune în evidenţă o altă diferenţă dintre unu și fiinţă, și anume o diferenţă cu privire la raportul dintre ele, la ordinea lor logică. Unul nu contrazice în nici un fel pluralitatea unei fiinţe, ci, din contră, o fundamentează. Unul precede fiinţa și o face posibilă; un lucru nu poate avea fiinţă decât dacă are o unitate. Pentru a demonstra acest lucru, Plotin pornește de la situaţia negativă sau răsturnată, în care un lucru și-ar pierde unitatea. ce se întâmplă în acest caz în privinţa fiinţei lui? ni s-a spus mai sus4 că unul este indivizibil, și numai 1 Platon, Parmenide, 142 b 7–c 5. 2 Platon, Parmenide, 142 c 4–5 (aej ¥llo ti shma‹non tÕ oesti toà ›n). 3 Așadar, Plotin distinge unul de fiinţă nu numai în sensul cel mai înalt al acestora - ca unu absolut, anterior fiinţei (precum în ipoteza întâi) -, ci le distinge chiar și la nivelul fiinţei concrete care deţine unitate, așa cum unul care deţine fiinţă (din a doua ipoteză) era diferit de fiinţa însăși. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 2.21. Capitolul 2: Unul din lucrurile individuale 51 lucrul respectiv (omul) poate fi divizat. Așadar, atunci când lucrul este divizat, el își pierde unitatea. numai că, pierzându-și unitatea, lucrul își pierde, în consecinţă, și fiinţa. fiinţa divizată, așadar fără unitate, nu mai este aceeași fiinţă. desfăcut în părţile sale componente, lucrul își pierde fiinţa, iar părţile devin fiinţe noi, diferite, având fiecare unitatea sa proprie. „dacă un lucru își pierde unul, el nu va mai fi deloc"1. la prima vedere, am putea crede că Plotin susţine tocmai identitatea unului cu fiinţa, în sensul că, atunci când se pierde unul, se pierde și fiinţa; numai că, de fapt, forma de viitor a verbului „a fi" (oesesqai) ne indică adevărata relaţie dintre unu și fiinţă: lucrul care și-a pierdut unul își va pierde fiinţa tocmai ca o consecinţă a pierderii unului, iar nu invers. de ce? Tocmai pentru că, așa cum am arătat mai sus, fiinţa este plurală și nu poate subzista decât în virtutea unului său. lucrul care își pierde unul își pierde fiinţa nu în sensul că fiinţa ar fi identică cu unul, ci, din contră, în sensul că lucrul plural nu poate exista fără o unitate care să îl ţină în forma și în fiinţa sa proprie. o pluralitate oarecare nu formează neapărat o fiinţă unitară; în schimb, o fiinţă este fiinţă doar ca întreg al părţilor sale, doar ca unitate a acestora. Altfel spus, orice fiinţă este o pluralitate, însă nu orice pluralitate este o fiinţă, ci doar pluralitatea stăpânită de o unitate. Așa cum unitatea are preeminenţă asupra pluralităţii, tot astfel, unul are preeminenţă asupra fiinţei. numai unul poate face ca o pluralitate să fie o fiinţă anume, numai unul face ca o fiinţă să fie propriu-zis o fiinţă2, cu un sens determinat, cu o raţiune de a fi, cu o definiţie proprie. Așadar, pentru ca o fiinţă să fie, ea trebuie să fie mai întâi unitară, să aibă un unu al său. Aici s-ar putea ridica o obiecţie: dacă unul este diferit de fiinţa unui lucru, rezultă că, pentru Plotin, 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 2.15 (e„ ¢pole‹ ›kaston tÕ ›n, mhd' oesesqai tÕ par£pan). 2 În schimb, la Aristotel, ceea ce făcea ca lucrurile (t¦ Ônta, cele ce sunt) să fie era fiinţa lor (oÙs...a). discutând acest context, P. Aubenque traduce termenul de oÙs...a prin „étantité" (fiinţitate); vezi „Plotin et le dépassement de l'onto logie grecque classique", art. cit., p. 102. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM52 „om", „om care este" și „un om" exprimă lucruri diferite. Pe de altă parte, ni se spune că un lucru care și-a pierdut unitatea nu mai este, ci își pierde și fiinţa. dar atunci, rezultă în mod necesar că „om" și „om care este" - în măsura în care exprimă o fiinţă - nu se pot referi decât la omul care are o unitate, așadar la „un om". În consecinţă, „om" sau „om care este" înseamnă același lucru cu „un om", ceea ce ne aduce în mod circular la afirmaţia lui Aristotel. faptul că o asemenea obiecţie este posibilă ne arată că Plotin însuși nu poate distinge în mod efectiv unul de fiinţa unui lucru, cel puţin nu poate pune în evidenţă această distincţie în limbajul și în logica gândirii noastre, în care orice fiinţă este deja o unitate. Unul este cel datorită căruia fiinţa este fiinţă, iar fără unu nimic nu poate fi. În Enneade, Vi, 9, 1, sunt discutate câteva cazuri în care o fiinţă își pierde unitatea: lucrurile constituite din mai mulţi indivizi (armata, corul, turma), lucrurile individuale formate din părţi (casa, nava), mărimile continue, corpurile vii (animale, plante), calităţile (sănătate, frumuseţe). nici unul dintre aceste lucruri nu poate subzista decât în virtutea unităţii sale. Sănătatea și frumuseţea constau tocmai într-un acord și o unitate a părţilor corpului, pe când pierderea unităţii corpului determină pierderea celor două calităţi. În cazul corpului viu - plantă sau animal -, atunci când acesta își pierde unitatea, fiind separat în părţi multiple, el își pierde fiinţa pe care o avea și se transformă în alte fiinţe, care, la rândul lor, sunt fiecare unu. Totuși, argumentaţia nu este pe deplin satisfăcătoare, cel puţin la acest nivel: căci, dacă este divizat în părţi, lucrul respectiv își pierde și unitatea, dar și fiinţa pe care o avea - așadar le pierde pe amândouă în același timp. Însă lucrul nu piere cu totul, ci el se transformă în alte fiinţe, care au fiecare o unitate proprie, așadar fiinţa și unitatea nu se pierd de tot, ci ele dispar în același timp și reapar în același timp, chiar dacă sunt diferite de fiinţa și unitatea iniţiale. Problema constă de fapt în imposibilitatea de a separa propriu-zis unitatea de fiinţă: atunci când lucrul își pierde Capitolul 2: Unul din lucrurile individuale 53 unitatea iniţială, el devine alt lucru, sau alte lucruri; însă aceste alte lucruri nu pot exista decât dacă au fiecare unitatea lor proprie. Poate că, tocmai din această cauză, adevărata problemă a relaţiei dintre unu și pluralitate, dintre unitate și număr, se va discuta la nivelul fiinţei inteligibile, acolo unde Plotin va încerca să explice în mod concret cum anume se naște pluralitatea fiinţei pornind de la unitatea anterioară. Plotin va fi obligat apoi să ridice această diferenţă la un nivel superior gândirii, făcând din unu un principiu în sine, absolut. Totuși, așa cum la acest nivel al lucrurilor nu putem gândi propriu-zis unul în distincţie faţă de fiinţă, nu îl putem exprima distinct, tot așa, la nivelul unului absolut, vom vedea că nici măcar gândirea cea mai înaltă, adică cea a intelectului, nu va putea să surprindă propriu-zis unul. Această observaţie ne pune pe urmele problemei pe care ne-am propus să o urmărim, anume cea a unei gândiri care face apel la ceea ce ea însăși nu mai poate gândi propriu-zis. Gândirea lui Plotin se vede încă de la început în această disjuncţie: fiinţa are nevoie de unul care să îi dea consistenţă și identitate, însă unul acesta nu poate fi propriu-zis distins de fiinţă, el nu poate fi gândit separat. Revenind la pierderea unităţii, un alt exemplu - poate mai intuitiv - este acela al armatei sau al corului: atunci când armata își pierde unitatea, părţile ei nu își pierd propriu-zis fiinţa pe care o aveau înainte (așa cum o parte ruptă dintr-un vieţuitor își pierde viaţa și suferă o modificare radicală la nivelul fiinţei sale); cu toate acestea, armata însăși își pierde fiinţa. Așadar, ceea ce face ca o armată să fie armată nu este ceva de ordinul fiinţei, ci ceva de ordinul unităţii. Un argument care ar putea întări cele spuse de Plotin, dar care nu apare în acest context, este faptul că un lucru își poate pierde fiinţa fără a-și pierde unitatea: de pildă atunci când lucrul este alterat, dar rămâne unitar. În schimb, lucrul nu poate să își piardă unitatea fără să își piardă și fiinţa, ceea ce demonstrează anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţă. În Enneade, Vi, 6, Plotin reia problematica relaţiei dintre fiinţă și unitate, în contextul unei discuţii mai amănunţite, în care PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM54 este integrat și numărul. Pentru Plotin, fiinţa nu poate exista ca pluralitate pură, infinită. dacă fiinţa nu ar avea o unitate a părţilor sale, ci ar înainta numai spre pluralitate, atunci ea s-ar disipa în cele din urmă și și-ar pierde sensul ei de fiinţă. Însă ceea ce face ca lucrurile să nu se disipeze, ci să aibă o fiinţă stabilă, este faptul că pluralitatea lor este oprită la un moment dat și este prinsă într-o unitate. ceea ce se naște în felul acesta este mărimea lucrului, numărul său. Schema este în esenţă una platonică: este vorba despre modul în care fiinţa ia naștere din unirea nelimitatului cu limita1. În orice lucru putem distinge - conform lecţiei platonice din Philebos, 14 c - între unitatea acestui lucru și pluralitatea lui. Plotin - păstrând opoziţia dintre acestea două - le oferă în același timp funcţii și valori specifice: astfel, un lucru este plural, însă numai în limita impusă de unitatea lui; lucrul există nu dacă devine mare și plural, ci din contră, dacă, în această desfășurare plurală a lui, părţile lucrului tind totodată spre unitate. Pluralitatea și unitatea coexistă, cu condiţia acestei direcţionări înspre unitate. Astfel, unitatea este anterioară pluralităţii deoarece a fi nu înseamnă în primul rând a fi plural, ci înseamnă a fi unu. Tendinţa lucrurilor de a se dispersa, de a se plurifica, este explicată de Plotin prin incapacitatea lor de a se avea pe sine și de a rămâne în sine însuși; a fi înseamnă a fi în sine însuși, concentrându-se asupra sa însuși2. Plotin conchide că doar atunci când un lucru are unitate, el se are pe sine3, ceea ce, urmând logica limbii grecești, poate fi tradus și prin: „atunci 1 Platon, Philebos, 16 c 9–10. Vezi și 16 d–17 a, în care Platon vorbește despre pluralitate ca fiind situată între unitate și infinit. Înţelepţii de astăzi (sofiștii) ignoră această intermediaritate. 2 Enneade, Vi, 6, 1.12–13. Plotin demonstrează acest lucru recurgând la același argument negativ, al unui lucru desfăcut în părţile componente, argument pe care l-am întâlnit și în Enneade, Vi, 9, 2.15: atunci când un lucru devine multiplu în sensul separării lui în părţile sale, părţile există fiecare în parte, însă lucrul însuși nu mai există. desigur, un fel de existenţă se păstrează și în acest caz, și anume existenţa fiecărei părţi; însă lucrul însuși nu mai este propriu-zis același. 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 1.22 (Óti d oecei ›n, oecei autÒ). Capitolul 2: Unul din lucrurile individuale 55 când este unu, lucrul este el însuși". lucrul este unu atunci când își aparţine sieși. dacă din punct de vedere logic - la Aristotel - a spune „om" este același lucru cu a spune „un om", în schimb, Plotin propune aici un punct de vedere mai esenţial: fiinţa nu poate fi cu adevărat decât în această apartenenţă a lucrului la sine însuși. nu numai că „un om" nu este același lucru cu „om", ci, mai mult, omul nu poate fi om decât în măsura în care el este „un om", adică în măsura în care fiinţa sa își aparţine sieși, în măsura în care își găsește unitatea proprie. Așadar, diferenţa dintre „om" și „un om" nu este neapărat una logică. conţinutul de sens al celor două expresii nu este radical diferit. Totuși, diferenţa apare la nivel ontologic: „unul" este ceea ce face ca „om" său fie „om"; „unu" este cel care dă sensul propriu fiinţei „om". Între cele trei formulări din exemplul aristotelic - anume „om", „om care este" și „un om" - am putea spune că „om" nu poate fi „om care este" decât dacă este „un om", intrând astfel într-o gradaţie ontologică. Pentru Plotin, prezenţa unităţii în lucruri are o relevanţă mult mai profundă decât în teza aristotelică a identităţii dintre fiinţă și unitate. Toate lucrurile au o tendinţă spre multiplicare, o tendinţă de a se dispersa în pluralitate și, astfel, în nefiinţă; dar ceea ce le face să fie totuși fiinţe - adică ceea ce le oprește din această dispersie și plurificare - este unitatea. o fiinţă este propriu-zis fiinţă numai deoarece, în ciuda pluralităţii sale, ea are un număr, așadar o limitare esenţială și o unitate. Astfel, în analiza lui Plotin, unul nu mai apare ca simplă unitate numerică a unui lucru - care pentru Aristotel nu însemna nimic mai mult decât lucrul însuși, fiind deja subînţeles sau inclus în acel lucru - ci are o valoare suplimentară, și anume este ceea ce face ca un lucru să fie determinat și stabil în fiinţa sa, ceea ce dă fiinţei identitate și, fără de care, orice lucru se disipează și își pierde fiinţa. Plotin pătrunde astfel la un nivel mai adânc al problemei, descoperind în fiinţa unui lucru „motivul" pentru care fiinţa este fiinţă. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM56 B. Anterioritatea unului faţă de gândire. Polemica anti-stoică Plotin a arătat că fiecare lucru este unu, însă unul însuși nu este identic cu lucrul respectiv, cu fiinţa sa, ci este anterior fiinţei și mai fundamental decât ea. Acest unu pe care îl observăm în lucruri - care însoţește fiinţa fiecărui lucru și fără de care fiinţa nu poate exista - nu este el însuși de natura lucrurilor respective, de natura substratului la care ne referim când spunem că ceva este unu. Gândim deci un unu anterior oricărui lucru care este unu, un unu anterior determinărilor pe care le poate lua: ca un om, un cal, etc. Totuși, ce înseamnă această anterioritate a unului faţă de fiinţă? este oare unul ceva în sine, ca o natură anume, anterioară fiecărui lucru unitar? nu cumva anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţă vine din faptul că gândirea noastră receptează lucrurile ca unitare, înainte de a distinge în ele o pluralitate specifică? nu cumva unitatea - ca și numerele din lucruri - se datorează actului sufletului de a număra, neavând, în consecinţă, o existenţă separată de gândirea noastră? Așadar, perspectiva lui Plotin nu poate fi validată decât dacă face proba că nu este o simplă manieră de a vorbi, că nu ţine doar de felul în care noi gândim lucrurile. dacă până acum Plotin l-a combătut pe Aristotel, încercând să instituie anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţa concretă care este una, în continuare, el va începe un dialog cu stoicii, încercând să instituie - împotriva lor - anterioritatea unului faţă de gândirea unului, faţă de reprezentarea pe care ne-o facem despre el. Adversarii lui, stoicii, nu caută în lucruri unitatea comună acestora - care leagă lucruri diverse sub aceeași idee - ci caută particularul, ceea ce este specific unei fiinţe determinate, ceea ce constituie prezenţa unică și irepetabilă a acelei fiinţe. În acest sens, ei neagă existenţa ideilor, precum și existenţa numerelor în sine; pentru ei, nu există un unu în sine, în virtutea căruia lucrurile sunt la rândul lor unităţi determinate, ci există Capitolul 2: Unul din lucrurile individuale 57 doar unităţi determinate, particulare1, respectiv reprezentările noastre mentale despre aceste unităţi. În consecinţă, nimic nu poate fi unu, decât ca un unu particular, ca un unu determinat2. Mai precis, pentru stoici, unul nu poate fi decât o afectare a sufletului3, în sensul în care sufletul nostru percepe fiecare lucru ca unu4. În schimb, Plotin va demonstra că unul există anterior gândirii; pentru aceasta, el pornește tocmai de la o idee stoică. Pentru stoici, reprezentarea noastră (despre unu sau despre oricare alt lucru) nu poate fi ea însăși unitară, ci este duală, deoarece presupune un subiect și un obiect. dar atunci - remarcă Plotin -, ideea unului nu poate fi obţinută din reprezentarea pe care ne-o facem despre unu, deoarece aceasta nu este unitară. Așadar, unul nu poate fi redus la reprezentarea noastră despre unu, ci avem unul în sufletul nostru, dar el nu este simpla reprezentare pe care ne-o facem despre el. Totuși, se poate ridica în continuare o obiecţie, spunând că acea noţiune de unu din noi vine de fapt de la lucrurile a căror reprezentare o avem, așadar de la substratul care este unu5; în felul acesta, chiar dacă unul nu este o simplă reprezentare, totuși, el nu este nici „anterior" lucrului însuși, ci unitatea apare o dată cu substratul despre care spunem că este unu. Pentru a răspunde 1 Vezi É. Bréhier, La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme, Paris, Vrin, 1980. 2 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 12.2 (oÙdn g¦r ›n, Ö m3⁄4 t ›n). Genul cel mai larg admis de stoici este acela al lui ceva (t...). În sensul acesta, orice lucru este ceva anume: fie ceva care există, fiind astfel corporal, fie un incorporal care nu există. În concluzie, în această logică, unitatea fie nu există, fie există și este ceva corporal, determinat. 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 12.2–3 (p£qhma ti tÁj yucÁj). Pentru expresia „afectare a sufletului", vezi Aristotel, Despre interpretare, 1, 16, a 3–5: „cuvintele rostite sunt simboluri ale afectărilor sufletului". 4 Vezi, de pildă, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (SVf) ii, 54, p. 21, 24, unde reprezentarea (fantas...a) este descrisă ca o afectare a sufletului (p£qoj TMn tÍ yucÍ), ce are loc atunci când percepem un lucru, de pildă, vedem ceva alb; vezi de asemenea SVf ii, 329, p. 117, 11, pentru unul ca noţiune (TMnnÒhma). 5 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 12.11–13. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM58 la această obiecţie1, Plotin atrage atenţia asupra distincţiei dintre noţiunea de „unu" (t3⁄4n nÒhsin toà nÒj) și noţiunea lucrului respectiv, a substratului sau subiectul (tÕ Øpoke...menon) în care se află acest unu. noţiunea de unu nu poate veni din substratul sau subiectul sensibil - care este un om, un animal sau o piatră - deoarece noţiunea acelui subiect este ea însăși diferită de noţiunea de unu. de pildă, noţiunea de „om" nu este aceeași cu noţiunea de „unu". Plotin arată că, dacă „om" ar fi același lucru cu „un om", iar noţiunea unului ar veni de la cea de om, atunci nu am mai putea aplica „unul" la ceea ce nu este „om", adică unor lucruri a căror noţiune este în mod evident diferită de noţiunea de „om". Altfel spus, a fi om nu înseamnă în mod automat a fi „unu", ci „om" înseamnă ceva, iar „unu" înseamnă altceva. În consecinţă, unul nu vine de la lucrul însuși care este unitar, ci este distinct de substratul care îl primește și este anterior acestuia. În spatele acestui argument descoperim o altă referinţă platonică, sau mai degrabă un mod de a gândi specific lui Platon. Astfel, în Parmenide, 139 d 3–4 (așadar, din nou în prima aporie), se arată că unul nu poate fi nici identic, nici diferit, deoarece unu este altceva decât identic sau decât diferit. concluzia radicală a lui Platon în acest sens este că unul nu poate fi nici măcar identic cu sine, căci natura unului nu este aceeași cu natura identicului. În același fel, Plotin distinge aici „a fi unu" de „a fi om" sau „a fi piatră". Așa cum „om" sau „piatră" înseamnă ceva anume, la fel și „unu" înseamnă ceva anume. Astfel, argumentul se continuă prin a arăta că „unu" nu este o adăugire inutilă la noţiunea de „om" - o adăugire ce nu ar spori cu nimic sensul lui „om", pentru că nu ar însemna ea însăși nimic - ci că, atunci când afirmă „unul", gândirea vizualizează efectiv ceva anume. Altfel spus, atunci când gândim „un om", gândim ceva mai mult decât dacă am spune doar „om", deoarece „unul" înseamnă el însuși ceva anume. Gândirea care gândește „unul" nu este o afectare vidă, iar acest „unu" nu este 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 13. Capitolul 2: Unul din lucrurile individuale 59 afirmat despre un nimic1. Plotin vrea astfel să pună în evidenţă faptul că există o natură specifică unului, la care gândirea se raportează de fiecare dată, iar această natură a unului nu este reductibilă la natura lucrurilor care sunt unu. Plotin merge însă și mai departe, și arată că orice gândire și orice reprezentare pe care o avem despre ceva anume presupune unul. Într-adevăr, orice lucru pe care îl gândim ne apare ca o pluralitate limitată - așadar ca având un număr - dar și ca o unitate, iar lucrul nu poate fi separat niciodată de unitatea sa. Tocmai de aceea se pune întrebarea dacă nu cumva această unitate este introdusă de gândirea noastră, dacă ea nu ţine doar de felul în care noi receptăm lucrul, atunci când îl gândim. În fond, în exemplul dat de Aristotel, „unul" apare ca o „dublare a cuvintelor": în loc să spunem „om", spunem „un om", însă de fapt nu exprimăm nimic nou prin această adăugire. Răspunsul lui Plotin constă în a arăta că gândirea nu numai că nu poate impune „unul", ci ea nici nu se poate exercita în lipsa unului, astfel încât unul este anterior fiinţei, dar și gândirii oricărei fiinţe. Unul nu poate fi așezat pe același nivel cu celelalte lucruri pe care le gândim, ci orice alt lucru pe care îl gândim presupune unul și se sprijină pe această anterioritate a unului. o primă obiecţie la această afirmaţie ar fi aceea că unul nu face decât să izoleze un lucru gândit faţă de celelalte, așadar el nu ar avea decât o valenţă negativă. „Unu" ar însemna „singur" sau „fără un altul"2. dar Plotin observă că „unu" nu are aceeași pondere în gândirea noastră ca „singur" sau ca „fără un altul", ci, pentru a putea gândi acest „singur" și acest „altul", trebuie să gândim mai întâi „unul": astfel, ceva este „altul" pentru că este „un altul" și este „altul" faţă de „unul" de la care am pornit, iar „singur" (mÒnon) înseamnă „unul singur" (doar unul). Așadar, pentru a gândi orice altceva - și chiar și pentru a încerca să explicăm ce înseamnă „unu" (ca în cazul în care spunem că „unu" 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 13.9 (oÙ g¦r d3⁄4 kenÕn p£qhma ka TMp mhden tÕ žn lšgei). 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 13.9–10 (mÒnon ka oÙk ¥llo). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM60 înseamnă „singur") - avem nevoie să gândim deja „unul" însuși. În logica gândirii noastre, oricare „alt lucru" este posterior „unului". fără „unu", nu putem gândi nimic altceva3, de vreme ce oricare „altul" este „alt unu". Astfel, chiar și când gândim o pluralitate, aceasta înseamnă „mai mult decât unul" (ple...w nÒj), așadar ea este gândită tot faţă de unu. de asemenea, dacă gândim un lucru plural, îl gândim din perspectiva unităţii sale, de pildă o armată sau o casă. Plotin merge mai departe: el analizează situaţia însăși a gândirii și observă că aceasta presupune o interacţiune între unul care gândește și unul care este gândit. Așadar, înainte de a afirma unul, gândirea este ea însăși un unu, iar cel despre care ea afirmă unul este deja un unu, înainte de a fi gândit4. Unul nu este doar un obiect al gândirii, ci el este presupus de gândire atât înaintea obiectelor sale, cât și înaintea ei însăși. fără unu nu putem gândi nimic altceva5 și nici măcar gândirea nu are sens. de aici, Plotin trage următoarea concluzie: dacă non-existenţa unului face imposibilă orice gândire, atunci nu putem spune că unul nu este6. desigur, dacă am spune chiar și acest lucru - anume că unul nu este - ar trebui să ne sprijinim tot pe existenţa unului. 3 Recunoaștem aici sursa platonică a problemei, cea din ipotezele negative asupra unului (ipotezele 6–9: Parmenide, 160 b 5–166 c 5), în care se arată că, dacă unul nu există, atunci nici el și nici celelalte lucruri nu pot fi gândite. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 13.14–16. 5 Plotin arată că nu putem spune nimic fără a gândi unul, deoarece atunci când spunem orice lucru (t...) spunem deja și unul (›n) (Ótan ti, žn aâ lšgei) (Enneade, Vi, 6, 13.42). Vezi Platon, Sofistul, 237 d–238 c 10, Theaitetos, 188 e 6–189 a 9: cel ce vede ceva (t...) nu vede un nimic (oÙdšn), ci „un ceva", iar „un ceva" (›n ti) înseamnă ceva care este. Vezi de asemenea Parmenide, 144 c 4–5: orice lucru care este este un anume unu (›n ti). În concluzie, unul este anterior fiinţei și îi dă naștere, căci nu există nimic care să nu fie unu (oÙdn g¦r Ôn, Ö m3⁄4 ›n) (Enneade, Vi, 6, 13.50–51). 6 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 13.45–47 (Oá g¦r m3⁄4 Ôntoj mhd' Ðtioàn dunatÕn noÁsai À e„pe‹n, lšgein m3⁄4 enai ¢dÚnaton). expresia grecească este circulară și greu de redat în română: „despre cel care - dacă nu este - face imposibil a gândi și a vorbi, nu se poate spune că nu este", sau: „nu se poate spune că nu este cel fără de care este imposibil a gândi și a vorbi". Capitolul 2: Unul din lucrurile individuale 61 există așadar o dublă implicare între gândirea unului - ca anterior oricărei gândiri - și existenţa unului ca o natură specifică: pe de o parte, fără unu nu putem gândi nimic altceva; pe de altă parte, dacă gândirea presupune unul, atunci nu putem gândi și nu putem accepta non-existenţa unului. Astfel, trebuie să ţinem cont de mai multe aspecte ale problemei: pe de o parte nu putem gândi nimic fără unu, pe de altă parte nu putem gândi că unul nu există, iar în cele din urmă nici un lucru nu poate fi - nu poate avea o fiinţă proprie - decât dacă are o unitate, un unu al său. Această unitate nu este adăugată de gândire, ci subzistă în sine, anterior lucrurilor unitare și anterior gândirii acestora. Un alt argument în favoarea acestei idei este următorul: în orice lucru există o unitate, într-un grad mai mare sau mai mic (precum într-o armată, o casă, sau, în măsură mai mare, în ceea ce este continuu sau indivizibil); dar ceva ce are grade nu poate fi inexistent1. În consecinţă, „unul este o natură determinată, subzistentă"2, o natură diferită de lucrurile în care el poate fi întâlnit3. În plus, există o relaţie direct proporţională între fiinţa unui lucru și unitatea sa: cu cât un lucru are mai multă fiinţă, cu atât el este mai unitar4. Gândirea doar „recunoaște" în lucruri unitatea, așa cum recunoaște forma inteligibilă sub care stă un lucru, dar nu impune ea însăși forma lucrului respectiv. 1 Aristotel, De philosophia, fr. 16, 9–10: „acolo unde există un mai bun, trebuie să existe și cel mai bun". 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 13.26 (dÁlon Óti Ôntoj tinÕj fÚsewj toà nÕj ka Øfestèshj). 3 În schimb, la Aristotel, natura unului era aceeași cu natura fiinţei (Metafizica, 1003 b 23). 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 1.26–28. Relaţia dintre gradul de unitate și gradul de fiinţă nu este întotdeauna foarte bine precizată la Plotin. În alte context, raportul dintre cele două nu pare a fi direct proporţional: vezi, de pildă, Enneade, Vi, 2, 11.12–16, unde Plotin spune că unele lucruri au același grad de fiinţă, însă au grade diferite de unitate. Astfel, o armată nu are mai puţină fiinţă decât o casă, însă are mai puţină unitate. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM62 * * * Am văzut că, la nivelul lucrurilor cu care ne întâlnim în mod obișnuit, deși gândim fiecare lucru ca unu, nu putem să explicăm acest unu în termenii obișnuiţi ai gândirii, deoarece orice lucru pe care l-am gândi presupune deja unul și se sprijină deja pe acceptarea unului în gândirea noastră. Unul nu poate fi redus la alte lucruri pe care le gândim, el nu poate fi explicat nici ca o simplă negaţie, nici ca un atribut al substratului, sau ca un lucru printre alte lucruri. Astfel, Plotin pune în evidenţă necesitatea pentru gândire a unui element pe care gândirea noastră discursivă nu îl mai poate explica. Unul se impune, încă de la acest nivel, ca o natură în sine, care nu poate fi asimilată naturii celorlalte lucruri, ci este anterioară acestora, și care nu poate fi prinsă în gândirea noastră, ci, din nou, este anterioară. Gândirea noastră nu poate decât să recunoască în lucruri unitatea, dar nu poate să o impună ea însăși. Unul pe care îl observăm în lucrurile sensibile nu este de natură sensibilă, ci, așa cum trecem de la lucrurile sensibile la fiinţa lor inteligibilă, la fel se întâmplă și în cazul unului: observăm unul în lucrurile sensibile (care sunt unu prin participaţie), însă unul însuși este perceput doar ca inteligibil și în mod inteligibil1. Astfel, în locul perspectivei aristotelice (care identifică unul cu lucrul care este unu) și în locul perspectivei stoice (pentru care unul este doar reprezentarea pe care ne-o facem noi despre un lucru unitar), Plotin pune existenţa unului în sine, anterior lucrurilor unitare și anterior gândirii acestor lucruri. 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 13.39–40 (nohtÕn mšntoi ka nohtîj 1 di£noia aÙtÕ lamb£nei). capitolul 3 UnUl inTeliGiBil Plotin a demonstrat anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţa concretă a unui lucru unitar și faţă de gândirea noastră asupra lucrurilor. Se pune atunci întrebarea de unde vine această anterioritate, unde întâlnim unul pentru prima dată în sine însuși. Răspunsul lui Plotin constă în aceea că, înainte de a exista în lucrurile însele, unul există în inteligibil, în fiinţa veritabilă, model al întregii realităţi. Pentru a impune această concluzie, el va recurge la o analiză foarte amănunţită a relaţiei dintre unu și numere la nivelul lumii inteligibile. Premisa care ghidează analiza lui Plotin este aceea că lumea inteligibilă este reală, într-o manieră superioară lucrurilor pe care le considerăm reale în lumea vizibilă. Tot ceea ce putem gândi în această lume de aici își are modelul său inteligibil, el însuși real. esenţa oricărui lucru există înainte ca ea să fie gândită, și nu poate fi instituită prin faptul că cineva o gândește. exemplul pe care îl folosește Plotin este acela al dreptăţii: dacă aceasta ar exista doar pentru că este gândită ca atare, atunci dreptatea nu ar mai fi cu adevărat dreptate, ci ea ar fi identică cu propria definiţie. o astfel de concluzie este însă inacceptabilă, deoarece ar destructura însuși sensul dreptăţii1. În același fel, 1 desigur, s-ar putea spune că este drept ceea ce noi definim ca drept, sau ceea ce noi stabilim prin convenţie că este drept. Totuși, chiar și în acest caz, nu putem să stabilim că ceva este drept în lipsa totală a ideii de dreptate. chiar dacă putem schimba ceea ce este drept - și putem chiar să instituim ca drept un lucru aparent nedrept - totuși, facem aceasta îndepărtându-ne de la un model iniţial al dreptăţii. dar atunci, înseamnă că avem în continuare un sens general al dreptăţii, conform căruia decidem ce este drept și ce este nedrept. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM64 gândirea nu creează fiinţa inteligibilă, ci acesta există în sine, iar gândirea nu face decât să o perceapă. dar, așa cum fiinţa inteligibilă există în sine, necondiţionată de faptul că o gândim - iar în inteligibil aceasta este simultană cu actul gândirii - la fel, numărul din lucruri nu vine din faptul că sufletul numără lucrurile, ci el este anterior actului de a număra, existând în sine, ca o natură distinctă, inteligibilă. Așa cum, la vederea lucrurilor sensibile, gândirea recunoaște ideea inteligibilă, la fel, atunci când numărăm lucrurile sensibile, acestea trezesc în noi ideea numărului în sine1. iar anterior numărului inteligibil, Plotin va identifica unul inteligibil, care dă unitatea fiinţei inteligibile și este anterior acesteia. În continuare, vom intra în această analiză amănunţită asupra numărului și a unului din inteligibil, punând în lumină soluţia surprinzătoare pe care o propune Plotin pentru anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţă la acest nivel. Problema este de o importanţă majoră pentru tema noastră. Astfel, la fiecare nivel analizat până acum - atât cel sensibil, cât și cel al gândirii noastre - descoperim un anume sens al unului. În fiecare caz, acel unu are o anumită anterioritate faţă de lucruri și faţă de gândirea lor. Totuși, înfruntarea cea mai mare a gânditorilor neoplatonici este aceea cu fiinţa veritabilă, neschimbătoare; ei intră în structura însăși a acestei fiinţe, descriind-o în cele mai mici amănunte. or tocmai modul în care unul este descoperit la nivelul fiinţei inteligibile va determina în continuare problema unui principiu absolut, unic și unitar, anterior fiinţei și întregii realităţi. A. Numărul din lumea sensibilă şi numărul din lumea inteligibilă orice lucru trebuie să aibă o unitate, respectiv un număr (obţinut ca limitare a pluralităţii prin unitate), iar unitatea este anterioară pluralităţii lucrului respectiv. Totuși, această unitate (respectiv 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 4.20–25. Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 65 numărul) fiecărui lucru nu are doar un sens strict nu meric, ci are valoare de fundament al fiinţei. Pentru a demonstra acest lucru, Plotin mută discuţia de la nivelul lucrurilor sensibile, la cel al lucrurilor inteligibile. el arată că numărul din lucrurile sensibile, numărul așa cum îl gândim noi, nu este decât o reflectare - slabă și derivată - a numărului inteligibil. Același lucru se întâmplă și cu unul din gândirea noastră. dacă la nivelul sensibil anterioritatea unului este doar schiţată, ea își va găsi sensul și explicaţia profundă la nivelul inteligibil. demonstraţia acestui lucru poate fi întâlnită în Enneade, Vi, 6, 21, unde Plotin pune în evidenţă sensul inteligibil al numărului. Mai precis, el arată că - anterior sensului aritmetic al numărului, cu care lucrăm noi în această lume - există un număr inteligibil, determinat de o necesitate internă a fiinţei inteligibile. Acesta este fix, neschimbător, dar în același timp complet, total, nesuferind nici o lipsă și nici un adaos. Acesta este numărul „real" al celor ce sunt, el controlează desfășurarea pluralităţii lucrurilor în lumea inteligibilă, precum și în cea sensibilă. Argumentul pe care îl dezvoltă Plotin este, pe scurt, următorul: numărul lucrurilor este finit2; în schimb, gândirea noastră nu reflectă acest număr, ci poate concepe mereu un număr mai mare, mergând spre infinit. În concluzie, numărul din gândirea noastră nu este decât o imagine a numărului real; numărul real nu este cel stabilit de gândirea noastră, ci este cel asociat fiinţei veritabile. Pentru a pune în evidenţă diferenţa dintre aceste două sensuri ale numărului, Plotin opune3 două referinţe platonice: pe de 1 În analiza acestui paragraf, am avut în vedere și traducerea, precum și comentariile adiacente oferite de J. Bertier, l. Brisson, A. charles, J. Pepin, H.-d. Saffrey, A.-Ph. Segonds (Plotin, Traité Sur les nombres, ennéades Vi, 6, [34], Paris, Vrin, 1980). Vezi și analiza lui J. Pépin, din „Platonisme et antiplatonisme dans le traité de Plotin Sur les nombres (Vi 6 [34])", Phronesis, 24, 1979, pp. 197–208. 2 infinitul nu poate exista în act (Aristotel vezi Fizica, iii, 6; Metafizica, 1067 a 20–23). 3 Vezi Enneade, Vi, 6, 4.11–24. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM66 o parte Epinomis, 978 d 1–51, iar pe de altă parte Republica, 529 d 2-3. În primul caz, Platon afirmă că oamenii au învăţat să numere prin observarea alternanţei dintre noapte și zi. Această afirmaţie poate ridica probleme perspectivei lui Plotin, deoarece s-ar părea că numărul apare printr-un act al sufletului, atunci când el urmărește alternanţa lucrurilor, și că, în plus, a gândi „unul" înseamnă a fixa gândirea noastră asupra unui singur lucru, fără a trece la un altul. Totuși, Plotin descoperă soluţia acestei probleme în cel de-al doilea text platonic, în care Platon se referă la un „număr veritabil", conform căruia se desfășoară mișcarea constelaţiilor inteligibile. Plotin trage concluzia că numărul nu există datorită sufletului care numără lucrurile, ci că el are o existenţa în sine, iar sufletul care numără nu face decât să trezească în sine noţiunea numărului. Să vedem însă cum stabilește Plotin anterioritatea numărului real, inteligibil, faţă de cel din gândirea noastră. Prima premisă este aceea că lucrurile sensibile nu pot fi infinite2, ci lumea sensibilă este limitată3: chiar dacă lucrurile pot fi divizate la infinit, totul (tÕ p©n) trebuie să fie limitat, pentru a fi cu adevărat „totul"4. În paragraful anterior (Vi, 6, 1), Plotin vorbea despre tendinţa lucrurilor de a se depărta de unu, de a-și pierde unitatea originară, dispersându-se înspre infinit. dar, așa cum se vede în acest paragraf, mișcarea aceasta de dispersie nu poate fi urmată până la sfârșit. deși tind spre pluralitate, lucrurile nu pot ajunge să realizeze o pluralitate infinită în act; ele sunt plurale, însă limitate5. 1 Vezi și Platon, Timaios, 47 a 4–6. 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 2.2–3. infinitul există doar ca potenţă, dar nu în act, vezi Aristotel, Fizica, iii, 6, 206 b 16–18, unde cele două feluri de infinit - prin diviziune și prin creștere - sunt prezentate ca fiind în potenţă, dar niciodată realizate în act. 3 Vezi Enneade, ii, 4, 7.21–22. 4 Același argument va fi folosit de damascius, care se referă la totul absolut: vezi De principiis, R. i, 1. 5 Vezi Platon, Philebos, 16 d–17 a, despre trecerea de la unu la infinit ignorând intermediarele (pluralitatea limitată). Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 67 Pentru a întări afirmaţia de mai sus (a limitării lumii sensibile), Plotin arată că infinitul nu poate fi atins nici măcar printr-un efort al gândirii: chiar dacă am aduna la un loc nu numai lucrurile care există în prezent, ci și cele din trecut, sau cele din viitor, totuși, suma lor va rămâne limitată. de asemenea, putem să ne imaginăm că acestea toate ar fi de două ori, sau chiar de multe ori mai multe decât sunt; dar, chiar și în acest caz, suma va fi limitată. În ambele cazuri - adică atât în sfera lumii sensibile, cât și în cea a gândirii - rămânem mereu în limitele unui număr determinat de lucruri. infinitul nu poate fi realizat în act nici în lumea sensibilă concretă, nici în gândirea care însumează și multiplică numărul lucrurilor. infinitul nu poate avea un sens absolut (oÙc ¡plîj ¥peiroj), ci doar unul relativ, în sensul în care gândirea noastră poate imagina mereu un număr mai mare, fără să ajungă însă vreodată să cuprindă infinitatea însăși1. dar, din această observaţie, Plotin trage niște concluzii radicale despre ce înseamnă numărul în gândirea noastră: numărul pe care îl gândim noi nu exprimă cu adevărat numărul fiinţelor; gândirea poate crea în mod artificial numere din ce în ce mai mari decât numărul real al fiinţelor - mergând astfel înspre un infinit relativ - însă fără a schimba numărul efectiv al fiinţelor. Acest pseudo-infinit2 - care nu este în act, ci doar în potenţă - ţine de gândirea noastră imaginativă, care iese din cadrul fix al celor ce sunt, depășind limitarea lor inerentă. În consecinţă, numărul lucrurilor nu depinde de cel care numără, nu este generat de acesta3, ci altceva îl determină, și anume, el este legat de existenţa efectivă a lucrurilor. faptul că gândirea noastră are o atât de mare libertate în privinţa numerelor, putând imagina mai multe decât sunt, arată că nu gândirea creează numărul lucrurilor; în privinţa numărului, 1 Astfel, „cel care numără nu numără infinitul" (Enneade, Vi, 6, 2.4). 2 Vezi A. charles, „notes sur l'¥peiron chez Plotin et Proclus", în Annales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Aix-en-Provence, 43, 1968, pp. 147–161. 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 2.8. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM68 realitatea nu ţine cont de gândirea noastră, nu se supune numărului pe care gândirea noastră îl concepe. intrăm aici pe terenul unei vechi probleme de „aritmetică a fiinţei": cum vorbim despre unu ca și cum ar fi plural. Problema este veche, formulată deja de Platon, care în Sofistul, 251 a–b, se întreabă cum este posibil ca un lucru unitar să fie numit prin mai multe nume; de pildă, omului care este unu, îi atribuim culoare, formă, mărime, vicii, virtuţi și alte calităţi1. Platon rezolvă această problemă prin ideea că genurile fiinţei comunică. Plotin însă merge mai departe, ducând problema la un nivel și mai profund. el însuși acceptă că fiinţa este plurală2. dar el distinge două niveluri ale problemei: pe de o parte, pluralitatea fiinţei în sine - care la Platon lua forma comuniunii genurilor - iar, pe de altă parte, pluralitatea pe care gândirea noastră o introduce în lucruri - după placul ei -, atribuind omului oricâte calităţi, imaginând omul mai mare decât este, sau multiplicând la nesfârșit imaginea lui, ca într-o oglindă3. Plotin distinge astfel între ceea ce este lucrul însuși - cu numărul corespunzător lucrului respectiv - și reprezentarea pe care ne-o facem noi despre lucru, multiplicând la infinit numărul atașat lucrului respectiv - desigur, fără să atingem vreodată infinitul4. Astfel, numărul din gândirea noastră nu este decât o imagine a numărului real, care este limitat și, în plus, determinat. dar ce anume determină acest număr al lucrurilor? cum este el stabilit, limitat? Răspunsul lui Plotin constă în aceea că numărul realităţilor este finit datorită modelului lor inteligibil, datorită faptului că numărul raţiunilor care se regăsesc în lucruri este limitat. desigur, este o diferenţă între faptul că numărul lucrurilor este limitat (éristai) 1 Vezi de asemenea Legi, 963 c–965 e: cum se poate ca patru virtuţi să aibă toate același nume, fiind astfel una și totuși diferite. 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 2.17–18 (tÕ ×n tÕ k£stou plÁqÒj TMsti). 3 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 2.10–13. 4 Aristotel (Fizica, iii, 8, 208 a 15–16) face diferenţa - pe care o face și Plotin în acest context - între ceea ce este lucrul în sine (tÕ pr©gma) și reprezentarea (1 nÒhsij) pe care ne-o facem despre el, atunci când ne imaginăm că un om crește la infinit. Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 69 și faptul că acest număr este stabil sau fix (›sthken)1. Astfel, numărul este limitat deoarece infinitul nu este posibil în act; dar, în plus, numărul este fix prin faptul că fiecare lucru are o raţiune corespunzătoare (o formă inteligibilă sub care stă), iar numărul total al lucrurilor este determinat de acest număr - stabil - al raţiunilor2. Apoi, problema pluralităţii indivizilor este rezolvată de Plotin în tratatul V, 7 (Dacă există idei ale individualelor), unde se vorbește despre faptul că există o raţiune a fiecărui individ, iar numărul raţiunilor este finit. numărul determinat își are sursa în lumea inteligibilă, unde „numărul, ca și fiinţa, are limitele sale, și anume el arată câte fiinţe există"3. În inteligibil, numărul și fiinţa își corespund exact - altfel spus, există un număr real al fiinţelor inteligibile, și tocmai acesta determină în continuare numărul fiinţelor sensibile. dar atunci, ne-am putea întreba ce înseamnă numărul inteligibil, ce anume „numără" el, sau care este pluralitatea căreia el îi corespunde. iată problema pe care vom încerca să o clarificăm în continuare. B. Numărul inteligibil anterior pluralităţii inteligibile a fiinţei 1. Pluralitatea unitară, limitată şi perfectă a intelectului Plotin nu demonstrează faptul că lumea inteligibilă este o pluralitate guvernată de număr, ci el ia acest lucru ca indiscutabil, dat fiind modul în care este gândită fiinţa în tradiţia platonică4. În 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 2.9. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 7, 1.12–13 (pluralitatea raţiunilor e limitată, deoarece aceleași fiinţe revin) și V, 7, 3.14–16 (numărul fiinţelor va fi determinat de desfășurarea și explicitarea tuturor raţiunilor). Vezi și Enneade, iV, 3, 8.20–22, unde Plotin aduce un argument pentru ideea că numărul fiinţelor din univers este determinat. 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 2.9–10. 4 Sursa acestei teme a pluralităţii fiinţei se află în dialogul Sofistul, unde ipoteza unei fiinţe lipsite de pluralitate este respinsă (vezi 245 b: o fiinţă absolut unitară se arată a fi contradictorie), în favoarea descrierii fiinţei ca o structură a genurilor supreme. Tot în Sofistul, 248 e, se arată că fiinţa trebuie să deţină viaţă și PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM70 schimb, el face efortul de a descrie această lume inteligibilă guvernată de număr. ca și universul sensibil, lumea inteligibilă este o pluralitate și are, de asemenea, o unitate proprie. ea nu este nici pluralitate nelimitată, nici unitate absolută, ci este o unitate multiplă, sau o pluralitate unitară, așadar ea are un număr propriu. Totuși, unitatea, pluralitatea și numărul au alt sens în lumea inteligibilă faţă de cea sensibilă, precum și altă relevanţă filozofică. Particularitatea numărului din inteligibil rezultă din faptul că intelectul1 este o lume ruptă de materie și de orice distincţie spaţio-temporală. În plus, el este o lume în care nu se mai regăsesc nici distincţiile specifice gândirii noastre discursive. ne pregătim astfel să discutăm despre o pluralitate fără distincţii și fără succesiune temporală, despre o pluralitate care nu părăsește - nici un moment și sub nici un aspect - unitatea sa. În lumea sensibilă, pluralitatea avea un sens mai radical: lucrurile sunt distincte unele faţă de altele, fiecare având separaţia lui spaţială care îl face inconfundabil, iar pluralitatea lucrurilor păstrează aceste separaţii. numărul din lumea sensibilă corespunde acestui tip de pluralitate, reflectând distincţiile dintre lucruri. este ceea ce Plotin numește „număr monadic" (monadikÕj ¢riqmÒj), adică numărul cantitativ, obţinut prin însumarea mai multor unităţi, așa cum este numărul cu care lucrăm în operaţii aritmetice. În schimb, în lumea inteligibilă, această separaţie radicală nu își mai găsește locul, deoarece fiinţele inteligibile sunt incorporale. deși fiecare fiinţă inteligibilă are individualitatea ei - în măsura în care fiecare este o putere distinctă - totuși, aceste fiinţe nu mai sunt rupte și distanţate unele faţă de altele. inteligibilul este o lume în care lucrurile sunt plurale, însă pluralitatea lor concură înspre o singură unitate, pluralitatea lor intelect, ceea ce pune din nou în evidenţă natura ei plurală. Plotin preia ideea platonică a pluralităţii fiinţei: vezi Enneade, V, 6, 6.20–24 și Vi, 9, 2.24–25. 1 În cele ce urmează, ne vom referi la lumea inteligibilă prin acest termen de „intelect" (noàj), care este denumirea cea mai curentă pentru acest nivel al realităţii. Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 71 nu poate fi înţeleasă și gândită decât prin prisma unităţii. lumea inteligibilă este o unitate plurală, un întreg format din părţi; totuși, ceea ce diferă în inteligibil - faţă de lumea sensibilă - este raportul dintre părţile acestei pluralităţi și respectiv raportul dintre această pluralitate și unitatea care o cuprinde. fiinţele din lumea inteligibilă nu împart această lume, nu o fragmentează, ci fiecare parte a inteligibilului are în același timp aspectul totalităţii; în fiecare parte poate fi regăsit întregul acestei lumi1. o altă particularitate a lumii inteligibile - care o individualizează faţă de gândirea noastră discursivă - este aceea că în lumea inteligibilă nu există distanţă între un lucru și gândirea acelui lucru. fiinţa inteligibilă este în sine o unitate, o natură unică (m...a fÚsij) și unitară, ce cuprinde toate formele inteligibile, așa cum universul vizibil este o natură unică, ce cuprinde toate lucrurile vizibile, numai că sensul acestei „cuprinderi" este diferit în cele două cazuri. Pentru a descrie această natură unitară, Plotin folosește expresia lui Anaxagora, care spune că „totul este împreună în unu" (Ðmoà TMn n p£nta)2. Totuși, dacă în universul sensibil fiecare lucru este la locul lui, despărţit astfel de toate celelalte, natura intelectului deţine toate inteligibilele împreună, ca și cum ele ar fi „înfășurate" (p£nta oecousan ka oOEon perilaboàsan). nu trebuie să înţelegem că fiinţele inteligibile ar fi confundate între ele. din contră, inteligibilele sunt separate (cwr...j) unele faţă de altele în măsura în care fiecare are sensul său, particularitatea sa, și fiecare introduce un caracter anume, necesar, în fiinţa inteligibilă. Totuși, această separaţie nu presupune un act separativ; intelectul care 1 Pentru raportul dintre părţi și întreg în fiinţa inteligibilă, vezi Enneade, iii, 2, 1.26–32, unde Plotin arată că în inteligibil părţile nu sunt rupte din întreg, partea nu este doar parte, ci este deja întregul, iar fiinţa trăiește și gândește totul împreună, fără separaţii. În Enneade, Vi, 4, 3.31–35, se arată că întregul intelectului este prezent în fiecare parte a intelectului, deoarece el nu poate fi împărţit ca un corp. Viaţa, intelectul și fiinţa nu pot fi divizate, deoarece nu sunt de natură corporală. Vezi și Enneade, V, 8, 4.6–11. 2 Anaxagora, dK 59 B 1. expresia este recurentă la Plotin: vezi Enneade, Vi, 6, 7.4; V, 3, 15.21; V, 9, 6.3; Vi, 4, 14.4; Vi, 5, 5.3–4; Vi, 2, 8.8. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM72 conţine și gândește fiinţele inteligibile nu separă pe fiecare în parte, ci acestea sunt deja dintotdeauna separate. Așadar, ele sunt împreună, însă fără să se confunde; de asemenea, ele sunt separate, însă fără a fi distanţate unele faţă de altele. Universul inteligibil ni se prezintă astfel într-un echilibru stabil între unitate și pluralitate. În lumea inteligibilă, pluralitatea rămâne strânsă în unitate; ea nu creează nici o breșă în unitatea care o conţine. dar cum se întâlnesc și cum coexistă unitatea și pluralitatea în acest caz? cel care leagă între ele această unitate și această pluralitate este numărul inteligibil; el este modul concret în care unitatea inteligibilă poate deveni plurală fără a se dispersa, respectiv modul în care pluralitatea inteligibilă poate să se desfășoare fără a părăsi unitatea specifică ei. ne amintim că pentru Platon (Philebos, 14 d) faptul că un lucru sensibil putea fi gândit atât ca unu cât și ca plural părea un lucru contradictoriu, ce dădea naștere disputelor de tip sofistic. În schimb, Platon arată că adevărata problemă a relaţiei dintre unu și multiplu - care nu mai cade în derizoriul discuţiei sofistice - este aceea care se ridică la nivel inteligibil, la nivelul unităţilor în sine, al formelor în sine. În analiza sa asupra lumii inteligibile, Plotin acceptă tocmai această provocare platonică. dar el duce provocarea și mai departe: pentru el, nu doar fiecare formă, ci lumea inteligibilă în ansamblul ei este unitară și plurală în același timp. inteligibilul însuși este unu-plural1. dar cum anume se realizează această pluralitate unitară? Pentru a răspunde, trebuie să spunem că inteligibilul este o natură perfectă, în care descoperim arhetipul tuturor lucrurilor. În inteligibil, totul există într-o formă pură, neschimbătoare, neamestecată cu materia. În plus, nimic nu poate exista în regimul 1 expresia žn poll£ - care desemnează intelectul divin la Plotin - apare în multe rânduri de-a lungul Enneadelor (vezi: V, 3, 15.11 și 22; V, 4, 1.21; Vi, 2, 15.14–15; Vi, 7, 14.11–12). ea este preluată din Parmenide, 144 e 5: „unul care este este plural" (tÕ ×n žn poll£ TMstin). din această formulă, Plotin comasează subiectul (unul care este: tÕ ×n ›n) și predicatul (este plural: poll£ TMstin), obţinând formula: unul-plural (žn poll£). Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 73 sensibil, dacă nu are mai întâi modelul său inteligibil; de aceea, inteligibilul este fiinţa desăvârșită, completă, care conţine raţiunile tuturor lucrurilor. Astfel, inteligibilul nu este numai o lume unitară, ci și o lume totală și perfectă. Pluralitatea inteligibilă este una necesară, iar ca atare ea nu poate nici să sporească, nici să se micșoreze. În inteligibil nu există schimbare, lipsă sau adaos. În această totalitate perfectă, lucrurile (formele, fiinţele inteligibile) există deja cu necesitate; ele nu pot deveni niciodată nici mai multe nici mai puţine decât sunt, ci ele sunt deja așa cum trebuie să fie și atâtea câte trebuie să fie. În felul acesta, pluralitatea fiinţei veritabile este una limitată și, în plus, fixă. or, tocmai această pluralitate limitată este numărul inteligibil, iar el este determinat prin necesitatea ce guvernează această lume. numărul din registrul sensibil este limitat datorită faptului că numărul raţiunilor inteligibile este limitat1; iar numărul raţiunilor este limitat deoarece pluralitatea fiinţei veritabile nu se poate desfășura decât într-un cadrul necesar, foarte bine determinat, acest cadru fiind numărul total a tot ceea ce există în mod primordial. desigur, dacă vorbim despre desfășurarea pluralităţii inteligibile, aceasta nu înseamnă sporirea efectivă a numărului fiinţelor inteligibile, ci, din contră, înseamnă expunerea sau manifestarea unui număr deja stabilit, care nu poate nici să crească, nici să se micșoreze. Totuși, la ce anume se referă acest număr inteligibil? Reprezintă el calculul concret al fiinţelor, suma precisă a formelor în sine? desigur că nu. dar atunci, în ce fel poate fi el determinat? 2. Numărul inteligibil numărul inteligibil va fi tocmai ordinea necesară pe care o urmează desfășurarea plurală a fiinţei inteligibile, altfel spus, structura dinamică inerentă lumii inteligibile. el nu exprimă o sumă a fiinţelor, ci o pluralitate de alt tip. iar această pluralitate poate fi aproape dedusă din însuși faptul că avem a face cu fiinţa 1 Vezi H. J. Blumenthal, „did Plotinus believe in ideas of individuals?", Phronesis, 14, 1969, pp. 77–96 și l. P. Gerson, cap. iV, 2: „forms of individuals", în Plotinus, Routledge, london, new York, 1994. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM74 veritabilă. Pentru aceasta, trebuie să nu pierdem din vedere care este natura fiinţei veritabile: ea nu este nici de ordin sensibil, nici de ordin conceptual (în sensul în care ea ar fi doar gândită de noi, ca un simplu concept), ci este o fiinţă incorporală, dar reală, substanţială1. În plus, caracteristica fundamentală a fiinţei veritabile este aceea că ea nu este inertă, nu este „un cadavru" (oÙ nekrÒn)2, ci este dotată cu viaţă și cu gândire. Recunoaștem, desigur, felul în care fiinţa este descrisă în Sofistul, 248 e: pentru Platon, fiinţa veritabilă nu poate fi lipsită de intelect, de viaţă și de suflet. la aceeași concluzie ajunge și Aristotel, în Metafizica, Xii, 7, pe o cale mai ocolită. el arată în primul rând că mișcătorul nemișcat este în mod necesar fiinţă; dar, deoarece el este cu necesitate, modul lui de a fi este bun (kalîj), necesarul fiind cel fără de care binele (tÕ eâ) este imposibil. În consecinţă, „cursul" lui, activitatea lui sau felul său de a petrece (diagwg») este cel mai bun, cel pe care noi oamenii nu îl gustăm decât pentru scurt timp; zeul este mereu (¢e...) așa cum noi suntem doar uneori. Însă activitatea cea mai bună și cea mai înaltă este aceea de a gândi. Această gândire, în actualitatea ei, este viaţa zeului. În consecinţă, fiinţa supremă deţine viaţa cea mai bună, adică gândirea. din nou vedem reunite aceste trei aspecte: fiinţa, viaţa și gândirea. la Plotin, aceste indicaţii platonico-aristotelice sunt dezvoltate într-o structură internă concretă a fiinţei, o structură triadică: fiinţă, viaţă și intelect3. fiinţa inteligibilă este fiinţa deplină 1 Plotin are mereu în subtext o dispută cu filozofii stoici, pentru care fiinţa este corporală, în timp ce lucrurile incorporale nu sunt considerate fiinţe propriu-zise (vezi Plutarch, De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos, 1073 e 4; și Enneade, Vi, 1, 25–27). Vezi, de asemenea, articolul lui P. Hadot, „Être, vie, pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin" (Les sources de Plotin, entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique, 5, Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 1960, pp. 108–109), care arată că Plotin a preluat această idee a substanţialităţii incorporalului de la numenius. 2 Vezi Enneade, iV, 7, 9.23–24; V, 4, 2.43; Vi, 9, 2.24–25. 3 Sufletul - pe care Platon îl menţiona printre caracteristicile necesare ale fiinţei veritabile (Sofistul, 248 e 6–a 2) - nu apare la acest nivel, ci el devine la Plotin o a treia ipostază, imagine a intelectului divin, a cărui parte cea mai înaltă rămâne însă în inteligibil. Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 75 și, de aceea, ea trebuie să aibă în mod arhetipal toate formele de realitate: atât viaţa cât și intelectul1. dar această structură fiinţă–viaţă–intelect nu este nici ea una statică, precum o grilă fixă și strâmtă aplicată fiinţei inteligibile. din contră, ea este o structură dinamică. ea este, de fapt, modelul conform căruia fiinţa se expune pe sine, exprimându-și pluralitatea sa inerentă. cum anume? În primul rând, trebuie să precizăm că cele trei aspecte (fiinţa, viaţa și intelectul) nu sunt niște părţi distincte ale lumii inteligibile, ele nu fragmentează această natură unică, ci ele sunt mai degrabă trei puteri care interacţionează și se determină una pe alta. fiecare dintre ele este prezentă în întreaga sferă a fiinţei, ceea ce înseamnă că fiecare dintre ele este în același timp prezentă în fiecare dintre celelalte două. fiinţa inteligibilă nu este statică, precum o imagine idealizată și purificată a lumii sensibile, ci ea este în mod esenţial activă, ea se exprimă ca o dinamică permanentă a acestor trei aspecte ale sale: fiinţa, viaţa și intelectul2. În această dinamică, fiinţa expune ea însăși pluralitatea care îi este constitutivă, ea manifestă numărul esenţial, sau substanţial, adică numărul complet al celor ce sunt în mod veritabil. dar în ce fel? fiinţa veritabilă - inteligibilă și dotată cu intelect - se gândește pe sine ca pluralitate a inteligibilelor. Astfel, triada fiinţă–viaţă–intelect pune în evidenţă această dinamică prin care fiinţa se manifestă ca pluralitate: fiinţa este primul moment, al unităţii inteligibilului. Al doilea moment este cel al vieţii, sau al actului intelectiv, în care fiinţa se pune pe sine în mișcare, se dedublează, am putea spune. Actul presupune o detașare faţă de sine însuși, o ieșire din sine înspre altceva. de aceea, având viaţă, fiinţa intră într-un fel de dualitate faţă de sine însăși. Viaţa este astfel primul moment al plurificării fiinţei, al înaintării ei de 1 Vezi Enneade, iii, 6, 6.10–32, care are în subtext o dispută anti-stoică. 2 În neoplatonismul de după Plotin, această structură triadică a fiinţei primordiale devine regula generală conform căreia se constituie orice fiinţă în genere. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM76 la unitate la pluralitate. dar viaţa fiinţei, actul său propriu, constă de fapt în gândire. de aceea, al treilea moment va fi acela în care fiinţa, după ce s-a detașat de sine prin actul său propriu, întoarce asupra sa acest act, gândindu-se pe sine. În acest proces, fiinţa este și obiect al intelecţiei, și agentul care realizează intelecţia (adică intelectul propriu-zis), dar și actul care leagă „obiectul" de „agent". În această mișcare internă, fiinţa pornește de la sine printr-un act de gândire, apoi se întoarce la sine pentru a se recunoaște pe sine ca lume inteligibilă. Acest al treilea moment - anume intelectul - este cel care definitivează dinamica internă a fiinţei, într-o viaţă intelectivă propriu-zisă1. intelectul vede în sine însuși pluralitatea lui caracteristică, „obiectul" viziunii sale; el se vede pe sine însuși plural. Totuși, ceea ce vede intelectul în sine sunt trei momente (fiinţă, viaţă, intelect) dintre care fiecare conţine atât fiinţă, viaţă, cât și intelect. În fiecare dintre cele trei momente (sau aspecte) se disting în continuare toate cele trei aspecte, și așa mai departe, pentru fiecare aspect nou care apare - după modelul unului care este din ipoteza a doua a dialogului Parmenide. fiinţa se multiplică pe sine prin acest act de auto-conștientizare, de gândire de sine. Astfel se instituie în mod efectiv pluralitatea inteligibilă, completitudinea lumii inteligibile. Mai precis, intelectul vede în sine numărul total al fiinţelor inteligibile, care sunt la rândul lor vieţuitoare inteligibile, deoarece nu sunt niște obiecte statice, inerte, ci sunt de natura gândirii. fiecare dintre aceste fiinţe inteligibile are aceeași structură triadică, fiind așadar, la rândul ei, o fiinţă, un intelect și un vieţuitor. Împreună, ele alcătuiesc vieţuitorul inteligibil desăvârșit. lumea inteligibilă este vieţuitorul prim (zùon prètwj), care cuprinde în sine toate vieţuitoarele 1 Vezi P. Hadot, „Être, vie, pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin", art. cit., mai ales pp. 112–113, care prezintă diversele interpretări ale lui Plotin asupra relaţiei dintre fiinţă, viaţă și intelect, în acord cu cele două concepţii - platonică și aristotelică - asupra fiinţei prime care deţine viaţă și intelect: viaţa apare ca act al fiinţei, urmând pasajul din Sofistul, fie ca act al inteligenţei, urmând referinţa aristotelică. Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 77 inteligibile1, adică numărul total al fiinţelor inteligibile2. Acesta este „vieţuitorul desăvârșit"3, din care nici o fiinţă inteligibilă nu poate lipsi. În felul acesta, fiinţa inteligibilă își descoperă pluralitatea ei inerentă; ea să naștere fiinţelor plurale, mișcându-se conform numărului4. Acest număr esenţial corespunde esenţelor inteligibile în desfășurarea lor de la unitate la pluralitate; el exprimă astfel echilibrul strict dintre unitate și pluralitate în inteligibil. o altă manieră în care putem înţelege ce înseamnă numărul esenţial ne este oferită de analiza lui Plotin asupra genurilor supreme5. Plotin arată că fiinţa nu poate fi gândită în sine, izolată de orice altceva, ci ea trebuie gândită din start ca având mișcare (deoarece fiinţa are viaţă) și repaus (deoarece fiinţa este eternă și nu iese niciodată din ceea ce îi este propriu ei), și astfel, ca având în sine diferenţa (care se instituie între primele trei genuri și care este necesară gândirii, actului inteligibil), dar și identitatea (în măsura în care fiinţa rămâne identică cu sine, iar gândirea nu se poate realiza fără identitatea obiectului său). fiinţa este o pluralitate, o comuniune a genurilor; ea are astfel un număr corespunzător. nu este vorba de numărul strict al genurilor - așa 1 după modelul din Timaios, 30 c 9–31 b 2, unde intelectul este prezentat ca vieţuitor perfect, care cuprinde toate vieţuitoarele, așa cum universul vizibil cuprinde în sine toate lucrurile vizibile. 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 8.1–2; Vi, 6, 15.6–7. 3 Sursa doctrinară a acestui moment al vieţuitorului inteligibil este Platon, Timaios, 39 e 7–9. Vezi de asemenea Timaios, 31 b 1: „prin unitatea ei, această lume trebuie să semene cu vieţuitorul desăvârșit" (tù pantele‹ zóJ). 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 15.24–29. 5 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 2, 6–8. la Plotin, genurile supreme nu mai sunt considerate în echilibrul opozitiv pe care îl aveau la Platon - care explica pe baza lor posibilitatea nefiinţei și chiar a falsului din discursul uman - ci ele devin niște aspecte indispensabile și inseparabile ale fiinţei, manifestând caracterul plural al acesteia. ele se completează unele pe altele și sunt deduse unele din altele, pornind de la ideea că fiinţa este inteligibilă dar și inteligentă în același timp. Pentru această schimbare de perspectivă, vezi articolul lui l. Brisson, „de quelle façon Plotin interprète-t-il les cinq genres du Sophiste? (Ennéades, Vi, 2 [43], 8)", în Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, Bibliopolis, napoli, 1991, p. 472. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM78 cum spunem că există cinci genuri supreme - ci numărul se referă la structura complexă obţinută din interacţiunea acestor genuri. fiecare gen implică existenţa celorlalte genuri. de la un gen putem trece la altul, parcurgând în diverse maniere reţeaua care le unește și care formează fiinţa însăși. numărul este astfel tocmai acest cadru în care genurile se întâlnesc și se implică reciproc, într-o manieră necesară. el se constituie prin faptul că genurile comunică, iar intelectul - care le conţine și le gândește pe toate - le poate parcurge în varii feluri, determinând de fiecare dată noi relaţii între diversele părţi ale fiinţei. Pentru a vorbi într-o manieră sugestivă, am putea spune că numărul inteligibil nu este un număr strict aritmetic, numărabil, ci este mai degrabă un număr geometric, adică unul care se constituie prin relaţiile reciproce care apar între genurile fiinţei, ca între niște faţete necesare ale acestei lumi unitare, care este intelectul divin, fiinţa veritabilă. fiinţa este astfel și unitatea genurilor, dar și pluralitatea lor, o pluralitate cu un profil aparte, cu o arhitectură proprie, cu un „cifru" al ei. Acesta este numărul esenţial; el constituie structura necesară a fiinţei și oferă ordinea internă a inteligibilului. intelectul este astfel și unu, dar și pluralitate a fiinţelor, iar această pluralitate nu este una întâmplătoare, ci una care se desfășoară în limita unui număr total, a unui număr necesar și perfect1. 1 Vezi și Enneade, Vi, 6, 18: în inteligibil nu se poate concepe un număr mai mare, căci inteligibilul este deja totul, așadar din inteligibil nu lipsește nici un număr. Astfel se configurează soluţia numărului infinit: numărul inteligibil este infinit pentru că din el nu poate lipsi nimic. el este un număr limitat, în sensul în care nimic nu i se mai poate adăuga, însă el este și infinit, în sensul în care nimic nu se poate sustrage din el, iar delimitarea lui nu înseamnă o lipsă sau o îngrădire a acestui număr, ci o indicare a perfecţiunii sale, a totalităţii sale. Așa cum în Parmenide, 144 a, se arăta că de la unu și fiinţă se obţine întregul număr, orice număr, până la cel infinit și, corespunzător, se obţin fiinţele plurale, la fel Plotin gândește inteligibilul ca pe un număr complet și ca pe o lume completă a fiinţei veritabile. Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 79 3. Anterioritatea numărului inteligibil faţă de pluralitatea fiinţelor Totuși, acest număr inteligibil - care guvernează și coordonează desfășurarea plurală a fiinţelor inteligibile - nu doar însoţește fiinţele în desfășurarea lor, ci, în mod fundamental, el este anterior acestor fiinţe, anterior pluralităţii lor. Pentru a demonstra acest lucru, Plotin formulează trei ipoteze1: fie numărul se adaugă formelor inteligibile, alăturându-se ulterior, fie numărul se naște o dată cu formele, fie numărul este gândit în sine, așadar anterior formelor, anterior pluralităţii inteligibile. dar numărul nu poate fi doar un aspect exterior, care se adaugă în mod accidental fiecărei fiinţe inteligibile în parte. În acest caz, fiecare fiinţă ar fi una, însă ele nu ar mai putea alcătui numărul total al fiinţelor. Am avea o pluralitate de fiinţe, o pluralitate de unităţi, însă aceste unităţi nu ar avea nici o legătură între ele, prin care să poată fi strânse într-un număr2. În plus, ceea ce există ca un accident ce însoţește lucrurile trebuie să existe și în sine, înaintea acestei prezenţe accidentale. În consecinţă, numărul nu poate exista ca un simplu aspect ce însoţește fiinţele inteligibile; așadar, prima ipoteză trebuie respinsă. de asemenea - urmând a doua ipoteză - dacă numărul s-ar naște odată cu fiinţa, atunci el ar fi sau un accident, sau un element dintr-un compus. dar, în ambele cazuri, ceea ce există în mod accidental - fie într-un compus -, trebuie să existe mai întâi în sine însuși. Astfel, singura ipoteză care rămâne acceptabilă este a treia: anume că numărul trebuie să existe în sine, anterior fiinţelor plurale. În concluzie, fiinţa inteligibilă este gândită de Plotin ca o unitate-plurală, o unitate care se poate desfășura într-o pluralitate specifică, fără însă a pierde unitatea sa. numărul intelectiv sau esenţial este tocmai cel care face această trecere de la unitatea fiinţei inteligibile la pluralitatea fiinţelor inteligibile; în acest sens, numărul este anterior pluralităţii inteligibile. Totuși, miza ultimă a gândirii lui Plotin este și mai înaltă. de fapt, el instituie această anterioritate a numărului, în virtutea unei simetrii: așa 1 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 4. 2 Vezi Enneade, Vi, 6, 5.1–10. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM80 cum numărul este anterior pluralităţii fiinţei, la fel unul este anterior fiinţei inteligibile însăși. or, problema majoră a lui Plotin în acest context este tocmai aceea a anteriorităţii unului faţă de pluralitatea fiinţelor și faţă de fiinţa însăși. Pluralitatea fiinţelor inteligibile nu este una haotică, întâmplătoare, ci este o pluralitate guvernată de număr. dar, dacă mergem și mai departe, fiinţa inteligibilă se poate desfășura într-o pluralitate guvernată de număr, tocmai pentru că, în mod fundamental, ea stă sub semnul unităţii, pentru că unul este anterior fiinţei. C. Unul anterior fiinţei în inteligibil Plotin lărgește lumea inteligibilă, adăugându-i ceea ce pare a fi elementul ei esenţial: numărul inteligibil. Acesta exprimă o coexistenţă a pluralităţii în unitate. Totuși, unitatea însăși este anterioară acestei pluralităţi, în măsura în care ea restrânge și limitează pluralitatea, fixând cadrul desfășurării sale. fiinţa inteligibilă este concepută de Plotin ca „unu-plural", ca „unu care este". dar acest unu, din „unul care este", are preeminenţă asupra fiinţei și asupra pluralităţii ei. Să ne apropiem, așadar, mai mult de acest unu care guvernează fiinţa inteligibilă, pentru a vedea ce sens îi acordă Plotin. care este rolul unului în constituirea fiinţei? Unul nu are un sens strict numeric, ci el exprimă faptul că fiinţa are o coeziune în sine, care îi permite să fie și să se desfășoare conform numărului inteligibil. Unul devine astfel condiţia însăși a existenţei fiinţei: pentru a exista, fiinţa trebuie să aibă mai întâi o unitate, la care se poate adăuga orice determinaţie ulterioară, care face din fiinţă o pluralitate. dar atunci, unul nu este un simplu atribut al fiinţei - precum în exemplul aristotelic al omului care este „un om" -, ci el precede însăși posibilitatea ca un atribut oarecare să poată surveni. ca simplu atribut, ca unitate numerică, unul conduce la niște concluzii contradictorii. Astfel, Plotin arată în Enneade, Vi, 6, 5.45, că unul - alăturat oricărui lucru - face ca acel lucru să fie Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 81 de fapt doi, iar nu unu. Aceasta este o veche problemă platonică: în Sofistul, 244 b, Platon se întreabă dacă întregul fiinţei poate fi unu, observând că, dacă unul este un atribut ce se alătură fiinţei, toate împreună vor fi mai mult decât unu. Astfel, dacă spunem că fiinţa este una, iar unul și fiinţa sunt același lucru, atunci admitem de fapt două nume pentru un singur lucru, deși am spus că nu există decât unul. În plus, însuși numele de „unu" va fi diferit de ceea ce el denumește, încât împreună vor fi două (numele unului și unul însuși). Platon arată chiar că, pentru a ieși din această aporie, ar trebui să admitem că unul nu este decât un nume al lui însuși, adică un nume al unui nume, respectiv unitatea unui nume. dar, dacă admitem așa ceva, ajungem într-o aporie și mai mare. În schimb, atunci când reia această problemă a prezenţei unului în fiinţa inteligibilă, Plotin o discută la un alt nivel, scăpând de aporiile de mai sus. Pentru Plotin, problema unităţii este mai fundamentală decât o simplă problemă de atribuire. fiinţa este unitară, înainte chiar de a fi o pluralitate. Unul dintr-o fiinţă este „pluralitatea ei luată împreună"1; el este cel care face ca pluralitatea fiinţei să nu se disperseze, ci să constituie cu adevărat o fiinţă. Astfel, unul nu se adaugă peste fiinţă, ca un atribut ulterior, ca „altceva" faţă de fiinţa însăși, ci unul este condiţia fundamentală a fiinţei, în care aceasta poate să apară și să se desfășoare într-o pluralitate necesară, conform numărului esenţial. Unul este astfel cel fără de care nici un alt lucru (așadar nici o fiinţă) nu poate exista. Astfel, Plotin nu pornește de la fiinţă, pentru a se întreba dacă aceasta poate fi unitară, ci el observă că fiinţa nu poate exista deloc, dacă nu este deja unitară. iar aceasta deoarece unul (din inteligibil) îi oferă fiinţei caracterul stabilităţii: „prin unul din ea, pluralitatea s-a întors înspre unu și și-a găsit stabilitatea (oemeinen)"2. Prin unu, fiinţa veritabilă (Ôntwj) își strânge pluralitatea sa într-o 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 10.18 (Ðmoà poll¦ Ãn tÕ žn). 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 3.9. Vezi și Enneade, Vi, 6, 1.4–8: orice lucru multiplu tinde să se disperseze; dar, dacă dispersia pluralităţii este oprită la un moment dat, atunci lucrul respectiv devine ceva stabil (ti mšnon). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM82 structură neschimbătoare, care poate să stea, sau să rămână stabilă, și să nu se disperseze. Astfel, Plotin descoperă ce anume face ca fiinţa platonică să fie veritabilă: ea este veritabilă (Ôntwj Ôn) tocmai prin caracterul unităţii, și deci al stabilităţii, pe care îl primește de la unu. Astfel, în Enneade, Vi, 6, 15.29–31, aflăm că fiinţa se plurifică, însă unul ei rămâne același, fără să se dividă el însuși. Plotin explică de fapt cum se poate ca fiinţa, chiar și cea veritabilă, să fie plurală, să se dividă în sine însăși și să fie într-o mișcare sau o dinamică interioară, să aibă o evoluţie internă a ei, și totuși să nu piardă caracterul stabilităţii ei, al identităţii în același, care o deosebește de simpla devenire. fiinţa primește caracterul stabilităţii sale de la unul său; chiar dacă ea se divide în sine, unul său nu se divide, ci rămâne unu. fiinţa se poate mișca în conformitate cu numărul, însă fără a ieși din ea însăși; ea poate să urmeze o desfășurare plurală, însă fără ca în acest fel ea să își piardă unitatea. ceea ce o face fiinţă veritabilă, stabilă, este tocmai acest unu care rămâne stabil. fiinţa poate fi astfel și număr și unitate în același timp: ea este și unu și pluralitate, fără ca aceste două aspecte să se anuleze reciproc. ea este astfel și sursă a pluralităţii inteligibile - așadar a fiinţelor care o compun - dar și o natură unică și unitară - datorită unului ei, care nu poate fi scindat. ea îndeplinește în cel mai înalt grad condiţia la care se gândea Platon (în Philebos, 14 c-d), anume aceea ca în inteligibil unul să fie plural și invers. fiinţa veritabilă este lumea inteligibilă, care este în ansamblul ei atât plurală, cât și unitară. Astfel, anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţarea sensibilă (respectiv faţă de felul în care gândim această fiinţare) își găsește sursa și explicaţia la acest nivel inteligibil, prin această anterioritate necesară a unului faţă de fiinţa inteligibilă. dacă în filozofia anterioară realitatea era explicată printr-o fiinţă privilegiată, veritabilă, eternă, Plotin analizează această fiinţă veritabilă în structura ei și descoperă - ca fundamentală pentru fiinţă - anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţă, faţă de pluralitatea acesteia. fiinţa inteligibilă nu Capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil 83 se poate constitui în absenţa unului inteligibil, așadar nici realitatea sensibilă nu ar putea exista fără fiinţa inteligibilă și fără unul care se află la originea acesteia. Totuși, până în acest moment1 Plotin a încercat să identifice unul în ceea ce este plural, vrând să scoată în evidenţă anterioritatea logică a unităţii faţă de pluralitate. În acest sens, chiar și la nivelul intelectului, gândirea este nevoită să oscileze de la pluralitate la unitate și invers, deoarece fiinţa inteligibilă este o pluralitate restrânsă în unitate, sau o unitate care conţine pluralitatea și îi dă naștere. dar gândirea lui Plotin are în continuare o miză și mai înaltă, și anume aceea de a impune necesitatea unei unităţi absolute, a unului ca principiu prim, în care nici o pluralitate nu mai poate să apară. În felul acesta, el va depăși filozofia tradiţională, intrând pe terenul unei gândiri care se vede nevoită să renunţe la spaţiul ei vital: anume la pluralitate. Totuși, scopul acestei părăsiri a pluralităţii este tocmai acela de a descoperi principiul necesar al oricărei gândiri și, astfel, al oricărei pluralităţi. Vom urmări în continuare care sunt articulaţiile gândirii lui Plotin în această încercare de a trece de la fiinţa veritabilă (cu unul specific ei) la principiul absolut unitar, anterior fiinţei și gândirii. două întrebări se impun în această analiză a noastră: de ce este nevoie de această trecere, și cum anume se realizează ea. 1 nu ne referim la o ordine cronologică sau sistematică a scrierilor lui Plotin, ci la ordinea doctrinară pe care am ales să o urmăm aici, parcurgând gândirea lui Plotin de la lucrurile sensibile înspre principiul prim al întregii realităţi. capitolul 4 de lA UnUl inTelecTUlUi lA UnUl ABSolUT: cRiTicA lUi PloTin lA ARiSToTel În acest capitol, ne vom opri asupra manierei în care Plotin depășește perspectiva de sorginte aristotelică, conform căreia principiul prim este gândirea care se gândește pe sine, adică intelectul divin. Pentru Plotin, acest intelect nu poate fi principiul cel mai simplu, ci înaintea lui trebuie să gândim un principiu absolut unitar și absolut simplu. după cum am văzut până acum, intelectul este descris de Plotin ca o unitate, ca un unu care instituie pluralitatea fiinţei. În felul acesta, unul este anterior pluralităţii inteligibile. În acest caz, ne putem întreba de ce Plotin merge și mai departe, înspre un unu încă și mai fundamental, anterior chiar și intelectului, care este fiinţa supremă, cea mai unitară? de ce intelectul - așadar fiinţa primă și unitară - nu este sursa ultimă a unităţii, ci are nevoie el însuși de un principiu anterior? Această ultimă întrebare conţine răspunsul în ea însăși: intelectul, lumea inteligibilă sau fiinţa primă denumesc într-adevăr unitatea cea mai înaltă a fiinţei; totuși, fiinţa este unitară, însă nu este doar unu, așadar ea nu este unul însuși. Acest moment al gândirii lui Plotin este cu adevărat surprinzător: pe de o parte, el face un efort atât de mare pentru a descrie intelectul divin cât mai adecvat cu putinţă - pornind de la niște date din istoria filozofiei, însă depășindu-le ca precizie a descrierii - dar, pe de altă parte, el va face în continuare efortul de a „critica" acest intelect pe care el însuși l-a gândit și l-a rafinat, pentru a-l depăși înspre un principiu și mai înalt. intelectul plotinian, fiinţa veritabilă, are la bază câteva modele filozofice: modelul aristotelic al intelectului care se gândește pe Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 85 sine și care este identic cu obiectele gândirii sale1; din direcţia platonică, Plotin preia modelul fiinţei veritabile dotată cu viaţă și intelect2, problema formelor inteligibile, precum și cadrul general al celei de-a doua ipoteze asupra unului care este3. Totuși, Plotin va arăta că nici gândirea unitară (după modelul aristotelic al intelectului), nici fiinţa veritabilă (din modelul platonic) nu sunt absolut simple, ci fiecare dintre ele presupune o anumită dualitate, sau chiar pluralitate, iar în acest sens ele trimit spre un principiu anterior, absolut unitar. Plotin acceptă că intelectul - ca gândire supremă și ca fiinţă inteligibilă - este unitar, însă nu acceptă că această unitate ar fi ea însăși absolută. Vom vedea în continuare cum anume argumentează Plotin fiecare dintre aceste teze. de fapt, Plotin accentuează în același timp unitatea și pluralitatea intelectului divin: pe de o parte, el vrea să arate că unitatea lui este mai mare decât lasă să se înţeleagă textele aristotelice; pe de altă parte, el însuși insistă asupra elementului pluralităţii intelectului, introducând în intelect pluralitatea formelor inteligibile - ceea ce Aristotel însuși nu accepta. dar, dacă sporește în același timp aspectul unităţii intelectului, precum și pe acela al pluralităţii acestuia, intenţia ultimă a lui Plotin este aceea de a arăta că unitatea și pluralitatea intelectului nu se contrazic și nu se anulează reciproc. el spune că în inteligibil „pluralitatea nu este în conflict cu unul" (oÜte m£cetai tÕ plÁqoj TMke‹ tù n...)4. Așadar, nici pluralitatea intelectului nu suprimă unitatea lui, dar nici unitatea intelectului nu suprimă pluralitatea lui. În cele ce urmează, ne vom opri asupra acestor două aspecte: unitatea și pluralitatea intelectului. 1 Aristotel, Metafizica, 1072 b 19–20; 1074 b 34; Despre suflet 430 a 2–5; 431 b 17. la Aristotel, cele două modele nu se suprapun, ci primul este intelectul divin, iar al doilea rămâne la nivelul sufletului uman. În schimb, așa cum vom vedea în continuare, Plotin va suprapune cele două modele, tocmai pentru a accentua identitatea și unitatea intelectului divin. 2 Platon, Sofistul, 248 e 6–249 a 2. 3 Platon, Parmenide, 142 b 1–155 e 3. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 4, 4.35–36. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM86 A. Unitatea intelectului la Plotin Plotin abordează unitatea intelectului divin din mai multe direcţii care se suprapun sau se completează una pe alta. Pe de o parte, este vorba despre unitatea intelectului ca gândire, de faptul că gândirea intelectului este în identitate cu obiectul acestei gândiri înseși. Pe de altă parte, intelectul este o unitate a formelor inteligibile, a fiinţelor veritabile. În al treilea rând, aceste două aspecte deja enunţate - intelectul divin ca fiinţă veritabilă, respectiv ca gândire primă - pot fi privite împreună, observând că, de fapt, intelectul este unitatea și identitatea dintre gândire și fiinţă. Acestea nu pot fi distinse propriu-zis, ci numai gândirea noastră discursivă pare să le distingă, deoarece ea însăși nu poate funcţiona decât prin distincţii. Vom analiza în continuare unitatea intelectului ca gândire și ca fiinţă, având mereu în vedere faptul că aceste două aspecte nu sunt separabile decât într-o ordine didactică, a expunerii. 1. Unitatea intelectului ca gândire Plotin se sprijină în analiza sa pe câteva indicaţii aristotelice, pe care le preia în propria sa descriere asupra intelectului, însă apoi le rafinează și le depășește. este vorba despre acele pasaje în care Aristotel descrie intelectul ca pe o gândire ce se gândește pe sine, arătând că, în cazul lucrurilor lipsite de materie, cunoașterea este identică cu obiectul cunoscut1. Pentru a completa fundalul doctrinar de la care pornește Plotin, trebuie să adăugăm, alături de aceste idei aristotelice, modul în care ele au fost preluate de comentatorii săi. Alexandru din Afrodisia - despre care Porfir ne spune că era citit și analizat în școala lui Plotin2 - identifica intelectul activ cu cauza primă3. 1 Vezi Aristotel, Despre suflet, iV, 430 a 2–5; V, 430 a 19–20; Vii, 431 b 17 (deși, în aceste contexte, Aristotel se referă la intelectul uman, iar nu la cel divin). Vezi și Metafizica, 1074 b 33–1075 a 5. 2 Vezi Porfir, Viaţa lui Plotin, 14, 13. În articolul „The Background of the doctrine «That the intelligibles are not outside the intellect»" (Les Sources de Plotin, op. cit., p. 406), A. H. Armstrong sugerează că Plotin a citit chiar acest comentariu al lui Alexandru din Afrodisia la Despre suflet. 3 Alexandru din Afrodisia, Despre suflet, p. 89, 22–23, ed. Bruns. Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 87 de asemenea, el afirmă simplitatea intelectului divin: fiind simplu, [intelectul se gândește] doar pe sine. căci intelectul care este simplu (¡ploàj) gândește ceva simplu, și nimic altceva nu este un inteligibil simplu, în afară de el însuși. căci este neamestecat și imaterial, neavând în sine nimic în potenţă. Așadar, el se va gândi doar pe sine. Astfel, în măsura în care este intelect, se va gândi pe sine ca inteligibil; în măsura în care este și intelect și inteligibil în act, se va gândi pe sine veșnic; în măsura în care doar el este simplu, se va gândi doar pe sine. căci, fiind singurul simplu, este capabil să gândească ceva simplu, și el este singurul simplu dintre inteligibile.1 deși acceptă ideea aristotelică a intelectului divin care se gândește pe sine - precum și explicaţia lui Aristotel, care spune că pentru lucrurile imateriale cunoașterea lucrului nu este diferită de lucrul însuși2 - totuși, Plotin o preia pentru a-i da un sens și mai radical. Astfel, el arată că identitatea dintre știinţă și obiectul ei - în cazul lucrurilor imateriale - nu înseamnă că obiectul acestei știinţe este știinţa însăși, ci înseamnă că obiectul este el însuși capabil de a cunoaște. Altfel, dacă știinţa ar avea ca obiect știinţa însăși, s-ar ajunge la un fel de subiectivitate a cunoașterii inteligibile, care nu ar cunoaște fiinţa veritabilă, ci ar cunoaște doar propriul ei act de a cunoaște; în plus, intelectul însuși nu ar mai fi unul veritabil, ci ar fi doar ceea ce el însuși gândește despre sine că este. Astfel, ar însemna că formele inteligibile nu sunt altceva decât propria lor definiţie: dreptatea nu ar mai exista în 1 Vezi Alexandru din Afrodisia, De anima liber mantissa, pp. 109, 28–110, 3 (vezi și traducerea engleză a lui R. W. Sharples: Supplement to „On the Soul", cornell University Press, ithaca, new York, 2004, p. 32). 2 Atunci când gândim un lucru material, gândim de fapt doar forma lui, iar nu lucrul însuși, în schimb, atunci când gândim un lucru lipsit de materie, nu gândim altceva decât lucrul însuși, care este pur inteligibil. Vezi Enneade, Vi, 2, 8.3–5: „lucrurilor care sunt împreună cu materia nu le revine a fi în intelect; în schimb, cele care sunt imateriale, dacă sunt gândite, atunci aceasta este fiinţa lor". Vezi de asemenea Enneade, Vi, 6, 6.19–26: „în lucrurile fără materie, știinţa este identică cu obiectul <știinţei>". observăm că Plotin suprapune teza aristotelică amintită, respectiv teza lui Parmenide asupra identităţii dintre fiinţă și gândire. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM88 sine, ci ar fi doar o definiţie a dreptăţii. Plotin exclude această posibilitate și arată că, de fapt, fiinţa veritabilă, în măsura în care este inteligibilă, este ea însăși inteligenţă și știinţă. Astfel, Plotin respinge orice consecutivitate între obiectul și știinţa inteligibilă: obiectul nu precede inteligenţa (caz în care el ar fi non-inteligibil, atâta timp cât nu ar exista o inteligenţă a lui), iar inteligenţa - ca act al cunoașterii intelective - nu precede obiectul cunoașterii (caz în care obiectul nu ar avea o existenţă reală, ci doar una convenţională). obiectul inteligenţei este deja inteligent și, în sensul acesta, el este deja inteligenţă și cunoaștere, așadar cunoaștere de sine. Într-un articol dedicat acestui subiect1, P. Hadot arată că la Aristotel intelectul divin este prima fiinţă, așadar el nu poate gândi decât ceva ulterior lui2, pe când Plotin însuși susţine o anterioritate conceptuală a formelor faţă de intelect3. considerăm însă că Plotin atacă formula aristotelică nu pentru a sublinia anterioritatea formelor faţă de intelect, ci pentru a exclude orice urmă de succesiune din cadrul intelectului. intelectul nu este un „obiect" lipsit de cunoaștere, de gândire, dar nici doar o gândire lipsită de obiect, ci, în cazul lui, această diferenţă obiect-subiect nu mai funcţionează. „obiectul" intelectului nu este ceva de altă natură, care s-ar prezenta în faţa intelectului, ca un lucru străin. din contră, acest „obiect" este deja inteligibil și gândire. Acest „amendament" pe care îl face Plotin formulei aristotelice subliniază și mai mult identitatea intelectului cu obiectele gândirii sale, adică unitatea intelectului divin. Un alt aspect al unităţii intelectului este acela al relaţiei dintre cel care gândește și ceea ce el gândește. În logica gândirii umane discursive, cel care gândește - adică sufletul nostru - se referă la 1 P. Hadot, „la conception plotinienne de l'identité entre l'intellect et son objet. Plotin et le De anima d'Aristote", în Corps et âme. Sur le de anima d'Aristote, Vrin, Paris, 1996, pp. 367–376, reluat în P. Hadot, Plotin, Porphyre: Études néoplatoniciennes, les Belles lettres, Paris, 1999, pp. 267–278. 2 Idem, p. 370. 3 Idem, pp. 372–373. Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 89 altceva decât propria sa gândire, și chiar la altceva decât el însuși, deoarece fie primește impresii din partea percepţiei sensibile, fie este iluminat de intelectul superior. Sufletul poate fi în acord cu intelectul, dar rămâne el însuși între aceste două puteri: cea perceptivă și cea inteligibilă1, iar dacă se gândește pe sine, el gândește atât pe cel gândit, cât și pe cel care gândește, fiind astfel împărţit în sine însuși; el gândește o parte a sa (pe cel gândit) cu o altă parte a sa (anume cu cea care gândește). În schimb, în cazul intelectului, această distincţie dispare: cel gândit este în același timp cel care gândește, iar cel care gândește este în același tip cel gândit, astfel încât actul intelecţiei nu împarte fiinţa intelectului. Gândindu-se pe sine, intelectul este în același timp inteligibil și intelectiv, iar nu o parte intelectiv și altă parte inteligibil. la originea acestei probleme - a unei gândiri de sine unitare - se află un argument formulat de Sextus empiricus2: intelectul nu se poate cunoaște pe sine nici ca întreg, nici ca parte. Astfel, dacă o parte a intelectului ar cunoaște o altă parte, atunci cum ar putea partea care cunoaște să se cunoască pe sine? ea ar cunoaște doar o parte diferită, însă nu s-ar cunoaște pe sine, ci ea însăși ar avea nevoie de o altă parte care să o cunoască, și așa la infinit. de asemenea, dacă intelectul s-ar cunoaște pe sine ca întreg, atunci el ar fi în întregul său cunoscător, așadar nu ar mai rămâne nimic altceva care să fie cunoscut, încât intelectul nu ar mai avea nici un obiect pe care să îl cunoască. Prin felul în care concepe intelectul divin - mai precis prin relaţia dintre părţi și întreg în intelect -, Plotin răspunde acestei probleme3. În cazul intelectului divin, o parte nu este desprinsă de 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 3. 2 Sextus empiricus, Adversus mathematicos, Vii, 310–312. Vezi articolul lui i. crystal, „Plotinus on the Structure of Self-intellection", Phronesis, 43, 1998, pp. 264–286. Pentru relaţia lui Plotin cu gândirea sceptică, vezi dominic o'Meara, „Scepticism and ineffability in Plotinus", Phronesis, 45, 3, 2000, pp. 240–251. 3 În articolul citat mai sus („Plotinus on Self-intellection", p. 265), i. crystal argumentează că, la Plotin, intelectul s-ar cunoaște pe sine doar ca întreg, iar nu ca parte. consider că această opinie nu este întru totul corectă. Într-adevăr, în PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM90 celelalte părţi, iar întregul nu este divizat de părţile sale, ci fiecare parte reflectă întregul intelectului, iar întregul reflectă fiecare parte. În felul acesta, intelectul se cunoaște pe sine atât ca întreg, cât și ca parte, într-o reciprocă fuzionare a părţilor și a întregului, într-o perfectă unitate a gândirii sale. Un alt aspect care individualizează intelectul divin, accentuând tipul său de unitate, este faptul că în el nu se poate distinge un act de o potenţă; intelectul divin nu este niciodată în potenţă1 - așa cum afirmă Aristotel despre intelectul uman2 - ci el este mereu intelect și mereu în act3, așadar el deţine și gândește Enneade, V, 3, 1, 9–13, Plotin arată că o fiinţă compusă nu se poate cunoaște pe sine, deoarece o parte a sa ar cunoaște restul părţilor, iar nu pe sine și nu întregul. Totuși, intelectul nu este o fiinţă compusă, așa cum omul este compus din trup și suflet, ci, în cazul intelectului, relaţia dintre parte și întreg este una aparte, diferită de cazul discutat în V, 3, 1. Astfel, părţile intelectului nu se individualizează și nu se separă de celelalte și de întreg, ci în fiecare parte a intelectului se regăsește întregul intelectului; fiecare parte vede toate celelalte părţi, vede întregul și se vede pe sine însăși în acest întreg. Vezi de pildă Enneade, iii, 2, 1, 27–37. 1 fiinţele inteligibile nu sunt în potenţă, deoarece nu au materie și nu sunt nici în timp; inteligibilul este formă desăvârșită, așadar nu are nevoie să devină altceva, nu are nevoie să primească o formă din afara sa (ceea ce ar echivala cu o trecere de la potenţă la act), inteligibilul este deja totul, în eternitate (Enneade, ii, 5, 3). Vezi de asemenea Enneade, V, 9, 4.7–8. Totuși, în alt context, Enneade, iii, 8, 11.1–2, Plotin spune că intelectul este o potenţă care ajunge la act (vezi și articolul lui A. H. Armstrong, „eternity, life and Movement in Plotinus' Account of the Nous", în Le Néoplatonisme, op. cit., p. 71). Trebuie observat însă că gândirea lui Plotin se desfășoară pe straturi care se reflectă diferit unele în altele, astfel încât, faţă de unul anterior, intelectul poate părea o potenţă, dar în sine însuși el nu are nici o potenţă, căci gândirea lui gândește în mod etern același lucru, fără să treacă vreodată la altceva. 2 desigur, nici Aristotel nu susţine că intelectul divin ar fi mai întâi doar în potenţă, ajungând ulterior în act. În Metafizica, 1074 b 18–20, el respinge această posibilitate: un intelect care nu ar gândi decât în mod potenţial nu ar putea fi fiinţa supremă. În schimb, în analiza sa asupra intelectului divin, Plotin preia și afirmaţii care la Aristotel se refereau la intelectul uman, pe care desigur, le respinge. În plus, chiar și textul din Despre suflet, 429 b 30 trebuie citit cu prudenţă: Aristotel spune că intelectul este „într-un fel" (pèj) inteligibilele în potenţă, însă că de fapt el nu este nimic înainte de a gândi propriu-zis. 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 9, 5.1–4. Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 91 dintotdeauna obiectele sale. el nu devine intelect datorită unui obiect pe care l-ar primi din afară - și care ar fi astfel diferit de sine - ci el este mereu deja intelect, iar obiectele pe care el le gândește alcătuiesc însăși fiinţa sa1. intelectul divin nu este altceva decât ceea ce el însuși gândește, iar „obiectele" gândirii sale nu sunt diferite de ceea ce el însuși este. Astfel, intelectul este ceea ce el gândeşte, și gândeşte ceea ce este. Pe de altă parte, privind din direcţia „obiectului" gândirii sale, al inteligibilului (tÕ nohtÒn), acesta este tocmai pentru că este gândit de intelect și este așa cum intelectul îl gândește. el nu diferă de intelect, ci este însăși fiinţa lui. fiinţa lui nu constă în altceva decât în faptul însuși că el este gândit de intelect. Așa cum intelectul este veșnic în act, tot așa și obiectul său este veșnic, neschimbător. În consecinţă, intelectul se gândește pe sine și este el însuși această gândire care se gândește pe sine. el este și cel gândit de propria sa gândire, dar și cel care gândește fiinţa sa inteligibilă. desigur, cele două aspecte nu sunt separabile decât în gândirea noastră, pe când Plotin vrea să arate că nu există nici o diferenţă între intelectul ca gândire și intelectul ca inteligibil2, între intelectul ca fiinţă inteligibilă și intelectul ca act de gândire. din faptul că inteligibilul este veșnic prezent ca obiect al gândirii intelectului, Plotin deduce faptul că intelectul este fiinţa primă: „dar, dacă gândirea și inteligibilul sunt unul și același lucru - pentru că inteligibilul este act, căci el nu este nici potenţă, nici neinteligibil, nici fără viaţă, iar viaţa și gândirea nu sunt adăugate unei fiinţe diferite, precum unei pietre sau unui lucru neînsufleţit - atunci inteligibilul este fiinţa primă."3 1 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, ii, 5, 3.25–32. Altfel, dacă intelectul ar avea această potenţă de a gândi, ar avea nevoie de un alt intelect anterior, care să îl facă să gândească în mod actual. 2 Aceasta va fi principala obiecţie a lui Proclus la adresa lui Plotin: anume că a identificat atât de mult cele două aspecte ale intelectului, încât a ajuns să le confunde. Proclus, urmându-l pe iamblichos, va separa nivelurile intelectului și le va analiza în mod distinct. 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 5.31–35. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM92 Astfel, inteligibilul nu este niciodată non-inteligibil, el nu devine inteligibil ulterior, ci este deja dintotdeauna inteligibil, fiind mereu în act. el nu mai are o altă fiinţă înaintea lui, de la care să își primească fiinţa, de aceea, el însuși este fiinţa primă, o fiinţă inteligibilă și incoruptibilă1, veșnic în acest act de a gândi și de a fi gândită. Trebuie să accentuăm acest aspect al gândirii lui Plotin: unitatea intelectului înseamnă identitatea dintre gândirea intelectului și obiectul acestei gândiri; însă această identitate revine de fapt la o identitate între gândire și fiinţă, mai precis, o identitate între gândirea supremă și fiinţa veritabilă. este vorba, în fond, despre unitatea și identitatea gândirii care se gândește pe sine ca fiind. În consecinţă, intelectul este fiinţa veritabilă, el gândește fiinţa veritabilă, și instituie fiinţa veritabilă prin însăși gândirea sa2. 2. Unitatea intelectului ca fiinţă: ca unitate a formelor dar această fiinţă veritabilă și primă are ea însăși o structură aparte și o unitate specifică, asupra căreia se cuvine să ne oprim. Așa cum am arătat deja, intelectul plotinian este identic cu obiectul gândirii sale - urmând teza aristotelică. dar Plotin îmbogăţește această teză, trecând-o printr-o lectură platonică: el identifică în inteligibil formele platonice, dându-i intelectului divin un conţinut concret, spre deosebire de Aristotel, care nu accepta existenţa formelor în intelectul divin. Astfel, obiectul intelectului (nohtÒn) are un profil aparte, și anume, el este alcătuit din forme inteligibile (noht£). Totuși, deși introduce formele în intelect, părând astfel să plurifice lumea inteligibilă, Plotin argumentează că aceste forme nu anulează unitatea intelectului. el argumentează că formele sunt în intelectul divin și în unitate cu acesta3, opunându-se astfel ipotezelor care circulau 1 În Enneade, V, 9, 4.7–8, Plotin accentuează faptul că „realităţile prime sunt în act, fără nici o lipsă și perfecte". 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 9, 5.12–13. 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 9, 5.26–28: „Așadar, intelectul este fiinţele veritabile, pe care nu le gândește ca fiind în altă parte: căci ele nu sunt nici înaintea lui, nici Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 93 în vremea lui, cum că formele ar fi anterioare intelectului, sau posterioare lui1. formele sunt raţiunile întregii realităţi, modelul după care lumea este creată. În universul sensibil ne întâlnim cu imaginea acestor raţiuni, percepând pe fiecare în mod distinct. În schimb, în lumea inteligibilă, Plotin arată că formele există în unitate, toate împreună, fără distincţie reală. comuniunea formelor este aceea a unui model inteligibil, în care separaţia nu își poate găsi loc. Așa cum intelectul nu se poate înstrăina de sine, gândind ceva diferit de sine, ci se gândește numai pe sine însuși, la fel se întâmplă și între forme. Acestea păstrează natura inteligentă a intelectului, și în fiecare dintre ele se regăsește aceeași schemă a fiinţei care se gândește pe sine, gândind însă în același timp pe fiecare dintre celelalte forme. formele sunt întrepătrunse total2; ele sunt prezente unele faţă de altele, fiecare se reflectă în actul de gândire al celeilalte, iar în fiecare dintre ele poate fi regăsit întregul lumii inteligibile. Relaţiile dintre forme refac - într-un mod mai aplicat și mai complicat, în același timp - relaţia intelectului cu sine însuși: o relaţie de completă auto-reflectare, care creează efectul unei lumini inteligibile, transparentă și vizibilă pentru ea însăși: „căci toate sunt transparente și nimic nu este după el". Aceeași idee este întâlnită și la Alcinous, Didaskalikos, 9–10, care susţine teza de sorginte aristotelică a zeului ce se gândește pe sine și aplică acesteia ideea platonică a formelor care sunt gânduri ale zeului (Parmenide, 134 b–c: ideile sunt obiectul cunoașterii absolute, care aparţine zeului). În felul acesta, gândirea ce se gândește pe sine ajunge o gândire a formelor inteligibile. Alcinous ar putea fi sursa lui Plotin, vezi A. H. Armstrong, „The Background of the doctrine «That the intelligibles are not outside the intellect»", art. cit., pp. 404–409. 1 Aceste ipotezele circulau în vremea lui Plotin, prima fiind susţinută de Porfir însuși, înainte de a fi convins de către Amelius, celălalt discipol al lui Plotin (vezi Porfir, Viaţa lui Plotin, 18, 10–19), iar a doua aparţine lui longinus (vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Timaios, i, 322, 24). Pentru mai multe detalii legate de relaţia dintre intelect și formele inteligibile, vezi A. H. Armstrong, „The Background of the doctrine «That the intelligibles are not outside the intellect»", art. cit. 2 ele sunt „toate împreună: p©n Ðmoà" (vezi Enneade, Vi, 4, 4.25 ), după expresia lui Anaxagora: „toate sunt împreună în unu" (Ðmoà TMn n p£nta) (dK 59 B 1). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM94 nici întunecat, nici opac, ci fiecare îi este în interiorul său vizibil celuilalt și toate sunt, căci sunt lumină <vizibilă> luminii. fiecare le are în sine pe celelalte și într-un altul le vede pe toate, încât toate sunt peste tot, totul este totul și fiecare este totul."1 Poate că maniera cea mai elocventă în care Plotin descrie lumea inteligibilă - ca unitate a formelor - este prin comparaţie cu lumea sensibilă2. Într-un exerciţiu mental, Plotin suprimă toate caracteristicile pe care materia le introduce în lumea noastră, făcând ca lucrurile să fie iremediabil distinse. el propune să vedem toate lucrurile acestei lumi la un loc, într-o sferă transparentă, din care excludem masa (Ôgkoj)3, locul și materia. numai într-o astfel de predispunere mentală putem înţelege în ce constă unitatea formelor inteligibile. Astfel, dacă nu mai sunt distinse între ele, formele sunt toate împreună, „strângându-se în unu" (p£ntej sunÒntej e„j ›n)4, iar fiecare dintre ele este în același timp toate celelalte. dacă în lumea sensibilă fiecare lucru este o parte a întregului, complet distins de celelalte lucruri, așadar de celelalte părţi, în schimb, în inteligibil părţile nu mai sunt limitate între ele. fiecare fiinţă inteligibilă devine parte a celorlalte fiinţe inteligibile, iar toate împreună realizează un organism unic și unitar, nefragmentat, fără graniţe și fără distincţii. B. Pluralitatea intelectului În ciuda analizelor sale foarte elaborate, prin care vrea să impună unitatea intelectului, Plotin remarcă în același timp că acesta păstrează o dualitate - și chiar o pluralitate - care nu îi permite să fie principiu prim. Astfel, căutând principiul prim, Plotin depășește în două sensuri poziţia aristotelică: pe de o parte, el pornește de la ideea 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 8, 4.4–8. 2 Vezi Enneade, V, 8, 9. 3 Pentru masă - sau greutatea asociată cu întinderea - vezi articolul lui l. Brisson, „entre physique et métaphysique. le terme Ôgkoj chez Plotin, dans ses rapports avec la matière (Ûlh) et le corps (sîma)", în Études sur Plotin, l'Harmattan, Paris, Montréal, 2000, pp. 87–111. 4 Plotin, Enneade, V, 8, 9.16. Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 95 aristotelică asupra intelectului divin, însă vrea să impună o unitate mai mare decât avea intelectul lui Aristotel. Pe de altă parte, el observă că, nici măcar această unitate (a fiinţei celei mai înalte) nu poate fi unul absolut. Gândirea lui Plotin urmează aici aceeași manieră caracteristică, de a relua probleme aristotelice și de a le trece prin „sita" critică a platonismului. or, la Platon1, fiinţa este inferioară unului; ea stă sub condiţia unului, sau este afectată de acesta (p£qoj mn toà nÕj oecein), însă rămâne ea însăși doar o unitate, așadar un unu determinat, iar nu absolut. În schimb, unul este diferit de fiinţă, el îi oferă acesteia unitate și este, în consecinţă, anterior. Astfel, unitatea atât de strânsă a gândirii și a fiinţei, a intelectului care se gândește pe sine, nu este - în viziunea lui Plotin - unitatea absolută, ci ea rămâne în continuare o unitate a unei pluralităţi, iar aceasta din două motive. În primul rând, chiar dacă este vorba despre gândirea supremă, gândirea nu se poate desfășura decât în dualitate. În al doilea rând, „obiectul" gândirii supreme este el însuși plural. Astfel, intelectul prim este plural atât ca gândire (căci gândirea presupune o dualitate între cel ce gândește și obiectul gândirii), cât și ca fiinţă. În continuare, vom discuta despre pluralitatea fiinţei și a gândirii prime, pentru a putea pune apoi în mod adecvat problema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă și de dincolo de gândire. 1. Pluralitatea intelectului ca gândire intelectul este gândirea cea mai unitară, în care nu poate intra nici o distincţie; totuși, intelectul însuși este gândire, iar gândirea - chiar și cea mai unitară - nu se poate desfășura decât în cadrul unei dualităţi. Pentru a pune în evidenţă acest lucru, Plotin descompune formula aristotelică a „gândirii care se gândește pe sine" și surprinde două aspecte. Pe de o parte, dacă aceasta este gândirea primă, 1 Platon, Sofistul, 245 a–b. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM96 autentică, ea nu poate fi gândire a unui lucru diferit - căci aceasta ar fi o gândire inferioară - ci ea trebuie să deţină propriul ei obiect, identificându-se cu el. Pe de altă parte, pentru ca gândirea să poată gândi în mod real, ea trebuie totuși să deţină obiectul ei, însă ca obiect, așadar într-o dualitate. Gândirea și obiectul ei vor fi, de aceea, două. Altfel, dacă această gândire ar fi doar unu, ea nu ar avea ce să gândească și deci, nu ar mai fi cu adevărat gândire. Așadar, în gândirea care se gândește pe sine, putem distinge două aspecte: pe de o parte aceasta este gândire, iar pe de altă parte, ea este gândire de sine. În măsura în care se gândește pe sine, gândirea primă este unitară; dar, în măsura în care este totuși gândire, ea trebuie să aibă un obiect al său, și astfel, ea este duală1. Plotin distinge cele două aspecte necesare ale gândirii care se gândește pe sine: aceasta este și obiectul gândit - inteligibilul (nohtÒn) - însă este și cel care gândește (noîn), fiind astfel duală2. Gândirea însăși, chiar și cea mai simplă formă a ei, nu poate fi absolut simplă, nu se poate desfășura în unitate. Astfel, Plotin arată că gândirea (specifică intelectului prim, divin) trebuie să fie în diferenţă, dar și în identitate, iar obiectul intelectului trebuie să fie, de asemenea, și identic și diferit faţă de intelectul însuși3. Recunoaștem aici maniera în care este descris unul din a doua ipoteză platonică, anume ca fiind în același timp identic și diferit. Mai mult, ne amintim că acest unul are caracterul fiinţei, iar unul și fiinţa sunt aici despărţite tocmai prin diferit (tù tšrJ) (Parmenide, 143 b 5). de asemenea, fiinţa din Sofistul, 254 d–e are în același timp caracterul identităţii și pe cel al diferenţei (q£teron); or intelectul plotinian este el însuși fiinţa supremă, păstrând toate caracteristicile fiinţei descrise de Platon, precum și pe cele ale unului secund din Parmenide. 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 1.23 (m©llon d Ôn, Óti noe‹, dÚo, ka Óti aÙtÒ, ›n). 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 4, 2.10–11 ("Esti mn oân ka aÙtÕj nohtÒn, ¢ll¦ ka noîn* diÕ dÚo 1⁄2dh). 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 10.24–28. Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 97 Gândirea are nevoie de dualitate. Altfel, o gândire absolut simplă nu ar putea fi, la limită, o gândire; ea nu s-ar putea afirma nici măcar pe sine ca gândire, fără a introduce pluralitatea1. Astfel, dacă o gândire încearcă să se afirme pe sine ca gândire, ea trebuie să spună „eu sunt aceasta" (e„m tÒde). dar, dacă ea spune „eu sunt aceasta", atunci, fie „aceasta" este ceva diferit de gândirea însăși, și atunci gândirea spune despre ea ceea ce nu este, minţind, fie „aceasta" este ea însăși, iar gândirea are în sine o pluralitate (fiind și cea care spune, dar și ceea ce spune ea însăși despre sine). Altfel, dacă nu ar avea nici o pluralitate, gândirea ar fi constrânsă să spună doar atât: fie „eu eu", fie „sunt sunt", încetând astfel să mai afirme ceva, așadar încetând să fie o gândire. Gândirea care se gândește pe sine poate fi privită și ca unitate, dar și ca dualitate; ea „devine două, deși este una"2. În consecinţă, această gândire de tip aristotelic nu poate ajunge la unitatea absolută și, tocmai de aceea, ea trebuie depășită înspre un principiu absolut unitar3. Trebuie totuși să observăm că există o dualitate în însăși gândirea lui Plotin: pe de o parte, el descrie fiinţa intelectului astfel încât în ea să nu mai încapă distincţia dintre „obiectul" gândirii și „subiectul" gândirii. Pe de altă parte, Plotin arată că, la limită, o gândire care nu mai are nici un „obiect" nu mai este o gândire. Așadar, pe de o parte Plotin suprimă diferenţa dintre „obiect" și „subiect" în gândirea inteligibilă, dar pe de altă parte el arată că gândirea are nevoie de această distincţie, sau, mai precis, are nevoie de dualitatea subiect–obiect, chiar dacă cei doi termeni ai dualităţii nu mai pot fi distinși în mod propriu-zis. Atunci când suprimă distanţa dintre „subiect" și „obiect", Plotin este nevoit să suprime însăși gândirea noastră obișnuită, înălţându-se deasupra raţiunii discursive. În schimb, atunci când arată că gândirea - chiar și cea 1 Plotin Enneade, V, 3, 10.34–39. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 1.5–6 ("Amfw oân g...netai žn Ôn). 3 Pentru mai multe implicaţii ale acestei depășiri, vezi J. M. Rist, „The one of Plotinus and the God of Aristotle", Review of Metaphysics, 27, 1973, pp. 75–87. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM98 a intelectului - este totuși duală, Plotin revine la maniera specifică gândirii noastre duale. Astfel, în exemplul anterior - al gândirii care trebuie să spună „eu sunt" - Plotin urmărește tocmai felul în care funcţionează gândirea noastră, o gândire inseparabilă de discurs, deși în repetate rânduri Plotin afirmă că în intelectul divin nu mai are loc nici un discurs și nici o decurgere temporală a unui obiect gândit1. Plotin este astfel prins între două condiţii greu de unificat: pe de o parte, intelectul divin trebuie descris ca unitar; însă aici intervine dificultatea de a descrie ceva unitar într-un limbaj inevitabil plural (în limbajul specific uman). Pe de altă parte, intelectul trebuie să fie el însuși plural într-un fel, anume în măsura în care el este totuși o gândire activă; dar aici intervine o altă dificultate, și anume faptul că gândirea intelectului divin nu este de același fel cu cea umană, așadar ea nu se desfășoară în mod discursiv, așa cum se desfășoară gândirea noastră, ci pluralitatea ei este una mult mai unificată decât puralitatea gândirii noastre. Astfel, se pare că atât unitatea cât și pluralitatea intelectului divin sunt imposibil de surprins în termenii gândirii noastre. Gândirea discursivă are ca obiect lucruri diferite de ea însăși, care intră în această gândire, însă își au ele însele fiinţa lor, distinctă de a gândirii care le gândește. În schimb, gândirea cea mai unitară, cea a intelectului divin, nu mai face apel la altceva decât ea însăși, ci ea are în sine totul, iar obiectul acestei gândiri își are fiinţa din însăși această gândire, din însuși faptul că este cuprins de această gândire. Totuși, nici chiar această suprimare a distanţei ontologice dintre cel ce gândește și cel gândit nu poate suprima distanţarea necesară gândirii. Menirea gândirii este aceea de a unifica; or, pentru a unifica, gândirea are nevoie de o anterioară distanţare, chiar și una minimă, așa cum se întâmplă în cazul intelectului divin. Acesta este în același timp gândire și obiect al gândirii, însă în 1 Vezi, de pildă, Plotin, Enneade, V, 8, 6.1–9, unde se arată că în intelect gândirea nu este propriu-zis un discurs sau o deliberare asupra obiectului acestei gândiri (oÙ dianÒhsij oÙd boÚleusij). Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 99 același timp, aceste două aspecte ale lui se diferenţiază și se identifică, păstrând astfel și unitatea, dar și dualitatea lor. 2. Intelectul ca pluralitate a fiinţei deși intelectul plotinian este conceput pornind de la modelul intelectului suprem care la Aristotel se gândea pe sine, într-o unitate foarte strânsă, într-o identitate a celui gândit și a celui ce gândește, totuși, Plotin lărgește foarte mult sfera acestui intelect, dându-i un conţinut concret (formele inteligibile), în virtutea căruia intelectul devine plural și, în consecinţă, nu mai poate fi - ca la Aristotel - principiul prim1. În acest context, intelectul - ca sumă a formelor platonice - apare ca o pluralitate completă, deoarece el cuprinde totul (p£nta), adică toate fiinţele posibile, însă le conţine pe toate în manieră inteligibilă. el conţine modelele inteligibile ale tuturor lucrurilor, iar aceste modele sunt de fapt - în viziunea lui Plotin - mai reale decât lumea sensibilă însăși, ele alcătuiesc realitatea propriu-zisă, faţă de care universul sensibil nu este decât o copie, ontologic ulterioară. dar atunci, fiinţele inteligibile - forme ale tuturor lucrurilor - diferă prin puterile lor2, adică prin capacitatea lor paradigmatică, prin putinţa de a produce lucrurile corespunzătoare. În Enneade, V, 3, 12, aflăm că intelectul nu este o pluralitate în sensul unui lucru compus, ci că pluralitatea lui se datorează activităţilor (TMnšrgeiai) sale3. Plotin compară puterile intelectului cu gândurile din suflet, pentru a arăta cum poate fi acesta plural și unitar în același timp4. Astfel, gândurile sufletului sunt distincte și nu se 1 Problema pluralităţii intelectului și a constituirii sale pornind de la unul absolut este discutată și de ş. Vianu, în Metafizica spiritului de la Aristotel la Hegel, Humanitas, București, 2005, capitolul „lumea inteligibilă în metafizica lui Plotin", pp. 34–69. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 8, 9.17. 3 Vezi și Enneade, V, 8, 9.20, unde se arată că fiinţele inteligibile sunt diferite prin forma lor inteligibilă (morf3⁄4 noer£). 4 Plotin, Enneade, V, 9, 6. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM100 amestecă, și fiecare poate acţiona separat faţă de celelalte. ele sunt împreună, însă fără a se confunda, fără a pierde pluralitatea lor. Plotin este foarte preocupat să arate că diferenţa dintre forme nu este o diferenţă de ordin sensibil, care distanţează, punând fiecare lucru într-un loc separat, și care întrerupe astfel comunicarea dintre fiinţe. Soluţia pe care o găsește Plotin constă în a spune că formele diferă nu în mod spaţial, ci doar prin alteritate1. Totuși, nu este foarte ușor să înţelegem ce înseamnă această alteritate ( terÒthj) care desparte formele2; am putea spune chiar că ea nu are un rol explicativ (ea nu lămurește de ce formele inteligibile sunt diferite) ci mai degrabă unul descriptiv: ea indică acea diferenţă minimă, între lucruri care nu se separă, dar care au totuși un profil diferit, putând fi astfel văzute în pluralitate. În această alteritate, care are aici rolul de a diferenţia formele inteligibile, recunoaștem acea alteritate care diferenţia gândirea intelectului de obiectul ei, făcând astfel posibilă gândirea însăși3. există chiar un pasaj în Enneade care pune în relaţie cele două aspecte ale alterităţii. Astfel, spre deosebire de diferenţa spaţială - care separă lucrurile sensibile, împiedicându-le să gândească și să comunice deplin -, alteritatea dintre fiinţele inteligibile este cea care le face plurale, fiind în același timp condiţia necesară pentru ca aceste fiinţe să poată gândi4. Un alt aspect al pluralităţii fiinţei inteligibile constă în aceea că, pentru Plotin, fiinţa nu are unitatea unui gen unic5. Plotin respinge existenţa unui gen comun, opunându-se astfel concepţiei stoice. el arată, în schimb, că există mai multe genuri ale 1 Vezi Enneade, Vi, 4, 4.23–26 și Vi, 9, 8.29–33. 2 J. M. Rist („The Problem of the «otherness» in the Enneads", în Le Néoplatonisme, op. cit., p. 79) remarcă faptul că această explicaţie - a diferenţei dintre forme prin alteritate - este oarecum circulară. Articolul arată în continuare că alteritatea ( terÒthj) este asociată cu mișcarea sau tendinţa originară de îndepărtare faţă de principiul unu, tendinţă specifică tuturor lucrurilor. 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 1, 4.41. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 8.24–33. 5 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 2, 2. Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 101 fiinţei, care au o unitate între ele, însă această unitate rămâne totuși multiplă. deși fiecare dintre genuri subîntinde întregul fiinţei inteligibile, totuși, ele diferă între ele prin accentul distinct pe care îl pune fiecare dintre ele asupra întregului, prin perspectiva din care fiecare parcurge întregul1. C. Intelectul nu este unul absolut, ci doar priveşte spre acesta Unul intelectului este într-adevăr unitatea2 cea mai înaltă, a fiinţei care se gândește pe sine; aceasta nu iese din sine prin nici un act al ei, ci toată activitatea ei de a fi și de a gândi se reflectă asupra sa; în plus, „conţinutul" acestei fiinţe - asupra căruia se îndreaptă actul celei mai înalte gândiri - este o pluralitate compactă, în care nu există distincţii, nu există ruptură și opoziţie, ci toate lucrurile (adică formele ineligibile) sunt împreună. dacă în cazul lucrurilor sensibile unitatea era atribuită unei pluralităţi și intra astfel în conflict cu pluralitatea însăși3, în schimb, în intelect, unitatea nu mai este contrazisă de pluralitate. din contră, unul din intelect este fundament al pluralităţii, el generează pluralitatea, însă poate în același timp să o restrângă din nou la unitate, fără să o lase să se disperseze în afară. Prin concepţia sa despre intelectul divin, Plotin oferă cea mai echilibrată descriere a întâlnirii dintre unu și pluralitate, suprimând contradicţia dintre 1 Se vorbește despre cele cinci genuri ale fiinţei ca și cum fiinţa ar fi unitatea acestor genuri. Însă unul dintre cele cinci genuri este fiinţa însăși, ceea ce ar duce la concluzia stranie că fiinţa este un gen al fiinţei. de fapt, există cinci genuri supreme, cinci genuri inteligibile, iar acestea sunt în comuniune, astfel încât fiecare este, așadar fiecare dintre ele este un gen de fiinţă. dar, în același fel, fiecare dintre ele are identitate sau mișcare, încât am putea spune că sunt cinci genuri ale identităţii. cele cinci genuri supreme existente nu sunt subordonate unui alt gen suprem, deci nu intră toate în genul fiinţei, de pildă, căci nu există un gen unic al lor. 2 Prin unitate înţelegem aici un unu determinat; intelectul, ca unitate a fiinţei, este un unu determinat, iar nu unul absolut, care nu va mai fi unu a ceva anume, ci doar unu în sine. 3 Așa cum remarcă Platon în Philebos, 14 d 4–e 4. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM102 ele și obţinând un fundament ontologic pentru întreaga sferă a realităţii, în care - așa cum am văzut - unitatea și pluralitatea se însoţesc la fiecare nivel. Totuși, fundamentul ontologic nu poate fi fundamentul ultim, absolut. deși intelectul este mai unitar decât orice alt lucru1, el nu este unul însuși, ci doar un unu determinat, un unu însoţit de o pluralitate specifică. chiar și expresia lui Anaxagora, „toate sunt împreună" (p£nta Ðmoà)2, prin care Plotin a indicat unitatea indestructibilă a intelectului, păstrează de fapt această urmă a pluralităţii, care face ca intelectul să nu fie primul, să nu fie unul absolut. Astfel, intelectul este „toate lucrurile împreună" (p£nta Ðmoà), el ţine pluralitatea sa împreună, într-o unitate. Însă, dacă „împreună" (Ðmoà) indică unitatea, „toate" (p£nta) indică totuși pluralitatea. Încercarea de a surprinde intelectul divin nu poate decât să „jongleze" între unitate și pluralitate, fără a lăsa unitatea să se desfacă într-o pluralitate de părţi, dar fără a lăsa pluralitatea să se confunde într-o unitate prea strâmtă pentru totalitatea, pentru deplinătatea fiinţei inteligibile. dar, pentru a putea gândi o unitate plurală, pentru ca unul să poată fi cu celelalte, adică cu pluralitatea fiinţei (așa cum se întâmplă în lumea inteligibilă), trebuie să existe mai întâi unul însuși, în sine, anterior pluralităţii, anterior celorlalte lucruri. Acesta este argumentul pe care Plotin l-a folosit deja pentru a trece de la nivelul sensibil la cel inteligibil, precum și pentru a trece de la nivelul pluralităţii inteligibile la cel al unului inteligibil3. odată ajuns la acest nivel, Plotin observă că, în măsura în care intelectul păstrează un fel de pluralitate, în măsura în care el este și unu și plural, el însuși presupune un unu anterior pluralităţii inteligibile. Pentru ca intelectul însuși să fie plural, trebuie 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 4.5–7. 2 Anaxagora, dK 59 B 1. Vezi și Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 4, 14.4, precum și iV, 4, 2.11; Vi, 9, 5.20–24 (tÕ Ðmoà plÁqoj). 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 5.43–45: „dacă unul se află într-un compus, trebuie să existe mai întâi în sine însuși". Capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut 103 să existe mai întâi un unu în sine, anterior1. dar acest unu nu mai poate fi unul inteligibil, unul intelectului, care există alături de celelalte, nedespărţit de pluralitatea sa, ci trebuie să fie „unul singur" (aÙtÕ mÒnon), luat „în sine însuși" (aÙtÕ kaq' autÒ)2. Plotin demonstrează anterioritatea unului în sine faţă de intelectul unu-plural, spunând că, dacă nu ar exista unul în sine, atunci nimic nu ar putea fi unu, așadar nu ar putea exista nici un compus din mai multe unităţi, așadar nu poate exista nici pluralitatea3. În concluzie, intelectul există în funcţie și în dependenţă faţă de unul anterior, care este doar unu, iar nu unu-plural. Această dependenţă a intelectului faţa de unul anterior poate fi înţeleasă și din altă perspectivă, și anume dacă pornim de la faptul că intelectul este gândire. intelectul divin, ca gândire supremă ce se gândește pe sine, are nevoie de unul anterior. Astfel, dacă gândirea lucrurilor exterioare tinde spre pluralitate - multiplicând la infinit numărul lucrurilor - în schimb, gândirea de sine tinde înspre unitate. Gândirea intelectului nu este una care despică lucrurile, care mai întâi divide lucrurile pentru ca apoi să le poată reuni - așa cum face gândirea noastră discursivă. intelectul nu are nevoie de acest ocol discursiv, ci este mai degrabă o încercare constantă de a se surprinde pe sine, în modul cel mai unitar cu putinţă. Gândirea însăși, care se gândește pe sine, caută de fapt unitatea4. dar, deși tinde spre unitate, nu o poate atinge niciodată în sine însăși, deoarece condiţia gândirii este dualitatea. Gândirea poate fi unitară - intelectul gândește ceea ce el însuși este, iar ceea ce el este are gândire - însă nu poate fi 1 Vezi Enneade, V, 6, 3.20–21: „dacă există ceva plural, trebuie să existe unul anterior pluralelor" (E„ ¥ra poll£ t... TMsti, de‹ prÕ tîn pollîn žn enai). 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 3.8–10. 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 3. În lipsa unului, lucrurile nu pot fi nici măcar plurale. Aceeași demonstraţie este reluată de Porfir în Comentariul la Parmenide, i, 91, 10–17, precum și de Proclus în Teologia platonică, ii, 1, p. 4, 8–21. 4 Vezi Enneade, V, 6, 1, unde se arată că, chiar și cel care gândește altceva decât pe sine încearcă de fapt să obţină unitatea, însă intelectul - ca gândire de sine - se apropie cel mai mult de unu. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM104 doar un singur lucru (žn mÒnon), deoarece atunci, gândirea însăși nu ar mai căuta nimic altceva, ci ar înceta să mai gândească1. Gândirea nu poate fi prima, nu poate fi actul prim, ci ea este o dualitate, așadar ea este secundă, fiind situată după cel în care nu mai există nici o dualitate2. dar atunci - într-un sens mai fundamental - gândirea este o înaintare spre acest principiu anterior dualităţii, precum și o dorire a acestuia3. Gândirea de sine caută de fapt unul, însă nu îl poate cuprinde. Plotin merge și mai departe, și privește gândirea de sine din perspectiva principiului anterior: astfel, el arată că intelectul vrea să gândească de fapt unul anterior, însă neputând să îl cuprindă, el ajunge să se gândească pe sine în mod incidental. intelectul se gândește pe sine - adică ajunge la cea mai înaltă și mai unitară formă de gândire - deoarece el privește, de fapt, spre binele anterior4, spre principiul în care nu mai există dualitate, spre unul absolut. 1 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 41.21. În același context, Plotin arată că însăși ideea cunoașterii de sine din preceptul delfic se adresează fiinţelor multiple, deoarece numai acestea au nevoie să cunoască părţile din care sunt alcătuite. În schimb, un lucru care ar fi doar unu (žn mÒnon) - așa cum va fi unul absolut - nu se poate cunoaște pe sine deoarece în el nu există „altceva" pe care să îl cunoască, și nici „altcineva" care să cunoască. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 5.5–10. 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 5.8–9 (toàtÒ TMsti noe‹n, k...nhsij prÕj ¢gaqÕn TMfišmenon TMke...nou). Vezi de asemenea Enneade, V, 3, 10.48–49, unde se arată că cunoașterea este ca o „dorire și descoperire a celui ce caută", ceea ce indică absenţa celui căutat, dar și tendinţa celui ce caută de a se apropia de acela. 4 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 5.17. orice gândire - chiar și gândirea de sine a intelectului - este o activitate, iar activitatea tuturor lucrurilor este îndreptată spre bine (conform unui principiu aristotelic preluat de Plotin, vezi Aristotel, Etica Nicomahică, 1094 a 1–2), așadar, chiar și gândirea intelectului tinde spre principiul anterior. capitolul 5 UnUl ABSolUT A. Plotin şi „dublul paricid" În acest capitol vom atinge ţinta cea mai înaltă a gândirii lui Plotin: principiul anterior intelectului divin, adică anterior fiinţei veritabile. Aici vom vedea cum s-a constituit propriu-zis problematica filozofică a unei transcendenţe absolute. Această trecere - de la pluralitatea cea mai unitară la unul absolut, de dincolo de realitatea plurală - se va dovedi extrem de provocatoare pentru o întreagă tradiţie de gândire, pentru seria de autori de după Plotin, care vor încerca să tragă concluziile ultime asupra transcendenţei principiului prim și asupra structurii realităţii. Tocmai de aceea se cuvine să ne oprim asupra manierei concrete în care Plotin gândește trecerea înspre un principiu anterior intelectului, suprimând de fapt tot ceea ce era specific lumii inteligibile și încercând să gândească - sau să intuiască - un astfel de principiu care nu mai poate fi obiectul concret al vreunei gândiri, fie aceasta umană sau divină. Înainte de a începe analiza propriu-zisă, să ne oprim asupra acestui mod, aparent straniu, de a gândi făcând apel la ceva care nu mai poate fi gândit. Mai precis, mă întreb care poate fi sursa acestei probleme. iar răspunsul pe care am să încerc să îl argumentez este acela că, în fundalul acestei probleme se află mai multe tipuri de raportare la enunţul parmenidian al identităţii dintre fiinţă și gândire1, cuplat cu enunţul unităţii acestei fiinţe2. 1 Parmenide, fr. B 3 (tÕ g¦r aÙtÕ noe‹n TMst...n te ka enai). 2 Parmenide, fr. B 8, 5–6: „nici nu a fost cândva, nici nu va fi [cândva], de vreme ce este acum, totul împreună, unu, continuu" (oÙdš pot' Ãn oÙd' oestai, TMpe nàn oestin Ðmoà p©n, ›n, sunecšj). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM106 În termenii fixaţi de Parmenide, problema unui „dincolo de fiinţă" sau „dincolo de gândire" nu poate apărea. Gândirea însăși, în identitate cu fiinţa, nu ar putea să ridice problema unui „dincolo", deoarece, prin acest enunţ al identităţii dintre fiinţă și gândire, graniţele oricărei problematizări sunt deja restrânse la spaţiul fiinţei. fiinţa unitară și în identitate cu gândirea deţine în sine însăși cognoscibilitatea (deoarece ea este deja gândire), iar existenţa ei nu mai poate fi explicată prin altceva anterior, deoarece, fiind unitară, fără început și fără sfârșit, ea nu poate accepta statutul de „cauzat", statutul secund al unei realităţi care depinde de un principiu anterior. În schimb, Platon este primul care desface această unitate a fiinţei și a gândirii1, încercând să explice posibilitatea nefiinţei și a falsului. dar, prin acest „paricid" la adresa lui Parmenide, el transformă fiinţa într-un domeniu cu o structură complexă și plurală; fiinţa nu mai este unitatea absolută, iar gândirea nu mai este în strictă identitate cu fiinţa, ci gândirea se autonomizează și se vede nevoită să iasă din spaţiul fiinţei, pentru a căuta o „sursă" a acestei fiinţe plurale. Astfel, dacă fiinţa este spaţiul cognoscibilului (al ideilor, prin care orice alt lucru poate fi cunoscut), se poate pune problema unei surse a acestui cognoscibil. Platon ajunge astfel la problema binelui de dincolo de fiinţă, care dă obiectelor cunoașterii acest fapt de a fi cunoscute. de asemenea, unitatea - desprinsă de fiinţă - devine problematizabilă în sine însăși. Astfel, unul din prima ipoteză, gândit în sine însuși, se arată a nu avea nimic în comun cu lucrurile plurale, așadar, în ultimă instanţă, el nu are nimic în comun nici măcar cu fiinţa (care are și ea o structură plurală), și el nu mai intră deloc în cadrele gândirii care îl problematizează. În felul acesta începe să se configureze distincţia dintre unu și fiinţă respectiv gândire, care în neoplatonism va fi accentuată din ce în ce mai mult. Plotin încearcă de fapt o reconciliere a perspectivei parmenidiene și a celei platonice. Astfel, el elaborează în cele mai mici 1 Vezi Platon, Sofistul, 241 d 3–7. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 107 detalii această identitate a gândirii și fiinţei, în unitatea intelectului divin. Altfel spus, în „vârful" cel mai înalt al fiinţei și al gândirii, acestea două coincid; fiinţa veritabilă este gândire, iar gândirea veritabilă este fiinţă, conform perspectivei lui Parmenide. Totuși, pe de altă parte, deși Plotin revine la afirmaţia parmenidiană a unităţii fiinţă–gândire (în intelect), el operează, în linia lui Platon, un nou „paricid", însă la un alt nivel. Mai precis, analizând enunţul parmenidian al „fiinţei care este identică cu gândirea", Plotin observă că, în însuși acest enunţ care afirmă identitatea celor două, este prezentă și distincţia lor, dualitatea lor: fiinţa și gândirea sunt identice, însă ele se identifică tocmai pentru că, de fapt, ele sunt două, așadar ele formează o unitate duală. dar aceasta nu poate fi unitatea absolută, a unului non-plural. consecinţa acestei observaţii va fi dublă: pe de o parte, fiinţa primă se întemeiază în unul absolut, iar nu în sine (ceea ce înseamnă depășirea tezei aristotelice a fiinţei inteligibile ca principiu prim), iar, pe de altă parte, acest unu absolut se sustrage în mod radical spaţiului fiinţei și oricărui acces al gândirii. Unul va fi astfel dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire, într-o variantă mult accentuată faţă de sugestiile platonice. ne-am putea întreba care este miza concretă a acestei depășiri a lumii inteligibile înspre un principiu absolut unitar. de ce este nevoie, în fond, de această ieșire din spaţiul fiinţei și mai ales din spaţiul gândirii, singurul care ne este accesibil în mod obișnuit? Pentru a răspunde, trebuie să facem apel la „exigenţa realismului" care funcţionează în scrierile lui Plotin și ale tuturor celorlalţi gânditori neoplatonici. Astfel, lumea inteligibilă, ca și acest principiu prim - și ultim în ordinea ascensiunii - nu sunt niște simple obiecte conceptuale, care răspund în mod docil intenţiei autorului de a construi un sistem filozofic, ci ele pun în evidenţă o parte a realităţii, mai precis cea mai „reală" parte a realităţii, pe care Plotin încearcă să o sistematizeze și să o urmărească până la ultimele sale consecinţe. Astfel, tot ceea ce spunem și gândim noi face apel la un nivel inteligibil al realităţii, PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM108 chiar dacă poate reflecta în același timp lumea concretă, sensibilă, în care trăim acum. Pentru a gândi, nu este suficient accesul la lumea sensibilă, ci avem nevoie de acest nivel non-sensibil, graţie căruia lumea prinde sens. dar miza lui Plotin este aceea de a vedea cum arată această lume inteligibilă în ea însăși, cum funcţionează acest nivel non-corporal al realităţii, care răspunde unor alte reguli decât lucrurile sensibile. este o lume la care noi avem acces într-o anumită măsură, de vreme ce facem mereu apel la ea, în tot ceea ce gândim. Totuși, gândirea noastră este mai degrabă o „aplicare" a acestei lumi, o particularizare a ei: întotdeauna gândim un lucru sau altul în funcţie de interesul imediat al gândirii noastre. În schimb, nu putem ști cum funcţionează în ea însăși o lume pur inteligibilă. În loc să „aplice" ceva din lumea inteligibilă la lumea concretă în care trăim - așa cum face gândirea noastră obișnuită - Plotin se întreabă cum arată această lume în sine, ne-aplicată la altceva. Aceasta este fiinţa veritabilă, „locul inteligibil", despre care vorbea Platon1, și în care neoplatonicii își propun să „locuiască". Plotin descrie lumea inteligibilă, ascultând exigenţele interne ale acesteia: lipsa materialităţii, a diviziunii spaţiale, a devenirii, a coruperii; de asemenea, exigenţa totalităţii, a existenţei paradigmatice, a unicităţii, a diversităţii unitare și a unităţii care cuprinde totalitatea, a prezenţei gândirii în această lume la care, de fapt, numai gândirea poate avea acces, a tipului aparte de gândire care se poate aplica unor obiecte pur intelectuale, care sunt ele însele capabile să gândească. Astfel, Plotin realizează o panoramă a lumii inteligibile, dându-i „carnaţie", descoperind conţinutul ei propriu. dacă stoicii excludeau incorporalul într-o zonă incertă a subzistenţei non-existente, Plotin recuperează tocmai existenţa concretă a acestei părţi a realităţii, anume partea inteligibilă, necorporală. Totuși, urmând până la capăt aceste exigenţe ale lumii inteligibile, Plotin ajunge să caute un principiu al acestei lumi: tot ceea ce există în această lume - întreaga pluralitate a fiinţelor 1 Platon, Republica, 517 b 5 (Ð nohtÕj tÒpoj). Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 109 inteligibile sau a genurilor acestora - se îndreaptă în cele din urmă spre o unitate anterioară, depinde de această unitate și nu poate subzista în lipsa ei. de asemenea, lumea inteligibilă este o lume vie, cu o activitate proprie (aceea de a gândi), însă această activitate este din nou îndreptată înspre ceva superior, înspre un bine propriu acestei lumi. În plus, chiar și aspectul auto-referenţialităţii (al gândiri care se gândește pe sine) tinde înspre o unitate care depășește această dedublare intelectivă. Astfel, Plotin observă de fapt că, din toate punctele de vedere, fiinţa inteligibilă depinde de o unitate anterioară, care este o unitate absolută. dacă nici o pluralitate nu poate exista în lipsa unei unităţi anterioare, atunci această pluralitate a fiinţei veritabile - care este fiinţa cea mai unitară cu putinţă1 - nu poate exista nici ea, decât datorită unului anterior, care nu mai este o altă unitate plurală, ci este unul absolut, adică doar unu. Acesta este singurul care poate genera pluralitatea unitară a intelectului, a fiinţei veritabile. În plus - de vreme ce gândirea noastră are ca model ultim această lume pur inteligibilă, așadar ea tinde într-un fel înspre fiinţa veritabilă, inteligibilă - înseamnă că, în ultimă instanţă, însăși gândirea noastră caută acest ultim fundament al lumii inteligibile, adică unul absolut. Astfel, trecerea înspre unul absolut nu este un exerciţiu filozofic gratuit, ci el reprezintă urmarea cerinţelor ultime ale gândirii. Tocmai în acest sens, după ce a reconstruit profilul lumii inteligibile, al fiinţei veritabile în sine, despărţită de orice corporalitate, Plotin va porni într-o încercare și mai provocatoare, anume aceea de a surprinde unul absolut, complet eliberat de orice pluralitate, chiar și de aceea a fiinţei inteligibile. B. Dincolo de fiinţă - TMpškeina tÁj oÙs...aj dacă intelectul este o lume inteligibilă în toată complexitatea ei, unul este punctul-reper în jurul căruia se poate constitui 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 4.5 ( Ð noàj m©llon žn tîn ¥llwn). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM110 această lume inteligibilă. dar, în felul acesta, unul însuși va fi surprins - printr-un efect răsturnat - tocmai ca o suprimare a ceea ce intelectul desfășoară. Astfel, dacă intelectul este fiinţă - și anume fiinţa în sensul cel mai înalt -, unul absolut va fi dincolo de fiinţă (TMpškeina tÁj oÙs...aj); dacă intelectul este gândirea cea mai unitară, atunci unul este dincolo de intelect şi de gândire (TMpškeina noà ka no»sewj); dacă intelectul este lumea totală, care cuprinde în mod paradigmatic întreaga realitate, toate lucrurile, atunci unul va fi dincolo de toate (TMpškeina p£ntwn). la Plotin, indicaţiile transcendenţei principiului unitar urmează referinţele platonice fundamentale, discutate mai sus1, însă ele se vor înmulţi, iar sensul lor se va diversifica. În plus, dacă la Platon „dincolo de fiinţă" era înţeles într-o relativitate faţă de obiectele cunoașterii (cărora le oferea fiinţă), în schimb, vom vedea că la Plotin sensul lui „dincolo de fiinţă", cuplat cu acela al lui „dincolo de gândire" se radicalizează: principiul va fi „dincolo" într-un sens total: el este „dincolo" faţă de orice aspect al fiinţei și al gândirii. el devine astfel în sine însuși un „dincolo" sau „cel de dincolo (tÕ TMpškeina)"2. În continuare, ne vom opri tocmai asupra acestor indicaţii trans-noetice și trans-ontologice asupra principiului prim, încercând să vedem ce sens au ele în gândirea lui Plotin, care este structura care le leagă între ele și cum reușesc ele împreună să susţină această gândire filozofică paradoxală, care își depășește propriile limite. 1 este vorba despre binele de dincolo de fiinţă din Republica, 509 b 9, și de unul care nu este nici măcar unu din concluzia primei ipoteze asupra unului (Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 8). 2 Vezi, de pildă, Enneade, i, 2, 3.31. luc Brisson notează că, la Plotin, TMpškeina nu apare niciodată ca substantiv separat, fără complement, așa cum apare el la Porfir (vezi Porphyre, Sentences, Vrin, Paris, 2005, propoziţia 10, 4 și nota lui l. Brisson din vol. ii, p. 403). Totuși, această afirmaţie nu este corectă, deoarece, în acest context, Plotin însuși se referă la principiul prim ca fiind „cel de dincolo". Aici, expresia apare la genitiv: virtuţile nu aparţin intelectului, nici „celui de dincolo" (toà TMpškeina). Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 111 1. Sensul lui TMpškeina Înainte de a începe această analiză, se impune să facem o scurtă cercetare asupra expresiei transcendenţei principiului, al cărei sens dorim să îl aprofundăm: mai precis, în formula platonică „dincolo de fiinţă" (TMpškeina oÙs...aj), trebuie să ne întrebăm ce înseamnă „dincolo" și ce înseamnă „fiinţă". de asemenea, trebuie să vedem ce sens avea această expresie la Platon, și cum s-a transformat sensul ei odată ce a fost preluată în gândirea lui Plotin. În primul rând, ce înseamnă TMpškeina? cuvântul este compus din prepoziţia TMp... și pronumele demonstrativ (neutru plural) TMke‹na (acelea, cele de acolo), care provine din adverbul de loc TMke‹ (acolo, în acel loc). la Platon, TMke‹na desemnează lumea ideilor, sau lucrurile din lumea inteligibilă1. Platon folosește chiar și expresia t¦ TMke‹ (cele de acolo), pe care o vom întâlni apoi și la Plotin, pentru a desemna lumea inteligibilă2. Sensul primar al termenului TMpškeina ar fi „în cele de acolo" (opus lui TMp t£de: „în cele de aici")3. ca un cuvânt compus, el poate fi tradus prin dincolo de, deasupra, de cealaltă parte de, mai departe de4, fiind utilizat cu un genitiv care indică lucrul sau locul faţă de care se face această trecere dincolo5. 1 Platon, Phaidros, 250 a 1–6. 2 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, V, 8, 4.31; Vi, 1, 1.23; Vi, 3, 16.29. 3 Vezi Platon, Phaidon, 112 b 5: termenul este folosit în expresia „e„j tÕ TMp' TMke‹na tÁj gÁj" (înspre cealaltă parte a pământului), în opoziţie cu „TMp t£de" (această parte a pământului). la Platon însuși, termenul este foarte rar; singura altă referinţă cu sensul de „dincolo de" este cea din Republica, 509 b 9. 4 Vezi, de pildă, Plutarh, Tezeu, unde t¦ TMpškeina este folosit cu sens local: „cele de dincolo" de marginea cunoscută a lumii (1, 1, 4), dar și cu sens temporal: „cele de dincolo" de timpul istoric cunoscut (1, 3, 1). 5 Acest amănunt se va dovedi de o mare importanţă în cadrul problemei principiului de dincolo de fiinţă, deoarece neoplatonicii ulteriori vor observa că „dincolo de" nu exprimă o transcendenţă absolută, așa cum ar trebui să aibă principiul prim, ci doar o transcendenţa în raport cu ceva anume. Vezi, de pildă, damascius, De principiis, R. i, 4.8: pentru a fi cu adevărat principiul prim, acesta nu trebuie numit nici măcar „dincolo de totul". PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM112 Să mai menţionăm o ocurenţă aristotelică a termenului, foarte interesată din perspectiva pe care o urmărim: în Comentariul la Despre cer, Vii, p. 485, Simplicius notează că, în cartea Despre rugăciune, Aristotel spune că „zeul este fie un intelect, fie ceva de dincolo de intelect" (Ð qeÕj À noàj TMstin À ka TMpškein£ ti toà noà)1. 2. Sensul lui oÙs...a Pentru a înţelege ce sens acordă Plotin principiului de dincolo de fiinţă, trebuie să pornim de la sensul cuvântului oÙs...a la Platon, mai ales în contextul din Republica. dacă Ôn desemnează lucrul care există în realitate, în schimb, atunci când se pune întrebarea ce este (t... TMstin) acel lucru, acel Ôn, dorim de fapt să aflăm oÙs...a lui, adică esenţa acelui lucru, ceea ce îl determină ca acel lucru anume și îl diferenţiază de alte lucruri2. OÙs...a individualizează lucrul respectiv3, arătând ce înseamnă acel lucru, ce gândim atunci când spunem că ceva este; oÙs...a se distinge astfel de lucrul însuși (Ôn)4, care nu este gândit el însuși, în sine, ci este înţeles prin oÙs...a lui. Astfel, oÙs...a ar fi intermedierea noetică a lucrului care este (tÕ Ôn), esenţa acestuia, care îi conferă un mod concret de a fi, care îl face să fie (enai). ceva este (Ôn), deoarece are o esenţă, o anume oÙs...a. 1 Vezi Aristotel, Fragmente, fr. 49. cartea Despre rugăciune, din care nu s-a păstrat decât acest fragment, aparţinea unei perioade „platonice" a lui Aristotel. 2 c. H. Kahn (The Verb„Be" and its Synonyms, vol. 6: The Verb „Be" in Ancient Greek, d. Reidel Publishing company, dordrecht, Boston, 1973, p. 460) arată că oÙs...a este o substantivizare a lui t... TMstin; vezi Euthyphron, 11 a 7, în care Platon suprapune oÙs...a și t... TMstin („ceea ce este un lucru"). 3 În L'Être et l'Essence, Vrin, Paris, 1972, p. 28, É. Gilson spune că oÙs...a ar fi caracterul de identitate cu sine al fiinţei veritabile („cette permanence dans l'identité à soi-même"). Totuși, considerăm că oÙs...a are și un caracter explicativ mai determinat: ea arată ce anume este un lucru, dând concreteţea a ceea ce este; tocmai de aceea oÙs...a constituie obiectul principal al analizelor dialectice. 4 Atunci când Socrate întreabă ce este X, el nu poate accepta un răspuns de felul X este x, de pildă, „virtutea este curajul". de asemenea, nu putem spune ce este omul indicând un om anume, căci între omul respectiv și ceea ce îl face să fie om există o diferenţă de nivel, o diferenţă ontologică. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 113 Astfel, tÕ Ôn este ființa determinată, ca particularizare a lui oÙs...a; tÕ Ôn reprezintă fiinţarea concretă, ceea ce ființează, iar oÙs...a reprezintă fiinţa lucrului, ceea ce este acel lucru1 și ceea ce poate fi cunoscut din el. Remarcăm de pildă că, în Republica, 509 b, binele care dă oÙs...a dă în același timp și faptul de a fi cunoscut, ceea ce este o indicaţie a faptului că oÙs...a este obiectul propriu-zis al cunoașterii, ceea ce cunoaștem dintr-un lucru. În logica platonică, oÙs...a este ideea (edoj) lucrului, la care acesta participă2. Totuși, ideile nu au o existenţă pur conceptuală, așa cum am tinde să le gândim astăzi, ci ele alcătuiesc de fapt sfera fiinţei veritabile, ele există cu adevărat, chiar dacă nu într-o manieră sensibilă. Altfel, ar fi absurd să spunem ce este un lucru, făcând apel la ceva care nu este, sau care este într-o măsură mai mică decât acel lucru însuși. din contră, ceea ce face ca un lucru să fie, așadar oÙs...a lui, este fiinţă în mod veritabil, adică o fiinţă neschimbătoare, care rămâne identică cu sine. Așadar, ideile au și ele caracterul fiinţării (Ôn), însă ele nu sunt ca orice alt fel de fiinţare, ci ele alcătuiesc fiinţa veritabilă (Ôntwj Ôn)3, faţă de care lucrurile din 1 În Phaidon, forma este numită „oÙs...a" (76 d 9, 77 a 2) dar și „aÙtÕ Ö oestin" (ceea ce este) (74 b 2, d 6, 75 b 1, d 2). 2 Vezi Parmenide, 133 c 4: ideea este oÙs...a fiecărui lucru; de asemenea la 135 a 8: pentru fiecare lucru există un gen și o oÙs...a în sine (aÙt3⁄4 kaq' aØt»n). la 141 e 11 se spune că unul nu este și nu este nici măcar unu, căci atunci el ar fi Ôn și ar participa la oÙs...a. Așadar, din nou se observă diferenţa dintre cei doi termeni: Ôn este ceva anume, un lucru concret, iar oÙs...a arată ce anume este lucrul respectiv. desigur, un lucru nu poate să fie o fiinţă anume (Ôn) și să nu aibă o oÙs...a, ci diferenţa dintre cei doi termeni este mai degrabă una de ordin logic. Toate lucrurile sunt fiinţe (Ônta), însă nu toate sunt în același fel, ci fiecare are un alt fel de a fi, fiecare are o altă oÙs...a, aceasta din urmă introducând identitatea fiecărui lucru precum și distincţia dintre lucruri. Vezi de asemenea Republica, 507 b, pentru identitatea dintre „dša și Ö oestin („ceea ce este un lucru"). 3 TÕ Ôn are sensul primar de „ceea ce este cu adevărat, starea de fapt, reală" (vezi c. H. Kahn, The Verb Be in Ancient Greek, op. cit., p. 455 și cele două exemple: Tucidide, Războiului peloponesiac, Vii, 8, 2: t¦ Ônta = faptele, situaţia reală, felul în care stau lucrurile; Herodot, Istorii, V, 50, 7: lšgein tÕ TMÒn = a spune adevărul, a spune cum stau lucrurile). la Platon, acest sens este preluat și întărit: fiinţa veritabilă, adică cea neschimbătoare și eternă, este numită PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM114 lumea sensibilă ajung să fie privite mai degrabă ca devenire, decât ca fiinţă1. dar, în felul acesta, oÙs...a se arată a fi ceea ce este cu adevărat, iar sensul lui oÙs...a se suprapune în mare măsură peste sensul lui Ôntwj Ôn: oÙs...a arată ceea ce este un lucru; însă ceea ce este un lucru este fiinţă în mod veritabil (Ôntwj Ôn)2. În acest sens, „dincolo de oÙs...a" ar însemna dincolo de idei, care sunt precum niște esenţe ale lucrurilor. de ce este nevoie de acest „dincolo de oÙs...a"? Pentru că, la Platon, problema ideilor ajunge într-o dificultate majoră: ideile arată ce sunt lucrurile, ele explică ce anume gândim atunci când spunem că ceva este. Totuși, se pune întrebarea ce sunt ideile însele, sau de ce ele reușesc să explice ce sunt lucrurile. Altfel spus, dacă atunci când cunoaștem un lucru cunoaștem de fapt ideea acelui lucru, atunci ce face ca ideile însele să fie cognoscibile? ideile însele au astfel nevoie de o sursă a lor, care să le facă să fie, și care să le facă cunoscute; iar această sursă este dincolo de oÙs...a. o problemă care subzistă însă la Platon este cea a statutului acestui bine de dincolo de fiinţă. Mai precis, binele însuși este descris, într-o primă etapă, ca o idee. Rămâne astfel neclar ce ar însemna o idee (a binelui) dincolo de spaţiul ideilor3. Ôntwj Ôn: „ceea ce este cu adevărat, fiinţa reală, veritabilă" (vezi Sofistul, 240 b 3: „adevărul este o fiinţă veritabilă", Timaios, 52 c 5: „discursul adevărat vine în ajutorul fiinţei veritabile"). expresia este formată din participiul Ôn (fiind), întărit de un adverb format tot de la verbul a fi: Ôntwj (în mod real, actual, în mod veritabil). limba greacă leagă astfel sensul fiinţei de sensul adevărului unui lucru. o traducere mai apropiată de expresia grecească ar fi „fiinţa care fiinţează cu adevărat", pentru a nu pierde nici nuanţa realităţii acestei fiinţe. de asemenea, Ôntwj Ôn poate fi înţeles drept „ceea ce este așa cum este", așadar ceea ce nu se schimbă, ceea ce rămâne identic. A fi cu adevărat înseamnă a rămâne identic cu sine, a nu se abate de la ceea ce acel lucru este, adică de la oÙs...a lui. 1 Această perspectivă se regăsește și la Plotin: vezi enneade, Vi, 2, 1.20. 2 la Aristotel, relaţia dintre cei doi termeni se schimbă: dacă Ôn se spune în multe sensuri (Metafizica, 1003, a 33), punctul în jurul căruia gravitează toate aceste sensuri este reprezentat de categoria oÙs...a, care însă indică în primul rând individualul concret, și apoi, într-un sens derivat, genul din care acesta face parte. 3 Plotin va depăși această dificultate, făcând ca binele de dincolo de fiinţă să fie un principiu non-formal, anterior ideilor. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 115 la Plotin, diferenţa dintre Ôn și oÙs...a se șterge complet în lumea inteligibilă. Aceasta nu este o abstracţie conceptuală, ideile nu sunt niște universale, ci sunt individuale, sunt fiinţe propriu-zise. În plus, în cazul fiinţelor inteligibile nu mai există o distanţă între existenţa lucrului respectiv și ce anume este el, ci orice fiinţă inteligibilă este ea însăși o esenţă, o oÙs...a. Plotin arată chiar că Ôn este un nume potrivit pentru oÙs...a1. Astfel, Ôn, oÙs...a și Ôntwj Ôn ajung să se identifice. Trebuie să insistăm mai mult asupra acestei diferenţe dintre „a fi" în lumea sensibilă și „a fi" în lumea inteligibilă. Într-un anumit context2, Plotin vorbește despre două feluri de „a fi" (enai). el spune că, dintre lucrurile despre care spunem că „sunt", unele sunt identice cu acest fapt însuși de a fi, iar altele sunt diferite de propriul lor a fi. de pildă, un om concret nu este identic cu umanitatea însăși, care îl face să fie om; în schimb, sufletul simplu, esenţial, care nu se predică despre altceva, este prin sine însuși, iar nu prin ceva anterior lui. Așadar, în lumea sensibilă, deși spunem că lucrurile de aici sunt (și le numim Ônta), totuși, ele sunt doar într-o manieră derivată, deoarece ele însele sunt distincte de propriul lor fapt de a fi, care le vine din altă parte. Tocmai de aceea, atunci când se trece la lumea inteligibilă, lucrurile de acolo vor fi numite fiinţe veritabile (t¦ Ôntwj Ônta), deoarece ele sunt identice cu propriul lor fapt de a fi, așadar ele sunt cu adevărat, adică în mod direct, iar nu derivat. Mai precis, în lumea inteligibilă nu mai există această diferenţă dintre lucrul care este (tÕ Ôn) și fiinţa lui (oÙs...a), care îl face să fie, care îi 1 Vezi Enneade, iii, 7, 6.27–29: Plotin se întreabă de unde vine nevoia de a preciza că fiinţa veritabilă este o fiinţă veşnică (¢e Ôn). de fapt, spune Plotin, termenul cel mai adecvat ar fi acela de Ôn. Însă, deoarece acest termen este folosit pentru a indica oÙs...a, iar unii au atribuit oÙs...a lucrurilor schimbătoare, a fost nevoie să se precizeze că fiinţa însăși (Ôn) este de fapt eternă. Plotin arată chiar că, în mod real, Ôn desemnează fiinţa inteligibilă, pe când lucrurile sensibile nu sunt propriu-zis „fiinţe", ci ele ţin de domeniul devenirii (vezi Enneade, Vi, 2, 1.16–21). 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 14.1–4. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM116 conferă un a fi (enai). OÙs...a, care arată ce este lucrul și care devine obiect al gândirii, se identifică cu fiinţa (Ôn) respectivă care gândește. Altfel spus, la acest nivel, nu mai avem o oÙs...a separată de cel care gândește această oÙs...a, așadar nu mai avem o oÙs...a pe care altcineva să o poată gândi, ci fiinţa inteligibilă își gândește propria oÙs...a, iar această oÙs...a este ea însăși cea care gândește. Plotin expune în mod detaliat tocmai această unitate dintre lucrul care este și ceea ce este acel lucru, respectiv cum este el gândit. el realizează astfel unitatea cea mai strânsă, dar și cea mai largă a fiinţei, suprapunând diversele aspecte ale fiinţei: ca Ôn, ca oÙs...a, ca obiect al gândirii, dar și ca agent al gândirii. Tocmai de aceea, vom vedea că pentru Plotin dincolo de oÙs...a va fi și dincolo de Ôn, adică dincolo de fiinţa veritabilă (Ôntwj Ôn), precum și dincolo de această gândire a intelectului care se gândește pe sine. Plotin folosește toate cele trei expresii, în echivalenţă: TMpškeina Ôntoj1, TMpškeina oÙs...aj2, precum și TMpškeina noà ka no»sewj3. 3. Expresia „dincolo de fiinţă" de la Platon la neoplatonici după aceste minime precizări privind sensul lui oÙs...a la Platon și apoi la Plotin, se cuvine să analizăm însăși expresia „fondatoare" a neoplatonismului: „dincolo de fiinţă", pornind de la rădăcina ei platonică și până la bogăţia de sensuri pe care o va cunoaște în neoplatonism. la Platon, expresia „dincolo de fiinţă" este singulară; ea nu reapare în nici un alt context afară de cel din Republica, 509 b 9. iar în acest context statului binelui de dincolo de fiinţă este discutabil. Pe de o parte, Platon vorbește despre ideea de bine, care ar intra în mod normal în spaţiul fiinţei, ca una dintre idei, iar pe de altă parte aflăm că acest bine este dincolo de fiinţă, sau deasupra 1 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, iii, 9, 9.1; iV, 4, 16.27; V, 1, 10.2; V, 5, 6.11; Vi, 8, 9.27. 2 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, i, 7, 1.19; V, 1, 8.8; Vi, 8, 16.34; Vi, 9, 11.42. 3 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, i, 7, 1.20; V, 1, 8.7; V, 8, 1.3. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 117 fiinţei, depășind-o în privinţa puterii și a vârstei. Totuși, maniera acestei depășiri nu este aprofundată și explicată mai mult. Putem înţelege că binele este superior ideilor distincte, lucrurilor cognoscibile pe care le face să fie și pe care le face să fie cunoscute: astfel, binele nu ar mai fi doar o anumită oÙs...a, așa cum soarele, prin care putem vedea celelalte lucruri, nu mai este el însuși un lucru anume, vizibil, ci este însăși lumina, adică condiţia oricărei vizibilităţi. În același fel, binele nu ar fi doar o anume oÙs...a, așadar un lucru cunoscut ca atare, ci el este cel care face ca fiecare obiect cunoscut să fie și să aibă o oÙs...a, aceasta fiind de fapt ceea ce cunoaștem, atunci când cunoaștem un lucru. dar, deși nu poate fi un lucru anume, cu o oÙs...a determinată, totuși, nu este deloc clar ce statut îi rămâne acestui bine. În lectura lor la acest pasaj despre binele de dincolo de fiinţă, neoplatonicii extrag din textul respectiv o indicaţie concretă a unui principiu anterior fiinţei, pe care îl identifică cu unul nonplural (din Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 8). Mai mult decât atât, ei operează un fel de reducţie a textului platonic, citindu-l într-o grilă mai radicală. Astfel, dacă la Platon binele era o idee1, Plotin și ceilalţi neoplatonici nu mai înţeleg binele ca o idee, ci ca anterior sferei ideilor, adică anterior lumii inteligibile în întregul ei. Pe de altă parte, în pasajul din Republica, Platon arată în ce sens este binele dincolo de fiinţă: el stă dincolo de fiinţă (tÁj oÙs...aj [...] Øperšcontoj) prin vârsta2 şi prin puterea lui (presbe...v ka dun£mei). o altă traducere mai precisă ar fi aceasta: „unul este deasupra fiinţei, prin vârsta și puterea lui", așadar el este de fapt mai vârstnic și mai puternic. el depășește fiinţa sub aceste două aspecte. În schimb, la autorii neoplatonici - începând cu Plotin - sensul lui TMpškeina devine absolut: unul-bine va fi dincolo de fiinţă și de intelect sub toate aspectele; el nu mai este o idee și nu mai are nici una dintre determinaţiile fiinţei, de aceea nici nu 1 Platon, Republica, 508 e 4 (toà ¢gaqoà „dšan). 2 cuvântul presbe...a, tradus aici prin „vârstă", are și sensul de rang sau demnitate, de drept al celui mai vârstnic. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM118 mai este nevoie să se precizeze sub ce aspect este unul-bine dincolo de fiinţă1. Acest lucru se reflectă și la nivel terminologic: din explicaţia mai largă a lui Platon, neoplatonicii vor păstra doar această expresie: „dincolo de fiinţă" (TMpškeina tÁj oÙs...aj), eliminând precizarea „în privinţa vârstei și a puterii" (presbe...v ka dun£mei). În plus, trebuie să mai remarcăm o nuanţă a textului platonic, pe care autorii neoplatonici tind să o absolutizeze: binele este dincolo de fiinţă, deoarece el dă fiinţă obiectelor cunoașterii. Așadar, la Platon, problema are trei niveluri: obiectele cognoscibile, fiinţa lor, pe care o primesc de la bine, și binele care este astfel dincolo de fiinţa acestor obiecte cognoscibile. Binele este superior fiinţei (oÙs...a) deoarece el oferă fiinţă lucrurilor cognoscibile. În loc să fie el însuși o fiinţă (oÙs...a), el este precum cauza fiinţei2, dar nu iese total din spaţiul lui „a fi"3, așa cum soarele care este sursa luminii și a vizibilităţii rămâne totuși în sfera luminii și a vizibilului. În schimb, pentru neoplatonici, principiul unu-bine este dincolo de fiinţă într-un sens absolut al fiinţei, adică dincolo de întreaga sferă a fiinţei veritabile și complet distins de natura fiinţei. Să vedem însă ce înseamnă pentru Plotin expresia platonică: „dincolo de fiinţă" și de ce aceasta devine pentru el maniera cea mai adecvată de a indica principiul prim. 1 Vezi și analiza lui l. Brisson („Présupposés et conséquences d'une interprétation ésotériste de Platon", în Lectures de Platon, Vrin, Paris, 2000, Anexa 3, pp. 83–87), care insistă asupra importanţei acestor două precizări din textul platonic. 2 Tot astfel, în Republica, 508 e, se spune că binele este cauza știinţei și a adevărului, și tocmai de aceea el este superior știinţei și adevărului. 3 Astfel, în Republica, 507 b, Platon vorbește despre „binele în sine" (aÙtÕ ¢gaqÒn), care este anterior lucrurilor multiple ce au caracterul binelui; binele în sine este ideea unică, aceasta fiind numită „Ö oestin", adică „ceea ce este". Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 119 C. Sensurile lui „dincolo de fiinţă" la Plotin expresia „dincolo de fiinţa" presupune doi „termeni": fiinţa, respectiv principiul de dincolo de fiinţă. În consecinţă, „dincolo de fiinţă" poate fi explicat fie din perspectiva principiului, fie din perspectiva fiinţei. Ambele perspective sunt la fel de îndreptăţite, iar la limită ele nu pot fi despărţite propriu-zis, ci diferă doar printr-un accent superior pus asupra unui termen sau asupra celuilalt. de aceea, vom încerca să le abordăm pe amândouă, discutând atât despre principiul care este „dincolo de fiinţă", cât și despre fiinţa care rămâne „dincoace" de principiu. În primul rând, vom discuta despre „identitatea" principiului de dincolo de fiinţă, și anume, ne vom referi la cele două aspecte prin care el este definit: principiul este „unu" și „bine" în același timp. după această primă analiză, vom trece la a doua parte a problemei, oprindu-ne asupra ocurenţelor textuale ale expresiei „dincolo de fiinţă" și discutând în mod aplicat care sunt „aspectele" fiinţei faţă de care principiul se arată a fi „dincolo". 1. „Dincolo de fiinţă" din perspectiva principiului unu-bine Sensurile transcendenţei principiului faţă de fiinţă sunt expuse de Plotin pornind fie de la aspectul de unitate al principiului, fie de la aspectul său de bine absolut. Tocmai de aceea trebuie să precizăm prin ce anume se disting aceste două aspecte ale principiului, dar și cum ajung ele să fie identificate de gândirea neoplatonică. În plus, această bivalenţă a principiului poate să surprindă. Astfel, dacă privim cele două aspecte ale principiului în distincţia lor, am putea avea impresia că acestea sugerează o dualitate a principiului. Totuși, așa cum vom încerca să explicăm în continuare, unul și binele nu se disting decât din perspectiva gândirii care încearcă să surprindă principiul, așadar din perspectiva fiinţei care urmează după principiu, fără însă a afecta natura unitară a principiului absolut, fără a împărţi această natură. Să vedem așadar ce înseamnă principiul ca unu și cum anume PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM120 acest unu este în același timp binele absolut, fără ca binele prim să fie „altceva" decât unul absolut. Principiul ca unu. Preluând expresia platonică dincolo de fiinţă și făcând din ea ţelul ultim al gândirii sale, Plotin iese din termenii ontologiei tradiţionale: fiinţa lucrurilor nu mai este gândită prin apel la o fiinţă primă, ci fiinţa - cu ambele sale caractere, atât cel de unitate cât și cel de pluralitate - este explicată prin ceea ce o face să fie unitară, înainte chiar ca ea să poată desfășura o pluralitate specifică. Plotin își dă seama de faptul că o unitate plurală nu poate exista decât printr-o unitate pură, printr-un unu absolut, deoarece într-o pluralitate unul este primit din altă parte, adică de la unul anterior; totuși, unitatea nu poate fi primită mereu din afară, de la o unitate anterioară, ci înaintea acestei serii de pluralităţi unitare trebuie să existe unul însuși, non-plural. Acesta este cel de la care fiecare dintre celelalte lucruri își primește unitatea, ajungând să fie un „unu" determinat1. Unul absolut generează fiinţa, impunându-i o unitate specifică, făcând-o să fie ea însăși un unu. diferenţa dintre cele două feluri de unu constă în aceea că unul fiinţei este un unu primit, pe când unul absolut este cel care dă unitatea, care dă acest unu al fiinţei. Unul dă fiinţei condiţia fundamentală în care aceasta poate apărea: anume unitatea; în felul acesta el generează fiinţa, făcând-o să fie ceea ce este. considerăm că acesta reprezintă punctul central al superiorităţii unului absolut faţă de fiinţă, și că doar pornind de aici putem înţelege ce înseamnă că unul este „dincolo de fiinţă". este adevărat că Plotin însuși nu prezintă transcendenţa unului faţă de fiinţă într-o anumită ordine sistematică, de aceea este foarte greu să identificăm un sens fundamental al acestei transcendenţe, pornind de la care să putem ordona toate celelalte sensuri. de fapt, unul este transcendent fiinţei în toate sensurile 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 15.17: „cel de la care, într-un fel, celelalte [lucruri] sunt și ele [unu]" (par' oá pwj ka t¦ ¥lla). Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 121 acesteia, iar analiza acestei transcendenţe poate începe cu orice aspect. Totuși, toate sensurile lui „dincolo de fiinţă" sunt legate de faptul că fiinţa, ca unu-plural, este instituită de unul absolut care îi dă unitatea. Principiul ca bine. Totuși, am văzut deja că fiinţa veritabilă nu este una inertă, lipsită de viaţă. dar atunci, această unitate - pe care o primește și în jurul căreia se constituie - nu îi poate rămâne indiferentă, și nu poate fi ceva de care fiinţa să nu „știe" într-un fel. din contră, fiinţa veritabilă este o fiinţă gânditoare, iar gândirea ei este îndreptată tocmai spre această unitate a fiinţei și, mai precis, spre cel de la care ea primește unitatea sa, adică spre unul absolut, pe care încearcă în mod constant să îl surprindă. fiinţa însăși nu poate exista în lipsa unului absolut; în plus, activitatea ei nu vizează altceva decât acest principiu absolut unitar. dar, conform unui principiu aristotelic1, orice activitate se îndreaptă spre un bine propriu. Plotin aplică și el acest principiu, însă într-o formă ușor diferită: pentru el, cel spre care se îndreaptă activitatea unui lucru este binele acelui lucru; în consecinţă, cel spre care se îndreaptă activitatea fiinţei veritabile este binele ei, iar acesta este binele absolut, deoarece el nu mai este binele unei fiinţe anume, ci este binele întregii fiinţe, și anume al fiinţei veritabile. el nu este doar „ceva bun", un bine determinat, ci este binele suprem2, dincolo de care nu mai poate exista un alt bine. dar atunci, binele fiinţei este însuși unul spre care se îndreaptă activitatea sa. În felul acesta, unul absolut este identificat cu binele absolut. Unul este identic cu binele. Totuși, nu trebuie să înţelegem că unul și binele ar fi două lucruri diferite, pe care Plotin - și întreaga tradiţie neoplatonică - le suprapune. din contră, cele 1 Aristotel, Etica Nicomahică, 1094 a 1–2. 2 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 13.1–2: „el este Binele, iar nu un bine" (t¢gaqÕn aÙtÕn Ônta ka m3⁄4 ¢gaqÒn). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM122 două aspecte ale principiului prim - acela de unu absolut și acela de bine prim - funcţionează în același timp, iar între ele nu există o diferenţă decât dacă privim relaţia principiului cu fiinţa, așadar cu realitatea pe care acest principiu o generează. Astfel, ca sursă a întregii realităţi plurale, principiul ne apare ca unu; în schimb, ca scop final al întregii realităţi, așadar ca acela spre care tinde întreaga realitate, principiul ne apare ca bine. Principiul „prim" este astfel și principiul „ultim" al întregii realităţi. el are două aspecte indisociabile: atât acela de sursă, origine și început al realităţii, cât și acela de ţintă, de scop și de finalitate a întregii realităţi1. Totuși, cei doi termeni - începutul și sfârșitul - au sens numai în relaţie cu ceea ce începe, respectiv cu ceea ce se îndreaptă spre un sfârșit, așadar ei au sens numai în relaţie cu ceea ce vine după principiu, cu ceea ce este diferit de principiu, și care își are în principiu atât sursa, cât și ţelul existenţei sale. de aceea, cele două aspecte ale principiului nu introduc nici o dualitate în principiul însuși și nu împart unitatea lui. Principiul este și cel care fundamentează întreaga realitate, cel care face posibilă fiinţa veritabilă - și, în consecinţă, chiar și spaţiul devenirii -, dar el este în același timp cel spre care întreaga fiinţă își concentrează activitatea ei specifică. de aceea, Plotin poate să vorbească despre principiu sprijinindu-se atât pe analiza platonică asupra unului, cât și pe analiza platonică privind binele - de aici decurgând bogăţia de sens a Enneadelor. Să vedem însă, și mai concret, cum anume coexistă cele două aspecte ale principiului și de ce fiinţa este generată tocmai de cel spre care ea însăși se îndreaptă. Actul prin care ia naștere fiinţa este un act de contemplaţie a unului absolut: fiinţa încearcă să cuprindă această unitate, însă nu obţine decât imaginea duală a propriei sale existenţe, care se depărtează de unu tocmai în timp ce vrea să îl cuprindă. dar atunci, acest act de contemplaţie este în același timp un act de dorire a unului anterior, iar în această 1 Pentru identitatea începutului (principiul) cu sfârșitul (scopul final), vezi Enneade, iii, 8, 7.17; V, 8, 7.45–47. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 123 dorire fiinţa se reîntoarce constant spre principiul ei, adică spre cel de la care ea provine, spre cel de la care, într-un fel, ea se depărtează. desigur, nu trebuie înţeles că ar exista o distincţie între aceste două aspecte ale principiului și că principiul ca sursă a realităţii ar fi diferit de principiul ca scop. Scopul final nu este un moment ulterior, la care realitatea ar ajunge în urma desfășurării sale. din contră, Plotin concepe relaţia de întemeiere a realităţii în principiu astfel încât această producere a realităţii să fie în același timp un act de dorire a principiului, o tensiune care reîntoarce lucrurile spre principiul lor. Altfel spus, lucrurile tind spre principiu în același timp în care ele sunt produse; ele vor să se întoarcă la principiul lor tocmai în măsura în care acesta le instituie ca diferite. În măsura în care fiinţa dorește principiul și tinde să îl cuprindă în gândirea ei, tocmai în această măsură ea este instituită ca diferită de principiu, pe care nu îl poate cuprinde, deoarece gândirea fiinţei rămâne plurală. Unul este astfel și cel de la care începe activitatea de contemplaţie proprie fiinţei, dar și cel spre care se întoarce dorinţa constantă a acesteia. Totuși, el nu este niciodată un „obiect" propriu-zis al contemplaţiei și al dorinţei fiinţei, ci acestea indică în direcţia principiului, fără însă a indica „ceva" anume1. Principiul este unu faţă de fiinţa plurală care provine de la ea, și este bine faţă de fiinţa care își îndreaptă întreaga sa activitate spre el; totuși, el nu este un „unu" determinat și nici un „bine" determinat. observăm astfel că cele două aspecte ale principiului, acela de „unu" și acela de „bine", nu au un sens static: ele nu sunt niște proprietăţi care ar reveni unui lucru anume, unei realităţi precise. ele au mai degrabă un sens „funcţional": fiinţa se instituie pornind de la unitatea absolută, care este în același timp binele ei cel mai înalt. Astfel, structura realităţii - de la principiul prim până 1 ideea va fi preluată și accentuată de damascius, care vorbește despre „presentimentul" principiului absolut, căruia nu-i corespunde, însă, un obiect concret, determinat (vezi De principiis, R. i, 4.6–8). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM124 la ultimele derivate - poate fi citită în două direcţii: pe de o parte, de la principiu la derivatele sale, vedem cum principiul întemeiază întreaga realitate, întreaga pluralitate a fiinţelor, care nu poate exista fără simplitatea anterioară a principiului unu. Pe de altă parte, de la derivate înspre principiu, principiul apare ca acela înspre care se îndreaptă dorinţa tuturor fiinţelor, el este scopul final al întregii realităţi, binele comun al tuturor fiinţelor. Astfel, principiul face ca desfășurarea realităţii să fie una circulară: realitatea începe de la principiu ca unitate absolută și anterioară, dar, în același timp, realitatea își are finalitatea în același principiu, ca bine absolut. Principiul este cel de la care începe desfășurarea - inevitabil plurală - a fiinţei, iar în acest sens el este unul absolut, necesar acestei desfășurări; în același timp, principiul este și cel în jurul căruia gravitează fiinţa, cel pe care fiinţa tinde să îl cuprindă, să îl atingă, iar în acest sens el este binele ei absolut. cele două aspecte ale principiului se „reflectă" unul în celălalt, constituind două laturi necesare ale relaţiei fiinţei cu principiul său: fiinţa se „depărtează" de la principiul care rămâne absolut unu, dar în același timp ea tinde să reducă această depărtare faţă de principiu, ea tinde spre unul absolut ca spre binele ei propriu. dacă între principiu și fiinţă există o dinamică dublă (în sensul în care fiinţa se depărtează constant de principiu, dar revine și tinde mereu spre el, rămânând totuși în distincţia ei faţă de el), atunci „unul" și „binele" nu sunt decât cele două capete perfect simetrice ale acestei dinamici1. În ambele cazuri, principiul are o existenţa și o funcţie extra-ontologică, adică el fie precede fiinţa (ca unul care o face posibilă), fie 1 imaginea intuitivă a acestei duble dinamici nu trebuie să fie aceea a unei linii, al cărei „început" imaginar este întotdeauna diferit de „sfârșitul" ei, ci metafora cea mai elocventă care sugerează această dinamică este cea a centrului unui cerc: punctele cercului se depărtează de centru, deoarece ele există tocmai în această depărtare faţă de centru, însă ele tind în același timp spre centru, și numai această con-centrare a lor spre centru este cea care le ţine împreună și care face din ele figura concretă a cercului. este o metaforă pe care Plotin o folosește în repetate rânduri: de pildă, Enneade, i, 7, 1.24; iV, 2, 1.24; V, 1, 11.10; Vi, 5, 5.13. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 125 direcţionează sfera fiinţei spre scopul ei cel mai propriu, rămânând însă în afara ei, într-o constantă „posteritate", ca un ţel mereu ţintit, însă niciodată atins în mod efectiv. Principiul rămâne astfel „dincolo de fiinţă", în două sensuri ale acestui „dincolo": atât ca un „început" care niciodată nu a fost materializat, cât și ca un „sfârșit sau scop", care niciodată nu va fi concretizat, atins. Principiul unește astfel sensul originii cu sensul finalităţii întregii realităţi. Totuși, aceste două aspecte nu individualizează principiul însuși, nu fac din el o origine propriu-zisă și un scop propriu-zis. Altfel spus, principiul nu este „un unu absolut" și „un bine absolut", adică un unu și un bine determinat, ci el își exercită aceste două „funcţii" ale sale, fără însă a deveni el însuși „o fiinţă anume", ci rămânând în afara sferei fiinţei pe care o generează și care tinde spre el. Principiul va fi astfel „dincolo de fiinţă". Tocmai acest caracter nedeterminat al principiului este cel care explică identitatea unului și a binelui. Unul absolut este identic cu binele absolut deoarece principiul nu este „ceva anume", la care să se adauge apoi proprietatea binelui, sau cea a unităţii, ca și cum unul ar fi diferit de bine. Să dăm un exemplu intuitiv, pentru a înţelege acest lucru: dacă Socrate și Platon sunt doi indivizi, ei sunt în primul rând oameni, sau fiinţe, iar faptul că unul este Socrate iar celălalt este Platon vine să îi departajeze, să îi distingă, făcând din ei două entităţi diferite. În schimb, în cazul principiului nu mai funcţionează această logică a fiinţei: principiul nu este „ceva anume", caz în care „a fi unu" și „a fi bine" s-ar aplica acestui „ceva" ca două proprietăţi distincte. din contră, binele și unul indică această natură primă și simplă a principiului, fără să o determine. Prin „unu" și „bine" nu spunem ceva despre principiu, „nu predicăm ceva despre el, ci ni-l indicăm nou înșine, pe cât posibil"1. Astfel, am putea spune că, la limită, unul este identic cu binele tocmai pentru că unul și binele nu mai au sensuri determinate - și astfel, sensuri distincte - ci „unul" și „binele" nu sunt 1 Plotin, Enneade, ii, 9, 1.7–8. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM126 decât maniere de a indica principiul prim, această natură unică și identică, în care nu există nici o dualitate. Așadar, la drept vorbind, este impropriu a spune că „unul" este identic cu „binele", pentru că unul și binele nu înseamnă două lucruri anume, care să se identifice. nu putem spune că principiul ca unu este identic cu principiul ca bine, deoarece unul și binele nu se află propriu-zis în principiu, ci ele sunt doar două maniere prin care gândirea noastră duală încearcă să-și arate sieși principiul1. În articolul „Plotinos", H.-R. Schwyzer consideră că fragmentul din Enneade ii, 9, 1.5 arată că unul și binele sunt identice2. dar, de fapt, dacă analizăm textul respectiv, observăm că Plotin însuși nu spune că unul ca atare ar fi identic cu binele ca atare, ci doar că, atunci când spunem unu și atunci când spunem bine, vorbim de fapt despre o aceeași natură. În concluzie, unul și binele nu sunt identice ca două principii, sau ca două aspecte concrete ale principiului, ci ca două maniere în care gândirea noastră indică un unic principiu. Mai precis, identitatea unului cu binele este afirmată ca o precauţie, în sensul că, atunci când numim principiul unu și bine, aceste două indicaţii nu trebuie înţelese ca distincte, nici ca o dualitate care ar afecta principiul însuși. Astfel, identitatea unului și a binelui are sens doar din perspectiva fiinţei, care se reclamă de la o unitate primă și care tinde spre un bine propriu; în schimb, din perspectiva principiului, unul și binele nu mai funcţionează propriu-zis, nu mai sunt prezente ca atare, deci, nici nu mai are sens să ne întrebăm dacă ele sunt identice. la limită, principiul este transcendent fiinţei tocmai pentru că el însuși nu mai este propriu-zis nici „unu", nici „bine". 1 Astfel, întreaga gândire a lui Plotin stă sub această condiţie: discursul despre principiu nu descrie principiul, ci încearcă doar să indice înspre el și să apropie pe cât posibil sufletul de principiul prim. 2 H.-R. Schwyzer, „Plotinos", în Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, XXi.1, 1951, col. 552, 48–52: „doch mus man sich Plotinos Gleichung vor Augen halten: Ótan lšgwmen tÕ ›n, ka Ótan lšgwmen t¢gaqÒn, t3⁄4n aÙt3⁄4n de‹ nom...zein t3⁄4n fÚsin ka m...an lšgein ii 9, 1, 5, d. h. ›n und ¢gaqÒn sind identisch." Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 127 2. „Dincolo de fiinţă" din perspectiva triadei fiinţă-viaţă-intelect Am analizat transcendenţa principiului prim atât ca unu, cât și ca bine. În continuare, vom aborda cealaltă perspectivă a lui „dincolo de fiinţă", și anume pornind de la fiinţă: mai precis, vom analiza caracteristicile fiinţei, pornind de la care Plotin instituie necesitatea unui „dincolo de fiinţă". Sprijinindu-ne pe ocurenţele lui „dincolo" (TMpškeina) în opera lui Plotin, vom vedea că există trei sensuri ale transcendenţei, corespunzătoare structurii triadice a intelectului divin, care este în același timp fiinţă, viaţă și gândire. Astfel, dacă intelectul a fost descris ca o fiinţă cu o structură plurală complexă, unul este dincolo de această structură; dacă intelectul are o viaţă proprie, o activitate internă, unul este anterior oricărei activităţi; de asemenea, dacă intelectul este o gândire de sine unitară, unul este dincolo de gândirea cea mai unitară. la fiecare dintre aceste niveluri, principiul este transcendent fie ca unu, fie ca bine absolut. Totuși, în măsura în care cele două sensuri se suprapun, ca două nuanţe inseparabile ale principiului, principiul nu este niciodată unul prim, fără a fi și binele absolut, și invers. de aceea, în analiza care urmează ne vom referi la principiu ca fiind „unul-bine", reunind astfel cele două aspecte ale principiului pe care gândirea neoplatonică le suprapune. Dincolo de structura fiinţei. Un prim sens al transcendenţei unului - foarte strâns legat de ideea că unul generează fiinţa - constă în aceea că unul absolut este non-plural. dacă fiinţa este o unitate plurală, ceea ce o face posibilă este un unu anterior; dar atunci, acest unu nu poate fi la rândul său plural, ci el este doar unu, așadar este non-plural. Pluralitatea fiinţei are un statut aparte: ea nu poate fi infinită (deoarece nu poate exista un infinit în act, ci doar în potenţă1); dar, pentru a fi limitată, pluralitatea are nevoie de o unitate. dar 1 Vezi partea întâi, capitolul 3, A. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM128 această unitate nu poate veni de la ceva care ar fi la rândul lui plural, ci numai de la ceva care este doar unu. Acest unu va fi însă dincolo de fiinţă, adică dincolo de pluralitatea fiinţei; el va avea, în consecinţă, toate „caracteristicile"1 răsturnate ale fiinţei: el nu mai este plural, nu mai este limitat, nu mai este compus, nu mai este determinat în nici un fel. Dincolo de fiinţă va însemna așadar dincolo de structura plurală a fiinţei. Plotin pune în mod explicit expresia „dincolo de fiinţă" în legătură cu structura fiinţei2. el arată că „dincolo de fiinţă vine de la faptul că fiinţa nu poate să nu fie plurală"3. În schimb - așa cum se arată în alt context4 - „cel care nu are în sine multe [părţi]" (tÕ m3⁄4 poll¦ oecon TMn autù) este unul însuși, care nu mai participă la un alt unu. faţă de acest unu în sine, absolut, orice altceva este inferior (ce‹ron), deoarece orice altceva este plural și aspiră spre unu. Astfel, anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţă - ca anterioritate faţă de pluralitate - capătă la Plotin un sens absolut: unul este dincolo de fiinţă și nimic altceva nu poate fi dincolo de unu5. Anterioritatea unului faţă de pluralitate este anterioritatea principiului faţă de derivatele sale. 1 Punem „caracteristici" între ghilimele tocmai pentru că, de fapt, acest unu de dincolo de fiinţă nu va avea nici o caracteristică, el fiind dincolo de suma caracteristicilor posibile în sfera fiinţei. „caracteristica" lui fundamentală este aceea că el nu mai poate fi determinat și că nimic nu îl mai poate caracteriza, iar tot ceea ce a fost spus despre fiinţă devine inadecvat unului însuși. 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 2, 17.22–25. 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 2, 17.23. 4 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 15.15–18. 5 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 15.8–9: „căci ce poate fi dincolo de unu? (t... g¦r n toà nÕj [...] TMpškeina)". Acesta este un context foarte fructuos din punct de vedere al problematizării neoplatonice asupra primului principiu. Astfel, la Plotin, faptul că principiul prim este dincolo de fiinţă şi dincolo de toate are și sensul că nimic nu poate fi dincolo de unu, dincolo de principiu. În schimb, așa cum vom vedea în continuare, damascius va observa că, dacă unul este dincolo de fiinţă și dincolo de toate, atunci el păstrează o relaţie cu acest „totul", nefiind, în consecinţă, absolut transcendent. Tocmai de aceea, damascius va pune problema unui principiu dincolo de unu, depășind astfel interdicţia lui Plotin în acest sens. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 129 explicând transcendenţa faţă de fiinţă prin transcendenţa faţă de pluralitate, Plotin unește de fapt cele două referinţe platonice: din Republica și din Parmenide. A fi dincolo de fiinţă înseamnă a fi non-plural: în felul acesta, binele de dincolo de fiinţă din Republica1 este învestit cu caracteristica non-pluralităţii a unul din prima ipoteză a dialogului Parmenide2. de la acest prim sens al lui „dincolo de fiinţă" ca „non plural", se desprind alte câteva aspecte ale transcendenţei unului, luând în considerare diversele aspecte ce determină pluralitatea fiinţei. În ipoteza unului absolut, Platon însuși pornea de la faptul că unul este non-plural, iar apoi nega de la el celelalte maniere ale pluralităţii (părţi, întreg, figură, mișcare, etc.). la rândul lui, Plotin va nega de la principiul prim toate manierele plurale în care funcţionează fiinţa. Astfel, în același context invocat mai sus3, se arată că fiinţa conţine mai multe genuri prime, fiind, în felul acesta, un unu-plural (žn poll£)4. În schimb, principiul nu poate avea pluralitatea generică a fiinţei5, această împărţire a ei pe mai multe linii de forţă: mișcare, repaus, identitate, alteritate. În plus, dacă fiinţa este o pluralitate determinată, iar fiecare „element" al ei are un caracter propriu, o putere paradigmatică și o formă proprie, în schimb, unul care depășește pluralitatea depășește și această determinare intrinsecă fiinţei. Unul-bine va fi lipsit de formă (¢ne...deon). Plotin explică acest lucru făcând din nou apel la faptul că fiinţa a fost generată pornind de la unu: fiinţa (oÙs...a) care a fost generată de la unu conţine formele tuturor lucrurilor6, deoarece nimic nu poate lipsi din ceea ce a fost 1 Platon, Republica, 509 b 9 (TMpškeina tÁj oÙs...aj). 2 Platon, Parmenide, 137 c 4–5 (e„ ›n TMstin, ¥llo ti oÙk n e‡h poll¦ tÕ ›n). 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 2, 17.22–25. 4 după expresia din dialogul Parmenide, 144 e 5. 5 Vezi, de asemenea, Enneade, Vi, 2, 13, unde se arată că unul anterior fiinţei nu poate fi el însuși gen, ci este anterior genurilor, fiind cel care produce pluralitatea genurilor. 6 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 6.3–4. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM130 generat de la unu. dar, unul nu poate fi nimic din lucrurile - sau dintre formele - pe care le-a generat, ci el este dincolo de acestea (TMpškeina toÚtwn)1. dar atunci, un alt sens al transcendenţei unului faţă de fiinţă este acela că unul-bine nu este „ceva anume", el nu poate fi determinat drept „acesta" (tÕ tÒde), așa cum era fiecare dintre fiinţe, precum și fiinţa în ansamblul ei2. Atât ca pluralitate a genurilor, cât și ca pluralitate a formelor, fiinţa este în mod necesar ceva determinat: fiecare parte a fiinţei este ceva anume, adică o formă anume (edÒj ti). În schimb, unul nu mai este determinat în nici un fel. el nu poate fi înţeles ca un lucru anume (aej tÒde)3 și nu poate fi numărat alături de lucrurile pe care le-a generat4. Unul absolut nu este „un unu anume" (›n ti), așa cum este orice lucru determinat, ci el este „unu fără ceva anume" (¥neu toà «t» ›n), adică unul însuși (tÕ «aÙtÒ»)5. el nu este mai întâi „ceva", căruia i-ar reveni apoi caracterul unităţii6. de aceea, Plotin 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 16.35. desigur, această manieră non-formală a unului nu indică o inferioritate a lui faţă de formă. el nu are nevoie de formă (Enneade, Vi, 7, 32.10) ci, din contră, el este sursa formei și este superior formei: el este cel în care sunt fundamentate toate formele și intelectul însuși, ca sumă a formelor, sau ca „formă a formelor prime", după cum îl numea Aristotel (Despre suflet, 432 a 2). Plotin preia această expresie aristotelică tocmai pentru a arăta că unul este superior intelectului și formelor sale (vezi Enneade, Vi, 7, 17.35–36). 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 6.5–6: „căci fiinţa trebuie să fie ceva anume (tÒde ti)". 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 6.7. 4 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 6. 5 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 12.47–52. Recunoaștem în fundalul acestei probleme o referinţă la stoici, pentru care genul suprem al tuturor lucrurilor era „ceva" (t...), în acesta intrând și fiinţa, și nefiinţa. În schimb, Plotin, care critică pe larg această idee stoică, arată că principiul suprem nu mai intră în nici un gen, el nu mai este nimic anume, și tocmai de aceea toate lucrurile pot veni de la el. 6 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, V, 4, 1.5–10: „el nu este altceva, și apoi unu" (oÙc ›teron Ôn, eta ›n). Se observă aici, ca și în multe alte pasaje ale Enneadelor, că Plotin vorbește despre unu utilizând vocabularul fiinţei (unul este prin el însuși și este cu adevărat unu), chiar dacă vrea să transmită de fapt transcendenţa unului faţă de fiinţă. Acesta va fi un aspect pe care damascius îl va specula foarte mult, arătând că limbajul nostru, discursul nostru, este cel care ne îndepărtează de fapt de principiu, afirmând despre el lucruri care nu i se potrivesc. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 131 trage concluzia că este fals chiar și a spune că el este unu (tÕ žn enai). desigur, în felul acesta reintroducem în el fiinţa și dualitatea, spunând în mod implicit că unul este ceva, deși el nu are în nici un fel fiinţă, ci este dincolo de fiinţă. Așadar, unul nu poate fi determinat nici măcar ca unu1, dacă prin unu înţelegem ceva unitar, adică un unu anume. Unul absolut este liber de orice determinaţie, chiar și de cea mai înaltă, a unităţii. În consecinţă, el nu mai poate fi indicat drept „acesta" sau „acela", deoarece el nu mai este ceva anume. dar atunci, înseamnă că, chiar și dacă spunem că unul este „dincolo de fiinţă", acest „dincolo de fiinţă" nu mai indică nici el „ceva anume"2, ci din contră, indică pe cel care nu mai este „acesta" (tÕ oÙ toàto)3. Așadar, dincolo de fiinţă nu indică o zonă determinată a realităţii, precum un lucru concret, situat deasupra fiinţei, ci indică ceea ce nu mai poate fi determinat, ceea ce, într-un fel, nici nu mai poate fi indicat, deoarece nu mai este „ceva anume". În măsura în care fiinţa este ceva anume și este ceva determinat, dincolo de fiinţă este tocmai dincolo de această condiţie a fiinţei. dacă universul inteligibil este foarte bine determinat și structurat ca esenţă și ca număr, deasupra intelectului avem o indeterminare absolută, însă nu în sensul unei instabilităţi ontologice, ci în sensul depășirii oricărei determinaţii: unul nu mai are nevoie să fie „ceva anume". el este absolut liber, pentru că în cazul lui nu mai funcţionează nici o determinaţie și nici o necesitate. dacă unul absolut este dincolo de orice determinaţie, fiinţa este un fel de urmă a unului4, deoarece el îi dă unitatea, ca o 1 Plotin reia analiza platonică asupra unului din prima ipoteză (Parmenide, 141 e 10–11), care, nefiind plural, nu putea avea nici o determinaţie a fiinţei - inevitabil plurală - , astfel încât, în cele din urmă, el nu putea fi nici măcar unu, deoarece chiar și în acest caz ar fi fost ceva anume și ar fi participat la fiinţă. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 6.11–12 (TÕ g¦r TMpškeina Ôntoj oÙ tÒde lšgei). 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 6.13. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 17. de asemenea V, 5, 5: fiinţa ca urmă a unului, de la care derivă. la damascius, întreaga realitate va fi gândită ca o urmă a inefabilului. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM132 primă determinaţie a fiinţei. formele inteligibile nu pot fi forme decât pentru că sunt precizate, fixate în ceea ce sunt ele, iar această fixare o primesc prin prezenţa unului care le dă unitate, rămânând el însuși dincolo de orice determinaţie, chiar și de cea concretă a unităţii. Astfel, principiul indeterminat dă naștere determinaţiei esenţiale a fiinţei: determinaţia unităţii. cel care este unitar fără a fi „ceva anume" determină prin prezenţa lui fiinţa unitară, cea care nu mai este unu absolut, ci este un prim unu determinat, un prim „ceva anume" unitar. Unul absolut este astfel sursa indeterminată a tuturor fiinţelor pe care le determină și le generează. Unul este „puterea tuturor [lucrurilor]" (dÚnamij p£ntwn). Venind de la cea mai mare putere, activitatea lui prinde existenţă reală și devine astfel fiinţă. dar, în felul acesta, principiul însuși este dincolo de fiinţă și dincolo de toate (TMpškeina tîn p£ntwn), adică dincolo de toate lucrurile pe care el însuși le produce1. În concluzie, un prim nivel de sens al expresiei dincolo de fiinţă este acela al unei depășiri a structurii fiinţei: unul este dincolo de pluralitatea unitară a fiinţei (el este unu non-plural: m3⁄4 poll£); el este dincolo de pluralitatea genurilor fiinţei; de asemenea, el este dincolo de totalitatea fiinţei, adică de suma celor care intră în această pluralitate (TMpškeina toÚtwn); unul este dincolo de determinaţia specifică fiecărui lucru din această pluralitate, deoarece el nu mai este „ceva anume" (oÙ tÒde); în plus, pentru a închide cercul, unul este dincolo de această structură complexă a fiinţei ca întreg (TMpškeina tîn p£ntwn), el fiind puterea care dă naștere acestei totalităţi a fiinţei. Plotin nu scapă din vedere nici unul dintre aspectele fiinţei, ci pe toate le suprimă, atunci când încearcă să treacă la principiul de dincolo de fiinţă. 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 4, 2.38. Trebuie să remarcăm că, în acest context, Plotin urmează îndeaproape referinţa platonică din Republica 509 b 9, în care Platon însuși spunea că binele este „superior fiinţei, depășind-o în putere (dun£mei)". dar, dacă la Platon dincolo de fiinţă trimite spre ceva superior în putere faţă de fiinţă, la Plotin unul-bine de dincolo de fiinţă este el însuși puterea tuturor lucrurilor, puterea care instituie fiinţa. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 133 Tocmai de aceea, transcendenţa unului-bine faţă de fiinţă trebuie înţeleasă cu toate aceste aspecte ale ei, iar nu redusă la un aspect sau altul. Astfel, în cartea sa Plotinus. The Road to Reality1, J. M. Rist arată că unul de dincolo de fiinţă ar însemna unul de dincolo de fiinţa limitată, în sensul în care, în filozofia greacă fiinţa trebuie să fie limitată. Unul de dincolo de fiinţă ar însemna „fiinţa infinită". considerăm însă că o astfel de interpretare este parţială. de altfel, ea este contrazisă de un aspect al gândirii lui Plotin, și anume acela că intelectul divin este el însuși deja fiinţa infinită, în sensul în care din fiinţa lui nu poate lipsi nimic2. În intelectul divin, limitarea și infinitul concordă, exprimând împreună perfecţiunea fiinţei prime, care este și unitară, și astfel limitată, însă este și totală, și astfel nelimitată. dar atunci, unul de dincolo de fiinţă trebuie să fie dincolo chiar și faţă de fiinţa infinită a intelectului divin3. Mai precis, unul este dincolo de orice manieră pe care o îmbracă fiinţa: în măsura în care fiinţa are o limitare inerentă (neputând fi un infinit în act), unul absolut nu mai este limitat în nici un fel; pe de altă parte, în măsura în care fiinţa este nelimitată ca potenţă, conţinând întreaga realitate în mod paradigmatic, unul este dincolo de această totalitate, de această completitudine pe care nimic nu o limitează, sau din care nimic nu lipsește; în acest sens, el este „dincolo de toate" (TMpškeina tîn p£ntwn)4, nefiind nici ceva anume din cele ce compun această totalitate, nici totalitatea însăși. faptul că unul nu mai este limitat este doar unul dintre aspectele transcendenţei sale faţă de fiinţă. dar transcendenţa unului are două laturi: el depășește ambele 1 J.M. Rist, Plotinus. The Road to Reality, cambridge University Press, cambridge, 1967, capitolul 3: „The Plotinian one", pp. 21–37, mai ales pp. 24–30. 2 Vezi Enneade, Vi, 6, 18. 3 Sensul infinitului pe care Plotin l-a elaborat în tratatul Vi, 6, 18 este singurul care poate fi acceptat în lumea inteligibilă, singurul care nu contrazice unitatea acesteia. dar atunci, ce alt sens ar mai putea primi „fiinţa infinită" în contextul Enneadelor, ce alt sens superior chiar și „fiinţei infinite" a intelectului divin? 4 Plotin, Enneade, V, 4, 2.39–40. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM134 aspecte ale fiinţei inteligibile: atât acela de unitate, cât și acela de totalitate; altfel spus, unul este dincolo de limitarea inerentă fiinţei, dar și dincolo de această infinitate a fiinţei. În plus, unul nu poate fi în continuare tot o fiinţă. faptul că unul este absolut nedeterminat nu înseamnă că el ar fi o fiinţă lipsită de determinaţii (în fond, fiinţa însăși este deja o determinaţie), ci el este cel faţă de care poate fi gândită orice determinaţie în genere. Prin unu, Plotin nu vrea să indice un tip superior de fiinţă, ci vrea mai degrabă să arate că fiinţa supremă, inteligibilă, infinită în potenţa ei, este constituită în funcţie de un principiu superior, care nu mai are nevoie de structura - duală și auto-reflexivă - a fiinţei. Prin principiul unu, Plotin vrea să descrie unitatea absolută: aceasta nu mai poate fi nici măcar unu, adică nu mai poate avea determinaţia unităţii; în plus, aceasta nu mai poate avea nici măcar determinaţia totalităţii, a infinităţii intelectului divin. Așadar, unul nu trebuie înţeles din nou în logica fiinţei, ca o fiinţă infinită - care rămâne totuși fiinţă - ci ca ieșind din termenii fiinţei. Unul trebuie să fie dincolo de orice aspect al fiinţei, chiar dacă această depășire a fiinţei aduce și o dificultate suplimentară în a preciza ce anume înseamnă unul. Principiul este dincolo de toate determinaţiile fiinţei, chiar și faţă de cele reciproc opuse, precum limita și nelimitatul. Dincolo de activitatea fiinţei. Unul este dincolo de întreaga sferă a fiinţei, de întreaga sa pluralitate, deoarece el este puterea care a generat această pluralitate. dar de aici se naște o problemă: dacă unul a generat întreaga sferă a fiinţei, atunci el însuși are o activitate proprie. Totuși - după expresia lui Aristotel pe care Plotin o acceptă -, orice activitate se îndreaptă spre binele propriu celui care realizează acea activitate1. dar atunci, dacă principiul prim are și el o activitate proprie, oare aceasta nu se îndreaptă la rândul ei spre altceva, spre un „bine" care ar situa principiul într-o poziţie de inferioritate? 1 Aristotel, Etica nicomahică, 1094 a 1–2. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 135 Răspunsul lui Plotin pornește tocmai de la afirmaţia aristotelică (anume că orice activitate tinde spre un bine propriu), însă depășește cadrul aristotelic al problemei1. el acceptă că fiecare lucru tinde spre bine; mai mult, el strânge relaţia dintre activitatea unui lucru și binele lui, spunând că binele unui lucru constă tocmai în activitatea celei mai bune părţi a lucrului respectiv2: de pildă, în cazul omului, partea sa cea mai bună este sufletul, așadar binele lui constă în activitatea sufletului. dar din această suprapunere, Plotin trage o concluzie care depășește fundalul propriu-zis al problemei. el spune că, dacă partea cea mai bună a unui lucru (în exemplul său este vorba despre suflet) își îndreaptă activitatea înspre ceea ce este cel mai bun, atunci acest cel mai bun nu mai este un bine relativ (adică doar al sufletului), ci este binele însuși, absolut3. Altfel spus, în fiecare lucru există o parte care este „cea mai bună", așadar fiecare lucru posedă un bine relativ, un bine al lui; dar, dacă această parte (care este cea mai bună în raport cu lucrul respectiv) tinde spre un alt bine, atunci acest alt bine este anterior binelui relativ, așadar el este un bine absolut. dar acest bine nu mai poate căuta un bine și mai înalt, de vreme ce el însuși nu mai este parţial. În concluzie, fiecărei fiinţe îi corespunde un bine propriu, parţial, însă, în plus, fiinţa ca întreg tinde spre acest bine absolut, care nu mai tinde la rândul lui spre un alt bine anterior. În acest sens, binele absolut este dincolo de fiinţă 4. 1 Plotin, Enneade, i, 7, 1. 2 Vezi Enneade, i, 7, 1.1–5. Plotin pare astfel să accepte atât ideea aristotelică despre tendinţa tuturor lucrurilor spre bine, cât și ideea stoică despre binele care constă în activitatea proprie fiecărei fiinţe. Totuși, unind aceste două idei, Plotin va trage concluzia existenţei unui bine suprem, spre care tind toate fiinţele, și care nu se mai manifestă ca activitate, ci este punctul final spre care se îndreaptă activitatea tuturor fiinţelor. 3 Așadar, binele propriu sufletului ar consta în activitatea părţii lui celei mai bune (anume activitatea de a gândi). Însă, dacă însuși acest bine propriu sufletului se îndreaptă la rândul lui spre un alt bine, atunci acel bine nu mai poate fi doar un bine propriu sufletului, ci este binele absolut, este binele pur și simplu (¡plîj toàto ¢gaqÒn). 4 Plotin, Enneade, i, 7, 1.7–10. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM136 Toate lucrurile tind spre acest bine absolut, însă el însuși nu mai tinde spre nimic altceva. În plus, el nu este bine printr-o activitate sau printr-o gândire a sa. căci activitatea - ca și gândirea - este o căutare a unui bine superior, pe când binele absolut nu mai caută nimic anterior lui. Binele suprem nu este bine așa cum poate fi o fiinţă bună (adică prin activitatea sa cea mai bună), ci el este binele în sine, adică prin simplul fapt de a rămâne sau de a sta în sine însuși1. Așadar, el este „dincolo de fiinţă", fiind dincolo de activitatea fiinţei2. dar ce înseamnă că acest principiu nu mai tinde spre altceva și nu mai are nevoie de altceva? Putem înţelege acest lucru în trei sensuri. Astfel, dacă toată fiinţa aspiră spre un principiu anterior și mai unitar decât ea, având nevoie de el, în schimb, acest principiu nu mai are nevoie de nimic: el nu are nevoie nici de fiinţa pe care a generat-o, nici de ceva superior lui și, la limită, nici de sine însuși3. În fiecare din aceste trei cazuri, principiul se va arăta a fi „dincolo de fiinţă". În primul rând, unul-bine nu are nevoie de ceva superior lui, căci nu mai poate exista nimic superior lui: altfel, el însuși nu ar mai fi binele, ci ar fi doar o altă fiinţă care aspiră spre un bine superior. observăm că sensul ascendent al realităţii - înspre un bine suprem - este aici întrerupt. dacă toată realitatea își 1 Enneade, i, 7, 1.18 (aÙtÍ monÍ). descoperim aici termenul mon», care indică stabilitatea principiului în el însuși, caracteristică pe care o oferă și fiinţei (vezi partea întâi, capitolul 3, c). de asemenea, în Enneade, V, 3, 12, 35–39, Plotin arată că „pentru ca altceva să existe după unu, acesta nu trebuie decât să stea în liniște în sine însuși (1suc...an ¥gein TMf' autoà); altfel, ar însemna că el se mișcă înaintea mișcării și gândește înaintea gândirii", ceea ce este absurd. 2 Enneade, i, 7, 1.19–20. Plotin leagă în acest context cele trei sensuri fundamentale ale transcendenţei principiului prim: el este dincolo de fiinţă, dincolo de activitate și dincolo de intelect şi de gândire. dacă fiinţa are o structură triadică (fiinţă, viaţă [adică activitate proprie] și intelect), principiul este dincolo de fiecare dintre aceste ramuri ale fiinţei. 3 Plotin (Enneade, Vi, 7, 24.15–16) arată că unul-bine este bine nu pentru el însuși, ci pentru celelalte; în schimb, el însuși nu mai tinde spre bine, ci este binele însuși, așadar nu are nevoie de sine însuși. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 137 îndreaptă activitatea spre acest principiu și bine prim, în schimb, binele însuși nu mai caută ceva dincolo de el. Tocmai în acest sens, unul-bine va fi „dincolo de fiinţă". În al doilea rând, el nu are nevoie de fiinţă. el generează fiinţa nu ca pe un lucru superior lui, de care ar avea nevoie, ci o creează ca pe ceva inferior și pe care, odată generată, o lasă în afara sa. or tocmai acest lucru indică expresia „dincolo de fiinţă". Astfel, în Enneade, Vi, 8, 19.13, Plotin reia această expresie platonică - pe care o pune de data aceasta pe seama „celor din vechime" (to‹j palaio‹j) - încercând să elibereze total unul de relaţia lui cu fiinţa. „dincolo de fiinţă" ar avea un sens ascuns, anume: nu numai că unul a generat fiinţa, ci, în plus, el este liber faţă de această fiinţă pe care a generat-o. el nu este supus fiinţei, ci toate lucrurile îi sunt supuse lui1, el fiind astfel „dincolo de fiinţă". În al treilea rând, binele absolut este liber și în sine însuși, căci el își dă sie însuși realitate (Øpost»saj aÙtÒn)2 dar, pentru aceasta, el nu are nevoie să facă ceva anume; activitatea prin care el își dă sieși realitate nu mai este o activitate propriu-zisă, ci este una care stă în sine, sau stă pe loc (TMnšrgeia mšnousa)3. Așadar, deși vorbim despre el ca și cum ar fi și ca și cum ar avea o activitate, de fapt, „ceea ce pare a fi fiinţa lui" (tÕ oOEon enai) constă în faptul că el însuși „pare să se producă pe sine" (oOEon poio‹ aÙtÒn), prin „ceea ce pare a fi activitate lui" (oOEon TMnšrgeia)4. Plotin folosește intenţionat acest limbaj al „aparenţei", sau al lui „ca și cum ar fi", pentru a arăta că, deși vorbim 1 Vezi și Enneade, Vi, 8, 16.10 „toate sunt supuse lui". 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 16.15. 3 Vezi și Enneade, i, 7, 1.15, în care se spune că principiul nu își mai îndreaptă activitatea sa spre altceva, ci „stă în liniște ca o sursă și principiu" (TMn 1sÚcJ oâsan phg3⁄4n ka ¢rc»n). Acest tip de activitate, care nu iese din sine înspre altceva, anunţă într-un fel perspectiva lui Porfir, care va gândi principiul ca pe un act pur de a fi, care nu se mai împarte în agent și obiect, care nu se mai îndreaptă spre ceva diferit de sine. Vom discuta această perspectivă în primul capitol al părții secunde din această carte. 4 Vezi Enneade, Vi, 8, 16.20–27. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM138 despre el în acești termeni specifici fiinţei (spunând că principiul este, produce și acţionează), de fapt, el este dincolo de toate acestea. el pare să fie, sau este ca şi cum ar fi, ca şi cum s-ar produce pe sine și ca şi cum ar avea o activitate specifică, însă, de fapt, el nu mai are nevoie de această condiţionare internă specifică fiinţei (care are o activitate propriu-zisă, prin care se manifestă ca fiinţă). dacă fiinţa presupune o manifestare duală (intelect - inteligibil) sau triadică (fiinţă - viaţă - intelect), iar în cele din urmă ea are forma unei pluralităţi totale (ca număr total), în schimb, activitatea unului nu mai este o activitate reflectată asupra sa (în care cel ce acţionează devine plural), ci o activitate pură, care stă pe loc. el este „ca și cum ar privi spre sine"1, însă această privire spre sine nu mai este realizată în dualitate, și tocmai de aceea Plotin îi dă acest caracter ipotetic: „ca și cum", pentru a sugera că asemănarea cu fiinţa nu se mai realizează propriu-zis. el pare să acţioneze, însă este de fapt anterior oricărui act, oricărei activităţi. Astfel, dacă fiinţa este în mod fundamental o activitate îndreptată spre bine, principiul este dincolo de activitatea fiinţei. Dincolo de gândirea fiinţei. Unul-bine este astfel dincolo de fiinţă, în acest sens în care el nu mai acţionează propriu-zis, ci produce toate lucrurile fiind anterior activităţii de producere și oricărei activităţi în genere. dar atunci, el este dincolo chiar și de cea mai înaltă dintre activităţi, anume cea specifică fiinţei: activitatea de a gândi. Așa cum am văzut, fiinţa deplină nu poate fi lipsită de viaţa și de activitatea de a gândi; fiinţa veritabilă este un intelect care tinde spre unitate și atinge cea mai mare unitate posibilă pentru o fiinţă. Totuși, acest intelect nu poate atinge unitatea absolută: deși încearcă mereu să o cuprindă, el recade în dualitate, neputând cuprinde unul absolut. În schimb, unul anterior este dincolo de intelect şi dincolo de gândirea 2 specifică 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 16.19–20 (oOEon prÕj aÙtÕn blšpei). 2 În grecește, gândire (nÒhsij) are același radical cu verbul a gândi, a înţelege (noein), și cu substantivul intelect (noàj). În românește este greu să păstrăm ~ Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 139 intelectului, adică dincolo de gândirea cea mai unitară. Acesta este al treilea sens major al transcendenţei unului-bine. Plotin pune de multe ori în egalitate faptul de a fi dincolo de fiinţă și faptul de a fi dincolo de intelect şi de gândire1. Astfel, în Enneade, V, 1, 8.8, Plotin arată că unul este tatăl intelectului, tatăl cauzei2, sau binele de dincolo de intelect şi de fiinţă. dar, dacă expresia dincolo de fiinţă se regăsește la Platon ca atare, în schimb, expresia dincolo de intelect nu există în textele platonice; totuși, Plotin o prezintă ca fiind o formulare platonică. de fapt, el suprapune sensul câtorva topos-uri platonice. În primul rând, este vorba de binele de dincolo de fiinţă (din Republica, 509 b 9) și de fiinţa care nu poate fi lipsită de intelect (din Sofistul, 248 e 6–249 a 2)3. din aceste idei platonice, Plotin deduce faptul că unul-bine este dincolo nu numai faţă de fiinţă, ci și dincolo de intelect. Pentru a înţelege mai bine fundalul acestei suprapuneri, am putea să amintim faptul că, în pasajul din Republica 509 b, binele este cel care dă obiectelor cunoașterii fiinţa, dar și acest fapt însuși de a fi cunoscute (tÕ gignèskesqai). dar atunci - deși Platon nu spune acest lucru explicit - se subînţelege că binele însuși este superior cunoașterii și faptului de a fi cunoscut. În al doilea rând, în concluzia primei aporii asupra unului (Parmenide, 142 a 5), Platon arată că unul nu are fiinţă și, în consecinţă, el nu poate fi cunoscut (oÙd gignèsketai). Pornind de aici, Plotin - urmat de întreaga tradiţie neoplatonică - poate identifica binele de dincolo de fiinţă și de cunoaștere, cu unul care nu este (și nici nu poate fi) cunoscut. Unul-bine va fi astfel dincolo de fiinţă, dar și dincolo de intelect, adică dincolo de gândirea cea mai înaltă și de cunoașterea cea mai unitară care caracterizează această unitate între termeni, redând nÒhsij prin înţelegere. Totuși, trebuie să avem în vedere această înrudire semantică. 1 Vezi, de pildă, Plotin, Enneade, i, 7, 1.19–20, precum și V, 3, 1.21–28. 2 Vezi Platon, Scrisori, 323 d 4. 3 Vezi de asemenea Platon, Timaios, 30 b 2–c 1, în care se spune că universul sensibil este un vieţuitor dotat cu gândire și este făcut după un model inteligibil, care la rândul lui trebuie să fie un vieţuitor perfect, adică dotat el însuși cu gândire. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM140 intelectul divin sau fiinţa veritabilă. Unul-bine este dincolo de gândirea primă, a fiinţei prime, care se cunoaște pe sine și cunoaște tot ceea ce este inteligibil1. intelectul și gândirea specifică lui sunt plurale, pe când principiul anterior nu mai este plural. este adevărat că Plotin a acordat foarte multă atenţie descrierii intelectului ca unitate a fiinţei și gândirii. Totuși, deși este o gândire în unitate, gândirea însăși rămâne duală, pe când principiul tuturor lucrurilor nu poate fi dual, ci dincolo de această dualitate a gândirii. Astfel, în Enneade, V, 6, 6.29, expresia dincolo de intelect este explicată pornind tocmai de la teza platonică (din Sofistul, 248 e 6–249 a 2) a necesităţii ca fiinţa să aibă intelect. Plotin observă însă că această dublă condiţionare între fiinţă și intelect (în sensul în care fiinţa este intelect, iar intelectul este fiinţă) indică, de fapt, pluralitatea intelectului. „A gândi este împreună cu a fi"2, așadar „a gândi nu este unu, ci plural". Mai mult decât atât, gândirea dedublează ea însăși lucrurile: avem pe de o parte omul și pe de altă parte gândirea omului; avem dreptatea și gândirea dreptăţii. Gândirea desface astfel orice unitate în două, pentru ca apoi să reunească din nou cele două părţi într-un întreg. În gândire, unul devine doi, iar doi devin unu3. Gândirea este tocmai această dublă 1 o altă referinţă platonică - pornind de la care Plotin construiește ideea unui „dincolo de gândire" - este aceea din Philebos, 64 c, în care Platon spune că viaţa cea mai bună - anume cea a intelectului - se află „în vestibulul binelui". Plotin preia această expresie, însă o aplică intelectului divin, care este în același timp fiinţa primă și viaţa cea mai înaltă, asociată acesteia. el arată că acest intelect nu este în sine primul, ci el stă „ca într-un vestibul al binelui", pe care îl exprimă, fiind ca o amprentă a binelui în pluralitate. Plotin însă arată că, în căutarea principiului prim, nu trebuie să ne oprim la acest „vestibul", ci trebuie să trecem la binele însuși, care este astfel „dincolo de intelect". 2 observăm că Plotin recurge în acest context la teza parmenidiană a identităţii fiinţei cu gândirea (tÕ g¦r aÙtÕ noe‹n TMst...n te ka enai) (teză a cărei sursă textuală se află chiar în Enneade, V, 1, 8.17), însă el accentuează mai degrabă aspectul plural al acestei identităţi: fiinţa este însoţită de gândire și invers, gândirea este însoţită de fiinţă, așadar gândirea este, de fapt, plurală. 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 6.27 (tÕ žn dÚo, ka aâ t¦ dÚo e„j žn oercetai). Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 141 mișcare, de dedublare și apoi de reunire, care nu poate funcţiona în lipsa dualităţii1. intelectul, precum și gândirea cea mai unitară care îi este specifică, rămân în cele din urmă duale. În schimb, cel care este dincolo de fiinţă trebuie să fie și dincolo de gândire (toà noe‹n TMpškeina)2: el nu se va gândi pe sine, și nici nu va putea fi gândit de către altceva. Pe de o parte, el nu se gândește pe sine, deoarece nu are nimic în sine pe care să îl gândească. În plus, el nu poate fi gândit sau cunoscut nici măcar de către altceva; desigur, așa cum am văzut, gândirea dedublează orice lucru, făcându-l să fie doi în loc de unu; în schimb, unul nu poate fi doi, așadar nu poate fi dedublat. În consecinţă, el nu mai poate fi gândit ca atare, ci este dincolo de intelect, dincolo de gândirea cea mai înaltă3. Gândirea intelectului este unitară, iar cel ce gândește nu este diferit de obiectul său ca două lucruri distincte, ci doar prin raţiunea lor distinctă (À lÒgJ)4, în sensul în care orice gândire are nevoie de un obiect al gândirii, și orice obiect al gândirii are nevoie de o gândire corespunzătoare, chiar și atunci când acestea ajung să coincidă, ca în cazul intelectului. dar atunci, o altă gândire mai unitară nu poate exista. de aceea, Plotin arată că, „dacă trecem deasupra acestei gândiri, nu ajungem la altă gândire și la altă fiinţă, ci ajungem dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire (TMpškeina oÙs...aj ka no»sewj), la ceva minunat5, care nu are în sine nici fiinţă, nici 1 dar nu numai că gândirea funcţionează în dualitate ci, în plus, faptul de a gândi sau de a cunoaște este el însuși „un lucru anume" (›n ti), iar prezenţa lui face ca însuși acela care cunoaște să fie dublu și determinat în sine. În schimb, unul absolut nu mai este „un lucru anume", ci el este unu fără „ceva anume" (¥neu toà «t» ›n); unul este absolut (tÕ «aÙtÒ»). Vezi Enneade, V, 3, 12.49–52. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 6.30. 3 Vezi, de asemenea, Enneade, V, 3, 11.28; V, 6, 2.2. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 40.17. 5 Acest „ceva minunat" (ti qaumastÒn) este obiectul celei mai înalte viziuni platonice (Banchetul, 210 e). el este minunat sau surprinzător, deoarece indică o ruptură de nivel faţă de toate celelalte obiecte ale contemplaţiei, care sunt doar frumoase. Viziunea lui apare „deodată" (TMxa...fnhj), așadar în mod PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM142 gândire, ci este singur cu el însuși"1. el nu mai are nici măcar o gândire asupra lui însuși, așa cum avea intelectul. Totuși, absenţa gândirii nu trebuie înţeleasă ca o lipsă a unului, ca și cum principiul prim nu ar fi în stare să gândească, ci ar fi inconștient de propriul său rang în ierarhia realităţii. Trebuie să remarcăm că, în fiecare dintre cele trei niveluri pe care le-am analizat, transcendenţa principiului nu aduce cu sine o „lipsă" ci, din contră, un prea-plin al principiului. Astfel, dacă unul nu este plural, nu înseamnă că el este mai puţin sau mai mic decât fiinţa plurală; din contră, el este puterea care instituia întreaga fiinţă. de asemenea, dacă principiul nu are o activitate, precum fiinţa, nu înseamnă că el este lipsit de activitate - într-un fel de inerţie, precum cea a materiei -, ci înseamnă că el instituie fiinţa fără să facă ceva în acest sens, așadar prezenţa lui este, de fapt, superioară activităţii. În același sens trebuie să înţelegem în contextul de faţă faptul că principiul nu gândește. Unul nu poate avea despre sine o cunoaștere intermediată de gândire, căci gândirea ar însemna deja o pluralitate obiect-subiect și o pluralitate a obiectului gândit. de aceea, în loc de gândire, Plotin vorbește în cazul unului despre „un fel de contact indicibil și fără gândire"2. dacă unul este indicibil, nu înseamnă că el însuși nu se cunoaște pe sine, ci, din contră, el se cunoaște pe sine în mod indicibil, adică fără ca această cunoaștere să producă o „expresie" anume a celui cunoscut, expresie diferită de acesta din urmă. Astfel, lipsa gândirii este de fapt superioară gândirii înseși. de aceea, Plotin rafinează această afirmaţie, spunând, în alte context ale Enneadelor, că totuși, unul ar avea un fel de cunoaștere neașteptat, ieșind din parcursul obișnuit al cunoașterii care descoperă lucrurile unul după altul. Același lucru este sugerat și de Plotin, aici sau în alte contexte: binele de deasupra fiinţei nu mai este el însuși o altă fiinţă și o altă gândire, ci ceva de altă natură, „ceva surprinzător", pe care îl putem indica doar printr-o altă expresie platonică, și anume aceea de „dincolo de fiinţă". Plotin leagă în felul acesta cele două referinţe platonice, din Banchetul și din Republica. 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 40.24–28. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 10.42. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 143 de sine, însă una nemijlocită, care nu mai este duală și nu mai are structura subiect-obiect, cunoscător-cunoscut1. Gândirea unului ar fi astfel o gândire pură, act pur de a gândi, în care nimic altceva nu se mai instituie ca un obiect distinct, așa cum se întâmpla în cazul intelectului2. Astfel, unul „gândește altfel" decât intelectul: el are o gândire intensă (katanÒhsij)3, sau are o gândire superioară (ØpernÒhsij)4. Unul este „transparent lui însuși" (diakritikÕn autoà)5. cunoașterea de la nivelul unului nu se mai realizează pe modelul vederii (precum în cazul intelectului care are o viziune a unului), ci pe modelul atingerii: unul are un contact (TMpibol») cu sine însuși, ca formă de cunoaștere. Totuși, această conștiinţă de sine a unului nu mai poate fi descrisă în termenii gândirii noastre. Plotin vrea numai să arate că aceasta nu mai are structura duală a gândirii, fie că ne referim la gândirea discursivă, fie la cea intelectivă. În schimb, gândirea însăși nu poate exista fără acest „dincolo de gândire". Astfel, gândirea cea mai înaltă, deși rămâne duală, caută o unitate anterioară dualităţii. ea tinde spre unul absolut, deși nu îl poate cuprinde. Gândirea propriu-zisă, a intelectului divin, se naște tocmai din această încercare - niciodată realizată - de a gândi principiul prim; neputând cuprinde acest principiu (care rămâne unu absolut, așadar sustras gândirii și dualităţii), intelectul ajunge să se gândească pe sine ca provenind de la acest prim principiu, ca fiind un reflex al acestuia. Astfel, Plotin descrie un proces foarte complicat de generare a fiinţei și a gândirii, pornind de la cel care nu este nici fiinţă, nici gândire. ceea ce este surprinzător este că gândirea intelectului se generează în primă instanţă ca o neputinţă de a gândi pe cel de dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire. În primă instanţă (desigur, nu în ordine temporală), principiul este în potenţă toate lucrurile 1 Vezi, de pildă, Enneade, V, 4, 2 sau Vi, 8, 16. 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 6.52–55; Vi, 7, 37. 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 4, 2.17; Vi, 8.16 și 33. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 16.32. 5 Plotin, Enneade, V, 4, 2.16. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM144 (Enneade, V, 4, 2.38). ca atare, el nu este nimic anume, nu este determinat în nici un fel, ci este unu absolut simplu. În consecinţă, el nu poate fi cuprins, nu poate fi gândit în această simplitate a lui. Prima activitate care se desprinde de la el este aceea a intelectului care încearcă (dar nu poate) să cuprindă și să gândească unul, tocmai pentru că intelectul (fiind secund) cade într-un soi de dualitate, fie aceasta și minimă. Totuși, acest intelect desprins de unu, acest prim act al primei gândiri propriu-zise, unitare, are capacitatea de a se conștientiza pe sine, de a se gândi pe sine. iar actul acesta de auto-gândire este un act total, complet, tocmai pentru că el provine de la puterea absolută a unului anterior. de aceea, intelectul se constituie ca o lume inteligibilă completă, din care nimic nu lipsește. Această lume inteligibilă va fi tocmai fiinţa primă, veritabilă, care se gândește pe sine ca un reflex al neputinţei iniţiale de a gândi unul absolut. În felul acesta, fără a face nimic anume - ci doar prin simplul fapt de a fi așa cum este el, inaccesibil gândirii -, unul absolut dă naștere fiinţei inteligibile veritabile (paradigmă a întregii realităţi cunoscute) și gândirii celei mai înalte. dar atunci, unul însuși nu poate să gândească înaintea gândirii, adică înainte să existe gândirea pe care el însuși o generează. Așadar, el însuși este anterior gândirii, fiind astfel dincolo de fiinţă şi de gândire. 3. Unul ca transcendenţă absolută Tripla anterioritate a unului faţă de fiinţă. cele trei niveluri ale transcendenţei principiului pe care le-am pus în evidenţă trebuie înţelese în complementaritatea lor. Așa cum fiinţa se desfășoară pe trei niveluri distincte, însă complementare, tot astfel unul este anterior fiinţei în fiecare dintre aceste trei accepţiuni și nuanţe ale ei. faptul că unul este dincolo de fiinţă pune de fapt în evidenţă un tip special de relaţie între unu și fiinţă, și anume o relaţie nesimetrică, nereciprocă. Astfel, unul-bine de dincolo de fiinţă este cel spre care tind toate fiinţele, cel pe care îl doresc toate fiinţele, dar el însuși nu mai dorește ceva anterior lui și nici nu Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 145 are nevoie de ceva din cele care îl doresc. Unul-bine este cel spre care se îndreaptă activitatea fiinţei, adică gândirea ei, însă el însuși nu mai intră în cadrele gândirii: el nu poate fi gândit ca atare și nici el nu gândește altceva, nici măcar pe sine însuși. Unul-bine dă intelectului (așadar fiinţei veritabile) tot ceea ce este acesta, însă el însuși nu este ceea ce dă, sau dă ceea ce nu are și ceea ce el însuși nu este, fiind superior faţă de ceea ce dă1. fiinţa este o pluralitate unitară și completă, care aspiră spre binele ei, spre unu, iar această aspiraţie este un act de dorire și de cunoaștere a principiului anterior, chiar dacă unul însuși nu e prins în această gândire, ci fiinţa primă ajunge astfel să se gândească pe sine. În schimb, principiul unu-bine, de dincolo de fiinţă, are tocmai caracterele opuse: el nu este o pluralitate (de genuri sau de forme), nu este unitar, adică nu este un unu anume, determinat. el este puterea generatoare a tuturor, dar nu are nevoie de ceea ce a generat. Unul nu aspiră spre nimic, nici măcar în maniera gândirii, care este actul cel mai bun. Anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţă are, în concluzie, trei niveluri se sens, strâns legate între ele: 1. unul-bine este doar unu, iar nu plural și determinat, 2. el este binele absolut, dorit de întreaga fiinţă, dar care nu mai tinde, la rândul lui, spre nimic altceva, 3. unul-bine este ţinta gândirii, dar el însuși nu mai are nevoie de gândire. după analiza sensurilor lui TMpškeina oÙs...aj, putem trage următoarea concluzie: pe de o parte, unul este dincolo de fiinţă în sensul în care el nu mai este de natura fiinţei (el nu este plural, nu mai tinde spre altceva și nu se mai gândește pe sine); pe de altă parte, unul este dincolo de fiinţă în sensul în care unul este cel care generează fiinţă, și de aceea nu poate fi ceva dintre cele pe care le generează, nici nu poate avea caracteristicile a ceea ce el însuși generează; de asemenea, unul este dincolo de fiinţă în sensul că fiinţa tinde spre unul-bine, pe când unul-bine nu tinde 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 17.8–9. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM146 spre nimic altceva. Avem așadar trei aspecte ale acestei transcendenţe: 1). o diferenţă de natură între principiu și fiinţă; 2). o precedenţă a principiului care a generat fiinţă; și 3). o direcţionare a fiinţei înspre principiul său, pe care tinde să îl gândească și pe care îl dorește ca pe propriul ei bine. În concluzie, dincolo de fiinţă indică o diferenţă de nivel între cel ontologic (în care lumea inteligibilă funcţionează într-o structură complexă, care se auto-determină, care se desfășoară într-o pluralitate proprie, care instituie o lume totală, care are o viaţă și o gândire auto-reflexivă, care este unitate a propriei pluralităţi și pluralitate a propriei unităţi), respectiv nivelul anterior, al principiului care nu se mai manifestă într-o pluralitate, care generează fără a intra într-o relaţie oarecare cu cel generat și a cărui prezenţă nu se mai reflectă în sine însuși (el nu se mai gândește pe sine). În continuarea analizei noastre, vom vedea că, în neoplatonismul de după Plotin, problema principiului prim a fost determinată - sau adâncită - tocmai de întâlnirea acestor două aspecte: cauzalitatea principiului, respectiv transcendenţa sa faţă de realitatea pe care a generat-o. Singurătatea unului absolut. Tocmai acest unu-bine răspunde acelei nevoi iniţiale a lui Plotin de a descoperi unitatea absolută, care instituie fiinţa. el răspunde acelei căutări care nu se putea opri nici la nivelul lucrurilor sensibile (deoarece unitatea acestora nu era una absolută, ci ea putea fi pierdută, odată cu sensul însuși al lucrului respectiv), nici la nivelul unităţii din lumea inteligibilă (deoarece aceasta nu era total desprinsă de pluralitate, ci era mereu direcţionată spre o unitate superioară). Astfel, dacă intelectul este simplu, totuși, el nu era „absolut simplu" (tÕ p£nth ¡ploàn)1 și „cel mai simplu" (¡ploÚstaton)2. Altfel spus, dacă intelectul era într-un fel unu, el era unu-plural 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 11.27 „cel care este absolut simplu și primul dintre toate trebuie să fie dincolo de intelect". 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 13.34. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 147 și era împreună cu pluralele; în schimb, unul absolut este unu în mod simplu, și el este singur (mÒnon): el nu este împreună cu altceva, ci este lipsit de orice pluralitate. Astfel, după ce Plotin s-a oprit la fiecare nivel al realităţii și a observat că fiecare lucru are o unitate inerentă, fără de care nu poate exista, odată ajuns în vârful fiinţei, el vede că aceasta rămâne duală, și de aceea are nevoie de o unitate care să nu mai însoţească fiinţa - dând astfel naștere unei dualităţi și, în consecinţă, unei pluralităţi întregi, fie aceasta și inteligibilă -, de o unitate singură (mÒnon), de un unu care nu mai este în altceva și nu mai este „ceva". Altfel, dacă ar fi „unu" și „ceva anume", acest unu ar reinstitui dualitatea. orice unitate este „ceva" și este „unu"; dar, în felul acesta, orice unitate este de fapt doi: unul și lucrul însuși. ne amintim că Platon observase deja acest lucru1: dacă spunem că fiinţa sau totul (tÕ Ólon) este unu, atunci acel totul deja nu mai este unu, deoarece unul este un al doilea element faţă de totul, instituind o dualitate. Plotin încearcă să rezolve tocmai această problemă: cum este posibilă unitatea absolută, unitatea în sine, care să nu mai fie „ceva" unitar - și astfel, o unitate duală -, ci să fie doar unu. iar răspunsul la această problemă este găsit de Plotin tot în textele platonice, și anume în această depășire a fiinţei și în indicarea acelui unu care nu mai este un unu determinat, care nu mai este o fiinţă determinată, ci suprimă în mod sistematic orice manieră determinată în care ni se arată fiinţa, rămânând în cele din urmă singur (mÒnon), fără nimic altceva. depășirea fiinţei înseamnă tocmai această eliberare de orice determinaţie care ar aduce în unu orice „altceva". Pentru a fi cu adevărat unu - fără nici o dualitate, fără nici o alteritate în sine însuși sau în afara sa - unul trebuie să fie dincolo de logica duală a fiinţei, în care funcţionează alteritatea, așadar el trebuie să fie singur. dar ce înseamnă singur? În alt context2, Plotin spunea că „unul", alăturat altor lucruri, nu înseamnă că acel lucru este singur, fără altceva. din contră, atunci când spunem că „ceva" este „unu", acest „unu" este el 1 Platon, Sofistul, 245 b. 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 13.9–10. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM148 însuși „ceva anume", așadar alăturarea unului face ca lucrul însuși care este unu să nu mai fie singur. În schimb, atunci când ajunge la unul absolut, Plotin arată că acest unu este el însuși singur (mÒnon), tocmai pentru că, dacă ar fi împreună cu altceva, el nu ar mai fi unu în mod absolut. Așadar, când „ceva este unu", el nu poate fi singur, ci este împreună cu acest unu determinat care i se alătură. În schimb, singurul care poate fi cu adevărat unu și „singur" (mÒnon) este unul absolut, care nu mai are nimic altceva în el însuși. dar, pentru a fi așa, pentru a fi cu adevărat singur, unul absolut nu mai este „ceva anume", ci este dincolo de fiinţă. „Singurătatea" principiului absolut unește astfel toate sensurile depășirii fiinţei: principiul nu are o pluralitate în sine însuși, nici nu intră în relaţie cu ceva plural, diferit de sine, și nimic altceva nu poate să aibă nici un raport faţă de el: de pildă, nimic altceva nu poate să îl gândească. Astfel, el este „singur și izolat" (mÒnon ka oerhmon)1 deoarece el nu este în sine însuși nimic altceva2 și nu are nevoie de nimic altceva3. el este binele prim, care, pentru a fi, nu are nevoie nici măcar de a fi bine. el nu este ceva anume, și astfel, nu este nici un bine determinat, ci, dacă este bine, el este într-un sens mai înalt4. de asemenea, el este „singur și izolat"5 deoarece, neavând nimic altceva în sine, nu are 1 expresia este recurentă la Plotin, care o atribuie lui Platon, însă este vorba, de fapt, despre o interpretare a unui context platonic: Philebos, 63 b 7–8, unde se spune că nici unul dintre genuri (plăcerea sau intelectul) nu poate fi neamestecat, „singur și izolat". Pentru Plotin, acest amestec despre care vorbește aici Platon este binele uman, un bine determinat, iar nu cel absolut (vezi Enneade, Vi, 7, 25.12– 14). de aceea, dacă binele determinat trebuie să fie amestecat, Plotin deduce că binele absolut trebuie să fie „singur și izolat". expresia „singur și izolat" apare și în alt context platonic, anume în Timaios, 34 b 5, unde este vorba despre cer ca fiind „unul singur și izolat", un zeu fericit, care nu are nevoie de nimic altceva. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 13.6. Vezi, de asemenea, Vi, 8, 21.32–33, unde se arată că „unul este doar el însuși (mÒnon aÙtÒ) și este cu adevărat el însuși, pe când fiecare dintre celelalte lucruri este și el însuși, dar și altceva". 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 40.28. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 25.15. 5 Sensul celor două cuvinte grecești (mÒnon ka oerhmon) este foarte apropiat. expresia ar însemna: singur și fără nimic altceva. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 149 spre ce să își îndrepte activitatea sa1. În consecinţă, el nu poate fi gândit nici măcar de către sine însuși, așa cum se gândește intelectul. dar atunci, cel care vrea să ajungă la acest principiu absolut simplu și absolut singur, nu trebuie să întreprindă un efort de gândire2, ci, din contră, trebuie să se elibereze pe sine de orice altceva și să înainteze „singur înspre cel singur"3. Înaintarea spre principiu va fi astfel o „fugă a celui singur înspre cel singur"4. Singurătatea principiului, izolarea lui faţă de toate celelalte lucruri, nu contrazice însă faptul că el susţine în același timp întreaga realitate, ca un fundament al ei. faptul că principiul este dincolo de fiinţă nu înseamnă o simplă negare a fiinţei - așa cum ar fi materia, la capătul celălalt al ierarhiei realităţii. din contră, depășirea fiinţei și izolarea principiului faţă de orice formă de dualitate este singurul fundament al fiinţei înseși și al logicii duale a acesteia. Astfel, am văzut că principiul rămâne singur, lipsit de orice altceva, și el nu se îndreaptă spre nimic altceva, ci stă nemișcat5. dar, prin faptul că principiul stă nemișcat, el este cel în care fiinţa însăși 1 Vezi Enneade, V, 3, 10.17–18. orice activitate se îndreaptă spre ceva anume: fie spre un alt lucru, fie spre o altă parte din sine. intelectul divin are nevoie să se gândească pe sine, de aceea el are o asemenea activitate îndreptată spre sine. În schimb, principiul prim este absolut unu (tÕ žn p£nth) (Enneade, V, 3, 10.16–17); în consecinţă, el nu are spre ce să își îndrepte activitatea, ci el este „singur și izolat", stând absolut imobil (p£nth st»setai) (Enneade, V, 3, 10.17–18). 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 13.33. Gândirea este plurală, de aceea nu poate ajunge la cel „izolat și singur". 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 34.7: „sufletul nu trebuie să aibă nimic altceva în sine, pentru a putea ca singur să primească pe cel singur". 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 11.51 (fug3⁄4 mÒnou prÕj mÒnon): acestea sunt cuvintele care încheie ultimul tratat al Enneadelor, în ordinea dată de Porfir. Vezi de asemenea Enneade, i, 6, 7.9, unde Plotin compară înaintarea spre principiu cu riturile sacre, în care iniţiatul vede „prin sine singur pe cel singur". Vezi articolul lui e. Peterson, „mÒnou prÕj mÒnon-formel bei Plotinos", în Philologus, 88, 1933, pp. 30–41. 5 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 10.17–18 (p£nth st»setai). Vezi de asemenea Enneade, Vi, 7, 39.29–35: „unul stă nemișcat" (semnÕn st»xetai), fiind astfel mai venerabil decât fiinţa, care nu poate fi nemișcată. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM150 își găsește stabilitate (oemeinen)1. fiinţa poate deveni stabilă (mšnon) tocmai datorită acestui principiu absolut, care este singur (mÒnon). fiinţa nu poate avea prin sine însăși stabilitate, pentru că în sine însăși ea este duală, iar activitatea ei este mereu îndreptată spre sine, încât fiinţa nu poată să rămână nemișcată. În schimb, ceea ce îi dă stabilitate, împiedicând-o de la o dispersie în pluralitate, este cel care rămâne nemișcat și singur. Interdicţia plotiniană de a trece dincolo de unu. Principiul fiinţei și al gândirii se arată a fi dincolo de gândire. Plotin își instalează gândirea sa filozofică tocmai în acest paradox. În același timp, el impune o limită gândirii care caută principiul, desigur, o limită care nu poate fi atinsă ca atare, însă o limită care protejează anterioritatea absolută a principiului unu-bine, interzicând gândirii noastre să mai caute ceva „dincolo" de el2. Pentru aceasta, Plotin pornește tocmai de la faptul că unulbine nu este un unu determinat și nu poate fi gândit ca atare, ca și cum ar fi „ceva" determinat. Principiul nu are nimic în comun cu lucrurile al căror principiu este. el nu poate fi pus alături de celelalte lucruri despre care spunem că sunt „unu". Altfel, dacă am număra unul absolut alături de celelalte lucruri - dintre care fiecare este un „unu" determinat -, atunci am putea gândi ceea ce este comun între unul absolut și unul determinat, iar acest element comun ar fi anterior unului absolut. dar atunci, unul absolut nu ar mai fi cu adevărat absolut, nu ar mai fi primul3. Astfel, anterioritatea absolută a unului este legată de faptul că el se sustrage cu totul gândirii și că el nu este un unu determinat, faţă de care să mai poată exista un unu anterior, mai simplu. 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 3.9. Vezi partea întâi, capitolul 3, c. 2 Totuși, gândirea filozofică ulterioară - cu iamblichos și damascius - va încerca să depășească chiar și această limită impusă de Plotin. Acesta va fi subiectul celei de a doua părţi a acestei lucrări. 3 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 4.15–16: „Altfel, ar exista ceva comun între el și cele numărate alături de el, iar acela ar fi anterior lui; dar [înaintea lui] nu trebuie să fie nimic" (e„ d m», koinÒn ti oestai TMp' aÙtoà ka tîn sunariqmoumšnwn, k¢ke‹no prÕ aÙtoà* de‹ d mhdšn). Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 151 Mai mult, Plotin arată că orice gândire și orice cercetare caută de fapt principiul și înaintează doar până la principiu, iar la acesta se oprește4. dar orice cercetare caută să explice un lucru sau altul, caută să înţeleagă „ce este" lucru respectiv și „de ce". În schimb, despre principiu nu ne mai putem pune în continuare alte întrebări, nu mai putem căuta „ce este" (t... TMstin) el și „de ce" (di¦ t...) este el așa, deoarece nu mai există un alt principiu înaintea principiului tuturor5. Principiul însuși nu mai poate fi gândit, nu mai poate fi cunoscut. Așadar, înaintea principiului prim - unu absolut și bine suprem în același timp - nu mai poate exista un alt principiu, prin care să explicăm mai departe acest principiu însuși. Plotin limitează înaintarea sufletului la nivelul binelui absolut: dincolo de acesta nu se poate trece, pentru că dincolo de el nu mai este nimic6. D. Paradoxul lui „dincolo de fiinţă şi de gândire" 1. Limitele expresiei „dincolo de gândire" cel de-al treilea nivel al transcendenţei pe care l-am descris pune în echivalenţă faptul că principiul este „dincolo de fiinţă" cu faptul că el este „dincolo de gândire". există însă un dublu paradox între aceste două expresii: pe de o parte, cum putem lămuri ce înseamnă „dincolo de fiinţă", spunând că acesta este „dincolo de gândire"? căci cum putem gândi ceva care ar fi dincolo de gândire? Pe de altă parte, dacă este dincolo de gândire, cum putem continua să spunem despre el că este „dincolo de fiinţă" și dincolo de pluralitatea fiinţei? căci a spune acest lucru înseamnă, într-un fel, a-l gândi. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 11.1–5. 5 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 11.8–9: „Întrebarea «de ce» caută un alt principiu; însă pentru principiul tuturor lucrurilor nu mai există un alt principiu" (TÕ d di¦ t... ¢rc3⁄4n ¥llhn zhte‹: ¢rcÁj d tÁj p£shj oÙk oestin ¢rc»). 6 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 22.19–21: „[Sufletul] se poate ridica deasupra intelectului, însă nu poate alerga deasupra binelui, deoarece nu este nimic care să stea deasupra." (Ka noà mn Øpera...rei, oÙ dÚnatai d Øpr tÕ ¢gaqÕn drame‹n, Óti mhdšn TMsti tÕ Øperke...menon). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM152 Astfel, problema cea mai profundă care se pune la acest nivel este aceea că, deși spunem că este dincolo de gândire, totuși, suntem în continuare nevoiţi să spunem ceva despre el, să îl gândim și să îl numim într-un fel. de pildă, spunem chiar acest lucru: anume că el este dincolo de fiinţă. dacă până acum am discutat problema transcendenţei principiului faţă de intelectul divin, așadar faţă de gândirea cea mai înaltă și mai unitară, se pune acum problema statutului lui „dincolo de fiinţă" în însăși gândirea noastră discursivă, în care orice negaţie pare să transmită ceva, ajungând astfel - printr-un efect paradoxal - să afirme ceva prin însuși actul de a nega. Astfel, dacă spunem că principiul este dincolo de fiinţă, spunem deja că „este" într-un fel, iar dacă spunem că este dincolo de gândire, spunem deja ceva despre el, așadar îl gândim deja. Plotin anticipează această dificultate și încearcă să iasă din paradox, stabilind limitele și valabilitatea expresiilor de tipul „dincolo de ...". Astfel, el arată în repetate rânduri cum anume putem accepta că principiul prim nu poate fi gândit, fără a ne contrazice prin ceea ce spunem despre el (de pildă, prin faptul că spunem că el este dincolo de fiinţă şi de gândire). Mai precis, problema care se ridică privește statutul însuși al expresiei „dincolo de fiinţă", cu toate variantele sale: „dincolo de toate", „dincolo de gândire", „cel de dincolo". Această expresie nu mai are - la Plotin și la toţi ceilalţi neoplatonici - o aplicare directă, descriptivă. În loc să descrie, în loc să afirma ceva, expresia impune, de fapt, o limită și interzice un acces direct la ceea ce numim „principiul prim"1. Soluţia paradoxului formulat mai sus va fi următoarea: „dincolo de fiinţă" poate fi pus în echivalenţă cu a fi „dincolo de gândire", deoarece a spune că principiul este „dincolo de fiinţă" nu înseamnă a-l gândi, ci înseamnă a suprima orice gândire asupra lui. Dincolo de fiinţă nu este un nume, o afirmaţie, 1 de remarcat faptul că damascius își începe tratatul său Despre principii (R. i, 1.5) într-o manieră foarte precaută: el nu vorbește în mod direct despre principiu, ci despre „ceea ce numim principiu". Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 153 un enunţ, o descriere1. din contră, dincolo de fiinţă sugerează absenţa numelui, in-descriptibilul și in-exprimabilul absolut. ea este o „expresie" a inexprimabilului. În Enneade, V, 3, 13.2, Plotin leagă anterioritatea unului-bine faţă de fiinţă și intelect de faptul că unul este „realmente inexprimabil" (¥rrhton tÍ ¢lhqe...v)2. de data aceasta, el se referă în mod explicit la gândirea umană și la incapacitatea acesteia de a cuprinde unul absolut3. Astfel, orice am spune noi, spunem mereu „ceva anume" (t...)4. În schimb, unul însuși nu mai este „ceva anume", astfel încât să poată deveni subiectul unui discurs despre el, ci el este „unu" fără a fi „ceva". el este unul însuși, unul în sine sau unul absolut (aÙtošn), iar cel ce este în sine sau absolut este anterior celui care este „ceva anume". În consecinţă, unul este indicibil, iar singura manieră adecvată în care mai putem totuși să ne referim la el este prin a spune că el este „dincolo de toate și dincolo de intelectul cel mai venerabil" (TMpškeina p£ntwn ka TMpškeina toà semnot£tou noà). iar această expresie nu este un nume, ci, din contră, ea arată că unul „nu are nume, nici discurs, nici știinţă"5. În consecinţă, expresia platonică dincolo de fiinţă nu este o descriere a principiului ci, din contră, este o expresie a faptului că acesta nu are nume și că nu poate fi gândit. dar, în 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 6.11–12 (TÕ g¦r TMpškeina Ôntoj oÙ tÒde lšgei- oÙ g¦r t...qhsin-oÙd Ônoma aÙtoà lšgei). Plotin leagă astfel referinţa din Republica, 509 b 9 (privind binele de dincolo de fiinţă), de referinţa din Parmenide, 142 a 3 („nu există nume al lui [al unului]"). 2 Termenul ¥rrhton poate fi tradus prin „inexprimabil" sau „indicibil". În unele traduceri - precum cea engleză realizată de A. H. Armstrong, cuvântul este tradus prin „inefabil". Totuși, preferăm să rezervăm această traducere pentru tÕ ¢pÒrrhton, termen foarte important în neoplatonismul de după Plotin, mai ales la damascius. Termenul „indicibil" (¥rrhton) este cel pe care Platon îl aplică nefiinţei (Sofistul, 238 c 10, 238 e 6, 239 a 5). de asemenea, el apare în Scrisori, Vii, 341 c 5. 3 desigur, numai în gândirea noastră discursivă are sens problema exprimării, pe când gândirea superioară, a intelectului divin, se realizează în manieră identitară, unitară, fără distanţă faţă de obiectul gândit. 4 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 13.1. 5 Vezi în acest sens Platon, Parmenide, 142 a 3–4. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM154 acest caz, unul nu este ceva anume, care ar fi ulterior numit „unu", ci chiar și numele este altceva decât el, de aceea este inadecvat a spune chiar și că el este „unu". Plotin reia aici concluzia deja cunoscută a primei ipoteze asupra unului din dialogul Parmenide: unului care este unu nu îi revine nici discurs (logos), nici știinţă. Principiul prim al lui Plotin va prelua această condiţie a unului platonic: „este fals a spune chiar și că este unul, despre cel căruia nu îi revine nici discurs, nici ştiinţă, și despre care se spune că este dincolo de fiinţă"6. Totuși, ce statut mai pot avea niște expresii care nu exprimă nimic? ce pot însemna aceste nume care nu sunt nume, ci care numesc doar absenţa totală a numelui? Plotin răspunde la această întrebare spunând că, de fapt, atunci când vorbim astfel despre principiu, nu îl numim, ci doar „ne facem nouă înșine semne despre el"7. numele unului are un rol propedeutic: cel care caută principiul trebuie să pornească de la unu deoarece acesta indică simplitatea, iar apoi, el trebuie să nege chiar și acest nume, deoarece nici el nu descrie natura principiului. Astfel, numele unului are o valoare intermediară, o valabilitate limitată: el indică simplitatea, însă o simplitate care este mai simplă decât însuși acest nume al unului. de aceea, numele unului folosește gândirii filozofice numai în măsura în care el însuși este depășit. Astfel, Plotin preia într-o manieră proprie afirmaţia platonică din Parmenide, 142 a, unde se spune că „unul nu are nume" (OÙd' ¥ra Ônoma oestin aÙtù): pentru el, această concluzie are o valoare doctrinară8. Totuși, la Platon concluzia avea o anumită doză problematică, în măsura în care unul a fost propus ca ipoteză, așadar cu un nume, dacă nu cu o știinţă explicită, apoi numele și știinţa i-au fost retrase. În plus, imediat după afirmarea acestei concluzii, Platon se întreabă 6 Plotin, Enneade, V, 4, 1.9–10. 7 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 13.5–6 (1m‹n aÙto‹j shma...nein TMpiceiroàmen per aÙtoà). de asemenea, în Enneade, V, 5, 6.23–37, se arată că nu știm ce să spunem despre unu, ci îi dăm un nume pentru a ni-l indica nouă înșine, deși el însuși nu are nume. 8 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 41, 37. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 155 - prin intermediul personajului Parmenide - dacă este posibil ca lucrurile să stea așa în privinţa unului, iar răspunsul este negativ. Plotin însă, nu numai că preia concluzia negativă a argumentării ca atare, dar „rezolvă" în același timp partea problematică a acestei concluzii. Pentru el, „unul" nu este un nume propriu-zis, deși ne folosim de el. Mai mult, nu numai că este posibil ca unul să fie așa cum se prezintă în concluzia platonică, ci doar aceste negaţii (ale numelui, știinţei, etc.) sunt adecvate unului, care transcende orice dualitate, așadar și pe cea implicată de gândire, de știinţă, de nume. În felul acesta, deși nu numește și nu descrie transcendenţa, expresia „dincolo de fiinţă" - ca și toate celelalte depășiri și negaţii care o însoţesc - ne indică maniera însăși în care sufletul poate atinge această transcendenţă1: anume suprimând și părăsind tot ceea ce ţine de fiinţă și rămânând în sine însuși, iar nu în altceva2. cel care merge nu înspre lucruri, ci în sens opus, nu va ajunge la o fiinţă, ci la sine însuși, iar cel ce este astfel în sine nu este în altceva, nu este în fiinţă, ci în acela (de dincolo de fiinţă), deoarece sufletul însuși devine nu o fiinţă, ci dincolo de fiinţă. „dincolo de fiinţă" descrie astfel o stare accesibilă sufletului care se unește cu principiul. Această stare constă în a fi în sine, iar nu în altceva, adică nu în ceea ce este. „cel care nu este în altceva nu este în nimic anume, ci doar în sine"3, într-un mod autentic al acestui în sine, un în sine ne-dedublat. iar cel care este în sine în acest fel este în cel care depășește dualitatea, adică în unu, devenind el însuși dincolo de fiinţă. Tocmai de aceea, dincolo de fiinţă nu trebuie înţeles ca referindu-se la o regiune determinată a realităţii, la un lucru anume, pe care l-am numi unu și care ar avea altă natură decât fiinţa. ci dincolo de fiinţă indică această unificare totală, înspre care fiinţa 1 despre cum putem noi să cunoaștem unul, vezi Enneade, Vi, 8, 11.23; iii, 8, 9.20. 2 Vezi Enneade, Vi, 9, 11.41–42. 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 11.39–40. Într-adevăr, alteritatea este o caracteristică a fiinţei; doar ea poate fi „în altceva", într-o dualitate cu acest „altceva". PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM156 însăși tinde, dar care nu mai poate fi o altă fiinţă. Dincolo de fiinţă nu mai este ceva anume, iar a ajunge dincolo de fiinţă - în identitate cu acest principiu transcendent - înseamnă a se desprinde de logica duală a fiinţei, a nu mai fi o fiinţă anume. Astfel, dacă „dincolo de fiinţă" descrie în primă instanţă transcendenţa principiului faţă de fiinţă, totuși, într-un sens mai profund, expresia nu transmite ceva despre principiul însuși, ci ea indică inadecvarea fundamentală faţă de principiu a oricărui nume și a oricărei expresii concrete - de vreme ce principiul rămâne in-exprimabil. În plus, funcţia acestei expresii este aceea de a indica sufletului uman „direcţia" principiului: renunţând pe rând la orice prezenţă de natura fiinţei, rămânând în cele din urmă în sine însuși iar nu în altceva, sufletul ajunge în unitate cu cel care nu este în altceva, și căruia nimic altceva nu îi este potrivit. Așadar, în loc să fie o expresie a unei naturi anume, „dincolo de fiinţă" are rolul de a suprima orice expresie și de a ne îndepărta de orice natură determinată, îndreptându-ne spre cel care este străin oricărei naturi, spre cel care nu mai este nimic anume1. 2. Principiul negândit al gândirii Am urmărit, până acum, modul în care Plotin înţelege transcendenţa principiului faţă de fiinţă, punând în evidenţă diferitele niveluri la care această anterioritate poate fi identificată: faţă de pluralitate, faţă de activitatea fiinţei și faţă de gândirea specifică ei. În urma acestei analize, se ridică însă o problemă de fond privind gândirea lui Plotin, și anume: cum putem admite un principiu la care gândirea nu are un acces direct, și care este relevanţa acestui principiu; de ce gândirea ar avea nevoie de un astfel de principiu, pe care nu îl poate nici măcar numi? Astfel de întrebări ating statutul cu totul aparte a ceea ce numim „principiu". Trebuie să înţelegem că există o dinamică a principiului în gândirea noastră, o dinamică din care nu ne putem opri niciodată: pe de o parte, 1 damascius va vorbi despre principiu ca despre un „nimic" propriu-zis, însă într-un sens superior fiinţei. Vezi De principiis, R. i, 6.22–26. Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 157 principiul se impune gândirii, sau gândirea însăși își caută un punct de reper absolut, dar, pe de altă parte, acest principiu, acest punct de reper absolut, nu poate fi identificat ca atare, ci el se retrage constant din gândire, iar gândirea se instituie de fapt tocmai faţă de această contantă retragere a principiului. Acest lucru creează efectul unor retractări constante: gândirea filozofică neagă ceea ce ea însăși a admis la un moment dat. Un exemplu de acest fel îl întâlnim la Plotin, a cărui gândire trebuie înţeleasă în stratificarea ei inerentă, în acest joc în care perspectiva se schimbă de fiecare dată. Gândirea lui Plotin se rafinează ea însăși pe măsură ce înaintează spre principiul prim. de pildă, dacă la un anumit nivel al analizei Plotin însuși propune anumite denumiri ale principiului (precum cea de „unu" și cea de „bine"), în schimb, la alt nivel al discuţiei, aceste denumiri sunt ele însele suspendate, Plotin arătând că nici ele nu sunt întru totul adecvate principiului, ci rolul lor este limitat: ele răspund unei nevoi a analizei, dar sunt apoi depășite, din aceeași nevoie a gândirii de a sugera principiul. Astfel, gândirea lui Plotin nu este una statică și descriptivă, ci este una care înaintează și se reformează ea însăși pe măsură ce înaintează. Acest lucru poate da impresia că Plotin însuși contrazice ceea ce a admis în alte părţi ale operei sale. de fapt, ceea ce răspundea exigenţelor gândirii sale la un anumit nivel al acesteia, nu mai răspunde exigenţelor unui nivel ulterior. Astfel, fiind dincolo de fiinţă, principiul prim nu poate fi nimic anume, așadar el nu poate fi nici bine, nici unu, ci acestea sunt doar două maniere în care noi indicăm principiul prim. În schimb, el însuși nu este bine pentru sine însuși, ci doar pentru celelalte lucruri, așadar pentru fiinţă1, iar el nu este un bine propriu-zis, un bine determinat. de asemenea, principiul nu este unu în mod propriu-zis, ca o caracteristică a lui, ci „unul" este modul cel mai simplu în care noi putem indica simplitatea absolută a principiului și depărtarea lui faţă de orice „lucru" pe care 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 24.15–16. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM158 îl putem gândi. „Unul" nu este, în ultimă instanţă, decât o indicaţie negativă asupra principiului, iar nu o descriere a acestuia1. numele „unului" nu este dat decât în manieră indicativă, pentru a arăta simplitatea principiului, în așa fel încât acela care caută principiul să suprime chiar și această indicaţie; astfel, este chiar mai potrivit a nu folosi nici un nume pentru unu, decât să înţelegem că acest nume ar exprima ceva pozitiv despre principiu. În concluzie, termenii „unu" și „bine" nu descriu propriu-zis principiul, nu au o referenţialitate directă, ci ei ghidează mintea înspre principiul, protejând, în același timp, principiul de orice descriere inadecvată lui2. În felul acesta, aporia platonică a principiului - care este admis ca unu, dar care se arată a nu avea fiinţă și a nu fi, la limită, nici măcar unu - se păstrează și în termenii lui Plotin. Într-adevăr, Plotin afirmă un principiu unu, care este în același timp bine, dar el nu acceptă că la acest principiu putem avea vreun acces în termenii gândirii. Singurul acces ar fi unul deasupra gândirii, într-o viziune privilegiată, care poate avea loc în mod cu totul excepţional. dar atunci, revenind la problema enunţată mai sus, ne putem 1 Astfel, numele „unu" este explicat ca o negaţie a pluralităţii (Enneade, V, 5, 6.26), explicaţia trimiţând la ipoteza primei aporii din Parmenide, cea în care unul este admis ca non-plural. Mai mult, Plotin leagă ideea unului nonplural de obiceiul pitagoric de a sugera principiul prin numele zeului Apollo, care exprimă de asemenea negaţia pluralităţii ('ApÒllwn - ¢pÒfasij tîn pollîn). Pentru Apollo ca nume al unui număr la pitagorici, vezi Porfir, De abstinentia, 2, 36 și e. Robbins, „The Tradition of Greek arithmology", Classical Philology, 16, 1921, pp. 97–123. 2 „[...] one and Good, though not proper names, descriptions or definitions, remain to some extent privileged terms for the neoplatonists. «one» suggests the absence of the articulation or organisation, division or boundary, which would make description or definition possible. And «Good», still more importantly, keeps our mind pointed in the right direction, and helps us to remember that we experience him primarily as the source of value and the goal of desire, and that he is more, not less, than anything we can describe or define." (A. H. Armstrong, „The escape of the one. An investigation of Some Possibilities of Apophatic Theology imperfectly Realised in the West", în Studia Patristica, Xiii, Berlin, 1975, pp. 77–89). Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 159 întreba: cum admitem acest unu în gândirea noastră? În ce termeni putem vorbi despre el, dacă el nu poate fi propriu-zis gândit? Pe de o parte, cum îl admitem, de vreme ce spunem că nu putem gândi așa ceva, iar, pe de altă parte, ce admitem, atunci când vorbim totuși despre unu? cum putem gândi așa ceva, pe de o parte, și pe de altă parte, nu cumva, ceea ce gândim este absurd și cu totul contradictoriu faţă de ceea ce însăși gândirea noastră poate accepta? Plotin are o soluţie la această aporie. Astfel, trebuie să înţelegem că gândirea, în termenii lui Plotin, înseamnă o depărtare de la unitatea absolută, deoarece gândirea necesită o dualitate (aceea între un obiect gândit și actul însuși de a gândi), așadar, gândirea noastră nu poate fi propriu-zis despre unu; orice gândire a noastră - oricât am încerca să ne apropiem de principiu - păstrează într-un fel distanţa faţă de unu. În plus, gândirea este în același timp dorinţă de a cunoaște și de a cuprinde unitatea absolută, iar această dorinţă este cea care ne atrage spre principiul prim. Așadar, într-un același act, se suprapun contemplaţia și dorinţa: pe de o parte, ne îndreptăm tot timpul spre principiu, dorind să îl cunoaștem, dar, în însăși această dorire și în această tendinţă de a ne apropia de el, de fapt, noi ne depărtăm de principiu, sau rămânem tot timpul la o anumită distanţă de el, indiferent cât de mult am vrea să ne apropiem, pentru că dorinţa de a-l cunoaște este în același timp cea care ne depărtează de el1. Așadar, felul în care Plotin gândește principiul prim ca unu și bine - ca obiectul suprem al contemplaţiei, dar dincolo de gândire, ca obiectul suprem al doririi, dar dincolo de orice obiect propriu-zis - reușește să impună în același timp și distanţa faţă de principiu, dar și faptul că orice gândire este referenţială, în cele din urmă, la acest principiu. Plotin iese astfel din aporia platonică, din contradicţia care ar părea să ameninţe gândirea principiului. Astfel, atunci când admitem principiul în gândirea noastră, nu admitem propriu-zis un 1 Plotin vorbește, de pildă, despre curiozitate ca sursă sau cauză a depărtării de principiu. Vezi n. Baladi, „origine et signification de l'audace chez Plotin", în Le Néoplatonisme, op. cit., pp. 89–99. PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM160 obiect, astfel încât gândirea lui să devină contradictorie, ci, vorbim despre principiu, dar niciodată nu îl exprimăm pe el, adică vorbim despre el, dar întotdeauna suntem la o distanţă faţă de el. Vorbim despre principiu incluzând în același timp această distanţă, sau incluzând conștiinţa acestei distanţări faţă de el. Principiul se impune astfel nu ca „obiect" (contradictoriu și paradoxal) al gândirii, ci ca o necesitate de ordinul gândirii. Mai precis, gândirea noastră este dublu condiţionată de acest principiu unitar: pe de o parte, gândirea duală are nevoie de o unitate anterioară, iar pe de altă parte gândirea este definită de Plotin tocmai ca un act de apropiere - și distanţare implicită - faţă de principiul prim. A vrea să cunoști înseamnă a dori să cunoști; dar gândirea se naște tocmai ca această dorinţă de a prinde unul într-un obiect al gândirii, instituindu-l astfel în diferenţă faţă de cel care vrea să cunoască. Unul este astfel, în cele din urmă, obiectul unic al gândirii, însă nu al unei gândiri care distinge unul faţă de alte obiecte - ceea ce ar fi imposibil - ci al unei gândiri care se mișcă în jurul unului, depărtându-se și apropiindu-se în același timp de el. Apropierea de unu este în același timp o depărtare. Unul este referinţa absolută a gândirii, precum centrul unui cerc, faţă de care punctele de pe cerc tind să se apropie, deși ele sunt departe, în același timp. În ea însăși, gândirea nu este suficientă deoarece este mereu duală, mereu despărţită de obiectul ei; în schimb, unitatea anterioară dă sens gândirii tocmai rămânând în afara acesteia, nedevenind obiectul ei propriu-zis - pentru a nu reinstitui astfel dualitatea gândirii. Gândirea se desfășoară faţă de o unitate, ea este mereu în jurul acestei unităţi anterioare. observăm astfel că tocmai ceea ce nu mai putem gândi propriu-zis susţine gândirea noastră, nu devenind un obiect al ei, nu subsumându-se gândirii, ci tocmai rămânând în afara ei. Același lucru se întâmplă și în cazul intelectului divin: unul susţine gândirea intelectului și îi dă sens, deși el însuși rămâne negândit. Gândirea depinde astfel de ne-gândirea principiului, de faptul că acesta nu mai poate fi gândit; altfel, o gândire care ar Capitolul 5: Unul absolut 161 cuprinde unul nu ar mai fi o gândire, căci ar pierde însăși dispunerea ei de gândire, inevitabil duală. În mod paradoxal, intelectul se constituie ca gândire tocmai prin depărtarea sa faţă de unu, obiectul doririi sale, cel spre care se îndreaptă gândirea sa, chiar dacă nu ajunge niciodată la el. intelectul se întoarce spre unu în contemplaţie, însă această contemplaţie, această vedere este în același timp o depărtare faţă de unu și, în consecinţă, o instituire a intelectului în dualitatea sa specifică. Vrând să cuprindă unitatea absolută, intelectul ajunge la pluralitate formelor. el ajunge astfel să gândească nu unul însuși - inconceptibil - ci pe sine, formele fiind conţinutul său intelectiv. Gândirea se constituie astfel pe sine, pornind de la un efort primar de a cuprinde unitatea cea de necuprins. Unul absolut (al primei ipoteze) este astfel surprins nu în mod direct, într-un act intelectual, ci indirect, ca unul-plural (din cea de-a doua ipoteză). Gândirea primă devine astfel manifestarea în pluralitate a ceea ce se sustrage pluralităţii și gândirii. Structura duală a gândirii ia astfel forma doririi: gândirea caută în permanenţă obiectul gândirii ei, însă nu poate ajunge niciodată la el - ca gândire - deoarece ea însăși este diferită de el, deoarece gândirea însăși presupune această diferenţă. Totuși, deși nu îl atinge, gândirea continuă să se îndrepte spre el, continuă să îl dorească. Tocmai această dorinţă - ca raportare constantă la principiul prim - este cea care constituie gândirea: „dorinţa a dat naștere gândirii și a produs-o odată cu sine"1. 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 6, 5.8–10. În plus, tot dorinţa este cea care poate face drumul invers, acela al regăsirii principiului. dacă gândirea nu mai ajunge la principiul ei, pe care îl dorește, în schimb, tocmai această dorinţă este cea care poate conduce la o uniune cu principiul. Accesul cu totul privilegiat la principiul unitar nu mai este găsit în direcţia gândirii, ci în cea a dorinţei, atunci când gândirea însăși este depășită, când gândirea însăși încetează. Uniunea mistică nu poate fi atinsă decât într-o schimbare de registru, care iese din schemele gândirii (Enneade, iii, 8, 11.23–24). „cunoașterea" cea mai înaltă nu poate fi cea a gândirii, ci cea a lui eros din Banchetul, care se realizează într-o stare de „iubire, nebunie, beţie" (Enneade, Vi, 7, 35.19–30). PARTeA i: GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM162 dacă Aristotel remarca, la începutul Metafizicii, că toţi oamenii au dorinţa de a cunoaște1, în schimb, la Plotin, relaţia dintre cunoaștere și dorinţă devine mult mai concretă, cele două fiind - în punctul lor cel mai înalt - identice. cunoașterea cea mai înaltă devine de fapt o dorinţă, o veșnică dorinţă îndreptată spre cel care nu se actualizează niciodată într-o cunoaștere determinată. neoplatonicii aduc astfel, în gândirea noastră, elementul non-gândirii, a ceea ce depășește gândirea, dar care este totuși presupus de gândire. În sistemul lor, gândirea propriu-zisă va fi pusă pe o treaptă inferioară în ordinea realităţii. dacă pentru Parmenide a fi este tot una cu a gândi, iar fiinţa este cea mai înaltă treaptă a realităţii, pentru neoplatonici, realitatea se constituie pornind de la un principiu anterior fiinţei; de asemenea, gândirea își pierde primatul său; ea nu mai este posibilă decât pornind de la un principiu care scapă cu totul gândirii. 1 Aristotel, Metafizica, 980 a 21 (P£ntej ¥nqrwpoi toà e„dšnai Ñršgontai fÚsei). PARTeA A doUA eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM dUPă PloTin: PoRfiR, iAMBlicHoS şi PRoclUS capitolul 1 PRoBleMA UnUi PRinciPiU de dincolo de fiinţă lA PoRfiR evoluţia problemei principiului de dincolo de fiinţă este o istorie cu multe amănunte și răsturnări de situaţie. linia doctrinară impusă de Plotin nu a fost urmată întotdeauna foarte strict. Astfel, pentru Porfir, principiul prim este actul însuşi de a fi. odată cu iamblichos, asistăm la o dedublare a primului principiu, sau la introducerea unui principiu suplimentar, anterior chiar și unului absolut - iar aceasta va fi prima încercare de a depăși structura realităţii expusă și impusă de Plotin. Proclus revine la perspectiva plotiniană, introducând însă noi dificultăţi privind eficienţa unului ca principiu prim al realităţii, așadar asupra statutului său de cauză primă. Vârful acestei evoluţii îl va constitui damascius, care vorbește despre un principiu absolut transcendent: inefabilul. În privinţa lui Porfir, sursele de care dispunem pentru elucidarea perspectivei sale asupra principiului prim sunt distincte și uneori contradictorii. Pe de o parte, este vorba de mărturii indirecte, venind din partea lui Proclus și a lui damascius. Pe de altă parte, dispunem de fragmentele unei scrieri a lui Porfir ('Aforma prÕj t¦ noht£)1, în care acesta încearca să expună într-o manieră sumară tratatele Enneadelor lui Plotin. de asemenea, dispunem de fragmente ale unui comentariu anonim la dialogul Parmenide, care a fost atribuit lui Porfir2. comparând cele două 1 Porphyre, Sentences, études d'introduction, texte grec et traduction française, commentaire par UPR 76, cnRS, avec une traduction anglaise par J. dillon, Vrin, Paris, 2005, vol. i și ii, travaux édités sous la responsabilité de l. Brisson. 2 Vezi P. Hadot, „fragments d'un commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide", Revue des Études Grecques, 74, 1961, pp. 410–438 și P. Hadot, Porphyre PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM166 texte - dintre care unul ne-a parvenit anonim, iar celălalt se referă de fapt la Enneadele lui Plotin - cu mărturiile lui Proclus și damascius, observăm o anumită neconcordanţă, cel puţin de suprafaţă, care pune în lumină un fragment foarte interesant din istoria evoluţiei ideilor filozofice. Tocmai despre această neconcordanţă vom vorbi în continuare. Vom începe cu mărturiile amintite mai sus, pentru a scoate în evidenţă dintru început neclaritatea care planează asupra perspectivei lui Porfir. este surprinzător - în primă instanţă - să observăm cum a fost receptat Porfir de către neoplatonicii ulteriori. Prima recepţie este cea a lui Proclus, care, într-un fragment al propriului său Comentariului la Parmenide, se referă la doctrina lui Porfir - deși fără să îl numească explicit pe acesta. el spune: „în nici un caz nu vom spune că vârful inteligibilului este zeul prim, așa cum aud despre unii dintre cei mai de seamă teologi, făcând pe tatăl de acolo [din inteligibil] identic cu cauza tuturor"1. conform acestei mărturii, s-ar părea că Porfir pune principiul prim la nivelul inteligibilului, ceea ce este cu totul neașteptat, dacă ne gândim la stringenţele pe care Plotin - maestrul lui Porfir - le-a impus asupra principiului prim. Trebuie remarcat că, în alt context, Proclus îl așează pe Porfir în rândul filozofilor care - precum Plotin - au înţeles că, la Platon, „cauza primă este dincolo de intelect și transcende toate fiinţele"2. Acest lucru complică problema, făcând să apară un echivoc. Totuși, nu putem presupune că prima afirmaţie (legată de identificarea zeului prim cu vârful inteligibil) nu ar aparţine lui Porfir, și că Proclus s-ar referi la altcineva, deoarece opinia pe care Proclus o amintește fără să numească autorul ei este menţionată și de damascius, de data aceasta legată în mod explicit de numele lui Porfir. et Victorinus, Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1968, vol. i, pp. 102–143 și vol. ii, pp. 59–113. 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1070.15–19. 2 Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 31, 25–28. În acest context, Proclus critică doar pe origen platonicianul, care, deși a primit o educaţie filozofică similară cu a lui Plotin, neglijează existenţa unului de dincolo de fiinţă și de intelect. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 167 damascius discută perspectiva lui Porfir într-un context în care el însuși își pune întrebarea câte și care sunt principiile situate înaintea triadei inteligibile, adică principiile anterioare intelectului divin, fiinţei veritabile și inteligibile1. Înainte de a răspunde el însuși la această întrebare, damascius enumeră trei opinii aparţinând filozofilor neoplatonici anteriori. Una dintre opiniile amintite este cea a lui Porfir: „sau poate [...] vom spune împreună cu Porfir că tatăl triadei inteligibile2 este principiul unic al totului?" damascius arată că această perspectivă nu poate fi acceptată, deoarece cauza unică a tuturor lucrurilor nu poate fi inclusă între lucrurile a căror cauză este. de asemenea, principiul este indicibil (¥rrhtoj), așadar el nu poate fi inteligibil și nu poate fi numit „tată al triadei" inteligibile. Triada - având un intelect al ei - este inteligibilă într-un anumit fel (Ópwj d»pote noht»), pe când principiul absolut este complet indicibil (p£mpan ¥rrhtoj)3. În plus, el trebuie să fie principiu al întregii realităţi, iar nu doar al unei singure triade. Astfel, damascius face foarte clar diferenţa dintre „vârful fiinţelor" (koruf3⁄4 tîn Ôntwn)4 și ceea ce transcende toate fiinţele (t¦ p£nta TMkbšbhken)5. dacă acceptăm ca atare mărturia lui damascius, s-ar părea că Porfir „regresează" faţă de poziţia lui Plotin, că se întoarce la un nivel inferior în raport cu ţinta cea mai înaltă a gândirii maestrului său, punând ca principiu al întregii realităţi partea cea mai înaltă a acestei realităţi însăși. S-ar părea că, pentru Porfir, principiul realităţii inteligibile - și, în consecinţă, al întregii realităţi - este partea cea mai înaltă a inteligibilului. Însă Plotin a insistat foarte mult asupra faptului că intelectul divin nu poate fi principiu prim. Întrebarea pe care ne-o punem este cum se explică 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 86.3–10. 2 „Tatăl triadei inteligibile" (tÕn patšra tÁj nohtÁj tri£doj) este o expresie inspirată din Oracolele caldeene; ea indică nivelul cel mai înalt al inteligibilului. 3 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 86.3–10. 4 Idem, R. i, 86.14. 5 Idem, R. i, 86.14–15. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM168 acest „regres", dacă este vorba de un regres propriu-zis, sau doar de unul aparent. A. Textele lui Porfir Totuși, mărturia lui damascius (și cea a lui Proclus) pare a fi contrazisă de anumite afirmaţii ale lui Porfir însuși. Astfel, în 'Aforma..., Porfir afirmă în mai multe rânduri transcendenţa principiului prim faţă de fiinţă. Principiul este dincolo de intelect, deasupra fiinţei, sau pur și simplu „cel de dincolo"1. de asemenea, într-un fragment (fr. 18) păstrat din lucrarea sa Istoria filozofică2, Porfir vorbește despre un prim zeu, anterior intelectului, pornind de la care intelectul se generează pe sine însuși. Această generare a intelectului pornind de la zeul prim nu necesită o mișcare a zeului prim înspre ceea ce îi este inferior, ci zeul rămâne veșnic în sine, deoarece este imposibil ca acesta să fie numărat alături de lucrurile ce vin de la el și să fie pus în serie cu acestea. el este „nenumărabil și necoordonat (mhd sugkatat£ttesqai)" faţă de celelalte lucruri. Porfir distinge așadar între intelect și un zeu anterior, pornind de la care intelectul se autogenerează3, ceea ce contrazice afirmaţia lui damascius, conform căreia Porfir nu ar mai admite nici un alt principiu dincolo de vârful intelectului. dar poate că mărturia cea mai elocventă pentru a descoperi în ce constă doctrina lui Porfir este Comentariul la Parmenide. Pentru istoria neoplatonismului, faptul că Porfir a scris un comentariu la dialogul Parmenide este un lucru remarcabil. Astfel, se știe că Plotin nu a realizat niciodată un comentariu aplicat asupra vreunei scrieri platonice. chiar și interpretarea primelor trei ipoteze din Parmenide este formulată în treacăt, fără o analiză 1 Vezi Porfir, Sentences, 10; 12; 25.1–2; 26; 30.5–6. 2 Vezi cyrillus, Contra Iulian, i 45, 10–27, 552 Bc, p. 196, Burguièreevieux (XViii, p. 15, nauck). 3 Vezi de asemenea Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, 11, p. 51, 4–8, în care se spune că Porfir distingea între intelect, care este etern, și o parte a intelectului care este pre-eternă (proaiènion), prin care intelectul se identifică de fapt cu unul. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 169 mai largă a textului de bază, fără o contextualizare a acestor ipoteze. Plotin urmărea liniile de forţă ale dialogului platonic, însă nu se simţea obligat să explice și amănuntele textuale și să le integreze în interpretarea generală pe care el o oferea - anume în această omologare a ipotezelor platonice cu cele trei ipostaze (unu, intelect, suflet). În schimb, după Plotin începe marea tradiţie a comentariilor platonice aplicate. dialogul Parmenide va fi citit ca un tratat concentrat de ontologie; el este preluat în detalii de comentatori, care încearcă să desprindă din el o perspectivă coerentă și amănunţită asupra întregii realităţi. Unul dintre primii autori care comentează dialogul Parmenide este Porfir, discipolul lui Plotin1. deși acest comentariu nu s-a păstrat integral, știm că el cuprindea analize concrete asupra tuturor ipotezelor din a doua parte a dialogului2. Porfir este primul care a împărţit textul platonic în nouă ipoteze3; dintre acestea, prima ipoteză vorbește despre zeul prim (per qeoà toà prwt...stou), iar a doua despre nivelul inteligibil (per toà nohtoà pl£touj). ceea ce ne interesează în acest context este diferenţa pe care o făcea Porfir între unul suprem, absolut simplu, și unul celei de-a doua ipoteze, pe care Plotin îl identificase deja cu intelectul divin. Pentru aceasta, fragmentele păstrate din Comentariul lui Porfir sunt foarte relevante, deoarece ele poartă asupra unor amănunte din primele două ipoteze. Analizând textele păstrate, observăm în primul rând că Porfir distinge foarte clar zeul suprem faţă de toate celelalte lucruri. 1 Se pare că și celălalt discipol al lui Porfir - anume Amelius - a comentat dialogul Parmenide, însă comentariul său nu s-a păstrat. 2 Proclus (Comentariul la Parmenide, 1051.34–1064.12) prezintă în mod sistematic interpretările neoplatonice anterioare asupra ipotezelor platonice privind unul. Primii trei filozofi care au oferit o interpretare asupra tuturor ipotezelor (fie că identificau opt sau nouă ipoteze) sunt Amelius, Porfir și iamblichos. Proclus însuși nu îi numește direct, însă numele lor sunt precizate în scoliile marginale. 3 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1053.36–1055.25. Pentru motivele atribuirii acestei interpretări lui Porfir, vezi H. d. Saffrey și l. G. Westerink, Introduction, în Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, i, nota 1, p. lXXXi. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM170 Acesta nu este descris ca un „vârf al inteligibilului" (precum în mărturia lui Proclus și a lui damascius despre Porfir), ci este net distins de inteligibil și de toate lucrurile de după el. Astfel, Porfir înaintează ipoteza că zeul prim este „neasemenea și diferit faţă de intelect"1, și anume „prin simplul fapt că zeul nu este intelect" (aÙtù ge tù m3⁄4 enai Ð noàj). el afirmă așadar ceea ce Proclus și damascius nu se grăbesc să îi conceadă, anume existenţa unui principiu anterior intelectului și diferit de intelect. Mai mult decât atât, nu numai că zeul prim al lui Porfir nu este intelect, ci el nici nu poate fi comparat cu intelectul, asemănat sau distins de acesta, deoarece zeul prim nu poate intra în nici o alteritate (nici faţă de intelect, nici faţă de altceva), ci el este incomparabil cu orice altceva: „nu alteritatea este cea care îl distinge de celelalte lucruri, deoarece el nu poate fi comparat, nici circumscris în raport cu lucrurile de după el"2. fiind incomparabil cu orice altceva, nimic din sfera fiinţei nu poate exprima ce este zeul. despre el nu putem vorbi decât prin negaţii, anume tocmai prin acele negaţii care - în prima ipoteză platonică - distingeau unul de sfera fiinţei. Astfel, zeul „nu poate fi exprimat și numit (¢rr»tou ka ¢katonom£stou Ôntoj)"3; el este dincolo de noţiunea de pluralitate, dar, mai mult decât atât, el este dincolo chiar și de noţiunea de unu4, neavând, așadar, nici o noţiune proprie, care să îl poată exprima. nimic din ceea ce sunt celelalte lucruri nu se poate aplica zeului prim, căci el este „deasupra tuturor lucrurilor" (TMp p©sin)5, „superior tuturor lucrurilor" (Øpšrteron 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iii, 1 ('Ar' oân ¢nÒmoioj Ð qeÕj tù nù ka ›teroj;) 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iii, 10–12. Vezi de asemenea Vi, 20 despre caracterul incomparabil al ipostazei unului prim (tÕ ¢sÚmblhton tÁj aÙtoà Øpost£sewj). 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, i, 3–4. cf. Platon, Parmenide, 142 a 3–4: „unul nu poate fi numit, nici exprimat" (OÙd' Ñnom£zetai ¥ra oÙd lšgetai). 4 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, ii, 1–14. cf. Platon, Parmenide, 141 e 12: „unul nu este nici măcar unu" (tÕ žn oÜte ›n TMstin). 5 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, i, 4. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 171 aÙtîn)1. Astfel, dacă toate lucrurile sunt fiinţe determinate, zeul prim este „supra-fiinţial" (p£ntwn ØperoÚsioj)2 sau „înaintea fiinţei" (prooÚsion)3, după modelul binelui din Republica. dar atunci, cum se face că autorii de după Porfir i-au atribuit acestuia o perspectivă diferită, în care principiul prim nu mai este propriu-zis dincolo de fiinţă, ci se identifică cu parte cea mai înaltă a fiinţei? Pentru a elucida această problemă, va trebui să intrăm și mai adânc în amănuntele textului lui Porfir, și să observăm care este elementul de originalitate ce intervine în privinţa principiului prim de dincolo de fiinţă. Porfir încearcă să explice în ce constă această superioritate a zeului (a unul prim) faţă de celelalte lucruri, faţă de sfera fiinţelor determinate, și care este motivul real pentru care acest zeu prim nu poate fi cunoscut și nici exprimat în termenii obișnuiţi ai gândirii noastre. Problema care se pune privește statutul acestei „supra-fiinţialităţi" (ØperoÚsioj) a principiului prim: dacă principiul este dincolo de fiinţă, oare trebuie să înţelegem că el este un fel de ne-fiinţă? ne amintim că Plotin însuși era foarte precaut în a vorbi despre principiul prim atribuindu-i fiinţă, iar într-un anumit context4, el suprimă însuși faptul de a fi al principiului. Totuși, Plotin însuși nu afirmă că principiul prim ar fi o nefiinţă5. În schimb, Porfir operează o răsturnare de sens, tocmai pen1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, ii, 1. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, ii, 11. 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, X, 25. 4 Vezi, de pildă, Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 8.13–15: „căci dăm la o parte acest este, precum și orice alt fel de relaţie faţă de cele ce sunt". de asemenea, în Enneade, Vi, 8, 11.25–26, Plotin spune că unul este „așa cum este" (aej oesti), însă precizează imediat că acest „cum este" este spus numai dintr-o necesitate a expunerii, iar nu pentru că unul însuși ar fi cu adevărat, nu pentru că lui i-ar reveni fiinţa. Vezi de asemenea Vi, 8, 16, 20, unde se spune că a fi-ul unului este aparent, căci el este ca şi cum ar fi (oOEon enai). 5 este ceea ce vor face abia neoplatonicii tardivi, precum Proclus și damascius. Așa cum vom vedea în continuare, acești autori vor prefera să se refere la principiul de dincolo de fiinţă ca la o nefiinţă, dar, desigur, în sensul superiorităţii faţă de fiinţă. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM172 tru a nu lăsa să se înţeleagă că principiul ar fi o nefiinţă, în sensul inferiorităţii faţă de fiinţă. el vrea să pună în evidenţă anterioritatea și superioritatea zeului prim, fără ca această anterioritate să fie aceea a unei nefiinţe, a unui neant. Astfel, dacă zeul este incomparabil cu orice lucru dintre cele care sunt, și nimic dintre acestea nu îl poate exprima, aceasta nu înseamnă că zeul însuși ar fi „ne-fiinţă", ca și cum ar avea o lipsă și ar fi mai puţin decât fiinţa. din contră, dacă privim lucrurile din perspectiva demnităţii lor ontologice, zeul este singurul care are fiinţă într-un sens veritabil, anume o fiinţă autentică, în cel mai înalt sens al termenului; în schimb, faţă de acest unu prim, celelalte lucruri par a fi, ele de fapt, neant1. Ele sunt, de fapt, lipsite de fiinţă, faţă de principiul care este cauza anterioară și neafectată a tuturor lucrurilor: „căci nu el este nefiinţă (m3⁄4 Ôn) și de neînţeles pentru cei care vor să îl cunoască, ci noi, împreună cu toate fiinţele, suntem nimic (mhdšn) faţă el"2. Tocmai de aceea, explică Porfir, nu putem cunoaște principiul, tocmai de aceea el ne apare ca inexprimabil și exclus din sfera fiinţei: nu pentru că el ar fi ne-fiinţă, ci pentru că, de fapt, fiinţa lui depășește fiinţa noastră, el este de necuprins în sfera prea strâmtă a ceea ce noi numim fiinţă, în sfera a ceea ce suntem noi și a ceea ce sunt celelalte lucruri pe care le numim fiinţe. Acesta este și motivul pentru care zeul rămâne fără relaţie cu tot ceea ce vine după el: nu pentru că toate celelalte lucruri sunt, în timp ce el însuși nu ar fi nimic, ci, din contră, pentru că el singur este, într-un mod preeminent faţă de toate celelalte lucruri. Porfir unește astfel faptul de a fi dincolo de fiinţă (sau dincolo de lucrurile determinate, care există) și faptul de a poseda fiinţă în sensul cel mai veritabil. Astfel se explică afirmaţia lui că: „Zeul 1 Vezi Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iii, 94, 5–9, unde se arată că unul prim rămâne același, într-o preexcelenţă (Øperoc») incomensurabilă faţă de orice altceva, iar aceasta indiferent dacă lucrurile care vin de la el ar exista sau nu; în consecinţă, totul care vine după el este ca și cum nu ar fi, faţă de această preexcelenţă a unului. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iV, 94, 19–22. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 173 posedă, ca pe ceva inseparabil, faptul de a fi, singur și dincolo de tot (tÕ enai mÒnon ka Øpr tÕ p©n)"1. Zeul are faptul de a fi (tÕ enai), însă acest fapt al său de a fi este dincolo de totul (Øpr tÕ p©n), mai presus de fiinţă (ØperoÚsioj) - chiar dacă, în primă instanţă, cele două enunţuri par contradictorii. Prin această afirmaţie atât de surprinzătoare, Porfir introduce o distincţie foarte fină între „tipurile" de a fi; el „desfoliază" faptul însuși de a fi, distingând în el mai multe niveluri: el nu distinge doar fiinţa veritabilă de fiinţa „neveritabilă" - așa cum făcea Plotin, urmându-l pe Platon -, ci distinge nivelurile fiinţei veritabile, nivelurile necesare în constituirea fiinţei înseși, în sensul ei de fiinţă inteligibilă, de fiinţă a intelectului divin. Totuși, dacă zeul prim este fiinţa în sens preeminent, ne întrebăm ce statut oferă Porfir fiinţei inteligibile, adică acelei „fiinţe" care a constituit interogaţia constantă a filozofiei, încă de la Platon. de aceea, ceea ce ne interesează în continuare este modul în care Porfir gândește unul secund (intelectul): cum anume se constituie acesta după zeul prim (unul absolut) și ce fel de „fiinţă" îi revine lui. Altfel spus, cum se face trecerea de la a fi-ul zeului prim, la a fi-ul intelectului divin. Se pare că tocmai aceasta ar fi problema care i-a făcut pe Proclus și pe damascius să spună că, pentru Porfir, principiul prim ar fi vârful intelectului, în ciuda faptului că Porfir insistă asupra anteriorităţii zeului prim faţă de intelectul divin. Așadar, cum se constituie intelectul divin în urma zeului prim, sau - în termenii ipotezelor platonice reluate de neoplatonici - cum trebuie înţeles unul secund faţă de unul prim, absolut? Pentru a răspunde la această întrebare, Porfir pornește tocmai de la textul platonic al celei de-a doua ipoteze, încercând să îl analizeze în amănunt. ceea ce caracterizează scrierea lui Porfir este, în primul rând, faptul că aceasta intră în detaliile textului platonic, ridicând probleme foarte punctuale și încercând să le dea o explicaţie „neoplatonică", așadar în acord cu doctrina ge1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iV, 94, 8–9. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM174 nerală a maestrului său, Plotin. Astfel, în cazul care ne interesează acum, Porfir crede că găsește în textul platonic o indicaţie privind relaţia concretă dintre intelect (sau unul secund) și unul suprem, mai precis o indicaţie asupra modului specific de a fi al intelectului. la drept vorbind, dacă respectăm termenii lui Porfir, nu putem vorbi despre o relaţie propriu-zisă între intelect și unul prim, în măsura în care acesta din urmă nu poate intra în nici o relaţie și nu poate fi comparat cu intelectul sau cu orice altceva de după el. Totuși, deși în primă instanţă el afirmă non-relaţionarea unului cu intelectul, în cele din urmă el ajunge să acorde unului un rol concret în raport cu intelectul. Tocmai de aici va decurge ambiguitatea lui Porfir; de asemenea, de aici decurge modul aparte în care Porfir a fost receptat de neoplatonicii ulteriori. Astfel, în contextul celei de-a doua ipoteze din Parmenide, Platon afirmă că „unul participă la fiinţă"1. Aceasta este o afirmaţie care, în primă instanţă, pare destul de spinoasă și la limită inacceptabilă în contextul general al gândirii neoplatonice, care privilegiază unul faţă de fiinţă. cum ar putea unul să participe la fiinţă, dacă unul este cel care precede fiinţa și o face posibilă, iar nu invers? după cum am arătat în prima parte a analizei noastre, Plotin a pus mereu în evidenţă anterioritatea unului faţă de fiinţă, atât la nivel sensibil, la nivel inteligibil, cât și ca anterioritate a unului absolut faţă de întreaga realitate. Totuși, Plotin însuși nu ia în calcul o asemenea afirmaţie, cum că unul ar participa la fiinţă. Pentru el, această afirmaţie ar constitui într-adevăr o mare problemă. În schimb, Porfir este primul care încearcă să integreze și acest amănunt platonic în gândirea neoplatonică. el încearcă să dea o soluţie acestei probleme. În acest sens, el formulează mai multe ipoteze. o primă explicaţie a acestei participări a unului secund la fiinţă este următoarea: „unul [se1 Platon, Parmenide, 142 b 5–6: „dacă unul este, oare este posibil ca el să fie, fără a participa la fiinţă? nu este posibil." (•En e„ oestin, «ra oOEÒn te aÙtÕ enai mšn, oÙs...aj d m3⁄4 metšcein; - OÙc oOEÒn te.). de asemenea, Parmenide, 143 a 4: „spunem că unul participă la fiinţă" (OÙs...aj famn metšcein tÕ ›n). Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 175 cund] nu mai este unul pur, ci proprietatea de a fi se alterează împreună cu el"1. Așadar, unul secund este unu, însă nu în mod pur, ci el este unu în mod derivat, ca o proprietate a lui, deţinând în același timp proprietatea de a fi. Unul secund rezultă astfel din întâlnirea „unului" și a „faptului de a fi" (enai) care, tocmai pentru că nu mai sunt pure, ci se amestecă una cu alta, creează o alterare faţă de unul prim, absolut. În acest caz, „unul [secund] participă la fiinţă (oÙs...a)" tocmai în sensul că are acest fapt determinat de a fi: el este unu, însă un unu determinat, care are, în consecinţă, un fapt de a fi determinat. Unul și faptul de a fi care se întâlnesc în unul secund determină o reciprocă relativizare, atât a unului cât și a faptului de a fi: unul nu mai este pur, iar faptul de a fi (nici el pur) este doar o proprietate a unului secund, care participă astfel la fiinţă. Totuși, Porfir nu se oprește la această interpretare, ci merge și mai departe, pentru a explica participarea unului secund la fiinţă. Pista pe care va merge va fi aceea de a căuta de unde vine această „proprietate de a fi" a unului secund, de unde primește el faptul de a fi. În unul secund, faptul de a fi se află deja într-un mod derivat, amestecat într-un fel cu unul. Însă unde se află faptul de a fi pur, la care, participând, unul secund devine un unu-fiinţă? ipoteza pe care o înaintează Porfir va fi aceea că unul secund primește fiinţa sa derivată prin participare la unul prim, așadar că, dacă „unul [secund] participă la fiinţă", această participare este o participare la unul prim anterior: „dar poate că, deoarece [unul] secund vine de la [unul] prim, tocmai de aceea spunem că cel secund participă la primul, întregul unu-care-este (žn enai) fiind generat prin participare la unul [prim]."2 dar aici, Porfir își ia o precauţie: dacă unul secund ar participa la unul prim, de ce textul platonic nu spune chiar asta, anume că unul secund participă la unul [prim]? Răspunsul lui Porfir este 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xi, 7–9 (oÙd tÕ ›n TMstin tÕ ¢kraifnšj, sunhllo...wtai d aÙtù 1 toà enai „diÒthj). 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 10–14. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM176 următorul: dacă s-ar fi spus că unul [secund] participă la unul [prim], atunci s-ar fi înţeles că unul secund este mai întâi generat ca atare, ca unu secund, și abia apoi participă la unul prim. dar acest lucru nu poate fi acceptat, ci tocmai participaţia unului secund la unul prim este cea prin care unul secund este generat: unul secund este unu (precum unul prim), însă el este în același timp diferit de unul prim, iar „această diferenţă îl conduce spre faptul-de-a-fi-unu" (¢pÕ toà nÕj terÒthj peri»gagen aÙtÕ e„j tÕ žn enai)1. Așadar, unul secund este constituit prin participare la unul prim, iar participarea sa la unul prim constă în aceea că unul secund își adaugă sieși acest fapt de a fi unu (prose... lhfe tÕ enai ›n)2, participând astfel la fiinţă. dar aici se ridică o problemă pentru analiza porfiriană. Unul secund deţine fiinţa, participând de fapt la unul prim; totuși, unul prim nu este el însuși fiinţare (în sensul de Ôn, de fiinţă determinată), ci el este - în bună tradiţie platonică - dincolo de fiinţă (TMpškeina oÙs...aj)3. dar atunci, ce este acest unu prim, la care, participând, unul secund ajunge să deţină fiinţă? Răspunsul lui Porfir este acela că: „unul [prim], care este dincolo de fiinţă și de fiinţare (TMpškeina oÙs...aj ka Ôntoj), nu este nici fiinţare, nici fiinţă, nici act, ci mai degrabă el „acţionează și este act pur" (tÕ TMnerge‹n kaqarÒn), astfel încât este și „faptul însuși de a fi" (aÙtÕ tÕ enai), cel care este înaintea fiinţării"4. Astfel, dacă mai înainte (iV, 94, 8-9) Porfir admitea că, faţă de fiinţările determinate, unul prim are pe a fi într-un mod superior, acum, el merge și mai departe, și spune că unul prim este însuşi faptul de a fi, cel anterior fiinţei și fiinţării determinate. din această perspectivă, participarea unului secund la fiinţă 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 18–19. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 21–22. 3 desigur, Porfir a spus că unul prim ar fi „singura fiinţă adevărată" (Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iV, 94, 27), însă aceasta nu înseamnă că unul prim poate fi considerat alături de celelalte fiinţări, ca una dintre ele, ci, din contră, înseamnă că doar unul este cu adevărat, separându-se astfel de mulţimea fiinţărilor determinate. 4 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 23–27. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 177 este același lucru cu participarea lui la unul prim. Unul secund participă la fiinţă și participă la unul prim deoarece, în fond, unul prim este tocmai faptul pur de a fi. Unul secund este un unu determinat și are o fiinţă determinată, deoarece el participă la unul pur, care este faptul pur de a fi. În această soluţie a lui Porfir recunoaștem mai multe surse doctrinare. Pe de o parte, Porfir însuși prezintă această afirmaţie a sa ca fiind o interpretare sau o lămurire a „manierei ascunse" în care Platon vorbește despre unul prim, de dincolo de fiinţă1. Porfir unește astfel - după maniera tipic neoplatonică - cele două referinţe platonice fundamentale: cea privind unul prim din Parmenide și cea privind binele de dincolo de fiinţă din Republica. Pentru el, acest dincolo de fiinţă - la care unul secund participă pentru a primi fiinţă - reprezintă însuși faptul de a fi, actul pur de a fi. dar în această a doua indicaţie recunoaștem o altă sursă doctrinară, și anume una plotiniană, la care se cuvine să ne referim în continuare. Vom vedea că interpretarea lui Porfir la formula platonică este intermediată de analiza lui Plotin asupra aceleiași formule. B. Sursa plotiniană a problemei este vorba despre două pasaje în care Plotin însuși discută expresia „dincolo de fiinţă", prezentând-o, de asemenea, ca având „un sens ascuns"2. „dincolo de fiinţă" ar indica independenţa absolută a unului faţă de fiinţă; unul a generat fiinţa, dar el însuși nu are nevoie de fiinţă, ci o lasă în afara sa: „cel care l-a făcut [pe a fi] nu are nevoie de a fi (oÙdn toà enai deÒmenoj). de aceea, unul nici măcar nu face pe este în măsura în care [el în1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 22–23: „Vezi dacă nu cumva Platon pare să spună în mod ascuns [sau să vorbească în enigme, într-un mod aluziv], despre unul de dincolo de fiinţă ..." ("Ora d m3⁄4 ka a„nissomšnJ oeoiken Ð Pl£twn, Óti tÕ žn tÕ TMpškeina oÙs...aj [...]). 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 19.13–14: „cei vechi au vorbit despre dincolo de fiinţă într-un mod ascuns [sau în enigme, în aluzii]" (tÕ TMpškeina oÙs...aj [...] to‹j palaio‹j legÒmenon di' a„n...xewj). PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM178 suși] este [sau conform cu faptul că el însuși este]"1. Plotin distinge astfel între ceea ce este principiul însuși și fiinţa pe care el o generează (spunând că principiul nu creează pe este conform cu ceea ce el însuși este). dar atunci, ce „este" acest principiu anterior fiinţei, care a făcut pe „este"? În ce constă el? Plotin va spune că principiul este „un act prim, lipsit de fiinţă (TMnšrgeian t3⁄4n prèthn [...] ¥neu oÙs...aj)" 2, deoarece „actul este superior fiinţei" 3. Într-adevăr, principiul nu poate fi produs de altceva (și, deci, nu poate avea un act anterior lui), ci el se produce pe sine. Totuși, în el nu există relaţia (și dualitatea) dintre produs și producător. el nu poate fi nici producător, nici produs, căci el nu poate nici să preceadă actul său propriu, nici să apară abia în urma acestui act - în ambele cazuri, principiul ar avea în sine însuși o dualitate. Principiul este doar actul de a produce, un act pur, independent atât de un „agent" care l-ar precede, cât și de un „rezultat" care i-ar urma. Principiul nu are o fiinţă a sa, diferită de actul său (fie că aceasta ar precede actul, fie că ar rezulta din acel act), ci principiul este însuși actul, însuși acest fapt de a se crea pe sine însuși ca act pur, anterior fiinţei. şi tocmai acesta consideră Plotin că ar fi sensul „ascuns" al expresiei dincolo de fiinţă. În consecinţă, principiul se produce pe sine ca act, iar faptul lui de a produce este deja ceea ce el este: „căci a fi este una cu producerea și cu această așa-zisă generare eternă"4. contextul pe care l-am analizat se apropie foarte mult de interpretarea lui Porfir. Astfel, ca și Plotin, Porfir arată că unul prim nu este ceva de ordinul fiinţei (oÙs...a), ci este faptul pur de a fi (tÕ enai), anterior fiinţei (oÙs...a)5. desigur, observăm că, 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 19, 13–20. 2 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 20.9–10. 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 20.14 (teleiÒteron 1 TMnšrgeia tÁj oÙs...aj). În această expresie recunoaștem o trimitere la doctrina aristotelică - acceptată de Plotin - privind anterioritatea actului faţă de potenţă. 4 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 8, 20.27. 5 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 23–27: „Unul care este dincolo de fiinţă și de fiinţare nu este nici fiinţare, nici fiinţă, nici act, ci mai degrabă el acţionează și este el însuși faptul pur de a acţiona, astfel încât el este și faptul Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 179 faţă de Plotin, Porfir schimbă într-un fel perspectiva, aducând în prim-plan acest fapt de a fi al principiului. Astfel, dacă Plotin spunea că, pentru principiu, a fi constă în actul anterior fiinţei, Porfir merge mai departe și spune că unul prim este însuși faptul pur de a fi anterior fiinţei, la care fiinţa însăși trebuie să participe, pentru a se constitui ca fiinţă determinată. În plus, el încearcă să explice și felul în care se constituie fiinţa veritabilă (adică intelectul) pornind de la acest fapt pur de a fi (care este unul prim) - iar aceasta va fi în același timp explicaţia dată de Porfir expresiei platonice: „unul [secund] participă la fiinţă"1. Astfel, el arată că: „participând la acesta [la faptul de a fi anterior fiinţei], unul [secund] primește un a fi derivat, și tocmai aceasta înseamnă a participa la fiinţă"2. Astfel, Porfir face diferenţa dintre a fi-ul pur al principiului, și proprietatea de a fi care revine unului secund. Avem pe de o parte unul prim, care este „doar unu" (žn mÒnon)3 și este în același timp „doar a fi" (tÕ enai mÒnon)4, așadar în el nu există nici o distanţă între „a fi" și „unu". Pe de altă parte, avem unul secund, care participă la unul prim, adică la acest fapt pur de a fi; însă, în felul acesta, unul secund este un unu determinat și are un fapt de a fi derivat. Unul secund nu mai este „doar unu", ci este „unu-fiinţă" (žn Ón)5; de asemenea, el nu este „doar a fi", adică doar faptul de a fi, ci el este o fiinţă determinată, el este prima fiinţă propriu-zisă. Astfel se constituie unul secund: el primește ambele „caracteristici" ale unului prim (aceea de unu și aceea de a fi), însă le primește pe amândouă nu pure, ci determinate; acestea sunt derivate și distinse una de alta, ele se adaugă una celeilalte, însuși de a fi, acela care este anterior fiinţării". 1 Platon, Parmenide, 142 b 5–6; 143 a 4. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 27–29 (oá metascÕn tÕ <ž>n ¥llo TMx aÙtoà oecei TMkklinÒmenon tÕ enai, Óper TMst metšcein Ôntoj). 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 4. 4 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iV, 8. Unul prim este „doar a fi" (tÕ enai mÒnon), fără ca acest „a fi pur" să se aplice la ceva sau să se însoţească cu ceva (deoarece unul prim nu este nimic din cele ce sunt, ci este anterior fiinţei). 5 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xi, 30. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM180 alterându-se una prin cealaltă1. În unul secund, faptul de a fi unu este adăugat2, iar faptul de a fi este derivat3. el participă astfel la fiinţă, participând la acest fapt pur de a fi. Porfir distinge astfel două feluri de a fi4. Pe de o parte, este vorba despre acest a fi care preexistă fiinţei (adică intelectului) (proãp£rcei toà Ôntoj), adică de unul de dincolo de fiinţă (TMpškeina toà Ôntoj). Acesta este a fi absolut (enai tÕ ¢pÒluton) și este „ca o idee a fiinţei" (ésper „dša toà Ôntoj). Pe de altă parte, este vorba de un a fi derivat, corespunzător unului secund, de un a fi produs de unul prim. Așadar, avem un a fi absolut și transcendent, și un alt a fi derivat și produs. interpretarea lui Porfir la expresia platonică „unul participă la fiinţă" se apropie destul de mult de textul platonic, dacă ne gândim că, atât în prima aporie, cât și în cea de-a doua, Platon pornește de la ipoteza că „unul este". desigur, în prima ipoteză, „unul este" (e„ ›n TMstin)5 are sensul că „unul este unu", adică unul este în sine însuși, iar în cea de-a doua, „unul este" (žn e„ oestin)6 are sensul că „unul participă la fiinţă", așadar că unul are o fiinţă a sa. Porfir privilegiază tocmai acest aspect al textului platonic, anume similaritatea dintre cele două ipoteze. fiecare dintre ele pornește de la faptul că unul este (›n TMstin), deși prima ipoteză pune accentul pe unu (›n) și izolează unul în sine, separându-l în cele din urmă chiar și de oÙs...a, pe când cea de-a doua pune accentul pe a fi (oestin) și caută modul în care unul participă la fiinţă. Am putea spune astfel că, dacă la Plotin unul de dincolo de fiinţă este unul din „concluzia" aporiei platonice - anume unul care nici măcar 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xi, 15–17: „Așa și aici, în cazul unului [secund]: unul se alterează împreună cu fiinţa, iar fiinţa împreună cu unul" (OÛtwj g¦r ka TMp toÚ<tou> tÒ te žn tÍ oÙs...v sunhllo...wtai 1⁄4 te oÙs...a tù n...). 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 21 (prose...lhfe tÕ enai ›n). 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 28 (TMkklinÒmenon tÕ enai). 4 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 29–35. 5 Platon, Parmenide, 137 c 4. 6 Platon, Parmenide, 142 b 3. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 181 nu este -, în schimb, Porfir revalorifică ipoteza de la care pornește aporia, anume faptul că, la începutul primei aporii, unul prim este anunţat ca fiind (›n TMstin), iar în cea de-a doua aporie, unul secund este enunţat ca participând la fiinţă. Prin această interpretare a sa, Porfir leagă anterioritatea absolută a unului prim faţă de cele de după el (el este dincolo de toate tocmai pentru că doar el are fiinţa în mod real, pe când, faţă de el, celelalte sunt neant), cu faptul că unul secund participă la a fi (și anume, el participă tocmai la faptul pur de a fi, care este unul prim, dincolo de toate celelalte lucruri, dincolo de fiinţa determinată). el pune astfel în acord textul Republicii, 509 b 9 (despre binele de dincolo de fiinţă), cu textul celei de-a doua ipoteze din Parmenide, în care unul [secund] participă la fiinţă. Pentru Porfir, unul [secund] participă la fiinţă deoarece participă la ceea ce este dincolo de fiinţă, la ceea ce fundamentează fiinţa: iar acesta este unul prim, identic cu faptul pur de a fi. faptul pur de a fi este dincolo de fiinţă, adică dincolo de fiinţa determinată. Maniera lui de a fi este însă preeminentă, superioară manierei determinate în care sunt celelalte lucruri. C. „Nemulţumirea" lui Damascius dar atunci, pentru a continua parcursul nostru, se ridică o întrebare: de unde venea „nemulţumirea" lui damascius faţă de Porfir, respingerea fără drept de apel a opiniei acestuia? de ce spune damascius - ca și Proclus, de altfel - că primul principiu al lui Porfir ar fi doar vârful inteligibilului, deși Porfir însuși insistă asupra anteriorităţii unului prim (care este faptul pur de a fi) faţă de unul secund (care este prima fiinţă determinată)? de care parte stă adevărul: de cea a lui Porfir (conform cu ceea ce ne arată Comentariul la Parmenide), sau de cea a lui damascius? Pentru a rezolva această dilemă, Pierre Hadot arată că poziţia lui Porfir este de fapt mai nuanţată: pe de o parte, unul prim este anterior și necoordonat intelectului, iar pe de altă parte, unul PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM182 prim este primul moment al constituirii intelectului, de aceea el este - în același timp, dar sub alt aspect - coordonat cu celelalte „momente" ale intelectului, adică cu viaţa și gândirea1. Totuși, această clarificare nu poate explica până la capăt nemulţumirea lui damascius. Ar părea că damascius ia în seamă doar o parte a gândirii lui Porfir, fie că nu ar fi înţeles și cealaltă parte a acesteia, fie că ar trece-o - în mod intenţionat - sub tăcere2. Să vedem însă, în amănunt, textele lui Porfir în care apare această problemă a coordonării sau necoordonării principiului faţă de intelect. ne vom opri, mai precis, asupra ultimei părţi păstrate din Comentariului la Parmenide3, unde Porfir discută rolul principiului prim în constituirea intelectului. el observă, în primul rând, că intelectul rămâne divizat în două părţi care nu se pot confunda: este vorba despre o parte intelectivă (tÕ nooàn) și o parte inteligibilă (tÕ nooÚmenon)4. cu alte cuvinte, intelectul este în același timp act al gândirii, dar și obiect al gândirii, el are mereu o „parte" intelectivă, diferită de „partea" sa inteligibilă. dar această distincţie - necesară intelectului - arată în același timp că intelectul rămâne într-un fel în afara sa, „neputând intra în sine" (m3⁄4 dun£menon e„j autÕn e„selqe‹n)5, de 1 P. Hadot, „la métaphysique de Porphyre", art. cit., p. 147: „[...] conform primului său aspect, Unul este absolut și necoordonat, conform celui de-al doilea aspect al său, Unul este coordonat cu viaţa și gândirea, deoarece atunci el este considerat drept primul moment al intelectului, drept existenţa pornind de la care intelectul se desfășoară, drept Unul izolat din Unul-care-este". 2 În articolul „Porphyry's doctrine of the one" (SOPHIES MAIETORES, « Chercheurs de sagesse » : Hommage à Jean Pépin, institut d'études augustiniennes, Paris, 1992, pp. 357–366), J. dillon, susţine chiar că succesorii lui Porfir (Proclus și damascius) prezintă doctrina acestuia într-o manieră foarte simplificatoare, din interese polemice. 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii–XiV. 4 la Plotin, cele două părţi ale intelectului sunt indicate ca atare, însă Plotin pune accentul pe identitatea lor, arătând că orice fiinţă inteligibilă este deja intelectivă, și invers. 5 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 1. Altfel, dacă intelectul ar intra complet în sine, atunci distincţia dintre inteligibil și intelectiv ar fi suprimată. dar atunci ar fi suprimată însăși condiţia duală a cunoașterii, iar, în consecinţă, Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 183 vreme ce aceste două părţi ale sale rămân distincte una de alta, atâta timp cât nimic altceva nu vine să realizeze unirea lor1. Pornind de la această observaţie, Porfir ridică o problemă foarte subtilă: dacă intelectul nu poate intra în sine, ci rămâne mereu divizat în inteligibil și intelectiv, atunci cum se face că, totuși, intelectul se vede pe sine însuși? Porfir scoate astfel în evidenţă condiţia paradoxală a cunoașterii, în ipostaza ei cea mai înaltă, anume aceea a cunoașterii de sine: pe de o parte, pentru a se cunoaște pe sine, intelectul trebuie să fie în același timp și inteligibil și intelectiv. Pe de altă parte, dacă intelectul are această situare duală, el nu poate intra în sine (ci intelectivul rămâne în afara inteligibilului), așadar, la limită, el nu se poate cunoaște pe sine, deoarece „partea" care cunoaște rămâne în afara celei care trebuie cunoscută. Această problemă ne amintește de dificultatea ridicată de Sextus empiricus privind cunoașterea de sine: dacă o parte cunoaște, iar alta este cunoscută, atunci intelectul nu ajunge niciodată să se cunoască pe sine însuși2. Plotin încercase să rezolve această dificultate, arătând că, în intelect, inteligibilul este în același timp intelectiv. Plotin punea accentul pe identitatea celor două aspecte ale intelectului, rezolvând astfel problema cunoașterii de sine. Totuși, intelectul presupune identitatea celor două aspecte ale sale (inteligibil și intelectiv), dar și distincţia dintre ele. Porfir va pune accentul nu pe identitatea, ci pe distincţia lor. el duce astfel mai departe această problemă de origine sceptică, întrebându-se cum se poate cunoaște intelectul pe sine însuși, tocmai în condiţia acestei distincţii din el însuși, a acestei distanţe faţă de sine însuși. Așadar, Porfir pornește de la faptul că intelectul nu poate inintelectul nu s-ar mai putea cunoaște pe sine. 1 dacă altul este intelectivul și altul este inteligibilul, atunci inteligibilul nu se poate cunoaște pe sine ca inteligibil (așadar nici nu poate fi inteligibil) pentru că cel care ar putea cunoaște acest lucru (adică intelectivul) rămâne diferit și „în afară". de asemenea, intelectivul (așadar cel care cunoaște) nu poate fi intelectiv, pentru că nu mai poate cunoaște nimic, deoarece inteligibilul (pe care l-ar putea cunoaște) îi rămâne străin, exterior. 2 Vezi partea i, capitolul 4, al lucrării noastre. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM184 tra în sine, deoarece el însuși nu poate suprima dualitatea din sine. dar atunci, se ridică trei întrebări. În primul rând, „cum poate [intelectul] să se vadă pe sine, dacă nu poate intra în sine?"1. Așadar, cum se cunoaște intelectul pe sine, dacă „sinele" său (inteligibil) rămâne „în afara" sa? În al doilea rând, dacă nu se poate vedea pe sine, se pune întrebarea: „cum [se poate vedea] pe sine [ca fiind] acela în care nu poate intra?"2. Așadar, cum poate intelectul să știe că el este tocmai acela în care, de fapt, nu poate intra? În al treilea rând, cum poate intelectul să știe chiar și acest fapt, anume că nu poate intra în sine? Altfel spus, de unde știe inteligibilul că el însuși este diferit de sine, dacă nu a ajuns încă la acest sine din „afara" sa, pentru a-l cunoaște ca diferit? cum ajunge intelectul să cunoască chiar și această distincţie din sine însuși? Așadar, Porfir observă că, dacă intelectul rămâne în această distanţă sau diviziune faţă de sine însuși, atunci el nu poate surprinde nici măcar această diviziune a sa, ci „altcineva" ar trebui să identifice această distanţă. „Altcineva" trebuie să fie în contact atât cu inteligibilul, cât și cu intelectivul, atât pentru ca acestea să se poată identifica, cât și pentru a vedea că „cel ce gândește" este altul decât „cel gândit". dacă diferenţa (dintre inteligibil și intelectiv) împiedică intelectul să surprindă atât identitatea celor două, cât și diferenţa lor, atunci cel care le va putea surprinde va fi cel în care nu mai există nici o diferenţă, nici o diviziune. iar acest punct de reper absolut va fi, pentru Porfir, principiul anterior intelectului, adică unul prim, care este actul pur de a fi. Pentru a explica în ce fel unul prim devine punctul de reper al intelectului - prin care acesta însuși se poate vedea pe sine - Porfir recurge la un exemplu din sfera biologică: într-un organism există mai multe puteri sau acte distincte, care nu se ating unele pe altele și nu se pot cunoaște unele pe altele în mod direct (de pildă, vederea, auzul, gustul). Pentru ca acestea să poată intra 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 1–2. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 3–4. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 185 în contact și să „știe" că sunt diferite între ele, este nevoie de o putere sau de un act care le transcende pe toate - pe care am putea-o numi conștiinţă internă - care nu este nici auz, nici văz, nici gust, dar care le cunoaște pe fiecare în parte, le distinge și le unifică, servindu-se de ele ca de niște instrumente1. În același fel, dacă intelectul este divizat în două părţi distincte, cărora le corespund două acte distincte (și tocmai de aceea nu se poate unifica pe sine într-un singur act de cunoaștere, ci rămâne mereu „în afara sa"), în schimb, unul anterior este un act pur și unic, în care nu există nici o distincţie2. el nu este un act anume, determinat - pentru a fi astfel separat de toate celelalte acte determinate la rândul lor, astfel încât celelalte acte să fie în afara lui și să îi rămână inaccesibile. din contră, toate celelalte acte îi sunt accesibile, tocmai pentru că el nu mai este un act determinat și distinct, ci este un act pur. Unul prim este astfel „acel act de dincolo de celelalte [acte], care le transcende pe toate, [...] care este în contact cu toate în mod identic, fără a fi [cuprins] în nici unul dintre acestea"3. Actul pur (așadar unul prim) este în contact cu toate celelalte acte de după el, garantând legătura dintre acestea. el devine astfel „acea putere (dÚnamij) prin care intelectul vede că nu poate intra în sine însuși"4, dar și acea putere prin care intelectivul ajunge totuși să se identifice cu inteligibilul. În actul pur al unului absolut este astfel suprimată acea diferenţă dintre inteligibil și 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 24–35. 2 Actul pur nu corespunde nici unui lucru anume. În consecinţă, el este un act fără formă, fără nume și fără fiinţă, căci orice alt act își ia forma de la lucrul căruia în corespunde, pe când el este anterior fiinţei. În el nu există nimic altceva (formă sau fiinţă), și tocmai de aceea el este lipsit de orice diferenţă. el este actul pur de a fi, anterior fiinţei și anterior oricărei distincţii, precum aceea dintre inteligibil și intelectiv. 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 9–13 (1 TMnšrgeia par' TMke...naj 1 TMpanabebhku‹a p£saij, 1 p£ntwn TMfaptomšnh ka kat¦ tÕ aÙtÕ ka TMn oÙden oâsa). 4 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 34–35 (1 dÚnamij kaq' ¿n Ðr Ð noàj m3⁄4 dun£menoj e„selqe‹n e„j autÒn). PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM186 intelectiv care făcea ca intelectul să nu se poată cunoaște pe sine, care ameninţa unitatea intelectului. Porfir rezolvă astfel - pe o altă cale decât Plotin - problema cunoașterii de sine a intelectului: atât diferenţa, cât și identitatea dintre intelectiv și inteligibil devin vizibile numai din perspectiva unului prim, care, ca act pur de a fi, nu se mai divide, ci transcende distincţia însăși. el este „dincolo de acestea ca vârstă și ca putere"1, Porfir reluând aici tocmai expresia din Republica, 509 b 9, privind binele de dincolo de fiinţa. Pornind de la această explicaţie a modului în care intelectul se cunoaște pe sine prin intermediul unului anterior, Porfir se vede nevoit să admită că, la originea sa, intelectul este tocmai acest act pur care transcende distincţia, această putere (dÚnamij) prin care intelectul se vede pe sine - atât ca distincţie, cât și ca unitate. În primă instanţă - anterior distincţiei propriu-zise, dintre intelectiv și inteligibil - intelectul este „unu și simplu" (žn ka ¡ploàn)2. intelectul, la originea sa, ajunge să se identifice cu unul prim. Mai mult decât atât, Porfir descoperă o sursă doctrinară pentru această explicaţie a sa, tocmai în textul platonic al dialogului Parmenide. Astfel, în cea de-a doua ipoteză, așadar în ipoteza unului secund, a intelectului, înainte de a desfășura însoţirea constantă dintre unu și fiinţă, Platon se întreabă cum este acest „unu în sine" (aÙtÕ tÕ ›n). Unul din a doua ipoteză participă, într-adevăr, la fiinţă, și devine astfel plural3, fiind descoperit în fiecare colţ al fiinţei; totuși, dacă gândim acest unu „în el însuși", separat de fiinţa la care participă, el ne va apărea a fi doar unu, iar nu plural4. Sprijinindu-se pe această indicaţie platonică, Porfir arată că, 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, XiV, 3–4 (TMpškeina toÚtwn oâsa presbe...v ka dun£mei). „dincolo de acestea" înseamnă dincolo de inteligibil și intelectiv, care sunt distinse în cadrul intelectului. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, XiV, 5. 3 Platon, Parmenide, 143 a 4–6: „spunem că unul participă la fiinţă [...] și că de aceea el s-a arătat a fi plural". 4 Platon, Parmenide, 143 a 6–9. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 187 înainte de a fi distins în sine însuși - așadar înainte de a se manifesta ca atare, ca act de a se gândi pe sine însuși - intelectul (acest „unu în sine" din ipoteza platonică) este „unu și simplu", și anume, el este tocmai acea „putere" prin care intelectul se vede pe sine, adică el este tocmai unul absolut: „în același fel, am putea spune că puterea prin care vede intelectul care nu poate intra în sine este diferită și superioară distincţiei dintre intelectiv și inteligibil, fiind dincolo de acestea ca vârstă şi putere, iar în felul acesta, acest [unu] în sine1, care este unu și simplu, diferă totuși de sine ca act și existenţă; așadar, el este într-un sens unu și simplu, iar în alt sens el diferă de sine"2. observăm astfel că Porfir identifică de fapt unul din prima ipoteză (această putere de dincolo de fiinţă, care este „dincolo de tot și este cauză necoordonată a totului"3, prin care intelectul se vede pe sine), cu acest unu din a doua ipoteză, care, înainte de a participa la fiinţă, este considerat în sine însuși și apare a fi unu și simplu, non-plural. el identifică astfel binele de dincolo de fiinţă (din Republica 509 b 9), cu unul din prima ipoteză platonică, dar și cu unul din expresia „unu-care-este" (žn Ôn)4 (din cea de-a doua ipoteză platonică) ce corespunde primului moment al constituirii intelectului divin5. Unul din a doua ipoteză (adică intelectul) este astfel dublu: pe de o parte, considerat ca unu în sine, separat de fiinţă, el este „unu și simplu", identificându-se cu unul absolut din prima ipoteză; pe de altă parte, dacă îl considerăm împreună cu fiinţa, așadar ca unul-care-este, el devine plural, fiind intelectul desfășurat, mani1 „Acest [unu] în sine" (tÕ aÙtÕ toàto) reia întocmai expresia din textul platonic Parmenide, 143 a 9. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 34–XiV, 8. 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 22–23. 4 Platon, Parmenide, 142 d 4. 5 P. Hadot, „la métaphysique de Porphyre", art. cit., p. 144: „Selon le Commentaire sur le Parmenide, l'intelligence en son premier état, identifiée à l'«Un» de l'«Un-qui-est», coïncide donc avec le premier Un lui-même". interpretarea este reluată de Steven K. Strange, în articolul „Porphyry and Plotinus' Metaphysics", în G. Karamanolis și A. Sheppard (ed.), Studies in Porphyry, Bulletin of the institute of classical Studies, 98, 2007, pp. 17–34. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM188 fest, pe care Porfir îl va descrie ca triadă (după modelul deja prezent la Plotin). Unul simplu constituie în același timp primul aspect al intelectului, acela în care intelectul nu este încă desfășurat. el este actul pur de a fi sau existenţa (Ûparxij), care transcende orice determinaţie și distincţie. Mai precis, în primul rând, existenţa (ca act pur de a fi) pre-există fiinţei (ca fiinţă determinată, ca Ôn)1. În al doilea rând, acest act pur de a fi este un act ce rămâne în sine, deoarece el nu are nevoie să se îndrepte spre altceva, așa cum intelectivul s-ar îndrepta spre inteligibil. la acest nivel, actul nu iese din sine, nu are o viaţă a sa, ci el este un act imobil ( stîsa)2. În al treilea rând, acest act pur de a fi (numit existenţă - Ûparxij) nu este determinat încă drept inteligibil sau intelectiv, ci el transcende această diferenţă, și tocmai de aceea poate face legătura dintre cele două, constituind astfel o cunoaștere anterioară distincţiei dintre subiectul și obiectul cunoașterii. Porfir spune chiar că, la acest nivel al existenţei, al unului prim, intelectivul coincide cu inteligibilul3. Pornind de la acest prim aspect, în care nu există încă nici o distincţie, intelectul se poate apoi desfășura: el iese din această pură existenţă, separându-se în intelectiv și inteligibil; el devine astfel o fiinţă determinată, cu un act determinat (actul de a gândi), îndreptat spre sine însuși (ca obiect al acestei gândiri). intelectul instituie astfel toate distincţiile care în unul prim nu funcţionau. Astfel, intelectul porfirian se desfășoară și se manifestă, el fiind 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xii, 29–30: „A fi (enai) este dublu: pe de o parte, cel care preexistă fiinţei (tÕ mn proãp£rcei toà Ôntoj)". Întradevăr, acest a fi al unului prim nu este a fi-ul unui lucru anume, el nu determină o fiinţă concretă, ci este doar actul de a fi, care nu se particularizează într-o fiinţă determinată și distinctă de alte fiinţe. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, XiV, 22–23: „conform existenţei, actul ar fi imobil" (kat¦ mn t3⁄4n Ûparxin stîsa n e‡h 1 TMnšrgeia). Acest act imobil a fost întâlnit deja la Plotin, care în Enneade, V, 3, 10.17–18 spune că unul nu are spre ce să își îndrepte activitatea, ci el rămâne „absolut imobil" (p£nth st»setai). 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, XiV, 16–17. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 189 constituit ca o triadă: existenţă-viaţă-gândire. intelectul lui Porfir are astfel două „aspecte": pe de o parte un prim aspect de imobilitate, în care intelectul coincide cu unul prim și rămâne în sine, cunoscându-se pe sine fără să se distingă în sine însuși, iar, pe de altă parte, acest al doilea aspect, cel desfășurat, în care intelectul capătă o viaţă a sa: el iese din sine ca intelectiv, pentru a se întoarcere apoi la sine ca inteligibil. D. Coordonat sau necoordonat? Să ne întoarcem însă la problema de la care am pornit, și anume dacă la Porfir principiul prim este coordonat (așa cum spune damascius) sau necoordonat cu cele de după el. În explicaţia lui P. Hadot amintită mai sus, aceste două aspecte coexistă: principiul prim este pe de o parte absolut, transcendent, așadar necoordonat, dar, pe de altă parte, el este coordonat celorlalte „momente" ale intelectului, ca vârf al intelectului. Totuși, în această interpretare subzistă o echivocitate. Hadot afirmă, pe de o parte, că „Tatăl din Oracole, identificat de Porfir cu Unul lui Plotin, este primul moment al mișcării prin care intelectul se pune pe sine" și că „intelectul este la origine identic cu Unul prim"1. Pe de altă parte, după ce distinge cele două aspecte ale intelectului (momentul său prim, identic cu unul prim, respectiv intelectul desfășurat ca triadă) Hadot deduce că unul are și el două aspecte: „dacă există un dublu aspect al intelectului, rezultă că există și un dublu aspect al Unului: conform primului său aspect, Unul este absolut și necoordonat, iar conform celui de-al doilea aspect Unul este coordonat cu viaţa și gândirea, deoarece îl considerăm ca fiind primul moment al intelectului"2. 1 P. Hadot, „la métaphysique de Porphyre", art. cit., p. 135. 2 P. Hadot, „la métaphysique de Porphyre", art. cit., p. 147. Vezi de asemenea p. 142: „această afirmaţie [a dualităţii intelectului] înseamnă în același timp că Unul sau Zeul suprem are și el un dublu aspect: un prim aspect, conform căruia el este Unul absolut și necoordonat, un al doilea aspect, conform căruia el este intelectul redus la momentul său prim". PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM190 cele două afirmaţii par însă să se contrazică: din prima afirmaţie rezultă că primul moment al intelectului ar fi unul prim (unul lui Plotin); în schimb, din cea de-a doua afirmaţie rezultă că primul moment al intelectului este „aspectul" coordonat al unului, așadar diferit de unul prim, absolut. conform explicaţiei lui P. Hadot - privind cele două aspecte ale unului - ar însemna că avem trei niveluri distincte: 1. Unul absolut, necoordonat 2. Unul ca prim moment al intelectului, care este deci coordonat (acesta ar corespunde unului din unul-care-este) 3. intelectul însuși, desfășurat (care ar corespunde unuluicare-este, respectiv triadei existenţă-viaţă-gândire) dar în felul acesta intelectul (în primul său moment) nu s-ar mai identifica cu unul absolut însuși, ci doar cu unul din unulcare-este, care ar fi considerat ca diferit, într-un fel, de unul absolut. Totuși, această interpretare ar merge împotriva a ceea ce vrea să spună Porfir, anume că unul absolut (1.) este faptul pur de a fi, anterior distincţiei dintre intelectiv și inteligibil, și este acela prin care intelectul se vede pe sine (adică primul moment al intelectului: (2.). de fapt, Porfir șterge diferenţa dintre (1.) și (2.), adică dintre unul absolut și unul din unul-care-este (sau primul moment al intelectului). Pentru Porfir, unul absolut este primul moment al intelectului, și el rămâne anterior - și necoordonat - distincţiei ulterioare între inteligibil și intelectiv. de fapt, la ce se referă coordonarea sau necoordonarea principiului? În Istoria filozofică, ocurenţa termenului necordonat (sugkatat£ttesqai) se referă la faptul că zeul nu poate fi pus alături de celelalte lucruri în privinţa demnităţii (mhd t3⁄4n ¢x...an sugkatat£ttesqai), așadar el depășește ca demnitate toate celelalte lucruri. În Comentariul la Parmenide, problema coordonării (în acest sens al lui sugkatat£ttesqai) apare o singură dată: Porfir spune că orice act determinat este ordonat (tštaktai) unui lucru, atât în privinţa formei sale, cât și în privinţa numelui1. 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 13–16 (`Ek£sth mn oân tîn Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 191 Altfel spus, fiecare act determinat corespunde unui lucru (de pildă, tăierea este actul cuţitului, iar gândirea este actul intelectului). În schimb, unul absolut, care este actul pur de a fi, nu este actul nici unui lucru. Înţelegem astfel că unul absolut nu are nici un alt lucru co-ordonat lui, căci „el nu este act al nimic anume" (aÛth d oÙdenÒj TMsti)1. observăm astfel că necoordonarea aparţine principiului prim, actului pur, în timp ce coordonarea apare la nivelul intelectului plural, diferenţiat în sine însuși. În interpretarea lui P. Hadot, coordonarea (principiului prim al lui Porfir - coordonare pe care o afirma damascius) este explicată prin faptul că unul, ca prim moment al intelectului, ar fi coordonat „celorlalte" momente. Totuși, oare chiar avem a face cu mai multe momente? Prin „moment" nu trebuie să înţelegem că intelectul ar apărea în scenă treptat, moment după moment, și că ar exista o decurgere între „momentele" sale. În acest caz, unul absolut (ca prim moment al intelectului) ar fi într-adevăr coordonat celorlalte momente ale intelectului. ne întrebăm însă dacă nu cumva este vorba mai degrabă de două „aspecte" sau „faze" ale intelectului, care rămân însă necoordonate între ele. Astfel, într-o primă „fază", avem un intelect „total", adică deja prezent, însă fără a fi distins în el însuși. Mai precis, el este deja existenţă (care este unul absolut); de asemenea, el este act (actul pur de a fi), însă nu este un act aplicat în afara sa, asupra altui lucru, așadar nu este coordonat cu nimic altceva. de aseme- ¥llwn prÒj ti pšphge ka kat¦ tÕ edoj p£ntwj aÙtù ka kat¦ tÕ Ônoma tštaktai). Acest tštaktai este aoristul 2, perfect, persoana a 3-a, singular, al verbului t£ssw (a aranja, a ordona), de la care sunt formaţi termenii ce desemnează coordonarea: sÚntaxij (coordonare), sunt£ttein (a coordona). 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 16–17. există totuși și un al doilea concept care descrie coordonarea (sau cuplarea) dintre doi termeni. este vorba despre adjectivul sÚzugon. Acesta apare de două ori în textul Comentariului: prima ocurenţă (Xii, 34) se referă la faptul că, la nivelul intelectului propriu-zis (adică cel descris în a doua ipoteză platonică), unul este coordonat cu fiinţa. A doua ocurenţă (Xiii, 23) vine să întărească faptul că unul prim, acest act pur de a fi, nu este coordonat cu nimic altceva, deoarece el nu corespunde nici unui lucru anume. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM192 nea, la acest nivel, Porfir afirmă că inteligibilul este identic cu intelectivul, așadar ele sunt deja prezente într-un fel (căci și unul absolut are cunoaștere de sine), însă ele nu sunt propriu-zis distincte. Totuși, putem afirma că tot ceea ce va fi intelectul ca triadă (adică existenţa, actul și gândirea) este deja prezent în această primă fază, însă nu în mod distinct. Într-o a doua fază, intelectul iese din această unitate absolută, se depărtează de sine și se diferenţiază în intelectiv și inteligibil. Aici, triada existenţă-viaţă-gândire este manifestă, s-a desprins din unitatea anterioară. dar această a doua fază nu este coordonată cu prima, nu avem a face cu un prim moment, urmat de un al doilea moment, ci prima fază rămâne necoordonată (pentru că este actul pur, care nu corespunde nici unui lucru și nu se îndreaptă spre nimic altceva, nu intră în relaţie cu nimic altceva), iar a doua fază este cea la nivelul căreia apare coordonarea - deoarece aici intelectivul este coordonat inteligibilului, iar unul este cuplat (sÚzugon) cu fiinţa. intelectul se poate vedea pe sine - în ciuda distincţiei sale - tocmai pentru că, în primă instanţă, el însuși este unu absolut, necoordonat cu nimic altceva. Așadar, coordonarea nu apare de sus în jos, pe verticală, (de la unul absolut, la unul secund al intelectului), ci apare „pe orizontală": termenii deja distinși ai intelectului sunt coordonaţi între ei (așa cum intelectivul e coordonat inteligibilului, iar unulcare-este este coordonat fiinţei). În schimb, „pe verticală" nu există nici o coordonare, ci unul absolut (care este în același timp „unu luat în sine", intelectul încă nedistins în sine, actul pur de a fi, respectiv existenţa) nu este coordonat cu nimic altceva. Tocmai de aceea „elementele" distincte ale intelectului (adică intelectivul și inteligibilul) pot fi coordonate între ele (adică intelectivul poate vedea inteligibilul, deși este diferit de el și în afara lui): anume pentru că unul absolut nu este coordonat cu nimic (pentru că el este act pur, care nu se distinge de nimic altceva și deci nu se diferenţiază de nimic altceva, ci rămâne în contact atât cu inteligibilul cât și cu intelectivul). necoordonarea principiului prim (cu orice altceva) garantează astfel coordonarea ulterioară a termenilor disCapitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 193 tincţi ai intelectului (termeni care, altfel, ar rămâne complet separaţi, așa cum avertiza Sextus empiricus). intelectul nu se constituie pornind de la actul pur, ca de la un prim moment al său, ci el se diferenţiază faţă de acesta (faţă de actul pur, nediferenţiat și necoordonat). În schimb, intelectul este deja prezent în întregime la nivelul unului absolut, însă este prezent în mod nedistins. Unul absolut este astfel cel care suprimă diferenţa dintre intelect și inteligibil, înainte chiar ca această diferenţă să fi apărut. el rămâne însă necoordonat cu orice altceva dintre cele care sunt distinse și coordonate după el. E. Proclus şi Damascius despre Porfir dar atunci, cum putem înţelege mărturia lui Proclus și a lui damascius despre Porfir? de ce aceștia lasă cu totul la o parte necoordonarea principiului prim al lui Porfir, spunând că principiul prim al lui Porfir este, de fapt, coordonat cu cele de după el, fiind doar vârful inteligibilului, doar vârful triadei? considerăm că răspunsul la această întrebare poate fi descoperit dacă ne gândim ce s-a întâmplat între timp, între Porfir și damascius. Mai precis, este vorba despre faptul că linia de interpretare a lui Porfir nu a fost urmată. În schimb, analiza neoplatonică asupra nivelurilor realităţii a înaintat foarte mult, apărând distincţii tot mai amănunţite în cadrul ierarhiei principiilor. Rezultatul acestei nuanţări este că descrierea pe care o dă Porfir principiului prim (ca existenţă anterioară distincţiei dintre inteligibil și intelectiv) a fost „depășită", ajungând să fie situată la un nivel inferior principiului prim. Pentru Proclus și damascius, acest prim aspect al intelectului (ca anterior distincţiei dintre inteligibil și intelectiv) nu mai poate fi principiu prim, necoordonat, ci el va fi doar un vârf al intelectului, așadar coordonat cu celelalte niveluri ale acestuia. Astfel, atunci când damascius se întreabă dacă „principiul unic al totului este tatăl triadei", așa cum afirmă Porfir, nu trebuie PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM194 să credem că damascius ignora „aspectul" necoordonat, absolut, al principiului prim descris de Porfir. ceea ce se întreabă damascius este dacă acest principiu - pe care Porfir îl descrie ca necoordonat (ca principiu absolut al totului) - este într-adevăr principiul prim, necoordonat, al totului. Răspunsul lui damascius este negativ: principiul lui Porfir nu poate fi principiul prim - chiar dacă Porfir îl descrie ca necoordonat și ca absolut - ci el se oprește la nivelul cel mai înalt al intelectului, al triadei inteligibile. de asemenea, ne amintim că Proclus dădea două mărturii despre Porfir: pe de o parte, Porfir ar fi spus că principiul prim transcende fiinţa1, dar, pe de altă parte, el ar fi identificat principiul prim cu vârful intelectului2. din aceste două afirmaţii trebuie să înţelegem că Porfir admitea existenţa unui principiu anterior fiinţei, însă, prin felul în care descria acest principiu, el identifica, de fapt, principiul prim cu ceea ce Proclus și damascius vor numi „vârful inteligibilului" sau „vârful fiinţelor" (koruf3⁄4 tîn Ôntwn)3. Altfel spus - privind din perspectiva lui Proclus -, perspectiva lui Porfir cuprinde o contradicţie: el vrea să vorbească despre principiul de dincolo de fiinţă, însă descrie doar punctul cel mai înalt al inteligibilului. de ce? Tocmai pentru că Porfir identifică unul prim cu unul din a doua ipoteză - desigur, considerat în sine, fără fiinţă. În schimb, pentru Proclus și damascius, acest unu din expresia „unu-care-este" - din a doua ipoteză platonică - nu poate fi principiul prim, ci reprezintă doar punctul cel mai înalt al lumii inteligibile, unitatea pornind de la care se constituie lumea inteligibilă. În neoplatonismul de după Porfir - mai ales la Proclus și damascius - „obiectele" primelor două ipoteze sunt foarte clar separate. Astfel, Proclus distingea unul absolut de unul din a doua ipote1 Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 31, 25–28. 2 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1070, 18. 3 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 86.14. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 195 ză, spunând că „unul-care-este nu poate fi același cu unul absolut"1. Pentru el, intelectul divin (sau unul-care-este) reprezintă o pluralitate inteligibilă2, care depinde de unul prim (deoarece își primește unitatea sa de la acesta), însă nu se identifică niciodată cu acesta, ci rămâne - prin însăși natura sa plurală -, diferit de unul absolut. Unul absolut este „dincolo de fiinţă și nu se amestecă cu nimic dintre cele ce există"3. după acest unu absolut - subiect al primei aporii din Parmenide - Proclus așează lumea inteligibilă, sau ordinea fiinţelor veritabile (tîn Ôntwj Ôntwn 1 t£xij)4, care se desfășoară - conform celei de-a doua ipoteze platonice - începând cu fiinţele cele mai simple și mai apropiate de unu, și până la pluralitatea inteligibilă propriu-zisă. A doua ipoteză expune așadar generarea fiinţelor divine, inteligibile, „începând de la unitatea supremă a inteligibilelor, până la fiinţa divină"5. Această lume sau ordine (t£xij) a fiinţelor inteligibile este o pluralitate, dar ea are în același timp unitatea sa proprie, diferită de unul absolut. cum se explică această diferenţă? Proclus face apel la un alt text platonic, și anume Sofistul, 245 a 1–b 9. În acest pasaj, Platon arată că fiinţa (care este o pluralitate), are totuși și condiţia unităţii, ca o afectare a sa, ca un efect pe care aceasta îl resimte6. din această indicaţie, Proclus deduce faptul că fiinţa (așadar lumea inteligibilă) nu este 1 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 68, 9–10. Vezi de asemenea Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 34 K, unde Proclus vorbește despre cele două sensuri ale unului: unul transcendent fiinţei, despre care nu se poate spune nici măcar că este unu, respectiv cel coordonat fiinţei, adică unul care este, din a doua ipoteză platonică. 2 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 68, 1–2, unde se arată că existenţa pluralităţii inteligibile (din a doua ipoteză) este foarte importantă, deoarece, punând în evidenţă această pluralitate, Platon se opune tezei parmenidiene conform căreia „totul este unu". 3 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 84, 4–5. dacă, pentru Porfir, unul absolut era existenţa (Ûparxij), faptul pur de a fi, pentru Proclus unul absolut este neamestecat cu existenţa. 4 Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, 55, 16. 5 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 82, 2–4. 6 Platon, Sofistul, 245 b 7–8: „fiinţa este afectată de unu" (peponqÒj te g¦r tÕ ×n žn ena...). PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM196 unul însuși, absolut, ci este doar o unitate impusă de unul anterior: ea este unificată. Pornind de la această observaţie, neoplatonicii vor desemna intelectul divin ca „unificat" (tÕ 1nwmšnon)1. Astfel, dacă Porfir identifica unitatea originară a intelectului cu unul anterior, în schimb, pentru Proclus, unitatea intelectului este resimţită mai degrabă ca un efect al unului prim, ca o afectare din partea lui, dar distinctă de unul prim însuși. Mai precis, lumea inteligibilă (fiinţa, unificatul, sau intelectul plotinian) va fi descrisă ca o structură piramidală: ea pornește de la o unitate primordială, de la un vârf unitar, și se desfășoară până la pluralitatea inteligibilă completă. iar această unitate a lumii inteligibile este strict distinsă de unul absolut, anterior, tocmai pentru că aceasta este unitatea unei pluralităţi și este inseparabilă de pluralitatea inteligibilă, pe când unul absolut transcende pluralitatea: „căci nu era permis să coordoneze (sunt£ttein) pluralitatea zeilor cu zeul-unu, nici zeul-unu cu pluralitatea zeilor, deoarece zeul prim transcende totul în mod desăvârșit"2. Așadar, dacă ipoteza a doua prezintă o lume în desfășurarea sa, o ordine (t£xij), în schimb, prima ipoteză este ipoteza unului absolut, care nu poate intra în această ordine a inteligibilelor și nu poate fi coordonat (sunt£ttein) cu pluralitatea fiinţelor inteligibile. Astfel, dacă Porfir identifica intelectul - la originea sa - cu unul absolut, în schimb, Proclus separă în mod radical cele două niveluri, respectiv ipotezele platonice care le corespund. Universul inteligibil (acest unu-care-este) are forma unei triade (prima triadă inteligibilă): el reprezintă de fapt o mișcare prin care unul - din a doua ipoteză, așadar diferit de unul absolut3 - se 1 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, 18, 17–20 sau i, 115, 24–25, unde se arată că unificatul este inferior unului (absolut); unificatul (fiinţa inteligibilă) este doar cel care primește efectul unificator al unului însuși, dar nu este unul însuși. 2 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 82, 5–7. 3 căci, așa cum observă Proclus (Teologia platonică, iii, 82, 8–10), despre unul din prima ipoteză se neagă chiar și faptul că el ar fi unu - desigur, pentru a sublinia transcendenţa sa -, ceea ce nu se întâmplă cu unul din a doua ipoteză. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 197 îndreaptă spre fiinţă1, sau, altfel spus, o mișcare prin care unitatea primă (acest „efect" al unului absolut) ajunge să instituie pluralitatea propriu-zisă a fiinţei inteligibile. Acest unu din a doua ipoteză nu este unul absolut (care este descris de Proclus ca dincolo de fiinţă și neamestecat cu existenţa2), ci este o henadă (o unitate) la care fiinţa participă3. el păstrează caracterul unitar al unului prim (de aceea este numit henadă: n£j), însă intră deja într-o relaţie cu fiinţa. Mai precis, el face să se constituie fiinţa, care participă la el. el este astfel baza pornind de la care se constituie fiinţa, însă, în felul acesta, el este totuși anterior fiinţei. desigur, el nu este absolut anterior fiinţei (precum unul prim), ci este anterior fiinţei, intrând totuși în relaţie cu aceasta, constituind-o. el este momentul prim, de la care începe să se constituie lumea inteligibilă, ordinea fiinţelor veritabile. Proclus afirmă că acest unu secund este „o existenţă superioară fiinţei, și <vârful> primei triade inteligibile"4. Așadar, unul secund este într-un fel anterior fiinţei (mai precis pluralităţii fiinţei), însă anterioritatea lui este una relativă. observăm astfel că Proclus distinge ceea ce Porfir identifica: dacă la Porfir, unul absolut era existenţa (Ûparxij), pornind de la care intelectul se distingea în sine însuși, în schimb, pentru Proclus unul absolut este dincolo de existenţă, neamestecat cu aceasta, „pre-existând dincolo de toate"5, iar unul secund este - el, abia - existenţa pornind de la care se constituie fiinţa. Pornind de aici, Proclus dă cu totul altă interpretare expresiei 1 Triada este de fapt constituită din unul (›n) secund, fiinţa (tÕ Ôn) care participă la acest unu și puterea (dÚnamij) prin care unul generează fiinţa - dar care, în a doua ipoteză, este trecută sub tăcere (vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 84, 9–23), sau, mai precis, este prezentă într-un mod ascuns (Teologia platonică, iii, 85, 28). de asemenea, triada este descrisă ca fiind alcătuită din unu, fiinţă și relaţia dintre acestea două (Tri¦j oân aÛth prèth noht», tÕ ›n, tÕ Ôn, ka scšsij ¢mfo‹n), vezi Teologia platonică, iii, 85, 17–18. 2 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 84, 4–5. 3 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 84, 5–6. 4 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 84, 9–10. 5 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 83, 23–24 (TMpškeina tîn Ólwn proãp£rcon). PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM198 platonice din a doua ipoteză, conform căreia „unul participă la fiinţă"6. ne amintim că aceasta era tocmai expresia de la care pleca interpretarea lui Porfir, care făcea din unul prim faptul pur de a fi, la care unul secund participa în sensul că își primea el însuși fiinţa, o fiinţă deja determinată. ca act pur de a fi, unul prim era cel pornind de la care intelectul se putea diviza în inteligibil și intelectiv, de aceea, unul prim ajungea să se identifice cu originea intelectului însuși. Proclus nu mai acceptă această identificare, ci el rezolvă problema „participării unului la fiinţă" la un alt nivel, și anume strict la nivelul ipotezei secunde. el valorifică în acest sens un alt pasaj din Parmenide7, în care se arată că, în a doua ipoteză, atât fiinţa este predicată despre unu, cât și unul este predicat despre fiinţă. Pornind de aici, Proclus vorbește despre o dublă participaţie: atât a unului la fiinţă, cât și a fiinţei la unu; însă el situează cele două feluri de participaţie la nivelul primei triade inteligibile, adică la nivelul acestui unu-care-este. el arată că, în relaţia dintre unu și fiinţă din prima triadă inteligibilă, fiinţa participă la unu deoarece ea depinde de acesta, primind de la el caracterul de fiinţă divină, iar unul participă la fiinţă în sensul că el iluminează fiinţa și îi dă caracterul divin8. dacă la Porfir participarea unului la fiinţă se făcea în direcţie ascendentă (adică unul secund participa la faptul pur de a fi al unului prim), în schimb, la Proclus, această participare se face „descendent": unul secund, considerat în sine, participă la fiinţa pe care el însuși o constituie. o altă diferenţă de interpretare între Proclus și Porfir intervine în privinţa percepţiei triadei caldeene tată-potenţă-intelect. Pentru Porfir, unul absolut corespunde tatălui din triada caldeeană, respectiv originii intelectului. În schimb, după acest prim moment de identitate cu unul absolut, intelectul iese din sine, devine potenţă (având un act propriu, o viaţă proprie) și astfel el 6 Platon, Parmenide, 142 b 5–6. 7 Platon, Parmenide, 142 d 1–2. 8 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 85, 1–4. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 199 devine intelect propriu-zis, adică un intelect care se gândește pe sine, un intelect atât inteligibil cât și intelectiv. În schimb, Proclus situează triada caldeeană strict la nivelul inteligibilului, identificând-o cu acea triadă inteligibilă pe care el o decriptează în cea de-a doua ipoteză platonică1. Astfel, tatăl triadei este identificat cu unul secund, din expresia „unul-careeste", dar acesta din urmă este strict distins de unul absolut. dacă Porfir identifica unul din „unul-care-este" cu unul absolut, această identificare revine - în termenii lui Proclus, de data aceasta - la a identifica pe „tatăl de acolo [din inteligibil] cu cauza tuturor"2. dar Proclus nu poate accepta această identificare, de aceea el respinge perspectiva porfiriană. Tabloul principiilor prime ar arăta astfel, conform lui Proclus: Unul absolut, cauza tuturor, transcendent fiinţei Prima triadă inteligibilă: Triada caldeeană: Unul secund, existenţa superioară fiinţei Tatăl Puterea, relaţia (scšsij) Potenţa fiinţa intelectul În concluzie, dacă pentru Porfir principiul prim este actul pur de a fi, de dincolo de fiinţele determinate și de actele determinate de a fi, iar acesta este în același timp „originea" intelectului divin, sursa pornind de la care el se constituie, în schimb, pentru Proclus, ca și pentru damascius, intelectul divin este o lume și o ordine inteligibilă triadică, ce se constituie pornind de la o unitate proprie, care este vârful intelectului, punctul său cel mai înalt. În schimb, principiul prim este anterior triadei inteligibile, complet distins de termenii acesteia. S-a spus despre Porfir că încerca să „salveze" abordarea specifică filozofiei, apărând-o de imixtiunile non-raţionale ce începeau 1 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 85, 17–21. 2 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1070, 18. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM200 să își facă apariţia - deja odată cu iamblichos1. Într-adevăr, chiar și în această privinţă, a principiului prim, deși acceptă anterioritatea principiului faţă de fiinţă, Porfir încearcă să gândească această anterioritate, să îi găsească o soluţie în termenii fiinţei, în termenii obișnuiţi ai gândirii. În schimb, vom vedea că, după Porfir, problema principiului prim anterior fiinţei nu mai poate fi o problemă propriu-zisă de filozofie, ci ea devine (la iamblichos, apoi la Proclus), o problemă de intuiţie non-raţională, intrând în domeniul teologiei și al teurgiei. În continuarea analizei noastre, vom vedea cum au gândit autorii neoplatonici de după Porfir anterioritatea principiului faţă de fiinţă și care sunt soluţiile lor pentru această transcendenţă absolută. neoplatonismul de după Porfir se caracterizează prin două aspecte: pe de o parte, spaţiul intelectului este împărţit în zone din ce în ce mai clar delimitate, așadar se realizează o cartografiere amănunţită a intelectului divin (fiinţa veritabilă sau unificatul), pornind de la indicaţiile platonice asupra relaţiei dintre fiinţă și gândire și asupra unului din a doua ipoteză. o a doua caracteristică va fi tocmai adâncirea distanţei dintre principiul prim și spaţiul intelectului, în care se întâlnesc fiinţa, respectiv gândirea cea mai înaltă. dacă la Porfir intelectul se identifica într-un fel cu unul absolut, în schimb, după Porfir, acest lucru devine imposibil. Principiul prim este separat foarte strict de realitatea de după el. ca atare, principiul trebuie să îndeplinească două condiţii, care în primă instanţă par contradictorii: pe de o 1 Vezi în acest sens articolul lui H. d. Saffrey: „Pourquoi Porphyre a-t-il édité Plotin?", în Porphyre, La vie de Plotin, vol. ii, Vrin, Paris, 1992, pp. 31–64. de asemenea, articolul lui Andrew Smith, „Porphyry and the Platonic Theology" (în A. Ph., Segonds și c. Steel (ed.), Proclus et la Théologie platonicienne, les Belles lettres, leuven University Press, Paris, louvain, 2000), care arată că iamblichos îi reproșa lui Porfir faptul că nu distingea foarte clar între metoda filozofică și cea teologică, pe care el o considera superioară. de asemenea, îl putem invoca pe damascius, care în Comentariul la Phaidon, i, § 172, 1–3, distingea gânditorii neoplatonici, împărţindu-i în două grupe, după cum aceștia au favorizat filozofia sau teurgia. Porfir și Plotin, sunt consideraţi mai degrabă filozofi, spre deosebire de iamblichos, Syrianus și Proclus. Capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de ființă la Porfir 201 parte, el este cauza primă a întregii realităţi, dar, pe de altă parte, el trebuie să fie transcendent întregii realităţi, tocmai pentru că, fiind cauza primă, principiul nu poate fi pus pe același nivel cu celelalte realităţi, nu poate fi considerat în vreun fel alături de ele. există așadar o tensiune și chiar o contradicţie între funcţionalitatea principiului prim în ierarhia realităţii (el fiind cauza primă) și preeminenţa lui faţă de întreaga realitate (adică transcendenţa lui absolută). dacă ne gândim la poziţia lui Porfir, remarcăm că el încerca de fapt să unească cele două condiţii: pe de o parte, principiul prim este descris ca transcendent fiinţei, ca un act pur, anterior oricărui act determinat; pe de altă parte, acest act pur, tocmai pentru că este transcendent și nedeterminat, poate fi punctul de reper pornind de la care intelectul se determină pe sine ca inteligibil și intelectiv, așadar el este originea pornind de la care se constituie prima fiinţă (intelectul prim, desfășurat) și, în continuare, toate celelalte fiinţe. Totuși, această soluţie a lui Porfir a fost respinsă și depășită de neoplatonicii care i-au urmat. Astfel, iamblichos este primul care se opune interpretării lui Porfir. Pentru el1 există un principiu anterior triadei inteligibile și necoordonat cu aceasta. Totuși, anterior acestui principiu necoordonat, iamblichos pune încă un principiu, anume un principiu absolut indicibil. În felul acesta, iamblichos întărește transcendenţa principiului prim faţă de fiinţă, însă desparte, în același timp, aspectul transcendent de cel cauzal al principiului. Proclus va încerca să împace cele două aspecte, unindu-le din nou. el admite ca principiu prim unul inefabil. Acest unu absolut (descris de prima ipoteză platonică) generează întreaga sferă a fiinţei inteligibile (descrisă de a doua ipoteză platonică) tocmai prin transcendenţa sa, tocmai prin faptul că el nu intră în sfera fiinţei, ci o lasă, într-un fel, în afara sa, negaţiile primei ipoteze dând astfel naștere afirmaţiilor din a doua ipoteză. damascius va 1 Așa cum decurge din mărturia lui damascius, De principiis, R. i, 86.11– 87.18. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM202 merge și mai departe decât Proclus. Pentru el, unul descris în prima ipoteză - acest unu care este cauza a orice altceva, și fără de care nimic nu poate exista - este, de fapt, doar o indicaţie a principiului inefabil, anterior. Unul rămâne într-un fel în relaţie cu totul, cu sfera fiinţei, și nu poate exprima transcendenţa absolută. Tocmai de aceea, Platon însuși suprima unul: anume pentru a sugera principiul cu adevărat prim, adică inefabilul. Acesta produce întreaga realitate într-un mod inefabil, iar toate celelalte principii pe care le distingem după el nu sunt decât maniere de a sugera acest principiu inefabil. Pentru damascius, așa cum vom vedea, „cauza primă" nu mai are nici o relaţie cu cele cauzate, iar „principiul transcendent" nu este nici măcar transcendent. damascius duce cele două condiţii ale principiului la antipodul lor: principiul prim nu este nici măcar transcendent, iar felul lui de a cauza nu este o relaţie cu cele cauzate. În cele ce urmează vom continua firul acestor problematizări asupra principiului de dincolo de fiinţă, punând în evidenţă dificultăţile ce au survenit. capitolul 2 iAMBlicHoS şi PRoBleMA PRinciPiiloR de dincolo de fiinţă În acest capitol, vom atinge una dintre cele mai acute probleme ale gândirii neoplatonice, privind statutul principiului prim de dincolo de fiinţă. În tradiţia filozofică inaugurată de Plotin, principiul prim este acea cauză pornind de la care se constituie întreaga realitate, însă care rămâne ea însăși dincolo de realitatea pe care o fundamentează, dincolo de fiinţă. Astfel, principiul se prezintă în mod diferit dacă îl considerăm în sine, respectiv în raport cu realitatea pe care o generează: el este și principiu al fiinţei, dar și dincolo de fiinţă. Totuși, aceste două „condiţii" ale principiului nu sunt foarte ușor de pus în acord; în primă instanţă, ele par, de fapt, contradictorii. Gândirea noastră se vede în faţa unui paradox, deoarece ea nu poate prinde într-un singur concept atât relaţia de cauzalitate a principiului faţă de realitate, cât și suprimarea oricărei relaţii, în transcendenţa absolută a principiului. În cele ce urmează, vom vedea cum a apărut această problemă - în gândirea lui iamblichos - și care este soluţia oferită de el. dacă la Plotin problema nu este foarte stringent formulată1, dificultatea se face simţită abia în gândirea lui Porfir. Acesta 1 Pentru Plotin, cele două aspecte ale principiului sunt inseparabile și necontradictorii: principiul dă naștere intelectului divin fără a fi el însuși afectat în vreun fel. el nu creează intelectul printr-un efort special în acest sens, ci tocmai prin a-și păstra starea lui, rămânând în liniște, în sine însuși. Asemenea unui izvor originar, care nu are nici o altă sursă, principiul dă naștere unei pluralităţi de izvoare, fără a pierde ceva din sine, ci păstrând într-un fel în sine tot ceea ce a produs (Enneade, iii, 8, 10.1–10). o altă imagine a acestei cauze transcendente este aceea a soarelui, care dă naștere luminii fără ca lumina să se despartă de el și fără ca el însuși să rămână cu „mai puţină" lumină (Enneade, V, 3, 12.39–47). Totuși, Plotin acceptă ca atare acest paradox al unei surse care dă fără să piardă ceva din sine. În schimb, gândirea post-plotiniană va intra în mod concret în firele acestui paradox, încercând să explice filozofic posibilitatea unei cauze transcendente. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM204 încearcă să precizeze în ce constă funcţia cauzală a principiului, explicând modul în care se constituie intelectul divin pornind de la unul anterior; în același timp, Porfir accentuează transcendenţa principiului, negând orice relaţie a acestuia faţă de lucrurile de după el, faţă de intelect. În felul acesta devine evidentă tensiunea dintre cele două aspecte ale principiului - transcendenţa și cauzalitatea -, deși Porfir însuși încearcă să le îmbine, sau chiar să le suprapună1. după Porfir, iamblichos este cel care va identifica această tensiune și va pune sub semnul întrebării coincidenţa dintre cele două aspecte sau funcţii ale principiului prim. el va aduce astfel problema în prim-planul meditaţiei filozofice, făcând pentru prima dată o distincţie clară între principiul ca fundament al fiinţei și principiul ca absolut transcendent, care nu mai intră în nici o relaţie cu fiinţa. el va ajunge să vorbească despre două principii anterioare fiinţei: principiul-cauză a fiinţei respectiv principiul-transcendent, indicibil. În consecinţă, iamblichos va propune o altă structură a ierarhiei principiilor - decât cea transmisă de Plotin și reluată de Porfir - și respectiv o altă interpretare a ipotezelor platonice din partea a doua a dialogului Parmenide, un alt fel de a integra nivelurile realităţii în cadrul oferit de ipoteze. este un pas interpretativ surprinzător, o depărtare de la linia de interpretare plotiniană, însă una care încearcă să răspundă unor probleme intrinseci tradiţiei, sau pe care aceasta le lăsa deschise. În cele ce urmează, ne propunem să elucidăm această schimbare intervenită odată cu iamblichos, să descoperim care sunt dificultăţile de ordin interpretativ din tradiţie care au făcut cu putinţă interpretarea lui iamblichos2. Analiza noastră va urmări 1 Pentru Porfir, principiul prim iese în afara distincţiilor specifice fiinţei, în afara manierei triadice în care se desfășoară aceasta, oferind în același timp fiinţei un punct de reper absolut, pornind de la care ea se poate desfășura. el este astfel și dincolo de fiinţă, dar și la originea fiinţei și a intelectului. 2 Pentru contextul filozofic mai larg în care se situează iamblichos, vezi B. dalsgaard larsen, „la place de Jamblique dans la philosophie antique tardive", în De Jamblique à Proclus, entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, 21, fondation Hardt, Vandoeuvres-Genève, 1975, pp. 1–34. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 205 două niveluri problematice. Primul este reprezentat de relaţia dintre inteligibil și unul anterior. În acest sens, vom încerca să arătăm că perspectiva lui iamblichos reprezintă un răspuns critic la adresa perspectivei lui Porfir. Al doilea nivel este acela al principiului absolut. Vom încerca să arătăm că tocmai felul în care gândește relaţia dintre intelect și unu îl determină pe iamblichos să considere încă un principiu anterior, absolut indicibil. dacă unul unit inteligibilului joacă rolul cauzei, principiul indicibil va juca rol de transcendenţă absolută. Problema este una de maximă importanţă în istoria neoplatonismului, deoarece, chiar dacă gânditorii neoplatonici ulteriori nu au acceptat întotdeauna - sau nu întocmai - perspectiva lui iamblichos, totuși, analiza neoplatonică ulterioară a fost suscitată tocmai de problemele ridicate de iamblichos: „criticii" lui iamblichos1 au fost nevoiţi să ţină cont de dificultăţile surprinse de el, iar rezultatele gândirii lui vor fi revalorificate și adâncite în gândirea lui damascius. Analiza noastră se lovește în mod inevitabil de lipsa surselor prime: textele principale în care iamblichos expunea viziunea sa asupra ierarhiei principiilor nu s-au păstrat2. Singurul mod de acces care ne rămâne este cel mediat de mărturiile filozofilor ulteriori asupra lui iamblichos. Acestea vin, de fapt, din două direcţii diferite: pe de o parte, Proclus prezintă perspectiva lui iamblichos deoarece el însuși nu este de acord cu ea, ci o respinge; pe de altă parte, damascius prezintă această perspectivă deoarece, într-o oarecare măsură, el o acceptă și o preia în propria sa interpretare. În cele ce urmează, vom discuta aceste două mărturii - procleană și damasciană -, precum și câteva fragmente din opera păstrată a lui iamblichos care ne pot ajuta să descoperim raţiunile ce stau în spatele perspectivei sale asupra principiilor prime. cele două mărturii pe care ne sprijinim ne pun însă în faţa unei contradicţii, sau mai degrabă în faţa unui echivoc în ceea ce privește perspectiva lui iamblichos. după cum vom vedea, Proclus 1 Vezi, de pildă, Proclus, a cărui critică o vom discuta în cele ce urmează. 2 de pildă Teologia caldeeană, pe care o menţionează damascius în De principiis, R. i, 86.6. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM206 respinge perspectiva acestuia, ca o abatere de la interpretarea tradiţională asupra principiilor prime. În schimb, damascius vede în interpretarea lui iamblichos un punct de profunzime în înţelegerea principiilor prime și a relaţiei dintre ele. Tocmai de aceea, damascius va păstra anumite amănunte ale perspectivei lui iamblichos și le va exploata în propria lui interpretare. Așadar, în primă instanţă, se ridică întrebarea: unde stă de fapt adevărul privind interpretarea lui iamblichos? este ea o abatere de la tradiţie, pe care interpretarea ulterioară a trebuit să o corecteze (așa cum pare să facă Proclus), sau este ea mai degrabă o adâncire a datelor fundamentale ale tradiţiei, o reevaluare și o repunere în discuţie a problemelor de fond pe care tradiţia le-a purtat cu sine nerezolvate? În cele ce urmează, vom încerca să răspundem la această întrebare, arătând că, de fapt, chiar dacă iamblichos s-a abătut de la litera interpretativă a tradiţiei, el a adus în centrul discuţiei o problemă de fond a gândirii neoplatonice, anume problema relaţiei dintre principiul-cauză primă și principiul-transcendenţă absolută. A. Perspectiva lui Iamblichos 1. Mărturia lui Proclus Proclus discută perspectiva lui iamblichos într-un context în care se referă la felul în care au fost interpretate ipotezele din dialogul Parmenide de către gânditorii neoplatonici anteriori. Astfel, în Comentariul la Parmenide, 1054.37–1055.171, el expune o interpretare a celor nouă ipoteze platonice, care va fi identificată ca aparţinând lui iamblichos2: 1. zeul și zeii; 2. zeii 1 Pasajul este menţionat de J. dillon între fragmentele comentariilor lui iamblichos la dialogurile platonice (Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta, Brill, leiden, 1973, pp. 206–209). 2 Proclus însuși nu menţionează cine este autorul acestei interpretări. identificarea autorului ca fiind iamblichos se sprijină pe o însemnare din scolii, precum și pe compararea mărturiei cu anumite texte în care damascius se referă direct la iamblichos. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 207 intelectivi; 3. îngeri, demoni, eroi; 4. suflete raţionale; 5. suflete inferioare; 6. formele unite cu materia; 7. materia; 8. corpurile cerești; 9. corpurile sublunare. dintre aceste ipoteze, pe noi ne va interesa aici numai prima, cea referitoare la „zeu și zei" (per qeoà ka qeîn)1. Încă de la această primă ipoteză intervine o netă diferenţă faţă de tradiţia plotiniană. Proclus însuși, înainte de a prezenta această perspectivă, remarcă faptul că ea urmează o altă linie interpretativă decât autorii anteriori (Plotin și Porfir)2. Astfel, pentru Porfir - ca și pentru Plotin - prima ipoteză era cea a zeului prim (sau a unului absolut, identic cu binele de dincolo de fiinţă), urmând ca a doua ipoteză să se refere la planul inteligibil. În schimb, pentru iamblichos, prima ipoteză se referă nu numai la zeul prim, ci și la o întreagă pluralitate de zei. despre ce pluralitate este vorba? după cum demonstrează H. d. Saffrey și l. G. Westerink3, prin „zeul și zeii", iamblichos înţelege unul prim (unul lui Plotin), respectiv zeii inteligibili. Urmând mărturia lui Proclus, s-ar părea că iamblichos nu vedea în prima ipoteză numai „unul" însuși. Pentru el, proprietăţile care în prima ipoteză sunt negate de la unul revin de fapt zeilor inteligibili și îi indică pe acești zei. Mai precis, având în vedere că toate lucrurile negate în această ipoteză ţin de sfera fiinţei (de la parte-întreg, mișcare, timp, până la fiinţa însăși), iamblichos consideră că aceste negaţii descriu nivelul cel mai înalt al fiinţei divine, anume nivelul inteligibil, și că acestor negaţii le corespund zeii 1 Asupra acestei prime ipoteze, Proclus însuși revine și în alte contexte, discutând-o și respingând-o. Vezi, de pildă, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vi, 1064.21– 1071.3 și Vii, 36.8–18, precum și Teologia platonică, iii, 23, p. 82. Toate aceste texte sunt reunite și analizate de H. d. Saffrey și l. G. Westerink în Proclus. Théologie platonicienne, vol. iii, „introduction, 3: exégèse de la première hypothèse du Parmenide par Jamblique selon Proclus", pp. xxxi–xxxii. 2 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vi, 1054.38: „cei de după aceștia [de după Plotin și Porfir] dispun realităţile în altă manieră". 3 Vezi H. d. Saffrey și l. G. Westerink, „introduction", pp. xxix–xxxi, în Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, vol. iii. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM208 inteligibili. În concluzie, el consideră că ipoteza se referă nu numai la zeul prim (de dincolo de fiinţă), ci și la zeii inteligibili, adică la nivelul cel mai înalt al fiinţei. În felul acesta, zeii inteligibili - care sunt cei mai simpli și mai unitari - „sunt uniţi cu unul"1 (din prima ipoteză). Proclus nu poate fi de acord cu perspectiva lui iamblichos, ci o respinge în mod sistematic. el arată că prima ipoteză este cea a principiului unu, transcendent, care nu poate fi asociat cu pluralitatea2. Pentru Proclus, negaţiile din prima ipoteză se pot aplica numai principiului prim, iar nu și nivelului inteligibil. Astfel, în prima ipoteză, Platon neagă chiar și faptul de a fi unu, iar această negaţie nu se potrivește decât unului prim, iar nu și unului determinat; doar unul prim transcende chiar și faptul de a fi unu, pe când celorlalţi zei inferiori le revine faptul de a fi unu3. Într-adevăr, pentru Proclus, după unul absolut urmează henadele, iar fiecare dintre acestea este un „un" determinat. ele sunt vârfuri ale claselor de fiinţe, fiind anterioare pluralităţii propriu-zise a fiinţei, iar fiinţa participă la ele; în schimb, unul prim este anterior fiinţei, rămânând imparticipabil. Totuși, explicaţiile critice ale lui Proclus la adresa acestei interpretări - atribuită lui iamblichos - sunt făcute din perspectiva noii soluţii pe care o dădea Proclus însuși problemei primelor principii. Proclus rezolvă în felul său problema diferenţei dintre transcendenţa absolută a principiului și cauzalitatea principiului faţă de întreaga realitate (funcţie ce revine mai degrabă henadelor, acestor „unu" determinaţi). dar respingerea lui iambli chos dintr-o perspectivă care îi este străină nu ne poate ajuta prea mult să înţelegem miza veritabilă a gândirii sale. În plus, critica lui Proclus este fragmentară și preferenţială, deoarece 1 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 82, 13 (sun»nwntai tù n...). 2 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 82, 5–7. 3 Același argument este oferit de Proclus și în Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 36 K: prima ipoteză platonică se referă doar la unul transcendent fiinţei, singurul despre care nu se poate spune nici măcar că este unu; în schimb, toate celelalte henade coexistă cu fiinţa. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 209 doctrinele criticate nu sunt prezentate cu întregul context pe care îl aveau acestea la iamblichos. 2. Mărturia lui Damascius despre Iamblichos damascius întregește imaginea pe care o avem despre felul în care iamblichos ordona principiile prime. dacă din mărturia lui Proclus pare să rezulte că principiul prim ar fi fost pentru iamblichos doar acest unu care devine subiect al primei ipoteze, alături de ceilalţi zei inteligibili, în schimb, de la damascius aflăm că, dincolo de triada inteligibilă (așadar dincolo de fiinţă), iamblichos nu punea un singur principiu, ci două principii: după acestea, să cercetăm dacă principiile prime, anterioare primei triade inteligibile, sunt două, adică cel absolut indicibil și cel necoordonat triadei - așa cum considera marele iambli chos în a douăzeci și opta carte a prea-perfectei Teologii caldeene.1 damascius precizează de asemenea că iamblichos este singurul care a susţinut această doctrină a existenţei a două principii anterioare fiinţei2. dacă ţinem cont de mărturia lui damascius, rezultă că iamblichos împărţea spaţiul de dincolo de fiinţă în două niveluri. Pe de o parte, el admitea existenţa principiului necoordonat faţă de triada fiinţei (1 ¢sÚntaktoj prÕj t3⁄4n tri£da), așezând acest principiu în prima ipoteză din Parmenide, alături de vârful inteligibil al fiinţei. Pe de altă parte, dincolo de acest vârf al fiinţei și dincolo de principiul necoordonat cu fiinţa (așadar „dincolo" chiar și de prima ipoteză platonică), iamblichos concepea încă un principiu, și anume un principiu complet indicibil (1 p£nth ¥rrhtoj). observăm așadar că asocierea unului cu inteligibilul 1 Vezi damascius, De principiis, R. i, 86.3–6. Pentru a întări această perspectivă, pe care el însuși o va relua și o va adânci, damascius o așează alături de alte câteva doctrine a căror autoritate era incontestabilă pentru gânditorii neoplatonici: cea pitagorică, cea platonică și cea a Oracolelor caldeene. 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 89.7–8. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM210 (adică a zeului cu zeii) nu însemna neapărat o pierdere a statutului preeminent al principiului prim (așa cum pare să sugereze Proclus în critica sa), deoarece pentru iamblichos ierarhia principiilor nu se oprea aici, ci mergea mai departe, stabilind încă un principiu dincolo de unu, și anume un principiu care iese chiar și din schema ipotezelor platonice. Altfel spus, iamblichos pare, pe de o parte, să coboare statutul „unului", asociindu-l cu inteligibilul, însă, pe de altă parte, el pare să ridice și mai mult statutul principiului prim, deoarece îl situează dincolo de unul din prima ipoteză. Așa cum vom încerca să arătăm în continuare, cele două mișcări sunt legate între ele, una determinând-o pe cealaltă, în sensul în care asocierea unului cu inteligibilul îl face pe iamblichos să considere că acest unu din prima ipoteză nu este principiul absolut, ci că înaintea acestui unu se află încă un principiu, pe care damascius în mărturia sa îl numește „indicibil". dar atunci, întrebarea care se ridică este următoarea: de ce „unul" tradiţiei nu mai poate juca pentru iamblichos rolul de principiu prim, părând să coboare din demnitatea lui, ajungând a fi asociat cu inteligibilul? B. Interpretarea primei ipoteze platonice 1. Zeul şi zeii la Iamblichos Pentru a răspunde la această întrebare, va trebui să urmărim mai departe mărturia lui damascius despre iamblichos. Această mărturie nu se limitează la existenţa acestui principiu indicibil, ci ea ne va lămuri și felul în care gândea iamblichos „zeul" situat în prima ipoteză platonică, alături de ceilalţi „zei". dacă în acest sens mărturia lui Proclus este profund negativă, scopul ei fiind în esenţă unul critic, în schimb, damascius preia perspectiva lui iamblichos și încearcă să găsească motivul adânc al asocierii dintre „zeu" și „zei". Mărturia lui damascius întărește convingerea că, prin „zeul și zeii", iamblichos înţelegea unul de dincolo de fiinţă, respectiv zeii inteligibili, deoarece damascius însuși amintește în Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 211 repetate rânduri faptul că, pentru iamblichos, inteligibilul este inseparabil de unu1. damascius va relua el însuși această idee, aplicând-o asupra relaţiei dintre unu și unificat (numele pe care damascius, urmându-l pe Proclus, îl acorda inteligibilului sau primei triade a fiinţei). Totuși, cum înţelegea damascius această imposibilitate de a separa inteligibilul de unu, și de ce vedea el în această idee unul dintre punctele „tari" ale gândirii lui iamblichos? Pentru a înţelege explicaţia lui damascius, trebuie să amintim felul în care gândește el însuși relaţia dintre unul anterior fiinţei și fiinţă, respectiv felul în care gândește el trecerea de la unu la fiinţa propriu-zisă, care este în același timp unitară și plurală. Pentru acesta, va trebui să facem o scurtă trecere în revistă a ierarhiei principiilor, așa cum o gândește damascius. ierarhia principiilor este de fapt maniera gradată și descendentă în care ajungem de la o sursă unică a întregii realităţi - sursă inexprimabilă și indeterminabilă - la ceea ce numim fiinţă, care este spaţiul predilect al gândirii, al determinărilor și al distincţiilor. damascius consideră că principiul absolut este inefabil, cu totul imposibil de prins în vreo expresie discursivă. de asemenea, el consideră că ceea ce tradiţia neoplatonică numește „unul absolut" este prima și cea mai înaltă manieră de a indica (fie și într-o manieră imperfectă, aproximativă) principiul prim. Unul absolut trebuie înţeles atât ca simplitate absolută, cât și ca totalitate; deși în el nu poate intra nici o dualitate, totuși, el nu are sensul minimalităţii, ci, din contră, el este unu în sensul unei puteri absolute, nelimitate și nedivizate. de aceea, damascius numește acest principiu „unul-tot dincolo de totul" (žn p£nta prÕ p£ntwn)2. Pornind de aici, el observă că gândirea noastră nu poate să exprime în mod adecvat nici măcar acest unu absolut, ci îl reduce de fapt la două aspecte: simplitatea și totalitatea. de 1 Vezi, de pildă, De principiis, R. i, 255.27: „inteligibilul este nediferenţiat (¢di£kriton) faţă de unu", precum și R. i, 127.13; 145.6; 147.22; 273.17; 191.7, pe care le vom analiza în continuare. 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 53.5. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM212 aceea, după unul absolut urmează alte două principii, care modulează unul absolut, adică oglindesc un aspect sau altul al principiului. Urmând o tradiţie deja foarte veche - pitagorică și apoi platonică - damascius pune după unul absolut „cele două principii", pe care pitagoricii le numeau monadă și diadă, iar Platon le numea limită și nelimitat. damascius le va numi unul și pluralele (tÕ žn ka t¦ poll£). dar aceste „două principii" pierd ceva din unitatea absolută a principiului, în care nu există nici o diferenţă și nici o distincţie între unitate și pluralitate. Într-adevăr, unul absolut este unul-tot anterior totului, adică el este totul, fără însă a pierde unitatea sa absolută, și este unu fără ca din el să lipsească ceva. În schimb, cele două principii creează impresia unei distincţii intervenite în principiu - chiar dacă damascius însuși insistă foarte mult asupra faptului că între cele două principii nu există nici o contradicţie, nici o opoziţie, nici o distincţie, ci ele sunt doar două aspecte ale unului absolut, principiu în care unitatea nu se opune pluralităţii. Totuși, de vreme ce gândirea noastră care încearcă să surprindă principiul introduce această pseudo-distincţie între cele două principii, ierarhia principiilor (sau mai degrabă ierarhia manierelor în care sugerăm principiul inefabil) nu se poate opri aici, ci este nevoie de încă un principiu, care să „corecteze" distincţia astfel introdusă între cele „două principii". Acest al treilea principiu va fi „unificatul" (tÕ 1nwmšnon). el este cel care exprimă tocmai identitatea - în unul absolut - a unităţii și a pluralităţii. după cum sugerează și numele lui, unificatul exprimă faptul că pluralele sunt restrânse sub unitate. damascius precizează că unificarea pe care o exprimă unificatul nu este una posterioară desfășurării pluralelor, ci una anterioară. Mai precis, unificatul nu reunește niște plurale deja distinse, ci el indică tocmai faptul că, înainte de a se distinge între ele, pluralele sunt unite, adică totalitatea lor este restrânsă în simplitatea cea mai unitară. În plus, această restrângere a pluralelor sub unitate, această întâlnire a pluralelor și a unităţii, este prima manifestare a fiinţei, Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 213 deoarece fiinţa este tocmai cea în care pluralitatea și unitatea sunt în echilibru, prezente deopotrivă1. Primul moment al apariţiei fiinţei este acela în care pluralitatea absolută este convertită spre unu, adică pluralele sunt restrânse sub unitate. Tocmai de aceea unificatul este numit și prima triadă a fiinţei, deoarece în el unitatea și pluralitatea se întâlnesc pentru a forma o natură distinctă. odată cu acest al treilea principiu - pe care pitagoricii îl numeau „triadă", Platon îl numea „mixt", iamblichos îl numea „inteligibil", iar damascius îl numește „unificat" - începem să intrăm în tărâmul fiinţei. Totuși, trecerea de la unu la fiinţa propriu-zisă nu se face direct. Acest prim moment, deși se apropie de natura fiinţei, nu este încă fiinţa propriu-zisă, deoarece acest principiu păstrează încă foarte mult din natura unului absolut, pe care îl exprimă. el este un fel de vârf al fiinţei, însă se află într-un fel tot „înaintea" fiinţei, adică înaintea fiinţei desfășurate ca pluralitate, deoarece unificatul manifestă de fapt strângerea pluralelor absolute sub unitatea absolută, așadar o coincidenţă a pluralelor cu unitatea, iar nu o pluralitate deja desfășurată, precum cea care caracterizează fiinţa propriu-zisă. el ocupă astfel un loc median între unu și fiinţa desfășurată, fiind o natură intermediară, după sugestia „unului-fiinţă", despre care vorbea Platon în cea de-a doua ipoteză din Parmenide. el este punctul cel mai înalt al fiinţei, numit „inteligibil", însă în el pluralitatea nu este încă distinsă de unitate. condiţia proprie fiinţei este aceea a distincţiei, a dualităţii în care gândirea își poate găsi locul. În schimb, în acest vârf inteligibil, gândirea nu poate fi încă prezentă, pentru că nici dualitatea nu este încă prezentă, ci pluralitatea este complet restrânsă în unitate. Abia într-un moment ulterior (numit inteligibil-intelectiv) vom descoperi o primă încercare de infiltrare a dualităţii, care va apărea în mod concret abia într-un al treilea nivel, numit 1 desigur, ele sunt prezente în altă manieră decât la nivelul principiului unu absolut, care era totul și unu în același timp, fără însă ca pluralitatea sau unitatea să poată fi distinse în sine, să se poată pune în evidenţă. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM214 „intelectiv". În schimb, la nivelul la care ne situăm acum, nu avem a face cu o dualitate, și de aceea unificatul (sau acest nivel inteligibil) nu este încă fiinţa propriu-zisă, ci este într-o anterioritate faţă de aceasta. În consecinţă, damascius va accentua foarte mult faptul că unificatul (sau inteligibilul) este aproape inseparabil de unul anterior, că el se constituie pornind de la unul absolut și că, de fapt, nici nu părăsește propriu-zis acest unu. Metafora cea mai elocventă prin care damascius ilustrează această relaţie dintre unu și unificat (sau inteligibil) este cea a centrului unui cerc: unul este înţeles prin analogie cu centrul cercului care, neavând nici o dimensiune, este imposibil de determinat, rămânând astfel „dincolo" de pluralitatea pe care o determină (adică cercul propriu-zis, care sugerează pluralitatea fiinţei). Această pluralitate a fiinţei se desfășoară pornind de la centrul cercului. Totuși, înainte de a deveni efectiv o pluralitate, fiinţa este prinsă într-o unitate anterioară, pe care ne-o putem imagina dacă ne reprezentăm întâlnirea într-un singur punct a tuturor razelor cercului. fiecărui punct de pe cerc îi corespunde în centrul cercului un astfel de punct, care este capătul razei ce pornește de la cerc înspre centru. Aici, damascius face o diferenţă între centrul cercului, ca punct absolut indeterminabil și sustras pluralităţii, respectiv această coincidenţă a unui număr infinit de raze. Această coincidenţă corespunde „unificatului" (tÕ 1nwmšnon), care este vârful cel mai înalt al fiinţei, pornind de la care se desfășoară aceasta. Unificatul corespunde nivelului inteligibil al fiinţei (în împărţirea triadică pe care o face deja iamblichos), adică acelui moment în care pluralitatea fiinţei nu este încă desfășurată, ci mai degrabă „stă să apară". Astfel, acest unificat este o pluralitate compactă, încă nedivizată, o pluralitate unificată. ea nu poate fi propriu-zis distinsă de unul anterior, așa cum intersecţia pluralităţii razelor nu poate fi distinsă de centrul unic al cercului1. deși cuprinde ca potenţă întreaga pluralitate 1 damascius accentuează acest aspect al ierarhiei principiilor, anume faptul că între principii nu există nici o ruptură, ci fiecare își are originea în cel anteCapitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 215 ulterioară a fiinţei, unificatul rămâne inseparabil de unul anterior. Altfel spus, în mod originar, fiinţa inteligibilă este înrădăcinată în unul absolut și este inseparabilă de acesta. Tocmai de aceea, pentru a întări această perspectivă a sa, damascius face apel la autoritatea lui iamblichos1, care a pus un accent deosebit pe relaţia foarte strânsă dintre unu și unificat (pe care iamblichos îl numește „inteligibil"): cum anume, interpretând inteligibilul, iamblichos spune că acesta subzistă în jurul unului (per tÕ žn aÙtÒ ØpostÁnai) și nu se îndepărtează de unu? desigur, deoarece el însuși concepe ceea ce noi numim unificat sau unu-fiinţă (žn Ôn)2 ca nefiind încă fiinţa propriu-zisă, dar nefiind nici unul însuși, ci fiind situat la mijloc între acestea.3 Tocmai de aceea iamblichos a declarat că inteligibilul rămâne (mšnein) în unu, deoarece el este unit mai degrabă cu unul și este specificat (e„dopoie‹tai) mai degrabă conform unului decât conform fiinţei.4 dacă luăm în considerare și ceea ce spune iamblichos, anume că inteligibilul subzistă în jurul unului (per tÕ žn Øpšsth tÕ nohtÒn), că este de aceeași natură cu binele [...], atunci este clar că acesta rămâne împreună cu unul, fără să se diferenţieze de el și fără să proceadă de la el.5 iamblichos, în repetate rânduri, ne îndeamnă să restrângem gândurile noastre multiple, sprijinindu-le ca într-un centru rior, de care este, la limită, indisociabil, diferenţa venind mai degrabă din gândirea noastre care, încercând să înţeleagă principiile, le determină și astfel le distinge între ele. 1 damascius vorbește despre iamblichos numindu-l „divinul iamblichos" și precizează că el este „cel mai bun interpret al lucrurilor divine, mai ales în ceea ce privește inteligibilul." (damascius, De principiis, R. i, 291.23–24). 2 expresia „unu-fiinţă" urmează, desigur, indicaţia lui Platon din a doua ipoteză din Parmenide, 142 c 9. 3 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 145.6–9. 4 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 147.22–23. 5 damascius, De principiis, R i, 255.24–27. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM216 unic, să facem din circumferinţă un centru și să aplicăm inteligibilului și unificatului, într-un mod inteligibil și unificat, o gândire mare și unică, nediferenţiată și inteligibilă.1 explicaţia lui damascius despre felul în care iamblichos unea inteligibilul cu unul ne permite să răspundem criticii pe care Proclus i-o aducea lui iamblichos, privind faptul că el ar fi pus pe același nivel unul absolut și pluralitatea zeilor - pierzând astfel unitatea absolută a principiului ce corespunde primei ipoteze din Parmenide. Astfel, urmând mărturia lui damascius, se pare că „zeii" inteligibili, pe care iamblichos îi considera alături de zeul din prima ipoteză nu introduc o pluralitate desfășurată, propriu-zisă - ceea ce ar fi dat dreptate criticii lui Proclus la adresa lui iamblichos. din contră, nivelul inteligibil (sau unificat) este nivelul cel mai înalt și cel mai unitar al fiinţei, care la limită nu poate fi distins de unul absolut. damascius însuși descrie acest nivel ca pe o unitate a pluralelor, însă o unitate anterioară desfășurării pluralelor. Unificatul restrânge pluralele nu după ce acestea s-au diferenţiat deja, ci înainte ca ele să se diferenţieze. ele se diferenţiază abia pornind de la această iniţială strângere-împreună (suna...resij) a lor2. Așadar, dacă unea inteligibilul cu unul absolut, iamblichos voia de fapt să pună în evidenţă unitatea indivizibilă a inteligibilului și faptul că, la originea ei, fiinţa este inseparabilă faţă de principiul ei, adică faţă de unul anterior. 2. Iamblichos contra lui Porfir Totuși, de ce insistă iamblichos asupra acestor aspecte și care sunt „provocările" interpretative cărora el le răspunde? iamblichos, fost discipol al lui Porfir3, a purtat faţă de acesta din urmă 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 273.17–21. 2 Vezi, de pildă, damascius, De principiis, R. i, 37.1, unde unificatul este descris ca o strângere-împreună a pluralelor, anterioară pluralelor propriu-zise. 3 Maestrul și discipolul erau apropiaţi ca vârstă, însă Porfir purta în spate autoritatea școlii filozofice a lui Plotin, pe care o va apăra ulterior în faţa atacuCapitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 217 o îndelungă polemică, făcându-se reprezentantul mai noilor curente extra-filozofice, integrate de gândirea neoplatonică. Întrebarea pe care ne-o punem în continuare este dacă nu cumva opoziţia dintre cei doi gânditori se referă și la ierarhia primelor principii, și în ce constă această opoziţie. Mai precis, ne întrebăm dacă nu cumva perspectiva lui iamblichos răspunde tocmai interpretării lui Porfir, pe care am discutat-o în capitolul anterior. Într-adevăr, mărturia lui damascius ne pune pe urmele unei polemici între iamblichos și Porfir, privind statutul inteligibilului și al principiului anterior. Astfel, într-un fragment în care amintește poziţia lui iamblichos, damascius menţionează faptul că această perspectivă se opunea în mod direct celei a lui Porfir: Toţi cei care spun aceste lucruri au pus lumea inteligibilă în uniunea nediferenţiată a totului și nimeni nu contestă acest lucru. iamblichos însuși este martor, deoarece acordă inteli gibilului al doilea grad de unire după principiul unu al tuturor lucrurilor. el susţine peste tot că inteligibilul subzistă în jurul unului (per tÕ žn Øfest£nai) și că în nici un caz nu poate fi smuls (¢napÒspaston) unului; el refuză orice separaţie (dia...resij), dualitate (diplÒh) sau distanţare (di£stasij) <în inte ligibil>, și face Bătrânului1 multe obiecţii în acest sens.2 Să vedem însă, mai în amănunt, în ce constă diferenţa dintre perspectivele celor doi filozofi și în ce constau obiecţiile lui iambli chos la adresa lui Porfir. Pentru aceasta, vom analiza mai întâi rilor „moderniste" ale discipolului iamblichos. cei doi aveau o divergenţă fundamentală în privinţa scopului ultim al filozofiei; vezi articolul lui H. d. Saffrey, „Pourquoi Porphyre a-t-il édité Plotin?", în Porphyre, La vie de Plotin, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 31–64. 1 „Bătrânul" este apelativul prin care neoplatonicii tardivi îl numeau pe Porfir (vezi P. Thillet, „indices porphyriens dans la Théologie d'Aristote", în Le Néoplatonisme, op. cit., p. 294, notele 6 și 7 și H. d. Saffrey & l. G. Westerink, „introduction" în Proclus. Théologie platonicienne, vol. iii, p. xxxviii). 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 292.5–11. În De mysteriis, i, 9, 58, iamblichos neagă în mod explicit distanţarea (di£stasij) spaţială, referindu-se la prezenţa indivizibilă a zeilor în întreaga realitate. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM218 fragmentele din Comentariul la Parmenide al lui Porfir, pentru a vedea cum gândea acesta relaţia dintre intelect și unu, criticată ulterior de iamblichos. În acest sens, există două pasaje asupra cărora ne-am putea opri: primul dintre ele se referă la anterioritatea unului absolut faţă intelectul divin și faţă de toate lucrurile de după el, iar al doilea se referă la rolul pe care îl are unul în constituirea intelectului divin (cu cele două părţi ale sale: inteligibil și intelectiv). Aceste două probleme discutate corespund tocmai celor două funcţii ale principiului - aceea a transcendenţei și aceea a cauzalităţii - pe care Porfir încearcă să le identifice, pe când iamblichos le va separa. Primul fragment asupra căruia ne vom opri se află în Comentariul la Parmenide, iii, unde Porfir își pune problema relaţiei dintre intelect și unul anterior. Referinţa de la care pornește Porfir - și prin care va explica el raportul dintre unu și intelect - este aceea din dialogul Parmenide, în care aflăm că unul din prima ipoteză nu este nici asemenea, nici neasemenea (oÙd m3⁄4n ÓmoiÒn tini oestai oÙd' ¢nÒmoion)1. În primă instanţă, Porfir se întreabă în mod retoric dacă nu cumva zeul, adică unul prim, este totuși diferit (›teroj) și neasemenea (¢nÒmoioj) faţă de intelect, de vreme ce unul nu este intelect. Totuși, urmând linia textului platonic, el va spune că unul nu poate fi nici diferit, nici neasemenea cu cele de după el, datorită superiorităţii (Øperoc») sale faţă de ele. Argumentul invocat este acela că diferenţa nu poate exista decât între lucruri ce sunt comparabile între ele, pe când unul este dincolo de toate, așadar el nu poate fi cuprins în nici un alt lucru și nici un alt lucru nu se poate compara cu el2. În consecinţă, unul nu poate fi diferit faţă de nimic altceva. Mai precis, „el este lipsit de relaţie (¥sceton) cu oricare dintre lucrurile care există după el și de la el"3. diferenţa aparţine numai lucrurilor produse de unu, care 1 Platon, Parmenide, 139 e 7. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iii, 11–12. 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iV, 11–12. observăm aici că Porfir, urmându-l pe Plotin, suprapune aspectul cauzal al principiului, cu cel al transcendenţei sale: lucrurile de după principiu există prin principiu, însă fără ca Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 219 „au devenit diferite (¢nomoioÚmena)"1 faţă de unu, însă această diferenţă este non-reciprocă, deoarece ea vizează numai lucrurile de după unul, dar nu și unul însuși. În schimb, ceea ce distinge unul de celelalte lucruri nu este o relaţie, o diferenţă propriu-zisă, ci este tocmai faptul că unul nu intră în nici o relaţie cu nimic altceva, astfel încât el nu poate fi nici măcar diferenţiat faţă de celelalte lucruri. Astfel, pentru a păstra statutul principiului prim, Porfir îl desparte de toate lucrurile pe care acesta le produce și îl așează dincolo de orice relaţie cu acestea. observăm că, pe de o parte, Porfir nu introduce o diferenţă propriu-zisă între unu și intelect; din contră, în primă instanţă, el exclude posibilitatea unei diferenţe concrete între principiul prim și orice altceva. Totuși, pe de altă parte, observăm că Porfir introduce o separaţie și mai radicală, despărţind în mod absolut unul de tot ceea ce urmează după el - așadar și faţă de intelect - excluzând posibilitatea oricărei relaţii a unului faţă de altceva. Pentru Porfir, „cele de după unul trebuie înţelese ca și cum ar fi aruncate în afara unului și ca și cum ar fi neant faţă de el"2. Tocmai la această separaţie fundamentală între unu și intelectul ce urmează după el se referă critica lui iamblichos, așa cum ne-a fost ea transmisă de damascius. iamblichos nu critică faptul că Porfir ar fi diferenţiat inteligibilul de unu, ci faptul că le-a separat, că le-a distanţat, că a „smuls"3 intelectul în afara unului. Separaţia pe care a introdus-o Porfir este una anterioară și mai radicală decât diferenţa dintre două lucruri: unul și lucrurile de după el (între care putem număra și intelectul divin) sunt incomparabile acesta să intre în relaţie cu ele, fără ca ele să se poată compara în vreun fel cu principiul însuși. 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iV, 1. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iV, 17–19. În relatarea lui damascius despre critica lui iamblichos la Porfir, se arată că, dacă pentru Porfir lucrurile sunt „ca aruncate în afara unului" (aej ¢pobeblhmšnwn ¢p' aÙtoà), pentru iamblichos, inteligibilul nu putea fi smuls (¢napÒspaston) unului. 3 conform lui damascius, iamblichos consideră că „intelectul nu poate fi smuls (¢napÒspaston) unului" (De principiis, R. i, 292.8). PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM220 între ele, de aceea este imposibil a stabili dacă între ele există asemănare sau deosebire, identitate sau diferenţă. Totuși, faptul că Porfir separă în acest fel principiul prim faţă de restul realităţii ridică o problemă fundamentală: principiul este cauza primă a întregii realităţi, de aceea, am putea spune că există cel puţin o relaţie între principiu și realitate, anume aceea de cauzare. cum poate principiul să fie cauză, dacă el nu poate în genere să aibă nici un raport cu cele de după el? cum rezolvă Porfir această problemă a unei cauze absolut separate, și de ce iamblichos nu va accepta soluţia lui Porfir? Pentru a răspunde la această întrebare, ne vom întoarce spre un alt fragment din Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, în care este discutată maniera în care ia naștere intelectul divin. ne amintim că problema de la care pornea Porfir era aceea că cunoașterea de sine a intelectului divin presupune identificarea celor două părţi ale sale (cea inteligibilă și cea intelectivă), care în primă instanţă sunt distincte, prin însăși natura lor. Pornind de la această observaţie, Porfir se întreabă cum ajunge această dualitate la unitate, și cine este acela care oferă intelectului divin unitate, făcându-l să se constituie ca atare. iar răspunsul său la această întrebare este că unul absolut suprimă diferenţa dintre inteligibil și intelectiv, dând naștere intelectului propriu-zis, în care cele două părţi se identifică. dar atunci, unul este anterior celor două părţi ale intelectului, precum și distincţiei dintre ele. ca act pur de a fi, unul este anterior actelor determinate ale celor două părţi ale intelectului divin: cine este cel care vede când se unește intelectivul cu inteligibilul? Bineînţeles că este acel act din afara lor (par' TMke...naj) care le transcende pe toate (1 TMpanabebhku‹a p£saij) [...] și care nu este în nici unul dintre ele (TMn oÙden oâsa).1 Pe de o parte, inteligibilul depinde de faptul că intelectivul îl cunoaște, iar unitatea ce se naște din inteligibil și din intelectiv este în același timp condiţionată de diferenţa dintre acestea, deoarece 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 7–13. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 221 cunoașterea, ca unitate a inteligibilului și a intelectivului, presupune o anterioară diferenţă a lor. Pe de altă parte, punctul de reper absolut, în care diferenţa aceasta este suprimată, este unul anterior inteligibilului, fără de care inteligibilul și intelectivul nu ar depăși niciodată diferenţa lor esenţială. dar, pentru a îndeplini această funcţie de mediere între inteligibil și intelectiv, pentru a fi în contact cu fiecare dintre ele și a restabili unitatea dintre ele, unul anterior nu mai poate fi el însuși ceva determinat, diferit la rândul lui de inteligibil și de intelectiv. diviziunea și distincţia se instituie abia între cele două părţi ale intelectului1, pe când unul este anterior acestora și anterior distincţiei. Porfir gândea schema principiilor în felul următor: Unul absolut- anterior distincţiei inteligibilul - intelectivul- ca două părţi distincte ale intelectului divin Unul absolut este „o putere diferită ( tšra) și superioară (diafšrousa) faţă de distincţia (TMp...noia) dintre inteligibil și intelectiv"2. distincţia (TMp...noia) dintre inteligibil și intelectiv este diferenţa necesară cunoașterii; în schimb, această „puterea" este diferită ( tšra) nu pentru că ar intra într-o relaţie faţă de un alt termen, ci tocmai pentru că este superioară (diafšrousa) distincţiei dintre cei doi termeni. Așadar, pentru Porfir, unul nu poate fi unit cu inteligibilul (așa cum va susţine iamblichos), ci el este anterior celor două părţi ale intelectului și distincţiei dintre acestea două. În fiecare dintre cele două fragmente discutate - fie că se referă la statutul unului absolut faţă de intelect, fie la rolul lui cauzal, de sursă pornind de la care se constituie intelectul -, Porfir subliniază separarea unului faţă de intelect. Pe de o parte, unul este transcendent intelectului, neavând nici o relaţie cu acesta; pe de altă parte, intelectul (cu diferenţa lui specifică între inteligibil și intelectiv) se poate constitui pornind de la unu tocmai 1 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 5–6; XiV, 1–3. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, XiV, 1–4. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM222 pentru că acesta rămâne în afara oricărei determinaţii și a oricărei diferenţe1. Mai mult, observăm că Porfir reușește în felul acesta să lege foarte strâns transcendenţa unului prim de cauzalitatea lui. Astfel, el merge mult mai departe decât Plotin în accentuarea statutului cauzal la unului faţă de intelect: mai precis, el face din unu o primă „fază" a intelectului2. În același timp, Porfir încearcă să păstreze transcendenţa principiului, arătând că acest prim moment nu este nici inteligibil, nici intelectiv, ci el este anterior acestora și tocmai de aceea el poate avea un rol de mediere între cele două părţi ale intelectului. Mai mult decât atât, nașterea intelectului propriu-zis - adică a intelectului divizat în inteligibil și intelectiv, respectiv în triada fiinţă-viaţă-gândire - este descrisă ca o ieșire a intelectului din starea sa iniţială3: aceea de identitate cu unul prim. Porfir descrie în mod distinct cele două momente ale intelectului: în primul dintre ele, intelectul este „unu și simplu"; în al doilea moment, intelectul este deja desfășurat și „diferă de sine". Mai precis, unul absolut, de la care se constituie intelectul, rămâne „unu și simplu", iar în el nu există diferenţă; diferenţa apare abia la nivelul intelectului desfășurat, care „diferă de sine însuși" (aÙtÕ autoà diafšrei)4. Altfel spus, prima instanţă este cea a unului prim, care este primul moment al intelectului, însă nu este nici identic nici diferit (conform indicaţiei din prima ipoteză platonică), iar a doua instanţă este cea a intelectului propriu-zis, a unului din a doua ipoteză, iar acesta se diferenţiază pe sine faţă de acel prim moment al său. Porfir descrie 1 Porfir ne spune chiar că unul este „în contact cu amândouă [cu intelectivul și cu inteligibilul], într-un mod al identităţii (kat¦ tÕ aÙtÒ), fără a fi în nici unul dintre acestea" (Comentariul la Parmenide, Xiii, 12–13). Așadar, unul nu preia diferenţa specifică a celor două părţi ale intelectului și nici nu intră el însuși în diferenţă faţă de ele. 2 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, XiV, 30–33: „[...] conform cu ceea ce în el este unul simplu și, într-un fel, unul prim și veritabil, intelectul nu este nici în repaus, nici în mișcare, nici același, nici altul [...]." 3 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, XiV, 18–19. 4 Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, XiV, 8. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 223 astfel o relaţie nereciprocă de diferenţă: intelectul desfășurat se diferenţiază faţă de unul prim (faţă de acest prim moment al intelectului), însă unul prim nu se diferenţiază faţă de intelectul desfășurat1. În felul acesta, perspectiva lui Porfir accentuează ambele laturi ale problemei: pe de o parte, el pune în evidenţă transcendenţa unului absolut, despărţindu-l complet de intelect (iar acesta va fi aspectul criticat de iamblichos); pe de altă parte, el admite unul absolut ca sursă a intelectului, sau ca un prim moment pornind de la care intelectul ajunge să se determine și să se dezvolte (iar acesta va fi aspectul criticat de Proclus și damascius, care consideră că acest principiu al lui Porfir este mai degrabă vârful triadei inteligibile, decât principiul absolut). Porfir pare astfel a cădea în două extreme în același timp: pe de o parte, el operează o separaţie drastică între unu și intelect, vrând să impună unului o transcendenţă absolută, fără nici o relaţie cu cele de după el; pe de altă parte, având în vedere că unul trebuie totuși să îndeplinească un rol faţă de cele de după el, anume rolul de cauză primă, Porfir ajunge să considere unul drept un prim moment al intelectului, părând astfel să coboare statutul unului, apropiindu-l foarte mult de lumea inteligibilă, de lumea fiinţei supreme. deși Porfir a încercat să îmbine cele două extreme, și să gândească un principiu-cauză ce rămâne transcendent celor cauzate, totuși, ambele extreme, ambele laturi ale perspectivei sale vor cădea pradă criticilor gânditorilor ulteriori, care, prin structura pe care o vor oferi ierarhiei principiilor, vor răspunde, direct sau indirect, acestor probleme ridicate de Porfir. iamblichos, primul critic al lui Porfir, nu poate accepta nici separaţia radicală a principiului faţă de ceea ce instituie acest principiu, adică faţă de lumea inteligibilă, nici opoziţia directă dintre inteligibil și intelectiv. din contră, iamblichos va gândi o trecere treptată de la principiu la intelect, precum și, în cadrul intelectului, de la inteligibil la intelectiv, de la unitatea intelectului 1 Aceeași perspectivă este expusă în Comentariul la Parmenide, iV, 1: cele de după unu sunt diferite de unu, însă unul nu este diferit faţă de acestea. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM224 la diferenţa propriu-zisă, la pluralitatea specifică fiinţei. Astfel, după unu nu urmează imediat distincţia dintre inteligibil și intelectiv, faţă de care unul însuși ar rămâne suspendat într-o transcendenţă absolută, ci inteligibilul - partea cea mai înaltă a intelectului - este unit cu unul anterior, cu sursa sa, și este el însuși mai apropiat ca natură faţă de unu, decât faţă de fiinţa propriuzisă, desfășurată1. inteligibilul este o pluralitate, însă o pluralitate unitară, a cărei unitate provine din strânsa lui legătură cu unul anterior2. chiar dacă nu este identic cu unul, inteligibilul este totuși unit unului, imposibil de separat de acesta. el „rămâne în unu (TMn tù n mšnein)"3 și se constituie „în jurul unului (per tÕ žn aÙtÒ ØpostÁnai)"4, ca de la un centru unic, pornind de la care se constituie întregul cerc5, cu pluralitatea specifică lui. Mărturia lui damascius asupra inteligibilului la iamblichos este întărită de câteva pasaje din De mysteriis, în care iamblichos încearcă să pună în evidenţă tocmai unitatea inseparabilă a lumii inteligibile, în ciuda manifestărilor plurale și diverse ale acesteia în realitate (prin diferitele clase divine). el arată că diversele clase ale fiinţelor superioare nu trebuie să fie reduse la una, pentru a nu pierde diversitatea specifică fiecăreia, dar nu trebuie nici 1 este ceea ce notează damascius, redând perspectiva lui iamblichos: inteligibilul este de aceeași natură cu binele (damascius, De principiis, R. i, 255.24–27); el are mai degrabă caracterul unului, decât caracterul plural al fiinţei (De principiis, R. i, 147.22–23). 2 desigur, trebuie să avem în vedere faptul că unitatea inteligibilului cu unul nu înseamnă lipsa oricărei pluralităţi din inteligibilul însuși, ci doar restrângerea pluralităţii sub unitate. Pluralitatea (sau mai precis totalitatea) este prezentă la orice nivel al principiilor, chiar și la nivelul unului, deoarece puterea principiului constă tocmai în cuprinderea lui. Problema neoplatonică a trecerii de la unitate la pluralitate este mai degrabă problema trecerii de la o totalitate unitară la o totalitate diferenţiată, desfășurată într-o pluralitate propriu-zisă. 3 Vezi damascius, De principiis, R. i, 147.22–23. 4 Vezi damascius, De principiis, R. i, 145.6–7. 5 Metafora cercului este prezentă deja la Plotin (vezi, de pildă, Enneade, Vi, 8, 18.8–37); din mărturia lui damascius (De principiis, R. i, 273.17–21) putem deduce că iamblichos o folosea de asemenea, iar damascius însuși va medita îndelung pe marginea ei. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 225 diferenţiate pe specii, astfel încât să se piardă ceea ce este comun între ele. de aceea, el preferă să vorbească despre o „identitate analogică" între clasele divine1. Această identitate analogică constă în aceea că toate clasele divine pornesc de la unitate și toate converg în același timp înspre unitate. Unitatea domină întreaga realitate și desfășurare a ei, făcând ca, în mod originar, toate clasele divine să coincidă. În felul acesta, manifestarea plurală a zeilor în realitate nu suprimă unitatea lor anterioară. Zeii sunt prezenţi în realitate așa cum este prezentă lumina soarelui, care luminează întreaga lume divizibilă, fără a fi ea însăși divizată, ci rămânând stabilă, în sine însăși. În același fel, lumina indivizibilă a zeilor este pretutindeni, totală și identică, prezentă în mod indivizibil pentru tot ceea ce poate participa la ea. ea umple totul cu puterea sa perfectă; ea conţine totul în sine, printr-o infinită superioritate cauzală, și este pretutindeni unită cu sine însăși (sun»nwta... te pantacoà prÕj autÒ), punând în contact pe cele ultime cu cele prime.2 iamblichos nu acceptă în inteligibil nici o diferenţă, nici o separaţie: zeii inteligibili sunt „în ei înșiși toţi împreună în unu, conform eternei lor preeminenţe"3. „esenţa imaterială și incorporală [a zeilor inteligibili] nu este divizată nici după loc, nici după substrat, nici împărţită conform unor circumscrieri parţiale ale părţilor, ci coincide în mod direct și concură în identitate"4. Astfel, lumea inteligibilă este o pluralitate care subzistă în unitate, în unu și în jurul unului: deoarece ordinea (t£xij) există în unitatea tuturor zeilor, iar speciile lor prime și secunde precum și tot ceea ce se naște în jurul lor subzistă împreună în unu (TMn n t¦ Óla sunufšsthke), în ele unul este totul (tÒ te p©n TMn aÙto‹j TMsti tÕ ›n), iar începutul, mijlocul și sfârșitul coexistă în unu. Astfel, nu trebuie să ne întrebăm de unde vine unul în toţi, căci unul lor este 1 iamblichos, De mysteriis, i, 4, 76–77. 2 iamblichos, De mysteriis, i, 9, 35–40. 3 iamblichos, De mysteriis, i, 19, 23–24 (kaq' aut¦ n Ðmoà p£nta kat¦ t3⁄4n diaiwn...an aÙtîn Øperbol»n). 4 iamblichos, De mysteriis, i,19,28–35. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM226 însuși faptul lor de a fi - orice ar fi acesta. În același fel, cei secunzi subzistă în unul celor primi, iar cei primi conferă celor secunzi unitatea (›nwsij) lor.1 În mod originar, zeii inteligibili sunt tocmai acest unu care îi cuprinde și în jurul căruia se desfășoară apoi întreaga ordine a zeilor, în care unitatea originară este comunicată claselor ulterioare de zei. observăm că iamblichos descrie lumea inteligibilă după modelul cercului, în care unitatea primă - cea a unului însuși - este transmisă claselor divine succesive, de la inteligibil, care este inseparabil de unu, până la nivelurile ulterioare. Prin acest model al cercului, iamblichos nici nu suprimă unitatea unului însuși, nu introduce nici o diferenţă în acesta, dar nici nu separă unul în mod radical faţă de ceea ce este după el. Porfir pornea de la o distanţare între inteligibil și intelectiv, pentru a se întreba apoi cum poate fi surmontată această distanţă, cum ajung cele două părţi ale intelectului să se identifice. Răspunsul lui este că cele două se identifică în unul anterior, care este în contact cu fiecare, rămânând de fapt dincolo de fiecare, necuprins în nici unul. Astfel, condiţia intelectului pare a fi de fapt cea a dualităţii, a distincţiei, iar identitatea și unificarea este atinsă dincolo de intelect, în unul anterior. Tocmai din această cauză unul anterior ajunge să fie considerat un prim moment al intelectului, anume momentul identităţii de la care pornește apoi distincţia propriu-zisă. şi tocmai de aici decurge statutul paradoxal al unului, care, deși este dincolo de intelect, joacă și rolul unui prim moment al intelectului. În schimb, pentru iamblichos, lucrurile stau altfel. În primul rând, problema de la care pornea Porfir - și anume cum ajung inteligibilul și intelectivul la unitate - nu se mai poate pune, deoarece intelectul nu se prezintă sub forma unei opoziţii între inteligibil și intelectiv, ci el are o structură ierarhică, de la inteligibil înspre intelectiv, de la unitatea originară a inteligibilului, înspre pluralitate. Astfel, intelectul nu atinge unitatea la un nivel 1 iamblichos, De mysteriis, i, 19, 50–60. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 227 de dincolo de intelect, ci el deţine unitatea în sine însuși, deoarece primul său moment (cel inteligibil) este unit (deși nu identic) cu unul anterior. Toate nivelurile ulterioare ale intelectului sunt co-originate în această unitate primă, care se transmite după modelul expansiunii cercului. chiar dacă desfășurarea intelectului ajunge până la pluralitatea propriu-zisă, el este în mod esenţial unitar, graţie legăturii indestructibile a inteligibilului cu unul anterior. În felul acesta, intelectul se poate desfășura în mod triadic pornind de la unitate, iar unul poate rămâne cu adevărat dincolo de intelect, fără a fi considerat un prim moment al intelectului (precum la Porfir)1. inteligibilul este unit cu unul anterior așa cum razele unui cerc sunt unite cu centrul cercului; totuși, așa cum centrul însuși nu poate fi precizat, ci rămâne într-un fel dincolo de pluralitatea razelor, la fel și unul de dincolo de intelect rămâne dincolo de intelectul însuși. Astfel, la Porfir inteligibilul și intelectivul sunt net distinse, de aceea, pentru a restabili unitatea lor, unul anterior trebuie să fie complet sustras atât inteligibilului cât și intelectivului, respectiv diferenţei dintre ele. el poate realiza contactul dintre cele două tocmai pentru că el însuși este sustras lor și le transcende. În schimb, pentru iamblichos, unul anterior intelectului este unit cu intelectul și tocmai de aceea el dă naștere intelectului, pentru că îi transmite unitatea. În schimb, acest unu nu mai poate fi absolut transcendent; de aici decurge nevoia încă unui principiu anterior. 1 Tocmai de aceea, damascius (De principiis, R. i, 86.3–10), atunci când se referă la Porfir, spune că pentru acesta principiul prim era „tată al triadei", care este coordonat triadei, iar când se referă la iamblichos spune că pentru acesta dincolo de triada inteligibilă se afla „principiul necoordonat triadei" (1 ¢sÚntaktoj prÕj t3⁄4n tri£da). Pentru iamblichos, inteligibilul este imposibil de desprins de unul în jurul căruia el se constituie; totuși, pe de altă parte, unul însuși nu se confundă cu inteligibilul, ci rămâne anterior triadei inteligibile, necoordonat ei. În schimb, Porfir separa prea tare unul de inteligibilul propriuzis (opus intelectivului), iar pe de altă parte ajungea să identifice unul cu primul moment al intelectului. Astfel, iamblichos răstoarnă perspectiva lui Profir. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM228 C. Iamblichos şi principiul indicibil Tocmai această relaţie specială între unu și intelect este cea care îl face pe iamblichos să depășească ierarhia tradiţională a principiilor, în încercarea lui de a răspunde unei probleme fundamentale: anume cum poate același principiu să fie și cauză și transcendenţă absolută? el va observa, de fapt, că acest unu, cauză a inteligibilului, nu este absolut transcendent, și de aceea el va considera că dincolo de principiul-cauză trebuie stabilit un principiu transcendent, despărţind astfel cele două aspecte ale principiului prim. Astfel, deși concepe acest principiu unu, care este sursa intelectului, a fiinţei inteligibile, iamblichos merge și mai departe în reinterpretarea lui asupra principiilor prime. distanţarea lui iamblichos faţă de Porfir (și faţă de tradiţia însăși inaugurată de Plotin) se face simţită mai ales în privinţa problemei principiului absolut. Reluând mărturia lui damascius invocată mai sus, aflăm că, pentru iamblichos, „principiile prime, anterioare primei triade inteligibile, sunt două, adică cel absolut indicibil (1 p£nth ¥rrhtoj) și cel necoordonat triadei"1. dacă „principiu necoordonat triadei" este acest unu în jurul căruia se constituie inteligibilul, atunci ce este acel principiu „indicibil", plasat mai sus chiar și decât unul tradiţiei? de ce unul „tradiţiei" este devansat de un alt principiu? de ce unul - pe care Porfir îl descria el însuși ca fiind indicibil2 - nu mai este principiul absolut, ci trece în urma unui alt principiu „indicibil"? Pentru a înţelege diferenţa dintre cele două principii propuse de iamblichos, vom face apel la un fragment din De mysteriis3, singurul din opera păstrată a lui iamblichos, în care apare această diferenţă. Vom reda acest pasaj, pentru a intra apoi într-o analiză amănunţită. 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 86.3–6. 2 Porfir însuși spune în mod explicit că „zeul care este dincolo de totul este indicibil și de nenumit (¢rr»tou g¦r ka ¢katonom£stou di¦ poll¦ toà TMp p©sin Ôntoj qeoà)" (Comentariul la Parmenide, i, 3–5). faptul că principiul este totuși indicat prin noţiunea de „unu" este explicat de Porfir prin aceea că „unul" suprimă ideea multiplicităţii și indică simplitatea lui. 3 iamblichos, De mysteriis, Viii, 2, 1–14. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 229 Înaintea fiinţelor veritabile și a principiilor claselor universale de fiinţă este un zeu unu, superior chiar și faţă de primul zeu și rege1, rămânând imuabil în singularitatea unităţii2 sale. căci nici un inteligibil și nimic altceva nu se unește cu el; el se instituie ca model al zeului care este propriul său tată, care se generează pe sine însuși și care este singurul său tată, adică al binelui veritabil: căci el3 este ceva superior și este primul și sursă a tuturor și fun dament al primelor gândite, care sunt ideile. de la acest unu, s-a manifestat zeul cel suficient sieși, și de aceea el este propriul său tată și suficient sieși: deoarece el este principiu și zeu al zeilor, monadă <care vine> din unu, anterior fiinţei și principiu al fiin ţei. căci de la el este fiinţialitatea și fiinţa, și de aceea este numit tată al fiinţei; căci el este fiinţa anterioară fiinţei, principiul inteli gibilelor, și de aceea este numit principiu al inteligibilelor.4 Pasajul redat confirmă mărturia lui damascius despre faptul că iamblichos distinge două principii: cel anterior fiinţei, pe care tradiţia (Plotin și Porfir) îl consideră primul principiu, și acest alt principiu, încă și mai înalt, prin care iamblichos depășește schema tradiţională a principiilor. Vom analiza în continuare ce caracterizează fiecare dintre aceste două principii, pentru a vedea care este sensul depășirii unului tradiţiei. 1 În Scrisoarea a II-a, 312 e 1–4, Platon vorbește despre „cei trei regi" pe care tradiţia neoplatonică, începând cu Plotin, îi va interpreta ca indicând cele trei niveluri principiale (unul, intelectul și sufletul). Pentru iamblichos, în acest context, „primul-zeu" corespunde unului tradiţiei, așadar corespunde și primului dintre cei trei regi platonici. 2 „În singularitatea unităţii sale" (TMn monÒthti tÁj autoà nÒthtoj), mai precis, în singularitatea caracterului său de a fi unu. iamblichos vrea să sublinieze unicitatea acestui zeu unu. felul său de a fi unu nu mai poate fi regăsit la nici un principiu inferior. 3 Textul grecesc poartă aici o urmă de echivoc: nu este foarte clar dacă acest „ceva superior, fundament al ideilor" se referă la zeul-unu, sau la bine. Totuși, având în vedere că mai jos binele veritabil este caracterizat ca „principiu al inteligibilelor", considerăm că și aici este vorba tot despre binele veritabil. 4 Singura ocurenţă a termenului „principiu al inteligibilelor" (noht£rchj). este posibil ca termenul să provină din Oracolele caldeene. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM230 Zeul unu (qeÕj eOEj) - anterior fiinţelor veritabile (prÕ tîn Ôntwj Ôntwn) - anterior primului zeu și rege (prètistoj toà prètou qeoà ka basilšwj) - imuabil în singularitatea unităţii sale (¢k...nhtoj TMn monÒthti tÁj autoà nÒthtoj) - modelul binelui veritabil (par£deigma toà Ôntwj ¢gaqoà) - nici un inteligibil nu se unește cu el (oÜte nohtÕn aÙtù TMpiplšketai) Primul zeu și rege (Ð prîtoj qeÕj ka basileÚj) - propriul său tată (aÙtop£twr)1 - suficient sieși (aÙt£rchj) - se generează pe sine însuși (aÙtÒgonoj) - binele veritabil (tÕ Ôntwj ¢gaqÒn) - ceva superior (me‹zon ti) - primul și sursă a tuturor (prîton ka phg3⁄4 tîn p£ntwn) - fundament al ideilor (puqm3⁄4n2 tîn „deîn) - s-a manifestat de la unul anterior (TMxšlamye ¢pÕ toà nÒj) - principiu și zeu al zeilor (¢rc3⁄4 ka qeÕj qeîn) - monadă <care vine> de la unul (mon¦j TMk toà nÒj) - anterior fiinţei și principiu al fiinţei (prooÚsioj ka ¢rc3⁄4 tÁj oÙs...aj) - tată al fiinţei (oÙsiop£twr) - fiinţa anterioară fiinţei (tÕ proÒntwj Ôn) - principiu (sau conducător) al inteligibilelor (tîn nohtîn ¢rc» / noht£rchj) observăm în primul rând că zeul-prim (conducător al inteligibilelor) este descris ca principiu al fiinţei, anterior faţă de fiinţă, și 1 Termenul aÙtop£twr provine din Imnurile orfice, 10, 10. Termenul este prezent și în descrierea pe care Porfir o face intelectului, în Istoria filozofică, 18, 10. 2 Termenul „fundament" (puqm»n) este de origine orfică (vezi damascius, Comentariul la Parmenide, R. ii, 177.16). În matematică, cuvântul se referă la primul termen al unei serii. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 231 ca auto-generat, el preluând astfel o parte din sensul „tradiţional" al principiului prim. În schimb, zeul-unu este descris ca anterior faţă de „zeul-prim", așadar ca anterior faţă de principiul prim al tradiţiei: zeul-unu este anterior fiinţei inteligibile (care nu se mai unește cu el) și anterior zeului-prim, adică binelui veritabil, instituindu-se într-un model al acestuia. Zeul-unu anterior zeului-prim. Totuși, încă de la început identificăm un aspect aparent paradoxal în perspectiva propusă de iamblichos: pe de o parte, el gândește un principiu sau „zeu prim", sursă a fiinţei, așa cum făceau și Plotin sau Porfir; pe de altă parte, dincolo de acest „zeu prim", iamblichos pune încă un principiu, și anume zeul-unu (qeÕj eOEj). În felul acesta, intervine un echivoc, deoarece zeul numit „primul" - atât de iamblichos cât și de Porfir - nu mai este cu adevărat primul, ci dincolo de „primul zeu" se mai află încă un zeu, „mai primul decât pri mul zeu" (prètistoj ka toà prètou qeoà). expresia care indică principiul cel mai înalt este una paradoxală. Autoritatea zeului pe care iamblichos însuși îl numește „zeul prim" pare astfel a fi subminată de existenţa acestui alt zeu, numit zeul-unu. În plus, maniera în care apare acest zeu-unu pare contradictorie: el va fi un principiu dincolo de principiul prim. din această cauză, indicaţia „primul zeu" trebuie luată cu prudenţă. Astfel, deși păstrează anumite aspecte ale principiului prim descris de Porfir - de pildă chiar această indicaţie: „primul zeu"1 -, iamblichos schimbă cu totul schema porfiriană a principiilor. dar atunci, ce vrea să spună iamblichos prin această perspectivă pe care o propune, ce înseamnă „zeul prim" în acest caz, și, mai ales, ce înseamnă zeul de dincolo de zeul prim, adică zeul „mai prim decât primul zeu" însuși? „Zeul prim" este primul faţă de ceilalţi zei inteligibili, adică faţă de întregul spaţiu inteligibil. ştim deja - din mărturiile invocate mai sus - că iamblichos considera inteligibilul (zeii inteligibili) în strânsă unitate cu principiul lor, așadar cu acest 1 Vezi Porfir, Istoria filozofică, fr. 18. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM232 prim-zeu. În pasajul din De mysteriis, acest zeu și principiu al inteligibilului este prezentat ca „sursă a tuturor", ca „fundament al ideilor", „principiu și zeu al zeilor", „principiu și tată al fiinţei", „principiu al inteligibilelor". Toate aceste formule indică de fapt relaţia pe care „zeul prim" o întreţine cu cele al căror principiu este1. Principiul acesta îndeplinește o funcţie faţă de fiinţa inteligibilă: el o fundamentează, el o generează. el este centrul pornind de la care se desfășoară întreaga sferă inteligibilă, iar această relaţie de întemeiere se răsfrânge și asupra principiului însuși, care este numit „principiu al inteligibilelor" sau „conducător al inteligibilelor" (noht£rchj)2, cu un termen ce sugerează strânsa relaţie a principiului cu inteligibilul. În orice caz, dacă în alte contexte iamblichos sublinia unitatea inteligibilului cu principiul său, aici el pune în evidenţă relaţia principiului cu inteligibilul pe care îl generează. În schimb, deasupra acestui principiu al inteligibilului, iambli chos vorbește despre un principiu și zeu-unu (qeÕj eOEj). iar ceea ce caracterizează acest principiu este faptul că el nu mai are nici o relaţie cu inteligibilul: „nici un inteligibil și nimic altceva nu se unește cu el". el este singur, într-o anterioritate absolută. În ordinea expunerii, acest principiu ar fi trebuit să fie numit „primul", de vreme ce el este deasupra principiului ce conduce inteligibilul (noht£rchj). Totuși, el nu este numit primul, tocmai pentru că el nu intră în relaţie cu celelalte niveluri ale realităţii, faţă de care să poată fi numit primul. el nu mai are nici o 1 Tema relaţiei principiului cu cele produse de el va fi analizată în amănunt de către damascius, care observă dificultatea inerentă conceptului de „principiu": acesta ar trebui să fie transcendent întregii realităţi produse de el, însă, pe de altă parte, el este principiu tocmai datorită acelei realităţi produse și este numit „principiu" al acelei realităţi, așadar pornind de la relaţia cu ea (vezi De principiis, R. i, 2.1–3). 2 Termenul noht£rchj nu mai apare în nici un alt context în filozofia greacă, iar faptul că fragmentul în care apare acest termen este prezentat ca redând o veche învăţătură revelată ne face să credem că provenienţa lui este una oraculară. Termenul este alcătuit după modelul cuvântului telet£rchj (conducător al riturilor secrete), care apare în Oracolele caldeene, fr. 86,1. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 233 relaţie de primordialitate, în raport cu ceva ulterior, ci este dincolo de nivelul la care se poate stabili o ordine și o succesiune. Tocmai astfel se poate înţelege paradoxul unui principiu „mai primul decât primul (prètistoj toà prètou)". dacă „conducătorul zeilor" poate fi înţeles ca primul dintre zei, în schimb, acest „zeu-unu" este izolat - prin însăși unicitatea sa - de ceilalţi zei, așadar el nu mai poate fi nici măcar „primul". Trebuie să remarcăm că, într-o anumită măsură, modul lui iamblichos de a gândi principiul cel mai înalt era deja prezent la Porfir: pentru acesta, principiului absolut era considerat a nu avea nici o relaţie cu cele de după el - așadar cu intelectul divin - deși, într-o a doua fază a analizei, el ajungea să joace rolul unui vârf pornind de la care inteligibilul se constituie. În schimb, observăm că iamblichos desparte acele caracteristici ale principiului pe care Porfir încerca să le identifice: este vorba despre caracterul absolut, anterior și lipsit de orice relaţie cu cele de după el, adică cu lumea inteligibilă, respectiv de caracterul de vârf sau moment prim, pornind de la care intelectul se constituie. dacă la Porfir, unul sau „zeul prim" avea ambele funcţii - a căror identificare ridica destule probleme - la iamblichos, ele sunt net distinse. Principiul prim și singur al lui Porfir devine la iamblichos două principii: zeul-unu (complet desprins de orice inteligibil) și zeul-prim (sursă unică a inteligibilului). În plus, între aceste două principii, așa cum le vede iamblichos, intervine un fel de ierarhizare, evidentă în termenii înșiși prin care sunt descrise aceste principii. În continuare vom analiza pe rând acești termeni ce diferenţiază și ierarhizează cele două principii ale lui iamblichos. Unul anterior monadei. Astfel, o primă problemă ţine de faptul că principiul cel mai înalt al lui iamblichos este numit el însuși „unu". numai că, din mărturia lui damascius știm că iamblichos considera unul împreună cu inteligibilele. Aceasta înseamnă că „unu" ar fi trebuit să se numească principiul ulterior, cel numit „conducător al inteligibilelor". dar atunci, de ce PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM234 iamblichos numește „unu" chiar și acest principiu anterior „conducătorului inteligibilelor", adică acest principiu care pare mai degrabă a fi dincolo de unu? de fapt, iamblichos distinge în acest context între „unul" care este „imuabil în singularitatea uni tăţii sale" și „monada <care vine> de la unul", care „s-a manifestat de la unul anterior (TMxšlamye ¢pÕ toà nÒj)"1. „Unul" indică principiul cel mai înalt, cel care nu este unit cu nici un inteligibil, iar „monada" se referă la principiul „conducător al inteligibilelor". dar în ce constă diferenţa dintre cele două noţiuni? dacă monada are deja sensul unei anteriorităţi determinate, faţă de ceva anume (adică faţă de triada intelectului), în schimb, „zeul-unul" indică tocmai faptul că acest principiu nu se mai instituie într-o anterioritate relativă, ci anterioritatea lui este absolută2: unitatea lui este una „singulară", așadar una care trebuie înţeleasă în sine, iar nu în raport cu alte tipuri de unitate ulterioare. În fond, „zeul prim" are și el o unitate (iar conform mărturiei lui Proclus despre iamblichos, acest zeu ar corespunde unului din prima ipoteză platonică), așa cum și intelectul însuși are sau este o unitate, însă nu o unitate absolută, ci una derivată. dacă „zeul prim", adică „conducătorul inteligibilului" ţine în unitatea sa întregul inteligibil, în schimb, unitatea „zeului-unu" este una anterioară, singulară și imuabilă, căreia nici un inteligibil nu i se mai poate uni. din nou putem compara această particularitate a gândirii lui iamblichos cu gândirea lui Porfir: la acesta din urmă, principiul 1 Această manifestare a monadei de la unul anterior implică și faptul că unul însuși (adică zeul-unu) nu a trebuit să intervină în nici un fel pentru ca monada să apară. Altfel spus, el însuși nu trebuie să își părăsească unitatea sa imuabilă pentru a genera ceva în afara sa. Tocmai de aceea, monada, adică zeul-prim, va fi numit „propriul său tată", „suficient sieși" și „care se generează pe sine". 2 Proclus și damascius vor numi monadă vârful intelectului, unificatul sau unul-fiinţă din a doua ipoteză platonică, așadar unul care este deja coordonat cu fiinţa, fiind astfel inferior unului absolut. Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 34 K („unul-fiinţă este monada fiinţelor") și damascius, De principiis, R. i, 2.20 („monada celor distinse este unificatul; în plus, unul este mai simplu decât monada"). Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 235 prim era unu în cel mai înalt grad, iar la limită Porfir arată că nici măcar noţiunea de „unu" nu i se potrivește; totuși, pe de altă parte, Porfir gândește principiul prim ca o primă unitate indivizibilă, pornind de la care se constituie intelectul, cu diviziunea lui caracteristică, aceea între inteligibil și intelectiv. În schimb, iamblichos distinge foarte clar unul singur, în sine însuși, de unul pornind de la care se constituie inteligibilul. Unul anterior fiinţei veritabile. Un alt aspect care diferenţiază cele două principii ţine de relaţia lor cu fiinţa. observăm că iamblichos spune despre „conducătorul inteligibilelor" că este „anterior fiinţei și principiu al fiinţei" (prooÚsioj ka ¢rc3⁄4 tÁj oÙs...aj), sau tată al fiinţei (oÙsiop£twr), însă această anterioritate a sa faţă de fiinţă nu este una absolută, ci ni se spune de asemenea că el este „fiinţă într-o manieră anterioară fiinţei (tÕ proÒntwj Ôn)". deși are și o anterioritate faţă de fiinţă (ca sursă a acesteia), zeul-prim, „conducător al inteligibilelor", păstrează totuși o relaţie cu fiinţa, și chiar ceva din caracterul fiinţei, el fiind numit „o fiinţă anterioară fiinţei". de asemenea, deși titlul de „conducător al inteligibilelor" îl plasează într-o anterioritate faţă de inteligibil, știm totuși că această anterioritate a sa nu este absolută, de vreme ce inteligibilul îi este totuși unit. În schimb, despre zeul-unu iamblichos ne spune că este „înaintea fiinţei veritabile" (prÕ tîn Ôntwj Ôntwn); de asemenea, ni se spune că inteligibilul nu se poate uni cu el. Așadar, el nu mai are nimic din caracterul fiinţei, ci anterioritatea lui este absolută. dacă revenim la perspectiva lui Porfir, descoperim într-un fel aceste două laturi ale anteriorităţii principiului: anume cea absolută și cea care mai păstrează o urmă de relaţie cu fiinţa sau ceva din natura fiinţei. Astfel, pentru Porfir, principiul prim este fiinţă în sensul cel mai propriu, superior modului de a fi al celor pe care le numim în mod normal „fiinţe"1, iar, la limită, doar el este fiinţă veritabilă. Pe de altă parte, Porfir însuși accentuează 1 Vezi Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, iii. 5–9. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM236 anterioritatea principiului faţă de fiinţă1. În cele din urmă, Porfir încearcă să „împace" aceste două afirmaţii, spunând că principiul este însuși faptul pur de a fi, anterior fiinţei determinate. În schimb, iamblichos desparte foarte clar cele două aspecte pe care Porfir le identifica: anume principiul ca fiinţă în sensul cel mai înalt și principiul ca dincolo de fiinţă într-un sens absolut. dacă „zeul prim" este dincolo de fiinţă în sensul unei superiorităţi relative - deoarece el este cel pornind de la care fiinţa se constituie propriu-zis - în schimb, principiul anterior „primului principiu" (așadar zeul-unu) este dincolo de fiinţă într-un sens abso lut, și anume, el este dincolo de orice relaţie de fundamentare, dincolo de orice relaţie în genere; acestui principiu nu i se poate adăuga nici o fiinţă inteligibilă și nimic în genere. Unul anterior binelui. o altă problemă ridicată de fragmentul din De mysteriis redat mai sus este aceea că iamblichos pare să opereze o schimbare radicală faţă de interpretarea neoplatonică obișnuită, distingând unul de bine. ştim că Plotin a insistat asupra identităţii dintre unul din prima ipoteză platonică și binele de dincolo de fiinţă, și că aceasta a fost linia urmată de filozofii ulteriori. dar atunci, de ce iamblichos se sustrage acestei linii de interpretare, punând zeul-unu ca „model al binelui veritabil" (par£deigma toà Ôntwj ¢gaqoà)? de fapt - dacă analizăm cu atenţie perspectiva lui iamblichos, punând acest text alături de celelalte mărturii despre iamblichos - ar trebui să spunem că iamblichos așează încă un „unu" sau un „zeu-unu" dincolo de ceea ce tradiţia considera a fi unul-bine, adică unul prim, identic cu binele prim. iamblichos păstrează determinaţiile principiului prim tradiţional (acelea de „bine", „prim", „unu", „sursă a fiinţei") dar le rezervă pentru acest principiu numit de el „zeul prim", conducător al inteligibilelor, care - conform mărturiei lui Proclus - este identificat cu unul din prima ipoteză platonică și asociat cu inteligibilele. În schimb, dincolo de acest principiu, iamblichos 1 Vezi Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, ii. 11. Capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor 237 așează încă un principiu, sau încă un „unu". Acest alt unu va fi considerat indicibil (după mărturia lui damascius). Altfel spus, iamblichos nu desparte unul de bine - așa cum ar părea la prima vedere - ci el nu mai consideră că acest unu identificat cu binele poate fi unul cel mai înalt, principiul absolut, ci acesta va fi devansat de principiul numit „zeul-unu" sau „indicibil". În urma analizei de mai sus, observăm că toate caracteristicile „pozitive" ale principiului prim - prezente deja în tradiţia neoplatonică - se regăsesc în acest principiu pe care iamblichos îl numește „conducător al inteligibilelor". el este zeul prim autosuficient, sursă a tuturor lucrurilor și fundament al ideilor, binele veritabil anterior fiinţei, tată al fiinţei și principiu al inteligibilelor. Totuși, observăm în același timp că aceste caracteristici „pozitive" sunt prezentate ca păstrând într-un fel o relaţie cu fiinţa inteligibilă. În schimb, caracteristicile „negative" ale principiului - cele care îl prezintă ca neavând nici o relaţie cu realitatea de după el - sunt rezervate principiului anterior, cel numit „zeul-unu". capitolul 3 PRoclUS şi PRinciPiUl de dincolo de fiinţă cA TRAnScendenţă şi cAUZAliTATe În capitolele anterioare am discutat felul în care s-a constituit problema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă (începând cu Plotin) și felul în care au fost separate cele două aspecte ale principiului, mai ales la iamblichos, care distinge un principiu-cauză de un principiu absolut transcendent. Totuși, paradoxul celor două funcţii îndeplinite de principiul prim nu a fost rezolvat în felul acesta, ci el a continuat să fie adâncit de către autorii neoplatonici ulteriori. În acest capitol vom discuta soluţia lui Proclus, care revine la perspectiva „tradiţională" a unui principiu unic de dincolo de fiinţă și încearcă să împace cele două aspecte ale principiului prim (ca transcendenţă și cauzalitate), subliniind în același timp caracterul indicibil și indescriptibil al principiului. Proclus depășește astfel problema lui Porfir (pentru care principiul transcendent intra într-un fel în structura intelectului pe care îl cauza), precum și pe cea a lui iamblichos (pentru care transcendenţa principiului trebuia separată radical de aspectul cauzal al acestuia). Pentru Proclus, principiul va fi cauză a întregii realităţi, însă fără a-și pierde statutul transcendent și fără a intra în nici un fel de relaţie cu inteligibilul, rămânând complet inaccesibil și inexprimabil. Proclus pare astfel să depășească dificultăţile inerente celor două perspective anterioare. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 239 A. Necesitatea principiului de dincolo de fiinţă 1. Fiinţa inteligibilă şi nivelurile ei Pentru a înţelege statutul acordat principiului prim de către Proclus, trebuie să vedem mai întâi cum înţelege și cum structurează el fiinţa însăși, în sensul ei cel mai înalt, de fiinţă inteligibilă. Proclus este gânditorul care a dezvoltat foarte mult partea sistematică a neoplatonismului, elaborând până în cele mai mici amănunte structura realităţii: el distinge, cu mijloacele raţiunii, niveluri din ce în ce mai fine ale lumii inteligibile. Vom prezenta pe scurt această perspectivă, pentru a vedea apoi cum unește Proclus întreaga ierarhie a realităţii sub un principiu de dincolo de fiinţă și care este rolul atribuit acestui principiu. la Proclus, sfera intelectului divin (sau a fiinţei veritabile) primește o structură proprie, ordonată ierarhic, care depășește tradiţionala identitate indistinctă dintre fiinţă și gândire. de altfel, Proclus - urmându-l pe maestrul său, Syrianus - reproșa lui Plotin faptul că a confundat toate fiinţele inteligibile într-o singură unitate, fără să le diferenţieze unele de altele1. el își va lua ca sarcină tocmai expunerea în mod distinct a claselor de fiinţe inteligibile, considerând că descrierea ipostazei secunde, ca fiind în același timp fiinţă, act și gândire, nu este întru totul adecvată, deoarece aceste trei aspecte nu au aceeași relevanţă, aceeași funcţie și nici aceeași cauzalitate în sfera realului. cele trei aspecte nu pot fi confundate, ci, chiar și în lumea sensibilă, ele sunt distincte. de pildă, nu orice lucru care este are în mod automat și un act al său (despre o piatră spunem că este, dar ea nu are nici un act propriu); de asemenea, nu orice lucru care acţionează are și gândire (de pildă, o plantă are viaţă, dar nu și gândire). dintre cele trei caracteristici ale ipostazei secunde, se pare că fiinţa iradiază 1 Vezi Teologia platonică, i, 10, p. 42, 4–20; iV, 36, pp. 105.16–107.12. Pentru o analiză mai detaliată a diferenţelor dintre gândirea lui Plotin și cea a lui Proclus, vezi H. Blumenthal, „Plotinus and the Platonic Theology of Proclus", în Proclus et la Théologie platonicienne, op. cit., pp. 163–176. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM240 cel mai mult în real (deoarece ea se află în toate lucrurile, fie că acestea au sau nu viaţă sau gândire); urmează actul sau viaţa (căci, dintre lucrurile care sunt, doar unele au viaţă și acţionează), apoi gândirea (căci, dintre cele care acţionează, doar unele au actul specific al gândirii). Pornind de la această observaţie, ierarhia realităţii inteligibile va fi constituită ţinând cont de puterea de iradiere sau de cuprindere a principiilor. Astfel, triada fiinţă-viaţă-gândire1 - care era prezentă deja la Plotin, fiind reluată apoi de Porfir - va căpăta la Proclus o structură etajată: fiinţa, urmată de viaţă, urmată de gândire. Proclus observă de asemenea că puterea mai mare de iradiere este însoţită și de o mai mare unitate. Astfel, actul (sau viaţa) este mai puţin unitar decât fiinţa, deoarece el presupune o dualitate, o ieșire din sine înspre altceva, o părăsire a identităţii sinelui. de asemenea, gândirea este mai puţin unitară decât actul, deoarece ea presupune nu numai o dualitate, ci chiar o triplicitate: ea presupune un obiect, un act și un agent al gândirii. Totuși, Proclus își ia precauţiile necesare pentru a nu separa complet fiinţa inteligibilă de viaţa și de gândirea inteligibilă. dacă în lumea sensibilă distingem foarte clar între un lucru care doar este (o piatră) respectiv un lucru care este dar are și viaţă (o plantă) și unul care, în plus, gândește (un om), în schimb, în lumea inteligibilă, deși cele trei aspecte sunt distincte ca putere de cauzare, ca eficienţă, totuși, ele nu sunt distincte în mod absolut, ele nu sunt separate, deoarece nu putem întâlni fiinţa complet lipsită de viaţă sau de gândire. de aceea, pentru a conserva distincţia dintre cele trei principii, dar pentru a nu le separa în mod nepermis, Proclus arată că, în fiecare dintre cele trei niveluri deja distinse (fiinţă, viaţă, gândire), se regăsesc, de fapt, toate cele trei aspecte, însă de fiecare dată într-un alt mod. În felul acesta, lumea inteligibilă va fi concepută sub forma unei triade de triade, adică sub forma unei enneade (de la termenul grecesc TMnnša: nouă). fiinţa, viaţa și gândirea vor fi constituite 1 inspiraţia acestei structuri a fiinţei vine de la Platon, care spunea că fiinţa nu poate fi lipsită de viaţă și de gândire (Sofistul, 248 e 6–a 2). Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 241 ca niște triade de fiinţă-viaţă-gândire, iar ceea ce distinge o triadă de alta este accentul pus pe un aspect sau altul, respectiv gradul de unitate din fiecare triadă. i Triada fiinţei Fiinţă Viaţă Gândire ii Triada vieţii fiinţă Viaţă Gândire iii Triada gândirii fiinţă Viaţă Gândire Structura celor trei triade este identică, însă în prima triadă elementele sunt indistincte, având cea mai mare unitate, în cea de-a doua elementele încep să se distingă între ele, iar în cea de-a treia ele sunt deja distinse, constituind astfel pluralitatea inteligibilă propriu-zisă, desfășurată. Fiinţa din prima triadă este în același timp viaţă și gândire, deoarece ea este „sursa" acestora. Altfel spus, actul și gândirea sunt prezente deja în fiinţă, deoarece, înainte de a se desfășura în dualitatea specifică lui, actul este deja ceva, iar înainte de a se desfășura în forma ei proprie, gândire este deja. Actul și gândirea au în ele însele fiinţă, iar în acest sens, ele sunt deja prezente la nivelul triadei fiinţei. Astfel, fiinţa (din prima triadă) este deja act și gândire, însă nu în sensul concret al actului și al gândirii, ci doar în sensul că fiinţa este punctul pornind de la care se constituie acestea din urmă1. În al doilea rând, la nivelul triadei vieţii, fiinţa este deja prezentă, deoarece viaţa însăși este deja, iar gândirea este prezentă sub forma condiţiei (o a doua condiţie) care precede gândirea însăși, cea desfășurată ca gândire. desigur, gândirea este în primă instanţă un act. În al treilea rând, la nivelul triadei gândirii, fiinţa și viaţa sunt deja prezente, pentru că gândirea este deja fiinţă și act (sau viaţă). În felul acesta, cele trei momente ale lumii inteligibile nu există niciodată în mod separat unele de altele, ci ele se implică reciproc, păstrând însă rangul distinct al fiecăruia: fiinţa are 1 Un exemplu intuitiv ar fi următorul: în genul animal există deja individul Socrate, chiar dacă animalul ca atare, luat în sine, nu este Socrate. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM242 preeminenţă faţă de celelalte două elemente, ea având în același timp și unitatea cea mai mare. ea este astfel „dincolo de viaţă și de gândire"1, deoarece ea este cea mai unitară dintre ele, are cea mai mare putere de cuprindere, cea mai mare extindere cauzală și este astfel „mai venerabilă decât ele"2. 2. „Înaintea fiinţei nu mai este decât unul"3 Pornind de la structura fiinţei expusă mai sus, putem înţelege cum face Proclus trecerea spre principiul absolut. dacă, în cadrul fiinţei, fiecare nivel „ulterior" presupunea și deţinea într-un fel nivelul mai fundamental, Proclus observă că toate cele trei niveluri ale fiinţei presupun și deţin unitatea, indicând astfel un nivel principial anterior fiinţei în totalitatea ei. fiinţa, deși este cea mai unitară dintre nivelurile lumii inteligibile, rămâne totuși în relaţie cu pluralitatea inteligibilă, cu viaţa și gândirea inteligibilă; ea este unitatea (cea mai înaltă) a unei pluralităţi. de aceea, ea nu este principiul prim, ci anterior ei se află unul absolut4, cel care poate da naștere pluralităţii unitare. Proclus continuă și la acest nivel argumentul său privind puterea de iradiere a unui principiu: el observă că singurul care are o putere de iradiere mai mare decât fiinţa este unul însuși. Astfel, ceea ce încă nu are fiinţă decât în mod potenţial, are totuși, deja, o unitate. Pentru a înţelege acest argument, ne-am putea folosi de următorul exemplu: ziua 1 Vezi Proclus, Elemente de teologie, propoziţia 138.3 (toà noà ka tÁj zwÁj TMpškeina tÕ Ôn). 2 Proclus, Elemente de teologie, propoziţia 138.5–6 (ka di¦ toàto p£ntwj semnÒteron). Recunoaștem aici tema venerabilităţii fiinţei, pe care, așa cum am văzut mai sus (partea i, capitolul 3, c), Plotin o lega de caracterul unitar primit de fiinţă de la unul anterior ei. Același lucru face și Proclus, pentru care venerabilitatea este dată de apropierea de unul absolut. 3 Proclus, Elemente de teologie, propoziţia 138.6 (¥llo d prÕ aÙtoà oÙk oesti pl3⁄4n toà nÒj). 4 Proclus, Elemente de teologie, 138. dacă pentru Aristotel, „toate lucrurile sunt și fiinţă și unu" (Metafizica, 1059, b 31), în schimb, Proclus, în linia lui Plotin, distinge și subordonează fiinţa faţă de unu. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 243 de mâine încă nu există, dar ea are totuși deja o unitate, fără de care nici nu am putea înţelege ce înseamnă „ziua de mâine"; de asemenea, rezultatul unei acţiuni care este încă în desfășurare nu este prezent, nu există încă, și nici nu putem ști care va fi el. Totuși, îi atribuim deja o unitate, rezultatul nu poate fi decât unul singur, și tocmai în virtutea acestei unităţi așteptăm rezultatul, ne predispunem înspre el. exemplul dat de Proclus însuși în acest sens este acela al materiei, care, deși participă la unu (cauza primă a tuturor lucrurilor), totuși, este lipsită de formă, așadar ea nu are, propriu-zis, fiinţă1. ierarhia principiilor se instituie astfel într-o simetrie inversă faţă de lucrurile pe care aceste principii le produc, faţă de lucrurile asupra cărora se resimte eficienţa unui principiu sau a altuia. Astfel, avem ca principii: a). Unul (care este doar unu) b). fiinţa (care este unu și fiinţă) c). Viaţa (care este unu, fiinţă și viaţă) d). Gândirea (care este unu, fiinţă, viaţă și gândire) iar ca realităţi corespunzătoare, avem: d). fiinţele raţionale (care participă la unu, fiinţă, viaţă și gândire) c). fiinţele vii dar nu raţionale (care participă doar la unu, fiinţă și viaţă) b). fiinţele lipsite de viaţă (care participă doar la unu și fiinţă) a). Materia, lipsită de formă (care participă doar la unu, dar nu și la fiinţă) În concluzie, unul este principiul cel mai cuprinzător, sau cel a cărui eficienţă este simţită în cuprinsul întregii realităţi. el este astfel mai cuprinzător decât fiinţa. Unul este dincolo de fiinţă, iar aceasta în două sensuri: pe de o parte, el este dincolo de fiinţa cea mai înaltă și mai unitară, așadar el este „deasupra" sau „înaintea" fiinţei veritabile; pe de altă parte, puterea lui de cuprindere și de iluminare trece dincolo de cuprinderea și de iluminarea fiinţei, 1 Proclus, Elemente de teologie, 72.8–9. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM244 adică „sub" ceea ce participă la fiinţă. Așadar, în ambele „direcţii" ale realităţii, unul depășește fiinţa: el o precede ca principiu și o depășește ca putere de cuprindere și de cauzare, ca eficienţă. Proclus unește astfel aspectul transcendenţei principiului prim, cu cel al cauzalităţii sale faţă de întreaga realitate. Principiul prim transcende fiinţa, tocmai pentru că el „ajunge" mai departe decât ea, pentru că sfera lui de cauzalitate se întinde mai mult decât cea a fiinţei, pentru că nu există nimic care să nu participe, într-un fel, la unul absolut, deși există „lucruri"1 care nu participă la fiinţă2. B. Transcendenţa principiului faţă de fiinţă Principiul de dincolo de fiinţă depășește fiinţa atât ca anterioritate (prin unitatea lui superioară, prin suprimarea oricărei pluralităţi), cât și ca „posterioritate" (prin puterea lui de radiere, de cauzare, care se întinde dincolo de pragul de jos al fiinţei). Totuși, problema relaţiei dintre transcendenţă și cauzalitate - problemă de la care pornește analiza noastră - subzistă, deoarece această extindere cauzală a principiului pare să afecteze statutul anteriorităţii sale faţă de realitate. Altfel spus, se pune pro blema: cum poate principiul să producă în genere ceva, fără a intra în relaţie cu cele produse? nu cumva, producând aceste lucruri, principiul dă ceva din sine, devenind imanent celor produse, pierzându-și astfel transcendenţa? dacă analiza anterioară pornește de la sensul unităţii - care este mai larg decât sensul fiinţei -, în continuare, va trebui să intrăm în esenţa însăși a transcendenţei și a cauzalităţii, pentru a 1 desigur, este impropriu să vorbim despre „lucruri", deoarece materia - care nu participă la fiinţă, dar participă la unu - nu este propriu-zis un lucru anume. 2 Aceeași concluzie - a existenţei unului anterior fiinţei și cauză a fiinţei - este stabilită în Teologia platonică, ii, 1–3. de data aceasta, Proclus se sprijină pe o analiză detaliată a posibilelor relaţii dintre pluralitate și unitate, aplicând metoda sa favorită, aceea a cernerii și a discernerii ipotezei corecte dintre mai multe ipoteze posibile. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 245 vedea cum înţelege Proclus aceste două aspecte ale principiului și cum reușește el să le armonizeze și să suprime antinomia dintre ele. Pentru început, vom pune în evidenţă transcendenţa radicală pe care o acordă Proclus principiului, pentru a discuta apoi problema cauzalităţii. 1. Unul ca nefiinţă superioară fiinţei. Republica, 476 e 7–477 a 7 Pentru întreaga tradiţie neoplatonică, principiul unic și unitar al întregii realităţi este anterior sferei fiinţei inteligibile; mergând însă și mai departe, Proclus insistă asupra faptului că principiul este anterior chiar și faţă de faptul însuşi de a fi; în con se cinţă, el va fi gândit ca negare a fiinţei. este prima dată în istoria filozofiei când sursa transcendentă a fiinţei este descrisă în termenii nefiinţei. Acest lucru reprezintă o schimbare de perspectivă majoră faţă de gândirea anterioară. Să ne amintim de pildă „respingerea" pe care o exprima Parmenide faţă de nefiinţă. Platon observă că, într-un sens, nefiinţa nu poate fi suprimată cu totul și nu poate fi exclusă în afara fiinţei; el va vorbi despre o nefiinţă relativă, ca alteritate reciprocă a genurilor fiinţei. Totuși, acest sens relativ este „demnitatea" cea mai înaltă până la care Platon ridică nefiinţa. Plotin, deși vorbește despre principiul de dincolo de fiinţă, nu îl înţelege în termeni de nefiinţă1. Porfir, tocmai pentru a nu lăsa ca principiul să cadă într-o nefiinţă absolută, îi acordă sensul de fiinţă prin excelenţă, ca fapt pur de a fi. În schimb, pentru Proclus, apropierea principiului de faptul de a fi reprezintă o relativizare a transcendenţei sale. de aceea, Proclus va considera că principiul se sustrage în mod total fiinţei, trecând într-o nefiinţă absolută. dar cum face Proclus această decizie de a transgresa limita fiinţei, pășind în nefiinţă, și anume în nefiinţa principiului absolut? 1 Vezi în acest sens articolul lui denis o'Brien: „le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parmenide, Platon, Plotin", în Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, op. cit., pp. 317–364, care pune în evidenţă sensurile nefiinţei la Plotin: ca nefiinţă relativă a formelor, ca nefiinţă a materiei și ca nefiinţă absolută. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM246 după cum am văzut în analiza anterioară, Proclus împarte domeniul „realităţii" în trei niveluri, distingând foarte strict fiinţa atât faţă de ceea ce îi este inferior, cât și faţă de ceea ce trece dincolo de ea. fiinţa ocupă poziţia de mijloc, fiind încadrată de două tipuri de nefiinţă: nefiinţa inferioară fiinţei, respectiv nefiinţa superioară fiinţei, aceasta din urmă reprezentând tocmai principiul suprem, binele de dincolo de fiinţă, unul transcendent fiinţei. În felul acesta, principiul prim capătă statutul unui nefiinţe prin excelenţă. Pentru a fundamenta această împărţire a realităţii, Proclus se întoarce la textul Republicii și încearcă să arate că Platon însuși întrevedea o astfel de structurare a realităţii și că, prin această nefiinţă superioară fiinţei, Platon ar fi avut în vedere unul absolut, respectiv binele de dincolo de fiinţă. Textul la care recurge Proclus este Republica, 476 e 7–477 a 7, pe care îl vom analiza în continuare pentru a pune apoi în evidenţă fina interpretare dată de Proclus. În acest pasaj al cărţii a V-a, Platon discută diferenţa dintre opinie (care vede doar lucrurile frumoase, dar ignoră ideea însăși de frumos) și cunoaștere (care cunoaște atât lucrurile frumoase, cât și ideea de frumos corespunzătoare, fără să confunde lucrurile cu ideea însăși). Întrebarea care se pune este ce înseamnă de fapt a cunoaște sau, mai precis, ce cunoaște cel care cunoaște. Analiza platonică pornește de la două întrebări: „cel care cunoaște cunoaște ceva sau nimic? [...] ceva ce este, sau ceva ce nu este?"1. Răspunsurile - oferite de personajul Glaucon - sunt: cel ce cunoaște cunoaște ceva, și anume ceva care este. de aici, Platon deduce împărţirea realităţii în: fiinţa absolută (căreia îi corespunde cunoașterea), lucrurile care, într-un fel, sunt și nu sunt (cărora le corespunde opinia) și nefiinţa (căreia îi corespunde ignoranţa). În schimb, Proclus interpretează pasajul într-o altă manieră, punându-l în legătură cu pasajul despre binele de dincolo de fiinţă din Republica, 509 b. el descoperă încă un aspect sau un nivel, 1 Platon, Republica, 476 e 7–10 (Ð gignèskwn gignèskei t À oÙdšn; [...] PÒteron ×n À oÙk Ôn;). Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 247 pe care textul însuși nu îl indică în mod explicit. Astfel, în Comentariul la Republica, 264.21–266.11, Proclus accentuează faptul că textul platonic pune nu una, ci două întrebări, pentru a localiza obiectul cunoașterii: prima întrebare este dacă „cel ce cunoaște cunoaște ceva sau nimic". Această întrebare este urmată de o a doua, și anume dacă cel ce cunoaște „cunoaște ceva ce este, sau ceva ce nu este". dar atunci, remarcă Proclus, înseamnă că acest „ceva" (tÕ t...) nu este același lucru cu „ceea ce este" (tÕ Ôn), și nici „nimic" (tÕ oÙdšn) nu este același lucru cu „ceea ce nu este" (tÕ m3⁄4 Ôn) - pentru că altfel a doua întrebare nu ar mai avea nici un rost. dacă cele două întrebări sunt puse în mod distinct, înseamnă că și „obiectul" lor este distinct, așadar a doua întrebare se referă la altceva decât prima. Astfel, prima întrebare („dacă cel ce cunoaște cunoaște ceva sau nimic") distinge între două niveluri ale realităţii: ceva și nimic. „nimicul" este inferior lui „ceva", indicând, de fapt, nefiinţa pură, sau neantul. În schimb, a doua întrebare se situează la nivelul lui „ceva" și distinge între „ceva care este" și „ceva care nu este". dacă „ceva care este" indică fiinţa, atunci „ceva care nu este" ar indica - după lectura lui Proclus - ceva superior fiinţei, așadar ceva care „nu este", însă nu pentru că ar fi inferior fiinţei, ci pentru că depășește fiinţa. Proclus sprijină această concluzie pe faptul că, în pasajul despre bine (din Republica, 509 b), se vorbește despre „ceva" care nu are fiinţă, dar care nu este pur neant, inferior fiinţei. În concluzie, Proclus - pornind de la textul platonic - împarte „realitatea" în: ceva (t...) ceva ce nu este (t m3⁄4 Ôn) unul (›n) sau binele de dincolo de fiinţă (TMpškeina tÁj oÙs...aj) ceva ce este (t Ôn) fiinţa (tÕ Ôn) nimic (oÙdšn) ceea ce nu este deloc (tÕ mhdamîj Ôn) nefiinţa (tÕ m3⁄4 Ôn) 1 Vezi Proclus, Commentaire sur la République, trad. fr. A. J. festugière, Vrin, Paris, 1970. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM248 Mai mult, Proclus observă că „nimic" (oÙdšn) este o negaţie a „unului" (›n)1, ceea ce ar indica faptul că unul, chiar dacă este el însuși nefiinţă, totuși, el nu este același lucru cu „nimicul" inferior fiinţei. Unul nu poate fi el însuși nimic, de vreme ce nimicul este de fapt o negaţie a unului însuși. din contră, nimicul este cel mai depărtat faţă de unul însuși, fiind situat la celălalt capăt al ierarhiei realului. Acest unu, care nu este fiinţă, este totuși „ceva", pe când nimicul inferior fiinţei nu poate fi descris nici măcar ca fiind „ceva" anume. În concluzie, unul este nefiinţă, însă nu în sensul nimicului, ci într-un sens care depășește fiinţa însăși. 2. Binele de dincolo de a fi În plus, așa cum spuneam mai sus, această depășire a fiinţei de către unu este gândită de Proclus într-o manieră absolută: unul nu este dincolo doar faţă de lucrurile care sunt, și nici doar faţă de fiinţă în ansamblul ei, ci el este dincolo faţă de faptul însuşi de a fi. În această perspectivă radicală a lui Proclus identificăm o critică implicită la adresa lui Porfir, critică ce se sprijină pe o lectură aparte a textului platonic al Republicii. Astfel, dacă pentru Porfir unul prim era identificabil cu faptul pur de a fi (tÕ enai), în schimb, pentru Proclus, principiul prim este nefiinţă, desigur, într-un sens al superiorităţii faţă de fiinţă. ne amintim că, pentru Porfir, principiul prim nu putea fi „ceva anume", însă nu putea fi nici „nimic", ca simplă nefiinţă, ca neant. Pentru a ieși din această dilemă, Porfir acordă principiului prim statutul de „act pur de a fi". Acesta nu este nici „ceva 1 Într-adevăr, cuvântul grecesc care desemnează nimicul (oÙdšn) este de fapt forma de neutru a pronumelui negativ nici unul (oÙde...j). Aceeași concluzie este formulată de Proclus și în Teologia platonică, ii, 3, p. 25.13–19: unul și nimicul sunt contrarele extreme, iar ceea ce nu este unu nu este nimic. În schimb, ceea ce nu este fiinţă nu este, totuși, neant. de pildă, unul însuși care este dincolo de fiinţă, dar și lucrurile care sunt prinse în devenire: despre toate acestea nu se poate spune că sunt (In Tim., i, p. 233.31–32, trad. festugière). Vezi de asemenea, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 46 K: „nimicul - adică nici unu - este negaţia unului și a orice altceva". Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 249 anume" - deoarece nu este un act determinat și nu aparţine unui subiect determinat - dar nu este nici „nimic", ci el este sursa pornind de la care ia naștere fiinţa inteligibilă, care se distinge faţă de acest act prim, nedeterminat. Proclus nu poate accepta această soluţie a principiului prim ca act pur de a fi. el nu ezită să afirme - cel puţin în acest context al Comentariului la Republica, 264–266 - că principiul este, de fapt, o ne-fiinţă1. el nu este un a fi privilegiat, un a fi pur, nedeterminat - așa cum îl înţelege Porfir - ci el trece dincolo de faptul însuși de a fi. din Republica, 509 b, aflăm că binele dă ideilor (ca obiecte ale cunoașterii) faptul de a fi și fiinţa; totuși, atunci când Platon afirmă transcendenţa binelui faţă de fiinţă, el nu precizează dacă binele este și dincolo de faptul de a fi. În schimb, Proclus citează pasajul respectiv spunând că Platon vorbește despre „binele de dincolo de fiinţă și de a fi"2. el adaugă așadar acest „dincolo de a fi", care nu există în textul platonic. În continuare, vom vorbi tocmai despre acest „dincolo de a fi", prin care Proclus radicalizează transcendenţa principiului prim, depășind perspectiva lui Porfir. Pentru a înţelege de ce afirmă Proclus această transcendenţă faţă de faptul de a fi - vom vedea mai întâi cum distinge el între: lucrurile care sunt (t¦ Ônta), fiinţa (oÙs...a) și ideile care configurează spaţiul fiinţei, respectiv faptul de a fi (tÕ enai). cunoaștem deja distincţia pe care o face Platon între lucrurile plurale și ideea unică sub care stau acestea, și care arată „ce este" (Ö oestin) fiecare dintre aceste lucruri3. dacă despre lucruri spunem că sunt (ena... famen), într-un fel sau altul, ideea precizează acest „a fi" al lucrurilor și în dă un sens propriu. ea este în mod deplin ceea ce spuneam mai înainte despre lucrul respectiv că ar 1 În alt context (Comentariul la Republica, i, 282.25), Proclus rafinează această afirmaţie, arătând că principiul nu este nici fiinţă, nici nefiinţă. desigur, ambele afirmaţii sunt valide, dacă înţelegem că principiul este ne-fiinţă nu ca inferior faţă de fiinţă, ci ca superior fiinţei. 2 Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, i, 270.8; 271.19; 280.12; 286.20–21. 3 Platon, Republica, 507 b 5–7. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM250 fi. Astfel, dacă un lucru este frumos, ideea nu este doar frumoasă, ci este frumosul însuși, prin care lucrul însuși putea fi numit frumos. Tocmai de aceea ideile sunt într-un mod superior lucrurilor de sub idee: ideile sunt „cele care sunt cu adevărat" (t¦ Ôntwj Ônta)1; ele sunt fiinţări reale sau veritabile, care alcătuiesc astfel spaţiul propriu-zis al fiinţei (oÙs...a). Proclus spune chiar că fiinţa (oÙs...a) este „genul tuturor ideilor"2, sau „genul tuturor celor ce sunt"3, de vreme ce tot ceea ce este (tÕ Ôn) participă la fiinţă (oÙs...a)4. iar ceea ce le face să fie idei, adică fiinţe propriuzise, este tocmai „faptul de a fi" care revine fiecărei idei5. În concluzie, ideile sunt „fiinţări" (Ônta) și anume „fiinţări adevărate" (t¦ Ôntwj Ônta); există un singur caracter comun tuturor ideilor, și anume faptul de a fi (enai), sau faptul de a fi cu adevărat (Ôntwj enai). În măsura în care au acest fapt de a fi, ideile participă la genul comun numit fiinţă (oÙs...a). dar acest fapt de a fi - caracteristic ideilor, adică fiinţelor veritabile - este primit tocmai de la binele de dincolo de fiinţă, conform afirmaţiei din Republica, 509 b 7–8. dar atunci, Proclus arată că, dacă dă faptul de a fi, binelui însuși nu îi mai rămâne nici un „alt fel de a fi", conform căruia el să fie. nu există decât un singur fel de „a fi", iar acesta este cel care aparţine ideilor (adică obiectelor inteligibile). În schimb, binele este dincolo de fiinţă (sau suprafiinţial: ØperoÚsion), el este dincolo de spaţiul ideilor, al celor ce sunt. dar atunci, înseamnă că el este și dincolo de „a fi", adică dincolo de singurul „a fi" care există, și anume cel asociat ideilor. 1 Platon, Sofistul, 240 b 3: „adevărul este o fiinţă veritabilă", Timaios, 52 c 5: „discursul adevărat vine în ajutorul fiinţei veritabile". 2 Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, i, 271.3; 278.27. 3 Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, i, 270.31. 4 Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, i, 270.21–22 (p©n g¦r tÕ ×n oÙs...aj ¢n£gkh metšcein). Proclus spune că aceste cuvinte ar aparţine chiar lui Socrate. Totuși, deși afirmaţia aceasta nu poate fi găsită ca atare în Republica, ea apare în Parmenide, unde, la începutul celei de-a doua ipoteze asupra unului, se spune că ar fi imposibil să existe ceva, fără a participa la fiinţă (Parmenide, 142 b 6). 5 Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, 282.15–17. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 251 concluzia lui Proclus este aceea că „Socrate a spus că binele este nu numai dincolo de fiinţă, ci și dincolo de a fi"1. desigur, Socrate nu spune acest lucru în mod textual, însă Proclus se vede îndreptăţit să deducă faptul că transcendenţa binelui faţă de fiinţă înseamnă și transcendenţă faţă de faptul de a fi. În felul acesta, Proclus impune principiului prim o transcendenţă absolută, faţă de orice mod de a înţelege fiinţa. dacă la Plotin am analizat pe straturi transcendenţa principiului faţă de fiecare dintre nivelurile fiinţei (forme și genuri, viaţă și activitate, gândire), în schimb, la Proclus, accentul este pus pe depășirea totală a fiinţei de către principiu: acesta nu mai este gândit ca anterior faţă de un aspect sau altul al fiinţei, ci ca sustrăgându-se în mod absolut din sfera fiinţei și a faptului de a fi. el este „dincolo de fiinţă și de a fi"2, „dincolo de intelect"3 și „dincolo de toate"4. C. Transcendenţa devine cauzalitate dar atunci, revenind la problema pe care am anunţat-o la în ce putul acestui capitol, se pune întrebarea cum rezolvă Proclus a doua parte, și anume cea legată de cauzalitatea principiului de dincolo de fiinţă? după cum am văzut mai sus, Porfir admite unul absolut ca un prim moment în procesul de constituire a intelectului. În schimb, Proclus nu acceptă această perspectivă, deoarece ea nu păstrează acea izolare absolută a principiului faţă de cele ce vin după el. Vrând să facă din principiul prim cauza primă, Porfir 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, 282.20–21 (t¢gaqÕn d oÙc mÒnhj tÁj oÙs...aj epen Ð Swkr£thj TMpškeina, ¢ll¦ ka toà enai). 2 Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, 271.19; 280.12; 282.20–21; 284.9; 292.21; Comentariul la Parmenide, 653.28; 904.34; 1032.33; 1073.11– 12; 1086.5; 1087.8–10; 1097.12–13; Teologia platonică, i, 16.23–24; i, 42.2; i, 45.4–5; ii, 21.8; ii, 31.11; ii, 31.26; ii, 35.4; ii, 38.27; ii, 47.26; ii, 73.7. 3 Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, i, 277.10. 4 Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, i, 274.7; Comentariul la Parmenide, 1065.29; 1143.15; 1200.7; Teologia platonică, ii, 73.14. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM252 pierde - în opinia lui Proclus - transcendenţa principiului. Pe de altă parte, iamblichos - care contracara și el perspectiva lui Porfir - admite un principiu-cauză a fiinţei, care rămâne în strânsă legătură cu fiinţa, cu nivelurile inteligibile pe care le generează; el consideră acest principiu ca subiect al primei ipoteze platonice, alături de toate nivelurile inteligibile ce corespund negaţiilor din această ipoteză. În plus, iamblichos stabilește încă un principiu, şi mai anterior, care nu mai are decât rolul unei transcendenţe pure, fiind complet izolat de fiinţă; acest principiu nu mai este cuprins în nici una dintre ipotezele platonice, deoarece nimic inteligibil nu mai poate avea legătură cu el. Proclus - după cum am văzut mai sus - nu acceptă nici această perspectivă, ci separă foarte clar unul din prima ipoteză platonică faţă de toate nivelurile inteligibile pe care acesta le generează. el vrea să păstreze - într-un același principiu prim - atât cauzalitatea, cât și transcendenţa, rezolvând astfel aparentul conflict dintre acestea, gândindu-le în așa fel încât ele să nu se mai suprime una pe alta. Vom discuta în continuare soluţia lui Proclus, punând în evidenţă dublul sens pe care îl acordă el expresiei „dincolo de fiinţă": atât ca transcendenţă faţă de fiinţă (dacă punem accentul pe dincolo), cât și ca sursă a fiinţei (dacă punem accentul pe fiinţă). Trebuie să observăm mai întâi că problema disjuncţiei dintre transcendenţa și cauzalitatea principiului pornea de fapt de la modul în care erau înţelese aceste două roluri ale principiului. Astfel, dacă transcendenţa înseamnă suprimare și negare a oricărui atribut de ordinul fiinţei, în schimb, cauzalitatea este înţeleasă ca o relaţie cu fiinţa. Astfel, la Porfir, deși principiul este descris ca transcendent fiinţei, totuși, cauzalitatea lui revine în cele din urmă la o relaţie cu cele două „părţi" ale fiinţei (unul pune în legătură inteligibilul cu intelectivul). Astfel, cele două funcţii ale principiului par să se suprapună într-un mod nepermis. la iamblichos, principiul absolut transcendent este complet izolat de fiinţă, pe când principiul care generează fiinţa este inseparabil de fiinţă. Altfel spus, cele două funcţii ale principiului sunt net Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 253 separate. În schimb, Proclus nu mai păstrează această înţelegere opozitivă a transcendenţei și a cauzalităţii, ci el concepe cauzalitatea ca decurgând din transcendenţă, sau ca având același sens cu transcendenţa. cauzalitatea principiului nu mai este o „abatere" de la transcendenţă și nici nu este distinctă de aceasta, ci cauzalitatea este cea care dă adevăratul sens al transcendenţei. În continuare, vom discuta contextele în care Proclus atinge această problematică și modul în care el identifică transcendenţa cu cauzalitatea. Astfel, în Comentariul la Parmenide1, Proclus analizează statutul negaţiilor prin care exprimăm transcendenţa. Înţelegem transcendenţa ca negaţie, ca suprimare a tuturor atributelor fiinţei. dar negaţia însăși are mai multe sensuri, de aceea trebuie precizat care este sensul ce revine negaţiilor specifice transcendenţei. Proclus distinge două tipuri de negaţii: de la un lucru negăm ceva atunci când, dintr-o gamă de proprietăţi, alegem pe cele ce îi revin lucrului respectiv și le respingem pe celelalte (de pildă când spunem că un lucru colorat are o anume culoare, dar nu le are pe toate celelalte); de asemenea, putem nega de la un lucru tot ceea ce nu intră în contact cu el, tot ceea ce îi este străin prin natură (de pildă când spunem că linia nu are culoare). În schimb, în cazul unului absolut, negaţiile au cu totul alt statut și relevanţă. Proclus răstoarnă, de fapt, accepţiunile de mai sus ale negaţiei, pentru a explica negaţiile ce corespund unului prim. În primul rând, toate aceste negaţii pe care i le aplicăm principiului prim nu indică o lipsă a lui, ci o superioritate a unului faţă de toate celelalte lucruri. faptul că suprimăm de la principiu orice urmă de pluralitate și de manifestare de ordinul fiinţei nu înseamnă pur și simplu că principiul ar fi privat de toate acestea pe care le suprimăm, și că ar avea într-un fel nevoie să le primească. Proclus distinge foarte clar între ne-fiinţa unului și negaţiile specifice lui, respectiv ne-fiinţa și negaţiile specifice materiei, la celălalt capăt al ierarhiei realităţii2. Unul este o nefiinţă 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1074.22–1075.16. 2 Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, 12.21–22. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM254 prin exces (kaq' Øperoc»n), iar orice adăugire de ordinul fiinţei l-ar limita și l-ar micșora, pe când materia este o nefiinţă prin lipsă (kat¦ oelleiyin), care tinde să primească o formă, să devină o fiinţă determinată. negaţiile materiei indică privaţiunea de fiinţă, pe când negaţiile unului indică depășirea fiinţei. În concluzie, deși este el însuși o ne-fiinţă, unul absolut nu este un neant pur, ci este o nefiinţă superioară fiinţei. În al doilea rând, ceea ce negăm de la unu nu sunt lucruri care rămân în afara lui - ca și cum nu ar exista nici o legătură între natura lor și unul anterior (așa cum obiectele matematice și culorile se exclud reciproc) - ci, din contră, sunt lucruri care își au cauza în unul anterior (par£getai TMke‹qen), și sunt aduse la fiinţă de către unul anterior (Øfšsthke TMke‹qen)1. Principiul nu este doar o negaţie și o suprimare absolută, care ar rămâne fără nici o relevanţă pentru cele suprimate2. din contră, el este cel care are puterea de a aduce la fiinţă toate lucrurile pe care le tran scende, așadar tot ceea ce negăm de la el. Proclus spune că „principiul nu este non-plurale ca pură privaţie, ci drept cauză"3. În felul acesta, negaţiile unului au, pe de o parte, sensul tran scendenţei unului faţă de toate lucrurile, iar, pe de altă parte, ele restituie unului sensul său de cauză a tuturor lucrurilor care în primă instanţă sunt negate de la unu. Urmând intuiţia maestrului său, Syrianus, Proclus stabilește un raport de corespondenţă precisă între negaţiile din prima ipoteză, a unului prim, și afirmaţiile 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1074.35–1075.1. 2 Proclus insistă asupra diferenţei dintre unu și nimic: chiar dacă amândouă sunt o negaţie și o suprimare a fiinţei, unul nu este o simplă non-existenţă. În Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 46 K, Proclus observă similaritatea dintre nimic (oÙdšn), definit ca „nici măcar unu" (oÙd ›n) și unul absolut, despre care, în prima ipoteză platonică, se spune că nu este „nici măcar unu". Pentru a diferenţia între cele două, Proclus arată că, dacă nimicul este o suprimare completă, a orice, chiar și a unului, în schimb, unul prim nu este o suprimare absolută a unului, ci doar a unului care însoţește fiinţa, a unului care intră în dualitate cu fiinţa. 3 Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 12, p. 66.16–17 (TÕ g¦r oÙ poll¦ stšrhsij oÙk oestin, Óper TMlšgomen, ¢ll¦ a„t...a tîn pollîn). Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 255 din cea de-a doua ipoteză, arătând că, „așa cum unul este cauza tuturor lucrurilor, la fel, negaţiile aplicate unului sunt cauza afirmaţiilor corespunzătoare"1. negaţiile nu exprimă o lipsă în unul absolut, o privaţiune a acestuia, ci indică de fapt transcendenţa cauzei faţă de ceea ce ea produce2. negaţiile sunt cauza lucrurilor negate, adică sunt cauza fiecărui nivel de fiinţă corespunzător. Astfel, afirmaţiile din ipoteza secundă sunt făcute posibile tocmai de către aceste negaţii din prima ipoteză. Toate cele afirmate în a doua ipoteză proced de la ceea ce a fost negat în prima ipoteză. Proclus concepe generarea fiinţei de către unu ca un proces complementar transcendenţei unului. Avem a face cu o dublă „desprindere" a unului faţă de fiinţă (și faţă de fiecare dintre clasele sau ordinele acesteia): astfel, desprinderea unului ca transcendent dincolo de fiinţă se face prin negarea ordinelor de fiinţă; pe de altă parte, instaurarea sau producerea tuturor ordinelor de fiinţă se face prin desprinderea faţă de unul anterior, care rămâne inaccesibil, prins în această reţea de negaţii succesive. Unul se impune ca transcendent prin negarea tuturor claselor de fiinţă; dar, în același timp, într-o mișcare complementară dar de sens opus, aceste clase de fiinţă apar tocmai prin intermediul negaţiei și suprimării iniţiale; ele se desfășoară una câte una, pe măsură ce sunt negate de la unul care se ridică dincolo de ele. Prima lor intrare în scenă este una negativă; ele sunt „lăsate în urmă" de către unul care se sustrage lor. de fapt, avem a face cu un dublu proces de negaţie, de raportare opozitivă: dacă unul aduce negarea fiinţei, în schimb, fiinţa nu este posibilă decât pornind de la ceea ce o transcende, de la unul care este el însuși o negativitate. instaurarea unului de dincolo de fiinţă se face prin negarea tuturor ordinelor fiinţei; în 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1075.16–22; vezi și 1061.23–31 și 1085.12–17. conform mărturie lui Proclus, Syrianus este primul care a observat că tot ceea ce este afirmat în a doua ipoteză este negat în prima. 2 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, 12, p. 57.21–22: „negaţiile [materiei] sunt privaţiuni, pe când negaţiile [unului] sunt cauze transcendente ale tuturor efectelor". PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM256 sens invers - însă corespunzător acestor negaţii -, afirmarea tuturor ordinelor de fiinţă se face tocmai ca o contraparte a acestei negativităţi fundamentale a unului absolut. desigur, negativitatea unului absolut - descris el însuși ca ne-fiinţă - este una superioară fiinţei. Proclus vorbește despre trei tipuri de negaţii: superioară afirmaţiei, coordonată cu afirmaţia și inferioară afirmaţiei - după cum și nefiinţa poate fi superioară, inferioară sau la același rang cu fiinţa1. dar, dacă orice negaţie presupune doi termeni - cel negat și cel de la care se negă - aceeași optică se poate aplica și negaţiilor din prima ipoteză. Această negaţie superioară afirmaţiei - care corespunde nefiinţei superioare fiinţei - are ea însăși două părţi, sau doi termeni: pe de o parte cel de la care se neagă (adică unul prim), care rămâne astfel neafectat de ceea ce se neagă, iar pe de altă parte ceea ce se neagă (adică ordinele fiinţei), dar care, deși este negat, este într-un fel afirmat tocmai ca neavând contact cu primul termen, tocmai ca rămânând într-un fel în afara lui. nivelurile fiinţei proced de la principiul prim tocmai ca negate de la acesta2: ele se depărtează astfel de el, provin de la el și se desfășoară în afara lui în mod gradat, de la cel mai asemănător unului (dar care, totuși, nu este unul) și până la cel mai depărtat și mai neasemenea unului prim (precum este materia). Astfel, negaţia superioară fiinţei capătă și sensul transcendenţei, dar și sensul cauzalităţii. desigur, nu este prima dată când cele două aspecte ale principiului sunt puse împreună și înţelese ca inseparabile. Plotin însuși spunea că „cel care este cauză a tuturor lucrurilor nu este nimic dintre cele a căror cauză este"3. Totuși, ceea ce face Proclus în plus este să explice cauzalitatea prin transcendenţă; schimbând puţin perspectiva, el arată că cel de la care negăm toate 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1073.2–8, precum și 1076.4–12. 2 Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 10, p. 63.11–12: „căci, prin faptul că primul nu este plural, pluralele proced de la el, iar prin faptul că el nu este un tot, totalitatea procede de la el și la fel toate celelalte". 3 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 6.55. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 257 celelalte lucruri este cauza acestor lucruri tocmai prin această transcendenţă a sa. Așadar, nu numai că, pentru a fi cauză, principiul nu trebuie să fie nimic din celelalte lucruri, ci, în plus, unul este cauză tocmai prin această sustragere a sa din celelalte lucruri, prin această negaţie a tuturor lucrurilor. cauzalitatea unului ajunge să aibă același statut ca și transcendenţa sa, fără ca acestea două să se mai contrazică în vreun fel: „deoarece unul este cauză a tuturor zeilor, el transcende pe toţi, iar deoarece el transcende pe toţi prin superioritatea lui, el dă tuturor fiinţă"1. Așa cum a nega ceva de la un lucru lasă acel lucru în afara celui de la care el a fost negat, la fel, principiul prim lasă și instituie în afara sa lucrurile pe care le depășește prin superioritatea sa. „Prin faptul că se simplifică deasupra (Øperhplîsqai)2 tuturor, [unul] le face pe toate să subziste (Øf...sthsin)"3. Proclus exprimă această depășire generatoare a principiului prin opoziţia și complementaritatea dintre cele două verbe: cel care este dea-supra (Øper-hplîsqai) face să sub-ziste (Øf-...sthsin) pe cele ce sunt sub el, pe cele care îi sunt inferioare. negaţiile prin care unul iese în afara tuturor celorlalte lucruri fac loc apariţiei lucrurilor însele, care vor fi tocmai ceea ce principiul nu este, și vor ocupa locurile rămase libere prin sustragerea principiului în afara tuturor. În felul acesta, „relaţia" principiului cu gradele de fiinţă pe care le generează nu mai este una directă - în sensul în care iamblichos considera inteligibilul inseparabil de unul anterior - ci este o relaţie negativă: generarea fiinţei este de fapt o excludere a fiinţei din proximitatea principiului, o excludere care păstrează 1 Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 10, 62.2–4. 2 Urmăm aici traducerea engleză a verbului, anume „a depăși în simplitate" (cf. Elements of theology, trad. e. R. dodds, pp. 248–249), bazându-ne și pe pasajul ulterior (Teologia platonică, ii, 10, p. 63.18–20), în care Proclus spune că unul „depășește întregul univers prin superioritatea simplităţii sale". În schimb, în traducerea pasajului anterior, H. d. Saffrey și l. G. Westerink redau verbul Øperhplîsqai prin „a se desfășura deasupra", ceea ce contravine sensului non-multiplu al unului prim. 3 Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 10, 62.5–6. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM258 transcendenţa principiului. fiinţa inteligibilă nu numai că nu are un acces direct la principiu, ci, în plus, ea este generată concomitent cu această sustragere a principiului dincolo de spaţiul inteligibil, dincolo de fiinţă. Totuși, deși Proclus a încercat să îmbine transcendenţa și cauzalitatea principiului și să rezolve aparenta neconcordanţă dintre ele, se ridică o problemă privind statutul însuși al transcendenţei și al cauzalităţii principiului prim. Pe de o parte, ne putem întreba cum reușește Proclus să păstreze statutul transcendent al principiului prim, dacă acest principiu trebuie să fie descris într-un fel sau altul, fie chiar și printr-un discurs negativ; altfel spus, cum poate fi cu adevărat transcendent un principiu care este, într-un fel, accesibil gândirii, fie și ca negaţie absolută. Pe de altă parte, se poate ridica problema complementară: cum anume este principiul prim cauză a întregii sfere a fiinţei, dacă el însuși nu intră într-o relaţie directă cu fiinţa, ci se instituie într-o negaţie deplină a acesteia; altfel spus, cum poate principiul absolut transcendent să aibă ca „efect" o realitate cu care nu mai are nici o legătură, și a cărei natură îi este complet străină. În continuare, vom aborda pe rând aceste două probleme „de fineţe", a căror rezolvare necesită o pătrundere și mai adâncă în gândirea lui Proclus. dacă până acum am vorbit despre raportul dintre transcendenţă și cauzalitate, în continuare vom analiza transcendenţa respectiv cauzalitatea principiului, pentru a vedea cum rezolvă Proclus aceste probleme și dacă nu cumva, odată cu aceste probleme, apar în gândirea lui Proclus noi aporii privind principiul de dincolo de fiinţă, aporii care vor deschide calea spre meditaţia neoplatonică ulterioară, în speţă spre gândirea lui damascius. D. Principiul inexprimabil Prima chestiune pe care o vom aborda este statutul discursului prin care se impune transcendenţa principiului de dincolo de fiinţă. Astfel, expresia cea mai adecvată a transcendenţei - dar Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 259 și a cauzalităţii - principiului este aceea a negaţiilor sistematice din prima ipoteză din Parmenide1. Totuși, cum poate această „negativitate" a principiului să fie coerentă cu celelalte expresii pe care principiul le primește în mod tradiţional, precum cele două nume platonice ale principiului (unu și bine), sau toate atributele ce exprimă superioritatea lui (principiu absolut, cauză, primul)? În plus, chiar și descrierea principiul ca dincolo de fiinţă este în primă instanţă o indicaţie de ordinul gândirii - așadar de ordinul fiinţei - fie și sub o formă negativă. de asemenea, expresiile negative (non-plural, ne-fiinţă, etc.) pot avea un sens afirmativ în logica minţii noastre, încât, la limită, discursul negativ din Parmenide poate fi înţeles ca o serie de indicaţii despre principiul prim. Astfel, problema antinomiei dintre principiul-transcendent și principiulcauză revine sub forma unei antinomii între un principiu transcendent și un principiu pe care trebuie totuși să îl descriem drept „transcendent", precum și drept „cauză primă". Această problemă, pe care o vom discuta în continuare, nu se mai situează la un nivel strict doctrinar - așadar nu se mai referă la modul concret în care Proclus înţelege și structurează ierarhia realităţii faţă de principiul ei - ci se situează mai degrabă la interfaţa dintre chestiunile doctrinare expuse până acum și modul discursiv în care aceste chestiuni sunt formulate și expuse. Avem a face cu o problemă foarte adânc infiltrată în gândirea neoplatonică, deoarece toţi autorii neoplatonici s-au lovit de această inadecvare a discursului lor la realităţile principiale despre care vorbeau. Totuși, problema devine foarte acută în neoplatonismul tardiv. la Plotin, inadecvarea discursului - inevitabil plural - era un lucru de la sine înţeles, pe care Plotin îl depășea printr-un constant exerciţiul mental de a imagina felul unitar în care funcţionează intelectul divin, și apoi depășirea acestui nivel însuși, prin renunţarea la orice determinaţii de ordinul intelectului. 1 Pentru Proclus, aceste negaţii alcătuiesc un adevărat imn înălţat zeului suprem, principiului absolut; vezi Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 1191, 34–35, sau Teologia platonică, ii, 11, p. 65.5–15. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM260 discursivitatea umană era astfel „ţinută la distanţă", izolată într-un nivel inferior al realităţii, iar miza cercetărilor plotiniene se situa mai degrabă la nivelul acelei părţi a sufletului nostru care nu a părăsit intelectul divin. În schimb, după iamblichos, situaţia se schimbă, odată ce acesta afirmă că sufletul uman este cu totul desprins din intelectul divin1. Problema se va accentua odată cu Proclus și va atinge apogeul odată cu damascius. dacă la Plotin, dincolo de fiinţă însemna în mod esenţial dincolo de fiinţa cea mai înaltă și de gândirea cea mai unitară, a intelectului, odată cu Proclus și mai ales cu damascius, problema mai acută va fi aceea de a gândi și de a vorbi despre un principiu pe care îl recunoaștem a fi dincolo de tot ceea ce spunem noi despre el. În esenţă, problema este dublă: pe de o parte, cum facem ca tot ceea ce spunem despre principiu să nu aducă nici un prejudiciu statutului său de principiu inexprimabil, iar, pe de altă parte, cum se realizează fie și un minim acces la principiu, în virtutea căruia să putem vorbi despre el. În continuare, vom urmări aceste două fire problematice în gândirea lui Proclus, punând în evidenţă statutul special pe care îl acordă el discursului despre principiu. ideea centrală a analizei procleene în acest sens este aceea că tot ceea ce spunem despre principiu (de pildă că el este unu, bine, dincolo de fiinţă) este spus de fapt din perspectiva lucrurilor care sunt după principiu, iar nu din perspectiva principiului însuși. Altfel spus, atunci când vorbim despre principiu, ne referim de fapt la fiinţa de după el, singura pe care putem să o gândim, iar nu la principiul însuși, care nu poate fi exprimat în nici un fel. indicaţiile privind principiul sunt doar moduri de a suprima tot ceea ce urmează după principiu și de a situa principiul dincolo de tot ceea ce este exprimabil în vreun fel. Vom intra în amănuntele gândirii lui Proclus, pentru a vedea cum înţelege el 1 despre această idee a lui iamblichos, vezi c. Steel, The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus, Bruxelles, 1978, mai ales pp. 38–51. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 261 acest mod paradoxal de a vorbi despre ceva referindu-ne de fapt la ceea ce el nu este. 1. Numele principiului de dincolo de fiinţă În mod tradiţional, urmând moștenirea platonică, principiul prim este desemnat prin două nume: unul non-plural, anterior pluralităţii și binele de dincolo de fiinţă. Totuși, Proclus - ca și Plotin, Porfir sau iamblichos, de altfel - explică maniera nuanţată în care trebuie înţelese și folosite aceste nume ale principiului prim. În primă instanţă, principiul prim nu poate avea nici un nume și nici o descriere, de vreme ce Platon însuși - în ipoteza întâi, a principiului prim - neagă de la unu numele și descrierea1. numele pe care le folosim pentru a indica principiul prim nu mai sunt niște nume propriu-zise, de vreme ce ele se referă la ceva care, de fapt, nu are nume. Astfel, urmând concluzia primei ipoteze platonice, Proclus arată că cel pe care îl numim unu în sens absolut „nu este nici măcar unu"2: altfel, dacă ar fi adevărat că unul „este unu", el însuși ar deţine și fiinţa implicată de acest „este unu", încât el nu ar mai fi doar unu3. numai unul secund „este unu", deoarece el este și unu și fiinţă. de aici decurg două concluzii paradoxale: pe de o parte, despre cel ce este unul absolut sau „unul însuși" nu putem spune că „este unu"; pe de altă parte, cel despre care Platon spune că „este unu" - adică unul secund, din a doua ipoteză - deţine deja fiinţă și, ca atare, el nu mai este „unul însuși", adică doar unu. Astfel, despre „unul însuși" nu putem spune că „este unu", iar cel despre care spunem că „este unu" nu este „unul însuși". numele însuși, adăugat unului absolut, ar duce la pierderea naturii absolut unitare a principiului prim. ne aflăm în faţa unui principiu pe care, dacă îl numim „unu", nu îl mai putem înţelege ca unu. el este în așa măsură unu încât, chiar și dacă spunem că „este unu", aducem în el o 1 Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, 29, 123.22–25. 2 Platon, Parmenide, 141 e 10–11 (OÙd' ¥ra oÛtwj oestin éste žn enai). 3 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 36 K. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM262 dualitate ce îi este străină. de aceea, unul absolut este incognoscibil și inexprimabil1, el neputând fi gândit și numit nici măcar ca „unu". dar atunci, ce înseamnă numele și descrierea unui lucru care nu poate fi numit și nici descris? Proclus arată că cele două nume ale principiului - acela de unu și acela de bine - exprimă mai degrabă cele două mișcări ale fiinţei faţă de principiu. Pe de o parte, prin unu indicăm faptul că întreaga fiinţă - plurală prin natura sa - este produsă pornind de la un principiu care nu mai este el însuși plural. Pe de altă parte, prin bine indicăm faptul că întreaga fiinţă tinde spre principiul prim ca spre binele ei absolut. Așadar, unul și binele indică aceste două funcţii ale principiului: de a genera întreaga realitate și apoi de a o concentra înspre sine. cele două nume corespund procesiunii de la principiu și respectiv conversiunii care se îndreaptă spre principiu2. Prin unu exprimăm funcţia generativă (ØpostatikÒn) a principiului, iar prin bine exprimăm funcţia sa conversivă (TMpistreptikÒn). dar, de fapt, principiul însuși rămâne inexprimabil (¥rrhton), căci cele două nume se referă la ceea ce procede de la principiu, respectiv la ceea ce se convertește spre el. cu alte cuvinte, cele două nume exprimă efectivitatea pe care o are principiul însuși în realitate, însă nu exprimă principiul însuși, care este dincolo de ceea ce generează el. Spunând că el este cel de la care se desfășoară întreaga realitate și înspre care se concentrează întreaga realitate, nu descriem principiul însuși, ci spunem de fapt că el este dincolo de tot ceea ce el generează. Unul și binele nu sunt două nume prin care cunoaștem principiu, două nume care i s-ar atribui în mod propriu-zis. noi nu cunoaștem principiul însuși ca unu și ca bine, pornind de la el ca de la un obiect propriu-zis al gândirii noastre, ci, din contră, îl numim unu și bine pornind de la modul în care întreaga realitate tinde spre el. Mai mult, îl numim unu și bine pornind de la felul în care gândirea noastră 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 40 K. 2 Vezi, de pildă, Teologia platonică, ii, 6, 40.9–10. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 263 percepe acest dublu raport dintre realitate și principiu, gândirea având ea însăși o mișcare proprie de procesiune respectiv de conversiune înspre principiu. de aceea, sensul celor două nume ale principiului primește încă o precizare și astfel o limitare: numele nu se referă în mod direct la principiul însuși, ci la modul în care noi percepem prezenţa principiului1. Îl numim „unu", nu pentru că el ar fi unu, nu pentru că ar corespunde acestui nume, ci pentru că, în tendinţa ei de a descoperi principiul, gândirea noastră are nevoie de un nume pentru a indica pe cel înspre care se îndreaptă, dar pe care, de fapt, nu îl poate atinge și, deci, nu îl poate nici numi. Avem a face cu un înţeles aparte al „numelui": este vorba despre un nume care nu mai poate avea un corespondent concret la care să se refere, ci indică doar calea înspre cel la care se referă, mergând astfel doar până la jumătatea întâlnirii cu acela, fără să ajungă să îl cuprindă în mod concret și să îl redea ca pe un obiect propriu-zis al gândirii și al numirii. Principiul pe care îl numim „unu" nu este propriu-zis „unu" - conform demonstraţiei aporetice din prima ipoteză platonică. ceea ce corespunde numelui „unu" este, de fapt, propria noastră tendinţă spre principiul prim, propriul nostru efort de a ajunge la principiu și imaginea pe care ne-o facem despre el, în efortul și tendinţa noastră de a-l cuprinde. Această imagine a principiului în noi este numită de neoplatonici „unul din noi" (tÕ TMn 1m‹n ›n)2. Ajungem astfel la o manieră paradoxală de a numi: ea nu numește „obiectul" ei (care rămâne de neatins), ci numește propriul ei fapt de a numi, propria imagine pe care ne-o facem în noi înșine, atunci când încercăm să numim pe cel pe care nu putem să îl numim3. nu este o numire a ceva anume, corespunzător 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 54 K. 2 Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 54 K: „Unul în sine însuși nu poate fi numit, ci doar unul din noi înșine <poate fi numit>." 3 Plotin însuși (Enneade, V, 3, 14.2–3) spunea că putem vorbi despre principiu, însă nu putem să îl exprimăm pe el însuși. În plus, vorbind despre el, vorbim de fapt despre noi, despre propriile afectări (p£qh) pe care le avem în PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM264 actului de a numi, ci este o numire a propriei noastre tendinţe de a numi și de a cunoaște pe cel care nu poate fi numit. de aceea, în această tendinţă a noastră spre unu, nu mai avem a face propriu-zis cu un act cognitiv. „Acest concept [de „unu"] nu este cognitiv și nu cuprinde unul, ci este în mod esenţial o lucrare a naturii și o dorire naturală a unului"1. Proclus observă că nu numai fiinţele dotate cu cunoaștere tind spre principiul unu, ci și fiinţele lipsite de cunoaștere și chiar lipsite de viaţă. În consecinţă, unul nu este un obiect al cunoașterii și nu corespunde cunoașterii, ci corespunde acelei tendinţe universale înspre unitate, care, în cazul fiinţelor dotate cu intelect, ia forma cunoașterii. el corespunde unei tendinţe mai fundamentale decât cunoașterea, fiind el însuși anterior și mai fundamental decât orice obiect al cunoașterii2, încât nici o cunoaștere nu îl poate atinge în mod propriu-zis. 2. Suprimarea discursului negativ din Parmenide dar atunci, cum putem înţelege un discurs despre principiu precum cel din prima ipoteză din Parmenide, care înaintează în manieră deductivă, de la o concluzie la alta, părând să se refere constant la unu? oare un astfel de discurs nu oferă o cunoaștere a principiului? de fapt, Proclus arată că acest tip de discurs are tocmai rolul de a păstra statutul inaccesibil al transcendenţei principiului: el este un discurs negativ, apofatic3, care suprimă pe privinţa lui (Enneade, Vi, 9, 3.49–54). Proclus accentuează această idee: nu putem exprima principiul și nu putem nici măcar să vorbim despre el, ci vorbim doar despre noi, adică despre acea imagine a principiului pe care ne-o facem, dar care nu este principiul însuși. 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 56 K. de aici, Proclus trage concluzia identităţii dintre unu și binele absolut al tuturor lucrurilor. 2 Vezi, de pildă, Comentariul la Parmenide, 58 K: „el este un obiect al dorinţei, mai înainte de orice cunoaștere". 3 Pentru metoda apofatică și pentru prezenţa ei în spaţiul neoplatonic, vezi P. Hadot, „Apophatisme et théologie négative", în Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, Bibliothèque de l'Évolution de l'Humanité, Albin Michel, 2002, pp. 239–252. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 265 rând toate nivelurile de fiinţă cu care lucrează gândirea noastră, mergând chiar până la propria lui suprimare, pentru a lăsa astfel de înţeles că nici măcar maniera negativă a gândirii nu poate avea un acces direct la principiul de dincolo de fiinţă. Pentru a stabili această concluzie, Proclus pornește de la un amănunt surprinzător și bulversant al textului primei ipoteze din Parmenide. este vorba despre faptul că, în urma tuturor întrebărilor din ipoteză - care ajung de fiecare dată la câte o negaţie în privinţa unului - este formulată încă o întrebare care pare să pună sub semnul îndoielii tot ceea ce s-a spus până atunci. la 142 a 7, personajul Parmenide întreabă: „dar oare este cu putinţă ca acestea să fie adevărate în privinţa unului? ('H dunatÕn oân per tÕ žn taàta oÛtwj oecein;)". Răspunsul personajului Aristotel la această întrebare este unul negativ: „nu mi se pare <că e cu putinţă> (OÜkoun oemoige doke‹)". Proclus se oprește îndelung asupra acestor două ultime replici din ipoteza unului absolut1, extrăgând din ele miza cea mai subtilă a întregului dialog. Proclus observă că, deși argumentaţia pornește de la ipoteza că „unul este" (137 c 4), se ajunge să se nege unului fiinţa (141 e 9–12), iar prin ultima întrebare se sugerează că nici măcar negarea fiinţei de la unu nu este adecvată principiului prim, deoarece nici măcar această suprimare nu exprimă nimic despre unu2. Totuși, această suprimare a fiinţei de la unul absolut corespunde, în interpretarea neoplatonică, tocmai principiului de dincolo de fiinţă din Republica, 509 b 9. de aceea, s-ar părea că, în acest final al primei ipoteze din Parmenide, este suprimat însuși faptul de a fi dincolo de fiinţă. „expresia" ultimă a principiului de dincolo de fiinţă pare a fi aceea că el nu este nici măcar dincolo de fiinţă. există astfel trei niveluri ale suprimării discursului despre principiul de dincolo de fiinţă: în primul rând, principiul este numit unu, știind însă că unul este doar o suprimare a pluralităţii și că nu se referă în mod direct la principiu; în al doilea rând, 1 Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 64–76 K. 2 Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 70 K. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM266 suprimăm fiinţa unului (Parmenide, 137 c 4), ajungând a spune că „unul nu este nici măcar unu", iar apoi, prin întrebarea finală a ipotezei, spunem că nici măcar negaţia (faptul că „unul nu este unu") nu este adecvată principiului. Totuși, cheia de boltă a interpretării procleene la discursul apofatic din Parmenide depășește în subtilitate chiar și această necesară suprimare a negaţiilor. Astfel, Proclus pune în joc propria sa interpretare, conform căreia negaţiile din prima ipoteză generează afirmaţiile din cea de-a doua ipoteză. Astfel, spune el, dacă negaţiile exprimă puterea unului de a genera afirmaţiile din a doua ipoteză (corespunzătoare întregului nivel al fiinţei), atunci ultima întrebare din prima ipoteză neagă chiar și faptul că unul are această putere de a genera toate lucrurile, așezând astfel unul dincolo de putere, așa cum el este dincolo de existenţă (adică dincolo de lucrurile care există, dincolo de lucrurile generate). Proclus leagă astfel transcendenţa principiului faţă de orice discurs cu transcendenţa lui faţă de fiinţa cauzată. Putem distinge două niveluri ale relaţiei dintre cauzalitate și transcendenţă: pe de o parte, unul generează toate lucrurile, însă rămâne transcendent faţă de lucrurile pe care le generează; pe de altă parte, nici măcar puterea de a genera toate lucrurile nu i se poate atribui în mod propriu-zis, ci el rămâne inexprimabil, și nimic nu poate afecta transcendenţa sa: nici faptul că el generează lucrurile, nici faptul că spunem că el generează lucrurile. Unul generează lucrurile, însă le generează negându-le (adică rămânând transcendent lor), iar, în ultimă instanţă, trebuie negat chiar și faptul că el le generează (pentru ca nici măcar acest lucru să nu fie înţeles ca o caracteristică pozitivă a unului). Proclus rezolvă astfel - pe o altă cale - antonimia dintre cauzalitate și transcendenţă, dintre faptul că, pe de o parte, spunem că principiul este transcendent (așadar inexprimabil), iar, pe de altă parte, trebuie să îl descriem ca generator al tuturor lucrurilor, ca principiu și cauză primă a întregii realităţi. Astfel, în primă instanţă, negaţiile exprimă cauzalitatea principiului și Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 267 condiţia sa transcendentă; totuși, ulterior, negaţiile trebuie suspendate, pentru a păstra condiţia in-exprimabilă a principiului. de asemenea, dacă în însăși expresia „dincolo de fiinţă" am putea simţi o tensiune între transcendenţa exprimată de dincolo și relaţia cauzală cu fiinţa (căci dincolo este totuși faţă de fiinţă), Proclus oferă ieșirea din aporie: în primă instanţă, metoda dialectică suprimă fiinţa unului - impunând faptul că unul este dincolo de fiinţă - însă apoi, dialectica însăși trebuie abandonată, iar negaţia fiinţei trebuie ea însăși negată, pentru ca expresia dincolo de fiinţă să nu determine principiul prim, pierzând caracterul lui inexprimabil. dacă, în primă instanţă, negaţiile sunt mai adecvate decât afirmaţiile pentru a fi aplicate principiului prim, deoarece favorizează accesul spre principiu, ulterior, chiar și ele trebuie suprimate. Apropiindu-se de principiul prim, sufletul „nu trebuie să mai întrebe nici ce nu este principiul și nici ce este el"1, ci trebuie să rămână în liniște, unificat cu principiul absolut simplu. este ceea ce face Platon - conform interpretării lui Proclus - la sfârșitul acestei prime ipoteze: anume, renunţând atât la afirmaţii cât și la negaţii, el „conclude discursul despre unu cu inexprimabilul", astfel încât „sfârșitul argumentelor despre faptul că [principiul] este inexprimabil este unificarea"2, iar „sfârșitul studiului despre unu este tăcerea"3. E. Unul imparticipabil şi henadele Principiul de dincolo de fiinţă este astfel sustras oricărei relaţii cu fiinţa pe care el o generează. nimic de ordinul fiinţei nu i se poate aplica, nici în manieră afirmativă, nici în manieră negativă. 1 Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 74 K. Proclus face referinţă la un pasaj platonic (Scrisori, ii, 312 e) citat mai sus (66 K), în care se spune că întrebarea „ce este principiul" nu se poate pune. 2 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 74 K. 3 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 76 K. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM268 Totuși, această depășire a principiului faţă de întreaga fiinţă ne pune în faţa unei noi probleme: cum este cu putinţă ca principiul să genereze fiinţa ca pe ceva cu care nu are absolut nici o comuniune de natură. În ce constă efectul principiului în fiinţă, dacă nimic de ordinul fiinţei nu se regăsește în principiu? Aceasta este de altfel cea de-a doua parte a problemei pe care am anunţat-o mai sus, și care reprezintă reversul problemei transcendenţei, discutată până acum. Astfel, dificultatea vine din faptul că, o accentuare puternică a transcendenţei principiului face foarte dificil să înţelegem maniera concretă în care principiul generează întreaga realitate. În acest ultim paragraf al capitolului de faţă, vom discuta soluţia oferită de Proclus privind maniera în care unul, ca principiu absolut, generează întreaga sferă a fiinţei, în ciuda faptului că el însuși rămâne inaccesibil fiinţei, dincolo de fiinţă. Proclus preia și dezvoltă o teorie a maestrului său, Syrianus, anume teoria henadelor divine1. Acestea sunt niște unităţi primordiale (de la termenul grecesc n£j, n£doj = unitate)2, care vor fi introduse în schema generală a realităţii, între unul transcendent și fiinţele propriu-zise3. Henadele vin să rezolve problema trecerii de la unul absolut transcendent - cu care fiinţa nu poate avea un contact direct -, la pluralitatea propriu-zisă a fiinţei generate, care deţine caracterul de unitate într-un mod derivat. Astfel, chiar dacă unul absolut trebuie considerat dincolo de fiinţă, totuși, ceea ce face ca un lucru să fie și să își conserve fiinţa este caracterului lui de unitate, fără de care orice lucru s-ar 1 Se pare că iamblichus ar fi fost cel care a introdus în neoplatonism termenul de „henadă". În acest sens, vezi J. dillon, „iamblichus and the origin of the doctrine of Henads", Phronesis, 17, 2, 1972, pp. 102–106. 2 Termenul este folosit de Platon (Philebos, 15 a 6) în sinonimie cu termenul „monadă" (mon£j), pentru a indica ideile, ca unităţi ce restrâng pluralitatea corespunzătoare (de pildă, omul-unu, frumosul-unu). 3 o expunere clarificatoare a problemei henadelor este făcută de H. d. Saffrey și l. G. Westerink în Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, vol. iii, Introduction, pp. iX–lXXVii. Textele pe care Proclus le dedică în mod special henadelor sunt: Elemente de teologie, 113–165 și Teologia platonică, iii, 1–6. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 269 dispersa. dar această unitate din fiecare lucru nu poate veni în mod direct de la unul absolut - care este dincolo chiar și de caracterul de unu, după cum am văzut mai sus1. de aceea, Proclus va considera că între unul absolut și pluralitatea fiinţelor există o pluralitate unitară (tÕ nia‹on plÁqoj), o pluralitate de unităţi, sau de henade2. Acestea manifestă caracterul unitar al unului absolut și îl transmit fiinţelor subordonate; în schimb, ele nu mai au statutul transcendent al unului, care făcea cu neputinţă o relaţie directă cu fiinţele. În felul acesta, unul absolut își păstrează statutul de cauză primă absolută, iar faptul concret de a cauza este „delegat" henadelor, care fac propriu-zis legătura cu fiinţa3. Textul platonic pe care se sprijină Proclus pentru introducerea henadelor este ipoteza a doua din Parmenide. Aceasta pornește de la afirmaţia că „dacă unul este", atunci el participă la fiinţă, iar fiinţa participă la unu. ipoteza arată că unitatea însoţește fiinţa în fiecare parte a acesteia și că există, în consecinţă, un număr egal (și infinit) de fiinţe, respectiv de unităţi corespunzătoare. Proclus vede în acest text o indicaţie a faptului că unitatea care face cu putinţă fiinţa (împiedicând-o să se disperseze) însoţește 1 Unul însuși nu este decât un nume inadecvat principiului, pe care Platon însuși îl neagă în prima ipoteză din Parmenide. 2 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 3, 13.27. Traducerea prin „henade" este mult mai apropiată de intenţia lui Proclus: „unitate" se poate referi la o unitate realizată din mai multe elemente, așadar la reunirea mai multor părţi. În schimb, henada nu are părţi, nu este divizibilă, ci este o unitate pură, care manifestă unitatea unului absolut și care guvernează pluralitatea de fiinţe ce iau naștere după ea. Așadar henada nu este orice fel de unitate, ci doar o unitate apriori, care precede pluralitatea fiinţei și o face posibilă. 3 În articolul „l'idée de causalité dans la Théologie platonicienne de Proclus", în Proclus et la Théologie platonicienne, op. cit., pp. 325–337, francesco Romano arată că există chiar și la nivel semantic o diferenţă între unul absolut, considerat drept cauză primă ce transcende realitatea cauzată (caz în care Proclus folosește termenul a„t...a) și cauzalitatea secundară, specifică termenilor intermediari, consideraţi într-o relaţie de cauză-efect faţă de realitatea subordonată lor (în acest caz, este vorba în principal de cauzalitatea henadelor, iar termenul folosit de Proclus este a‡tion). Unul însuși este numit a‡tion doar în sensul în care cauzalitatea lui se manifestă prin intermediul henadelor. PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM270 de fapt fiinţa la fiecare nivel al desfășurării acesteia, ca un fel de prezenţă - din ce în ce mai îndepărtată - a unului absolut. Acesta, deși nu părăsește niciodată statutul său inaccesibil, însoţește totuși întreaga procesiune a fiinţei, prin această manifestare a sa. „iată ce arată Parmenide prin intermediul celei de-a doua ipoteze, atunci când combină unul cu fiinţa [...] și declară că ceea ce procede până la limita de jos a fiinţelor este unul. căci trebuia să facă să existe henadele înaintea fiinţelor veritabile."1 Henadele sunt niște „existenţe unitare"2, fiind cele mai apropiate de unul primordial; ele nu sunt produse de unul absolut, ca niște efecte ale principiului, ci ele sunt de fapt o primă manifestare a acestuia3. el le face să existe ca fiind cele mai asemănătoare și mai apropiate lui, și le face să existe prin pura sa bunătate4. ca manifestări ale unului absolut, henadele au rolul de a conferi fiinţelor caracterul unitar al principiului, precum și providenţa lui: caracterul lui de bine absolut. În plus, ele convertesc toate fiinţele înspre unu. fiecare henadă este cauza unei anumite zone a fiinţei, iar fiinţele participă la henada corespunzătoare. În schimb, unul rămâne imparticipabil, dincolo de fiinţă. lui îi revine o cauzalitate absolută, care nu intră în relaţie directă cu cele cauzate. Proclus va vorbi în acest sens despre o „cauzalitate care transcende toate cauzalităţile"5. Proclus imaginează un sistem ierarhic de transmitere a unităţii, de la unul absolut până la limita inferioară a procesiunii fiinţei: de la unul absolut, unitatea trece la henade, de la henade ea trece la fiinţele prime, inteligibile - care sunt monade sau idei -, iar de la idei, ea trece la fiinţele determinate, subsumate unei idei sau alteia. fiecare henadă și apoi fiecare monadă (sau idee) este principiu pentru zona de fiinţă care îi este subordonată, ceea ce face ca termenul însuși de „principiu" să fie relativizat și să nu se mai refere doar 1 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 3, 13.19–23. 2 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 3, 13.12. 3 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 9, 36.13–15. 4 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 9, 14.1–3. 5 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 4, 15.4. Capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de ființă 271 la principiul absolut. de asemenea, dacă privim dinspre fiinţă înspre principiul prim, observăm că fiecare lucru participă la unitate prin intermediul clasei de fiinţă care îi este imediat superioară, apoi, clasele de fiinţă participă la henade; deasupra henadelor, nu mai este decât principiul absolut, care guvernează întreaga realitate, fiind el însuși considerat o „henadă a henadelor"1. În urma acestei analize, ne putem întreba dacă nu cumva aporia subzistă - într-o formă și mai subtilă - în soluţia oferită de Proclus. Astfel, pe de o parte, Proclus insistă asupra transcendenţei principiului și asupra faptului că generarea fiinţelor nu afectează cu nimic transcendenţa sa; pe de altă parte, atunci când își pune în mod concret problema cum ajunge unitatea în fiinţe, sau cum se face trecerea de la unul inaccesibil la fiinţele plurale, el recurge la pluralitatea unitară a henadelor, pe care o interpune între unu și fiinţe. dacă fiinţele nu participă direct la unu, în schimb, henadele sunt inseparabile de unu. dar, în felul acesta, unului însuși i se atribuie un soi de pluralitate care îi este inseparabilă, el însuși este o „henadă a henadelor". În plus, henadele sunt unite atât cu unul absolut2 (ca manifestări ale acestuia și ca fiind cele mai apropiate de el), cât și cu fiinţele (ca vârfuri ale acestora și ca acel nivel care în fiecare fiinţă este cel mai unitar). Totuși, în felul acesta - deși vrea să păstreze caracterul inaccesibil și imparticipabil al unului absolut -, Proclus ajunge să admită un acces indirect al fiinţei la principiul de dincolo de fiinţă; el arată că, prin intermediul henadelor, fiinţele sunt unite cu unul absolut3. observăm, de fapt, că problema cea mai radicală a neoplatonismului - spre care se concentrează toate eforturile filozofilor deja 1 Vezi Teologia platonică, ii, 65, 12. 2 Vezi Teologia platonică, iii, 3, 14.2–3: „prin natura lor, [henadele] sunt unite unului". 3 Vezi Comentariul la Parmenide, 1043.26–29: „apoi, chiar și în monade, considerăm această demnitate [de principiu] în ceea ce au ele mai înalt și mai unitar [adică henadele], în măsura în care și acestea sunt unite cu unul, deificate și inseparabile de acest principiu sublim". PARTeA ii: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM272 discutaţi și pentru care orice soluţionare este doar parţială - constă în aceea că, pe de o parte, gândirea este nevoită să afirme inaccesibilitatea principiului prim (atât pentru gândirea care ar încerca să-l descrie, cât și pentru fiinţa care tinde spre o legătură concretă cu acesta) dar, pe de altă parte, gândirea trebuie să acorde principiului un rol concret în constituirea realităţii, și astfel ea ajunge atât să îi dea principiului o descriere (fie și recunoscută ca neadecvată), cât și să accepte o legătură, sau un contact (fie și mediat) între principiu și fiinţa de după el. Problema este concentrată în expresia „dincolo de fiinţă", prin care ne referim la principiul prim, expresie care indică în același timp - și în mod paradoxal - atât depășirea fiinţei de către principiu, cât și faptul că acest principiu ce depășește fiinţa este totuși principiu al fiinţei, dând fiinţei ceea ce îi este propriu1. expresia „dincolo de fiinţă" are astfel o dublă direcţionare, sau un dublu sens în care poate fi citită: atât dinspre fiinţă înspre ceea ce o depășește, cât și invers, de la principiu înspre fiinţa al cărei principiu este. iar cele două sensuri ale expresiei ajung să se contrazică, într-o anumită măsură, sau, cel puţin, echilibrul dintre ele este foarte greu de stabilit. dar această situaţie atât de problematică este cea care a împins mai departe meditaţia neoplatonică asupra primului principiu, asupra formulării acestui echilibru atât de fragil între anterioritatea principiului și statutul său de sursă a întregii realităţi. În ultima parte a lucrării noastre, vom analiza felul în care se continuă această meditaţie în opera lui damascius, ultimul filozof neoplatonic care a acordat o importanţă deosebită gândirii unui principiu absolut și felului în care se structurează întreaga realitate pornind de la un principiu de dincolo de fiinţă. Vom vedea cum se constituie gândirea lui damascius pornind tocmai de la această dificultate radicală de a pune în același principiu atât cauzalitatea, cât și transcendenţa absolută. 1 ne amintim că, în textul Republicii, 509 b, unde apare această expresie, „binele de dincolo de fiinţă" este cel ce dă fiinţa, fără a fi el însuși fiinţă, ci dincolo de fiinţă. PARTeA A TReiA dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil capitolul 1 APoRiA PRinciPiUlUi de dincolo de ToTUl descoperit relativ recent1, damascius a fost un autor destul de controversat în literatura de specialitate, care oscilează între a-i acorda un loc de primă importanţă în istoria neoplatonismului2 și a trece în grabă peste analizele lui foarte fine3, în care limbajul și obișnuinţele gândirii noastre sunt puse de multe ori în încurcătură. este adevărat că gândirea lui damascius urmează niște reguli nu tocmai lesne de înţeles și nu se lasă ușor sistematizată și redată. Acest lucru se datorează faptului că damascius încearcă o abordare radicală a principiului prim, una care nu mai face nici o concesie manierei duale în care gândim noi. În căutarea primului principiu, damascius forează în singura „materie" pe care o are la îndemână, anume în gândirea însăși - fie cea deja fixată în textele tradiţiei, fie propria sa gândire, propriul său 1 Tratatul Despre primele principii a fost editat pentru prima dată - într-o variantă foarte restrânsă - în 1722–1724 de către J. chr. Wolf; o primă ediţie completă a tratatului De principiis apare în 1826, fiind realizată de Joseph Kopp, iar ediţia care cuprinde atât tratatul De principiis cât și tratatul In Parmenidem este oferită abia în 1889–1899 de către charles e. Ruelle. Prima traducere apare în limba franceză în 1898, aparţinând lui A. ed. chaignet. Traducerea în limba română, pe care o vom folosi în continuare, este damascius, Despre primele principii: aporii şi soluţii, vol. i, trad., introducere și note de M. Vlad, Humanitas, 2006. 2 Vezi, de pildă, J. dillon („damascius on the ineffable", Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie, 78, 1996, p. 124), care îl consideră pe damascius un filozof de talia lui Plotin. 3 Vezi, de pildă, R. T. Wallis, The Neoplatonists, duckworth, london, 1972, p. 158, care îl consideră pe damascius prea obscur, pretinzând că el nu face decât „să pună în evidenţă implicaţiile învăţăturii tradiţionale" și că, în felul acesta, el ajunge aproape „să anihileze întreaga ierarhie neoplatonică". PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil276 discurs - care caută principiul și care se vede în neputinţa de a-l exprima. damascius încearcă să descopere motivele ascunse ale acestei neputinţe, forţând la maxim limitele exprimabilului și identificând de fiecare dată „distanţa" ce separă orice afirmaţie despre principiu de principiul însuși, de natura lui transcendentă. În cele din urmă, tocmai prin această analiză detaliată a neputinţei de a gândi principiul, damascius va ajunge să ofere o ultimă perspectivă asupra principiului prim de dincolo de fiinţă. Gândirea lui damascius este în cea mai mare măsură critică, în sensul că el reevaluează punct cu punct „îndreptăţirea" fiecărui concept prin care tradiţia neoplatonică a încercat să sugereze principiul prim. În felul acesta, gândirea lui devine o ultimă privire de ansamblu asupra tradiţiei, însă nu o privire care repetă lucrurile spuse de tradiţie, ci una care repune în discuţie principiul prim și încearcă să obţină o situare originară, „de la început" (TMx ¢rcÁj; în grecește, expresia are ambele sensuri: de la început și de la principiu). interesul studierii lui damascius este, de aceea, unul dublu. Pe de o parte, din punct de vedere istoric, vom vedea că gândirea neoplatonică despre primul principiu se încheie cu această critică generală care o radicalizează și, într-o anumită măsură, o depășește. Pe de altă parte, gândirea lui damascius comportă un aspect foarte actual, în măsura în care el practică un discurs auto-referenţial, care „descoase" propriile sale supoziţii și concluzii, pe măsură ce înaintează. Vom asista la un exerciţiu foarte amănunţit de dedublare în limbaj și metalimbaj, în discurs și metadiscurs, damascius punând de fiecare dată în evidenţă faptul că discursul însuși - prin natura sa - introduce o serie de „aluviuni" în această încercare fundamentală de a gândi principiul. Gândirea lui va fi astfel una care nu se mai constituie pornind de la niște presupoziţii admise necritic, ci de la sesizarea aporiei fundamentale a gândirii: aceea care ţine de tentativa de a concepe totalitatea gândirii și principiul acestei totalităţi. Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 277 ceea ce ne propunem în această ultimă parte a analizei noastre este să clarificăm: 1. aporia principiului prim, pe care damascius o pune ca început al gândirii sale, 2. semnificaţia principiului prim pe care îl propune el, anume inefabilul (tÕ ¢pÒrrhton), 3. modul în care gândirea noastră se poate raporta la un principiu inaccesibil. intenţia acestei analize este aceea de a arăta că damascius reușește să pună în acord ideea unui principiu absolut inaccesibil, cu practica unei gândiri care - departe de a abdica de la statutul și menirea ei - se raportează neîncetat la un astfel de principiu: este vorba despre un tip de gândire pe care am putea-o numi aporetică. Mai precis, gândirea aporetică este cea care pune în evidenţă - prin însuși exerciţiul ei susţinut - prezenţa inefabilă a principiului; în sens invers, prezenţa și provocarea constantă a principiului inefabil este cea care stimulează această gândire ultimă, extrem de lucidă, care nu mai lucrează cu presupoziţii admise necritic, ci se auto-deconstruiește, se are constant pe sine în vedere, într-o manieră auto-reflexivă. dacă în mod tradiţional fiinţa era spaţiul preponderent al gândirii, am putea spune că la damascius acest „dincolo de fiinţă" al principiului absolut devine spaţiul preponderent al unei gândiri aparte, care nu mai descrie și nu mai afirmă, ci își încearcă neîncetat propriile limite. A. Situaţia problemei înainte de Damascius Înainte de a trece la discutarea perspectivei lui damascius, se cuvine să precizăm fundalul problematic în care se instalează această gândire. după ce Plotin stabilește ierarhia generală a realităţii, cu cele trei ipostaze ale sale (suflet, intelect, unu) și încearcă să impună anterioritatea absolută a unului faţă de fiinţa inteligibilă, Porfir - deși păstrează dezideratul unui principiu de dincolo de fiinţă - încearcă să găsească o funcţie concretă a PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil278 principiului faţă de fiinţă; el consideră că principiul prim este actul pur de a fi, absolut nedeterminat, pornind de la care se poate constitui fiinţa veritabilă, determinată ca inteligibilă respectiv ca intelectivă. criticând această perspectivă, iamblichos distinge cele două aspecte ale principiului, gândind un principiu-cauză și sursă a fiinţei, respectiv un principiu absolut transcendent fiinţei. Proclus revine la perspectiva plotiniană a unui principiu unic și indicibil, dincolo de totalitatea fiinţei. Totuși, în același timp, el sporește numărul entităţilor și „extinde" spaţiul de dincolo de fiinţă, prin introducerea henadelor, care fac trecerea de la principiul absolut la fiinţa determinată. el introduce astfel ceva determinat și un fel de pluralitate înaintea pluralităţii propriu-zise a fiinţei. „Spaţiul" supra-fiinţial devine astfel „populat" de o lume de zeităţi. observăm că toţi gânditorii dinaintea lui damascius își canalizează atenţia în două mari direcţii: fie aceea de a gândi anterioritatea absolută a principiului faţă de fiinţă, fie invers, aceea de a gândi felul în care fiinţa poate lua naștere pornind de la un astfel de principiu. este vorba, de fapt, de cele două direcţii de analiză care încep să fie distinse în mod explicit o dată cu iamblichos: principiul ca transcendenţă absolută și principiul ca o cauză universală. cu alte cuvinte, este vorba despre cele două sensuri ale lui „dincolo" din expresia „dincolo de fiinţă", care indică în mod tradiţional principiul prim: dincolo ca anterioritate absolută, sau dincolo ca relaţie de cauzare. Aceste două aspecte fundamentale ale principiului prim - respectiv două probleme radicale ale neoplatonismului - au întreţinut întotdeauna o relaţie problematică între ele, iar fiecare gânditor a înţeles în mod diferit paradoxul întâlnirii lor. Așa cum am văzut, după Plotin - care păstrează echilibrul dintre cele două aspecte, fără să discute opoziţia lor - Porfir este primul care atacă frontal problema, încercând să îmbine cele două aspecte; iamblichos le distinge radical, iar Proclus încearcă să le identifice din nou și să rezolve contradicţia dintre ele. Totuși, așa cum am văzut în capitolele anterioare, fiecare soluţie oferită păstra anumite dificultăţi sau aporii inerente. Astfel, Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 279 la Porfir, principiului de dincolo de fiinţă ajungea să fie gândit într-o legătură prea strânsă cu fiinţa, intrând aproape în spaţiul acesteia. la iamblichos, cele două funcţii ajung de fapt două principii, iar relaţia dintre ele este greu de precizat1. Proclus, care face toate eforturile pentru a identifica aceste două aspecte ale principiului, ajunge în cele din urmă să introducă pluralitatea henadelor, deoarece nu poate explica altfel trecerea de la un principiul absolut transcendent la o realitate plurală. Înscriindu-se în această tradiţie de gândire, damascius avea în faţă o sarcină foarte grea: aceea de a dezlega (și respectiv de a relega) iţele aporetice care alcătuiesc problema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă. B. Damascius şi dubla aporie a principiului unic 1. Prima aporie la sfârșitul unei tradiţii de nuanţate meditaţii asupra principiului prim, damascius pare să fie pe deplin conștient de toate aceste dificultăţi care, o dată rezolvate, survin în altă formă și cu subtilităţi și mai adânci. Totuși, aruncându-se la rândul lui în această dispută, el își asumă în mod categoric dificultatea. Astfel, în tratatul său cel mai important - Despre primele principii -, damascius deschide discuţia tocmai cu această dublă problemă a principiului prim ca transcendenţă și cauză absolută, dându-i o formulare sistematică, interogativă și exclusivă2. Aceasta va 1 desigur, în cazul lui iamblichos trebuie avută mereu în vedere dificultatea de a înţelege până la capăt gândirea lui, dată fiind lipsa aproape totală a textelor în care aceste chestiuni sunt discutate. 2 Problema „începutului" scrierilor neoplatonice - pe care, din motive de transmitere a textelor, nu o putem discuta decât în două cazuri (anume la Proclus și la damascius) - nu este deloc lipsită de interes. Astfel, am putea compara stilul celor doi filozofi de a „deschide discuţia". Pe de o parte, avem în faţă modul foarte prevenitor și profund îndatorat tradiţiei, în care Proclus începe Teologia platonică (i, 1, pp. 5–6), făcând apel la zeii depozitari ai adevărului, referindu-se apoi la filozofia lui Platon și la modul în care aceasta a parvenit PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil280 constitui prima aporie a tratatului Despre principii, aporie care va trasa direcţia întregului tratat. iată această aporie: ceea ce numim principiul unic al totului este oare dincolo de totul, sau este ceva ce aparţine totului, fiind vârful celor ce proced de la el? iar despre totul vom spune oare că este împreună cu principiul, sau că este după principiu și <procede> de la el? (damascius, De principiis, ed. Ruelle [R], vol. i, p.1, 4–6) Întrebarea lui damascius este întrebarea fundamentală a neoplatonismului, anume aceea privind situarea principiului faţă de lucrurile derivate de la el: este principiul total suspendat faţă de realitate, într-un „dincolo" absolut, lipsit de orice relaţie cu totul, sau este el acel vârf pornind de la care se constituie totul, dar care, ca atare, păstrează o legătură concretă cu totul și joacă un rol precis în structura pe care o numim totul? damascius radicalizează această întrebare prin aceea că el gândește realitatea ca un tot (t¦ p£nta) și se întreabă unde își are locul principiul acestui tot: în interiorul totului, sau în afara lui? În locul expresiei „dincolo de fiinţă", damascius vorbește despre principiul de „dincolo de totul". desigur, în tradiţia neoplatonică, cele două expresii sunt de mult sinonime: principiul este dincolo de fiinţă, dincolo de toate fiinţele, sau pur și simplu dincolo de toate1. Totuși, așa cum vom vedea în continuare, damascius reia această problemă - a unui principiu de dincolo de fiinţă sau de dincolo de totul - tocmai pentru a proba această expresie, pentru a vedea dacă ea rezistă în faţa unei analize mai aplicate a ideii înseși de „tot" și până la maestrul său, Syrianus, pe care îl numește „ghid al misterelor veritabile". Pe de altă parte, îl vedem pe damascius care, fără să facă apel la vreo tradiţie anterioară, pune direct problema spinoasă a principiului prim și observă că această problemă, cu care întreaga tradiţie și-a măsurat forţele, este, în fond, una irezolvabilă, imposibil de tranșat într-o parte sau alta: înspre principiulcauză sau înspre principiul-transcendenţă. 1 Vezi de pildă Plotin, Enneade, V, 4, 2.39; Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, i, 274.7; Comentariul la Parmenide, 1065.29; 1143.15; 1200.7; Teologia platonică, ii, 73.14. Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 281 a sensului de totalitate pe care îl introduce aceasta. În felul acesta, damascius este primul care pune sub semnul întrebării tocmai afirmaţia fundamentală, autoritară - a unui principiu de dincolo de fiinţă, respectiv dincolo de tot -, încercând să vadă dacă ea poate fi acceptată până la capăt, dacă ea este coerentă cu ideea de „principiu al totului" și, în cele din urmă, dacă nu cumva ea introduce în mod neexplicit ceea ce ea vrea să suprime în primă instanţă, adică o relaţie directă între principiu și lucrurile al căror principiu este. damascius va descoperi că, într-un anume sens, această formulă nu este adecvată principiului absolut al lucrurilor. Mai precis, damascius va analiza pe rând mai multe sensuri posibile ale expresiei dincolo de totul (TMpškeina p£ntwn), încercând să o rafineze și să depășească acele sensuri care sunt inadecvate principiului. În cele din urmă, damascius va renunța la expresia dincolo de totul, arătând că despre principiu nu se poate spune nici măcar aceasta, ci și această expresie trebuie suprimată. Să vedem însă cum ajunge damascius la această concluzie. În primul rând, să analizăm modul în care el formulează întrebarea capitală a tratatului Despre primele principii. el pune faţă în faţă două concepte fundamentale ale gândirii neoplatonice - totul (t¦ p£nta, faţă de care nimic nu poate fi mai cuprinzător) și principiul totului (1 tîn p£ntwn ¢rc», faţă de care nimic nu poate fi superior, care pretinde anterioritate absolută faţă de orice altceva) - și se întreabă cum se situează acestea unul faţă de celălalt. Pornind de aici, damascius propune patru alternative: a). principiul este dincolo de tot (TMpškeina tîn p£ntwn) b). principiul este ceva din totul, ca vârf al totului (ti tîn p£ntwn, oOEon koruf») b'). totul este împreună cu principiul (t¦ p£nta sÝn aÙtÍ) a'). totul este după principiu și procede de la el (t¦ p£nta met' aÙt3⁄4n ka ¢p' aÙtÁj). Întrebarea, așa cum o formulează damascius, are structura unui chiasm: cele 4 posibilităţi propuse își corespund două câte două: dacă principiul ar fi dincolo de totul (a), atunci totul ar fi PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil282 după principiu și de la principiu (a'); în schimb, dacă principiul ar fi ceva din totul (b), atunci totul ar fi cu principiul (b'). Într-un fel, acesta este chiasmul problematic fundamental al gândirii neoplatonice. În capitolele anterioare am văzut că nici unul dintre filozofii neoplatonici nu a putut ieși din cadrul acestui chiasm, ci fiecare a discutat o direcţie sau alta a lui. Însă, așa cum vom vedea în continuare, damascius arată că nu se poate ieși din acest chiasm preferând o direcţie a lui și suspendând-o pe cealaltă. el analizează ambele laturi ale problemei - dintre care fiecare poate fi privită atât dinspre principiu, cât și dinspre totul - și arată că fiecare dintre ele ajunge să se blocheze, neputând fi acceptată ca soluţie ultimă pentru raportul dintre principiu și totul. Pentru aceasta, damascius face apel tocmai la sensul ultim al totului, respectiv al principiului, la felul în care aceste două concepte funcţionează în gândirea noastră. În primul rând, ce înseamnă totul? damascius va preciza sensul totului într-o manieră gradată, identificând mai multe caracteristici ale lui: pluralitatea, completitudinea și limitarea. Prima definiţie pe care o dă este aceea că: „în sens absolut, totul este cel din care nimic nu lipsește1". În plus, „totul este o pluralitate limitată (poll¦ peperasmšna), căci cele nelimitate n-ar putea fi propriu-zis totul. Așadar, nimic nu se manifestă în afara totului"2. Totul absolut trebuie să fie limitat, însă nu limitat de ceva din afara sa, ci limitat de faptul că nimic nu i se mai poate adăuga, pentru că nimic nu i se sustrage și nimic nu rămâne în afara sa. Acest totul cuprinde deja toate lucrurile, într-o pluralitate limitată. el este definit ca o totalitate (pantÒthj)3 care presupune limitare şi cuprindere. 1 De principiis, R. i, 1.7–8. o definiţie asemănătoare regăsim la Platon, Theaitetos, 205 a. 2 De principiis, R. i, 1.10–11. damascius se sprijină aici pe problema clasică a infinitului: vezi Aristotel, Fizica, iii, 6; Metafizica, 1067 a 20–23, precum și Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 6, 3.1–3. 3 Termenul este forjat de Proclus, la care apare pentru prima dată, în expresia „totalitate inteligibilă", care desemnează completitudinea paradigmatică a lumii inteligibile, a fiinţei veritabile, descrisă în ipoteza a doua din Parmenide Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 283 dar atunci, damascius observă că, faţă de acest sens al totului, nici măcar principiul nu se mai poate individualiza; principiul însuși nu se mai poate sustrage acestui tot. căci, dacă ar exista ceva care nu intră în totul, ci rămâne în afară, atunci totul însuși nu ar mai avea sensul lui absolut, ci ar fi un tot incomplet, un tot din care lipsește ceva. dar un tot din care lipsește ceva este o contradicţie în termeni, este absurd. În concluzie, dacă luăm în calcul ce înţelegem prin totul, principiul nu poate să fie „dincolo de tot", iar totul nu poate fi „după principiu". Principiul nu poate ocupa decât locul cel mai înalt din totul, adică locul limitei superioare - însă nu poate ieși dincolo de totul. În consecinţă, damascius va spune că: principiul este limita superioară, iar ultimul <lucru care procede> de la principiu este limita inferioară; așadar totul este cu limitele sale (De principiis, R. i, 1.12–2.1) damascius merge însă și mai departe, analizând problema și din perspectiva principiului. el observă că nici sensul prim al principiului - așa cum îl înţelegem în primă instanţă - nu ne îndreptăţește să separăm principiul de totul. Astfel, principiul este înţeles în raport cu lucrurile pe care le produce, cu lucrurile care vin de la el: „principiul este coordonat cu cele ce vin de la el, căci în raport cu acestea el se numește și este principiu" (De principiis, R. i, 2.1–2). Într-adevăr, chiar și în formularea aporiei iniţiale, principiul era numit principiu unic al totului, așadar sensul lui era legat de cel al totului. există astfel o dublă condiţionare între principiu și totul: pe de o parte, principiul este înţeles în relaţie cu totul pe care îl guvernează, așadar el este principiu tocmai prin coordonarea sa cu totul. Pe de altă parte, totul însuși este propriu-zis totul - adică această pluralitate limitată și cuprinzătoare - tocmai datorită prezenţei principiului, care îi oferă unitate și ordine. Astfel, s-ar părea că totul nu lasă principiul în (cf. Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii, 95.15; V, 138.4; In Timaeum, i, 390.21; 426.24). damascius preia acest termen pentru a indica totul în sensul lui cel mai larg, absolut. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil284 afara sa și nici principiul nu poate fi principiu în mod independent de cele ce vin de la el, pe care le guvernează și le ordonează. de aceea, damascius va spune că: prin „totul" înţelegem cele ce sunt plurale și au o coordonare unică, astfel încât în totul se află și principiul (De principiis, R. i, 2.3–4) Principiul nu poate fi separat de totul - pentru a nu pierde sensul însuși al totului - și, în plus, tocmai prezenţa principiului este cea care dă sensul propriu totului. Astfel, prin prezenţa principiului, totul este limitat și complet (căci nici măcar principiul nu este în afara lui), este ordonat și primește o structură și o unitate proprie, care îi permit să fie propriu-zis totul. Prin prezenţa principiului, totul este o coordonare unică1. Pentru a întări cele spuse, damascius face încă o precizare, care vine să răspundă unor posibile obiecţii. Astfel - din perspectiva comună a tradiţiei neoplatonice - s-ar putea obiecta că principiul care este dincolo de totul nu este ceva anume, care să poată fi inclus în totul, respectiv care să rămână într-un fel în afara totului. În al doilea rând, se poate obiecta că dincolo nu are sensul lui în afară, deoarece anterioritatea principiului nu este anterioritatea unui obiect care să rămână pe dinafară, ci este o anterioritate ce ţine de o ordine ontologică diferită: mai precis, principiul nu este de natura totului și, de aceea, nu poate fi inclus 1 expresia „coordonare unică" (m...a sÚntaxij) se regăsește în Republica, 462 c 10. Preluată de Plotin, expresia se referă la unitatea și acordul tuturor lucrurilor din univers, chiar și al celor care în primă instanţă par contrare. Întreaga realitate este o coordonare unică - datorită principiului unic care o guvernează, oferindu-i unitate, ordine și armonie (vezi Plotin, Enneade, ii, 3, 7.14; iii, 2, 2.31; iii, 3, 1.11; V, 1, 9.14). la damascius, expresia este recurentă: R. i, 2.3; 2.9; 13.1; 52.29. ceea ce observă damascius - faţă de Plotin - este faptul că această coordonare unică a totului și-ar pierde sensul dacă am sustrage din ea principiul însuși, care dă totului sensul său deplin de pluralitate completă și limitată. În consecinţă, prima variantă propusă - aceea a unui principiu în afara totului - nu poate fi acceptată. Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 285 în totul. damascius răspunde acestor posibile obiecţii, oferind încă o definiţie a totului: numim totul în sens absolut <toate> cele pe care le concepem într-un fel sau altul (De principiis, R.i, 2.5: ka Ólwj p£nta lšgomen ¡plîj Ósa ka Ðpwsoàn TMnnooàmen) Prin această definiţie, damascius lărgește sfera totului și îi dă un alt mod de constituire. În primul rând, totul nu se mai referă doar la suma lucrurilor care există în lumea fizică1. În al doilea rând, totul definit de damascius depășește pe cel definit de Plotin și ajuns deja „tradiţional". Astfel, la Plotin, totul era sfera intelectului divin, care gândea toate lucrurile existente și le făcea să existe concomitent cu acest act de a le gândi. el cuprindea astfel toate lucrurile în manieră paradigmatică. În schimb, damascius aduce lucrurile la un alt nivel, și de aceea totul devine mai cuprinzător și mai strict, nelăsând nimic în afara sa. Astfel, pentru damascius, totul nu mai este determinat de o gândire divină, în care lucrurile sunt prezente în manieră inteligibilă, ca fiinţe propriu-zise. din contră, damascius coboară la sensul concret al gândirii noastre și la ceea ce înseamnă totul în această gândire2. Totul nu mai este tot ceea ce este prezent în gândirea intelectului divin, ci tot ceea ce este prezent în gândirea noastră. În această analiză, damascius va fructifica modul „comun", am putea spune, în care gândim noi totul, respectiv principiul. Altfel spus, el nu pornește de la definirea unui 1 de pildă, în analiza lui Aristotel asupra diferenţei dintre infinit și tot, totul era până la urmă universul, lumea aceasta, dincolo de care nu mai există nimic altceva. infinitul nu poate fi mai mare decât cerul, ceea ce înseamnă că cerul este limita maximă până unde se poate înainta. În schimb, damascius nu se mai oprește la o astfel de limită. 2 Această schimbare de perspectivă trebuie înţeleasă în contextul mai larg în care, începând cu iamblichos, se consideră că sufletul uman a coborât total din intelectul divin. În consecinţă, punctul reper al analizei filozofice nu mai este intelectul divin, ci sufletul uman, acest nod al întregii realităţi, situat între natura divină și cea fizică. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil286 principiu absolut, pe care gândirea nu îl poate cuprinde, respectiv de la definirea unui tot absolut la care gândirea noastră are un acces mediat, niciodată total. din contră, el pornește de la ceea ce înseamnă „pentru noi" principiul și totul. În loc să pornească de sus în jos, damascius pornește de la acest „jos" în care ne aflăm în primă instanţă, de la această atitudine iniţial bulversată în care se descoperă gândirea noastră faţă de concepte precum principiul și totul, pe care, în primă instanţă nu știe cum să le situeze unul faţă de celălalt. el va „amenda" ulterior această atitudine iniţială, încercând să o rafineze, să o înalţe spre contemplarea principiilor prime. În același timp, însă, el va ţine mereu cont de aceste aporii reiterate, în care gândirea noastră continuă să cadă, la fiecare nivel al înaintării. Așadar, în primă instanţă, totul înseamnă „toate lucrurile pe care le gândim, într-un fel sau altul (Ðpwsoàn)". Această ultimă precizare este foarte importantă: desigur, gândirea noastră nu poate cuprinde în sens adecvat anumite lucruri. de pildă, chiar principiul: deși vorbim despre el și îl gândim într-un fel, nu înseamnă că putem să îl definim, sau că putem să îl gândim în mod direct. de fapt, gândim principiul într-o manieră inferioară și inadecvată lui. Totuși, damascius arată că totul cuprinde chiar și ceea ce gândim în acest fel incomplet sau nu complet adecvat. Simplul fapt că principiul este prezent - chiar și într-o formă imprecisă - în gândirea noastră, îl face să intre în ceea ce numim totul. Mai precis, orice am gândi noi că este principiul intră în totul a ceea ce gândim. În acest caz, este evident că principiul sau ceea ce numim principiu nu poate fi dincolo de totul, de vreme ce deja îl gândim într-un fel. observăm că, pe de o parte, totul este cel dincolo de care nu mai putem gândi nimic, iar pe de altă parte totul este tot ceea ce gândim. Altfel spus, totul este spaţiul cel mai larg pe care îl poate subîntinde gândirea. dar, faţă de acest sens absolut al totului, principiul nu mai poate fi dincolo, din două motive: fie pentru a nu pierde sensul totului, care nu lasă nimic în afara sa, fie pentru Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 287 că, dacă îl gândim ca „dincolo de totul", principiul va fi un lucru gândit, devenind un element din totul, din tot ceea ce gândim. În concluzie, principiul prim și unic al totului nu poate fi dincolo de totul - cel puţin nu în această manieră care separă principiul și îl instituie în afara totului1. Astfel, prima parte a chiasmului problematic se arată a fi impracticabil. În acest caz, va trebui încercată cea de-a doua variantă, anume ideea că principiul este în totul, respectiv totul este cu principiul 2 (b și b'). Această a doua variantă pare să decurgă în mod direct din respingerea primei variante. Astfel, dacă totul trebuie să fie o coordonare unică a pluralelor, principiul intră și el în aceasta, ca limită superioară a totului. este ceea ce damascius spunea - cu titlul de ipoteză - în aporia iniţială: anume că principiul ar putea fi „vârful"3 totului, cel de la care procede totul. Așadar, dacă principiul ar fi inclus în totul, el nu ar putea ocupa 1 desigur, așa cum vom vedea în continuare, damascius însuși va reveni la expresia „dincolo de totul", însă îi va da un alt sens, încercând să rezolve astfel aporia iniţială a principiului. 2 În aporia iniţială, damascius formulase această a doua variantă spunând că totul este „cu principiul" (sÝn aÙtÍ); atunci când reia propriu-zis această variantă, damascius preferă expresia p£nta met¦ tÁj ¢rcÁj, cu prepoziţia met£ în loc de sÚn. 3 Vârful (koruf») totului nu trebuie înţeles doar ca punctul cel mai înalt la totului, însă care ar rămâne distinct și departe faţă de părţile „de jos" ale totului, fără nici o legătură cu acestea. Koruf» este într-adevăr punctul cel mai înalt, însă în sensul de punct iniţial, sau cap de la care pornesc toate celelalte, care le generează pe toate și le guvernează, rămânând astfel în legătură cu ele. În felul acesta, ceea ce în exterior este plural, în interior este unitar, iar pluralitatea este determinată tocmai de unitatea anterioară. ideea unui cap comun pentru lucruri distincte, sau chiar opuse, trimite la Platon, Phaidon, 60 b 8: durerea și plăcerea sunt legate, ca și cum ar avea un cap unic. În neoplatonism ideea este des întâlnită, cu referire la principiul unu, care precede și determină pluralitatea lucrurilor ce compun totul și care pot fi uneori chiar contradictorii. o imagine sugestivă în acest sens o întâlnim la Plotin (Enneade, Vi 5, 7.7–11): faţă de unul anterior, fiinţele sunt precum feţele multiple ale unui singur cap (koruf»); acestea toate privesc în afară și de aceea sunt incapabile să perceapă unitatea simplă de care ele depind. Proclus folosește și el această idee a unului ca un cap unic anterior contrariilor (vezi, de pildă, Comentariul la Parmenide, 741.4). PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil288 decât locul cel mai înalt, al cauzei generatoare, al limitei superioare a totului. Totuși, damascius respinge și această alternativă, iar explicaţia lui în acest sens este una foarte scurtă: dar dacă totul este împreună cu principiul, principiul totului nu poate fi ceva anume, căci atunci <principiul> ar fi inclus în totul; de aceea, coordonarea unică a tuturor, pe care o numim totul, rămâne fără principiu și fără cauză, pentru a nu înainta la infinit. (De principiis, R.i, 2.8–10) el preia, de fapt, opinia comună gânditorilor neoplatonici, conform căreia principiul totului nu poate fi el însuși ceva din totul1. Argumentul său este că, dacă principiul ar fi ceva din totul, atunci am obţine un nou tot, care include principiul, iar acestui tot ar trebui să îi căutăm în continuare un alt principiu, înaintând astfel la infinit - dacă fiecare nou principiu obţinut ar intra din nou în alcătuirea totului. observăm o tensiune între cele două direcţii ale gândiri: pe de o parte, sensul totului ne obligă să includem și principiul în totul; pe de altă parte, includerea principiului în totul și gândirea lui ca atare, drept ceva din totul, ne face să pierdem sensul principiului. dacă separăm principiul de totul, pierdem totul; în schimb, dacă includem principiul în totul, pierdem principiul. În concluzie, ambele situări propuse pentru principiul totului - atât ca dincolo de totul (a) cât și ca inclus în totul (b) - sunt respinse. Principiul totului nu poate fi stabilit în raport cu totul: nici în afara, nici înăuntrul lui. de asemenea, totul nu poate fi 1 Vezi Plotin (Enneade, iii, 8, 9.39–42), care arată că principiul nu poate fi ceva din totul, pentru că atunci el nu ar mai putea da naștere totului însuși. Vezi de asemenea Enneade, V, 3, 13.2–5, unde Plotin pune în legătură expresia „dincolo de toate și dincolo de intelect" cu faptul că principiul nu este ceva din totul. Vezi de asemenea Enneade, V, 5, 13.20–21: „principiul nu este nici toate, nici ceva dintre toate". Proclus preia această idee în Teologia platonică, ii, 37.24–25: principiul unu nu poate fi ceva din toate, de vreme ce toate provin de la el. Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 289 înţeles nici ca fiind după principiu (a') - lăsând principiul în afara sa - nici ca incluzând principiul (b'). 2. A doua aporie damascius merge însă și mai departe, pentru a pune în evidenţă dificultăţile implicate de conceptul de „principiu al totului". de data aceasta, el pornește de la totul și se întreabă cum este situat acesta faţă de principiu. În acest sens, damascius formulează o aporie pornind de la o afirmaţie a lui Aristotel: „orice lucru trebuie sau să fie principiu, sau <să provină> de la un principiu"1. din expresia lui Aristotel deducem că, o dată admisă existenţa principiului, realitatea se împarte în două: în principiu și în ceea ce vine de la principiu. damascius, însă, va aplica această afirmaţie la cazul totului: ce este totul însuși? este el principiu, sau provine de la principiu? damascius va observa că, în cazul totului, nici una dintre alternativele formulate de Aristotel nu este acceptabilă. În primul rând, dacă totul ar proveni de la principiu, am ajunge din nou la ipoteza (a), pe care damascius a combătut-o deja: anume aceea că principiul ar fi în afara totului. dar, așa cum s-a arătat mai sus, în afara totului nu poate fi nimic. În al doilea rând, totul nu poate fi el însuși principiu, căci ar însemna că totul produce la rândul lui ceva, care rămâne, din nou, în afara totului, ca un efect al totului. dar în afara totului nu poate fi nimic, nici măcar în sensul a ceva inferior faţă de totul. În consecinţă, totul nu poate fi nici principiu, nici nu poate proveni de la principiu, și nici nu poate să conţină principiul, ca 1 Aristotel, Fizica, iii, 203 b 6. În acest context, Aristotel arată de ce unii filozofi au făcut din infinit un principiu: orice lucru trebuie sau să fie principiu, sau să provină de la principiu; dar infinitul nu poate avea un principiu înaintea sa (căci acest principiu ar limita infinitul, făcându-l să nu mai fie infinit); în concluzie, el trebuie să fie principiu. În schimb, damascius aplică afirmaţia lui Aristotel tocmai asupra totului, pe care, în linia analizelor aristotelice, l-a definit mai înainte ca având limite. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil290 pe unul dintre elementele sale. la rândul său, principiul nu poate fi nici înaintea totului, nici inclus în totul, și nici totul însuși. cele două aporii cu care începe tratatul lui damascius vizează de fapt posibilitatea de a gândi totul și principiul într-un raport oarecare. damascius arată însă că este imposibil - cel puţin în primă instanţă - să stabilim un astfel de raport direct, deoarece felul însuși în care noi gândim totul nu poate fi în acord cu felul în care gândim principiul. la nivelul gândirii noastre obișnuite, la nivelul a ceea ce înţelegem noi prin principiu, respectiv prin totul, este imposibil să stabilim ce ar însemna cu adevărat un principiu unic al totului. Aceasta este situaţia în care ne aflăm în mod obișnuit: anume în imposibilitatea de a gândi principiul totului. Aceasta este situaţia de la care pornim, și pe care damascius a ţinut să o evidenţieze încă de la început. Totuși, consecinţa acestei imposibilităţi, a acestei aporii fundamentale în care ne aflăm, nu este în nici un caz suprimarea acestei probleme (a principiului totului), nici renunţarea la ţinta cea mai înaltă a gândirii neoplatonice. din contră, damascius va face un pas surprinzător, anume el va încerca să gândească principiul pornind tocmai de la aceste aporii iniţiale, care arată că principiul nu poate fi gândit nici ca un lucru anume (care ar intra în totul), nici ca o entitate exterioară totului (care din nou ar intra în totul, prin simplul fapt că e gândită într-un fel), nici ca fiind totul însuși. C. „Unul-tot anterior totului" şi ieşirea parţială din aporie 1. Unul şi unificatul ca principii după această primă parte aporetică - ce pare să „traseze terenul" analizei prin marcarea dublei imposibilităţi1 de a gândi principiul totului -, damascius trece la o discuţie mai amănunţită a felului în care totul și principiul au fost deja gândite în 1 imposibilitatea este dublă, desigur, pentru că este privită și din perspectiva principiului, dar și din perspectiva totului. Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 291 tradiţia neoplatonică. intenţia acestei analize este una dublă: pe de o parte, aceea de a identifica în continuare aporiile recurente ale principiului totului, iar pe de altă parte aceea de a identifica - pornind de la aceste aporii - maniera ultimă în care trebuie înţeles principiul absolut, cel care ar depăși dificultăţile de până acum. damascius pune mai întâi în evidenţă acele caracteristici ale totului pornind de la care putem face trecerea înspre principiu. el arată că „totul este văzut în pluralitate și, în același timp, întro anumită distincţie" (De principiis, R. i, 2.17). Altfel spus, totul este o pluralitate, însă nu o pluralitate de lucruri identice - așa cum ar fi de pildă un număr format din unităţi identice - ci o pluralitate de lucruri care se disting între ele, care intră sub genuri și specii diferite. Pluralitatea și distincţia ies în evidenţă la prima privire pe care o acordăm realităţii în care trăim. Totul este, în fond, pluralitatea diversă a fiinţei, atât a celei sensibile, cât și a celei gândite. dar tocmai aceste caracteristici ale totului ne fac să căutăm un principiu al totului. ele sunt cele care ne „intrigă" și ne fac să ne punem întrebarea: de unde și cum au apărut toate acestea? este întrebarea pe care și-o pune și damascius: „cum se face că a apărut imediat o anume distincţie și pluralitate?" (De principiis, R.i. 2.18-19). Urmând doctrina comună neoplatonică, el va spune: Poate că totul nu este în distincţie și în pluralitate sub toate aspectele, ci vârful celor plurale este unul, iar monada celor distinse este unificatul (De principiis, R.i, 2.19–20) Totul s-a arătat a fi plural și distinct, însă nu sub toate aspectele, sau nu complet, nu peste tot, nu întru totul 1. Totul nu poate fi doar plural, căci, așa cum arătase deja Plotin, o pluralitate pură, infinită, ar fi absurdă: ea n-ar putea fi gândită și n-ar putea nici măcar să se constituie ca pluralitate. Același argument se poate face și pentru distincţie. În concluzie, totul este plural și în 1 Termenul pantacÍ conţine rădăcina p£nta, totul; exprimarea lui damascius este într-un fel circulară: totul este în pluralitate și distincţie, însă nu întru totul. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil292 distincţie, însă el nu poate fi doar plural și nu poate fi doar în distincţie, ci trebuie să existe ceva care unifică totul, restrângând pe cele distincte, respectiv pe cele plurale. Totul se constituie mai degrabă din întâlnirea pluralităţii cu unitatea care restrânge pluralitatea, respectiv din întâlnirea distincţiei cu unificarea ce restrânge pe cele distincte. Totul nu poate fi gândit ca totul decât dintr-o perspectivă înglobatoare, din care el nu mai apare ca plural și distins, ci ca unificat, respectiv unitar. Această perspectivă înglobatoare este dată de unu, respectiv de unificat: acestea restrâng pluralitatea, respectiv distincţia totului, făcând din el un tot propriu-zis. dar ce sunt acest unu, vârf al pluralelor, respectiv acest unificat, monadă a celor distinse? la prima vedere, răspunsul pare de la sine înţeles: unul și unificatul sunt tocmai ipostazele prime din schema generală a realităţii neoplatonice, așa cum a fost ea alcătuită deja de Plotin. Unul este principiul prim, non-plural, unul primei ipoteze din Parmenide, descris ca acela care suprimă orice aspect plural al fiinţei (părţi, întreg, început, sfârșit, formă, timp, etc.). el este așadar opus pluralităţii. În schimb, unificatul este a doua ipostază principială, pe care Plotin o numea intelect1, iar filozofii anteriori o numeau fiinţă. el este acela pe care ipoteza secundă din Parmenide îl descrie ca pe un unu-plural ce traversează întreaga 1 Termenul însuși de „unificat" nu apare la Plotin; totuși, în Enneade, Vi, 6, 9.29–31, se face diferenţa între fiinţele distincte și fiinţa în sensul ei cel mai înalt, anterioară distincţiei: fiinţa în sine (tÕ Ôn) este numărul unificat (¢riqmÕj 1nwmšnoj), pe când fiinţele plurale (t¦ Ônta) reprezintă numărul desfășurat. după Plotin, termenul apare din nou la Porfir: vezi Sententiae, 37.24, Vita Pythagorae, 49.15. iamblichos folosește termenul de unificat (De mysteriis, i, 5.61; i, 9.50) pentru a indica unitatea zeilor, anterioară diviziunii lor pe clase; lumea unificată a zeilor umple toate fiinţele, rămânând însă unitară, așadar anterioară distincţiilor specifice fiinţelor. Proclus este primul care dă termenului de unificat un sens „tehnic". Unificatul este fiinţa veritabilă, inteligibilă, mai precis primul ei moment, cel mai înalt și mai unitar (vezi Teologia platonică, i, 4, 18.17–20, unde Proclus se referă la pasajul din Sofistul, 245 b). după unul absolut, procesiunea fiinţei începe tocmai de la acest prim moment unificat. Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 293 sferă a fiinţei, unificând astfel toate părţile fiinţei, dar însoţind fiinţa în toată pluralitatea în care aceasta se desfășoară. de asemenea, unificatul corespunde fiinţei din Sofistul, 245 b: aceasta are o unitate proprie, însă nu este unul însuși, anterior. fiinţa stă sub condiţia unului sau este afectată de unu, însă rămâne totuși diferită de el, deoarece, în esenţa ei, ea este plurală. dacă unul este opus pluralităţii, fiind cel care restrânge pluralitatea totului, unificatul este fiinţa veritabilă, inteligibilă și unitară, care restrânge distincţiile dintre fiinţe. ştim că Plotin considera că în intelectul divin (fiinţa cea mai unificată) nu mai există distincţiile proprii fiinţelor determinate, ci toate formele sunt prezente în manieră unitară, fără a mai fi separate propriu-zis. 2. „Unul-tot anterior totului" Totuși, ceea ce este nou în contextul de faţă al analizei lui damascius este faptul că, pentru el, nu numai unificatul este totul, ci și unul este totul. la Plotin, intelectul divin era totul: într-o manieră paradigmatică, el conţinea raţiunile de a fi ale tuturor lucrurilor. În schimb, unul nu mai era totul, ci dincolo de tot, fiind dincolo de intelect; unul era doar puterea totului1, acea putere de a genera totul conţinut de intelect, însă rămânea el însuși dincolo de totul. În schimb, damascius consideră că, atât unificatul, cât și unul anterior, sunt maniere din ce în ce mai unitare ale totului însuși. Trecerea de la totul propriu-zis (ca pluralitate în care funcţionează deja distincţia) la unificat și apoi la unu se face prin simplificarea și „concentrarea" totului într-o 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 1, 7.9–10 (tÕ žn dÚnamij p£ntwn). de asemenea Enneade, V, 4, 2.39–40: „acela [unul] este puterea tuturor, pe când celălalt [intelectul] este deja totul" (TMke‹no mn dÚnamij p£ntwn, tÕ d 1⁄2dh t¦ p£nta). Totuși, această indicaţie, conform căreia unul ar fi puterea totului, este cea care deschide calea înţelegerii principiului prim ca fiind deja totul. Astfel, Porfir va spune că toate lucrurile sunt în toate: în intelect, totul este în mod inteligibil, iar în cel de dincolo de intelect (așadar în principiul de dincolo de fiinţă), totul este într-o manieră non-inteligibilă și supra-esenţială (sau supra-fiinţială) (vezi Porfir, Sententiae, 10). PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil294 unitate din ce în ce mai strânsă, reducând mai întâi distincţiile din cadrul totului, unificându-le, apoi reducând la unitate însăși pluralitatea specifică totului. Atunci când spune că unul însuși este totul, damascius urmează de fapt stringenţele - sau avertismentele - celor două aporii cu care a început tratatul Despre primele principii. Astfel, prima aporie arăta că principiul nu poate fi nici în afara totului, nici în totul. În consecinţă, damascius nu va include unul în totul, dar nici nu-l va izola de totul. Unul nu este nici în totul, nici în afara totului, ci unul este chiar totul. În acest sens, damascius aduce un argument deja clasic, pe care îl întâlnim și la Plotin și Porfir: „el nu este unu în sensul de minim, așa cum se pare că a spus Speusip" (R.i, 2.25–3.1). dacă totul este o pluralitate completă, desăvârșită, atunci principiul totului - adică unul - nu poate fi inferior totului. dacă totul este maximul posibil pe care îl putem gândi, unul nu poate avea sensul unui minim. el nu neagă și nu suprimă totul; din contră, el este chiar totul, el cuprinde totul1. dar aici intervine „corecţia" sau stringenţa impusă de cea de-a doua aporie cu care începe tratatul De principiis. Aceasta arată că totul însuși nu poate fi principiu. de aceea, unul însuși nu se identifică pur și simplu cu totul, în sensul cel mai de jos al totului - anume ca pluralitate și distincţie. Unul este totul, însă într-o manieră anterioară desfășurării plurale a totului: acest unu este tot ceea ce sunt pluralele în procesul diviziunii lor, numai că el este toate acestea anterior diviziunii, prin indivizibilitatea lui absolută (De principiis, R.i, 2.24-25) 1 ideea că unul nu poate fi un minim apare și la Plotin (Enneade, Vi, 9, 6.4), care însă nu îl amintește pe Speusip, și la Porfir (Comentariul la Parmenide, cf. P. Hadot, 1968, vol. ii, pp. 65–113), care, ca și damascius, critică poziţia lui Speusip. deși oferă același argument, Plotin și Porfir ajung la o soluţie întrucâtva diferită de cea a lui damascius. cei doi arată că unul este indivizibil, nu pentru că ar fi lucrul cel mai mic cu putinţă, ci, din contră, pentru că este o putere nelimitată. Totuși, pentru Plotin - urmat de Porfir - această putere nelimitată nu este ea însăși totul, ci este dincolo de totul. Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 295 În consecinţă, ţinând cont de aporiile iniţiale ale principiului - mai precis, de aporiile relaţiei dintre principiu și totul - damascius descrie unul (acest principiu prim al tradiţiei neoplatonice1) printr-o relaţie foarte nuanţată între unitate și totalitate, între unu și totul: „unul însuși este totul, anterior totului" (R.i, 3.3). „Unul-tot anterior totului" (žn p£nta prÕ p£ntwn) pare a fi un compromis între stringenţele și imposibilităţile expuse în aporiile iniţiale ale principiului prim. el este acel punct de mijloc care reușește să nu cadă nici într-o extremă, nici în cealaltă, din cele asupra cărora avertizează aporia. iată cum gândește damascius această soluţie extremă. În primul rând, „unul-tot anterior totului" nu este separat de totul, izolat în afara totului (precum în varianta (a) din prima aporie), în acel spaţiu care - din perspectiva totului - este imposibil de gândit și chiar absurd. Între unu și totul nu mai este o relaţie de excludere; din contră, „unul-tot anterior totului" este chiar totul. el este „unul care a absorbit totul"2. În al doilea rând, „unul-tot anterior totului" nu este ceva din totul (precum în varianta (b) din prima aporie) și nici totul însuși, ca pluralitate limitată (precum în a doua aporie), ci el este anterior pluralităţii totului, fiind cel care - prin 1 desigur, ne referim la linia predominantă a tradiţiei, care a păstrat unul ca principiu prim, având însă în vedere că există și cazuri - precum cel al lui iamblichos - care par să se abată de la această linie. 2 damascius, De principiis, R.i, 3.1 (¢ll' žn aej p£nta katapiÒn). este interesant de observat că damascius preia aici o expresie pe care Plotin o folosea pentru intelectul divin, care conţine și el totul, în manieră paradigmatică. este vorba de termenul katap...nw, care înseamnă propriu-zis a înghiţi; acesta apare în mitul zeului cronos, care își înghite propriii fii (vezi Hesiod, Teogonia, 459, precum și Fragmentele orfice, fr. 82, 129, 146, 167). la Plotin (Enneade, V, 1, 7.31), această imagine devine o metaforă pentru intelectul divin, care înghite din nou fiinţele pe care le-a generat, păstrându-le astfel mereu în sine. Plotin vrea să indice astfel plenitudinea și perfecţiunea fără nici o lipsă a intelectului divin. Aceeași idee este reluată de Proclus (Comentariul la Timaios, ii, p. 93.18–19). În schimb, observăm că la damascius metafora nu se mai referă la ipostaza secundă (intelect sau unificat), ci la unul anterior. Acest lucru se datorează faptului că, pentru damascius, nu numai unificatul (așadar intelectul divin) este totul, ci și unul anterior este totul. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil296 anterioritatea sa faţă de pluralitate - face cu putinţă pluralitatea însăși: Unul a strâns totul laolaltă în simplitatea sa și a făcut ca totul să fie unu. Tocmai de aceea totul procede de la unu: pentru că unul însuși este totul, anterior totului (De principiis, R.i, 3.2) Unul nu se identifică cu nimic din totul; din contră, în el, totul însuși se identifică cu unul. la acest nivel, totul nu mai are funcţia de a îngloba lucrurile (caz în care principiul însuși ar fi cuprins în totul și subsumat acestuia), ci pluralitatea totului este simplificată și subsumată unului. Unul este totul înainte de desfășurarea plurală a totului, în sensul că totul însuși nu se poate desfășura decât pornind de la această iniţială unitate a lui în unul anterior. În concluzie, „unul-tot anterior totului" pare să fie ieșirea din aporiile principiului: astfel, el este împreună cu totul, însă fără a se identifica cu ceva din totul și nici cu totul în ansamblu; de asemenea, el este dincolo de totul, însă fără a fi în afara totului. „Unul-tot anterior totului" este cauză a totului - fiind cel de la care procede totul - tocmai pentru că el însuși este totul; totuși, el este în același timp anterior totului, fiind anterior pluralităţii totului. el este dincolo nu pentru că iese în afara pluralităţii totului, ci pentru că reduce această pluralitate la unitate. observăm că damascius a trecut de la un prim sens al anteriorităţii principiului - care presupunea excluderea principiului în afara totului - la un al doilea sens, anume acela în care principiul este anterior faţă de pluralitatea totului și restrânge totul în unitate. D. Recurenţa aporiei Totuși, această ieșire din aporie nu este decât una parţială, deoarece damascius va descoperi în continuare alte dificultăţi ale admiterii propriei sale soluţii. el însuși va observa că principiul propus de el reintră - pe altă cale - în aporiile care au fost expuse la începutul tratatului și că, din această cauză, trebuie Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 297 depășit. concluzia lui se sprijină pe felul în care înţelegem noi acest principiu numit „unul-tot anterior totului". Analiza lui damascius va juca tocmai în spaţiul foarte îngust dintre principiu și gândirea principiului, dintre admiterea unui principiu al totului și felul în care principiul admis își pierde demnitatea sa de principiu prim atunci când intră în angrenajul gândirii noastre totalizatoare. Pentru a înţelege acest lucru, trebuie să remarcăm care este relaţia dintre cele trei maniere ale totului deja discutate: unul-tot-anterior-totului, unificatul și totul plural. 1. Cele trei maniere ale totului damascius observă faptul că: „atunci când vom desface gândirea noastră pentru a cuprinde totul, nu vom predica totul într-o singură manieră, ci în cel puţin trei moduri: unitar, unificat și plurificat" (R.i, 3.5-7). Trebuie să observăm că cele trei moduri ale totului sunt enunţate în mod intenţionat în această ordine - de la cel unitar la cel plural - pentru că, din punct de vedere „ontologic"1, maniera unitară nu este obţinută din cea plurală ci, din contră, o precede pe aceasta și o face posibilă. ierarhizarea celor trei feluri de tot rezultă și din indicaţia lui damascius, cum că acestea trei sunt: „de la unu și în raport cu unul, după cum obișnuim a spune" (De principiis, R.i, 3.8). damascius reia aici două expresii prin care Aristotel descria unitatea fiinţei, anume ca dependenţă faţă de o categorie unică (¢f' nÒj) și ca raportare a semnificaţiilor la un termen unic (prÕj ›n)2. Aristotel vorbește în aceiași termeni despre bine (în sensul că toate bunurile provin de la o origine comună și converg 1 desigur, totul-unitar, care corespunde „unului-tot anterior totului" este anterior fiinţei propriu-zise (care se situează la nivelul unificatului). de aceea, termenul „ontologic" este impropriu în acest context; dacă îl folosim, ne referim doar la rangul pe care îl au cele trei feluri de tot în ierarhia generală a realităţii. 2 Vezi Aristotel, Metafizica, 1003 a 33. Vezi, de asemenea, P. Aubenque, „les origines néoplatoniciennes de la doctrine de l'analogie de l'être", în Néoplatonisme. Mélanges offerts à Jean Trouillard, les chiers de fontenay, 19–22, enS, 1981, pp. 63–76. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil298 spre un același bine) 1, precum și despre unu: acesta se spune în mai multe feluri, dar de fiecare dată faţă de unul prim2. În același fel, cele trei tipuri de tot ale lui damascius sunt „de la unu și în raport cu unul (¢f' nÕj ka prÕj ›n)". Aici, textul comportă o echivocitate, poate nu întâmplătoare, legată de interpretarea cuvântului ›n. Astfel, s-ar putea înţelege că cele trei sensuri ale totului sunt în raport cu un singur termen (care ar putea fi totul), dar se poate înţelege și că sensurile sunt în raport cu unul însuşi. Pentru a găsi interpretarea corectă a textului, trebuie să ne amintim că damascius a spus mai înainte că totul subzistă tocmai prin aceea că el provine de la unu. Așadar, totul plurificat (ca și cel unificat) este un sens derivat de la cel prim, de la unul care este totul. În consecinţă, termenul „de referinţă" (în raport cu care sunt înţelese celelalte) nu este totul cel mai de jos, cel văzut în pluralitate și în distincţie, ci, din contră, este totul în sensul lui unitar. Acesta este „unul-tot anterior totului", pornind de la care își primesc sensul și „realitatea" celelalte două tipuri de tot, derivate, subsumate. Unitatea dintre cele trei feluri de tot este dată de raportarea lor comună la termenul cel mai unitar. În plus, ceea ce numim în mod obișnuit totul - adică totul în pluralitate și în distincţie - își primește sensul tocmai de la acest unu primordial, care este unul-tot anterior totului. ceea ce vrea să sublinieze damascius este că, deși cele trei înţelesuri ale totului sunt distincte și fiecare are ceva specific, totuși ele nu sunt independente, nu sunt lipsite de legătură. ele sunt într-o unitate organică, pe de o parte (¢f' nÒj) deoarece ele provin de la un termen prim, pe de altă parte (prÕj ›n) deoarece fiecare dintre ele este totul, deși într-un mod specific. deoarece sunt ¢f' nÒj, adică provin de la același termen prim (unul-tot), înseamnă că există o coordonare (sÚntaxij) între cele trei niveluri (unu, unificat, totul). Pe de altă parte, deoarece fiecare are o relaţie cu același termen prim comun (unul-tot), înseamnă că au între ele un raport, o relaţie (scšsij). 1 Aristotel, Etica nicomahică, 1096 b 27. 2 Aristotel, Metafizica, 1005, a 7. Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 299 Această desprindere gradată a pluralităţii pornind de la un principiu unitar este, de altfel, maniera comună de a gândi a tradiţiei neoplatonice. ceea ce aduce damascius în plus este faptul că el nu gândește principiul ca o unitate absolută, anterioară - și la limită opusă totului - ci ca o unitate care este deja totul, într-o manieră simplă, anterioară pluralităţii. Totul este astfel prezent - în maniere diferite - la fiecare nivel: și la cel comun, al realităţii plurale, și la cel al fiinţei veritabile (numită unificat) care cuprinde totul în manieră unificată (analogic unui gen, care cuprinde tot ceea ce sunt speciile sale, însă precede distincţiile propriu-zise dintre specii), și la cel al principiului unitar, anterior oricărei pluralităţi, chiar și celei a fiinţei unificate. Astfel, primordial și dătător de sens este tocmai acest ultim tot, anume cel unitar, cel al unului-tot anterior totului. 2. Dualitatea „unului-tot anterior totului" şi reintegrarea principiului în totul damascius gândește ca principiu această identitate unitară dintre unu și totul, tocmai pentru a ieși din aporia reciprocei excluderi a principiului și totului, respectiv din aceea a reincluderii principiului în totul. dar atunci, de ce nu rămâne damascius la această soluţie? de ce merge analiza lui și mai departe? Tocmai pentru că există o diferenţă sau o ne-suprapunere între soluţia oferită de damascius și felul în care gândirea noastră preia această soluţie, astfel încât soluţia nu poate fi acceptată până la capăt. iată ce spune damascius: dacă, în modul cel mai firesc, am numi totul cele ce subzistă în pluralitate și distincţie, atunci vom stabili drept principii ale acestora unificatul și, mai ales, unul. Însă, dacă și pe acestea le gândim ca fiind totul și le reunim cu totul celălalt, conform relaţiei și coordonării în care se află faţă de el, atunci, așa cum am spus și mai înainte, raţionamentul ne va cere un alt principiu anterior totului, pe care nu se mai cuvine să îl gândim ca totul, nici să îl punem în coordonare cu cele ce proced de la el. (De princiipiis, R.i, 3.8-13) PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil300 damascius observă că principiile propuse de el ajung să fie reintegrate în „totul", întocmai cum se întâmpla în prima aporie formulată la începutul tratatului. Mai precis, deși damascius a propus ca principiu prim unul-tot anterior totului, totuși, gândirea noastră nu poate ieși din sfera totului-plural. ea lucrează în continuare doar la nivelul al treilea al totului - cel care implică pluralitatea și distincţia. iar ceea ce este specific acestui nivel nu este unificarea, ci este mai degrabă totalizarea. desigur, în primă instanţă noi distingem cele trei tipuri de totul și știm că unul este totul într-o manieră unitară; totuși, gândirea noastră le reunește, le pune pe toate în comun (sull£boimen)1, obţinând din nou un tot comun, înglobator. dar, în felul acesta, principiul nu mai este propriu-zis principiu, pentru că este reintegrat în totul. În plus, obţinem un nou tot, virtual, pentru care vom avea nevoie de încă un principiu, așa cum s-a arătat în prima aporie a principiului2. Mai mult decât atât, nimic nu garantează că acel nou principiu, o dată găsit, nu va fi la rândul lui reintegrat în totul și deci, că el nu-și va pierde din nou statutul de principiu, și așa la infinit. Gândirea noastră face aceeași mișcare pe care damascius o punea în evidenţă în prima aporie: anume, gândirea reintroduce principiul în numărul celor al căror principiu este, tocmai pentru că el este gândit ca principiu, așadar într-o „coordonare unică" (m...a sÚntaxij) cu cele ce vin după el3 și în relaţie cu cele de după el (kat¦ t3⁄4n prÕj aÙt¦ scšsin). dar, dacă unul intră în 1 Verbul sullamb£nw are sensul de a pune împreună, a reuni, dar și sensul de a concepe, de a gândi. Așadar, unul și unificatul ajung din nou să fie gândite ca fiind totul și să fie reintegrate în ceea ce numim totul. Însă acest lucru nu poate fi admis în privinţa principiului. damascius trimite la un pasaj anterior (De principiis, R. i, 2.8–9), în care era folosit același verb, sullamb£nw, la forma lui de participiu pasiv (suneilhmmšnhj), pentru a arăta că principiul nu poate fi ceva anume, integrat în totul, căci atunci ar trebui să căutăm un alt principiu al totului astfel format, și fie am înainta la infinit, fie totul ar rămâne fără principiu. 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 2.7–10. 3 Într-adevăr, unul a fost propus ca „vârf al celor plurale" (De principiis, R. i, 2.19–20). el este sursa non-plurală a totului, însă rămâne într-o anumită relaţie cu lucrurile plurale al căror vârf este. Capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul 301 această coordonare cu totul, el este reintegrat în totul și își pierde calitatea de principiu. Așa cum am văzut, prezenţa principiului coordonat cu totul este cea care dă sens totului, conferindu-i o unitate proprie, o structură, niște limite constitutive. numai că, tocmai în măsura în care guvernează această coordonare unică a totului, unul însuși ajunge să își piardă statutul de principiu, fiind înglobat de acest tot coordonat. Tocmai în măsura în care este principiu al totului, unul-tot anterior totului ajunge să nu mai fie propriu-zis principiu prim. capitolul 2 de lA APoRiA PRinciPiUlUi lA PRinciPiUl necooRdonAT Unul-tot-anterior-totului nu poate fi acceptat ca principiu absolut, ci el însuși reiterează aporia principiului. Totuși, acest aparent eșec va da un nou impuls gândirii lui damascius. departe de a renunţa la căutarea principiului, damascius vede în aporie tocmai semnul principiului, indicaţia superioară despre cum trebuie să fie principiul, despre cum trebuie păstrat acesta în gândire, sau despre cum gândirea însăși trebuie să se situeze în preajma principiului. Astfel, dacă unul-tot-anterior-totului sfârșește prin a fi reintegrat în totul, pierzându-și statutul de principiu, înseamnă că principiul veritabil trebuie să fie sustras totului, complet necoordonat cu acesta. Pornind de aici, damascius va urmări ce se întâmplă cu gândirea noastră în faţa unui asemenea principiu. Vom vedea că din aporia iniţială se nasc o serie de fenomene care vor deschide drumul înspre principiul absolut, sau, mai precis, înspre „expresia" cea mai înaltă a acestui principiu absolut necoordonat. Aceste fenomene, pe care le vom analiza în capitolul de faţă, sunt: divinaţia, suprimarea discursului, înaintarea în vid înspre nimicul superior fiinţei, travaliile gândirii. Toate acestea ne vor conduce înspre soluţia ultimă pe care o dă damascius problemei principiului prim: anume spre principiul inefabil, despre care vom discuta în capitolul următor. A. Divinaţia unui principiu necoordonat Văzând că „unul-tot anterior totului" nu poate evita aporia, damascius vrea să se ferească de posibilitatea de a regresa la infinit, Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 303 căutând mereu alte și alte principii, unul mai anterior decât altul. el își dă seama că unul-tot anterior totului nu poate fi acceptat ca principiu ultim - ci trimite spre un alt principiu - tocmai din cauză că el rămâne coordonat cu totul al cărui principiu este. În consecinţă, dacă discursul nostru ajunge să caute încă un principiu, anterior chiar și unului-tot anterior totului, atunci înseamnă că, de fapt, principiul pe care îl căutăm trebuie să fie necoordonat totului1: Așadar, sufletul nostru are divinaţia faptului că totul, oricum ar fi conceput, are un principiu dincolo de tot, necoordonat faţă de totul. (De principiis, R.i, 4.6-7) damascius valorizează tocmai neputinţa gândirii de a obţine un principiu absolut2. Gândirea caută în continuare un alt principiu, deoarece unul însuși a fost gândit în același timp ca fiind totul, într-o anumită manieră. dar atunci, înseamnă că gândirea noastră tinde spre un principiu absolut al totului, însă nu doar al totului gândit ca plural sau al totului gândit ca unificat, ci al totului pur și simplu, în orice manieră l-am gândi3. iar condiţia pentru ca acel principiu să fie cu adevărat principiu al totului - în sensul absolut al totului - este aceea ca acest principiu să nu mai fie coordonat cu totul; altfel spus, trebuie ca acest principiu să nu mai poată fi pus alături de totul, pentru a forma 1 Altfel, atâta timp cât am avea un principiu coordonat totului, am reintegra acest principiu în totul, făcându-l să nu mai fie principiu absolut. 2 În faţa acestei prime neputinţe de a exprima principiul, damascius se sprijină tocmai pe aceste aporii și imposibilităţi, pentru a propune perspectiva cea mai radicală din istoria neoplatonismului. neputinţa de a gândi principiul nu este una acceptată cu resemnare, ci devine o metodă foarte puternică de a îndepărta din faţa principiului însuși chiar și ultimele maniere - inevitabil inferioare și inadecvate - prin care acesta era indicat. damascius descoperă prezenţa principiului absolut în însăși ascunderea sa, în însăși imposibilitatea de a-l exprima. Gândirea noastră, chiar dacă nu poate exprima principiului, descoperă propria sa înrădăcinare în acest principiu. 3 Vezi explicaţia lui damascius despre faptul că totul absolut înseamnă „toate cele pe care le putem gândi" (De principiis, R. i, 2.5). PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil304 astfel un nou tot comun. Acest principiu trebuie să fie complet inaccesibil manierei totalizante a totului - respectiv a gândirii noastre, care corespunde totului. observăm că damascius ajunge în felul acesta la un al treilea sens al anteriorităţii principiului faţă de totul1: principiul căutat trebuie să fie „dincolo de totul și necoordonat totului". Totuși, cum putem înţelege faptul că, după ce a respins ipoteza unui principiu care este „TMpškeina tîn p£ntwn" - în chiar primele rânduri ale tratatului - damascius revine acum și spune că sufletul nostru are totuși divinaţia unui principiu anterior totului (TMpškeina p£ntwn)? cum se poate ca ipoteza respinsă mai sus să fie acum readmisă? de fapt, trebuie să distingem între cele două maniere de a fi dincolo (TMpškeina) de totul. În aporia iniţială a totului, era vorba despre un principiu dincolo de totul, dar în raport cu totul, în coordonare cu totul (TMpškeina tîn p£ntwn), într-un dincolo ce se definește relativ la totul. În schimb, acum este vorba de a fi dincolo de totul, însă nu relativ la totul, ci dincolo în mod absolut (TMpškeina p£ntwn), adică fără a mai fi coordonat totului. dintre cele două sensuri complementare ale expresiei „dincolo de fiinţă"2, damascius păstrează aici numai un sens, anume acela al transcendenţei absolute, care nu mai are nici o relaţie cu lucrurile pe care le transcende, tocmai pentru ca nu cumva relaţia să relativizeze transcendenţa. de asemenea, remarcăm că, dacă principiul anterior - identic cu principiul absolut al întregii 1 Un prim sens al anteriorităţii este cel din aporia iniţială a tratatului De principiis, unde era vorba despre un principiu din afara totului (tîn p£ntwn TMktÒj). damascius a respins acest prim sens. Al doilea sens este acela din expresia „unul-tot anterior totului" (žn p£nta prÕ p£ntwn), care însă rămâne o anterioritate parţială. Acest al treilea sens al anteriorităţii pe care damascius îl propune acum este unul radical, în care principiul nu mai are nici o coordonare cu totul. 2 este vorba de sensul cauzalităţii, respectiv de sensul transcendenţei. Primul sens este relativ: principiul este dincolo faţă de fiinţa pe care o cauzează, având astfel o relaţie cu aceasta. În schimb, sensul transcendent este absolut: principiul este dincolo de fiinţă, pentru că iese în afara oricărei relaţii cu aceasta. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 305 tradiţii - este descris ca fiind „unul-tot anterior totului", acest principiu de acum este descris printr-o dublă suprimare a celor două aspecte ale principiului anterior: astfel, el nu mai este „totul", ci este „dincolo de totul" și, în plus, el nu mai este „anterior totului" - păstrând o relaţie de anterioritate cu totul - ci este „necoordonat totului"1. Totuși, întrebarea care se ridică este următoarea: dacă avem în vedere prima aporie formulată de damascius însuși la începutul tratatului, atunci nu cumva chiar și acest principiu - care este dincolo de tot și necoordonat totului - rămâne în afara totului, contrazicând astfel totalitatea totului? Sau, dacă luăm sensul celălalt al aporiei, se poate întreba dacă nu cumva acest principiu de acum intră din nou în totul, de vreme ce gândim chiar și despre el că este principiu, iar totul înseamnă „tot ceea ce gândim, într-un fel sau altul". Pentru a răspunde la această întrebare - și pentru a înţelege cum depășește damascius însuși această problemă - trebuie să observăm modul în care damascius introduce acest principiu în discursul său: el nu spune că acest principiu este gândit, ci că sufletul nostru „are divinaţia" unui astfel de principiu. ce înseamnă acest lucru? dacă principiile de până acum au fost obţinute pornind de la totul și de la necesitatea de a restrânge totul sub o unitate anterioară, în schimb, la acest principiu de acum se ajunge altfel, și anume pornind de la faptul că gândirea însăși - care a obţinut principiile anterioare - rămâne în aporie faţă de principiile pe care le-a obţinut deja. Gândirea nu mai ajunge propriu-zis la acest principiu necoordonat. din contră, tot ceea ce poate gândi gândirea noastră este un lung șir de aporii, în care totul include principiul său și are apoi nevoie de încă un principiu. Aceasta este limita maximă la care poate ajunge gândirea, cu maniera ei 1 Să remarcăm că și „unul-tot anterior totului" a fost obţinut tot printr-o dublă negaţie: el nu era unul în sensul de minim, ci era unu-tot și, în plus, el nu era totul, într-o manieră imanentă, ci „anterior totului". PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil306 totalizantă - desigur, o limită foarte imprecisă, foarte instabilă, mai degrabă o ne-limită. În schimb, faptul că șirul aporiilor ar fi infinit ne arată că această gândire, care nu își mai poate atinge principiul, tinde de fapt spre un principiu pe care ea însăși să nu îl mai poată include din nou în totul, adică spre un principiu necoordonat totului. dar la acel principiu gândirea nu poate ajunge niciodată, ci ea doar indică spre el, prin propriile sale eșecuri repetate. Așadar, principiul prim nu apare propriu-zis în discursul despre primele principii, nu îl gândim, nu îl cunoaștem, dar știm că el trebuie să fie anterior tuturor manierelor noastre de gândire. Acest mod de acces - în care știm de existenţa unui principiu, fără să știm propriu-zis ce este el, ci doar indicând spre el - este descris prin termenul de divinaţie: sufletul nostru are divinaţia (manteÚetai) unui astfel de principiu. este un termen greu de tradus în mod unitar; el înseamnă a avea presentimentul a ceva, a ghici sau a avea divinaţia a ceva. este un termen cu o lungă istorie, pe care trebuie să o reamintim pentru a putea înţelege cum intră el într-un context de filozofie speculativă și ce exprimă acest termen la damascius. la origine, divinaţia sau arta divinaţiei (mantik») este arta prezicătorului, arta oraculară. este vorba despre un mod de cunoaștere non-raţională, care ajunge la opinia adevărată, însă nu prin mijloacele obișnuite ale cunoașterii, anume prin cele deductive, demonstrative, ci prin inspiraţie divină sau prin interpretarea unor semne și simboluri. Pentru a înţelege care este sensul filozofic al divinaţiei, ne vom întoarce la Platon. Acesta distinge două registre ale acestei practici: primul, inferior, este în vederea obţinerii anumitor avantaje imediate ale individului (de pildă aflarea viitorului); al doilea registru este acela în care se urmărește aflarea voii divine, aflarea lucrurilor pe care divinitatea vrea să le transmită oamenilor1. Aceasta este divinaţia inspirată, 1 Platon, Phaidros, 244 d–e. Pentru Platon, sufletul însuși are capacitatea divinaţiei (mantikÒn gš ti ka 1 yuc») vezi Phaidros, 242 c 7: expunând Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 307 superioară oricărei înţelepciuni (swfrosÚnh) umane. dar al lui Apollo, divinaţia inspirată este o formă de nebunie divină, pe care Platon o pune alături de arta iniţiatică, de poezie și de iubire. În Banchetul, 202 e, Platon face legătura dintre acest tip de cunoaștere non-raţională și filozofie. el vorbește despre un tip de divinaţie care este arta specifică filozofului. este vorba despre o cunoaștere care leagă două niveluri ontologice distincte: cel divin și cel uman, realizând astfel o comuniune (koinwn...a) și o mijlocire între oameni și zei, anume prin intervenţia naturii intermediare a daimonului1. Această divinaţie superioară este cea care însoţește iubirea supremă, cea îndreptată spre divinitate. În această iubire, sufletul nu poate ști dinainte și în mod exact ce caută, spre ce se îndreaptă iubirea și dorinţa lui. Totuși, căutarea lui nu este vidă, ci el „ghicește" într-un fel spre ce anume se îndreaptă. Sufletul are un fel de intuiţie sau presentiment al scopului iubirii sale2. Aceasta nu este o cunoaștere împlinită, completă, primul discurs despre iubire, Socrate presimte sau are divinaţia faptului că a greșit faţă de zei în cele spuse. Prezenţa semnului daimonic însoţitor face ca Socrate să apară ca un prezicător (m£ntij). 1 cel care realizează această intermediere este eros, natură daimonică, ce participă atât la natura divină cât și la cea umană. eros transmite zeilor cererile oamenilor, iar oamenilor le transmite mesajele zeilor. divinaţia este așadar un tip de cunoaștere ce se instituie între două lumi care prin natura lor nu pot intra în contact, este o cunoaștere ce leagă două niveluri ontologice distincte. eros unește cele două lumi într-un același întreg. el este o natură filozofică prin excelenţă (el caută înţelepciunea), deoarece în natura lui se întâlnesc atât lipsa unei cunoașteri superioare (rezervată zeilor), cât și dorinţa înaintării spre această cunoaștere. 2 Vezi Platon, Banchetul 192 c 7–d 2. Același sens al divinaţiei apare în Republica, 505 e 1; de data aceasta, Platon pune divinaţia sau presentimentul binelui în legătură cu aporia în care se află sufletul, din cauză că nu știe exact ce este binele pe care îl caută. la damascius, divinaţia și aporia vor fi de asemenea legate între ele. o altă ocurenţă relevantă a divinaţiei este cea din Republica, 516 d 2, referitoare la capacitatea de a intui sau ghici mișcările lucrurilor însele, pornind de la umbrele lor. Așadar, divinaţia se referă în general la capacitatea de a surprinde un nivel superior al realităţii, chiar și atunci când, în cazul principiului prim, o cunoaștere propriu-zisă nu mai este posibilă. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil308 pe care am putea-o exprima în mod explicit, ci este mai degrabă o cunoaștere difuză, care se completează pe parcurs, pe măsura apropierii de lucrul căutat. Totuși, doar prin această cunoaștere specială, sufletul știe să păstreze direcţia corectă a căutării sale. nu este o cunoaștere care pornește de la un obiect prezent „în faţa ochilor", a unui lucru deja întâlnit, deja descoperit, ci este cunoașterea specifică actului însuși al căutării. Pentru a căuta, avem nevoie de o direcţie a căutării. Mai mult, avem nevoie de acea atracţie spre „altceva", spre ceva pe care nu îl deţinem încă în manieră raţională și pe care poate că nici nu îl vom întâlni vreodată în acest fel, dar care, totuși, nu încetează să ne provoace din acea retragere a sa. Astfel, presentimentul este în același timp cel care trezește căutarea. Acest tip de divinaţie va avea o evoluţie foarte interesantă în istoria neoplatonismului. Plotin preia ideea că sufletul, deși nu își cunoaște binele propriu, are totuși un presentiment al lui, pornind de la o imagine slabă pe care o deţine despre bine1. În felul acesta, deși binele rămâne în cele din urmă inaccesibil cunoașterii noastre imperfecte, totuși tindem spre el, ne îndreptăm spre el prin această cunoaștere non-raţională, prin acest presentiment sau divinaţie. Pentru Plotin2, nu numai sufletul are acest presentiment, ci întreaga realitate tinde spre binele suprem, dorindu-l în mod spontan, ca și cum ar ghici că nu poate exista fără el. Proclus preia și el această tematică a doririi unui principiu prim pe care nu îl cunoaștem, dar a cărui prezenţă o presimţim3; necunoașterea principiului, 1 Vezi Plotin, Enneade iii, 5, 7.7, context în care este discutat mitul nașterii lui eros, prezentat în Banchetul 203 b–e. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 12.8. 3 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, 22, 102.15–22: „Astfel, tensiunea și dorinţa fiinţelor pentru unu este insaţiabilă, căci acest obiect al dorinţei pe care îl caută fiinţele este incognoscibil și insesizabil. neputând nici să cunoască nici să sesizeze ceea ce caută, toate stau împrejurul lui ca într-un cortegiu și sunt în durerile facerii din cauza lui, părând să aibă doar un presentiment despre el (oOEon ¢pomanteÚetai)". În Comentariul la Republica, i, 287.2, se arată că, prin ideea binelui ca scop al tuturor lucrurilor, avem presentimentul faptului că binele este dincolo de fiinţă. În Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 58.9, Proclus Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 309 respectiv dorirea și divinaţia lui, sunt puse în corespondenţă cu cele două denumiri tradiţionale ale principiului: unul, respectiv binele. ca unu, principiul ne este necunoscut, dar ca bine, avem dorinţa și divinaţia lui. dacă la Platon divinaţia era o artă a mijlocirii între zei și oameni - în condiţia în care oamenii nu pot avea acces direct la cele divine și nici zeii nu se amestecă direct în cele umane -, în schimb, pentru neoplatonici, începând deja cu Plotin, sufletul uman capătă el însuși o funcţie ontologică de mediere, el aparţinând prin însăși natura sa atât lumii inteligibile, cât și lumii sensibile, anume ca suflet întrupat. Astfel putem înţelege de ce damascius atribuie sufletului divinaţia unui principiu necoordonat. Reluând tema divinaţiei unui principiu absolut, damascius îi dă un sens mai tehnic. la el nu mai este vorba doar de faptul că ne îndreptăm spre un principiu pe care îl dorim, însă fără să deţinem o cunoaștere propriu-zisă a lui. divinaţia capătă un sens „tare", anume acela al unei demonstraţii indirecte a existenţei unui principiu absolut necoordonat. Prin intermediul aporiilor, damascius arată că gândirea tinde spre un principiu care nu mai poate fi inclus în totul și nu mai poate fi gândit în vreo relaţie oarecare cu totul însuși, dar spre care, totuși, sufletul nostru tinde mereu. Astfel, divinaţia nu mai este doar un sentiment - mai mult sau mai puţin vag - al sufletului în căutarea principiului, ci este acest fenomen pe care îl resimte gândirea noastră atunci când încearcă să se apropie de principiu: gândirea nu se poate opri la un principiu anume, pe care să îl gândească alături de totul, sau să îl integreze în totul, ci ea caută un principiu pe care să nu îl mai poată situa în nici un fel faţă de totul, un principiu necoordonat totului. Astfel, dacă divinaţia înseamnă a ghici sau a intui caracterul unui lucru absent, pornind de la anumite semne vizibile care trimit spre acela, în cazul principiului, aporiile funcţionează ca arată că însuși numele de „unu" al principiului produce în noi divinaţia a ceea ce depășește acest concept. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil310 niște semne: din faptul că nu putem surprinde principiul, ci cădem din nou în aporie, „ghicim" prezenţa neexplicită, nemanifestă și inaccesibilă a unui alt principiu. Aporiile sunt cele care, prin recurenţa lor - care tinde să meargă spre infinit -, ne indică faptul că principiul trebuie să fie necoordonat totului. Însăși neputinţa noastră de a concepe principiul ne dă presentimentul sau divinaţia unui principiu de dincolo de tot, pe care totul însuși să nu îl mai poată reintegra. În felul acesta, gândirea nu ajunge propriu-zis la principiu, ci doar descoperă necesitatea existenţei unui astfel de principiu, spre care ea însăși se îndreaptă neîncetat1. În articolul său, „damascius on the ineffable"2, J. dillon, spune că principiul absolut al lui damascius (anume inefabilul) ar fi ceva pe care gândirea îl postulează (manteÚetai) pentru a face explicabile alte fenomene pe care le observăm. În acest sens, dillon compară inefabilul cu găurile negre și cu ceea ce M. Heidegger numește „ereignis" sau „es gibt Zeit"3. divinaţia ar fi așadar o postulare a principiului absolut. Totuși, principiul absolut al lui damascius nu este un postulat al gândirii și nu este admis pentru a explica altceva. Mai degrabă, admiterea lui se face din cauza acestei dorinţe a sufletului nostru, care nu se poate opri la nici un principiu și la nici un sens al totalităţii realităţii. dacă postulare înseamnă admitere fără demonstraţie, în schimb, principiul absolut al lui damascius este într-un fel dedus în umbra aporiilor, necesitatea lui fiind „demonstrată" de prezenţa constantă a 1 Presentimentul sau divinaţia indică mai degrabă nevoia de acel lucru superior spre care ne îndreptăm. iar damascius însuși va vorbi ulterior despre faptul că, urcând treptele realităţii, există o astfel de nevoie - de nedesăvârșire dar și de dorinţă și aspiraţie - spre ceva superior. Această nevoie este resimţită la fiecare treaptă a realităţii, până la principiul cel mai înalt, de dincolo de ultima noastră supoziţie, de dincolo de unu. 2 J. dillon, „damascius on the ineffable", art. cit., p. 127. 3 M. Heidegger, Despre miza gândirii, trad. de c. cioabă, G. cercel și G. lepădatu, Humanitas, București, 2007, pp. 42–43. Aceeași interpretare - care apropie principiul prim neoplatonic (mai precis unul plotinian) de conceptul de Ereignis la Heidegger - este susţinută de J. M. narbonne în La métaphysique de Plotin, suivi de Henosis et Ereignis: remarques sur une interprétation heideggérienne de l'Un plotinien, Paris, Vrin, 2001. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 311 paradoxurilor ce însoţesc gândirea principiului1. Principiul absolut al lui damascius - numit inefabil - nu este un postulat absolut, de la care începe gândirea, ci este mai degrabă „punctul de fugă" spre care se îndreaptă gândirea, fără însă a-l atinge vreodată. cu aceste precizări, putem reveni la întrebarea pe care am pus-o mai sus: anume dacă nu cumva principiul absolut necoordonat intră și el în aporia iniţială a principiului, instituindu-se ca un lucru din afara totului, sau fiind el însuși reintegrat în totul, prin însăși gândirea noastră totalizantă. Totuși, devine acum clar în ce fel principiul necoordonat iese din această aporie: principiul necoordonat nu mai este gândit în nici un fel, ci, din contră, din ceea ce gândim noi, putem trage concluzia că ne îndreptăm spre principiul absolut, ca spre ceva pe care nu putem niciodată să îl atingem. divinaţia, ca manieră de raportare la principiu, ferește principiul însuși de orice interferenţă a gândirii: el nu este gândit nici ca un lucru din afara totului, nici ca un lucru pe care gândirea ar putea să îl reintegreze în totul, deoarece, de fapt, nu îl gândim deloc. ceea ce gândim este mai degrabă tendinţa gândirii noastre de a se îndrepta spre principiu, dar spre un principiu pe care nici un tot posibil nu îl va putea integra, sau, într-un cuvânt, spre un principiu necoordonat (¢sÚntakton). Totuși, oare nu tot despre un principiu necoordonat vorbeau și filozofii dinaintea lui damascius? ce anume este nou și special în analiza sa? Într-adevăr, ideea unui principiu necoordonat realităţii de după el nu este străină neoplatonismului anterior. Totuși, damascius merge mai departe decât tradiţia care îl precede: el va gândi o manieră radicală de necoordonare a principiului faţă de cele de după el, iar din această perspectivă radicală a sa el va critica în mod indirect tradiţia, în sensul că va observa 1 În plus, așa cum se va vedea din primele două metode de ascensiune spre principiu (De principiis, R. i, 18–38), gândirea nu poate găsi nici un lucru suficient în sine, la care să se oprească. Astfel, nici măcar unul - principiul admis de tradiţie - nu poate fi punctul cel mai înalt, la care gândirea să se poată opri, ci și el suscită alte aporii, făcându-ne să căutăm mai departe. Gândirea însăși este obligată să „alunece în sus", înspre un principiu superior. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil312 că principiul prim al tradiţiei (anume unul absolut) nu îndeplinește acest criteriu al necoordonării, ci, într-un fel, rămâne încă într-o relaţie de coordonare cu totul. În schimb, pentru damascius însuși, această necoordonare absolută va constitui „trambulina" pornind de la care va reuși să treacă spre principiul cu adevărat absolut, de dincolo de fiinţă și de dincolo de întreaga ierarhie de principii propusă de tradiţia neoplatonică anterioară: acesta va fi principiul inefabil. Vom vedea în continuare ce înseamnă pentru damascius principiul necoordonat și cum poate acesta să depășească aporia fundamentală a principiului. coordonarea (sÚntaxij) indică includerea mai multor lucruri într-un întreg, într-o unitate comună. În coordonare intră toate lucrurile care au ceva în comun1, care pot fi așezate împreună, într-o aceeași structură sau ordine (t£xij). coordonarea cea mai largă, care cuprinde toate lucrurile, este descrisă de damascius - în linia întregii tradiţii neoplatonice - drept acel „suflu comun" (ÐmÒpnoia)2 care unește toate părţile realităţii, făcând ca pluralitatea lor să fie unitară. În plus, această coordonare generală a tuturor lucrurilor nu are numai sensul de a uni între ele diversele părţi ale realităţii, făcând din ele o realitate închegată, întreagă, ci, în plus, fiecare parte a realităţii își primește sensul său cel mai propriu tocmai în cadrul coordonării tuturor lucrurilor3. În schimb, principiul prim este singurul „lucru" care - pentru a rămâne cu adevărat ceea ce este - nu poate și nu trebuie să 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 13.1–3; 14.9–10. 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 5.12–13. cuvânt foarte rar, ÐmÒpnoia desemnează unitatea pe care o imprimă principiul asupra realităţii pe care o guvernează. Aceeași idee este exprimată de termenul sÚmpnoia, de origine stoică, utilizat de Plotin în expresia sÚmpnoia m...a (Enneade, ii, 3, 7.17). faptul că toate lucrurile au aceeași cauză primă face ca ele să alcătuiască un întreg organic. nici un lucru din lume nu este izolat, ci toate sunt legate între ele, într-un suflu comun; un lucru ce are loc într-o parte a universului se repercutează asupra celorlalte lucruri. lucrurile sunt în legătură unele cu altele: „totul conspiră", după cum traduce e. Bréhier. ideea unui suflu unitar prezent în întreaga realitate apare și la Proclus: Teologia platonică, i, 66.12; Comentariul la Parmenide, ii, 762.12; iV, 916.27. 3 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 52.28–29. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 313 fie inclus într-o astfel de ordine comună, alături de orice altceva; el este singurul care trebuie să rămână complet necoordonat cu cele de după el, adică cu totul. În consecinţă, el trebuie să nu aibă nimic comun cu nici un lucru care intră în alcătuirea totului, iar, în sens invers, nimic din totul nu i se poate aplica principiului, nimic nu îi poate fi adecvat. damascius va aplica această condiţie radicală a principiului necoordonat, încercând să elimine de la principiu orice urmă de comuniune cu totul. el va încerca să se plaseze în proximitatea - foarte greu de situat - a unui principiu care este cu totul sustras din ceea ce cunoaștem, din tot ceea ce gândim sau am putea gândi, din ceea ce îndeobște numim totul. Totuși, cum putem vorbi despre un astfel de principiu și cum reușește damascius însuși să își ia ca ţintă a analizei sale un „lucru" care nu are absolut nimic în comun cu ceea ce gândim noi, instituindu-se într-un u-topic dincolo de totul, în afara realităţii și a gândirii? ce înseamnă acest principiu de dincolo de totul, necoordonat totului? B. Suprimarea discursului 1. Principiul necoordonat nu poate fi gândit în nici un fel În primă instanţă, observăm că, în loc să anunţe dintru început că principiul „de dincolo de totul și necoordonat totului" este inefabilul, damascius pare că amână să dea principiului necoordonat orice expresie. de fapt, el construiește drumul, sau eliberează terenul în vederea propunerii inefabilului. Astfel, imediat ce a ajuns la concluzia că principiul pe care îl caută sufletul nostru este dincolo de totul și necoordonat, damascius întreprinde o respingere radicală a tuturor manierelor în care tradiţia anterioară a indicat principiul absolut. dacă principiul este necoordonat totului, atunci: acesta nu trebuie numit principiu, nici cauză, nici primul, nici anterior totului sau dincolo de tot; cu atât mai mult, nu trebuie să îl proclamăm a fi totul însuși și, în general, nu trebuie să îl proclamăm, să îl concepem sau să presupunem ceva despre el. (R. i, 4.7–10) PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil314 observăm similitudinea cu discursul platonic din prima ipoteză, unde se arată că nici o manieră a gândirii nu are acces la unul absolut1. Totuși, damascius merge și mai departe, aplicând această teologie negativă asupra ultimelor expresii prin care tradiţia indica principiul prim. el începe prin a suprima orice posibilă manieră de a numi principiul absolut. În primul rând, damascius suprimă însuși termenul de principiu; apoi, suprimă modurile tradiţionale de a indica principiul (precum faptul că acesta este primul și cauză), dar și expresiile prin care el însuși a vorbit până acum despre principiul unu (ca fiind totul și anterior totului); în ultimă instanţă, el suprimă și expresia însăși a transcendenţei principiului: dincolo de tot, deși în fraza anterioară el însuși vorbise despre divinaţia unui principiu de dincolo de totul2. dar damascius suprimă nu numai aceste indicaţii asupra principiului, ci și actele cognitive prin care gândire noastră se raportează la principiu: astfel, „nu trebuie să concepem (TMnnoe‹n) principiul, să îl proclamăm (Ømne‹n) sau să presupunem (Øponoe‹n) ceva despre el". cele trei maniere care sunt suprimate aici nu sunt alese întâmplător. Primul dintre ele (TMnnoe‹n) este chiar modul în care gândim totul în sens absolut: „totul este tot ceea ce într-un fel sau altul concepem" (Ósa ka Ðpwsoàn TMnnooàmen)3, tot ceea ce cuprindem cu gândul. Spunând că principiul nu poate fi conceput, damascius arată de fapt că principiul nu poate fi cuprins în totul. este tocmai ceea ce avertiza prima aporie a tratatului De principiis. de asemenea, Øponoe‹n corespunde ultimei maniere în care mai putem spune ceva despre principiul unu: anume printr-o supoziţie (ØpÒnoia): „nu avem nici o noţiune și nici o supoziţie mai simplă decât unul, așadar cum am putea presupune ceva dincolo de ultima supoziţie?" (R.i, 5.16–17). Vom vedea mai jos 1 Platon, Parmenide, 142 a 4–6: unul nu poate fi numit, exprimat, nu poate fi obiect al unei opinii și nu poate fi cunoscut sau simţit. 2 Pentru damascius nici măcar acest „dincolo de totul" (TMpškeina p£ntwn) nu mai poate fi adecvat principiului, deoarece chiar și el indică o raportare a principiului la cele de după el (De principiis, R. i, 10.23). 3 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 2.5. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 315 de ce damascius suprimă chiar și această ultimă supoziţie pe care o putem avea despre principiu. În ceea ce privește verbul Ømne‹n (a proclama), el a avut o însemnătate deosebită pentru gândirea neoplatonică anterioară. În continuare, vom insista mai mult asupra lui, tocmai pentru a pune în evidenţă până unde merge damascius în încercarea sa de a suprima orice formă de a gândi principiul și cum intervine această suprimare în contextul tradiţiei neoplatonice. 2. Principiul necoordonat nu poate fi proclamat Sensul originar al verbului Ømnšw este acela de a lăuda, a celebra, a înălţa un imn în cinstea cuiva, mai precis în cinstea unui zeu. Pentru tradiţia anterioară, maniera cea mai înaltă în care gândirea putea să întâmpine principiul prim era tocmai prin acest fapt de a-i aduce un imn (Ømne‹n). Se știe că neoplatonicii gândeau ipostazele principiale în analogie cu zeii principali ai panteonului grec (și nu numai). Primul care face această identificare simbolică este chiar Plotin1, care pune nivelurile principiale în corespondenţă cu zeii cei mai înalţi: Uranos, cronos, Zeus. În Enneade ii, 9, 9.33, Plotin vorbește despre faptul că trebuie să lăudăm prin imnuri (Ømne‹n) pe zeii inteligibili și, deasupra lor, pe regele cel mare (adică principiul prim), care își manifestă măreţia prin pluralitatea zeilor de după el. Proclus duce și mai departe această manieră de gândire la interferenţa între filozofic și religios, până acolo încât exerciţiul filozofic nu mai poate fi conceput separat de viaţa religioasă. Viaţa lui Proclus, scrisă de discipolul său Marinus, arată cât de mult se contopesc cele două aspecte: filozofic și religios. Se știe de pildă că Proclus este el însuși autorul unei colecţii de imnuri adresate nu numai zeilor din panteonul grecesc, ci și celor veneraţi de alte popoare. În școala lui Proclus, exerciţiul filozofic devine în esenţa lui un act religios, lectura textelor filozofice primește o valoare rituală, 1 Plotin, Enneade, V, 1, 8. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil316 identificându-se cu rugăciunea1. citite într-o grilă teologică, dialogurile platonice sunt privite ca o revelaţie, ca o „doctrină divin inspirată"2. cel mai teologic dintre dialoguri este Parmenide, dialog epoptic3, adică unul care procură cea mai înaltă iniţiere, nivelul cel mai înalt al contemplării divine. În acest context teologico-filozofic, nu este deloc surprinzătoare cheia în care Proclus interpretează prima ipoteză asupra unului. el consideră că negaţiile din această ipoteză alcătuiesc un imn teologic închinat principiului prim4. Proclus înţelege acest lucru în două sensuri complementare: prima ipoteză este un imn în onoarea unului, în măsura în care acesta transcende toate nivelurile divine5, dar și în măsura în care el generează toate aceste niveluri ontologice6. În felul acesta, imnul primește la Proclus un sens filozofic explicit, în contextul analizelor henologice. În acest sens al său, 1 În acest sens, se poate citi percutantul articol al lui H. d. Saffrey, „Quelques aspects de la spiritualité des philosophes néoplatoniciens de Jamblique à Proclus et damascius", Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 68, 1984, pp. 169–182, reluat în Recherches sur le néoplatonisme après Plotin, pp. 213–226. 2 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, i, 1, 5.16–18, unde filozofia lui Platon este comparată cu „iniţierea în misterele divine". 3 Vezi Platon, Banchetul, 210 a 1. 4 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 1191, 34–35 (Ûmnon di¦ tîn ¢pof£sewn toÚtwn ›na qeologikÕn ¢napšmpwn e„j tÕ ›n). 5 În Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 1191, 34–35, Proclus pune în evidenţă transcendenţa unului faţă de toate clasele divine. În interpretarea lui Proclus, fiecare nivel al analizei platonice (întreg, parte, asemenea, neasemenea, etc.) corespunde unei clase divine. faptul că în prima ipoteză toate aceste forme sunt respinse de la unu arată că acesta este transcendent tuturor claselor divine, fiind el însuși zeul prim. Proclus arată că negaţiile din prima ipoteză nu au doar o valoare logică raţională. Unul nu este superior doar uneia sau alteia dintre formele analizate, ci unul transcende toate clasele posibile; de aceea, negaţiile nu sunt niște raţionamente distincte, ci ele depășesc raţionamentul. ele nu au sens de cunoaștere, de determinare a unului faţă de celelalte niveluri de realitate. Unul transcende toate nivelurile de realitate posibile, așa cum zeul suprem este dincolo de toate clasele divine. de aceea, deși multiple și distincte între ele, negaţiile din prima ipoteză nu trebuie despărţite și văzute ca raţionamente asupra principiului prim - unul - ci sensul lor cel mai adecvat vine din a le considera în unitate, ca pe un singur imn unitar adus zeului transcendent: unul. 6 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 11, p. 65.5–15. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 317 teologic și filozofic în același timp, imnul din prima ipoteză unește cele două aspecte ale principiului: cel al transcendenţei și cel al cauzalităţii. imnul devine astfel modul cel mai potrivit de a ne apropia de principiul suprem, un mod superior gândirii discursive, dialectice1. Acesta este fundalul filozofic în care damascius vine să nege însăși posibilitatea de a aduce principiului prim un imn. damascius atacă tocmai această dualitate ce apare între transcendenţa unului și faptul că el produce totul. Pentru damascius, transcendenţa înţeleasă ca producătoare a totului - pe care damascius a numit-o unul-tot-anterior-totului - rămâne încă în relaţie cu totul și nu mai poate fi cu adevărat principiu prim. de aceea, dacă pentru Proclus prima ipoteză este imnul suprem adus principiului prim, damascius spune că nici măcar imnul nu este potrivit pentru principiul cu adevărat prim. ce sens va avea atunci prima ipoteză, acest text cu o autoritate indubitabilă pentru tradiţia neoplatonică? Sensul pe care i-l va acorda damascius - așa cum vom vedea în continuare - va fi acela de a ne conduce în mod inefabil spre inefabilul însuși, în fața căruia chiar și imnul trebuie suprimat. 3. Principiul necoordonat este dincolo de ultima supoziţie Totuși, așa cum vom vedea, damascius nu face această suprimare radicală decât pentru a împinge gândirea noastră dincolo de ultima supoziţie de care ea este în stare. iar ultima asemenea supoziţie este aceea de „unu", adică este tocmai maniera cea mai înaltă în care tradiţia a indicat principiul prim. desigur, damascius însuși - ca toţi filozofii neoplatonici anteriori - recunoaște că unul nu poate fi gândit în mod propriu-zis, căci gândirea noastră plurală nu poate cuprinde simplitatea acestuia. Totuși, el observă că există încă o manieră în care mai putem să ne raportăm 1 În Teologia platonică ii, 11, p. 65, 16–17, Proclus spune că, după ce înalţă un imn unului, intelectul coboară din nou la nivelul raţionamentelor, unde avem a face cu știinţa dialecticii. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil318 la unu și să ni-l imaginăm într-un fel, și anume pornind de la relaţia lui cu totul: căci ceea ce putem gândi sau imagina este fie ceva ce aparţine totului (iar acesta este sensul cel mai propriu <în care gândim ceva>), fie, pentru o gândire purificată, este totul însuși, chiar și atunci când, reducând și reducându-ne, înaintăm spre cel mai simplu, care este cel mai cuprinzător pentru totul, fiind circumferinţa ultimă, atât a celor ce sunt, cât și a celor ce nu sunt. (R.i, 4.10–14) damascius arată că, într-un fel, putem gândi și acest totul însuși și, mai mult decât atât, putem gândi unul care ţine totul în unitate1. Mai precis, putem gândi unul prin relaţia lui cu totul: prin faptul că unul produce totul și prin faptul că unul restrânge totul la unitate. Pentru totul, unul este „vârful indivizibil", „cel care cuprinde totul", ca o „circumferinţă ultimă" și ca un „coronament"2. Unul cuprinde totul şi tocmai de aceea el pro1 Unul este gândit prin reducerea totului, sau mai precis „reducându-ne" pe noi înșine (¢naluÒmenoi), adică reducând sau simplificând gândirea însăși care cuprinde totul. observăm din nou insistenţa lui damascius asupra subiectivităţii acestei gândiri a principiilor, asupra prezenţei gândirii noastre plurale, care introduce o dualitate inadecvată principiului și care trebuie ea însăși simplificată. Termenul care desemnează reducerea sau simplificarea pe care trebuie să o operăm este ¢nalÚw. 2 „coronament" (qrigkÒj) este un termen din arhitectură ce desemnează partea superioară a unei clădiri, ultimul element care se adaugă unei structuri arhitecturale. Rolul coronamentului este dublu: acesta încheie construcţia, însă, în același timp, el este cel care susţine întreaga structură, dându-i stabilitate. Astfel, deși este ultimul element adăugat, coronamentul poate fi privit în același timp ca primul element în ordinea importanţei. folosind acest termen ca metaforă pentru unu, damascius vrea să pună în evidenţă tocmai această ambivalenţă a principiului: el este în același timp primul în sine, dar și ultimul în sine, sursa tuturor, dar și scopul ultim al tuturor. ca termen filozofic, coronament își are originea în Republica 534 e 2, unde Platon spune că dialectica este coronamentul știinţelor, fiind cea care conduce spre principiul non-ipotetic. damascius, în schimb, aplică termenul de coronament unului însuși. Așa cum dialectica este coronamentul tuturor știinţelor, tot așa unul (obiect al dialecticii la Platon) este coronament al tuturor lucrurilor. Totuși, damascius va Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 319 duce totul. el este punctul prim al totului (pornind de la care totul se desfăşoară), dar şi punctul ultim al totului (în care totul este resorbit în unitate); el închide astfel cercul întregii realităţi, unind începutul cu sfârşitul: „iar cel care este cauza propriu-zisă şi primă, acela este şi scopul în sine şi ultimul în sine"1 (De principiis, R.i, 4.23–24). Unul poate fi astfel gândit pornind de la funcţia pe care o are el faţă de totul. În acest sens, putem să îi aplicăm toate predicatele de mai sus (precum „principiu, cauză, primul sau cel mai simplu"), cu condiţia de a înţelege că, în unu, toate acestea sunt prezente într-o manieră unitară2, iar nu în maniera în care le afirmă gândirea noastră. Unul este astfel un fel de chintesenţă a observa că acest coronament rămâne încă într-o legătură foarte strânsă cu realitatea pe care o produce, o guvernează și o încununează, și, de aceea, el va face trecerea spre un principiu anterior unului. 1 damascius preia aici teza neoplatonică fundamentală a identităţii dintre principiul prim și scopul ultim al realităţii; toate lucrurile provin de la un principiu unic și toate au în același timp tendinţa de a se întoarce spre acest principiu, dorindu-l ca pe binele suprem. În felul acesta, pentru neoplatonici, unul (din prima ipoteză a dialogului Parmenide) se identifică cu binele (din Republica, 509 b). ca unu, principiul este sursa primă a totului, iar ca bine, el este cel pe care toate lucrurile îl caută; el este dorit de totul, ca scop ultim al tuturor. Astfel, cel de la care începe procesiunea este și cel spre care se îndreaptă conversiunea tuturor lucrurilor, așadar scopul ultim, în care ele își găsesc desăvârșirea, binele absolut spre care toate tind. Unul este astfel și vârful prim, de la care totul se desfășoară, dar și cel care cuprinde totul, care reintegrează totul. Momentul prim este identic cu cel ultim. Această idee este întâlnită și la Plotin (Enneade, iii, 8, 7.17), care arată că principiul este în același timp început și sfârșit, așadar și principiu și scop ultim. identitatea dintre punctul prim și cel ultim face ca în neoplatonism întreaga realitate să aibă o structură circulară, în care procesiunea de la principiu și conversiunea spre principiu se suprapun. Proclus (Elemente de teologie, § 31) arată că orice lucru care procede de la un principiu se întoarce spre același principiu, unind astfel sfârșitul său cu începutul. ideea coincidenţei principiului (începutului) cu scopul final apare și la Platon, în Legile, iV, 715 e 8–716 a 1, unde se vorbește despre zeu, care este începutul, mijlocul și sfârșitul tuturor fiinţelor. Sursa acestui fragment platonic este orfică (cf. Fragmentele orfice, fr. 21 și 158). 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 4.18: „toate acestea sunt în unu conform unului" (kat¦ tÕ ›n). PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil320 totului, care cuprinde totul în manieră unitară. el corespunde astfel punctului celui mai înalt până la care gândirea noastră poate înainta, reducând ceea ce în ea este plural și divizat; el corespunde ultimei noastre supoziţii. În schimb, principiul necoordonat trebuie să fie dincolo de ultima noastră supoziţie (cea a unului). damascius ajunge aici pe punctul de a face pasul cel mai anti-tradiţional cu putinţă, anume acela de a trece dincolo de interdicţia ultimă impusă de Plotin, apoi reluată, respectată și întărită de Porfir și de Proclus. damascius va trece „dincolo de unu", dincolo de cel faţă de care tradiţia subliniase în repetate rânduri că nu se poate trece. el anunţă această trecerea treptat, mai întâi în manieră interogativă. „dar, dacă unul este cauza totului și cuprinde totul, atunci ce în seamnă această ascensiune a noastră dincolo de unu?" (De principiis, R.i, 5.2–3) Într-adevăr, privind din perspectiva tradiţiei, această trecere este de neimaginat. Plotin însuși este primul care impune această limită, spunând că orice cercetare merge doar până la unul absolut, iar acolo se oprește1. după iamblichos, care pare să admită un principiu anterior unului absolut, Proclus revine la perspectiva plotiniană, spunând că dincolo de unu nu mai poate fi gândit nimic altceva2. C. Trecerea înspre nimic 1. Principiul necoordonat este nimic; cele două sensuri ale nimicului damascius își dă seama de pasul pe care urmează să îl facă și de consecinţele lui, de aceea formulează această trecere cu prudenţă, parcă temându-se că trecerea nu va duce spre nimic: Poate că înaintăm în gol, fiind atrași înspre nimicul însuși, căci ceea ce nu este nici măcar unu, acela nu este cu adevărat nimic. 1 Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 7, 22.19–20; Vi, 8, 11.1–5. 2 Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, 292, 7; Elemente de teologie, propoziţiile 12, 13, 20, 113; Comentariul la Parmenide, 1097.17. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 321 (De principiis, R.i, 5.4–5: m»pote g¦r kenembatoàmen e„j aÙtÕ tÕ oÙdn ¢nateinÒmenoi: Ð g¦r mhd ›n TMsti, toàto oÙdšn TMsti kat¦ tÕ dikaiÒtaton.) În primă instanţă, damascius reia acest avertisment pe care îl formulase tradiţia anterioară, anume că dincolo de unu nu mai este nimic. Într-adevăr, pentru neoplatonici, ceea ce face ca un lucru să fie este tocmai unitatea lui, fără de care lucrul s-ar dispersa într-o pluralitate imposibil de cuprins cu mintea. În consecinţă, orice lucru este și unu, iar ceea ce nu este unu nu poate fi nimic. este ceea ce argumentează Proclus1, făcând apel și la etimologia cuvântului „nimic" (oÙdšn), care este construit ca o negaţie a cuvântului „unu" (›n). cel care nu este nici măcar unu (oÙd ›n), acela nu este nimic (oÙdšn). Tot ceea ce este este unu. la limită, chiar și nefiinţa este unu, căci fără unu ea nu ar putea fi gândită. chiar dacă nu deţine fiinţă, nefiinţa deţine totuși unitate. damascius însuși arătase acest lucru, spunând că unul este „circumferinţa ultimă, atât a celor ce sunt, cât și a celor ce nu sunt"2. În schimb, dincolo de unu nu mai putem întâlni nimic. Totuși, aici intervine un element de originalitate al lui damascius, o schimbare neașteptată de perspectivă. dacă pentru Plotin și Proclus dincolo de unu nu mai este nimic, damascius, în schimb, va încerca să facă tocmai acest salt înspre nimic. În același timp, el va da acestui „nimic" de dincolo de unu un sens pozitiv, răsturnând interdicţia tradiţională într-o manieră nouă de înaintare spre principiului absolut. Mai precis, el va considera că „dincolo de unu" este chiar nimicul, însă nu un nimic în sens inferior, ca simplu neant, ci un nimic în sens superior, ca depășire a ultimelor noastre concepte și supoziţii, precum aceea care se aplică unului. observăm în primul rând maniera destul de stranie în care se exprimă damascius - cel puţin pentru logica 1 Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 1, 14.14; 2, 22.2 și Comentariul la Republica, i, 265.7–9. 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 4.13–14. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil322 limbii noastre. Astfel, fraza citată mai sus are în grecește un sens afirmativ. el nu spune că „cel care nu este nici măcar unu, acela nu este nimic", ci spune că „cel care nu este nici măcar unu, acela este nimic". Altfel spus, damascius înţelege acest „nimic" nu ca pe o pură absurditate, ci, așa cum vom vedea, el va da acestui nimic sensul superiorităţii absolute, faţă de fiinţă și faţă de orice altceva. el trece de la „nici măcar unu" (oÙd ›n), la „nimicul" (oÙdšn) în sens superior, întorcând avertismentul plotinian (că dincolo de unu nu mai este nimic), într-o afirmaţie: dincolo de unu este nimicul, acest nimic înspre care suntem atrași acum. În plus, nimicul devine „nimicul însuși" (aÙtÕ tÕ oÙdšn), fiind astfel conceptualizat și marcându-i-se importanţa. dar ce înseamnă acest nimic? În contextul amintit mai sus1, Proclus distingea fiinţa de două tipuri de nefiinţă: cea inferioară, adică nefiinţa prin lipsă (tÕ mhdamîj Ôn), numită și nimic, respectiv cea superioară, care este unul de dincolo de fiinţă. nimicul avea așadar doar un sens negativ, identic cu nefiinţa inferioară fiinţei. În schimb, damascius face foarte clar diferenţa dintre simpla nefiinţă (tÕ m3⁄4 Ôn) și nimicul (tÕ oÙdšn). nefiinţa este o negare sau o depășire a fiinţei în ambele sensuri: atât în sens superior, înspre unul de dincolo de fiinţă, cât și în sensul inferior, înspre materie, care nu deţine formă și fiinţă, dar participă întrun fel la unu. În schimb, nimicul se situează dincolo chiar și de aceste limite ale nefiinţei, căci el este o negare și o suprimare a unului însuși, respectiv a ultimului lucru care mai participă la unu. Astfel, nimicul este și el dublu: atât în sens superior, ca negare a unului absolut, trecând înspre principiul necoordonat, cât și în sens inferior, spre nimicul care nu mai este nici măcar materie și nu mai are caracterul unului, ci este pur neant de inferioritate. Astfel, dacă unul absolut este înţeles ca un fel de nefiinţă, deoarece este dincolo de fiinţă, nimicul despre care vorbește acum damascius este dincolo atât faţă de fiinţă, cât și faţă de nefiinţă, adică faţă de nefiinţa superioară a unului absolut. 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Republica, 264.21 –266.1. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 323 Putem să ne imaginăm realitatea pe care o descrie damascius sub forma a trei niveluri concentrice: în mijloc, vom avea fiinţa, cu sensurile ei: superior (al fiinţei inteligibile), respectiv inferior (al lucrurilor care participă la fiinţă). dincolo de acest prim nucleu, avem nefiinţa, care depășește și pare să cuprindă fiinţa pe dinafară, în ambele sensuri: atât superior (ca unul de dincolo de fiinţă), cât și inferior (ca pură negaţie a fiinţei, dar care participă totuși la unu). deasupra acestui al doilea nivel, damascius mai adaugă încă unul, anume acela al nimicului: atât în sens superior (ca principiul care este dincolo de unu), cât și în sens inferior (ca neant care nu este nici măcar unu). nimic superior = inefabilul nefiinţa de dincolo de fiinţă = unul fiinţa inteligibilă fiinţările (cele ce sunt) nefiinţa inferioară fiinţei nimic inferior fiinţei = ceea ce nu este în nici un fel și sub nici un raport dar de ce trece damascius înspre acest nimic care până acum era „interzis"? Tocmai pentru că el a observat că, de fapt, gândirea noastră este atrasă înspre acest „dincolo de unu". Altfel spus, deși se poate argumenta că dincolo de unu nu mai este nimic, așa cum făceau filozofii anteriori, totuși, prin recurenţa aporiilor - pe care damascius a pus-o în evidenţă până acum - se poate observa că gândirea noastră tinde „dincolo de totul", chiar dacă în primă instanţă „dincolo de totul" ne apare ca „nimic". Suntem „atrași înspre nimicul însuși" (e„j aÙtÕ tÕ oÙdn ¢nateinÒmenoi), avem această tendinţă în sus, înspre principiu, dincolo chiar și faţă de unu. 2. Înaintarea în vid înspre principiul necoordonat dar oare această atracţie spre nimic nu este ea o înaintare în vid? damascius remarcă aparentul pericol în faţa căruia se află PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil324 gândirea noastră acum, anume acela de a intra pe un teren gol, fără nici un corespondent concret pentru ceea ce spune, căci „nimicul" nu mai poate fi „ceva anume". Gândirea și discursul riscă să „meargă în gol (kenembate‹n)". dar damascius arată că tocmai aceasta va fi maniera adecvată în care se poate trece înspre principiul prim, necoordonat. faptul că damascius descrie trecerea înspre principiul necoordonat ca o „înaintare în vid" amintește de o problemă pe care deja Proclus o pusese, dar căreia Proclus îi dăduse o interpretare complet diferită. Vom vedea și de această dată cum damascius reia teme deja „rezolvate", deja clasice ale tradiţiei, și le întoarce în direcţia depășirii tradiţiei înseși. Astfel, în Comentariul la Republica, 274.3-9, Proclus se referă la momentul în care Socrate anunţă „binele de dincolo de fiinţă" și la maniera în care reacţionează personajul Glaucon, acest personaj care - în înţelegerea lui Proclus - nu poate să distingă nefiinţa superioară fiinţei de cea inferioară fiinţei, ci crede că singura nefiinţă posibilă este cea inferioară: de aceea, în continuare, după ce a spus că binele este dincolo de fiinţă, iar Glaucon zice că aceasta este o transcendenţă minunată, el l-a dojenit, spunându-i că e ridicol cum vorbește. Apoi, în timp ce Glaucon pare că merge în vid în privinţa a ceea ce este dincolo de totul, el spune încă o dată că va lăsa de-o parte părerile sale în acest sens, pentru a expune doar analogia cu soarele. Pentru Proclus, „mersul în vid" are o conotaţie negativă1. Glaucon nu este în stare să își dea seama de natura cu totul 1 Aceeași conotaţie o dă și Plotin. la el, cuvântul kenembate‹n nu apare decât o singură dată, într-un context care însă ne poate interesa în acest moment al analizei noastre. Referinţa se găsește în Enneade, iii 9, 3.11, unde Plotin vorbește despre sufletul individual, care poate avansa fie în sus, spre ceea ce îi este anterior și care îl poate ilumina, fie spre ceea ce vine după el, adică spre corp. În acest caz, sufletul înaintează de fapt spre o non-existenţă, deoarece după suflet nu mai există decât o imagine vidă, pe care sufletul însuși o creează despre sine însuși. Așadar sufletul înaintează spre o imagine, și tocmai de aceea el pare să meargă în vid (oOEon kenembatoàsa). Astfel, Plotin dă termenului kenembate‹n un sens negativ: acela de a înainta spre nefiinţa inferioară a corpului. Vom vedea însă că damascius dă cuvântului un sens pozitiv. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 325 specială a acestui „dincolo de fiinţă" pe care Socrate i-l pune în faţă. Pentru el, tot ce se poate cunoaște este fiinţa, iar ceea ce nu este fiinţă este neant inferior fiinţei. Tocmai de aceea el este surprins să audă vorbindu-se de ceva de dincolo de fiinţă. confundând nefiinţa de dincolo de fiinţă cu nefiinţa inferioară fiinţei, Glaucon înaintează în vid. de fapt, în vid nu se mai poate înainta propriu-zis; tocmai de aceea Proclus - ca și Plotin, de altfel, în contextul amintit mai sus - folosește verbul „a înainta în gol" însoţit de expresia „ca și cum" (aej kenembatoàntoj): Glaucon pare să înainteze în gol, rămânând însă incapabil să surprindă binele de dincolo de fiinţă. damascius reia tocmai acest context problematic, deoarece pasul filozofic pe care urmează să îl facă acum poate părea, în primă instanţă, o simplă înaintare în neant, așadar în sensul negativ pe care îl indicase Proclus. Într-adevăr - conform avertismentelor lui Plotin și Proclus -, s-ar părea că dincolo de unu nu mai avem a face cu nimic, și că, deci, dacă mergem mai departe, ne-am afla tocmai în situaţia de a înainta în vid, de data aceasta nu din neștiinţă, precum Glaucon, ci prin însăși natura lucrurilor, prin însuși faptul că dincolo de unu nu mai este nimic. Totuși, pariul pe care pare să îl facă damascius este tocmai acela de a merge în acest vid, de a înainta dincolo de unu. el va arăta că înaintarea spre principiu nu poate fi decât o înaintare în vid, însă de data aceasta într-un sens privilegiat: înaintarea noastră nu ne mai duce spre neantul inferior fiinţei, ci spre nimicul superior atât fiinţei cât și unului. Înaintarea în vid este necesară tocmai pentru că este o trecere dincolo de unu, așadar înspre ceea ce nu este nici măcar unu, (oÙd ›n), ci este nimic (oÙdšn). Astfel, damascius arată că, așa cum nimicul are două sensuri (anume „dincolo de unu și respectiv dincoace de unu", adică sub ultimul lucru care participă la unu), la fel și înaintarea în vid este de două feluri: una se îndreaptă spre neantul pur, în sens inferior, cel care „nu este în nici un fel și sub nici un raport", iar alta se îndreaptă spre principiul absolut, de dincolo de unu. Ambele PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil326 sunt indicibile, dar, din nou, una în sens superior, iar cealaltă în sens inferior. iar acest caracter indicibil este cel care determină înaintarea noastră în vid. În cazul nimicului inferior, înaintarea în vid este cea pe care o identifica Platon însuși1, atunci când spunea că cel care încearcă să vorbească despre ceea ce nu este (într-un sens absolut al nefiinţei), de fapt, nu spune nimic, și acela nici măcar nu vorbește, deși i se pare că spune ceva. În schimb, în sens superior, înaintarea în vid constă în aceea că respingem de la principiul necoordonat orice manieră a gândirii și ne dăm seama că orice am spune despre el - la limită, chiar și aceste suprimări - îi sunt inadecvate. Problema lui kenembate‹n ne aduce în faţă două maniere diferite de a asigura transcendenţa și non-accesul spre principiu. Proclus observă o primă nuanţă a problemei, și anume faptul că, despre ceea ce depășește nivelul fiinţei nu trebuie să vorbim ca despre o fiinţă, și nici ca despre o simplă nefiinţă - riscând astfel să înaintăm în vid, precum făcea Glaucon. În schimb, pentru damascius, problema se pune într-o manieră și mai radicala. el observă că simplul fapt de a considera principiul dincolo de fiinţă - ca o nefiinţă superioară fiinţei - nu este de ajuns pentru a garanta transcendenţa acestuia, deoarece gândirea ajunge să reintegreze acest principiu în totul a ceea ce ea gândește. Transcendenţa principiului trebuie impusă prin însăși imposibilitatea și aporeticul înaintării noastre spre el. Tocmai de aceea, damascius va propune înaintarea în vid ca pe un fel de metodă, pentru ca transcendenţa principiului să se impună în marginea sau pe fundalul înaintării noastre inevitabil vide. Pentru damascius, problema este dublă: pe de o parte, trebuie înaintat spre principiul de dincolo de unu, iar, pe de altă parte, această înaintare este inevitabil înaintare în vid. Trebuie înaintat dincolo de unu pentru că altfel rămânem în aporia principiului, dar înaintarea este 1 Platon, Sofistul, 237 e 1–7. damascius însuși trimite indirect la acest pasaj platonic, amintind că pentru Platon ceea ce nu este în mod absolut este indicibil (De principiis, R. i, 6.25–26). Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 327 înaintare în vid, pentru că nu înaintăm ca spre un alt principiu, anterior și diferit de cele dinainte, ci înaintăm în ceea ce este cu adevărat indicibil și care abia așa, în această înaintare, se arată cu adevărat a fi indicibil și se impune ca atare. dar atunci, devine și mai evident că înaintarea în vid pe care o propune damascius este cu totul deosebită de cea a lui Glaucon, criticată de Proclus: în primul rând, nimicul de dincolo de unu este foarte clar distins de nimicul inferior fiinţei (pe când Glaucon confunda unul cu nefiinţa inferioară fiinţei); în al doilea rând, așa cum vom vedea, înaintarea lui damascius nu se face în maniera obișnuită a discursului - așa cum făcea Glaucon, afirmând lucruri inadecvate despre principiul de dincolo de toate - ci se va face în maniera aporetică, a suprimării oricărui discurs. de fapt, damascius își dă seama că, în această înaintare a noastră spre principiul necoordonat, orice am afirma sau nega despre acest principiu nu se mai aplică propriu-zis principiului însuși. Înaintarea în vid constă tocmai în a ne da seama că gândirea noastră nu mai numește nimic anume și nu mai poate numi pe cel înspre care ea este acum atrasă. opinia noastră despre principiul necoordonat „înaintează în vid în noi înșine"1, deoarece, chiar dacă avem impresia că numim principiul, știm în același timp că acesta nu poate fi numit. Astfel, dacă Gaucon părea că înaintează în vid deoarece nu-și dădea seama că unul de dincolo de fiinţă este superior fiinţei și discursului, în schimb, acum, înaintăm în vid tocmai pentru că ne dăm seama că principiul este cu totul dincolo de orice discurs și că, deci, nimic din ce am spune despre el nu se mai aplică principiului, ci rămâne doar o vidă opinie a noastră, care nu mai vorbește despre ceva anume, care nu mai are un referent corespunzător. dar, în acest caz, întrebarea foarte îndreptăţită ce se ridică este de ce să mai continuăm această înaintare care nu spune nimic, care nu vorbește despre nimic și care știe că nici nu poate vorbi despre acel nimic absolut? 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 12.23 (TMn 1m‹n kenembatoàn). PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil328 D. Travaliile gândirii înspre principiul necoordonat 1. Conştiinţa principiului necoordonat de fapt, chiar dacă, în primă instanţă, această manieră de înaintare înspre principiu pare să nu aducă nici un progres cognitiv - tocmai pentru că principiul este în afara posibilităţii cunoașterii - totuși, nu înseamnă că înaintarea este lipsită de miză. Trecerea dincolo de ultima noastră supoziţie nu este, întradevăr, o trecere propriu-zisă, spre ceva anume; din contră, ea are sensul de a trezi în noi conștiinţa prezenţei unui principiu care nu mai este ceva anume, a principiului la care cunoașterea propriu-zisă nu mai poate accede: nu avem nici o noţiune și nici o supoziţie mai simplă decât unul, așadar cum am putea presupune ceva dincolo de ultima supoziţie și noţiune? dacă ar spune cineva acestea, vom cădea de acord cu el în privinţa aporiei (căci, într-adevăr, o asemenea manieră de reflecţie pare impracticabilă și fără ieșire); cu toate acestea, pornind de la cele ce ne sunt mai cunoscute, va trebui să stimulăm travaliile indicibile din noi, înspre conștiinţa indicibilă (căci nu știu cum să o numesc) a acestui adevăr sublim. (De principiis, R.i, 5.15–20) damascius invită astfel spre un alt tip de conștiinţă, sau de conștientizare a ceea ce depășește cunoașterea obișnuită, dar spre care cunoașterea obișnuită tinde și trimite neîncetat. Această conștiinţă (suna...sqhsij) nu este o cunoaștere propriu-zisă a principiului, care fixează principiul, ci este mai degrabă una care ne face conștienţi de existenţa principiului, care ne aduce în preajma lui și angajează mintea în direcţia principiului. expresia însăși „conștiinţă indicibilă" pare în primă instanţă paradoxală: este o conștiinţă, însă nu o conștiinţă a ceva anume, este o conștiinţă parcă oprită în actul de a conștientiza, care nu ajunge niciodată la un obiect al conștiinţei. iar acest tip de conștientizare - care nu se mai termină cu un conţinut determinat, care nu se mai concretizează în „ceva anume" - damascius îl numește Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 329 „travaliu al gândirii", reluând o expresie platonică foarte cunoscută - prezentă și la neoplatonicii anteriori - dar căreia el îi va oferi un sens și mai precis. Travaliul (çd...j) este de fapt acea tensiune și încordare care precede nașterea, așadar „durerile facerii". Termenul este prezent deja la Platon cu un sens filozofic: el desemnează apropierea de adevăr, uneori destul de dureroasă pentru suflet, și care devine obiectulul de interes al maieuticii socratice1. Travaliul este momentul de fecunditate al sufletului, care încearcă să surprindă și să exprime adevărul, dar care încă nu a ajuns la adevăr, ci doar îi presimte prezenţa. la Platon, metoda căutării adevărului este cea dialectică, în care, prin întrebări și răspunsuri, sufletul este eliberat de durerile sale și îndreptat spre opinia corectă. Preluând această idee, Plotin leagă travaliul de dificultatea (aporia) în care se află sufletul atunci când încearcă să vorbească despre principiul prim (unul absolut) și nu știe ce nume să îi acorde, deoarece el este inexprimabil2. Sufletul este plin de gânduri și simte durerile facerii, atunci când încearcă să vorbească despre unu; singura manieră de a calma aceste dureri este aceea de a fermeca sufletul, prin repetarea discursurilor despre unu3, deși, atunci când fixăm în mod raţional ceea ce este unu, de fapt, ne îndepărtăm de el. la rândul lui, Proclus pune travaliul alături de dorinţa care face 1 Vezi Platon, Banchetul 206 d, Phaidros 251 e, Republica, 490 b, 403 b, Theaitetos 151 a, Scrisoarea a II-a, 313 a. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 5, 6.23–25: „în travaliul nostru, suntem în aporie despre ce anume trebuie să spunem". 3 Vezi Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 17.15–18: „trebuie să descântăm sufletul, pentru a-i ușura durerile facerii". Vezi de asemenea Platon, Charmides, 157 a: descântecele sunt identice cu discursurile frumoase. Metafora corespunde, de asemenea, celei platonice a descântecului aplicat de moașă pentru a liniști durerile nașterii, care corespunde la rândul ei manierei prin întrebări și răspunsuri în care maieutica socratică ajută sufletul să „nască" adevărul (vezi, de pildă, Theaitetos, 149 c 9–d 3). Vezi și W. Beierwaltes, Selbsterkenntnis und Erfahrung der Einheit. Plotins Enneade V 3, Text, Übersetzung, Erläuterungen, Vittorio Klostermann, frankfurt am Main, 1991, pp. 247–248, unde autorul analizează fundalul platonic al celor două metafore și felul în care sunt ele preluate de Plotin. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil330 ca întreaga fiinţă să se îndrepte spre unu1; astfel, dorinţa de a ajunge la unu și de a-l cuprinde este însoţită de „durerile facerii", pentru că fiinţa nu poate, în cele din urmă, să cuprindă unul, deși tinde spre aceasta. Totuși, tocmai această dorinţă și travaliul ce o însoţește este cea care ne face să vorbim despre unu, chiar dacă știm că nu putem să îl exprimăm în mod adecvat2, iar faptul că numim principiul „unu" sau „bine" ţine tot de acest travaliu al gândirii noastre, de dorinţa ei puternică de a cuprinde și de a exprima într-un fel principiul, deși „unul" și „binele" sunt doar niște cuvinte, care nu pot surprinde cu adevărat transcendenţa principiului3. la damascius, termenul capătă o nuanţă suplimentară, deoarece travaliul devine singurul efort adecvat pe care îl putem face în direcţia principiului - anume acela de a rafina constant concepţiile noastre despre principiu, pentru a nu-l fixa în nici o expresie inadecvată. În plus, doar prin această constantă depășire și rafinare putem produce - ca în oglindă - efectul dorit, anume acela de a conștientiza caracterul inefabil și de necuprins al principiului. Spun „ca în oglindă" tocmai pentru că nu este vorba de un efect direct, de a gândi în mod efectiv inefabilul, ci este un efect indirect: conștiinţa inefabilului se naște pe fundalul acestui travaliu neîncetat, care nu mai ajunge la o „naștere" propriu-zisă. Travaliile gândirii nu mai pot avea o finalizare, nu se 1 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1115.32. Vezi, de asemenea Teologia platonică, i 102.18, pentru această relaţie între durerile nașterii și divinaţia principiului. 2 Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, 1191.9. 3 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 9, 58.24–59.4. Proclus consideră că maniera cea mai înaltă a travaliului este cea din expresia ultimă a primei aporii din Parmenide: după ce Platon a desfășurat întregul discurs negativ despre unu, el se întreabă dacă toate cele spuse până atunci sunt cu putinţă. Proclus interpretează această ultimă mirare ca datorându-se travaliului mental care se îndreaptă spre unu. În acest travaliu, nici o expresie a unului nu poate fi păstrată ca definitivă, ci suntem mereu obligaţi să căutăm mai departe, îndoindu-ne de ceea ce am admis deja. Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, Vii, 42.26, ed. Klibansky-labowsky, precum și nota editorilor de la pp. 87–88. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 331 mai pot îndrepta spre un rezultat concret, spre un discurs adevărat, așa cum se întâmpla, totuși, la Platon1. Pentru damascius, efortul travaliului intelectiv este unul care nu se încheie, pentru că el este suscitat de ceva ce nu poate fi atins niciodată în mod discursiv: anume de principiul prim, indicibil. Travaliul este tocmai această neputinţă de a exprima principiul, acest efort nesfârșit îndreptat spre principiu, dar care nu își atinge niciodată scopul, deoarece atingerea acestui scop ar însemna exprimarea celui inexprimabil. „nașterea" propriu-zisă este amânată indefinit. Totuși, travaliul continuu este singurul mod în care ne putem situa faţă de principiu, căutându-l mereu, chiar dacă nu putem să îl cuprindem într-o formulare oarecare. Sensul travaliului este acela de a purifica gândirea noastră înspre principiul absolut, suprimând orice manieră concretă de a gândi principiul și scotând principiul din orice formă de coordonare cu totul. dar ultimul punct la care mai avem un minim acces - și care rămâne astfel într-o oarecare relaţie și coordonare cu totul - este acela pe care îl numim principiul unu. de aceea, travaliul pe care îl va întreprinde damascius va consta într-o „critică" a unului, pentru a trece astfel „dincolo de unu", înspre ceea ce el va numi „inefabil". 2. Travaliul şi „critica" unului instituirea inefabilului ca principiu absolut, dincolo de unu, se conturează tocmai în urma unei critici - pe mai multe paliere - la adresa unului absolut al tradiţiei, ca ultimă treaptă până la care gândirea poate, într-un fel, să ajungă. desigur, prin „critică" nu înţelegem altceva decât faptul de a pune în vedere limitele până la care unul poate sluji drept principiu și dificultăţile în faţa cărora gândirea unului se oprește și este nevoită să caute un 1 Vezi, de pildă, Republica, 490 b 7, unde se arată că eliberarea de durerile facerii urmează abia după ce sufletul a atins adevărul și fiinţa veritabilă. Vezi de asemenea Banchetul, 209 a, unde discursurile sunt numite copii, precum și Phaidros 261 a. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil332 alt principiu. damascius va arăta pe mai multe niveluri de sens că, în timp ce unul mai rămâne încă într-o anumită relaţie cu totul și este gândit într-un fel sau altul, inefabilul iese din orice posibilă relaţie. damascius aduce trei argumente în acest sens: privind relaţia unului cu cele de după el, privind faptul că unul este totul și privind faptul că, într-un fel, unul este încă gândit. Primul argument constă în aceea că: prin natura lui, unul este situat înaintea pluralelor, cel <ce este> mai simplu <este> înaintea celor ce sunt într-un fel compuse, iar cel mai cuprinzător <este înaintea> celor cuprinse în el; dar cel ce este dincolo - dacă ar fi să-i spunem așa - este dincolo de orice asemenea antiteză: nu doar cea dintre termeni de același rang, ci și cea dintre un termen prim și un termen secund (De principiis, R.i, 6.3–7) Acestea sunt caracteristicile „tradiţionale" ale unului: el este opus pluralităţii1 și este anterior pluralităţii, păstrând astfel o relaţie opozitivă cu aceasta; de asemenea, el este înţeles drept cel mai simplu, iar simplitatea precede și se opune compunerii; în plus, unul nu trebuie înţeles ca minim2, ci ca fiind cel mai cuprinzător, ajungând astfel într-o relaţie - chiar dacă nu opozitivă - cu cele cuprinse. În schimb, principiul absolut trebuie să nu mai intre în nici o astfel de opoziţie și în nici o relaţie. ceea ce observă damascius este faptul că - chiar dacă este înţeles ca anterior faţă de orice altceva -, unul are o anterioritate raportată la cele pe care le transcende. desigur, întreaga tradiţie - exceptându-l poate pe iamblichos - s-a străduit să conceapă o manieră de anterioritate absolută a unului faţă de orice altceva. Totuși, damascius observă aici că orice astfel de anterioritate este gândită pornind tot de la cele „ulterioare", sau, în orice caz, mai poate fi gândită în raport cu 1 Încă de la începutul primei ipoteze din Parmenide, 137 c 4–5, unul este definit ca non-plural. la Plotin, de asemenea (Enneade, V, 5, 6.26), numele unului apare ca o negaţie a pluralităţii. 2 Vezi damascius, De principiis, R. i, 3.1. Capitolul 2: Principiul necoordonat 333 acestea. În schimb, el însuși va încerca să impună prin inefabil o anterioritate și o transcendenţă fără termen de reper, sau care nu mai este gândită pornind de la cele inferioare. Al doilea argument și critică implicită a unului privește faptul că el este totul. este, în linii mari, același argument pe care l-am discutat și în cadrul aporiilor iniţiale ale tratatului: unul este totul în manieră simplificată, unitară; însă totul - indiferent în ce sens îl luăm - nu poate fi principiu1. Al treilea argument privește faptul că unul este încă gândit, într-o anumită măsură: Pe lângă acestea, noi concepem unul printr-o purificare deplină a gândirii înspre cel mai simplu și cel mai cuprinzător, pe când cel mai prestigios trebuie să fie inaccesibil oricărei înţelegeri și supoziţii (De principiis, R.i, 6.18–21) de fapt, problema gândirii unului - așa cum o înţelege damascius - este dublă: pe de o parte, gândim unul într-un fel, drept acel punct virtual de coincidenţă a tuturor lucrurilor și a tuturor gândurilor noastre - după analogia centrului unui cerc. Pe de altă parte, noi nu putem gândi cu adevărat unul simplu, deoarece gândirea noastră este duală și ea aproximează unul suprapunând, de fapt, două imagini: cea a simplităţii și cea a totalităţii2. Totuși, acest statul echivoc al unului - care într-un fel este gândit, dar într-un fel nu este gândit - îl împinge pe damascius să facă pasul spre un principiu care să nu mai aibă acest echivoc, ci să fie cu totul inexprimabil3. 1 Vezi damascius, De principiis, R. i, 6.8–17. 2 Gândirea noastră introduce dualitatea în unu. Vezi De principiis, R.i, 3.15–4.6. 3 Așa cum vom vedea în continuare, inefabilul nu va mai fi cognoscibil în nici un fel, iar singura manieră în care vom mai putea deduce prezenţa lui va fi tocmai prin a observa neputinţa de a-l mai gândi. În plus - și aici va fi iarăși un punct de originalitate a lui damascius - toate nivelurile principiale ulterioare, care sunt într-un fel cognoscibile și într-un fel incognoscibile, vor fi niște aproximări ale principiului absolut inefabil. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil334 Toate aceste fenomene la limita gândirii - pe care le-am analizat în acest capitol - au o strânsă legătură între ele. Astfel, aporia iniţială este cea care - fără să ne lase în concepţiile noastre despre principiul prim - ne trezește divinaţia unui principiu necoordonat. la rândul ei, divinaţia unui principiu necoordonat impune suprimarea oricărui discurs despre acest principiu, suprimarea oricărei coordonări. ea ne conduce astfel înspre principiul care nu este nimic, sau care, într-un fel, este nimicul absolut. Astfel, gândirea noastră înaintează în vid. dar înaintarea în vid nu este o înaintare propriu zisă, spre ceva anume; din contră, ea constă într-un travaliu neîncetat al gândirii, care „critică" și suprimă orice determinaţie, orice supoziţie, ultima supoziţie fiind cea a „unului". Mai mult decât atât, fenomenele analizate constituie deja maniera adecvată în care putem păși „dincolo de unu". este, desigur, o manieră cu totul aparte de gândire, care nu își fixează niciodată „obiectul" său, ci doar îi presimte prezenţa și necesitatea. În loc să descrie principiul, această gândire înaintează în vid, suprimând în mod sistematic ultimele supoziţii de care ea dispune. În locul unei gândiri propriu-zise, avem a face cu un travaliu intelectiv, care conștientizează prezenţa principiului, știind însă că nu va ajunge niciodată la o cunoaștere propriu-zisă, ci că cel spre care merge va rămâne tot timpul „în faţă", într-un orizont de neatins. În umbra tuturor acestor fenomene se conturează principiul absolut: el trebuie să „fie" absolut necoordonat cu altceva, un vid sau un neant pur, care nu este în nici un fel și sub nici un raport. el se arată ca un „nimic" care depășește simplitatea și cuprinderea unului. iar toate aceste suprimări succesive, aceste semne ale transcendenţei principiului absolut, se vor concentra înspre o ultimă expresie, cu totul paradoxală, a acestui principiu: anume aceea de inefabil. În cele ce urmează, vom discuta despre momentul cel mai înalt al gândirii lui damascius, despre principiul numit inefabil, în care damascius încearcă să cuprindă atât imposibilitatea cunoașterii principiului, cât și necesitatea unei constante raportări la acesta. capitolul 3 PRinciPiUl inefABil Aporia recurentă a principiului prim ne conduce spre un principiu necoordonat, care nu poate fi cuprins în nici una dintre manierele obișnuite ale gândirii. Totuși, nu avem încă nici o „expresie" a acestui principiu, ci toate fenomenele (și experienţele de la limita gândirii) pe care le-am analizat în capitolul anterior nu au făcut decât să „cureţe terenul" gândirii noastre de orice posibilă expresie, punându-ne în gardă în faţa pericolului de a transforma principiul necoordonat într-un „obiect" determinat al gândirii. S-ar părea că până în acest punct damascius nu a făcut decât să suspende atât gândirea tradiţiei - cu soluţiile ei nu îndeajuns de satisfăcătoare pentru problema principiului - cât și, în genere, orice gândire care ar mai vrea să se exerseze asupra acestei probleme, de acum înainte. Totuși, lucrurile nu se opresc aici. În faţa acestui principiu care pare să „fugă" din faţa oricărei concepţii despre el, damascius va încerca el însuși o ultimă manieră de a-l sugera, sau, mai degrabă, de a sugera sustragerea lui din orice gândire: astfel apare în analiza sa „inefabilul" (tÕ ¢pÒrrhton), „expresia"1 cea mai înaltă prin care damascius se referă la principiul de dincolo de totul şi necoordonat totului. În cele ce urmează, vom scoate la lumină sensul - destul de torsionat - al acestui principiu, prin care damascius face, de fapt, încercarea de a lumina spaţiul cu totul de nestrăbătut al unui dincolo absolut. Pentru aceasta, vom depăna și vom relega firele istorice, filologice și filozofice ale termenului „inefabil". 1 Punem „expresie" între ghilimele tocmai pentru că, după cum vom vedea, această expresie va fi ea însăși suprimată ulterior și depășită. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil336 Întâi de toate, să vedem cum intervine inefabilul în gândirea lui damascius și care este motivul admiterii lui. Termenul apare în tratatul Despre primele principii, după destule tatonări și amânări, prin care damascius pare să pregătească terenul - sau să-l elibereze - în vederea propunerii acestui ultim principiu. este ceea ce am încercat să arătăm în capitolul anterior. Înainte de a enunţa propriu-zis acest termen, damascius argumentează îndelung faptul că gândirea noastră nu poate cuprinde principiul, ci rămâne într-o recurentă aporie faţă de el, dar că, în ciuda acestor aporii, înaintarea către un principiu absolut - a cărui autoritate n-ar mai fi slăbită de alte aporii - trebuie continuată. damascius pune el însuși în mod explicit întrebarea „de ce avem nevoie" de un astfel de principiu, care s-a anunţat deja a fi un fel de nefiinţă absolută, de neant pur. iar răspunsul lui este că avem nevoie stringentă de acesta (1 p£ntwn ¢nagkaiot£th cre...a), deoarece: de la el proced toate, ca dintr-un sanctuar: <totul procede> din inefabil și într-o manieră inefabilă, căci inefabilul nu produce pluralele ca și cum ar fi unul și nici nu produce pe cele distinse ca și cum ar fi unificatul, ci, ca inefabil, produce totul în aceeași manieră inefabilă. (De principiis, R.i, 6.28-7.2) damascius a observat că tradiţia a propus principii care intră în opoziţie și în relaţie cu cele cauzate. de pildă, unul produce pluralele și este opus acestora, ajungând astfel, în cele din urmă, să fie reintrodus în totul și deci să nu mai fie principiu absolut. În schimb, damascius a demonstrat necesitatea unui principiu necoordonat, care produce totul fără să se mai opună totului produs, fără să intre în vreo relaţie cu acest totul, așadar fără să poată fi gândit și reintegrat în totul. Acest principiu va fi inefabilul: el produce totul nu în manieră opozitivă (precum unul sau unificatul), ci într-o manieră inefabilă. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 337 A. Inefabilul înainte de Damascius o primă întrebare care se ridică este de ce alege damascius tocmai termenul de „inefabil" pentru a-i sluji ca „fir roșu" în această căutare radicală a sa. Pentru a răspunde la această întrebare, va trebui să facem o scurtă incursiune de recuperare a sensului, precum și a sugestiilor implicite pe care le purta acest cuvânt la sfârșitul antichităţii. damascius însuși ne pune încă de la început pe pista potrivită, deoarece, așa cum observăm în textul citat mai sus, înainte chiar de a numi principiul inefabil, el îl compară cu un sanctuar (¥duton). Sanctuarul este partea inaccesibilă a templului, cea în care nu se poate pătrunde, care este interzisă. În neoplatonism, principiul prim este asimilat cu zeul suprem, de aceea „locul" lui simbolic este un sanctuar1. dar damascius merge și mai departe: el aduce în prim-planul gândirii sale termenul care desemna misterul însuși ascuns în sanctuar: inefabilul, tÕ ¢pÒrrhton. Principiul prim preia la damascius prerogativele iniţierii mistice, fiind indicat drept misterul inefabil care rămâne ascund în sanctuar, imposibil de dezvăluit. la origine, termenul de inefabil desemnează misteriile, secretul care nu se divulgă niciodată, doctrina esoterică. Adjectival, ¢pÒrrhtoj înseamnă interzis, secret, despre care nu se vorbeşte, fie 1 la Plotin, apropierea sufletului de principiul prim este comparată cu intrarea într-un sanctuar (Enneade, Vi, 9, 11). Sufletul trece de nivelul virtuţilor pregătitoare (comparate cu statuile care străjuiesc intrarea în templu), renunţă să mai contemple orice altceva și ajunge în sanctuar, locul viziunii unului, abandonându-se contactului direct. Proclus preia și el această idee: vezi Teologia platonică, iii, 18, 64.8–12, cu referire la unul-bine care rămâne ascuns în sanctuar. Proclus vorbește despre sanctuar ca loc al principiului absolut. În faţa acestui sanctuar se află vestibulul (prÒquron), care ferește sanctuarul de accesul celor din jur; acesta este locul celor trei monade ce preced principiul prim (vezi Teologia platonică, iii, 64.11 și Comentariul la Republica, i, 295.19–24). Sursa de inspiraţie a „vestibulului" este platonică (Philebos, 64 c 1). În afara acestui vestibul se întinde „locul supracelest", sau „câmpia adevărului" (tÕ ¢lhqe...aj ped...on) despre care vorbea tot Platon (Phaidros, 248 b 6). Vezi și Proclus, Teologia platonică, iV 23, 8. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil338 într-un sens superior, ca mister ascuns, fie chiar în sens opus, ca lucruri ascunse, rușinoase sau abominabile, a căror pomenire ar fi de rău augur. Pare straniu să vedem că, la sfârșitul unei tradiţii care pune în centru principiul prim, imposibil de cuprins în discurs, damascius numește principiul folosind tocmai termenul care exprimă prin excelenţă imposibilitatea - și chiar interdicţia - de a numi ceva. Totuși, așa cum vom încerca să arătăm în continuare, damascius nu face aceasta pentru a „dezvălui" ceea ce este de nedezvăluit și pentru a transgresa astfel limitele - atât cele filozofice, cât și cele ale teologiei implicite - ci, din contră, pentru a potenţa acest nedezvăluit, pentru a-l sustrage accesului indiscret al gândirii, pentru a impune o dată pentru totdeauna o limită gândirii. Pe de altă parte, vom vedea că - introducând acest termen care indică neputinţa ultimă a oricărui discurs - gândirea lui damascius nu sfârșește într-o suspendare de tip sceptic, într-o agnozie care ar însemna sfârșitul oricărei gândiri filozofice. din contră, o dată cu acest principiu extrem, de dincolo chiar și de unu, damascius propune o manieră de gândire radicală, care se raportează constant la principiu, care-l păstrează mereu „în vedere" și care recunoaște prezenţa lui tăcută în fiecare nivel al realităţii. Înainte de a trece la analiza propriu-zisă a manierei în care damascius utilizează conceptul de inefabil, vom face o scurtă punere în revistă a ocurenţelor sale relevante din tradiţia (neo) platonică, pentru a putea pune apoi în lumină schimbarea de perspectivă pe care o aduce damascius faţă de aceasta. la Platon, termenul apare pentru a desemna lucrurile spuse în învăţăturile secrete1 sau, adverbial, cu referire la ceea ce trebuie spus în secret și doar unor oameni iniţiaţi, iar nu mulţimii2. Totuși, vom vedea mai jos că, în interpretarea lui damascius, miza ultimă a gândirii lui Platon este tocmai aceea de a trimite în mod 1 Platon, Phaidon, 62 b 3 și Cratylos, 413 a 3. 2 Platon, Republica, ii, 378 a 4 și Theaitetos, 152 c 10. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 339 tacit (și tăcut)1 înspre inefabil. Pentru Plotin, principiul prim este sustras oricărei cunoașteri și este indicibil (¥rrhton)2. În schimb, termenul însuși de inefabil nu apare decât o singură dată, însă nu cu referire la principiul prim3, ci într-un context neutru: Plotin nu face decât să redea pasajul din Phaidon, 62 b 3: „în mistere (TMn ¢porr»toij) se spune că sufletul este ca într-o închisoare"4. 1. Inefabilul la Iamblichos - indicibil şi inefabil la iamblichos - desigur, în textele care s-au păstrat - termenul inefabil nu pare să aibă un sens filozofic foarte bine determinat. În Protrepticul (8.8; 105.1; 106.7-16; 111.23), referinţele sunt la doctrinele secrete, mai precis cele pitagorice, interzise profanilor. Același sens este prezent în De vita Pythagorica: simboluri inefabile (1.2.5; 23.103.7), mistere inefabile (3.14.9; 6.31.3; 35.258.7). În De mysteriis, termenul de inefabil se referă la: „cauza inefabilă" a riturilor sacre (1.11.4), „simbolurile inefabile" care exprimă secrete inexprimabile (1.21.14, 4.2.31, 6.6.2), invocaţiile inefabile, pe care doar zeul le poate înţelege și care sunt în afinitate cu acesta (3.24.30; 5.23.43), secretul în general, adică 1 Platon trimite spre inefabil în mod tacit, deoarece el nu mai vorbește efectiv despre un asemenea principiu de dincolo de unu; de asemenea, el trimite spre inefabil în mod tăcut, adică tocmai prin păstrarea tăcerii în privinţa lui. 2 Plotin, Enneade, V, 3, 13.1. Tot ceea ce putem spune noi este „ceva anume"; în schimb, cel care nu mai este ceva anume nu poate fi decât indicibil. 3 În articolul său „Scepticism and ineffability in Plotinus" (Phronesis, 45, 3, 2000, pp. 240–251), dominic o'Meara vorbește despre „inefabilitate" la Plotin. Totuși, este vorba de fapt despre caracterul indicibil al unului. Autorul face așadar o extrapolare a termenului de inefabil, folosindu-l însă în strictă sinonimie cu termenul „indicibil". În schimb, Plotin însuși nu folosește termenul de inefabil (¢pÒrrhton), care, ca termen filozofic, apare abia în neoplatonismul tardiv. Vezi de asemenea dominic o'Meara, Plotinus. An Introduction to the Enneads, clarendon Press, oxford, 2005, cap. 5, Speaking of the One, 1: The Ineffability of the One. Pentru a înţelege miza gândirii lui damascius, nu trebuie să confundăm inefabilul cu nici una dintre formele de indicibil despre care au vorbit neoplatonicii anteriori. 4 Plotin, Enneade, iV, 8, 1.31. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil340 misterul din spatele unui rit iniţiatic (6.5.6; 6.7.2), imaginea inefabilă a zeului (7.4.24). Termenul de inefabil nu este folosit niciodată pentru a indica principiul însuși. cu toate acestea, exegeza modernă îi atribuie destul de des lui iamblichos introducerea inefabilului în ierarhia neoplatonică a principiilor1, sprijinindu-se pe mărturia lui damascius. Totuși, dacă analizăm cu atenţie această mărturie, vom vedea că damascius nu spune că pentru iamblichos principiul ar fi inefabil. Principiile lui iamblichos pe care le menţionează damascius sunt: cel necoordonat triadei și cel absolut indicibil (¥rrhtoj): după acestea, să cercetăm dacă principiile prime anterioare primei triade inteligibile sunt două, adică cel absolut indicibil (p£nth ¥rrhtoj) și cel necoordonat triadei - așa cum considera marele iamblichos (De principiis, R.i, 86.3–5) Această confuzie duce la ideea că damascius ar fi preluat cadrul general al gândirii lui iamblichos. de fapt, cauza mai adâncă a acestei confuzii constă - după părerea noastră - într-o suprapunere terminologică între ¥rrhton și ¢pÒrrhton în literatura de specialitate. de multe ori, exegeza traduce pe ¥rrhton prin inefabil, deși inefabil este termenul încetăţenit pentru ¢pÒrrhton, o dată cu traducerea lui damascius de către J. combès2. dacă iamblichos ar fi folosit deja termenul de „inefabil" cu referire la principiul prim, ar însemna că damascius nu face decât să reafirme ceva deja prezent în tradiţie. Totuși, dacă dăm la o parte echivocul și suprapunerea terminologică, s-ar părea că damascius este primul care aplică principiului prim termenul de inefabil (¢pÒrrhton); aceasta va rămâne o particularitate a gândirii ultimului conducător al şcolii neoplatonice ateniene. 1 Vezi d. P., Taormina, Jamblique critique de Plotin et de Porphyre, Vrin. Paris, 1999, pp. 8–9 și J. dillon, „damascius on the ineffable", art. cit., p. 123. 2 ceea ce este mai grav, putând induce și mai mult în eroare, este faptul că, în traducerea tratatului De principiis, M.-c. Galpérine redă în mod indistinct ¥rrhton și ¢pÒrrhton, prin „indicibil". Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 341 2. Inefabilul la Proclus la Proclus, majoritatea ocurenţelor termenului inefabil se referă la doctrinele secrete; iar sensul privilegiat al acestor doctrine este acela al învăţăturilor platonice despre principiul unu-bine și despre nivelurile divine succesive. Aceste învăţături secrete, inefabile, sunt cele pe care, în opinia tuturor gânditorilor neoplatonici, Platon le-ar fi primit de la cei „mai vechi"1, adică din tradiţiile anterioare, precum cea orfică și cea pitagorică. În consecinţă, învăţăturile cele mai teologice ale lui Platon - precum prima ipoteză din Parmenide - sunt considerate de Proclus adevărate iniţieri mistice2. În afară de astfel de indicaţii - destul de numeroase - despre natura secretă, inefabilă, a învăţăturilor platonice, întâlnim însă și o altă utilizare a termenului de inefabil, nu fără legătură cu cea anterioară. Mai precis, termenul inefabil este transpus uneori, în manieră adjectivală, asupra principiului unu-bine, înspre care conduc aceste „iniţieri mistice". Proclus vorbește astfel despre natura inefabilă a binelui3, despre „dorinţa inefabilă" a tuturor lucrurilor spre bine4, sau despre „misterul inefabil" al binelui5. Acest caracter inefabil trebuie înţeles tocmai în legătură cu faptul că unul-bine este ţinta ultimă a acestor învăţături inefabile, ascunse, prin excelenţă teologice. Unul inefabil este cel spre care duce filozofia cea mai înaltă, care are rolul de iniţiere mistică. În schimb, vom vedea în continuare că, atunci când damascius propune inefabilul ca principiu absolut, el nu mai vrea să 1 Vezi Teologia platonică, i, 1, p. 7, 5–8, unde Proclus vorbește despre tradiţiile secrete (TMn ¢porr»toij) primite și transmise mai departe de Platon. Aceeași idee, a transmiterii unei tradiţii, apare și la Plotin, Enneade, V, 1, 8–9. 2 Vezi Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii, 10, p. 61.15; iii, 23, p. 83.16–17. dialogul Parmenide conduce la „iniţierea inefabilă în mistere". Pentru o discuţie mai amplă a valenţelor „mistice" ale gândirii neoplatonice, vezi d. Mazilu, Raison et mystique dans le néoplatonisme, Zeta Books, București, 2008. 3 Proclus, Teologia platonică, ii p. 60.4. 4 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii p. 63.28. 5 Proclus, Teologia platonică, iii p. 64.5. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil342 indice doar caracterul ascuns și inefabil al textelor platonice pe care tradiţia se sprijină, primindu-le ca pe niște texte revelate. desigur, el nu contestă cu nimic autoritatea moștenirii platonice, ci, așa cum vom vedea mai jos, el interpretează aceste texte într-o cheie nouă, considerând că ele conduc de fapt spre un principiu anterior celui al tradiţiei. de asemenea, la damascius, termenul nu mai are un sens strict adjectival, el nu mai indică doar caracterul misterios, ascuns și inexprimabil al principiului unu, ci el va constitui un principiu autonom, singurul principiu absolut, în cele din urmă. damascius utilizează termenului de inefabil într-o manieră originală, prin care nu numai că va accentua și va conceptualiza astfel de intuiţii - destul de rare, de altfel - precum cele ale lui Proclus despre caracterul inefabil al principiului prim, ci va depăși soluţiile oferite de tradiţie, ajungând aproape să le suprime. inefabilul său va fi dincolo de unul absolut al tradiţiei. 3. Inefabilul ca secret la Platon Totuși, ceea ce este surprinzător în această critică a lui damascius, care ajunge să instituie inefabilul dincolo de unu, este faptul că, deși analiza sa este o depășire a tradiţiei, totuși, el reușește să recupereze sursa și autoritatea platonică. Gânditor platonic autentic, el nu se poate lipsi de o bază textuală platonică, ci încearcă să înrădăcineze gândirea sa - ultima creaţie teoretică neoplatonică - în sursa comună a întregii tradiţii. Astfel, deși în primă instanţă inefabilul este absent din corpusul platonic, el va citi textele platonice fondatoare ca pe o indicaţie a principiului inefabil, considerând că, în ultimă instanţă, ele trimit spre acest principiu de dincolo de unu1. Această concluzie decurge din maniera ambivalentă în care Platon însuși 1 interpretarea lui damascius aduce în scenă un fenomen ciudat, de dublă fundamentare: pe de o parte, el înrădăcinează propria sa gândire în sursa comună a tradiţiei; pe de altă parte, el dă sursei platonice un nou înţeles, reinvestigând miza ultimă a platonismului, pornind de data aceasta de la propria sa gândire, de la propria sa manieră de a vedea lucrurile. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 343 vorbește despre unu, ezitând între a spune că unul este absolut incognoscibil și a spune că unul este cognoscibil, într-un fel. Pe de o parte, damascius amintește referinţele platonice în care este vorba despre neputinţa de a exprima unul: căci, despre unu, Platon spune că, dacă este, atunci nu este nici măcar unu, iar dacă nu este, atunci nu i se potrivește nici un fel de discurs, nici măcar negaţia, astfel că nu îi revine nici nume [...], nici vreo opinie sau știinţă (De principiis, R.i, 7.11–13) Recunoaștem aici două trimiteri: una la sfârșitul primei ipoteze din Parmenide, 141 e 10 –142 a 8, unde Platon suprimă unul însuși, iar cealaltă la ipoteza a 7-a, cea negativă. În ambele cazuri, discursul despre unu nu poate surprinde unul. Pe de altă parte, damascius trimite și la texte ale lui Platon în care s-ar părea că unul este gândit într-un fel, că există un fel de discurs potrivit lui: [...] în Sofistul, a arătat că el concepe unul pur printr-o anume afirmaţie și demonstrează că unul este în sine însuși, preexistent fiinţei. (De principiis, R.i, 7.19) În mod evident, damascius se referă aici la pasajul din Sofistul, 245 a–b, în care unul este descris ca preexistent fiinţei și ca oferindu-i acesteia unitate1. Platon pare să păstreze aici unul ca atare, afirmându-l ca principiu al fiinţei. dar atunci, întrebarea logică ce se naște este cum se explică această aparentă contradicţie: pe de o parte, unul este gândit ca unu anterior fiinţei, iar pe de altă parte se arată că unul nu este nici măcar unu. damascius răspunde la această întrebare spunând că: S-ar putea ca Platon, prin intermediul unului, să ne îndrepte, într-un mod inefabil, spre inefabilul pe care îl avem acum în faţă, care este dincolo de unu; Platon face aceasta prin supri marea 1 Vezi, de asemenea, De principiis, R. i, 44.1–5, unde damascius invocă faptul că Platon numește binele (identificat de neoplatonici cu unul) „cel mai important obiect al știinţei" (Republica, 505 a 2–3, 519 c 9–10). PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil344 unului, așa cum prin suprimarea celorlalte a ajuns la unu (De principiis, R.i, 7.15–18) În primă instanţă, unul poate fi gândit în mod direct, ca principiu al fiinţei, așa cum se arată în Sofistul. Totuși, într-un al doilea pas, el trebuie suprimat (așa cum se întâmplă în Parmenide). Unul însuși a fost obţinut de Platon prin suprimarea pluralelor1. dar, dacă suprimarea pluralelor are ca scop descoperirea unului, atunci, conform interpretării lui damascius, suprimarea unului are ca scop descoperirea inefabilului sau, cel puţin, punerea gândirii „pe urmele" inefabilului. corelând cele două texte (Sofistul, 245a–b și Parmenide, 141 e 10–142 a 8), damascius pune în evidenţă necesitatea principiului inefabil, anterior unului. Astfel, la sfârșitul tradiţiei neoplatonice, el oferă o interpretare cu totul nouă și surprinzătoare asupra mesajului ultim al operei platonice. În plus, el își sprijină propria sa elaborare despre inefabil pe această lectură subtilă a textelor platonice. damascius depășește astfel limita tradiţiei: pentru el, aporia întâi din Parmenide nu mai este doar o descriere a principiului unu, ci este o trimitere ne-explicită înspre principiul inefabil, de dincolo de unu, deoarece ea ajunge în cele din urmă la a suprima unul. În felul acesta, damascius se apropie de iamblichos, pentru care obiectul primei ipoteze platonice nu era principiul absolut, deoarece principiul absolut nu poate fi prins nici măcar într-o astfel de ipoteză; în consecinţă, principiul absolut era anterior obiectului primei ipoteze. damascius păstrează unul ca obiect al primei ipoteze - așa cum făcea întreaga tradiţie de dinainte și de după iamblichos - însă el însuși consideră că principiul absolut este dincolo chiar și faţă de ceea ce spune Platon în prima ipoteză. Prima ipoteză nu este despre principiul prim (inefabil)2, ci doar indică spre el. Totuși, cum poate damascius însuși să presupună că ar exista un astfel de mesaj în subtextul învăţăturii platonice, dacă acesta 1 este ceea ce se arată în prima ipoteză din Parmenide, 137 c 4–142 a 8: „dacă unul este unu, atunci el nu este nimic din cele plurale". 2 Spre deosebire de ceea ce afirmă J. combès („damascius, lecteur du Parménide", în Études néoplatoniciennes, Grenoble, Millon, 1989, p. 87). Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 345 nu este făcut niciodată explicit? de ce Platon nu a vorbit el însuși despre acest principiu? Tăcerea lui Platon în acest sens îi pare lui damascius cu totul îndreptăţită și chiar relevantă, din două motive: pe de o parte, datorită naturii acestei teme, care nu mai poate fi propriu-zis discutată, explicitată; pe de altă parte, datorită precauţiilor metodologice de a nu expune un subiect atât de important, de a nu-l lăsa la îndemâna celor neiniţiaţi într-ale filozofiei1. Platon ajunge până la unu, însă nu mai spune nimic despre ceea ce este dincolo de unu. Acest lucru s-ar explica prin obiceiul antic2 de a păstra tăcerea asupra secretului din religia misterelor. observăm însă că damascius preia - ca termen ultim al sistemului său - însuși acest „mister" inefabil în privinţa căruia Platon însuși păstrează tăcerea. Am putea spune că damascius continuă acolo unde Platon tace; el vorbește tocmai despre acele lucruri pe care Platon nu le-a mai spus. o altă explicaţie a tăcerii lui Platon ar fi aceea că unul este ultimul principiu al discursului. constituindu-și gândirea în jurul acestui principiu, Platon nu mai are nevoie să meargă mai departe: Unul este principiu al totului, de aceea Platon însuși nu are nevoie de alt principiu al discursului. În schimb, inefabilul nu e principiu al discursului, nici al cunoașterii, ci al totului în mod absolut. de aceea, despre acesta Platon nu mai spune nimic, nu mai dă nici o indicaţie. Platon a negat toate celelalte lucruri, pornind de la unu, însă nu a negat unul însuși. el a spus chiar și că unul nu este unu, însă nu a negat unul însuși. (De principiis, R.i, 37.26–38.12) Platon indică spre inefabil prin aceea că ajunge să spună că „unul nu este unu" (în această exprimare paradoxală3); totuși, el 1 Vezi damascius, De principiis, R. i, 8.1–3. 2 obiceiul antic despre care vorbește damascius în acest context poate fi cel al pitagoricilor (cf. iamblichos, Viaţa lui Pitagora, §§ 104–105). În privinţa păstrării tăcerii la Platon, vezi Scrisori, ii 312 d 7–e 1, 314 c 1–7; Vii 341 c 9–d 6, Timaios, 28 c 5, 53 d; Parmenide, 136 d–e. 3 damascius explică maniera paradoxală în care Platon vorbește despre unu tocmai prin apropierea unului de inefabil: „la Platon, raţionamentele despre unu se răstoarnă, deoarece unul este aproape de totala răsturnare a primului PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil346 nu trece mai departe și nu spune nimic despre acel „altceva" inefabil, care nu mai este nici măcar unu și care nu mai este principiu al discursului. Platon rămâne la unu ca principiu al discursului, acest unu pe care într-un fel îl gândim iar într-un fel nu îl mai putem gândi. Gândirea lui Platon - ca, de altfel, cea a întregii tradiţii - rămâne henocentrică (gravitând în jurul unului absolut). În schimb, damascius va nega unul însuși, trecând înspre inefabil. Acesta nu mai este într-un fel accesibil gândirii și într-un fel inaccesibil, ci va fi complet inaccesibil. B. Damascius şi inefabilul 1. Inefabilul şi răsturnarea gândirii dar ce înseamnă că inefabilul este sustras oricărei gândiri? În fond, întreaga tradiţie neoplatonică a insistat asupra caracterului inconceptibil al principiului, adică al unului. dar atunci, de ce inefabilul ar fi cu adevărat sustras oricărei gândiri, mai mult chiar decât unul însuși? Pentru a răspunde la această întrebare, trebuie să reamintim faptul că tradiţia a oscilat între a descrie rolul principiului faţă de realitate și faţă de gândire - sau, într-un cuvânt, faţă de ceea ce damascius numește totul - respectiv a sugera natura inaccesibilă a principiului. În schimb, damascius face pasul spre un principiu care este sustras oricărei relaţii cu totul. Acesta nu mai este gândit pornind de la totul - nici măcar în manieră negativă, ca depășire a totului -, ci el este sustras oricărei coordonări cu totul, adică cu spaţiul cel mai larg în care gândirea este posibilă. de aceea, el nu mai este gândit în nici un fel, ci gândirea care vrea să ajungă la el se răstoarnă. Ultimul semn pe care îl mai avem despre acest principiu este tocmai această răsturnare a gândirii. [a inefabilului], deși unul diferă de acesta prin aceea că încă este unu și totul conform unului" (R. i, 56.11–14). este vorba, desigur, despre faptul că, în Parmenide, Platon ajunge să spună că „unul nu este nici măcar unu", arătând astfel că, într-un fel, nici măcar unul nu poate fi gândit propriu-zis. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 347 Termenul însuși de inefabil aduce gândirea noastră într-o stare cu totul paradoxală, deoarece în același termen sunt cuprinse și afirmarea și negarea acestui termen. Sensul însuși al „inefabilului" se obţine în acest caz într-o manieră contorsionată, în care, în primă instanţă, respingem ceea ce vrem să exprimăm prin acest termen. Astfel, imediat după ce a anunţat că principiul trebuie să fie ca un sanctuar inefabil, din care proced toate lucrurile în mod inefabil, damascius observă că: dacă spunem acestea despre el, anume că este inefabil, sanctuar al totului și incomprehensibil, atunci discursul nostru este răsturnat (De principiis, R.i, 7.2–4) Mai precis, vrem să spunem că principiul este inefabil și incomprehensibil. Totuși, în această afirmaţie - cum că „principiul este inefabil" - sunt cuprinse două maniere de negare, de suprimare a ceea ce vrem să spunem. Pe de o parte, spunând că „este inefabil", spunem de fapt că el este sustras gândirii și, deci, că nu ne mai putem referi la el. dar atunci, înseamnă că el nu poate fi numit nici măcar inefabil și incomprehensibil. În felul acesta, discursul nostru despre principiu - adică faptul că am spus că el este inefabil - este suprimat, deoarece afirmă că nu ne mai putem referi la principiu. este ca și cum discursul ar afirma că nici un discurs nu mai este posibil; astfel, discursul însuși se suprimă. discursul se întoarce împotriva lui însuși, fiind astfel răsturnat (peritrepÒmeqa tù lÒgJ)1. Pe de altă parte, deși vrem să spunem că este inefabil și că, deci, nu mai putem afirma nimic despre el, totuși, observăm că 1 Textual: „suntem răsturnaţi în discurs". la Plotin (Enneade, V, 3, 13.9) descoperim acest verb într-un context apropiat de problematica lui damascius. Plotin vorbește despre unul cel de dincolo de tot și de dincolo de intelect, unul care depășește sfera gândirii. el este superior gândirii și nu se gândește pe sine, fiind mai simplu decât gândirea însăși. noi însă nu putem înţelege cu adevărat acest lucru, ci, când spunem că unul „nu se cunoaște pe sine", ni-l imaginăm ca și cum el ar avea nevoie să se cunoască pe sine și reintroducem în unu dualitatea dintre cunoaștere și cunoscut. Astfel, gândirea noastră este întoarsă spre contrarul a ceea ce ea însăși afirmă, fiind astfel răsturnată. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil348 încă mai afirmăm ceva despre el, anume acest predicat: inefabil. În felul acesta, discursul este întors și răsturnat încă o dată, deoarece noi vorbim despre ceva despre care am spus că nu se poate vorbi. ceea ce spunem despre principiu - anume că e inefabil - este răsturnat de două ori: o dată ca inadecvat, și altă dată ca mergând împotriva a ceea ce vrea, de fapt, să spună despre principiu. În primul caz, ceea ce spunem se contrazice pe sine (căci inefabilul nu poate fi numit nici măcar „inefabil"); în al doilea caz, însuși faptul că mai vorbim despre el (numindu-l inefabil) vine în contradicţie cu ceea ce am spus (anume cu faptul că el este inefabil, adică sustras oricărei gândiri, asemenea unui sanctuar inaccesibil). Răsturnarea - această manieră paradoxală în care gândirea se comportă în faţa principiului ultim, inefabil - se manifestă prin aceea că, încercând să vorbim despre principiu, afirmăm de fapt tocmai lucrurile contrare faţă de cele pe care vrem să le spunem și observăm astfel că, de fapt, despre el nu putem vorbi, iar ceea ce spunem nu mai ajunge până la el. În felul acesta, principiul inefabil se sustrage tocmai gândirii care încearcă să spună că el este inefabil. În consecinţă, principiul va fi inefabil - adică sustras gândirii - însă nu în măsura în care spunem că este inefabil (căci această afirmaţie ajunge să se contrazică), ci tocmai în măsura în care nu mai putem nici măcar să afirmăm inefabilitatea sa, ci observăm că ceea ce afirmăm despre el este suprimat în chiar momentul în care afirmăm și tocmai din cauză că afirmăm. Voind să afirmăm că principiul este inefabil, discursul nostru se răstoarnă, iar principiul rămâne de fapt în afara a ceea ce spunem despre el, dincolo de ceea ce exprimăm noi. el este astfel inefabil. damascius merge însă și mai departe, pentru a pune în evidenţă maniera „răsturnată" în care ni se arată acest principiu ultim. el va analiza toate denumirile sau atributele prin care tradiţia neoplatonică obișnuia să indice superioritatea principiului faţă de fiinţă și faţă de gândire. de asemenea, va analiza manierele de gândire posibile, prin care am putea încerca să ne raportăm Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 349 la principiu. În ambele cazuri, damascius pune în evidenţă faptul că inefabilul - mai mult decât unul - se sustrage oricărei maniere de discurs, că nimic din ceea ce putem spune noi nu i se aplică, ci ajunge chiar să se contrazică și să se anuleze, iar singurul fel în care putem intui prezenţa inefabilului este tocmai prin această răsturnare totală a gândirii în faţa lui. Toate numele prin care este sugerat principiul prim sunt suprimate atunci când ajungem la nivelul inefabilului. Astfel, am văzut deja că, atunci când spunem că principiul este inefabil, gândirea noastră se răstoarnă, părând să se contrazică - deși inefabil este expresia cea mai înaltă pe care o folosește damascius însuși în privinţa principiului absolut, de dincolo de unu. de aceea, damascius va spune că, de fapt, despre acest principiu nu putem spune nici măcar că este inefabil1. dar atunci, despre el nu putem spune nici că este incognoscibil, căci despre cel cu adevărat incognoscibil nu putem ști nici măcar atât: anume că e incognoscibil; altfel, dacă am ști că e incognoscibil, el ar fi deja, într-un fel, cunoscut, așadar nu ar mai fi cu adevărat incognoscibil2. În plus, termenul de incognoscibil nu poate exprima natura principiului, căci principiul nu este „ceva anume", a cărui natură ar fi incognoscibilă3. orice astfel de indicaţie despre el ar face din el un lucru distinct, pe care l-am putea apoi reintegra în totul. Mai mult, damascius observă că, la drept vorbind, nu putem să aplicăm inefabilului predicate precum „nimic, dincolo de totul, cauză supremă și cel necoordonat în raport cu totul"4. damascius pare aici să nege ceea ce el însuși a afirmat mai înainte. Într-adevăr, el a spus despre inefabil că este un „nimic" superior; în schimb, acum el spune că inefabilul nu este nici măcar nimic5. 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 8.23–24: „Poate că inefabilul absolut este <inefabil> în sensul că despre el nu se poate considera nici măcar că este inefabil". 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 9.11–25. 3 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 10. 4 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 10.25–11.1. 5 Vezi de asemenea De principiis, R. i, 13.22–23: „căci el <nu> este nimic; mai mult, el nu este nici măcar aceasta: nimic". PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil350 de fapt, dacă mai înainte el a avut nevoie să indice principiul inefabil drept „nimic" - anume pentru a face trecerea dincolo de ultima noastră supoziţie (aceea de unu) -, în schimb, acum el vrea să ne avertizeze că nici măcar „nimicul" nu trebuie înţeles drept „ceva anume", care ar fixa principiu, care l-ar transforma într-o natură determinată. la fel și în privinţa faptului că inefabilul ar fi „necoordonat totului". căci nici măcar „necoordonarea" nu constituie natura inefabilului, care nu poate avea nici o natură determinată. În concluzie, nici măcar aceste predicate ultime - precum „nimic" sau „necoordonat" - nu exprimă natura propriu-zisă a inefabilului, ci doar superioritatea lui faţă de orice natură posibilă. În cele din urmă, damascius suprimă chiar și ideea de transcendenţă, arătând că însăși transcendenţa se contrazice pe sine, atunci când ajungem să o aplicăm principiului inefabil. Astfel: cel transcendent transcende întotdeauna ceva anume și nu este absolut transcendent, deoarece el are o relaţie cu cel pe care îl transcende; căci, în general, când ceva este anterior, el intră într-o anumită coordonare, pe când, dacă trebuie să îl punem ca veritabil transcendent, atunci trebuie considerat că nu este nici măcar transcendent (De principiis, R.i, 15.15–18) din nou, damascius nu contrazice ceea ce a spus mai sus1, ci rafinează această afirmaţie. Mai precis, în primă instanţă, aporia iniţială a principiului a indicat faptul că principiul absolut trebuie să fie transcendent unului și totului. În schimb, mergând mai departe pe firul acestei maniere radicale de a gândi principiul, damascius observă acum că transcendenţa nu poate fi o expresie adecvată pentru principiul absolut, deoarece aceasta cuprinde în ea însăși ideea adversă, a unei legături cu totul, fiind gândită în raport cu totul. În însăși transcendenţa principiului este cuprins sensul totului faţă de care se instituie această transcendenţă. Altfel 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 4.3: „principiul totului trebuie să fie transcendent totului însuși". Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 351 spus, cel transcendent faţă de ceva este transcendent în manieră relativă, iar nu în manieră absolută. În schimb, pentru cel absolut transcendent, nici măcar transcendenţa nu mai este o expresie adecvată. În concluzie, despre cel absolut transcendent, chiar și transcendenţa trebuie negată. dar oare această negaţie însăși (a transcendenţei) nu se aplică în continuare principiului? nu! ci damascius arată că negaţia - ca și afirmaţia - transmite un sens anume, pe când principiul inefabil nu poate fi cuprins în nici un sens determinat. În consecinţă, nici o afirmaţie nu îi este adecvată, dar, în plus, nici negaţia nu i se poate aplica1. Tocmai acest lucru este răsturnarea discursului, anume faptul că inefabilului nu i se aplică nici un discurs: nu putem nici să afirmăm, dar nici să negăm ceva la adresa lui. Răsturnarea este mai mult decât negaţia. căci, dacă negaţia mai transmite încă un sens determinat, o semnificaţie oarecare, în schimb, răsturnarea nu arată decât că ceea ce spunem este respins înapoi de la principiul căruia încercăm să îi aplicăm acele predicate. În felul acesta, răsturnarea nu mai impune principiului o semnificaţie oarecare, ci doar ne indică nouă suprimarea absolută a oricărei determinaţii în privinţa lui. În plus, ceea ce se răstoarnă nu mai lasă loc negaţiei acelui predicat. dacă negaţia era o suprimare a unui anumit predicat și implicit o afirmare a unui predicat opus, în schimb, răsturnarea discursului este un fel de negaţie absolută, care nu mai oscilează între un predicat și predicatul opus, ci le suprimă pe amândouă. Răsturnarea discursului nu mai este propriu-zis un discurs, ci este experienţa faptului că principiul însuși iese din orice discurs posibil și că, la limită, nu putem exprima nici măcar această depășire a discursului. În concluzie, inefabilul nu poate fi numit în nici un fel, căci nici unul dintre numele principiului absolut nu îi este adecvat, nici în manieră afirmativă, nici în manieră negativă. nici predicatele cele mai înalte și nici suprimarea lor nu se mai referă 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 15.23. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil352 propriu-zis la inefabil; ele nu mai demonstrează nimic despre el, ci demonstrează doar neputinţa noastră de a ne referi la inefabil1. nici predicatele și nici suprimarea lor nu mai pot cuprinde inefabilul și nu-l pot instanţia într-un obiect al opiniei noastre. damascius se întreabă - într-o manieră retorică, într-un efort disperat al gândirii - dacă nu cumva, cel puţin acest lucru este adevărat despre inefabil: anume faptul că el nu este obiect al opiniei, că nu mai putem avea nici o opinie despre el2. dar, de fapt, acest efort ultim al gândirii de a mai cuprinde principiul - fie și într-o manieră negativă, fie și prin această recunoaștere a necunoașterii lui - nu mai este un discurs propriu-zis, ci este o răsturnare a oricărui discurs: opinia noastră nu mai este o opinie propriu-zisă, ci o suprimare a oricărei opinii. faptul că nu avem nici o opinie despre el - și că nici nu putem avea vreo opinie despre el - nu mai spune nimic despre principiul însuși, despre care recunoaștem că nu putem avea nici o opinie, ci spune ceva doar despre noi, despre propria noastră neputinţă de a-l exprima3. Asistăm astfel la o adevărată „luptă" între inefabilul care se sustrage din orice manieră de discurs - chiar și din cele negative, care suprimă orice conţinut cu putinţă - și gândirea noastră, care, negând și suprimând orice conţinut, are în continuare senzaţia că, măcar așa, se poate referi la principiu, că măcar negarea oricărei opinii și a oricărui nume poate fi adevărată despre inefabil. Gândirea se vede pusă într-o postură paradoxală: pe de o parte, ea tinde spre principiu, tinde să spună ceva despre el, sau măcar să spună ceea ce nu este adecvat acestui principiu; pe de altă parte, fiecare încercare a gândirii de a mai spune ceva despre inefabil este „dejucată", este răsturnată, neputându-se concretiza 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 11.16–21. 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 12.16: „Totuși, avem opinia că el nu este obiect al opiniei". 3 este ceea ce damascius numește „propriile noastre afectări" (t¦ o„ke‹a p£qh) în privinţa principiului, adică faptul că resimţim incognoscibilitatea principiului, însă aceasta nu determină principiul însuși, nu este un atribut propriu-zis al acestuia. Vezi De principiis, R. i, 7.6. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 353 într-o opinie propriu-zisă. Gândirea are aici mișcarea unui val care înaintează spre un punct nedeterminat, dar nu îl poate cuprinde, ci se întoarce înapoi, iar apoi, astfel răsturnată, astfel negată, gândirea încearcă din nou să cuprindă principiul, măcar prin negaţiile predicatelor anterioare. Astfel, primele care sunt negate și răsturnate sunt predicatele cele mai înalte folosite de tradiţie pentru principiul absolut (precum principiu, transcendent, unu, cauză). În al doilea rând, văzând că aceste predicate nu reușesc să cuprindă principiul, gândirea pune în aplicare negaţiile acestor predicate. În ultimă instanţă, nu îi mai rămân la îndemână decât negaţiile negaţiilor, cu condiţia ca nici acestea să nu se transforme într-un discurs indirect, ci să fie ele însele suprimate. Această manieră paradoxală de gândire - în care fiecare înaintare spre principiu este răsturnată în mod sistematic - este „travaliul" gândirii noastre. este vorba de un efort constant - chiar dacă nefinalizat într-un discurs anume - de a cuprinde principiul. Totuși, tocmai această răsturnare constantă a gândirii și acest travaliu reluat, în ciuda unei ulterioare răsturnări, este maniera ultimă și singura în care noi înșine putem deveni conștienţi de prezenţa - de necuprins - a principiului inefabil. iar această răsturnare constantă este singurul lucru pe care îl putem „spune" despre principiu, cu condiţia ca răsturnarea să nu se oprească niciodată la o expresie anume - care ar fixa și ar determina principiul - ci să fie o răsturnare infinită: iar dacă este nevoie să arătăm ceva, trebuie să folosim negaţiile acestor predicate, spunând că <el> nu este nici unu, nici plural, nici generator, nici negenerator, nici cauză, nici lipsit de cauzalitate; în plus, chiar și aceste negaţii <trebuie să fie> răsturnate, nu știu cum, într-o răsturnare care este de fapt infinită (De principiis, R. i, 16.11–14) Printr-un efect paradoxal, repetarea negaţiilor este singura manieră adecvată în care ne putem raporta la principiul absolut. doar o gândire răsturnată poate locui în preajma principiului care răstoarnă orice gândire. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil354 damascius accentuează în mod repetat această neputinţă de a cunoaște principiul, fie chiar și prin negarea negaţiei. Totuși, această răsturnare constantă a gândirii nu duce la un eșec generalizat și lipsit de orice perspectivă. din contră, efectul ei este unul spectaculos și neașteptat: de fapt, conștientizarea răsturnării și răsturnarea conștientă a oricărui predicat va constitui pentru damascius o metodă prin care gândirea poate conștientiza principiul într-un mod adecvat: chiar dacă nu cunoaște principiul, ea conștientizează faptul că acesta se sustrage din orice discurs1. Răsturnarea constantă este metoda prin care gândirea se instalează în această proximitate a principiului, experimentând „afectarea"2 pe care o avem din partea principiului. chiar dacă nu poate exprima principiul însuși, gândirea poate exprima propriile ei „afectări" sau „stări" faţă de principiu și faţă de sustragerea principiului din orice discurs posibil. dacă la Plotin accesul la principiul prim presupunea în cele din urmă o renunţare la însăși natura gândirii, o ieșire din cadrul ei normal - astfel încât gândirea nu are acces la principiu, iar ceea ce are acces la principiu nu mai este gândire, ci viziune și contact unitiv - în schimb, damascius reușește să obţină un mod de conștientizare a principiului, tocmai în termenii gândirii3. Pentru aceasta, gândirea nu trebuie 1 Vezi articolul lui J. combès, „négativité et procession des principes chez damascius", în Études néoplatoniciennes, op. cit., pp. 101–130, unde se arată că acest tip de negaţii absolute nu se transformă în afirmaţii, nici nu neagă existenţa principiului, ci îl scot pe acesta din orice discurs posibil (p. 106). 2 despre propriile noastre afectări (t¦ o„ke‹a p£qh) în privinţa principiului, vezi, de pildă, De principiis, R. i, 7.6. este vorba despre felul în care resimţim noi prezenţa principiului, fără ca aceste resimţiri să exprime cu adevărat ceea ce este principiul în el însuși. Vezi de asemenea Plotin, Enneade, Vi, 9, 3.51–54, precum și Porfir, Comentariul la Parmenide, ed. P. Hadot, 1968, vol. ii, pp. 78–79, și Proclus Comentariul la Parmenide, Vi, 1073.29–30. 3 În articolul „la théurgie comme pénétration d'éléments extra-rationels dans la philosophie grecque tardive" (Recherche sur le Néoplatonisme après Plotin, Vrin, Paris, 1990), H. d. Saffrey explică prezenţa principiului inefabil prin intrarea în filozofie a unor elemente extra-raţionale, de natură magico-religioasă. Perspectiva este criticată parţial de J. dillon în „damascius on the ineffable", art. cit., p. 120. Întărind această critică, considerăm că în cazul lui Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 355 să își părăsească natura ei, însă ea este provocată la maxim, subminată și răsturnată, pusă într-un travaliu neîncetat. 2. Indicibil şi inefabil Totuși, o problemă care se ridică este aceea a diferenţei dintre principiul prim admis de tradiţie și principiul prim admis de damascius. de ce unul rămâne doar indicibil, pe când principiul absolut al lui damascius este inefabil, așadar dincolo de indicibil1? Răspunsul la această întrebare este că, în timp ce indicibilul comportă o formă de relativitate faţă de dicibil, faţă de exprimabil, inefabilul iese cu totul din sfera exprimabilului. Indicibilul (¥rrhton) este „atributul" unanim acceptat al principiului, în întreaga tradiţie neoplatonică. Totuși, damascius observă că unul este și indicibil, dar și exprimabil, într-un fel2. de asemenea, acest unu este incognoscibil (pentru că nu îl putem aborda cu gândirea noastră duală)3, dar este într-un fel și cognoscibil, anume „prin simplificarea totului înspre unu"4. În schimb, principiul prim al lui damascius este inefabil, marcând astfel completa ieșire din spaţiul exprimabilului. el iese din acest echivoc și dualitate dintre dicibil și indicibil, dintre cognoscibil și incognoscibil, astfel încât despre el nu putem spune nici măcar că este indicibil sau incognoscibil. Indicibilul descrie situaţia unui lucru care se prezintă în faţa gândirii, dar pe care gândirea nu îl poate cuprinde, nu îl poate exprima; el este ¥-rrhton, de damascius principiul absolut nu este rodul unei influenţe extra-filozofice - cel puţin nu exclusiv - ci este mai degrabă rezultatul împingerii până la extrem a unei gândiri lucide, care ia în seamă aporiile principiului absolut și afirmă în mod radical transcendenţa principiului. 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 7.15. 2 De principiis, R. i, 9.3–10. damascius se sprijină pe textele platonice care arată că unul este indicibil (Parmenide, 141 e 10–142 a 8), dar și dicibil (Sofistul, 245 a–b). 3 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 14.16–19. 4 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 15. 7–8 (¢naploàntej t¦ p£nta e„j TMke‹no). PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil356 ne-exprimat. În schimb, inefabilul se sustrage de fiecare dată gândirii, tocmai atunci când aceasta încearcă să se apropie. el este ¢pÕ-rrhton, adică se sustrage gândirii, se depărtează de gândire și nu îi apare niciodată în faţă, nici măcar drept un lucru in-exprimabil. În fond, inexprimabilă este, într-un fel, și materia, în măsura în care ei nu îi revine nici o formă, așadar ea nu are nici o prezenţă pentru gândire. Totuşi, ea nu se sustrage gândirii în maniera inefabilului, ci, la limită, ea poate fi exprimată indirect, prin însăşi lipsa sa de orice formă. În schimb, inefabilul nu poate fi exprimat nici măcar prin indicarea neputinţei noastre de a-l descrie, de a-l exprima. Pentru el, nu putem avea nici o indicaţie, fie ea şi indirectă, deoarece el nu pune în faţa gândirii un „obiect concret", accesibil. nici măcar inefabilitatea lui nu este o indicaţie a lui, căci, dacă despre unu putem spune că este indicibil, în schimb, despre inefabil nu putem spune, la drept vorbind, nici măcar că este inefabil: „Poate că acela [inefabilul] este absolut inefabil în sensul că despre el nu se poate considera nici măcar că este inefabil" (R.i, 8.24). dacă unul este indicibil, inefabilul nu mai este nici măcar indicibil, ci dincolo de indicibil (toà ¢rr»tou TMpškeina). de asemenea, dacă unul este transcendent fiinţei și dincolo de fiinţă, inefabilul nu mai este nici măcar transcendent. damascius accentuează astfel anterioritatea inefabilului faţă de dicibil și indicibil, suprimând în mod repetat fiecare „expresie" a acestei anteriorităţi. În cele din urmă, dacă inefabilul este, în fond, o suprimare a oricărui (in)dicibil, damascius suprimă chiar și inefabilul, chiar și această ultimă suprimare. de aceea, diferenţa dintre indicibilul unului și inefabil - așa cum o înţelege damascius - pare să rezide în faptul că, dacă unul presupune o negare a oricărui exprimabil, constituindu-se astfel într-un indicibil anterior gândirii, în schimb, inefabilul presupune nu numai o negare, ci o răsturnare, și o răsturnare repetată, nu numai a exprimabilului, ci și a oricărei negaţii ulterioare. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 357 C. Inefabilul şi ierarhia principiilor 1. Dedublarea principiului? Analiza anterioară, prin care am pus în evidenţă distincţia dintre indicibil și inefabil, ne aduce în faţa unei probleme ce vizează miza ultimă a gândirii lui damascius. Astfel, tratatul Despre primele principii pare să suplimenteze sistemul tradiţional al principiilor cu încă un nivel, anume cu inefabilul, anterior unului indicibil. damascius distinge foarte clar între transcendenţa principiului și relaţia de cauzare pe care el o întreţine cu totul; el identifică aporiile ce se nasc din aceste două funcţii ale principiului, din suprapunerea lor1. dar, făcând această distincţie, s-ar părea că damascius distinge și două principii corespunzătoare celor două aspecte. Mai precis, s-ar părea că pentru el principiul se dublează, se separă: pe de o parte ca principiu prim, absolut transcendent, pe de altă parte ca principiu care produce totul. Aceasta este interpretarea pe care o oferă É. Bréhier, fiind reluată apoi și de alţi exegeţi2. Totuși, această interpretare intră în contradicţie cu ceea ce spune damascius însuși despre principiu. În primul rând, damascius respinge orice manieră numerică de a gândi principiile. deși distinge el însuși mai multe niveluri principiale, damascius se grăbește să precizeze că toate aceste distincţii se datorează naturii titanești3 a gândirii noastre, care fragmentează orice lucru, 1 Vezi începutul tratatului De principiis, R. i, 1–2. 2 Vezi É. Bréhier, „l'idée du néant et le problème de l'origine radicale dans le néoplatonisme grec", în Études de philosophie antique, PUf, Paris, 1955, pp. 248–283, în special pp. 269–280. Vezi de asemenea articolul lui Ph. Hoffmann, „l'expression de l'indicible dans le néoplatonisme grec de Plotin à damascius", în Dire l'évidence, l'Harmattan, Paris, 1997, p. 376: „damascius dédouble le principe premier en Indicible et Un-tout-avant-toutes-choses". 3 Vezi De principiis, R. i, 44.24–25: „suntem dispersaţi ca într-un război titanic". Războiul titanic este o imagine des întâlnită la neoplatonici. ea provine dintr-un mit orfic (vezi Fragmentele orfice, fr. 34, 35, 210–235), în care titanii îl devoră pe dionysos, fiind apoi pedepsiţi de Zeus, care îi fulgeră. neamul omenesc se naște din rămășiţele titanilor fulgeraţi. Pentru neoplatonici, mitul PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil358 despărţind ceea ce este în unitate. Principiile nu sunt distinse decât în ordinea discursului nostru. Gândirea noastră este cea care practică distincţia, până acolo încât a gândi înseamnă a distinge un lucru de altul. dar, în ceea ce privește principiile, lucrurile stau altfel. Acestea nu sunt distinse prin însăși natura lor, distincţia nu le este în nici un fel proprie. din punct de vedere logic, distincţia însăși este posterioară principiilor prime (ea apare abia la nivelul cel mai de jos al inteligibilului). de aceea, nu avem a face în sens propriu cu un număr determinat de principii. dar atunci, cum să înţelegem faptul că damascius vorbește despre mai multe principii? de fapt, la damascius, sistemul principiilor nu funcţionează decât ca indicaţie a prezenţei principiului prim, unic și inefabil. Unul însuși, care este cel mai aproape de inefabil, nu este decât un simbol al acestuia1. Ajungem astfel la un dublu paradox al ierarhiei de principii desfășurate de damascius. În primul rând, condiţia esenţială care stă la baza acestei ierarhii este aceea că principiul absolut este inefabil, așadar complet sustras gândirii și realităţii în ansamblu; dar atunci, fiecare alt principiu care vrea să sugereze inefabilul rămâne în mod inevitabil inadecvat faţă de cel pe care vrea să îl exprime. În al doilea rând, această inadecvare este cea care ne provoacă, făcându-ne să rafinăm gândirea noastră înspre principiul absolut, să „corectăm" această inadecvare; dar atunci, fiecare nou principiu, care vrea să suprime distanţa faţă de principiul prim, nu face decât să o mărească. ceea ce numim „ierarhie" este o „ierarhie răsturnată": deși aceasta tinde spre principiul absolut, de fapt, ea se naște printr-o simbolizează dualitatea naturii umane: pe de o parte, gândirea noastră nu poate surprinde principiile prime decât într-o manieră divizată, așa cum titanii au rupt în bucăţi corpul lui dionysos; pe de altă parte, trupul lui dionysos mâncat de titani reprezintă urma din sufletul nostru a unei cunoașteri supreme a principiului prim. Vezi Proclus, Comentariul la Parmenide, iV, 875.26–28; damascius, Comentariul la Phaidon, i, §§ 7–9; olympiodor, Comentariul la Phaidon, 1, § 3–6. Vezi de asemenea l. Brisson, „le corps dionysiaque", în SOPHIES MAIETORES, « Chercheurs de sagesse », op. cit., pp. 483–499. 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 91.7–11. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 359 mișcare de îndepărtare de la principiu. Încercarea de a ne apropia de principiu are ca efect răsturnat depărtarea de el. iar „urmele" sau mărcile acestei apropieri - care, de fapt, se depărtează - sunt tocmai nivelurile principiale de după inefabil. Așadar, în locul unei ierarhii propriu-zise, ce conţine un număr determinat de principii, avem o ierarhie de reflectări improprii ale unui principiu unic. Să vedem însă cum se constituie această ierarhie. Principiul prim este inefabilul, cel de la care provine totul, într-o manieră inefabilă. Acest principiu nu este niciodată gândit și considerat în sine, ca un principiu anume, ca un lucru distinct. de fapt, el nu este niciodată gândit, ci singurul fel în care el este descoperit este printr-o suspendare totală a gândirii, printr-o răsturnare a tuturor categoriilor obișnuite ale gândirii. inefabilul depășește ceea ce noi gândim propriu-zis. iar ultima noţiune și conjectură pe care noi o avem, cea mai cuprinzătoare și cea mai simplă în același timp, este aceea de unu. Aici, la noţiunea unului, gândirea noastră se oprește; mai departe nu putem merge decât observând „inadecvarea" și răsturnarea gândirii noastre. Totuși, ce este acest „unu" însuși? În primă instanţă, el pare a fi un alt principiu, al doilea faţă de inefabil; de fapt, nu este vorba decât de ultima aproximare a principiului. Unul este diferit de inefabil doar în ordinea gândirii noastre; unul are un mod de a fi dicibil pentru că îl exprimăm prin această ultimă noţiune de care dispunem, dar el însuși rămâne indicibil. În privinţa unului, gândirea rămâne în aporie, deoarece acesta i se arată când ca fiind cognoscibil, când ca fiind incognoscibil. obţinem unul și noţiunea unului prin simplificarea totului1: purificăm gândirea noastră și restrângem sub o singură noţiune ceea ce în noi este plural, ceea ce în gândirea noastră este multiplu. Totuși, pe de altă parte, unul nu este nici el distins ca principiu, identificat ca atare, ci el însuși ne rămâne în sine inaccesibil, căci gândirea noastră rămâne plurală. În însăși noţiunea de unu, noi gândim în același timp unitatea, dar și totalitatea. Mai precis, gândim 1 Pentru această simplificare (¢n£plwsij), vezi De principiis, R. i, 155. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil360 unul atât ca unu cât și ca tot în același timp, fără să putem ieși din această dualitate. Gândirea noastră rămâne astfel în dualitatea care îi este proprie, și pe care nu o poate depăși. de aceea, unul însuși nu este propriu-zis un principiu determinat, distins de gândirea noastră. el este o primă aproximare a principiului inefabil, dar această aproximare are ea însăși urma inefabilului în ea, căci unul însuși este înrădăcinat în inefabil. la rândul lui, unul nu este gândit decât într-o inadecvată dualitate. Îl gândim ca unul-tot (ca unul care cuprinde totul) și ca totul-unu (ca totul redus la unu). Astfel, în locul unului pur, anterior distincţiei, noi gândim două principii distincte: sunt „cele două principii" (aƒ dÚo ¢rca...), pe care Platon le numea limită și nelimitat, pitagoricii le numeau monadă și diadă, iar damascius însuși le va numi unul-tot (žn p£nta) și totul-unu (p£nta ›n), sau, și mai simplu, unul și totul. damascius va descrie îndelung aceste principii: fiecare dintre ele exprimă unitatea dintre unu și tot, însă cu un accent în plus, fie asupra unului (în cazul unului-tot, în care unul are preeminenţă asupra totului), fie asupra totului (în cazul totului-unu). Totuși, deși aceste două principii vor să sugereze identitatea unului și a totului în unul pur anterior (cel pe care damascius îl numea unul-tot anterior totului), de fapt, ele ratează unitatea absolută a unului pur, prin simplul fapt că ele sunt două. deși îl gândim în dualitatea celor două principii, noi știm că unul pur este anterior dualităţii. Tocmai de aceea gândirea noastră va trece la încă un principiu, care să sugereze că „cele două principii" sunt de fapt în unitate, sau au o unitate anterioară. Acest alt principiu va fi unificatul (tÕ 1nwmšnon)1. Acesta este cel pe care Platon îl numea amestec (miktÒn)2, fiinţa propriu-zisă (cea inteligibilă, veritabilă), a doua 1 Astfel, unul însuși nu ne apare decât sub forma unei triade: unul-tot, totul-unu, unificat. Acestea sunt nuanţe și accente sau modalizări ale aceleiași unităţi primordiale, în care totul este cuprins conform unului, dar pe care noi nu o putem gândi ca atare, ci o „desfacem" în aceste aspecte succesive. 2 Vezi Platon, Philebos, 23 c 9–d 1; 25 b 5–6; 27 b 7–9. fiinţa este un amestec de limită și de nelimitat. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 361 ipostază principială a sistemului lui Plotin. Unificatul este primul principiu compus: el restrânge unitatea și pluralitatea, simplitatea și totalitatea. Tocmai de aceea el este identificat cu fiinţa, ea însăși compusă, plurală1. Unificatul este fiinţa inteligibilă; totuși, noi nu gândim această fiinţă decât ca o pluralitate de forme, în timp ce unitatea lor anterioară nu o putem concepe. de aceea, unificatul păstrează și el o urmă de inefabil. Totuși, nici forma nu o gândim în sine - așa cum arată și Platon - ci trecem tot timpul de la un element al formei la altul2. de fapt, gândim un lucru în măsura în care participă la o formă sau alta, dar forma însăși nu o gândim ca atare. descoperim astfel, chiar și la nivelul formei, o urmă de inefabil. În felul acesta, principiile despre care vorbim nu sunt propriu-zis distincte, nu sunt fiecare în sine un principiu concret, determinat și diferit de celelalte. ci toate acestea nu sunt decât moduri de a aproxima principiul prim și unic, în descendenţa căruia gândim, dar care este el însuși inaccesibil. Toate aceste „principii" sunt de fapt niveluri ale prezenţei principiului unic, care niciodată nu se dă ca atare, într-o manieră concretă, sesizabilă, ci „se dă" doar în acest mod al retragerii. ceea ce „se dă" din principiul inefabil este această urmă a retragerii sale, de la fiecare nivel al gândirii. chiar și ceea ce numim „principiul inefabil" nu este în sine un principiu inefabil3, ci este un mod de a exprima totala sustragere a principiului unic din sfera gândirii noastre. 1 este surprinzător să vedem că fiinţa - cea de la care începe meditaţia neoplatonică propriu-zisă, cea pe care vrea să o explice și să o fundamenteze această căutare radicală a principiului - devine ea însăși o aproximare, o expresie (inevitabil inadecvată) a principiului de dincolo de fiinţă și de dincolo de toate. 2 Vezi De principii, R. i, 45.1–3, sau R. i, 54.10–15. În Republica, Vi, 506 d–509 b, Timaios, 28 c și Scrisoarea a VII-a, 341 c–344b, Platon însuși neagă posibilitatea de a înţelege în mod raţional chiar și formele. Vezi de asemenea Parmenide, 133 b 4–c 1, despre dificultatea de a cunoaște formele. 3 ştim că, în privinţa acestui principiu, damascius a negat atât faptul că el ar fi principiu (De principiis, R. i, 4.7), cât și faptul că ar fi inefabil (De principiis, R. i, 8.23), punând astfel în evidenţă neputinţa de a-l cuprinde în orice expresie posibilă. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil362 Acest fel de a aproxima principiul inefabil - coborând de la un nivel la altul al ierarhiei de principii, identificând nivelurile prezenţei principiului - este numit de damascius probol»: proiecţie1. În faţa principiului absolut inefabil, gândirea este răsturnată; ea se depărtează apoi de la principiu și - în incapacitatea ei de a-l cuprinde - proiectează asupra lui maniere din ce în ce mai inadecvate, deși ea încearcă de fapt să se apropie de principiu și să corecteze inadecvarea sa faţă de el. Astfel, proiectăm unul, apoi „cele două principii", apoi unificatul. la fiecare dintre nivelurile astfel distinse, damascius face efortul de a arăta că, de fapt, nivelul respectiv rămâne înrădăcinat în principiul absolut indicibil, iar maniera noastră de a gândi acel nivel principial este inadecvată, introducând distincţia acolo unde nu există nici o distincţie. În felul acesta, damascius nu doar că nu introduce o dedublare a principiului prim - prin inefabilul de dincolo de unu - ci, din contră, damascius vrea să restrângă pluralitatea de reprezentări pe care principiul prim a primit-o în tradiţie, la un principiu absolut ireprezentabil. damascius vrea să arate că pluralitatea de niveluri ulterioare - și de concepte corespunzătoare acestora - nu este decât seria de reprezentări și de aproximări pe care o avem noi despre principiu, în depărtarea noastră faţă de el. În sensul acesta, am putea spune nu numai că inefabilul nu este o dedublare a unului ci, mai degrabă, că unul este o dedublare a inefabilului, iar, în continuare, fiecare nou nivel principial 1 De principiis, R. i, 58.18–23. Sensul primar al lui probol» este acela de a pune ceva în faţa altui lucru, cu scopul de a-l apăra. Astfel, toate nivelurile principiale pe care noi le gândim după inefabil nu sunt decât maniere de a feri inefabilul însuși de intruziunea minţii. dacă la Platon apărarea secretului filozofic se făcea prin tăcere, la damascius, se pare că un mod de apărare a inefabilului este însuși faptul de a pune în faţa lui aceste maniere discursive inadecvate, știind că în spatele lor se ascunde altceva, inaccesibil. Vezi de asemenea Philebos, 65 a 1–6, despre cele trei monade (adevăr, simetrie, proporţie) care stau la intrarea sanctuarului binelui, manifestând într-un fel binele, însă, în același timp, ascunzându-l de orice intruziune. Reluată de neoplatonici, această idee exprimă maniera voalată în care se lasă întrevăzut principiul prim. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 363 este o dedublare a nivelului anterior, deoarece apariţia lor urmează tendinţa gândirii noastre de a „se dedubla și de a se plurifica"1. Tocmai de aici - din această recurentă dedublare a gândirii noastre - decurge seria interminabilă de aporii care alcătuiesc tratatul Despre primele principii: anume din faptul că fiecare nivel principial pe care încercăm să îl descriem este de fapt dedublat și are în sine o inadecvare esenţială faţă de altceva anterior, adică faţă de principiul absolut, inefabil. Totuși, din inadecvarea gândirii noastre faţă de el și din identificarea aporiilor ce se succed neîncetat, damascius scoate o metodă de a păstra principiul în vederea gândirii, însă ferit de orice acces direct al gândirii. În locul unei descrieri a nivelurilor realităţii - specifică lui Proclus, de pildă, - damascius recurge la o critică a felului în care noi gândim ierarhia realităţii, pentru a pune astfel în evidenţă faptul că toate nivelurile principiale nu fac decât să indice spre un principiu anterior, pe care ele nu pot decât să-l arate de departe, însă fără să-l cuprindă. 2. Inefabilul - ultima soluţie a tradiţiei pentru principiul prim de dincolo de fiinţă Așadar, nu distingem între mai multe principii, ci proiectăm moduri de a aproxima principiul unic și inaccesibil. Aparent, damascius trece dincolo de unu, la un principiu superior. dar inefabilul nu este un alt principiu, ci este singurul principiu posibil, iar el este dincolo de unu în măsura în care principiul prim este dincolo de orice încercare a gândirii de a-l fixa într-o expresie. Propunând acest principiu, damascius surmontează aporia tradiţională în care rămâne chiar și Proclus, care afirmă transcendenţa și inefabilitatea principiului, dar, pe de altă parte, este obligat să admită și cauzalitatea sa, faptul că el face ca totul să fie2. dubla aporie care se naște de aici constă în aceea că, pe de o 1 Vezi De principiis, R. i, 4.1–3: „noi suntem, de fapt, cei care ne divizăm și ne dedublăm [...] și chiar ne plurificăm". 2 Vezi partea a ii-a, capitolul 3, e, din această carte. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil364 parte, principiul este gândit în opoziţie cu realitatea, ca o transcendenţă exterioară, de dincolo, iar, pe de altă parte, principiul este gândit ca având încă o relaţie și o coordonare cu realitatea pe care o cauzează. În schimb, damascius trece dincolo de perspectiva tradiţională, spunând că principiul este inefabil, iar toate nivelurile ulterioare sunt reflectări ale acestei inefabilităţi. dacă la Proclus subzistă o antinomie între aspectul inefabil-transcendent și cel cauzal-generator, damascius arată că toate nivelurile pe care noi le identificăm nu sunt decât imagini ale aceluiași principiu inefabil; există niveluri de inefabil. În felul acesta, aspectul „generator" al principiului nu mai este distinct și nu se mai opune aspectului transcendent. nivelurile ulterioare inefabilului nu fac decât să manifeste inefabilitatea principiului. ca transcendent, principiul ar trebui să se sustragă într-un dincolo de realitate, fără legătură cu aceasta; ca generator și cauză a realităţii, el ar trebui să reintre în „întregul" realităţii, în „totul". În schimb, cu inefabilul, damascius scapă din cele două alternative contradictorii. Principiul inefabil este absolut transcendent; totuși, transcendenţa nu exclude cauzalitatea; din contră, transcendenţa este resimţită la fiecare nivel al realităţii, căci fiecare nivel al realităţii nu este decât o indicaţie a inefabilului. Pe de altă parte, faptul că inefabilul este prezent (în manieră cauzală) la fiecare nivel al realităţii nu suprimă transcendenţa principiului, nu îl include în „totul", deoarece „prezenţa" inefabilului în realitate este, de fapt, prezenţa unei constante sustrageri. inefabilul nu este niciodată gândit ca un lucru anume, integrabil în „totul", chiar dacă resimţim prezenţa lui la fiecare nivel al „totului". Astfel, chiar dacă principiul este cu totul transcendent, sustras gândirii și realităţii, totuși, el rămâne în continuare cauza tuturor lucrurilor, acea prezenţă de necuprins, acea prezenţă inefabilă, prin care toate lucrurile sunt ceea ce sunt, într-un mod inefabil. În felul acesta, instituirea realităţii (cu caracterul ei inefabil) este doar „oglinda răsturnată" a transcendenţei absolute a inefabilului. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 365 la damascius, maniera - fie și inadecvată - în care gândim principiul, depărtându-ne de fapt de la el, se suprapune peste maniera în care întreaga realitate se desprinde din acest principiu prim, absolut inefabil. Așa cum realitatea păstrează la fiecare nivel ceva inefabil, la fel, gândirea care încearcă să se apropie de principiul inefabil „cade" dincoace de el, de la un nivel la altul de inefabilitate, refăcând astfel parcursul inefabil al realităţii înseși, de la principiu până la fiinţă și de la fiinţă încă și mai jos, până la nefiinţa pură, care este ea însăși inefabilă, într-o manieră a lipsei absolute. faptul că, la Proclus, unul ca principiu prim, transcendent și inexprimabil ar produce niște niveluri ontologice reale, intelective și inteligibile, face ca unul însuși să reintre, într-un anume fel, printre acestea din urmă. dacă negaţiile produc afirmaţii, atunci unul însuși este într-o anume relaţie cu aceste afirmaţii, el pierzându-și astfel caracterul complet transcendent. În schimb, la damascius, cele ce urmează după principiu nu sunt într-o manieră pur „afirmativă" (opusă „negativităţii principiului"), ci ele rămân înrădăcinate în inefabilul principiului, în caracterul „negativ" al acestuia - însă negativ ca superioritate. Toate nivelurile ontologice, până la cel al nimicului inferior, sunt și ele într-un anumit grad inefabile. În plus, prin această soluţie a sa, damascius oferă o ultimă perspectivă cuprinzătoare asupra tuturor nivelurilor de realitate distinse de gândirea neoplatonică. Într-adevăr, dacă avem divinaţia unui principiu necoordonat, totuși, necesitatea și prezenţa lui se face simţită nu doar dincolo de fiinţă și dincolo de ultima noastră supoziţie, ci la orice nivel al gândirii și al realităţii: unificat, forme, etc. damascius redă astfel unitatea și sistematicitatea ipotezelor din Parmenide, unindu-le pe toate prin acest „fir roșu" inefabil. dar oare soluţia lui damascius este cu adevărat o soluţie? faptul că damascius ajunge să vorbească despre un principiu inefabil - la care gândirea nu mai are un acces propriu-zis, ci doar înţelege de departe că există un astfel de principiu - ar putea părea o PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil366 nereușită, o experienţă filozofică ce nu își atinge niciodată ţinta. Travaliile gândirii care încearcă să se apropie de principiu nu ajung niciodată la o finalizare, ci ele sunt totdeauna pe drum, ele sunt mereu provocate, fără a ajunge vreodată la un rezultat, ci doar la conștiinţa faptului că un astfel de rezultat ar fi imposibil de atins. În acest caz, s-ar putea pune întrebarea dacă nu cumva analiza lui damascius rămâne o nereușită, o stranie apropiere de ceea ce nu poate fi apropiat. demersul lui damascius a fost comparat cu scepticismul, datorită accentuării acestei neputinţe a gândirii de a cuprinde principiul1. considerăm însă că acest calificativ nu este deloc meritat. În primul rând, damascius nu este mai „sceptic" decât au fost ceilalţi filozofi neoplatonici, care au accentuat cu toţii imposibilitatea gândirii principiului prim. În al doilea rând, rezultatul analizei lui damascius nu este unul strict negativ: anume că principiul prim nu poate fi cunoscut. În fond, o asemenea afirmaţie era deja prezentă la scriitorii neoplatonici anteriori. ceea ce aduce nou damascius este ideea că, la fiecare nivel al gândirii noastre, facem experienţa indirectă a unui principiu inefabil. Toate nivelurile principiale de după inefabil sunt, de fapt, niște aproximări ale acestuia. Astfel, nici măcar aceste niveluri ulterioare nu ţin exclusiv de gândirea raţională, discursivă, ci și ele sunt - fiecare în felul său - inefabile, ele păstrează caracterul inefabil al principiului prim. Astfel, damascius îmbină inefabilitatea principiului cu prezenţa lui la fiecare nivel ulterior lui. nivelurile ulteriore vor să aproximeze inefabilul, dar nu reușesc propriu-zis, și, în plus, nici ele nu sunt decât aproximate de gândirea noastră. la limită, s-ar părea că nimic nu poate fi gândit propriu-zis. dar, de fapt, prin această neputinţă de a gândi ceva propriu-zis, identificăm prezenţa discretă a inefabilului. Realitatea întreagă nu mai este un simplu obiect perfect adecvat gândirii - mereu prezent în faţa gândirii care îl disecă - ci la 1 Vezi S. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Nondiscursive Thinking in the Texts of Plotinus, Proclus and Damascius, cambridge University Press, cambridge, 2000, cap. 9. Capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil 367 fiecare nivel rămâne ceva de negândit, ceva inefabil în fiecare lucru, care nu mai poate fi descris, dar care dă fiecărui lucru aura lui specifică, personală, ireductibilă. Gândirea lui damascius nu este una pesimistă, care observă că nu poate spune nimic. din contră, gândirea lui damascius are un efect paradoxal: accentuând imposibilitatea de a gândi principiul, damascius pune în evidenţă tocmai necesitatea principiului și prezenţa lui inefabilă la orice nivel al gândirii și al realităţii. Astfel, intenţia lui damascius nu este - și nici nu poate fi - aceea de a exprima principiul, ci este aceea de a obţine un mod al prezenţei principiului, însă o prezenţă eliberată de orice expresie pe care gândirea noastră i-ar plica-o în mod inadecvat. Pentru aceasta, damascius se sprijină tocmai pe imposibilitatea de a exprima principiul; mai mult decât atât, el însuși accentuează această imposibilitate, formulând în mod radical aporia principiului. observăm astfel că la damascius - spre deosebire de ceilalţi reprezentanţi ai tradiţiei - imposibilitatea de a exprima sau de a cunoaște principiul nu este concluzia discursului său, ci este ipoteza absolută de la care el își începe analiza. Pornind de aici, damascius încearcă să elibereze principiul din orice manieră de a-l gândi în coordonare cu totul. ceea ce vrea să obţină damascius este un fel de exercitare a gândirii care se ridică deasupra oricărei cunoașteri și oricărei expresii. „expresia" ultimă a acestei depășiri a cunoașterii va fi tăcerea1, acea tăcere care înconjoară principiul inefabil și în care orice discurs - o dată ajuns - se oprește, acostând ca într-un port2. Aporiile și răsturnările succesive ale gândirii sunt maniera în care forţăm limitele exprimabilului, pentru a face să se „audă" această tăcere a principiului pe care nimic nu îl poate cuprinde, această tăcere în care nici o 1 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 9.9–10: „acela [inefabilul] trebuie onorat printr-o deplină tăcere și, mai întâi, chiar printr-o deplină neștiinţă care desconsideră orice cunoaștere". 2 damascius, De principiis, R. i, 18.20–24. Pentru această imagine a portului în care acostează gândirea, vezi R. M. van den Berg, „Towards the Paternal Harbour. Proclean Theurgy of the forms", în Proclus et la Théologie platonicienne, op. cit., pp. 426–443. PARTeA iii: dAMASciUS şi PRinciPiUl inefABil368 expresie nu poate pătrunde. În felul acesta, pe calea filozofiei și a gândirii, damascius vrea să obţină o stare superioară gândirii înseși, o stare de suprimare a gândirii. Într-un fel, această suprimare a gândirii este tocmai starea pe care, într-un limbaj inspirat, o descria Plotin vorbind despre viziunea principiului prim. Astfel, gândirea lui damascius, este, în ultimă instanţă, o încercare de a experimenta prezenţa principiului absolut, pornind însă tocmai de la imposibilitatea de a-l exprima, de a-l prinde în vreo formulă discursivă. În felul acesta, faptul că principiul prim este inefabil - adică sustras oricărui mod de acces - nu este o concluzie negativă, sceptică, nici o închidere a drumurilor și a oricărei întreprinderi filozofice posibile, ci, din contră, este o descoperire originară a faptului că sensul și fundamentul ultim al realităţii - pe care îl caută gândirea noastră - nu poate fi cuprins în nici o descriere, nu poate fi limitat de nici o perspectivă raţionalistă, și tocmai de aceea el provoacă neîncetat „travaliile indicibile" ale gândirii. În felul acesta, drumul gândirii noastre nu se termină niciodată. Într-adevăr - dincolo de tot ceea ce am putea noi să spunem despre principiu, dincolo de toate posibilele experienţe filozofice, dincolo de „travaliile indicibile" ale gândirii noastre - principiul rămâne de neatins. Totuși, deși rămâne ascuns dincolo de orice acces, el susţine în același timp tot ceea ce putem noi gândi, căci totul procede de la acest principiu inaccesibil și nimic nu este posibil în lipsa lui. la fiecare nivel al gândirii noastre facem experienţa principiului inefabil, experienţa necesităţii unui principiu care nu se arată, care rămâne absent. În fiecare lucru la care avem într-un fel acces, identificăm prezenţa subtilă a principiului inaccesibil; și tocmai acest inaccesibil din fiecare lucru este cel care dă specificul lucrului însuși. la limită, am putea spune că ceea ce gândim la fiecare nivel al realităţii este, de fapt, prezenţa subtilă și paradoxală a inefabilului care se sustrage din gândirea noastră. conclUZie cartea noastră a parcurs trei etape ale gândirii neoplatonice în privinţa principiului de dincolo de fiinţă. Prima dintre acestea, reprezentată de gândirea lui Plotin, este etapa „genezei", a stabilirii unui teren problematic fundamental. Analizând această etapă, am pus în evidenţă modul în care a apărut problema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă, cu paradigma nouă de gândire implicită, cu depășirile sau integrările unor aspecte din gândirea filozofică anterioară (în special cea platonică și aristotelică). o a doua fază, de „construcţie", este cea care prezintă în mod ascendent perspectivele lui Porfir, iamblichos și Proclus. Aici observăm cum ajunge principiul de dincolo de fiinţă în centrul unei dispute filozofice de amploare, care va constitui propriu-zis tradiţia neoplatonică. dificultăţi care la Plotin nu erau formulate explicit încep acum să iasă la lumină, iar încercările succesive de a rezolva aceste dificultăţi sunt cele care dau naștere în continuare unor dificultăţi și mai mari. A treia etapă a parcursului nostru, pe care am numit-o „critică", are ca ţintă gândirea lui damascius, care realizează o reevaluare radicală a datelor tradiţiei, a modului în care este gândit principiul prim al întregii realităţi, și trage concluziile ultime în acest sens. Parcursul nostru este unul ascendent, scoţând la iveală diverse moduri de înţelegere și de soluţionare ale problemei principiului prim. Astfel, în ceea ce îl privește pe Plotin, el este primul care se întreabă cum poate subzista lumea inteligibilă; altfel spus, el se întreabă dacă acest spaţiu al fiinţei și al gândirii - conform identificării parmenidiene - poate exista în sine, singur, fără nici un alt principiu? criticând perspectiva aristotelică a identităţii dintre intelect și principiul absolut, Plotin arată că lumea inteligibilă rămâne duală, scindată în sine însăși, sub mai multe aspecte. În dincolo de fiinȚă370 consecinţă, reinvestind și accentuând anumite referinţe platonice fundamentale, Plotin demonstrează necesitatea existenţei unui principiu prim absolut, anterior fiinţei inteligibile și gândirii celei mai simple: acesta este unul prim, binele absolut al întregii realităţi. el este în același timp sursa sau cauza fiinţei inteligibile - care nu poate fi o realitate ultimă, auto-suficientă - dar și dincolo de fiinţa inteligibilă, așadar sustras fiinţei celei mai înalte și mai simple, precum și fiinţei în ansamblul ei. Așa cum am încercat să arătăm, urmărind ocurenţele cele mai relevante din opera lui Plotin, această anterioritate a principiului unu faţă de intelect trebuie înţeleasă pe mai multe niveluri. În primul rând, unul este anterior și mai simplu în raport cu structura fiinţei, care, deși unitară, nu exclude totuși pluralitatea. În al doilea rând, unul este anterior activităţii sau vieţii specifice fiinţei, care presupune o veșnică mișcare de auto-conștientizare, de auto-reflectare, de întoarcere spre sine. În al treilea rând, unul este anterior gândirii specifice fiinţei inteligibile, iar simplitatea lui nu se mai poate dedubla nici măcar în actul celei mai simple gândiri. Astfel, intelectul divin (paradigmă a întregului univers) are el însuși ca sursă și ca scop final acest principiu unu, absolut simplu, de dincolo de fiinţă. conform acestei duble anteriorităţi - cea paradigmatică a intelectului și cea absolută a unului prim -, Plotin împarte întreaga realitate în trei niveluri sau ipostaze care își găsesc corespondentul și fundamentul teoretic în primele trei ipoteze din dialogul Parmenide (137 c 4–157 b 5). Totuși, gândirea lui Plotin rămâne prinsă într-un fel de circularitate: pe de o parte, unul este „dedus" pornind de la imposibilitatea intelectului de a exista în sine, auto-suficient. Pe de altă parte, se arată că intelectul ia naștere prin contemplarea principiului anterior, unu. Plotin nu tranșează problema modului în care se trece de la unul absolut la intelectul divin, adică la prima fiinţă inteligibilă. la Porfir, problema care se pune este tocmai aceea de a oferi principiului prim un rol precis în constituirea realităţii inteligibile, păstrând anterioritatea principiului, însă fără a-l transforma într-un neant, într-o nefiinţă. Porfir gândește principiul ca act pur Concluzie 371 de a fi, anterior fiinţei determinate, pornind de la care fiinţa propriu-zisă se distinge ca inteligibilă și intelectivă. Totuși, această perspectivă ridică la rândul ei alte dificultăţi privind relaţia și limita concretă dintre principiul absolut, de dincolo de fiinţă, respectiv fiinţa inteligibilă cauzată de principiu. Pornind de aici, iamblichos va identifica o dificultate și mai mare, și anume imposibilitatea de a gândi principiul ca fiind în același timp cauză a realităţii și dincolo de realitate. el va despărţi aspectul cauzal al principiului (care are o anumită relaţie cu fiinţele inteligibile pe care le produce) de aspectul transcendent al principiului (care este considerat dincolo de aspectul cauzal și fără nici o relaţie cu fiinţele de după el). În felul acesta, iamblichos ajunge să propună o altă interpretare a ipotezelor platonice, făcând ca obiectul primei ipoteze să fie multiplu. Proclus critică la rândul lui soluţia anterioară, insistând asupra imposibilităţii de a considera unul absolut al lui Platon (din prima ipoteză) ca având fie și vreo urmă de pluralitate. el accentuează separaţia radicală dintre ipoteza negativă (prima ipoteză, a transcendenţei) și ipoteza pozitivă (cea secundă, care desfășoară nivelurile inteligibile produse de principiul prim). Mai mult, el propune o manieră în care negaţiile din prima ipoteză (respectiv unul care transcende fiinţele inteligibile) să genereze afirmaţiile din a doua ipoteză (respectiv nivelurile inteligibile), fără ca transcendenţa principiului să fie afectată. În felul acesta, Proclus leagă din nou transcendenţa și cauzalitatea principiului, ajungând la limită să explice pe una prin cealaltă: principiul unu este transcendent tocmai pentru că el cauzează întreaga realitate, pe care o lasă într-un fel „în afara" sa; în sens invers, principiul unu este cauza primă, absolută, tocmai pentru că el nu mai intră în sfera realităţii și nu mai are nevoie de o cauză anterioară, ci el transcende totul. damascius, ultimul gânditor din această serie a problematizării principiului absolut, începe analiza sa într-o manieră nouă faţă de ceea ce ne-a oferit tradiţia anterioară. el nu caută în primă instanţă să „rezolve" problema principiului prim, ci își pune în primul rând întrebarea radicală a validităţii acestei probleme dincolo de fiinȚă372 înseși. Astfel, el recurge la o critică radicală a conceptului de principiu absolut, critică ce vizează întreaga tradiţie anterioară. el pune faţă în faţă principiul totului și totul pe care acest principiu îl produce. damascius observă însă că principiul nu poate fi gândit propriu-zis ca principiu al totului și nu poate fi situat nici în interiorul totului, nici în afara lui. de asemenea, totul nu poate fi gândit nici ca având un principiu sub care stă, nici ca fiind el însuși principiu. Admiterea unui principiu al totului diferit de totul ajunge la suprimarea sensului principiului, precum și la suprimarea sensului de totalitate al totului. Ridicând această obiecţie fundamentală asupra conceptului însuși de „principiu", damascius este împins să caute un principiu care să nu mai aibă nici un fel de relaţie - de incluziune sau de excluziune - faţă de totul. el va încerca astfel să arate că principiul trebuie să fie absolut inefabil, adică sustras oricărei maniere de gândire și de totalizare, și că toate manierele în care tradiţia a încercat să indice acest principiu nu sunt decât niște proiecţii ale minţii noastre asupra lui, inevitabil inferioare și neadecvate. care sunt, în concluzie, „expresiile" principiului de dincolo de fiinţă de-a lungul tradiţiei neoplatonice? la Plotin, întâlnim unul-bine, care este anterior structurii triadice a intelectului divin: fiinţă, viaţă, gândire. Porfir introduce în discuţie actul pur de a fi, anterior fiinţei determinate a intelectului. la iamblichos apare zeul-unu, necoordonat intelectului și anterior zeului-prim. Pentru Proclus, unul-bine este nefiinţa absolută, de dincolo de totul, care produce totul prin transcendenţa sa, într-o coincidenţă a transcendenţei și a cauzalităţii. În sfârșit, pentru damascius, inefabilul este expresia ultimă a principiului prim, fiind dincolo de dualitatea transcendenţă-cauzalitate; faţă de el, chiar și transcendenţa și cauzalitatea nu sunt decât niște aproximări, niște imagini inadecvate, niște proiecţii ale gândirii noastre. În urma analizei noastre, putem identifica mai multe caracteristici generale ale gândirii neoplatonice, pe care le-am atins, deja, într-o formă sau alta, însă pe care am dori acum să le punem din nou în evidenţă, pentru a sublinia legătura dintre ele. Concluzie 373 Mai precis, este vorba de câteva paradoxuri care au traversat gândirea neoplatonică, fără să o submineze, ci provocând-o în mod constant să adâncească această căutare radicală în care ea s-a angajat. după cum vom vedea, toate aceste paradoxuri ţin de raportul aparte pe care îl are gândirea - ca exerciţiu filozofic propriu-zis - faţă de „obiectul" ei, adică faţă de principiul de dincolo de fiinţă. Primul dintre aceste paradoxuri ţine de faptul că ceea ce caută gândirea neoplatonică se arată a fi de negândit. observăm astfel un raport „instabil" între principiu și gândirea care reflectă acest principiu. Mai precis, este vorba despre faptul că „intriga" acestei teme a principiului prim se naște din întâlnirea a două tipuri de raportare a gândirii faţă de principiu. Pe de o parte, gândirea neoplatonică pornește de la premisa celei mai stricte raţionalităţi, care vrea să explice întreaga realitate, până la concluziile ultime ce se pot obţine; în acest sens, gândirea ajunge să descopere necesitatea existenţei unui principiu unic și absolut unitar, cauză a fiinţei și dincolo de fiinţă. Pe de altă parte, urmând aceeași cerinţă sau pretenţie de raţionalitate, gândirea neoplatonică se vede obligată să continue până la capăt această „descoperire" a sa și să vadă ce înseamnă propriu-zis un astfel de principiu prim, suprafiinţial. Totuși, în acest moment se naște dilema fundamentală a neoplatonismului: încercând să gândească acest principiu absolut unitar, gândirea descoperă că principiul nu mai poate fi absolut simplu și unitar, iar aceasta tocmai în măsura în care îl gândim, sau încercăm să îl gândim. Principiul pe care vrem să-l gândim nu poate fi gândit. din această cauză, are loc acea mișcare tipic neoplatonică, prin care gândirea încearcă să se suprime, sau să suprime ceea ce în ea este inadecvat principiului. Gândirea intră astfel pe terenul celui mai aspru și mai subtil apofatism. Totuși, nici chiar în felul acesta, principiul absolut nu poate fi propriu-zis gândit, iar gândirea filozofică își continuă dubla ei mișcare, de înaintare și retragere, de afirmare și suprimare a propriului ei demers, „tatonând" distanţa care o desparte de principiu. dincolo de fiinȚă374 Astfel, vom fi oricând surprinși de modul în care se întâlnesc în opera lui Plotin pasaje despre necesitatea principiului și rolul său fundamental pentru realitate, respectiv pasaje profund apofatice, în care se arată că principiul nu seamănă cu nici unul dintre lucrurile pe care noi le putem gândi într-un fel sau altul. dar, dacă la Plotin opoziţia dintre cele două atitudini filozofice (a vorbi despre principiu și a suprima orice afirmaţie despre el) nu pare a fi încă problematică, în schimb, ea devine explicit problematică la Porfir. Acesta atribuie unului absolut un rol concret în constituirea fiinţei inteligibile, identificându-l, la limită, cu originea intelectului, deși accentuase el însuși faptul că principiul este dincolo de intelect, neavând nici o legătură cu acesta. la iamblichos, diferenţierea a două ipostaze principiale - cea transcendentă și cea cauzală - pune și mai mult în evidenţă tensiunea unei gândiri care caută principiul, dar nu poate ajunge la el, ci se vede nevoită să asume pentru principiu condiţia celei mai inaccesibile transcendenţe. Proclus încearcă să obţină un echilibru între gândirea și neputinţa (de facto) de a gândi principiul: el vorbește despre discursul negativ (precum cel din prima ipoteză din Parmenide) ca fiind singurul discurs adecvat principiului; totuși, în ultimă instanţă, Proclus însuși arată că acest discurs „cel mai adecvat" principiului este, de fapt, unul care se auto-suprimă, așa cum lasă să se înţeleagă ultima remarcă din această ipoteză. damascius are o altă atitudine faţă de această situare duală și aparent contradictorie a gândirii în faţa principiului, și anume el o asumă ca atare și o propune ca pe o practică în sine, ca pe singura metodă prin care ne putem apropia de principiu: anume prin întreţinerea acestei stări de constantă suprimare a oricărui rest discursiv, a oricărei afirmaţii (implicite sau explicite) din gândirea noastră. Gândirea neoplatonică este astfel una profund problematică; pe de o parte, ea se vede nevoită să își suprime propria înaintare; totuși, pe de altă parte, ea înaintează tocmai prin acest tip de suprimare repetată. Pornind de aici, putem desprinde o a doua caracteristică a gândirii neoplatonice, în raportarea ei la principiul Concluzie 375 prim: este vorba despre faptul că, deși această gândire își recunoaște neputinţa de a surprinde principiul prim, totuși, ea însăși ia naștere pornind de la acest principiu, ea se constituie pornind de la ceea ce ea nu mai poate surprinde. Acesta este un alt paradox al gândirii neoplatonice: ea caută principiul absolut, fără a-l putea atinge vreodată, dar, în același timp, ea însăși depinde, în ultimă instanţă, de acest principiu, și nu se poate constitui în absenţa lui, în ignorarea lui „a priori". Se instituie astfel un soi de circularitate, în sensul că gândirea caută principiul, dar, în același timp, acest principiu este principiul gândirii înseși care îl caută. Altfel spus, gândirea care caută principiul se poate constitui numai pornind de la acest principiu - și tocmai de aici vine impresia de circularitate. Problema aceasta apare încă de la Plotin, și anume în privinţa raportul dintre unu și intelect (ca gândire primă și cea mai simplă): așa cum am văzut, Plotin ajunge să gândească unul, deducându-l într-un fel din însăși pluralitatea implicită intelectului; totuși, pe de altă parte, el gândește intelectul în dependenţă de unul anterior, ca o încercare constantă de a reflecta unitatea absolută. Astfel, este la limită imposibil să stabilim o ordine logică între gândirea care se îndreaptă spre principiu (în ipostaza ei cea mai înaltă, de gândire a intelectului divin) și principiul gândirii (adică această unitate absolută, în jurul căreia se constituie gândirea). este imposibil de stabilit o anterioritate logică (în ordinea discursului însuși al lui Plotin) între gândirea care își caută principiul și principiul care dă naștere gândirii. Totuși, acest paradox - al unei gândiri care caută (și descoperă, într-un fel) principiul, respectiv depinde de acest principiu - nu reprezintă un eșec sau o contradicţie, ci este un paradox „bun" și prolific, specific celei mai autentice gândiri filozofice. Astfel, gândirea autentică se naște din încercarea radicală de a duce lucrurile până la capăt, de a le urmări până la concluziile ultime. iar concluzia ultimă a gândirii neoplatonice este tocmai existenţa principiului absolut, de dincolo de fiinţă și de gândire. Întrebându-se ce înseamnă a gândi sau cum arată în sine însăși gândirea cea mai înaltă și mai dincolo de fiinȚă376 pură, filozofii neoplatonici ajung la concluzia că gândirea (inclusiv în ipostaza ei de gândire unitară, inteligibilă) trimite spre un principiu absolut, anterior ei, fără de care gândirea însăși s-ar disipa într-o pluralitate fără limită și fără sens. Astfel, gândirea autentică, dusă până la capăt, este tocmai cea care caută principiul prim, iar aceasta este singura care se poate pune pe sine sub un principiu. A căuta principiul nu este o altă mișcare, secundă faţă de aceea de a depinde de principiu, ci este însăși mișcarea prin care gândirea se pune pe sine sub propriul ei principiu. În fond, ceea ce caută această gândire este ceea ce fundamentează gândirea însăși, depășind-o. Pornind de aici, putem puncta o a treia caracteristică paradoxală a neoplatonismului, care ţine de faptul că, deși tinde spre principiu și depinde de principiul anterior ei, de fapt, gândirea nu poate exprima nici măcar această anterioritate. despre ce este vorba? Gândirea descoperă în primă instanţă necesitatea unui principiu care depășește gândirea; totuși, într-o a doua instanţă și la o analiză mai nuanţată, se observă că această depășire însăși nu poate fi surprinsă propriu-zis, nu poate fi exprimată în mod adecvat, deoarece afirmarea anteriorităţii atrage cu sine o formă de gândire. chiar dacă spunem că principiul este de negândit, noi îl gândim deja într-un fel indirect și nu putem, la drept vorbind, să exprimăm anterioritatea sa absolută. Gândirea însăși pare a fi „trasă în sus", în această încercare de a sugera pe cel de dincolo; ea este deja prezentă în încercarea sa de a sugera pe cel anterior gândirii. Acest al treilea paradox constă așadar în aceea că, deși știm că principiul nu poate fi gândit, totuși, observăm că despre principiu nu putem afirma în mod valid nici măcar faptul că este de negândit. Acest lucru este cauza pentru care, de-a lungul tradiţiei neoplatonice, se face simţit un fel de decalaj între cele două laturi ale problemei principiului, mai precis între anterioritatea sa faţă de fiinţă, respectiv faţă de gândire. este adevărat că aceste două laturi nu pot fi niciodată izolate. la Plotin, ele aveau un echilibru foarte strâns, principiul fiind gândit ca dincolo de fiinţa inteligibilă, respectiv de gândirea cea mai unitară, adică gândirea Concluzie 377 fiinţei veritabile. În schimb, după Plotin, raportul începe să se schimbe, neoplatonismul tardiv operând o „migrare" a accentului de la dincolo de fiinţă la dincolo de gândire. cum se face această trecere? În neoplatonismul tardiv, între principiul prim și fiinţa propriu-zisă se interpun mai multe niveluri intermediare, care „pregătesc" apariţia fiinţei (de pildă henadele la Proclus și damascius). În consecinţă, fiinţa este astfel deja „depășită", nu numai de principiul prim, ci chiar și de henadele acestuia. În felul acesta, dincolo de fiinţă pare a fi lăsat în urmă; în schimb, anterioritatea cea mai radicală pe care și-o dispută principiul absolut este aceea faţă de gândire. Problema care pare mai greu de rezolvat este aceea a depășirii gândirii: oricâte niveluri am identifica între fiinţă (spaţiul propriu-zis al gândirii) și principiu, totuși, gândirea însăși își face simţită prezenţa la oricare dintre aceste niveluri. Mai mult, chiar și principiul este încă gândit ca principiu, astfel încât, oricât am întări transcendenţa sa, continuăm să îl gândim ca atare. Transcendenţa faţă de gândire este cel mai greu de impus. Tocmai de aceea, ultimul diadoh atenian va insista foarte mult asupra acestui aspect, încercând să găsească o manieră de a ieși din acest paradox, din aceste chingi ale gândirii, și de a sugera pe cel de dincolo. o dată cu această migrare a accentului de la dincolo de fiinţă la dincolo de gândire, observăm și că gândirea despre care este vorba la sfârșitul neoplatonismului nu mai este în primul rând cea unitară a intelectului divin, așa cum se întâmpla la Plotin, ci este gândirea umană, discursivă. de aceea, dificultatea cea mai mare va fi aceea de a impune un principiu absolut, care este dincolo de gândirea umană, mai precis, dincolo de orice expresie discursivă pe care această gândire o poate oferi principiului. dacă la Plotin unul era dincolo de gândire, adică dincolo de gândirea cea mai înaltă, a intelectului divin, în schimb, o dată ce apare problema celor două aspecte ale principiului - cauzal și transcendent - începe să se pună un mai mare accent pe felul în care gândirea noastră discursivă percepe principiul, deoarece însuși acest mod al nostru de a gândi este cel care introduce acesdincolo de fiinȚă378 te contradicţii, „coborând" principiul în ceea ce îi este inferior. Poate tocmai de aceea, la Plotin nu apare propriu-zis problema distincţiei dintre cauzalitate și transcendenţă: deoarece transcendenţa principiului se situa la alt nivel (anume faţă de gândirea intelectului divin, non-discursivă), pe când ceea ce spunem noi în discurs (când spunem de pildă că principiul este cauza tuturor lucrurilor) nu afectează cu nimic principiul însuși. În schimb, neoplatonismul ulterior a dus până la capăt această problemă: cum să vorbești despre un principiu pe care gândirea nu îl poate cuprinde, dar de la care nici nu se poate da înapoi, pentru a lăsa evidentă această imposibilitate însăși de a-l gândi? la sfârșitul neoplatonismului, problema cea mai grea nu mai este aceea de a găsi o manieră adecvată de a vorbi despre principiu, ci aceea de a găsi o manieră adecvată de a sugera imposibilitatea de a gândi principiul. Astfel, imposibilitatea absolută a gândirii devine tema ei principală. Această imposibilitate este „vânată" neîncetat, fără însă a fi vreodată exprimată făţiș. ne amintim că, la Platon, acest „dincolo de fiinţă" nu a fost niciodată tematizat propriu-zis, ci rămâne neexplicit, poate tocmai din cauza dificultăţii pe care o resimţea Socrate privind faptul de a vorbi despre așa ceva. În schimb, în neoplatonism, acest dincolo devine „explicit", gândirea încearcă să îl prindă într-un fel. În consecinţă - într-o manieră răsturnată, dar complementară faţă de atitudinea socratică -, dificultatea ultimă în care sfârșește neoplatonismul nu mai este că nu se poate vorbi despre așa ceva, ci că nu se poate afirma în mod valid nici măcar imposibilitatea de a vorbi despre așa ceva. În concluzie, triplul paradoxul al gândirii - pe care neoplatonismul îl experimentează - constă în aceea că gândirea depinde de un principiu pe care nu îl poate gândi, despre care nu poate spune propriu-zis nici măcar că nu îl poate gândi, dar pe care, totuși, ea îl caută, tocmai pentru că în această căutare se constituie gândirea însăși, propriu-zisă, cea care își dă ca scop descoperirea fundamentelor sale ultime. Tocmai acest paradox explică evoluţia contorsionată a neoplatonismului, pe care am încercat să o punem în evidenţă în Concluzie 379 această carte. Astfel, analiza noastră a arătat că ideea unui principiu de dincolo de fiinţă nu are un profil unitar și monoton. din contră, fiind vorba de o idee în ea însăși problematică și greu de asimilat la nivelul gândirii, ea a dat naștere multor dispute interpretative, de la o generaţie la alta de gânditori neoplatonici. În plus, firul problematic al lui dincolo de fiinţă se leagă cu probleme care apar pe parcurs - precum cea a distincţiei dintre transcendenţă și cauzalitate, sau aceea a intermediarelor prin care se poate ajunge de la principiul absolut la fiinţa propriu-zisă și la pluralitatea desfășurată - iar aceste probleme nuanţează și mai mult și adâncesc problema de bază, a principiului de dincolo de fiinţă. Astfel, problema principiului de dincolo de fiinţă nu este aceeaşi, de la începutul până la sfârșitul tradiţiei. ea nu se poate reda ca o doctrină fundamentală, neschimbată. Mai degrabă, profilul ei este acela al unei încercări din ce în ce mai disperate, mai încrâncenate, de a descoperi o manieră de gândire care să iasă din spaţiul coordonării, al totului. de ce este nevoie de o astfel de ieșire? Tocmai pentru că gândirea noastră are în ea însăși tendinţa de a-și căuta un principiu al său, un termen ultim, care să nu mai aibă nevoie de altceva din afara lui pentru a fi explicat. În exerciţiul neîncetat al gândirii - care constă în cele din urmă în a lega un lucru de altul, de o cauză sau o raţiune a lui -, întreaga realitate este traversată în căutarea unui termen auto-suficient. Acesta se impune a fi în afara reţelei de relaţii în care un lucru este explicat prin altul. el se arată a fi dincolo de gândire şi dincolo de fiinţă. Totuși, în felul acesta, acest termen însuși nu mai poate fi gândit în sine, ci doar prin diverse maniere indirecte, pe care neoplatonicii au încercat să le descopere. desigur, nu este vorba de a gândi ceea ce e de negândit, ci doar de a păstra gândirea noastră însăși cât mai mult în preajma acestui principiu, cât mai conștientă de existenţa acestuia. Tocmai de aceea, discuţiile și disputele despre principiul de dincolo de fiinţă au avut forma unor critici suprapuse, de la un filozof la altul. Astfel, încercând să dea o expresie discursivă acestui principiu de dincolo de fiinţă, fiecare filozof lucrează cu maniere de exprimare inevitabil dincolo de fiinȚă380 inadecvate principiului. dar miza căutării principiului nu este aceea de a-l prinde o dată pentru totdeauna într-o descriere adecvată, ci mai degrabă aceea de a elibera terenul gândirii noastre plurale, pentru a o face conștientă de prezenţa principiului unitar, de dincolo de gândire. Tocmai de aceea, de multe ori, ceea ce admite un filozof devine materia analizei urmă to rului filozof, în sensul în care acesta din urmă ajunge să critice ceea ce a admis cel dinainte, pentru a adânci problema, pentru a spori „sensibilitatea" gândirii noastre faţă de principiu. dar atunci, acest fel de critică nu se referă la lucruri „greșite", pe care un alt filozof le-ar corecta, ci ea ţine de maniera însăși a gândirii, care se depășește pe sine, înspre principiul de dincolo. Mai mult decât atât, filozofii ajung nu doar să critice ceea ce admit cei dinaintea lor, ci și ceea ce admit ei înșiși, într-o anumită perioadă a gândirii lor. Gândirea neoplatonică este astfel o continuă luptă pentru absolut; deși se știe că miza căutată e dincolo de discurs, totuși, lupta aceasta se dă în discurs, prin căutarea unei expresii cât mai apropiate de principiul inexprimabil. Astfel, problema lui dincolo de fiinţă nu este una neutră, ci ea se desfășoară tocmai în încercarea gândirii de a depăși de fiecare dată ceea ce a fost admis mai înainte. Dincolo de fiinţă leagă astfel o tradiţie de depășiri succesive, de căutări din ce în ce mai înalte. În problema aceasta nu există afirmaţii ultime, pe care vreun filozof să nu le fi atacat, să nu le fi luat ca punct de pornire spre o expresie și mai înaltă a acestei depășiri a fiinţei și a gândirii. 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Harries (ed.), The Significance of Neoplatonism, old dominion University, norfolk, Virginia, 1976, pp. 155–172 Whittaker, Thomas, The Neo-Platonists: a study in the history of Hellenism, Thoemmes, Bristol, 1993 cUPRinS Introducere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Partea întâi PReMiSele Şi GeneZA PRoBleMATicii PRinciPiUlUi PRiM: PloTin capitolul 1: Principiul de dincolo de fiinţă. Constituirea unei tradiţii . . . . . 25 A. Platon şi depăşirea fiinţei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 B. Plotin şi structura realităţii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 c. Înainte şi după Platon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 d. Percepţia neoplatonică asupra tradiţiei . . . . . . . . . . 41 capitolul 2: Unul din lucrurile individuale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 A. Unul este diferit de fiinţă - polemica anti-aristotelică . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 B. Anterioritatea unului faţă de gândire. Polemica anti-stoică. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 capitolul 3: Unul inteligibil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 A. numărul din lumea sensibilă şi numărul din lumea inteligibilă . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 B. numărul inteligibil anterior pluralităţii inteligibile a fiinţei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 c. Unul anterior fiinţei în inteligibil . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 cUPRinS402 capitolul 4: De la unul intelectului la unul absolut: critica lui Plotin la Aristotel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 A. Unitatea intelectului la Plotin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 B. Pluralitatea intelectului . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 c. intelectul nu este unul absolut, ci doar priveşte spre acesta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 capitolul 5: Unul absolut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 A. Plotin şi „dublul paricid" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 B. dincolo de fiinţă - TMpškeina tÁj oÙs...aj. . . . . . . 109 c. Sensurile lui „dincolo de fiinţă" la Plotin . . . . . . . . . 119 d. Paradoxul lui „dincolo de fiinţă şi de gândire" . . . . . . 151 Partea a doua: eVolUţiA PRoBleMei PRinciPiUlUi PRiM dUPă PloTin: PoRfiR, iAMBlicHoS Şi PRoclUS capitolul 1: Problema unui principiu de dincolo de fiinţă la Porfir . . . . . . 165 A. Textele lui Porfir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 B. Sursa plotiniană a problemei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 c. „nemulţumirea" lui damascius. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 d. coordonat sau necoordonat? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 e. Proclus şi damascius despre Porfir . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 capitolul 2: Iamblichos şi problema principiilor de dincolo de fiinţă . . . . . . 203 A. Perspectiva lui iamblichos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 B. interpretarea primei ipoteze platonice. . . . . . . . . . . 210 c. iamblichos şi principiul indicibil . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 capitolul 3: Proclus şi principiul de dincolo de fiinţă ca transcendenţă şi cauzalitate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 A. necesitatea principiului de dincolo de fiinţă . . . . . . . 239 cUPRinS 403 B. Transcendenţa principiului faţă de fiinţă . . . . . . . . . 244 c. Transcendenţa devine cauzalitate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 d. Principiul inexprimabil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 e. Unul imparticipabil şi henadele . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Partea a treia: dAMASciUS Şi PRinciPiUl inefABil capitolul 1: Aporia principiului de dincolo de totul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 A. Situaţia problemei înainte de damascius . . . . . . . . . 277 B. damascius şi dubla aporie a principiului unic. . . . . . . 279 c. „Unul-tot anterior totului" şi ieşirea parţială din aporie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 d. Recurenţa aporiei. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 capitolul 2: De la aporia principiului la principiul necoordonat . . . . . . . . 302 A. divinaţia unui principiu necoordonat . . . . . . . . . . 302 B. Suprimarea discursului . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 c. Trecerea înspre nimic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 d. Travaliile gândirii înspre principiul necoordonat . . . . . 328 capitolul 3: Principiul inefabil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 A. inefabilul înainte de damascius. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 B. damascius şi inefabilul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346 c. inefabilul şi ierarhia principiilor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 Concluzie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369 Bibliografie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Availability: Paperback & electronic (pdf ) Publication date: 10 Sept 2009 Size: 6 x 8.65 in Pages: 468 language: french iSBn: 978-973-1997-32-2 (paperback) iSBn: 978-973-1997-33-9 (ebook) Paperback: 27 eUR (shipping not included) eBook individuals: 9 eUR eBook institutions: 90 eUR franz-emmanuel Schürch Le Savoir en appel Heidegger et le tournant dans la vérité Series: foundations of Modern Thought, vol. 2 Availability: Paperback & electronic (pdf ) Publication date: november 2010 Size: 13 x 20 cm Pages: 360 language: french iSBn: 978-973-1997-83-4 (paperback) iSBn: 978-973-1997-84-1 (ebook) Paperback: 23 eUR (shipping not included) eBook individuals: 9 eUR eBook institutions: 90 eUR claudiu Gaiu La prudence de l'homme d'esprit L'éthique de Pierre Charron Préface de denis Kambouchner 51 B-dul coposu ap. 48, Bucharest Ro-030604, Romania Tel. (004) 0733046689 fax. (004) 0318166779 www.zetabooks.com [email protected] ¤

////// recenze //////////////// ANOMÁLIE A METODOLOGIE VĚDY Vladimír Havlík. Anomálie, ad hoc hypotézy a temné stránky kosmologie. Plzeň: Západočeská univerzita v Plzni, 2015, 165 stran. Peter Sýkora Cieľ Havlíkovej monografi e Anomálie, ad hoc hypotézy a temné stránky kosmologie je veľmi ambiciózny – pokúsiť sa pomocou metametodologickej analýzy konkrétneho kruciálneho problému v súčasnej kozmológii (temná hmota a temná energia) vytvoriť preskriptívnu metodológiu vedy. Inými slovami, ponúknuť vedcom metodologické „know-how", ktoré by im malo pomôcť vyrovnávať sa s tzv. anomáliami, čiže neočakávanými empirickými zisteniami, ktoré sú v rozpore s etablovanou teóriou („paradigmou"). Na anomálie vedci reagujú vytváraním tzv. ad hoc hypotéz. Pokiaľ anomálie neignorujú, pretože ich nepovažujú za signifi kantné (napr. možná chyba merania) alebo z čisto pragmatických dôvodov nechcú riskovať zavrhnutie už dobre etablovanej teórie. S tak ambicióznym cieľom sa v českom a slovenskom fi lozofi ckom prostredí stretávame veľmi ojedinele a preto treba oceniť autorovu odvahu. Aj keď sa nakoniec ukáže, že tento cieľ možno ani nie je možné naplniť v dôsledku tzv. neeliminovateľnosti metodologickej bezradnosti, ponúka svojou analýzou špecifi ckého charakteru súčasnej kozmológie náznak, ako sa pohnúť ďalej. Kniha pozostáva z úvodu, piatich častí a súhrnu v angličtine. V prvej časti (13–26) autor vysvetľuje, čo sú vedecké anomálie a ad hoc hypotézy. V druhej (27–72) sa snaží odpovedať na otázku, či existujú presné kritériá pre ad hoc hypotézy. V tretej časti (73–123) konfrontuje možnosti vysvetliť empiricky pozorované anomálie štandardného kozmologického modelu pomocou ad hoc hypotéz, predovšetkým hypotéz o temnej hmote a temnej energii. V štvrtej časti (125–39) autor identifi kuje tri dôležité aspekty súčasnej vedy, ktoré je potrebné vziať do úvahy pri posudzovaní vzťahu medzi anomáliami, teóriou a ad hoc hypotézami: previazanosť, empirickosť a simuláciu. A napokon v piatej časti (141–50) sa autor pokúša načrtnúť nové, ekosystémové poňatie vedy. Predovšetkým musím zdôrazniť, že autorovi sa v práci skvele podarilo ukázať na viacerých príkladoch a vo viacerých kontextoch, že problém ad hoc hypotéz je pre metodológiu vedy fundamentálny. Dnešná situácia je taká, že viaceré medzi sebou súťažiace a dobre etablované metodológie vedy fakticky miscelanea 131 rezignovali na svoju preskriptívnu úlohu. Metodológia by z defi nície mala byť predovšetkým pomôckou pre vedcov ako robiť vedu, resp. ako ju robiť lepšie, ale v skutočnosti sa metodológie vedy sústreďujú už len na deskripciu vedeckého vývoja ex post, i keď stále s cieľom pochopiť jeho vnútornú logiku. Pokiaľ vedecké metodológie nemajú byť len históriami vedeckého bádania, či povedané ešte ráznejšie slovami autora, „verbálnou symbolikou" (109), potom musia byť schopné ponúknuť vedcom metodiku, vďaka ktorej by bolo možné odlíšiť, či konkrétna anomália si vyžaduje len kozmetické úpravy etablovanej teórie pomocou ad hoc hypotéz alebo prijatie alternatívnej teórie, pokiaľ takáto teória už existuje alebo ju treba ešte len vytvoriť. Za exemplárny príklad z kozmológie, na ktorom chce Havlík otestovať etablované metodológie čo do ich preskriptívnej schopnosti, si autor vyberá ad hoc hypotézy tzv. temnej hmoty a temnej energie. Základnou otázkou, na ktorú sa snaží nájsť odpoveď je, či metodológia vedy je vôbec schopná nájsť a odporučiť vedcom preskriptívnu metodológiu, ktorá by im pomohla rozlíšiť napríklad medzi rôznymi druhmi ad hoc hypotéz, medzi tými, ktoré sú úplne nesprávne, a tými, ktoré len modifi kujú teóriu, či tými, ktoré sú dôvodom pre vytvorenie novej teórie. Za veľmi správne rozhodnutie považujem autorov zámer sústrediť sa len na jeden konkrétny, ale pritom fundamentálny vedecký problém a na ňom demonštrovať metodologické ťažkosti s anomáliami. V tomto prípade ide o empiricky pozorované anomálie, ako je napr. zrýchľovanie pohybu galaxií alebo ich rotácia, ktoré sú v rozpore s predikciami štandardného modelu vesmíru. Sústredenie sa na jeden vedecký problém umožňuje autorovi ísť v analýze do potrebnej hĺbky. Obdivuhodná je autorova orientovanosť v súčasných problémoch kozmológie, oboznámenosť s najnovšími empirickými poznatkami a hypotézami, ktoré súvisia s problémom temnej hmoty a temnej energie. Havlík hľadá analógiu medzi riešením obdobných problémov s anomáliami vo fyzike, astronómii a kozmológii v minulosti a riešením súčasného problému temnej hmoty a temnej energie. Ide o veľmi detailnú a značne sofi stikovanú komparáciu, pretože autor porovnáva nielen to, ako sa rôzne tradičné metodológie vedy vyrovnávajú s anomáliami pri ex post vysvetľovaní vývoja vedeckého poznania, ale súčasne ich konfrontuje medzi sebou navzájom. V pozadí všetkého tohto úsilia je všadeprítomná autorova snaha nájsť analógiu medzi postulovaním ad hoc hypotéz v minulosti (medzi ktorými vieme diferencovať) miscellanea 132 a dnešným postulovaním nových ad hoc hypotéz (medzi ktorými diferencovať nevieme). Nájsť nejaký princíp, podľa ktorého by bolo možné dopredu vedieť, či ad hoc hypotéza akou je navrhovaná nová fyzikálna entita sa ukáže byť správnou (ako to bolo v prípade planéty Neptún alebo Higgsovho bozónu) alebo omylom (ako v prípade hypotetickej planéty Vulkán, či fl ogistónu). Ad hoc riešenia sa v tradičných metodológiach vedy netešia veľkej podpore. Výnimkou je Lakatosov model výskumných programov. V jeho metodologickom modeli anomálie zohrávajú dôležitú úlohu, pretože vďaka tomu ako teórie reagujú na anomálie je možné rozpoznať v akej etape sa nachádza výskumný program – či v stagnujúcej alebo progresívnej. Havlík si preto kladie otázku, či by Lakatosova metodológia nemohla pomôcť v predexplanačnej situácii? Testuje túto možnosť na svojom príklade ad hoc hypotézy temnej hmoty a štandardného kozmologického modelu. Ukazuje sa, že Lakatosova metodológia, pokiaľ ju Havlík zmodifi kuje tak, že začne rozlišovať medzi aproximatívnymi a neaproximatívnymi zmenami vo vývoji výskumného programu („vedeckej teórie") je schopná prekonať svoju neschopnosť rozlišovať medzi ad hoc hypotézami, ktoré patria do ochranného pásu teórie alebo k jej jadru. Žiaľ, ukáže sa, že preskriptívna neschopnosť metodológie sa takýmto spôsobom nedá eliminovať, dokonca sa nedá eliminovať vôbec („neeliminovatelnost metodologické bezradnosti"). Havlík potom v súlade so súčasnými trendami vo fi lozofi i vedy a epistemológii upozorňuje, že na rozdiel od presvedčenia vedcov, nemôže to byť empíria, ktorá rozhodne, ktoré z alternatívnych riešení je správne. V tejto súvislosti autor poukazuje na Duhemovu koncepciu teoreticky zaťaženého pozorovania (theory-ladeness). „[N]ezbýva nám tedy než přijmout závěr, že moderní metodologie nijak nepřekonávají Duhemovy postřehy o nemožnosti rozhodnout o platnosti kompetetívních hypotéz empirickým testem [...]," (122) konštatuje Havlík. Tu mi nedá, aby som sa ako bývalý experimentálny vedec na chvíľu nezastavil. Skutočne môžeme s takou „neznesiteľnou ľahkosťou bytia" ako sa to dnes vo fi lozofi i vedy bežne robí, zavrhnúť kľúčovú úlohu empirického zistenia (rešpektujúc jeho komplexnosť a previazanosť s teóriou) v rozhodovaní medzi teoretickými alternatívami? Vezmime si problém temnej hmoty. Samotná vedecká prax súčasných kozmológov jasne demonštruje aký veľký dôraz kladú na samotné empirické pozorovania. Absencia očakávaných meraní vedie k vývoju citlivejších detektorov alebo nových ad hoc hypotéz či dokonca k návrhom opustenia celej paradigmy. Pekne miscelanea 133 túto pluralitu možných riešení anomálií ilustruje aj najnovší vývoj v hľadaní temnej hmoty z roku 2017 ako o ňom referujú prestížne vedecké časopisy Science a Nature. Kým na jednej strane dve nezávisle skupiny vedcov oznámili (podľa New Scientist z 9. októbra 2017 dokonca „defi nitívne") nájdenie temnej hmoty,1 na druhej strane vedci ventilujú svoju frustrovanosť z toho, že sa im zatiaľ napriek veľkému úsiliu a novým špecializovaným prístrojom nepodarilo temnú hmotu detegovať2 volaním po úplne novej teórii. Napriek mnohým teoretickým alternatívnym riešeniam empirické zistenia stále zohrávajú v diskurze o rozhodovaní medzi alternatívami kľúčovú úlohu, pretože aj v prípade nových ad hoc hypotéz či novej teórie budú mať posledné slovo zase len empirické merania. Nakoniec, ani Havlík sa neuspokojuje so spomínanou nemožnosťou rozhodnúť medzi hypotézami empirickým testom a navrhuje, aj keď len v náznakoch, novú ekosystémovú koncepciu vedy, ktorá má tento problém preklenúť. A tak 1 Adam Mann, „Astronomers Say Th ey've Found Many of the Universe's Missing Atoms," in Science, navštíveno 15. 11. 2017, http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/10/ astronomers-say-they-ve-found-many-universe-s-missing-atoms. 2 Elizabeth Gibney, „Dark-Matter Hunt Comes up Empty," Nature 551, č. 7679 (2017): 153–54. na jednej strane Havlík potvrdzuje tézu o prepojení teórie a experimentu, na druhej strane hovorí o jej prekročení. Má tu na mysli akýsi druh bootstrappingu, kde teória a empíria (pozorovanie, meranie alebo experiment) sa vzájomne dynamicky preplietajú, pričom sa anomália stáva akýmsi korekčným ovládačom parametrizácie teoretického modelu (145). Podľa Havlíka modernú vedu charakterizuje previazanosť, empirickosť a simulácia. Nemá na mysli len tesnú previazanosť s inými odbormi prírodných vied, ale previazanosť priam ontologická, pripomínajúca previazanosť (entanglement) akú poznáme v kvantovej fyzike. Pod empirickosťou má Havlík na mysli stále sofi stikovanejšie a viac na teórii závislé spôsoby rozširovania našej empirickej skúsenosti. A nakoniec, pod simuláciou má na mysli význam, ktorý zohráva vo vedeckom výskume dnes modelovanie v počítači. Na základe tohto všetkého autor dospieva k novému ekosystémovej koncepcii vedy. Ide skôr o akýsi manifest vedy ako sebaštrukturujúceho sa komplexného systému. Pre problematiku preskripčnej schopnosti metodológie vedy, hľadanie návodu ako rozlišovať medzi ad hoc hypotézami, však už táto koncepcia nič konkrétne neponúka. Havlíkova monografi a Anomálie, ad hoc hypotézy a temné stránky miscellanea 134 kosmologie je napísaná vysoko kultivovaným odborným jazykom, ktorý niekde zachádza do úzko špecializovaného terminologického slovníka modernej kozmológie. Napriek tomu problémovo orientovaná a koherentne vystavaná štruktúra knihy, napísaná pútavým a dynamickým štýlom robí z jej čítania zážitok nie nepodobný čítaniu dobrej detektívky. A to sa dá povedať len o veľmi málo knihách z oblasti fi lozofi e a metodológie vedy. ////// recenze //////////////// PROLEGOMENA K NĚKTERÝM PŘÍŠTÍM TEORIÍM POJMU Pavel Materna. Hovory o pojmu. Praha: Academia, 2016, 158 stran. Ivo Pezlar Teorie pojmu je fi losofi cké téma, které stále přitahuje pozornost odborného publika. Profesor Materna se ve své nové knize Hovory o pojmu ovšem pokouší zaujmout obecenstvo mnohem širší. Předpoklady k tomu má výborné, 1 avšak napsat 1 Autor se tématu pojmů věnuje dlouhodobě, viz např. Pavel Materna, Svět pojmů a logika (Praha: Filosofi a, 1995); Pavel Materna, Concepts and Objects (Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica, 1998); Pavel Materna, Conceptual Systems (Berlin: Logos dobrý popularizační text je vždy výzvou. A to platí dvojnásob, je-li přitom užita Tichého transparentní intenzionální logika (krátce TIL). Autor hned ze začátku upozorňuje, že se nejedná o „standardní vědeckou práci" (13–14) a že on sám bude „úmyslně jednostranný" (14) k TIL. Limitace takového přístupu jsou zřejmé, na druhou stranu to autorovi umožňuje naplno se věnovat výkladu své teorie. Hovory o pojmu dávají čtenáři k nahlédnutí střípky velmi ambiciózního díla. Na konceptuální rovině dochází ke ztotožnění pojmů, TIL konstrukcí, abstraktních procedur (algoritmů), významů a problémů. V praxi to znamená, že např. TIL konstrukci zvanou kompozice [0 + 05 07] můžeme současně chápat jako pojem „sčítání 5 a 7", proceduru „sečti 5 a 7", význam výrazu ‚5 + 7' a jako problém „kolik je 5 + 7?". Pojem je tedy vysvětlen jako konstrukce, resp. konstrukce bez volných proměnných, tzv. uzavřená konstrukce (88). Tato explikace je na první pohled rozhodně schopná vyvolat pocity jistého neuspokojení, ba až zklamání. A to, domnívám se, platí obzvláště v případě, setkáváme-li se s TIL poprvé: termín Verlag, 2004); Marie Duží, Bjørn Jespersen a Pavel Materna, Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010). miscelanea

A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 1 | P a g e International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature Vol. 3, Issue 2, Feb 2016 IF2.255 ISSN: (2394-1642) © Associated Asia Research Foundation (AARF) Publication Website: www.aarf.asia Email : [email protected] , [email protected] PRESUPPOSITIONS AS REQUIRED LEXICOGRAPHIC SUPPLIED UTTERANCES FOR UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DISCOURSE Mustafa Shazali Mustafa Ahmed Nile Valley University/Sudan ABSTRACT The main point of this paper is to find new ways for describing the linguistic pragmatic inference of presupposition. The data of this study is driven empirically from two selected dictionaries as a purposeful sampling The first, is "A dictionary of Islamic Juristic Terminologies" , written in English language by Al Busiari ( 2007) The second one is " A Dictionary of Philosophy" translated from Russian into English language by Dixon and Saifulin ( 1967) . All the philosophical literature on this subject have dealt with it as a heterogeneous collection of semantics, and other varieties of pragmatic implication .The present study adopts Ahmed's(2011) double system of linguistic structures "illustrate" , and what is actually conveyed by these same linguistic structures, "extend" to solve the problem of literal senseequivalents, and non-existed equivalents in the target language . Also , the study, and by investigating two entries from each dictionary mentioned above is potentially revealing "how source language knowledge", is presupposed by the conventional structures of the target language sentences in question. These presupposition dictionaries' entries proposed are not like any of the different types of the known "Encyclopedic entries. These 'lexicosuppositions dictionaries ( if this coinage is appropriate ) are balancing entries for the nonexisted, or with only literal sense terms,( knowledge) in the target language by which the dictionary is written to make sure that these particular terms are likewise what they are intended by the source languages' audiences . Keywords: lexicographic, pragmatics, presupposition, semantics, target language., utterances . A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 2 | P a g e Introduction: In his attempt to justify that presupposition structures cannot be thought of as only semantics, Levinson (1983,p.167) assumes that language structures are commonly based on certain contextual assumptions which can clearly be seen in the cooperativeness of participants in a conversation. He (1983, p.168) showed two types of presuppositions. That is, presupposition can either be used in its ordinary sense, or it is used technically as in the following : "... What these examples have in common is that they use the ordinary language notion of presupposition to describe any of background assumption against which an action, theory, expression or utterance makes sense or is rational. In contrast, the technical sense of presupposition is restricted to certain pragmatic inferences or assumptions that seem at least to be built into linguistic expressions and which can be isolated using specific linguistic tests (especially, traditionally, constancy under negation", ...( p. 168) These views of presupposition are, after all, still, scope out this inference as semantics, as well as pragmatics fields. There are other research findings on the topic, also, minimized this inference to include linguistic structures of sentences and conversations. For example, Kärttunen and Peter (1977) see it as conventional implicatures. Kempson( 1975), and Wilson (1985) reduce it to matters of entailment and conversational implicatures. In addition presupposition was a central issue in linguistic theory during the period 1969-1976, because it provided forward opposing propositions to all kinds of generative linguistic theories prevailing at that time. The inference thus also been linked to definite description; factive verbs; imperative verbs; change of state verbs; iteratives, verbs of judging; temporal clauses; cleft sentences; implicit clefts with stressed constituents; comparisons and contrasts; non-restrictive relative clauses; counterfactual conditionals; and questions ( see Levinson's , 1983, pp. 84-181) list of examples for more details. All the above grammatical items were considered as presupposition – triggers by Kaspersky and Kaspersky (1971), Fillmore (1971), Lyons (1977), Katz (1972). Some of these examples are selected ,here,. as a sentence followed immediately by its presupposition ( between brackets) as in the following : 1.John saw/ did not see the man with two heads. (There exist a man with two heads) 2.John realized/did not realize that he was in debt. A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 3 | P a g e (John was in debt) 3/John managed/ did not manage to open the door. (John tried to open the door) 4. John stopped/ did not stop beating his wife. (John had been beating his wife) 5. The flying saucer came / did not come again (The flying saucer came before ) 6. Agatha accused/ did not accuse Ian of plagiarism (Agatha thinks ) plagiarism is bad 7. Before Strawson was even born , Frege noticed/ did not notice presupposition ( Strawson was born ) 8. It was / wasn't Henry that kissed Rosie. ( someone kissed Rosie) 9. Linguistics wasn't invented by CHOMSKEY! ( someone invented linguistics ) 10. Marianne called Adolph a male chauvinist , and then HE insult HER ( For Marianne to call Adolph a male chauvinist would be to insult him ) 11. The ProtoHarrappans , who flourished 2800-2650 B.C. , were / were not great temple builder ( The ProtoHarrappans flourished 2800-2650 B.C.) 12. If Hannibals had only had twelve more elephants , the Romance languages would/ would not this day exist. ( Hannibal didn't have twelve more elephants) 13. Who is the professor of linguistics at MIT? ( Someone is the professor of linguistics at MIT) Again, one of the strongest controversy against generative theories is Karttunen's quoted in Levinson's (1983, p.181) notion of blocking and filtering of the presupposition inference which appears in the following examples. If I have a wife, then my wife is blonde. If it's already 4 a.m., then my wife is probably angry. Here, the first clause of the conditional in the first sentence does not imply that I have a wife; therefore, the inferred presupposition is blocked. The conditional in the second sentence acts as a filter for the presupposition that is triggered by the expression in its consequent clause. A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 4 | P a g e Presupposition inference has also been linked to linguistic pragmatics in items like social deixis, conventional and conversational implicatures, to Searle's (1969) notion of felicity condition within the theory of speech acts, and as two set, of a sentence background and foreground entailments. Here, it is assumed that the sentence background entailments remains as it is, while, the sentence foreground entailments keeps changing by providing new information to the background, in order to convey what is intended by the producer of the utterance in question. Example for this is taken from Levinson (1983, p. 179). John, who is a good friend of mine, regrets that he stopped doing linguistic, before he left Cambridge. Levinson's (1983, p. 180) natural questions on the subject: 'what are the structure and lexemes that give rise to presuppositions?,'' do they have anything in common?' ,' why do some linguistic items have such inferences built into them and not the others?' and so forth, have provided so intricate, sophisticated views. These views listed this inference with logical implication Frege.(trans.1952), assertion (Strawson, 1952), relation between sentences (Frege trans.1952), or statements (Strawson), or relation between speakers and their assumptions etc. There are, but a few, new attempts which conjoined the inference of presupposition with syntactic processes, sociolinguistics, and psycholinguistics (See, Levinson,1983, p. 373) for more details. Having reviewed all the attempts so far mentioned on the topic, the writer of this paper, still, thinks that all these attempt, from Frege's (trans.1952) remarks on the topic, until now, have not moved the cursor from semantics, and pragmatics as linguistic domains. There is, but, a different attempt of Ahmed (2011, p. 65) which looked at this inference as something over and above the linguistic structures of a sentence. Ahmed( 2011) based his study on François Bacon's four idols of, (tribes, cave, marketplace, theatre), whose descriptions are able to tell about, or presuppose for the intellectual philosophy of his time. The idol of tribes is presupposing for deceptive beliefs inherent in the mind of man. They are considered as mere abstractions in error mingled with some existing facts. Ahmed (2011) used this idol to answer Watson and Hills (1977, 9. 151) media questions:' how audience actually uses the news?' ,' how far newstories actually do inform and influence the audience?'. The idol of cave redresses the thoughts of an individual wandering over in this dark cave "mind" by external assistance like temperament, education, habit, environment, and accident. Individual in this inference, according to Ahmed's (2011) view, are presupposing for their peculiar interests, and to the degree of the knowledge they have obtained in their lives. The idol of marketplace assumes that "words" of a language often betray their own purposes. This idol's description A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 5 | P a g e has been proven to be true by the modern pragmatic theories of conventional implicatures. These types of conventional implicatures usually arise from "lexical synonyms", "language particles", "rhetorical questions", "social deictic", and "discourse deictic expressions". The idol of theatre is attributed to sophistry and false learning. This idol is built up in the field of theology, philosophy, and science. This idol is completely accepted by the masses because it is uttered by learned groups. Using the presuppositions of Bacon's four idols, Ahmed (2011) is able to describe this inference as a powerful force that directs the process of communication to certain changes and development that are required by the discourse in question. Ahmed's (2011, p. 68) table showed this notion of how presupposition inference can illustrate as well as extend the discourse in question . Table 1 The Role of Pragmatic Inferences in Discourse Analysis process Diesis categories Speech acts Implicatures Presuppositions clarify/ illustrate identify/ illustrate beautify/ illustrate Illustrate/ extend Ahmed (2011) in table 1 provides a technical definition for this inference of presupposition to include both linguistic structures of a language (illustrate), and the practical uses of these linguistic structures to help an individual pursue knowledge of something that he may come to know about ,or may not even be conscious of (extend) . Methodology: By adopting Ahmed's (2011) technical definition on the subject, the present study uses this double system of "illustrate", and "extend" to investigate some lexicographic samples of presuppositions that are pertaining to different human paradigms. These paradigms are seen as human intellectual perceptions, or views held by an individual, a society as a pattern of how things work in the world (see Business Dictionary for the world paradigm). Lexicographic presuppositions ( lexicosupposition) "if this coinage is accepted", are theological, philosophical, and scientific "words" which presuppose, (convey, or catch) meanings or knowledge that help people with their communications. For example, the late AlBusiari (2007) was striving so hard to clarify, using English language as a target language, some of the Islamic juristic terms, in his 'Dictionary of Islamic juristic terminologies'. He illustrates the Islamic "word" "taymum" meaning as the following "I translate the term "taymum" as dry ablution (wadu) and explain it as the purification by sand or stone instead of water replacing the customary ritual A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 6 | P a g e ablution (al-wadu), or, if necessary the greater allusion (ghusl) as well. The substitution is made if water is not available or if, for health reasons, one cannot use water". (AlBusiari, 2007, p. xxxi). AlBusiari has linked the above term "taymum" with five Islamic presuppositions which appears in the following it– cleft sentences : 1. It is a dry ablution. 2. It is a kind of purification by sand or stone. 3. It is replacing the customary ritual ablution (al-wadu), or the greater ablution (ghusl). 4. It is ordered if water is not available. 5. It is done for health reasons, for example, if one cannot use water. It can be assumed, then, that AlBusiari (2007) has signaled out five Islamic presuppositions, or, new knowledge for the Islamic term "taymum" to the target language audience, or, in this case, English language speakers throughout the world. The previous literature on the topic, however, has labeled this inference with other pragmatic inferences such as implicatures, speech acts theory. Also, much of the previous findings have examined it as "linguistic structures of sentences", (see Levinson, 1983, p. 225). The present study looks at it with the two categories of "illustrate", and "extend" mentioned earlier. Also, for the study to be heuristic, and to control these two variables of "illustrate", and "extend", two dictionaries are examined. The first is AlBusirai's (2007) "Dictionary of Islamic Juristic Terminologies", and the second is "A Dictionary of Philosophy", which is translated from the Russian language to English language by Dixon and Saifulin (1967). In examining the two dictionaries, the study employs meaning based, rather than statistical form of analysis (Polkinghorne, 1983). The study, also, narrow its focus by selecting from each dictionary only two entries, or terms. The study has followed Creswell's, (1998) purposeful sampling by choosing two dictionaries of "theology", and "philosophy" The methodology which is used by this study is to enroll, under the entry, what are claimed to be the presuppositions of the entry in question. Results: AlBusiari's (ibid, p. 70) first term is the following: Al – idah: The woman's prescribed waiting period or interval of time of retreat following the dissolution of a marriage, during which the legal rights of the spouses are A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 7 | P a g e not wholly extinguished. In particular a widow or a divorcee is not allowed to remarry during this period. The above term presupposes for the following Islamic orders: 1. There is a prescribed waiting period following the dissolution of a marriage. 2. During this period the legal rights of spouses are not wholly extinguished. 3. A widow, or a divorcee is not allowed to remarry during this period. There are, still, the writer of this paper thinks, some presuppositions that should ,also, be questioned such as "how many months of waiting that are prescribed for each of "a widow", and "a divorcee" and why? It is also important ,if the lexicographer adds, a sentence to show the Islamic philosophy behind such a doctrine. Islam prescribes four months and ten days as a waiting period for the widow , and three months for the divorcee to make sure if there is , or there is not a baby in the womb . There are much more Islamic terms' presuppositions which have no exact equivalents in target languages , and only these terms' presuppositions expressed in the target languages are promising to fill the gap between existent and nonexistent terms . One of these types of Islamic terms mentioned in AlBusiari (2007) is 'Arrida': 'fosterage' or ' milk relationship' the act of suckling a baby which counts like blood relationship . AlBusiari's (2007 p. 36) second term , selected by this study, is (riba), or in English language "usury". Riba: An increase, an addition over and above the principal sums that is lent or expended. Basically interest on a capital loan, the term covers many forms of gain and profit which are precisely calculable at the time the transaction was concluded. Riba as – Sawiq: Meal of parched barley (as – sawiq) which had water poured upon it and in consequence swelled. A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 8 | P a g e Riba al-fadl: An exchange of a superior things for more of an interior quantity of the same kind and thus receiving profit (i.e. an addition that is obtained by selling food for food or ready money for ready money. Riba annasia: Profit obtained in the case of delay of payment (nasia). A delay of payment Is deferred by the creditor to a future period or a sale on credit in which the payment is to be made at a certain or definite period. The term riba (usury) in Islam provides the following presuppositions: 1. It is an increase over and above the principal sum that is lent or expanded. 2. It has many types. For example, riba as sawiq which is described as a meal of swelled parched barley because of some water that had been poured on it. Riba al-fadl is a process of exchanging of the same commodity, that is, a superior versus an inferior quantity. Riba annesia is a profit gained in case of delay of payment. The study, again, has selected the first term of philosophy from Dixon and Saifulin's "dictionary of philosophy" (1967, p. 29). A priori in idealist philosophy, A, is used to qualify knowledge obtained prior to and independent of experience, knowledge which is inherent in consciousness from the beginning as opposed to a posteriori (q.v.) knowledge, which results from experience. This contraposing of the two terms is particular typical of Kant's (q.v.) philosophy; Kant stated that knowledge obtained by means of sensory perception is untrue and contra posed to it as authentic knowledge the a priori forms of sensation (space and time) and reason (cause, necessity, etc.). Dialectical materialism does not accept any form of a priori knowledge. The term in the idealist philosophy is presupposing for two types of knowledge. A priori is used to qualify knowledge that is independent of experience A posteriori is used to A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 9 | P a g e describe knowledge that got by experience. It is also presupposing that Kant philosophy adopted the former one; while Dialectical materialism rejected it. The second term by Dixon and Saifulen's dictionary (p. 87) is the following: Comparison a way of determining resemblances and differences between objects. It is the key premiss of generalization (q.v.). C. is prominent in judgments by analogy (q.v.). Judgments expressing the result of C. serve the purpose of determining the content of concepts of the objects compared. In this sense, C. is a method supplementing and sometimes replacing, definitions The above term used by the analogists to determine the content of concepts of the objects compared. It is a method that replacing definitions. It is presupposing, also, for determining resemblance and differences between objects. Discussion: Levinson (1983, p. 186) provides the example; 'John doesn't know that Bill came' , to prove that presuppositions are defeasible. He (1983) comments on that by saying such a sentence can presuppose for the second person "Bill came", but it cannot presuppose for the first person "I don't know Bill came". More importantly, it is believed by the most philosophical literature on the term that presupposition can be cancelled, suspended, or even completely abandoned as in "Sue died before she finished her thesis". All the findings so far have synthesized the inference as a unique part of the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions. The present study, however, and by adopting Ahmed's (2011) definition of "illustrate" (conventional meaning of expressions), and extend (new gained knowledge), is able to conceive it differently. Presupposition, according to the present study, is always preserved, and cannot be denied, but it can be negotiated. Also, it has been observed ,that is, the Islamic juristic presuppositions remains fixed and constant over the time. Also , there is ,may be a need for thousands of scientific research findings by the modern science to be synthesized and pieced together to show why such prescribed duration that Islam has assigned for a 'widow', and 'divorcee' proved over years to be valid , and reliable for families as important social units entities .While , as it has been noticed, the philosophical presuppositions keep changing in every different time (e.g. ' A priori according to Kant vs. ' A priori according to the ' Dialectical materialism' From , here , it can be claimed that presupposition inference, with this new sense in this paper, is promising to find some answers to the relation between A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 10 | P a g e 'philosophy', and 'religion' an area which was questioned much in the old philosophy, and, also, to reconcile between different extremes and help human beings understand each other more deeply There is , for instance, , still, much is needed to fully understand about the prescribed period of the divorcee , and the term may generate other presupposition entries in order to pointedly convey its Islamic juristic meaning These new dictionaries of lexicosuppositions , the study hopes, are promising to plainly generate and embrace this world new discoveries, expanding knowledge, and growing science. Concluding Remarks: New types of dictionary entries should be thought ofas effectual means for advancing all parts of useful knowledge to all human being who live in this world. These entries should be classified according to the mechanism of "illustrate", and extend mentioned earlier in this paper. These entries should convey the knowledge, that has no direct equivalent, in the target language, by which a particular dictionary is written, and even if the equivalents are found, only with their literal senses. The presupposition inference, then, is promising to send all the relevant triggers (knowledge) of a particular language entry to a certain speech community that uses a different linguistic code. Firth (1966, p. 207) for example, states that there are "2,000 million human beings on this planet speak about 1,500 languages. These huge varieties, the writer of this present paper thinks, need to know about each other. Dictionaries of presuppositions should be designed to solve this serious issue. The present study coins the "lexicosupposition entries" as a name replacing words, like "terminologies", special words, and connotations. For example, a 'dictionary of Islamic juristic lexicosuppositions' is more precise nomenclature rather than the word "terminologies" which are seen as special words, or expressions used in relation to a particular subject or activity in a certain language. Presupposition triggers , however, are seen, as a double system which compromises "different knowledge ' between a source and target language ".Lexicosupposition dictionaries proposed by this study ,then, are not like encyclopedia entries which usually written for a target audience who share one language . Lexicosupposition entries are seen , here, as identitycards like , which present factual information of a particular culture , ethnic , or national perspective to target audience with nominal knowledge .That is , these presuppositiontriggers should be short , precise , and dealing with one category of knowledge ( e.g. AlBusiari's juristic terms). Dixon and Saifulin's dictionary of philosophy , on the other hand, is a general reference that deals with different entries of philosophy at different historical A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 11 | P a g e times . The present study's idea, then, and in order to promote it into a 'lexicographic presupposition' is to classify each philosopher's pronouncements alone in a dictionary , and this type of classification , whether it is alphabetically ,or as information retrieved system, may help the presupposition entry in question to thoroughly be detailed, and quickly be understood That is , in order for a lexicographer to lexicosuppose for any terms, s/he should ,honestly, transfer the intended terms without any kind of distortion, and leave them as they are to see how far they work in the target language , and how far the target audience's coincide with ,or show a kind of reaction against them. This mechanism is considered by the present study as the required supplied utterances for pointedly understanding human discourse . . About the Author: I am Mustafa Shazali Mustafa Ahmed. I am associate professor in English language / Nile valley University / Sudan. I have been working in Nile Valley University in Sudan since 1994. I have worked for three academic years in Saudi Arabia / Al – Baha University 20112014. I have written many scientific papers in some International reputed journal. Also, I am an editor of many international journals. I have supervised a considerable number of international and local M.A, and PhD students . References: Ahmed, M. S. (2011). Presupposition as a Pragmatic Inference toward a New Conceptualization of the term. International Journal of Business and Social Sciences , .2.7.Special Issue AlBusairi, M. (2007). A Dictionary of Islamic Juristic Terminology. Khartoum: Al-Sadad Press. Creswell, J. W. (1998). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing among five traditions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Dixon, R. & Saifulin, M. eds (1967). A Dictionary of Philosophy. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Fillmore, C. J. (1971). Verbs of Judging: an exercise in semantic description. In Fillmore & Langendoen 273-90. Firth, J. R. (1966). The Tongues of Men and Speech. London: Oxford University Press. A Monthly Double-Blind Peer Reviewed Refereed Open Access International e-Journal Included in the International Serial Directories. International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature ISSN: (2394-1642) 12 | P a g e Frege, G. (1952). On Sense and Reference. In P T. Geach and M. Black (eds.) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford Blackwell , PP.56-78 Kiparsky, P. & Kiparsky, C. (1971). Fact in Steinberg & Jakobovits 345-69. Katz, J.J. (1972). Semantic Theory. New York: Harper & Row. Kempton, R.M. (1975). Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Karttunen, L. & Peter, S. (1977). Requiem for presupposition. Proceeding of the Third Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistic Society,.360-71 Levinson, S. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Polkinghorne, D. (1983). Methodology for Human Sciences. Albany, NY: Human Sciences Press. Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Watson, J. & Hill, A. (1997). A Dictionary of Communication and Media Studies. London: Arnold. Wilson, D. (1975). Presuppositions and Non-Truth Condition of Semantics. New York: Academic Press.

Forthcoming in the 2015 Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association How Must We Be for the Resurrection to Be Good News? Chad Engelland [[email protected]] University of Dallas Abstract: While the promise of the resurrection appears wonderful, it is also perplexing: How can the person raised be one and the same person as the one that dies? And if the raised person is not the same, why should any of us mortals regard the promise of the resurrection as good news? In this paper, I articulate the part-whole structure of human nature that supports belief in the sameness of the resurrected person's identity and the desirability of the resurrection: (1) the immaterial core of the person must survive the destruction of the body; (2) the person must nonetheless be incomplete apart from the body; and (3) the personal core must be the source for the personal identity of the resurrected body. In light of these criteria, I conclude by arguing that survivalism rather than corruptionism is the more compelling account of death and resurrection present in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Key words: Death, Resurrection, Personal Identity, Human Nature, Peter Geach, Thomas Aquinas Blaise Pascal memorably maintained that the fear of death motivates the diversions of mankind: "Being unable to cure death, wretchedness and ignorance, men have decided, in order to be happy, not to think about such things." 1 The possibility that we should cease to exist or, continuing to exist, should cease to have our bodily way of being, is naturally a terrifying possibility. St. Augustine thinks we have an "obvious natural revulsion to annihilation," 2 St. Thomas Aquinas thinks that "everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist," 3 St. John Paul II thinks that in us "there is an irrepressible longing to live forever," 4 and Socrates 1. Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 37. 2. City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 11.27. To support this claim, he says that if people were given the choice of immediately ceasing to be or living a longer life of misery, they would choose the latter. 3. Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1948), I, q. 75, a. 6. The senses are rooted in the here and now but the intellect apprehends things without temporal limitation. 4. Pope St. John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Tertio Millennio Adveniente, November 10, 1994, no. 9. 2 says "I have good hope that some future awaits men after death." 5 Now, Christianity claims to have some good news on this score. We are not only promised immortality as hoped for by a philosopher such as Socrates; we are promised the resurrection of our flesh, a possibility unanticipated by any philosopher-not even by Heraclitus, who counsels us to expect "the unexpected." 6 Surely, if this is a credible promise, it is good news. We need only recall its original proclamation to philosophers. St. Paul came to Athens and engaged with Epicurean and Stoic philosophers, who, like all Athenians, always wanted to hear something new. St. Luke records their reaction to the resurrection as follows: "Now when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked; but others said, 'We will hear you again about this.'" 7 The promise that Jesus will make all things new is so unexpected that even those who only want to hear novelties wanted to hear of it again. Beyond the question of credibility, which is an issue for faith and theology, I want to isolate a specifically philosophical concern. While the resurrected person may appear to others and to himself to be the same person as I am now, it is not immediately clear that it really could be me. Why wouldn't the resurrected person be merely a clone that thinks he is the same as me? I want to ask philosophically, to the extent that it is a philosophical question, whether hope in my resurrection makes sense. Is the prospect of the dead's resurrection good news or only apparently good news? I think it is good news provided we understand the human person in a very particular kind of way, and I want to spell out the basic features of that way here. I offer the following as conditional: what part-whole structure of human nature is necessary if the resurrection of the dead is to be meaningful to each of us? My thesis is that the 5. Plato, Phaedo, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), 63c. 6. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, trans. Charles Kahn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 31. For Heraclitus's provocative musings on the reversibility of death, akin to the alterations of the seasons or the interplay of waking and sleeping, see Kahn, pp. 210-227. 7. Acts 17:32 (RSV). 3 resurrection requires an intellective hylomorphism: a dependent part (the body) that ceases to be at death and is restored later, and an independent part (the soul) that persists through death, establishes my selfhood, and causes the body to be, thereby making the restored body one and the same body. According to hylomorphism, soul and body constitute a single substance; according to intellective hylomorphism, the human soul not only animates the body, it can also exist in an incomplete fashion apart from the body. Death does not corrupt the soul, which is the personal core. This paper weighs in on the contemporary debate between corruptionists and survivalists among Thomistically inspired hylomorphic accounts of mind. The corruptionists think that the dead person is no longer a person; the survivalists think that the dead person remains the same person. In this paper, I side with survivalism against corruptionism; on my view, for the resurrection to be good news for each of us now living, survivalism must obtain. I. Why No Proxy Will Do. The resurrection of the dead appears as good news contrasted with the two apparent alternatives: existing in a disembodied manner in some mythical land of the dead or the immediate annihilation of self with the possibility of existing through some kind of proxy. The possibility of disembodied personal existence is manifestly dissatisfying, especially when we consider our loved ones, whom we love as embodied; that they will rise again, body and all, is very good news indeed. Compared to the possibility of existing through some kind of proxy, the resurrection is extremely good news, for, in the last analysis, existence through proxy is not personally satisfying. I cannot say of the proxy, "I, Chad Engelland, will still be Chad Engelland in virtue of that item." Consider the various candidates for proxy: 4 reincarnation, progeny, fame, works, or in the latest hope, a computer program. 8 For reincarnation, how am I the same as the person from a former or future life? Not in terms of the body, not in terms of memories and experience, but just in terms of the bare soul-substance; yet this continuity is akin to the anonymous self-identity of a rock; it is not a living or personal identity; I now cannot say, I, Chad Engelland, will be the same person then as now. Saul Kripke seems right to say that the identity of one's parents is essential for personal identity: "How could a person originating from different parents, from a totally different sperm and egg, be this very woman? ... It seems to me that anything coming from a different origin would not be this object." 9 Reincarnation maintains that the parents are incidental; this means that reincarnation does not grant the sort of personal immortality that we naturally long for. For living through descendants, I continue only as a fainter and fainter echo: a biological inheritance that didn't entirely belong to me, a generous link in a chain of generations, and a living memory forgotten after several generations; as for living through one's works, deeds, or a computer simulation, I do not live, but a limited appearance of me might; still this is not the same as me. I am no longer there to experience and be experienced "in person." Having a photograph of a loved one is no real substitute for having that loved one himself or herself. If what we really want is to continue to be as the person each of us is now and for loved ones to exist as they are now, the proxy provides little consolation. Consider the desire that motivated the Ted Williams family to resort to cryogenics: "This is what we want, to be able to be together in the future, even if it is only a chance." 10 We want to be together in the future and that means that each of us must really be. 8. Stephen Hawking, for example, said, "I think the brain is like a programme in the mind, which is like a computer, so it's theoretically possible to copy the brain on to a computer and so provide a form of life after death." Dailymail.com, 21 September 2013, accessed February 27, 2015. 9. Naming and Necessity (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1981), p. 113. 10. Richard Sandomir, "Note Dated 2000 Says Williams Wanted His Remains Frozen," New York Times, July 16, 2002. 5 The proxy falls prey to vanity, for it is not what we really want. Rather it is a pale and ultimately unsatisfying substitute for personal immortality. As Woody Allen puts it, "I don't want to achieve immortality through my work, I want to achieve immortality through not dying." 11 Opposed to the impersonal immortality of the proxy, resurrection promises personal immortality: "I, Chad Engelland, will continue to be as Chad Engelland thanks to the resurrection of the dead." It is apparently great news. And yet the resurrection of the dead is puzzling. Can it really distinguish itself from impersonal immortality? Resurrection holds that at some unspecified future point, the dead will come back to life. How can this resurrected person be the same person as each of is now? Might it not be another person? In such a case, the resurrected person would in effect be a proxy for the person that died. What does human personal identity require? We are not angels. The story of our genesis is essential to our identities. To be the same person, I must be the son of the same parents who came together at a particular time. 12 But this is not enough for the same could be said of an identical twin. Personal identity also requires the same agency of experience. As a newborn, I looked up into my parents' eyes and smiled. They saw my affectivity, the fact that experience happens for me, and I saw in their eyes their affectivity, the fact that experience happens for each of them. 13 To be the same person means that we remain the same dative and agent of experience. Metaphysically, this requires that the same subject persist, for the agency of experience is an expression of this being. Each of us takes in the world from our own vantage points thanks to the fact that each is a separate being. There are at least three interrelated factors for personal identity: 11. Quoted by Sam B. Girgus, "Afterword: The Abyss: Woody Allen on Love, Death, and God," in A Companion to Woody Allen, ed. Peter J. Baily and Sam B. Girgus, 559-572 (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 570. 12. See Chad Engelland, "On the Personal Significance of Sexual Reproduction," The Thomist, forthcoming. 13. See Chad Engelland, "Unmasking the Person," International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2010): 447460. 6 the resurrected person must [a] have the same genesis, [b] have lived the same life, and [c] be the same subject as the person before he or she died. Why think that sameness requires continuity of existence? Why cannot the sameness be realized on the side of the creator? Surely if God can create a being at one time he can recreate the same one being at another time, outfitted with the same genealogy, the same experiences, and the same subject. Let me spell out why I do not think this is the case. First, the recreated person would have a different story of its origins; rather than coming to be through the secondary causality of particular parents at a particular time, the recreated person would come to be independent of secondary causes at another time. Second, while the recreated person would likely be outfitted with the same memories as the original person, those memories would not be the fruit of experience; they would be memories of a life lived by another being. Third, the recreated person would not be the same subject, for a subject is not just something with a certain intelligibility; it is something with a particular act of being. The particular act of being does not merely actualize a certain divine idea; the particular act of being constitutes the root and ground of personal identity, which makes real my particular essence and activities. I am my act of being. While the "idea" may be the same in the recreated being, the act of being could not be; therefore the being would not in fact be the same. In view of the above, we can say that the sameness of the resurrected must be realized in the creature; it cannot be realized simply on the side of the creator. W. Norris Clarke, SJ, puts it this way: The recreated entity might be a clone, like me in many ways, but not the same unique personal me, because the new unity, the self-the "I"-organizing the similar body is not the same as me, for the simple reason that it never experienced the same personal life, the same story with all its challenges, successes and failures, that became an inseparable part of my identity before my death. That self is simply gone, and not even the omnipotence of God can do what is a metaphysical impossibility: recreate the identical being that 7 existed before, with no bond of continuity on the personal level between the before and the after. 14 I want to think how we must be in order for the resurrection to be in fact good news, not just apparently good news. What are the necessary principles of human nature? II. The Criteria for Resurrected Identity. Let us take death to be the end of bodily being and resurrection to be the beginning again of bodily being. I regard this understanding of death to be a basic fact, confirmed both by ordinary experience and by philosophical and scientific investigation. The living body not only undergoes metabolic activity, it not only evidently perceives, feels, and moves, but it also serves to express the specifically human life of the mind. The corpse, by contrast, undergoes no such vital, perceptual, or personal activities. Moreover, the unity it heretofore enjoyed appears to be irremediably compromised. It is therefore not the same thing. What is it? A naturally occurring likeness of the person's body that once was. The frightful absence that marks the corpse marks a radical change of being. My sense of the resurrection comes from Christian witness: the resurrection of Christ as firstborn from the dead and the bold proclamation that the restoration of our bodily selves, spiritualized, is a possibility that will be actualized for all. 15 It is a basic feature of orthodox Christian teaching. 14. The Creative Retrieval of St. Thomas Aquinas: Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, New and Old (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), p. 188. 15. See, for example, The Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 997: "In death, the separation of the soul from the body, the human body decays and the soul goes to meet God, while awaiting its reunion with its glorified body. God, in his almighty power, will definitively grant incorruptible life to our bodies by reuniting [coniungens] them with our souls, through the power of Jesus' Resurrection." For a theological overview of the issue, see Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, trans. Michael Waldstein and Aidan Nichols, OP (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), pp. 69-214. He writes, "How can there be an identity between the human being who existed at some point in the past and the counterpart that has to be re-created from nothing? The irritated refusal of such questions as 'philosophical' does not contribute to a more meaningful discussion" (p. 106). 8 In order for the hope in the resurrection not to be empty, I think the following three criteria must hold: [1] The Principle of Personal Persistence: When Patches the rabbit is run over by a bus, it perishes. The act of violence compromises the unity of the whole with a total loss of being; what remains, the carcass, was but no longer is a rabbit. Patches as a whole and in all its parts has ceased to be. Could God resurrect Patches? God could create a being just like Patches down to the last detail but, without some principle of continuity in being, it would not be Patches but a clone of Patches. From the point of view of the pet owner, that might not be a big deal; Patches's own point of view is not relevant, for Patches is not a person, not a spiritual being with a desire for immortality. But for humans, our own point of view is not irrelevant regarding our own death and resurrection and the death and resurrection of our loved ones. It is not enough for clones of us to be restored. It must really be us for this possibility to be personally satisfying. What enables the resurrected self to be the same self? There must be a principle safeguarding personal continuity; unlike the case of Patches the rabbit, death must not be the end of the entire substance. Of course, it is a basic fact that death, whether for Patches or for me, must involve the destruction of the body. But though I am my body I am not only my body. If I lose my leg, I am still human even though I am not a complete human being. Similarly, if I lose all my limbs I am still human even though I am not a complete human being. Finally, if I lose my whole body in death, I am still human even though I am not a complete human being. Privation can extend not just to the body part but to the whole part of us that is the body. Now, this privation of a whole metaphysical part is an extreme form of privation. My personal core must survive this extreme privation so that Chad Engelland alive and Chad Engelland resurrected would be the same person. The principle of personal persistence identifies that, as a condition for maintaining the 9 identity of a person there must be something more than the bodily being that manifestly ceases to be with the event of death. And this persisting principle must be personal. For example, it would not do for just the teeth of the person to persist; it must be that which somehow instantiates the person. Can't our bodies constitute personal identity? Can't we say, with Peter van Inwagen and other materialists, that God could, despite the appearances, somehow preserve the bodily organism, that, in effect, we will only appear to die? 16 Such conjuring is metaphysically possible, but it questions one of the basic facts of the case, which is that we know people die and their bodies decompose. 17 It also serves to deny that there is such a thing as the resurrection. Rather, the resurrection on this view is not something that will happen in the future; it is rather a code name for something that God already always does: makes it appear like people die while carting their living bodies off to somewhere else. It's van Inwagen's materialism that leads him to question the basic fact of death and to reinterpret the resurrection. Instead, I want to think of a way to make sense of the possibility of the resurrection that preserves the reality of the appearances and leaves the resurrection as a hoped-for futural event. Like Augustine and Aquinas, I do not find materialism compelling, and I can therefore accept the fact of death as something that's not illusory. 18 Van Inwagen is right to insist on a principle of continuity, but the 16. "The Possibility of Resurrection," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1978): 114-121. 17. Van Inwagen distinguishes between "suspension of life," in which the organism enters into a reversible metabolic rest, such as a frozen cat, which could in principle be resuscitated, and "disruption of life," in which the organism ceases to exist. At the human death, the person's life is suspended but there remains a possibility for reanimation. But to maintain that the dead has only died in the first sense and not in the second he has to resort to metaphysical conjuring, and say that what we see evidently decomposing is not really the remains of the body, for the body has been whisked away and been replaced with this imitation. See Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 147, and "The Possibility of Resurrection," pp. 119-121. 18. Among the many problems with materialism is its inability to account for the fact that we can show things to each other. See Chad Engelland, Ostension: Word Learning and the Embodied Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), chapters 8-10. Another problem is its inability to account for the normativity of truth. See Chad Engelland, "Heidegger and the Human Difference," Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2015): 175-193. 10 body, evidently demising, is not the most promising candidate in our metaphysical makeup for this feat. If the body does not account for personal persistence, what part can? The soul must not be bodily; it must be able to persist apart from the decomposing body, and it must constitute the root of personal identity. 19 As Augustine puts it, we love the deceased Apostle, because "we believe that what we love in him lives even now, for we love his just rational soul [animus]." 20 If the body ceases to be and yet the person continues to exist, there must be some non-bodily dimension of the person that survives. Now, we might resist the thought that the person, a bodysoul composite, could somehow be the same person even while missing an essential part, the body. But, granting that the soul can exist apart from the body, we can see that it can in fact exist as the same human person provided that it contains virtually the powers of the non-existent body. Consider some relatively uncontroversial analogues. When we are sleeping, we are generally not exercising our higher order linguistic capacities, but we retain those powers in potentiality. Even though speaking is essential to us as human beings, it does not have to be continually exercised for us to be the human beings that we are. When we were babies, we did not even have the developed capacity to speak. We could still be human, without this essential attribute's development, because our nature remained as it were primed for this development. In fact, for our natural ability to speak to develop, we had to be exposed to the speech of others; feral children, for example, develop neither semantics nor syntax; consequently, natural powers can rest on extrinsic factors for their realization. 21 Infants and feral children, despite this lack, are nonetheless essentially human. Similarly, the soul of the dead person, bereft of the body, retains 19. See Clarke, Creative Retrieval, p. 189. 20. On the Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 8.6.9. On Augustine's non-dualistic philosophical anthropology, see Chad Engelland, "Perceiving Other Animate Minds in Augustine," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming. 21. Derek Bickerton, Language and Species (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 115-118. 11 the human capacity to animate a body; though it lacks an essential part, it retains its essential ordering to that part. The separated soul remains primed for an actuality it cannot realize on its own. [2] The Personal Relevance of the Absent Body: Unlike the case of Patches the rabbit, the human soul must be able to survive the event of death in order for the resurrected person to be the same as he or she is now. That means that in the case of humans, death must not be a substantial change; the body ceases to be, while the person does not. But for the resurrection to be good news, our bodies, as inessential as they are for our bare existence must nonetheless be essential for the living out of our human lives. The demise of the body must remain something other than a mere accidental change. Otherwise there would be no serious reason for each of us to hope in the resurrection. Set free from the tomb of the body we could look upon the prospect of a resurrection with disinterest. If the resurrection of the dead is good news, substance dualism, whether of the sort advocated by Plato or by Descartes, must not obtain. For the resurrection to be anticipated, the body must be part of what we are. Augustine expresses this twofold whatness with admirable precision: "Man is a rational substance consisting of soul and body." 22 While our personal core, who we are, might persist through the death of the body, we nonetheless would remain less than what we are-unless the resurrection of the dead should occur. Our bodies are also essential to how we are. To be a human is to be a being that can experience, act, and show things to each other. 23 What would life without our bodies be like? Because we lack experience of it, we cannot say with confidence what will be natural to us then, but we can be confident that for human nature as we experience it now, our bodies are essential. 22. On the Trinity, 15.7.11. 23. For a classical treatment, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge Classics, 2002); for recent restatements, see Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, "Animation: The Fundamental, Essential, and Properly Descriptive Concept," Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2009): 375-400, and Chad Engelland, Ostension: Word Learning and the Embodied Mind. 12 Without our bodies as the instruments of experience we would presumably have total emptiness of experience. We could not speak or be spoken to, we could not see or be seen, and we could not give or receive. Nor, does it seem, could we relive our memories, lost as they would be with the death of the body and the loss of our brains. It seems possible that we might achieve selfawareness and other peculiarly intellective acts; but such acts would not constitute a full human life. Now, I have no doubt that God will grant all sorts of cognitive achievements to this disembodied soul, but considering its natural powers alone, the life of a disembodied soul would seem to be a dreamless sleep accompanied by dim self-awareness. The natural life of the disembodied human soul would appear to be a life longing for wakefulness, longing for the restoration of the flesh. [3] What Persists Must Make the Body Be. If the resurrection is to be good news, the resurrected body must really be my body. The provincial council of Toledo formulated this requirement with admirable clarity: "And we do not believe that we shall rise in an ethereal body or in any other body, as some foolishly imagine, but in this very body in which we live and are and move." 24 According to the basic fact of death, the body has ceased to be. How then can my body that exists now, cease to exist when I die, and yet be restored as the selfsame body in the resurrection? I think it can be the same body provided that it has the same being. But it can only have the same being if that being has been held in reserve, as it were, by the persisting soul. The soul that survives must be the animating form of the flesh; it must make the body be the body it is. This means that the soul can cause to be only its own body and none other. The resurrected body would be the selfsame body in virtue of being animated by our soul. What about our bodily remains? Mustn't they be incorporated into the resurrected body for it to 24. Quoted in The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, 7th ed., ed. Jacques Dupuis (New York: Alba House, 2001), p. 1016. 13 be the selfsame body? Remember that death is destruction of the body. The promised miracle is that our bodies will be restored not that we never will have died or will have only seemed to die. And evidently death involves the demise of the body as a whole. Even a corpse artificially kept from decaying, such as Lenin's in Red Square, no longer is the body that it once was. Rather, it is a vestige that harbors no possibility of life within it; its matter has returned to subpersonal being. And many of the dead will be in the position of Father Thomas Byles, the priest who heard confessions on the sinking Titanic and whose remains have been dissolved into the sea. If the hope of resurrection for them is not to be in vain, the corpse must not be necessary for establishing the identity of the body. Am I really saying that God could have resurrected Lazarus while leaving his corpse in the tomb? Yes, I am: Lazarus in this scenario would have his selfsame body in virtue of having his selfsame soul animating a body; the remains in the tomb are inessential. Still, it would not be fitting for God to have resurrected Lazarus while his corpse is on hand. 25 He would seem like a ghost, because his corpse is a sign of his being dead. Resurrection, to present faithfully the restoration of bodily life to the one that died, should involve taking up and cancelling the sign of death. And of course, thinking of Lazarus is misleading; the hoped-for resurrection of the dead will not restore us to mortal life as with Lazarus; it will bring us to immortal life. The body raised will not be the body in the same condition as the one that died, but one in its prime and, according to Augustine, one that will be better looking than the one each of us has now. 26 Thus, I grant that it may be fitting for bodily remains to somehow (I know not how) be reincorporated into the resurrected body, but it is not necessary. One will have the selfsame body thanks to one's selfsame soul that animates the body. Nor should this conclusion seem strange. Even in 25. I am thankful to Chris Malloy for this point. 26. City of God, 22.19. 14 this life, after all, it is the form, rather than the ever-changing matter, that makes my body be the same through time. 27 I have the same body I did ten years ago even though on the physical level I am constituted of different molecules. Even more so, soul-form, rather than material parts, establishes the identity of the body before death and after the resurrection. Any animated body would be the same body if it is animated by the same form. What about our brains? It is worth noting, of course, that talk of "the brain" is an abstraction, for it is but part of the nervous system which is itself but part of the body as a whole; perception and experience is an activity that puts into play the entire person. 28 Still, as far as bodily organs go, the brain seems to be a kind of privileged part, which therefore occasions some puzzles of its own. Can we really say that we will be the same person even though our original brains will have returned to nothingness? I think the resurrected brain will be outfitted with the same memories; it will not be a replica, however, but the same brain thanks to the identity of the immaterial animating soul. It will belong to the same one person. What, however, of our memories? These are in some sense stored neurologically whenever we undergo experiences. Certainly, these new brains have to have the same memories as the old ones. But how can they be the same memories when one was formed as the fruit of experience and another is as it were uploaded? The point, however, is not the causal origin of the memories as physically stored; the point is whether or not the numerically same person was the subject of those experiences. Consider a different situation. Say I forget where I bought a pair of shoes; on the level of my neurons, the memory of the location of that shoe-buying no longer exists. However, my wife reminds me; the fact that the memory was stored outside of me and comes to be stored in my 27. For a contemporary defense of the role of living form in organic identity, see Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 64-98. 28. See Alva Nöe, Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), pp. 209-231, and Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness (New York: Hill & Wang, 2009). 15 brain through instruction rather than experience does not compromise the reality that I myself bought the shoes at that store. However, it would compromise the reality if in fact they had been bought by someone else and my wife was misremembering or misinforming. It is the identity of the person that establishes the identity of the brain as an organ of the body and its memories as stored personal experiences. 29 III. Kinds of Parts. Peter Geach recognizes the importance of bodily sameness without, however, adequately accounting for its possibility. He maintains that apart from the body the soul is no longer the self but "a mere remnant." Therefore, only granting the resurrection can we hope for personal immortality; the mere continued existence of this remnant would not be personal: "The existence of a disembodied soul would not be a survival of the person Peter Geach; and even in such a truncated form individual existence seems to require at least a persistent possibility of the soul's again entering into the make-up of a man who is identifiably Peter Geach." 30 He affirms against dualism the contribution of the body to personal identity; he also recognizes the role of the soul's persistence in establishing continuity between the self that is alive now and the self that was alive then. The problem comes in the way he construes the soul as but "a mere remnant." It cannot mean the body makes the person again be the person it was before, for it is the soul that establishes the continuity of substance and the personal identity of the body. 29. For a non-reductive way of relating the brain and nervous system to the person as a whole, see Robert Sokolowski's fascinating discussion of "lensing" in Phenomenology of the Human Person (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 225-237. 30. "Immortality," in God and the Soul (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 24. 16 Now, remnant is an ambiguous term. It means "that which remains." But what makes it ambiguous is whether what remains still is or no longer is what was there before; and if it is, what kind of part it is, simply a piece or that which instantiates the whole. So, we can point to the dead rabbit and say, these are the remains of Patches. That was Patches although, as a matter of fact, it no longer is Patches. In a different scenario, we might point to a single slice of pie and identify it as the remains of the whole pie that once was. Unlike Patches' remains, the pie slice still is a slice of pie; the point is simply that the whole is no more and therefore this part is a remnant. Of course, if we bake a new pie around the remnant, we won't say it's the same pie as before. Neither of these senses of remnant fulfills the requirements for the sameness of the resurrected person. In accordance with the first criterion, we can posit the possibility of a persisting part that instantiates the whole. This is the case with the hydra, a half-inch aquatic creature, which lives for years and years by monthly regrowing its body from stem cells. Rob Steele, a hydrobiologist, described its feat as follows: "It doesn't have any cells that hang around long enough to get old and decrepit, and therefore the individual doesn't get old and decrepit." 31 Similarly, the world's oldest tree is 9,950 years old despite the fact that its trunk and branches has died every 600 years or so. Leif Kullman, an ecologist who discovered this conifer, says that "as soon as a stem dies, a new one emerges from the same root stock. So the tree has a very long life expectancy." 32 In this sense of remnant, the persisting stem cells or root stock instantiate the identity of the organism across the continual regeneration of the rest of its body. Remnant, then, can mean (1) what's left as a result of the body's ceasing to be, which I call "residue," (2) some part of a whole that survives that demise intact, which I call "a persistent 31. Matt Simon, "Absurd Creature of the Week: This Amazing Little Critter Just Might Be Immortal," Wired, http://www.wired.com/2015/02/absurd-creature-of-the-week-hydra/. 32. James Owen, "Oldest Living Tree Found in Sweden," National Geographic, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/04/080414-oldest-tree.html. 17 part," or (3) some part that survives that demise intact and that instantiates the identity of the whole, which I call "the persistent core." 33 What does Geach have in mind by referring to the soul as "a mere remnant"? He seems to regard both the soul and the dead body as persisting parts, albeit in different ways. He says that the disembodied soul cannot say of itself, "I am Socrates," just as the single slice of pie could not say (if it were to say) "I am the pie." Also, he thinks the corpse somehow contributes to the personal identity of the resurrected person. I think he is mistaken on both counts. First, the body is not a persisting part but a residue, and it can therefore no longer contribute to personal identity. Consider the difference between the corpse of Socrates and the body of Socrates before he died. While a disembodied soul is not a complete person, a corpse is not a person at all. The corpse is a naturally occurring likeness produced by the body's loss of being. It is closer in being to a portrait than to a person. It can no longer make a significant contribution to the personal identity of Socrates. Second, the soul is not simply a persisting part, for that is not enough to establish the sameness of the self then and now; the soul must rather be the persisting core that makes the body be; the sameness of the soul as animating principle and not the "using up" of the corpse is what makes the person the same. What is lacking in Geach's account is the specification that, while the disembodied soul is not the whole person, it is nonetheless the root and ground of the person and only therefore is the resurrected person's body the same body as before. The soul is not just a persistent part; it is the personal core. IV. 33. The term, "persistent core," is similar to John Haldane's notion of "residual substance." See "The Examined Death and the Hope of the Future," Proceedings of the ACPA 74 (2001): 254. "Persistent core" has the advantage of highlighting the causal properties that enable this part and none other to bear the full weight of personal identity. 18 Thomistic Hylomorphism and Survivalism. According to the first criterion, the principle of personal persistence, versions of materialism fail to maintain personal identity; for these accounts hope in the resurrection is vain. Versions of dualism fail regarding the second and third criteria regarding the importance of the body and the role of the soul-form in establishing the sameness of the resurrected body; for these accounts hope in the resurrection is vain. However, hylomorphism in the version set out by Thomas Aquinas seems to fulfill the criteria laid out above provided it is construed along survivalist rather than corruptionist lines. According to corruptionism, death is a substantial change and therefore the separated soul is neither a human being nor a person until it is reunited with its bodily residue. According to survivalism, the persistence of the soul is enough to account for the persistence of the human person, and the soul, rather than some bodily residue, will make the restored body be the same body. Thomas deploys both accounts throughout his career, but survivalism is the superior one. 34 Corruptionism undercuts hope in the resurrection, for unlike survivalism it cannot account for the sameness of the self now and then. Also, it in effect denies the full reality of death as the complete loss of my bodily being and instead holds that my body somehow persists through the continuous substantial changes it undergoes: my body somehow remains my body through death and decomposition, etc. so that in the future some bit of my body can be rescued and returned to me 34. Scholars typically argue for one over the other, but Silas Langley convincingly shows that Aquinas ambiguously used both accounts from his first to his last writings. "Aquinas, Resurrection, and Material Continuity," Proceedings of the ACPA 75 (2002): 135-147. For a recent presentation of survivalism, see Eleanore Stump, "Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul," in Die Menschliche Seele: Brauchen wir den Dualismus? ed. Bruno Niederbacher and Edmund Runggaldier, pp. 153-174 (Heusenstamm: Ontos, 2006), and of corruptionism, see Patrick Toner, "St. Thomas Aquinas on Death and the Separated Soul," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2010): 587-599. 19 at the resurrection. 35 Survivalism, by contrast, faces the fact that the body is no longer the same, for it has lost its being. 36 Let me retrace the outlines of Thomas's survivalism here. He says the souls of men "remain" (remanent) apart from their bodies even though, as the form of the body, it is contrary to the nature of the soul to be apart from the body. 37 In arguing that we can be perfectly happy in the beatific vision without our bodies, he makes clear that the human soul, being an intellective soul, is an odd kind of part: "The relation of the [human] soul to being is not the same as that of other parts." 38 Why not? In other animals, the part-whole structure is such that the being of the part depends on the being of the whole, so that if the whole ceases to be, the parts either cease to be or change in being: "for the being of the whole is not that of any individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the whole line." In the unique case of the animal endowed with an intellect, the soul can survive the destruction of the whole in such a way that it remains the same and retains the being of the whole: But the human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the I, 75, 2. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that 35. Langley tries to make sense of Thomas corruptionist account as follows: "Throughout all the substantial changes that some particular matter goes through, it still keeps some dimensions, some location, and thus some division from all other matter. There is a spatio-temporal trajectory here, even if nothing whatsoever remains numerically identical throughout it." "Aquinas, Resurrection, and Material Continuity," p. 142. 36. Survivalism, better than corruptionism, fits with Christian faith and practices: "The Church affirms that a spiritual element survives and subsists after death, an element endowed with consciousness and will, so that the 'human self' subsists, though deprived for the present of the complement of its body." "Letter of the S. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on Certain Questions Concerning Eschatology," May 17, 1979, no. 3. 37. Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Charles O'Neil (Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1957), IV, c. 79. He argues for the fittingness of the resurrection as follows: "But nothing contrary to nature can be perpetual. Perpetually, then, the soul will not be without the body. Since, then, it persists perpetually, it must once again be united to the body; and this is to rise again. Therefore the immortality of souls seems to demand a future resurrection of the body." 38. Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 4, a. 5, ad 2. 20 consequently it can have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature. Thomas calls this unique kind of subsistent part that retains the being of the whole, the "principal part." Commenting on the death of Christ in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas says that even though the subject ceases to be a complete man, it does not cease to be the same subject. Why not? Man is said to be his own intellect, not because the intellect is the entire man, but because the intellect is the principal part of man, in which man's whole disposition lies virtually [quia intellectus est principalior pars hominis, in quo virtualiter existit tota dispositio hominis]; just as the ruler of the city may be called the whole city, since its entire disposal is vested in him. 39 Consequently, the being of the resurrected body can be the same as the being of the body now, because it will be animated by the same principal part. Despite this agreement with the three criteria, Thomas says some things that might appear puzzling and challenging for the view I have laid out: "My soul is not I." 40 Does this assertion undermine the criterion of personal continuity? This is in effect Geach's suggestion, and this is the view advocated by contemporary corruptionists. However, Thomas thinks the soul is not I in the sense that my soul is not the entirety of what I am as a human being. Nonetheless, my soul is what makes my body be and be mine; the soul is the root and ground of my bodily being. Therefore, the disembodied soul can indeed say "I am (the principal part of) Thomas Aquinas" or more simply "I am the dead Thomas Aquinas." 41 It is just not in a position to say "I am Thomas Aquinas whole and entire." It 39. Summa Theologiae, III, q. 50, a. 4, ad. 2. Translation modified. I am thankful to Catherine Nolan for calling my attention to this passage. 40. "Man naturally desires his own salvation; but the soul, since it is part of man's body, is not an entire man, and my soul is not I; hence, although the soul obtains salvation in another life, nevertheless, not I or any man." Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. and Daniel Keating (http://dhspriory.org/thomas/SS1Cor.htm), n. 924. 41. Aquinas thinks that a disembodied human soul is not a "man" but is instead a "dead man" (homo mortuus). See Summa Theologiae, III, q. 50, a. 4. 21 won't be able to say that until after the resurrection. The separated soul is identical in subject to Thomas Aquinas but not identical in totality to all that Thomas once was and will again be. 42 "If the resurrection of the body is denied, it is not easy, yea it is difficult, to sustain the immortality of the soul." 43 Thomas thinks that apart from the resurrection, the immortality of the soul is hard to affirm; I, on the other hand, maintain that apart from the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the dead is hard to maintain. Thomas's point, I take it, is in fact mine: the resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul are conceptually interdependent. The problem is that while the latter, as a natural possibility, admits of a philosophical defense, the former, as a natural impossibility, does not. "But which old woman nowadays would not know that the soul is immortal? Faith is capable of much more than philosophy is." 44 When it comes to the soul, Christian revelation bestows more light than the greatest of philosophical speculations. Thomas thinks the immortality of the soul is difficult to maintain according to natural principles alone. But a philosophy inspired by revelation, what John Paul II calls "Christian philosophy," might nonetheless dare to defend philosophically the natural possibility of human immortality. Doing so without reference to theology might leave it in an embarrassing situation: the naked soul, without the body, appears an awkward thing. Thomas's anthropology, seen in this light, is a kind of philosophical anthropology worked out in reference to the resurrection. In this way, it fulfills 42. For the distinction between being identical in subject and being identical in totality, see Summa Theologiae, III, q. 50, a. 5, in which Aquinas is dealing with the special case of Christ's body. 43. "If the resurrection of the body is denied, it is not easy, yea it is difficult, to sustain the immortality of the soul. For it is clear that the soul is naturally united to the body and is departed from it, contrary to its nature and per accidens. Hence the soul devoid of its body is imperfect, as long as it is without the body. But it is impossible that what is natural and per se be finite and, as it were, nothing; and that which is against nature and per accidens be infinite, if the soul endures without the body. And so, the Platonists positing immortality, posited re-incorporation, although this is heretical. Therefore, if the dead do not rise, we will be confident only in this life." Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, n. 924. 44. "Sermon 14," Academic Sermons, trans. Mark-Robin Hoogland, C.P. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), p. 203. He had already written, "Just one old woman knows more about these things that pertain to the faith than heretofore all philosophers." "Sermon 14," Academic Sermons, p. 202. 22 the exact meaning of "Christian philosophy" articulated by John Paul II. It is "a philosophical speculation conceived in dynamic union with faith" and "includes those important developments of philosophical thinking which would not have happened without the direct or indirect contribution of Christian faith." 45 Intellective hylomorphism, which maintains both the immortality of the soul and the need for the body, is just such a philosophical development. 46 V. Conclusion. For the resurrection to be good news, a very particular and peculiar understanding of human nature is required. What must we be if we can die and resurrect as the selfsame person? We must be hybrid beings, neither pure animals nor pure spirits. Like animals, we can really die, but unlike animals this does not involve a complete loss of substance, for our spiritual cores persist. Unlike pure spirits, our separated souls are essentially incomplete, for our bodies are not incidental to what and how we are. Our restored bodies can be our bodies in virtue of being formed by our persisting part, our personal core, which is our intellective soul. What is death if it is neither a substantial change (as with pure animals) nor merely an accidental change (as with pure spirits)? Death, for us humans, is a radical change that cuts deeper than an accident but not as deep as the substance. I suggest we call it a "change in property," so that the loss of bodily being modifies something essentially human without compromising the identity of the person. Just as the ability to speak is essential to us humans though we need not have it to exist 45. Fides et Ratio, n. 76. 46. In 1977, Ratzinger made this claim regarding Thomistic anthropology, which in his judgment joins "Plato and Aristotle precisely at the points where their doctrines were mutually opposed": "Compared with all the conceptions of the soul available in antiquity, this notion of the soul is quite novel. It is a product of Christian faith, and of the exigencies of faith for human thought. Only the downright ignorance of history could find this contestable." Eschatology, p. 148 and p. 149, respectively. 23 as the same person we are, so our bodies are essential to us humans though we need not have them to exist as the same person each of us is. But just as the loss of language is a great personal loss that cuts us off from a whole domain of properly human activities so it is with the loss of our bodies. Consider Helen Keller's account of learning to speak: "I was born again that day. I had been a little ghost in a no-world. Now I knew my name. I was a person. I could understand people and make them understand me." 47 Though she remained the selfsame personal substance in learning to speak through the initiative of her teacher, she nonetheless realized something essential to being human and to living a full human life. Similarly, though we can remain the selfsame person through death, the resurrection will restore something essential to being human and to living a full human life: our animate bodies. Resurrection is a possibility that belongs to the agency of God the creator; I want to open up the logical space in human nature for God's effect. Unless I am mistaken, human nature must have the part-whole structure I have iterated for the hope in the resurrection not to be in vain, whatever God's power might be. To hope in the resurrection entails believing both that the body is part of me and that the root and ground of my selfhood subsists in the part of me that is not bodily. It requires survivalism rather than corruptionism. Hence, on the last day, when I, God willing, rise again, I will have the same body and fully be the same person thanks to that part of me that persists through death. Can philosophy go further than presenting the above view of human nature conditionally? Can it argue for the immortality of the soul and the soul as form of the body? I believe so, but these are extremely difficult topics for another day, another venue, 47. Helen Keller, quoted in Steward and Molly Anne Graff, Hellen Keller: Crusader for the Blind and Deaf (New York: Dell Publishing, 1991), p. 17. 24 and maybe even another philosopher. 48 My aim here has been more modest: simply to clarify what's implicit in our hope. 49 48. For a start, see Kenneth Schmitz, "Purity of Soul and Immortality," in Texture of Being: Essays in First Philosophy (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007); Robert Sokolowski, "Soul and the Transcendence of the Human Person," in Christian Faith & Human Understanding: Studies on the Eucharist, Trinity, and the Human Person (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006); and Michael Sweeney, "Allan Bloom and Thomas Aquinas on Eros and Immortality," Interpretation 23 (1996): 445-456. 49. I am thankful to Catherine Nolan, Jonathan J. Sanford, Chris Malloy, Michael Bowler, Gary Michael Gurtler, S.J., Molly Flynn, Mark K. Spencer, Turner C. Nevitt, and Isela Engelland for their critical comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Scienze Sociali / 9 Collana Scienze Sociali Direttore Mario Aldo Toscano Comitato scientifico Prof. Mario Aldo Toscano, University of Pisa, Italy Prof. Alessandro Bruschi, University of Firenze, Italy Prof. David L. Altheide, Arizona State University, USA Prof. Anders J. W. Andersen, University of Agder, Norway Prof. Luigi Bonanate, University of Torino, Italy Prof. Andrea Salvini, University of Pisa, Italy Volumi pubblicati 1. Gabriele Tomei, Comunità trans locali. Identità e appartenenze alla prova della mondializzazione 2. Franco Angioni, Costruire la pace. Possibilità e vincoli 3. Mario Aldo Toscano, Sofia Capuano (a cura di), Perché sia possibile. Modelli di pensiero-azione per la pace 4. Luca Corchia (a cura di), Rei occulti. La violenza sulle donne nella Provincia di Massa-Carrara 5. Vincenzo Mele (a cura di), Sociology, Aesthetics and the City 6. Gabriele Tomei (a cura di), Capire la Crisi. Approcci e metodi per le indagini sulla povertà 7. Rachele Benedetti, Esclusione e lavoro. Alcuni percorsi di ricerca tra crisi economica, traiettorie soggettive e welfare locale 8. Andrea Salvini, Anders Johan W. Andersen (a cura di), Interactions, Health and Community 9. Silvia Cervia (a cura di), Oltre le circoscrizioni. Ripensare le regole della democrazia locale OLTRE LE CIRCOSCRIZIONI Ripensare le regole della democrazia locale a cura di Silvia Cervia Silvia Cervia, (a cura di) Oltre le circoscrizioni. Ripensare le regole della democrazia locale / a cura di Silvia Cervia. – Pisa : Plus-Università di Pisa, c2011 - (Scienze sociali ; 9) 323.042 (21.) I. Cervia Silvia 1. Partecipazione politica CIP a cura del Sistema bibliotecario dell‟Università di Pisa Regione Toscana Comune di Pisa Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali Università di Pisa Pubblicazione edita con il contributo di DercoModus srl. © Copyright 2011 by Edizioni Plus – Pisa University Press Lungarno Pacinotti, 43 56126 Pisa Tel. 050 2212056 – Fax 050 2212945 [email protected] www.edizioniplus.it Member of ISBN 978-88-8492-818-4 Le fotocopie per uso personale del lettore possono essere effettuate nei limiti del 15% di ciascun volume/fascicolo di periodico dietro pagamento alla SIAE del compenso previsto dall‟art. 68, comma 4, della legge 22 aprile 1941 n. 633. Le riproduzioni per finalità di carattere professionale, economico o commerciale o comunque per uso diverso da quello personale possono essere effettuate a seguito di specifica autorizzazione rilasciata da AIDRO, Corso di Porta Romana n. 108, Milano 20122, e-mail [email protected] e sito web www.aidro.org L‟eguaglianza politica senza discussione non serve a molto, perché non è nient‟altro che il potere senza l‟opportunità di pensare a come andrebbe utilizzato. James S. Fishkin, 1991, 36 Il testo presenta i risultati di una esperienza complessa e particolarmente significativa sotto il profilo della elaborazione e collaborazione istituzionale. Esso prende le mosse da una legge innovativa recentemente varata dal Consiglio regionale della Toscana, intesa a promuovere originali forme di partecipazione democratica. Il Comune di Pisa ha colto questa opportunità nella maniera più solida sia dal punto di vista programmatico che dal punto di vista concretamente operativo. È stato, quindi, formalizzato un progetto di ricerca-azione che ha ottenuto il sostegno ufficiale degli appositi organismi della Regione Toscana e ha permesso di procedere alla costruzione di un percorso cittadino di grande e non rituale rilevanza. Al sindaco Marco Filippeschi e all‟assessore David Gay va il riconoscimento di aver posto come momento fondamentale del loro programma di governo il tema della partecipazione ai livelli più prossimi alle aspettative dei cittadini sulla base, peraltro, di una tradizione di lavoro assolutamente positiva, quale quella delle Circoscrizioni. La progettazione e supervisione scientifica del lavoro teorico ed empirico è stata affidata al prof. Mario Aldo Toscano del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali dell‟Università di Pisa che si è avvalso di un cospicuo gruppo di giovani studiosi il cui contributo è stato assiduo ed efficace dalla prime fasi fino alle ultime e conclusive. Li ricordiamo con l‟affettuosa considerazione che si deve al loro impegno: Antonella Cirillo, Marco Chiuppesi, Luca Corchia, Claudia Damari, Linda Ferretti, Giovanna Lucci, Elisa Mattutini e Gerardo Pastore. Al prof. Andrea Borghini e alla prof.ssa Roberta Bracciale va il ringraziamento più cordiale per le loro sollecitazioni e per il confronto intellettuale istituito durante tutto l‟itinerario. Viva gratitudine deve essere inoltre espressa a quanti, dall‟interno del Comune di Pisa, nelle due Direzioni interessate, hanno sostenuto l‟intera esperienza: Daniela Burchielli e Luigi Paoli in primis. Un sentito grazie va, egualmente, ai funzionari che hanno partecipato al corso di formazione e che hanno voluto e saputo mettersi in gioco con entusiasmo e generosità: Sandra Bertini, Caterina Corbo, Barbara Dainelli, Rosa Daniele, Sandra Ferrari, Annalisa Fontana, Tiziana Fustini, Lucia Magliocca, Roberto Marchi, Concetta Moni, Paola Senatore e Giuseppa Vallone. A tutti quei cittadini di Pisa, infine, che hanno contribuito con le loro idee, le loro proposte e il loro vissuto a dare vita ad un dialogo costruttivo e proficuo, va un riconoscimento speciale: essi hanno permesso una verifica iniziale assai promettente per gli sviluppi futuri non solo del processo partecipativo ma anche della speranza pubblica. Silvia Cervia Coordinatrice del Progetto „Pisa-Partecipa‟ 9 INDICE Premessa La partecipazione come priorità del programma di mandato di Marco Filippeschi ............................................................................. p. 11 Prefazione Dialettiche della partecipazione di Mario Aldo Toscano ........................................................................ 15 Introduzione „Pisa-Partecipa‟. Un percorso di meta-partecipazione di Silvia Cervia ..................................................................................... 21 Sezione prima SCENARI TEORICI E QUADRI NORMATIVI ........................................ 31 I. La nouvelle vague della democrazia deliberativa di Luca Corchia ................................................................................... 33 II. L‟Unione Europea e la partecipazione. Tra orizzonti simbolici e prassi istituzionale di Silvia Cervia ..................................................................................... 63 III. L‟Italia e la riforma degli Enti locali. Buon governo, trasparenza e partecipazione di Linda Ferretti .................................................................................. 85 IV. La legge 69/2007. La partecipazione nel sistema politico-istituzionale toscano di Antonio Floridia .............................................................................. 97 Sezione seconda IL PROCESSO PARTECIPATIVO ............................................................ 115 V. I Responsabili Territoriali della Partecipazione come „agenti del cambiamento‟ di Silvia Cervia ..................................................................................... 117 VI. La partecipazione come processo e come contenuto. Il caso „PisaPartecipa‟ di Silvia Cervia ..................................................................................... 129 10 VII. La comunicazione istituzionale di Daniela Burchielli ............................................................................ 153 VIII. Il percorso partecipativo visto dai cittadini di Marco Chiuppesi ............................................................................. 163 Sezione terza PERCORSI ISTITUZIONALE ................................................................ 177 IX. Rappresentanza. L‟esperienza delle Circoscrizioni a Pisa di David Gay e Linda Ferretti ........................................................... 179 X. Partecipazione e decentramento nel Comune di Pisa. di David Gay ..................................................................................... 189 XI. I Consigli Territoriali di Partecipazione di Pietro Pescatore ................................................................................. 197 Postfazione Un bilancio sulla normativa della Regione Toscana di Riccardo Nencini .............................................................................. 205 RIFERIMENTI BIBLIOGRAFICI .............................................................. 207 AUTORI ..................................................................................................... 219 APPENDICE ............................................................................................. 221 Proposta finale dei cittadini ................................................................. 223 33 CAPITOLO PRIMO LA NOUVELLE VOGUE DELLA DEMOCRAZIA DELIBERATIVA di Luca Corchia Introduzione Il tema della partecipazione politica rappresenta un riferimento sempre più presente nel quadro normativo e nel dibattito italiano. Non esageriamo l‟entità del fenomeno se affermiamo che la ricerca di modelli di governance più partecipativi della res pubblica è una delle caratteristiche fondamentali delle attuali democrazie moderne. Certo, come avvertono Daniela Ciaffi e Alfredo Mela, "non è un tema nuovo. Eppure ogni volta che lo si affronta, soprattutto nella pratica politica, si ha come l‟impressione di dover re-inventare la ruota"1. In effetti, da tempo si discute della crisi delle istituzioni politiche sia nella sfera della rappresentanza che in quella dell‟amministrazione. Dagli anni ‟60, la "rottura della delega" e la "crisi di razionalità" del pubblico sono all‟ordine del giorno; ma le pratiche di autogestione proposte dai movimenti sociali nei due decenni successivi – a parte l‟esperienza delle circoscrizioni – non hanno risolto il problema2. Dopo la ricaduta nel privato degli anni ‟80, con una larga popolazione rinserrata nella sfera „familistico-professionale‟ ed appagata dal lavoro, dal consumo e dagli affetti3, non è senza speranza che oggi si assiste al moltiplicarsi di rinnovate esperienze partecipative che sembrano testimoniare una maturazione nella cultura politica generale. Precisiamo che il genere di coinvolgimento nella sfera pubblica a cui facciamo riferimento – di cui „PisaPartecipa‟ è un esempio locale – connota il concetto di partecipazione con specifici significati. 1 D. Ciaffi, A Mela, La partecipazione. Dimensioni, spazi, strumenti, Roma, Carocci, 2006, p. 9. 2 Cfr. M. Chiti, Partecipazione popolare e pubblica amministrazione, Pisa, Pacini, 1977. F. Lussana, G. Marramao (a cura di), L‟Italia Repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta. Culture, nuovi soggetti, identità, Soveria Mannelli, Rubettino, 2003. 3 O. De Leonardis, Declino della sfera pubblica e privatismo, in "Rassegna italiana di sociologia", 38, 2, 1997, pp. 169-193. Sul nesso pubblico/privato si veda anche A.O. Hirschman [1982], Felicità privata e felicità pubblica, Bologna, il Mulino, 1983. 34 Il termine partecipazione viene impiegato nelle scienze politiche e sociali per identificare una molteplicità di comportamenti. Vi sono, in primo luogo, le attività attraverso cui si estrinseca costituzionalmente la sovranità popolare, ovvero gli atti di democrazia rappresentativa e di democrazia diretta che prevedono rispettivamente le elezioni di organi politici centrali e periferici e alcune forme di espressione più immediata, quali i referendum propositivi o abrogativi, le istanze, le petizioni popolari. La sfera pubblica politica coinvolge, inoltre, le adesioni ad associazioni partitiche ma anche culturali, civiche, economiche e sindacali, solidaristiche e i comitati tematici in cui pure si esprime un orientamento di rilevanza pubblica. E rientrano nella partecipazione politica le azioni collettive svolte nella società civile, quali ad esempio, gli scioperi, i comizii, i cortei, le manifestazioni, i boicottaggi, etc. Vi sono poi comportamenti partecipativi più inattivi, come le discussioni sulla sfera pubblica all‟interno delle proprie reti relazionale, in famiglia, a scuola, al lavoro, con gli amici, etc. E, infine, il coinvolgimento dei cittadini si esprime nella mera informazione sulla carta stampata, in televisione, alla radio o sul web4. A garanzia di queste espressioni della sovranità popolare sono posti i diritti di voto – universale, libero, uguale –, di associazione in partiti politici, comitati referendari e altre organizzazioni di rappresentanza di interessi, etc. e di espressione delle opinioni nella sfera pubblica. Per tener conto di tutte le forme di coinvolgimento dei cittadini, Umberto Allegretti ha definito in senso ampio la partecipazione politica come "un relazionamento della società con le istituzioni, tale da porsi come un intervento di espressioni dirette della prima nei processi di azione delle seconde"5. Negli ultimi due decenni, accanto a tali consuete forme di partecipazione, si è avuta la sperimentazione di innovative attività di co- 4 Sull‟analisi semantica e l‟operativizzazione metodologica del concetto di partecipazione politica cfr. A. Pizzorno, Introduzione allo studio della partecipazione politica, in "Quaderni di Sociologia", 3-4, 1966, pp. 288-309; M. Cotta, Il concetto di partecipazione politica: linee di un inquadramento teorico, in "Rivista italiana di scienza politica", IX, 2, 1979, pp. 193-227; G. Sani, Partecipazione politica, in "Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali", vol. VI, Roma, Istituto dell‟Enciclopedia Italiana, 1996, pp. 502508; F. Raniolo, La partecipazione politica, Bologna, il Mulino, 20072. L‟Istat ha dedicato – nell‟Indagine multiscopo "Aspetti della vita quotidiana". Anno 2009 – una sezione al tema La partecipazione politica: differenze di genere e territoriali, Roma, 2010. 5 U. Allegretti, Basi giuridiche della democrazia partecipativa in Italia: alcuni orientamenti, in "Democrazia e diritto", XLIV, 3, 2006, p. 156. Nel presente saggio non sono prese in considerazione le forme di partecipazione politiche di chi – riprendendo la formula di Max Weber – vive „di‟ e „per‟ la politica. M. Weber [1919], La politica come professione, in Id., Il lavoro intellettuale come professione, Einaudi, Torino 1948, p. 57. 35 involgimento dei cittadini: bilanci partecipativi, cellule di pianificazione, consensus conference, giurie dei cittadini, sondaggi informati, etc.6 Si tratta di una "famiglia di dispositivi" a cui occorre riconoscere – come precisa Allegretti – un "senso proprio e specifico"7 che connota delle attività partecipative di soggetti extra-istituzionali, spesso cittadini comuni, nella determinazione di policies, abitualmente realizzate dalla pubblica amministrazione in maniera unilaterale8. Nel ventaglio delle relazioni tra istituzioni e cittadini, tali pratiche si collocano nel paradigma di una partecipazione collaborativa che rifiuta posizioni antagoniste o tecnocratiche della politica9. In tal senso, "intendono democratizzare la democrazia, darle sviluppi tante volte promessi, complementare – non sostituire – le sue realizzazioni classiche e provvedere sbocchi diretti o indiretti alla loro crisi"10. In questo variegato repertorio di esperienze si intravede la disponibilità a forme di condivisione differenti rispetto alla militanza politica – forme che possono costituire un utile complemento della democrazia rappresentativa e degli strumenti di democrazia diretta. Per lo più sono processi che si caratterizzano per l‟assenza di una 6 Limitatamente alla realtà italiana, cfr. almeno L. Bobbio (a cura di), A più voci. Amministrazioni pubbliche, imprese, associazioni e cittadini nei processi decisionali inclusivi, Napoli-Roma, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2004; Id. (a cura di), Amministrare con i cittadini. Viaggio tra le pratiche di partecipazione in Italia, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008; Formez, Linee guida per la promozione della cittadinanza digitale: E-Democracy, Roma, Dipartimento della Funzione Pubblica, 2004; A.C. Freschi, F. De Cindio, L. De Pietro (a cura di), E-democracy: modelli e strumenti delle forme di partecipazione emergenti nel panorama italiano, Roma, Dipartimento della Funzione Pubblica, 2004. Rivolti ad amministratori, esperti e cittadini che siano alle prese con i problemi della partecipazione, tali manuali si presentano come una raccolta di „buone pratiche‟, selezionate da casi concreti di politiche pubbliche per lo più locali. 7 U. Allegretti, Il cammino accidentato di un principio costituzionale: quaranta anni di pratiche partecipative in Italia, in "Rivista telematica giuridica dell‟Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti", 1, 2011, p. 3. Il carattere di „novità‟ di tali pratiche nel campo delle politiche pubbliche è ribadito da Luigi Pellizzoni nel saggio Politiche pubbliche e nuove forme di partecipazione, in "Partecipazione e conflitto, 0, 2008, p. 93. 8 Avremo modo di dire perché – secondo Bobbio – "Essi segnano un‟aperta rottura rispetto alle modalità usuali di policy making (maggioritario o negoziale) e costituiscono anche un superamento delle forme tradizionali di partecipazione in cui i cittadini vengono tenuti ai margini del processo decisionale. Tali esperienze si stanno diffondendo in contesti geografici e culturali molto diversi tra di loro e presentano, ciò malgrado, caratteristiche sorprendentemente simili". L. Bobbio, Le arene deliberative, in "Rivista italiana di politiche pubbliche", 3, 2002, p. 21. 9 D. Ciaffi, A Mela, La partecipazione. Dimensioni, spazi, strumenti, cit., pp. 24-39. 10 U. Allegretti, Democrazia partecipativa e processi di democratizzazione, in "Democrazia e diritto", XLV, 2, 2008, p. 178. 36 appartenenza politica precostituita e sono rivolti a influenzare le decisioni che riguardano da vicino la vita dei cittadini: la tutela ambientale, la riqualificazione urbana, i servizi sociali e sanitari, lo sviluppo locale, le politiche di bilancio, la sicurezza, le libertà civili, etc. Queste forme di partecipazione, infatti, appaiono più aderenti al bisogno di personalizzazione, autonomia ed efficacia dei cittadini così tipico dei ceti medi ad elevata istruzione11. E sembra che – in ragione dei processi di individualizzazione – essi siano disposti a partecipare a condizione di poter rendere visibile il loro impegno e di contribuire a risolvere pragmaticamente questioni più concrete e circoscritte12. Tali esperienze sono state condotte indipendentemente le une dalle altre, in contesti differenti, su tematiche diverse, con metodiche dissimili e diseguali livelli di trasferimento di potere decisionale. Eppure, come scrive Luigi Bobbio, ciò che le accumuna è che in tali processi "si insediano vere e proprie arene deliberative nelle quali tutti i diretti interessati prendono parte, in modo strutturato, a un processo collettivo di decisione fondato sull‟uso di argomenti"13. La definizione di „arena deliberativa‟ costituirà la traccia del presente saggio, rivolto a precisare le condizioni sociali che hanno reso necessari dei nuovi tipi di processi partecipativi, i principi che orientano la concezione di democrazia deliberativa – che ispira la legge n. 69/2007 della Regione Toscana e, quindi, il progetto „PisaPartecipa‟ – e le procedure generali che tali esperimenti devono assicurare. Crediamo che una riflessione preliminare sulla democrazia deli- 11 R. Inglehart [1990], Valori e cultura politica nella società industriale avanzata, Torino, UTET, 1997; Id. [1997], La società postmoderna, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1999. 12 Andrea Millefiorini ha sottolineato la specificità „civica‟ dei nuovi fenomeni di partecipazione: "La partecipazione civica è quell‟agire pubblico effettuato non sulla base di un‟appartenenza politica immediata (partito o movimento) allo scopo di un obiettivo politico attribuibile a un partito o a un movimento, ma è un‟azione esercitata da semplici cittadini, singoli o in gruppo, aventi come scopo quello di migliorare le condizioni della convivenza civica di un quartiere, di una città, di una regione o dell‟intero paese". A. Millefiorini, La partecipazione politica in Italia. Impegno politico e azione collettiva negli anni Ottanta e Novanta, Roma, Carocci, 2002, p. 10. Nonostante il livello locale sia la „nicchia ecologica‟ più adatta a tali sperimentazioni, Alberto Magnaghi ritiene che la partecipazione stia mutando la propria „scala‟ e i propri „orizzonti‟: "nelle esperienze locali degli ultimi anni, a partire dal bilancio partecipativo di Porto Alegre, la partecipazione ha iniziato a uscire dalle pratiche Nimby, per investire, unendo in rete le migliaia di „cortili‟ di casa propria, il futuro delle città, delle regioni, del mondo". A. Magnaghi, Presentazione, in E. Frascaroli, G. Allegretti (a cura di), Percorsi condivisi. Contributi per un atlante di pratiche partecipative in Italia, Firenze, Alinea, 2006, p. 9. 13 L. Bobbio, Le arene deliberative, cit., p. 5. 37 berativa possa far luce su alcune questioni problematiche che riguardano la costruzione e la realizzazione delle politiche partecipative. 1. La crisi dei partiti e i nuovi compiti degli enti locali Prima di ricostruirne i principi normativi della democrazia deliberativa – seppure in forma estremamente sintetica, dato il complesso corpus teorico ad essa riconducibile – è opportuno dedicare alcune considerazioni ai problemi in cui si trova il sistema politicoamministrativo. Infatti, vi è una stretta relazione tra la crisi di legittimità e razionalità delle nostre istituzioni e la particolare concezione democratica incarnata nelle nuove pratiche partecipative. In primo luogo, è stato ampiamente rilevato che vi è un logoramento del legame fiduciario tra il ceto politico e i cittadini14. La credibilità dei politici è scossa dai continui scandali e dai costi ma lo è ancor più dalla reiterata incapacità di mostrare doti di governo15. Sembrano inadatti in quanto classe dirigente in un mondo che presenta incessantemente più sfide di quanto essi non comprendano, così prigionieri delle antiquate retoriche dell‟appartenenza politica16. In ossequio alla sospetta ideologia del „partito leggero‟, che certo non ha risolto il problema del finanziamento illecito della politica, inoltre, si è persa un‟„agenzia‟ che raccoglieva preventivamente i biso- 14 Dall‟ultima ricerca dell‟Istat risulta un incremento – dal 16,6% del 1999 al 24,8% del 2009 – delle persone che non si informano per „mancanza di fiducia‟. 15 La letteratura sulla crisi e sulle trasformazioni dei partiti italiani è ampia. Tra i principali studi segnaliamo: Cfr. P. Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti: evoluzione e crisi di un sistema politico: 1945-1996, Bologna, il Mulino, 1997; D. Antiseri, L‟agonia dei partiti politici, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 1999; D. della Porta, I partiti politici, Bologna, il Mulino, 2001; R. Biorcio, La sociologia politica. Partiti, movimenti e partecipazione, Bologna, il Mulino, 2003; F. Raniolo (a cura di), Le trasformazioni dei partiti politici, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2006; L. Morlino, M. Tarchi (a cura di), Partiti e caso italiano, Bologna, il Mulino, 2006; L. Bardi, P. Ignazi, O. Massari, I partiti italiani. Iscritti, dirigenti, eletti, Milano, Università Bocconi Editore, 2007. 16 Se ciò non bastasse – osserva Rodolfo Lewanski – la società contemporanea si trova a compiere scelte su questioni oggettivamente complesse (sul piano etico, tecnico e sociale) e ad affrontare «conflitti intrattabili»: gli impieghi della tecnologia (ogm, biotecnologie, nanotecnologie), il degrado dei beni ambientali (cambiamento climatico, inquinamento), l‟emergere di questioni valoriali (eutanasia, riproduzione assistita, unioni tra persone dello stesso sesso, ecc.). Il sistema politico-istituzionale si trova in forte difficoltà nell‟affrontare temi su cui la conflittualità all‟interno della società risulta spesso molto elevata, tagliando trasversalmente anche le tradizionali divisioni sinistra/destra". R. Lewanski, La democrazia deliberativa. Nuovi orizzonti per la politica, in "Aggiornamenti Sociali", 58, 12, 2007, p. 744. 38 gni e le proposte rilevanti per i cittadini, le associazioni e le imprese. E tuttavia – come osserva Mario Aldo Toscano –, a dispetto della discussa „crisi della politica‟, "mentre dappertutto difettano programmi davvero convincenti, non si fa che chiedere alle istituzioni e ai partiti politici, soprattutto se partiti di governo, un impegno a dare risposte alle continue e diverse richieste di gruppi, ceti, classi, individui, cittadini, consumatori, etc.". Il problema è di trovare soluzioni nuove alle ricorrenti crisi: "L‟equilibrio tra le parti del sistema sociale è diventato virtualmente più arduo, proprio per la molteplicità ed eterogeneità delle „esigenze‟ a cui far fronte: da conciliare secondo canoni e criteri sottoposti anch‟essi a trasformazioni e relativismi difficilmente controllabili. Così appare che le stesse „basi‟ delle società siano sottoposte a spinte e controspinte che alla fine, come si rilevava, rendono più „instabile‟ tutta la costruzione"17. Non sorprende che le attese di ascolto, collaborazione e intervento siano rivolte alle istituzioni locali, a cui si domanda di mantenere una relazione diretta che ai partiti politici, sempre più chiusi in una sorta di „autoriferimento‟, oramai sembra quasi non interessare. Proprio gli enti locali sono stati oggetto di interventi legislativi che hanno accresciuto la responsabilità dei loro dirigenti, a cui ci rivolgiamo in quanto „amministratori‟ ancor prima che „politici‟. Tuttavia anche a livello periferico non mancano molte difficoltà. Per un verso, se agli enti locali competono maggiori compiti – confermati dalla riforma del Titolo V che ha li collocati al centro dell‟architettura costituzionale della Repubblica – le incertezze normative sulle loro competenze18 e la mancata attuazione del „federalismo fiscale‟ non li mettono nelle condizioni di agire. Per altro verso, l‟assetto istituzionale del governo locale – con l‟elezione diretta dei sindaci e la crisi delle assemblee elettive – obbliga i primi cittadini e le giunte a fronteggiare una domanda sociale esigente senza la mediazione di un Consiglio comunale ben radicato sul territorio19. A livello locale si manifestano le tensioni maggiori, con l‟emergere di conflitti territoriali che sfuggono sempre più al controllo politico. Molte scelte possono essere all‟origine di conflitti, reali o potenziali, da parte di chi non si ritenga soddisfatto della decisione presa o disat- 17 M.A.Toscano, Pensare la società – I, in Id. (a cura di), Zoon politikon 2010 – I. Per la democrazia e l‟integrazione sociale, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2011, pp. 14-15. 18 G.C. De Martin, Il sistema delle autonomie locali dopo il Titolo V: quali prospettive?, in «Amministrazione in Cammino», 2, 2007. 19 A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa, dalla teoria alle procedure: il caso della legge regionale toscana sulla partecipazione, in "Le Istituzioni del Federalismo", 5, 2007, p. 609. 39 tesa. Le cosiddette sindromi NIMBY(not in my back yard) o NIMO (not in my office) rappresentano la situazione ordinaria con cui nel paese si misurano e, quasi sempre, si arrestano i processi decisionali20. Senza contare che il governo locale è nelle mani dell‟apparato amministrativo, il cui sostegno o le cui resistenze ne condizionano l‟operato. Il problema è noto. Qual è la finalità delle normative approvate a partire dai primi anni ‟90 se non quello di ribaltare la prospettiva autoreferenziale di una pubblica amministrazione inadeguata alle richieste minime di trasparenza, accesso e comunicazione?21 La pubblica amministrazione non dovrebbe costituire una fonte continua di incomprensibili e gravose complicazioni ma un valido strumento in grado di approntare delle risposte adeguate ai bisogni che la società civile non è in grado di soddisfare autonomamente. Non è in gioco solo la fiducia dei cittadini, delle associazioni e delle imprese verso le istituzioni ma anche l‟efficienza e l‟efficacia di una pubblica amministrazione di cui si chiede il conto anzitutto ai politici. La sfida per tutti è quella dar principio a una buona amministrazione. Leonardo Morlino ha ben argomentato che oltre ai requisiti costitutivi di una „definizione minima empirica‟ della democrazia – il suffragio universale, le elezioni libere, competitive, ricorrenti, corrette, il multipartitismo, la pluralità e concorrenza delle fonti di informazione –, la correttezza procedurale rispetto alle leggi, la responsabilità politica di tipo verticale nei confronti dei cittadini, quella orizzontale nei confronti di altre istituzioni e soggetti collettivi, e la capacità di rispondere alle domande dei governati rappresentano gli elementi che danno sostanza alla „qualità della democrazia‟22. 20 Cfr. L. Bobbio, A. Zeppetella (a cura di), Perché proprio qui? Grandi opere e opposizioni locali, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 1999; W. Sancassiani, Gestire i processi deliberativi: problemi e soluzioni, in L. Pellizzoni (a cura di), La deliberazione pubblica, Roma, Meltemi, 2005, pp. 205-227; R. Lewanski, Democrazia delle infrastrutture, infrastrutture per la democrazia, in D. Bianchi, G. Gamba (a cura di), Ambiente Italia 2007. La gestione dei conflitti ambientali, Milano, Edizione Ambiente, 2007, pp. 61-92. 21 Il processo di modernizzazione fu avviato con le leggi n. 142 e n. 241 del 1990, il D.Lgs. 29/1993, l‟approvazione delle cosiddette "leggi Bassanini" (59/1997, 217/1997, 191/1998, 50/1999) e della legge-quadro 150/2000 (Disciplina delle attività di informazione e di comunicazione delle pubbliche amministrazioni). Tali interventi concernono il diritto di accesso nei confronti delle attività amministrative, il radicamento di criteri di efficacia, efficienza ed economicità delle policies e la comunicazione istituzionale. Cfr. M. Careri, R. Cattaneo (a cura di), Cambiare la Pubblica Amministrazione, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2000; F. Caringella, A. Giuncato, F. Romano, L‟ordinamento degli enti locali: commentario al testo unico, Milano, Ipsoa, 2007. P. Mancini, Comunicazione politica, in A. Costabile, P. Fantozzi, P. Turi (a cura di), Manuale di sociologia politica, Roma, Carocci, 20072, pp. 261-272. 22 L. Morlino, Democrazia e Democratizzazioni, Bologna, il Mulino, 2003, p. 25, 40 C‟è bisogno di una risposta vera che "risolva l‟impasse nei tradizionali circuiti della accountability e della responsiveness democratica"23. La tesi qui sostenuta è che tale risposta è la partecipazione, con il superamento della divisione tra i policy makers e i policy takers24. In tal senso, la „qualità della democrazia‟ si realizza quando il sistema politico-amministrativo favorisce l‟informazione e istituzionalizza l‟ascolto, la collaborazione e un ragionevole grado di empowerment. La gravità della situazione è tale da rigettare in toto la vetusta concezione tecnocratica ed élitaria del funzionamento delle istituzioni25. Il coinvolgimento dei cittadini e degli attori collettivi della società, infatti, è fondamentale per migliorare la qualità delle politiche. È la ricchezza delle esperienze depositate nella società civile che richiede di non disperdere un patrimonio di „intelligenza collettiva‟ inutilizzato perché ancora troppo disconosciuto e/o denigrato26. E ciò accade soprattutto a livello locale in cui dovrebbe essere maggiore l‟esperienza diretta delle questioni da parte della popolazione. Le pratiche partecipative rispondono, in primo luogo, ad una esigenza conoscitiva. Non sono sufficienti le indicazioni espresse dai cittadini a sostegno del programma di uno schieramento politico durante i comizi elettorali. Solo una pubblica amministrazione che si doti di strumenti atti a comprendere adeguatamente la molteplicità dei bisogni collettivi potrà garantire dei servizi appropriati ai cittadini27. L‟ascolto dei cittadini serve a valorizzare quelle „funzioni di 239-240. Vedi anche la relazione Esplorando il nesso tra efficacia delle politiche pubbliche e qualità della democrazia di Francesca Gelli al Esplorando il nesso tra efficacia delle politiche pubbliche e qualità della democrazia, Convegno della SiSP, Bologna, 4-6.9.2006. 23 A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa, dalla teoria alle procedure: il caso della legge regionale toscana sulla partecipazione, cit., p. 606. 24 L. Bobbio, Le arene deliberative, cit., p. 19. 25 Sul repertorio della concezione élitaria e tecnocratica della politica cfr. D. Fisichella, Tecnocrazia, in N. Bobbio, N. Matteucci, G. Pasquino (a cura di), Dizionario di Politica, Torino, Utet, 19832, pp. 1178-1181; R.A. Dahl [1985], Democrazia o tecnocrazia?, Bologna, il Mulino, 1987; P.P. Portinaro, Tecnocrazia, in «Enciclopedia delle Scienze Sociali», VIII, Roma, Istituto Enciclopedia Italiana, 1998; I. Sanderson, Participation and democratic renewal: from „instrumental‟ to „communicative rationality‟?, in "Policy & Politics", 27, 3, 1999, pp. 325-341. 26 P. Lévy [1994], L‟intelligenza collettiva. Per un‟antropologia del cyberspazio, Milano, Feltrinelli, 20022. Per una disamina critica dell‟opera cfr. il mio La democrazia nell‟era di Internet. Per una politica dell‟intelligenza collettiva, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2001. 27 "talvolta sono proprio i cittadini invece a possedere, in un contesto di elevata complessità sociale, esperienze e competenze che sfuggono al decisore politico e alla sua "macchina" burocratica e che possono rivelarsi invece decisive ai fini di una buona scelta". A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa, dalla teoria alle procedure: il caso della legge regionale toscana sulla partecipazione, cit., p. 612. 41 allarme e cassa di risonanza‟ che l‟opinione pubblica può esercitare a vantaggio dell‟operato del sistema politico-istituzionale28. La loro collaborazione è in grado di mobilitare l‟apporto di conoscenze e abilità maggiori e, quasi sempre, diverse rispetto a istituzionali. In altri termini, sebbene i processi partecipativi richiedano delle risorse aggiuntive potrebbero produrre decisioni alternative più efficaci ed efficienti. Luigi Pellizzoni ha colto il collegamento tra le virtù cognitive‟ e le „virtù di governo‟ della partecipazione civica29. Per un verso, il confronto consente l‟apertura dei circuiti decisionali, ridefinendo la natura del problema, gli argomenti e conducendo a soluzioni innovative che, in prima battuta, non si erano considerate30. Per altro verso, è presumibile un risvolto pragmatico dovuto alla circostanza che, essendo maggiore la legittimità delle scelte partecipate, le decisioni assunte siano più stabili e facili da attuare. Anche se egoisticamente non soddisfatti dell‟accordo raggiunto, i partecipanti riconoscono in ogni caso di aver contribuito alla soluzione finale. È soprattutto Alberto Magnaghi a sostenere che se tutti i soggetti sono coinvolti in un processo di condivisione delle soluzioni è più probabile che nessun abbia interesse a mettere in discussione l‟esito31. Da ultimo, il coinvolgimento ai processi decisionali può contribuire a formare le „virtù civiche‟, accrescendo le qualità morali ed intellettuali dei singoli e il senso di appartenenza alla propria comunità. Sono i cosiddetti effetti derivati dal processo deliberativo (l‟outcome) relativi all‟acquisizione di maggiore competenza, responsabilità e autonomia da parte dei cittadini, alla fiducia dei cittadini nelle istituzioni32 e alla creazione e al rafforzamento dei legami interpersonali. A 28 A tale riguardo cfr. le riflessioni di G.F. Lanzara, La deliberazione come indagine pubblica, in L. Pellizzoni (a cura di), La deliberazione pubblica, cit., pp. 51-74. Si veda anche l‟esame che Charles E. Lindblom svolge sui casi di social problem solving che vengono attivati nella risoluzione e nel miglioramento di situazioni problematiche attraverso processi interattivi e di inquiry e knowledge. C.E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making through Mutual Adjustment, New York, The Free Press, 1965; Id., Inquiry and Change, New Haven-Londra, Yale University Press, 1990. 29 L. Pellizzoni, Che cosa significa deliberare? Promesse e problemi della democrazia deliberativa, in Id. (a cura di), La deliberazione pubblica, cit., p. 26. 30 Stefania Ravazzi ha posto al centro delle sue indagini proprio tale problema. S. Ravazzi, Quando i cittadini decidono, in "Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche", 2, 2006, p. 61-89; Id., Civicrazia. Quando i cittadini decidono, Roma, Aracne, 2007. 31 A. Magnaghi, Dalla partecipazione all‟autogoverno della comunità locale: verso il federalismo municipale solidale, in "Democrazia e diritto", XLIV, 3, 2006, p. 143. 32 È il mainstream che l‟Unione Europea ripropone nel Libro Bianco sulla governance del 2001: "La qualità, la pertinenza e l‟efficacia delle politiche dell‟Unione dipendono dall‟ampia partecipazione che si saprà assicurare lungo tutto il loro percorso, dalla prima elaborazione all‟esecuzione. Con una maggiore partecipa- 42 sua volta l‟accrescimento di spazi pubblici e capitale sociale è un fattore virtuoso per il buon esito della democrazia nella sua interezza33. 2. I principi della democrazia deliberativa Dopo avere introdotto il „contesto di genesi‟ delle nuove pratiche partecipative ne consideriamo i principi sulla scorta delle riflessioni disponibili nella letteratura politologica. Infatti, come ha rilevato Antonio Floridia a proposito di quelle toscane, tali esperienze costituiscono il "tentativo di dare forma istituzionale e procedurale ai principi normativi della „democrazia deliberativa‟". E per quanto non tutte le esperienze partecipative possano essere ricondotte, in senso proprio, a tale modello, esso ne costituisce il "principale punto di riferimento"34. Deliberazione e partecipazione non sono certamente concetti intercambiabili. Tuttavia, sosteniamo l‟idea – ribadita da Bernard Gbikpi – che, con i loro presupposti esigenti, i processi deliberativi possono essere considerati il „compimento‟ della democrazia partecipativa35. La deliberazione costituisce il modello ideale delle pratiche partecipative e – controfattualmente – ne orienta le sue procedure. Ciò detto, quando discutiamo di democrazia deliberativa siamo di fronte a una dottrina complessa, il cui corpus teorico è multivocale e non privo di contraddizioni, in cui confluiscono una pluralità di idee36 zione sarà possibile aumentare la fiducia nel risultato finale e nelle istituzioni da cui emanano tali politiche". European Commission (2001), European Governance. A White Paper, Bruxelles, European Commission, COM 2001 428. 33 Sul capitale sociale esiste una vasta letteratura. Cfr. A. Bagnasco et al., Il capitale sociale. Istruzioni per l‟uso, Bologna, il Mulino, 2001; M. Almagisti, Qualità della democrazia. Capitale sociale, partiti e culture politiche in Italia, Roma, Carocci, 2006; R. Cartocci, Mappe del tesoro. Geografia del capitale sociale in Italia, Bologna, il Mulino, 2007; M. Pendenza, Teorie del capitale sociale, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008. 34 A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa, dalla teoria alle procedure: il caso della legge regionale toscana sulla partecipazione, cit., p. 604. 35 B. Gbikpi, Dalla teoria della democrazia partecipativa a quella deliberativa: quali possibili continuità?, in "Stato e mercato", 73, 2005, p. 98. 36 Luigi Bobbio sottolinea che alla medesima dizione „democrazia deliberativa‟ alcuni studiosi preferiscono altre espressioni, che peraltro non risolvono le ambiguità: „democrazia fondata su argomenti‟, „democrazia discorsiva‟ (Dryzek 1990), „democrazia riflessiva‟ (Beck et al. 1994; Olson 2006; Schön, Rein 1994) o „democrazia dialogica‟ (Giddens 1994). L. Bobbio, Le arene deliberative, cit., pp. 102-103. Sono tutte terminologie diverse per indicare concezioni della politica "antiche quanto la democrazia stessa". J. Elster, Introduction, in Id. (a cura di), Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics, Cambridge-London, MIT Press, 1998, p. 3. 43 che rischiano di fargli assumere una semantica troppo estensiva37. Non procederemo qui a confrontare le molteplici posizioni in cui prende vita, tra anni Ottanta e Novanta, come paradigma teorico e il quadro che emergerà non sarà esaustivo del dibattito in corso38. Seguiremo piuttosto come linea argomentativa privilegiata la riflessione di Jürgen Habermas, almeno nei suoi tratti fondamentali39, e intorno ad essa preciseremo le condizioni di un processo deliberativo. Lo studioso tedesco ricostruisce il concetto di democrazia politica a partire dalla compresenza delle dimensioni di „fattualità‟ e di „validità‟. Le istituzioni democratiche, infatti, sono una forma di „intelaiatura organizzativa‟ dello stato e fissano, al contempo, l‟"autocostituirsi di una comunità di consociati eguali e liberi"40. Da un lato, le decisioni politiche sono assunte e rese vincolanti con mezzi legislativi e amministrativi, la cui forza persuasiva poggia, in ultima istanza, su di un potenziale di minaccia che è coperto dagli "strumenti di violenza acquartierati nelle caserme". D‟altro lato, se – come Habermas ritiene – il sistema politico consegue la propria legittimità dal perseguimento dell‟„interesse generale‟, in un regime democratico è basilare che la procedura deliberativa incarni una prassi che possa essere interpretata come la realizzazione di diritti umani e in cui si realizza effettivamente il principio della sovranità popolare. Quest‟ultima prende la forma tramite la partecipazione alla vita politica, nelle forme e limiti previste dalle costituzioni, indirettamente, eleggendo gli organi di rappresentanza, direttamente, nei referendum propositivi o abrogativi, nelle petizioni popolari, etc., e in maniera mediata concorrendo alla formazione dell‟opinione pubblica. Jürgen Habermas condivide con Hannah Arendt e la tradizione 37 La preoccupazione è posta in un bel saggio da Laura Cataldi, Promesse e limiti della democrazia deliberativa: un‟alternativa alla democrazia del voto?", Torino, Laboratorio di Politica Comparata e Filosofia Pubblica–Centro Einaudi, 3. 2008, pp. 5-8. 38 Una compiuta ricostruzione della dottrina deliberativa si trova nello studio a cura di J. Bohman e W. Rehg, Deliberative democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics, Cambridge, Mit Press, 1997. Crf. anche J. Bohman, The Coming Age of Deliberative Democracy, in "Journal of Political Philosophy", VI, 4, 1998, pp. 399-423. Nel panorama italiano, il saggio di M. Bonanni, M. Penco, Modelli deliberativi: una ricognizione critica, in L. Pellizzoni (a cura di), La deliberazione pubblica, cit., pp. 157-176. 39 Per una trattazione della concezione della democrazia nell‟opera di Jurgen Habermas si veda M. Ampola, L. Corchia, Dialogo su Jürgen Habermas. Le trasformazioni della modernità, Pisa, ETS, 20102, pp. 151-178. Una rassegna bibliografica degli studi sulla teoria deliberativa si trova in L. Corchia, Jürgen Habermas. A Bibliography: works and studies (1952-2010), Pisa, Il Campano-Arnus University Books, 2010. 40 J. Habermas [1992], Fatti e norme: contributi a una teoria discorsiva del diritto e della democrazia, Milano, Guerini e Associati, 1996, p. 164. 44 repubblicana l‟idea che il recupero di una cittadinanza attiva sia possibile solo rivitalizzando una sfera pubblica che operi da „controforza‟ rispetto alla ricerca di „lealtà di massa‟ di un sistema partitocratico autonomizzatosi e al "privatismo civico" di una popolazione spoliticizzata che trova realizzazione nella sfera familistico-professionale e appagamento nel lavoro, nel consumo e nello stato sociale. Il limite delle concezioni minimaliste della democrazia è che concentrandosi sulla divisione dei poteri e sulle regole dell‟alternanza finiscono per trascurare che la sfera pubblica svolge delle funzioni strumentali e simboliche vitali per l‟esistenza di una comunità politica41. La democrazia deliberativa si assume il compito di migliorare la qualità del confronto pubblico, attraverso una procedura articolata che favorisce l‟informazione, la riflessione, il dibattito e la decisione. L‟allargamento della base culturale della politica italiana attraverso il l‟elevazione della qualità dell‟opinione pubblica è una sfida ineludibile. Oggi i momenti di informazione e dibattito sembrano compromessi dalla banalizzazione dell‟agenda pubblica, la superficialità del consenso su programmi dei partiti politici sempre più vaghi e scarni, la personalizzazione della campagna elettorale sulle parole e sulle immagini del leader e l‟evocativo richiamo al senso comune dei cittadini. Donatella della Porta così sintetizza la situazione: "La democrazia mediatica, con una legittimazione filtrata attraverso i mezzi di comunicazione di massa, ha facilitato gli appelli populistici, mentre la commercializzazione del sistema dei media riduceva la loro capacità di promuovere informazione e dibattito critico"42. L‟uso strumentale dei sondaggi demoscopici non fa che aggravare lo stato delle cose43 e giustamente James Fishkin ricorreva al mito della caverna di Platone per denunciare la pericolosa alterazione della „voce della massa‟44. 41 J. Habermas [1992], Tre modelli normativi di democrazia, in Id., L‟inclusione dell‟altro: studi di teoria politica, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1988, p. 246. In maniera non dissimile procede il saggio di Francesco Raniolo, La partecipazione politica, cit., pp. 18-21, 84. 42 D. della Porta (in collaborazione con B. Gbikpi), La partecipazione nelle istituzioni: concettualizzare gli esperimenti di democrazia deliberativa e partecipativa, in "Partecipazione e conflitto", 0, 2008, p. 19. Analogamente Pierre Lévy denuncia la perdita di intelligenza collettiva e il senso di irrealtà che attanaglia la rappresentazione mediatica della sfera pubblica alle prese con il rumore di una "politicaspettacolo discontinua, esplosa, senza memoria, senza progetto, incoerente". P. Lévy [1994], L‟intelligenza collettiva. Per un‟antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 92. 43 Sul tema dei sondaggi di opinione: M.C. Pitrone, Il sondaggio, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 1996; M. Barisione, R. Mannheimer, I sondaggi, Bologna, il Mulino, 1999. 44 "Oggi i cittadini vivono in una versione high-tech della caverna di Platone. L‟allegoria di Platone risulterà meno sorprendente ai lettori moderni di quanto sia 45 Al contrario, lo scopo dei processi deliberativi non è di rappresentare ciò che gli interpellati credono o auspicano su problemi che concernono spesso questioni complesse che scompaginano le tradizionali divisioni sinistra/destra bensì mostrare che la gente, avendo la possibilità di approfondirle con la raccolta di pareri informati può raggiungere livelli di cognizione che assicurano una discussione migliore. La concezione deliberativa della democrazia si fonda sull‟idea che vi è il bisogno di elevare il livello di conoscenza dei problemi e delle possibili soluzioni tra la cittadinanza, educando alla cultura del dialogo tra le molteplici e spesso opposte ragioni e alla responsabilità pubblica45. Giuliano Amato ricorda che il concetto di „deliberazione‟ nella dottrina politica si riferisce al "processo nel quale si discute prima di decidere, secondo il senso della parola inglese deliberation. Quando si chiede una fase deliberativa si chiede in sostanza che si discuta, che si confrontino le opinioni, che si renda possibile che l‟opinione dell‟uno influenzi quella dell‟altro in modo che alla fine si possa poi raggiungere una conclusione che tiene conto di tutte le opinioni"46. risultata agli antichi, poiché, come gli abitanti della caverna di Platone, tendiamo a prendere per mondo reale la nostra immagine del mondo, specialmente la nostra immagine del mondo politico, a partire da immagini riflesse e da echi di voci. Invece delle ombre formate dal riverbero del fuoco che si riflette sul muro di una caverna, guardiamo le immagini della televisione nel nostro salotto. Invece dell‟eco delle voci di coloro che creano queste ombre cinesi, ascoltiamo le voci dei dibattiti e delle pubblicità radiofoniche e televisioni. Come gli abitanti della caverna di Platone, tendiamo a prendere per mondo reale queste immagini riflesse e queste voci. Quantomeno nei termini del nostro ruolo di cittadini, le cose che non accadono in televisione non hanno nessuna forza, vivacità o immediatezza, o ne hanno pochissima. Sono le immagini riflesse che appaiono reali ed importanti". J.S. Fishkin [1995], La nostra voce. Opinione pubblica & democrazia, una proposta, Venezia, Marsilio, 2003, p. 31. Cfr. anche J.S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, New Directions for Democratic Reforms, New Haven-London, Yale University Press, 1991. Sulle differenti finalità dei sondaggi demoscopici e deliberativi rimando al mio Il sondaggio deliberativo di James S. Fishkin, in "The Lab‟s Quarterly", 1, 2007. 45 Esaminando il complesso rapporto tra la „democrazia dei partiti‟ e la „democrazia del pubblico‟, Bernard Manin pone in evidenza che, per quanto le democrazie contemporanee siano rappresentative, la partecipazione è una delle fonti di legittimazione essenziali; ed essa si compie attraverso il voto ma anche sottomettendo le decisioni alla "prova della discussione". Manin B., La democrazia dei moderni, Milano, Anabasi, 1993. 46 G. Amato, La forza del discutere e le palle di biliardo, in "Reset", 113, 2009, p. 65. Analogamente Giancarlo Bosetti richiama il senso etimologico del termine: "Per capirsi su quel che è la democrazia deliberativa, bisogna anzitutto mettere in chiaro una questione linguistica: in inglese to deliberate ha un significato diverso che deliberare in italiano e vuol dire esaminare attraverso una discussione i pro e i contro di una scelta, prima di decidere. Il significato italiano mette invece 46 Questa definizione introduce quelli che Luigi Bobbio indica come le due condizioni-chiave dei processi deliberativi: "la prima è che vi prendano parte, su un piano di parità, tutti coloro che sono coinvolti dalle conseguenze della decisione. La seconda è che l‟interazione tra i partecipanti si basi sul confronto di argomenti imparziali"47. Tali proposizioni, in realtà, comprendono più di due condizioni-chiave che si riferiscono ai principi controfattuali che Jürgen Habermas ha condensato nella figura della „situazione linguistica ideale‟48 e da cui possiamo cominciare per esaminare le procedure deliberative. 3. Le procedure della democrazia deliberativa 3.1. La discorsività e la forza degli argomenti migliori La democrazia deliberativa si affida alla presunzione che i soggetti coinvolti nei processi partecipativi possano confrontarsi sugli oggetti di discussione facendo valere la "forza degli argomenti migliori". Sul piano dialettico, la deliberazione è una vera e propria lotta ritualizzata e non a caso Habermas descrive la competizione argomentativa riprendendo da Robert Brandom l‟immagine dello scorekeeping49. L‟obiettivo è porre fine alla controversia sulle ipotetiche pretese dei l‟accento sul dopo, sul decidere. E questo fa una bella differenza". G. Bosetti, Tutti insieme per ragionare appassionatamente, in "La Repubblica", 19.7.2003. Vedi anche di G. Bosetti e S. Maffettone, Introduzione, in Id., Id. (a cura di), Democrazia deliberativa: cosa è, Roma, Luiss University Press, 2004, p. 7; R. Morgan, Cosa significa deliberare? Promesse e problemi della democrazia deliberativa, in L. Pellizzoni (a cura di), La deliberazione pubblica, cit., p. 8. Sulla matrice anglosassone delle concezioni ed esperienze di democrazia deliberativa si soffermano molti interpreti. 47 L. Bobbio, La democrazia deliberativa nella pratica, in "Stato e mercato", 73, 2005, p. 67. 48 Per una disamina delle dimensioni semantiche, dello statuto controfattuale, dei riferimenti bibliografici e intellettuali rimando al mio La logica dei processi culturali. Jürgen Habermas tra filosofia e sociologia, Genova, Ecig, 2010, pp. 87-93. 49 "La prassi discorsiva consiste, nel caso fondamentale, in uno scambio di affermazioni, domande e risposte che i partner si attribuiscono reciprocamente e giudicano in vista di possibili ragioni, uno scambio dove ciascuno, dalla sua visuale, tiene la contabilità su chi aveva il diritto di quali atti linguistici, su chi ha accettato in buona fede quali affermazioni da chi altro – e infine su chi, con pretese di validità non riscattate discorsivamente, ha scoperto il conto di credibilità generalmente concesso, screditandosi così agli occhi dei compagni di gioco. Ogni partecipante che, con i suoi contributi, fa dei punti calcola contemporaneamente il punteggio che gli altri raggiungono con i loro contributi". J. Habermas [1999], Da Kant a Hegel. Sulla pragmatica linguistica di Robert Brandom, in Id., Verità e giustificazione. Saggi filosofici, Bari-Roma, Laterza, 2001, p. 138. 47 differenti contendenti con il raggiungimento di un‟„intesa motivata razionalmente‟ a favore degli argomenti più convincenti50. Si raggiunge un accordo seguendo le „prese di posizione sì/no‟ con cui i partecipanti accettano oppure respingono le tesi. La forza persuasiva è data dalla plausibilità delle ragioni con cui gli interlocutori cercano di convincersi circa la validità delle rispettive pretese. È tale plausibilità che distingue il consenso „razionale‟ e quello „non razionale‟. Il consenso non può essere il prodotto di fattori esterni alla discussione delle pretese di validità, quali la violenza, l‟autorità, l‟inganno, etc. La partecipazione diretta e indiretta nel processo decisionale delle istituzioni rappresenta solo una condizione necessaria di per sé non sufficiente per parlare in senso proprio di deliberazione51. Quest‟ultima, infatti, richiede altresì che il confronto tra le parti sia orientato all‟intesa attraverso un discorso razionale degli argomenti. Come scrive Lewanski, ciò che caratterizza i processi deliberativi rispetto alla mera partecipazione è la funzione assegnata alle discussioni nel migliorare la conoscenza dei problemi, la comprensione reciproca e degli attori in campo e la ricerca di un‟intesa attraverso il confronto ponderato delle argomentazioni: "la partecipazione certamente si basa su processi discorsivi: vi sono discussioni, scambi verbali più o meno aggressivi, talvolta negoziati e mediazioni. Ma non necessariamente si tratta di processi dialogico-deliberativi. [...] La «deliberazione» è invece è un processo che mira a generare un consenso informato attraverso un metodo dialogico (in greco «discorso tra persone») che porti a comunicazioni interpersonali significative, a una progressiva comprensione delle ragioni altrui (senza rinunciare aprioristicamente alle proprie), a uno spostamento verso valutazioni più bilanciate, condivise, ragionate e orientate al cambiamento"52. Ognuno è motivato da interessi specifici e orientato da credenze precostituite ma nel discorso le preferenze sono poste a confronto 50 Si deve considerare che sono molteplici i „tipi di argomentazioni‟ implicati nei processi deliberativi. Seguendo la classificazione di Jürgen Habermas possiamo distinguere: i discorsi esplicativi, i discorsi teoretici, i discorsi pragmatici, i discorsi pratico-morali, i discorsi esistenziali e le critiche terapeutiche, i discorsi etici e le critiche estetiche. Cfr. L. Corchia, La logica dei processi culturali, cit., pp. 79-86. 51 Oltre alla diversa origine delle pratiche deliberative e partecipative, le prime tipiche dell‟ambiente anglo-americano, le seconde di quello latino-americano, in numerose indagini segnalano la natura procedurale e normativa vs. quella sostanziale e applicativa. Da ultimo si legga l‟intervento Democrazia partecipativa e democrazia deliberativa svolto da Raffaele Bifulco al convegno: La democrazia partecipativa in Italia e in Europa: esperienze e prospettive, tenutosi a Firenze il 2-3 aprile del 2009. Tornerò più avanti sulla questione a proposito dell‟efficacia dei processi deliberativi. 52 R. Lewanski, La democrazia deliberativa. Nuovi orizzonti per la politica, cit., pp. 4-5. 48 critico ed essere modificate in tutto o in parte, riducendo altresì il rischio che il dissenso si tramuti in un conflitto più o meno palese53. Alcune brevi considerazioni devono essere rivolte alla peculiare differenza tra il metodo deliberativo, la votazione e la negoziazione54. Certamente, quest‟ultime si distinguono tra loro: la votazione fa valere la „regola della maggioranza‟ per cui si aggregano e si contano le preferenze allo scopo di determinare la posizione vincente, mentre la negoziazione si svolge in base alla „regola dell‟unanimità‟ intorno a un compromesso con cui i partecipanti in maniera „consociativa‟ si distribuiscono la posta in gioco55. Tuttavia, entrambe contemplano che le motivate posizioni di partenza non siamo messe in discussione, se non strategicamente in ragione di interessi nuovi e relazioni di potere. Per quanto possa capitare che durante le arene deliberative si faccia ricorso alla votazione o alla negoziazione, ciò che le dovrebbe caratterizzare è, per contro, la trasformazione delle preferenze mediante la „discussione razionale‟, giacché – asserisce Luigi Bobbio – "gli attori apprendono gli uni dagli altri, correggono i loro punti di vista, ridefiniscono i problemi, e diventano capaci di inventare nuove opzioni"56. Come puntualizza D. Miller, la deliberazione va concepita come "un processo attraverso il quale le preferenze iniziali vengono trasformate allo scopo di prendere in considerazione i punti di vista degli altri"57. La deliberazione presuppone l‟esistenza di valori e scopi comuni che 53 Antonio Floridia sottolinea che nella concezione democratica deliberativa prevale "l‟idea che una decisione collettiva possa essere assunta sulla base di argomenti razionali, e sulla base di informazioni e conoscenze condivise (e non, necessariamente, sulla base di un negoziato tra interessi contrapposti e/o di un conflitto che veda una tesi prevalere sull‟altra)". A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa, dalla teoria alle procedure: il caso della legge regionale toscana sulla partecipazione, cit., p. 639. 54 J. Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in J. Bohman, W. Rehg (a cura di), Deliberative Democracy, cit., pp. 3-33; J. Elster [2005], Argomentare e negoziare, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2005. 55 Sulla differenza tra il „governo maggioritario‟ e il „governo consociativo‟ cfr. A. Lijphart. [1984], Le democrazie contemporanee, Bologna, il Mulino, 2001; L. Di Gregorio, Modelli di democrazia di Lijphart tra "ideale" ed "empirico", Wp del "Centro di Metodologia delle Scienze Sociali", 93, 2003. 56 L. Bobbio, Come smaltire i rifiuti. Un esperimento di democrazia deliberativa, in "Stato e Mercato", 64, 2002, p. 100. In un saggio successivo lo studioso torinese precisa che "Secondo i „deliberativisti‟, l‟essenza della democrazia non consiste nella conta dei voti tra posizioni precostituite, secondo il principio di maggioranza, o nella negoziazione tra interessi dati, ma nella discussione fondata su argomenti (deliberation, in inglese) tra tutti i soggetti coinvolti dal tema sul tappeto". Id., Dilemmi della democrazia partecipativa, in "Democrazia e diritto", XLIV, 4, 2006, p. 14. 57 D. Miller, Deliberative democracy and social choice, in D. Held (a cura di), Prospects for democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993, p. 75. 49 dovrebbe ricreare ed estendere tramite il confronto argomentativo58. Se questa è la filosofia del gioco argomentativo si devono avere però alcune condizioni che alimentino la fiducia nei partecipanti59. L‟elemento cardine della democrazia deliberativa, infatti, è il confronto basato su argomentazioni. Tuttavia questo criterio di selezione si basa su dei presupposti esigenti che concernono, in termini generali, le condizioni socio-culturali e istituzionali necessarie a promuovere il desiderio e la possibilità effettiva di partecipare e, in termini più specifici, la strutturazione dell‟arena deliberativa al fine di assicurare la correttezza del processo sul piano procedurale. Antonio Floridia ha rimarcato come nelle riflessioni sulla democrazia deliberativa il tema della "traducibilità" dei suoi paradigmi normativi all‟interno di procedure istituzionali assuma un rilievo crescente60. D‟altra parte, quello istituzionalizzazione dei processi deliberativi è un problema serio che i sostenitori della democrazia deliberativa devono risolvere se vogliono superare il piano della sperimentazione. Nel panorama italiana è stato soprattutto Luigi Bobbio ad aver posto il problema del „disegno istituzionale‟ e quindi delle regole condivise che mirano ad assicurare delle regole alla partecipazione. Secondo lo studioso torinese, un contesto deliberativo richiede necessariamente un tasso di „strutturazione‟61, ossia quel contesto re- 58 La definizione e la condivisione di „bene comune‟ o „interesse generale‟ costituiscono, in realtà, delle sfide aperte per una deliberazione davvero inclusiva. Non è così improbabile che, in situazioni di distanza culturale, i processi partecipativi possa condurre a una intensificazione dei conflitti tra i partecipanti piuttosto che ad una loro composizione, dovuta al fatto che manca un „terreno‟ condiviso. 59 "La fiducia è necessaria perché la pratica deliberativa ha senso solo se tutti i partecipanti seguono le „regole‟ del modello deliberativo che auspica il raggiungimento di un accordo a seguito di un confronto aperto e ragionato in vista del perseguimento del bene comune". L. Cataldi, Democrazia deliberativa e politiche partecipative: i processi inclusivi in Piemonte e in Lombardia, tesi del Dottorato di Ricerca in Studi Politici, ciclo XIX, Milano, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2007, p. 33. 60 "uno dei motivi di scetticismo più ricorrenti, nei confronti del modello teorico della democrazia deliberativa, è proprio quello che si rivolge alla presunta «impraticabilità» o all‟«irrealismo» delle premesse normative su cui poggia il suo edificio teorico; un atteggiamento che, nel migliore dei casi, pur concedendo il beneficio di un certo interesse agli «esperimenti» deliberativi, ne asserisce però la dimensione intrinsecamente parziale e non estendibile". A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa in pratica, il caso Toscana, in "Reset", 114, 2009, p. 58. 61 A differenza di Luigi Bobbio, il quale ritiene che la democrazia deliberativa richieda dei "processi che trovano spazio in un quadro istituzionale ad hoc", Luigi Pellizzoni si fa interprete di una strutturazione più debole per cui tali processi sono "peculiari modalità di relazione in contesti istituzionali non specificamente dedicati". L. Pellizzoni, Che cosa significa deliberare? Promesse e problemi della democrazia deliberativa, in Id. (a cura di), La deliberazione pubblica, cit., p. 18. 50 golamentato di garanzia che Jon Elster chiamava deliberative setting62. Francesca Gelli e Leonardo Morlino hanno sottolineato la radicale distanza rispetto "agli spontaneismi, alle forme di protesta o di rivendicazione del movimentismo" propri dell‟ondata partecipativa degli anni ‟60 e ‟70: "Una caratteristica dei processi deliberativi è, infatti, che si tratta di forme proceduralizzate di democrazia, normativamente intese, in cui c‟è poco spazio per l‟improvvisazione"63. Il primo compito di ogni processo deliberativo è, dunque, quello di stabilire le regole di funzionamento e di sottoporle all‟approvazione dei partecipanti. Ciò significa, peraltro, che sebbene le arene deliberative siano riunioni „altamente strutturate‟, a giudizio di Luigi Bobbio, esse non dovrebbero essere predefinite su base giuridica. Ciò per evitare che l‟ordinamento si trasformi in una "gabbia" che impedisce di adeguare le regole all‟imprevedibile svolgimento degli eventi64. Per tale ragione, Umberto Allegretti ha recentemente auspicato che le sempre più frequenti normative continuino a mantenersi „leggere‟65. Questo aspetto costituisce al contempo un punto di forza e debolezza dei processi deliberativi, i quali, per un verso, beneficiano di un benefico livello di flessibilità, per altro verso, essendo extra legem non assicurano gli stessi livelli di legalità e legittimità delle istituzioni. Nel merito, le regole riguardano, in primo luogo, la garanzia dei principi di trasparenza e di massima pubblicità degli esiti delle discussioni sia all‟interno che all‟esterno delle arene deliberative66. Altrettanto importanti sono le regole che prestabiliscono i tempi dei processi, ossia la durata delle riunioni, degli interventi di ciascun partecipante e la previsione delle diverse fasi, l‟ordine dei lavori, etc. Fondamentali sono poi le regole relative ai principi di inclusione e 62 J. Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in Id. (a cura di), Deliberative Democracy, cit., p. 104. 63 F. Gelli, L. Morlino, Democrazia locale e Qualità democratica. Quali teorie, XXII Convegno della Società Italiana di Scienza Politica, Pavia, 4-6.9.2008, p. 24. 64 "Le arene deliberative sono altamente strutturate, ma le regole su cui si basano non hanno, per lo più, natura giuridica. Le arene deliberative non sono di solito istituite per legge e, se lo sono, la previsione legislativa è molto generica e lascia amplissimo spazio all‟autoregolazione dei partecipanti. Più spesso, le arene deliberative agiscono completamente al di fuori delle procedure legali oppure operano nei loro interstizi, aprendo una parentesi informale all‟interno di un procedimento ufficiale. Ciò comporta che i partecipanti non possono vantare diritti sul piano legale e che le conclusioni raggiunte dalla discussione non sono giuridicamente vincolanti". L. Bobbio, Le arene deliberative, cit., p. 11. 65 U. Allegretti, Democrazia partecipativa e processi di democratizzazione, cit., p. 197. 66 Si consideri però che l‟apertura al pubblico potrebbe incentivare la presenza di atteggiamenti da „comizio‟. Cfr. L. Bobbio, Come smaltire i rifiuti, cit., p. 127. 51 di imparzialità, a cui dedicheremo una considerazione specifica in quanto chiamano in causa il problema della selezione dei partecipanti, la questione delle associazioni e il ruolo dei mediatori e facilitatori. 3.2. L‟inclusività e i metodi di selezione dei partecipanti I processi deliberativi dovrebbero garantire pari opportunità di accesso nel senso di assicurare la possibilità di essere coinvolti a tutti coloro che sono potenzialmente interessati all‟oggetto della deliberazione e che vogliano pronunciarsi su decisioni di interesse pubblico67. L‟obiettivo deve essere quello di "estendere al massimo la partecipazione e di compiere ogni sforzo per evitare che interessi o punti di vista rilevanti rimangano al di fuori del processo deliberativo"68. La regola dell‟„inclusività‟ risponde ai principi più generali di eguaglianza tra i cittadini e di pluralismo delle posizioni socio-culturali69. Al fine di assicurare tali principi è necessario un complesso lavoro di ricerca di tutti i soggetti potenzialmente interessati e di intervento per verificare la loro disponibilità a prender parte alla deliberazione. Data l‟impossibilità di realizzare un ampio coinvolgimento, la selezione dei partecipanti è il risultato di approssimazioni che finisce per includere un numero di individui molto piccolo70. A tale proposito va detto che una completa inclusione dei cittadini forse non è neppure auspicabile. Infatti, la tradizione repubblicana che da James Madison giunge a James Fishkin ci insegna che affinché sussista la possibilità di deliberare, i gruppi di discussione devono essere relativamente ristretti, con la facoltà di confrontarsi dialogicamente sulle questioni e poter interloquire personalmente con gli esperti71. Vero 67 J. Elster, Introduction, in Id. (a cura di), Deliberative Democracy, cit., p. 8. Pellizzoni ritiene in senso più restrittivo che "la partecipazione ha dietro di sé due ordini di giustificazioni: cognitiva o normativa. Si ha titolo a partecipare in quanto si possiede una competenza cognitiva riconosciuta oppure perché interessi, preoccupazioni, valori di cui si è portatori sono ritenuti rilevanti e legittimi". L. Pellizzoni, Che cosa significa deliberare? Promesse e problemi della democrazia deliberativa, cit., p. 32. 68 L. Bobbio, Le arene deliberative, cit., p. 13. 69 J. Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in A. Hamlin, P. Pettit (a cura di), The Good Polity, Normative Analysis of the State, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 18. 70 "Il principale paradosso della democrazia partecipativa sta proprio qui. Ambisce a includere tutti, ma – di fatto – riesce a concretamente a coinvolgere solo qualcuno, ossia una piccola (spesso piccolissima) frazione della popolazione interessata" L. Bobbio, Dilemmi della democrazia partecipativa, cit., p. 16. 71 A titolo esemplificativo, il noto caso del bilancio partecipativo di Porto Alegre ha visto il coinvolgimento nelle assemblee di quartiere e agli incontri informali di circa il 5-7 per cento della popolazione. Cfr. M. Gret, Y. Sintomer, Porto 52 è che il basso livello di coinvolgimento della popolazione comporta che tali esperienze finiscono per avere un "basso grado di visibilità politica, anche quando esse si realizzino attraverso interazioni intense e producano esiti efficaci". Luigi Bobbio conclude che "sono importantissime per chi le vive, ma rimangono ignote al grande pubblico72. In ogni modo è essenziale che la selezione sia svolta con metodo, procedendo all‟inclusione mediante un campionamento random (un sorteggio) oppure mediante la partecipazione degli stakeholders73. La prima soluzione dovrebbe garantire una rappresentatività di tutta la popolazione da parte del campione estratto casualmente, favorire la partecipazione di soggetti che non hanno un‟opinione specifica sul tema e ai quali è offerta una possibilità di conoscenza. Si tratta di una procedura statistica che può tener conto di molteplici variabili socio-demografiche74 ed è definita anche „metodo del microcosmo‟75. La selezione casuale consente di coinvolgere persone molto differenti che, difficilmente, si sarebbero confrontate sui quei temi e che ancor meno sono consultate dal sistema politico-amministrativo76. Lo svantaggio è dato dall‟alto tasso di non risposta e dall‟auto-selezione. Normalmente, le persone disposte a partecipare sono una netta minoranza della popolazione con caratteristiche personali ricorrenti. Tanto più che l‟auto-esclusione coinvolge soprattutto le fasce più deboli, già poco rappresentate nei centri del potere77. Oppure le persone appartenenti a schieramenti politici diversi dalla maggioranza78. Alegre. L‟espoir d‟une autre démocratie, Paris, La Découverte, 2002, pp. 75-76. 72 L. Bobbio, Le arene deliberative, cit., p. 26. 73 Per una trattazione dei metodi della „porta aperta‟, della „selezione casuale‟ e della „selezione mirata‟, oltre ai saggi di Luigi Bobbio, si rinvia a quello di Achong Fung, Survey article: Recipes for public spheres: Eight institutional design choices and their consequences, in "The Journal of Political Philosophy", 11, 2003, pp. 338-367. 74 L. Pellizzoni, Opinione o indagine pubblica? Concetti ed esperimenti di democrazia deliberativa, in "Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche", 2, 2007, pp. 101-126. 75 Y. Sintomer [2007], Il potere al popolo. Giurie cittadine, sorteggio e democrazia partecipativa, Bari, Edizioni Dedalo, 2009. 76 Coerente con le idee della democrazia deliberativa, "La scommessa che sta dietro a questo approccio è che qualsiasi cittadino, messo in condizioni di interloquire con gli altri e di assumere le informazioni necessarie, sia in grado di esprimere posizioni puntuali su qualsiasi problema pubblico e costruire, insieme agli altri, soluzioni intelligenti" L. Bobbio, Dilemmi della democrazia partecipativa, cit., p. 18. 77 Per tale ragione viene ribadito che "Il reclutamento dei partecipanti a tali processi dovrebbe quindi prevedere anche sforzi diretti a coinvolgere soggetti marginali che altrimenti non sarebbero presenti per ragioni culturali, sociali e materiali". R. Lewanski, La democrazia deliberativa. Nuovi orizzonti per la politica, cit., p. 6. 78 G. Allegretti, Politiche di partecipazione in Venezuela: tra discorso costituzionale e pratiche sperimentali, in "Democrazia e diritto", XLIV, 3, 2006, p. 56. Si tratta del perico- 53 I processi partecipativi sembrano indirizzati per lo più alla „cittadinanza attiva‟, ossia ai cittadini più consapevoli, disponibili e competenti che per inclinazione e possibilità si impegnano nel pubblico79. Anche il cosiddetto „metodo della porta aperta‟, secondo cui ogni cittadino può decidere liberamente se partecipare o meno al processo, pur costituendo un "un netto rovesciamento della pratica con cui abitualmente vengono prese le decisioni pubbliche"80, comporta il rischio di coinvolgere soltanto i cittadini già „attivi‟. Andrea Millefiorini aveva, giustamente, sottolineato che le forme di partecipazione civica, rispetto a quelle tradizionali, presentino una ridotta capacità di rappresentare tutto lo spettro delle fasce sociali81. La seconda soluzione consiste in una selezione mirata di tutti i punti di vista rilevanti sul tema dibattuto, di modo che la deliberazione avvenga tra coloro che hanno un interesse specifico sulla posta in gioco. La rappresentanza non riguarda la popolazione ma le posizioni di cui va assicurata la completezza dei punti di vista possibili, anche attraverso un‟attività di indagine sul campo (outreach). Anche questa strategia è definita „metodo del microcosmo‟, in questo caso però ricreato ad hoc dagli artefici del processo deliberativo. Il rischio, come rileva L. Bobbio, è quello di "dare spazio ai punti di vista organizzati e per togliere ogni chance di partecipazione agli interessi che non riescono ad esprimersi in forma associata"82. Vi sono, infine, interessi così generali che non produrre alcuna tutela attiva da parti di specifici soggetti della popolazione, quali ad esempio quelli relativi ai cosiddetti „beni comuni‟: l‟acqua, l‟aria, etc.83 3.3. L‟individualità e la partecipazione dei cittadini comuni La questione della diseguale distribuzione delle risorse partecipa- lo di credibilità per tali esperienze dovuto all‟"isomorfia politica tra governo e assemblee" di cui parla Bobbio in Dilemmi della democrazia partecipativa, cit., p. 17. 79 A. Magnaghi, Dalla partecipazione all‟autogoverno locale: verso il federalismo municipale solidale, in "Democrazia e diritto", XLIV, 3, 2006, pp. 143-144. 80 L. Bobbio, G. Pomatto, Modelli di coinvolgimento dei cittadini nelle scelte pubbliche, rapporto redatto per conto della Provincia Autonoma di Trento, nel quadro di una ricerca sulla qualità della democrazia coordinata da Sergio Fabbrini, p. 6. 81 A. Millefiorini, La partecipazione politica in Italia. Impegno politico e azione collettiva negli anni Ottanta e Novanta, cit., pp. 57-58. 82 L. Bobbio, Dilemmi della democrazia partecipativa, cit., p. 15. È differente il problema della rappresentanza degli interessi „non organizzabili‟, ossia di quelli che – come ad esempio le generazioni future – non hanno alcun soggetto referente. 83 R. Geuss [2003], Beni pubblici, beni privati, Roma, Donzelli, 2005. 54 tive ci introduce alla prospettiva liberale della democrazia deliberativa. Anche se spesso vi è il problema di riuscire a coinvolgere i „soggetti più forti‟, poco inclini a esporsi al confronto nell‟arena pubblica, lo scopo dei processi deliberativi è quello di attivare i cittadini comuni. La loro inclusione ha il valore di contrastare la tendenza al „neocorporativismo‟ che da decenni irreggimenta e blocca la società italiana, favorendo soprattutto stakeholders che finiscono per stringere delle relazioni durature con gli apparati amministrativi e il ceto politico84. Umberto Allegretti definisce i modelli che valorizzano la partecipazione dei soggetti organizzati come „democrazia associativa‟85. Ora le associazioni rappresentano la linfa della vita civile e politica, svolgono un ruolo insostituibile nel mobilitare i cittadini verso le opportunità di partecipazione e rafforzano la legittimità delle istituzioni con cui tali organizzazioni intrattengono dei rapporti stabili. Tuttavia, i segni di una involuzione particolaristica sono evidenti. Anche il ricco tessuto di corpi intermedi che costituisce l‟ossatura del capitale sociale spesso pare che escluda più di quanto non includa. La pressione degli interessi concorrenti sottrae legittimità alle decisioni pubbliche, determina un sovraccarico di tensioni all‟interno dell‟amministrazione in ragione dei contrasti tra i molteplici interessi e impedisce la „liberazione‟ di rinnovate competenze e abilità. Pure lo strumento dei tavoli di concertazione diffusi nella governance della Regione Toscana esprime una visione troppo „organicistica‟86 84 Questo timore era presente sin dai primi anni ‟70 a studiosi come Jürgen Habermas preoccupati che la saldatura tra istituzioni e organizzazioni potesse determinare una „controcircolazione‟ che andasse in senso inverso al circuito dei processi decisionali controllati dal „potere comunicativo‟. L‟allargamento della partecipazione ai soggetti comuni potrebbe essere una condizione indispensabile affinché il controllo diffuso eviti una „rifeudalizzazione‟ della sfera pubblica da parte di particolari interessi corporativi a scapito degli interessi generali. J. Habermas [1973], Sulla logica dei problemi di legittimazione, in Id., La crisi di razionalità nel capitalismo maturo, Bari, Laterza, 1975, pp. 105-159. Cfr. M. Ampola, L. Corchia, Dialogo su Jürgen Habermas. Le trasformazioni della modernità, cit., pp. 141-145. 85 U. Allegretti, Il cammino accidentato di un principio costituzionale: quaranta anni di pratiche partecipative in Italia, in "Rivista telematica giuridica dell‟Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti", 1, 2011, pp. 9-10. Cfr. L. Baccaro, Stato e società civile: verso un modello di democrazia associativa?, in "Stato e mercato", 72, 2001, pp. 383-411. 86 Le relazioni organiche, come riassumono bene Daniela Ciaffi e Alfredo Mela, creano degli spazi di deliberazione paralleli a quelli istituzionali: "Il „tavolo‟ corrisponde nel concreto ad una o più sedi istituzionali in cui si compie la parte più diretta e formale dell‟interazione tra gli attori; oltre ad esso, tuttavia, hanno in qualche misura il carattere di luoghi della partecipazione anche le sedi in cui il confronto avviene in forma indiretta, siano esse spazi fisici (ad esempio, luoghi di convegni, centri studio) o virtuali (teleconferenze, dibattiti televisivi, siti internet). 55 della partecipazione che promuove l‟integrazione all‟interno dei processi decisionali di realtà associative strutturate e già riconosciute87. Come scrive Mario Aldo Toscano, l‟Italia è un paese da tempo alle prese con le sue Prove di società e troppo spesso sull‟interesse generale prevalgono le logiche di appartenenza comunitaria delle consorterie88. La perenne commistione tra interessi pubblici e privati si presenta anche nelle arene deliberative allorché vi partecipino dei soggetti che rappresentano le associazioni del terzo settore, le imprese, i sindacati, etc. Come scrive puntualmente Laura Cataldi, quando si coinvolgono dei „cittadini organizzati‟ si pone un problema di „fedeltà‟: "il partecipante all‟arena, nel migliore dei casi, sarà portatore di due tipi di fedeltà differenti e difficilmente conciliabili, cioè la fedeltà verso il processo deliberativo, qualora sia autentico, e la fedeltà rispetto all‟organizzazione di cui egli è rappresentante"89. Infine, possono anche essere intesi come luoghi (fisici e virtuali) partecipativi, ma di carattere latente e ancora meno aperti ad un controllo pubblico, quelli in cui si svolge l‟attività delle reti di soggetti che hanno capacità di influire sulle decisioni: ad esempio sedi di partito, di associazioni sindacali, di ordini professionali". D. Ciaffi, A Mela, La partecipazione. Dimensioni, spazi, strumenti, cit., pp. 33-34. 87 Antonio Floridia sintetizza bene i vantaggi e gli svantaggi di un sistema di governance regionale fondato – a livello normativo, programmatico e attuativo – sulla concertazione sociale e istituzionale: "Non si può dire certo che questa evoluzione non abbia prodotto risultati: al contrario, ha permesso che le forme di regolazione dello sviluppo regionale e locale e i livelli di coesione sociale, in passato spesso affidati ad una serie di meccanismi informali, potessero continuare ad operare e ad essere garantiti in un contesto più strutturato e istituzionalizzato. E tuttavia, questi meccanismi di regolazione sono apparsi via via sempre più insufficienti (anche per una crisi di rappresentatività delle grandi organizzazioni di interesse): come se, tra le maglie di una concertazione sempre più capillare, sfuggisse poi la capacità di intessere un reale, più ampio rapporto con la società e le sue mille, variegate e contraddittorie espressioni e le sue molteplici e mutevoli aggregazioni". A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa, dalla teoria alle procedure: il caso della legge regionale toscana sulla partecipazione, cit., p. 614. Per una disamina delle linee di frattura (cleavage) e delle continuità nella cultura politica e nella struttura socio-economica toscana si veda l‟ottimo studio di Francesco Ramella, Cuore rosso? Viaggio politico nell‟Italia di mezzo, Roma, Donzelli, 2006. 88 M.A.Toscano, Prove di società. Come uscire dallo stile pubblico «all‟italiana», Roma, Donzelli, 2011. 89 L. Cataldi, Promesse e limiti della democrazia deliberativa: un‟alternativa alla democrazia del voto?, cit., p. 19. E ancora si legge "pur ipotizzando una forte lealtà al processo e dunque la reale disposizione del partecipante a giungere a una soluzione condivisa in nome del bene comune, bisogna tenere in conto che egli sarà continuamente costretto a mediare tra la sua personale fedeltà al processo e la fedeltà alla propria organizzazione. E, se è ipotizzabile, che il partecipante come individuo sia disposto a cambiare le proprie preferenze e a costruire almeno parte dei propri interessi nel corso del processo attraverso il dialogo, è necessario ammettere che, 56 3.4. L‟imparzialità e il ruolo dei facilitatori Ai partecipanti deve essere data una ripartizione simmetrica delle possibilità di informarsi, esporre e scegliere gli argomenti, in virtù di cui ciascuno gode di un‟„uguale opportunità‟ nella deliberazione90. Affinché un processo deliberativo sia credibile è essenziale che vi sia una condizione di imparzialità tra i diversi punti di vista, che il „potere di agenda‟ sia esercitato nel modo più trasparente e che sia scongiurato anche solo il sospetto di una qualche strumentalizzazione91. Giovan Francesco Lanzara indica nel „rischio di manipolazione‟ – ascrivibile "a chiunque e per qualunque scopo", anche se spesso esercitato dai più „forti‟ – il più grave difetto dei processi deliberativi.92 Riadattando le categorie di rischio dei processi decisionali proposte da Albert Hirschman93, Luigi Pellizzoni prende in esame tre critiche fondamentali che la letteratura ha rivolto all‟attuazione dei processi partecipativi: la futilità, la perversità e la messa a repentaglio. La manipolazione della volontà dei partecipanti concerne quella „perversità‟ che può verificarsi se sono favoriti particolari interessi, posizioni e capacità da parte di chi promuove i medesimi processi, ad esempio, orientando la discussione nel modo desiderato, facendo prevalere le proprie fonti, censurando domande e pareri rilevanti94. Tanto più che tali esperienze sono il risultato di iniziative top-down invece, come rappresentante di un‟organizzazione sarà meno disposto a mutare le proprie posizioni, in quanto il suo compito è proprio quello di difendere gli interessi che rappresenta senza la facoltà di interpretarli a proprio piacimento". Ibidem. 90 Per Habermas, l‟imparzialità si traduce sul piano argomentativo, anzitutto, nel rispetto di due condizioni „banali‟: 1. Tutti i potenziali partecipanti a un discorso debbono avere uguali possibilità di utilizzare atti linguistici comunicativi in modo tale che in ogni istante si possano aprire discorsi, e continuarli mediante interventi e repliche, domande e risposte. 2. Tutti i partecipanti al discorso debbono avere la stessa possibilità di avanzare interpretazioni, affermazioni, raccomandazioni, spiegazioni e giustificazioni e di problematizzare motivare o confutare le loro istanze di valore, cosicché nessuna opinione precostituita rimanga alla lunga sottratta alla tematizzazione e alla critica. J. Habermas [1972], Discorso e verità, in Id., Agire comunicativo e logica delle scienze sociali, Bologna, il Mulino, 1980, pp. 337-338. 91 In definitiva, secondo Antonio Floridia, "occorre che si evitino situazioni in cui si possa sospettare che "i giochi siano stati già fatti", o una decisione appaia in qualche modo già precostituita". A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa, dalla teoria alle procedure: il caso della legge regionale toscana sulla partecipazione, cit., p. 666. 92 G.F. Lanzara La deliberazione come indagine pubblica, in L. Pellizzoni (a cura di), La deliberazione pubblica, cit., pp. 51-73. 93 A.O. Hirschmann [1991], Retoriche dell‟intransigenza, Bologna, il Mulino, 1991. 94 L. Pellizzoni, Che cosa significa deliberare? Promesse e problemi della democrazia deliberativa, in Id. (a cura di), La deliberazione pubblica, cit., p. 30. 57 da parte delle amministrazioni pubbliche, le quali predefiniscono l‟agenda dei problemi, i limiti del dibattito e gli effetti del processo. E in effetti, come sottolinea Luigi Bobbio, per un verso, "le arene deliberative sono più spesso create dall‟alto che promosse dal basso" e, per altro verso, esse "sono create ad hoc per trattare specifici temi"95. Il rischio della mobilitazione „dall‟alto‟ è quello di "essere piegata alle convenienze dei decisori politici, allo scopo di confermare (e legittimare) scelte già assunte o di creare un cortocircuito populista"96. La disparità di potere tra la pubblica amministrazione e i soggetti coinvolti è una condizione strutturale dei processi partecipativi. A questa si aggiunge il differenziale in termini di prestigio sociale, risorse economiche, risorse organizzative, capacità di alleanze, etc. tra i cittadini comuni e coloro che partecipano per conto di una organizzazione, sia essa un‟associazione no profit, un‟impresa, un ente locale. Per tali ragioni, come ha avvertito Giuliano Amato, l‟esito dei processi partecipativi potrebbe dipendere dal ruolo esercitato dai professionisti „terzi‟ e „imparziali‟ invitati a organizzare la deliberazione97. Oltre alla costituzione di comitati di garanzia composti da persone indipendenti e di riconosciuto prestigio, infatti, le arene deliberative prevedono l‟assistenza di mediatori o facilitatori professionali che hanno una specifica expertise nella mediazione dei conflitti, nella conduzione della discussione, nella gestione di piccoli gruppi, etc. Essi intervengono sin dalla fase preparatoria, contribuendo a disegnare le procedure della partecipazione e a selezionare i partecipanti, coadiuvando tutti i momenti deliberativi fino alla loro conclusione. Sull‟importanza di tali figure richiama l‟attenzione Luigi Bobbio: "alla democrazia partecipativa serve anche un contributo dall‟esterno, ossia da parte di attori che si trovano al di fuori della mischia"98. Più precisamente, egli aveva così raffigurato il facilitatore-mediatore: "Il punto di forza dei mediatori è che si tratta di attori che non hanno alcun interesse sul merito della posta in gioco, ma che sono esclusivamente interessati, sul piano professionale, al buon esito del processo, di cui diventano perciò i custodi. In tali circostanze, il mediatore non è semplicemente – come si afferma di solito – 95 L. Bobbio, Le arene deliberative, cit., pp. 8-10. Attivate per iniziativa politicoamministrativa, tali processi sono definiti da Fung e Wright come state piuttosto che voluntaristic centered. A. Fung, E.O. Wright, Deepening democracy, innovations in empowered participatory governance, in "Politics and Society", XXIX, 1, 2001, p. 25. 96 L. Bobbio, Dilemmi della democrazia partecipativa, cit., p. 20. 97 G. Amato, Il sondaggio deliberativo, l‟innovazione di Fishkin, in J.S. Fishkin, La nostra voce. Opinione pubblica & democrazia, una proposta, cit., pp. 5-12. 98 L. Bobbio, Dilemmi della democrazia partecipativa, cit., p. 21. 58 un‟entità neutrale o equidistante dalle parti. La sua virtù non risiede nella distanza che riesce a frapporre rispetto agli interessi di ciascuno, ma piuttosto nella capacità di essere ugualmente vicino a tutti"99. La dote dell‟esperto è quella di aiutare il corretto svolgimento di un processo partecipativo, al contempo, strutturato e informale100, favorendo la discussione e l‟elaborazione di nuove prospettive cognitive e promuovendo la ricerca di soluzioni razionali e condivise101. Ma egli deve soprattutto evitare di „ingombrare‟ troppo la scena102, compiere azioni manipolatorie oppure dare l‟impressione di farlo. In generale, Gloria Regonini invita a riservare alla democrazia deliberativa, senza troppa benevolenza, lo stesso trattamento riservato alla democrazia rappresentativa, mettendone in luce aspetti critici e rischi103. Tra le ombre delle esperienze deliberative, vogliamo qui considerare da ultimo il problema dell‟efficacia di tale partecipazione, anche se non è compito del presente contributo esaminare l‟attuazione delle procedure deliberative nei processi che sono stati sinora realizzati. 99 "Le arene deliberative sono altamente strutturate, ma le regole su cui si basano non hanno, per lo più, natura giuridica. Le arene deliberative non sono di solito istituite per legge e, se lo sono, la previsione legislativa è molto generica e lascia amplissimo spazio all‟autoregolazione dei partecipanti. Più spesso, le arene deliberative agiscono completamente al di fuori delle procedure legali oppure operano nei loro interstizi, aprendo una parentesi informale all‟interno di un procedimento ufficiale. Ciò comporta che i partecipanti non possono vantare diritti sul piano legale e che le conclusioni raggiunte dalla discussione non sono giuridicamente vincolanti". L. Bobbio, Le arene deliberative, cit., p. 12. 100 G.F. Lanzara La deliberazione come indagine pubblica, in L. Pellizzoni (a cura di), La deliberazione pubblica, cit., p. 67. 101 Giancarlo Paba teme che l‟habitus dei facilitatori finisca per soffocare le questioni sociali calde nella fredda retorica del tecnicismo. G. Paba, Per una pianificazione partecipata e inclusiva, in G. Paba e C. Perrone (a cura di), Cittadinanza attiva. Il coinvolgimento degli abitanti nella costruzione della città, Firenze, Alinea, 2002, pp. 33-48. 102 Silvia Cervia ha giustamente rimarcato che "Il ruolo dell‟expertise deve porsi non nell‟ottica di approntare prodotti prête a porter in termini di protocolli e di policy, quanto piuttosto orientarsi a dare indicazioni di processo, impostate a partire dalle specificità del territorio, che possano contribuire alla „messa a sistema‟ del territorio e accompagnare il processo stesso consentendo così al „sapere scientifico‟ di interagire e contaminare il „sapere diffuso‟, vedendo a sua volta da questo orientato nella propria ricerca e creando quel valore aggiunto in termini culturali che rappresenta l‟unico autentico volano di promozione allargata e processava". S. Cervia, Per una lettura del territorio in direzione progettuale, in A. Borghini (a cura di), Cultura e sviluppo, Pisa, Felici Editore, 2009, p. 173. 103 G. Regonini, Paradossi della democrazia deliberativa, in "Stato e mercato", 73, 2005, pp. 3-31. 59 4. L‟efficacia dei processi deliberativi L‟eterogeneo insieme di esperienze partecipative è accomunato dall‟esigenza di aumentare la capacità dei cittadini di influenzare in modo più consapevole e pubblico le decisioni di interesse collettivo. Ora abbiamo detto che la democrazia deliberativa si differenzia dalle forme di partecipazione di tipo negoziale perché in essa i cittadini non si limitano a influenzare le politiche attraverso una „pressione esterna‟ che lascia inalterato il modus operandi dei centri decisionali. I processi deliberativi mirano a una trasformazione di questi ultimi in istituzioni in cui la partecipazione dei cittadini possa diventare regola, quando si tratta di produrre decisioni di pubblico rilievo104. Tuttavia nel valutare l‟efficacia dei processi deliberativi occorre aver presenti alcuni tratti essenziali che ne limitano la portata generale. In primo luogo, l‟efficacia va sempre commisurata alle finalità che preliminarmente sono attribuite al „processo partecipativo: possono essere disattese solo delle „promesse‟ che sono state compiute, fermo restando che l‟idea di una la delega "in bianco" è preclusa. Secondariamente, come precisa Luigi Bobbio, la partecipazione nelle arene deliberative non mira a „combattere il potere‟ ma piuttosto a migliorare settorialmente l‟operato delle amministrazioni pubbliche, aprendo le politiche del government alla prospettiva della governance. I risultati diretti del processo deliberativo (l‟output) devono essere graduati al livello di coinvolgimento richiesto ai cittadini e solitamente si distinguono cinque scalini della „scala della partecipazione‟. Le amministrazioni pubbliche, infatti, possono intendere la partecipazione come: a) „informazione‟ ("Vi teniamo informati"); b) „consultazione‟ ("Vi ascoltiamo"); c) „coinvolgimento‟ ("Le vostre opinioni sono prese in considerazione"); d) „cooperazione‟ ("Abbiamo bisogno delle vostre opinioni e ci impegniamo a tenerle in considerazione"); e e) empowerment ("Metteremo in atto le vostre decisioni")105. Assai raramente i processi deliberativi prevedono un reale trasferimento di almeno una quota del potere decisionale ai cittadini. 104 L. Mazzuca, Democrazia partecipativa e democrazia deliberativa: alcune riflessioni sul modello di Fung e Wright, XXIV Convegno della Società italiana di Scienza Politica, Venezia, Università IUAV, 16-18.9.2010, p. 21. 105 La „scala della partecipazione‟, elaborata da Sherry Arnstein in The Ladder of citizens participation ("Journal of the American Institute of Planners", XXXV, 4, 1969, pp. 216-241), è stata adottata in forma semplificata dall‟Ocse e promossa in Italia da Rodolfo Lewanski. Cfr. La democrazia deliberativa. Nuovi orizzonti per la politica, cit.; Id., Come salire la scala della partecipazione?, in "Aut & Aut", 3.2009, p. 17. 60 Molto più spesso le esperienze partecipative nei settori dei servizi socio-sanitari, dell‟ambiente, dell‟urbanistica, dello sviluppo economico, etc., si collocano ai livelli di informazione e di consultazione; in misura minore, ai livelli di coinvolgimento e di cooperazione106. In una prospettiva più pragmatica Antonio Floridia afferma che l‟empowerment dei cittadini "non va inteso come una „delega‟ di potere, ma come una crescita della loro capacità di „padroneggiare‟ e influenzare in modo sempre più consapevole i processi di decisione collettiva e le situazioni problematiche e complesse che li caratterizzano"107. Ciò detto, indipendentemente, dai livelli di partecipazione, vi sono alcune regole generali che salvaguardano i risultati dei processi. I cittadini sono invitati a discutere e proporre le soluzioni alternative ai problemi oggetto della deliberazione ma non ogni decisione assunta deve essere accolta dall‟amministrazione pubblica, a cui competono in ultima istanza la responsabilità delle proprie politiche. Luigi Bobbio ricorda che "Dove c‟è potere decisionale, ci devono essere garanzie" e le attuali pratiche partecipative non possono o non intendono assicurare le procedure di carattere adeguate a standard democratici: "per esempio regole sulla titolarità a partecipare, sul numero legale, sulla verifica dei poteri, sulla formazione dell‟ordine del giorno, lo svolgimento della discussione e le votazioni"108. Senza considerare la diversa fonte che istituisce e legittima gli organismi delle due forme di rappresentanza e governo degli interessi. Nessun processo partecipativo potrà rivendicare la legittimità riconosciuta ai rappresentanti votati dall‟interno corpo elettorale e la legalità che disciplina l‟agire amministrativo dei dipendenti pubblici. Una „cessione di sovranità‟ è impraticabile sul piano giuridico e politico perché significherebbe un diniego di accountability e responsiveness. Le istituzioni però devono impegnarsi a motivare pubblicamente le ragioni di un eventuale rigetto delle scelte raggiunte collegialmente. Chi ha coinvolto i cittadini non può ignorare del tutto le loro attese ed è una precisa responsabilità del sistema politico-amministrativo „tener conto‟ e „render conto‟ dei risultati dei processi deliberativi. 106 F. Gelli, L. Morlino, Democrazia locale e Qualità democratica. Quali teorie, cit., p. 11. 107 A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa, dalla teoria alle procedure: il caso della legge regionale toscana sulla partecipazione, cit., p. 640. In termini simili Luigi Bobbio scrive che "L‟obiettivo fondamentale della democrazia partecipativa è quello di creare empowerment a favore dei cittadini. Ma questo termine non va inteso nel senso giuridico di attribuire potere, bensì come capacitazione, ossia nel senso di aumentare le loro capacità di elaborazione e invenzione e le loro possibilità di influenza". L. Bobbio (a cura di), Amministrare con i cittadini, cit., p. 175. 108 L. Bobbio, Dilemmi della democrazia partecipativa, cit., p. 22. 61 D‟altra parte, A. Floridia osserva che le decisioni pubbliche saranno tanto più „legate‟ agli esiti dei processi partecipativi "quanto più seria, ricca e credibile è stata la discussione che ha caratterizzato il processo stesso, quanto più „peso politico‟ essa è riuscita ad assumere. Al contrario, un‟istituzione potrà molto più facilmente „avere le mani libere‟ nell‟assumere un orientamento, quanto più debole e parziale, o „inconcludente‟, sarà apparsa l‟arena pubblica che avrebbe dovuto affrontare un problema e offrire una qualche soluzione"109. Se i risultati sono solidi e condivisi è difficile che non incidano in una certa misura nel processo decisione della pubblica amministrazione110. Un terzo correlato concerne l‟irrilevanza dei temi da discutere. L‟artificiosità degli esperimenti deliberativi, infatti, è uno dei fattori che maggiormente ne erode la qualità democratica. A tale proposito, Marinella Sclavi avverte che la partecipazione può funzionare, solo se i termini della controversia sono chiari e interessanti111. Quando ciò non si verifica si finisce per assistere a esperienze futili, sovente con eccessi di retoricismo di cui nessuno sente il bisogno. Non ci riferiamo al problema di risorse scarse che vanno spese meglio. In tali casi, la partecipazione non è un lusso ma una pratica stupida che dilapida piuttosto che accrescere la coesione sociale e l‟intelligenza collettiva. A tale riguardo, non è affatto secondaria la questione delle fasi dei processi decisionali su cui si attivano i percorsi partecipativi. Come avverte Giovanni Moro, troppo spesso le esperienze partecipative riguardano la discussione preliminare sulle soluzioni ma non l‟implementazione delle decisioni e la valutazione degli interventi112. Il futuro della democrazia deliberativa dipende da quella rappresentativa: "Senza una ridefinizione del ruolo e della sensibilità del politico, si correre il rischio che le arene deliberative restino dei forum di dibattito, in cui certo si definiscono i problemi e si elaborano soluzioni, ma dalle quali non escono vere e proprie decisioni reali che, invece, sono prese altrove, nelle tradizionali „arene di politiche pubbliche‟"113. 109 A. Floridia, La democrazia deliberativa, dalla teoria alle procedure: il caso della legge regionale toscana sulla partecipazione, cit., p. 633. 110 U. Allegretti, Il cammino accidentato di un principio costituzionale: quaranta anni di pratiche partecipative in Italia, cit., p. 12. 111 M. Sclavi, Avventure urbane. Progettare la città con gli abitanti, Milano, Eléuthera, 2002; Id., L‟arte di ascoltare e mondi possibili, Milano, Mondadori, 2003. 112 G. Moro, Partecipare a cosa? Per una riconsiderazione del nesso tra democrazia partecipativa e attivismo organizzato dei cittadini in Italia e in Europa, XXIII Convegno della Società italiana di Scienza Politica, Roma, Università LUISS, 18.9.2009. 113 L. Cataldi, Democrazia deliberativa e politiche partecipative: i processi inclusivi in Piemonte e in Lombardia, cit., p. 92. 62 Ma poiché, nelle società avanzate, la democrazia partecipativa può funzionare solo se funziona la democrazia rappresentativa e viceversa, è in gioco la credibilità dell‟azione politica nel suo insieme. Per tale ragione, affinché tali processi contribuiscano a irrobustire la stretta connessione tra partecipazione e rappresentanza114, occorrerebbe che fossero percepite dal ceto politico come una vera risorsa. L‟atteggiamento necessario non è né quello di „competizione‟ verso un‟apertura delle amministrazioni pubbliche che viene avvertita come una minaccia al proprio „mestiere‟ né quello dell‟„interferenza‟ verso una „perdita di tempo‟ politicamente ininfluente. La democrazia senza illusioni ha bisogno di atteggiamenti di „presidio‟ e „sostegno‟115. La ridefinizione del ruolo del politico rimane una questione aperta e di primaria importanza così come quella della partecipazione politica. Essendo quello della deliberazione un „campo in divenire‟, confidiamo che, procedendo per tentativi ed errori, esplorando e inventando, i politici – assieme agli amministratori, agli esperti e ai cittadini –, concorrano con passione a promuovere il „potere della ragione‟. A essa affidino i „lumi‟ nella ricerca della felicità pubblica e privata116. 114 P. Ginsborg, La democrazia che non c‟è, Torino, Einaudi, 2006, p. 85. 115 L. Bobbio, Smaltimento dei rifiuti e democrazia deliberativa, Working Paper n. 1, Torino, Dipartimento di Studi Politici, 2002, pp. 51-52. 116 „Democrazia senza illusioni‟ è il titolo di un saggio che Domenico Settembrini, a dispetto della grave diagnosi sullo stato di salute della „democrazia reale‟, alle prese con la fine della „prima repubblica‟, concludeva con un richiamo suggestivo, ispirato dalla lettura di James Bryce, al senso fondativo delle istituzioni democratiche: "la democrazia non morirà, finché on sia morta nel mondo la speranza. Una democrazia che dobbiamo saper accettare e difendere senza illusioni di utopistiche palingenesi. Una democrazia che, nonostante tutte le sue imperfezioni e tutti i suoi mali, agli occhi degli uomini e delle donne del mondo intero conserva intatto il fascino delle origini: «il diritto riconosciuto a tutti di perseguire la propria felicità»". D. Settembrini, Democrazia senza illusioni, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1994, p. 99. Finito di stampare nel mese di novembre 2011 da Editografica s.r.l., Rastignano (Bologna) per conto di Edizioni PLUS – Pisa University Press

A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S FOLIA GERMANICA 8, 2012 Łukasz Marek Plęs∗ FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE – DICHTER ODER DENKER? Die Werke Friedrich Nietzsches – des Autors, „der sich seinem Publikum als Philosoph, Psychologe, Essayist, Feuilletonist, Altphilologe, Dichter, Komponist und schliesslich auch als Gott präsentierte" (Köhler 2000, S. 7)1 – sind inzwischen zweifelsohne ein fester Bestandteil des Weltkulturerbes geworden, von der okzidentalischen Kulturgeschichte ganz zu schweigen.2 Nietzsche, der als „fugitivus errans" (so Markowski 1999, S. 419) sein Leben lang zwischen Orten und Ländern umherirrte, nirgendwo warm wurde, gilt als eine Persönlichkeit mit unzähligen Gesichtern, von denen Geisteswissenschaftler bis heute die Verhüllung zu entfernen versuchen, eine Gestalt, die viele Rätsel birgt und um die Legenden ranken, und zwar: Die schwarze [Legende] des Gotteslästerers und Tabubrechers, der die heiligen Kulturund Moralwerte in den Schmutz zieht, um an ihrer Stelle die Herrschaft des rücksichtslosen Egoismus zu etablieren. Die heroische eines stolzen, die gesellschaftlichen Ehren verschmähenden Weisen, der in mönchischer Abgeschiedenheit, vielfach missverstanden und verkannt, eine revolutionäre Wissenschaft vom Menschen und menschenwürdigen Leben begründete, und diese alle seine geistigen Kräfte fordernde Leistung mit dem Ruin der physischen und psychischen Gesundheit erkaufen musste (Światłowski 2001, S. 53). Sein abwechslungsreicher und von dramatischen, aufregenden und spannungsreichen Wenden sowie drastischen und einschneidenden Entscheidungen geprägter Lebenslauf, sein künstlerisch garniertes OEuvre, seine stilistisch überreichen Schriften und unermesslicher Gedankenreichtum seiner Aphorismen, ∗ Dr. Łukasz Marek Plęs, Lehrstuhl für deutsche und angewandte Sprachwissenschaft, Universität Łódź. 1 Ähnlich äussert sich Karl Ulmer: „[...] und er erscheint bald als Psychologe und Moralist, bald als Lebensphilosoph und Dichter, bald als Kulturkritiker und Schriftsteller" (Ulmer 1962, S. 7). 2 Seine Ideen sind weiterhin eine beängstigende, erschreckende Herausforderung, der zu Lebzeiten des Dichterphilosophen kaum einer die Stirn geboten hatte. Heutzutage wird man immer bewusster, wie einschneidend und bahnbrechend die von Nietzsche vorausgesagten Änderungen in diversen Sphären der Existenz, wie Wahrheit, Wissenschaft oder Moral waren (vgl. Gane, Chan 1998, S. 3). Łukasz Marek Plęs 36 sein feiner und scharfer Intellekt, seine ungezähmte, einzelgängerische Natur, nonkonformistische Lebenseinstellung wie unvoreingenommene Weltanschauung, brillante Eloquenz und nicht zuletzt sein auf gründliche Ausbildung gestütztes, profundes Wissen waren und sind unerschöpfliche Quelle jeder Menge Inspirationen. Philosophen, Schriftsteller, Dichter, Kulturkenner, Geisteswissenschaftler, die daraus schöpfen, machen eine Legion aus. Tief beeindruckend ist ebenfalls die Themenmannigfaltigkeit, welche mit Nietzsche verknüpft wird: Es gibt kaum eine Wirklichkeit der kulturellen Welt, über die Nietzsche nicht etwas gesagt hätte. In seinen Schriften äusserte er sich über Staat, Religion, Moral, Wissenschaft, Kunst, Musik, Arbeit, Frau und Mann, über Liebe, Ehe, Familie, über Geschichte und geschichtliche Persönlichkeiten etc. (Rajewicz 2003, S. 143). Obwohl die obige Auflistung alleine vom unüberblickbar weiten Horizont der Individualität Nietzsches zeugt, lässt sie sich problemlos erweitern.3 Es ist jedoch zu vermerken, dass der Versuch, Nietzsches Gesamtwerk und Ideen als ein zusammenhängendes System zu begreifen, meistens scheitert: Von allen Gestalten der geistigen Geschichte der letzten hundert Jahre ist Nietzsche wohl die vieldeutigste, ungeklärteste und beirrendste Erscheinung. Ungeklärt ist, welches der eigentliche Sinn seines Werkes ist, ungeklärt ist, welche Stellung er in dieser Geschichte einnimmt und welche Bedeutung ihm damit für die Gegenwart zukommt. Die Unklarheit über Nietzsche entspringt der Vielseitigkeit und dem Umfassenden seines Werkes. In diesem Werk wird eine Hülle von Themen durchlaufen, die zwar zu Gruppen geordnet werden können, die aber im Ganzen kein notwendiger Zusammenhang zu verbinden scheint. Hinzu kommt, dass sich in diesem Werk die verschiedensten Ansichten über dasselbe Thema finden, die nicht miteinander vereinbar sind und zudem auf das Verschiedenartigste begründet werden. Diese Vielfältigkeit findet sich nicht nur, wenn man das gesamte Werk ins Auge fasst, sondern sie zeigt sich auch bei den Gedankengängen, die Nietzsche selbst zur Einheit eines Buches zusammengestellt hat (Ulmer 1962, S. 7). Trotz alledem ist Nietzsche eine im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes beeindruckende Persönlichkeit. Sein Name ist in der abendländischen Welt durchaus ein Begriff. Jeder kultivierte Mensch muss auf seinen Namen vielmals gestossen sein. Seine einprägsamen und auffälligen Begriffe wie ‚Übermensch', ‚die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen', ‚der Tod Gottes', ‚der Wille zur Macht', ‚die HerrenMoral' oder ‚die blonde Bestie', haben sich in der Kulturgeschichte fest etabliert. Der bekannte Nietzsche-Kenner schreibt jedoch, diese Schlagwörter „können wenig zum Verständnis von Nietzsches Denken beitragen, wenn sie nicht im Zusammenhang seiner Philosophie und auf dem Hintergrund seines 3 Von Nietzsche angesprochen fühlen sich Philosophen, Schriftsteller, Theologen, Psychologen, Soziologen, Ethiker, Politologen, Künstler, in seinen Abhandlungen, Schriften, Aphorismen, Erinnerungen, Briefen und lockeren Kommentaren widerspiegeln sich auch Reflexionen über Sprache, Stil und nicht zuletzt über Translation (siehe Nietzsche 1963, S. 136ff.). Friedrich Nietzsche – Dichter oder Denker? 37 gesamten literarischen Werks betrachtet werden" (Kaufmann 1982, S. 8). In diesem Satz widerspiegelt sich offensichtlich die Kontroverse, ob Nietzsche als Philosoph oder als Schriftsteller gelten sollte. Das ausgeprägteste aller Antlitze Nietzsches ist, unter Anlehnung an das „allgemeine Wissen", das des Philosophen. Dies ist jedoch nicht unumstritten, was im Folgenden in Erwägung gezogen wird. Nietzsches Vielseitigkeit bietet einerseits, wegen ihrer inspirierenden Kraft, viele Vorteile, andererseits bereitet sie eine Menge Probleme. Umstritten ist beispielsweise sein philosophischer Status.4 Dabei muss man betonen, dass Nietzsche selbst nicht als Philosoph gelten wollte: Nietzsche hat das Unglück gehabt, in der Nachwelt als Philosoph fortzuleben – obwohl er manches andere hätte werden wollen, Apostel oder Artillerieoffizier, Lyriker oder Komponist, Umstürzler oder Reformator, und zuletzt Hanswurst oder Gott. Ein Unglück in der Tat, denn so lebt er fort als das, was er gerade nicht sein wollte, was seine Lehre ein für allemal ausser Kraft setzen wollte: als reiner Geist statt als runde Figur (Ross 1980, S. 7). Obgleich sein Name wahrscheinlichstens in keinem Handbuch zur Geschichte der Philosophie fehlt, ist er nicht immer so offensichtlich als Philosoph ausgewiesen.5 In einem Interview, welches Paweł Dybel (2007) mit Krzysztof Michalski führte, machte der Interviewer die folgende Bemerkung: Als junger promovierter Hochschullehrer wohnte ich mal einer Versammlung des wissenschaftliches Rates im Institut für Philosophie und Soziologie bei, in der ein HabillitationsKolloquium über eine Abhandlung zum Thema Nietzsche stattfand. Ein ehrwürdiger Professor, Vertreter der Lemberg-Warschau-Schule, sagte, das ganze Habilverfahren sei, nach seinem Dafürhalten, ein Missverständnis, da Nietzsche kein Philosoph, sondern ein Schriftsteller gewesen sei. Deshalb habe die Habillitation im Literaturinstitut und nicht im Philosophieinstitut stattfinden sollen... (ebd., S. 6, übers. von Ł. M. P.).6 4 Das hängt natürlich vom Kriterium ab. Frenzel (1966, S. 7) schreibt z.B.: „Beurteilt man die Bedeutung eines Philosophen nach der Wirkung, die seine Werke auf die Nachfahren haben, so steht Friedrich Nietzsche ebenbürtig neben Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard und Schopenhauer – er ist einer der wenigen grossen Denker des 19. Jahrhunderts, die ihrer Zeit weit voraus waren und ohne die das 20. Jahrhundert nicht geworden wäre, was es ist". 5 Tebarzt van Elst (1994, S. 192) bemerkt: „Die Radikalität von Nietzsches Metaphysik und Sprachkritik und seine metaphorische Sprache haben dazu geführt, dass sein Denken lange nicht als Philosophie anerkannt wurde". 6 Mit der Problematik stehen im Einklang die Worte eines Schweizer Kritikers Josef Victor Widmanns (Nietzsches gefährliches Buch 1886), der schon 1886 Folgendes über Jenseits von Gut und Böse schrieb: „Viele dieser Aphorismen haben mehr einen dichterischen als philosophischen Wert, was so weit wahr ist, dass man an ihnen, d.h. an ihrer lebhaften und schönen Form, noch Wohlgefallen empfindet, wenn man ihren Inhalt auch als grundfalsch erkennt" (In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 60). In diesem Zusammenhang ist auch das Zitat von Curt Grottewitz (Der Kultus der Persönlichkeit 1891) erwähnenswert: „Aber mächtiger als der Dichter war diesmal der Philosoph; freilich ein Philosoph, der zugleich alle Gaben des Dichters besass, wenn er auch wenig gedichtet hat: Friedrich Nietzsche" (In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 77). Łukasz Marek Plęs 38 Michalski bestreitet dies, da sich nach seiner Auffassung in Nietzsches Schriften eine kohärente Begriffsstruktur finden lässt (siehe ebd.). Die sei nur, und zwar nicht zufällig, sinnbildlich, vielstimmig ausgedrückt, was mit Platons Dialogen in Parallele gesetzt werden könne. Es sei ein Diskurs, ein immer wieder erneut aufgenommenes Gespräch, wo der Kontext, wer zu wem, wann, wo spricht, eine grosse Rolle spiele.7 Eine Art Kompromiss ist hier die 1907 von Wilhelm Dilthey formulierte Einschätzung. Dilthey betrachtete Nietzsche als einen „Lebensphilosophen" und stellte ihn unter andere philosophische Schriftsteller (siehe Vattimo 1992, S. 1f.). Diese beschrieb er folgendermassen: Ihr Auge bleibt auf das Rätsel des Lebens gerichtet, aber sie verzweifeln daran, dieses vermittelst einer allgemeingültigen Metaphysik, auf Grund einer Theorie des Weltzusammenhangs aufzulösen; das Leben soll aus ihm gedeutet werden – das ist der grosse Gedanke, das diese Lebensphilosophen mit der Welterfahrung und mit der Dichtung verknüpft (Dilthey 1984, S. 39). Gianni Vattimo vertritt die Meinung, dass für die Wirkungsgeschichte Nietzsches erst Martin Heideggers Deutung den Ausschlag gibt, da die frühe Rezeption seiner Werke eher als „literarisch", „kulturkritisch" oder „ideologiegeschichtlich" zu verstehen wäre als im engeren Sinne „philosophisch" (siehe Vattimo 1992, S. 1). Heidegger stimmt damit nicht überein, dass Nietzsche kein strenger Denker war und betrachtet solche Urteile als Irrtum, der nur dann erkannt wird, „wenn eine Auseinandersetzung mit Nietzsche zugleich durch eine Auseinandersetzung im Bereich der Grundfrage der Philosophie in Gang kommt" (Frenzel 1966, S. 136f.). Einen Meilenstein stellt in dieser Hinsicht Heideggers Buch über Nietzsche dar, welches zwischen 1936 und 1946 entstand und 1961 veröffentlicht wurde.8 Vattimo (1992) schreibt, sich auf Heidegger berufend, dass Nietzsche als ein im Wesentlichen metaphysischer Denker betrachtet werden sollte: Nietzsche galt nicht nur zu Recht als Philosoph, sondern er war ein Philosoph auch im technischen Sinne des Wortes, weil er ins Zentrum seiner Aufmerksamkeit das älteste und grundlegendste Problem der Philosophie stellte, die Frage nach dem Sein (ebd., S. 1). 7 Dem steht jedoch die folgende Meinung entgegen: „Und Nietzsche! Von einem System im Denken keine Spur; nur lose, zusammenhängende Aufsätze und Aphorismen, die mehr psychologischen als logischen Zusammenhang haben; also ohne eigentliches Zusammenraffen des Geistes zu verstehen" (P. Ernst, Friedrich Nietzsche. Seine Philosophie 1890. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 65). 8 Siehe Heidegger (1961). Dieses Werk verfinsterte damals die bisherigen Auslegungen Nietzsches Philosophie und beeinflusste stark weitere Arbeiten, die Nietzsches Gedanken zu systematisieren versuchten (vgl. Markowski 2001, S. 18f.). Friedrich Nietzsche – Dichter oder Denker? 39 Auf jeden Fall kann Nietzsche als kein Philosoph im Sinne eines kohärenten, zusammenhängenden und einheitlichen Systems betrachtet werden. Zu diesem Problem ergreift Jaspers (1981) das Wort: Gegen die Systematiker gehalten ist er nicht zum Erbauer eines logischen Denkganzen geworden: seine systematischen Werkpläne sind entweder Ordnungen für die Darstellung, die immer auch wieder anders möglich sind, oder sie sind Gebilde aus bestimmten Zielsetzungen einer vereinzelten Forschungseinsicht oder einer damit beabsichtigten Wirkung seines Philosophierens (ebd., S. 9). Ungeachtet dessen, welchen Platz man Nietzsche in der philosophischen Weltrangliste einräumt, ist hervorzuheben, dass in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts die Philosophie, wenn man Tatarkiewicz (1970) Glauben schenken will, unter diversen Machthabern zersplittert war: Zu diesen Zeiten herrschte die Auffassung vor, dass von der Philosophie weniger erwartet werden sollte, als bislang der Fall war. Ein Philosoph, der sich von der Philosophie lossagte, stellte ein typisches Phänomen dar (ebd., S. 84, übers. von Ł. M. P.). In der Tat waren die Zeiten der grossen Systemschöpfer in der deutschen Philosophie für immer dahin. Es fehlte an Denkern, welche dermassen ambitioniert gewesen wären, die Errungenschaften Kants oder Hegels zu wiederholen, d.h. eine ganzheitliche Darstellung der Ontologie, Epistemologie und Axiologie vorzuschlagen. Deshalb kommt Nietzsches Name viel häufiger zum Vorschein, als dies aus seiner Position gegenüber den grossen Systemschöpfern wie Kant, Fichte oder Hegel resultieren würde. Es ist jedoch nichts Seltsames daran: ganz anders funktionierte in der breit zu verstehenden Kultur Nietzsche als Visionär und Nietzsche als Kritiker der gegenwärtigen Zivilisation, eine ganz andere Rolle spielten die grossen Systemphilosophen (vgl. Karolak u.a. 2007, S. 376).9 Auch ist sein Stil nicht, der Nietzsche als Philosophen diskriminiert, was von Alexander Nehamas (1991) folgendermassen begründet wird: Sein Schreiben ist ungewöhnlich und idiosynkratisch. Das wiederum heisst nichts anderes als seine Werke tragen nicht die Züge, die man gewöhnlich von philosophischen Abhandlungen erwartet. Das hat man oft als Berechtigung dafür genommen, Nietzsches Werke im gewissen Sinne für unphilosophisch zu erklären, und dabei vergessen, dass philosophische Abhandlungen selbst in allen erdenklichen Stilen geschrieben worden sind (ebd., S. 27). Von der anderen Perspektive her betrachtet ist Nietzsche ein Wegbereiter der präzedenzlosen philosophischen Schreibweise. Zwar hat Nietzsche kein kohärentes System geschaffen, dagegen jedoch erstellte er eine neue Begriff- 9 Als „die Blütezeit der deutschen Philosophie" (so W. Windelband) gilt die Wende des 18. und des 19. Jahrhunderts (vgl. Andrzejewski 2007, S. 11). Łukasz Marek Plęs 40 lichkeit, die er in seinen Schriften verwendete. Über diese Terminologie schreibt der bekannte französiche Humanist Gilles Deleuze (1991): Davon hängt gänzlich die Strenge dieser Philosophie ab, deren systematische Genauigkeit im Übrigen zu Unrecht in Zweifel gezogen wird – ob mit Schadenfreude oder auch mit Bedauern: zu Unrecht allemal. In Wahrheit verwendet Nietzsche sehr genaue neue Worte für sehr genaue neue Begriffe (ebd., S. 59).10 Unabhängig davon, wie Nietzsches Zugehörigkeit zur Philosophie und Dichtung bewertet wird, sei festgestellt, dass er auf beiden Gebieten als eine aussergewöhnliche Autorität gilt, denn, „was man auch gegen Nietzsche vorbringen mag, er war eine Erscheinung hohen Ranges, die unter zwei Gesichtspunkten positiv gewertet werden kann: einmal ist er einer der glühenden Geister, die um ein Weltbild leidenschaftlich ringen; sodann ein Meister unserer [d.h. der deutschen] Sprache".11 Somit kann man eine Art Kompromiss finden und Nietzsche sowohl als „Dichterdenker" wie auch als „Stilbildner"12 betrachten. Dies bekräftigt die Anschauung, „Nietzsches Denken wird von der Differenz zwischen einer vom individuellen Sprechen ausgehenden poetischen, produktiven Kraft der Sprache einerseits und der Notwendigkeit disziplinierten, an die Intersubjektivität der Art zurückbindenden Redens andererseits bestimmt. Diese Differenz schein für ihn unaufhebbar zu sein" (Simon 1980, S. 197). Wie paradoxal die Einstufung Nietzsches in der Geschichte der Philosophie ist, veranschaulicht der Kommentar von Werner Ross (1980): Philosophen verflüchtigen oder verfestigen sich zu Ideensystemen, das ist ihr Schicksal. Sie zeugen sich als Ideen fort, Wort entspringt aus Wort, wie es im Johannesevangelium heisst. Nietzsche entschied sich gegen den Wahrheitsanspruch jedweder Lehre, sogar seiner eigenen. Dafür ersehnte er Wirkung, eine Veränderung aller Verhältnisse, die Abschaffung des Christentums, den Beginn einer neuen Zeitrechnung. Er wollte die Geschichte der Menschheit in zwei Hälften schiessen. Stattdessen ist er eingeordnet, wird in Lehrbüchern behandelt wie Leibniz und Kant (ebd., S. 7). Heutzutage gilt Nietzsche unumstritten vor allem als Denker, mit dessen Philosophie „sich fast alle Schriftsteller der Zeit auseinander setzen mussten und von der sie Impulse erhielten" (Szyrocki 1984, S. 10). Seine zerfledderten Gedanken wurden systematisiert, seine Lehren entmythisiert und von „suspekten" Deutungen gereinigt, seine Schriften gründlich und sorgfältig aufs Neue 10 Bogdan Banasiak (1993) schreibt dazu: „Deleuze gibt seinen eigenen Worten Zeugnis – aus eingegebenen Poemen, zerstreuten Aphorismen und Satzfetzen konstruiert er eine unheimlich zusammenhängende und ganzheitliche Interpretation Nietzsches Gesamtwerkes [...]" (ebd., S. 209, übers. von Ł. M. P.). 11 So. O. Flake, Nietzsche 1947. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) (1978a), S. 275. 12 So W. Weigand, Welt und Weg 1940. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) (1978a), S. 273. Friedrich Nietzsche – Dichter oder Denker? 41 ediert. Somit ist sein Gedankentum zugänglicher, seine Ideen stechen in allen Bereichen des breit gefächerten kulturellen wie auch intellektuellen Lebens hervor. Wie Störig (1971, S. 201) bemerkt, philosophiert Nietzsche „mit dem Hammer", denn er „zertrümmert rücksichtslos alte als falsch erkannte Werte, richtet jedoch zugleich neue Werte und Ideale auf". Wie bereits angedeutet, kann man nicht umhin, zu bemerken, dass das stilistische Vermögen Friedrich Nietzsches, des „homo scribens" (so Colli 1980, S. 139), ausser Frage steht. Seine Werke waren sprachlich dermassen anmutig, dass viele schon zu seinen Lebzeiten dessen schriftstellerische Genialität begründeten. Leo Berg schrieb schon gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts: „Man mag einst über Nietzsche denken, wie man will, über den Schriftsteller in ihm wird es bald keinen Zweifel mehr geben. Er ist der grösste Virtuos der deutschen Sprache" (L. Berg, Friedrich Nietzsche 1889. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 63). Krzysztof Michalski bemerkt hierzu: Nietzsche ist ein schwieriger Autor. Aus eben diesem Grunde, dass er so augezeichnet schreibt. Man soll ihn sehr langsam lesen, mehrmals, wie Poesie, jede grosse Prosa, Mathematik. Das Schöne an seiner Sprache veranlasst manchmal zu einer leicht herabsetzender Behauptung, er sei „kein Philosoph, sondern Schriftsteller" (In: Dybel 2007, S. 6, übers. von Ł. M. P.). Es ist jedoch zu betonen, dass sein Stil nicht so einfach einzustufen und zu klassifizieren ist. Im Laufe der Zeit änderte sich seine Sprache, die für die Bedürfnisse seiner folgenden Werke in einen bestimmten Stil gebracht wurde. Überdies ergeben sich hier noch weitere Kontroversen. Die Erfassung des Stils Friedrich Nietzsches muss vielschichtig und mehrdimensional erfolgen. Sein Stil ist von seinem Leben kaum zu trennen und braucht anhand seiner Lebensverhältnisse gedeutet und beschrieben zu werden. „Seine beschwingte Sprache" (so Safranski 2007, S. 19) ist auf vielerlei Faktoren zurückzuführen. Die Beurteilung der Werke des Philosophen, der „seine Lehre zu Parabeln dichtete" (R. Dehmel, Liebe Freunde! 1895. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 101), ist von Zeit zu Zeit und von Werk zu Werk unterschiedlich. Bereits in seiner Kindheit und Jugend zeigte Nietzsche eine enorme Eloquenz und war bewusst, was man mithilfe einer gekonnten Sprache erreichen kann.13 Es ist umstritten, in welcher Periode Nietzsche mit seinem Stil das Beste geleistet hat oder welches seiner gedankenträchtigen Werke im Hinblick auf die Stilistik als vorbildhaft zu gelten hat. Es 13 Safranski bemerkt: „Bereits der junge Nietzsche hat die Sprache und das Schreiben als jene Macht entdeckt, die ihm erlaub, etwas aus sich zu machen" (Safranski 2007, S. 46). Köhler (2000) schreibt über Nietzsche: „Der Mann, der heute als einer der bedeutendsten Stilisten der deutschen Sprache gilt und mit seiner Virtuosität ganze Generationen von Autoren beflügelte, war bereits als Schüler dem Schreiben verfallen" (ebd., S. 12). Łukasz Marek Plęs 42 herrschen beispielsweise Meinungen vor, seine erste Schaffensperiode sei stilistisch die beste gewesen: Jedenfalls ist seine erste Periode die erfreulichste. Seine Sprache hat hier noch die Geduld und Ruhe in prächtigem und tadellosem Aufbau einen grösseren Zusammenhang ununterbrochen und nacheinander durchzuführen. Sie ist frisch, belebt, gesund, beweglich, vielseitig, schmuckreich ohne Überladenheit, aber noch nicht nervös, unruhig, spielerisch, um nicht zu sagen in allzu freigelassener Wortund Begriffsgourmanderei narzisselnd, geschweige gar pathologisch, wie in seinen späteren Schriften (J. Schlaf, Der ‚Fall' Nietzsche 1907. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 149). Die anderen dagegen wissen die letzten Jahre seiner Schaffenskraft wegen der stilistischen Reife zu schätzen: Mit vierzig Jahren hat Nietzsches Sprache [...] mehr frische Farbe, Verwegenheit, Leidenschaft und Musik als mit siebzehn, und der Einsame von Sils-Maria geht leichteren, beschwingteren, tanzhafteren Schrittes durch sein Werk als der frühere vierundzwanzigjährige, frühalte Professor (S. Zweig, Friedrich Nietzsche 1925. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 221). Wie Karl Jaspers (1981) zu Nietzsches Sprache der letzten zehn Jahre vor dessen geistiger Umnachtung bemerkt, zeigt sich sein neuer Stil „in der Kraft der Bilder, in den mythisch werdenden Gleichnissen, in der Plastik des Geschehenen und in dem Klang der Worte, in der Wucht der Diktion, der Dichtigkeit der Sprache" (ebd., S. 103). Es gehört sich anzumerken, dass sein Stil ständig variierte und sich ununterbrochen entfaltete. Der von Natur aus in vielen Aspekten chaotische Nietzsche konnte seine sprachliche Kompetenz nicht zähmen. Seine Ausdrucksweise kam immer wieder aus dem Gestade der Konventionalität, Starrheit und Bewegungslosigkeit. Auf der Suche nach einprägsamen, durchbrechenden, einschneidenden, auffälligen und brillanten Formulierungen und Floskeln wollte er nie ruhen und rasten. Krzysztof Michalski bemerkt mit Recht: Je älter und reifer Nietzsche ist, desto ungeduldiger wird er. Seine Phraseologie radikalisiert sich immer heftiger, er möchte sprachliche und begriffliche Konventionen durchbrechen, vielleicht auch Aufmerksamkeit erwecken. Es fällt einem zuweilen leicht, diesen Radikalismus zu wörtlich zu nehmen (In: Dybel 2007, S. 6, übers. von Ł. M. P.). Die Gewalt seiner Sprache trug dazu bei, dass er von vielen, wie hier bereits mehrmals vermerkt wurde, nicht als Philosoph, sondern als Schriftsteller betrachtet wurde und wird. Dazu schreibt Stanisław Przybyszewski (Erinnerungen an das literarische Berlin 1926): Nietzsches deutsche Sprache vergewaltigte das Deutsch seiner Zeit: man las ihn wie einen fremden Schriftsteller – diese Sprache rief Erstaunen und heftigen Prozess hervor... Die Friedrich Nietzsche – Dichter oder Denker? 43 Deutschen schmähen Nietzsche mit dem Namen eines Philosophen, er aber war nie ein Philosoph und wollte nie einer sein – er war vor allem und allein ein machtvoller Dichter und Schöpfer einer eigenen, nur ihm eigentümlichen Sprache [...] (In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 223). Zur Bekräftigung kann man auch die Worte Schmitters (2007) anführen: Denn wenn Nietzsches Texte nichts wären als die brillant formulierten Übersetzungen allein persönlicher Erfahrung, dann wären sie: immer noch grosse Dichtung, aber eben nicht Teil der Philosophiegeschichte (ebd., S. 393). Schon zu Nietzsches Lebzeiten bemerkte Heinrich Hart (Ein Typus 1892. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 81): „Und doch ist Nietzsche ein Genie, nicht als Denker, sondern als Dichter, nicht durch das Was, sondern durch das Wie seiner Verkündigung [...]". Von Belang ist auch die musikalische Perspektive Nietzsches Sprache. Er war selbst Komponist, Musikkenner, Klavierspieler, seiner Zeit auch der grosse Verehrer Richard Wagners und Arthur Schopenhauers, von dem er sich auch die Auffassung von der philosophischen Bedeutsamkeit der Musik für das Leben angeeignet hatte. Das Musikalische an seiner Sprache resultiert in erster Linie aus seiner Erziehung. Sein Haus war ein Daheim der Musikliebhaber. Wie Rüdiger Safranski (2007, S. 9) schreibt, hatte Nietzsche gern, „so gut es geht, mit Sprache, Gedanken und Begriffen zu musizieren". Die musikalische Beschaffenheit seiner Sprache bewunderte später ein anderer hervorragender Meister des Deutschen, Thomas Mann (Vorspruch zu einer musikalischen Nietzsche-Feier 1925), Er unterschied zwischen Augenmenschen und Ohrenmenschen und rechnete sich zu den letzteren. Über bildende Kunst hat er sich kaum geäussert und offenbar keine seiner grossen Stunden mit ihr gefeiert. Sprache und Musik waren das Feld seiner Erlebnisse, seiner Liebesund Erkenntnisabenteuer und seiner Produktivität. Seine Sprache selbst ist Musik und bekundet eine Feinheit des inneren Gehörs, eine Meisterschaft des Sinnes für Fall, Tempo, Rhythmus der scheinbar ungebundenen Rede, wie er in deutscher Prosa, und wahrscheinlich in europäischer überhaupt, bisher ohne Beispiel war (In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 209). Mit dem Melos seiner Sprache hat Nietzsche den deutschen Stil „bereichert und der modernen deutschen Seele als der erste die Zunge gelöst" (J. Schlaf, Der ‚Fall' Nietzsche 1907. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 151). Das darf man auf keinen Fall unterschätzen, denn „Friedrich Nietzsche war es, der, als Meister eines zauberhaften Stils, der deutschen Sprache einen ungeahnt neuen Rhythmus verlieh und ganz Europa aufhorchen liess" (W. Weigand, Welt und Weg (1940). In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 273). Es sei hervorgehoben, dass Nietzsche aus einer Intelligenzlerfamilie stammte, in der ihm das kulturelle Leben beigebracht und angeeignet wurde. Er war ein unermüdlicher Bücherwurm, nachtschwärmerischer Schriftsteller, scharfsinniger Łukasz Marek Plęs 44 Beobachter und geistreicher Kritiker der Realität, der mit seinem wachen Intellekt und profunden Wissen alle Autoren, unabhängig von ihrem geistigen Kaliber, akribisch und tiefgründig durchzuleuchten vermochte. Mithilfe seines ausgeprägten Spürsinnes und feinen Instinktes war er im Stande, relevante Auszüge zu orten und zu verwerten. Über seine lesefreundliche Veranlagung schreibt Rüdiger Safranski (2007) wie folgt: Nietzsche, das weiss man, war kein geduldiger, aber auf seine Weise ein gründlicher Leser. Selten las er Bücher durch, aber er las in ihnen mit einem untrüglichen Instinkt für jene Aspekte, die aufschlussreich und anregend waren (ebd., S. 125). Colli (1980) bemerkt, dass sich Nietzsche in seinen Heften bestimmte Ausdrücke notierte, „unter denen sich nicht mehr gebräuchliche Verben und Substantive, besondere Wortzusammenstellungen usw. finden; zu gegebener Zeit sucht[e] er sie dann hervor und benutzt[e] sie [...] Und Nietzsche g[ing] schlau zu Werke, wenn er später diese Fragmente zusammenfügt[e] und mit kluger Berechnung den Eindruck erzeugt[e] zu improvisieren" (ebd., S. 126f.). Obwohl seine Werke gewisse Affinitäten aufweisen, kann man sie einzeln unter die Lupe nehmen. Zum ersten Mal kam sein stilistisches Talent an die breitere Öffentlichkeit mit dem Werk Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik,14 welches seine universitäre Karriere ruinierte, jedoch den Auftakt seiner Abkehr von der trockenen Philologie darstellte und später als Meilenstein auf dem von ihm neu eingeschlagenen Weg galt. Leo Berg (Friedrich Nietzsche 1889) schrieb über dieses Werk: Abgesehen aber auch von der Originalität und Gedankenfülle dieser Schrift, sie überrascht vor allem, ja sie fasziniert geradezu durch die Schönheit ihrer Diktion, die unwillkürlich den Vergleich mit derjenigen Platos wachruft. Eine so durchgeistigte, eine so bilderreiche und anschauliche und zugleich so abgerundete und klare Sprache findet man nicht bald wieder in irgend einem deutschen Buche; und in mancher Beziehung nimmt es auch eine ganz einzige Stellung unter den Nietzscheschen Schriften ein. Während in den späteren Werken oft eine gewisse Teufelei ihr Spiel treibt, und während vor allem die Vorliebe für einen konzisen, epigrammatischen Stil den Schriftsteller sich oft in lauter Aphorismen verlieren lässt: hier ist das Ganze noch einheitlich in der Form, wie eine schöne Blume aus einem einzigen Stengel, dem Grundgedanken, emporgeblüht (In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 62). Über Jenseits von Gut und Böse schreibt Widmann (Nietzsches gefährliches Buch 1886. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 59): „Professor Nietzsche sagt diese Dinge viel feiner, mit hundert geistreichen Wendungen und Blendungen." 14 In Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik bot Nietzsche, durch die Zusammenführung seiner Lebenserfahrungen mit den Gedanken des Opernkomponisten Richard Wagner, eine geniale, wenn auch eine unbeweisbare Hypothese über die Quellen der Kunst, deren Ursprung für beide in der Musik liegt, in der, laut Schopenhauer, das wahre Wesen der Welt zum Vorschein kommt (vgl. Köhler 2000, S. 23). Friedrich Nietzsche – Dichter oder Denker? 45 Bezüglich Menschliches, Allzumenschliches äussert sich Joachim Köhler (2000) folgendermassen: Die blitzende Feder, die Nietzsche hier führt, lässt seine früheren Texte, trotz deren oft genialem Einfallsreichtum, wie schwerfällige Traktate erscheinen. Statt langer Abhandlungen reisst er seine Gedanken nur noch kurz an; statt umständliche Beweise zu führen, überzeugt er durch Wortwitz und sichere Pointen (ebd., S. 30). Zur Sprache in Also sprach Zarathustra, dem Buch, das sich schon auf den ersten Blick von anderen Werken Nietzsches unterscheidet, ergreift wiederum Stanisław Przybyszewski (Erinnerungen an das literarische Berlin 1926) das Wort: Was dagegen meine höchste Begeisterung und Bewunderung erregte, war Nietzsches Sprache. Nicht Nietzsches Hauptwerk Menschliches, Allzumenschliches war für mich eine Offenbarung – nur ein paar Seiten sagten mir etwas Neues-, sondern das königliche, in seiner unendlich poetischen Schönheit majestätische Werk Also sprach Zarathustra! (In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 223). Nietzsche ist ein Demiurg, Kreator der nie dagewesenen Sprachqualität im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes. Bei ihm finden sich nicht nur unkonventionelle, geistreiche, scharfsinnige Wendungen, sondern Neologismen und Termini, die in die weltliche Philosophie und Literatur Einzug gehalten haben.15 Nietzsche kann als bahnbrechender Wortschmied angesehen werden, denn ein „ganz neuer Wortschatz arbeitete sich heraus und mit ihm, in befruchtendster Wechselwirkung, [...] alles neuprägend und umwertend" (C. Flaischlen, Zur modernen Dichtung 1895. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 103). Max Krell (Vorbemerkung zu „Die Entfaltung. Novellen an die Zeit" 1921. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 205) zählt ihn, neben Luther und Goethe, zu den grössten deutschen Sprachschöpfern. 1950 konstatiert Gottfried Benn, Nietzsche sei „seit Luther das grösste deutsche Sprachgenie" (zit. nach Kohl 2003, S. 223) gewesen. Der berühmte Literaturkritiker Johannes Schlaf (Der ‚Fall' Nietzsche 1907) schreibt zu Nietzsches Sprachschmiedekunst: Man rühmt an Nietzsche den grossen Sprachschöpfer. Es ist keine Frage: man tut es mit Recht. Wir haben seit unsern Klassikern keinen grösseren Sprachmeister gehabt als ihn; und es verhält sich so, dass er der deutschen Sprache neue Offenbarungen abgerungen hat. Es ist auch gern wahr, dass die Formklarheit der romanischen Sprachen bei diesen Offenbarungen 15 Avenarius (Zu Friedrich Niezsches Tod 1900) schreibt: „Zum Gestalter ward er in Tönen, vor allem aber in der Sprache des Worts. Nietzsches Sprache, die jedes Wort bald in diesem Schatten, bald in jenem Licht dämmern oder aufglänzen lässt, diese Sprache, die kaum je darauf ausgeht, eine Sache in nüchternen Grenzen fest zu umschreiben, Nietzsches Sprache, die nur angeregt ist vom Gegenstand, aber gesättigt vom Ich, ist gewiss ein unzweckmässiges Werkzeug zu logischer Wissenschaft" (In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 125). Łukasz Marek Plęs 46 mitgeholfen hat. Indessen nicht überall, wo dieser Einfluss derselben in Nietzsches Sprache zutage tritt, wird man ihn gutheissen dürfen; vor allem vom Französischen her hat er Nietzsche zu allzuviel Spielereien verleitet; zu einer artistischen Lust an der Frivolität, der man trotzdem, gottlob! anmerkt, wie sie ihm innerlichst gar nicht liegt. Nietzsche muss uns hier geradezu unleidlich sein. Leider, leider wird ihm hier am meisten nachgeahmt, in all diesen Jonglierereien und Kapriolen, die er der deutschen Sprache aufgenötigt und aufdressiert hat (In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 150f.) Der bereits angeführte deutsche Schriftsteller Gottfried Benn „sah in Nietzsche fast ausschliesslich den Verkünder einer neuen Kunstlehre, den Theoretiker und Praktiker eines für Deutschland neuen, artistischen Stils. Mit Nietzsche beginnt, der Ansicht Benns zufolge, eine gänzlich neue Stilrichtung der deutschen Literatur. [...] Für Benn ist Nietzsche aber nicht nur der Urheber und Anreger, sondern immer auch der unerreichte Meister dieses neuen Kunststils" (B. Hildebrand, Gottfried Benn und Friedrich Nietzsche. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 185). Das „oratorische Genie"16 studierte unter anderem die Stilvorschriften von Lessing, Lichtenberg und Schopenhauer (vgl. Safranski 2007, S. 45). Seine „uneigentliche Sprache" (so Heftrich 1962, S. 74) weist jedoch auch viele Divergenzen auf. Rüdiger Safranski (2007, S. 232) bemerkt hierzu: „Nietzsche erprobt Formulierungen, unterstreicht, streicht durch, setzt mehrere Ausrufezeichen, Fragezeichen mitten im Satz, bricht ab, setzt neu an, lässt Wörter aus, kürzt andere ab". Tomasz Małyszek erwähnt eine Edition Nietzsches Werke aus dem Jahre 2001, welche die Faksimiles seiner Handschriften enthält. Zum Zwecke einer getreuen Reproduktion seiner Schreibweise wurden fünf verschiedene Drucktypen sowie sieben diverse Farben verwendet. Das veranschaulicht gut den Entstehungsprozess Nietzsches Schriften samt allen Unzulänglichkeiten und Unklarheiten (siehe Małyszek 2007, S. 64). Darüber hinaus wird oft nicht nur das Gegensätzliche seiner Denkweise (vgl. etwa Müller-Lauter 1971), sondern auch das Zwiespältige seines Schrifttums unterstrichen. Beda Alleman (1974) schreibt: Eine Poetik im streng technischen Sinne gibt es bei Nietzsche nicht. Es gibt eine Vielzahl von poetologischen Äusserungen, die sich aber immer auf den Grundzwiespalt zurückführen lassen. Nietzsche versteht bis zuletzt seine dichterische Produktion als eine apollinische Traumprojektion in poetische Bilder (ebd., S. 55). Dieser Zwiespalt kommt auch bei Martens (Nietzsches Wirkung im Expressionismus) zum Ausdruck: Liegt hier nicht eine Dichtung vor, in der weniger in der inhaltlichen Aussage als im Vorgang sprachlicher Formung Stagnation und schablonenhafte Erstarrung zerbrochen wird, 16 So wurde Nietzsche von Richard Dehmel bezeichnet (vgl. Kohl 2003, S. 223). Friedrich Nietzsche – Dichter oder Denker? 47 damit also in einer Sprache, die durch eine eigentümliche Spannung zwischen Starrheit und Dynamik geprägt ist [...]? (In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978b, S. 65). Das erlaubt jedoch dem Philosophen bestimmte Ziele zu erreichen, denn „Nietzsches stilistischer Pluralismus ist eine seiner Hauptwaffen in dem Bestreben, sich selbst von der philosophischen Tradition, wie er sie auffasst, abzugrenzen, sie zu kritisieren und ihr Alternativen entgegenzusetzen" (Nehamas 1991, S. 35). Unabhängig davon, ob man Nietzsche zu schätzen weiss oder nicht, muss gesagt werden, dass seine Werke nicht nur philosophisch, sondern auch allgemein künstlerisch eine wichtige Zäsur in der Kulturgeschichte der deutschen Sprache darstellen. Das verdankt sich vor allem seiner Erziehung, Ausbildung, Belesenheit und nicht zuletzt seinem Intellekt und seiner Begabung: Das Können allein entscheidet über den Künstler und was von ihm bleiben soll. Eine Hauptfrage des Könnens ist die Form: da sehe man Nietzsche und seinen Stolz, wie sehr er die deutsche Sprache verändert habe... (H. Mann, Nietzsche 1939. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 265f.). Nietzsches dichterischer Beitrag zur Weltliteratur ist in diesem Sinne unumstritten. Die Kontroversen, die über die Zugehörigkeit Nietzsches zur Philosophie oder Literatur ausgetragen werden, kann man mit einer folgenden Formulierung abbauen: „Nietzsche engagiert sich als Denker – in einer Dichtung" (Fleischer 1993, S. 83). Da seine Schriften philosophisch überladen waren, fragt sich Hugo von Hofmannsthal (Das Schrifttum als geistiger Raum der Nation 1927. In: Hildebrand (Hrsg.) 1978a, S. 225), ob Nietzsche vielleicht „mehr Prophet als Dichter" ist. LITERATURVERZEICHNIS Allemann B. (1974), Nietzsche und die Dichtung. In: Steffen H. (Hrsg.), Nietzsche. Werk und Wirkungen, Göttingen, S. 45–64. Andrzejewski B. (2007), Historia filozofii niemieckiej do połowy XIX wieku, Koszalin. Banasiak B. (1993), Problemat Nietzschego. In: Deleuze G., Nietzsche i filozofia, Warszawa 1993, S. 209–213. Colli G. (1980), Nach Nietzsche, Frankfurt a.M. Deleuze G. (1991), Nietzsche und die Philosophie, Hamburg. Dilthey W. (1984), Das Wesen der Philosophie, Hamburg. Dybel P. (2007), Płomień Nietzschego. In: Nowe Książki 5, S. 4–8. Fleischer M. (1993), Der „Sinn der Erde" und die Entzauberung des Übermenschen. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Nietzsche, Darmstadt. Frenzel I. (1966), Nietzsche, Reinbek. Gane L., Chan K. (1998), Introducing Nietzsche, Cambridge. Heftrich E. (1962), Nietzsches Philosophie. Identität von Welt und Nichts, Frankfurt a.M. Heidegger M. (1961), Nietzsche, 2 Bde, Pfullingen. Łukasz Marek Plęs 48 Hildebrand B. (Hrsg.) (1978a), Nietzsche und die deutsche Literatur. Band 1: Texte zur NietzscheRezeption 1873–1963, Tübingen. Hildebrand B. (Hrsg.) (1978b), Nietzsche und die deutsche Literatur. Band 2: Forschungsergebnisse, Tübingen. Jaspers K. (1981), Nietzsche. Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens, Berlin, New York. Karolak Cz. u.a. (2007), Dzieje kultury niemieckiej, Warszawa. Kaufmann W. (1982), Nietzsche: Philosoph, Psychologe, Antichrist, Darmstadt. Kohl K. (2003), Die Rhetorik ist das Wesen der Philosophie Nietzsches (Hans Blumenberg). Klassische Tradition moderner Wirkung. In: Görner R., Large D. (Hrsg.), Ecce Opus. Nietzsche-Revisionen im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen, S. 205–225. Köhler J. (2000), Wer war Friedrich Nietzsche? Kurzer Versuch, eine Jahrhundertfrage zu beantworten, Bonn. Małyszek T. (2007), Literatura niemiecka w teorii i praktyce, Wrocław. Markowski M. P. (1999), „Moje życie jest torturą". In: Nietzsche F., To rzekł Zaratustra, Warszawa, S. 415–430. Markowski M. P. (2001), Nietzsche. Filozofia Interpretacji, Kraków. Müller-Lauter W. (1971), Nietzsche. Seine Philosophie der Gegensätze und die Gegensätze seiner Philosophie, Berlin, New York. Nehamas A. (1991), Nietzsche. Leben als Literatur, Göttingen. Nietzsche F. (1963), Zum Problem des Übersetzens. In: Störig J. (Hrsg.), Das Problem des Übersetzens, Darmstadt, S. 136–138. Rajewicz T. (2003), Nietzsches Philosophie in polnischen Übersetzungen. Am Beispiel von Zarathustras Rede Von den drei Verwandlungen. In: Studia Germanica Posnaniensia 29, S. 143–151. Ross W. (1980), Der ängstliche Adler. Friedrich Nietzsches Leben, Stuttgart. Safranski R. (2007), Nietzsche. Biografie seines Denkens, Hamburg. Schmitter E. (2007), Begreifen durch Ergriffenheit. In: Safranski R., Nietzsche. Biografie seines Denkens, Hamburg, S. 392–394. Simon J. (1980), Grammatik und Wahrheit. Über das Verhältnis Nietzsches zur spekulativen Satzgrammatik der metaphysischen Tradition. In: Salaquarda J. (Hrsg.), Nietzsche, Darmstadt, S. 185–218. Störig H. J. (1971), Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Bd. 2, Stuttgart. Światłowski Z. (2001), Leseund Lebenserfahrungen mit der deutschsprachigen Literatur 1890– 1945, Rzeszów. Szyrocki M. (1984), Geschichte der deutschsprachigen Litertur vom Ausgang des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 1945, Warszawa. Tatarkiewicz W. (1970), Historia filozofii, Bd. 3, Warszawa. Tebarzt van Elst A. (1994), Ästhetik der Metapher. Zum Streit zwischen Philosophie und Rhetorik bei Friedrich Nietzsche, Freiburg, München. Ulmer K. (1962), Nietzsche. Einheit und Sinn seines Werkes, Bern. Vattimo G. (1992), Nietzsche: Eine Einführung, Stuttgart, Weimar. Friedrich Nietzsche – Dichter oder Denker? 49 Łukasz Marek Plęs FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE – POET OR PHILOSOPHER? (Summary) Friedrich Nietzsche is considered one of the most brilliant thinkers in the history of philosophy, although a number of myths have grown up about the character, also surrounded by many controversies. His works and thoughts have provided inspiration for humanists with a wide spectrum of most different interests. Nietzsche did not want to be regarded as a philosopher, but he has been living in the contemporary consciousness as a thinker nonetheless. According to the extraordinary style of Nietzsche's works, however, he also is considered a poet, one of the most distinctive stylists, even the most virtuoso writer in the history of German. What is more, the stylistic level of Nietzsche's oeuvre leads to discourses upon its affinity with philosophical or literary studies. The aim of the present article is to review the question mentioned in the title, following the opinions of representative literary figures (such as Heinrich Mann, Thomas Mann, Gottfried Benn, Stanisław Przybyszewski) and philosophers (e.g. Martin Heidegger, Wilhelm Dilthey, Karl Jaspers) as well.

How Humean is Bohumianism? Tomasz Bigaj University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy Krakowskie Przedmieście 3 00-927 Warsaw Antonio Vassallo International Center for Formal Ontology Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences Warsaw University of Technology Plac Politechniki 1 00-661 Warsaw Accepted for publication in Foundations of Physics Abstract An important part of the influential Humean doctrine in philosophy is the supervenience principle (sometimes referred to as the principle of separability). This principle asserts that the complete state of the world supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its most fundamental components and their spatiotemporal relations (the so-called Humean mosaic). There are well-known arguments in the literature purporting to show that in quantum mechanics the Humean supervenience principle is violated, due to the existence of entangled states. Recently, however, arguments have been presented to the effect that the supervenience principle can be defended in Bohmian mechanics. The key element of this strategy lies in the observation that according to Bohmian mechanics the fundamental facts about particles are facts about their spatial locations, and moreover, for any proper subsystem 1 of the world its state may non-trivially depend on the spatial configuration of the rest of the universe. Thus quantum-mechanical states of subsystems do not represent their intrinsic properties but rather characterize their relations with the environment. In this paper we point out the worry that this Bohmian strategy –known as Bohumianism– saves the letter but not the spirit of the Humean doctrine of supervenience, since it prima facie violates another seemingly important Humean principle, which we call Strong Supervenience and whose denial implies the existence of necessary connections among distinct individuals. We argue that the best defense for Bohumians is to question the fundamental existence of complex physical systems and their states by treating any reference to them as a convenient description of the underlying collection of Bohmian particles. We consider several pros and cons of this strategy. Keywords: Humean supervenience; quantum entanglement; Bohmian mechanics; Bohumianism 1 Introduction The main purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate the latest attempts to reconcile modern developments in quantum physics with the broad philosophical doctrine of Humeanism. It is no secret that the worldview emerging from quantum mechanics turns out to be rather hostile to many venerated philosophical views, such as for instance determinism. The doctrine of Humeanism, with its insistence on separability, non-modality and reductionism, seems to be another prime target for an assault inspired by quantum discoveries. And yet, given the persistent popularity of Humeanism among contemporary philosophers of science, no wonder that this assault is met with powerful resistance. One recent episode in an ongoing battle between various philosophical approaches to quantum mechanics started out with a vigorous attack on Humeanism at the hands of Tim Maudlin in his provocatively titled piece "Why be Humean?" (Maudlin, 2007). It didn't take long before defenders of the "greatest denier of necessary connections" responded to this challenge in various ways. A particularly interesting response has been based on a popular in philosophical circles interpretation of quantum mechanics known as Bohmian mechanics (Miller, 2014; Esfeld, 2014; Callender, 2015; Bhogal and Perry, 2017). In our contribution to this debate we will try to identify some weak points of this strategy, and we will suggest, on behalf of the Bohmians, how to strengthen their defensive position. The plan of this article is as follows. Section 2 is mainly expository, de2 voted to the presentation of the main assumptions and arguments in Maudlin's original polemic with Humeanism, as well as the general strategy of defense against Maudlin's attack. Here we will introduce two pillars of the Humean doctrine: the rejection of modal facts and the elimination of necessary connections between separate entities, and we will present the wellknown Humean principles of Physical Statism and Separability. Reconstructing Maudlin's criticism of Separability based on the example of entangled states (singletand triplet-spin states), we will formulate an equivalent version of Separability that we call Supervenience, and we will show, following Elizabeth Miller, how Supervenience can be defended by denying that the singlet and triplet-states are intrinsic to the quantum systems. In section 3 we will explore the physical details of Bohmian mechanics relevant to the above-mentioned strategy of defending Humeanism. We will stress the nomological character of the universal wave function (interpreted according to the Best System approach), and we will introduce the concept of an effective wave function that enables us to make a distinction between physical systems and their environments while still admitting that the states of these systems are not intrinsic to them. Section 4 is central to the article. In it we present our main critique of the Bohmian defense of Humeanism, which is that Separability (or Supervenience) by itself does not guarantee that no necessary connections between separate entities will be present. Supervenience ensures the lack of necessary connections between fundamental objects, but does not exclude the possibility that these connections may emerge at higher levels of complexity. To clarify this further, we spell out the conditions of Strong Supervenience and Binary Separability that in our opinion should constitute parts of the broader Humean doctrine, and we argue that Bohmian mechanics refutes them. In section 5 we discuss one possible way for Bohmians to continue their commitment to Humeanism by denying the objective existence of complex entities on a par with fundamental objects. We explain why this move does not imply that objects of our experiences are mere illusions or arbitrary constructs. We end the article with a suggestion for Bohmians to bite the bullet and go "Democritean", i.e. accept that only fundamental particles ("atoms") exist in the most literal sense of the word. 2 Humeanism and Quantum Mechanics The modern version of Humeanism is based on two intuitions, both of which can be traced back to David Hume himself. One of them is skepticism regarding irreducible modal facts: facts involving necessity, possibility, dispositions, 3 powers, counterfactuals etc. The other intuition suggests that there can be no necessary connections between separate entities.1 The first intuition can be expressed in the statement that all facts about the world are exhausted in its total state that tells us what the world is, as opposed to what it could, or would, or ought to be. All purported modal facts, encompassed for instance in laws or tendencies or dispositions or whatever, are to be ultimately reducible to the total state of the world (in the sense that there could be no difference in modal facts without the underlying difference in the total state). The non-existence of necessary connections between separate individuals gives us more insight into the internal composition of the total state of the world according to Humeanism. Roughly speaking, the state of the world should be decomposable into the states of separate individuals plus their spatiotemporal arrangements. The so-called Humean mosaic, consisting of the assignment of intrinsic, natural and non-modal properties to individual objects, together with the spatiotemporal arrangement of these objects, should be sufficient to fix the state of the entire world. Admitting any facts beyond what is included in the Humean mosaic would amount to the acceptance of fundamental correlations between distinct entities that are not reducible to their intrinsic properties and spatiotemporal relations, and hence would infringe the second Humean intuition. Tim Maudlin's verbalization of Lewis's variant of Humeanism has become the gold standard in the literature. He spells out two principles he calls Physical Statism and Separability as follows (Maudlin, 2007, p. 51): (Physical Statism) All facts about a world, including modal and nomological facts, are determined by its total physical state. (Separability) The complete physical state of the world is determined by (supervenes on) the intrinsic physical state of each spacetime point (or each point-like object) and the spatiotemporal relations between those points. As Bhogal and Perry (2017, p. 74) point out, Physical Statism and Separability jointly imply that the world is fundamentally non-modal, and that there are no necessary connections at the fundamental level. The last supposition is secured by Separability, since Separability ensures that fundamental 1We are not claiming that these two intuitions are independent from one another. In particular, it may be argued that rejecting irreducible modal facts, as per the first intuition, eliminates necessary connections between distinct entities. On the other hand, it is at least feasible to reject irreducible modal facts as parts of the world, and still insist that there are some necessary connections which present themselves in the fact that certain combinations of fundamental, non-modal properties are not admissible. 4 objects are characterized by intrinsic states, and intrinsic properties by definition are possessed by an entity independently of anything else in the world. It is worth stressing that the supervenience basis described in Maudlin's Separability consists of fundamental entities (points or point-like entities) that cannot be further decomposed into smaller constituents. This is a rather important restriction, since from Separability understood in such a way it does not immediately follow that an analogous principle will hold for nonfundamental objects and their properties. In other words, it may still be the case that the total state of the world is not reducible to the Humean mosaic consisting of larger, non-fundamental individuals (for instance middle-size objects of our everyday experience). Maudlin argues that Separability comes under severe fire from the development of quantum physics. Here entangled states provide the required ammunition. An entangled state of a two-particle system is a state that cannot be written as a product of two one-particle states. It is possible to find two distinct entangled states such that both give the exact same predictions regarding the behavior of individual particles taken separately (they produce the same reduced states for each particle), and yet they differ with respect to the global measurable features of the entire system. The example given by Maudlin uses the singlet and triplet spin-states of two electrons. Both states give identical statistical predictions regarding individual electrons: the probability of obtaining any result (up or down) for spin in any chosen direction equals 50%. And yet when the system is in the singlet spin state the results of measurements of spin in the same direction on both particles are always anticorrelated (they have opposite values), while in the case of the triplet state we can choose a direction of spin measurement in which both outcomes must be the same. Thus the quantum state of the whole two-particle system does not supervene on the intrinsic properties of the separate particles and their spatiotemporal locations. However, the argument from quantum entanglement does not directly affect Maudlin's Separability, as the latter principle concerns the world as a whole and not small isolated systems such as a two-electron system. In order to question Separability we need an additional assumption that would enable us to get from the violation of Humean supervenience at a local level to the global violation. The missing link was identified by Elizabeth Miller (Miller, 2014) as the claim that the quantum state of a two-electron system forms its intrinsic property.2 From this assumption we can now derive that the 2We do not wish to enter the intricate debate on the exact meaning of "intrinsic properties". For our purposes it is sufficient to accept the following partial characteristic: if an intrinsic property of a system X supervenes on any property of an object Y , Y has to be a spatiotemporal part of X. 5 singlet and triplet states of two electrons cannot supervene on properties of objects other than the electrons themselves, since this would contravene the intrinsic character of the two-particle states. Thus neither singlet nor triplet states supervene on any properties of the fundamental elements of the world (whether or not these elements are parts of the considered system) and their spatiotemporal arrangements. And because the total state of the world must contain the states of its components, Separability is violated. Proceeding slightly more formally, we can first introduce a new principle that can be simply called Supervenience: (Supervenience) For any physical system S, the intrinsic properties of S supervene on the intrinsic physical states and spatiotemporal relations between points and pointlike objects that are parts of S.3 Given some reasonable assumptions, it can be proven that Supervenience is in fact equivalent to Separability. Because trivially all the properties of the entire world are intrinsic to it, Separability follows from Supervenience (if we assume that the world constitutes a physical system, which seems plausible). The entailment in the opposite direction can be shown as follows. If Supervenience were false, some intrinsic properties of a particular system S would not supervene on the Humean mosaic of fundamental, point-like objects that are parts of S. But intrinsic properties of system S cannot depend on any object spatiotemporally external from S, hence the intrinsic properties of S do not supervene on the fundamental properties of point-like objects at all. Provided that the intrinsic properties of any physical system are parts of the total state of the world, this means that Separability is false. It is clear that the example of the singlet and triplet states directly violates Supervenience, if only these states qualify as intrinsic properties of appropriate systems. But here one escape route immediately opens up. We can namely attempt to save Supervenience (and Separability) by denying that the singlet and triplet states represent genuine intrinsic properties of physical systems. This is precisely the strategy adopted by Miller in her attempt to defend Humeanism against Maudlin's argument. If we can argue that the singlet or triplet states of a system of two particles depend nontrivially on the properties of objects extrinsic from this system, Maudlin's argument can be repelled.4 3Miller calls the negation of Supervenience Metaphysical holism (Miller, 2014, p. 568). 4Another strategy of how to deal with Maudlin's challenge to Humeanism has been considered by George Darby (Darby, 2012). The idea is roughly to include in the supervenience basis irreducible relations between particles occupying the singlet or triplet state, 6 In order to provide a philosophically clear discussion of this strategy, we will focus on the so-called "primitive ontology" approach to quantum physics (see Allori et al., 2008, for a technical discussion of the framework), In particular, we will follow Miller in framing the discussion in the context of non-relativistic Bohmian mechanics.5 3 The Best System Approach to Bohmian Mechanics Bohmian mechanics, in rough outline, is based on the assumption that the world consists of fundamental particles which have well-defined trajectories. The modern version of the theory,6 as set out in Dürr et al. (2013), is in fact the simplest non-local Galilean-invariant theory of N moving particles. The dynamics of the theory is given by: i~ ∂ ∂t Ψ(Q, t) = ĤΨ(Q, t); (1a) dQ dt = ~m−1Im〈Ψ,∇Ψ〉 〈Ψ,Ψ〉 (Q, t). (1b) Q =  q1* * * qN  ∈ R3N represents an instantaneous configuration of N particles, ∇ =  ∇1* * * ∇N  is the "gradient vector", m is the N ×N diagonal "mass matrix" {δijmi}, and 〈*, *〉 is an appropriate inner product defined over the space of wave functions. thus expanding the Humean mosaic. Darby claims that this move saves the reductive spirit of Humeanism, but he himself admits that some form of holism has to be accepted, which may be seen as departing from the Humean idea that everything that is is the local matters of particular fact. To that we would like to add that admitting irreducible, external relations between distinct individuals violates the intuition of no necessary connections. Clearly, the holding of the relation of anticorrelation between electrons in the singlet spin state implies that there is a necessary connection between the values of the spin of both electrons. 5We stress the fact that here we are adopting a primitive ontology approach just as a working hypothesis that lets us exemplify the issues at stake, being fully aware that not everybody would agree with this choice (see Ney and Philips, 2013, for a critical discussion of the primitive ontology approach). 6The roots of the theory can be traced back to the work of Louis de Broglie (see de Broglie, 1928). 7 To sum up, (1b) is a concise way to write N coupled equations of the form: dqk dt = ~ mk Im 〈Ψ,∇kΨ〉 〈Ψ,Ψ〉 (Q, t). (2) Formally, (1b) depicts a vector field on R3N depending on Ψ, whose integral curves Q = Q(t) can each be "unpacked" as collections of N continuous trajectories {qi = qi(t)}i=1,...,N .7 The dynamics encoded in (1) is deterministic: once provided a set of initial conditions (Ψ0,Q0) at a fixed time t0, the dynamics singles out a unique dynamical evolution at earlier and later times. Moreover, it can be shown that (1) recovers Born's rule of standard quantum mechanics, thus matching all the empirical predictions of this latter theory (Dürr et al., 1992, provide a detailed justification of this claim). The above formalism establishes that Bohmian mechanics is a theory of N point-like particles with definite positions qk = (xk, yk, zk) in Euclidean 3-space at all times. The non-locality of the theory is evident in (2), the velocity of the k-th particle particle being instantaneously dependent on the positions of all the other N − 1 particles. Furthermore, Bohmian mechanics is by construction a universal theory since (1) describes the dynamics of all there is in the universe –i.e. particles. The role of the wave function in this picture is to generate the vector field on the right-hand side of (1b), and it is thus said to "guide" the motion of the particles. A key point to be stressed is that the formalism works well with any type of wave function, including spinor states (of which singlet/triplet states represent a particular case). Put in these terms, a natural interpretation of the wave function as a law-like element of the formalism suggests itself. To see this, we can follow (as people like Miller and Esfeld do) the well-trodden path taken by many Humeans with respect to the laws of nature. According to the Best System Approach (known also as the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis theory) laws are axioms systematizing our knowledge of individual facts that achieve the best balance between strength and simplicity (see Hall, 2015, for an exhaustive introduction to the subject). In other words, laws ultimately supervene on the collection of individual facts. In the same vein, the universal wave function can be treated as a law that gives us the best description of the behavior of individual particles.8 In this sense, the Humean treatment of quantum 7People like David Albert (see, e.g., Albert, 1996) would deny the need for this last step. For them, the real dynamics literally unfolds in a higher dimensional space, where a single "world-particle" is pushed around by a "Ψ-field". We will not consider this controversial reading of (1) here. 8However, see Dewar (2018) for a recent critique of the Best System approach to Bohmian mechanics. We do not wish to take a stand on whether this critique is serious enough to undermine Bohumianism independently of our objections developed in 8 physics is very similar to that of classical physics. The mosaic is given by the history of change of particle positions9 over time and their mutual spatiotemporal relations, of which the wave function (or, say, the Hamiltonian, in the classical case) represent just (a part of) the simplest and most informative description. In this context, all the physical properties usually encoded in the wave function can be reduced to the mutual arrangement of particles throughout the entire history of the universe, spin being one of such properties.10 It is important to stress the fact that this story makes sense because Bohmian mechanics by construction accords a metaphysically privileged status to positions, otherwise one could wonder why, among the many physically possible bases onto which the quantum state could be projected, we just focus on the position basis. Hence, if we adopt this perspective, then the entanglement encoded in the wave function does not represent anymore a threat to a Humean reading of Bohmian mechanics. In fact, it seems that Bohmianism may be argued to satisfy Separability. To emphasize the Humean character of Bohmian mechanics, Miller even coins the term "Bohumianism". It is enlightening to see how Bohumianism concretely defuses Maudlin's challenge. Let's start from the trivial case in which the two-particle system is all there is to the world. In this case, the mosaic would be too meager to be describable in terms of singlet/triplet states. Particles' relative motion might instead allow for, e.g., a description in terms of simple Coulomb interactions. In this case, Maudlin's challenge is dodged rather than defused. The most interesting case involves, of course, the actual world. The first question to be answered, then, is how Bohmian mechanics is able to describe the behavior of our pair of entangled particles, given that they represent just a small portion of the universal N -particle configuration. Let's call q the two-particle subsystem andQ the rest of the configuration. Clearly, (q,Q) = Q. Now, in general there is no physically interesting case in which the universal wave function Ψ can be written as a simple product state of the form Ψ(Q) = ψ(q)φ(Q). However, there are more physically interesting cases in which it can be written as Ψ(Q) = ψ(q)φ(Q) + Ψ⊥(Q) and the section 4. 9Standard Humeans would add some natural intrinsic properties, such as mass and charge, on top of positions. However, it is now clear that nothing over and above particles' (relative) positions and change thereof is needed in order to make sense of the Humean approach to laws of physics. See Esfeld et al. (2018) for a presentation of this "SuperHumean" stance. 10Such a construction is not immune to criticism. For example, Matarese (2018), argues that purging the mosaic of all natural properties makes it impossible to establish which description among the many possible is in fact the simplest and most informative. Simpson (2019), goes as far as arguing that a mosaic consisting only of material particles' trajectories is untenable. 9 wave packet Ψ⊥(Q) remains empty throughout the dynamical evolution (i.e. it never gets to "guide" any particle). This happens when the following conditions are met: 1. ψφ and Ψ⊥ do not substantially overlap in configuration space. 2. Q always lies in a region of configuration space where Ψ⊥ is close to zero but φ is not. In this case, we recover the orthodox picture11 in which system and environment are assigned an effective wave function, ψ and φ respectively, each of which is subjected to a Schrödinger-like dynamics. From this point on, we can give the standard quantum description of ψ(q) and φ(Q) in terms of a "subsystem" and its "environment" (see, Dürr et al. (1992), section 5, for a far more rigorous presentation of this topic). The above story makes it manifest why there is strictly speaking nothing in the effective wave function ψ that is intrinsic to the two-particle system. Indeed, ψ is just the tip of the iceberg of a more complex description involving also the particles in the environment. In other words, we say that the twoparticle subsystem is in a singlet or triplet state just in virtue of how the trajectories of the two particles are related to those of the particles making up, say, a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. In this sense, the appropriate ontological picture is not that of an initially isolated subsystem that gets mixed with the environment as a result of the dynamical evolution but, rather, that of a global mosaic of trajectories to which we attach a simple and informative description in terms of subsystem/environment. The important point is that all the relevant information to account for, say, the detection of a two-particle system in a singlet or triplet state is crafted, so to speak, in the mosaic: nothing more is needed. In this sense, there is no question whether quantum physics is compatible with Humeanism. Does all of this mean that Humeanism is fully vindicated in Bohmian mechanics? Well, not so fast! 4 A Challenge to Bohumianism The key point of our critique of the above-described strategy is the observation that while Separability reflects strong Humean sentiments, it by no means exhausts the entire Humean doctrine, as encompassed in the two basic 11The reader interested in nonstandard approaches to quantum measurements (especially those dispensing with decoherence), can take a look at, e.g., Drossel and Ellis (2018). 10 intuitions mentioned in section 2 (no irreducible modal facts and no necessary connections). In other words, we argue that it is possible to have a non-strictly Humean theory that still preserves Separability, and Bohmian mechanics may fall in this category. To see that, let us start by noting that there are two distinct ways of satisfying the requirement of Supervenience for a given physical system. One way is direct and straightforward: the total physical state of any system is intrinsic to it, and moreover supervenes on the Humean mosaic consisting entirely of the system's parts. However, Supervenience can also be satisfied vacuously, as it is essentially a conditional statement: if P is an intrinsic property of S, then P supervenes on the properties and spatiotemporal relations of S's parts. But what if S has no interesting intrinsic properties (i.e. its physical state turns out to be an extrinsic property)? Then the conditional is true, but its truth follows simply from the falsity of the antecedent. There is no genuine supervenience here, because there is no property to which the supervenience could be attributed in the first place. The distinction we've made immediately suggests a natural strengthening of the Supervenience principle: rather than limiting the supervenience property to the intrinsic features of physical systems, we may extend it to all their physical states. Thus a stronger Supervenience presents itself: (Strong Supervenience) For any physical system S, the complete physical state of S supervenes on the intrinsic physical states and spatiotemporal relations between points and pointlike objects that are parts of S.12 It should be noted that the only difference between Strong Supervenience and Supervenience is that the former drops the condition of intrinsicality with respect to the complete physical state of S. However, this difference has some dramatic consequences. In particular, Bohmian mechanics violates Strong Supervenience, since the singlet/triplet states of two electrons do not supervene on the properties of the individual electrons and their spatiotemporal arrangements, as we have explained in the previous section. But is Strong Supervenience a necessary part of any Humean doctrine? Can a Humean accept a situation in which the total physical state of a system contains an irreducible reference to objects spatiotemporally separated from this system? We believe not, since such a scenario clearly flies in the face of the second Humean intuition regarding the lack of necessary connections between separate entities. It seems that a committed Humean should sub12Bhogal and Perry (2017) call this principle Strong Separability. 11 scribe to the following variant of Separability that we call Binary Separability, which entails Strong Supervenience: (Binary Separability) For any physical system S equipped with its own physical state, the complete state of the world supervenes on the intrinsic properties of S, intrinsic properties of its environment E, and the spatiotemporal relations between S and E. According to Separability, the supervenience basis for the total state of the world consists of the most fundamental elements of reality (points or point-like objects). Binary Separability, on the other hand, insists that a supervenience basis can be also found on non-fundamental levels. This stronger principle ensures that each time when we identify a physical system that is a proper part of the world (but does not have to be a simple element with no further proper parts), we can split the state of the world into two components: one that is associated with the selected system, and the other characterizing its environment (plus the requisite spatiotemporal relations between the two). In other words, physical systems do not enter into any relations with their environments that would not be already included in their intrinsic properties plus spatiotemporal arrangements. That Binary Separability implies Strong Supervenience can be proven as follows. First, we can observe that Binary Separability implies Separability, since Binary Separability can be applied to fundamental systems (points or point-like objects), which proves that these systems and their intrinsic states belong to the supervenience basis for the entire world. Next, assume that Binary Separability is true and take any physical system S. Since the physical state of S is part of the total state of the universe, by Separability it must supervene on the Humean mosaic of fundamental objects and properties. But if the state of S supervened on fundamental objects that are not parts of S, this would violate Binary Separability, since the state of S would no longer be an intrinsic property of S. Thus Strong Supervenience has to be true as well. Hence, if we can argue that Humeans should accept Binary Separability, they should also commit themselves to Strong Supervenience. In order to help the reader keep track of the logical relations among the array of metaphysical claims introduced and discussed in this paper, we present the following diagram of mutual logical dependencies among these claims, where arrows indicate the relation of logical entailment: Binary Separability Strong Supervenience Separability Supervenience 12 Our assertion is that the committed Humean should accept Binary Separability and thus all the remaining theses as well. However, even though Bohmian mechanics is compatible with Separability and Supervenience, it violates Binary Separability and Strong Supervenience, which poses a challenge to the Bohmians who want to subscribe to Humeanism. Why isn't simple Separability enough for a Humean? Why do we need a stronger assumption regarding the supervenience of the whole on its parts? One reason may be the intuition that the relation of supervenience should "mesh" naturally with the intuitive mereological structure of the world.13 Suppose that Binary Separability is false while Separability remains true. This means that the supervenience basis for the entire Humean mosaic for the world consisting of the fundamental objects and their properties cannot be divided up into the smaller supervenience bases for the objects composed of the corresponding elements of the fundamental mosaic. Let us choose a subset P of the set of all fundamental (point-like) objects that compose a particular physical system S. Even though the entire mosaic of pointlike objects constitutes the supervenience basis for the world, the subset P does not analogously ground the state of system S. The state of system S supervenes not only on P but on some elements outside of P as well. Thus the part-whole relation is not compatible with the supervenience relation. Still, this argument may not convince all Humeans. For example, Bhogal and Perry (2017) defend the view that Separability is all the Humean could ever want, and that introducing any stronger principle, such as Binary Separability or Strong Supervenience, does not add anything of value to the Humean. They believe that Separability already satisfies the requirements of no modal irreducible facts and of no necessary connections, so why bother? To that we can repeat what has already been said earlier that Separability assures only the non-existence of necessary connections between fundamental entities, but does not guarantee that such connections will not appear at a higher level. Without Binary Separability a complex physical system may display irreducible connections with its environment due to the fact that the supervenience basis for its state extends beyond its spatiotemporal parts.14 In response to the above argument one may object that Humeans can 13Some might object that such a (standard) mereological structure is compatible with a classical world. We are going to discuss this point in the next section. 14Miller (2016) acknowledges that the acceptance of such connections amounts to the reinstatement of the anti-Humean doctrine of holism. She writes « [S]uppose it turns out that we can distinguish singlet and triplet pairs on the basis of differing relations their members bear to other elemental parts of the universe. We again might think this global interdependence itself indicates some kind of holism [...] regardless of whether entangled wholes bear any non-supervenient intrinsic properties» (p. 512). 13 and do happily accept some cases in which seemingly local states of affairs turn out to be dependent on the global distribution of properties.15 Take for instance the Humean regularity analysis of causation. Considering a single instance of causal interaction, for instance a stone smashing a window, the Humean will insist that this individual causal fact actually supervenes on the totality of similar cases in which a breakage of a fragile object follows a collision with a fast-moving projectile.16 If the supervenience basis for a singular causal fact contains states of affairs external with respect to this fact, why can't the same apply to the case of the state of a physical system? To that we reply that there is a fundamental ontological difference between purported causal facts and physical states of systems. Causality is an inherently modal notion, and as such is the subject of a reductionist analysis by Humean standards. Providing such a reductionist analysis in terms of global regularities does not show that a genuine local state of affairs supervenes on some extrinsic facts. Rather, Humeans would insist that singular causal facts are not local to begin with –they necessarily involve facts regarding external objects and systems. To put it differently, the Humean analysis of causation amounts to an elimination of causal connections between particular events, if we interpret such connections as modal facts intrinsic to appropriate pairs of events. But physical states of systems are supposed to be genuinely non-modal, so prima facie there is no reason why the Humean should reduce them to more fundamental properties and their distributions. A similar response can be provided with respect to other purported counterexamples to the Humean prohibition of necessary connections between distinct entities and their properties. There is an undeniable necessary link between the value associated with a ten-dollar bill in my wallet and the decision of the Federal Reserve to increase the budget deficit by printing more money. Similarly, there a necessary connection linking the death of a husband to the change of the marital status of his wife from being married to being a widow. However, in both examples the properties involved (the purchasing power of a currency, the marital status of a person) are, to put it loosely, "conventional" or "human-dependent". And as such they are unlikely to be part of the most fundamental description of the world (they fail to "carve nature at its joints", using David Lewis' famous characterization of natural properties vis-à-vis non-natural ones; see e.g. Lewis, 1999). In a sense, there is no objective, physical fact of the matter as to whether a person is married, divorced or widowed – all there is here is a certain social 15We owe this objection to Michael Esfeld (private communication). 16Another reductive analysis of that kind concerns individual chances of events which for Humeans are analyzable in terms of frequencies of occurrences of similar events throughout the history of the universe. 14 norm that designates a person as such. And while Humeanism does not logically imply physicalism, it seems that in the context of the discussions on the metaphysics of fundamental scientific theories we should adopt physicalism as a working hypothesis. Thus we believe that whereas Humeans do not have to reject all necessary connections, they are certainly obliged to explain away such connections when they involve legitimate physical properties used in our best scientific theories, regardless of whether they are attributed to simple objects with no parts or complex entities. As we have shown, Bohumians are forced to accept the existence of necessary, nomological connections between the physical state of composite quantum systems and the configuration of the environment. We insist that this constitutes a violation of the general spirit of Humeanism, and we have tried to deal with some arguments purporting to show that Humeans can happily live with this form of necessary connections between distinct entities. At this point, however, we think that the onus is on the Bohumian to provide an explanation of why we are allowed to relax the strictures of traditional Humeanism as conceived by its founder, who definitely didn't have in mind the fundamental Bohmian particles when he scorned the existence of objective necessary links connecting distinct entities. In other words, why is the separability of the objects at the fundamental level enough for a modern Humean? One legitimate way to respond to this challenge could be to insist that only fundamental entities exist in the literal sense of the word, while composite objects are mere constructs used for the purpose of economy and can be eliminated from the ontologically committing contexts.17 This position, akin to mereological nihilism, rejects the existence of necessary connections between complex entities simply by rejecting the existence of the entities in question. We may note that Bhogal and Perry do not subscribe to this view, since they explicitly include in the total state of the world what they call the L-state, i.e. the collection of physical states attributed to spatiotemporal regions that do not supervene on the states of their subregions (Bhogal and Perry, 2017, p. 77). Hence they have to assume the existence of objects (regions) that are neither point-like nor identical with the entire universe. This move can be seen as conflicting with the ontologically reductionist spirit of the Humean framework. However, at this point, it looks like the only way the committed Humean could abandon Strong Supervenience without reneging on the intuition of no necessary connections is by denying the literal existence 17We cannot offer any precise definition of the term "literal existence" (or "fundamental existence") other than that it is meant to refer to the irreducible ontological commitments of our best theories when expressed in a most parsimonious and simplest language possible, stripped of all metaphors and unnecessary vocabulary. 15 of complex physical systems. This strategy will be the subject of the next section. 5 A Possible Way Out So it seems that now the Bohumian is cornered. Either she accepts that Strong Supervenience is vacuously equivalent to Supervenience because there are no physical systems other than individual points (or point-like objects) and the universe, or she altogether abandons Strong Supervenience understood as a principle that is genuinely stronger than Supervenience, thus letting her framework be haunted by a ghost of necessity. At this point, the Bohumian might be tempted to buy into the second horn of the dilemma, and just accept as a bare fact of the matter that some physical systems may display mutual irreducible connections that do not depend on their spatial separations. After all, Hume's tenets are a heritage from a pre-quantum era, so there would be nothing unreasonable in seeking to radically revise the doctrine under the light of modern physics. The Bohumian might further point out that the problem of necessary connections between distant systems plagues also Best System Approaches to classical mechanics (see in particular Huggett, 2006, section 5). In that case, the problem is roughly that the way regularities in a small region A of the mosaic determine inertial frames is so strong that it automatically fixes all the other inertial frames throughout the universe, including a far distant region B. Indeed, the construction makes automatically true the counterfactual "had the regularities been different in A, the inertial frames in B would have been different".18 Going back to the quantum case, the Bohumian can furthermore point out that the existence of such irreducible necessary connections do not affect the way physics is done in the lab. It is in fact clear that for all practical purposes the effective wave function is insensitive to the exact configuration of the environment as long as no measurement-like interaction happens. So Bohumians may be tempted to downplay the ontological significance of the necessary connection between a given system and its environment. However, it is quite obvious why this FAPP approach fails. If we can convince ourselves that the quantum state of a system is practically intrinsic to this system, then Maudlin's original argument against Separability returns in full force! In our opinion, the most promising way out of the impasse is to go for the 18Huggett is very careful to attach the notion of frame to that of a reference body (see Huggett, 2006, page 46, second paragraph), so the talk of frames here is just a shorthand for referring to elements of the mosaic. 16 first horn of the dilemma and show that this choice does not necessarily entail a commitment to any kind of anti-realism with respect to macroscopic objects radical enough to fly in the face of scientific practice (or even common sense, for that matter). Needless to say, this option requires a careful examination and discussion of its weak points, which we cannot afford in the remaining parts of this paper. We hope that our subsequent remarks, preliminary as they may be, will prompt further investigations by philosophers interested in these matters. We first of all notice that quantum physicists themselves acknowledge the fact that entanglement is an "infection" that spreads via decoherence throughout the entire universe. This in particular means that even in standard physical practice the distinction between a quantum system and its environment is just an approximation made for practical purposes and valid on very small spacetime-scales. This is exactly what is conveyed in Bohmian mechanics through the treatment of effective wave functions presented in section 3. Furthermore, the undivided nature of the universe is strongly implied by the universal non-local dynamics of the theory. These are the reasons why Bohmian mechanics does not support any part/whole relation that goes beyond the particle/configuration distinction. So what is the place for electron pairs, or even tables, chairs, and the like in all of this? The key consideration here is that such a categorization of reality is made by us, but may be argued to be unnecessary for Bohmian mechanics in order to be empirically adequate.19 All Bohmian mechanics needs in order to fit into the physical practice is presented in section 3. But, if that is the case, why do we in fact make such a categorization? Because of the role that these objects play in the lab20 (or in our lives). Thus we call a thing "chair" because it has such and such shape and it sustains our weight when we sit on it. Note that it is extremely simple to argue that the previous sentence is nothing but a shorthand description of how a bunch of particles trajectories relate to another bunch of particles trajectories throughout spacetime. Of course, it has to be stressed that what individuates a chair is its functional role, not just its shape, otherwise we could have cases in which a bunch of particles coalesce into ethereal chairs floating around. This is not to say that complex subsystems are mere arbitrary constructs. It is still the particle trajectories that determine which sub-configurations are salient and which are not. However, as already said, this salience boils down to the way particle 19We do not wish to enter the debate on the exact meaning of empirical adequacy and its relation to perception and scientific practice. A proper analysis of these topics would require at least a separate article. 20Here the word "lab" is intended in the broadest sense possible, including, e.g., astrophysical systems. 17 trajectories are related. In this sense, there is no human arbitrariness involved in the definition of a chair, but still a chair is defined by the functional role it plays with respect to humans.21 That being said, it is also possible to go further and argue that our perception of a chair sustaining our weight can be given in terms of correlations between trajectories of "chair" particles and those of our "brain" particles. For those still skeptical that Bohmian mechanics supports such a functionalist-like reduction of subsystems we can point out that the procedure to define an effective wave function literally is a functional definition of a subsystem. Hence we submit that, by going for a functionalist-like account of subsystems, we can defend a minimalist Humean primitive ontology without claiming that such subsystems, including macroscopic objects, are mere illusions or arbitrary constructs.22 From what we have said so far, still it is not clear why Strong Supervenience and Binary Separability seem so compelling principles to our intuitions when, in fact, they cut no metaphysical ice. In other words, even granted that everything can be ontologically reduced in a strong sense to an underlying universal dance of particles, still there is no convincing explanation for the fact that it is totally natural to think (i) that all that can be predicated of a chair is reducible to facts happening in the spacetime region where the "chair" particles' trajectories are located, and (ii) that a coarse-grained version of the mosaic still represents a legitimate Humean supervenience basis. The answer to these doubts lies in the quantum-to-classical transition. Actually, the classical limit of Bohmian mechanics is still largely work-in-progress (see, e.g., Allori et al., 2002), so a full answer is still to come. Very roughly speaking, because of the decoherence mechanism, effective Bohmian states (ψ,q) evolve at large spatiotemporal scales as classical states (p,q), thus washing away the non-local dependencies at a macroscopic level. This gives the appearance of having a situation in which Strong Supervenience holds, that is, where non-fundamental levels have the same ontological "dignity" as the fundamental one. Of course, overlooking this fact, and thus considering coarse-grained classical states in parallel with the fine-grained Bohmian dynamics would muddle the ontological waters enough to create the problems introduced in the previous section. To sum up, the suggested strategy for Bohumians is to question the fundamental ontological reality of complex physical systems other than the entire universe. This move solves all the problems described earlier at one bold stroke. The theses of Separability and Supervenience become trivially equiv21But not only humans, of course: a chair can sustain, say, a pile of books, not just a person! 22This line of reasoning is adopted by Dickson (2000) as a reply to the challenge in Bedard (1999). 18 alent, as now the universe is considered the only complex physical system in existence. Even more importantly, Supervenience and Strong Supervenience collapse into one, since the physical state of the universe is by definition intrinsic to its bearer. The success of this strategy, which may be called Austere Bohumianism, depends primarily on the plausibility of the aforementioned story that purports to explain the appearances of complex structures, including but not limited to the macroscopic objects of our experience. Even if we accept that austere Bohumians can offer a convincing explanation of how such objects emerge from the underlying reality of swarming elemental particles, still one ontological price to be paid is the rejection of the principles of mereology. Humeanism is definitely not a free lunch. 6 Conclusion In this paper we have tried to assess the compatibility of the Humean tenets with Bohmian mechanics. While we side with Miller, Esfeld, Bhogal, and Perry in claiming, pace Maudlin, that quantum mechanics does not put the reductionist core of the Humean doctrine in serious jeopardy, we nonetheless submit that the literature on the subject has so far glossed over a serious consequence that salvaging Humeanism in a Bohmian framework implies. In fact, if we want to repel Maudlin's challenge, we basically need to abandon the intuitive –and scientifically successful– picture of the world as having a standard, well behaved mereological structure ((in the sense of displaying a part-whole structure that meshes with the relation of supervenience, as explained in section 4). The point, then, is to decide how much of the Humean doctrine actually rests upon the assumption of such a structure, that is, how much of the strong supervenience principle is dispensable without perverting the nature of Humean supervenience thesis. And even if Strong Supervenience can be salvaged in its entirety, the question remains what other concessions have to be made in order to preserve the main tenets of Humeanism. In order to forestall possible objections, we would like to stress that we do not insist that there is one, well-defined view that can be properly called "Humeanism". On that issue we side with Earman and Roberts (2005) who wrote: "["Humean Supervenience"] is a name shared by many different theses, differing from one another in subtle ways, though they are all intended to capture the same general view of the world" (p. 2), and then added even more forcefully "Thus, HS [i.e. Humean Supervenience] has acquired a status like the one that doctrines like materialism, dualism, and empiricism often appear to have: there seems to be an idea there, that one can be determi19 nately for or against, even while it remains an open question exactly how the idea should be formulated" (p. 3). As we have explained above, we believe that one legitimate way to formulate the idea of Humean Supervenience is in terms of the principles we call Strong Supervenience or Binary Separability, even though we acknowledge that some philosophers who subscribe to the broad doctrine of Humeanism may be unwilling to accept these principles. By showing that Bohumianism does not respect Strong Supervenience or Binary Separability we do not commit a straw man fallacy against those philosophers, but rather bring to the surface a potentially troubling consequence of their position (the existence of necessary connections between complex physical systems), which in our opinion has been ignored in recent debates. If they are happy with a version of Humeanism that accepts this consequence, we have nothing to say against that, other than that there are other variants of Humeanism on the market.23 The doctrine we call Austere Bohumianism restores the Humean order at the fundamental level of reality. It dispenses altogether with glaringly anti-Humean phenomena such as holism and non-separability that, as we are being told, permeate the quantum world. Yet this victory has its price, as we have already conceded. The complex systems emerging from the underlying dance of particles must be interpreted as ontologically secondary (in comparison to the full-fledged reality of Bohmian particles), lest they become a threat to Humeanism either by exhibiting holistic, irreducible features, or by displaying suspicious necessary connections with their environments.24 It is rather interesting to observe that while the Bohumians gladly accept that for all practical purposes the world behaves as if consisting of isolated and wellindividualized systems equipped with their own quantum states, they are not so keen to admit that for all practical purposes the world at the micro-level but not limited to fundamental particles looks decidedly anti-Humean, as evidenced by the cases of singletand triplet-spin states of composite systems of particles. This "illusion of anti-Humeanism" evaporates when we move to the fundamental level of reality, but so does the familiar picture of chairs, trees, and many-particle systems of textbook quantum mechanics. It seems 23Incidentally, it is worth pointing out that Earman and Roberts themselves argue for a variant of Humeanism that seems to be very close to our interpretation based on Binary Separability. They namely interpret the Humean base to which all the facts should be reducible as consisting of non-nomic facts that can be outcomes of spatiotemporally finite observation or measurement procedures (p. 17), and they add that their formulation does not make reference to point-like entities (p. 20 ft. 29). So it seems that on their approach states of composite physical systems can be included in the Humean base. 24It is interesting to note that this provides the proponents of mereological nihilism with a new argument based on the foundations of physics, aside from the usual arguments from metaphysics. 20 that Humeans may be ultimately tempted to go all the way and insist, as Democritus would put it, that nothing exists except atoms and empty space; everything else is opinion. Acknowledgements Tomasz Bigaj acknowledges financial support of grant No. 2017/25/B/HS1/00620 from the National Science Centre, Poland. Antonio Vassallo worked on the first draft of this paper while being at the University of Barcelona as a Juan de la Cierva Fellow. Hence, he gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, fellowship IJCI-2015-23321. The rest of his work on the paper has been carried out at the Warsaw University of Technology with financial support from the Polish National Science Centre, grant No. 2019/33/B/HS1/01772. References Albert, D. (1996). Elementary quantum metaphysics. In J. Cushing, A. Fine, and S. Goldstein (Eds.), Bohmian mechanics and quantum theory: An appraisal, pp. 277–284. Kluwer. Allori, V., D. Dürr, S. Goldstein, and N. Zanghì (2002). Seven steps towards the classical world. Journal of Optics B 4 (4), S482. Allori, V., S. Goldstein, R. Tumulka, and N. Zanghì (2008). On the common structure of Bohmian mechanics and the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59, 353–389. http://arxiv. org/abs/quant-ph/0603027. Bedard, K. (1999). Material objects in Bohm's interpretation. Philosophy of Science 66, 221–242. Bhogal, H. and Z. Perry (2017). What the Humean should say about entanglement. Noûs 51 (1), 74–94. Callender, C. (2015). One world, one beable. 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Chapter 7 ILLegIBLe SALvATIon: THe AuTHoRIT y oF L AnguAge In ThE C onCEPT oF AnxiET y Sarah Horton Language is dangerous, as vigilius Haufniensis, the pseudonymous author of The Concept of Anxiety, is well aware. Language makes possible the self-forgetfulness of objective chatter by dividing the self from itself, and even our ability to distinguish good and evil fails when signs vanish into illegibility. positioning himself as a detached observer, Haufniensis views with suspicion that which thus escapes observation. But although his warnings about the dangers of language are true, I argue that this very illegibility is the condition of possibility for salvation. Language may kill the self by permitting chatter, yet salvation (one might even say resurrection) is possible only because language opens the self to alterity and leads us to the atonement that no observations and definitions can access. Haufniensis, the watchman of Copenhagen, thus sets up a guard against the possibility of salvation by resisting the authority of language. By writing of language indirectly, via a pseudonymous author who distrusts it, Kierkegaard forces us to confront this illegibility that a more direct writing style might have obscured by its very clarity. Directness would risk giving the impression that this text, this author, had mastered language, but here pseudonymity calls the author's authority into question from the start, which prepares us to realize that the play of language always escapes the bounds that anyone could authorize. Awareness of language's dangers never permits us to control it, and as we discover by considering what Haufniensis does and does not say about language and sin's origin (which prove to be intertwined questions), such grasping for control is precisely sin. The inaccessible origins of sin and Language Haufniensis's observations concerning the origin of sin immediately raise a problem that he never adequately addresses: the origin is precisely that which cannot be observed. He acknowledges that if we are to explain sin by its origin, that origin cannot be located outside history: "no matter how the problem is raised, as 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 121 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authorship and Authority in Kierkegaard's Writings122 soon as Adam is placed fantastically on the outside, everything is confused."1 Thus, on the one hand, Adam cannot be located radically outside the human race, or else any explanation of his sin fails to explain anyone else's. yet a dilemma emerges straightaway for, on the other hand, Adam cannot be treated as just another human being within history, such that any of us could have chosen (as Adam could have done) to refrain from sin, or else we deny hereditary sin, thereby succumbing to the pelagian heresy, which claims that man could potentially be good without god's aid. Summing up the dilemma, Haufniensis explains that "man is individuum and as such simultaneously himself and the whole race, and in such a way that the whole race participates in the individual and the individual in the whole race. If this is not held fast, one will fall either into the pelagian, Socinian, and philanthropic singular or into the fantastic."2 In short, any orthodox analysis of sin must maintain both that each individual is responsible for his or her own sin and that each individual is, because of Adam, born into a sinful race. And because Adam is neither radically outside the human race nor within the human race in the manner of subsequent individuals, the origin of sin cannot be located on either side of the dichotomy between without and within, exterior and interior. More exactly, the origin cannot be located: it haunts history but slips away as soon as one claims to have found it. Rather than directly considering this haunting absence of the origin, however, Haufniensis reiterates that although sin enters history with Adam and each individual is therefore born into a sin-tainted history, the individual is still responsible for his or her own sinfulness and cannot blame it on Adam. Thus, "the history of the race proceeds quietly on its course, and in this no individual begins at the same place as another, but every individual begins anew."3 Adam alone came into an innocent world, yet each individual's sin originates in that individual-a statement that simply displaces the problem of sin's origin by focusing on its origin in each individual. And even as Haufniensis continues to seek the origin, he undermines his investigation by insisting that "the transition that is to be made from innocence to guilt" be understood as a "qualitative leap,"4 thereby locating an innocent original state radically and inaccessibly outside of history. Indeed, as the starting point of the leap is unobservable and nonlocalizable, the claim that there is a leap at all is impossible to confirm. As Sylviane Agacinski points out, "It is the leap that posits sinfulness and not the other way around: sinfulness already presupposes the leap-but the understanding will have none of that. For philosophy (in other words, the faculties of the intellect, the understanding, and reason), the leap is a blank. And philosophy has always worked hard at filling it in."5 Filling in this blank is, however, precisely what philosophy is unable to do. 1. CA, 28 / SKS 4, 332. 2. CA, 28 / SKS 4, 335. 3. CA, 34–35 / SKS 4, 314. 4. CA, 43 / SKS 4, 349. 5. Sylviane Agacinski, Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of søren Kierkegaard, trans. Kevin newmark (Tallahassee: Florida State university press, 1988), p. 97 (Aparté: Conceptions et morts de sören Kierkegaard [paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1977], pp. 77–78). 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 122 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authority of Language in The Concept of Anxiety 123 Able to observe only the endpoint-sinfulness-Haufniensis can never determine that it is in fact the endpoint of a leap. Thus, the observer turns away from the reality of sin to pursue an unobservable state of innocence-which, paradoxically, allows him to remain only an observer by giving him an excuse to not grapple concretely with sin. To truly face one's own sin, one must willingly remain haunted by that blank-that is, one must give up one's need to control the narrative by explaining everything.6 Disinterestedly explaining sin is an attempt to explain it away by pretending that it has no relevance to life. Interestingly, Haufniensis implicitly warns against this detached manner of proceeding: "every man loses innocence in essentially the same way that Adam lost it. It is not in the interest of ethics to make all men except Adam into concerned and interested spectators of guiltiness but who are not guilty, nor is it in the interest of dogmatics to make all men into interested and sympathetic spectators of the Atonement [Forsoning] but who are not atoned for."7 Asking how sin originated with Adam amounts to refusing to acknowledge one's own guilt, as though sin were something foreign that one could consider only from the outside, and refusing to admit guilt is refusing the atonement. yet Haufniensis remains a psychological observer, not an ethicist or a dogmatist, and he insists on a strict demarcation between these sciences.8 Thus, even as he considers how sin originates in each individual, and not only in Adam, he still examines the problem from the outside. Readers must keep in mind that his analyses will therefore remain disconnected from the lived experiences of sin and atonement-a point that will become crucial as we examine his approach to language. Indeed, the investigation into sin's origin demands an inquiry into language, for the command not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was spoken. That prohibition puzzles Haufniensis, for an innocent Adam could not have understood it and therefore, on hearing it, experienced no guilt but rather anxiety in the face of "freedom's possibility."9 According to this account, language 6. This point recalls paul Ricoeur's conclusions that "we never have the right to speculate about original sin ... as if it had a proper consistency ... We never have the right to speculate on the evil already there, outside the evil that we do ... We never have the right to speculate on either the evil that we inaugurate, or on the evil that we find, without reference to the history of salvation." Ricoeur, "'original Sin': A Study in Meaning," trans. peter McCormick, in The Conflict of interpretations: Essays in hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde (evanston, IL: northwestern university press, 1974), p. 286 ("Le 'péché originel': étude de signification," in Le Conflit des interprétations: Essais d'herméneutique [paris: Seuil, 1969], p. 282). The detached examination of sin, as though it were irrelevant to our lives and certainly not something from which we need to be saved, is itself sin. 7. CA, 36 / SKS 4, 342. Translation modified. 8. See the Introduction (CA, 9–24 / SKS 4, 317–331) in which Haufniensis carefully distinguishes psychology, dogmatics, and ethics. 9. CA, 44 / SKS 3, 350. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 123 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authorship and Authority in Kierkegaard's Writings124 precedes even sin: thus, it is not only the origin of language but language itself that escapes the confines of history and cannot be assigned a location. And if the origin of sin is unobservable, how much more the origin of language! Haufniensis in fact leaves that latter origin a mystery and refuses even to attribute the prohibition to god, asserting rather that "the imperfection in the narrative-how could it have occurred to anyone to say to Adam what he essentially could not understand- is eliminated if we bear in mind that the speaker is language, and also that it is Adam himself who speaks."10 Haufniensis thus isolates Adam, leaving him alone with language-and he does not ask in what sense one who is alone with language is truly alone. It is true that he briefly acknowledges in a footnote that language interrupts man's ipseity: If one were to say further that it then becomes a question of how the first man learned how to speak, I would answer that this is very true, but also that the question lies beyond the scope of the present investigation. However, this must not be misunderstood, as though, through evasive replies in the manner of modern philosophy, I wanted to give the impression that I could answer the question in another place. But this much is certain, that it will not do to represent man himself as the inventor of language.11 He does not, however, pursue the matter further. That man did not invent language entails that by speaking man enters into relation with an other, even if that other is simply language itself, but Haufniensis, the observer, refuses to be the observed and so does not take this opportunity to consider alterity. In particular, there is no room in his version of the edenic narrative for god, the divine other. one might argue that the absence of god from Haufniensis's version of the story is an attempt to defend god by making it impossible for him to bear the slightest responsibility for Adam's sin. Haufniensis does imply that this is his motivation when he explains why the serpent is such an enigma: god does not tempt anyone, yet attributing the temptation to the serpent also fails, "For the serpent's assault on man is also an indirect temptation of god, since it interferes in the relation between god and man, and one is confronted by the third statement [in James 1:13–14], that man is tempted by himself."12 If temptation comes from the self, then one who sins turns inward on himself, rejecting any relation to alterity. When one considers sin in this light, Haufniensis's choice to write god out of the narrative appears not as a righteous attempt to justify god but as a suspicious refusal to acknowledge alterity. on the one hand, god is absent from this account of the Fall precisely because sin is a turning away from god. on the other hand, however, Haufniensis's attempt to locate sin's origin serves as a distraction from the lived reality of sin and so reenacts that turning away from god. god's absence from Haufniensis's version of the story can thus be read on two levels: first as 10. CA, 47 / SKS 4, 353. 11. Ibid. Translation modified. 12. CA, 48 / SKS 4, 353. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 124 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authority of Language in The Concept of Anxiety 125 a natural reflection of sinful man's self-absorption and second as an indication of Haufniensis's own reluctance to acknowledge any other who might observe him or call him out of his detached observation. Although writing god out of the narrative may be a reasonable decision when considered from the standpoint of an observer commenting disinterestedly on sin, that very standpoint is itself problematic. Chatter: The Dangers of Language Haufniensis's unwillingness to be observed by any other accords with his suspicion of language, for, as indicated above, language is an other that disrupts the self. Here, we must attend to a crucial nuance: it is not that his claims about the dangers of language are wrong per se but rather that they are selectively chosen truths.13 Warning that people must not forget their responsibility for sin by falling into a detached objectivity, he states, How sin came into the world, each man learns solely by himself. .... That the man of science ought to forget himself is entirely true; nevertheless, it is therefore also very fortunate that sin is no scientific problem, and thus no man of science has an obligation (and the project maker just as little) to forget how sin came into the world. If this is what he wants to do, if he magnanimously wants to forget himself, then he will become, in his zeal to explain all of humanity, as comical as that privy councilor who was so conscientious about leaving his calling card with every Tom, Dick, and Harry that in doing so he at last forgot his own name. or his philosophical enthusiasm will make him so self-forgetful that he needs a good-natured, level-headed wife whom he can ask, as Soldin asked Rebecca when in enthusiastic self-forgetfulness he also lost himself in the objectivity of the chatter, "Rebecca, is it I who is speaking?"14 Thus, we see that language can certainly be dangerous, for it might degenerate into objective chatter, a universalizing attempt to explain everyone in which the individual is lost. one who produces universal explanations will end by forgetting herself so entirely that she is no longer even aware of herself as a speaker. This is a legitimate warning, odd as it may be to find it coming from the pen of one who, for all his insistence on the individual, remains a detached observer. Furthermore, the fact that this warning follows closely on the analysis of the prohibition may further incline readers to view language with suspicion: thus far in the text, we have seen that language conditions anxiety and now that it can lead to a dangerous 13. He does later comment more favorably on language and does not simply view it as bad. As I will argue in section four ("The Illegible Sign"), however, even those more favorable passages still reveal an unwillingness to acknowledge alterity. 14. CA, 51 / SKS 4, 356. Translation modified. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 125 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authorship and Authority in Kierkegaard's Writings126 self-forgetfulness. It is thence easy enough to conclude that language primarily leads us astray. Indeed, commenters have tended to follow Haufniensis in his suspicion of language. Hugh S. pyper argues, for instance, that "language introduces the possibility of error and therefore of doubt .... Language is inextricably implicated in the genesis of doubt, and therefore of anxiety."15 Moreover, he proposes that "the serpent is the problem of language and its interpretation, the creative potential of counterfactuality, which opens the way to deception and the dizziness of possibility."16 And peter Fenves maintains that "the 'problem' of 'original sin' comes down to this: 'chatter,' which is original language, outgrows its origin and corrodes the very language that is determined to bring it to a halt."17 yet must we hold language responsible for the possibility of error, and must we accept that chatter is "original language" and ultimately contaminates all language? Let us take the latter question first: it errs by presupposing the quest for the origin that, as I have argued, cannot succeed. If we accept that we cannot find the origin-cannot fill in the blank, to borrow Agacinski's words-and must rather grapple with sin as part of our lived experience, then we can no longer seek an external explanation for error, doubt, deception, and chatter. We ourselves bear the responsibility for them all. But are we not thereby letting language off too easily? error, doubt, deception, and chatter are real dangers, and although the self may well be responsible for these failings, it is true that they are possible only because language enables the self to distance itself from itself. one who was perfectly self-identical could never forget herself in chatter, or distance herself from her beliefs to state, deceptively, what she did not accept as true, or waver, divided and doubtful, between two positions, or erroneously call one thing by another's name. If, however, language did not exist, the individual would be unrecognizable. As Steven Shakespeare notes, according to Haufniensis's account, "in the disruptive power of language is the inauguration of the fall. Language cancels our immediate innocence. However, language does not come upon humanity from the outside; it is intrinsic to its very structure."18 We simply cannot conceive of a nonlinguistic humanity. Language enables the self to enter into relation with the other and also grounds the self 's own existence. Moreover, Shakespeare adds that "the text contains no such one-sided equation of language with good or evil. Language is the presupposition of sin, not sin itself."19 As I will argue, if we read the text attentively, we see that language is also the presupposition of atonement. The self that is interrupted by and conditioned by 15. Hugh S. pyper, "Adam's Angest: The Language of Myth and the Myth of Language," Kierkegaard studies yearbook (2001), p. 93. 16. Ibid., p. 95. 17. peter Fenves, "Chatter": Language and history in Kierkegaard (Stanford: Stanford university press, 1993), p. 84. 18. Steven Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, Language, and the Reality of God (Burlington: Ashgate, 2001), p. 72. 19. Ibid., p. 73. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 126 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authority of Language in The Concept of Anxiety 127 language may seek to become entirely absorbed in itself in a rejection of alterity (and this Haufniensis will call inclosing reserve)-but language can also lead the self to embrace the relation to the other that constitutes it. Thus, it will turn out that language is certainly dangerous, but the very danger that interrupts and destabilizes the self also saves. In short, Fenves is right to warn against chatter, and pyper is right to say that language makes error and doubt possible, but what they neglect to consider is that language also makes salvation possible. Deriving the self Before we can properly consider how language makes salvation possible, however, it is necessary to return to the impossibility of locating sin's origin in order to examine in more detail the constitution of the self. Again, Haufniensis insists that the sin of each individual originates with that individual: "To want to deny that every subsequent individual has and must be assumed to have had a state of innocence analogous to that of Adam would be shocking to everyone and would also annul all thought, because then there would be an individual who is not an individual and who relates himself merely as a specimen [Exemplar] to his species."20 The puzzle of the origin of sin in each subsequent individual is, however, no easier to solve than that of its origin in Adam, for innocence has no place in history. Haufniensis himself implicitly acknowledges that it is impossible to speak of the origin: While the history of spirit (and it is precisely the secret of spirit that it always has a history) ventures to stamp itself upon the countenance of the man in such a way that everything is forgotten if only the imprint is distinct and noble, the woman on the other hand will make her effect as a totality in another way .... The expression must be that of a totality that has no history. Therefore silence is not only a woman's greatest wisdom but also her highest beauty.21 note the connection between silence and that which cannot be located within a history. one cannot speak of that which has no history-but spirit always does have a history. And that spirit always has a history is its secret, both because spirit wishes to conceal this fact-for spirit longs for an originary time of innocence when it had no history-and also because the absence of an origin must be secret, must be hidden, for an absence cannot be located anywhere. The nowhere of the origin haunts spirit everywhere, for spirit constantly bears within itself the blank space that no attempt to find the origin can fill. Spirit, the uniting of "the psychical and the physical,"22 is a synthesis with no origin, no moment of innocent prelapsarian self-identity located somewhere outside history. It has always been 20. CA, 60–61 / SKS 4, 365. 21. CA, 66 / SKS 4, 370. Translation modified. 22. CA, 43 / SKS 4, 349. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 127 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authorship and Authority in Kierkegaard's Writings128 constituted precisely by this blank, this absence of any origin, that renders it other than itself.23 Although Haufniensis associates womanly beauty with the absence of history, he also states that "in a sense, [woman] signifies that which is derived,"24 as she was created after Adam. If the origin is always absent, however, then every individual is derived, and Haufniensis acknowledges that "the difference in pleno [common] to all subsequent individuals is derivation."25 Moreover, as he has already observed, "in order to posit the synthesis [spirit] must first pervade it differentiatingly, and the ultimate point of the sensuous is precisely the sexual."26 The pre-eve Adam thus appears as another nonlocalizable origin, for he is truly a self only once eve exists, only once her difference from him constitutes him as well. As Kevin newmark aptly notes, "Adam must now be understood as himself and his other, as becoming a self only by passing through his own sexual difference in his relation to eve."27 Thus, although Haufniensis, still in pursuit of the origin, implies that only subsequent individuals are derived (and has less to say about eve than about Adam), it turns out that Adam too is derived and that he, like all subsequent individuals, can exist as a self only via difference. eve does come from Adam, yet he comes from her as well: she "signifies that which is derived" not because she came second but because her creation (her derivation from him) was just as much his creation (his derivation from her). To be a self is precisely not to be absolutely self-identical. And because Adam (like everyone else) becomes a self only through derivation, he never experienced the ahistoric origin that spirit desires yet can never reach. "[D] eny[ing] that every subsequent individual has and must be assumed to have had a state of innocence analogous to that of Adam" may well be "shocking to everyone,"28 but we are here led to a conclusion that is more shocking still: we cannot speak of any state of innocence, neither in the case of subsequent individuals nor in the case of Adam. Innocence is, and always has been, a haunting absence.29 Moreover, the 23. See also Kevin newmark's remark that "in Kierkegaard, the hidden event that lies in this way beyond the mastery of any subject, the shadowy secret to which the subject constantly bears witness in its faith, is the rapport between the self and its absolutely other, that is to say, the wound of death conditioning the self in its relation to everything else." newmark, irony on occasion: From schlegel and Kierkegaard to Derrida and de Man (new york: Fordham university press, 2012), pp. 84–85. At stake in The Concept of Anxiety is how language constitutes the self in its relation to the other (or as other than itself) and how the self responds to being thus opened and divided by language. 24. CA, 63 / SKS 4, 368. 25. Ibid. 26. CA, 49 / SKS 4, 354. 27. newmark, irony on occasion, p. 80. 28. CA, 60–61 / SKS 4, 365. 29. See also Agacinski's remark that "in this sense, innocence is merely dead and absent ... The fall is neither a passage, nor a beginning, nor an end; it does not designate a limit where innocence would stop and culpability would begin. Rather, it would be a gap or an opening [ouverture] ... The fall is the name for the possibility of differences." Agacinski, 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 128 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authority of Language in The Concept of Anxiety 129 sexual difference between man and woman appears as a visible reminder that the individual is truly a self only through his or her difference from another, and the impossibility of absolute self-coincidence is thereby inscribed in our very bodies. The attempt to locate the origin can now appear in its true light: it is an attempt to control one's own identity by filling in this blank, this absence, that constitutes the self by rendering it different from itself. In other words, it is an attempt to erase that difference by tracing the self back to a pure, undifferentiated origin. Furthermore, because it is language that relates the self to its other and constitutes the self as other than itself (as discussed in the preceding sections), this desire to control one's own identity amounts to a desire to control language, to neutralize its differentiating power. yet as absolute self-identity, independent of language, is impossible to attain, turning away from language destroys the self rather than constituting it as self-identical. Speaking of the genius, who "knows that he is stronger than the whole world,"30 Haufniensis draws a telling analogy: The significance of the genius to himself is nil, or as dubiously melancholy as the sympathy with which the inhabitants of the Faroe Islands would rejoice if on this island there lived a native Faroese who astounded all of europe by his writings in various european languages and transformed the sciences by his immortal contributions, but at the same time never wrote a single line in Faroese, and then at last forgot how to speak it. In the deepest sense, the genius does not become significant to himself.31 The genius who is so confident in his own strength ends up losing himself-and it is thereby as if he lost his native language, the language into which he was born and which, having renounced it, he forgot entirely. The analogy is limited insofar as Haufniensis does not suppose that this person abandoned all language, only his native Faroese, but it still stands as a sobering reminder of the intertwining of language and the self. The illegible sign We now can finally consider how language makes salvation possible. Shortly before introducing the crucial notion of inclosing reserve, Haufniensis remarks in a footnote that "the good cannot be defined at all. The good is freedom."32 A few 30. CA, 100 / SKS 4, 402. 31. CA, 101 / SKS 4, 404. Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of søren Kierkegaard, p. 99 (Aparté: Conceptions et morts de sören Kierkegaard, pp. 79–80). Translation modified. It does not follow that difference is sin. on the contrary, as will become clear in the following section, sin involves the rejection of difference, and the attempt to identify a pre-Fall originary state of innocence, inasmuch as it is the rejection of difference, is sin. 32. CA, 111 / SKS 4, 413. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 129 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authorship and Authority in Kierkegaard's Writings130 pages later, he adds that "the good, of course, signifies the restoration of freedom, redemption, salvation, or whatever one would call it."33 The good is beyond definition: when it comes to the good, language slips away from our grasp and cannot be fixed in place with definitions that we would seek to impose. Thus, we are able only to gesture toward the good with words such as "the restoration of freedom, redemption, salvation" and can never turn it into an object that is simply present to us. As the self can never fully comprehend the good, the good always remains other, irreducible to interiority. given that the disruption of the self is associated with the Fall, one may be tempted to conclude that such disruption is simply bad and that the absolute self-identity associated with the supposed preFall state of innocence would be good, but it now becomes apparent that the good is a disruptive force. Absolute self-identity would be not good but rather inhuman, and as we can finally come to see, sin is the refusal of alterity, the attempt to force language to serve one's misguided desire for such self-identity. It is language that opens us to alterity, and for this reason, the demonic cannot endure it. Turning now to inclosing reserve, Haufniensis explains that the demonic is inclosing reserve [det indesluttede] and the unfreely disclosed [Aabenbare]. The two definitions indicate, as intended, the same thing, because inclosing reserve is precisely the mute, and when it is to express itself, this must take place contrary to its will, since freedom, which lies in the ground of unfreedom, by entering into communication [Communication] with freedom from without, revolts and now betrays unfreedom in such a way that it is the individual who in anxiety betrays himself against his will.34 The demonic cannot speak-or, more exactly, the demonic does not speak willingly. Haufniensis notes that the involuntary disclosure need not be in words,35 but language is still operative in such a wordless disclosure, for (as argued above) it is language that renders the individual other than himself, preventing him from closing in on himself in absolute self-identity, and that thereby compels disclosure or, in other words, an opening (however unwilling) to alterity. Involuntary disclosure, precisely because it is involuntary and indeed contrary to the will of the demonic individual, indicates that the demonic individual is still divided, and it is therefore the mark of the failure to attain absolute self-identity. one cannot escape language-cannot truly become inclosed on oneself such that alterity is kept out- but insofar as it is possible to exist in opposition to language, the demonic does so. Haufniensis adds that "freedom is always communicerende [communicating] (it does no harm to take into consideration the religious significance of the word); unfreedom becomes more and more inclosed [indesluttet] and does not want communication."36 note that communicerende means not only "communicating" 33. CA, 119 / SKS 4, 421. 34. CA, 123 / SKS 4, 425. Translation modified. 35. CA, 129 / SKS 4, 430. 36. Ibid. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 130 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authority of Language in The Concept of Anxiety 131 but also "taking communion." By rejecting language, the demonic also refuses any form of community with the other, including god, the divine other. By thus connecting language and the religious, Haufniensis here portrays language comparatively positively-but his positive observations are restrained, for they are precisely and only observations. He asserts that "inclosing reserve is precisely muteness. Language, the word, is precisely what saves, what saves from the empty abstraction of inclosing reserve."37 Indeed, this is so, for language and freedom cannot be separated. Furthermore, as Haufniensis also acknowledges, the loss of communication is also the loss of the self: "Communication is in turn the expression for continuity .... It might be thought that inclosing reserve would have an extraordinary continuity; yet the very opposite is the case, although when compared with the vapid, enervating falling away from oneself continually absorbed in the impression, it has an appearance of continuity."38 The attempt to become inclosed on oneself can only destroy the self, as the self 's ground is that very blank that opens it to alterity. Again, the self must be other than itself in order to be truly a self. Thus, although the demonic individual may appear continuous, he is actually disintegrating utterly. only the embrace of language as that which constitutes the self can prevent this destruction. The problem here is that Haufniensis remains a psychological observer who is concerned with the origin of the demonic. near the beginning of his analysis of the demonic, he explains that "in relation to innocence [the demonic] is an actuality posited by the qualitative leap."39 Discussing the demonic in such terms again conceals the fact that there has never been an originary state of innocence. He states that in the demonic "freedom is lost,"40 which covers over the extent of the problem by suggesting that freedom at some point was not yet lost. even his remark that "language, the word, is what saves" is phrased in a strikingly detached manner (a point the translation unfortunately obscures by inserting the words "the individual"): whom, exactly, does language save? Who needs to be saved? Certainly, Haufniensis has willingly accused all individuals of sin,41 yet here, precisely at this moment when he asserts that language saves, he does so in as abstract a manner as possible without referring to anyone or everyone. Is this a mere oversight that we might reasonably overlook on the grounds that he does at least recognize that no one remains innocent? one could suppose so-and yet, coming from a figure who positions himself as an observer and who has previously expressed suspicion of language, the abstractness of this remark makes it appear as another attempt to distance himself from the lived reality of the demonic. Furthermore, given that the search for an origin is precisely a turn away from alterity and toward the self, 37. CA, 124 / SKS 4, 425–426. Translation modified. 38. CA, 130 / SKS 4, 431. Translation modified. 39. CA, 123 / SKS 4, 424. 40. Ibid. 41. Recall his statement: "Every man loses innocence in essentially the same way that Adam lost it." (CA, 36 / SKS 4, 342.) emphasis added. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 131 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authorship and Authority in Kierkegaard's Writings132 it is not surprising that he hesitates, even momentarily, when considering the individual's need for salvation. This momentary hesitation is unsurprising for another reason as well: language is dangerous, to the point where one might struggle to see how it could save the individual. Recall also that the good lies beyond definition: how then does language relate us to the good? This question becomes even more pressing when Haufniensis marks both inclosing reserve and the good with an x. Although at first he marks only the demonic with the x, stating, "Let x signify the demonic, the relation of freedom to it something outside x,"42 he then tears down that distinction: "Let the inclosing reserve be x and its content x, denoting the most terrible, the most insignificant, the horrible, whose presence in life few probably even dream about, but also the trifles to which no one pays attention; what then does the good signify as x? It signifies disclosure."43 Disclosure, or the good (and so, by implication, freedom), is thus represented with the same symbol that represents inclosing reserve, raising the terrifying possibility that no distinguishing mark allows us to tell the difference between them. If the x may be the mark of the demonic or of salvation, what even is the difference between them? The x becomes a horrifyingly illegible sign, communicating nothing, for behind it the demonic and the salvific blend together beyond all possibility of distinction. As Fenves comments, "no longer is there even the pretense that something-the good ....-stands outside the x. nothing can stand outside so long as x stands for everything, and the x is, once again, this sheer coming outside itself: .... disclosure 'itself,' .... communication no longer capable of communicating anything, communication as ex-communication."44 on this reading, there is no escape from ex-communication, from the x that undoes any possibility of salvation. Communication becomes utterly impossible. Fenves thus concludes his analysis of The Concept of Anxiety with the warning that "the drift of the x empties every communication" and that "our age" is "an age in which communication again and again crosses itself out."45 The individual thus cannot look to language for salvation; language simply is this empty, drifting x (insofar as we can even write "is" of the x). Searching for signs, we find only the x blocking our path. one can, however, read the x in another way, a way that does not cut off the possibility of salvation: namely, the x is the demonic attempt to flee illegibility, and illegibility is necessary for salvation. Haufniensis can say nothing satisfactory about salvation precisely because it emerges beyond the limits of definition, and so no distinguishing sign can mark it for us. Recall that embracing communication and thereby giving up the pursuit of self-identity is giving up the quest for an originary innocence. And giving up the quest for innocence is abandoning any attempt to exculpate ourselves (to however slight a degree) by insisting that we 42. CA, 124 / SKS 4, 426. 43. CA, 126–127 / SKS 4, 427–428. Translation modified. 44. Fenves, "Chatter," p. 111. 45. Ibid., p. 112. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 132 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authority of Language in The Concept of Anxiety 133 were good once. In short, embracing communication requires that we give up the desperate fear of being always already caught in sin. It is precisely the demonic that sees a threat in the illegible sign, for if we lose the power to draw distinctions, if guilt and goodness blur together such that we cannot tell them apart, then we have no way to defend ourselves against the charge that we were never innocent. Remember also that the demonic attempts to control language. Here the demonic responds to the inevitable failure of that attempt by concealing with an x that which escapes definition, as if it were a temporarily unknown quantity that could yet be discovered and not an ineradicable illegibility that no algebraic manipulations can ever solve for.46 It is the demonic that seeks to conceal behind the x the failure of distinctions, of definitions that fix differences firmly in their respective places. It is not that the x is itself an illegible sign; rather, by means of this legible letter, the demonic seeks to cover over the illegibility that it cannot endure. With the x, we sign our own writs of excommunication. To be saved by language, one must abandon the attempt to control it, to resist its authority, to fight its ultimate illegibility by imposing definitions and distinctions on that which we do not have the power to read. This argument should not be mistaken for a false reassurance that salvation is easy or cheap. on the contrary, it indicates that salvation is beyond our power. even our capacity to distinguish good and evil, which one might have thought essential to salvation, turns out to be a trap, precisely because we lack that capacity and therefore cannot put our trust in it. nor should we suppose that salvation will grant us the ability to find some realm of pure distinctions and fixed definitions. on the contrary, "Whoever lives in daily and festive communion [omgang] with the thought [Forestilling] that there is a god could hardly wish to spoil this for himself, or see it spoiled, by himself piecing together a definition of what god is."47 note that even here Haufniensis continues to speak abstractly: he refers not to one who lives in communion with god but to one who lives in communion with the thought that there is a god. unwilling to consider the actuality of an undefinable god, he stops at the thought that such a god exists. one who willingly lets language open him to alterity must face god's actuality, and furthermore she must face it without the aid of definitions that would allow her to abstractly mark out what god is and so reassure her that she really is dealing with god. Thus, error and sin remain, terrifyingly, possibilities, for one might be mistaken about 46. Haufniensis uses the analogy of algebra three times: in a footnote to the beginning of his discussion of anxiety about evil, he notes that he "can indicate the particular state only very briefly, almost algebraically" (CA, 113 / SKS 4, 415); in his analysis of inclosing reserve and disclosure, shortly after introducing the x, he asks, "How could I finish even a merely algebraic naming ...?" (CA, 128 / SKS 4, 429); and in his analysis of the somatic-psychic loss of freedom, he states that it is "so difficult to talk about these things in abstracto, since speech itself becomes algebraic" (CA, 137 / SKS 4, 437). Although these remarks hint at the limitations of the algebraic, the analogy may lead one to suppose that x could be solved for. 47. CA, 147 / SKS 4, 447. Translation modified. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 133 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authorship and Authority in Kierkegaard's Writings134 who god is-but refusing god through fear of error and sin is itself error and sin. Haufniensis, the psychological observer, falls into this latter error: he cannot endure this unobservable, undefinable god. no sooner does he state that "the true autodidact is precisely in the same degree a theodidact .... Therefore he who in relation to guilt is educated by anxiety will rest only in the Atonement"48 than he must conclude, for psychological observation can go no farther. Indeed, the observer still cannot resist implying that one can be both an autodidact and a theodidact, although his text has revealed that one cannot teach oneself salvation. Language opens the self to alterity, and salvation comes thereby.49 Where Does Language Lead? As noted above, commenters have tended to accept Haufniensis's suspicion of language, and at this point, it is instructive to consider a particularly noteworthy example. george pattison does not consider language as potentially salvific and argues that it is dangerous because it bears within itself the threat of meaninglessness: That there is that which precedes and constrains the free play of language if language is to "work" as a medium of communication, that not everything can be named at will, is not simply a requirement registered, as it were, by the external world, as if language's first obligation was to be true to external appearance: rather, it is a requirement that Spirit, qua Spirit and therefore freely, places upon itself. It is the task not so much of imposing or constraining meaning but of continually claiming, reclaiming, retrieving, and recollecting meaning; the work of truth/aletheia as the endless deliverance of meaning from the tide of forgetfulness and dissipation, and of poiesis as the "making" and free rendering of the truth thus delivered. Here, then, is where we encounter the prohibition: the requirement of the limit, that Spirit, precisely as the agent of language must place upon itself. But also the penalty: for the breach of that limit is, by definition, the giving of Spirit 49. one might ask how inwardness fits with this insistence on alterity. Inwardness and abstraction are incompatible: "The individuality who wants to make himself into an abstraction precisely lacks inwardness" (CA, 141 / SKS 4, 442). Inwardness thus resists the abstractions of inclosing reserve; it is precisely not an attempt to achieve absolute selfidentity. Seeking to lose oneself in pure exteriority is just as much a rejection of the divided self as is inclosing reserve: the former seeks unity outside subjectivity, the latter inside. As any flight into abstraction amounts to a rejection of the ultimate illegibility of language, inwardness may be understood as the self 's willing acceptance of its essential relation to language and so to alterity, although Haufniensis certainly does not consider it in those terms. 48. CA, 162 / SKS 4, 460–461. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 134 07-06-2018 22:12:22 Authority of Language in The Concept of Anxiety 135 itself over to meaninglessness, its surrender to a power that leads it where it will not go and, thus, its ceasing to be Spirit, its death.50 Spirit, on pattison's view, falls by giving in to "the free play of language," to meaninglessness. His warning against meaninglessness is all very well so far as it goes, but it tells only half the story. Indeed, communication would be impossible if we simply denied the need for words to have any commonly agreed-upon meanings. But what does it mean to refer to spirit as "the agent of language"? Is spirit the agent who acts on language or the agent who acts in language's service and so is acted on by it? pattison seems to imply that spirit should act on language, lest it be led to meaninglessness and death. What if, however, "its surrender to a power that leads it where it will not go"-or, at least, where it cannot, of itself, will to go-were precisely what is necessary for its life? Fearing being led to meaninglessness is itself a grave danger, for that fear leads one to impose abstract definitions on everything and so to resist that alterity, which cannot be reduced to abstract definitions. We see the fear of meaninglessness in Haufniensis's attempt to conceal the illegible with an x, as though there were a sign we could read provided we could follow the map or solve the equation. Like the fear of sin, the fear of meaninglessness may seem virtuous but all too easily becomes sin, becomes the rejection of language's authority and hence of any hope for meaning. Surrendering to the power of language indeed means, for spirit, being led "where it will not go"-that is, to that which cannot be defined. It is true that in the absence of fixed definitions, we have no comforting assurance that we are being led toward life-little wonder, then, that spirit cannot find god without being led!51 But as horrifying as being thus led may seem, it is the alternative that is death.52 In his The Philosophy of Kierkegaard, pattison does not warn against being led astray by language (indeed, he emphasizes that spirit alone is responsible for its fall), but he states that "'grasping at finitude' is, rather, when, having become anxious in the face of its own possibilities and not daring to submit them to the obligation of concrete, responsible communication, spirit flees responsibility for its limitation and projects the responsibility onto another: a forbidding voice, a tempting 50. george pattison, "The Most Dangerous of gifts or 'What Did Language Say to Adam?'" Kierkegaard studies yearbook (2001), p. 232. 51. Cf. the passage in Practice in Christianity in which, commenting on Christ's call, "Come here to me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will give you rest," AntiClimacus states, "All his willingness to help perhaps still would not help if he did not say this word and thereby take the first step, for in the calling out of this word ('Come here to me') he does indeed come to them" (pC, 21 / SKS 12, 32).Translation modified. In other words, we cannot of ourselves go to god; rather, through language, he comes to us and draws us to himself. 52. pattison's concerns may call to mind Haufniensis's remark that "the purpose of language is to conceal thoughts-namely, to conceal that one has none" (CA, 108 / SKS 4, 410). But using language for concealment is not being unwillingly led by it; rather, one who uses language to conceal a lack of thought is seeking to use language for her own purposes. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 135 07-06-2018 22:12:23 Authorship and Authority in Kierkegaard's Writings136 serpent."53 This warning is still incomplete, however, for although we may respond to language's indeterminacy by abandoning any responsibility to convey meaning and simply babbling nonsense, we may also flee that indeterminacy by attempting to establish meanings that are more fixed than is possible. Indeed, these two errors ultimately form but one: we babble nonsense that entirely misses the truth when we seek to establish those impossibly fixed meanings. our "responsibility to speak the concrete or actual world of truth,"54 as pattison puts it, requires that we avoid insisting on definitions where there are none to be had-which is itself a form of objective, abstracting chatter. In conclusion, it is entirely true that language is dangerous and that indeterminacy makes meaningless chatter possible. Indeed, in an 1854 journal entry, Kierkegaard identifies the dangers of language in a manner that recalls Haufniensis's warning against chatter: "Language, the gift of speech, engulfs the human race in such a cloud of drivel and twaddle that it becomes its ruination. god alone knows how many there are in every generation who have not been ruined by talking, who have not been transformed to prattlers or hypocrites."55 yet this warning is not the final word on language, for the very indeterminacy that permits the self to lose itself in "drivel and twaddle" also breaks open inclosing reserve and grounds the self 's relation to god.56 Regretting the gift of language, as though it had cost us some originary goodness, fundamentally misunderstands goodness: the pure self-identity sought by one who insists on investigating the origin of sin would be inhuman, not good. Salvation demands that we give up that attempt to find the origin, which is really a reenactment of the Fall, for it is an attempt to demarcate the boundaries of good and evil.57 And let us be clear: no legible sign marks salvation, and language is certainly dangerous, even deadly. That 53. george pattison, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard (Montreal: Mcgill-queen's university press, 2005), p. 82. 54. Ibid. 55. Jp 3, 2237 / SKS 26, 392–393 (nB35: 33). 56. Here it is worthwhile to note that in Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard conceives of the good as communication such that it benefits all people: "Thus the goods of the spirit are in themselves essentially communication [Meddelelse]; their acquirement, their possession, in itself a benefaction to all" (CD, 117 / SKS 10, 128). Communication, or the good, is not confined to the self 's relation to god; rather, Kierkegaard suggests that the self becomes rightly related to others through right relation to god. We see also that, despite the critical comments on language in the above-cited journal entry, he does elsewhere make positive references to communication and thus implicitly to language. 57. This point recalls Dietrich Bonhoeffer's argument that the Fall was precisely the desire to judge good and evil for oneself. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "god's Love and the Disintegration of the World," in Ethics, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 6, ed. Clifford J. green, trans. Reinhard Krauss, Charles g. West, and Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: Fortress press, 2009), pp. 299–339 ("Die Liebe gottes und der Zerfall der Welt," Ethik, Werkausgabe, Band 6 [München: Christian Kaiser verlag, 1998], pp. 301–342). 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 136 07-06-2018 22:12:23 Authority of Language in The Concept of Anxiety 137 it saves (even, perhaps, resurrects) does not lessen the danger. yet by employing a pseudonym who resists language's authority, Kierkegaard dramatically shows us that such resistance, however reasonable it may seem, is ultimately demonic. It is indeed a risk to be led by language to that which lies beyond all definition, but only through bowing to language's authority and being thus led can we be freed from objective chatter and inclosing reserve. 9781350055957_txt_prf.indd 137 07-06-2018 22:12:

SCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS: MODELS AND CHALLENGES Assen I. Dimitrov SCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS: MODELS AND CHALLENGES Reviewers: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tatiana Batouleva Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nikolay Obreshkov © Assen I. Dimitrov author, 2016 © Faber, 2016 ISBN 978-619-00-0535-3 SCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS: MODELS AND CHALLENGES Reviewers: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tatiana Batouleva Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nikolay Obreshkov © Assen I. Dimitrov author, 2016 © Faber, 2016 ISBN 978-619-00-0535-3 3 SCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS: MODELS AND CHALLENGES Table of contents Foreword..........................................................................................5 General annotation of the enquiry...........................................8 INTRODUCTION: THE PROBABILISTIC MATRIX OF REALITY AND ITS INFORMATIONAL INTERFACE.................................................10 PART I: MENTAL STATES................................................................28 Chapter 1: What is intelligent behaviour?........................... 28 Chapter 2: What is information?.............................................32 Chapter 3: How does the subject extract energy and information from the outside world? .....................................41 Chapter 4: What are the mental states? .............................49 Chapter 5: How do the mental states occur?.....................52 Chapter 6: What are the data? ...............................................56 Chapter 7: A concise model ....................................................59 PART II: NEUROSCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS: THEORETICAL MODELS ................................................................63 Chapter 1: Holonomic ideologeme .......................................63 Chapter 2: Computational ideologeme ................................79 PART III: CONSCIOUSNESS IN A SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVE: INDUCTIVE INTERACTIONS ..........................................................93 Chapter 1. The inductive interactions – the missing link between causal processes and intelligent behaviour.......................................................................................94 1.1. Blind causality................................................................95 1.2. Adaptive behaviour.......................................................95 1.3. Meaning...........................................................................96 1.4. Semiosis..........................................................................97 4 1.5. Semiotic induction......................................................100 Chapter 2. Interpretation and adaptation...........................107 1. Interpretation.......................................................................107 2. The adaptation....................................................................108 PART IV: CHALLENGES................................................................110 Chapter 1: Advantages and deficiencies of the presented models..........................................................................................110 Chapter 2: The romantic theory of information and the new physics of information.....................................................121 4 1.5. Semiotic induction......................................................100 Chapter 2. Interpretation and adaptation...........................107 1. Interpretation.......................................................................107 2. The adaptation....................................................................108 PART IV: CHALLENGES................................................................110 Chapter 1: Advantages and deficiencies of the presented models..........................................................................................110 Chapter 2: The romantic theory of information and the new physics of information.....................................................121 5 Foreword I don't know why books should be written about things that could be told in a few lines: Just the sleeping Nature awakens and regains consciousness. This happens as a result of an 'informational collapse' due to the accumulation of a super-critical amount of information in an intelligent subject. That's all I have to say on the issue of the nature of consciousness. And, the prerequisites of this hypothesis are set out below, namely: Aristotel Gavrilov's conception of the nature of consciousness as an open window of the subject towards the objective reality; Claude Shannon's and Léon Brillouin's conception of the nature of information as removed uncertainty; As well as an account of my wanderings, in search and trial of different approaches to a plausible solution to the problem of the nature of the mental states. 6 * * * Consciousness is not something; in actual fact, it is nothing. That is to say, I accept Aristotel Gavrilov's idea that consciousness is just an open window of the subject towards objective reality. Consciousness or awareness is the event in which a window of the subject towards objective reality is being set ajar; a window is crack open through which the subject obtains an informational access to reality and thus an ability and means of cognition, respectively knowledge about it and control over it.1 Coming to consciousness is the opening of the information window of the subject to objective reality that to an insentient object is closed. * * * But who and when does open this window? What is the physical meaning of this metaphor? Two options are be explored below and beyond this account. 1. One option is that the window of the subject towards reality opens at the so-called (equilibrium or 1 Consciousness is not something. It is an event. It is the event of the opening of the informational window of the subject to objective reality in equilibrium or nonequilibrium phase transitions. A reduction of probabilistic uncertainty is carried out in these phase transitions that from an informational point of view is equivalent to a net gain of information. 6 * * * Consciousness is not something; in actual fact, it is nothing. That is to say, I accept Aristotel Gavrilov's idea that consciousness is just an open window of the subject towards objective reality. Consciousness or awareness is the event in which a window of the subject towards objective reality is being set ajar; a window is crack open through which the subject obtains an informational access to reality and thus an ability and means of cognition, respectively knowledge about it and control over it.1 Coming to consciousness is the opening of the information window of the subject to objective reality that to an insentient object is closed. * * * But who and when does open this window? What is the physical meaning of this metaphor? Two options are be explored below and beyond this account. 1. One option is that the window of the subject towards reality opens at the so-called (equilibrium or 1 Consciousness is not something. It is an event. It is the event of the opening of the informational window of the subject to objective reality in equilibrium or nonequilibrium phase transitions. A reduction of probabilistic uncertainty is carried out in these phase transitions that from an informational point of view is equivalent to a net gain of information. 7 nonequilibrium) phase transitions, where the probabilistic uncertainty of the system's thermodynamics is reduced, which in itself is equivalent to a net growth of information; 2. The other option is that this is done at an event, which was already referred to as an 'informational collapse'. * * * We can see that the metaphor is literally valid. The window was closed with the blind of thermodynamic probabilistic uncertainty – the entropy. The reduction of entropy in phase transitions raises the blind and the window of the subject to objective reality becomes transparent and open. Another hypothetical solution is that the informational openness of the subject towards objective reality occurs at the so called 'informational collapse.' This collapse takes place when the accumulated supercritical amount of information is energetically equivalent to the magnitude of the mass, wherein a gravitational collapse occurs. 8 General annotation of the enquiry The first part of the book offers a hypothetical answer the following questions: What is intelligent behaviour? What is information? How does the intelligent subject extract energy and information from the external environment? What are the mental states? How do the mental states occur? Despite the immense diversity of disciplines, topics and issues relating to the structure and the dynamics of the nervous system, of human consciousness, of intelligence in a synchronous and evolutionary perspective, two main philosophical and theoretical ideologemes stand out in the neurosciences of today: the computational and the holonomic one. They are presented in the second part of the investigation. The third part is entirely focussed on the semiotic approach to the study of intelligence. Particular attention is paid to the issue of the missing link between natural causality and intelligent behaviour, to which it offers a particular reply. The fourth part is itself a summary in the perspective of the conclusions of the previous parts. * * * A book should possess not only content, but also a plot, that is, each successive event is to be caused or motivated by the previous ones. Of course, new characters and events that so far have been away from the subject line appear constatntly. But the plot must 8 General annotation of the enquiry The first part of the book offers a hypothetical answer the following questions: What is intelligent behaviour? What is information? How does the intelligent subject extract energy and information from the external environment? What are the mental states? How do the mental states occur? Despite the immense diversity of disciplines, topics and issues relating to the structure and the dynamics of the nervous system, of human consciousness, of intelligence in a synchronous and evolutionary perspective, two main philosophical and theoretical ideologemes stand out in the neurosciences of today: the computational and the holonomic one. They are presented in the second part of the investigation. The third part is entirely focussed on the semiotic approach to the study of intelligence. Particular attention is paid to the issue of the missing link between natural causality and intelligent behaviour, to which it offers a particular reply. The fourth part is itself a summary in the perspective of the conclusions of the previous parts. * * * A book should possess not only content, but also a plot, that is, each successive event is to be caused or motivated by the previous ones. Of course, new characters and events that so far have been away from the subject line appear constatntly. But the plot must 9 entrain them into the mainstream and its logic. Otherwise, we don't draw up a thesis but write a reference book. So, my intent is that each chapter should answer a question posed in the previous and formulate a question to the following ones. Last but not least, I had to sacrifice the eloquence of the presentation for the accuracy of its reception. Keywords: mental states; information; entropy and negentropy; energy and information; informational collapse; computation; biocomputation; holonomic paradigm; semiotics; causality and semiosis; electromagnetic induction; signal transduction; adaptive behaviour; intelligence 10 INTRODUCTION: THE PROBABILISTIC MATRIX OF REALITY AND ITS INFORMATIONAL INTERFACE Synopsis: This section will detail the thermodynamic preconditions of conscious awareness; together with the problem of how we perceive and become aware of the objects, we will pause on another intriguing problem – how do we give rise to our actions by means of our thoughts? * * * It is not solid physical structures that lie in the foundation of objective reality, but merely probabilities and superpositions among them. The solid structures of our sensorial and practical experience are an outcome of the collapse of probability functions as a result of physical measurement and perhaps, even – sensory observation. While in causal processes energy is applied to alter the existing spatial structures, information processes employ energy for the conversion of the probability distributions of the systems' dynamical states. There are equivalences and mutual conversion of mass, energy and information. Mass, energy and information are just three appearances under which probability communicates with us. From the above frame of reference, we shall consider a hypothetical answer to the questions: What is probability? What is and what does the process view on information disclose? What is the cognitive (the mental) image? 10 INTRODUCTION: THE PROBABILISTIC MATRIX OF REALITY AND ITS INFORMATIONAL INTERFACE Synopsis: This section will detail the thermodynamic preconditions of conscious awareness; together with the problem of how we perceive and become aware of the objects, we will pause on another intriguing problem – how do we give rise to our actions by means of our thoughts? * * * It is not solid physical structures that lie in the foundation of objective reality, but merely probabilities and superpositions among them. The solid structures of our sensorial and practical experience are an outcome of the collapse of probability functions as a result of physical measurement and perhaps, even – sensory observation. While in causal processes energy is applied to alter the existing spatial structures, information processes employ energy for the conversion of the probability distributions of the systems' dynamical states. There are equivalences and mutual conversion of mass, energy and information. Mass, energy and information are just three appearances under which probability communicates with us. From the above frame of reference, we shall consider a hypothetical answer to the questions: What is probability? What is and what does the process view on information disclose? What is the cognitive (the mental) image? 11 What are the equivalences and mutual conversions of mass, energy, and information? How do our thoughts bring about our actions? * * * Key assumptions and key issues Before proceeding to the main themes and issues, here are the main assumptions, on which the exposition is based: 1. Probability is uncertainty. 2. Information is that, which removes uncertainty. 3. Uncertainty is removed at the so-called 'equilibrium' and 'nonequilibrium' phase transitions. 4. There is equivalence and mutual conversion of energy and information. Here are the key issues that will be discussed below: 1. What is probability? 2. What is information? 3. What are the mental images? 4. How do we cause our actions by our thoughts? And here are the keywords: probability, information, phase transitions, mental images, Toyabe experiment, mind body problem. 1. Everything is probability. 1.1. Simple maths of probability Insofar as the term 'probability' is a key to the theses presented herein, we shall start with its brief 12 explication. Probability is a measure of the likelihood that an event will occur. It is calculated by the formula nP 1= , where P is the probability, and n is the number of all possible, equiprobable, outcomes of a state of affairs. Most often, the calculation of probability is illustrated by the game with a 'clean', i.e., unbiased coin. Insofar as it is assumed that the production of 'heads' or 'tails' are equally possible events, the likelihood for any of them to occur is 2 1=P . Measured in percentage, in this case, the probability to hit 'heads' or 'tails' is 50%. It should be noted that probability is a number from the interval[0, 1], which is designated as follows: ]1,0[)( ∈AP . The square brackets mean that 0 and 1 are included in this interval. The impossible events are denoted by 0, and by 1 – the events that will necessarily happen. (Wikipedia 2015) 1.2. Solid matter is falling apart before our eyes. Synopsis: It turns out that reality is not made out of solid state structures but rather out of objective probabilistic states. The deep substantial matrix of objective reality is probabilistic. It is not solid physical structures and interactions between them that underlie physical reality, but rather – objective probability states and superpositions among them. The structures of our sensory and practical experience are a product of the collapse of probability functions as a result of physical measurement and perhaps even of sensory observation. 12 explication. Probability is a measure of the likelihood that an event will occur. It is calculated by the formula nP 1= , where P is the probability, and n is the number of all possible, equiprobable, outcomes of a state of affairs. Most often, the calculation of probability is illustrated by the game with a 'clean', i.e., unbiased coin. Insofar as it is assumed that the production of 'heads' or 'tails' are equally possible events, the likelihood for any of them to occur is 2 1=P . Measured in percentage, in this case, the probability to hit 'heads' or 'tails' is 50%. It should be noted that probability is a number from the interval[0, 1], which is designated as follows: ]1,0[)( ∈AP . The square brackets mean that 0 and 1 are included in this interval. The impossible events are denoted by 0, and by 1 – the events that will necessarily happen. (Wikipedia 2015) 1.2. Solid matter is falling apart before our eyes. Synopsis: It turns out that reality is not made out of solid state structures but rather out of objective probabilistic states. The deep substantial matrix of objective reality is probabilistic. It is not solid physical structures and interactions between them that underlie physical reality, but rather – objective probability states and superpositions among them. The structures of our sensory and practical experience are a product of the collapse of probability functions as a result of physical measurement and perhaps even of sensory observation. 13 * * * Mechanics is this branch of physics, which in recent centuries determines the relationship of science (and not only science) to determinism. Absolute or Laplace determinism reigns in classical mechanics. The advent of quantum mechanics in the early twentieth century radically changed the picture of the events in the micro world, which are now viewed as entirely probabilistic functions. Even with the introduction of the quantummechanical model of the atom, it was portrayed as a nucleus of protons and neutrons, and a probability cloud of electrons hovering around it. If the nucleus is displayed with the size of a tennis ball, then the electron cloud will hover at about 20 km away from it. It is emptiness between them. So, the vast, the major part of space occupied by the 'solid', 'indivisible', 'impenetrable' atom is empty. Before ourselves we see hard, impervious, solid macro-physical objects. In reality they are hollow; in their prevailing volume they are void space. That's not all. The electron cloud itself is not a saturated, even though amorphous mass, as it should be expected from a 'cloud.' It is a matter of a probabilistic quantum-mechanical system without an analogue in the macro world we are used to perceive with our senses. Therefore, it is impossible to give even a metaphorical description of this quantum-mechanical model. In general, it can be described with mathematical formulas as the Schrödinger function. It is usually said that the electron cloud is a superposition of all its possible probabilistic states. In such form, the electron exists so far as it does not become an object of observation or more accurately speaking – measurement. Subjected to 14 such physical procedure, because measurement necessarily involves a physical impact over it, the electron collapses into and behaves exactly like a corpuscle, known from classical mechanics. To continue with the atomic nucleus, it, however limited and submicroscopic in volume, again doesn't behave like a classic solid from our macro world and displays the quantum mechanical probability dynamics inherent in the electron cloud. Below, at the level of quarks or strings, things become even more fuzzy and abstract for us to be able to assign them some real physical content and meaning inherent in the categories of solid material objects in which we think and perceive our macro world. Probability wave functions – that's what after all remains out of what's called 'objective reality'. The density of matter is actually a density of the probability distributions of the localization or the actualization of each fragment of objective reality. 2.1. The simple maths of information is given in Shannon's celebrated formula: ibi PPH log∑−= , where iP is the probability of character number i showing up in a stream of characters of a given 'script'. (Wikipedia 2015) What we do make out of the above formula is that: Information is a direct offspring of probability; The lower the probability for an event to occur, the higher the quantity of information it provides; Information is neg-entropy, that is – removed uncertainty. 14 such physical procedure, because measurement necessarily involves a physical impact over it, the electron collapses into and behaves exactly like a corpuscle, known from classical mechanics. To continue with the atomic nucleus, it, however limited and submicroscopic in volume, again doesn't behave like a classic solid from our macro world and displays the quantum mechanical probability dynamics inherent in the electron cloud. Below, at the level of quarks or strings, things become even more fuzzy and abstract for us to be able to assign them some real physical content and meaning inherent in the categories of solid material objects in which we think and perceive our macro world. Probability wave functions – that's what after all remains out of what's called 'objective reality'. The density of matter is actually a density of the probability distributions of the localization or the actualization of each fragment of objective reality. 2.1. The simple maths of information is given in Shannon's celebrated formula: ibi PPH log∑−= , where iP is the probability of character number i showing up in a stream of characters of a given 'script'. (Wikipedia 2015) What we do make out of the above formula is that: Information is a direct offspring of probability; The lower the probability for an event to occur, the higher the quantity of information it provides; Information is neg-entropy, that is – removed uncertainty. 15 Further, we shall emphasize mainly on the latter quality of the information – neg-entropy, i.e. removed uncertainty. Information is that, which removes uncertainty. For this reason, further we'll discuss precisely the mechanisms, the processes that lead to the reduction and elimination of probabilistic uncertainty. Here, one cannot help but recall the words of Michelangelo: 'Every block of stone has a statue inside it and it is the task of the sculptor to discover it.' And, especially his aphorism: 'It's simple. I just remove everything that doesn't look like David.' These great words hardly need a comment of ours. So, let us, before getting back to them briefly, now proceed with a 2.2. Simple physics of information In view of the subject discussed here, there are two types of physical interactions: Interactions that result in the change of the spatial patterns of the object of their impact; such processes we usually denote as 'causal interactions' (e.g. I break a glass, or I tear a sheet of paper, etc.); Interactions that alter the temporal patterns of the occurrence of an event. In particular, the latter interactions are phase transitions, such as: change in aggregate state, changing seasons, self-organization, etc.; or it can be a qualitative transition in a social dynamics associated with its evolution or revolution. What is important is that, in the latter occasions, the energy of the interaction is not employed to change the structure of a system, but rather the structure of the probability distributions of its dynamics over time. 2.3 Phase transitions reduce informational uncertainty 16 Uncertainty in physical systems is removed either through the addition of external energy into the system, i.e. E∆+ ; or through the removal of internal heat out of the system, i.e. Q∆− . Hence, phase transitions are nothing but a physical mechanism of removal of uncertainty, or in other words – entropy (randomness, disorganization) – out of the dynamical physical system. Thus, to return for an instant to Michelangelo's iconic phrase, thanks to the informational physics of thermodynamic phase transitions, the greatest artist and the greatest sculptor, by far, remains to be Nature. 16 Uncertainty in physical systems is removed either through the addition of external energy into the system, i.e. E∆+ ; or through the removal of internal heat out of the system, i.e. Q∆− . Hence, phase transitions are nothing but a physical mechanism of removal of uncertainty, or in other words – entropy (randomness, disorganization) – out of the dynamical physical system. Thus, to return for an instant to Michelangelo's iconic phrase, thanks to the informational physics of thermodynamic phase transitions, the greatest artist and the greatest sculptor, by far, remains to be Nature. 17 Fig. 1. Spiral iceberg in Antarctica http://www.youramazingplaces.com/12-stunningphotos-of-places-decorated-with-the-most-beautifulelement-water-in-solid-state/ 3. Information and mind To summarize what has been said so far: 18 Information is reduced uncertainty and phase transitions in real systems are the mechanism that actually carries out this reduction. As a result, conditions to achieve a special state of 'informational openness' arise in the system that has undergone such informational dynamics. This will be discussed shortly. Now, we continue with 3.1. Gavrilov's thesis: As the outstanding Bulgarian researcher of consciousness, Aristotel Gavrilov, put it: Consciousness has no content of its own. The mental image is not a picture of an object, but an open window through which we observe this object. 'Mental images', in the sense of some material or ideal representations of the objects of our observation, do not exist. For, if such representations mediating the observed objects did exist, they would not reveal, but rather would obscure the authentic content of the objective original. The cognitive image is an open window to the objective world.2 The process view of information is a good physical basis of Gavrilov's thesis. This thesis is totally in line with the view, according to which information is the process of: changing the structure of the probability distributions of a dynamic occurrence, 2 The idea can be tracked down as early as in Locke – tabula rasa – the mind in its hypothetical primary blank or empty state before receiving outside impressions. ( http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tabula%20rasa) 18 Information is reduced uncertainty and phase transitions in real systems are the mechanism that actually carries out this reduction. As a result, conditions to achieve a special state of 'informational openness' arise in the system that has undergone such informational dynamics. This will be discussed shortly. Now, we continue with 3.1. Gavrilov's thesis: As the outstanding Bulgarian researcher of consciousness, Aristotel Gavrilov, put it: Consciousness has no content of its own. The mental image is not a picture of an object, but an open window through which we observe this object. 'Mental images', in the sense of some material or ideal representations of the objects of our observation, do not exist. For, if such representations mediating the observed objects did exist, they would not reveal, but rather would obscure the authentic content of the objective original. The cognitive image is an open window to the objective world.2 The process view of information is a good physical basis of Gavrilov's thesis. This thesis is totally in line with the view, according to which information is the process of: changing the structure of the probability distributions of a dynamic occurrence, 2 The idea can be tracked down as early as in Locke – tabula rasa – the mind in its hypothetical primary blank or empty state before receiving outside impressions. ( http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tabula%20rasa) 19 through nonequilibrium or equilibrium phase transitions, thereby removing its inherent probabilistic uncertainties, and accordingly reaching an informational transparency (openness) to the objects of our knowledge and action. 3.2. How do our thoughts cause our actions? For sure, we have more than serious reasons to look with irony at 'para-phenomena' as 'telekinesis' and 'levitation'. But the reasonable question remains: 'How do our thoughts cause our actions?' How is it for instance, that by the force of the intellectual act of will, I manage to raise my hand? Because, whether the power of consciousness will cause changes in the outside world or in our own body and our own physical activity is quite insignificant from the standpoint of philosophical theory. In both cases – the first is as dubious as the second is unambiguous – it is a matter of causing physical acts with the power of human mind. It seems however that today's physics of information can offer a hypothetical answer to this typically insoluble, 'metaphysical' question. Generally, the answer consists in the recently, empirically confirmed, equivalence and mutual conversion of energy and information. In fact, so far we have dealt in a good level of detail with the first conversion – that of energy into information. It consists in the fact that there are physical processes in which energy is employed in the change of probability distributions rather than of spatial structures. These same processes called 'phase transitions' reduce thermodynamic entropy in real systems and therefore can reasonably be seen as a process of production of 20 information or in other words, the conversion of energy into information3. But, the great news came in 2010, when the team of Prof. Shoichi Toyabe succeeded to demonstrate empirically the transformation of information into energy. 3.3. Prof. Shoichi Toyabe's experiment In the description of their experimental setting, the investigators refer to the famous thought experiment with the Maxwell's demon. In it, a microscopic intelligent being is able to extract energy from an isothermal gas. – Thanks to its knowledge of the dynamics of all gas molecules, the demon, through a valve controlled by it, separates the hot particles in one compartment of the device and the cold – in the other. In the experimental setup used by the Japanese scientists: a nanoparticle with a diameter of 0.3 μm, climbs up a spiral staircase-like energy potential, only due to informational control, without any external energy to be applied to the particle. "In 1929, Leó Szilárd invented a feedback protocol in which a hypothetical intelligence-dubbed Maxwell's demon-pumps heat from an isothermal environment and transforms it into work. After a long-lasting and intense controversy it was finally clarified that the demon's role does not contradict the second law of thermodynamics, implying that we can, in principle, 3 For instance, when ice is melted, a definite quantity of energy is used not for the raising of the temperature of the ice lump, but exclusively for the transformation of its aggregate state, which means nothing else but a change of the patterns of the thermal fluctuations, that is, the probability distributions of the dynamics of the water molecules. 20 information or in other words, the conversion of energy into information3. But, the great news came in 2010, when the team of Prof. Shoichi Toyabe succeeded to demonstrate empirically the transformation of information into energy. 3.3. Prof. Shoichi Toyabe's experiment In the description of their experimental setting, the investigators refer to the famous thought experiment with the Maxwell's demon. In it, a microscopic intelligent being is able to extract energy from an isothermal gas. – Thanks to its knowledge of the dynamics of all gas molecules, the demon, through a valve controlled by it, separates the hot particles in one compartment of the device and the cold – in the other. In the experimental setup used by the Japanese scientists: a nanoparticle with a diameter of 0.3 μm, climbs up a spiral staircase-like energy potential, only due to informational control, without any external energy to be applied to the particle. "In 1929, Leó Szilárd invented a feedback protocol in which a hypothetical intelligence-dubbed Maxwell's demon-pumps heat from an isothermal environment and transforms it into work. After a long-lasting and intense controversy it was finally clarified that the demon's role does not contradict the second law of thermodynamics, implying that we can, in principle, 3 For instance, when ice is melted, a definite quantity of energy is used not for the raising of the temperature of the ice lump, but exclusively for the transformation of its aggregate state, which means nothing else but a change of the patterns of the thermal fluctuations, that is, the probability distributions of the dynamics of the water molecules. 21 convert information to free energy. An experimental demonstration of this information-to-energy conversion, however, has been elusive. Here we demonstrate that a non-equilibrium feedback manipulation of a Brownian particle on the basis of information about its location achieves a Szilárd-type information-to-energy conversion. Using real-time feedback control, the particle is made to climb up a spiral-staircase-like potential exerted by an electric field and gains free energy larger than the amount of work done on it. This enables us to verify the generalized Jarzynski equality, and suggests a new fundamental principle of an 'information-to-heat engine' that converts information into energy by feedback control." (Toyabe 2010) It happens like this: By virtue of its spontaneous thermal fluctuations, the particle oscillates continuously between levels with higher and lower energetic potential. The information control of the particle's behaviour consists in the fact that when the particle occupies a higher level, an energy barrier is switched on that prohibits it to revert to a lower energy state. The same procedure leads the particle to climb the next energy stair and so on, until the particle occupies the highest level allowed by its spontaneous thermal fluctuations. "The experiment consisted of a 0.3 μm-diameter particle made up of two polystyrene beads that was pinned to a single point on the underside of the top of a glass box containing an aqueous solution. The shape of an applied electric field forced the particle to rotate in one direction or, in other words, to fall down the potential-energy staircase. Buffered by the molecules in the solution, however, the particle every so often rotated slightly in the opposite direction, allowing it to take a step upwards. By tracking the particle's motion using a video camera 22 and then using image-analysis software to identify when the particle had rotated against the field, the researchers were able to raise the metaphorical barrier behind it by inverting the field's phase. In this way they could gradually raise the potential of the particle even though they had not imparted any energy to it directly." (Cartlidge 2010) A comprehensive interpretation of the experiment from the viewpoint of the philosophy of information is presented in "The Digital World – Construction and Reality" (Lazarov 2015). 3.4. So, what makes us raise our hand? The answer comes by itself taking account of the equivalence between energy and information, and in particular that the acquisition of new information can contribute to the increase in the body's energy potential.4 Mental states: either spontaneously 'absorb' information in their capacity of sensorial acts; or, they produce information in their capacity of intellectual acts (e.g. logical operations). Thus, perhaps the information acquired on purely cognitive terms may eventually be converted into enough energy to switch on the control levers of our behaviour? Once we have reached a state of conscious awareness, i.e. informational openness to the world, the information acquired on purely cognitive terms may eventually be converted into enough energy, sufficient to switch on the control levers of our behaviour? To sum up, here are the answers to the questions posed in the Foreword: 4 In this case, it is clear that any mental decision is related to a solution of a problem, which in itself should contribute to the raising of the information potential of the intelligent agent. 22 and then using image-analysis software to identify when the particle had rotated against the field, the researchers were able to raise the metaphorical barrier behind it by inverting the field's phase. In this way they could gradually raise the potential of the particle even though they had not imparted any energy to it directly." (Cartlidge 2010) A comprehensive interpretation of the experiment from the viewpoint of the philosophy of information is presented in "The Digital World – Construction and Reality" (Lazarov 2015). 3.4. So, what makes us raise our hand? The answer comes by itself taking account of the equivalence between energy and information, and in particular that the acquisition of new information can contribute to the increase in the body's energy potential.4 Mental states: either spontaneously 'absorb' information in their capacity of sensorial acts; or, they produce information in their capacity of intellectual acts (e.g. logical operations). Thus, perhaps the information acquired on purely cognitive terms may eventually be converted into enough energy to switch on the control levers of our behaviour? Once we have reached a state of conscious awareness, i.e. informational openness to the world, the information acquired on purely cognitive terms may eventually be converted into enough energy, sufficient to switch on the control levers of our behaviour? To sum up, here are the answers to the questions posed in the Foreword: 4 In this case, it is clear that any mental decision is related to a solution of a problem, which in itself should contribute to the raising of the information potential of the intelligent agent. 23 1. What is probability? Probability is a measure of the uncertainty of complex dynamical systems. On the micro level, reality is nothing more than a superposition of objective probability states. 2. What is information? Information is a process. It is the process of reducing the uncertainty of complex systems' dynamics, which takes place at their equilibrium and nonequilibrium phase transitions; a simple example of such a transition is a change of the aggregate state. In these phase transitions, the energy of the interaction is not employed in changing the present physical state of the system but in the change of the structure of its probability distributions; besides, that change does not manifest itself immediately, but only in its subsequent dynamics. 3. What are the mental images? Mental images are an open window of the subject to the objective reality. Mental images are a state of informational openness of the reality for the subject, arising from a reduction of the probabilistic uncertainty in the complex phase transitions of the subject's dynamical communication with reality. A more detailed exposition of the particular mechanism of mental states' emergence, however, will be elaborated elsewhere. 4. How do we cause our actions by our thoughts? There is a mutual conversion of energy and information. In the first case, this is a matter of the employment of energy not for the change in the particular physical state, but for the change of the structure of the probability distributions of a certain system's dynamics. The second case was empirically confirmed by the experiment of Prof. Shoichi Toyabe (a materialization of the fabulous Maxwell's demon, achieved by means of modern technology), where the purely informational 24 control of the dynamics of a nanoparticle (i.e., without applying external energy over it, but only by imposing restrictions on the structure of its spontaneous probabilistic thermal fluctuations) leads to the increase of its energetic potential. But then it is clear that the net growth of the information gained from the state of informational openness of the subject to the world, should lead to a net increase of energy in the subject, which would be sufficient at least to switch on the control levers of its physiological systems or effecter organs. For example, the net energy growth obtained in the state of informational openness of the subject (which is due to the reduction of probabilistic uncertainty produced under thermodynamic phase transition) would probably provide enough energy to be registered by a certain type of receptors. The activation of these receptors is already enough to bring us into the course of well-studied mechanisms of behavioural regulation. The whole problem is how can these receptors be switched on only 'with the power of thought'? Modern physics of information, thanks to the crucial Toyabe experiment already seems to have readiness to give a specific reply. 'Physical activity caused by the power of mind' actually means the following sequence of processes: 24 control of the dynamics of a nanoparticle (i.e., without applying external energy over it, but only by imposing restrictions on the structure of its spontaneous probabilistic thermal fluctuations) leads to the increase of its energetic potential. But then it is clear that the net growth of the information gained from the state of informational openness of the subject to the world, should lead to a net increase of energy in the subject, which would be sufficient at least to switch on the control levers of its physiological systems or effecter organs. For example, the net energy growth obtained in the state of informational openness of the subject (which is due to the reduction of probabilistic uncertainty produced under thermodynamic phase transition) would probably provide enough energy to be registered by a certain type of receptors. The activation of these receptors is already enough to bring us into the course of well-studied mechanisms of behavioural regulation. The whole problem is how can these receptors be switched on only 'with the power of thought'? Modern physics of information, thanks to the crucial Toyabe experiment already seems to have readiness to give a specific reply. 'Physical activity caused by the power of mind' actually means the following sequence of processes: 25 26 Fig. 2. Mental causation – a hypothetical scheme Discussion: One could question whether the state of informational openness is a necessary prerequisite for obtaining a net gain of information. Such growth of information may also occur in the initial phase transition, wherein the physical energy is introduced solely for the alteration of the structure of the probability distributions of a certain dynamics, which in itself can be regarded as the production of information. In other words, the initial thermodynamic phase transition can be seen as a process of conversion of energy into information. Accordingly, the energy produced at the second conversion – of information into energy – could be detected by certain receptors, and thereby – turn on a particular behavioural chain. In this case, however, the state of informational openness would be unnecessary as a conscious volitional control over our behaviour, and the latter would be reduced to a standard causal chain based on mutual conversion of energy and information. Besides, it is not clear whether the state of entropy reduction (reducing the probabilistic uncertainty) leads to a state of informational openness as well. Otherwise, we should expect that a similar openness to information is available to any non-equilibrium thermodynamic system. Actual informational openness, in our judgment, arises only at particularly high levels of accumulation of information, especially at a specific phenomenon called 'informational collapse', to be considered further in this piece of writing. 26 Fig. 2. Mental causation – a hypothetical scheme Discussion: One could question whether the state of informational openness is a necessary prerequisite for obtaining a net gain of information. Such growth of information may also occur in the initial phase transition, wherein the physical energy is introduced solely for the alteration of the structure of the probability distributions of a certain dynamics, which in itself can be regarded as the production of information. In other words, the initial thermodynamic phase transition can be seen as a process of conversion of energy into information. Accordingly, the energy produced at the second conversion – of information into energy – could be detected by certain receptors, and thereby – turn on a particular behavioural chain. In this case, however, the state of informational openness would be unnecessary as a conscious volitional control over our behaviour, and the latter would be reduced to a standard causal chain based on mutual conversion of energy and information. Besides, it is not clear whether the state of entropy reduction (reducing the probabilistic uncertainty) leads to a state of informational openness as well. Otherwise, we should expect that a similar openness to information is available to any non-equilibrium thermodynamic system. Actual informational openness, in our judgment, arises only at particularly high levels of accumulation of information, especially at a specific phenomenon called 'informational collapse', to be considered further in this piece of writing. 27 Bibliography: Cartlidge, Edwin (2010) Information converted to energy. Physics World. http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2010/nov /19/information-converted-to-energy . Entropy (Information theory). Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_t heory) . Cited 18 November 2015. Gavrilov, Aristotel (1975) Kam vaprosa za prirodata na saznanieto (To the Question of the Nature of Consciousness). Sofia University Publishing Lazarov, Alexander (2015) The Digital World – Construction and Reality. LAP Lambert Academic Publishing Probability. Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability . Cited 18 November 2015. Shannon, C.E. (1948) A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 27, pp. 379-423 & 623-656 Shoichi Toyabe, Takahiro Sagawa, Masahito Ueda, Eiro Muneyuki and Masaki Sano (2010). Experimental demonstration of information-to-energy conversion and validation of the generalized Jarzynski equality. Nature Physics 6:988-992 The Holographic Universe (Part 1). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lMBt_yfGKpU . Viewed 26 November 2015. 28 PART I: MENTAL STATES Chapter 1: What is intelligent behaviour? Synopsis: The control over the things and the knowledge about them are inseparable. The cognition of the things is a hierarchical act. Consciousness is an instrument of control of the subject over its world. The control and ascending above the world of things is a prerequisite for their understanding and cognition. To know the things, the subject must first rise above the causal hierarchy of the objects; it must tear itself away from causal determinism; it has, in the most literal sense, to escape, to rise above the object; to become free of it and in its turn to subject it and turn it into its own object and instrument. 1. The ontic schism: knowledge, hierarchy and control That subject and object are fundamentally different is as obvious as it is generally recognized by the majority of philosophical stands and approaches. We shall note only that this fundamental opposition is not just a fact; it is a prerequisite for them to be what they are, and in particular – to allow the subject to perform its fundamental ontological and epistemological function. This function is not limited to knowledge and to experience in general, but we shall mainly address them – in their quality of mental states. Indeed, the subject should be off to an insurmountable distance from reality to be able to enter into a radically new type of ontological relationship with it. This type of ontological relationship becomes possible 28 PART I: MENTAL STATES Chapter 1: What is intelligent behaviour? Synopsis: The control over the things and the knowledge about them are inseparable. The cognition of the things is a hierarchical act. Consciousness is an instrument of control of the subject over its world. The control and ascending above the world of things is a prerequisite for their understanding and cognition. To know the things, the subject must first rise above the causal hierarchy of the objects; it must tear itself away from causal determinism; it has, in the most literal sense, to escape, to rise above the object; to become free of it and in its turn to subject it and turn it into its own object and instrument. 1. The ontic schism: knowledge, hierarchy and control That subject and object are fundamentally different is as obvious as it is generally recognized by the majority of philosophical stands and approaches. We shall note only that this fundamental opposition is not just a fact; it is a prerequisite for them to be what they are, and in particular – to allow the subject to perform its fundamental ontological and epistemological function. This function is not limited to knowledge and to experience in general, but we shall mainly address them – in their quality of mental states. Indeed, the subject should be off to an insurmountable distance from reality to be able to enter into a radically new type of ontological relationship with it. This type of ontological relationship becomes possible 29 only when the subject is already able to attain freedom from the natural causal links that carry it back, reduce and degrade it to the blind, unintelligent submission to causal determinism. Once that it has lost this freedom and is caught back into the grip of the causal links, the subject loses its intelligent ontic aura and becomes an ordinary, indistinguishable from the others, physical object. Awareness, experience in general, is an act of separation of the subject from objective reality. The subject is detached from it; it rises beyond reality – this is a non-alternative precondition to turn reality into an object and content of its reflection. This detachment is not a metaphor; it is a matter of a deep rift with causal determinism; the ontic schism between the subject and the object is not only an ideological construction but a real physical fact. If the subject was not able to actually differentiate, and that means not only in an axiological, ideological, or ontological sense, but in a literal and strict physical sense, it would not be any subject, but just another of the countless physical objects blindly managed by physical causality. Its relation to reality would be causal and not free, cognitive, constructive, based on values; not intelligent. Another tacit premise is that the knowledge of things is a hierarchical act – the problem of consciousness is inseparable from that of freedom and control. The problem of consciousness has a hierarchical solution – mind is an instrument of control that the subject exercises over its world. In order to tear the subject away from causal determinism, to set it free, it must first rise above the causal hierarchy of objects; it must in the most literal sense escape, rise above the reality of the objects. That the subject sees, realizes the object is only the effect. The underlying cause is that it has already plucked out from the obedience to causality. 30 An asylum and a new command position over the world of physical objects, the subject finds in a new, imaginary, semantic dimension, supplemented to the four-dimensional physical continuum. 2. Gavrilov's thesis Consciousness has no content of its own. The mental image is not a picture of an object, but an open a window through which we observe this object. Consciousness is a particular relation of the subject regarding the object in which the object is revealed to the subject in its authentic nature. 3. What kind of relation can this be? The answer is in what the function of consciousness might be. Here, two of its features can be emphasised: One is control: Mind is the instrument through which the subject achieves two objectives; one is to get away and become independent of the causal laws of the physical world, a part of which the subject itself is; the other is something more than that – to stand over and control the physical causality and physical reality as a whole. The other function is epistemological: the subject must ascend beyond, break away from physical reality in order for the reality to stand in front of it, i.e. to become an object, subject-matter of its perception. We see that for both aims and objectives, the means is a separation, departure from causal reality. Basically it is a hierarchical staging – the subject should stand above the object reality in a figurative, hierarchical sense and in a literal – epistemological sense. Perception as a cognitive attitude is only a consequence and subsequently an instrument of the relationship of subordination and control – the hierarchical relationship. 30 An asylum and a new command position over the world of physical objects, the subject finds in a new, imaginary, semantic dimension, supplemented to the four-dimensional physical continuum. 2. Gavrilov's thesis Consciousness has no content of its own. The mental image is not a picture of an object, but an open a window through which we observe this object. Consciousness is a particular relation of the subject regarding the object in which the object is revealed to the subject in its authentic nature. 3. What kind of relation can this be? The answer is in what the function of consciousness might be. Here, two of its features can be emphasised: One is control: Mind is the instrument through which the subject achieves two objectives; one is to get away and become independent of the causal laws of the physical world, a part of which the subject itself is; the other is something more than that – to stand over and control the physical causality and physical reality as a whole. The other function is epistemological: the subject must ascend beyond, break away from physical reality in order for the reality to stand in front of it, i.e. to become an object, subject-matter of its perception. We see that for both aims and objectives, the means is a separation, departure from causal reality. Basically it is a hierarchical staging – the subject should stand above the object reality in a figurative, hierarchical sense and in a literal – epistemological sense. Perception as a cognitive attitude is only a consequence and subsequently an instrument of the relationship of subordination and control – the hierarchical relationship. 31 The hierarchical relation is what Gavrilov speaks about; it is the attitude of control and awareness. In it, the subject of knowledge is detached from causal reality and stands above it; thus the subject assigns to itself an exterior content which it experiences as its own inner state. What this inner state is and how it can be reached – this is the central storyline in the book. The other major plot threads will occur in the second and the third book's parts. Bibliography: Гаврилов, Аристотел. Към въпроса за природата на съзнанието. Издателство на Софийския университет, София, 1975. Gavrilov, Aristotel (1975) Kam vaprosa za prirodata na saznanieto (To the Question of the Nature of Consciousness). Sofia University Publishing Гаврилов, Аристотел. Беркли и проблемът за вторичните качества. Годишник на СУ 'Кл. Охридски', София, 1971. Gavrilov Aristotel. Berkeley and the Problem of the Secondary Qualities. Annual of Sofia University "Kliment. Ohridski", Sofia, 1971. Янкулова, Елка. Еволюция на йерархични системи. Фабер, 2012, ISBN 978-954-400-812-2 Yankulova, Elka (2012). Evolution of Hierarchical Systems. Faber, ISBN 978-954-400-812-2 32 Chapter 2: What is information? Synopsis. The category information – projected onto the semiotic triad: The category 'information' is interpreted on the basis of the semiotic representation of reality (Frege's and Ogden&Richards' triangle) separating it into: signs, meanings and concepts (senses). When we talk about information in the sense of some news, some knowledge about an object or an event, it refers to the semantic, conceptual side of the semiotic triad. When we talk about the information as a signal flowing along a channel of communication, non-relatively to its source and to its recipient, that message (information) is nothing but a set of signs (characters, symbols). As to the objective referent of the informational processes, the latter are physical interactions associated with the change and the control over the probabilistic distributions of the spontaneous thermal fluctuations in thermodynamic systems. When talking about information, often completely different things are meant: some knowledge, a database, or a message, news...; Shannon's information theory defines information through concepts such as probability and entropy – or rather negative entropy – negentropy (Brillouin 1966); hence, with reason, the understanding of information is inseparable from that of order. All these notions of information have their grounds and their relevance; the question is to establish unity and unambiguousness in the use of this term. In such cases, the semiotic approach is useful and reliable, and Frege's triangle – a universal and comprehensive model; not only in this case, but practically everywhere we want to give a – clear enough as content and precise as a sense – definition. 32 Chapter 2: What is information? Synopsis. The category information – projected onto the semiotic triad: The category 'information' is interpreted on the basis of the semiotic representation of reality (Frege's and Ogden&Richards' triangle) separating it into: signs, meanings and concepts (senses). When we talk about information in the sense of some news, some knowledge about an object or an event, it refers to the semantic, conceptual side of the semiotic triad. When we talk about the information as a signal flowing along a channel of communication, non-relatively to its source and to its recipient, that message (information) is nothing but a set of signs (characters, symbols). As to the objective referent of the informational processes, the latter are physical interactions associated with the change and the control over the probabilistic distributions of the spontaneous thermal fluctuations in thermodynamic systems. When talking about information, often completely different things are meant: some knowledge, a database, or a message, news...; Shannon's information theory defines information through concepts such as probability and entropy – or rather negative entropy – negentropy (Brillouin 1966); hence, with reason, the understanding of information is inseparable from that of order. All these notions of information have their grounds and their relevance; the question is to establish unity and unambiguousness in the use of this term. In such cases, the semiotic approach is useful and reliable, and Frege's triangle – a universal and comprehensive model; not only in this case, but practically everywhere we want to give a – clear enough as content and precise as a sense – definition. 33 Fig. 3. 'By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference.' Frege (1892) To take an example: we want to give a definition of 'a tree'. Then clearly, under Frege's scheme, it is seen that: 1) 'tree' is a linguistic sign, which denotes 2) a certain real object, called by us 'tree'; this object in Frege's scheme is called 'meaning', or 'reference' and 3) besides the sign and its meaning, we have a certain knowledge, concept about the tree; in Frege's scheme this concept is referred to as 'sense'; the sense is this concept that we gain about the object designated by the sign, once we have already decoded, i.e. interpreted that sign. To put it even more succinctly: 'tree' is a linguistic sign; 2) the image, the thought, the concept of 'tree' is what Frege called sense; 3) the real object, existing independently of our knowledge about it and its designation by us, Frege called reference or meaning. Sign (Zeichen) Reference (Bedeutung) Sense (Sinn) 34 Now to refer the term 'information' to the semiotic triangle: 1) First of all we must distinguish its sign. This is nothing other than the carrier of the information – a data signal. Data carriers are really endless, beginning with physical processes and arriving at linguistic structures (verbal or textual); besides, they often move from one form to another and form indefinite in length signal chains before they reach their interpretation. Once the information (here – the data signal) is interpreted, we come to its meaning and its sense. 2) As for the meaning of the information signal, as already hinted, here we shall accept such an objective reference: a real order in the world, existing outside and independently of the process of the information communication. The nature of this order will be discussed in more detail shortly. 3) As for the sense of the information signal, it is obviously the knowledge that we gain, after this signal has reached us in the event that we are able to interpret it correctly. In Shannon's theory of information, the interpretation of signals is quite simple – each signal carries a predefined response to a question that can be answered only with 'yes' or 'no.' Such was the signalling ('telecommunication') of the ancients, where the occurrence of fire or its absence in a particular place could really mean a lot. By the same extremely simple, binary code work computers, and indeed most today's media and telecommunications systems. So, there is no ambiguity or dispute whether information is knowledge, or a printed text, or a database, or as implicitly the theory of complexity assumes – a structural or dynamic order. These are only different perspectives of the category information revealing themselves, however, from the different vertices of Frege's triangle. 34 Now to refer the term 'information' to the semiotic triangle: 1) First of all we must distinguish its sign. This is nothing other than the carrier of the information – a data signal. Data carriers are really endless, beginning with physical processes and arriving at linguistic structures (verbal or textual); besides, they often move from one form to another and form indefinite in length signal chains before they reach their interpretation. Once the information (here – the data signal) is interpreted, we come to its meaning and its sense. 2) As for the meaning of the information signal, as already hinted, here we shall accept such an objective reference: a real order in the world, existing outside and independently of the process of the information communication. The nature of this order will be discussed in more detail shortly. 3) As for the sense of the information signal, it is obviously the knowledge that we gain, after this signal has reached us in the event that we are able to interpret it correctly. In Shannon's theory of information, the interpretation of signals is quite simple – each signal carries a predefined response to a question that can be answered only with 'yes' or 'no.' Such was the signalling ('telecommunication') of the ancients, where the occurrence of fire or its absence in a particular place could really mean a lot. By the same extremely simple, binary code work computers, and indeed most today's media and telecommunications systems. So, there is no ambiguity or dispute whether information is knowledge, or a printed text, or a database, or as implicitly the theory of complexity assumes – a structural or dynamic order. These are only different perspectives of the category information revealing themselves, however, from the different vertices of Frege's triangle. 35 As noted, the category 'information' can effectively be interpreted on the basis of the semiotic representation of reality (Frege's triangle) separating it into: signs, meanings and concepts (senses). When we talk about information in the sense of some news, of some knowledge about something (an event or an object), it refers to the semantic, conceptual side of the semiotic triad. When we talk about information as a message flowing along a channel of communication, non-relatively to its source and to its recipient, that message (information) is nothing but a set of signs (characters, symbols). * * * More difficult, however, is the issue of what information is beyond and independently of the communication and its addressees. Obviously, behind the information as knowledge and information as a signal stands some objective reference. But we mean not just whether such reference is out there, but what in particular, it might be? Of course that in an everyday word usage, the reference of 'information' can be any subject, object or event. But such word usage cannot lead us to a deeper understanding of information, let alone to any management, control or practical, say technological application of or through the real information dynamics. In order that such a goal is achievable, information should interest us as physical quantity – like mass or energy; a magnitude that can be registered and measured, and ultimately to create technological applications based on its management and control in our interest. Fortunately, the development of physics overcomes the classic Augustine shock and 36 bewilderment how to answer the question: 'What is information?' Today, physicists have quite a specific answer to this question. Of course, in practice they do not deal with categorical explication of the term; often that would make it even more difficult to define it. What is certain is that in its most common and probably most adequate use, information is interpreted in terms of thermodynamics and probability theory. In other words, in today's physical science information is conceived as order, however not just any order but one opposite to thermodynamic entropy; information is understood as negentropy, entropy with a negative sign. Such an interpretation of information actually turns it into a standardized physical magnitude to be measured, subjected to various empirical studies; along with its precise quantification and structural modelling of the widest range of information processes. Together with this, of course, the term 'information' retains its full semiotic diversity, which alongside its objective meaning as negentroy, includes subjective knowledge and symbolic character – the information signal. While in Part III we shall emphasize precisely on the symbolic and semantic side of information, here we'll focus on its objective reference. Therefore, after the general response, as to what information is as physical quantity, namely the opposite of entropy – negentropy, we now move on to the second question: Are there any informational processes outside and independently of human consciousness as well as whether did they ever exist before the advent not only of humans, but even that of life in the universe? To ground the above more or less general and abstract reasoning let us refer to some specific physical interpretations of the category 'information' and what scientists refer to as 'informational' physical processes. 36 bewilderment how to answer the question: 'What is information?' Today, physicists have quite a specific answer to this question. Of course, in practice they do not deal with categorical explication of the term; often that would make it even more difficult to define it. What is certain is that in its most common and probably most adequate use, information is interpreted in terms of thermodynamics and probability theory. In other words, in today's physical science information is conceived as order, however not just any order but one opposite to thermodynamic entropy; information is understood as negentropy, entropy with a negative sign. Such an interpretation of information actually turns it into a standardized physical magnitude to be measured, subjected to various empirical studies; along with its precise quantification and structural modelling of the widest range of information processes. Together with this, of course, the term 'information' retains its full semiotic diversity, which alongside its objective meaning as negentroy, includes subjective knowledge and symbolic character – the information signal. While in Part III we shall emphasize precisely on the symbolic and semantic side of information, here we'll focus on its objective reference. Therefore, after the general response, as to what information is as physical quantity, namely the opposite of entropy – negentropy, we now move on to the second question: Are there any informational processes outside and independently of human consciousness as well as whether did they ever exist before the advent not only of humans, but even that of life in the universe? To ground the above more or less general and abstract reasoning let us refer to some specific physical interpretations of the category 'information' and what scientists refer to as 'informational' physical processes. 37 To begin with the first, let us look at the concept of the holographic universe, developed by Leonard Susskind, in a debate, critical but constructive, with S. Hawking. – Suskind's and other authors' thesis is that 'information' should not disappear in similarity with the principle that mass and energy should not be wasted. – These are not abstract philosophical speculations but concrete conclusions of cosmological theory – in particular relating to the 'black holes'. As known, all absorbed by the 'black hole' matter irreversibly disappears behind its visible horizon of events and is absorbed by its singularity. But does this not contradict the second law of thermodynamics, according to which the entropy of the universe is only growing, but is not to be deleted? If all of entropy absorbed by the 'black hole' objects irreversibly disappears behind its visible horizon, is it not this an example of reduction of entropy at odds with the universal laws of physics? We shall not discuss this matter, and shall only say that Susskind and Hawking in their debate directly refer not to the thermodynamic entropy (of ingested objects, the very 'black hole' and the universe as a whole), but to their information! They say that what should not disappear is not the entropy, but the information relating to the physical system under consideration, besides basing themselves on purely thermodynamical arguments. I pointed this example just to show that for hard science information is namely a category and a magnitude of thermodynamics and informational processes themselves – thermodynamic. In the further account we shall go back to this theoretical case, and shall enclose two more – the principle of Landauer and the experiment by Shoichi Toyabe. On one hand they are opposed, on the other they establish an important equivalence. Landauer argued that the erasure of one bit of information 38 inevitably leads to the release of a minimum amount of heat. Toyabe conversely shows experimentally that the introduction of one additional bit of information in a physical system leads to the increase of its energetic potential with a maximum quantity of energy theoretically predicted by Leo Szilard and Léon Brillouin. These are really exciting experiments, pulling round the scientific community discussing them, but here we consider them with a different purpose. The aim is to see what actually Landauer and Toyabe understand by a physical informational process. What do both scientists actually change in their experimental setups; what makes them and the scientific community carefully controlling them, so convinced that their experiments are informational; that they are experiments, related to nothing else but precisely the informational aspect of the studied objects and events? Without explicitly going into details (this will be done in the next, Part II), we shall note that in practice, from an energetic point of view, in both experiments the scientists attach quite negligible amounts of energy to a nanoparticle, but it is interesting that this nanoparticle starts to behave in a qualitatively new way, unexpected and challenging for the standard expectations of the scientific community. In particular, the experiments related to Landauer's principle register the release of heat associated with the erasure of information, and in the Toyabe experiment – an energy gain, related this time with the addition of information. Outwardly, both experiments can be reduced to purely energetic processes and interactions. Then what is their difference from the standard energetic interactions? Why is the scientific community consensual that at their core these processes, changes and effects are informational? If one expects to find in such processes a new 'informational' substance to be registered experimentally 38 inevitably leads to the release of a minimum amount of heat. Toyabe conversely shows experimentally that the introduction of one additional bit of information in a physical system leads to the increase of its energetic potential with a maximum quantity of energy theoretically predicted by Leo Szilard and Léon Brillouin. These are really exciting experiments, pulling round the scientific community discussing them, but here we consider them with a different purpose. The aim is to see what actually Landauer and Toyabe understand by a physical informational process. What do both scientists actually change in their experimental setups; what makes them and the scientific community carefully controlling them, so convinced that their experiments are informational; that they are experiments, related to nothing else but precisely the informational aspect of the studied objects and events? Without explicitly going into details (this will be done in the next, Part II), we shall note that in practice, from an energetic point of view, in both experiments the scientists attach quite negligible amounts of energy to a nanoparticle, but it is interesting that this nanoparticle starts to behave in a qualitatively new way, unexpected and challenging for the standard expectations of the scientific community. In particular, the experiments related to Landauer's principle register the release of heat associated with the erasure of information, and in the Toyabe experiment – an energy gain, related this time with the addition of information. Outwardly, both experiments can be reduced to purely energetic processes and interactions. Then what is their difference from the standard energetic interactions? Why is the scientific community consensual that at their core these processes, changes and effects are informational? If one expects to find in such processes a new 'informational' substance to be registered experimentally 39 in pure form; which once removed is converted into heat, and next increased – produces energy, he will be disappointed. Yet the experimenters are explicit – both changes (in the amount of heat and the amount of energy) are caused by nothing other than informational processes. But what does that mean? If we carefully follow what happens in the course of the experiments, on the surface, we shall see nothing special – just an external influence. – Just insignificant energetic impacts are applied to the spontaneous thermal fluctuations of a nanoparticle. But what is actually changed as a result of the experimental impacts? – Here we encounter something interesting – the attached external energy does not trigger a change of the energetic behaviour of the nanoparticles, but a change in the overall structure of the probability distributions of their dynamics. – Which is really not as complicated as it can be assumed from this formulation, but is a matter of a common phase transition in the dynamics of the object. For instance, such a phase transition is freezing, melting or evaporation of water. The special feature of such a phase transition however is that, subsequent to it, the probability distributions of the spontaneous thermal fluctuations of the particles in the system become completely different. And, which is not less essential, at the very point of such phase transitions, the applied external energy, or the heat released from them, is not connected with a change in the energetic behaviour of the particles, but only with the general structure or what is called the probability distribution patterns of their dynamics. So, by informational processes we'll further understand such physical processes that are associated with the change and control of the sustainable characteristic pattern of the probabilistic distributions of the spontaneous thermal fluctuations in thermodynamic 40 systems. Or to get a cruder, but neater definition – information processes are aimed at changing the probability distributions of the behaviour of thermodynamic systems, not of their particular physical structure. This in turn enables us to move forward and treat the category 'information' with regard to the nature of the mental states. Bibliography: Shannon, C.E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 27, pp. 379–423 & 623–656, July & October, 1948 Бриллюэн Л. (1966). Научная неопределенность и информация. - М.: Мир 40 systems. Or to get a cruder, but neater definition – information processes are aimed at changing the probability distributions of the behaviour of thermodynamic systems, not of their particular physical structure. This in turn enables us to move forward and treat the category 'information' with regard to the nature of the mental states. Bibliography: Shannon, C.E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 27, pp. 379–423 & 623–656, July & October, 1948 Бриллюэн Л. (1966). Научная неопределенность и информация. - М.: Мир 41 Chapter 3: How does the subject extract energy and information from the outside world? Synposis: Based on considerations and examples of thermodynamic and biochemical character, it is inferred that the energetic dynamics of the subject is directed against the gradient of physical nonequilibrium. Let me first make a proviso that the reader should have in mind when reading this chapter. I have been interested in the problem of the relationship between consciousnesses and information for decades and my view has been changing. In the beginning I tended to understand information as a kind a substance. Certainly it was not just my attitude but it was based on a whole sustainable trend of information studies, which at the end of the book is referred to as 'the romantic theory of information'. On the whole this approach tends to accept that information is a kind of 'entity', or a 'substance', much in the same way as 'matter' and 'energy' are considered to be substantial, although qualitatively completely different from them. Correspondingly, I was inclined to believe that information has an independent physical existence of its own; that it is a very specific physical object (or rather – substance) indeed, and whatever it is, it does objectively exist; that it is very closely connected with knowledge and consciousness and which under certain still unknown circumstances could somehow be converted into them. Now my standpoint is quite the opposite and I tend to understand information in a purely negative way. That is, I believe that what does objectively exist is order, or to be even more precise – disorder, entropy – and information is just neg-entropy (Brillouin). So now I believe that information is not a 'substance', to say nothing at all that 42 it may be some independent physical object. Entropy is the level of disorder and information is just the measure of the reduction of disorder in dynamical systems during nonequilibrium or equilibrium phase transitions. The thesis of this chapter was developed under the 'substantial ideologeme' of information. Although the word 'information' is scarcely mentioned in it and the basic object of consideration here is 'energy', I must recognize that at that time I did believe that we could somehow 'extract' information from the environment and on the whole handle information as a kind of 'fluid', a flow analogous to an energy flux. Still, I think the thesis remains correct provided that we properly substitute 'order' ('negentropy') for information, instead of 'substance' or 'something'. * * * Sometimes it is believed that the discovery of the principle of self-organization has also led to the understanding of the behaviour of intelligent systems. This discovery is undoubtedly a significant step forward; in many cases the life dynamics of biosystems, especially at biochemical level, or the neurodynamics, the cardiodynamics and the general physiology, not only they, but even their macro-dynamics, besides not just their individual behaviour but also that of the social systems, reveal interesting projections, evidence and forms of self-organization. But although it includes self-organization in its toolbox, the principle of intelligent behaviour is different. In fact it is the opposite of self-organization, although like it (and often even using it as a tool), it also creates order 42 it may be some independent physical object. Entropy is the level of disorder and information is just the measure of the reduction of disorder in dynamical systems during nonequilibrium or equilibrium phase transitions. The thesis of this chapter was developed under the 'substantial ideologeme' of information. Although the word 'information' is scarcely mentioned in it and the basic object of consideration here is 'energy', I must recognize that at that time I did believe that we could somehow 'extract' information from the environment and on the whole handle information as a kind of 'fluid', a flow analogous to an energy flux. Still, I think the thesis remains correct provided that we properly substitute 'order' ('negentropy') for information, instead of 'substance' or 'something'. * * * Sometimes it is believed that the discovery of the principle of self-organization has also led to the understanding of the behaviour of intelligent systems. This discovery is undoubtedly a significant step forward; in many cases the life dynamics of biosystems, especially at biochemical level, or the neurodynamics, the cardiodynamics and the general physiology, not only they, but even their macro-dynamics, besides not just their individual behaviour but also that of the social systems, reveal interesting projections, evidence and forms of self-organization. But although it includes self-organization in its toolbox, the principle of intelligent behaviour is different. In fact it is the opposite of self-organization, although like it (and often even using it as a tool), it also creates order 43 and often one that is incomparably more efficient and beautiful. Spontaneous self-organization arises at levels, highly remote from the equilibrium; but self-organization cannot itself give rise to nonequilibrium; it is the fruit of its dynamics, but nonequilibrium must first be caused by external factors, by an external supply of energy; it is impossible for a non-living system, to create itself the preconditions for its self-organization; this is always at the expense of external forces – random or intentional. This brings us to an important point with regard to the behaviour of intelligent systems: the subject has a unique attitude to the energy and the informational order in the outside world: 1. The energetic dynamics of the subject is directed against the gradient of non-equilibrium. This dynamics does not drift down the slope, but against the spontaneous inertia gradient of the physical processes. One convincing way to illustrate this is the example of the sailor, who can orient the sails so that he can move against the wind. A look at the energetic and the informational specificity of biodynamics will also show that it is based precisely on the transmission of energy and information (negentropy) from the lower level to a higher gradient level. * * * Let us, because of their crucial and universal application, refer for example to the various 'energetic pumps' that control the channels of the material communication between the cell and its external 44 environment. Thus, for example, the Na+/K+ pumps in the neurons maintain levels, contrasting the natural osmotic gradient of potassium and sodium in the cell environment and its exterior, thereby creating a stable polarized state, allowing the flow of bioelectric information impulses to the cortical analyzers. Sodium-potassium pumps The relatively high concentrations of potassium ions, but low concentrations of sodium ions into the cell are due to active transport. The mechanism responsible for this is the sodium-potassium pump which moves the two types of ions in opposite directions across the plasma membrane. It is already known that the carrier is the enzyme ATPase which pumps three sodium ions out of the cell for every two potassium ions introduced inside. This leads to the formation of a negative energetic potential of the cell protoplasm with respect to the positively charged extracellular environment. Mechanism: The pump, while connecting with the ATP is associated with 3 intracellular Na+ ions. ATP is hydrolyzed, leading to phosphorylation of the pump at a highly conserved aspartate residue and subsequent release of ADP. The conformational change in the pump brings the Na+ ions out. The phosphorylated form of the pump has a low affinity for the Na+ ions so that they are released out of the cell membrane. The pump is connected with 2 extracellular К+ ions. This causes the dephosphorylation of the pump; it returns to its previous structural state, transporting in this way 2 К+ ions into the cell protoplasm. In the nonphosphorylated form, the pump has a higher affinity for the Na+ ions than for the К+ ions; so that two bound К+ ions are released. The ATP is bound and the process begins anew. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%2B/K%2B-ATPase) 44 environment. Thus, for example, the Na+/K+ pumps in the neurons maintain levels, contrasting the natural osmotic gradient of potassium and sodium in the cell environment and its exterior, thereby creating a stable polarized state, allowing the flow of bioelectric information impulses to the cortical analyzers. Sodium-potassium pumps The relatively high concentrations of potassium ions, but low concentrations of sodium ions into the cell are due to active transport. The mechanism responsible for this is the sodium-potassium pump which moves the two types of ions in opposite directions across the plasma membrane. It is already known that the carrier is the enzyme ATPase which pumps three sodium ions out of the cell for every two potassium ions introduced inside. This leads to the formation of a negative energetic potential of the cell protoplasm with respect to the positively charged extracellular environment. Mechanism: The pump, while connecting with the ATP is associated with 3 intracellular Na+ ions. ATP is hydrolyzed, leading to phosphorylation of the pump at a highly conserved aspartate residue and subsequent release of ADP. The conformational change in the pump brings the Na+ ions out. The phosphorylated form of the pump has a low affinity for the Na+ ions so that they are released out of the cell membrane. The pump is connected with 2 extracellular К+ ions. This causes the dephosphorylation of the pump; it returns to its previous structural state, transporting in this way 2 К+ ions into the cell protoplasm. In the nonphosphorylated form, the pump has a higher affinity for the Na+ ions than for the К+ ions; so that two bound К+ ions are released. The ATP is bound and the process begins anew. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%2B/K%2B-ATPase) 45 * * * An Intelligent subject, on account of the application of specific tools, technologies and approaches, can not only, like a sailor, move against the energetic gradient, but is able even to extract additional energy and information in a direction opposite to this natural causal gradient. How does this work? – Only through the use of most versatile, smart, and in all cases effective means for this purpose. We've already considered the potassium-sodium pumps, which allow maintaining an artificial electrical imbalance between the protoplasm of the cell and its external environment. But personally I like to refer to another, belonging to domestic life, example – the heat pump (known also as 'air conditioner' or 'refrigerator'): Fig. 4. Diagram of the cycle of operation of a heat pump: 1) capacitor, 2) expansion valve, 3) evaporator, 4) compressor. Heat pumps use a refrigerant fluid as an intermediate agent: 46 In order to absorb heat when the agent is evaporated in the evaporator and then To release heat when the refrigerant is liquefied in the condenser. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heat_pump) This clever device allows us to be heated, as we extract heat from the chilly winter air; or to export heat from our premises outside in the summer swelter. The air conditioner is designed so that the temperature in the evaporator is always lower than the ambient one (whether in or outside the room), and the temperature in the condenser is always higher than the ambient temperature. Thus, the air conditioner can always transfer heat in the opposite direction of the existing thermodynamic gradient between the external and internal environment. The point is that there are always such natural phenomena that allow us, at the local level, to achieve an energy gradient lower or higher than that of the environment5. Once such processes have been found 5 In the living cell, such phenomenons are the enzymes. 'From a biochemical viewpoint the enzymes are catalysts of chemical reactions in living cells. They have extremely complex and relief spatial form. They don't react chemically with the organic substances in the cell, but only accelerate the biochemical processes. They accomplish this because of their complex structure, which meshes in the critical points of the cellular molecules. The enzymes shape the structure of the chemical agents and achieve an inimitable acceleration of chemical reactions in the cell, which often run at a speed of one million times higher than that in the non-living nature. This widest possible range of intensity enables the realization of a maximally possible behavioural repertoire. The catalytic dynamics of the enzymes raises complex chains of conjugated autocatalytic reactions. They are the basis of the stable periodic behaviour and chaos, and the ability to self-replication 46 In order to absorb heat when the agent is evaporated in the evaporator and then To release heat when the refrigerant is liquefied in the condenser. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heat_pump) This clever device allows us to be heated, as we extract heat from the chilly winter air; or to export heat from our premises outside in the summer swelter. The air conditioner is designed so that the temperature in the evaporator is always lower than the ambient one (whether in or outside the room), and the temperature in the condenser is always higher than the ambient temperature. Thus, the air conditioner can always transfer heat in the opposite direction of the existing thermodynamic gradient between the external and internal environment. The point is that there are always such natural phenomena that allow us, at the local level, to achieve an energy gradient lower or higher than that of the environment5. Once such processes have been found 5 In the living cell, such phenomenons are the enzymes. 'From a biochemical viewpoint the enzymes are catalysts of chemical reactions in living cells. They have extremely complex and relief spatial form. They don't react chemically with the organic substances in the cell, but only accelerate the biochemical processes. They accomplish this because of their complex structure, which meshes in the critical points of the cellular molecules. The enzymes shape the structure of the chemical agents and achieve an inimitable acceleration of chemical reactions in the cell, which often run at a speed of one million times higher than that in the non-living nature. This widest possible range of intensity enables the realization of a maximally possible behavioural repertoire. The catalytic dynamics of the enzymes raises complex chains of conjugated autocatalytic reactions. They are the basis of the stable periodic behaviour and chaos, and the ability to self-replication 47 and causing them at our will and desire, through our actions (work – in the sense of physics), we are able to manage the flows of free natural energy for our own purpose and benefit. Moreover, by doing work with specific tools we can extract and create such free flows of energy, which would themselves have never occured in this world spontaneously, by virtue of the natural causal law alone. 2. The same principle applies to the information interactions of the intelligent subject. As to cognition, it is clearly a process directed against the natural information gradient, i.e., against the gradient of entropy; a process in which the subject that has dramatically higher information potential than its life world, is able to extract information from it. * * * To achieve control of information flows, the subject is required to have the means with which to reverse their natural move towards increasing entropy or in other words – to extract information from the outside world. What we saw is that this is achievable for cellular biochemistry and even for engineering constructions. The subject, however, must achieve much more than that; it must rise to the full diversity of the semiotic triangle, as not only its valences of the sign and meaning should be satisfied, but also that of the sense. Here, of biological systems. The living cell is a self-replicating system of catalysts-enzymes. (Димитров, А., Елка Янкулова. 2004. Хаотична динамика на биологичните системи и комплексна генна динамика. Фабер, В. Търново) 48 however, we talk about information not only in its sense of order; it is about knowledge in the sense of an inner subjective state, peculiar of intelligent agents. Bibliiography: Димитров, А., Елка Янкулова. 2004. Хаотична динамика на биологичните системи и комплексна генна динамика. „Фабер', В. Търново 48 however, we talk about information not only in its sense of order; it is about knowledge in the sense of an inner subjective state, peculiar of intelligent agents. Bibliiography: Димитров, А., Елка Янкулова. 2004. Хаотична динамика на биологичните системи и комплексна генна динамика. „Фабер', В. Търново 49 Chapter 4: What are the mental states? Synopsis: Mental states do not occur in and do not represent the presence and impact, but on the contrary – the absence of specific physical agents. It is argued in particular, that colours do not appear in the presence of certain electromagnetic waves but in their absence. – Colours don't express the presence, but the absence of certain electromagnetic waves. For example, the black colour is the complete absence of light waves. Orange is not the colour of the wave of length of 620-590 nm; orange colour is in fact the absence of any other waves of the light spectrum, except that one of a length of 620-590 nm (and emitted at a frequency of 484 THz). Similar is the relationship between the feeling of hunger and the various taste sensations; the same principle seems to be valid for other sensory modalities. One can discuss whether intelligent behaviour is possible unless it refers to mental images. Are intetntionality and rationality possible without the mediation of concepts or mental states at the least? Something similar to this is the discussion of artificial intelligence. Whether the machine can generate rational behaviour without the use of mental 'software'; without having concepts, perceptions, feelings, emotions, etc. mental states? But whatever the answer to the question whether intelligence without mentality is possible, human intelligence and rationality are inseparable from the phenomena of mentality. 50 Mental states: Mental states can be cognitive, emotional or volitional. Cognitive mental states include: sensations, perceptions, ideas, thinking, etc. Sensations in particular comprise: interoceptive (pain, hunger. etc.); proprioceptive (mainly motor and equilibrium) and exteroceptive (visual, hearing, taste, smell, tactile). Here we shall mainly refer to visual sensations – the different colours, i.e. the various colour tonalities. The term 'colour tonality' is introduced by analogy with the sound tonality, i.e. with the sounds – the specific states of the auditory modality. We shall afford a wider use of the term 'tonality' or 'tonal state', which in some cases (they will be specifically mentioned) it will designate mental states whatever. The reasons for this will become clear at the end of this chapter. So far, we've paused shortly on the ontological schism, the rift between the subject and the object of knowledge, the subject on the mental states in general. Now we shall continue with some other assumptions – some particular theses concerning the nature of the subject and its internal, subjective mental states, from energetic, informational and substrative perspective. Then, we'll try to assemble these foreshortenings in a more coherent picture. About the substrate of the mental states One of the central themes of our outstanding explorer of consciousness, Aristotel Gavrilov is that the mental image cannot have a content of its own. The image, he says, is not a picture, a portrait, but an open window through which the subject perceives the very real object itself. Indeed, if the image was a picture, it would not be revealing, but rather would be hiding the original object. Its own content would be a blind, a screen, a wall that 50 Mental states: Mental states can be cognitive, emotional or volitional. Cognitive mental states include: sensations, perceptions, ideas, thinking, etc. Sensations in particular comprise: interoceptive (pain, hunger. etc.); proprioceptive (mainly motor and equilibrium) and exteroceptive (visual, hearing, taste, smell, tactile). Here we shall mainly refer to visual sensations – the different colours, i.e. the various colour tonalities. The term 'colour tonality' is introduced by analogy with the sound tonality, i.e. with the sounds – the specific states of the auditory modality. We shall afford a wider use of the term 'tonality' or 'tonal state', which in some cases (they will be specifically mentioned) it will designate mental states whatever. The reasons for this will become clear at the end of this chapter. So far, we've paused shortly on the ontological schism, the rift between the subject and the object of knowledge, the subject on the mental states in general. Now we shall continue with some other assumptions – some particular theses concerning the nature of the subject and its internal, subjective mental states, from energetic, informational and substrative perspective. Then, we'll try to assemble these foreshortenings in a more coherent picture. About the substrate of the mental states One of the central themes of our outstanding explorer of consciousness, Aristotel Gavrilov is that the mental image cannot have a content of its own. The image, he says, is not a picture, a portrait, but an open window through which the subject perceives the very real object itself. Indeed, if the image was a picture, it would not be revealing, but rather would be hiding the original object. Its own content would be a blind, a screen, a wall that 51 obscures and makes the sight of the original content inaccessible. However, mental images do exist. How can there be something lacking a content of its own? What are mental images (mental states) made out of? There is only one logical answer. – From nothing. Perhaps the futile efforts to find mental images as a correlate of brain activity are the strongest confirmation. But here we adopt a more positive approach to the nature of the tonal states as generally all the sensations are, of which, in particular, we shall refer to colours. Nothingness, however this is unlikely, but equally obvious and common knowledge – nothingness has colour. We do not perceive the absence of any visual stimulus as 'nothing'; we all know that this total absence is perceived as black colour. The black colour is the complete absence of light waves. We can explain the occurrence and the nature of the other colours in much the same way. The orange colour from such viewpoint is not the colour of the wave of a length of 620-590 nm; the orange colour is in fact also a 'black' colour, i.e. it is the absence of any other waves of the light spectrum, except that of a length of 620-590 nm (and emitted at a frequency of 484 THz). It is clear that the other colour tonalities can be approached in the same way. Similar is the relationship between the feeling of hunger and the many taste sensations; the same principle seems to be valid for other sensory modalities. How to approach the tonal states inherent in other sensory modalities? Say, the sounds? Shall we start from silence as 'an empty' tonal perception of the complete absence of audio waves? Or should we refer to the synaesthesia, which allows reducing all sounds to colours? Or, shall we look for a basic for all modalities zero tonality from which to get all of them? 52 Chapter 5: How do the mental states occur? Synopsis: The hypothesis about the 'informational collapse' as a physical prerequisite for the generation of mental states is outlined. The possibility of such a collapse is referred to the equivalences of respectively mass and energy, and energy and information. The idea of this chapter was also developed from the standpoint that information is a 'substance', along with matter and energy. As mentioned, currently I do not share this view, associated with Norbert Wiener. I accept, in agreement with Shannon and Léon Brillouin that information is a value derived from probability (and through it – from uncertainty); i.e. that information is not a substance but a reduced, removed uncertainty. The idea of the informational collapse assumes that the information is a substrate which the subject can extract from the outside world (and against the gradient of non-equilibrium); this substrate could be accumulated and hence its super-critical accumulation leads to the occurrence of an informational collapse. Accordingly, the idea is that after the advent of the informational collapse, the information transfers into a mental state and a new ontological entity arises that has all the qualities of the intelligent subject: ability to learn, to understand, capability for targeted actions and so on. The question, however, is that the idea of the informational collapse entirely preserves its relevance in a purely probabilistic, i.e. non-substrate view of information to which I now adhere. First, the very mechanism of the informational collapse is expressed in non-substrate categories and is in fact based on the theoretical equivalence of energy and information. As far as this equivalence is valid 52 Chapter 5: How do the mental states occur? Synopsis: The hypothesis about the 'informational collapse' as a physical prerequisite for the generation of mental states is outlined. The possibility of such a collapse is referred to the equivalences of respectively mass and energy, and energy and information. The idea of this chapter was also developed from the standpoint that information is a 'substance', along with matter and energy. As mentioned, currently I do not share this view, associated with Norbert Wiener. I accept, in agreement with Shannon and Léon Brillouin that information is a value derived from probability (and through it – from uncertainty); i.e. that information is not a substance but a reduced, removed uncertainty. The idea of the informational collapse assumes that the information is a substrate which the subject can extract from the outside world (and against the gradient of non-equilibrium); this substrate could be accumulated and hence its super-critical accumulation leads to the occurrence of an informational collapse. Accordingly, the idea is that after the advent of the informational collapse, the information transfers into a mental state and a new ontological entity arises that has all the qualities of the intelligent subject: ability to learn, to understand, capability for targeted actions and so on. The question, however, is that the idea of the informational collapse entirely preserves its relevance in a purely probabilistic, i.e. non-substrate view of information to which I now adhere. First, the very mechanism of the informational collapse is expressed in non-substrate categories and is in fact based on the theoretical equivalence of energy and information. As far as this equivalence is valid 53 irrespective of whether information is a substrate or not, obviously the possibility of the occurrence of the informational collapse remains under the non-substrate theory of information. Second, the idea of the informational collapse retains its epistemological value under the non-substrate theory as well, because it seems that the informational collapse is precisely the event, leading to the opening of the window of the subject towards objective reality, i.e. to a state of informational openness of the subject towards the external objective world. Another possibility to achieve informational openness can of course be seen in the reduction of probabilistic uncertainty of thermodynamic systems under phase transitions. But such a possibility seems a more unlikely mechanism of mental processes as far as phase transitions are a ubiquitous physical phenomenon that can hardly be distinguished from standard physical causality. 1. The hypothesis about the informational collapse The informational collapse should be considered in analogy to the gravitational one. – The super-critical concentration of information should lead to an informational collapse – a condition in which information changes its physical condition – from material order, it becomes the singularity of an informational 'black hole'. This singularity continues to 'absorb' or I would rather say now to produce information. On the other hand, this singularity is the reference of the 'informational nothingness' – the zero information state, which in turn is characteristic of the mental states. So, thanks to the informational collapse, information acquires mental nature; it refers not only to the object 54 side of the semiotic triangle, but also to its conceptual, semantic side. 2. The physical meaning of the informational collapse The physical meaning of information most often refers it to order; or, to the concept of probability. And of course, both concepts intersect and overlap in the sense that the more ordered a structure is (and more organized a dynamic is), the less likely it is for it to exist. But, be as it may, we do not have such a robust definition of 'information' as we have about 'mass', i.e. about the object of the gravitational collapse. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine the physical conditions under which an informational collapse could occur. Not to mention about its experimental verification. Therefore, we shall follow a circumlocutory approach: We have the theoretical relationship between mass and energy: Е = МС2 If we find a theoretical relationship between energy and information, this brings us to the mass equivalent of information. – Which is nothing else but the searched condition in the presence of which it is expected than an informational collapse should occur. Such a link does exist. Other solutions may be possible, but the familiar to me is the one, already mentioned, based on the Szilárd ratio of the equivalence of energy and information, described in: http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2010/nov/19 /information-converted-to-energy "Szilárd formulated an equivalence between energy and information, calculating that kTln2 (or about 0.69 kT) is both the minimum amount of work needed 54 side of the semiotic triangle, but also to its conceptual, semantic side. 2. The physical meaning of the informational collapse The physical meaning of information most often refers it to order; or, to the concept of probability. And of course, both concepts intersect and overlap in the sense that the more ordered a structure is (and more organized a dynamic is), the less likely it is for it to exist. But, be as it may, we do not have such a robust definition of 'information' as we have about 'mass', i.e. about the object of the gravitational collapse. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine the physical conditions under which an informational collapse could occur. Not to mention about its experimental verification. Therefore, we shall follow a circumlocutory approach: We have the theoretical relationship between mass and energy: Е = МС2 If we find a theoretical relationship between energy and information, this brings us to the mass equivalent of information. – Which is nothing else but the searched condition in the presence of which it is expected than an informational collapse should occur. Such a link does exist. Other solutions may be possible, but the familiar to me is the one, already mentioned, based on the Szilárd ratio of the equivalence of energy and information, described in: http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2010/nov/19 /information-converted-to-energy "Szilárd formulated an equivalence between energy and information, calculating that kTln2 (or about 0.69 kT) is both the minimum amount of work needed 55 to store one bit of binary information and the maximum that is liberated when this bit is erased, where k is Boltzmann's constant and T is the temperature of the storage medium." 6 Now we can go on the reverse way, i.e.: First, calculate the energetic equivalent of the gravitational mass at which a gravitational collapse takes place7; i.e., Ecollapse = 2МSun С2 Next, calculate the informational equivalent of the above energy; Icollapse = Ecollapse/ kTln2 (bits) As a result we obtain the amount of information in bits, which is equivalent to the mass at which a gravitational collapse occurs; Icollapse = Ecollapse/ kTln2 (bits) Then, we can look for empirical systems with a similar concentration of information potential and to observe their behaviour; The next step is to artificially produce similar systems. So, Icollapse = Ecollapse/ kTln2 = = 2МSun С2/ kTln2 (bits) 6 In more detail, the question of the equivalence of energy and information will be discussed in Part II, Chapter 1 (The computational Ideologeme). 7 The amount of that mass is approximately equal to two solar masses (2MSun). – "According to Einstein's theory, for even larger stars, above the Landau-Oppenheimer-Volkoff limit, also known as the Tolman–Oppenheimer–Volkoff limit (roughly double the mass of our Sun) no known form of cold matter can provide the force needed to oppose gravity in a new dynamical equilibrium. Hence, the collapse continues with nothing to stop it." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_collapse) 56 Chapter 6: What are the data? Curiously, the same thing that occurs with money happens to information. Money, as we know from political economy is a later product of exchange relations. Along with natural products, a new product began to attend the exchange. Money itself possesses no natural use-value. At a certain stage a brand new semiotic construct was included in the exchange of natural products. Initially, the function of money is purely technical and the goal is to facilitate the exchange. It is something completely different from the actual use-value, subject to stock exchange, and in relation to these natural products it is nothing more than an additional external label or accessory sewn on them. Money is simply a character that should mark the actual presence of a natural product; an external tool applied to exchange. But by the time that sign changes its semiotic status and is reified, i.e. converted into meaning (reference, denotat). And it happens so that money, from an external label sewn to the goods, itself becomes a real product or more precisely acquires exactly the same ontological status in the system of market economy. Further, it ascends more and more rapidly and uncontrollably, and today in more and more diverse and bizarre mutant forms, it dominates the heights of social hierarchy. But these are things described in a far more accurate, specific and justified manner in Marx' political economy, and as for today's evolution of money it is worth reading the short but very meaningful study by Alexander Gungov in the collective monograph "Ontology of Virtual Realities." Our problem is information and, as already mentioned, it undergoes a disturbingly similar in character evolution in today's information society. 56 Chapter 6: What are the data? Curiously, the same thing that occurs with money happens to information. Money, as we know from political economy is a later product of exchange relations. Along with natural products, a new product began to attend the exchange. Money itself possesses no natural use-value. At a certain stage a brand new semiotic construct was included in the exchange of natural products. Initially, the function of money is purely technical and the goal is to facilitate the exchange. It is something completely different from the actual use-value, subject to stock exchange, and in relation to these natural products it is nothing more than an additional external label or accessory sewn on them. Money is simply a character that should mark the actual presence of a natural product; an external tool applied to exchange. But by the time that sign changes its semiotic status and is reified, i.e. converted into meaning (reference, denotat). And it happens so that money, from an external label sewn to the goods, itself becomes a real product or more precisely acquires exactly the same ontological status in the system of market economy. Further, it ascends more and more rapidly and uncontrollably, and today in more and more diverse and bizarre mutant forms, it dominates the heights of social hierarchy. But these are things described in a far more accurate, specific and justified manner in Marx' political economy, and as for today's evolution of money it is worth reading the short but very meaningful study by Alexander Gungov in the collective monograph "Ontology of Virtual Realities." Our problem is information and, as already mentioned, it undergoes a disturbingly similar in character evolution in today's information society. 57 'Pure' information exists as data. Data are nothing but signs, i.e. complex material structures, in which information is encoded. But data are not information. The information is externally attributed, assigned to data as money itself has no natural use-value and only is a convenient sign substrate. Any material structure can be a database; just some material structures are technically more suitable for this purpose than others – because of their durability, compactness, portability, calculation mode of operation etc., etc. But, to repeat – data is not information, but its sign and to put it more generally – they are a particularly effective tool in the creation, transmission, reception, processing and storage of information. In itself, information exists objectively as negentropy, i.e. removed probabilistic uncertainty. As well as subjectively – as a mental state, knowledge, and sense. To date, however, by analogy with the cash flows, the data, the data bases as well as the operations of their generation, transmission, processing and so on acquire the status of information objects. In fact, it is these arrays and data streams what are most often understand as information and information processes today. The aim of this brief reminder is not a social or theoretical critique of the information society. It is an attempt at a short explication of its three main semiotic pillars: its symbolic structures (information data), its objective meanings (references – negentropy, i.e. the reducing of the probability uncertainty of systems' dynamics) and their subjective image (knowledge, concepts, and meanings). As to the particular dynamics and future perspectives of the information society, the shapes of its self-organization and control will become still more complex and will expect a truly befitting and deserving theoretical analysis. 58 Bibliography: Gungov, Alexander. From virtuality of gold coins to virtual currencies backed by gold. In: Alexander GungovGungov, Alexander, Alexander Lazarov, Plamen Makariev, Silvia Mineva and Olya Harizanova. Ecology of Virtual Realities. 2015. Projectoria, Sofia. 154 pages. http://www.projectoria.com. ISBN: 978-619-156117-9, (PDF), 978-619-156-118-6 (ePub), 978-619-156-119-3 (mobi) pp. 144-154 58 Bibliography: Gungov, Alexander. From virtuality of gold coins to virtual currencies backed by gold. In: Alexander GungovGungov, Alexander, Alexander Lazarov, Plamen Makariev, Silvia Mineva and Olya Harizanova. Ecology of Virtual Realities. 2015. Projectoria, Sofia. 154 pages. http://www.projectoria.com. ISBN: 978-619-156117-9, (PDF), 978-619-156-118-6 (ePub), 978-619-156-119-3 (mobi) pp. 144-154 59 Chapter 7: A concise model It goes as follows: 1. What is information? Information is reduction of entropy. 2. What is consciousness? Consciousness is a state of informational openness of the subject to the objective reality. 3. When is a state of informational openness achieved? It is achieved at very high levels of reduction of its entropy. 4. How high are these levels of reduction of entropy? Very high. In all likelihood this ontological breakthrough comes about at reduction levels that are informationally and energetically equivalent to the mass in which a gravitational collapse occurs. Therefore, the event in which informational openness occurs, i.e. the window of the subject to the objective reality opens, we call 'informational collapse.' For convenience of the reader, the tentative calculation of the quantitative aspects of the informational collapse is reproduced below: First, we calculate the energetic equivalent of the gravitational mass at which a gravitational collapse takes place; i.e., Ecollapse = 2МSun С2 60 Next, calculate the informational equivalent of the above energy; Icollapse = Ecollapse/ kTln2 (bits) As a result we obtain the amount of information in bits, which is equivalent to the mass at which a gravitational collapse occurs; Icollapse = Ecollapse/ kTln2 (bits) Then, we can look for empirical systems with a similar concentration of information potential and to observe their behaviour; The next step is to artificially produce similar systems. So, Icollapse = Ecollapse/ kTln2 = = 2МSun С2/ kTln2 (bits) 5. What is the likely physical mechanism of the informational collapse? As it became clear, such an event requires a massive reduction of entropy. Probably, the main task of the human brain is: First, to generate colossal entropy in the dynamic system of the communication of the tens of billions of neurons; Secondly, to reduce this entropy close to zero. These two events as a whole are equivalent to the necessary gain of information, which is a prerequisite for an 'informational collapse', i.e. the event in which the subject receives an informational access, openness to objective reality. From this point of view, the principle of the information machine (the technology of absorption of information – in fact of entropy!) of the subject does resemble that of the heat pump. – I.e., along the channels of the sensory 60 Next, calculate the informational equivalent of the above energy; Icollapse = Ecollapse/ kTln2 (bits) As a result we obtain the amount of information in bits, which is equivalent to the mass at which a gravitational collapse occurs; Icollapse = Ecollapse/ kTln2 (bits) Then, we can look for empirical systems with a similar concentration of information potential and to observe their behaviour; The next step is to artificially produce similar systems. So, Icollapse = Ecollapse/ kTln2 = = 2МSun С2/ kTln2 (bits) 5. What is the likely physical mechanism of the informational collapse? As it became clear, such an event requires a massive reduction of entropy. Probably, the main task of the human brain is: First, to generate colossal entropy in the dynamic system of the communication of the tens of billions of neurons; Secondly, to reduce this entropy close to zero. These two events as a whole are equivalent to the necessary gain of information, which is a prerequisite for an 'informational collapse', i.e. the event in which the subject receives an informational access, openness to objective reality. From this point of view, the principle of the information machine (the technology of absorption of information – in fact of entropy!) of the subject does resemble that of the heat pump. – I.e., along the channels of the sensory 61 communication, a data stream with very high entropy flows from reality to the the subject, that is sharply cooled (reduced) on the above thermodynamic principle. This leads to the acquisition of a huge amount of information as regards objective reality by the epistemological subject. The informational collapse is a physical mechanism underlying mental states. – Mental states, as it was shown (e.g. about colours) are states that are completely empty of any physical or informational content whatsoever. Consequently, the function of the informational collapse is to generate a state of complete informational emptiness much in the same way that the gravitational collapse creates a physical singularity, devoid of any physical content that the principles and laws of physics can explain and handle. Mental states require a complete informational nothingness (emptiness) and this is a state that only a presumable informational collapse could produce. As to the possible informational preconditions and the scenario leading to such an informational collapse, they were partly discussed above and certainly remain as topic of subsequent and further discussions. Another mechanism is also possible assuming that information is a physical substance, alike matter and energy. If, from this point of view we assume that information, conscious or not, is an objective substrate, an informational collapse should occur in an information machine (computer), provided that a super-critical amount of information necessary for the occurrence of an informational collapse is introduced into its active memory. In fact, in that same moment it can be assumed that a fantastic event has happened – the information machine 62 has acquired the ability to be aware. And we can precisely calculate at what amount of bits stored in its active memory this fantastic event is supposed to take place. 62 has acquired the ability to be aware. And we can precisely calculate at what amount of bits stored in its active memory this fantastic event is supposed to take place. 63 PART II: NEUROSCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS: THEORETICAL MODELS Synopsis: The neuroscience of today is dominated by two main models of the nature and function of consciousness: the holonomic and the computational one. Chapter 1: Holonomic ideologeme 8 Not only in science but also in today's enlightened mass consciousness, mainly two models of consciousness, the holographic and the computational are most popular. We shall consider both. We begin with the holographic model. It starts from many assumptions and poses many problems; it leads to a variety of answers, draws different perspectives, on which we cannot and need not to stop here. The main thing that interests us is its account on the nature of the mental images. – It is that mental images are holograms. In fact the whole world in which we live, the whole universe is a giant hologram, projected on the periphery of a cosmological 'black hole'. In any case, the general solution to the problem of consciousness and in particular – mental images is that they are a holographic projection of a quantum field of possible states, which is accomplished by our brain. Many questions arise here. – What is the substantial nature of the primary quantum probability field? A very 8 The text has been prepared also in consideration of presentations: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lMBt_yfGKpU, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DIl3Hfh9tY, http://ademyakup.blogspot.com/2011/08/blog-post_16.html . 64 vague answer is that it is informational. What is the projector itself – the brain – is it a part of the primordial quantum field or is it also a holographic image? If the world, we see, is nothing else but a holographic image, then who is the one that sees? If this is the 'soul' or the mind, then what's the point of the whole holographic ideologeme that should explain just that – the nature of mental images and that of mind? There are two disturbing tendencies in modern science and academic philosophy. – Philosophy is not particularly interested in the revolutionary changes in the scientific picture of the world; even enlightened mass consciousness seems to be much more involved with it. The reason for this seems to be the role of modern technologies, which penetrated into the everyday life of the people; another reason are the electronic media, which are not in need of the royal sanction of academic philosophy so as to bring the really impressive breakthroughs in modern technology, besides in a very accessible form, into the worldview picture of the common user of information. Another disturbing fact is that the ideological popularizers of the modern scientific picture, and unfortunately scientists themselves sometimes show unenviable philosophical incompetence. Seeking for answers to questions that philosophy is not able to resolve, they formulate these questions in a very naive way; their responses accordingly lose their value and relevance; these responses would lose their value even for those who pose them, if only they rethink them a little more carefully and critically. It seems the most attractive point in the holographic ideologeme for those who defend it, is that the hologram is a 'disembodied' optical image; that, according to them, the hologram in the same way as mental image is not located anywhere. This claim is unfounded. Ultimately 64 vague answer is that it is informational. What is the projector itself – the brain – is it a part of the primordial quantum field or is it also a holographic image? If the world, we see, is nothing else but a holographic image, then who is the one that sees? If this is the 'soul' or the mind, then what's the point of the whole holographic ideologeme that should explain just that – the nature of mental images and that of mind? There are two disturbing tendencies in modern science and academic philosophy. – Philosophy is not particularly interested in the revolutionary changes in the scientific picture of the world; even enlightened mass consciousness seems to be much more involved with it. The reason for this seems to be the role of modern technologies, which penetrated into the everyday life of the people; another reason are the electronic media, which are not in need of the royal sanction of academic philosophy so as to bring the really impressive breakthroughs in modern technology, besides in a very accessible form, into the worldview picture of the common user of information. Another disturbing fact is that the ideological popularizers of the modern scientific picture, and unfortunately scientists themselves sometimes show unenviable philosophical incompetence. Seeking for answers to questions that philosophy is not able to resolve, they formulate these questions in a very naive way; their responses accordingly lose their value and relevance; these responses would lose their value even for those who pose them, if only they rethink them a little more carefully and critically. It seems the most attractive point in the holographic ideologeme for those who defend it, is that the hologram is a 'disembodied' optical image; that, according to them, the hologram in the same way as mental image is not located anywhere. This claim is unfounded. Ultimately 65 the holographic image falls exactly where fall and are located all optical images, regardless of their physical medium, namely – on the eyes' retina. As for the actual physical substrate – the carrier of the holographic information, here things are not sensational, either. The primary carrier is the holographic photo plaque; that on their path to the retina, the optical beams projected from the photo plaque pass in a very complex and specific route is also not a phenomenon without precedent, compared even to the route of a beam of light refracted through a simple optical lens. As mentioned, there is another reason for the persistence of the holographic model. It is its connection with modern information technology and especially its relication in the environment of the mass media. That replication, circulation and one would even say universality, is probably the reason for the strength of the impact of this model on, scientific and, if so to speak – mass culture technological consciousness. At any rate, my goal by far is not to debunk holographic ontology of consciousness. There are many interesting assumptions, theses, arguments and even original conclusions of what many of my esteemed colleagues would call metaphysical nature. The most interesting thing for me here is what led to the formulation of the holographic ideological view of the world and consciousness; what are its specific, original, meaningful and above all ideologically attractive premises? 66 1. Solid matter, for the umpteenth time in a row, is falling apart before our eyes Synopsis: It turns out that reality is not made out of solid state structures but rather out of objective probabilistic states. The deep substantial matrix of objective reality is probabilistic. It is not solid physical structures and interactions between them that underlie physical reality, but rather – objective probability states and superpositions among them. The structures of our sensory and practical experience are a product of the collapse of probability functions as a result of physical measurement and perhaps even of a sensory observation. Holonomic ideologeme paid particular attention to a most important and equally old, experiment in quantum mechanics – 'the double slit experiment'9. The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether the electron is a wave or a particle. For this purpose it had to pass through two holes of a dense membrane, backed by a photographic plate. Clearly, if the electron is a particle the imprint on the plate must be two vertical bands corresponding to the two openings of the membrane. In the case that the electron is a wave, however, a different picture consisting of a greater number of vertical, parallel to the two openings, stripes 9"Clauss Jönsson`s double-slit experiment with electrons. (1961) The double-slit experiment is a demonstration that light and matter can display characteristics of both classically defined waves and particles; moreover, it displays the fundamentally probabilistic nature of quantum mechanical phenomena. This experiment is sometimes referred to as Young's experiment." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doubleslit_experiment) 66 1. Solid matter, for the umpteenth time in a row, is falling apart before our eyes Synopsis: It turns out that reality is not made out of solid state structures but rather out of objective probabilistic states. The deep substantial matrix of objective reality is probabilistic. It is not solid physical structures and interactions between them that underlie physical reality, but rather – objective probability states and superpositions among them. The structures of our sensory and practical experience are a product of the collapse of probability functions as a result of physical measurement and perhaps even of a sensory observation. Holonomic ideologeme paid particular attention to a most important and equally old, experiment in quantum mechanics – 'the double slit experiment'9. The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether the electron is a wave or a particle. For this purpose it had to pass through two holes of a dense membrane, backed by a photographic plate. Clearly, if the electron is a particle the imprint on the plate must be two vertical bands corresponding to the two openings of the membrane. In the case that the electron is a wave, however, a different picture consisting of a greater number of vertical, parallel to the two openings, stripes 9"Clauss Jönsson`s double-slit experiment with electrons. (1961) The double-slit experiment is a demonstration that light and matter can display characteristics of both classically defined waves and particles; moreover, it displays the fundamentally probabilistic nature of quantum mechanical phenomena. This experiment is sometimes referred to as Young's experiment." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doubleslit_experiment) 67 should be observed on the plate. The reason is the interference of electrons-waves that passed through the holes. The first results were not worrisome. Interference pattern, consisting of many parallel vertical stripes was observed, which should mean that the electron behaves like a wave. – More precisely – the electrons – because the plate was originally bombarded not with a single electron, but by a beam of electrons. Later it became possible to emit not a bundle, not many, but even a single electron. And even in this case, although as a single pulse, the electron typified the interference pattern on the plate, which could mean one thing it is able to pass through both slits simultaneously and interfere with itself; i.e. it was a clear confirmation of its wave nature. But the researchers wanted to see if indeed a single electron can pass simultaneously through two holes and for the purpose put detectors at both of them. The result was so astounding that the comments have not been completed even today. If the passage of the electron was 'observed', or it is more correct to say registered, measured by a detector, the electron behaved like a corpuscle and left on the plate only such traces as say a bullet leaves behind while shelling a paper target. The picture was completely in line with the hypothesis about the effect of bombardment with an electron particle, not an electron wave. But all this happened in the early 60s of XX-th century; why does the holographic ideologeme of today resurrect the spirit of a particularly bright and exciting, but bygone historical era? – Today this experiment is held and modified in an ever more sophisticated manner, however not in the quest for scientific data and facts, but rather in order to achieve some frankly ideological effects. The main one is to show that it is not so much the physical registration, measurement of the state of the 68 electron by the detector, but it's very human observation that causes the physical collapse of the wave into a corpuscular structure. For this purpose, even known authors such as T. Campbell state: even if the detectors on the slits have been switched on and they did record, if data records are deleted we shall again have interference, not corpuscular picture of the experiment. It's really to say too much; even to people like me who are unfamiliar with quantum mechanics. Indeed, there have been other experiments whose essence is to mark the emitted electrons, and when the electrons pass the slits, the marks are to be deleted. These experiments give a wave picture of the distributions on the plate and are recognized to be correct. Experts say that the difference between Campbell's theory and the experiments with marked electrons is that the registration of the detector is an irreversible, while marking – a reversible process. "Physicist Thomas Campbell makes the following claim if you leave the detectors turned on, but you throw away the data from the detectors without looking at it, you get a wave interference pattern on the screen behind the slits. Is this true? No. Once the data is detected by an irreversible process, deleting the data does not induce any changes. It does not matter whether you throw away the data or look at it. The only thing you can erase are reversible markers. For example you can make the paths in the double slit experiment distinguishable by using polarizers at each slit. Afterwards it is possible to change this polarization without destroying the photon, so you can shift the polarization of the beams originating from both slits such, that they are the same again. As no irreversible process happened, the interference pattern will reappear. In this case you could get which-way information and destroy the interference pattern if you measured the photon at the right position and time, but as you never measure, it persists. This is very different 68 electron by the detector, but it's very human observation that causes the physical collapse of the wave into a corpuscular structure. For this purpose, even known authors such as T. Campbell state: even if the detectors on the slits have been switched on and they did record, if data records are deleted we shall again have interference, not corpuscular picture of the experiment. It's really to say too much; even to people like me who are unfamiliar with quantum mechanics. Indeed, there have been other experiments whose essence is to mark the emitted electrons, and when the electrons pass the slits, the marks are to be deleted. These experiments give a wave picture of the distributions on the plate and are recognized to be correct. Experts say that the difference between Campbell's theory and the experiments with marked electrons is that the registration of the detector is an irreversible, while marking – a reversible process. "Physicist Thomas Campbell makes the following claim if you leave the detectors turned on, but you throw away the data from the detectors without looking at it, you get a wave interference pattern on the screen behind the slits. Is this true? No. Once the data is detected by an irreversible process, deleting the data does not induce any changes. It does not matter whether you throw away the data or look at it. The only thing you can erase are reversible markers. For example you can make the paths in the double slit experiment distinguishable by using polarizers at each slit. Afterwards it is possible to change this polarization without destroying the photon, so you can shift the polarization of the beams originating from both slits such, that they are the same again. As no irreversible process happened, the interference pattern will reappear. In this case you could get which-way information and destroy the interference pattern if you measured the photon at the right position and time, but as you never measure, it persists. This is very different 69 from actually measuring and throwing away the data, which will never give a persisting interference pattern." Source: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/double-slitexperiment-with-detectors-not-recording.414617/ I do not dare to go into thinner details. With or without them, the ontological thesis of the holonomic ideologeme seems to be definite enough: reality in itself is a quantum superposition of all its possible states. – If we liken the space occupied by the electron cloud with an empty room, this will be an extremely harsh and distorted but clear image of that quantum-mechanical superposition. However, when the electron cloud or reality in general is the object of observation, it collapses into discrete structures, such as the electron or the familiar everyday objects. Ultimately, the holonomic ideologeme regards reality, as an actual but rather not material and even not energetic but as an information structure, as information. It is this information that is encoded in a holographic matrix, and this information that is projected by our brain and is perceived by our senses as a holographic image. In fact holonomic ideologeme in a bizarre fashion intertwines most advanced ideas of modern cosmology with archaic eastern, mostly Hindu and Buddhist mystical dogmas of reality as 'Maya', as an illusion. While mysticism is set say in the 'disappearing' stoutness of matter in the direction of our movement to the microworld, as well as in the over-exaggerated role of the supervising intelligent subject that alone with his eyes and intentionality, is capable of such overwhelming transformations of the fundamental structure of the universe, advanced science is elsewhere. It rests on the ever more imperative role that information began to play as a cosmological factor. 70 For example, recently in the theory of 'black holes' was announced the result that all the information about the objects ingested by the 'black hole' is encoded and stored on the periphery of this 'black hole'. Hence, the already aforementioned thesis, defended in most serious scientific circles, that the universe observed by us is actually nothing else but a holographic projection of the information about it, stored on the periphery of a 'black hole' that had once swallowed it. 2. The world is not before, but into our brain. If Berkeley, back in the 18th century (1709, 1710, 1713) attained an overpowering logical refutation of the idea of objective reality, then even today, despite of its unmatched simplicity and imagery, it is deeply alien to the philosophically unsophisticated mass consciousness. Nobody today wants to believe that the apple is a collection of sensations on the grounds that we have an access only to them, to the sensations, and not to any real and substantial qualities and structures. Don't we see that the apple is not some spooky feeling; that it stands in the objective world in front of us; that it is hard and corporeal; that besides that it is red, sweet and juicy, and a delicious food that can satiate our hunger, the apple gives us a fresh burst of energy? And let Berkeley and the philosophers think and say whatever they want. Holographic ideologeme however seems to be on the track to reach one though seemingly very naive, but on the other hand much closer to the categories and images of everyday consciousness, and therefore much more effective refutation of the idea of 'the world in front of us', of objective reality. Turkey, as per my university memories, has never boasted of brilliant philosophers. But things are never too late to change. Adem Yakup (Adnan Oktar) is not a philosopher in the academic sense, rather he is a pro70 For example, recently in the theory of 'black holes' was announced the result that all the information about the objects ingested by the 'black hole' is encoded and stored on the periphery of this 'black hole'. Hence, the already aforementioned thesis, defended in most serious scientific circles, that the universe observed by us is actually nothing else but a holographic projection of the information about it, stored on the periphery of a 'black hole' that had once swallowed it. 2. The world is not before, but into our brain. If Berkeley, back in the 18th century (1709, 1710, 1713) attained an overpowering logical refutation of the idea of objective reality, then even today, despite of its unmatched simplicity and imagery, it is deeply alien to the philosophically unsophisticated mass consciousness. Nobody today wants to believe that the apple is a collection of sensations on the grounds that we have an access only to them, to the sensations, and not to any real and substantial qualities and structures. Don't we see that the apple is not some spooky feeling; that it stands in the objective world in front of us; that it is hard and corporeal; that besides that it is red, sweet and juicy, and a delicious food that can satiate our hunger, the apple gives us a fresh burst of energy? And let Berkeley and the philosophers think and say whatever they want. Holographic ideologeme however seems to be on the track to reach one though seemingly very naive, but on the other hand much closer to the categories and images of everyday consciousness, and therefore much more effective refutation of the idea of 'the world in front of us', of objective reality. Turkey, as per my university memories, has never boasted of brilliant philosophers. But things are never too late to change. Adem Yakup (Adnan Oktar) is not a philosopher in the academic sense, rather he is a pro71 Islamic ideologist-creationist, author of, say – parascientific and theosophical bestsellers, whose star, as it is right as per astronomical postulates rose from the East. Let before us be a colourful songbird. Our idea formed by neuroscience is that the photons reflected from the bird reach our eye retina. There they are registered by our visual receptors that generate a stream of electrons, which along the neural pathways heads to the cortical vision centre located in the occipital part of the cortex. Similarly, the sound waves caused by the bird's song, are registered by the auditory receptors that generate a flow of electrons directed to the auditory cortical centre. There is no darker and quieter site than these cortical centres, yet our bright, colourful or loudly voiced visual or auditory images are to be found precisely in them. The same applies to the perception of space. The stars we perceive as remote at millions of light years away are perceptions in reality present in the confined space of about a few cubic centimetres in the occipital part of our brain. The colourful songbird is not located before our eyes but in our brains. We are not in the room where we write or read this; on the contrary the room is inside us. Let us not forget that not only our body but also our very brain is a physical object, and therefore it is also in the centre of our visual perception. Let's imagine that the human brain can be isolated and placed in a tank of chemical solution supporting it. Let us now with artificial sensors (cameras, microphones, etc.) record a working environment, for example a business office. Let's now digitize these data and as a flow of electrons forward them to the corresponding cortical centres of the brain. – Then the brain, possibly located in a closed plastic box, will 72 perceive itself as a businessman involved and managing stunning stock market or bank speculations. There is neither a businessman nor transactions; no colourful songbird, no business office, not even a brain, enclosed in a plastic box. There are not even atoms and elementary particles. There is no world before our eyes, there is no objective reality. There is only one continuous probabilistic quantum field as the superposition of countless possible states. Apparently, someone has created the hologram and installed it into our brain; the brain projects it to us as 'the world in front of us'; it only remains for us to accept this hologram and interpret it in a manner consistent with our ideas, feelings, motives or values. And to respond with our actions of the challenges this hologram casts at us. Clearly, holographic ideologeme is vulnerable to professional philosophical criticism. There is a lot of controversy – e.g. vicious logic circles, which use different subject categories as a tool to be refuted themselves. It introduces unjustified assumptions, which are not different from the mystics or myth-creativity – eg. about 'someone' or 'something' that creates a hologram and installs it in the brain. Holonomic ideologists do not trouble to argue that a hologram is 'the world outside us', and the brain itself – i.e. a hologram creates for us another hologram that is projected by a third hologram. But who perceives the screening – perhaps a fourth hologram – our mental I? No , the one to perceive is the human soul. But what is our soul – what was the point to construct a whole new holographic universe, besides with the purpose to explain what awareness and consciousness are, what the very soul itself is, if finally to this whole new universe it is necessary to add the soul whose explanation we are actually searching for? 72 perceive itself as a businessman involved and managing stunning stock market or bank speculations. There is neither a businessman nor transactions; no colourful songbird, no business office, not even a brain, enclosed in a plastic box. There are not even atoms and elementary particles. There is no world before our eyes, there is no objective reality. There is only one continuous probabilistic quantum field as the superposition of countless possible states. Apparently, someone has created the hologram and installed it into our brain; the brain projects it to us as 'the world in front of us'; it only remains for us to accept this hologram and interpret it in a manner consistent with our ideas, feelings, motives or values. And to respond with our actions of the challenges this hologram casts at us. Clearly, holographic ideologeme is vulnerable to professional philosophical criticism. There is a lot of controversy – e.g. vicious logic circles, which use different subject categories as a tool to be refuted themselves. It introduces unjustified assumptions, which are not different from the mystics or myth-creativity – eg. about 'someone' or 'something' that creates a hologram and installs it in the brain. Holonomic ideologists do not trouble to argue that a hologram is 'the world outside us', and the brain itself – i.e. a hologram creates for us another hologram that is projected by a third hologram. But who perceives the screening – perhaps a fourth hologram – our mental I? No , the one to perceive is the human soul. But what is our soul – what was the point to construct a whole new holographic universe, besides with the purpose to explain what awareness and consciousness are, what the very soul itself is, if finally to this whole new universe it is necessary to add the soul whose explanation we are actually searching for? 73 We see that the power of holographic ideologeme is not in the details. Its strength is primarily in some bright theses resting on solid scientific theories and data, and as mentioned – its universal support by the new, unique technological, communication, informational and cultural environment, which is generally referred to as 'virtual reality'. Good or bad, but persistent in consolidating itself in the structures of mass enlightened consciousness, this ideologeme, in its coarse grain structure states: The world outside us is a quantum wave function; Our consciousness collapses this wave function in the known discrete objectiveness. The same thing, in other words sounds like this: The world outside us is a hologram; Our brain projects this hologram in the form of the world before our eyes; Our consciousness perceives, experiences, interprets and reacts actively to the the message contained in the hologram. 3. How to shoot a hologram? A laser bundle is split into two beams. One beam is reflected from shot object and falls on the photo plate. The other beam is refracted through a system of mirrors, so as to finally get on the same point on the photo plate. So it is proceeded point by point until the entire object is shot. An observer doesn't see any clear image on the photo plate, but a blurry, chaotic set of points. When the hologram on the plate is illuminated at the proper angle, a three-dimensional image of the shot object can be seen clearly. This image may be circumvented to see all the details on the shot object that otherwise cannot be seen in a simple, two-dimensional photography. Even, if the hologram is made not with light but with X-rays, the object being taken can be examined from the inside. 74 Holographic technology has advanced so far that the holographic images are virtually indistinguishable from the original visual objects. Unless, of course, the person to communicate with the hologram may not think of going through his interlocutor that still should not be quite a normal attitude anyway. Going back to the two-slit experiment, we will notice that the shooting of a hologram resembles this very strange event in which electrons are torn and seem to pass through both slits simultaneously. Then again, when registered on the photo plaque they gave an interference pattern. In fact, in the shooting of a hologram, namely the diffraction of interfering with each other light waves what is observed on a photo plate. But what happens when the holographic photo plaque is lit at the accurate angle? – The same thing that happens with the electrons in the event that their passage through the slits is 'lit', i.e. observed, registered, measured. In the same manner as the illuminated or observed photon essentially changes its shape and from a wave is converted into a corpuscle, the holographic image from a two-dimensional diffraction pattern wave is converted into a discrete three-dimensional object. Probably this is the reason for the supporters of holonomic ideologeme to argue simultaneously that 'reality is nothing else besides quantum wave function' and that 'reality is nothing more than a hologram.' Indeed, in its twodimensional mode, the hologram is an optical image of such a wave function. And a collapsed wave function has the same discreet three-dimensional image as a lit hologram. Holographic ideologeme is promoted not only by arguments of quantum mechanics and quantum optics, but also those of cosmology and information theory. The 74 Holographic technology has advanced so far that the holographic images are virtually indistinguishable from the original visual objects. Unless, of course, the person to communicate with the hologram may not think of going through his interlocutor that still should not be quite a normal attitude anyway. Going back to the two-slit experiment, we will notice that the shooting of a hologram resembles this very strange event in which electrons are torn and seem to pass through both slits simultaneously. Then again, when registered on the photo plaque they gave an interference pattern. In fact, in the shooting of a hologram, namely the diffraction of interfering with each other light waves what is observed on a photo plate. But what happens when the holographic photo plaque is lit at the accurate angle? – The same thing that happens with the electrons in the event that their passage through the slits is 'lit', i.e. observed, registered, measured. In the same manner as the illuminated or observed photon essentially changes its shape and from a wave is converted into a corpuscle, the holographic image from a two-dimensional diffraction pattern wave is converted into a discrete three-dimensional object. Probably this is the reason for the supporters of holonomic ideologeme to argue simultaneously that 'reality is nothing else besides quantum wave function' and that 'reality is nothing more than a hologram.' Indeed, in its twodimensional mode, the hologram is an optical image of such a wave function. And a collapsed wave function has the same discreet three-dimensional image as a lit hologram. Holographic ideologeme is promoted not only by arguments of quantum mechanics and quantum optics, but also those of cosmology and information theory. The 75 thesis, as already mentioned, is that the threedimensional universe we observe is actually an optical illusion, behind which stands only a screening, a recorded in holographic format information about it on the periphery of the 'black hole' that had swallowed it long ago. This is the scenario behind which besides unscrewed fancy stand serious scientific arguments. These arguments start from the premise that information, like energy and matter is indestructible. In such a case, in cosmology, the gravitational collapse leads to an information paradox. The information about the objects swallowed by the 'black hole' not only remains behind its luminous horizon, but with time it should disappear as far as the black hole itself radiates, i.e. it evaporates. Here again advanced theoretical ideas are mixed with unprofessional ontological culture. Scientists work guided by everyday object intuitions, while they perform complex mathematical calculations over strict empirical data. The results, when they want to represent them not only in the form of equations and theoretical models, but also to a wide audience, need to be reformulated in natural language. However, I'll do attempt to follow a little more throughout this unimaginably complicated and at times misleading argumentation. What is information from the standpoint of 'holographic' cosmology? Surprisingly, the answer is simple and intuitively acceptable. Information is nothing but distinctions, differences between objects. But on what basis it can be argued that information, like matter and energy is eternal and indestructible? I could not find a sufficiently accessible concrete answer from the proponents of this idea, so I shall rather try to reconstruct it on the basis of theses and arguments of theirs. One answer, of course, is that it is a principle. Principles are applied and not argued. Clearly, in our 76 time, the era of information society, information should be attributed the same fundamental nature that matter and energy enjoyed in past epochs, and certainly today. Not to mention that after the works of Shannon and Wiener, this attitude towards information has gained a rigorous theoretical formulation. But if we look at the details of let us call it a cosmological, quantum, or holographic information theory we shall see other, perhaps even more powerful and original arguments. Who from this point of view is the carrier of the information about the holographic universe? That, as we are told is the surface of the 'black hole'. The argument is that a 'black hole' can contain as much information as can be recorded on its surface. The rationale for this I willingly submit to the authors of this thesis – for example Jacob Bekenstein and Leonard Susskind10. But I would venture to speculate over the minimum area on which one bit of information can be written down – the Plank area – a truly unattainable small surface, even compared with the size of elementary particles. – Perhaps, the recording on such a surface is truly 10 In 1971, Stephen Hawking showed that the total area of the event horizon of a random group of classical black holes can not decrease. This sounds very similar to the second law of thermodynamics, as the former area plays the role of entropy. Even earlier Jacob Bekenstein assumed that the entropy of a black hole is proportional to the surface area of its event horizon. In 1974, Hawking applied quantum field theory to semi-classical curved space-time and found that black holes can emit thermal radiation, known as Hawking radiation. This enabled him to calculate the entropy of the black hole, which really is proportional to its surface area, confirming the hypothesis of Bekenstein. (source Wikipedia http://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0% BD%D0%B0_%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BA%D0%B) 76 time, the era of information society, information should be attributed the same fundamental nature that matter and energy enjoyed in past epochs, and certainly today. Not to mention that after the works of Shannon and Wiener, this attitude towards information has gained a rigorous theoretical formulation. But if we look at the details of let us call it a cosmological, quantum, or holographic information theory we shall see other, perhaps even more powerful and original arguments. Who from this point of view is the carrier of the information about the holographic universe? That, as we are told is the surface of the 'black hole'. The argument is that a 'black hole' can contain as much information as can be recorded on its surface. The rationale for this I willingly submit to the authors of this thesis – for example Jacob Bekenstein and Leonard Susskind10. But I would venture to speculate over the minimum area on which one bit of information can be written down – the Plank area – a truly unattainable small surface, even compared with the size of elementary particles. – Perhaps, the recording on such a surface is truly 10 In 1971, Stephen Hawking showed that the total area of the event horizon of a random group of classical black holes can not decrease. This sounds very similar to the second law of thermodynamics, as the former area plays the role of entropy. Even earlier Jacob Bekenstein assumed that the entropy of a black hole is proportional to the surface area of its event horizon. In 1974, Hawking applied quantum field theory to semi-classical curved space-time and found that black holes can emit thermal radiation, known as Hawking radiation. This enabled him to calculate the entropy of the black hole, which really is proportional to its surface area, confirming the hypothesis of Bekenstein. (source Wikipedia http://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0% BD%D0%B0_%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BA%D0%B) 77 indestructible? Perhaps, in such scale quantum laws of classical thermodynamics actually cease to be valid and the information stored on such nano-carriers becomes truly eternal and indestructible? Perhaps we'll also find here an answer to the question of what happens with the information about the ingested into the 'black hole' of the past time: objects, structures, states, properties and qualities? 4. Bohm and Pribram Karl Pribram is an American neuropsychologist. He established a curious fact: in operations of lobotomy of rats, whatever part of their brain was to be cut, they retained their capacity to complete sensory and motor activity. This was true mystique for Pribram until he met physicist David Bohm, who was interested in the application of the holographic model with a very different purpose – the solution of problems of modern physics. The answer to Pribram's problem proved to be that such information is distributed on the cortex on a holographic pattern. It is known that whatever part of the hologram is to be cut, the projection displays the complete image of the photographed object. A cardinal contribution to the establishment of holonomic ideologeme (in mass, but also in scientific consciousness) belongs to the American author Michael Talbot (1953-1992). * * * Some open questions: The 'holographic Universe' is an attractive concept, but it is silent on the essentials: how do we perceive the things, incl. the holograms? – Because the hologram may be not a solid physical body, but it isn't a perception 78 either. It is a, though interesting from a physical viewpoint, phenomenon, but it certainly does not replace the subjective perception. If the holographic model is correct, then why natural objects are physical (corporeal), and are not disembodied holograms? It is true that there aren't photons in the visual brain centre. But why is it believed that only photons are associated with a sense of colour, rather than say the electrons? So much for the holonomic ideologeme. 78 either. It is a, though interesting from a physical viewpoint, phenomenon, but it certainly does not replace the subjective perception. If the holographic model is correct, then why natural objects are physical (corporeal), and are not disembodied holograms? It is true that there aren't photons in the visual brain centre. But why is it believed that only photons are associated with a sense of colour, rather than say the electrons? So much for the holonomic ideologeme. 79 Chapter 2: Computational ideologeme Introductory note: The reader, with interest and pleasure, will get acquainted with the innovative research of Alexander Lazarov on 'The digital world – construction and reality' (Lazarov, 2015), which for me was a source of information, research challenges and an example of what a philosopher should devote his strength and talent to nowadays. Lazarov constructs a steady social and cultural platform – that of information society, its: ideological, ontological, social, scientific, technological and theoretical framework that finds its authentic and effective expression in the electronic communication and the digital reality of today. Looking from this perspective, the very nature of the universe and that of human society is arranged so that the vector of their evolution necessarily points to the Digital reality. In view of the ontological prerequisites Lazarov focuses on the binary structure as a fundamental principle of ontic organization of physical reality (from the moment of the Big Bang on). In view of the civilizational and the cultural prerequisites, there stand out: social communication as a form of information exchange and the resulting strategic social interest in information as a phenomenon; in the logical and technical operations and procedures, as well as in the revolutionary development of technological tools for retrieving, storage, processing, transmission and interpretation of incomparably powerful and diverse stream of binary data in the socium; symbolic representation as a unique aspect of intelligent communication, leading to the establishment of the information communication as a specific social 80 sphere, which in the form of virtual reality increasingly dominates the other social domains of today. Lazarov departs from the Big Bang, which as Data explosion should rightly be called Bit Bang, and goes ahead to the wonders of modern digital technology. He does not seek a speculative connection and logic between the qualitative transitions in this alternative digital picture of reality and its evolution, and finds out the link in the actual, basic ontic structures (data bits), the symbolic nature of human communication, the main philosophical and scientific theories and the actual events in human history and the history of technology that have led to the triumph of digital reality and have outlined new horizons for the future of the intelligent agents. Lazarov's theses are solidly grounded and presented in a lively and fascinating philosophical language and style, and his research is already an event not only in our philosophical literature. This short presentation allows me to look, now from the perspective of an external observer, and trace my own approach: 1) Now it seems fragmented, one-sided and what is worse speculative in view of the real picture and the mainstream of the digital age. And also with an expired date as far as my approach does not account for the developments imposed by quantum information theory and information nanotechnologies; 2) In this work information is understood as a process, as a dynamic, not as a substrate (though fundamentally different from matter or energy) and not as a structure. Accordingly, the basis of information processes here are not binary structures (as in Seth Lloyd) but probabilities (as in Shannon and Brillouin). Information processes themselves and their effects here are displayed based 80 sphere, which in the form of virtual reality increasingly dominates the other social domains of today. Lazarov departs from the Big Bang, which as Data explosion should rightly be called Bit Bang, and goes ahead to the wonders of modern digital technology. He does not seek a speculative connection and logic between the qualitative transitions in this alternative digital picture of reality and its evolution, and finds out the link in the actual, basic ontic structures (data bits), the symbolic nature of human communication, the main philosophical and scientific theories and the actual events in human history and the history of technology that have led to the triumph of digital reality and have outlined new horizons for the future of the intelligent agents. Lazarov's theses are solidly grounded and presented in a lively and fascinating philosophical language and style, and his research is already an event not only in our philosophical literature. This short presentation allows me to look, now from the perspective of an external observer, and trace my own approach: 1) Now it seems fragmented, one-sided and what is worse speculative in view of the real picture and the mainstream of the digital age. And also with an expired date as far as my approach does not account for the developments imposed by quantum information theory and information nanotechnologies; 2) In this work information is understood as a process, as a dynamic, not as a substrate (though fundamentally different from matter or energy) and not as a structure. Accordingly, the basis of information processes here are not binary structures (as in Seth Lloyd) but probabilities (as in Shannon and Brillouin). Information processes themselves and their effects here are displayed based 81 on the transition to different levels of probability distributions of a system's dynamics. The probabilistic model of information starts from Shannon's mathematical theory of communication; Léon Brillouin subsequently built over it a physical theory of information, some of whose exciting results are to be discussed in this chapter yet. – I find the probabilistic model of information processes to be still productive and heuristic. It should be noted that: first the very binary structures Lloyd applies are actually quantum probability functions and, second, that Shannon's and Brillouin's theories are dating respectively from the 50s and the 60s of 20th c.; while Seth Lloyd, the creator of the engineering model of the quantum computer, is working in the paradigm of advanced quantum information theory11 and there, as expected, the best is yet to come. I should also emphasize Radnyo Dzanev's original theory of the physical vacuum, in particular – the introducing of imaginary components in it not only puts forward a credible alternative to the classical relativistic effects, but also gives an important place to information processes in such a complex reality.12 Dzanev's theory sets the scientific ontological framework of the conception of the mental image as a detachment from the real dimensions of causal reality through transition to imaginary physical coordinates and dimensions. Hence – the cognitive image is devoid of any real physical substrate and the connection of the subject with the 11 Lloyd, S., Programming the Universe: A Quantum Computer Scientist Takes On the Cosmos, Knopf, March 14, 2006, 240 p., ISBN 1-4000-4092-2 12 The momograph is also published:on https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B_jyRrHlBrSflhNV05nY0dRMFNCZVFHYTRLRE1MOUxTV2pBNkdlTD hHNWVYYzg0d25xb2c&usp=sharing 82 world is only informational, in which, as through an open window the world of objective reality reveals itself in front of the subject. I will also note the systematic, thorough and conducted in an environment of active international communication, interest and recognition Vasil Penchev's research in quantum information theory and quantum computation13. 3) I would define my own approach as 'mentalist', i.e. oriented not so much to artificial intelligence and technology as to natural (biological and human) intelligence. This approach is strongly influenced by the studies of Aristotel Gavrilov on consciousness and in particular his conception about the epistemological image. An additional accent, in the same direction, as we shall see, was imported by semiotics. This will be true in the presentation of computational ideologeme. So even here, when we talk about computations, or data processing in general, we shall look mostly for an answer to the question whether and how consciousness itself, the state of mental awareness can cope with the role and function of an 'information processor'. Background: Hobbs 'Computational ideologeme' apparently refers to the use of computers to achieve the stated objective. But the origin of the ideologeme dates back long before the advent of computers. The original version was referred to as 'calculational' ideologeme. This ideologeme is most often associated with the name of Leibniz. To Leibniz belongs the strategic idea to create a formal apparatus 13 A detailed information of the studies of the author can be obtained on: http://www.slideshare.net/vasil7penchev/ss15275499 82 world is only informational, in which, as through an open window the world of objective reality reveals itself in front of the subject. I will also note the systematic, thorough and conducted in an environment of active international communication, interest and recognition Vasil Penchev's research in quantum information theory and quantum computation13. 3) I would define my own approach as 'mentalist', i.e. oriented not so much to artificial intelligence and technology as to natural (biological and human) intelligence. This approach is strongly influenced by the studies of Aristotel Gavrilov on consciousness and in particular his conception about the epistemological image. An additional accent, in the same direction, as we shall see, was imported by semiotics. This will be true in the presentation of computational ideologeme. So even here, when we talk about computations, or data processing in general, we shall look mostly for an answer to the question whether and how consciousness itself, the state of mental awareness can cope with the role and function of an 'information processor'. Background: Hobbs 'Computational ideologeme' apparently refers to the use of computers to achieve the stated objective. But the origin of the ideologeme dates back long before the advent of computers. The original version was referred to as 'calculational' ideologeme. This ideologeme is most often associated with the name of Leibniz. To Leibniz belongs the strategic idea to create a formal apparatus 13 A detailed information of the studies of the author can be obtained on: http://www.slideshare.net/vasil7penchev/ss15275499 83 for calculation of mental operations in a manner identical with mathematical calculations. But when it comes to a philosophical exposé of the calculation ideologeme, Leibniz himself prefered to give the word to Thomas Hobbes and here we shall confidently follow his choice. The calculational approach to the nature of thinking is outlined by Hobbes, in a remarkably clear and compelling way, in his 'Leviathan'. Hobbs' thesis underwent a long and fruitful evolution to pass through the propositional calculus and be crowned with the triumph of computer science and digital technology of today. What is reasoning? Here is the original statement of Thomas Hobbes (1588 1679), developed in his 'Leviathan' (1651): "When man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another: which, if it be done by words, is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, as in numbers, besides adding and subtracting, men name other operations, as multiplying and dividing; yet they are the same: for multiplication is but adding together of things equal; and division, but subtracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers, so the geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and superficial), angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftness, force, power, and the like; the logicians teach the same in consequences of words, adding together two names to make an affirmation, and two affirmations to make a syllogism, and many 84 syllogisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, or conclusion of a syllogism, they subtract one proposition to find the other. Writers of politics add together pactions to find men's duties; and lawyers, laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place for reason; and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do." Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes. Chapter V Of Reason and Science https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/c hapter5.html Too much time has passed since the rise of the fundamental thesis of Hobbes about the calculational nature of thinking; it has been further elaborated by its philosophical proponents; propositional calculus appeared that formulates far more specific and strict prerequisites and operations. But we shall not discuss the precision and the remarkable evolution of Hobbes' thesis; we assume that (despite the obvious limitations) it is essentially a very successful epistemological and methodological model (e.g. in computer science and digital technology); a model, which is gaining yet novel and bold dimensions: Thus, in search of such novel, cutting-edge solutions computer scientists seriously consider to develop the trend of biocomputation – computers whose processors have biological nature – e.g. DNA computers. In the early '90 of the twentieth century researchers began exploring the possibility of using the ability of DNA to store and process information beyond the borders of biology. In 1994 a principle study in the US showed that DNA can be used to solve mathematical problems. To date research on DNA computers is primarily engaged in 84 syllogisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, or conclusion of a syllogism, they subtract one proposition to find the other. Writers of politics add together pactions to find men's duties; and lawyers, laws and facts to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, in what matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place for reason; and where these have no place, there reason has nothing at all to do." Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes. Chapter V Of Reason and Science https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/c hapter5.html Too much time has passed since the rise of the fundamental thesis of Hobbes about the calculational nature of thinking; it has been further elaborated by its philosophical proponents; propositional calculus appeared that formulates far more specific and strict prerequisites and operations. But we shall not discuss the precision and the remarkable evolution of Hobbes' thesis; we assume that (despite the obvious limitations) it is essentially a very successful epistemological and methodological model (e.g. in computer science and digital technology); a model, which is gaining yet novel and bold dimensions: Thus, in search of such novel, cutting-edge solutions computer scientists seriously consider to develop the trend of biocomputation – computers whose processors have biological nature – e.g. DNA computers. In the early '90 of the twentieth century researchers began exploring the possibility of using the ability of DNA to store and process information beyond the borders of biology. In 1994 a principle study in the US showed that DNA can be used to solve mathematical problems. To date research on DNA computers is primarily engaged in 85 the study of processes in cells that can be seen as logical calculations and only then to seek how to use these calculations in our favour. The first DNA computer Leonard Adelman, professor of computer science and molecular biology at the University of Southern California, USA, is a pioneer in the field, who built the first DNA-based computer (LM Adleman, Science 266, 1021-102; 1994 [PubMed]). Intrigued by the huge capacity of the DNA molecule to store information in a very small space, he set out to solve a classic mathematical puzzle – the so-called 'Hamilton path' problem, better known as the 'travelling salesman problem'. This is a seemingly simple puzzle – a vendor should visit a number of cities that are connected by a limited range of roads without passing through any city more than once. Even the most powerful supercomputers will take years to calculate the optimal route for 50 settlements. Adelman solved the problem for seven settlements within one second, using DNA molecules in a standard tube. He presented each of the seven cities as separate, single-stranded DNA molecules, 20 nucleotides long, and all possible routes between the cities as DNA molecules composed of the last ten nucleotides of the city of departure and the first ten nucleotides of the city of arrival. The mixing of the DNA strands with DNA ligase and adenosine triphosphate (ATP) generates all possible random paths between the cities. The majority of these roads however, were not applicable to the situation – they were too long or too short, or they did not start or finish in the correct city. Then Eydalman filtered all roads that neither started nor ended with the right molecule and those without the required length and composition. All other DNA molecules represented a solution. 86 Source: Computing with DNA. Jack Parker. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC131581 9/ . EMBO Rep. 2003 Jan; 4(1): 7–10. doi: 10.1038/sj.embor.embor719. PMCID: PMC1315819 Ehud Shapiro's Molecular Turing machine One such demonstration of this objective is achieved by the group of Ehud Shapiro at the Weizmann Institute in Israel who built a programmable and autonomous computing machine made of biomolecules. It is modelled on the hypothetical Turing machine, developed by the British mathematician Alan Turing (1912-54) in 1936 – a device that converts information from one form to another, operating with a terminal sequence of characters. Shapiro's machine uses two 'inputs''. Based on a series of rules for the transition, the machine changes its internal state according to the current state and input until it reaches the 'end state' when all inputs are processed. Shapiro's 'Automater' uses restriction endonucleases and a ligase as 'hardware' in order to change the state of the machine, and a double stranded DNA as inputs and transition rules. The DNA 'software' is constantly ligated and cut by the enzymes until it reaches a final state – a certain sticky end – to which it is ligated with the DNA-'reporter', and thus the calculation is terminated. Source: (Y. Benenson et al. Nature 414, 430-434; 2001 [PMC free article] [PubMed]), And here is news from 'Nature' (June 2013): "Plants perform molecular mathematics. Arithmetic division directs use of energy from the plant at night." Plants do so that the reserves of starch produced by them during the day could withstand almost exactly to dawn. Until recently, scientists thought that starch is 86 Source: Computing with DNA. Jack Parker. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC131581 9/ . EMBO Rep. 2003 Jan; 4(1): 7–10. doi: 10.1038/sj.embor.embor719. PMCID: PMC1315819 Ehud Shapiro's Molecular Turing machine One such demonstration of this objective is achieved by the group of Ehud Shapiro at the Weizmann Institute in Israel who built a programmable and autonomous computing machine made of biomolecules. It is modelled on the hypothetical Turing machine, developed by the British mathematician Alan Turing (1912-54) in 1936 – a device that converts information from one form to another, operating with a terminal sequence of characters. Shapiro's machine uses two 'inputs''. Based on a series of rules for the transition, the machine changes its internal state according to the current state and input until it reaches the 'end state' when all inputs are processed. Shapiro's 'Automater' uses restriction endonucleases and a ligase as 'hardware' in order to change the state of the machine, and a double stranded DNA as inputs and transition rules. The DNA 'software' is constantly ligated and cut by the enzymes until it reaches a final state – a certain sticky end – to which it is ligated with the DNA-'reporter', and thus the calculation is terminated. Source: (Y. Benenson et al. Nature 414, 430-434; 2001 [PMC free article] [PubMed]), And here is news from 'Nature' (June 2013): "Plants perform molecular mathematics. Arithmetic division directs use of energy from the plant at night." Plants do so that the reserves of starch produced by them during the day could withstand almost exactly to dawn. Until recently, scientists thought that starch is 87 broken down with the same fixed rate throughout the whole night. However, it was found that the small weed Arabidopsis thaliana can calculate the speed of decomposition in progress when exposed to unusually early or late night. The team of Alison Smith and Martin Howard from John Ince centre, in Norwich, UK, believes that the base is a complex molecular calculation. Scientists assume that there are two molecules: S, which shows how much starch remains and T, which informs of the time remaining until dawn. They have found a mutant of Arabidopsis thaliana, which cannot change the rate of consumption of starch in response to the particular situation. This suggests that the mutated gene, PWD, regulates this response in normal individuals and may be an important factor in the molecular calculations of the plant. (Ledford, 2013) Recently the idea whether the universe is a giant computer is also seriously discussed; i.e. calculations are extrapolated on the physical world. (Zenil, 2012) This requires looking in more detail at the relationship between energy and information in the light of some recent research results: Landauer's principle Roughly speaking, the Landauer's principle holds that at the erasing of one bit of information a specific amount of heat should be released. (Source Wikipedia) Recently this principle has been experimentally proven by a team of Austrian, French and German scientists. In this experiment, a tiny silica beed fluctuates with equal probability between two energy wells (states 0 and 1). Thus, the bead models an information system storing 1 bit of information. The bead is controlled by optical queezers and is made to occupy only one of the 88 two equally possible energetic states. This turns its probabilistic distribution equal to 1 and thus the 1 bit of information, which characterizes the experimental system, is erased. The erasure is coupled with tjhe release of a certain very small amount of heat, which is very close to the theoretical value, predicted in the Landauer's principle. Shoichi Toyabe's experiment: Information converted to energy Although the basic content of Professor Shoichi Toyabe's experiment was outlined and considered more than once, I allow myself to reproduce an essential part of the exciting article by Edwin Cartlidge, published in Physics world: ^The experiment consisted of a 0.3 μm-diameter particle made up of two polystyrene beads that was pinned to a single point on the underside of the top of a glass box containing an aqueous solution. The shape of an applied electric field forced the particle to rotate in one direction or, in other words, to fall down the potential-energy staircase. Buffered by the molecules in the solution, however, the particle every so often rotated slightly in the opposite direction, allowing it to take a step upwards. By tracking the particle's motion using a video camera and then using image-analysis software to identify when the particle had rotated against the field, the researchers were able to raise the metaphorical barrier behind it by inverting the field's phase. In this way they could gradually raise the potential of the particle even though they had not imparted any energy to it directly. 88 two equally possible energetic states. This turns its probabilistic distribution equal to 1 and thus the 1 bit of information, which characterizes the experimental system, is erased. The erasure is coupled with tjhe release of a certain very small amount of heat, which is very close to the theoretical value, predicted in the Landauer's principle. Shoichi Toyabe's experiment: Information converted to energy Although the basic content of Professor Shoichi Toyabe's experiment was outlined and considered more than once, I allow myself to reproduce an essential part of the exciting article by Edwin Cartlidge, published in Physics world: ^The experiment consisted of a 0.3 μm-diameter particle made up of two polystyrene beads that was pinned to a single point on the underside of the top of a glass box containing an aqueous solution. The shape of an applied electric field forced the particle to rotate in one direction or, in other words, to fall down the potential-energy staircase. Buffered by the molecules in the solution, however, the particle every so often rotated slightly in the opposite direction, allowing it to take a step upwards. By tracking the particle's motion using a video camera and then using image-analysis software to identify when the particle had rotated against the field, the researchers were able to raise the metaphorical barrier behind it by inverting the field's phase. In this way they could gradually raise the potential of the particle even though they had not imparted any energy to it directly. 89 Quantifiable breakthrough In recent years other groups have shown that collections of particles can be rearranged so as to reduce their entropy without providing them with energy directly. The breakthrough in the latest work is to have quantified the conversion of information to energy. By measuring the particle's degree of rotation against the field, Toyabe and colleagues found that they could convert the equivalent of one bit information to 0.28 kTln2 of energy or, in other words, that they could exploit more than a quarter of the information's energy content." Source: http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2010/nov/19/ information-converted-to-energy * * * There are informational interactions in the world, besides the causal ones, as well. Modern science interprets and explores information in terms of thermodynamics. More precisely as entropy reversed – negentropy. It considers informational processes as thermodynamic and more generally as probabilistic. Information is regarded most frequently as encoded in the probabilistic thermal fluctuations of the microparticles, which may have either a zero or a nonzero value. Information processes themselves are those in which a work is done or heat is produced that is not related not with the change of the current physical structure, but of the probability distributions of the behaviour of the dynamical system. 90 Information processes can be interpreted both thermodynamically and epistemologically: From a thermodynamic point of view Information interactions are associated with the energetic effects, leading to a change of the probability distributions of some dynamics. Basically, they are related to the reduction, or vice versa – the increase in the degrees of freedom of the dynamic behaviour of the system. The reduction of the degrees of freedom is accomplished by disposing of entropy in the environment; this from a thermodynamic point of view is equivalent to release of heat. In contrast, the increasing of the degrees of freedom is equivalent to an increase of the entropy of the system, which requires its 'heating' with external energy. This process is equivalent to the process of change of the phases of the aggregate state of water. We know that freezing water releases heat, while the melting of ice requires additional heat. Note that the heat does not lead to the increase or decrease of the water temperature; ice at 0° C absorbs this heat and is converted into liquid water at the same temperature of 0° C. This is the heat associated with the change in the probability distribution of the degrees of freedom of the thermodynamic system; or in others words, it is heat, related with the change in the information state, the negentropy of that thermodynamic system. For more detailed information: The enthalpy of fusion of a substance, also known as (latent) heat of fusion, is the change in its enthalpy resulting from providing energy, typically heat, to a specific quantity of the substance to change its state from a solid to a liquid at constant pressure. When a body is heated its temperature rises for the sole reason that the kinetic energy of the thermal motions of the constituent particles of that body is increased. However, this does not apply to the absorption of heat during melting. In this case, the temperature of this 90 Information processes can be interpreted both thermodynamically and epistemologically: From a thermodynamic point of view Information interactions are associated with the energetic effects, leading to a change of the probability distributions of some dynamics. Basically, they are related to the reduction, or vice versa – the increase in the degrees of freedom of the dynamic behaviour of the system. The reduction of the degrees of freedom is accomplished by disposing of entropy in the environment; this from a thermodynamic point of view is equivalent to release of heat. In contrast, the increasing of the degrees of freedom is equivalent to an increase of the entropy of the system, which requires its 'heating' with external energy. This process is equivalent to the process of change of the phases of the aggregate state of water. We know that freezing water releases heat, while the melting of ice requires additional heat. Note that the heat does not lead to the increase or decrease of the water temperature; ice at 0° C absorbs this heat and is converted into liquid water at the same temperature of 0° C. This is the heat associated with the change in the probability distribution of the degrees of freedom of the thermodynamic system; or in others words, it is heat, related with the change in the information state, the negentropy of that thermodynamic system. For more detailed information: The enthalpy of fusion of a substance, also known as (latent) heat of fusion, is the change in its enthalpy resulting from providing energy, typically heat, to a specific quantity of the substance to change its state from a solid to a liquid at constant pressure. When a body is heated its temperature rises for the sole reason that the kinetic energy of the thermal motions of the constituent particles of that body is increased. However, this does not apply to the absorption of heat during melting. In this case, the temperature of this 91 substance is not changed. The most simple example is given by an ice cube: when heating this ice cube with a starting temperature of say -40 ° C and with a mass of 0,1 kg, then its temperature gradually increases until it reaches the melting point, which is 0° C, then the cube ice begins to melt, but at the time of melting, though the ice cube continues to absorb heat, its temperature does not change until it is not completely melted; it's only then that this ice cube, already in liquid form as water, begins to raise its temperature again. Enthalpy of fusion is represented by the Greek letter λ (lambda) to yield the formula λ=Q/m, i.e. by enthalpy of fusion is meant the amount of heat (Q), necessary for melting of a crystalline solid with mass m = 1 kg, after the melting point of this crystal is reached." (Source Wikipedia) * * * To take a brief look at the epistemological side of the information processes: What the cognitive process is doing is that, by acting on the probability distributions of the information flow, it leads to the elimination of their uncertainty, hence to an extraordinary reduction of their entriopy. This may ultimately lead to a unique state of informational openness of the objective reality to a subject, conscious of it, perceiving and feeling it,. In more detail, we shall pause on some epistemological aspects of information processes at the end of the book, in Part IV: Challenges Chapter 2. Romantic information theory and modern physics of information. So much for the computational ideologeme. 92 Bibliography: Lazarov, Alexander (2015). The Digital World – Construction and Reality. LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 208 p. ISBN – 10: 3659711551, ISBN – 13: 978-3659711558 R.I. Dzanev (2004). Vacuum theory, Publishing complex of Military Academy G.S. Rakovsky, Sofia http://rnda.armf.bg/wpcontent/uploads/000s/EN/Activities/Publication/Dza nev.php Accessed: February 10, 2016 92 Bibliography: Lazarov, Alexander (2015). The Digital World – Construction and Reality. LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 208 p. ISBN – 10: 3659711551, ISBN – 13: 978-3659711558 R.I. Dzanev (2004). Vacuum theory, Publishing complex of Military Academy G.S. Rakovsky, Sofia http://rnda.armf.bg/wpcontent/uploads/000s/EN/Activities/Publication/Dza nev.php Accessed: February 10, 2016 93 PART III: CONSCIOUSNESS IN A SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVE: INDUCTIVE INTERACTIONS Synopsis: To the concept of Gavrilov and the developed by today's science holonomic and computational models of consciousness we'll add a fourth – semiotic model. The formulated hypotheses has its basis in the booming semiotics and biosemiotics as separate disciplines, as well as their endorsement as one of the leading paradigms of modern science and culture, along with that of complexity. 94 Chapter 1: The inductive interactions – the missing link between causal processes and intelligent behaviour Synopsis: This section focuses on the missing link within this still insuperable conceptual gap between natural causality and semiosis. In particular, it will address the inductive interactions: context–based interactions in which an object does not respond to the direct impact of a certain physical agent, but rather to the transformed meaning which this agent acquires in the interaction context. A very simple instance of such interaction is the electric current, induced in a metal contour due to its mechanical movement in a magnetic field. The same principle however holds for the intracellular signal transduction chains and also underlies the dynamics of conditioned reflexes. What is essential here is that the environmental context in the latter cases ascribes a totally new meaning to the original physical agent, which hence is interpreted as a mere sign, while the resulting interaction turns itself into a proto-semiotic communication. Keywords: causality; semiosis; electromagnetic induction; signal transduction; adaptive behaviour 94 Chapter 1: The inductive interactions – the missing link between causal processes and intelligent behaviour Synopsis: This section focuses on the missing link within this still insuperable conceptual gap between natural causality and semiosis. In particular, it will address the inductive interactions: context–based interactions in which an object does not respond to the direct impact of a certain physical agent, but rather to the transformed meaning which this agent acquires in the interaction context. A very simple instance of such interaction is the electric current, induced in a metal contour due to its mechanical movement in a magnetic field. The same principle however holds for the intracellular signal transduction chains and also underlies the dynamics of conditioned reflexes. What is essential here is that the environmental context in the latter cases ascribes a totally new meaning to the original physical agent, which hence is interpreted as a mere sign, while the resulting interaction turns itself into a proto-semiotic communication. Keywords: causality; semiosis; electromagnetic induction; signal transduction; adaptive behaviour 95 1.1. Blind Causality There was time when nature was dead, and blind causality undisputedly reigned in the Universe: Agents encountered themselves and destroyed themselves in a physical or chemical manner. There was also self-organization; order was sometimes increased in equilibrium or nonequilibrium phase transitions. But it was all difference in the outward appearance – static or dynamical, orderly or chaotic, physical nature remained equally dead and blind. – And, all of a sudden, as if for no apparent reason, nature substituted causality with acts of meaning... 1.2. Adaptive behaviour The agents began to act adaptively. Their behaviour became consistent with the context in which it occurred: Imagine a planet moving aside to prevent itself from a meteorite pouncing on it; or, throwing satellites at it, in order to push it out of orbit; or, how an amoeba reacts if an aggressive chemical penetrates into its environment... Had it not been an amoeba but a nonliving substrate – the inevitable result is a chemical interaction, which terminates both the chemical and the substrate. – While the amoeba simply flees away from the aggressor, whereupon both remain intact. – The so called 'fight or flight response' – so characteristic of living beings and unthinkable in purely physical settings. Whatever we say about Le-Chatelier-Brown homeostatic or Belousov-Zhabotinski auto-catalytic chemical reactions, nothing even slightly resembling an adaptive 'fight or flight response' occurs there. I bet that even the most advanced chemistry of self-organization will never witness the escape of one chemical at the very sight of another. – Or, the other way round, a chemical agent 96 chasing another one within the laboratory in a predatorprey manner. 1.3. Significance Why do things have significance for us? If a bull enters into a china shop, this doesn't matter at all for the sets of porcelain; as for the bull, I guess that this is just a curious experience; while for the store owner the connotation is crucial. The driver always turns if an obstacle pops up unexpectedly in front of him; or, he hits the brakes to protect both himself and the pedestrian/oncoming vehicle. Why is self-preservation so important for intelligent subjects? Take a statue – let it be Michelangelo's David, or the Venus de Milo. And take a very humble person unknown to anyone. That the hands of the Venus de Milo are broken does not matter to her. Whatever part of this unrivalled excellence in marble sculptures – David – is cropped off – it is devoid of any significance for this statue. The matters stand completely differently with our seemingly unassuming subject. Even if a hair falls from his head, this could evoke quite unexpected and undesired reactions in him. It is of great significance for ourselves whether we'll continue to exist and in what a way – whether while alive we'll succeed in satisfying our needs and realizing our goals. But why and how is that possible? When the firewood has burnt up, the fire just goes out. That the external supply of energy is dried up, and that it would be therefore extinguished, has absolutely no significance to the fire. When the energy reserves of the living body are depleted, it is severely starved; it immediately takes up the demand for fresh addition. Why does the energy potential of the fire bear no semiotic 96 chasing another one within the laboratory in a predatorprey manner. 1.3. Significance Why do things have significance for us? If a bull enters into a china shop, this doesn't matter at all for the sets of porcelain; as for the bull, I guess that this is just a curious experience; while for the store owner the connotation is crucial. The driver always turns if an obstacle pops up unexpectedly in front of him; or, he hits the brakes to protect both himself and the pedestrian/oncoming vehicle. Why is self-preservation so important for intelligent subjects? Take a statue – let it be Michelangelo's David, or the Venus de Milo. And take a very humble person unknown to anyone. That the hands of the Venus de Milo are broken does not matter to her. Whatever part of this unrivalled excellence in marble sculptures – David – is cropped off – it is devoid of any significance for this statue. The matters stand completely differently with our seemingly unassuming subject. Even if a hair falls from his head, this could evoke quite unexpected and undesired reactions in him. It is of great significance for ourselves whether we'll continue to exist and in what a way – whether while alive we'll succeed in satisfying our needs and realizing our goals. But why and how is that possible? When the firewood has burnt up, the fire just goes out. That the external supply of energy is dried up, and that it would be therefore extinguished, has absolutely no significance to the fire. When the energy reserves of the living body are depleted, it is severely starved; it immediately takes up the demand for fresh addition. Why does the energy potential of the fire bear no semiotic 97 correlations to its dynamics? Why did such correlations emerge and what are they due to in living beings? To say that intelligent systems are animate, and this makes their difference from the non-living physical or chemical substrates, is to say nothing. This means to attribute the difference to the divine spark that illuminates the animate subjects. People have committed the Great October socialist revolution; they have discovered special relativity, quantum mechanics and chaos theory; they have invented the TV, the computer, the A bomb, the laser, the Internet and Dolly the sheep; they have walked on the Moon; it's high time for the origins and nature of life and its meaning. 1.4. Semiosis Intelligent agents are not physical but are semiotic entities. The complexity of intelligent agents is semiotic complexity: Fig. 5. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference. Frege (1892) Sign (Zeichen) Reference (Bedeutung) Sense (Sinn) 98 For the convenience of the reader, above, we reproduce again Frege's triangle of reference14 (1892), which we already met in Chapter 1 of Part I (see. Fig. 1). While in the physical world we have interactions only between natural causal agents, in the world of the living, intelligent systems, the 'object' breaks down into something more complicated, which is presented in the above scheme. What was in the physical world an inanimate agent now becomes nothing more than a sign. This sign, however, is subject to semiotic interpretation in which it is assigned a certain objective reference that, in turn, is mentally experienced as a certain concept (sense). In a purely physical interaction, if say a stone strikes upon a stone, the interaction will be entirely subject to the principles of Newtonian mechanics. In a semiotic communication, on the other hand, the interaction is subordinated to the principle of interpretation. The physical agent is seen only as a sign, or to be more precise – a signal. The intelligent subject doesn't respond to the immediate physical parameters of the signal's impact, but rather to the reference he has ascribed to the signal through the meaningful act of semiotic interpretation. From a physical point of view the 'signal' is nothing more than a common physical process. Each physical process, each physical agent may under certain conditions turn into an information signal. However, for this purpose, we must leave the context of causal, 14 Frege's complete definition goes like that: 'To make short and exact expressions possible, let the following phraseology be established: A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference.' 98 For the convenience of the reader, above, we reproduce again Frege's triangle of reference14 (1892), which we already met in Chapter 1 of Part I (see. Fig. 1). While in the physical world we have interactions only between natural causal agents, in the world of the living, intelligent systems, the 'object' breaks down into something more complicated, which is presented in the above scheme. What was in the physical world an inanimate agent now becomes nothing more than a sign. This sign, however, is subject to semiotic interpretation in which it is assigned a certain objective reference that, in turn, is mentally experienced as a certain concept (sense). In a purely physical interaction, if say a stone strikes upon a stone, the interaction will be entirely subject to the principles of Newtonian mechanics. In a semiotic communication, on the other hand, the interaction is subordinated to the principle of interpretation. The physical agent is seen only as a sign, or to be more precise – a signal. The intelligent subject doesn't respond to the immediate physical parameters of the signal's impact, but rather to the reference he has ascribed to the signal through the meaningful act of semiotic interpretation. From a physical point of view the 'signal' is nothing more than a common physical process. Each physical process, each physical agent may under certain conditions turn into an information signal. However, for this purpose, we must leave the context of causal, 14 Frege's complete definition goes like that: 'To make short and exact expressions possible, let the following phraseology be established: A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference.' 99 energetic physical forces and interactions and introduce this agent in a new, semiotic context. Here, the physical process-signal is the herald of another agent that is really relevant to the recipient of the signal. The very response of the recipient is no longer based on the third principle of Newtonian mechanics. The recipient responds to the reference of the acting signal, which is reached after a complex interpretation. – The physical parameters of the signal are not of any special importance for the recipient. What do determine the strength of his response are actually the parameters of the signal's reference, which is ascribed within the communication's settings. – It is sufficient that the citizen that has involuntarily stepped on our foot in the tram apologizes and we almost immediately forget about his misdemeanour. But we never ignore the insult or the threat, or a compliment, even though murmured in a whisper. Physical interactions can also be called causal or energetic. They are confined to the effects of the energetic action of certain physical forces (agents), governed by specific, peculiar to them, physical laws. Fig. 6. Physical interaction Agents in semiotic interactions are signals. Signals are also physical or chemical agents, but their impact is not causal. – First, prior to the behavioural response, the signal is captured by a (specific for it) receptor. The behaviour performed by the relevant effector organ is also preceded by a complex chain of signals transmitted along a reflex arc. This signal transmission is nothing but Cause Effect 100 processing of the incoming information signals, or in other words – their meaningful interpretation. Fig. 7. Semiotic interaction based on a complex reflex arc 1.5. Induction A meaning is ascribed to an entity through a semiotic act. But where does the semiotic act itself come from? How to get from causality to semiosis? From blind causality to meaningful behaviour? Shall we let the answer to creationism? Or to emergent evolution? Or shall we search for the missing natural link? Now, we have to make the more difficult transition and to return from semiotics to the true and only reality – that of physics. – Whatever it is in the world of meanings and senses, it has a substantial basis in the world of fundamental physical forces and their causal interactions. Looking historically, semiotic interpretation has not appeared elsewhere and not from somewhere else, but from the universe of the fundamental physical interactions. signal receptor nerve centre effector organ interpretation 100 processing of the incoming information signals, or in other words – their meaningful interpretation. Fig. 7. Semiotic interaction based on a complex reflex arc 1.5. Induction A meaning is ascribed to an entity through a semiotic act. But where does the semiotic act itself come from? How to get from causality to semiosis? From blind causality to meaningful behaviour? Shall we let the answer to creationism? Or to emergent evolution? Or shall we search for the missing natural link? Now, we have to make the more difficult transition and to return from semiotics to the true and only reality – that of physics. – Whatever it is in the world of meanings and senses, it has a substantial basis in the world of fundamental physical forces and their causal interactions. Looking historically, semiotic interpretation has not appeared elsewhere and not from somewhere else, but from the universe of the fundamental physical interactions. signal receptor nerve centre effector organ interpretation 101 So now we must find at least one physical process that could be a physical prologue, or prototype, of semiotic interpretation.15 1.5.1. First, we shall examine the case of electromagnetic induction: Fig. 8. The movement of a metal wire in a magnetic field ascribes a new reference to it. The movement of the metal loop in the magnetic field induces, 'ascribes' a new reference (meaning) to it. From a mechanical item, it turns into an agent of an electromagnetic interaction. It is not the initially active agent (the mechanical movement of the metal loop), but the new reference it acquires within the context of the magnetic field, that affects the arrow of the ammeter. Within this new, inductive, pro-semiotic context, the original agent turns into a mere sign, while the true agent 15 For convenience, we shall allow ourselves to reduce the aspect of mentality from the above semiotic scheme. Preserving just the sign and its reference does not remove its adequacy, as long as the basic principle of semiotics – the moment of interpretation – is preserved. 102 of the impact on the ammeter is the new reference16 that the electromagnetic induction assigns to it. Fig. 9. Semiotic interaction 1.5.2. Second, we shall consider signal transduction – the best-studied inductive interaction in biological systems: The process of induction in the physical and in the biological systems is in effect the same. It is in both cases an alternative to causal interactions. While causal interaction is always limited to the production of effects, the inductive processes both in the inanimate and the living world are targeted at the production of new references (meanings) of the objects of their impact. Despite their general kinship with the induction in the physical world, inductive interactions in biochemistry have their own complex specificity, which we shall follow within the process of signal transduction in living cells. There is no process in a living organism that is not mediated by the transmission and interpretation of biochemical signals. Even the passage of water molecules through the cell walls is not of a causal, 16 Here and elsewhere in this communication 'meaning' is synonymous with 'reference'. induction agent – sign agent – reference effect 102 of the impact on the ammeter is the new reference16 that the electromagnetic induction assigns to it. Fig. 9. Semiotic interaction 1.5.2. Second, we shall consider signal transduction – the best-studied inductive interaction in biological systems: The process of induction in the physical and in the biological systems is in effect the same. It is in both cases an alternative to causal interactions. While causal interaction is always limited to the production of effects, the inductive processes both in the inanimate and the living world are targeted at the production of new references (meanings) of the objects of their impact. Despite their general kinship with the induction in the physical world, inductive interactions in biochemistry have their own complex specificity, which we shall follow within the process of signal transduction in living cells. There is no process in a living organism that is not mediated by the transmission and interpretation of biochemical signals. Even the passage of water molecules through the cell walls is not of a causal, 16 Here and elsewhere in this communication 'meaning' is synonymous with 'reference'. induction agent – sign agent – reference effect 103 osmotic nature, but rather occurs through specific channels, controlled by biochemical signals. The living body is not a flask in which simmer turbulent biochemical reactions. The picture is different: each biochemical reaction is mediated by an enzyme provided with a receptor, which switches itself upon the recognition of a specific chemical signal; the product of this response is again a chemical signal which is detected by the receptors on another enzyme that converts chemical intermediates into the following chemical signal. Fig. 10. Life metabolism as signal transduction s i g n a l 1 e n z y m e 1 re ce pt or 1 pr od uc t 1 = s i g n a l 2 s i g n a l 2 e n z y m e 2 re ce pt or 2 pr od uc t 2 = s i g n a l 3 s i g n a l 3 e n z y m e 3 re ce pt or 3 pr od uc t 3 = s i g n a l 4 ... 104 Signal transduction proceeds in the following basic path: A signal (ligand 17) is recognized by a receptor and binds to it. The binding induces a conformation in the receptor molecule, which in turn switches a specific cell protein into an active state. This protein binds with the regulatory centre of a specific enzyme and induces a conformation in its structure, followed by a change in its function, which in turn induces structural conformation and functional change in the next unit of the signal transduction chain. "Dispersed on the outer surface of the cell are the molecular antennas known as receptors, which detect an incoming messenger and activate a signal pathway that ultimately regulates a cellular process such as secretion, contraction, metabolism or growth. The major barrier to the flow of information is the cell's plasma membrane, where transduction mechanisms translate external signals into internal signals, which are carried by 'second messengers'. In molecular terms the process depends on a series of proteins within the cell membrane, each of which transmits information by inducing a conformational change – an alteration in shape and therefore in function – in the protein next in line. At some point the information is assigned to small molecules or even ions within the cell's cytoplasm. They are the second messengers, whose diffusion 17 In biochemistry and pharmacology, a ligand is a substance that forms a complex with a biomolecule to serve a biological purpose. In protein-ligand binding, the ligand is usually a signal-triggering molecule binding to a site on a target protein. The binding typically results in a change of conformation of the target protein. In DNA-ligand binding studies, the ligand can be a small molecule, ion or protein that binds to the DNA double helix. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ligand_(biochemistry 104 Signal transduction proceeds in the following basic path: A signal (ligand 17) is recognized by a receptor and binds to it. The binding induces a conformation in the receptor molecule, which in turn switches a specific cell protein into an active state. This protein binds with the regulatory centre of a specific enzyme and induces a conformation in its structure, followed by a change in its function, which in turn induces structural conformation and functional change in the next unit of the signal transduction chain. "Dispersed on the outer surface of the cell are the molecular antennas known as receptors, which detect an incoming messenger and activate a signal pathway that ultimately regulates a cellular process such as secretion, contraction, metabolism or growth. The major barrier to the flow of information is the cell's plasma membrane, where transduction mechanisms translate external signals into internal signals, which are carried by 'second messengers'. In molecular terms the process depends on a series of proteins within the cell membrane, each of which transmits information by inducing a conformational change – an alteration in shape and therefore in function – in the protein next in line. At some point the information is assigned to small molecules or even ions within the cell's cytoplasm. They are the second messengers, whose diffusion 17 In biochemistry and pharmacology, a ligand is a substance that forms a complex with a biomolecule to serve a biological purpose. In protein-ligand binding, the ligand is usually a signal-triggering molecule binding to a site on a target protein. The binding typically results in a change of conformation of the target protein. In DNA-ligand binding studies, the ligand can be a small molecule, ion or protein that binds to the DNA double helix. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ligand_(biochemistry 105 enables the signal to propagate rapidly throughout the cell. [...] The major signal pathways are now known. One employs the second-messenger cyclic adenosine monophosphate (cyclic AMP). The other employs a combination of second messengers that includes calcium ions and two sub-stances, inositol triphosphate (IP3) and diacylglycerol (DG), whose origin is remarkable: they are cannibalized from the plasma membrane itself. [...] In both paths however, the final stages are similar: the second messengers induce cellular proteins to change their structure. [...] There are two main ways in which second messengers function. In one of them the second messenger acts directly. It binds to the protein (specifically, it binds to the 'regulatory component of the protein') and thus triggers a conformational change. A classic example is found in skeletal muscle. There are second messenger calcium binds to the protein troponin C, triggering a conformational change that leads to the contraction of the muscle. In the alternative, more common mechanism the second messenger acts indirectly: it activates an enzyme called protein kinase, which then phosphorilates a protein. The phosphorilation (that is the addition of a phosphate group) induces the protein to change its shape." (Berridge, 1985, 124) The forces underlying the signal transduction are of a various nature, such as: hydrogen bonding, ionic interactions, Van Der Waals forces, and hydrophobic packing. (Lodish et al., 2003, 30) In other words, physically they are quite different from electromagnetic induction considered in the previous subsection. What is essential about induction, however, regardless of its particular physical mechanism, is that it remains in all cases a non-causal, pro-semiotic act, 106 which is targeted at attributing new objective references, new meanings to the objects of its physical impact. Induction continues to be at the core of highly developed semiotic mechanisms, underlying advanced intelligent behaviour. Thus, conditioned reflexes, for instance, are nothing but an inductive mechanism that converts the original neutral meaning of a signal into one bearing a vital biological relevance, as manifested in Pavlov's paradigmatic experiment. Induction is, generally considered, a mechanism of converting meanings of interacting agents, depending on the interaction context. This is what was observed starting from electromagnetic induction, through cell signal transduction, to conditioned reflexes. Next we turn to the adaptive significance of the signal transduction as a biological inductive process. 106 which is targeted at attributing new objective references, new meanings to the objects of its physical impact. Induction continues to be at the core of highly developed semiotic mechanisms, underlying advanced intelligent behaviour. Thus, conditioned reflexes, for instance, are nothing but an inductive mechanism that converts the original neutral meaning of a signal into one bearing a vital biological relevance, as manifested in Pavlov's paradigmatic experiment. Induction is, generally considered, a mechanism of converting meanings of interacting agents, depending on the interaction context. This is what was observed starting from electromagnetic induction, through cell signal transduction, to conditioned reflexes. Next we turn to the adaptive significance of the signal transduction as a biological inductive process. 107 Chapter 2. Interpretation and adaptation 2.1. Interpretation The receptor can be likened to a switch, a button. Our action upon a button is not intended to cause a qualitative change in the button, but just to switch it to a new active or inactive state. We merely attribute a new reference to the button through our impact. What we actually do is to induce, ascribe a new objective reference to it. This is what induction is always about, regardless of its physical, or chemical, or other character and apart from its level of complexity. The essence of the inductive processes is precisely in that they are targeted at and result in the change in the meaning of physical agents. Hence, inductive interactions have a pronounced pro-semiotic character. Induction is the mechanism of transition from causality to semiosis. Thus, inductive interactions can be considered precisely as the searched missing link between dead and blind physical nature and the live and meaningful semiotic universe. Induction switches the agents on or off, changing their function, without changing their identity. This is impossible under causal physical premises. Causal physical or chemical interactions result in either a qualitative change in the object of the impact (most often irreversible and destructive), or the other way round – only in a change in its spatial position. Causal interactions either destroy or leave the subject of their impact completely unchanged. Hence they can have no semiotic relevance. Inductive interactions maintain the identity of their objects and, besides, attribute to them new meanings, dependent on the specificity of the interaction context. Hence, inductive, or we may also call them signalling, or information interactions, are precisely the searched 108 interactions that establish pro-semiotic dependencies between their subjects. 2.2.Adaptation What kind of reactions takes place in nonliving matter? – Causal chemical reactions. – A causal chemical reaction ends in an effect, e.g.: 2HH2 + OO2 → 2HH2OO What kind of reactions takes place within the living cell? – Inductive chemical reactions: E.g. the reaction between the primary messenger molecule (PMM) and the receptor macromolecule (RM): PPPPPP + RRPP → iiiiiiiiiiiiii RRPP. – An inductive biochemical reaction ends in a new cause. Inductive biochemical reactions result in a chain of induced agents. This inductive transition chain is comparable to the transformations made in order to solve an algebraic equation. The final algebraic expression is equivalent not only to the previous one, but also to the unknown quantity x, which is specified in the problem's statement. Thus the chain of biochemical signal transduction is the inductive mechanism by which the biosystems look for adaptive responses to the complex challenges of the environment. If the interaction between organism and environment was not inductive, i.e. not driven by meanings, but driven by blind causal forces, as any direct causal interaction is indeed, it would have ended with a destructive effect, detrimental to the agent and its counterpart. Inductive interactions not only transmit signals in the biosystems, but also convert, adapt the systems to their new meanings; to be precise – signal transduction induces specific protein synthesis that is an adaptive, intelligent, meaningful response to the fluctuations in the biotic environment. 108 interactions that establish pro-semiotic dependencies between their subjects. 2.2.Adaptation What kind of reactions takes place in nonliving matter? – Causal chemical reactions. – A causal chemical reaction ends in an effect, e.g.: 2HH2 + OO2 → 2HH2OO What kind of reactions takes place within the living cell? – Inductive chemical reactions: E.g. the reaction between the primary messenger molecule (PMM) and the receptor macromolecule (RM): PPPPPP + RRPP → iiiiiiiiiiiiii RRPP. – An inductive biochemical reaction ends in a new cause. Inductive biochemical reactions result in a chain of induced agents. This inductive transition chain is comparable to the transformations made in order to solve an algebraic equation. The final algebraic expression is equivalent not only to the previous one, but also to the unknown quantity x, which is specified in the problem's statement. Thus the chain of biochemical signal transduction is the inductive mechanism by which the biosystems look for adaptive responses to the complex challenges of the environment. If the interaction between organism and environment was not inductive, i.e. not driven by meanings, but driven by blind causal forces, as any direct causal interaction is indeed, it would have ended with a destructive effect, detrimental to the agent and its counterpart. Inductive interactions not only transmit signals in the biosystems, but also convert, adapt the systems to their new meanings; to be precise – signal transduction induces specific protein synthesis that is an adaptive, intelligent, meaningful response to the fluctuations in the biotic environment. 109 Thus, the transmission of information signals between/in biosystems means also their adaptation to their environmental settings. Bibliography: Berridge, M.J. 1985. The molecular basis of communication within the cell. Scientific American, 253 (4): 124–134 Frege, Gottlob (1892). On Sense and Reference, translated by Max Black. Accessed February 1, 2013. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Sense_and_Referen ce Lodish, Harvey, Arnold Berk, Paul Matsudaira, Chris A. Kaiser, Monty Krieger, Matthew P. Scott, Lawrence Zipursky, James Darnell (2003). Molecular Cell Biology. New York: W. H. Freeman 110 PART IV: CHALLENGES Chapter 1: Advantages and deficiencies of the presented four models So far there have been outlined: Aristotel Gavrilov's model: cognitive image is an open window to the content of objective reality; The holonomic model: reality does not have substantial nature; its nature is informational and in particular it is a holographic image; The computational model: inherently knowledge is computation (calculation); the brain is a biological computer; computation is possible in the inanimate nature, too; The semiotic (inductive) model: intelligent processes differ from causal in their contextually-based nature; induction is a physical process that can provide such a semiotic connection. Are these models competitive; or, are they in their deep essence identical; or they complement one another, as each of them has its place and function in the complex dynamics of a real and specific cognitive process; or each model (mechanism) shall take effect independently, according to the particular situation and cognitive task? I think it would be premature to ask such questions at this stage; more wisely and productively is that each of these approaches be developed in full detail regarding its greatest strengths and weaknesses when tested in particular epistemological settings. In fact, the purpose and mission of all the above models is the same – to go beyond the phase space of the immediate interactions; to reach the outside context; to include the interaction context and thus to identify and 110 PART IV: CHALLENGES Chapter 1: Advantages and deficiencies of the presented four models So far there have been outlined: Aristotel Gavrilov's model: cognitive image is an open window to the content of objective reality; The holonomic model: reality does not have substantial nature; its nature is informational and in particular it is a holographic image; The computational model: inherently knowledge is computation (calculation); the brain is a biological computer; computation is possible in the inanimate nature, too; The semiotic (inductive) model: intelligent processes differ from causal in their contextually-based nature; induction is a physical process that can provide such a semiotic connection. Are these models competitive; or, are they in their deep essence identical; or they complement one another, as each of them has its place and function in the complex dynamics of a real and specific cognitive process; or each model (mechanism) shall take effect independently, according to the particular situation and cognitive task? I think it would be premature to ask such questions at this stage; more wisely and productively is that each of these approaches be developed in full detail regarding its greatest strengths and weaknesses when tested in particular epistemological settings. In fact, the purpose and mission of all the above models is the same – to go beyond the phase space of the immediate interactions; to reach the outside context; to include the interaction context and thus to identify and 111 implement more meaningful, more efficient and more sustainable solutions: * * * Let's have a metal ball located in the grounds of a high mountain that moves toward its ridge (Fig. 8). It will climb it in case it has sufficient energy. Besides, at any point of its trajectory, it will do the most economical energy consumption. This is an implicit requirement of the conservation laws. Fig. 11 Only a metre, a millimetre away from the path of the metal ball might be located a convenient tunnel (see. Fig. 12)... 112 Fig. 12 ... but no matter how close to the trajectory of the ball, outlined by the causal powers directly influencing it, this convenient energy-saving transition is, the ball will not take advantage of it. Obviously, in this case the most energetically sustainable solution is not to be found in the phase space of the immediate causal interactions, the physical material points are subjected to. This incomparably more efficient energetically solution can be found only if the dynamic system has the capability and means to take into account the opportunities provided by the broader context of its behaviour. * * * So what is it that we see? Strictly speaking, this is everything but not what immediately happens to us, in our physical body. If one wants to know what is going on in there, he will have to take an X-ray, MRI or ultrasound. Is it not strange that our nature is so constituted, as to be overwhelmed by the flow of events that most often does not concern us, and we know almost nothing about the 112 Fig. 12 ... but no matter how close to the trajectory of the ball, outlined by the causal powers directly influencing it, this convenient energy-saving transition is, the ball will not take advantage of it. Obviously, in this case the most energetically sustainable solution is not to be found in the phase space of the immediate causal interactions, the physical material points are subjected to. This incomparably more efficient energetically solution can be found only if the dynamic system has the capability and means to take into account the opportunities provided by the broader context of its behaviour. * * * So what is it that we see? Strictly speaking, this is everything but not what immediately happens to us, in our physical body. If one wants to know what is going on in there, he will have to take an X-ray, MRI or ultrasound. Is it not strange that our nature is so constituted, as to be overwhelmed by the flow of events that most often does not concern us, and we know almost nothing about the 113 actual physical, chemical, etc. internal processes, within us, or more precisely, that actually we are? Indeed, our internal receptors constantly inform us of our own physiological state, but first, over 90% of the information we receive comes through the channels of the visual modality that relates exactly to what doesn't concern us (immediately); secondly, we do everything possible not only to ignore but also, through the use of various 'healing' substances – delete the most important internal information, about the critical state of our organs and tissues18. As we wonderfully understand, all that's not by accident. Of all the processes taking place in the universe, actually the most important to us are precisely those in which we are not directly causally involved. – Because we are not physical objects, but knowledgeable and capable intelligent actors who know how to control their lives and their world precisely through their knowledge and their control over the hidden power and energy of the external context of their behaviour. * * * To start with the inductive model: Its strength is that it reveals a possible direct link between a physical process and its context – something which standard causal processes are incapable of. With this, the inductive processes can actually prove to be the missing link in the inexplicable transition from blind, causal to pro-semiotic, pro-semantic and thus meaningful connections and effects. The weakness of the inductive model is that for now it cannot simulate the state of mental awareness, the Holy 18 Or, as it is written on the advertising of such a product: 'Life without pain'. (I'm not sure about its name.) 114 of Holies of human consciousness19. Second, the inductive processes occur spontaneously, similar to the standard causal processes. This means that in their deployment they don't provide role for conscious volition; indeed, they can reach the context of the processes, but whether and what relationship to the context will be implemented (because it is not even clear whether this relationship will not prove to be destructive)? I'll stop here; we live in an age of radical self-PR, where self-criticism is seen as infantilism. Let's stay with this: induction for now remains the only known real, physical connection between a process and its context with which it finds one, though still fragmentary studied and described horizon to contextually-based, i.e. rational behaviour. In this sense, the induction might be a beam to or from the light of reason. * * * Before proceeding to the computational model – a note of a more general nature: There are scientists who tend to think that the appearance of consciousness is an emergent act. From their perspective, the attempt to deduce the emergence of consciousness as a cumulative chain of standard, universal physical interactions, processes and their evolution is untenable. For information of the younger readers, such was precisely the approach of the 19 In fact, we know a lot more of the original tabernacle – the Holy of Holies: the room in which are stored the Ark of the Covenant containing the tablets with the Ten Commandments, and also the blossomed rod of Aaron, and a sealed jar of manna. (https://bg.wikipedia.org./wiki/Кивот). 114 of Holies of human consciousness19. Second, the inductive processes occur spontaneously, similar to the standard causal processes. This means that in their deployment they don't provide role for conscious volition; indeed, they can reach the context of the processes, but whether and what relationship to the context will be implemented (because it is not even clear whether this relationship will not prove to be destructive)? I'll stop here; we live in an age of radical self-PR, where self-criticism is seen as infantilism. Let's stay with this: induction for now remains the only known real, physical connection between a process and its context with which it finds one, though still fragmentary studied and described horizon to contextually-based, i.e. rational behaviour. In this sense, the induction might be a beam to or from the light of reason. * * * Before proceeding to the computational model – a note of a more general nature: There are scientists who tend to think that the appearance of consciousness is an emergent act. From their perspective, the attempt to deduce the emergence of consciousness as a cumulative chain of standard, universal physical interactions, processes and their evolution is untenable. For information of the younger readers, such was precisely the approach of the 19 In fact, we know a lot more of the original tabernacle – the Holy of Holies: the room in which are stored the Ark of the Covenant containing the tablets with the Ten Commandments, and also the blossomed rod of Aaron, and a sealed jar of manna. (https://bg.wikipedia.org./wiki/Кивот). 115 founders of the Marxist theory of reflection, as well as of earlier materialists, indeed – cumulative – to search for a primary property in the foundation of matter, which evolved into human consciousness. My aim is neither to criticize nor intercede for emergentism or cumulativism. – Cumulativism can easily degenerate into preformationism where at the beginning we are given what we want to deduce through a complex evolution. Emergentism could even more easily slip to agnosticism. Rather, my goal is to defend a free analysis of the evolution of consciousness that is not afraid of any labels, which loosely follows the rationality and the intuition of the intelligent, ideologically unburdened yet tempted contemporary – the actual target group of any authentic philosophical discourse. In this sense, yes, here we are looking for natural prerequisites for the origin of consciousness, starting with the earliest stages of cosmological evolution and the most fundamental physical forces and interactions. Even if it turns out that consciousness arises spontaneously and emergently at a given evolutionary stage; even be that its appearance has nothing to do with the forces and any of the physical agents acting at this stage, nevertheless – that stage of the history of the universe should be precisely identified and the links or absence of links with the emergence of consciousness at this stage must be accurately documented and justified. * * * Calculation is a process in which the real physical structures and processes are converted into mathematical objects and operations with them, with the result that we get new knowledge relevant to the real 116 objects. E.g.: 16 = 7 + х; х = 16 – 7 = 9; 16 can be apples; 7 can be yellow; x can be red. But the calculation is much more: it can tell us about the number of planets in our solar system, the age of the universe, the age of archaeological artefacts and paleontological findings; things that we cannot see immediately, but could be a ground for a much more sustainable and effective – contextually-based, that is intelligent behaviour. * * * There is something significant in common between the computational processes and those of selforganization. It is that both types of processes reduce complexity and increase the systems' order. But there is a fundamental difference in the way they achieve this. The calculation is possible based on the preliminary hierarchization of the mental content. In particular, in summation, the elements are pre-ranked in a hierarchy of classes. Curiously, spontaneous hierarchization is possible in the self-organizing systems, too. For example, the wind not only scatters the fallen autumn leaves, but can also put them into piles. Not only them. On the ceiling of our rural house I could see with my eyes that the snow, penetrated through the cracks in the roof has arranged itself into cones. I.e., it wasn't spread evenly on the floor in a formless snowdrift, but had formed three identical and situated at spaced locations perfect cones. Spontaneous causal hierarchization is even better known thanks to the phenomenon of fractal self-similarity – many biological structures: organisms, organs, or tissues have a fractal structure that is preserved at almost unlimited change in the physical scale. 116 objects. E.g.: 16 = 7 + х; х = 16 – 7 = 9; 16 can be apples; 7 can be yellow; x can be red. But the calculation is much more: it can tell us about the number of planets in our solar system, the age of the universe, the age of archaeological artefacts and paleontological findings; things that we cannot see immediately, but could be a ground for a much more sustainable and effective – contextually-based, that is intelligent behaviour. * * * There is something significant in common between the computational processes and those of selforganization. It is that both types of processes reduce complexity and increase the systems' order. But there is a fundamental difference in the way they achieve this. The calculation is possible based on the preliminary hierarchization of the mental content. In particular, in summation, the elements are pre-ranked in a hierarchy of classes. Curiously, spontaneous hierarchization is possible in the self-organizing systems, too. For example, the wind not only scatters the fallen autumn leaves, but can also put them into piles. Not only them. On the ceiling of our rural house I could see with my eyes that the snow, penetrated through the cracks in the roof has arranged itself into cones. I.e., it wasn't spread evenly on the floor in a formless snowdrift, but had formed three identical and situated at spaced locations perfect cones. Spontaneous causal hierarchization is even better known thanks to the phenomenon of fractal self-similarity – many biological structures: organisms, organs, or tissues have a fractal structure that is preserved at almost unlimited change in the physical scale. 117 Regardless of this curious but misleading coincidence, computational order is based on entirely different grounds. It starts with choosing of an appropriate base of the numbering system. Normally we use the decimal system, but it is interesting and useful to note the origin of other numbering systems as well – e.g., the duodecimal: „...the importance of the number 12 is usually linked to the fact that lunar cycles in a year are 12, or such is the number of the phalanges of the fingers of the one hand (three on each of the four fingers, the thumb is not considered).' (http://www.introprogramming.info/intro-csharpbook/read-online/glava8-broini-sistemi/) If we choose to represent the decimal number 13 662 by duodecimal hierarchical notation, it will be 7AA6, in which there is nothing special, except that the sorting base is already the dozen (i.e. not the fingers but their phalanges), and that besides the numbers 0 to 9 appear two new A = 10 and B = 11. Once organized into a hierarchal order the matter of thinking is processed (calculated) with simpler and more efficient operations. So things are manageable, perspicuous; converted into a form suitable for their mental manipulation and rational control. Thus the distinction between the pro-informational processes of self-organization and the process of computation gets clear. Self-organization proceeds spontaneously under the effect of causal physical forces. Computation is instrumental. It uses specific tools for the production of knowledge: abstract objects, symbols, rules of inference, algorithms, computer programs... 118 * * * We know much more about how to calculate, than what this actually means. Why is it necessary to calculate at all? The trivial answer is that it is more economical and more efficient. Which again brings us to the point that the computation reveals things that we cannot see directly and which could, however, be grounds for their more sustainable and effective – contextually-based – consideration. So it is in a rational, whether individual or social context. But calculations have a place as an event in a causal physical world and, if so, what could be their function there? Do calculations have a role and a function in physical interactions? Does nature need to calculate? If we are looking for straight analogies, so yes, nature can definitely 'sum'; mass is an additive value; besides, nature can 'subtract' and 'divide'; these are all physical processes governed by causal laws of physics. Furthermore, even the most sophisticated mathematical and logical operations are accomplished by a hardware based on standard physical processes. Moreover, we know almost nothing about our mental states and acts, yet what we do know for sure is that they are also the product of neurophysiologic processes that could be based on nothing but the standard fundamental physical interactions. If by calculation we will understand the operation reducing the informational uncertainty of a system, so yes, in nature, there are spontaneous transitions of selforganization, which reduce the entropy of thermodynamic systems, too. 118 * * * We know much more about how to calculate, than what this actually means. Why is it necessary to calculate at all? The trivial answer is that it is more economical and more efficient. Which again brings us to the point that the computation reveals things that we cannot see directly and which could, however, be grounds for their more sustainable and effective – contextually-based – consideration. So it is in a rational, whether individual or social context. But calculations have a place as an event in a causal physical world and, if so, what could be their function there? Do calculations have a role and a function in physical interactions? Does nature need to calculate? If we are looking for straight analogies, so yes, nature can definitely 'sum'; mass is an additive value; besides, nature can 'subtract' and 'divide'; these are all physical processes governed by causal laws of physics. Furthermore, even the most sophisticated mathematical and logical operations are accomplished by a hardware based on standard physical processes. Moreover, we know almost nothing about our mental states and acts, yet what we do know for sure is that they are also the product of neurophysiologic processes that could be based on nothing but the standard fundamental physical interactions. If by calculation we will understand the operation reducing the informational uncertainty of a system, so yes, in nature, there are spontaneous transitions of selforganization, which reduce the entropy of thermodynamic systems, too. 119 But the calculation is not just an operation or a process; it has a role and a function. We calculate something in order to use it in a 'target' chain. I would hold that nature calculates if there arises such a situation: For example, I need to calculate what transportation from the city A to the town B is more acceptable as security, cost, time and comfort. And if some data are missing, I cannot continue my journey, respectively, I do nothing until I finish the calculation. Let's say now that in nature happens something like this: a meteorite is sweeping to the Earth and it's torn on what orbit to take: one that lands it in Moscow; or this – in Washington; or as a popular radio whispers: 'Sofia is also a nice city.' And the meteorite stops halfway waiting for additional data. But there is a more serious interpretation. According to it, in inanimate nature, there are long-term and wide-range correlations that have no direct (immediate, 'here and now') causal nature but are evolutionary. To manifest and notice such correlations, generations are required, historical, geological, perhaps cosmological eras. "Explosions are also compressions of time. Observable changes in the natural universe all are explosive to some degree and from some point of view; otherwise you would not notice them. Smooth Continuity of change, if slowed sufficiently, goes without notice by observers whose time/attention span is too short. Thus, I tell you, I have seen changes you would never have marked." Frank Herbert, "Heretics of Dune – Leto II" http://elboneyard.org:8088 – Accessed February 12, 2016 120 The Interference of: cosmological, evolutionary, social and other macro-correlations and immediate ('here and now') causal interactions may indeed imply a situation of 'search', and 'choice' of 'decision', and perhaps it might really lead to 'calculations'? Bibliography: Searle, John. R. (1980) Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 417-457 120 The Interference of: cosmological, evolutionary, social and other macro-correlations and immediate ('here and now') causal interactions may indeed imply a situation of 'search', and 'choice' of 'decision', and perhaps it might really lead to 'calculations'? Bibliography: Searle, John. R. (1980) Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3): 417-457 121 Chapter 2: The romantic theory of information and the new physics of information The concept of information is very convenient as a measure of the extent to which we know the things. – But very uncomfortable as a base camp to the heights of consciousness. In 1948, came out two fundamental publications on information. One is the article 'Information Theory' by Claude Shannon in which he offers his famous formula on measuring the amount of information and from which it is clear that it is the same as another fundamental formula – of entropy, by Boltzmann, but with a reversed sign. Although Shannon's proper goal did not include the study of the nature of the information, but only the accurate measurement of its amount flowing through the channels of communication, the identity of the measure of the two quantities – entropy and information – had a powerful resonance in physics and natural science in general, that induced not less far pronounced philosophical aspirations. As far as the theory of communication and thermodynamics especially, are solid substrate theories, the hope was to get to, on their base, a fantastic philosophical result, namely the substance of knowledge. That hope was fuelled particularly by the other landmark publication in the same year – 'Cybernetics' by Norbert Wiener, in which he states the iconic phrase: 'Information is information. It is not matter or energy.'20 that gives a most authoritative scientific sanction to the 20 'Information is information, not matter or energy.' Cybernetics, 2nd ed., p. 132 122 substrate treatment, if not to say – the materialisation of information. 21 Let's add to this the unwavering attitude of everyday consciousness that information and knowledge is the same. When we add to the sum the not less persistent attitude of scientists to interpret information as a substrate we'll fully understand the reciprocal enthusiasm of philosophers to get their hands on the Holy Grail, if not on the substance of knowledge and consciousness. Such enthusiasm in retrospect is naive. But doesn't in the foundation of any epochal event stand a deception, an illusion, an adventure or a dream? Didn't people land on the Moon captured by their childhood dreams or by the sacred archetypes of the generic subconscious? Didn't Schliemann discover Troy, led by the belief in an ancient legend in which the actual characters are more problematic than their divine sponsors? Although sometimes it's just the opposite – today we are convinced that Columbus was looking for a western route to India, but the maps that apparently were available22 to him and the revolutionary type of navigation23 of his fleet speak otherwise. * * * The 'informational collapse' was just such a romantic substrate conception about information. To think about 21 Although, as we know, his pupose was just the opposite. 22 https///bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/Пири_Реис 23 Columbus' fleet has used underwater navigation; otherwise it could not have got away from the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar and to embark on a course to the New World. 122 substrate treatment, if not to say – the materialisation of information. 21 Let's add to this the unwavering attitude of everyday consciousness that information and knowledge is the same. When we add to the sum the not less persistent attitude of scientists to interpret information as a substrate we'll fully understand the reciprocal enthusiasm of philosophers to get their hands on the Holy Grail, if not on the substance of knowledge and consciousness. Such enthusiasm in retrospect is naive. But doesn't in the foundation of any epochal event stand a deception, an illusion, an adventure or a dream? Didn't people land on the Moon captured by their childhood dreams or by the sacred archetypes of the generic subconscious? Didn't Schliemann discover Troy, led by the belief in an ancient legend in which the actual characters are more problematic than their divine sponsors? Although sometimes it's just the opposite – today we are convinced that Columbus was looking for a western route to India, but the maps that apparently were available22 to him and the revolutionary type of navigation23 of his fleet speak otherwise. * * * The 'informational collapse' was just such a romantic substrate conception about information. To think about 21 Although, as we know, his pupose was just the opposite. 22 https///bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/Пири_Реис 23 Columbus' fleet has used underwater navigation; otherwise it could not have got away from the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar and to embark on a course to the New World. 123 the collapse of information implies that it should be seen as a substance in which processes similar to those in physical systems take place. But to identify information with knowledge and take information itself for a substance is naive. Only the data signal can be considered as a physical object. But without its interpretation, it has no information content. Any 'information content' or 'substance' whatsoever is absent from the information signal. It is obvious that the interpretation itself does not hold any information content or substance of its own that it could assign to the information signal. – Because if the interpretation had them, there would be no need for data signals. It is equally clear that if the signals were carrying informational content or substance themselves, there would be no need for interpretation. But then how to supersede this romantic picture of information interactions? Is a physical theory of information possible and what does it refer to today? Yes, a physical information theory exists. It is precisely it that the Landauer principle and the Toyabe experiment are based on. As we have seen, informational physicists do not treat information as any substance whatsoever, but as a process. The essence of this process lies in the fact that an agent applies external power to change the quality framework of the probability distributions of the dynamics of another agent. The strength of this approach is that it finds a sustainable substrate of the information processes and, it seems, it will be able to retain at least some of the significant points of the romantic theory of information. Say, the hypothesis of the informational collapse: it remains a possible event opening a horizon to the generation of mental states. Indeed, now an informational substance that can accumulate to a supercritical amount beyond which starts its irreversible 124 collapse is absent. Nevertheless, there remains the theoretical possibility that, based on the impact on the structure of the probability distributions of the dynamics of a system, an accumulated critical mass of information can undergo an informational collapse, leading to the physical analogue of the mental state – the informational singularity. The other significant point of a romantic theory of consciousness that remains valid under the new physical theory of information is Aristotel Gavrilov's model. This is a fortunate consequence, because it is a beautiful epistemological model. Gavrilov's model is exquisitely economical in view of the metaphysical entities with its insistence that we do not need any substantial accessories in order to see and understand the world; on the contrary, the epistemological image is just a window open towards objective reality. On the occasion of this model one recalls about 'Occam's razor': 'Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity'. – And more, Michelangelo's principle – to remove all superfluous from the marble rock and thus reach the exquisite sculpture. – In the ontological picture of today's physics of information, information processes are similarly related solely to the effects that remove the probabilistic uncertainty and thus focus, clarify and brighten the macro-framework of the probability distributions of the systems' dynamics. The cognitive image, from this perspective, is a special condition that should spontaneously arise in a thermodynamic system as long as it has reached a critical point, a specific state of its information dynamics. This would actually be a state capable of informational openness to the object of perception and in no case could be a metaphysical doubling of the real object in an imaginary world of mental entities. 124 collapse is absent. Nevertheless, there remains the theoretical possibility that, based on the impact on the structure of the probability distributions of the dynamics of a system, an accumulated critical mass of information can undergo an informational collapse, leading to the physical analogue of the mental state – the informational singularity. The other significant point of a romantic theory of consciousness that remains valid under the new physical theory of information is Aristotel Gavrilov's model. This is a fortunate consequence, because it is a beautiful epistemological model. Gavrilov's model is exquisitely economical in view of the metaphysical entities with its insistence that we do not need any substantial accessories in order to see and understand the world; on the contrary, the epistemological image is just a window open towards objective reality. On the occasion of this model one recalls about 'Occam's razor': 'Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity'. – And more, Michelangelo's principle – to remove all superfluous from the marble rock and thus reach the exquisite sculpture. – In the ontological picture of today's physics of information, information processes are similarly related solely to the effects that remove the probabilistic uncertainty and thus focus, clarify and brighten the macro-framework of the probability distributions of the systems' dynamics. The cognitive image, from this perspective, is a special condition that should spontaneously arise in a thermodynamic system as long as it has reached a critical point, a specific state of its information dynamics. This would actually be a state capable of informational openness to the object of perception and in no case could be a metaphysical doubling of the real object in an imaginary world of mental entities. 125 Like the reader, I've been struggling with the mystery of where the mental image might be; even I planned to title so this last book's chapter. But now, it turns out that not only with regard to Gavrilov's theory of consciousness, but in view of the model of the information processes adopted by today's information physics, mental images do not exist. They are to be found neither in the human head, nor are they projected onto the physical objects of our sensory experience. They are not any physical holograms, nor ghostly mental beings hovering now in our brains, now in our 'consciousness' or in some cosmic super-consciousness, now in a holographic projection, then in the physical world. Mental images, in the sense of any material or ideal objects existing outside and independently of some other, different from them 'original', do not exist. What actually exists is a specific state of awakening of the information subject about objective reality – a state of openness, of conscious awareness. This state, in view of modern physics of information occurs when an information system amasses a critical amount of information. Then, the window of its communication with the world spontaneously opens and this real world becomes its subjective proprietorship – what we also call: feeling, perception or knowledge of objective reality. However, if we still assume that information is a physical substance, enjoying an equal ontological status with matter and energy, the idea of the informational collapse is still compatible with such a concept. Then, an informational collapse should occur in an information machine (computer), provided that the critical amount of information necessary for the occurrence of an informational collapse24 is stored in its active memory. In 24 Icollapse = 2МSun С 2/ kTln2 (bits) 126 fact, in that same moment it can be assumed that the fantastic event has already happened – the information machine has acquired the ability to be aware. Bibliography: Колмогоров, А. Н. Основные понятия теории вероятности. Изд. 2-ер М. Наука, 1974, 120 с. Kolmogorov, Andrey (1956). Foundations of the Theory of Probability (2nd ed.). New York: Chelsea. Penrose, Roger (1989). The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics. Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19851973-7 Shannon, C.E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 27, pp. 379-423 & 623-656, July and October, 1948 Wiener, Norbert. 1961. Cybernetics: Or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. MIT Press. 2-nd revised ed. ISBN 978-0-26273009-9 Review: Ecology of Virtual Realities'. tripleC 13(1): 136– 143, 2015, http://www.triple-c.at, ISSN: 1726-670X 126 fact, in that same moment it can be assumed that the fantastic event has already happened – the information machine has acquired the ability to be aware. Bibliography: Колмогоров, А. Н. Основные понятия теории вероятности. Изд. 2-ер М. Наука, 1974, 120 с. Kolmogorov, Andrey (1956). Foundations of the Theory of Probability (2nd ed.). New York: Chelsea. Penrose, Roger (1989). The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics. Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19851973-7 Shannon, C.E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 27, pp. 379-423 & 623-656, July and October, 1948 Wiener, Norbert. 1961. Cybernetics: Or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. MIT Press. 2-nd revised ed. ISBN 978-0-26273009-9 Review: Ecology of Virtual Realities'. tripleC 13(1): 136– 143, 2015, http://www.triple-c.at, ISSN: 1726-670X 127 About the Author Assen I. Dimitrov, PhD is associate professor at the Department of Ontology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Field of research interests: complexity and intelligence, order and control in complex hierarchical (information, bioand social) systems' dynamics. Books: Complexity and meaning, or about intelligence. 2004. V. Turnovo: Faber; Nonalgorithmic order. 2010. V. Turnovo: Faber; Mind and control. 2014. V. Turnovo: Faber; Author of over 50 papers, including: Virtual Information Systems. 1998. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science 33 (1): 41-48; Packages: The Atoms of Communication. 2007. tripleC – Cognition, Communication, Co-operation: Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 5(2): 82-86. Accessed November 4, 2014. http://www.triplec.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/6. Fellow of Alexander S. Onassis foundation (2001) E-mail: [email protected] Assen I. Dimitrov SCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS: MODELS AND CHALLENGES • Reviewers Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tatiana Batouleva Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nikolay Obreshkov • Format 60x84/16 • FABER – (062) 600 650 V. Turnovo 5000, p.o.box 241 www.faber-bg.com

Introspecting in the Twentieth Century Maja Spener (University of Birmingham) Forthcoming in Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, A. Kind (ed.), Routledge. This version of the paper is only a draft. For quotation please consult the published version. Introspection in the 20th century is a vast topic. Discussions involving introspection figured in the relatively new discipline of experimental psychology, as well as in various debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology. Introspection has been a focus of interest as a method of investigation and as a psychological and epistemic capacity itself. Over the course of the century, these theoretical interests did not always connect well, although they have intersected and influenced each other at different points. But there is no helpful sense in which one might talk of 'the history' of introspection in the 20th century if by that one means a straight line of development across ten or so decades of psychological and philosophical theorizing with, and about, introspection. Instead, there is a criss-crossing pattern of various storylines and what I shall do here is track a couple of different strands in the overall pattern to the exclusion of many others.1 In particular, I shall concentrate on philosophers' and psychologists' use of introspection, and the discussions surrounding such use. A story we are often told is that during the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, experimental psychology was synonymous with introspectionism, exemplified by the work of Wilhelm Wundt and E. B. Titchener. According to the story, these early psychologists took the subject-matter of psychology to be conscious states only and their main method of investigation was introspection. The new experimental science aimed to provide data about consciousness via introspection under scientifically controlled conditions. We are told that this approach, while ground-breaking in its aim to make psychology thus conceived scientific, failed because it imploded from within while at the same time being superseded by a different approach to psychology: behaviourism. Behaviourism rejected not only the idea that introspection could be conducted in scientifically respectable ways, it also rejected the central assumption that the subject-matter of psychology concerned conscious states. According to the story, introspectionism, and with it the use of introspection in theorizing about the mind, was pretty much annihilated after the behaviourists were finished with it (see e.g. (Braisby & Gellatly, 2012)). Behaviourists themselves might not have in the end successfully established their own methodological preferences and choice of the bona fide subject-matter of psychology, but they are generally credited with putting an end to introspectionism by the late 1920 or early 1930s. What is curious, if this story were even half-way true, is that throughout much of the 20th century, within certain philosophical debates (e.g., in philosophy of perception and epistemology) philosophers have been happy to appeal to first-person reflections on sensory 1 For instance, I will not provide an overview of all the different accounts of the nature of introspection and self-knowledge put forward. For excellent, up-to-date, and comprehensive survey articles covering this material (Gertler, 2008; Kind, April 2015; Schwitzgebel, Summer 2014). 2 experiences in their theorizing. This raises questions about the relationship between the apparently scorching critique of the use of introspection within psychology during the first part of the century, and the continued and relatively easy-going use of introspection in philosophical theorizing. One suggestion might be that psychologists and philosophers were engaged in something like parallel play, working in relative ignorance of each other's fields. While there is a kernel of truth to this, there is also plenty of evidence of common interests and interaction between philosophers and psychologists. So the question is not really whether philosophers and psychologists talked to each other and read each other's work – they clearly did. The question is how much they talked and in what way this is reflected in theorizing in their own domains. The answer is, predictably, complex. In this paper, I make a start on it by showing some of the persisting influences psychology and philosophy had on each other when it comes to using introspection in theorizing. Equally, I highlight the lack – or loss – of influence in certain cases, resulting in a more rudimentary conception of the use of introspection towards the end of the century than the often quite sophisticated earlier debates about it would warrant. I begin with discussions involving introspection in the philosophy of perception in the first half of the century that reflect certain pressures felt at the time concerning the use of introspection in theorizing about experience. I then turn to relevant developments within psychology during this period and earlier, which show a more sustained engagement with various worries about introspection giving rise to these pressures. I finish by looking briefly at philosophical discussions about perceptual experience late in the century displaying a mix of lessons absorbed and lessons forgotten with respect to their use of introspection. 1. Introspection in the sense-datum theory debate In this section, I will look at how early 20th century philosophers of perception used introspection in their theorizing. I will focus specifically on proponents and critics of the sensedatum theory of perception. Moore's paper 'The Refutation of Idealism' seems a good starting point because it was published right at the beginning of the century in 1903, and also because it bridges different philosophical epochs. On the one hand, it is engaged in a (from our vantage point) backwards-looking debate with the then still more widely defended idealism; on the other hand it constitutes an early contribution to the ensuing lively focus on sense-datum theories of perception. In his paper, Moore argues for a distinction between sensory experience and its (mindindependent) object, which he thinks is missing from extant accounts of sensory experience. He is also concerned to explain why his opponents failed to posit such a distinction: [T]here is a very good reason why they should have supposed so, in the fact that when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only a single term. The term "blue" is easy enough to distinguish, but the other element which I have called "consciousness" -that which sensation of blue has in common with sensation of green -is extremely difficult to fix. That many people fail to distinguish it at all is sufficiently shown by the fact that there are materialists. And, in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us: it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent -we look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that there is something but what it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly recognised. (Moore, 1903, p. 446) Moore suggest here that introspective reflection on experience easily leads philosophers astray on this matter. He points out that introspection does not clearly reveal any conscious element in addition to whatever non-conscious objects experience presents. It is then understandable, according to Moore, that philosophers think that experience is monolithic ('a single term') with no distinctive conscious aspect separable from the objects presented by experience. Further on, though, he tempers both his claim about what introspection reveals, and about how misleading introspection is concerning the nature of sensory experience. While still insisting 3 that introspective reflection is likely to mislead, he explains that this occurs because it is not done carefully enough: [T]he moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. My main object in this paragraph has been to try to make the reader see it; but I fear I shall have succeeded very ill. (...) Whether or not, when I have the sensation of blue, my consciousness or awareness is thus blue, my introspection does not enable me to decide with certainty: I only see no reason for thinking that it is. But whether it is or not, the point is unimportant, for introspection does enable me to decide that something else is also true: namely that I am aware of blue, and by this I mean, that my awareness has to blue a quite different and distinct relation. (Moore, 1903, pp. 450451) Thus, introspection is not a poor guide when done right. Moore is happy to use introspective data in theorizing about the nature of conscious experience, indeed, it forms a central plank in defence of his own view. But he makes clear that since introspection is apt to mislead, using it in theorizing is not easy business. He works hard to get the reader to introspectively attend to experience properly. Moore accepts both that introspection is a major source of bona fide, theory-relevant information about the mind, but that significant care must be taken in availing oneself of it. Versions of Moore's attitude to introspection can be traced through the philosophy of perception in the 20th century. It is common among both sense-datum theorists and their critics dominating discussion in the first half of that century. First and foremost, these philosophers took for granted that in providing an account of conscious perceptual experience one must start with an accurate description of its phenomenal character. Further, they assumed that this description is acquired via first-person access to one's experience. Philosophers talked of, e.g., 'introspecting', 'attending to one's own experience' or 'direct inspection of experience' (see, e.g. (Lewis, 1929, p. 57; Firth, 1949, p. 523)). This basic assumption of first-person access to important data about perceptual consciousness is reflected in the way philosophers typically employ it without much ado, other than occasional emphatic assertions that we have it. It suggests a relatively uncomplicated and natural-seeming first-person way of becoming aware (or being aware) of one's own conscious experience. C.I. Lewis, for instance, talks about the character of pure sensory experience, i.e. experience which has not had interpretative involvement from thought (Lewis, 1929, pp. 36-66).2 According to him, 'the sensuously given' is that which is unalterable by different interests or levels of knowledge and it has a distinctive 'sensuous feel or quality'. As such, Lewis says, it must always be ineffable, because when one tries to articulate it one applies interpretation of one type or another. Nonetheless, he expects us to have a good grasp of the given: It is that which remains untouched and unaltered, however it is construed by thought. Yet no one but a philosopher could for a moment deny this immediate presence in consciousness of that which no activity of thought can create or alter. (Lewis, 1929, p. 53) Lewis does not explicitly say how we are aware of the given, but he clearly thinks that it is in some very basic and ordinary way obvious from the first person. It is 'the brute-fact element in perception, illusion and dream' (57), the 'immediate and indubitable' (65). A similar stress on what seems beyond doubt and obvious from the first-person is evident in others during this era, such as C.D. Broad and H.H.Price. Broad, e.g., observes that The fundamental fact is that we constantly make such judgements as: 'This seems to me elliptical, or red, or hot' as the case may be, and that about the truth of these judgements we do not feel the least doubt. (...) I may 2 I am presenting Lewis as a sense-datum theorist here, but see (Crane, 2000, pp. 180-181) for discussion. 4 be perfectly certain at one and the same time that I have the peculiar experience expressed by the judgement: 'This looks elliptical to me' and that in fact the object is not elliptical but round. (...) I do not suppose that anyone, on reflection, will quarrel with this statement of fact. (Broad, 1923, p. 236) And Price, too, relies easily on introspection. In his book Perception he investigates the nature of perceptual experience and how they can justify our perceptual beliefs. He insists that his enquiry is squarely philosophical: '[w]e must simply examine seeing and touching for ourselves and do the best we can' (Price, 1932, p. 2). Providing an example, Price describes what he can and cannot doubt when reflecting on how things appear to him as he is undergoing a visual experience as of a tomato: [T]hat something is red and round then and there I cannot doubt. Whether the something persists even for a moment before and after it is present to my consciousness, whether other minds can be conscious of it as well as I, may be doubted. But that it now exists, and that I am conscious of it – by me at least who am conscious of (?) it this cannot possibility be doubted. (3) 'The something' Price isolates via first-person reflection is a sense-datum. Sense-data differ from other kinds of data present to consciousness on two counts. Firstly, they give rise to belief in external-world objects. Secondly, it seems plain that there is also another characteristic common and peculiar to them, which may be called 'sensuousness'. This is obvious on inspection, but it cannot be described. (4) Again, the quote displays the confidence with which Price and others put forward first-person judgements about experience. In sum, early philosophers of perception took the results of firstperson inspection to be palpable, unassailable and generalizable. Further, they considered gathering first-person phenomenal descriptions of experience with which to constrain one's account an appropriate method for theorizing about experience.3 Yet, there exists also a different current in these discussions about conscious experience. Philosophers agreed that harnessing first-person access to experience for use in theorizing requires some care. Moore, we saw, introduced this complication because introspection is the source of a mistaken view about experience as well as the source of crucial information supporting the right view. As the debate about perceptual experience and the sense-datum theory gathered speed, similar issues arose. E.g. there were disputes about what sort of qualities are part of what is presented in phenomenal consciousness and what kinds of objects we are immediately phenomenally conscious of, which are the bearers of such qualities. In particular, opponents of sense-datum theorists maintained that experiential character is as of ordinary objects and properties, rather than as of special sensory objects and their relatively sparse properties (e.g. (Barnes, 1944-45; Reichenbach, 1938, pp. 163-169). These disputes put participating philosophers under pressure concerning their shared assumption about the appropriateness of the introspective method. Many felt the need to balance the claim that the kind of supporting evidence delivered by introspection is tremendously forceful with acknowledgement that there is a genuine debate about the phenomenal character of experience. What had to be reconciled was that certain aspects of experience are 'quite plain', 'indubitable', 'obvious' on the basis of introspection and yet that opponents could be so thoroughly introspectively misled. The pressure typically was relieved in one of two ways. Just as Moore did, some philosophers attempted to diagnose a problem on the part of the opponent which would explain t their failure to introspect adequately, consistent with maintaining that conscious experience was properly introspectively available all along. This style of explanation was preferred by opponents of 3 '[T]he only way to decide a question of this sort is by direct inspection of perceptual consciousness itself.' (Firth, 1949, p. 453) 5 sense-datum theory who held that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is as of ordinary objects and properties (as opposed to being as of sense-data with a sparser collection of sensory qualities).When Roderick Firth in 1949 reviews the debate between sense-datum theory and what he calls 'percept theory', he notes that sense-datum theorists seem entirely unresponsive to compelling phenomenological criticism from their opponents. But, he adds, [i]f this indifference [to such criticism] is not to be attributed to ignorance or perversity, it is likely to suggest that there are certain fallacies or prejudices which prevent many people ... from examining perceptual consciousness with complete objectivity. (Firth, 1949, p. 452) For instance, philosophers might be prevented from introspecting properly if they are in the grip of a particular conception of perceptual experience which weakens their introspective capacity to judge the character of experience.4 The second style of explanation involved allowing that there are different ways to access experience via the first person. This tack, which tended to be used by defenders of sense-datum theory, consisted in shifting the goal-posts from thinking of the debate as manifesting straightforwardly conflicting deliverances of introspection to manifesting different ways to introspect. Lewis, Broad and Price, for instance, each concede that there is a sense in which the character of perceptual experience can be described in terms of presenting ordinary objects and properties. Indeed, they all agree that it is how the character of experience would strike the naïve observer: on casual inspection we encounter 'the thick experience of the world of things' (Lewis, 1929, p. 54), which presents all the rich qualities had by ordinary objects. But these philosophers also insist that in casual inspection we fail to notice something that on careful inspection we can become aware of. One then must make sense of this in terms of an introspective method: what do these different ways of inspecting experience amount to and which one ought we to use in theorizing? To illustrate the general strategy, I focus here on Price's view.5 Ordinary perceptual consciousness, Price agrees, is consciousness as of material objects (objects are leibhaftig gegeben in such consciousness, Price remarks using Husserl's phrase). However, perceptual consciousness in fact involves two different mental events: acquaintance with a sense-datum and an act of perceptual acceptance, i.e. a kind of taking for granted that there is a material object that 'belongs' to the sense-datum with which one is acquainted. The two states of mind, the acquaintance with the sense-datum and the perceptual consciousness of [say] the tree, just arise together. The sense-datum is presented to us, and the tree dawns on us, all in one moment. The two modes of 'presence to the mind' utterly different though they are, can only be distinguished by subsequent analysis. (Price, 1932, p. 141) Price holds that while awareness of a sense-datum and awareness of a material object in the same experience arise in unison, they constitute different kinds of cognitive acts. The former is factive, i.e. an acquaintance with something actually existing, which Price calls an 'intuitive' cognitive act. The latter is not factive, as experiential awareness as of material objects is consistent with there being no such object present. Perceptual acceptance is not intuitive, then. However, Price says it is 'pseudo-intuitive' because just like acquaintance of sense-data it contrasts with deliberative or discursive cognitive acts, such as inferring and surmising: it is not an activity but 'effortless...undoubting and unquestioning' (153). Price bases these claims on introspection: 4 According to Firth sense-datum theorists might hold an over-intellectualised conception of perceptual experience which 'could blind [them] to the very phenomenological facts which would correct it' (455). 5 See (Broad, 1923, pp. 247-248; Lewis, 1929, pp. 38-66) different versions of this explanatory strategy. See also (Firth, 1949). 6 That [perceptual acceptance] has this character is just an introspectible fact, however difficult to describe. (Price, 1932, p. 156) As Price explains, the source of this character is different for intuitive and pseudo-intuitive acts, constituting their fundamental difference. However, in ordinary perceptual consciousness, we do not seriously reflect on experience and so we miss the difference. What happens is not that we identify [the sense-datum and the material object in an experience], but that we fail to distinguish between them. Our state is, as it were, a dreamy or half-awake state, in which we are unaware of a difference, which if we reflected would be obvious. Now the sense-datum really is intuitive. And since we fail to distinguish it from the remainder of the thing, the whole thing is as if it were intuitive, though only the sense datum actually is so. (Price, 1932, p. 168) Thus, Price can agree that the character of ordinary perceptual experience involves the presentation of material objects and their properties – this is so when we introspect in casual manner. For Price, this does not conflict with the view that introspection reveals distinct sensedata. It would conflict if he were to claim that the very same thing presented in experience which opponents hold to be a material object is really a sense-datum. But this is not so on Price's picture. In the casual case – everyday introspection – we are not theorizing about experience and do not attend carefully to it. We do not discriminate between the two kinds of presented objects in such a superficial characterization. When we do introspect perceptual experience with the aim of providing an account of its nature – in careful introspection – we make more fine-grained discriminations. We notice that there are distinct kinds of object which are present to the mind very differently, i.e. there are sense-data, which are intuited, and material objects which are pseudo-intuited. This sort of explanatory approach was challenged in various ways by critics of sense-datum theory. They typically favoured the first type of explanation, insisting that the first-person inspection genuinely relevant to the introspective method is a kind of everyday introspection. Such introspection is immediate, commonplace and non-theoretical and it produces our naive take on experience. Careful inspection, on the other hand, is a more removed, optional take on experience which has no particular claim to priority in an analysis of perceptual consciousness (Firth, 1949, pp. 462-463; Wild, 1940, p. 82). In choosing careful introspection, sense-datum theorists were said to elevate an 'attitude of "doubt" or "questioning"', as Firth puts it, to be the central method in analysing experience without any justification. By contrast, everyday introspection – and with it the introspective datum that experience is as of ordinary objects and properties – is not arbitrary as it is ubiquitous and already in use independently of one's theoretical aims. A further objection to the method of careful introspection is more fundamental. As we saw, careful introspection aims to expose basic elements of phenomenal character to which we are allegedly insensitive in everyday introspection. . Opponents argued that rather than helping to uncover the basic sensory structure of experience, careful introspection leads to a misrepresentation of the character of experience. Once the stance of everyday introspection is abandoned and careful introspection, driven by, say, epistemological concerns, is employed, we are in fact destroying, or at least heavily obscuring, the original target of observation.6 Both of these objections – and the wider discussion of which kind of first-person access is appropriate in philosophical theorizing about perceptual experience – echo some of the 6See (Firth, 1949, pp. 460-461). In the preface to the 1954 reprint of Perception, Price says that while he still thinks that sense-datum terminology is useful for describing how things strictly look, say, from a painter's perspective, it is not useful in accounting for ordinary perceptual experience. He explains that sensing (acquaintance with sense-data) is not as previously argued a core constituent of ordinary experience, but is rather itself a kind of phenomenal inspection. (Price, 1932, p. ix) 7 dominant concerns shaping the discussion in experimental psychology around that time. Firth, for instance, frequently mentions that psychologists agree with him about what direct inspection of experience reveals. He particularly cites Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler's criticism of introspectionist psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener as one way to understand what has gone wrong with the sense-datum view (Firth, 1949, p. 461). Overall, it is evident that philosophers of perception during this period assumed that firstperson access to experience makes available an apt description of phenomenal experience. Possession of such access was not a matter of grave concern for any of them, some difficulties and disagreements about the relevant type of access notwithstanding. However, when we look more closely at parallel discussions in psychology around the turn of the century and carrying on into the 1940s, the contrast is stark. For, the basic worries at the centre of analogous debates in psychology threatened the very use of introspection in psychological theorizing. 2. The scientific role of introspection In 1865, John Stuart Mill, responded to Auguste Comte's criticism of scientific psychology and of its core method, self-observation, as follows: There is little need for an elaborate refutation of a fallacy respecting which the only wonder is that it should impose upon anyone. (Mill, 1907/1865, p. 63) Comte had previously argued that scientific psychology is doomed for practical and conceptual reasons.7 Self-observation, he said, in the sense of first-person attention to one's own conscious mental states, results in the destruction of the state one seeks to observe. As soon as one attentively reflects on one's conscious visual experience of a horse, say, one ceases to visually attend (at least in the manner one did before) to the horse and this changes one's visual experience. Moreover, the idea of a single self attending to her own attending seems to require that the self splits attention. But such splitting, according to Comte is conceptually suspect. Mill offers two quick responses. Concerning the conceptual worry, he points out that splitting attention has been demonstrated to be possible. He refers to William Hamilton's experiments showing that subjects can attend to several things at once ('as many as six'): while attention is weakened by such splitting, it is not impossible. Furthermore, Mill suggests that the conceptual point can be side-stepped in any case because scientific psychology can use a form of selfobservation which does not involve attending to a concurrent act of attention. Rather, good scientific practice would use immediate retrospection, a technique of reflecting on a conscious experience just after having it 'when its impression in memory is still fresh' (64). But mainly, concerning both the practical and the conceptual point, Mill simply insists that the assumption that we have introspective knowledge of our own thoughts and experiences is not up for debate. Whatever we say about introspection, on Mill's view, we had better be able to explain how we could ... have acquired the knowledge, which nobody denies us to have, of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have affirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We know of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or by memory the moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and not ... merely by their results. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte's argument. Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe. (ibid. 64) Thirty-five years on, William James agrees with Mill's assessment on certain points. He attributes to common sense the unshakable belief that we have introspective awareness of our own conscious states and he asserts that this belief is central to psychology ('the most fundamental of all the postulates of Psychology'): 7 See the lengthy passage from Cours de philosophie positive, cited in (James, 1890/1981, pp. 187-188). 8 Introspective Observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always. The word introspection need hardly be defined – it means, of course, the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover. (185) However, James acknowledges concerns about the accuracy of introspective observation. He notes that there are extreme positions on this issue, ranging from Brentano's claim that introspective apprehension of conscious states is infallible, to Comte's rejection of direct introspective knowledge as 'a pure illusion'. James suggests that Mill's view about introspective knowledge by immediate retrospection expresses a 'practical truth about the matter'. He points out that even those who hold that introspective observation is infallible would concede that in addition we have access to our conscious states by immediate retrospective reflection, which is fallible due to the involvement of memory.8 The question is which of these types of first-person access to the mind can serve as the basis for psychological method. James' answer is that it must be retrospective reflection. But the psychologist must not only have his mental states in their absolute veritableness, he must report them and write about them, name them, classify and compare them and trace their relations to other things. Whilst alive they are their own property; it is only post-mortem that they become his prey. (James, 1890/1981, p. 189) Indeed – here James agreed with Comte – judging, labelling or classifying our own conscious states cannot be done concurrently. We are fallible in making classifications and generalizations whatever the subject matter or area of inquiry. In other words, this kind of fallibility is not merely an aspect of introspective classification and judgement within psychology, but of any scientific or ordinary context where classification, generalization and labelling are at work. Thus, it is also a feature of ordinary situations, concerning everyday judgements such as that I feel tired. It may seem as if at that moment one is merely expressing the very feeling one is experiencing 'and so to be experiencing and observing the same inner fact at a single stroke.' But in fact, says James, the experience one is having at that moment is that of saying-I-feel-tired. Insofar as the latter involves the feeling of tiredness it is very different from the feeling of tiredness felt just a moment before. 'The act of naming [it] has momentarily detracted from their force.' Thus, both ordinary introspective judgement and introspective observation in psychology involve immediate retrospection. Retrospection is required when we are going beyond merely feeling, to classifying and labelling. The question about accuracy thus is an empirical question and, says James, we do 'find ourselves in continual error and uncertainty' when engaging in introspection of this type.9 But equally, for James, that introspection is difficult and fallible is nothing out of the ordinary. All kinds of observation – especially scientific observation – have this feature. We simply have to do the best we can. And, just like in most other areas of investigation by observation, agreement among participating investigators is the ultimate arbiter of adequate theorizing. The only safeguard is in the final consensus of our farther knowledge about the thing in question, later views correcting earlier ones, until at last the harmony of a consistent system is reached. Such a system, gradually worked out, is the best guarantee the psychologist can give for the soundness of any particular psychologic observation which he may report. (191) In sum, for James, the adequate psychological method is just ordinary introspective reflection, which involves labelling and classifying conscious experiences based on immediate 8 James notes Brentano's distinction between 'the immediate feltness of a feeling' and our awareness of it via retrospective reflection. 9 Especially when introspecting experiences which are complex or not very strong, according to James. See (James, 1890/1981, pp. 190-191) for more discussion. 9 retrospection. Both the involvement of memory and the activity of classification mean that this kind of introspection is fallible. James contrasted this method with that employed by his contemporaries in psycho-physics and experimental psychology. He was not a fan of the latter, to put it mildly.10 His main complaint was that experimental introspection is too restricted in scope, concerning both the conditions under which introspective data can be collected and the kinds of phenomena introspective data can be collected about. For James, this literally takes the life out of the subject-matter, trivializing psychological work. To preserve the lived character of perceptual consciousness – for him so essential to the phenomenon– means using more free-flowing first-person retrospective reflection on ordinary experience, constrained mainly by seeking agreement about its best description with other psychologists and subjects engaged in describing it. 2.1 Wundt and Restricted Introspection I now turn to the views of these experimentalists, with a less hostile eye than James'.11 I shall concentrate on the key figure of Wilhelm Wundt and then contrast his views briefly with those of his students, Edward Bradford Titchener and Oswald Külpe. Collectively, these psychologists are most often associated with so-called 'classical introspectionist psychology'. A founding figure in experimentalist psychology as it developed from early psycho-physics in the mid to late nineteen hundreds, Wundt is perhaps the most well-known representative of the German tradition of early experimentalist psychology which gave a key role to introspection. Early on, Wundt distinguished between different kinds of first-person access to conscious experience. He, too, was sensitive to Comte's criticism of introspection as having destructive or distorting effects (see, e.g. (Wundt, 1896, p. 25).12 In response, Wundt accepted Brentano's distinction between two kinds of first-person access to one's own conscious states, namely selfobservation (Selbstbeobachtung) and inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) (Brentano, 1874, pp. 35-42).13 According to it, self-observation is an active form of direct deliberative attention to one's conscious experiences; inner perception is the fairly automatic and passive awareness one has of one's own conscious experience, as one goes along in the world in an ordinary manner. Wundt thought that both are real psychological phenomena, but that only inner perception constitutes genuine introspective awareness in the sense of being epistemically successful. For pretty much Comte's reasons, he argued that any attempt at deliberately attending to one's conscious states with the aim of observing them would distort or destroy the latter. So, while this does not mean that self-observing in this manner is impossible qua mental activity, it does mean that it cannot yield a scientifically valid form of observation, since the cognitive upshot cannot provide accurate data about the conscious phenomenon putatively attended to (Wundt, 1888, p. 296). Wundt is highly critical of psychologists who use self- 10 'This method taxes patience to the utmost, and could hardly have arisen in a country whose natives could be bored. Such Germans as Weber, Fechner, Vierordt and Wundt obviously cannot.... (...) There is little of the grand style about these new prism pendulum, and chronograph-philosophers. They mean business, not chivalry. What generous divination, and that superiority in virtue which was thought by Cicero to give a man the best insights into nature, have failed to do, their spying and scraping, their deadly tenacity and almost diabolic cunning, will doubtless some day bring about.' (192) 11That hostility is a manifestation of different viewpoints not just about introspection but also about the overarching theoretical conception of psychology, between the British tradition James is ensconced in, and the German experimentalist tradition of Wundt. For the historical origin and background debates surrounding introspectionist psychology, see (Danziger, 1980), also (Boring, 1953) and (Lyons, 1986, p. ch 1). 12 Wundt was also reacting to similar criticism of introspective methods in psychology by his teacher, Friedrich Lange (Lange, 1887, pp. 679-690). 13 'Innere Wahrnehmung' is often translated as 'inner perception' and to avoid confusion I will stick with this terminology. But the choice of words is unfortunate in suggesting the perceptual model of introspection, which seems not strictly part of the notion as it was used by Brentano and Wundt. 10 observation in their work, likening these efforts to Baron Munchhausen's pulling himself out of the bog by his own hair. Inner perception, on the other hand, was taken to be the source of our firm common sense belief – one that Wundt endorsed – that we can know about our own conscious experiences. In contrast to self-observation, inner perception can supply the essential data for scientific psychology. But it cannot do so on its own, since it is a passive form of introspection not involving a deliberate attempt to attend to one's conscious experiences. Rather, inner perception involves noticing them indirectly, 'out of the corner of one's "mental eye" (Lyons, 1986, p. 4) as one goes along having them. Inner perception is therefore unsystematic and unpremeditated. The trouble is that if one now tries to directly use inner perception to provide introspective data about conscious experience, one thereby turns passive inner perception into destructive active self-observation. Our capacity for inner perception therefore has to be carefully exploited so as to yield scientifically respectable data. Wundt's experimental method aims to achieve this by inducing inner perception under tightly controlled circumstances (Danziger, 1980, p. 245). In light of this, he placed severe constraints on using introspection in psychology. They are needed to enable scientific investigation because of the fleetingness of the subject-matter of psychology ( i.e. conscious experiential events being very unstable), one the one hand, and the difficulties with our first-person access to this subject-matter, on the other. Given that direct observation is not possible, we have to use objective measures and experiments to observe somewhat indirectly as best as we can. For one thing, we have to ensure that we can get the conscious phenomenon reliably to present in subjects, without the latter attempting to self-observe. Wundt's various experimental set-ups are crucial aids to this (Hülfsmittel).14 For another, Wundt maintained that not all conscious phenomena can be investigated in this manner. Thoughts and emotions, for example, are not reliably correlated with external stimuli to the same extent that basic sensations seem to be. Moreover, concerning sensory experiences themselves, we can only acquire data about elementary features, elicited by simple judgements or behavioural responses. Wundt's experiments shun qualitative reports because for him they are products of active self-observation. He therefore restricted experimental introspective investigation to certain basic aspects of sensory experiences. Other types of conscious and non-conscious mental phenomena, e.g. thought and emotions, were to be investigated by different, non-introspective methods (see (Wundt, 1896, pp. 24-28) and (Wundt, 1888)). Having developed different methods of investigation for different psychological phenomena under the heading of 'social psychology' (Völkerpsychologie), he published extensively in this area. Contrary to currently widespread belief, Wundt's conception of psychology thus encompasses vastly more than investigation by introspection (see (Danziger, 1980)).15 2.2 Titchener, Külpe, and Systematic Introspection Wundt was gradually superseded by a new generation of introspectionist psychologists within the first decade of the century. Some were students of his, who, although receiving their training in his laboratory, came to reject many of his restrictions on introspection. Two main brands of 14 Wundt disagreed with James's choice of retrospection as the key introspective method. For Wundt, retrospection isn't scientific observation at all because the latter requires by definition that the target of observation be present while being observed (Wundt, 1888, p. 294). Retrospection involves merely remembering the relevant conscious experience. However, Wundt did think that it can be used to good effect,. Some of his experiments employed retrospection, mainly to retrospectively access the upshot of inner perception. 15 For a representative caricature view of Wundt's psychology as confined to investigating conscious experience via introspection, see (Braisby & Gellatly, 2012, p. 9). Also (Davies, 2005), which presents nuanced picture of the complex development of experimental psychology overall, though. 11 introspectionist psychology emerged directly out of Wundt's laboratory: Titchener's structuralism and Külpe's Würzburg school. These differed significantly, and they were at times bitter critics of one another. However, they both endorsed the scientific legitimacy of qualitative data collected from subjective introspective reports under experimental conditions. This alone constituted a clear break with Wundt.16 Attitudes to introspection had very much changed among these psychologists. Titchener, for instance, confidently claimed that introspection itself can be a perfectly good source of scientific observation: But if self-observation means, simply, psychological observation; and if observation in psychology has as its end a knowledge of mind, ... then, just as certainly, introspection may be as impersonal, as objective, as matterof-fact, as is the observation of the natural sciences. (Titchener, 1912, p. 434) In response to the kind of worries that had led Wundt to regard inner perception as the only source of legitimate data (which still needed to be manipulated appropriately with the help of various experimental set-ups), Titchener took a more sanguine approach. He argued that these worries concern a former use of introspection in psychology which is 'precritical, precomparative and pre-experimental' (435). It involved introspective judgements that were infected by theoretical bias and the aim for metaphysical systematization. However, Titchener maintained, the mature psychology of his day used introspection differently. For example, in the case of introspective disagreement, a regimented and repeated application of the experimental introspective method could be relied upon to eradicate biased and confused reports. Psychology is not the only science in which the strict application of the best available methods leads to opposite conclusions. But is there the same hope, in psychology, that differences will presently be resolved? I see no reason for any but an affirmative answer. (...) A more methodical series of observations, with variation of conditions, would either bring two observers into agreement or would give us the key to their disagreement. (437) This echoes James' insistence that introspective observation is just like any other form of scientific observation – fallible and subject to disagreement. Titchener also emphasises the role of agreement about introspective data in ensuring that the introspective data passes scientific muster. More generally, the various ways in which the new generation of introspectionist psychologists conceived of their work constituted a rapprochement of sorts with the nonexperimentalist British empiricist tradition and their use of introspection. One loosening of Wundtian restraint concerned the proper scope of introspective method. Külpe's Würzburg laboratory, for example, specifically aimed to investigate conscious thought, judgement, emotions and thought's relation to action (see the work of e.g. Karl Marbe, Karl Bühler, Otto Selz, and Narziss Kaspar Ach). Titchener, too, endorsed a much larger domain of investigation, including memory and mental processes more generally (Titchener, 1912, pp. 227-8). More importantly, and correlatively, the other substantial loosening of constraint concerned the kind of introspective access harnessed in psychology, i.e. the proper method of investigation. The new generation accepted retrospection as a central introspective method, along the lines of James and Mill (see, e.g., (Bühler, 1908, pp. 100-101; Külpe, 1920; Müller, 1911; Titchener, 1912)). Typically, they accepted both, use of a more direct introspective awareness along the lines of inner perception, as well as immediate retrospective awareness. With that inclusion, the whole nature of the experimental method changed as well. The method of systematic introspection (Ausfrageexperimente) became dominant. Experiments designed to elicit immediate retrospective judgments about one's conscious 16 See, e.g., Wundt's detailed criticism of the Würzburg experimental approach (Wundt, 1907). 12 experiences moved away from use of objective, performance-related measures to a focus on subjective report and on qualitative description of experience. In particular, we see a striking change in how the experimenter is involved in the experiment: eliciting qualitative data requires the experimenter to ask questions to which the subject responds. One consequence was that certain theoretical differences were prone to show up in the introspective data itself, rather than in what was taken to be the scientific interpretation of the introspective data (Danziger, 1980, p. 253). The infamous 'imageless thought controversy' between Titchener and the Würzburg school is a case in point. Würzburgers like Külpe claimed that they could introspect non-imagistic and non-sensational awarenesses (unanschauliche Bewusstheiten) reflecting higher cognitive activity. Titchener, on the other hand, argued that introspection did not reveal anything non-imagistic or non-sensational and hence that his opponents were simply confused in various ways, either mistaking sensational composites for putatively non-sensational elements of experience or letting their theoretical preferences infect their introspective data. This episode thus also reflects another aspect of the state of play among experimental introspectionists in the early decades of the 1900s. The debate had become one about competing pictures of the metaphysics of conscious experience, with Titchener defending a structuralist, bottom-up picture, and the Würzburg school defending a richer conception of conscious experience including complex and higher-level cognitive elements. Titchener adhered to the doctrine of sensationalism, the view that conscious experience is composed of sensory elements that combine to produce the overall experience. Sensationalism, endorsed already by Mill and earlier British empiricists (Mill, 1843, p. ch 4), gives introspection a key role in analysing experience into its basic components and in discovering the rules of combination in terms of which complex conscious contents of ordinary experience can be explained. In this capacity the role of introspection was to overcome the naïve but misleading take on experience, and to discern the real conscious character with its basic sensational structure. In Titchener's hands, then, introspective investigation of conscious experience is a form of analysis, or, as it was sometimes called 'reduction', of experience into its basic sensory components (Titchener, 1912). Külpe and the Würzburgers endorsed a rather different picture of conscious experience. Specifically, they held that in addition to sensory aspects, conscious experiences included other fundamental aspects, in the form of mental activity. The latter could not be analysed into combinations of the former. This basic outlook drew on Brentano's act psychology and Husserl's phenomenological approach to investigating experience. The Würzburg emphasis on investigating conscious thinking and activity in experience derived from these very different interests. Both sides of the debate practiced systematic introspection, however. Yet, systematic introspection presented several methodological problems (some old, some new) none of which were particularly hidden from practitioners. Central use of immediate retrospection meant that the concern about memory as a potential source of distortions and gaps resurfaced. The reliance on verbal articulation and report of qualitative data about subjects' conscious experience introduced worries about scientific validity of the data, given the inability to independently check for the presence of the experiences in question. In addition, the experiments of systematic introspection, with their active involvement of the experimenter, have a strong demand character, which presents its own danger for infecting the data collected (Müller, 1911). Part of the explanation of why systematic introspection was attractive to its proponents despite all these known problems is the pervasive influence of phenomenalism in science and philosophy at that time.17 Phenomenalism is the view that theories and explanatory terms must be 17 For detailed accounts of these background influences see (Boring, 1953), (Danziger, 1980), (Hatfield, 2005). 13 epistemically grounded in what is directly given in experience. It takes for granted that we have access to what we are experientially given. Access to experience is, of course, the bone of contention in the discussions concerning introspective methodology. However, specific worries concerning introspective method might not have appeared fundamentally threatening but just something to be worked around, in light of the truly dominant position of phenomenalism at the time. The background influence of phenomenalism also sheds light on the two basic pictures of the nature of experience separating the two camps (see (Danziger, 1980), (Boring, 1953) and (Hatfield, 2005) for more details). Titchener was heavily influenced by the positivism of Ernst Mach, which reinforced the atomistic-sensational conception of conscious experience found in the sensationalism inherited from the British empiricists. As mentioned above, Külpe and the Würzburg school, by contrast, were guided by Brentano's act psychology and Husserl's phenomenological approach and they held a far less constructivist view of conscious experience. By the 1920s, the method of systematic introspection had more or less run its course. In Germany, Gestalt psychology had taken hold, which although continuing with some of the basic ideas of the Würzburg school, constituted another important shift in methodological outlook. In the US, among other things, the gradual rise of behaviourist psychology, encompassing an outright rejection of the conception of psychology concerned with inner conscious states, led to a fizzling out of Titchener's programme by the time of his death in 1927.18 2.3 Gestalt Psychology and Phenomenological Method Gestalt psychology is said to have been founded by Max Wertheimer, who argued that movement – independently of an object which moves could be shown to be literally seen. Perceived movement was to be neither reduced to more constituent sensational elements, nor explained in terms of further judgement (Wertheimer, 1912). The recognition of perceived movement as an unreducible feature of conscious experience, was followed by recognition of other features, providing a very different conceptual framework of the basic organization of experience. Describing experience in terms of fundamental organizational features, such as object constancy, was a far cry from the sparse features figuring in Wundt's constrained introspective investigation or Titchener's unconstrained systematic introspective analysis. Two specific changes are relevant from our point of view. The first is a deliberate return to a less liberal introspective experimental method. Gestalt psychologists attempted to avoid or minimize problems associated with the demand character of systematic introspection and the involvement of memory by including checks of overt behaviour in their experimental techniques (Danziger, 1980). The second is a full-throated endorsement of the need for a phenomenological description of experience which is naïve or pre-theoretical. In doing this they rejected both, Titchener's introspective analysis and Wundt's restriction on the scope of introspective investigation. Gestalt psychologists thereby manifested their affinity with the Würzburg school and Husserl's work on phenomenology (Koffka, 1924, p. 150). As Kurt Koffka emphasises, at the centre of their approach to psychology is the 'phenomenological method': 18 For space reasons I will concentrate on Gestalt psychology in this paper. But the relationship between behaviourist psychology and introspection is fascinating in its own right (Boring, 1953; Lyons, 1986, pp. 2344). For classic papers by early behaviourists critiquing introspectionist psychology see, e.g. (Watson, 1913; Dunlap, 1912). For attempts to account for introspective belief in behaviourist terms see, e.g. (Lashley, 1923) 14 In reality experimenting and observing must go hand in hand. A good description of a phenomenon may by itself rule out a number of theories and indicate definite features which a true theory must possess. We call this kind of observation 'phenomenology,' a word which has several other meanings which must not be confused with ours. For us phenomenology means as naïve and full a description of direct experience as possible. In America 'introspection' is the only one used for what we mean, but this word has also a very different meaning in that it refers to a special kind of such description, namely the one which analyses direct experience into sensations of attributes, or some other systematic but not experiential ultimates. (Koffka, 1935, p. 73) Indeed, Gestalt psychologists saw themselves in a kind of Goldilocks position between (systematic and analytical) introspectionism and behaviourism. Koffka and Köhler took great pains to explain how their approach differed from, overlapped with – and, of course, improved upon –introspectionism, as well as behaviourism (Koffka, 1924; Köhler, 1930, pp. 1-77). Both types of experimental psychology were accused of 'remoteness from life'. Behaviourism is criticised for leaving our experience altogether: In their justified criticism they threw out the baby with the bath, substituting pure achievement experiments and tending to leave out phenomenology altogether. (...)Without describing the [conscious character of experience] we should not know what we had to explain. (73) Introspectionism was criticised for using a procedure to isolate certain features of experience (local size, form and brightness) from their ordinary experiential contexts. The result is that of all objective experience, as both layman and psychologist enjoy it in the visual field of everyday life, very little is left as pure and genuine sensory fact (...) As long as the introspectionists' attitude prevails, however, psychology will never seriously study those experiences which form the matrix of our whole life. Instead it will observe and discuss the properties of rare and unusual experience which, though they are supposed to be continually present beneath our naïve experiences, seem to be so well hidden most of the time that their existence has nothing to do with life as we actually experience it. (Köhler, 1930, pp. 64-65) Gestalt psychologists accepted that the introspectionists' data about experiences is genuine in that there really are such pure sensory experiences, discoverable by the introspective methods in question. But they also held that these experiences do not represent mainstream types of perceptual experience that form the starting point of any psychological inquiry. Gestalt psychologists argued that the central focus of psychology is the description and explanation of direct (naïve, immediate, uncritical) experience, i.e. of everyone's normal experiential awareness when they, say, open their eyes and look around. Ordinary experience is typically of the world, of objects such as chairs, tables and trees and their ordinary properties. The character is objective in that it is as of external-world, mind-independent stuff (Köhler, 1930, pp. 1-25). According to Gestalt psychologists, the most apt characterization of experience is obtained by just describing one's surroundings in as naïve a manner as possible: '[a]ny description I can give of my surroundings, of this room, the people in it, and so on, are facts for psychology to start from' (Koffka, 1924, p. 153). Koffka's phenomenological method has its origin in Husserl's work and I provide no more than the briefest gloss on it here.19 The key thought is that we can gain knowledge of experience by directing our attention outwards into the world first and then shifting our attitude from experiencing the world to considering the character of such experiencing. The shift in attitude is something intellectual we do – Husserl calls it 'bracketing' – where we withhold certain kinds of commitment that come with normal experiencing the world. Such bracketing, according to Husserl, does not distort the experience itself but merely disconnects it from performing its normal function, thereby transforming our experiential knowledge of the world into knowledge of the experiential character of the former. 19 My (rudimentary) understanding of Husserl's approach is due to (Thomasson, 2005). See Walsh and Yoshimi's chapter on the phenomenological tradition in this volume. 15 Much more would need to be said to adequately present and elucidate Husserl's view and its influence on Gestalt psychologists, among others. But it should be clear already that the phenomenological method differs not only from systematic introspection, it differs from all the other introspective methods discussed so far. The latter all involve kinds of first-person access to experience via fairly basic psychological kinds (observation, memory, attention, feeling). The former does not; the sense in which it constitutes first-person access to experience is quite different since the route to first-person awareness of experience is via outward experiential attention together with further deliberate and complex intellectual efforts. Koffka further explains that one can also take an investigative, first-person ('analytic') attitude to experience, i.e. one can introspect one's experience in the more traditional sense. However, taking that attitude to one's experience changes one's mental situation, namely the 'subjective conditions' under which the organism is reacting to the environment. Consequently, it is no surprise that there are different experiences ('reactions') in these cases. 'You were looking at this room and were interested in it at the beginning, you were introspecting and interested in psychology afterward' (154). Thus, introspecting involves changing the experience one is having in a way the phenomenological method does not. In light of this, Koffka argues that while psychology can and does usefully engage in introspective investigation of conscious experience, it has to do so very carefully. Sometimes the changes brought about in the target experience are not destructive, but are in keeping with the dynamic organization of the target experience's content. In that case, the introspectively changed experience amounts to 'a development' of the former. But sometimes the changes result in an entirely different experience altogether. This is why it is wrong to attempt to maintain an analytical attitude at all costs as the method of psychology. In most cases such an attitude does not develop the [original experience], but destroys many of its original tendencies. The attitude which is legitimate has to be determined by the nature of each separate whole dealt with, and in this appears the art of introspection. Introspection, like every other kind of observation, is an art, and it is not an easy one. (158) The criticism here not that analytic introspectionism uses introspection to investigate conscious experience – Gestalt psychology does so, too. Rather, introspectionism uses it irresponsibly and exclusively. Because of this, the fact that introspection inevitably changes the target experience becomes too destructive. The root problem is that introspectionists use introspective data so acquired as the starting point for theorizing, assuming that it offers the most basic and accurate description of conscious sensory experience. But, as we saw, Gestalt psychologists hold that the latter and hence the starting point for psychology is based on the naïve and uncritical take on it derived from simply describing the scene around one, i.e. describing 'the world, as we have it'. 2.4 Varieties of first-person access In sum, psychologists of this era tended to accept that introspection delivers useful and important data about the conscious mind, but also that there are different kinds of introspection, i.e. different kinds of first-person access and that not all are equally suitable to the task. Moreover, even if suitable such access must be employed carefully because getting scientifically respectable introspective data is difficult under the best circumstances. They agreed that the central difficulty comes from the potentially distorting and destructive effects of deliberate introspective reflection but they disagreed about what to do about this. Their disagreement has many sources, and I have been able to convey only a small part of the overall story. Among the experimental psychologists, the Gestalt psychologists emphasized further that the first point of departure for the scientist must be a description of 'direct experience', by which they meant ordinary, lived experience from the point of view of the naïve experiencer. 16 As we saw, this description is obtained by describing, as uncritically as possible, the world around one as one is experiencing it. Insofar as this method owes to Husserl's phenomenological method, and by the Gestalt psychologists' own insistence, this way of acquiring first-person data about experience is significantly different from any of the other kinds of first-person access classified as introspection. In section 1, I said that Firth refers to the Gestalt psychologists' naïve take on experience to explain what he means by direct inspection of experience. Moreover, his critique of sensedatum theory mentions the Gestalt psychologists' rejection of Titchener's systematic introspective method. This clearly shows the influence psychological discussion of introspection had on philosophy of perception at that time. This impact was long-lasting. Thirty years later, P.F. Strawson, in critiquing A.J. Ayer's sense-datum view, insisted that when we ask 'a non-philosophical observer gazing idly through a window' to describe his experience to us '[h]e does not start talking about lights and colours, patches and patterns (Strawson, 1979, p. 43)'. Instead, Strawson claims, the world is objectively 'given with the given' (47). However, just like in the case of the Gestalt psychologists' view about the naïve description of experience, it is not entirely clear what the nature of the first-person access involved is. According to Strawson, [the observer will] use the perceptual claim – the claim it was natural to make in the circumstance – in order to characterise [his] experience, without actually making the claim. [He] renders the perceptual judgement internal to the characterization of the experience without actually asserting the content of the judgement. And this is really the best possible way of characterising the experience. (Strawson, 1979, p. 44) The Husserlian heritage seems plain in this passage. Against the background of the developments in psychology just discussed, this raises interesting questions about whether – and if so in what sense – the method employed counts as a first-person access we recognise as a kind of introspection at all. 3. Transparency and introspecting at the end of the 20th century While earlier philosophical discussions surrounding perception were typically motivated by epistemological concerns, late-20th century focus shifted to philosophy of mind topics such as physicalism and the mind-body problem. There was an active debate about perceptual experience between representationalism, qualia theories and disjunctivism. Sense-datum theory had largely dropped out of the picture by then. Some of the main reasons for this connect smoothly with the critique Firth made against Price: the view that sense-datum theory severely distorts the character of experience and that a correct description of the latter involves reference to ordinary objects and properties. It is fair to say that the claim that the phenomenal character of experience is as of the objective world was broadly taken as common ground in the 1980s and 1990s and many disputes about the correct description of phenomenal character concerned certain further details.20 The details of these views are not important here, rather, it's the way in which such descriptions were typically put forward in those discussions. Specifically, the claim that phenomenal character is as of the objective world was often affirmed in the context of the thesis that experience is transparent to first-person reflection. The transparency thesis has played a powerful role in the philosophy of perception at the end of the century, providing a major source of support for arguments in favour of representationalist and disjunctivist views 20 One key issue concerned whether one needs to appeal to additional non-objective, qualitative properties to adequately describe phenomenal character (e.g. (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1992; Tye, 1995; Tye, 2000; Searle, 1983; Peacocke, 1983; Levin, 1995; Block, 1980, p. 278). Another issue, e.g., concerned the precise manner of objective givenness, that is, whether it involves particular objects or merely generalized existential reference to them (e.g. (Soteriou, 2000; Martin, 1997; Davies, 1992). 17 of perceptual experience. Roughly, it says that when one reflects on what (e.g.) visual experience is like for one – when one reflects on the phenomenal character of one's visual experience – one looks through the experience to what it is about, namely to the ordinary objects and their sensible properties presented in experience. As Tye puts it: Why is it that perceptual experiences are transparent? When you turn your gaze inward and try to focus your attention on intrinsic features of these experiences, why do you always seem to end up attending what the experiences are of? (...) In turning one's mind inward to attend to the experience, one seems to end up scrutinizing external features or properties. (Tye, 1995, pp. 135-136) Proponents of the transparency thesis thus maintain that first-person reflection on phenomenal character does not lead to awareness of any special experiential object or properties, distinct from those we would refer to in describing the world as we experience it (see also, e.g. (Shoemaker, 1996, pp. 100-101; Dretske, 1995, p. 62)). The most apt description of phenomenal character is in terms of ordinary objects and properties. Interesting for our purposes is what kind of reflection is supposed to be involved in the transparency thesis. The blunt assumption by philosophers in these debates was that it is introspection (see, e,g (Loar, 1997, p. 597; Lycan, 1995, p. 82; Tye, 2000, p. 51). They tended to identify what they (and others) are doing when they reflect on phenomenal character as introspecting and often called the data about experience thus collected 'introspective evidence' (e.g. (Martin, 2000, p. 219; Crane, 2000, p. 50). Other phrases are also used, such as 'turning one's attention inwards', or 'attending to one's experience', or 'reflecting on what experience is like' and so forth. The impression one forms on the basis of this literature is that there is a fairly straightforward first-person access to one's own conscious states. It was taken for granted that we have introspective access to our experiences and that such access yields appropriate descriptions of phenomenal character for use in theorizing. However, not much is said about what kind of access it is. Thus, philosophers of perception towards the end of the 20th century took seriously phenomenal adequacy constraints on their theories and they did not consider them difficult to come by via introspection. This contrasts with both debates discussed previously. The early sense-datum discussion held that introspecting phenomenal character is possible as well as knowledge-conducing, but they also recognized that it must be done with great care. Moreover, we saw that the fact that opponents accepted different introspective verdicts raised a serious question for them about the kind of first-person access at work in their respective theorizing. Firth argued that direct inspection of experience reveals that phenomenal character is best described objectively, but he also acknowledged different kinds of first-person attitudes one might take to one's conscious experiences and that they might be responsible for the different verdicts. In the case of experimental psychology, we saw that psychologists were much preoccupied with the question of which kind of first-person or introspective access was suitable for gathering accurate descriptions of the target experiences. Much of their discussion was driven by worries over the potential of various kinds of introspection to distort or destruct the target experience and this worry was crucial to their choice of introspective method. In the last two decades of the 20th century, philosophers of perception in the debates mentioned above were not concerned about these issues. They put forward claims about phenomenal character, where these claims were meant to be obvious upon introspection. Insofar as there was sensitivity to the issue of diverging introspective claims about phenomenal character, this is not taken to impugn the first-person access to conscious experience as such in a serious way. For instance, Michael Martin explains the differences between the descriptions of phenomenal character by sense-datum theorists and representationalists as resulting from prioritizing different elements of the naïve introspective description of phenomenal character which forms common ground between them. 18 From this perspective, what is notable about each of the main traditions is not what they seek to defend by reference to introspection, but what they are prepared to reject in the face of introspective support. The sensedatum tradition denies the manifest fact that it seems to us as if we are presented in experience with mindindependent objects and states of affairs in the world around us. The intentional tradition denies the introspective evidence that things apparently sensed must actually be before the mind for one to experience so. (Martin, 2000, p. 219) Most surprisingly, though, is the seeming lack of awareness of any connection between the transparency thesis and Husserlian phenomenological method among many mainstream proponents of the transparency thesis. In their hands, the latter tends to be taken to articulate that which is introspectible, namely the thoroughly objective character of experience. But when one looks at accounts of the process involved, they bear significant resemblance to those put forward by psychologists and philosophers more directly inspired by Husserl.21 The reason why this is important here is that, as we saw above, whether the phenomenological method counts as a kind of introspection at all is a genuine question. Late-20th century discussions involving transparency thus display a kind of selective forgetfulness with respect to introspection. On the one hand, there is a clear line running from early critics of sense-datum theory and the experimental psychologists who influenced them, to later proponents of representationalism and disjunctivism endorsing the thought that naïve reflection on experience reveals its character to be objective. On the other hand, though, the earlier long-standing and sophisticated discussions in which this thought was typically embedded – in particular the distinction between types of first-person access at work in theorizing about conscious experience – has almost entirely washed out. 21 The issue plays out in different ways in some later discussions concerning the nature of introspection, see, e.g. (Sellars, 1956/1997; Drestke, 1999; Byrne, 2005; Tye, 2000). The Husserlian origin is hardly ever acknowledged, much less discussed in any detail. See, though, (Thomasson, 2005) for an excellent discussion of Husserl's view of self-knowledge and his influence on Sellars' view in particular. 19 Works Cited Barnes, W., 1944-45. The Myth of Sense-data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Block, N., 1980. Troubles with Functionalism. In: N. Block, ed. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. London: Methuen. Boring, E., 1953. A History of Introspection. Psychological Bulletin, pp. 169-189. 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Ueber Ausfrageexperimente und ueber die Methoden zu Psychologie des Denkens. Psychologische Studien, Issue 3, pp. 301-360.

The People Problem in Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility, ed. Gregg Caruso, New York: Lexington Books, 2013, pp. 141-60 Benjamin Vilhauer Philosophers who are skeptical about free will have to contend with an issue that I will call "the people problem". Do we have to treat human beings as if they have free will to treat them as persons, in the sense that matters for morality and the meaning of life? A lot is at stake in this question. If the answer is "yes", then a world in which human beings no longer treated each other as having free will would be impoverished in some important ways, and it would be natural for this to motivate some to argue against the view that we lack free will. If the answer is "no", on the other hand, then we have one less reason to resist this view. This question has received a fair bit of discussion in the literature, but a lot more effort has been invested in arguing for "yes" than for "no". My goal here is to contribute to the "no" side (with a caveat that I will mention shortly). I will argue that a primary concern of philosophers in the recent literature who argue for "yes" is the worry that if we stop treating people as if they have free will, then we are driven to consequentialism, and we end up instrumentalizing human beings and treating them as mere means to social ends. I will argue that this concern is misplaced, since there is a broadly Kantian ethics available to free will deniers which holds that we must always treat people as ends, and never merely as means. Let me explain a few terms before proceeding. "Free will" refers to whatever satisfies the control condition of moral responsibility. I will sometimes use "treating as free" as shorthand for "treating as having free will". "Moral responsibility" refers to the relationship to our actions 2 which is necessary for us to be appropriately praised or blamed for our actions. "Free will believers" claim that we have free will. "Free will deniers" claim that we lack free will. "Free will skeptics" claim that we don't know whether we have free will or not. I will occasionally refer to both deniers and skeptics as "philosophers who take skeptical approaches to free will theory". I will not try to establish that a particular sense of "treating as persons" is the one that matters for morality and the meaning of life. There are different senses that matter for different aspects of morality and life-meaning, and I do not want to deny that there is indeed a sense of "treating as persons" that does imply "treating as free", which really does matter for some aspects. My own position is free will skepticism rather than denial. I agree with Kant that it is possible that we have free will, but we do not know that we do. I also agree with Kant that the mere possibility of free will can be enough to justify us in treating each other as free. 1 But while Kant thinks the mere possibility of free will justifies us in treating each other as free across the board, I think it justifies us in treating each other as free only in some contexts, for example, when we seek to justify some kinds of praise. 2 The mere possibility of free will is not sufficient to justify retributive punishment, at least not when significant harm such as imprisonment is at issue. 3 However, despite my own preference for skepticism over denial, I think that the freewill-implying sense of "persons" is necessary for much less of morality and life-meaning than many philosophers seem to believe, and that we can do quite well without much of the stuff for which it is necessary. I do not wish to claim that we lose nothing worth having. But I think we lose less than many think. My main effort in this paper will be to focus on a particular sense of "treating as persons" which does not imply free will in any way, and which is therefore readily 3 available to free will deniers-a sense which has been mentioned in the literature but does not seem to have received detailed discussion. I have in mind the Kantian notion that to treat human beings as persons is to treat them as ends in themselves, rather than as mere means to ends. 4 I will not presuppose any background in Kant's philosophy. However, philosophers with even a passing acquaintance with Kant will probably know that Kant's own account of personhood and treating others as ends is not compatible in all respects with a philosophy that denies free will. 5 For example, Kant is a retributivist who holds that criminals can only be treated as ends when we punish them if we hold them morally responsible for their actions. He is also a strident advocate of the death penalty. I will discuss these points later, and argue that Kant would be better off without his retributivism. However, in light of Kant's actual position, it may seem confused to look to Kant's philosophy for a notion of "treating as persons" that does not imply "treating as free". But Kant's work is noteworthy for how much effort he expends in providing multiple explanations of his basic ideas, and how little effort he devotes to showing how those different explanations fit together. Commentators still argue about whether Kant's different explanations of treating others as ends cohere. To my mind, Kant's most helpful explanation of treating others as ends is in terms of treating them as they would rationally consent to be treated. Even if Kant thought that treating others as they would rationally consent to be treated implies treating them as having free will, I think it can be demonstrated that it does not. This thread in Kant's thought is helpfully drawn out in Rawls' notion of original position deliberation. Properly understood, original position deliberation serves to "filter out", as morally irrelevant, desert claims that involve attributions of moral responsibility (what I call our "actionbased" desert claims) and focus our attention instead on what we deserve just by virtue of being persons (what I call our "personhood-based" desert claims). Choosing the basic principles for 4 society in the original position allows us to identify appropriate norms and practices for a society in which we can treat each other as persons in a robust Kantian sense without treating each other as having free will. But before we can see how this works, it will be helpful to briefly review a few points in the recent history of the people problem, which is cast in its distinctive form for the contemporary literature in P.F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" (1997). 6 1. Some Highlights in the Recent History of the People Problem The idea that there is a special connection between treating human beings as persons and treating them as having free will been a part of philosophical reflections on free will for a very long time. But P.F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" prompted a renewed interest in this issue. Most readers will know his basic story, so I will treat it in summary fashion. Strawson frames his thoughts in terms of a debate between "optimists" and "pessimists". Optimists think that the concept of moral responsibility still works just fine if determinism is true, because praise encourages people to continue doing more of what we want them to do, and blame encourages people to behave differently. Pessimists not only disagree, but find the optimists' vision of the world deeply disturbing. They see the optimist vision as depersonalizing, and they hold that we can only legitimately hold people morally responsible if we have libertarian free will. Strawson thinks both sides in this quarrel have a point. He thinks optimists are right to insist that we must find a way of going on with our practices of holding morally responsible which does not presuppose libertarianism, because libertarianism is merely a fantasy. But pessimists are right to see the optimist vision as depersonalizing. Optimists recommend that we regard each other with what Strawson calls the "objective attitude", rather than the "reactive attitudes" which are essential components of "ordinary inter-personal attitudes". The reactive 5 attitudes are the attitudes involved in our holding each other morally responsible, including praise and blame, as well as any other attitudes that have praise or blame as essential elements. Strawson thinks we avoid the depersonalizing effects of the objective attitude by maintaining the reactive attitudes. But on his view, the pessimists are wrong to suppose that we need libertarian free will to justify the reactive attitudes. In some sense that is a bit mysterious, Strawson sees the reactive attitudes as self-justifying-the reactive attitudes themselves "fill the gap" in the optimists' vision. For purposes of studying the people problem, the key point here is the claim that we can avoid a depersonalizing objectivity of attitude if we maintain the reactive attitudes. But why, exactly, would it depersonalize us if we relinquished the reactive attitudes and took up a permanent objectivity of attitude? Strawson's remarks here are not as clear as one might wish. At first pass, we can discern (at least) two sub-problems. One is about a profound sense of isolation Strawson thinks would ensue. The other is about consequentialism. Ultimately they may best be viewed as the same problem, the former being a consequence of the latter, but the literature seems not always to have connected them. The isolation issue has already received a fair bit of discussion in the literature, so I will discuss it briefly, and then move on to discuss the consequentialism problem which is my main concern. Strawson claims that a world where the objective attitude was universal would be a tragic world of "human isolation" (Strawson, 129). He thinks this because he thinks that the reactive attitudes are essential elements of a very wide range of human emotions and relationships, including friendship and love (124). John Martin Fischer endorses this view, and claims that such a world would be "colorless and cold", and would be missing one of the "key normative ingredients in the notion of personhood" (Fischer 1995, 2-3). 6 But it is not clear that love and friendship are essentially reactive, i.e. that they are intrinsically bound up with holding people morally responsible. Consider love. Suppose Anisha successfully acts in ways designed to cultivate virtues such as fidelity and courage, and Bud loves Anisha because of these virtues. If Bud supposes that Anisha is morally responsible for these actions, then he can take his love to be a response to her that she can claim to deserve. But suppose that he instead believes that she has done nothing to cultivate her character. She has always been this way-it is simply her nature. Would this give him a reason to love her any less? As Derk Pereboom puts the point, Explaining love is a complex enterprise. Besides moral character and action, factors such as one's relation to the other...and her affinities with persons or events in one's history all might have a part....But even if there is an important aspect of love that is essentially a deserved response to moral character and action, it is unlikely that one's love would be undermined if one were to believe that these moral qualities do not come about through free and responsible choice. For moral character and action are loveable whether or not they merit praise. Love of another involves, most fundamentally, wishing well for the other, taking on many of the aims and desires of the other as one's own, and a desire to be together with the other. (2009, 20) To take the next step in reflection, now suppose that Bud comes to see his love for Anisha as simply a consequence of his own nature, rather than something he has in any way willed or cultivated. It is not clear that any of this should make him see this love as shallower, or less valuable. As I discuss in more detail elsewhere, the same sort of argument can be made regarding many other attitudes that Strawsonians sometimes claim to be essentially reactive, such as friendship, and respect. (We can respect people for their fidelity and courage without liking or loving them for it, even if we do not suppose that it involves free will.) There are no doubt some attitudes that are essentially reactive, such as the attitudes involved in praise and blame, and some species of gratitude, anger, resentment, and vengefulness. A world devoid of these attitudes would be a different world, without question. But if the worry is that it would be 7 so devoid of emotional engagement that the human beings populating it could no longer be counted as persons, then the recognition that it could still contain love, friendship, and respect should suffice to allay this worry. 7 Now I want to turn to the problem about consequentialism. Consequentialists hold that the rightness of actions is determined entirely by the consequences they produce. Nonconsequentialists deny this. They hold (among other things) that there are some actions we cannot take, no matter what the consequences may be. Utilitarianism is probably the most widely discussed form of consequentialism. Utilitarians hold that the morally correct end is maximum overall happiness, and that whatever means maximizes overall happiness is the means we should take. 8 Strawson associates optimism and the objective attitude with utilitarianism. He explains that the optimist finds "an adequate basis for certain social practices in calculated consequences", an approach which he calls "a one-eyed utilitarianism"(140). When the optimist "undertakes to show that the truth of determinism would not shake the foundations of the concept of moral responsibility and of the practices of moral condemnation and punishment, he typically refers, in a more or less elaborated way, to the efficacy of these practices in regulating behavior in socially desirable ways. These practices are represented solely as instruments of policy, as methods of individual treatment and social control"(137). The pessimist "is apt to say...that the humanity of the offender himself is offended by this picture of his condemnation and punishment"(137). Strawson acknowledges that we should have "some belief in the utility of practices of condemnation and punishment"(139). But he goes on to say that "the social utility of these practices, on which the optimist lays such exclusive stress, is not what is now in question. What is in question is the pessimist's justified sense that to speak in terms of social utility alone is to leave out something vital in our conception of these practices". He thinks that 8 the "vital thing can be restored by attending to the complicated web of [reactive] attitudes and feelings which form an essential part of the moral life as we know it, and which are quite opposed to objectivity of attitude"(139). As Susan Wolf puts it, in commenting on Strawson, To justify praise and blame in the way the optimist suggests is to...leave out of account any question of whether it is an individual's fault that he has done something wrong or whether it is to the individual's credit that he has done something right. In short, to justify the praise and blame of persons in the way the optimist suggests is...to justify these practices only as a means of manipulation or training. The pessimist's fear may now be expressed as the fear that if determinism is true, this consequentialist justification of praise and blame is the only kind of justification that would be available to us. (390) If I may gloss Wolf's claim in the final sentence of this excerpt in slightly broader terms, the worry seems to be that attributions of free will and moral responsibility are not just a way for us to avoid a slide into consequentialism, but are necessary if we are to avoid a slide into consequentialism. It is probably fair to assume that this is Strawson's view too, even if he never quite states it explicitly. But philosophers who take skeptical approaches to free will can resist this view. Wolf goes on to ask us to Imagine for a moment what a world would be like in which we all regarded each other solely with the objective attitude. We would still imprison murderers and thieves, presumably, and we would still sing praises for acts of courage and charity...But these actions and words would have a different, shallower meaning than they have for us now...they would be bits of positive and negative reinforcement meted out in the hopes of altering the character of others in ways best suited to our needs. (1981, 391) Tamler Sommers (2007) argues that Strawson and Wolf are too grim about the implications of rejecting the reactive attitudes. He considers a world of universal objectivity of attitude in which a character named Sally loses a wallet and a helpful stranger finds it and returns it to her: Sally should thank the woman, but not only because it may reinforce the behaviour. She should also thank the woman because she deeply appreciates the gesture. And while it is true that the woman is not ultimately deserving of praise 9 for her actions (ultimately, Sally believes, it is a matter of luck that she became the kind of person who performs them), there is no reason for Sally to be coldhearted to her. She can warmly appreciate the gesture and the person who performed it without attributing desert-entailing responsibility to her. Sally can exult in the gesture, if she wants to; she can think 'What a nice world it is that produces clumsy, absentminded people like me who drop money-stuffed wallets, and sweet unselfish women like her who return them'. And the greater the heroes – the Danes, for example, who protected Jews during the Holocaust – the more profound one's feelings of appreciation will be. (2007, 229-330) I take part of Sommers' point here to be that even if we endorse a consequentialist, behavior-reinforcement justification of thanking people who do good turns for us, we are not required to think of this as a calculating, cynical manipulation of them. We can have a sincere, emphatic, emotionally rich experience of this appreciation. This is what a utilitarian would encourage, since we will probably contribute more to the maximization of overall happiness in this way. But this point does not go far enough to resolve the consequentialism problem (though in fairness to Sommers, he does not claim that it does-he does not appear to take up this broader worry about consequentialism). I see Sommers' point here as adding another reply to the isolation issue. That is, one might think that the root of the isolation issue is the fear that a thoroughgoing consequentialist justification of all our interactions would mean that we should always be calculatingly putting on a show when interacting with others, trying to reason out what sort of emotional experiences we should be pretending to have, in order to cause the people around us to behave as we desire. If we looked out across our social world and saw that all our potential interlocutors were manipulative, dissembling play-actors, then this would be isolating indeed. I take Sommers' point to be that if that is not what we want our lives to be like, then the mere fact of relinquishing the reactive attitudes gives us no reason to try to make them that way. This is an important point, but the problem about consequentialism extends further. Sommers goes on to say that 10 Kantian proclivities may begin to rebel at this picture, but the rebellion can be suppressed, at least for now. True, we are not attributing to these heroes a dignity and respect as autonomous agents. But this does not prevent us from admiring and applauding their characters and the actions that arise from their characters. We are grateful to the world for having such people in it, and we appreciate the heroes themselves for being what they are (even if they are not morally responsible for it). This is a deep, warm, unbleak, unbarren, unironic appreciation, and it is entirely consistent with denying free will and taking the objective attitude. (2007, 330) I think Sommers is correct that Kantian proclivities need not rebel when what is at issue is whether we can legitimately have sincere and heartfelt emotional experiences in contexts where they raise no moral qualms, barring misplaced concerns about the objective attitude. But what about when confronted with the issues that more traditionally divide consequentialists and Kantians-issues about human rights, for example? To treat each other as persons is surely not only to have sincere, engaged emotions in our interactions, but also to respect each others' rights, and to develop social institutions together that safeguard our rights. What should free will deniers say about a situation in which, by depriving just a few agitators of their right to vote, or their right to free speech, we can dramatically improve social harmony, thereby maximizing overall happiness? Or, what if, by punishing criminals with torture, we will get such vigorous general deterrence that the overall crime rate will be dramatically lower, and overall happiness dramatically higher? Many philosophers seem to think that free will deniers have to accept consequentialism, and then choose between accepting disturbing answers to these questions, on the one hand, or on the other, taking on the burden of complex consequentialist attempts to offer less disturbing answers. But I think free will deniers should develop a non-consequentialist theory which allows them to attribute to human beings what Sommers calls "a dignity and respect as autonomous agents". Free will deniers can make such dignity and respect for people a central moral principle if they respect people as rational agents rather than as free agents, and if 11 they regard agents as autonomous not with respect to the laws of nature, but instead with respect to the undue influence of other agents. There is of course a long and rich consequentialist tradition of developing sophisticated strategies for accommodating rights-rule consequentialism, indirect consequentialism, and so on. But it is widely held that it is harder for consequentialists to explain rights in a satisfying way than it is for non-consequentialists. So it seems worthwhile to explore a non-consequentialist alternative. 2. A Kantian Deontology for Free Will Deniers It may be easier to determine what free will deniers need in a non-consequentialist ethics if we a have better understanding of why so many accept the view that eschewing attributions of moral responsibility requires us to be consequentialists. 9 I think this view derives from an impoverished picture of what we might call "directions" of justificatory grounding in ethics. The impoverished picture is that, when justifying claims about how people ought to be treated, we have two options: we can either offer "forward-looking" justifications, or "backward-looking" justifications. Forward-looking justifications are consequentialist justifications: they justify treating people in particular ways based on the future consequences of that treatment. Backward-looking justifications justify treating people in particular ways based on events prior to the proposed treatment. Backward-looking justifications can in principle refer to any sort of event prior to the proposed treatment. In principle, they can refer to the event of being born under a bad sign. But the only sort of reference event that mainstream ethicists typically accept in backward-looking justifications is action-more specifically, actions that they take agents to be morally responsible for performing (if they suppose that there are such things). According to backward-looking justifications of this form, we deserve to be treated in particular ways because 12 of how we have acted. I will refer to such justifications as action-based desert claims. Since we can only deserve to be treated in particular ways based on our actions if we are morally responsible, action-based desert claims imply that the agent at issue acted with free will. Those who accept this "two directions" picture, and who think that action-based desert claims are the only legitimate backward-looking justifications, see action-based desert claims as the only way to constrain consequentialist justifications. With a little reflection, however, this "two directions" picture looks like an oversimplification, because there certainly seem to be non-consequentialist justifications that do not look backward. Care ethicists think we can justify kinds of treatment by referring to the ways in which we care about, or are attached to, other people. Virtue ethicists refer to the virtuousness of treating people in particular ways. Deontologists refer to our duties to treat people in particular ways. The things these views refer to, in grounding their justifications, are not facts about the past or future in any obvious way. So it seems reasonable to speculate that we might develop a variety of any of these theories that avoids a depersonalizing consequentialism and still eschews attributions of moral responsibility. 10 Some may object that the very idea of ethics without free will is absurd, since there is nothing we ought to do if there is no free will, because "ought" implies "can", and this "can" implies free will. But there is an epistemic interpretation of this "can" which does not involve free will: I can do x so long as it is possible to the best of my knowledge for me to do x. Even if determinism and incompatibilism are true, there typically will be a variety of mutually exclusive actions that I can take, in the epistemic sense of "can", at any given point in the future, given the limits of our predictive abilities. 11 Objectors may go on to claim that, in a non-consequentialist ethics, there cannot be any right or wrong way to treat people if we're not praiseworthy or 13 blameworthy for how we treat people. But this is simply to assert that no sense can be made of a non-consequentialist ethics that dispenses with action-based desert claims, and that is precisely what is in question here. Objectors may now lodge a more specific objection: the only way for human beings to have the moral status necessary for a non-consequentialist justification to be plausible is for human beings to be morally responsible. The objection I have in mind states that when we justify something on the basis of it being required by, say, duty or virtue, we aren't necessarily offering an action-based justification, but for creatures to have the right sort of moral status for us to have duties to them, or for virtue to require us to treat them in particular ways, they must be creatures with the capacity for morally responsible action. Let me frame this objection in different terms. I think that everyone should acknowledge the pull of consequentialist justifications. Even staunch non-consequentialists typically accept the legitimacy of consequentialist justifications when it comes to the lower animals. If saving most of the inhabitants of an overpopulated earthworm farm means killing a few, most non-consequentialists will not be too burdened by non-consequentialist qualms, because they do not regard earthworms as having the right sort of moral status to impose non-consequentialist obligations on us. What makes human beings different? A common explanation in the philosophical tradition is that human beings have free will, which allows them to (for example) set their own ends, and consequentialist justifications go wrong in (for example) setting their ends for them. I think the best way to reply to this objection is to work out a counterargument in detail, with respect to one of these non-consequentialist theories, and in this paper I am focusing on Kantian deontology. Kantian deontologists are non-consequentialists who hold that we distinguish permissible and impermissible means to our ends by applying the principle that 14 persons must always be treated as ends, and never as mere means. It may be objected that personhood itself implies free will, so that human beings cannot have the moral status of persons unless they are free. At points, Kant himself advocates this view. In the Metaphysics of Morals, he states that "A person is a subject whose actions can be imputed to him", while "A thing is that to which nothing can be imputed. Any object...which itself lacks freedom is therefore called a thing" (1996, 6:223). 12 For Kant, to impute something to someone is just to hold them morally responsible for it, and by "freedom" here he means free will. But Kant does not need to define persons in this way. He can define persons as beings who autonomously set their own ends, and who must therefore be treated only as they would rationally consent to be treated. Free will skeptics can follow Kant in making respect for our right to independently set our own ends a central moral principle. So long as we understand the influence that we are independent from, in autonomously setting our own ends, as the undue influence of others, rather than the influence of the causal nexus constituting the world, this view is entirely compatible with free will skepticism. We might think this was a specious distinction if we thought that doing things for reasons implies doing things with free will. But I have never seen an argument for this view which does not include controversial compatibilistic or libertarian premises, and it seems to be a straightforward matter for free will skeptics to draw a line between the kind of control involved in doing things for reasons and the kind of control necessary for moral responsibility. We can have a robust Kantian deontology without looking backward to action-based desert. We need only look to the people with whom we are interacting to find a basis for desertclaims that constrain consequentialist justifications. Personhood can provide a basis for desertclaims which is irreducibly different from action, and which does not depend upon free will in 15 the way action-based desert does. Persons deserve to be treated only as they would rationally consent to be treated, just because they are persons. Let me explain the distinction between personhoodand action-based desert in more detail. Action-based desert claims are very diverse-examples include claims about praise and blame, the Lockean claim that we come to deserve property when we "mix our labor" with objects, and the retributivist claim that criminals deserve the suffering of punishment based on their criminal actions. But on reflection, it seems clear that not all desert claims are actionbased. 13 Some are based on the mere fact of being a person. 14 For example, when we claim to deserve the right to free speech, to be granted due process, and to be respected as persons (the sort of respect that Darwall calls "recognition respect" 15 ), these claims are not based on facts about our actions, but instead on the fact that we are persons. Since personhood-based desert does not depend on how we act, we do not need to appeal to moral responsibility to make sense of it. Therefore free will deniers can endorse personhood-based desert claims even though they must reject action-based desert claims. Our rights to due process offer an especially clear illustration of personhood-based desert. It is part and parcel of our understanding of due process that there is nothing anyone could conceivably do to deserve not to be treated as innocent until proven guilty. And consider the concept of inalienable rights-rights can only be inalienable if they are disconnected from action-based desert, because they are by definition rights that we cannot lose through action. I think that personhood-based rights can all be seen as ramifications of a more basic right to be treated as ends and not mere means. Since many of the desert claims that we are pretheoretically inclined to accept are action-based, we would be in for substantial revisions of everyday notions of desert if we excised action-based desert claims from our thinking. But I think that enough of the rights that make up our pretheoretical ethical 16 understanding are personhood-based that free will deniers need not entirely lose grip on that understanding. I think Kant's most helpful way of explaining how to treat others as ends is as follows. We refrain from coercing, deceiving, or otherwise manipulating other people into serving as means to our ends, by causing them to do things they would not rationally consent to do, and (at least some of the time) we actively share others' ends, by taking on their ends as our own. The "others as ends" principle doesn't require us to avoid treating each other as means in all cases, because it is sometimes rational to consent to serving as a means to another's end, for example, when he is a collaborator reciprocally serving as a means to one's own end. If I have the end of teaching philosophy, then the students I teach are among the means to my end. If they have the end of learning philosophy, then I am among the means to their end. Since our ends are complementary in this way, we can rationally consent to this interaction, and treat each other as ends as well as means. 3. Rational Consent Without Free Will To my claim that rational consent doesn't imply free will, some may object that consent is only morally significant insofar as someone acts to give or withhold consent, in a way that makes them morally responsible for consenting or withholding consent. But this is a mistake- one which can be avoided if we properly distinguish between actual consent (consent given in the actual world) and hypothetical consent (counterfactual consent, consent that would have been given under different circumstances). When we properly understand the ethical significance of consent, it is clear that sometimes (though by no means always) the rationality of consent matters more than actuality of it. Sometimes what matters is hypothetical rational consent, and we quite 17 properly disregard actual consent. Since we can only be morally responsible for what we actually do, we cannot be morally responsible for what we would hypothetically consent to do. So it follows from the moral significance of hypothetical consent that moral responsibility is not essential to the moral significance of consent. Let me explain in more detail. There are times when we disregard actual consent precisely because it is irrational-in other words, we care about what the agent would consent to if he thought rationally about things, not what he actually consents to, because he is not reasoning properly for one reason or another. Imagine a situation in which someone has been kidnapped by a cult and brainwashed into accepting his own enslavement. We kidnap him back and force him to undergo deprogramming therapy. After brainwashing but prior to deprogramming, he actually consents to enslavement, and actually refuses consent to deprogramming. But in this case it is clearly appropriate to tell the cult members that his actual consent to enslavement does not license them to enslave him, and to force him to undergo deprogramming therapy even though he actually refuses consent. It is appropriate because in this case his actual consent is clearly irrational, and it is his hypothetical rational consent that determines how he should be treated. He would consent to deprogramming therapy if he thought rationally about things, and it is that consideration which carries the day. Respecting autonomy sometimes means treating people as they would rationally consent to be treated, rather than as they actually consent to be treated. When we turn from extreme cases like the brainwashed slave to subtler cases in everyday life, there will of course be more debate about when it is appropriate to override actual consent in favor of hypothetical rational consent. Too often in our society, labelling someone's viewpoint as irrational amounts to nothing more than a prejudiced rejection of his perspective. A great deal 18 turns on how we understand what it would be rational to consent to do. A bit later, I will offer an account of rational consent that draws on Rawlsian original position deliberation. I think this is a good way to proceed, but I will not argue that here, and I will certainly not try to argue that it is the only way, or the best way, to proceed. I will merely claim that this seems to be an approach in the Kantian tradition which is worth exploring. There may be others that are worth exploring too. I must also emphasize that I am in no way claiming that actual consent is not morally significant. In many cases, it is clearly wrong to override actual consent based on claims about hypothetical rational consent. These include cases where we are not sure what would be rational to do, or we think it important to tolerate disagreement about what is rational. Salient examples include voting, and choosing our friends and romantic partners. In pluralistic societies like those of the contemporary West, most of us agree that it is important to tolerate quite a lot of disagreement about what is rational. Kantians should hold that when in doubt, we ought to assume that an agent's actual consent is rational, and that claims about hypothetical rational consent have to meet a very high standard to justify overriding actual consent. But it is nonetheless important to see that we all draw the distinction between actual and hypothetical rational consent, and we all acknowledge that there are cases where hypothetical rational consent is what matters. This point severs the connection that may initially seem to exist between the ethical role played by consent, on the one hand, and the concept of moral responsibility, on the other. As mentioned above, this is because we can only be morally responsible for things that we actually do-not for things we would do if we acted rationally. Since moral responsibility plays no role in explaining the moral significance of hypothetical rational consent, moral responsibility is not essential to the moral significance of rational consent. This point gives us 19 no reason to get more comfortable with overriding actual consent. It is a metaethical point about the modal structure of actual and hypothetical consent, not a normative claim that actual consent matters less than we might previously have thought. A Kantian deontology for free will deniers should recognize the moral importance of both hypothetical and actual rational consent. Objectors may now take a different tack-they may argue that the metaphysics of moral responsibility is still crucial to explaining the moral significance of hypothetical consent, because hypothetical consent can only be morally significant if agents could have rationally consented in cases where they did not actually do so, and this implies that a possible world in which they rationally consented was accessible to them. Objectors could point out that the metaphysics of accessible alternatives depends on the concept of free will, which is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. They might claim that this shows that the moral significance of hypothetical consent depends on free will, even if it does not directly depend on moral responsibility. This would pose just as much of a problem for free will deniers as a direct dependence on moral responsibility would pose. The problem for this way of objecting is that if we look at how claims about hypothetical consent are typically formulated and applied, it is clear that they do not imply accessibility. That is, a claim about hypothetical consent typically states that an agent would have consented if he had thought rationally about things, but this does not imply that he could have thought rationally about it. And this is not simply a quirk of phrasing. Let us return to the case of the kidnapped and brainwashed cult slave. It is obviously morally significant that he would have refused consent to enslavement, and consented to deprogramming, if he had thought rationally about it, but it is just as obvious that as things were, in his brainwashed state, he could not have thought rationally about it. In other words, in his brainwashed state, his hypothetical rational consent 20 remains significant even though a possible world in which he thought rationally about things was not accessible to him. This demonstrates that neither moral responsibility nor free will are prerequisites for the moral significance of hypothetical consent. Objectors may persist-they may claim that moral responsibility and free will are crucial to the significance of rational consent in the cases where actual consent matters, even if they are not in the cases where hypothetical consent matters. But given that these concepts have no role when it comes to explaining the significance of hypothetical consent, it seems unmotivated to insist on a role for them in an account of actual consent. It seems entirely adequate to say that respecting actual consent is the best way to respect autonomy in cases where we do not have extremely good grounds for favoring hypothetical consent. We can, after all, respect actual consent without supposing that actual consent is important because it is an expression of free will. Further, treating people as they would hypothetically consent to be treated, instead of as they actually consent to be treated, often involves coercion, which we must assume to be an invasion of autonomy unless we have extremely good grounds to believe otherwise. Presumably all will agree that law enforcement is an area where coercion is necessary. Broadly speaking, Kantians should prefer the least invasive legal system consistent with the protection of human rights. But given human nature, whatever laws we do have will have to be enforced, and this seems to imply coercion. On the view I am advancing here, law enforcement sometimes requires us to disregard actual consent and instead treat people as they would rationally consent to be treated. The notion is that even when we sanction or punish lawbreakers, we are obligated to treat them as they would rationally consent to be treated. On this view, it is legitimate to garnish the wages of a tax cheat, or imprison a violent criminal, so long 21 as it is the case that if these law-breakers had thought rationally about things, then they would have consented to this treatment. This approach can be worked out in more detail with the help of social contract theory, which can be used to model rational consent. If it would be rational to choose to join in a social contract with a particular institutional structure, then we can view that institutional structure as one to which we would rationally consent. Kantian free will deniers should model rational consent based on personhoodbut not action-based desert. The Rawlsian social contract seems especially well-suited to this approach, because original position deliberation has the effect of ''filtering out'' action-based desert claims. The original position is an idealized standpoint in which the members of a society choose the basic principles that will govern their society. It is formed by drawing what Rawls calls a "veil of ignorance" between the people who make up a society and all their particular characteristics. Original position deliberators must choose principles to govern society without knowing where they will end up within society. In the original position, one cannot know whether one is among the best or worst off, what one's religion, ethnicity, or sex is, or what patterns of action one exhibits, for example, whether one is industrious or lazy. Rawls holds that the veil of ignorance ensures that the principles chosen in the original position will be just, since one will not be able to choose principles that make any of one's particular characteristics advantageous. Further, since people are self-interested and riskaverse in conditions of uncertainty, deliberators will worry most about ending up among the worst-off members of society, and they will therefore choose principles which make the circumstances of the worst-off members of society the best they can be. When it comes to human rights and distributive justice, Kantian free will deniers can take on board Rawls' view of original position deliberation in its entirety. Rawls thinks that original 22 positions deliberators will insist on equality of rights and basic liberties, as well as what he calls the "difference principle". This is the principle that economic inequalities are just if and only if they improve the conditions of the worst-off members of society. This implies that it is just for the industrious to derive advantages from their industry to the degree that it produces economic dynamics that raise the standard of living for the worst-off, for example, by creating incentives for hard work, and by making redistributive taxation possible. Once we raise the veil of ignorance, we can justly disregard a wealthy person's actual withholding of consent to taxation, because original position deliberation demonstrates that he would rationally consent to the taxation of the wealthy. Rawls himself refuses to apply original position deliberation to penal justice. He allows us to assume that we will be able to follow the laws we choose in the original position. It is a matter of controversy why Rawls takes this approach. 16 But free will deniers should part ways with Rawls on this point, since applying original position deliberation to penal justice makes possible a non-retributive justification of punishment that avoids treating criminals as mere means. This means that we must assume ignorance about whether we are law-followers or lawbreakers. It is more difficult to apply original position deliberation to punishment than to distributive justice, since there is no singular worst-off position here in the way there is with respect to distributive justice. That is, potential victims of crime and the people punished "compete" for the position of the worst-off, and also with one another, in the sense that if we assume that punishment deters, then modifying the penal system to improve things for one party tends to worsen things for the other party, and vice-versa. If the purpose of original position deliberation is to ensure fairness, then I think original position deliberators must assume that they have an equal chance of finding themselves among the punished, and among those protected by 23 the institution of punishment. Under these circumstances, it would be rational to choose to imprison violent criminals in benign prisons (prisons much less harmful than contemporary ones). But it would not be rational to choose an institution of punishment that included the death penalty, or torture, or imprisonment under harsh conditions. For people with normal social attachments, and a normal desire to be free from interference in the pursuit of their ends, prison would inevitably be harmful, even under benign conditions, and would therefore serve as a deterrent. But it would make sense to risk that harm if it significantly diminished our chances of being murdered or seriously injured by a violent criminal. This justification of punishment countenances using criminals as means, since the rationale for accepting an institution of imprisonment is that it protects potential victims. However, since we would choose this approach to punishment in the original position, with the understanding that we might well turn out to be criminals when the veil of ignorance is lifted, we all satisfy the hypothetical rational consent requirement for punishment. So we can punish criminals without treating them as mere means, given their hypothetical rational consent. In other words, once we raise the veil of ignorance, we can justly disregard a violent criminal's actual withholding of consent to imprisonment, because original position deliberation demonstrates that he would rationally consent to punishment. 4. Conclusion: Reforming Kant's Own Theory To conclude, I would like to apply the results of this inquiry to reforming Kant's own theory. As I mentioned toward the beginning, Kant himself is a retributivist. That is, he holds that punishment must be justified in terms of action-based desert. Kant bases his argument for 24 the legitimacy of the death penalty on the claim that murderers deserve to die. The core of Kant's argument goes like this: Punishment... can never be inflicted as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It must always be inflicted on him only because he has committed a crime. For a human being can never be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another...(1996, 6:331) In this passage, Kant seems to accept the "two directions" picture I criticized earlier. He assumes that if we do not hold that criminals deserve punishment based on their actions, then the only other way to justify punishment is with a consequentialist appeal to the positive consequences of punishment for society. But as I have argued, there is another alternative-a personhood-based justification of punishment that turns on the claim that criminals would have rationally consented to punishment-and Kant's own theory has helped provide the resources to demonstrate this. In a nearby passage (1996, 6:335) Kant denies that, in the social contract, one has "consented to lose his life in case he murdered someone else", and he is certainly right here, at least insofar as we take a Rawlsian approach to social contract theory. Original position deliberation about punishment can justify benign imprisonment, but not seriously harmful measures. It may be that the only way to justify the death penalty is with action-based desert claims. But contemporary ethicists should see this as a point against the death penalty, rather than a point in favor of justifications that include action-based desert claims. Kant's own reasoning here may be driven by such a deep commitment to the death penalty that he cannot be content with any justification of punishment that will not support it. But this is not a part of Kant's theory that we should seek to preserve. It seems quite clear that Kant's ethical theory as a whole becomes stronger if he gives up his retributivism and instead adopts a non-retributive justification of punishment. 17 As I mentioned at the outset, Kant holds that it is possible that we have free will, but we cannot know 25 that we do. The mere possibility of free will is simply not adequate to justify retribution, at least not seriously harmful retribution of the sort that is involved in imprisonment under harsh conditions, and certainly not the sort involved in the death penalty. We recognize that we must meet a very high burden of proof to justify harming people when we impose the "reasonable doubt" standard on arguments in criminal courts, and we ought to apply the same standard in assessing justifications of punishment. 18 Kant himself acknowledges a parallel standard when he argues that the priests of the inquisition could not have known that God wanted the inquisition's victims to die, and that no evidentiary standard short of knowledge could justify anyone in imposing so severe a penalty (Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, 6:185). I think it is fair to ask Kant to apply the same high standard to claims about free will when they appear in justifications of serious retributive harm. Bibliography Darwall, S. 1977. "Two Kinds of Respect." Ethics 88.1 (1977): 36-49. Feldman, F. 1996. "Responsibility as a Condition for Desert." Mind 105.417 (1996): 165-68. ---. 1995. "Desert: Reconsideration of Some Received Wisdom." Mind 104.413 (1995): 63-77. Fischer, J.M. 1995. The Metaphysics of Free Will (Aristotelian Society Series v. 14). Malden, MA: Blackwell Press. Kant, I. 1996. Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor. New York: Cambridge, 1996. ---. 1998. Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. and ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni. New York: Cambridge, 1998. Mills, E. 2004. "Scheffler on Rawls, Justice, and Desert", Law and Philosophy 23, 261-72. Moriarity, J. 2003. "Against the Asymmetry of Desert", Noûs 37:3, 518-36. Pereboom, D. 2001. Living Without Free Will. New York: Cambridge University Press. ---. "Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent?" Philosophical Topics 32 (2006): 27586. ---. "Free Will, Love, and Anger." Ideas y Valores: Revista de Colombiana de Filosofía 141, 2009, 5-25. 26 Rachels, J. 1978. "What People Deserve." In Justice and Economic Distribution, ed. J. Arthur and W.H. Shaw. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Rawls, J. 1999. A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap. Sadurski, W. 1985. Giving Desert Its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Scheffler, Samuel. (2000) "Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory", California Law Review 88, 991-1000. Sommers, T. "The Objective Attitude", The Philosophical Quarterly, 57, 228 (2007), 321-41. Smilansky, S. 1996. "Responsibility and Desert: Defending the Connection." Mind 105.417 (1996): 157-63. ---. 2000. Free Will and Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press. ---. 2005. "Free Will and Respect for Persons." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005): 24861. ---. 2006. "Control, Desert, and the Difference between Distributive and Retributive Justice." Philosophical Studies 131 (2006): 511-24. Strawson, P.F. 1997. "Freedom and Resentment." In Free Will, ed. Pereboom, D. Hackett, 1997. 119-42. Vilhauer, B. 2004a. "Can We Interpret Kant as a Compatibilist about Determinism and Moral Responsibility?" The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2004, 719-30. ---. 2004b. "Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 42, 4 (2004), 547-64 ---. 2008. "Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46, 1 (2008), 121-44. ---. 2009a. "Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2009, Vol. 39, no. 3, 489-511. ---. 2009b. "Free Will and Reasonable Doubt", American Philosophical Quarterly, 2009, Vol. 46., No. 2, 131-40. ---. 2010a. "The Scope of Responsibility in Kant's Theory of Free Will", The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2010, Vol. 18. No. 1, 45-71. ---. 2010b. "Persons, Punishment, and Free Will Skepticism", Philosophical Studies 'Online First', DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9752-z, forthcoming in print. ---. 2012. "Taking Free Will Skepticism Seriously", The Philosophical Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00077.x, forthcoming in print. Wolf, S. "The Importance of Free Will". Mind, New Series, Vol. 90, No. 359. (Jul., 1981), pp. 386-405. 27 Wood, A. 2010. "Punishment, Retribution, and the Coercive Enforcement of Right". In Lara Denis (ed.), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. New York: Cambridge University Press. 111-29. Sadurski, W. 1985. Giving Desert Its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Notes 1 Kant claims that we cannot have "theoretical knowledge" that we have free will, but that we can nonetheless have "practical knowledge" that we have free will. How to interpret this claim about practical knowledge is a matter of longstanding controversy. It seems to have something to do with the idea that it is necessary to think of ourselves as having alternative possibilities of action when we deliberate about how to act. But without an account of the sort of necessity Kant has in mind, it is not clear what moral implications it has. If it is a merely psychological necessity, due (for example) to contingencies of evolution, then it would be hard to see how it could have any moral implications at all. Kant clearly means something stronger than mere psychological necessity, but he also seems to mean a sort of necessity that is consistent with acknowledging that we may not really be free after all. In my view, such practical necessity is of little help if we seek to justify holding each other morally responsible. So I think that Kant's approach must ultimately rest on the notion that the mere possibility that we have free will is enough to justify the assumption that we have free will whenever we reason about our practices. 2. Influential views in the contemporary literature which bear interesting relationships to Kant's view include those of Pereboom and Smilansky. I take Pereboom to hold that it is possible that we have free will, but that it is impossible to provide evidence that we do, and that the mere possibility that we have free will does not justify us in treating anyone as free in any context. 28 Smilansky holds that we can know we lack free will, but that free will is so important in ethics and practical reasoning that we are nonetheless justified in treating people as free in many contexts. See e.g. Pereboom 2001 and Smilansky 2000. 3. I discuss this in more detail in Vilhauer 2009b and 2012. 4. See Pereboom (2001, 151) for some helpful points on Kant and free will denial. 5. I discuss Kant's free will theory in Vilhauer 2004a and 2010a. 6. All references to Strawson are "Freedom and Resentment" (1997). 7. I make this argument in more detail in "Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base". 8. A more detailed account of utilitarianism would have to distinguish between actand ruleutilitarianism, but Strawson does not mention this distinction. 9. Parts of this section and the following section are adapted from Vilhauer 2009a and 2010b. I re-work ideas from those papers here in order to make them more general, explain their connection to Kant, and show their application to the people problem. 10. I discuss virtue ethics and attachment approaches for free will deniers in Vilhauer 2004b and 2008. 11. I discuss this further in Vilhauer 2012. Also see Pereboom 2001, 137. 12. All Kant citations are by Akademie pagination. 13. Philosophers who hold that all desert is action-based include Rachels (1978, p. 157) and Sadurski (1985, p. 131). Smilansky holds a related position, i.e., that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible for their actions implies giving up all our morally significant beliefs about desert (1996, 157-63). 29 14. Fred Feldman discusses this point, but not in the context of free will skepticism. (Feldman 1995a). 15. Darwall 1977, 38. 16. See Saul Smilansky (2006), Eugene Mills (2004), Jeffrey Moriarity (2003), and Samuel Scheffler (2000) for discussion of this issue. 17. Also see Wood 2010 for discussion of related issues. 18. Pereboom proposes applying the "reasonable doubt" standard in the free will debate (2001, 161). I also discuss this issue in Vilhauer 2009b.

The Morality of Price/Quality and Ethical Consumerism Julian Fink Daniel Schubert Abstract Hussain claims that ethical consumers are subject to democratic requirements of morality, whereas ordinary price/quality consumers are exempt from these requirements. In this paper, we demonstrate that Hussain's position is incoherent, does not follow from the arguments he offers for it, and entails a number of counterintuitive consequences. 1 Introduction In "Is Ethical Consumerism an Impermissible Form of Vigilantism?" (2012), Waheed Hussain aims to establish a motive-relative consumer ethics. Hussain argues that consumers with ethical motives to alter the way other market participants behave are subject to a different set of moral requirements than consumers who base purchasing on price/quality considerations: When [consumers] make choices based on price-quality considerations, they can approach their choices as private purchasing decisions: they are not required to focus on the common good, deliberate with their fellow citizens, or make their reasons public. But when consumers make choices based on [ethical] considerations, they must shift gears and approach these choices as part of the legislative process: they must focus on the common good, deliberate with their fellow citizens, and make their reasons public. (p. 138)1 Accordingly, Husain presents the following claim. Suppose you act as a so-called "social change ethical consumer". You base your purchasing decisions on setting an incentive for other market participants to change their (from your point of view) unethical behaviour. You are then subject to a distinct set of moral requirements. For example, you are morally required to ensure that your efforts do not prevent market participants from exercising their fundamental rights (such as freedom of movement, thought, and religion), are directed at making public the issue you aim to address, and respect formal democratic legislative processes. By contrast, if you base your purchasing decisions exclusively on buying products and services with the best price/quality ratio, your practice will be exempt from these requirements. Your purchasing decisions will not be subject to the moral requirements listed above. Hussain premises this position on two general lines of reasoning. On the one hand, he argues that any practice that (substantively) influences the evolution of society is subject to procedural or "democratic" requirements. These requirements "determine how a society should evolve over time". 2 This explains why social change ethical consumers are subject to a set of democratic moral requirements. On the other hand, Hussain declares that if a practice is essential to generating (significant) Pareto welfare improvements (i.e. a significant number of people are made better off while no one is made worse off), then these practices are exempt 1 All page numbers refer to (Hussain, 2012). 2 "Certain laws, policies, and patterns of behavior may be attractive in themselves, but the processes through which these develop in society may be morally objectionable because they are inconsistent with procedural values. For example, if a wealthy person bribes political officials to get them to increase healthcare spending for low-income people, the new policy may be a substantive improvement, but the process of social change would be objectionable because it is not adequately inclusive, transparent, or public" (p. 115). 2 from these democratic requirements. Since Hussain considers price/quality consumerism (PQC hereafter) to be essential for gaining Paretian welfare improvements, this explains why price/quality consumers are not subject to democratic requirements. In this paper, we claim that Hussain's position is untenable. We offer three arguments for this claim. First, we argue that the consumer's motive (social/ethical change vs. price/quality) cannot determine whether she is subject to democratic requirements. Second, we show that Hussain's motive-relative consumer ethics cannot be derived from the reasoning he offers in arguing for his position. Third, we argue that the premises Hussain employs to derive his position entail an inconsistency. 2 Hussain's Argument To begin, we introduce Hussain's position. Suppose you act as a social change ethical consumer. You base a purchasing decision "at least partly on the grounds that doing so will create an economic incentive for other agents to act in ways that will advance some moral, social, environmental, or other nonmarket agenda" (p. 113). For instance, suppose you decide to buy fair-trade coffee in order to "create an incentive for coffee manufacturers to treat growers better" (p. 112). Or suppose you boycott pharmacies that sell the "morning after pill" in order to provide an incentive against the production and distribution of this type of contraception. According to Hussain, you are then subject to a distinctive set of moral requirements. These requirements "reflect the importance of democratic ideals" (p. 128). Put generally, morality requires you to treat your purchasing decision as if your intention were enforced by the coercive power of the state and served as the basis for future legislation (see p. 121). Like the state and its coercive institutions, you are subject to a distinctive set of public and democratic requirements ("democratic requirements" hereafter). In concrete terms, Hussain holds that you are morally permitted to engage in social and ethical change consumerism (SCEC hereafter) only if you satisfy the following set of requirements: (1) The exercise of bargaining power does not deprive anyone of their basic liberties. (2) The exercise of bargaining power is directed at (significantly) advancing an agenda framed in terms of a reasonable conception of the common good. (3) The formal democratic process has not already addressed the issue in question. (4) The process that guides the exercise of bargaining power is appropriately representative and deliberative. (5) The process that guides the exercise of bargaining power generates standards and arguments that can be the basis of future legislation. (6) The overall effort aims to raise awareness of the issue and (if necessary) to put it on the formal legislative agenda. (p. 126) However, things differ for ordinary PQC. Suppose again that you decide to buy fair-trade coffee. This time you base your decision purely on price/quality considerations. Then, Husain argues, none of the above democratic requirements apply to you as a consequence of the practice you engage in. In making price/quality purchasing decisions, you are not required to preserve basic liberties, focus on the common good, deliberate with your fellow citizens, make your purchasing reasons public, etc.3 3 It is important to note here that Hussain restricts his argument to ethical consumerism that can be characterised as SCEC. Indeed, SCEC is the key category of Hussain's argument; he makes it explicit that his reasons aim at this form of ethical consumerism alone. Other forms of ethical consumerism, e.g. clean hands ethical consumerism, expressive ethical consumerism, and unmediated ethical consumerism, are not within the scope of Hussain's argument (p. 113). 3 3 Two Premises Hussain's defence of his position is best presented in the form of two premises. These two premises represent the core of Hussain's reasoning. First, there is the "inclusion premise", which implies that SCEC is governed by democratic requirements. Second, there is the "exclusion premise", which implies that private consumers are exempt from democratic duties of morality. (The inclusion and exclusion premises are our formulations; Hussain does not explicitly formulate his argument in these terms. Nevertheless, we take them to be the best representation of Hussain's argument.) The inclusion premise can be stated as follows: Inclusion premise: For all practices x, if x yields social change (to a significant degree), then x is subject to democratic requirements.4 Hussain justifies this premise as follows. There is a set of values that determine "how a society should evolve over time" (p. 115). In order to uphold these values, any practice that causes change must be restricted by democratic requirements: For example, electoral practices in a liberal democracy define the power to vote, but they also specify that citizens are only authorized to vote their best political judgment, not to support candidates in exchange for payment. This restriction is essential because the democratic process could not achieve one of its justifying ends in a liberal democracy-protecting the rights of all citizens, rich and poor alike-if the wealthy were allowed to buy votes to advance their interests. (p. 116) The inclusion premise not only entails that state practices are subject to democratic requirements but also explains why SCEC and the employment of bargaining power to advance social, moral, and environmental changes are subject to democratic requirements. Hussain sums this up as follows: The market is also a social institution, and it defines various powers, such as the power to buy and sell goods. These powers enable people to exercise an influence [...] on the course of social life. Putting these powers in their broader social context, we can think of the permissibility of SCEC in terms of a question about how individuals are authorized to use the market powers that we collectively create and maintain in our society. (p. 116) In sum, if you act as a social change ethical consumer, you aim to exercise power over other individuals or groups. The exercise of this power must be subject to checks and balances in order to guarantee the democratically legitimate evolution of society over time. This explains why SCEC cannot remain unrestricted. It needs to be subject to the set of democratic requirements cited above. We now turn to Hussain's exclusion premise, which explains why ordinary PQC is not subject to democratic requirements: Exclusion premise: For all practices x, if x is internal or essential to (profound) 4 By saying that practice "x is subject to democratic requirements", we of course mean to say that the agent who engages in practice x is subject to democratic requirements. We choose the shorter formulation in order to avoid using a cumbersome formulation. 4 Pareto improvements, then x is exempt from democratic requirements. According to Hussain, if a practice "generate[s] profound improvements in people's lives, improvements that meet the very high threshold necessary to justify certain departures from [democratic] ideals", then the "[democratic] defects of [a practice] are justified" (p. 136). According to Hussain, PQC qualifies for such a departure: The price-quality preferences of consumers are an essential component in the vast social opportunity for Pareto improving transfers [...]: it is the correspondence between these consumer preferences and the preferences of workers and investors that creates the opportunity. Under the right conditions, the market process will generate all of the Pareto improving transfers that make up this social opportunity, but in order for the process to work, consumers must actually make buying decisions based on their price-quality preferences. If they do not signal their price-quality preferences and pursue these preferences through their purchasing decisions, the market exchange process will not achieve its justifying end. (p. 137) In sum, PQC generates vast Pareto improving exchanges. This creates a public justification for allocating goods and services via markets: "The market is a social institution that has an appropriate public justification, that is, it provides the institutional setting for an exchange process that tends toward a Pareto optimal outcome" (p. 122). This justifies its exemption from democratic requirements. Price-quality consumerism is internal to the market, and it is essential to the achievement of the market process's justifying end. The price/quality consumer is thus authorised to use her bargaining power without keeping an eye on democratic requirements. 4 Counterintuitive Consequences We will argue that Hussain's double-standard position (the inclusion of SCEC and the exclusion of PQC from democratic requirements) is indefensible. We shall formulate three concerns. First, the position entails a gravely counterintuitive consequence: it makes it too easy to exempt oneself from the application of democratic requirements. Second, Hussain's position cannot in fact be derived from the premises he offers for it. Third, the premises Hussain offers for his position are incompatible insofar as they generate an inconsistency. To begin, consider a counterintuitive consequence of Hussain's position. Suppose you act as a social change ethical consumer. You intend to use your purchasing power to adjust a market participant's behaviour. In doing so, however, you happen to deprive a supplier of their freedom of expression, you employ your bargaining power against widely agreed public interests, you ignore how current (or future) legislation handles the supplier's behaviour, etc. In sum, you promote your moral agenda by violating others' rights and public interests. According to Hussain's argument, you infringe central democratic requirements. You are therefore not entirely moral. How can you redeem your moral standing? One option is that you can bring your actual behaviour in line with what morality requires of you. That is, you can ensure that your purchasing decision does not infringe freedom of expression, does not contradict widely agreedupon public interests, and does not ignore the impact of current (or future) legislation. However, Hussain's position also allows for a second option: you can redeem your moral standing by simply altering your purchasing motive. By becoming a price/quality consumer, you exempt yourself from democratic requirements. So, ceteris paribus, by merely transitioning from being an ethical to a price/quality consumer, you can become a more moral individual. 5 But his is implausible. Suppose that in the situation described, ceteris paribus, you abandon your social ethical change consumerism by becoming a self-absorbed hedonistic materialist. That is, your utility function no longer includes concern for the wellbeing or rights of others. Your only concern is your own good, which you aim to promote with PQC. Should we conceive of this as a way of improving your morality? Surely not. On Hussain's view, however, PQC in fact represents a panacea for those who infringe democratic requirements qua ethical consumers. This is untenable. PQC alone cannot exempt us from the demands of public morality.5 To avoid this counterintuitive consequence, Hussain could argue that market participants are universally morally required to engage in social change ethical consumerism. This would result in a two-tiered normative view. First, consumers would be morally obligated to be social change ethical consumers. Second, once consumers satisfied that obligation, they would then be obliged to satisfy the democratic requirements Hussain outlines. In this case, PQC would no longer represent a panacea for those who infringe democratic requirements qua ethical consumers. By adopting a price-quality motive, one would violate the moral requirement to consume on the basis of social change ethical motives. In the context of Hussain's argument, however, this move would be ad hoc. It would imply the end of morally unobjectionable PQC. PQC would be immoral per se. Given that Hussain assigns such moral importance to PQC (in that it is internal to or necessary for Paretian welfare advances), this line of argumentation does not appear to be open to Hussain. We therefore maintain that Hussain's position remains gravely counterintuitive. 5 An Invalid Argument We now turn to a second problem. We doubt that Hussain's premises licence an inference to his motive-relative consumer ethics. In particular, the inclusion premise does not entail that every act of SCEC (as defined by Hussain) makes a consumer subject to democratic requirements. Likewise, not every act of PQC exempts a consumer from being subject to democratic requirements. Our point here is this. Hussain argues that practices that effectuate social change are subject to democratic requirements. However, not every act of SCEC qualifies as such a practice. SCEC is a practice where a consumer acts with an intention to change a market participant's behaviour. Clearly, not every purchasing decision made with the intention of changing market participants' incentive structures will result in social change. As with any other action, one may fail to realise one's intention. If, for instance, your purchasing decision is only responsible for an ultramarginal reduction in a multinational company's turnover, your decision will not set any effective incentives to alter behaviour. In fact, the more perfectly a market or competition operates (i.e. where all firms and consumers are price takers), the less the impact of individual purchasing decisions, independently of the motives behind them. Likewise, not every particular act of PQC will turn out to be essential for Paretian welfare improvements. True, under the circumstances of perfect competition, every market exchange based on price/quality motives will lead to a Pareto improvement to welfare. However, as soon 5 This is not to say, of course, that motives are generally under our direct voluntary control. But we do not believe that this matters for our objection here. Whatever prompts a change in motive, it cannot count as pivotal for whether or not democratic requirements apply to a consumer. 6 as a purchasing decision is taken under imperfect information (instead of buying a perfectly functioning car, you buy a lemon) or severe externalities (your purchasing decision results in the pollution of a community's drinking water), an increase in Paretian welfare is not guaranteed. In sum, the motive is inapt for tracking the degree of change or welfare improvement that will result from a purchasing decision. The consequence of this criticism is plain. As it stands, it does not follow from Hussain's argument that the motive of a purchasing decision determines whether you are subject to democratic requirements. Instead, it implies the following: first, democratic requirements apply to acts of consumption that in fact contribute to social change; second, price/quality consumers are exempt from democratic requirements if their purchasing decisions are in fact essential or internal to contributing to Paretian welfare improvements.6 The motive alone does not make you liable to or exempt from democratic requirements. If Hussain wants to expand his argument to cover acts performed merely in virtue of their motives, he still needs to present an additional argument for that. We believe that such an argument is far from trivial. Here is why. Suppose there are conditions C which imply that you are subject to a moral requirement to x. At least as a principle of inference, this does not imply that if you intend C, then you are subject to a moral requirement to x. Suppose that if you witness a child drowning in a pond you are morally required to try your best to save that child. Of course, this does not imply that if you intend to witness a child drowning in a pond you are morally required to save that child. That makes no sense at all. Rather, morality requires you to rid yourself of that dubious intention. 6 An Inconsistent Position In this section, we add a further criticism. We argue that the inclusion premise and the exclusion premise entail an inconsistency. The inclusion premise says that if your actions yield significant social change, then they are subject to democratic requirements. The exclusion premise says that if your actions yield significant Pareto improvements, then they are not subject to democratic constraints. Hence, if we are to consistently rely on these premises, there cannot be an action that yields both significant social change and significant Pareto improvements. However, Hussain himself explicitly embraces the existence of a practice that generates both. For example, PQC not only generates Pareto improvements but also [...] involves the use of our market powers, and [...] has an enormous impact on the course of social life: new forms of work, housing, and social interaction-even new cities and towns-are in large part the product of price-quality decisions that people make as consumers. (p. 135) In fact, Hussein's point here can be seen in the context of Joseph Schumpeter's point about the creative destruction inherent in capitalist societies: Capitalism [...] is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never 6 This, of course, would raise another worry. If we are to focus on the actual effects of one's consumption, then one does seem to be in the position to know whether the democratic requirements apply at the moment of consumption. Whether an act of consumption will yield social change often will not be clear until a later point in time. So, Hussain would need to adjust his view and make the application of democratic requirements conditional on what is foreseeable or reasonable to expect ex ante. We thank the editors of this journal for considering this point. 7 is but never can be stationary. [...] The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates. (Schumpeter, 2013, pp. 82–83) In sum, capitalism is inherently change driven. Price/quality consumption involves creative destruction. Schumpeter leaves no doubt as to the degree of this self-destructive upheaval: "the capitalist process in much the same way in which it destroyed the institutional framework of feudal society also undermines its own" (Schumpeter, 2013, p. 139). In view of Hussain's argument, this generates a fundamental contradiction. On Hussein's premises, there are situations in which PQC is both included under and excluded from democratic constraints. Thus, the inclusion and the exclusion premises yield contradicting propositions. So, Hussain cannot rely on these premises to warrant his position. He must at least abandon one of them. The same inconsistency can be generated not only via PQC but also via SCEC. Hussain includes SCEC under the authority of democratic requirements via the inclusion premise, yet he explicitly denies that the exclusion premise can also apply to SCEC. That is, on his view, SCEC consumerism does not contribute significantly to Pareto improvements. We argue, however, that this position is untenable. There is in principle no reason to assume that SCEC can also yield significant Pareto improvements. Hussain makes his point as follows: [First,] price-quality consumerism is internal to the market exchange process. The price-quality preferences of consumers are an essential component in the vast social opportunity for Pareto improving transfers. [Second,] [b]y contrast, SCEC is not internal to the process in the same way. The social change preferences of individual consumers tend to conflict with the social change preferences of workers, investors, and other consumers. These preferences do not present a significant opportunity for Pareto improving transfers, and as such, SCEC does not contribute to the market achieving its justifying end. (p. 137) Hussain's use of "internal" and "essential" suggests that he intends this point to be a conceptual one. That is, there is something conceptually inherent in PQC that makes it a significant source of Pareto-improving transfers. Likewise, there is something conceptually inherent in SCEC that excludes it from being a source of Pareto-improving transfers. As a conceptual claim, however, this point is misguided. Suppose you want to establish whether a transaction is Pareto improving. You must determine whether a transaction makes no affected party worse off while making at least one affected party better off. That is, you need to determine (or so it is commonly assumed) whether a transaction satisfies the (rational and informed all-things-considered) preferences of the affected parties. One thing you do not need to establish, however, is whether the motive behind a preference is an ethical or a price/quality consideration. For example, suppose you exchange $3 for a cup of fair-trade coffee. Are you now better off? This depends on whether you thereby satisfy a (rational and informed) preference of yours. It does not depend on whether the motive behind the preference is the quality of the coffee or how the producer treats his coffee farmers. Here is an alternative way to make this point. Take a market with a particular kind of consumption behaviour. Suppose all individual consumers in this market base their 8 consumption decisions entirely on price-quality considerations. Suppose also that these consumers have no social change ethical motives. Compare this now with a market that displays the same consumption behaviour. That is, precisely the same products are bought and consumed. However, now the consumers base their consumption decisions entirely on social change ethical motives. There is no reason to suppose that, in the latter situation, the number or magnitude of Pareto-improving transfers will be diminished. As a result, there is no foundation for discriminating against ethical preferences here. We cannot conceive of any argument for why, conceptually, the satisfaction of an ethical preference impacts your wellbeing differently than the satisfaction of a price-quality preference. In sum, Hussain's attempt to ensure that the exclusion premise does not apply to SCEC fails. On Hussain's reasoning, there is no conceptual reason to believe that SCEC, like PQC, cannot contribute significantly to Paretian welfare improvements. However, as SCEC can therefore generate social change and Paretian welfare improvements, Hussain's premises generate a contradiction. There are instances were SCEC will and will not be subject to democratic requirements simultaneously. This again shows that Hussain should abandon one of his premises. We now turn to an alternative interpretation of Hussain's claim. Perhaps we should not read Hussain's point that SCEC does not present an opportunity for Paretian welfare improvements as a conceptual claim. Perhaps it is better viewed as an empirical point (hence his use of "tend to" in the above quote). So, in comparison with PQC, SCEC has a greater propensity to generate fewer Pareto-improving transactions. In other words, by comparing a sufficiently large number of ethical and price/quality purchasing decisions, SCEC fails to contribute as significantly to Pareto improvements as PQC. If this is Hussain's point, he presents no argument for it. He only asserts that "social change preferences of individual consumers tend to conflict with the social change preferences of workers, investors, and other consumers". This point remains entirely intuitive. It does not follow from any of his claims. What might an argument for this position look like? One possibility is to say that PQC is necessary for a market's ability to signal what people produce and at what price.9 That is, only the demand created by price-quality preferences gives rise to a price mechanism that leads to an efficient allocation of resources and labour. Joseph Heath outlines this mechanism as follows: If stores [for example] have too many ladles, and not enough toothbrushes, they will be willing to order more toothbrushes, and pay more for them. This in turn means that the toothbrush makers will be willing to pay more for the plastic. Thus, if all firms sell to the highest bidder, the resources will be channelled toward the use for which there is the greatest need. But if there is not a competitive market for all these goods, not only will firms not have the incentive to engage in the necessary transactions, but the absence of prices will make it difficult for anyone even to determine which transaction should be occurring. (Heath, 2014, p. 30) We agree that a functioning price mechanism is essential for the efficient allocation of resources. However, we disagree that SCEC necessarily undermines this mechanism (at least to a greater degree than PQC). Suppose there is high demand for product F and low demand for 9 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation. 9 E. Suppose that this is put into reverse. Under non-ideal market conditions (in particular, conditions of incomplete information), this will result in some short-term inefficiency, at least until the price-signalling effect transmits through the market chain of supplies and effectuates a change in resource allocation. During this adaptation period, the market participants will face a loss in Paretian welfare. However, whether the change in demand stems from SCEC or PQC is irrelevant to this effect. Suppose people are willing to pay a higher price for a product if it comes with a particular product-inherent quality. Likewise, suppose people are willing to pay more if its production or consumption comes with a particular moral quality. The underlying price-signalling mechanism remains the same. Again, against Hussain's suggestion, the exclusion premise can also apply to SCEC. The resulting inconsistency threatens again. We now turn to another possible argument for Hussain's suggestion that SCEC cannot be excluded from democratic requirements via the exclusion premise. We believe that this is the best argument Hussain can give in support of his claim. Suppose you engage in SCEC. You are boycotting a particular product in order to change a supplier's behaviour. Suppose that you succeed in instigating a critical mass of consumers to follow your practice. So, in effect, you manage to form what is known as a collusive monopsony (i.e. a buyer's cartel). The economic or welfare consequences of a collusive monopsony are clear (and analogous to the consequences of a colluding monopoly): In some markets buyers may collude among themselves in an effort to influence the price that they pay for a product or an input. Just as collusion among sellers can lead to economic results that are similar to monopoly (i.e., elevated price and reduced output), so can collusion among buyers lead to monopsonistic outcomes. Acting in concert, the buyers would orchestrate their purchase decisions to achieve precisely the same results as the monopsonist [...]. Consequently, collusive monopsony has the same deleterious effects on social welfare as does pure monopsony: Too few resources will be employed. It is clear that the suppliers of the collusively monopsonized product are hurt by a collusive reduction in the purchase of their outputs. Moreover, since the suppliers provide less of their product, the quantity of the final good must be reduced, or its quality must be reduced. Consequently, such restraints are inconsistent with consumer welfare and should be condemned. (Blair and Harrison, 2010, pp. 48–49) Consequently, in a situation where SCEC leads to a collusive monopsony, Hussain's point that SCEC does "not present a significant opportunity for Pareto improving transfers, and as such, SCEC does not contribute to the market achieving its justifying end" (p. 137) is a credible one. Collusive monopsony can reduce Paretian welfare. However, this point is still too weak to ground the conclusion that SCEC is never exempt from democratic requirements via the exclusion premise. There are two points we would like to highlight here. First, it is obvious that not every activity that qualifies as SCEC succeeds in establishing an effective collusive monopsony. Stable and effective collusive monopsonies only occur under a set of restricted conditions (cf. Blair and Harrison, 2010, pp. 49–51). Second, the loss of welfare also depends on the market environment in which collusive activity takes place. If it takes place in an environment where there is a (collusive) monopoly on the supply side, 10 then "[n]either the monopolist nor the monopsonist can exploit its market power in the usual way" (Blair and DePasquale, 2008, p. 6). Moreover, conclusive monopsony is not idiosyncratic to SCEC. It can also be driven by PQC. A group of consumers may collude to depress a product's price exclusively from pecuniary motives. Where this is the case, democratic requirements will again apply to PQC (via the inclusion premise)-a result that Hussain tries to block via the exclusion premise. But the exclusion premise does not apply to this type of collusive PQC because it fails to generate the welfare improvements that Hussain employs as grounds for rejecting the application of democratic requirements. Finally, we would like to offer another argument for why Hussain cannot avoid having the exclusion premise also apply to SCEC. Not only does PQC involve "the vast social opportunity for Pareto improving transfers" (137), but it also leads to a significant amount of market failure and negative externalities, i.e. Pareto-deteriorating spill-over costs of consumption. There is an endless list of devastating examples: global warming, overfishing, trafficking, antibiotic resistance, etc. Much of the motivation for SCEC arguably hinges on the reduction of negative externalities. As ethical consumers, we accept higher prices if, in exchange, we contribute to reducing negative externalities and their social costs. If that is correct, SCEC seems to play a role in creating social opportunities for Pareto-improving transfers. This, again, opposes Hussain's position. When SCEC reduces externalities (and therefore involves Paretian welfare improvements), SCEC, like PQC, is not subject to democratic requirements. The upshot of this discussion is plain. Hussain's premises generate an inconsistency in two distinct ways. First, PQC can yield Pareto improvements and social change. According to the inclusion and exclusion premises, there are instances in PQC that imply that a price-quality consumer both is and is not subject to democratic requirements. Second, SCEC can yield Pareto improvements and social change. According to the inclusion and exclusion premises, there are instances of SCEC that imply that a social change ethical consumer both is and is not subject to democratic requirements. In effect, Hussain's premises generate a kind of "Schrödinger's consumer": one who both is and is not liable to public demands of morality. 7 Only a Subsidiary Norm The last section concluded that Hussain's premises generate two independent inconsistencies. Hussain should therefore reconsider at least one of his premises. To make his position consistent and to preserve as much as possible of the impetus behind his original idea, Hussain could alter his position in two ways. For one, he could stick to the inclusion premise and drop the exclusion premise. As a result, if your actions yield social change, morality requires you to not deprive other agents of their fundamental rights or basic liberties, to deliberate with your fellow citizens, to look after the common good, and to ensure that your moral reasoning is subject to public debate. However, contrary to Hussain's position, there exists no sub-class of actions or practices, like PQC, that are exempt from this. Even if your actions (are internal to) yield(ing) welfare-inducing consequences, democratic requirements pose effective moral and deontic restrictions that are to be respected no matter how beneficial an action or practice may be.10 10 This line of reasoning appears to be consistent with Hussain's position that "[c]ertain laws, policies, and patterns of behavior may be attractive in themselves, but the processes through which these develop in society may be morally objectionable because they are inconsistent with procedural values". In this sense, Hussain's democratic 11 Alternatively, Hussain could replace both premises and opt for a hybrid view (making the application of the inclusion-premise conditional on welfare considerations). Accordingly, for all practices x, if x yields social change (to a significant degree), then x is subject to democratic requirements unless x is internal or essential to (profound) Pareto improvements. That is, every instigation of social change is, in principle, subject to democratic requirements except when it is essential to increasing welfare. Again, as above, this would also eradicate the special statues of PQC as being exempt from democratic requirements. Both adjustments would improve the consistency of Hussain's position. But how plausible are the resulting views? In fact, Hussain anticipates that both positions are extremely demanding. First, by abolishing the exclusion premise, ordinary market transactions would become subject to weighty moral demands. In fact, Hussain claims that if we "must [for example] approach all purchasing decisions as part of a deliberative process that aims to find the allocation of resources in society that best serves the common good", "this would effectively rule out pricequality consumerism as we know it" (136). And, second, even if the inclusion premise applies only if a practice of social change does not generate profound welfare improvements, overseeing and appraising the consequences of our market behaviour would use up vast cognitive resources. This is precisely why Hussain introduces the exclusion premise-a move, as we have shown above, that is ad hoc and that seems to effectively introduce more problems than it solves. We therefore conclude with an alternative suggestion. First, we believe that the inclusion premise generates at best only a subsidiary norm for consumers. By this we mean that the inclusion premise only applies to consumers in non-ideal circumstances. We believe that these non-ideal circumstances are best characterised as circumstances where the state fails to satisfy its obligation to appropriately protect those who suffer from the results of economic and social changes. Procedural values, inter alia, reflect fundamental rights. They are first and foremost to be upheld by the state, not by consumers. Only in circumstances where the state fails to uphold these values does the obligation to ensure the satisfaction of democratic requirements transfer to individual consumers. Let us illustrate this by using the structure of one of Hussain's own examples (pp. 117–118). Suppose that, due to some collective purchasing decision (whether based on a price/quality or an ethical motive), you face economic difficulties to the point where it can be said that you can no longer freely express your opinion, execute your rights, or, for instance, practice your religion. Against the inclusion premise, we argue that in this situation it is not primarily your own obligation as a consumer but rather the state's obligation to guarantee your fundamental rights and liberties. In fact, your obligation as a consumer kicks in only if the state fails to satisfy its obligation to create the economic circumstances necessary to uphold your fundamental rights and liberties. How might the state discharge this obligation? Precisely as the modern welfare state does. For example, one effective way is through establishing obligatory insurance schemas (such as unemployment or contingency insurance) that guarantee a certain level of physical, social, and spiritual subsistence in the face of social and economic change. Another example is the legal provision of limited liability, i.e. legally limiting an owner's responsibility for a company's financial liabilities to the nominal value of the owner's shares. This would also ensure that the requirements can be understood as Nozickian "side constraints", i.e. moral restrictions that stem from rights and legitimate concerns that ought not to be overstepped in the pursuit of the greater social good (Nozick, 1988). 12 market-power-driven demise of an economic activity would not deprive owners of an economic foundation for exercising fundamental rights and liberties. References Blair, R.D., DePasquale, C., 2008. Monopsony and Countervailing Power in the Market for Nurses. POLICY 393, 408. Blair, R.D., Harrison, J.L., 2010. Monopsony in Law and Economics [WWW Document]. Camb. Core. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511778766 Heath, J., 2014. Morality, Competition, and the Firm: The Market Failures Approach to Business Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York. Hussain, W., 2012. Is Ethical Consumerism an Impermissible Form of Vigilantism? Philos. Public Aff. 40, 111–143. Nozick, R., 1988. Side Constraints, in: Scheffler, S. (Ed.), Consequentialism and Its Critics. Oxford University Press. Schumpeter, J.A., 2013. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Routledge.

© 2014 Baishideng Publishing Group Inc. All rights reserved. Key words: Life; Information; Quasi-species; Incompleteness theorem; Genetic content operators Core tip: Meaning in natural languages/codes and communication is context dependent. In contrast, artificial formalizable (algorithm based) languages employ a "universal" syntax in order to determine meaning independent of the contextual circumstances. It is empirically evident that no natural language speaks itself as no natural code codes itself. It always requires living agents that share a competence to generate and interpret these natural codes. Therefore I suppose that changes in the genetic code, which are of evolutionary relevance, are rather the result of fine-tuned processes by a large network of mobile genetic elements, persistent viruses, its defectives and other genetic parasites that alter DNA sequences. In this respect DNA remains as ecosphere habitat for social interacting RNA inhabitants. This represents a pragmatic turn in biology from syntax centered molecular biology to pragmatics centered agents interactions. Witzany G. Pragmatic turn in biology: From biological molecules to genetic content operators. World J Biol Chem 2014; 5(3): 279-285 Available from: URL: http://www.wjgnet.com/1949-8454/full/v5/i3/279.htm DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.4331/wjbc.v5.i3.279 INTRODUCTION Sydney Brenner recently described the radical revolution in life sciences in the early 1950s: the occupation of biology by quantum mechanics examining the fundamental questions of matter and energy followed by the rise of genetics that showed that chromosomes were the carriers of genes. The discovery of the double helix resulted in Guenther Witzany Pragmatic turn in biology: From biological molecules to genetic content operators FIELD OF VISION Guenther Witzany, Telos-Philosophische Praxis, 5111 Buermoos, Austria Author contributions: Witzany G solely contributed to this paper. Correspondence to: Guenther Witzany, PhD, Telos-Philosophische Praxis, Vogelsangstrasse 18c, 5111 Buermoos, Austria. [email protected] Telephone: +61-43-62746805 Fax: +61-43-62746805 Received: January 22, 2014 Revised: April 16, 2014 Accepted: May 16, 2014 Published online: August 26, 2014 Abstract Erwin Schrödinger's question "What is life?" received the answer for decades of "physics + chemistry". The concepts of Alain Turing and John von Neumann introduced a third term: "information". This led to the understanding of nucleic acid sequences as a natural code. Manfred Eigen adapted the concept of Hammings "sequence space". Similar to Hilbert space, in which every ontological entity could be defined by an unequivocal point in a mathematical axiomatic system, in the abstract "sequence space" concept each point represents a unique syntactic structure and the value of their separation represents their dissimilarity. In this concept molecular features of the genetic code evolve by means of self-organisation of matter. Biological selection determines the fittest types among varieties of replication errors of quasi-species. The quasi-species concept dominated evolution theory for many decades. In contrast to this, recent empirical data on the evolution of DNA and its forerunners, the RNA-world and viruses indicate cooperative agent-based interactions. Group behaviour of quasi-species consortia constitute de novo and arrange available genetic content for adaptational purposes within real-life contexts that determine epigenetic markings. This review focuses on some fundamental changes in biology, discarding its traditional status as a subdiscipline of physics and chemistry. World J Biol Chem 2014 August 26; 5(3): 279-285 ISSN 1949-8454 (online) © 2014 Baishideng Publishing Group Inc. All rights reserved. World Journal of Biological ChemistryW J B C 279WJBC|www.wjgnet.com August 26, 2014|Volume 5|Issue 3| Submit a Manuscript: http://www.wjgnet.com/esps/ Help Desk: http://www.wjgnet.com/esps/helpdesk.aspx DOI: 10.4331/wjbc.v5.i3.279 Witzany G. Pragmatic turn in biology the new paradigm that information is physically embodied in DNA sequences of four different types [1] . In contrast to the years before 1953, the question of "information" now became central: the components of DNA are simple chemicals, but the biological complexity that can be generated by the information of different sequences is revolutionary. The fundamental concept that integrated this new biological "information" with matter and energy was enshrined in the universal Turing machine and von Neumann's self-reproducing machines [2-4] . Consequently it follows that biology is physics with computation [5] . This was the core paradigm of molecular biology for almost the next half-century. The crucial step in the serious discussion of "information" as an essential part of definitions of "life" was taken by Manfred Eigen. MANFRED EIGEN COMBINES PHYSICS, CHEMISTRY, MATHEMATICS AND INFORMATION THEORY In a series of articles and books Manfred Eigen developed a model of how the essential features of life and its inherent complexity can be explained by physical properties of matter [6,7] . If certain chemical properties exist on a planet and certain physical conditions obtain, life will start by self-reproducing macromolecular cycles which act in a complementary way. On the one hand there are "information"-carrying nucleic acids which build a reproductive cycle. On the other there are functional amino acids which build the protein bodies. Both code-systems together can build a catalytic "hypercycle" which is the basis of the self-reproductivity of life. Both parts can be reconstructed physically. Nucleic acids (information) and proteins (function) represent a closed system, because there is no function without information, and information gets meaning from function. "Mutations" are replication errors with selective advantage, i.e., instabilities in this system represent irreversible thermodynamic processes. A series of such mutations in nucleic acid sequences leads to quasi-species that are mutant distributions of primitive replicating entities. Such dynamic distributions of genomes that share genetic variation, competition and selection generate the fittest types ("master copies") and therefore avoid "error thresholds", i.e., excessively high mutation rates, in that information cannot further reproduce. The resulting evolution of life is an optimising process in that Darwinian selection evaluates the fittest results of mutations [8,9] . Manfred Eigen adapted the concept of Hammings "sequence space" to explain hypercycle concept by physical properties of matter. Similar to Hilbert space, in which every ontological entity could be defined by an unequivocal point in a mathematical axiomatic system, in the abstract ‚ information space" concept each point represents a unique syntactic structure and the value of their separation represents their dissimilarity. In this concept molecular features of the genetic code evolve by means of self-organisation of matter. Each point in the sequence space can be occupied by one of four different nucleotides. But each point can also be represented by digital computation (1 and 0) [7] . BIOLINGUISTICS, BIOINFORMATICS, SYSTEMS BIOLOGY AND SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY A series of varieties of mathematical theories of language emerged such as Biolinguistics, Bioinformatics, and systems biology. They all interpret and investigate genetic structures in the light of linguistic categories as quantifiable sets of signs [10-12] and use statistical methods and algorithms to identify genetic sequence orders. An emerging hybrid of information-theoretical aspects of nucleic acid language is synthetic biology. Its theoretical assumptions clearly derive from systems biology and information theory and generally from a mathematical theory of language. Proponents of synthetic biology want to deconstruct complex biological systems into its parts and artificially reconstruct and even evolve biological systems [13] . This kind of artificial molecular design could serve as an appropriate tool in genetic engineering for, e.g., new vaccines, immune functions, etc. This rather mechanistic concept depends on syntax structure identification that represents meaning/function. The context-dependent epigenetic imprinting which represents a deep grammar hidden in the superficial grammar of nucleic acid sequences is not the focus of synthetic biology approaches. In contrast to predominant genetic engineering synthetic biology tries to construct complex biological systems which are then subject to selection processes. They are expected to be mutation-resistant in a certain sense. UNEXPECTED EARTHQUAKE IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS The original mainstream assumptions regarding the several mathematical theories of language are still present in concepts, curricula and even the definition of life and animated nature [14,15] . The conviction of an exact science based on exact definitions of scientific sentences in contrast to non-scientific ones is at the basis of scientific communities and their self-understanding [16] . The history of science or even sociology of knowledge evidences the interesting fact that it is still largely ignored that 50 years ago the basis of this world view was shaken to the core. The belief that mathematics was the best tool for depicting the physical reality of matter and natural laws marginalised world views other than mathematical ones [16-19] . In his Unvollständigkeitssatz (incompleteness theorem) Manfred Gödel investigated a formal system converting a meta-theoretical statements into an arithmetical one [20] . He strove to convert the statements formulated in a meta-language into the object language S. This led 280WJBC|www.wjgnet.com August 26, 2014|Volume 5|Issue 3| Gödel to two prominent and critical conclusions: (1) If system S is consistent, then it will contain at least one formally indeterminable sentence. This means that onev sentence is inevitably present that can be neither proved nor disproved within the system; and (2) If system S is consistent, then this consistency of S cannot be proved within S. The consequence of the incompleteness theorem for the automaton theory of Turing and von Neumann was significant: a machine can principally calculate only those functions for which an algorithm can be provided. Signmediated interactions between living organisms in which the meaning of the signs depends on real life circumstances relay on non-formalizable sequence generation, for which no algorithm can be provided. Essential functions of every natural language, such as non-formalizable features are not object of algorithm based calculations. Living organisms are no machines [21] . PRAGMATIC TURN IN BIOLOGY: NATURAL GENETIC CONTENT OPERATORS EDIT GENOMES Manfred Eigen's concept of natural languages/codes and the current concepts embraced by bioinformatics, biolinguistics, systems biology and synthetic biology are not coherent with current knowledge about key features of natural languages or codes, i.e., the three levels of rules that govern natural code use by competent code-using groups: combinatorial rules (syntax), contextual rules (semantics) and context-dependent rules (pragmatics). In all mathematical theories of language the syntax determines semantics (function), but in natural codes pragmatics (context) determines semantics. Pragmatic rules do not exist in Eigen's concept. Natural code-inherent rules are absent in abiotic matter that is determined strictly by natural laws: no syntax, pragmatic or semantic rules are present if water freezes to ice. Therefore the explanation of the evolution of biological macromolecules in Eigen's concept as well as in other mathematical theories of language cannot explain the evolution of natural codes and its inherent rules [22-25] . RNAS THAT ORGANIZE GENETIC CONTENT COMPOSITION The change from a read-only-memory genome with copying errors to a read-and-write genome with active change operators is fundamental. In contrast to the decades long assumption that the driving forces of evolution were chance mutation (statistical replication errors) and selection it is now recognised that although mutation is an empirical fact it does not contribute very much to genetic novelty. Key roles now act as non-random genetic change operators in the production of complex evolutionary inventions [26-28] . Now we can investigate several key players that organise the genetic content compositions of host organisms such as, e.g., endogenous viruses and its defectives, transposons, retrotransposons, LTRs (long terminal repeats), non-LTRs (non-long terminal repeats), LINEs (long interspersed nuclear elements), SINEs (short interspersed nuclear elements), ALUs, group I introns, group II introns, phages, plasmids[29-31]. We now recognize that DNA is not solely a genetic storage medium but is also a kind of ecological habitat. Many of such mobile genetic elements have been found within the last 40 years as inhabitants of all genomes [32-35] . Some cut and paste, others copy and paste and both spread within the genome. They modify host genetic identities through insertion, recombination, or the epigenetic regulation of genetic content. They co-evolve with the host, interact in a modular manner and additionally generate highly adaptive immune systems for host organisms from the simplest prokaryotes (CRISPRs/Cas system) to the most complex eukaryotes (VJD-Systems). Such mobile genetic elements shape both genome architecture and regulation. Therefore they are agents of change not only over evolutionary time but also in real time as domesticated agents [36-38] . FROM MOLECULAR BIOLOGICAL ENTITIES TO SOCIAL GROUPS The question arises how these RNA populations, it's closely related RNA viruses and their complex interactions can be explained and understood without mathematical theories of language. How should we investigate non-coding RNA interactions, competencies and even their role in epigenetic imprinting without formalisable tools? This world of life processes is dominated by RNA, whereas DNA remains a habitat, an ecosphere of interacting RNAs that behave like inhabitants and as genetic information storage [39-43] . All these these RNAs, share a secondary structure like a hairpin, or a stem-loop. In more complex ligated consortia of such stem loops we can look at tRNAs, or ribosomal subunits, RNA polymerases or a great variety of RNA viruses and its defectives as listed above. The RNA stem loops have two characteristic parts: stems that consist of base-paired nucleic acids and loops, bulges and junctions that consist of unpaired regions limited by stems. Most interesting from an evolutionary perspective are two recently found key features [44-46] : (1) Randomly associated RNAs that have no evolutionary history show the same structuredependent compositional bias as ribosomal RNAs. This means that the differences do not depend on selection processes but on the overall composition of the RNA consortium; and (2) The singular RNA stem loop behaves like a random assembly of nucleotides without selective forces and underlies physico-chemical laws exclsusively Only if stem loops build groups, they share a culture of interactional patterns and a history of defined timescales, i.e., they underlie biological selective forces. This looks like the true split of life and non-life processes. To better understand behavioral motifs of RNA 281WJBC|www.wjgnet.com August 26, 2014|Volume 5|Issue 3| Witzany G. Pragmatic turn in biology stem-loop swarms and viruses, one should add group membership features that are absent in the inanimate world. The basic tool of such RNAs is their complementary composition of base-pairing stems and not basepairing loops, the result of an inherent property of RNA chemicals, the foldback of polyRNAs. The variety of regulations on protein coding genes as well as the processing of these regulatory RNAs by phases of splicing and editing RNA transcripts makes its algorithm based predictability nearly impossible because of its complexity [39] . These populations of RNAs share properties with RNA viruses, which have defined capabilities. In contrast to DNA viruses RNA viruses have much smaller genomes on RNA bases without proofreading and repair. In contrast to the previous perspective (mutation, i.e., replication error) the new perspective assembles the property of invention of new sequence contents, de novo, that have not existed before and for which no algorithms are available in principle. This is important for variation and innovation, as well as infection, immunity and identity, for both diversified viral and cellular populations [47-50] . RNA STEM LOOP STRUCTURES CONSTITUTE LIFE This change in perspective from molecules to agentbased behaviour will look at interactions of RNA viruses, DNA viruses, RNA-DNA viruses, viral swarms, and sub-viral groups like any ligated RNA stem loop groups that cooperate and coordinate (regulate) within cellular genomes as replication-relevant co-players [51-53] . Or they interact as suppression-relevant silencers or as infectionderived modular tools of non-coding RNAs that have built consortia of complementary agents that function together such as retrovirus-derived remnants, such as LTRs, non-LTRs, group II introns, rRNAs, tRNAs, spliceosomes, editosomes, and other counterbalancing modules [54-58] . Such populations determine regulations in many ways and may newly adapt different functions. The use of a natural language or code depends on consortia of living agents, because natural languages and codes function according to rules. In contrast to the inevitability of natural laws rule-following is a feature of social interaction and not solely one of physico-chemical necessity [58] . Investigating syntactic sequences without knowing something about the real-life context of code-using agents is senseless because syntactic structures do not represent unequivocally semantic meaning. Quantifiable analyses of signs, words and sequences cannot extract meaning. Only in a restricted (statistical) sense this is possible through sequence comparison. EVOLUTIONARY GENETIC INVENTION IS NOT THE RESULT OF REPLICATION ERRORS The virosphere in particular exemplifies how genetic innovation derives from novel nucleic acid sequences and their combination [59] . If cells are infected by more than one virus, the genomes of different viruses are copackaged into the viral progeny. During reverse transcription the reverse transcriptase switches between two or more templates, generating a new DNA sequence [60] . Similar sequence generations are known in various co-infection events such as the combination of external RNA viruses and persistent endogenous retrovirus, infectious RNA viruses with former viruses, retaining defective parts which can be combined into new sequence orders of still functioning viruses [52,53] . Interestingly, not only viruses generate de novo, or combine and recombine sequences. With this innovation competence quasispecies-consortia (qs-c) transfer this adaptive principle also to all forms of cellular life. The defective parts of infectious genetic parasites represent an abundance of appropriate tools for cellular needs, documented in the variety of non-coding RNAs which are essential actors in all stages of cellular life such as transcription, translation, repair, recombination and immune functions [60-65] . REMEMBER GÖDEL: NATURAL CODES ARE OPEN "SYSTEMS" RNA group membership can be described by its various features. But this membership can never be completely specified, since it can always be further parasitised by unknown and even unpredictable parasites. This essential feature renders the ability to specify membership absolutely impossible. Additionally this means absolute immunity in this open "system" is impossible in principle. This "insecurity" provides the inherent capacity for novelty, that is, the precondition for greater complexity. It seems we are here at the core competence of variation the essential feature for biological selection. How do agents emerge from ribozymes to form identity of replicators and then form groups that learn membership? The emergence of single RNA stem-loops solely depends on physico-chemical properties. As mentioned above, if stem-loop groups build complex consortia biological selection and social interactions emerge that are not present in a purely chemical world [44-46] . This looks coherent with the results of sociology and the evolution of natural languages. Natural languages and codes depend on competent agents that followsemiotic (syntactic, pragmatic, semantic) rules, and rule-following are social interactions. This means one agent alone cannot generate or follow a rule. Evolution of identity implies emergence of self/non-self differentiation competence. This is a crucial step from single RNA stem loops to RNA stem loop groups [28,36,45,46] . RNA GROUP BUILDING: CONTEXT DETERMINES MEANING If we apply some interactional motifs of RNA agents 282WJBC|www.wjgnet.com August 26, 2014|Volume 5|Issue 3| Witzany G. Pragmatic turn in biology to form biotic structures that follow biological selection processes and not mere physico-chemical reaction patterns we must also look at the group-building of RNA stem-loop structures. As previously mentioned it has been found that single stem loops react in a purely physico-chemical reaction mode without selective forces, regardless of whether they derived randomly or are constructed under in vitro conditions [39,46] . Conversely, if these single RNA stem loops build groups they overrule pure physico-chemical reaction patterns and emerge as biological selection forces: biological identities of self/non-self recognition and preclusion, immune functions, dynamically changing (adapting) membership roles. A single alteration in a base-pairing RNA stem that leads to a new bulge may dynamically alter not only a single stem loop but the whole group identity from which this stem loop containing the newly emerged bulge derives [39,46] . Simple self-ligating RNA stem loops can build much larger groups of RNA stem loops that serve to increase complexity [66] . This may lead to ribozymatic consortia, which later on build success stories, such as the merger of the two subunits of transfer RNAs or RNA-dependent RNA-polymerases for replication of RNA through RNA or the subunits of ribosomal RNAs, all of them being former groups that evolved and functioned for different reasons than those applicable to subsequent conserved modes [67-69] . If RNA fragments self-ligate into self-replicating ribozymes they constitute networks. For example, threemembered networks represent highly cooperative growth behavior. If such networks compete directly with selfish autocatalytic cycles, the former grow faster. This clearly indicates the ability of RNA populations to evolve into higher complexity through cooperation which clearly outruns selfishness [46] . Another intriguing example of the biological (selective) group-building competence of RNA stem loop consortia is the chemical interaction based on the molecular syntax in stem-loop "kissing", in that single-stranded regions of RNA stem loops bind according to Chargaff rules to other single-stranded stem loop structures to unite and build more complex group identities for several functions, such as dimerisation of genomic RNA in viruses, e.g., HIV 1. Such complementary interactions are also important in RNA replication of the hepatitis C virus [70-72] . Complex three-dimensional structures can be built by consortia of single RNA sequence strings. One of the most interesting structures is the pseudoknot composed of two helical segments connected by single-stranded regions or loops. Bases in the single-stranded loop are base-pairings with bases outside the loop. This interaction pattern clearly depends on the rules of molecular syntax but is initiated for adaptational purposes by different ecosphere habitat dynamics. So the results of these interactions may lead to structurally diverse groups with important different biological roles such as the catalytic core of key players of the present RNA world, i.e., ribozymes, self-splicing introns, telomerase and its contextdependent altering gene expression by inducing ribosomal frameshifting in several viruses [73-75] . Most interestingly, the base-pairing in pseudoknots is strictly context-sensitive and base-pairs overlap with one another in sequence positions. This leads to the limits of algorithm-based prediction models such as dynamic programming or stochastic context-free grammars. This indicates the natural language nature of nucleic acid code3aw which represents the possibility of coherent de novo generation and context-dependent alterations for a diversity of different meanings (functions) for the same syntax structures. CONCLUSION How long will biology remain a subdiscipline of physics and chemistry? As I have tried to demonstrate, the investigation methods of natural languages/codes such as the genetic code (in terms of both its superficial syntax and the deep grammar hidden as a result of epigenetic imprintings) in the light of mathematical theories of language and its derivatives such as biolinguistics, bioinformatics, systems biology and synthetic biology can lead to quantifiable, i.e., statistical, results which can be compared, measured and computed. The question remains whether it is sensible, to measure, investigate and compare the wavelength and modulations of phonetic utterances of humans to extract a meaning? Can we extract semantics from investigations of certain features of syntax structure? In natural languages/codes it is not the structure of syntax that determines the meaning of sequences. In nearly all cases it is the hidden deep grammar which determines meaning for the recipient of the message. The deep grammar depends on how the superficial syntax is marked: in the genetic code by epigenetic imprintings or in sign sequences of utterances by gestures and emphasis. In all cases the hidden deep grammar decides whether a competent recipient can understand the intended meaning of the sender or not. The real-life world in which natural sign users are included decides the meaning of a natural language or code, not the in vitro experimental set ups, the universal grammar or similar algorithm-based components. In contrast with previous approaches the real action between interactors determines what signs of communication and coordination are used to express what should be transported, what is intended, and what is focused. The real actions are the driving force of content and represent the context which determines the meaning of thoughts and interpretations. Therefore pragmatics is of essential relevance to identify the meaning of natural languages/ codes, not syntax or semantics. This aspect is missing completely in Eigens concept of a sequence space in which each nucleotide sequence occupies a unique position that can be computed by digi283WJBC|www.wjgnet.com August 26, 2014|Volume 5|Issue 3| Witzany G. Pragmatic turn in biology tal units. Because each nucleotide sequence can have several meanings, depending on the contextual use, sequence space position can not explain the variety of its functions. 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Convergence of natural and artificial evolution on an RNA looploop interaction: the HIV-1 dimerization initiation site. RNA 2000; 6: 1267-1276 [PMID: 10999604] 73 Rivas E, Eddy SR. A dynamic programming algorithm for RNA structure prediction including pseudoknots. J Mol Biol 1999; 285: 2053-2068 [PMID: 9925784] 74 Staple DW, Butcher SE. Pseudoknots: RNA structures with diverse functions. PLoS Biol 2005; 3: e213 [PMID: 15941360 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030213] 75 Gupta A, Rahman R, Li K, Gribskov M. Identifying complete RNA structural ensembles including pseudoknots. RNA Biol 2012; 9: 187-199 [PMID: 22418849 DOI: 10.4161/rna.18386] PReviewer: Dovat S, Soriano-Garcia M SEditor: Wen LL LEditor: A EEditor: Lu YJ 285WJBC|www.wjgnet.com August 26, 2014|Volume 5|Issue 3| Witzany G. Pragmatic turn in biology © 2014 Baishideng Publishing Group Inc. All rights reserved. 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ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online) Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2018, Вип. 14 Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2018, NO 14 СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ АСПЕКТ ЛЮДСЬКОГО БУТТЯ doi: 10.15802/ampr.v0i14.115314 © T. S. Pavlova, V. V. Bobyl, 2018 UDC 316.33:141.319.8 T. S. PAVLOVA1*, V. V. BOBYL2* 1*Oles Honchar Dnipro National University (Dnipro, Ukraine), e-mail [email protected], ORCID 0000-0001-7178-3573 2*Dnipropetrovsk National University of Railway Transport named after Academician V. Lazaryan (Dnipro, Ukraine), e-mail [email protected], ORCID 0000-0002-7306-3905 THE PHENOMENON OF NEGATIVE EMOTIONS IN THE SOCIAL EXISTENCE OF HUMAN Purpose. The research is aimed at determining the influence of negative ethical emotions on social life and the activity of the individual, which involves solving the following problems: a) to find out approaches to the typology of ethical emotions, b) to highlight individual negative ethical emotions and to determine their ability to influence human behaviour. Theoretical basis. The theoretical and methodological basis of the research is the recognition of the significant influence of negative emotions on human activity in society. In this regard, it is proposed to consider them as a complex multidisciplinary phenomenon, which is predetermined by both social and personal factors of origin and has a certain specificity of objectification. Originality. The authors determined that in addition to destructive effects on a person of negative emotions, they can also have a constructive effect on person's behaviour, due primarily to the fact that a person does not want to experience these emotions and therefore tries to avoid situations they cause. Conclusions. The ethical emotions of guilt, embarrassment, anger, disgust and contempt can affect, through the cognitive aspect of the emotional process, the decision-making process of people when they predict situations in which they risk to feel such emotions. So the emotion of guilt creates a constructive setup aimed at correcting inappropriate social norms of human behaviour. The emotion of embarrassment motivates a person to behave more benevolently in society in order to integrate in it and get its approval, thus encouraging the person to adhere to social and moral agreements and norms. The emotion of anger motivates a person to act to eliminate injustice, herewith not only in relation to himself, but also in relation to others. Rejecting those people who cause moral and social aversion, society creates a system of punishments and rewards that acts as a strong deterrent to the sociocultural behaviour. The emotion of contempt performs the function of preventing punishment in relation to the despised individual. Keywords: phenomenon; human; emotion; feelings; anthropology; morality; behaviour Introduction The research topic is extremely relevant and represents a multidisciplinary interest. Ethical emotions are closely related to the social being of the individual, interaction within society, behaviour, as well as the relationship between the general and the individual in social action. The fulfilment of social norms and rules by human implies their mental and psychological inclusion in social life in relation to which they experience many different emotions, as well as are active actors in the social activities in which these emotions manifest themselves. The impact of emotions on social interactions was considered already by A. Smith 1759. Many philosophical works raised the questions of the general cultural significance of emotions, anthropology of morality, cognitive aspects of emotions, ethical experiences in morality and law (Petrazycki, 1907; Levy, 1984; Bgazhnokov, 2009; Pavlova, 2013; V. Khmil, & T. Khmil, 2015). Some researchers drew attention to the influence of emotions on the mood and behaviour of a person, considering not only the internal, but also the external side thereof (Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006; Frijda, 2001; Vélez, & Ostrosky-Solís, 2006). They also considered the decisive role of emotions in making decisions in comparison with rational, logically weighted motives. Many authors believe that emotional factors affect financial decisions from the standpoint of the social and economic security of the society (Benartzi, & Thaler, 2013; Gintis, 2014; Gjerstad, 84 ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online) Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2018, Вип. 14 Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2018, NO 14 СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ АСПЕКТ ЛЮДСЬКОГО БУТТЯ doi: 10.15802/ampr.v0i14.115314 © T. S. Pavlova, V. V. Bobyl, 2018 & Smith, 2014; Khmarskyi, & Pavlov, 2017). The typology of ethical emotions was considered by Haidt (2003), who drew attention to the possibility of dividing ethical emotions into emotions with negative and positive valence, as well as singled out self-conscious emotions and emotions associated with evaluating other individuals. This allows moral emotions with negative valence to be seen as punishment mechanisms, while those with positive ones as reward mechanisms. Many scientists tried to reveal the specifics of such emotions as guilt, embarrassment, anger, disgust and the peculiarities of their manifestation (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Purpose In view of the foregoing, the purpose of the article is to determine the influence of negative ethical emotions on social life and the activity of the individual, which involves solving the following problems: a) to find out approaches to the typology of ethical emotions; b) to highlight individual negative ethical emotions and to determine their ability to influence human behaviour. Statement of basic material In the humanities that deal with the problems of emotions, there are many of their definitions, comparing which one can reveal various aspects of this phenomenon. According to P. Niedenthal, S. Krauth-Gruber, and F. Ric (2006), emotions are not only an internal phenomenon, they manifest themselves as a certain behaviour. Frijda (2001) believes that emotions belong to the category of affect, which covers, in particular, emotions and moods. In its turn, the mood is defined as a diffuse affective state of low intensity, which is not necessarily the result of some easily recognizable cause. Duration of mood can persist for a period of several minutes to several weeks. The mood is felt explicitly, whereas its appearance or termination is not necessarily perceived separately. Unlike mood, emotions are more intense, less durable and, as a rule, have a very definite cause (Frijda, 2001). Emotions can appear with regard to the situations related to our interests. Of particular interest from the point of view of philosophical research are moral emotions. They are the basis of the ethical or unethical behaviour of the individual in society. Haidt (2003) defines moral emotions as those that are closely related to the interests and welfare of society as a whole or, at least, to the well-being of the other person (with the exception of the individual who feels these kinds of emotions). Consequently, moral emotions are caused by social situations, connected not only with the individual personal being of a human, but also with the interaction with other people. Moral emotions can appear when people interact with each other or arise when a person experiences a violation of moral standards. Interest in the study of such emotions is growing within various sciences. Especially relevant is their socio-philosophical and anthropological research. The philosophical approach to moral emotions broadens the scope of their understanding, including this phenomenon in the general cultural context, and is not limited to their consideration only as an individual phenomenon. Thus, considering the concept of anthropology of morality, Bgazhnokov (2009) defines it as "the reality of moral life, the moral state of a person and society, given in experience" (p. 15). According to Levy (1984), moral emotions should be the subject of philosophical research, as they relate to the sphere of cognition. The problem of ethical emotions is also considered in economic science, in particular, it is relevant in the behavioural economy, for example, in the decision-making of economic agents, as 85 ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online) Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2018, Вип. 14 Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2018, NO 14 СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ АСПЕКТ ЛЮДСЬКОГО БУТТЯ doi: 10.15802/ampr.v0i14.115314 © T. S. Pavlova, V. V. Bobyl, 2018 was also mentioned by A. Smith in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments" (Smith, & Haakonssen, 2002). Of course, psychologists are also involved in this problem; some of them suggested that in some social interactions our behaviour depends, to the greater extent, on the moral emotions than on logical thinking or cognitive abilities (Vélez, & Ostrosky-Solís, 2006). A prominent representative of the psychological law school L. Petrazycki made a great contribution to the study of ethical emotions. Particularly interesting are his views on the problem of their influence on human behaviour in society. According to Petrazycki (1907), the essential significance of ethical experiences of the moral and legal types is manifested in the fact that they 1) act as motives for behaviour, encourage one to carry out certain actions and to refrain from performing other ones; 2) create certain changes in the very dispositive psyche of individuals and masses, develop and strengthen certain habits and inclinations, weaken and eradicate other ones. Moral emotions have common characteristics. An important moment in determining the characteristics of moral emotions and their differentiated impact on the social behaviour of a person is their division into 2 types: 1) those characterized by negative valence; 2) those promoting welfare and benefit. For a more detailed analysis of ethical emotions, one must turn to their classification. The moral emotions include shame, guilt, embarrassment, anger, contempt and disgust (emotions with negative valence), as well as generosity, gratitude and admiration (emotions with positive valence), etc. Haidt (2003) offers the typology of moral emotions that includes self-conscious emotions, as well as emotions associated with evaluating other people and empathy. Self-conscious emotions include shame, embarrassment, guilt and generosity. What they have in common is that they are caused by interpersonal events (negative or positive), the cause of which is attributed to the person himself. For example, it is entirely possible that he will experience an emotion of guilt or shame after opportunistic behaviour associated with the use of the fruits of collective efforts. Conversely, a person can experience the emotion of generosity by making serious investments in the implementation of a collective project. According to Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek (2007), these kinds of emotions are caused by self-esteem and reflection. They are valuable indicators for assessing how we are perceived in our social environment, and thus help to maintain good relations with other people. In particular, they inform us about the social or moral acceptability of our behaviour, acting as an emotional punishment or reward. As noted by J. Tangney, J. Stuewig, and D. Mashek (2007), these assessing emotions function as a "moral emotional barometer". When an individual commits a crime or makes a mistake that harms others, he can experience such emotions as guilt, shame or embarrassment, which can lead not only to personal troubles, but also to social, in particular economic losses. Conversely, when a person's behaviour corresponds to social and moral norms, positive emotions of generosity or self-approval can lead to a positive personal and social result, which fully compensates for socially directed behaviour. Self-conscious moral emotions have the most important social significance in people's lives; this is due, first of all, to the person's need to belong to a group, community and society as a whole. These emotions, according to Haidt (2003), are designed to successfully adapt people to life within the community by excluding behaviour that may cause others to feel such emotions as contempt, anger or disgust, or to promote social and moral behaviour evoking in others such emotions as admiration or gratitude. It is these emotions, according to Haidt (2003), that refer to the second group of moral emotions, i.e. emotions associated with evaluating others. In their consideration, the object of evaluation is no longer the person himself, but a focus is on the behaviour of his environment. As in the case of self-conscious emotions, within the second group of moral emotions, emotions are dis86 ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online) Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2018, Вип. 14 Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2018, NO 14 СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ АСПЕКТ ЛЮДСЬКОГО БУТТЯ doi: 10.15802/ampr.v0i14.115314 © T. S. Pavlova, V. V. Bobyl, 2018 tinguished as with negative valence, which Haidt (2003) calls other-condemning emotions (including emotions of anger/indignation, contempt and disgust), and emotions with positive valence, for example, praising emotions, in particular, emotions of gratitude and admiration. The other-condemning emotions as anger, indignation, disgust and contempt are moral emotions on the same grounds as emotions that encourage social behaviour, as they represent the most important mechanisms for regulating interpersonal relations and maintaining public order. These emotions can lead to revenge, boycott or insults with respect to the object of evaluation, that is, a person or a group of people who violated moral norms. Consequently, such moral emotions encourage the adoption and use of coercive measures by people who experience such emotions towards such a person or group of people because of their antisocial or morally unacceptable behaviour. In particular, this can lead, through expectation, foreseeing of coercive measures, to suppression of a person's desire to carry out such behaviour. The praising emotions arise when the people around us behave "excellently" or perform actions aimed at increasing our personal welfare or the prosperity of society as a whole. The othercondemning emotions imply a negative reciprocity on the part of persons experiencing this kind of emotion towards the people who are the source of these emotions, while the other-praising emotions may be the cause of positive reciprocity that encourages social behaviour. According to Haidt (2003), the positive emotions in question can stimulate members of society to create social bonds and become better and better, and also openly show a desire to help others. The otherpraising emotions can enhance social behaviour both of those who evoke this kind of emotion in other people, and those who experience these positive emotions. Within the framework of these two groups of moral emotions, one can conduct regrouping by valence in order to represent different emotions and their characteristics. This is due to the fact that moral emotions with negative valence can be punitive mechanisms that are oriented toward themselves or to other individuals with respect to inappropriate moral or social behaviour. In turn, emotions with positive valence are the basis of remuneration mechanisms that are also oriented toward themselves or to others in connection with social behaviour and actions. In the scientific literature, there are no clear boundaries between self-conscious emotions with negative valence. Haidt (2003) noted that in some non-Western cultures, for example Asian, there are no lexical differences between the emotions of shame and embarrassment, the guilt emotion does not stand out separately, but is more or less integrated into the emotion of shame or embarrassment. However, nevertheless between such different emotions there are subtle differrences and they should be considered. Shame and guilt are emotions that emerge when a person commits an action that violates social or moral norms. Nevertheless, the guilt emotion is more appropriate in the context of violation of moral norms, when other people are harmed. Tangney et al. (1996) indicate that when describing situations in which the shame emotion is experienced, subjects express greater concern about the other's opinion relative to themselves compared with the guilt emotion, but when describing the cases when the guilt emotion is experienced, the subjects are more concerned about the potential impact through their behaviour on others. Thus, the intervention of egocentrism in the experience of the shame emotion forces the subject to believe that it is more meaningful than the guilt emotion when there is a public violation of moral norms, because it directly depends on the opinions and judgments of others. The clearest difference between the emotion of shame and the emotion of guilt is at the level of the focal difference that arises from the experience of such emotions. In the case of shame, the focus of attention is directed toward oneself: "it is ME who did a terrible thing", "what a terrible 87 ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online) Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2018, Вип. 14 Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2018, NO 14 СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ АСПЕКТ ЛЮДСЬКОГО БУТТЯ doi: 10.15802/ampr.v0i14.115314 © T. S. Pavlova, V. V. Bobyl, 2018 person I am", whereas in the case of guilt, the accent shifts to actual behaviour: "yet I did this terrible THING", "what a terrible THING I did". According to Haidt (2003), the emotion of shame is not a regulator of any behaviour, but rather it indicates who someone should be. Therefore, in today's West European society, shame is a more painful emotion associated with a person's personality and reduces his self-esteem. Thus, on the scale of valence, the emotion of shame usually has a stronger negative intensity than the emotion of guilt, respectively, and the psychological hardships caused by the shame emotion can be stronger than those caused by the guilt emotion. Emotions of guilt and shame have very different potentials of action, since guilt refers to moral emotions and usually leads to a specific concrete action – helping people in distress, this allows not to experience an emotion of guilt towards them, as well as to provide compensation for the damage to the affected party, apology or remorse. According to Haidt (2003), this tendency is intended to mitigate or eliminate the negative consequences of the guilt emotion and is aimed at restoring relationships that are threatened by inappropriate, unacceptable behaviour. J. Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek (2007) indicate that the emotion of shame generates a desire to limit one's social presence by hiding or escaping. Shame can also be associated with an emotion of anger and a strong reaction to revenge in the context of seeking to protect one's own dignity or reputation. Embarrassment is an emotion very similar to shame. However, self-conscious emotions are associated with self-esteem, which is carried out in relation to moral norms and social agreements. According to Haidt (2003), Western society makes some distinctions between problems of moral nature, for example, when someone harms another individual by addressing issues of justice and law; and the problems of social agreements, for example, what is associated with the choice of clothing and food, care for themselves. Thus, the author points out that the emotion of embarrassment will be experienced mainly in the context of violations of social conventions, while the emotion of shame will be mainly related to violations of moral norms. Haidt (2003) also notes that the emotion of embarrassment is experienced in situations in which, to a lesser degree, the self-esteem of a person is less endangered than others and is less violent than an emotion of shame. Also, the author connects the emergence of emotion of embarrassment with the inconsistency of the social status of people entering into communication. According to J. Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek (2007), embarrassment is an emotion somewhat less connected with morality than shame and guilt. Miller (1995) believes that the emotion of embarrassment is defined as an abominable state of humiliation, confusion and sadness after difficult public situations, when a person behaves awkwardly, absent-mindedly or unsuccessfully. Emotion of embarrassment is associated with situations where, to a lesser extent, the assessment of a person in the eyes of others is threatened and causes much less loss than an emotion of shame. The other-condemning emotions result from a negative assessment of the behaviour or actions taken by people around us. These kinds of emotions play a key role in maintaining respect for moral and social norms, encouraging the use of punishment mechanisms for example revenge, boycott, ridicule, against those who violate these norms. This group of emotions includes anger and indignation, as well as disgust and contempt. Emotion of anger is the primary emotion inherent in all people in all cultures of the world. It is inherent in both humans and other living beings, such as rats and dogs, and is felt during frustration. In humans, anger can also occur in other cases, such as insult, dissatisfaction, anxiety, physical or psychological pain. According to A. Ortony, G. Clore and A. Collins (1988), the emotion of anger is experienced, in particular, when a person faces emotional distress especially if the latter is perceived as unfair, and it can be both actual and potential, and responsibility and 88 ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online) Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2018, Вип. 14 Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2018, NO 14 СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ АСПЕКТ ЛЮДСЬКОГО БУТТЯ doi: 10.15802/ampr.v0i14.115314 © T. S. Pavlova, V. V. Bobyl, 2018 intent are associated with the offender. The influence of emotion of anger can be found in many social situations; in particular, it can be experienced during the process of exchange between several partners, when one of them makes an unjust proposal in the opinion of the other party. It is possible that after the appearance of such an emotion, the main tendencies to action in an individual may be revenge and the demand for compensation. For example, in the case of business negotiations, one partner may decide to take revenge by rejecting a proposal that he considers unfair. Therefore, the emotion of anger is characterized by negative reciprocity in relation to the source of the given emotion. According to Haidt (2003), these tendencies may seem selfish and antisocial. However, anger has other aspects that endow it with characteristics of moral emotion. D. Watts and P. Dodds (2007) indicate that the relationship between anger and morality is invert. Anger reflects the individual's moral susceptibility in the sense that an immoral person is certainly not capable of such an emotional reaction. Emotion of anger is also experienced in response to an event or behaviour that constitutes a violation of moral standards. The damage, in this case, does not need to be done personally to the individual experiencing such an emotion. Thus, the emotion of anger helps to increase the level of moral sensitivity in people and leads to social behaviour. According to J. Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek (2007), anger can arise as a result of observing unacceptable behaviour directed against a third party. Yet the work by Charles Darwin (1872) "On the expression of emotions in humans and animals" noted that disgust refers to something disgusting, mostly associated with taste perception real or imaginary. This is also true for other types of perception, especially visual, tactile, olfactory ones. The definition in question can be extended, on the one hand, by intentions or actions related to outrageous use of one's own body, incest, child abuse, sexual deviation, drug abuse, and on the other hand, as P. Rozin, J. Haidt and C. McCauley (2008) noted, violations of a purely social and moral character. Unlike anger that suggests a tendency to attack, criticize or revenge, the tendency to act for the disgust emotion is directed towards self-defence and consists in avoiding a source of disgust, for example, a dish with spoiled food or a person who betrayed confidence. According to Haidt (2003), this tendency is particularly useful in terms of human security, since it avoids the consumption of products potentially hazardous to health. Emotion of contempt, like anger and disgust, is the result of negative evaluation of others. Contempt for any person implies looking down on that person and feeling one's moral superiority. According to J. Tangney, J. Stuewig and D. Mashek (2007) contempt refers to the social hierarchy, status. This emotion is less connected with the notion of morality than anger or disgust. However, the emergence of such an emotion in human is due to ridicule and disrespectful attitude towards them. The less despicable are the less developed people or those whose social status is lower or they cannot meet high moral standards. If we take as an example the workers of an enterprise, then this emotion will motivate some of them to exert maximum efforts in order to reduce the likelihood of condemnation and hostility on the part of the employer and colleagues. Originality The authors determined that in addition to destructive effects on a person of negative emotions, they can also have a constructive effect on person's behaviour, due primarily to the fact that a person does not want to experience these emotions and therefore tries to avoid situations they cause. 89 ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online) Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2018, Вип. 14 Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2018, NO 14 СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ АСПЕКТ ЛЮДСЬКОГО БУТТЯ doi: 10.15802/ampr.v0i14.115314 © T. S. Pavlova, V. V. Bobyl, 2018 Conclusions The influence of ethical emotions on the human social behaviour was determined. We identified the constructive and destructive attitudes of human social behaviour caused by different ethical emotions of negative orientation. If the guilt emotion creates a constructive correction attitude, the emotion of shame tends to cause behaviour that seriously damages the conventional social relations. Emotion of embarrassment also affects the human social behaviour, it in particular motivates to friendliness. Emotion of anger, which is sometimes called indignation, has both constructive and destructive orientation. Constructive orientation is that it motivates to eliminate injustice, while destructive one demonstrates itself when the anger is of high intensity and is of massive nature, then its manifestation can lead to negative, destructive consequences for society. Disgust can also be the cause of actions aimed at favourable social behaviour. This emotion plays a crucial role in supporting respect for moral and social norms, as it contributes to the introduction of punishment mechanisms in relation to those who violate these norms. Those circumstances that all these emotions are undesirable for a person can be understood as a serious deterrent to antisocial behaviour in the long run. The expectation of potential violators of the appearance of emotions of anger, indignation, disgust, contempt and corresponding tendencies to act on the part of other people can convince them not to commit violations, and thus motivate to adhere to social desirable behaviour. REFERENCES Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R. (2013). Behavioral economics and the retirement savings crisis. Science, 339(6124), 11521153. doi: 10.1126/science.1231320 (in English) Bgazhnokov, B. (2009). Antropologiya morali. Nalchik: Izdatelskiy otdel KBIGI. (in Russian) Darwin, C. (1872). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. 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Бгажноков. – Нальчик : Издательский отдел КБИГИ, 2009. – 128 с. Darwin, Ch. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals / Ch. Darwin. – London : John Murray, 1872. – 374 p. doi: 10.1037/10001-000 Frijda, N. H. The Emotions / N. H. Frijda. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2001. – 544 p. Gintis, H. The Bounds of Reason. Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences / H. Gintis. – Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2014. – 265 p. doi: 10.1515/9781400851348 Gjerstad, S. Rethinking Housing Bubbles. The Role of Household and Bank Balance Sheets in Modeling Economic Cycles / S. Gjerstad, V. Smith. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2014. – 296 p. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511979194 Haidt, J. The Moral Emotions / J. Haidt // Handbook of Affective Sciences / Eds. by R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, H. H. Goldsmith. – New York : Oxford University Press, 2003. – P. 852–870. Khmarskyi, V. Relation Between Marketing Expenses and Bank's Financial Position: Ukrainian Reality / V. Khmarskyi, R. Pavlov // Benchmarking: An International Journal. – 2017. – Vol. 24, Iss. 4. – Р. 903–933. doi: 10.1108/BIJ-02-2016-0026 Хміль, В. В. Антропологічна компонента природи держави / В. В. Хміль, Т. В. Хміль // Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень. – 2015. – Вип. 7. – C. 7–15. doi: 10.15802/ampr2015/43374 Levy, R. Emotion, Knowing, and Culture / R. Levy // Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion / Eds. by R. Shweder, R. LeVine. – Cambridgeb : Cambridge University Press, 1984. – P. 214–237. Miller, R. On the Nature of Embarrassabllity: Shyness, Social Evaluation, and Social Skill / R. Miller // Journal of Personality. – 1995. – No 63, Iss. 2. – Р. 315–339. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1995.tb00812.x Niedenthal, P. Psychology of Emotion: Interpersonal, Experiential, and Cognitive Approaches / P. Niedenthal, S. Krauth-Gruber, F. Ric. – New York : Psychology Press, 2006. – 417 p. Ortony, A. The Cognitive Structure of Emotions / A. Ortony, G. Clore, A. Collins. – Cambridge : Cambridge University Princeton Press, 1988. – 207 p. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511571299 Павлова, Т. С. Етична емоція як основа права і моралі: соціально-філософський аспект / Т. С. Павлова // Культура народів Причорномор'я. – 2013. – No 245. – С. 179–181. Петражицкий, Л. И. Теория права и государства в связи с теорией нравственности / Л. И. Петражицкий. – Санкт-Петербург : Слово, 1907. – Т. 1. – 312 с. Rozin, P. Disgust / P. Rozin, J. Haidt, C. McCauley // Handbook of Emotions / Eds. by M. Lewis, J. HavilandJones, L. Barrett. – 3 Edit. – New York : Guilford Press, 2008. – P. 757–776. Smith, A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments / A. Smith ; Ed. by K. Haakonssen. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. – 411 p. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511800153 Relation of Shame and Guilt to Constructive Versus Destructive Responses to Anger Across the Lifespan / J. Tangney, P. Wagner, D. Hill-Barlow, [ and other] // Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. – 1996. – Vol. 70, Iss. 4. – Р. 797–809. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.4.797 91 ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online) Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2018, Вип. 14 Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2018, NO 14 СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ АСПЕКТ ЛЮДСЬКОГО БУТТЯ doi: 10.15802/ampr.v0i14.115314 © T. S. Pavlova, V. V. Bobyl, 2018 Tangney, J. Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior / J. Tangney, J. Stuewig, D. Mashek // Annual Review of Psychology. – 2007. – Vol. 58. – Р. 345–372. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145 Vélez García, A. From Morality to Moral Emotions / A. Vélez García, F. Ostrosky-Solís // International Journal of Psychology. – 2006. – Vol. 41, Iss. 5. – Р. 348–354. doi: 10.1080/00207590500345898 Watts, D. Influentials, Networks, and Public Opinion Formation / D. Watts, P. Dodds // Journal of Consumer Research. – 2007. – Vol. 34, Iss. 4. – Р. 441–458. doi: 10.1086/518527 Т. С. ПАВЛОВА1*, В. В. БОБИЛЬ2* 1*Дніпровський національний університет імені Олеся Гончара (Дніпро, Україна), ел. пошта [email protected], ORCID 0000-0001-7178-3573 2*Дніпропетровський національний університет залізничного транспорту імені академіка В. Лазаряна (Дніпро, Україна), ел. пошта [email protected], ORCID 0000-0002-7306-3905 ФЕНОМЕН ЕМОЦІЙ НЕГАТИВНОЇ СПРЯМОВАНОСТІ В СОЦІАЛЬНОМУ БУТТІ ЛЮДИНИ Мета. Дослідження спрямоване на визначення впливу негативних етичних емоцій на соціальне життя й діяльність особистості, що передбачає розв'язання певних задач: а) з'ясувати підходи до типологізації етичних емоцій, б) виділити окремі негативні етичні емоції і визначити їх здатність впливати на людську поведінку. Теоретичний базис. Теоретико-методологічною базою дослідження є визнання вагомого впливу етичних емоцій негативної направленості на діяльність людини в суспільстві. У зв'язку з цим пропонується їх розглянути як складний мультидисциплінарний феномен, що зумовлений як соціальними, так і особистісними факторами виникнення і має певну специфіку об'єктивації. Наукова новизна. Авторами було визначено, що, окрім деструктивного впливу на людину етичних емоцій негативного характеру, вони можуть також і конструктивно впливати на її поведінку; пов'язане це перш за все з тим, що людина не бажає переживати ці емоції і тому намагається уникнути ситуацій, які їх викликають. Висновки. Етичні емоції провини, збентеження, гніву, відрази, презирства можуть впливати через когнітивний аспект емоційного процесу на процес прийняття рішень людьми, коли вони прогнозують ситуації, в яких ризикують відчути такі емоції. Так, емоція провини створює конструктивну установку, що спрямована на виправлення невідповідної суспільним нормам поведінки людини. Емоція збентеження мотивує людину поводитися більш доброзичливо в суспільстві з метою інтеграції в нього і схвалення з його боку, таким чином заохочуючи її дотримуватися соціальних і моральних угод і норм. Емоція гніву мотивує людину до дії з усунення несправедливості, при чому не тільки щодо неї самої, а й по відношенню до інших. Відкидаючи тих людей, що визивають моральну і соціальну відразу, суспільство створює систему покарань і заохочень, що діють як сильний стримуючий фактор для належної в соціально-культурному відношенні поведінки. Емоція презирства виконує функцію попередження покарання по відношенню до індивіда, що зневажається. Ключові слова: феномен; людина; емоція; почуття; антропологія; мораль; поведінка Т. С. ПАВЛОВА1*, В. В. БОБЫЛЬ2* 1*Днепровский национальный университет имени Олеся Гончара (Днипро, Украина), эл. почта [email protected], ORCID 0000-0001-7178-3573 2*Днепропетровский национальный университет железнодорожного транспорта имени академика В. Лазаряна (Днипро, Украина), эл. почта [email protected], ORCID 0000-0002-7306-3905 ФЕНОМЕН ЭМОЦИЙ НЕГАТИВНОЙ НАПРАВЛЕННОСТИ В СОЦИАЛЬНОМ БЫТИИ ЧЕЛОВЕКА Цель. Исследование направлено на определение влияния негативных этических эмоций на социальную жизнь и деятельность личности, что предусматривает решение определенных задач: а) выяснить подходы к типологизации этических эмоций, б) выделить отдельные негативные этические эмоции и определить их способность влиять на человеческое поведение. Теоретический базис. Теоретико-методологической базой 92 ISSN 2227-7242 (Print), ISSN 2304-9685 (Online) Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень, 2018, Вип. 14 Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research, 2018, NO 14 СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ АСПЕКТ ЛЮДСЬКОГО БУТТЯ doi: 10.15802/ampr.v0i14.115314 © T. S. Pavlova, V. V. Bobyl, 2018 исследования является признание весомого влияния этических эмоций негативной направленности на деятельность человека в обществе. В связи с этим предлагается их рассмотреть как сложный мультидисциплинарный феномен, который обусловлен как социальными, так и личностными факторами возникновения и имеет определенную специфику объективации. Научная новизна. Авторами было установлено, что, кроме деструктивного воздействия на человека этических эмоций негативного характера, они могут также и конструктивно влиять на его поведение; а связано это прежде всего с тем, что человек не желает переживать эти эмоции и поэтому старается избегать ситуаций, которые их вызывают. Выводы. Этические эмоции вины, смущения, гнева, отвращения, презрения могут влиять через когнитивный аспект эмоционального процесса на процесс принятия решений людьми, когда они прогнозируют ситуации, в которых рискуют испытать такие эмоции. Так, эмоция вины создает конструктивную установку, которая направлена на исправление несоответствующего общественным нормам поведения человека. Эмоция смущения мотивирует человека вести себя более дружелюбно в обществе с целью интеграции в него и одобрения с его стороны, таким образом, поощряя его придерживаться социальных и моральных соглашений и норм. Эмоция гнева мотивирует человека к действию по устранению несправедливости, причем не только в отношении его самого, но и по отношению к другим. Отвергая тех людей, которые вызывают моральное и социальное отвращение, общество создает систему наказаний и поощрений, действующих как сильный сдерживающий фактор для надлежащего в социальнокультурном отношении поведения. Эмоция презрения выполняет функцию предупреждения наказания по отношению к индивиду, которого презирают. Ключевые слова: феномен; человек; эмоция; чувства; антропология; мораль; поведение Received: 03.05.2018 Accepted: 22.11.2018

FACULDADE DE SÃO BENTO PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO STRICTO SENSU EM FILOSOFIA MESTRADO ACADÊMICO VICENTE DO PRADO TOLEZANO FIO CONDUTOR DE ARISTÓTELES NA TÁBUA DAS CATEGORIAS SÃO PAULO 2013 FACULDADE DE SÃO BENTO PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO STRICTO SENSU EM FILOSOFIA MESTRADO ACADÊMICO VICENTE DO PRADO TOLEZANO FIO CONDUTOR DE ARISTÓTELES NA TÁBUA DAS CATEGORIAS Dissertação de Mestrado Acadêmico apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação Stricto Sensu em Filosofia da Faculdade de São Bento do Mosteiro de São Bento de São Paulo, como requisito parcial para a obtenção do título de Mestre em Filosofia. Área de Concentração: Lógica e Filosofia da Ciência Orientador: Prof. Dr. Djalma Medeiros SÃO PAULO 2013 3 Tolezano, Vicente do Prado. Fio condutor de Aristóteles na tábua das categorias / Vicente do Prado Tolezano. – 2013. n. 117: il. Dissertação (Mestrado Acadêmico em Filosofia) – Faculdade de São Bento, 2013. Área de concentração: Lógica e Filosofia da Ciência Orientador: Dr. Djalma Medeiros 1. Aristóteles 2. Doutrina das Categorias 3. Fio Condutor 4. Trendelenburg 5. Brentano 6. Reale I. Faculdade de São Bento II. Filosofia III. Mestre. 4 VICENTE DO PRADO TOLEZANO FIO CONDUTOR DE ARISTÓTELES NA TÁBUA DAS CATEGORIAS Dissertação de Mestrado Acadêmico apresentada ao Programa de Mestrado em Filosofia, Área de Concentração em Filosofia da Ciência, da Faculdade de São Bento, sob orientação do Prof. Dr. Djalma Medeiros. Dissertação aprovada em __ / __ / ____. BANCA EXAMINADORA _____________________________ Prof. Dr. Djalma Medeiros – Faculdade de São Bento _____________________________ Prof. Dr. Edelcio Gonçalves de Souza – Faculdade de São Bento _____________________________ Prof. Dr. João Carlos Nogueira – Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Campinas 5 Dedico este trabalho à minha mãe, Márcia Rezende do Prado Tolezano. Além do inesgotável amor materno, ela houve de proficientemente assumir todas as funções paternas ante a perda, por força criminosa, de meu pai, Salvador Tolezano, na minha tenra infância. Perante todas as várias e agigantadas injustiças sofridas por nós, minha mãe jamais se apequenou e manteve sempre o meu desenvolvimento pleno como prioridade absoluta, fosse qual fosse o custo de labor ou energias demandadas. Parabéns a ela por absolutamente tudo é o mínimo a registrar aqui e sempre. 6 AGRADECIMENTOS À FACULDADE DE SÃO BENTO, é fato inconteste que não apenas este mestrando, mas também as sociedades paulistana e brasileira, devemos agradecimentos pela manutenção de um vivaz oásis de erudição. Evidentemente, os agradecimentos à instituição tanto se devem quanto, mais ainda, se confundem com os devidos às pessoas que a vivificam, quais sejam, professores e colaboradores diversos. A muitíssima maior parte dos nobres relacionamentos de que gozei com o corpo desta Casa se deu com pessoas probas, orientadas ao fomento da formação reta, que é aquela lastreada na persecução humilde e objetiva da verdade e na valorização da plenitude da deliberação humana, sensos coincidentes com as mais elevadas virtudes cristãs e beneditinas. Os anos aqui passados, dedicados a este Programa de Mestrado e a outros cursos, proveram-me expressivos incrementos intelectual e cultural cujas irradiações de efeitos concretos serão longevas, senão para a vida toda. Até pelos riscos de lapso em não menção de alguém, não é o caso de listar exaustivamente o valoroso rol das pessoas com quem me relacionei, mas não é possível não registrar um destaque diferenciado de agradecimentos ao Prof. Dr. EDELCIO GONÇALVES DE SOUZA, pessoa elegantíssima, professor com "P" maiúsculo, amigo servil e humilde do educando no melhor sentido dos termos, o qual é digno de toda minha simpatia, respeito e confiança. Outro merecedor de agradecimentos diferenciados é o Prof. Ms. EDUARDO CONSALVO. Há 5 anos, quando cheguei à Faculdade de São Bento, inicialmente para estudar Lógica, deixei-lhe claro na entrevista vestibular que eu não aceitava ingressar num curso com viés forte em Filosofia, pois meu foco estava nas "coisas úteis". Esta dissertação é a prova cabal de que fui demovido, por ele, dos meus preconceitos destrutivos. Quem tem potência intelectual e a atualiza em atos concretos dirigidos à elevação do nível de consciência das pessoas merece o nobre predicado de "Educador", coisa tristemente escassa. Agradeço também à queridíssima amiga CARLA CAFFARENA, que gentilmente me ajudou na confecção do texto com as transliterações do idioma grego e, muito mais, pelo irrestrito apoio de cunho humano e de motivação que dela recebi em momentos difíceis passados na reta final da consecução deste projeto, momentos daqueles em que o juízo da separação entre o bem o 7 mal não é trivial e em que, pois, "as vontades ficam turvas" e precisamos que alguém nos fale através da difícil arte da escuta atenta e empática. O agradecimento derradeiro cabe ao Prof. Dr. DJALMA MEDEIROS, não porque último seja, de forma alguma, na escala de merecimento o reverso é o caso - , mas única e tão somente porque assim são os ditames protocolares relacionados aos orientadores. Valiosíssima, em destaque, sua ajuda, entre incontáveis outras, à minha bem sucedida eleição dos pontos de afinidade intelectual no vasto espectro filosófico, restando eu agraciado com a magnífica excursão no aristotelismo. As generosa proficuidade e a prazerosíssima fruição dos nossos anos de densa convivência, recheados de aulas, seminários, reuniões, discussões, trabalhos, muitas conversas, etc ... serão bastante e carinhosamente lembradas. 8 Oxalá venha o dia em que não existam eruditos, ditos professores de filosofia, que se valham da evocação de medo em seu mister, ainda que sob mera figura de linguagem, até porque senão a genuína prática filosófica continuará a ser ofuscada com coisa muito pior que a futilidade, que é a perversão pura. Lamentavelmente, nosso meio acadêmico ainda é tolerante com esse tipo de coisa, pois, em tantos particulares, não exige a si um estatuto mais elevado que o de um clube de amigos. Afinal, há como haver uma única razão legítima à educação filosófica genuína que não prover a elevação da consciência individual e/ou para suprimir do homem os medos todos e quaisquer ?Medo é anti-filosofia e a filosofia genuína é anti-medo, ainda que se trate de filosofia de viés acadêmico". Vicente do Prado Tolezano Ora, a santificação do trabalho ordinário constitui como que o fundamento da verdadeira espiritualidade para aqueles que, como nós, estão decididos a viver na intimidade de Deus, imersos nas realidades temporais. São José Maria Escrivá 9 RESUMO A presente dissertação trata da Doutrina das Categorias de Aristóteles, mais especificamente sobre a controvérsia acerca de se o Filósofo teria ou não se valido de algum fio condutor para a dedução da diversidade das Categorias, problemática que foi expressamente levantada por Kant quando este, ao apresentar seu modelo de dedução transcendental das Categorias na Crítica da razão pura (1781), asseverou expressamente que o pensador de Estagira não tinha nenhum fio condutor. Em resposta à crítica, adveio a tese de Trendelenburg publicada em Das categorias (Berlim, 1833), a qual advoga que Aristóteles teria um fio condutor na dedução da diversidade das Categorias – as considerações das figuras gramaticais. Essa tese recebeu grande aceitação contemporaneamente a sua divulgação e foi ulteriormente rejeitada, em aspectos, extensões e por motivações diferentes pelos doutrinadores que lhe seguiram, em especial Brentano, Zeller, Bonitz e Reale. Este último, a propósito, publicou o artigo Fio condutor gramatical e fio condutor ontológico na dedução das categorias aristotélicas (1957), que se tornaria um clássico do tema e pelo qual refuta a tese de Trendelenburg e propõe que Aristóteles valera-se de um fio condutor para a dedução das Categorias, mas que este não é de índole gramatical e sim ontológico, extraído a partir da Física, em particular das reflexões decorrentes do sínolo matéria e forma. Apresentaremos os termos objetivos dessa discussão precedidos de exposição acerca das linhas gerais da filosofia de Aristóteles, em particular da sua doutrina do Ser, bem como da própria crítica kantiana. Palavras-chave: Aristóteles. Doutrina das Categorias. Fio Condutor. Kant. Dedução Transcendental das Categorias. Trendelenburg. Brentano. Reale. 10 ABSTRACT This work refers to the Doctrine of Aristotle's Categories, more specifically about the controversy as to whether or not the Philosopher would have used any guiding principle for the deduction of diversity of the Categories, an issue which was expressly raised by Kant when he presented his model of transcendental deduction of the Categories in Critique of Pure Reason (1781) having expressly stated that the thinker from Stagira had no guiding principle. The thesis by Trendelenburg published in The categories (Berlin, 1833) resulted from the response to criticism, which advocates that Aristotle would have a guiding principle in the deduction of diversity of the Categories and this would be the considerations of the grammatical characters, this thesis received great acceptance contemporaneously to its disclosure and was ultimately rejected in aspects, extensions and for different reasons by scholars that followed him, specially Brentano, Zeller, Bonitz and Reale. The latter, by the way, dedicated the article Grammatical guiding principle and ontological guiding principle in the deduction of Aristotle's categories (1957) which would become a classic of the theme and whereby the thesis by Trendelenburg refutes and proposes that Aristotle used a guiding principle for the deduction of the Categories, but that this is not of grammatical nature but rather ontological, extracted from the Physics, particularly from the reflections derived from the synolon matter and form. We will present the objective terms of this discussion preceded by exposure regarding the general lines of Aristotle's philosophies, particularly his doctrine of Being, as well as Kantian critique. Key Words: Aristotle. Doctrine of the Categories. Guiding Principle. Kant. Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Trendelenburg. Brentano. Reale. 11 SUMÁRIO 1 INTRODUÇÃO ................................................................................................................... 12 2 LINEAMENTOS DA FILOSOFIA DE ARISTÓTELES ............................................... 15 2.1 DESEJO DE CONHECER, ASCENSÃO DO CONHECIMENTO, PRIMEIRAS NOÇÕES DE CAUSA, MOVIMENTO E CIÊNCIA ...................................................... 15 2.2 CLASSIFICAÇÃO DAS CIÊNCIAS E PRIMAZIA DA METAFÍSICA ................ 20 2.3 FÍSICA DE ARISTÓTELES, A DOUTRINA DAS QUATRO CAUSAS E A NOÇÃO DE SUBJACENTE ............ 24 2.4 METAFÍSICA, POLIVALÊNCIA DO SER E SUBSTÂNCIA ................................ 31 2.5 OS GRUPOS DE MODOS DO SER .......................................................................... 40 2.5.1 O MODO ACIDENTAL ..................................................................................... 41 2.5.2 O MODO DO SER POR SI ................................................................................ 42 2.5.3 O MODO DO SER VERDADEIRO ................................................................... 48 2.5.4 O MODO DO SER PELA POTÊNCIA E DO ATO .......................................... 50 2.6 TEORIA DA PREDICAÇÃO .................................................................................... 53 2.6.1 PREDICADO DEFINITÓRIO SOBRE O GÊNERO E ESPÉCIE ................ 57 2.6.2 PREDICADO DEFINITÓRIO SOBRE A DIFERENÇA ............................... 59 2.6.3 PREDICADO DEFINITÓRIO SOBRE O PRÓPRIO ..................................... 60 2.6.4 PREDICADO ACIDENTAL .............................................................................. 60 2.6.5 PREDICAÇÃO E CATEGORIAS ..................................................................... 61 3 O TRATADO DAS CATEGORIAS ................................................................................. 64 3.1 CONTEÚDO OBJETIVO DO TRATADO DAS CATEGORIAS ............................ 64 3.1.1 SOBRE A SUBSTÂNCIA .................................................................................. 66 3.1.2 SOBRE A QUANTIDADE ................................................................................. 68 3.1.3 SOBRE A RELAÇÃO ........................................................................................ 69 3.1.4 SOBRE A QUALIDADE ................................................................................... 70 3.2 SITUAÇÃO DO TRATADO DAS CATEGORIAS NO CORPUS ARISTOTELICUM E A LINHA FALSA DE INTERPRETAÇÃO DAS CATEGORIAS ................................................................................................................. 72 4 A DOUTRINA DAS CATEGORIAS ................................................................................ 82 4.1 O QUE SÃO SUAS PRINCIPAIS CONTROVÉRSIAS SEUS SIGNIFICADOS E DIVERSOS ASPECTOS .............................................................................................. 82 4.1.1 CATEGORIAS COMO QUADRO DE CLASSIFICAÇÃO ............................. 83 4.1.2 CATEGORIAS COMO CONCEITOS RELATIVOS AO JUÍZO .................... 84 4.1.3 CATEGORIAS COMO CONCEITOS REAIS .................................................. 85 4.2 ASPECTOS GERAIS SUPERPOSTOS OU CONTRASTANTES DAS CATEGORIAS ................................................................................................................. 86 4.3 A CRÍTICA DE KANT .............................................................................................. 96 4.4 A DEDUÇÃO DAS CATEGORIAS, TESE DE TRENDELENBURG PELO FIO CONDUTOR GRAMATICAL E REFUTAÇÃO DE REALE PELO FIO CONDUTOR ONTOLÓGICO ......................................................................................... 100 5 CONCLUSÃO ..................................................................................................................... 112 6 REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS .............................................................................. 115 12 1 INTRODUÇÃO A filosofia de Aristóteles apresenta a profunda marca do realismo, no sentido não só de preconizar que toda a atividade especulativa do engenho humano parte da percepção sensível dos fenômenos naturais – e que, a partir daí, perscrute, pela mediação racional, o plano metafísico e suprassensível –, mas também no sentido de esposar a crença nos fenômenos como reveladores das coisas em si e assumida, sempre, como intuição fundante de seu sistema, uma noção de estrutura orgânica da realidade. Sob essa perspectiva de organicidade, o sistema filosófico do autor compõe visões de paralelismo estrutural entre os mundos natural, lógico, da linguagem e metafísico. A ciência cujo domínio tem interseção com todas as dimensões do real e, por isso mesmo, é considerada por Aristóteles a superior de todas, é a Metafísica, chamada pelo Estagirita de Filosofia Primeira. Dentre outros objetos, ela ocupa-se do estudo do Ser enquanto Ser – área que correntemente chamamos de Ontologia – e serve de esteio imprescindível a toda e qualquer atividade inteligente, ao ponto de nem sequer ser possível haver condições de conhecimento sem a assunção do significado do Ser, ou, mais precisamente sob a perspectiva aristotélica, a assunção dos múltiplos significados que o Ser denota. A brilhante doutrina aristotélica do Ser quebrou fortemente os paradigmas das filosofias antecedentes. O autor preenche o lugar de destaque central com a Doutrina das Categorias, a qual expressa o Ser na sua acepção forte, o Ser por Si, que é justamente o núcleo que permeia com todas as demais acepções do Ser e, pois, com todas as demais dimensões da realidade e das ideias. Em caráter bem geral, a dita doutrina aponta dez categorias que inventariam, em gêneros supremos, todos os entes reais e ideais do mundo, de forma que tudo o que existe ou tudo o que é dito é necessariamente passível de subsunção a ao menos uma delas, a saber: 1) Substância; 2) Quantidade; 3) Qualidade; 4) Ação; 5) Paixão; 6) Estado; 7) Posição; 8) Lugar; 9) Tempo; 10) Relação. 13 Em função direta da subsunção de um ente ou ideia a uma dada categoria, decorre a respectiva outorga de um estatuto ontológico expressando uma determinação de gênero de significado, pois cada categoria se associa a uma distinção, no grau mais geral possível, de significado. Sobre essa Doutrina das Categorias, no particular aspecto de sua forma de dedução por Aristóteles, ocupar-nos-emos nesta dissertação. Nosso percurso terá início com a apresentação geral da filosofia aristotélica no que concerne à ascensão do conhecimento, organização das ciências e teoria das causas. Na sequência, apresentaremos a articulação multissignificativa do Ser com a exposição de todos os grupos de modo de significados do Ser – Ser Acidental, Ser por Si, Ser do Falso e Verdadeiro, Ser do Ato e Potência –, com destaque à alocação da Doutrina das Categorias no sistema. Ainda, discorreremos, em linhas gerais, sobre a Teoria da Predicação tida como pressuposto ao entendimento pleno das Categorias. Prosseguiremos com apresentação dos termos objetivos do tratado propriamente dito das Categorias e das reflexões existentes sobre o seu escorreito encaixe no Corpus Aristotelicum. Passaremos, então, à investigação da natureza íntima do que sejam as Categorias discorrendo sobre três possibilidades de interpretativas, quais sejam, das Categorias como quadro de classificação de conceitos, como quadro de conceitos relacionados ao juízo ou, ainda, como conceito simples, no sentido de mera representação na mente. Seguiremos com a apresentação da crítica expressa de Kant a Aristóteles, segundo a qual este último teria composto a tábua das categorias de forma rapsódica e sem contar com um fio condutor, indispensável para aferição da correção e completude da tábua. Ao cabo, alcançaremos nosso foco central: a apresentação das especulações havidas em resposta à crítica kantiana sobre a ausência de um fio condutor que teria guiado Aristóteles na dedução da Doutrina das Categorias. Em particular, apresentaremos a tese de Trendelenburg, que preconiza que Aristóteles teria se valido de um fio condutor de índole gramatical, e a sua refutação por Reale, levada a efeito pelo célebre artigo "Fio condutor gramatical e fio condutor ontológico na dedução das categorias aristotélicas", publicado na Revista de Filosofia NeoEscolástica em 1957, pelo qual advoga a tese de que Aristóteles dispunha, sim, de um fio condutor, mas de índole ontológica, tirado a partir da Física. 14 Após a apresentação da controvérsia e fundamentos das diversas teses, chegaremos a nossa conclusão, ressaltando nossa visão mais inclinada a que Aristóteles tenha, em efeito, seguido um fio condutor e que este tenha, ao menos de forma preponderante, arrimo ontológico, decorrente da Física – da observação da natureza, em particular da observação do encontro matéria e forma. 15 2 LINEAMENTOS DA FILOSOFIA DE ARISTÓTELES 2.1 DESEJO DE CONHECER, ASCENSÃO DO CONHECIMENTO, PRIMEIRAS NOÇÕES DE CAUSA, MOVIMENTO E CIÊNCIA Para Aristóteles, o desejo de conhecer é inato ao homem, conforme assentou expressamente no parágrafo inaugural do livro I da Metafísica, assinalando a comparação entre o saber e o prazer das sensações: Todos os homens, por natureza, tendem ao saber. Sinal disso é o amor pelas sensações. De fato, eles amam as sensações por si mesmas, independentemente da sua utilidade e amam, acima de todas, a sensação da visão. Com efeito, não só em vista da ação, mas mesmo sem ter nenhuma intenção de agir, nós preferimos o ver, em certo sentido, a todas as outras sensações. E o motivo está no fato de que a visão nos proporciona mais conhecimentos do que todas as outras sensações e nos torna manifestas numerosas diferenças entre as coisas1. O grau mais primário do conhecimento é o que nos é dado pelas sensações, as quais, de forma imediata e inclusive prazerosa, tal como o Autor aponta na transcrição acima, nos dão acesso imediato ao conhecimento do mundo, ou, de forma mais precisa, nos levam à constatação do o quê das coisas do mundo (por exemplo, o fogo queima), já evidenciando o que sem a própria constatação não seria possível: que entre as coisas do mundo há diferenças decorrentes de vários níveis de semelhança e dessemelhança. Em especial em sua obra De anima – na qual, entre outros objetos, examina os aspectos da alma humana –, mas também de forma conjugada com várias passagens ao longo de toda a sua filosofia, inclusive nas obras dedicadas à Metafísica e à Analítica,2 Aristóteles aponta os diferentes níveis ou graus de conhecimento que o homem pode alcançar, partindo daquilo que lhe é mais cognoscível – as aludidas constatações do o quê das coisas do mundo – até aquilo que lhe 1 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 980a. 2 Nome pelo qual o Filósofo chamava a ciência que hoje conhecemos por "lógica". 16 é menos cognoscível – no sentido de que demanda uso de abstração e raciocínio – e mais cognoscível por si – no sentido de que é mais necessário ser como é, ou seja, em disposição ontológica –, qual seja, o porquê das coisas que são e o modo por que elas são – por exemplo, qual a causa por conta da qual o fogo queima. Os termos causa, princípio, razão de ser, o porquê de ser, condição e fundamento, quando empregados como os que fundam e condicionam as coisas, são sinônimos. Ross bem sintetizou o caminho de gradação dos graus do conhecimento exposto pelo Autor, em especial no livro I da Metafísica; da evolução que segue desde a simples sensação fenomênica até a plena inferência causal – ocasião em que o grau de conhecimento recebe o status de científico – apontando a necessária apreensão, a se dar mediante o emprego de raciocínio abstrato indutivo, de regras práticas a princípios gerais: No grau mais baixo, manifesta-se no prazer que sentimos em utilizar os nossos sentidos. O estádio imediatamente superior em direção ao conhecimento pleno é aquele que está envolvido no uso da memória, e que nos diferencia dos animais inferiores. O estádio seguinte, apenas atingido pelo homem, constitui-se pela "experiência", por intermédio da qual, através da coalescência de várias recordações da mesma espécie de objeto – por exemplo, daquilo que curou Calias, Sócrates e outros quando estes sofriam de uma certa doença –, adquirimos, sem disso conhecermos as razões, uma regra prática. Num estádio superior surge a "arte", o conhecimento das regras práticas repousando sobre princípios gerais. Acima de todos estes situa-se a "ciência", o puro conhecimento das causas. Este estádio constitui o grau mais elevado por não estar, como a arte, sujeito a qualquer fim prático ulterior, mas antes procurar o conhecimento pelo conhecimento. É este o último e mais elevado produto da civilização 3 . Cada qual das etapas dos graus de conhecimento, é de ver, se diferencia da anterior por ascensão a um maior grau de universalidade. A sensação – e só ela – é puramente singular. A experiência, a seu turno, decorre de várias recordações da mesma espécie de coisa. A arte decorre de várias experiências de várias coisas semelhantes entre si, donde, com o emprego do raciocínio, já se inferem princípios gerais aplicáveis. A própria noção de espécie de coisa para fixar a memória, bem como, aliás, o todo da ascensão de graus de conhecimento acima apontados, se dá mediante o uso do raciocínio abstrato indutivo,4 o qual consiste em perquirir, à luz da fenomenologia, os conceitos gerais, conforme o 3 ROSS, David. Aristóteles. Lisboa: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1987. p. 161. 4 Boa definição de "indução" é dada pelo próprio autor: "Onde há um termo médio, o silogismo procede por meio do [termo] médio; onde não há, procede por indução. Num certo sentido a indução se opõe ao silogismo, pois este demonstra através do termo médio que o extremo maior se aplica ao terceiro termo, ao passo que a primeira demonstra através do terceiro termo que o extremo maior se aplica ao médio. Assim, por natureza o silogismo por 17 autor anota expressamente ao ponto que "está claro, então, que tem que ser por indução que adquirimos conhecimento das premissas primárias, porque é este também o modo no qual os conceitos gerais nos são transmitidos pela percepção sensorial"5. Em Segundos analíticos, tratado dedicado ao estudo dos lineamentos da demonstração científica, consta o asserto do autor que dita a sua noção de ciência6 como a de conhecimento das causas necessárias das coisas: "julgamos conhecer cientificamente cada coisa, de modo absoluto e não à maneira sofística, por acidente, quando julgamos conhecer a causa pela qual a coisa é, que ela é sua causa e que não pode essa coisa ser de outra maneira" 7. Em maior precisão, é de ver que também em Segundos analíticos o autor elenca o rol de todas as perguntas-problema que o conhecimento científico suporta responder, quais sejam, o quê, por quê, se é e o que é. Vale observar que tal rol de perguntas-problema, de certo modo, implica, segundo nosso pensar, os limites mesmo de cognição humana, donde se verifica que: 1) todas as perguntasproblema orbitam em torno da questão do Ser; 2) no sentido de como se respondem a todas as perguntas-problema, a própria inteligibilidade necessária pressupõe, por seu turno, a noção de causa (cujo paralelo na Analítica e apontada no trecho abaixo é o termo médio), que, por sua vez, é o núcleo dos arquétipos de todas as respostas: São quatro os tipos de questões que formulamos, correspondentes aos tipos de coisas que conhecemos. São elas: as questões do "o quê", do "porquê", do "se é" do "o que é". Quando perguntamos se isso é isto ou aquilo, introduzindo uma pluralidade de termos (por exemplo, se o sol sofre o eclipse ou não), estamos perguntando pelo o quê. Uma vez de posse da demonstração, ou seja, descoberto que ele sofre o eclipse, nossa investigação estará concluída com a questão respondida; e se soubéssemos desde o início que o sol sofre o eclipse, não perguntaríamos se o sofre ou não. É quando conhecemos o "o quê" (o fato) que perguntamos pelo "porquê" (a razão) – por exemplo, se sabemos que o sol experimenta o eclipse e que a Terra se move, indagamos pelos porquês destes fatos. É assim que formulamos tais questões. Mas há outras que assumem forma diferente; por exemplo, se um centauro ou um deus é. A questão do ser tange simples existir e não a se o sujeito é, digamos, branco ou não. Quando sabemos meio do termo médio é anterior e mais conhecido, enquanto o raciocínio indutivo nos é mais aparente." ARISTÓTELES. Segundos analíticos. Trad. Edson Bini. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP:. Editora Edipro, 2010. 68b30. 5 ARISTÓTELES. Segundos analíticos. Trad. Edson Bini. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP. Editora Edipro, 2010. 100b. 6 Sobre a diferenciação entre "arte" e "ciência", destacamos que é recorrente na obra de Aristóteles o uso da metonímia, de forma que o termo "arte", por vezes, é tratado como técnica (tékhne), bem como por "ciência produtiva", e o termo "ciência", por seu turno, por vezes, é tratado como "ciência teórica" ou mesmo por "filosofia". De qualquer forma, e essa é a diferenciação específica, o grupo de termos "arte"/"técnica"/"ciência produtiva" se diferencia do grupo de termos "ciência"/"ciência teórica" em razão não do lineamento de seus meios, mas da finalidade buscada pelo conhecimento – o primeiro grupo tem o conhecimento das causas como meio a fins práticos e o segundo grupo o tem como meio exclusivo à contemplação da verdade. 7 Ibidem, 71b9-12. 18 que o sujeito é, perguntamos o que é, por exemplo, "O que é, então, um deus?..., ou um homem?". São estes os quatro tipos de questões que fazemos e os quatro tipos de conhecinento que dispomos quando descobrimos as respostas. Quando formulamos a questão do fato ou do simples existir, estamos indagando se a coisa possui ou não um termo médio; mas quando, após termos ciência do fato ou de que o sujeito existe (em outras palavras, que o sujeito é num sentido particular ou simplesmente é), passamos, em seguida, a questionar o porquê do fato, ou o que é o sujeito, estamos indagando o que é o termo médio. Ao descrever o fato e a existência como modos particulares e simples do ser, entendo o seguinte: um exemplo de ser particular está na questão "A lua experimenta eclipse?" ou em "A lua cresce?" porque nestas questões indagamos se um atributo é predicável do sujeito; um exemplo do ser simples está na questão "A lua existe?" ou "A noite existe?". Conclui-se, portanto, que em todas essas questões estamos indagando ou "Há um termo médio?" ou "Qual é o termo médio?", porque o termo médio é a causa e isso o que estamos procurando descobrir em todos os casos. "Experimenta eclipse?" significa "Há ou não há uma causa para o eclipse?" e, então, uma vez cientes de que há uma causa, indagamos "Qual é a causa?". A causa do ser da substância – não ser isto ou aquilo, mas simplesmente existir – e a causa não do seu simples existir, mas por ser associada a algum predicado essencial ou acidental são em ambos os casos o termo médio. (...) Assim, como asseveramos, conhecer a essência de uma coisa é o mesmo que conhecer sua causa. (...) É manifesto, portanto, que em todas as nossas indagações buscamos descobrir um termo médio.8 A conclusão, pois, não apenas evidente, mas mesmo expressa no trecho acima, é que o conhecimento humano, sobre qualquer perspectiva, há de versar sobre o Ser, e, a seu turno, versar sobre o Ser é o mesmo que versar sobre a causa do Ser, pois não há Ser sem causa e toda causa também é um Ser. Aliás, de notar que a conclusão acima corrobora a tradição antecedente a Aristóteles, que vinha desde os eleatas (para muitos, os pais da ontologia), segundo os quais o Ser só vem do Ser e que do Não Ser não vem o Ser, princípio esse fundacional da ontologia. De outro viés, observa-se que a conclusão acima altera conteúdo informativo ao princípio ontológico que vinha dos eleatas ao tratar o Ser como suscetível de movimento. Isto porque, na concepção aristotélica há o vir a Ser pelo Ser, tal como o Ser é que causa o Ser ou, em outras palavras, Ser gera Ser, noção inaceitável à concepção eleata, que preconizava um mundo estático. 8 Ibidem, 89b23-90a 35. 19 É evidente que a noção de causa implica, a seu turno, a noção de que há movimento9 no mundo. Se não houvesse o movimento – e, portanto, fossem estáticas todas as coisas que percebemos –, não se haveria de investigar suas causas, pois o simples juízo de constatação do o quê exauriria todo o conhecimento possível. Doutra banda, a se assumir a hipótese do mundo estático, estar-se-ia a negar, tal como o fizeram os eleatas, o valor cognitivo dos fenômenos. A rigor, o paradoxo a que chegaram os eleatas advém, entre outros problemas, da não assunção, como ponto de partida – tal como fez Aristóteles –, das sensações sobre o mundo, para, só a partir delas ou de abstração delas10, firmar os primeiros princípios para a dedução. Ademais, ainda nesse caso puramente hipotético de mundo estático, o verbo ser seria o único verbo do mundo e possívelmente seria inclusive inútil, eis que num mundo estático nem haveria condições de linguagem11. Uma digressão importante neste ponto é notar que Aristóteles não outorga ao tempo um estatuto ontológico, ou seja, não o trata substancialmente como algo em si e o indica meramente como uma percepção de quantidade do movimento. Em outras palavras: o tempo, ao Estagirita, consiste num produto puramente ideal, tal como a aplicação de um número ao movimento, do qual o tempo depende (do movimento), apesar de com ele não se confundir. Mas nem o tempo existiria sem a mudança; pois quando o estado de nossas mentes não muda em nada, ou nós não notamos a sua mudança, não pensamos que o tempo passou, mais do que pensam, quando despertam, aqueles que são famosos por dormir entre os heróis de Sardenha; pois eles aliaram um "agora" anterior a um tardio e os tornaram um, retirando o intervalo por causa de sua deficiência em percebê-lo. Então, da mesma forma, se o "agora" fosse, não diferente, mas um só e o mesmo, não haveria o tempo, assim como quando sua diferença escapa à nossa percepção, o intervalo não parece temporal. Se, então, a não realização da existência do tempo acontecesse para nós quando não discernimos nenhuma mudança, mas a mente parece permanecer num estado indivisível, e quando notamos e discernimos, dizemos que o tempo passou, evidentemente o tempo não é independente do movimento e da mudança. Logo, é evidente que o tempo tampouco é movimento nem independente de movimento12. 9 Conforme exposto pelo Autor, "Há seis tipos daquilo que chamamos de movimento: geração, corrupção, aumento, diminuição, alteração e deslocamento". ARISTÓTELES, Categorias. Trad. Edson Bini. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP. Editora Edipro, 2010. 15a14-15. 10 Rigorosamente, nesse ponto, Aristóteles aponta tal como erro de premissa de Parmênides não ter abstraído da constatação do mundo que o Ser também se diz em acepção de movimento: "a premissa é falsa na medida em que assume que o ente se diz de modo simples, embora ele seja dito de muitas maneiras". ARISTÓTELES. Física. Trad. Lucas Angioni. 1a. Edição. Campinas, SP. Editora Unicamp, 2009. 186a26. 11 Aspecto esse de que os Eleatas, a despeito de pugnarem por um mundo estático, não se ocuparam. 12 ARISTÓTELES. Física. Trad. Lucas Angioni. 1a. Edição. Campinas, SP. Editora Unicamp, 2009. 218b21-30. 20 Doutra mão, também é evidente que não haveria qualquer condição de conhecimento se tudo o que o homem alcançasse fosse exclusivamente movimento (ou coisas móveis desprovidas de um mínimo de permanência), pois nesse caso o primeiro grau do conhecimento de constatação das coisas do mundo pelas semelhanças e dessemelhanças não seria possível. Igualmente, não haveria condições de dizibilidade do mundo pois o homem não gozaria de a que referir. As aporias acima apontadas são solucionadas por Aristóteles pela sua concepção do Ser imanente às coisas, que rompe drasticamente as concepções anteriores e cuja base se iniciou com a sua Física, tudo como será exposto adiante. 2.2 CLASSIFICAÇÃO DAS CIÊNCIAS E PRIMAZIA DA METAFÍSICA A Aristóteles, as ciências13 se classificavam em três gêneros: as teóricas, práticas e produtivas, e "o propósito imediato de cada uma delas é o de conhecer, mas os seus propósitos últimos são, respectivamente, o conhecimento, a conduta e a produção de objetos úteis ou belos"14. Castro assinala em profundidade a semântica evocada pelo autor com o termo teórico, ressaltando o senso realista do Autor: O que caracteriza as ciências teóricas é o fato de seu objeto ser externo ao homem. Ao contrário das ciências práticas e produtivas, no caso das ciências teóricas, o homem não é sua causa eficiente; a própria natureza é essa causa. E, por ser um objeto natural, ele é eterno e necessário. "Teorizar", portanto, significa observar as leis eternas da natureza e deduzir seu funcionamento.15 13 Aqui o termo "ciência" é empregado num sentido amplo, englobando "arte". 14 ROSS, David. Aristóteles. Lisboa: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1987. p. 31. 15 CASTRO, Suzana de. Três formulações do objeto da metafísica de Aristóteles. 1. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2008. p. 124. 21 Já acerca da diversidade específica das ciências teóricas, o Autor assenta expressamente que "são três os ramos da filosofia teorética: a matemática, a física e a teologia"16. À matemática cabe o estudo das entidades que, no dizer de Ross, "estão livres da mudança, mas apenas existem como aspectos possíveis de distinguir nas realidades concretas"17. Assim, tais como concebidos por Aristóteles, os objetos matemáticos, imateriais, são alcancáveis pelo pensamento por meio de um processo de abstração da realidade sensível – entes tomados num sentido ideal –, bem como, ainda, são aplicáveis como predicados de coisas imóveis e não corruptíveis. Não têm, de forma absoluta, um estatuto ontológico ou de existência própria, já que sempre seriam dependentes da materialidade das coisas a partir das quais são intuídos. Castro bem explica: Aristóteles não considera absoluta a imaterialidade de certos objetos matemáticos, pelo fato de só existirem na mente, pois eles continuam, de alguma forma, presos à matéria. Os objetos matemáticos não são imateriais, mesmo sendo originários do pensamento. A razão da materialidade dos objetos da matemática reside na necessidade de intuí-los. Aplicamos as formas geométricas e os números à realidade, num quadro-negro, na forma de uma montanha, e assim chegamos a compreendê-los.18,19 A Física, disciplina que o autor chamava de Filosofia Segunda,20 ocupa-se, a seu turno, do estudo da natureza (physis), a qual ao autor aponta como "certo princípio ou causa pela qual aquilo que primeiramente se encontra se move ou repousa em si mesmo".21 Num sentido escorreito, o estudo da Física é o estudo dos seres que se sujeitam ao movimento, seres esses todos materiais. Nessa disciplina, é importante destacar, Aristóteles não se limita a meras constatações fenomênicas descritivas das coisas sensíveis, mas ingressa em efetiva atividade especulativa acerca da própria natureza do Ser das coisas sujeitas ao movimento, de forma que a Física, tal como tratada por ele, ganhou caráter de ontologia. Assim, não é absurdo dizer que, num certo sentido, cuidava de uma Física metafísica ou de uma metafísica do sensível, perseguindo, quanto às coisas sensíveis, o que o Ser precisamente é. 16 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1025b18-19. 17 ROSS, David. Aristóteles. 1. ed. Lisboa: Publicações Dom Quixote. 1987. p. 163. 18 CASTRO, Suzana de. Três formulações do objeto da metafísica de Aristóteles. 1. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2008. p. 126. 19 Importante registrar que, nos termos da Física, "matéria" é o princípio de movimento. 20 Ou "ciência da natureza". 21 ARISTÓTELES, Física. Trad. Lucas Angioni. 1a. Edição. Campinas, SP. Editora Unicamp, 2009. 192b19. 22 As doutrinas assentadas por ele na Física, entre as quais: 1) a da multiplicidade de formas de dizer o Ser, 2) a das quatro causas do Ser e 3) a da essência sob um substrato, são doutrinas que não só se harmonizam, mas serão ulteriormente incrementadas nos trabalhos dedicados à Metafísica, o que, aliás, guarda plena coesão com o caminho de evolução do conhecimento preconizado por Aristóteles, que, como já anotado, parte do sensível ao suprassensível e/ou, paralelamente, do mais concreto ao mais universal. No particular, Berti atenta afirmando que não é exatamente verdade que a física de Aristóteles dependa de sua metafísica, como muitos acreditam, mas é verdadeiro o contrário, porque a metafísica é justamente o êxito extremo da física, e no âmbito desta última Aristóteles formula suas mais importantes doutrinas, aquelas que regem toda sua visão de realidade, antes de todas a famosa doutrina das quatro causas, segundo a qual para toda realidade natural é necessário procurar as causas formal, material, motora e final.22 A ciência teórica da "teologia" aludida acima é a que hoje chamamos usualmente por Metafísica,23 termo esse nunca utilizado por Aristóteles24 e cuja criação usualmente se atribui a Andrônico de Rodes. Um total de 14 tratados do Autor sobre essa ciência são tradicionalmente organizados, para fins de edição, num só arranjo sob o mesmo nome de Metafísica. Por vezes, a Metafísica também é chamada por sabedoria ou, ainda, por filosofia primeira. A Metafísica, em distinção da Física, ocupa-se também dos seres separados e imóveis (portanto, seres imateriais e suprassensíveis), conforme o Autor expressou no texto que abaixo transcrevemos, o qual ainda registra a anterioridade, no sentido de disposição ontológica, da Metafísica em relação à Física e às demais ciências, mesmo teóricas: Mas se existe algo eterno, imóvel e separado, é evidente que o conhecimento dele caberá a uma ciência teorética, não porém à física, porque a física se ocupa de seres em movimento, nem à matemática, mas a uma ciência anterior a uma e à outra. De fato, a física refere-se às realidades separadas mas não imóveis; algumas das ciências matemáticas referem-se a realidades imóveis, porém não separadas, mas imanentes à matéria; ao contrário a filosofia primeira refere-se às realidades separadas e imóveis.25 Cuidar dos seres separados e imóveis implica, no sistema cosmológico aristotélico, cuidar das essências (Ser separado), bem como o que há de mais universal, ou seja, aquilo que, em 22 BERTI, Enrico. As razões de Aristóteles. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola. 2002. p. 46. 23 Como "para além do físico". 24 Aristóteles referia-se também à Metafísica como "Sapiência" ou "Filosofia Primeira". 25 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1026a10-16. 23 outras palavras, outorga ao sábio26 o conhecimento de todas as coisas, não no sentido de que conheça todas as coisas individualmente, mas que conheça os primeiros princípios e causas a partir dos quais todas as coisas derivam, inclusive das causas, que, a despeito de imóveis, são moventes das coisas da natureza. Em outras palavras – aliás, nas do próprio autor –, o sábio "sabe todas as coisas particulares, enquanto estão sujeitas ao universal"27. É expressão também contida no livro inaugural da Metafísica: Ora, dado que buscamos justamente essa ciência, deveremos examinar de que causas e de que princípios é ciência a sapiência. E talvez isso se tome claro se considerarmos as concepções que temos do sábio. 1) Consideramos, em primeiro lugar, que o sábio conheça todas as coisas, enquanto isso é possível, mas não que ele tenha ciência de cada coisa individualmente considerada. 2) Ademais, reputamos sábio quem é capaz de conhecer as coisas difíceis ou não facilmente compreensíveis para o homem (de fato, o conhecimento sensível é comum a todos e, por ser fácil, não é sapiência). 3) Mais ainda, reputamos que, em cada ciência, seja mais sábio quem possui maior conhecimento das causas 4) e quem é mais capaz de ensiná-las aos outros. 5) Consideramos ainda, entre as ciências, que seja em maior grau sapiência a que é escolhida por si e unicamente em vista do saber, em contraste com a que é escolhida em vista do que dela deriva. 6) E consideramos que seja em maior grau sapiência a ciência que é hierarquicamente superior com relação à que é subordinada. De fato, o sábio não deve ser comandado mas comanda; nem deve obedecer a outros, mas a ele deve obedecer quem é menos sábio28. Reale aponta, em boa síntese, que o objeto de investigação pertencente à Metafísica "ao longo dos catorze livros, é determinado de quatro modos diferentes, quais sejam: 1) as causas dos princípios primeiros ou supremos; 2) a ciência do "Ser enquanto Ser" e seus atributos essenciais; 3) a doutrina da substância; 4) a teoria do Divino".29 Das determinações acima estampadas do objeto da Metafísica, evidencia-se que esta tem dimensões ontológicas, gnosiológicas, aitiológicas,30 usiológicas,31 e teológicas, todas jungidas sob unidade de uma ciência do universal, apta a explicar tudo (no sentido de todos os princípios e causas da razão do Ser, da realidade, de todos os seres sem distinção), de forma que o entrelaçamento das doutrinas da Metafísica para com todas as demais ciências é umbilical, mas no que concerne à plena subordinação destas em relação àquela, já que às demais ciências cabe investigar apenas zonas particulares da realidade, ou, em outras palavras, setores circunscritos do 26 "aquele que se dedica à sapiência/metafísica". 27 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola. 2005. 982a 23-25. 28 Ibidem, 982a4-19. 29 REALE, Giovanni, in Aristóteles Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. p. 37. 30 Relativas às causas. 31 Relativas à substância/"ousia". 24 Ser, sendo certo, outrossim, que não há como haver ciência em desrespeito às verdades metafísicas. Reale assenta: Portanto, a metafísica é ciência do porquê último de todas as coisas, é ciência das razões supremas da realidade, por isso é ciência incomparavelmente superior a todas as outras ciências particulares; é – Aristóteles diz inclusive – ciência divina: em primeiro lugar, porque é ciência de Deus (Deus é, de fato, o supremo dos princípios e a primeira das causas), e, em segundo lugar, porque, se por acaso alguém possui esta ciência em sua perfeição e completude, este só pode ser o próprio Deus.32 Que o estudo do Ser, no seu sentido mais amplo e universal, qual seja, o Ser enquanto Ser, é objeto da Metafísica, Aristóteles assentou de forma expressa, quando, entre várias outras vezes, a ela se referiu: Existe uma ciência que considera o ser enquanto ser e as propriedades que lhe competem enquanto tal. Ela não se identifica com nenhuma das ciências particulares: de fato, nenhuma das outras ciências considera universalmente o ser enquanto ser, mas, delimitando uma parte dele, cada uma estuda as características dessa parte. Assim o fazem, por exemplo, as matemáticas.33 2.3 FÍSICA DE ARISTÓTELES, A DOUTRINA DAS QUATRO CAUSAS E A NOÇÃO DE SUBJACENTE Antes de apresentar suas próprias teorias, Aristóteles expõe, em especial no livro I da Física, as filosofias que lhe antecederam a respeito do Ser, do movimento e da natureza em geral, chegando a expressamente examinar as especulações de Heráclito, Melisso, Parmênides, Colofão, Demócrito, Platão e Anaxágoras. Aliás, rigorosamente, boa parte do nosso conhecimento dos 32 REALE, Giovanni, in Aristóteles Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. São Paulo. Edições Loyola. 2005. p 39. 33 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1003a, 20-26. 25 filósofos precedentes a Aristóteles se deve justamente aos registros que ele fez dos mesmos em seus trabalhos. Usualmente, aliás, com exceção a poucos trabalhos, era seu estilo iniciar a exposição de qualquer assunto pela exposição dos pensamentos dos filósofos anteriores sobre o mesmo tema. Ultrapassa os limites de interesse desta dissertação a exposição detalhada das refutações que Aristóteles levou a cabo contra as concepções anteriores sobre o Ser, senão o registro de que refutou, fundamentalmente, a concepção de que o Ser fosse uma unidade absoluta ou imóvel. Aristóteles aponta que tal concepção implicava um erro de partida e a indivisibilidade do Ser, o que criava embaraços graves ao ponto de não ser possível distinguir concomitâncias e dependências entre as coisas que são e tampouco assumir a mobilidade do Ser. O Estagirita chega a registrar que tão grandes eram tais embaraços, particularmente quando envolviam afecções do Ser, que mesmo alguns precedentes foram buscar tentativas de solução puramente linguística, com a supressão do é nas proposições. Até mesmo o último dos antigos se perturbaram cuidando para que a mesma coisa não lhes tornasse ao mesmo tempo uma e muitas. Por isso, uns suprimiram o "é", como Licofrão, ao passo que outros requintaram o modo de falar: não "o homem é branco", mas "branqueou-se", nem "é caminhante", mas caminha, a fim de que não fizessem o um ser muitos, ao aplicar-lhe o "é" – como se o um e o ente se dissessem de uma só maneira34. Um dos argumentos centrais da multiplicidade de formas de dizer o Ser e o esteio para o reconhecimento do Ser concomitante, a ser ulteriormente identificado como o Ser Acidental, está assentado no livro I da Física, e aborda exemplos da multiplicidade de Ser pelos aspectos das afecções de qualidade e quantidade, que reproduzimos abaixo: Assim, se "aquilo que o ser precisamente é" não se atribuir a nada mais, senão ao ente, por que então "aquilo que o ser precisamente é" significaria ser, em preferência a não ser? Pois se "aquilo que o ser precisamente é" for também branco, e o ser para branco não for "aquilo que o ser precisamente é" (pois não seria possível atribuir-lhe o ser, pois nenhum item que não seja "aquilo que o ser precisamente é" é ser), o branco não seria ser, não como certo não ser, mas como não ser por completo. Ora, então, "aquilo que o ser precisamente é" não seria ser, pois era verdadeiro afirmar que ele é branco, mas esse último significava não ser. Por conseguinte, também o branco significa "aquilo que o ser precisamente é". Ora, mas então o ser significa mais de um.35 34 Idem, Física. Trad. Lucas Angioni. 1a. Edição. Campinas, SP. Editora Unicamp. 2009. 185b25. 35 Ibidem, 186b4. 26 Nem sequer grandeza, então poderá ter o ser, se o o ser é "aquilo que o ser precisamente é", pois o ser é distinto para cada uma das partes.36 Aristóteles, ainda, reforça a argumentação com a arguição de que "a definição do todo não se encontra na definição daquilo que está presente em seu enunciado definitório ou de que se constitui seu enunciado definitório. Por exemplo: no bípede não se encontra a definição do homem, nem no branco se encontra a definição do homem branco",37 donde resta evidente a multiplicidade do Ser. Veja-se, nesse sentido, que se Ser bípede não fosse coisa múltipla haveria de estar presente na definição de homem, que é bípede, apesar de não ter isso expresso na sua definição. Doutra banda, não é comportável incluir homem na definição de bípede, pois é homem que está contido em bípede e não o reverso. Concepção dos antigos que foi expressamente acatada por Aristóteles foi a assunção dos contrários como princípios explicativos das coisas naturais. Nesse sentido, o Autor foi expresso: É evidente, portanto, que de certo modo todos fazem contrários os princípios. Isso é razoável, pois é preciso que os princípios não provenham uns dos outros, nem de outras coisas, mas que todas as coisas provenham deles; e nos contrários primeiros se encontram esses requisitos: por serem primeiros, não provêm de outras coisas; por serem contrários, não provêm uns dos outros38. Mas é preciso observar como isso sucede também na linguagem. Ora, deve-se assumir primeiramente que entre todos os entes, não é verdade que qualquer um naturalmente pode fazer qualquer coisa ou sofrer qualquer coisa por força de outro ente qualquer, tampouco é verdade que de qualquer coisa, vem a ser qualquer coisa, a não ser que alguém as assuma como concomitantes. De fato, como o branco poderia provir de musical, a não ser que o musical fosse concomitante do não branco ou do negro? Mas é certo que o branco provém de não branco, e não de qualquer não branco, mas do negro ou dos intermediários, assim como também o musical provém do não musical, embora não de qualquer um, mas sim do amusical ou de outro intermediário entre eles, se tal existe39. Assim, se isso é verdadeiro, tudo que vem a ser provém dos contrários, bem corno tudo que se corrompe se corrompe nos contrários (e em seus intermediários). E os intermediários provêm dos contrários, por exemplo, as cores provêm do branco e do negro: de modo que tudo que vem a ser por natureza é contrário ou provém de contrários40. 36 Ibidem, 186b12. 37 Ibidem, 186b28. 38 Ibidem, 188a26. 39 Ibidem, l88a30. 40 Ibidem, 188b21. 27 É evidente, portanto, que é preciso que os princípios sejam contrários41. Tão primeiros são os contrários como princípios que Aristóteles bem mostra que a noção dos contrários é daquela que afirma as coisas idênticas e distintas, ou seja, justamente por onde o intelecto inicia toda cognição, nas discriminações por semelhanças e dessemelhanças. A distinção das coisas pelos contrários é tema de fato e de identidade e se dá num sentido de analogia, pois estruturalmente os contrários coordenam seus elementos de mesma forma, tal como uma presença ou ausência e/ou uma falta ou excesso. Mais ainda, em reforço ao aspecto de primeiros dos princípios, Aristóteles expressamente aponta que são princípios para explicar tanto as coisas sensíveis quanto as coisas da razão. Com efeito, é nessa exata medida que afirmam de modo idêntico e distinto, bem como pior ou melhor, e uns mencionam os mais cognoscíveis pela razão, como foi dito antes, outros mencionam os mais cognoscíveis pela sensação (pois o universal é cognoscível pela razão, mas o particular o é pela sensação, pois a razão é do universal e sensação do particular), por exemplo: o grande e o pequeno são mais cognoscíveis pela razão e o raro e o denso, pela sensação42. Os contrários, por si só, contudo, não se podem autoexplicar plenamente, devendo necessariamente haver algo mais, de natureza distinta deles, pois "não se saberia dizer como a densidade naturalmente faria algo da rareza ou como esta faria algo da densidade. Semelhantemente também qualquer outra contrariedade. De fato, amizade não agrega o ódio nem faz algo dele, tampouco o ódio faz algo dela"43. É de ver: não há como os contrários, em si, sofrerem diretamente os efeitos um do outro, e a grande solução lograda por Aristóteles foi a de pugnar pela existência de um terceiro item aos contrários (que, por si, são dois), pela noção ou ideia de um substrato, tal como a de servir como receptáculo ou subjacente sobre o qual os contrários atuam, o que o autor denominava hypokéimenon. Evidentemente, o subjacente não pode ter a mesma natureza dos contrários, pois, se assim fosse, não se haveria de alçar os contrários ao status de princípios primeiros e seria aí o subjacente um princípio dos princípios, e não, tal como Aristóteles o assentou, um terceiro princípio fundante, cumulativo. O autor, sobre a imprescindibilidade do subjacente quanto ao Ser, é expresso: 41 Ibidem, 189a9. 42 Ibidem, 189a2. 43 Ibidem, 189a23. 28 De fato, sempre há algo que subjaz, de que provém aquilo que surge, tal como os animais e plantas provêm da semente. As coisas que vêm a ser sem mais vêm a ser umas por refiguração, como a estátua; outras por adição, como as que crescem; outras, por subtração, como o Hermes provém da pedra; outras por composição, como uma casa; outras, por alteração, como as que se pervertem pela matéria. É manifesto que todas as coisas que vêm a ser dessa maneira provêm de algo subjacente. Por conseguinte, pelo que foi dito, é evidente que tudo que vem a ser, sem exceção, é sempre composto, e que há, de um lado, algo que surge e, de outro, algo que que vem a ser isso, de dois modos: o subjacente ou o oposto44. É pela exímia constatação do Ser composto com um subjacente que se superam os problemas ontológicos anteriores e que se logra a correta apreensão do sentido de que do não Ser o Ser não pode vir a Ser. Aristóteles também partilha do dito princípio, mas num sentido de afirmar que é correto que do não Ser não vem o Ser sem mais, tal como que do nada absoluto não se chega a qualquer Ser. Contudo, há um sentido em que do não Ser se vem ao Ser, que é o sentido do Ser por concomitância, tal como se exemplifica: o homem só pode vir a ser branco a partir do não branco, ou seja, mantêm-se o subjacente homem e altera-se-lhe a forma, pela privação do preto e recepção do branco. Dessa forma, a noção de subjacente assenta a concepção de imanência do Ser, de forma que o Ser está nas coisas que são, e não é o caso que as coisas que são o são porque participam das formas do Ser, ponto justamente em que Aristóteles difere de Platão. Prenuncia-se aí, já na Física, a doutrina da Substância, expressão mais elaborada do subjacente, ao passo de o Autor já asseverar no livro 2, referindo-se às coisas da natureza, que "todas essas coisas são substância, pois são um subjacente, e a natureza sempre reside num subjacente"45. A conclusão de que a natureza reside num subjacente conduz à investigação aprofundada do que este seja. Dessa investigação, Aristóteles chegará à doutrina das quatro causas do Ser, uma de suas principais teorias e que será também reforçada na Filosofia Primeira. Aristóteles faz observar que o subjacente, num primeiro sentido e tal como, também num primeiro sentido, a própria natureza, condiz com a noção de matéria (hylé),46 assumida como a mescla dos elementos mais irredutíveis (fogo, terra, água e ar). Diferentes matérias decorreriam de diferentes composições dos elementos. 44 Ibidem, 190b3. 45 Ibidem, 192b33. 46 "Hylé" designa, em grego, as florestas de onde era retirado o material próprio para a construção de embarcações; portanto, o material apropriado para receber determinada forma ou feição" (in FARIA, Maria do Carmo Bitencourt de. Aristóteles, a plenitude como horizonte do ser. 2a Edição. São Paulo. Editora Moderna, 2006. fls. 41). 29 Como as coisas da natureza têm movimento e são materiais (e por isso, inclusive, sensíveis), Aristóteles concluiu que a matéria, em si, é o princípio de movimento, ao ponto que fora dela não há movimento. O movimento contido na matéria pura e simplesmente, contudo, é caótico, desarrumado; tudo a se ver que a matéria, em si, é indeterminada, avessa, pois, à compreensão pura pelo intelecto. É uma das propriedades da alma humana o reconhecimento de formas, a intelecção propriamente dita, tal como a reprodução da estrutura do Ser do mundo na mente. A expressão linguística da forma se denomina definição. A determinação da matéria, ou seja, a atribuição de essência, a identificação do Ser, se dá pela forma (eidós). É por meio da forma que há condição de inteligibilidade do Ser. A matéria, conquanto por si não identifique o Ser, é apta à recepção da forma e assim ser determinada. Para a zona da realidade dos seres naturais, a forma está recepcionada pela matéria (cuja junção se denomina sínolo) e não há Ser material sem forma, tal que num sentido também a forma é natureza. A matéria ora tem posse, ora tem privação de certas formas. Por exemplo, uma pedra ora é identificada puramente pela essência pedra; noutra, por estátua; noutra, por paralelepípedo, tudo alinhado aos primeiros princípios da subjacência e dos opostos. Dessa forma, resta evidente que a forma é atualização das potências da matéria. É evidente, outrossim, que qualquer coisa é Ser num sentido mais forte enquanto atualidade que enquanto potência, donde resulta a proeminência ontológica da forma em relação à matéria, o que, aliás, guarda plena harmonia com a Filosofia Primeira e o sistema cosmológico do autor, que reconhecem um Ser imaterial dotado de forma pura – Deus – como Ser ordenante de toda a realidade. Não há interrupção na geração e movimento do mundo; ou seja, as sucessivas alterações de posse e privação de formas. Num sentido, já exposto, o Ser vem do Ser, o Ser move o Ser. Tal como os intermediários na noção dos contrários, um Ser tal passa a um Ser outro Ser por conta de ainda outro Ser. Isso é muito evidente na geração dos seres vivos. É um sentido de motor (kínoun) ou de eficiência. O movimento das coisas da natureza visa a própria natureza. Ou seja, há um fim (télos) na natureza e tudo o que é o é com vistas a alguma coisa. Isso tudo conduz a que não só, como já visto, não há Ser sem causa, como a causa não pode ser única. Os aspectos acima, de matéria, forma, motor e fim são todos tratados como 30 causas concorrentes ou "partes indissociáveis" do Ser, tendo ganhado o nome de causas material, formal, motora (ou eficiente) e final. Aristóteles sumariza-as em trecho conciso da Física: Assim, de um modo, denomina-se causa o item imanente de que algo provém, por exemplo, o bronze da estátua e a prata da taça, bem como os gêneros dessas coisas; de outro modo, denomina-se causa a forma e o modelo, isso é a definição do aquilo que o ser é e seus gêneros (por exemplo, da oitava, o dois para um, e, em geral, a relação numérica) bem como as partes contidas na definição. Além disso, denomina-se causa aquilo de onde provém o começo primeiro da mudança e do repouso, por exemplo, é causa aquele que deliberou, assim como o pai é causa da criança, e, em geral, o produtor é causa do produzido e aquilo que efetua a mudança é causa daquilo que muda. Além disso, denomina-se causa como um fim, ou seja, aquilo em vista de que, por exemplo, do caminhar, a saúde; De fato, por que caminha? Dizemos a fim de que tenha saúde e, assim dizendo, julgamos ter dado a causa. Também denomina-se causa tudo que – uma outra coisa tendo iniciado o movimento – vem a ser intermediário para o fim, por exemplo, da saúde o emagrecimento, a purgação, as drogas ou os instrumentos; todos esses itens são em vista do fim, mas diferem entre si porque uns são operações, outros são instrumentos47. As espécies de causas – de que acima tratamos – não se confundem com os modos de causas, sobre as quais Aristóteles também discorreu na Física, apontando-as como anteriores, posteriores, simultâneas, pelo acaso, espontâneas, por necessidade e pela maioria das vezes. Aos interesses desta dissertação, cumpre e é suficiente discorrer sobre o acaso, que se relaciona com o Ser por concomitância. Aristóteles anota quanto a ele: Pois bem: quando tais coisas vêm a ser por concomitância, dizemos que elas são por acaso (pois, assim como certa coisa é algo ou em si mesma ou por concomitância, também cabe que algo seja causa do mesmo modo; por exemplo, de uma casa, o construtor é a causa em si mesmo, mas o branco ou o musical são causas por concomitância; assim, está já determinado aquilo que é causa em si mesmo, mas é indeterminável aquilo que é causa por concomitância, pois ilimitadas coisas podem ser atribuídas como concomitantes a algo). Assim, como foi dito, quando isso sucede entre as coisas que vêm a ser em vista de algo, denomina-se então "pelo espontâneo" e por "por acaso"48,49 Assim, necessariamente não se podem determinar as causas das quais poderia provir aquilo que se dá por acaso. Por isso, reputa-se que o acaso pertence ao indeterminável e não é transparente ao homem, e de certo modo, pode-se plausivelmente reputar que nada vem a ser por acaso. Tudo isso se diz de modo acertado, razoavelmente. Pois, de certo modo, é possível vir a ser por acaso, pois vem a ser por concomitância, e o acaso é causa 47 Ibidem, 194b23. 48 Em precisão, existe distinção entre "acaso" e "espontâneo" e os trechos transcritos, embora usem o termo "acaso", se referem a "espontâneo". Todo acaso é espontâneo e o inverso não é verdadeiro. Aos fins desta dissertação, o rigor na precisão da distinção não é relevante. Apenas em caráter en passant, "por acaso" se liga ao domínio de escolhas e "por espontaneidade" se liga a domínios em que o elemento escolha ou pensamento não está presente. O "espontâneo" guarda semelhança com o "em vão". 49 ARISTÓTELES, Física. Trad. Lucas Angioni. 1a. Edição. Campinas, SP. Editora Unicamp, 2009. 196b22. 31 enquanto concomitante; no entanto, sem mais, o acaso não é causa de nada. Por exemplo: da casa, é o construtor que é causa, mas por concomitância é o flautista, e, do recobrar o dinheiro ao vir à praça, quando se vem não em vista disso, são ilimitadas as causas por concomitância, pois pode-se vir à praça querendo ver alguém, ou para acusar e defender-se no tribunal, ou a fim de assistir a um espetáculo50. É correto dizer que o acaso é algo que foge à razão, pois a razão se aplica às coisas que são sempre ou às que são no mais das vezes, mas o acaso está no domínio das coisas que vêm a ser à parte delas. Por conseguinte, visto serem indetermináveis as coisas que são causas desse tipo, também o acaso é indeterminável51. Do trecho acima, bem se vê a distinção, que se revelará fundamental na filosofia aristotélica da divisão do ser em si e do Ser concomitância, a qual orientará todo o sistema cosmológico-metafísico do Estagirita, fundado na ideia da substância e sua articulação com todos os seres, que dela dependem, eis que concomitantes. 2.4 METAFÍSICA, POLIVALÊNCIA DO SER E SUBSTÂNCIA A doutrina do Ser lançada por Aristóteles, cujos alicerces já estavam lançados na Física, também tratada em vários dos livros da Metafísica, rompe de forma drástica com as concepções anteriores dos filósofos eleatas, dos sofistas e mesmo dos platônicos, as quais propugnavam concepções do Ser em sentido: 1) de absolutamente idêntico, unívoco e imóvel, tal como o Ser é e o não Ser não é (Ser dos eleatas); ou, 2) sob concepção relativista absoluta tal como o Ser e o não Ser tanto são quanto não são (Ser dos sofistas); ou, ainda, 3) da perspectiva transcendental tal como que o que é só o é por participação nas formas do Ser, em si transcendentes ao Ser concreto (teoria das formas de Platão). Aristóteles inova ao tratar o Ser sob uma concepção estrutural e orgânica e como um termo equívoco – no sentido de polívoco – ao qual atribui quatro grupos de grandes sentidos 50 Ibidem, 197a8. 51 Ibidem, 197a18. 32 diferentes, quais sejam: 1) o Ser por acidente; 2) o Ser por si; 3) o Ser como verdadeiro e falso; 4) o Ser como ato e potência. Essa concepção da multiplicidade de sentidos do Ser foi exposta pelo Autor em várias passagens da Metafísica (os livros cinco,52 sexto,53 sétimo,54 nono,55,56 e décimo quarto57) e também, aliás, já na Física. Pela maior clareza de redação, em nosso sentir em comparação com as demais, transcrevemos a passagem nuclear quanto à multiplicidade de sentidos do Ser contida no livro cinco da Metafísica: (1) Em sentido acidental dizemos por exemplo: (a) que "o justo é músico" ou (b) que "o homem é músico" ou (c) que "o músico é homem", do mesmo modo como dizemos que "o músico constrói uma casa", porque pode ocorrer que o "músico" seja "construtor", ou que o "construtor" seja "músico". De fato, "isto é aquilo" significa que isto é acidente daquilo. Isso vale também para os exemplos acima, citados: quando dizemos "o homem é músico" ou "o músico é homem", "o branco é músico" ou "o músico é branco", o fazemos porque, no último caso, os dois atributos são acidentes da mesma coisa, enquanto no primeiro caso o atributo é acidente do que verdadeiramente existe. E diz-se "o músico é homem" porque "músico" é acidente de homem; do mesmo modo diz-se também "o não branco é", porque é aquilo de que ele é acidente. Portanto, as coisas que são ditas em sentido acidental, o são: (a) ou por serem dois atributos pertencentes a uma mesma coisa que é, (b) ou por se tratar de um atributo que pertence à coisa que é, (c) ou, ainda, porque se predica o que propriamente é daquilo que é seu acidente. 52 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1017a7 a 1017b10. 53 O ser, entendido em geral, tem múltiplos significados: (1) um destes dissemos anteriormente é o ser acidental; (2) outro é o ser como verdadeiro e o não-ser como falso; (3) ademais, existem as figuras das categorias (por exemplo a essência, a qualidade, a quantidade, o onde, o quando e todas as outras); e, ainda, além destes, (4) existe o ser como potência e ato (in ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1026a, 33b2). 54 O ser tem muitos significados, como estabelecemos anteriormente, no livro dedicado aos diversos significados dos termos De fato, o ser significa, de um lado, essência e algo determinado, de outro, qualidade ou quantidade e cada uma das outras categorias. (in ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1028a). 55 Tratamos do ser que é primeiro e ao qual se referem todas as outras categorias do ser; ou seja, a substância Em relação com a substância são chamados ser também a quantidade, a qualidade e as outras categorias; todas elas, com efeito, devem ter uma relação com a substância, como dissemos nos raciocínios precedentes E dado que o ser é entendido no significado de essência, ou de qualidade, ou de quantidade e, noutro sentido, o ser é entendido segundo a potência e o ato e segundo a atividade, também devemos tratar da potência e do ato (in ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola. 2005. 1045b, 27-35). 56 O ser e o não-ser se dizem, num sentido, segundo as figuras das categorias, noutro sentido, segundo a potência e o ato dessas categorias ou segundo seus contrários, e, noutro sentido ainda segundo o verdadeiro e o falso. (in ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1051a, 34). 57 Na verdade existem mui tos tipos de não-ser: (a) em primeiro lugar, existem tantos significados de não-ser quantas são as categorias; (b) ademais, existe o não-ser no significada de falso e (c) existe o não-ser no significado de potência. (in ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1089a, 26-28). 33 (2) Ser por si são ditas todas as acepções do ser segundo as figuras das categorias: tantas são as figuras das categorias quantos são os significados do ser. Porque algumas das categorias significam a essência, outras a qualidade, outras a quantidade, outras a relação, outras o agir ou o padecer, outras o onde e outras o quando. Segue-se que o ser tem significados correspondentes a cada uma destas. De fato, não existe diferença entre as proposições "o homem é vivente" e "o homem vive", e entre "o homem é caminhante ou cortante" e "o homem caminha ou corta"; e o mesmo vale para os outros casos. (3) Ademais, o ser e o é significam, ainda, que uma coisa é verdadeira, enquanto o não ser e o não é significam que não é verdadeira, mas falsa; e isso vale tanto para a afirmação como para a negação. Por exemplo, dizemos "Sócrates é músico" enquanto isto é verdadeiro, ou "Sócrates é não branco", na medida em que isso é verdadeiro; e dizemos que "a diagonal não é comensurável", na medida em que isso não é verdadeiro, mas falso. (4) Além disso, o ser ou o ente significa, por um lado, o ser em potência e, por outro, o ser em ato, e isso no âmbito de cada um dos significados acima mencionados. De fato, dizemos que vê tanto quem pode ver como quem vê em ato; e de maneira semelhante dizemos que sabe tanto quem pode fazer uso do saber como quem faz uso dele em ato; e dizemos que está em repouso tanto quem já está em repouso como quem pode estar em repouso. Isso vale também para as substâncias: de fato, dizemos que um Hermes está na pedra e que a semirreta está na reta, e dizemos que é trigo também o que ainda não está maduro.58 Reale comenta a multiplicidade de sentidos do Ser para o Autor, aduzindo que ela goza de unidade, mas não no sentido simples, e sim em uma unidade dita por analogia59 (no sentido de afirmar que o termo Ser não é nem absolutamente unívoco nem equívoco60), alcançando uma universalidade de cunho transespecífico e transgenérico. (...) Entre univocidade e equivocidade pura existe uma via intermédia, e o caso do ser situa-se, justamente, nessa via intermédia. ... (...) Sendo assim (ou seja, implicando múltiplos sentidos πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον) é claro que o ser não poderá ser reduzido a um "gênero", menos ainda a uma "espécie". Trata- 58 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica, Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1017a7b10. 59 Aristóteles, propriamente, nunca usou o termo "analogia" ao Ser; tal vem da interpretação iniciada com os medievais. 60 Murilo Cardoso de Castro aponta que: "Unívocos" chamam os lógicos aos termos que designam sempre uma e a mesma coisa. São termos que, por assim dizer, não têm perda; significam sempre o mesmo e não há possibilidade de enganar-se, conhecendo-se o único significado que possuem. A palavra "homem", por exemplo, é termo unívoco, que designa sempre o mesmo ser, o mesmo objeto. "Equívocos" chamam em troca, os lógicos aos termos ou conceitos que têm duas ou mais significações completamente diversas, quer dizer, que se referem a dois ou mais objetos totalmente distintos entre si e heterogêneos. A palavra "macaco", por exemplo, significa umas vezes o conhecido animal e outras vezes o aparelho mecânico que serve para levantar peças grandes e pesadas (o "macaco do carro"). Entre "macaco" no primeiro significado e "macaco" no segundo não existe a menor semelhança, a menor relação, e embora a palavra que designa essas duas coisas heterogêneas seja a mesma fonética e ortograficamente falando, há na realidade como que duas palavras e dois conceitos distintos. "Análogos" chamam, por último, os lógicos aos termos ou conceitos que designam – como os equívocos – objetos distintos, mas não inteiramente diferentes, antes em parte semelhantes e em parte diferentes, ou seja, termos cuja significação não varia senão em parte ao designar ora uns, ora outros objetos. 34 se, portanto de um conceito transgenérico, ademais de transespecífico, vale dizer, mais amplo e extenso do que o gênero e também do que a espécie. Os medievais dirão que é um conceito analógico"61,62 Em outras palavras, há modos distintos do Ser ao mesmo tempo diferenciados e unificados por alguma zona de valência semântica, a qual não pode ser tratada como um gênero e do qual os diferentes significados seriam espécies. Essa posição acerca do Ser múltiplo implica, por si, contornos fixos ao todo da filosofia que se segue do Autor.63 Isto porque, como é evidente, a assunção da multiplicidade de sentidos do Ser implica necessariamente um pressuposto lógico de haver de haver diversidade nas coisas do mundo, o que, por seu turno, seria consequência ilógica se tratasse o Ser como unívoco. Doutra banda, essa posição de multiplicidade assume também um pressuposto de haver de haver limitação no número de modos distintos do Ser, pois, do contrário, chegar-se-ia a um ceticismo absoluto, já que se não houvesse nada de comum entre os seres da realidade (hipótese da equivocidade ou Ser pluris-significativo sem limites ou com limites muito amplos) o conhecimento não seria possível, eis que impossível que alguém acumulasse o conhecimento de todas as coisas pela somatória de conhecimento de todas (ou muitas, excessivas) as realidades, tal como se cada uma contivesse um sentido próprio de Ser. Para Aristóteles, o princípio unificador ou referencial estrutural dos múltiplos significados do ser, ou seja, que preenche a valência semântica comum de que tratamos e dá unidade ontológica à multiplicidade, está claro na transcrição abaixo, in fine, tirada da Metafísica. É a OUSIA, traduzida ao latim como SUBSTANTIA e que podemos, em português, tratar como substância, ente, entidade ou essência. O ser se diz em múltiplos significados, mas sempre em referência a uma unidade e a uma realidade determinada. O ser, portanto, não se diz por mera homonímia, mas do mesmo modo como chamamos "salutar" tudo o que se refere à saúde: seja enquanto a conserva, seja enquanto a produz, seja enquanto é sintoma dela, seja enquanto é capaz de recebê-la ou também do modo como dizemos "médico" tudo o que se refere à medicina: seja enquanto a possui, seja enquanto é inclinado a ela por natureza, seja enquanto é obra da medicina; e poderemos aduzir ainda outros exemplos de coisas que se dizem de modo semelhante a estas. Assim também o ser se diz em muitos sentidos, mas todos em referência a um único princípio: algumas coisas são ditas ser porque são substância, outras porque afecções da substância, outras porque são vias que levam à substância, ou porque são corrupções, ou privações, ou qualidades, ou causas 61 REALE, Giovanni, in Aristóteles Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. São Paulo. Edições Loyola. 2005. p. 64. 62 Para os fins dos contextos usados em toda esta dissertação, "análogo" e "analógico" são tratados como sinônimos. 63 Em efeito, praticamente todo sistema filosófico tem que assumir a condição do Ser entre termo unívoco, equívoco e análogo e se agrilhoar aos limites que disto decorrem logicamente. 35 produtoras ou geradoras tanto da substância como do que se refere à substância, ou porque negações de algumas destas ou, até mesmo, da própria substância. (Por isso até mesmo o não-ser dizemos que é não-ser).64 De ver que a substância não é só o centro de unificação dos significados do Ser, como, inclusive, lhe dá ordenação e mesmo sustentação, conforme aponta Pellegrin as dizer que "a substância é a resposta à questão do ser, de sorte que é o substrato que ordena a multiplicidade do ser: ela é, na realidade, o suporte único das outras propriedades e, nos enunciados, o sujeito dos predicados"65. Etimologicamente, o termo substância (do latim sub stare, substantia, quod sub stat) nos dá a idéia de suporte, o que está abaixo, o que é estável, a base do que é real"66, tal como a "subsistência que jaz sob os acidentes"67. É claramente uma noção aprimorada do princípio de subjacente, já explorada na Física e tal como já anotamos precedentemente nesta dissertação. Uma forma de compreensão da noção de substância, tal como observa Wolff,68 é assunção da noção de permanente se tratarmos das coisas eternas do mundo ou do permanente temporário; se tratarmos, a seu turno, das coisas não eternas do mundo, as coisas naturais ou materiais. Importante o destaque a que a substância não é alcançada pelo imediatismo fenomênico, mas sim exclusivamente pela razão, não obstante o processo intelectual se inicie a partir da detecção de fenômenos. Pelos fenômenos, alcançamos de forma direta apenas os acidentes, suportados pela substância, imaterial. Santos bem sintetizou: O fato de não ser a substância objeto sensível, não implica a sua não-realidade. Seria mister provar, e o exigiríamos apoditicamente (com necessidade lógica), que só pode ter realidade o que é objeto sensível. E onde encontrariam a razão suficiente de tal afirmativa os sensistas ? A substância é por nós captada numa experiência conjugada com a razão. Nós vemos esta casa, mas, na verdade, não vemos a casa, como não vê a casa um cão. A casa é algo que já implica uma esquemática mental. O que vemos são os acidentes, que tal casa mostra. Para dizermos que isto é uma caixa de fósforos, que aquilo é uma árvore, que esse animal é um cão, já penetram ai conceitos, esquemas eidético-noéticos diversos, uma operação mental superior. Os sentidos podem ser a fonte de nossos conhecimentos, ou melhor estes principiam ali, mas são estruturados, 64 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1003a31-b10. 65 PELLEGRIN, PIERRE. Vocabulário de Aristóteles. Trad. Claudia Berliner. São Paulo. Ed. Martins Fontes. 2010. Verbete Substância. 66 SANTOS, Mario Ferreira dos; Dicionário de Filosofia, consultado via web http://www.tirodeletra.com.br/ensaios/Dicionario-Substancia.htm em 12/07/12; 67 Ibidem; 68 Cf. WOLFF, Francis. Dizer o Mundo. Tradução: Alberto Alonso Muñoz. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 1999. 36 segundo a esquemática fundamental da nossa mente sem dúvida, que capta, nas coisas, o que estas têm de essencial, o que nelas permanece sendo o que elas são 69 . A substância, tal como uma causa, antecede também ao próprio Ser, cuidando ela própria de ser a questão primeira ao conhecimento. Em outras palavras, a substância é questão primeira à própria condição do conhecimento de qualquer ser, o que o Autor afirmou expressamente, inclusive: Ora, como existe uma única ciência de todas as coisas que são ditas "salutares", assim também nos outros casos. De fato, não só compete a uma única ciência o estudo das coisas que se dizem num único sentido, mas também o estudo das coisas que se dizem em diversos sentidos, porém em referência a uma única natureza: de fato, também estas, de certo modo, se dizem num único sentido. É evidente, portanto, que os seres serão objeto de uma única ciência, justamente enquanto seres. Todavia, a ciência tem como objeto, essencialmente, o que é primeiro, ou seja, aquilo de que depende e pelo que é denominado todo o resto. Portanto, se o primeiro é a substância, o filósofo deverá conhecer as causas e os princípios da substância70. Conforme Barnes: A questão "O que é ser?" é uma questão ontológica, uma questão sobre a existência; "O que é ser?" significa "O que é existente?" ou melhor, "Que itens existem?" Em Zeta I, Aristóteles reduz a questão do ser à questão da substância, a questão do que existe à questão do que existe da maneira primária ... 71 Como já vimos precedentemente nesta dissertação, a Aristóteles o quê é reduzível ao por que, tanto que asseverara em Segundos analíticos que conhecer a essência de uma coisa é o mesmo que conhecer sua causa, bem como que a noção de por que ou causa implica a noção de movimento, tudo num esquema de que a causa de uma coisa que é só pode ser o movimento de outra coisa que é, conforme já expusemos precedentemente. Assim, e no que concerne às coisas não eternas do mundo, ante a constatação de uma tensão de movimento (eventos) e repouso (coisas), Aristóteles teria deduzido o conceito de substância para denotar um plano mediano ou intermédio entre o repouso (o quê) e o movimento (por que), sendo essa condição de permanente temporário o que possibilita às faculdades da alma o reconhecimento e a identificação das formas nas coisas materiais, tanto quanto à recepção ou 69 SANTOS, Mario Ferreira dos; Dicionário de Filosofia, consultado via web http://www.tirodeletra.com.br/ensaios/Dicionario-Substancia.htm em 12/07/12; 70 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1003b,12. 71 BARNES, Jonathan; Aristóteles. Aparecida, SP. Editora Ideias e Letras, 2009, p. 117. 37 perda destas, que garantirá, mais que a inteligibilidade, mesmo a sensação de duração das substâncias. O sistema cosmológico que Aristóteles desenvolveu para explicar a totalidade da realidade, tema esse que não é objeto de nossa dissertação e ora abordamos meramente em digressão en passant, funda-se na articulação de substâncias de três ordens distintas pela forma de articulação para com o movimento. São elas: 1) Substâncias supra-sensíveis imóveis (forma pura, sem matéria): Deus ou Movente Imóvel; as Inteligências, que movidas pelo movente imóvel, movem as esferas planetárias. 2) Substâncias sensíveis móveis (quanto ao lugar), eternas (não corruptíveis) e compostas de matéria e forma: o Sol, astros e todo o céu. 3) Substâncias sensíveis móveis (em todos os sentidos), corruptíveis e compostas de matéria e forma: todos os seres da esfera sub-lunar. É bem relevante ressaltarmos neste ponto que, no todo da filosofia aristotélica, o termo ousia, tal como, aliás, já sói ocorrer ao próprio termo Ser, também é polívoco72 e comporta usos linguísticos analógicos, mantida sempre a zona de valência semântica comum a de ser a unificação estrutural dos sentidos de ser ou sujeito dos modos do ser73. 72. "A substância é entendida, se não em mais, pelo menos em quatro significados principais: considera-se que substância de alguma coisa seja a essência, o universal, o gênero e, em quarto lugar, o substrato" (in ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1028B, 33). 73 Reale anota que a tradução do termo grego ousia é um dos mais difíceis e discorre sobre a possibilidade de emprego tanto do termo "substância" quanto de "entidade" em português (donde também podemos perquerir pelo termo "ente". Diz o estudioso (in ob. citada, fls. 91): "Antes de entrar no cerne da questão, devemos proceder a alguns esclarecimentos a respeito do termo oúsía e de sua tradução. Um termo de qualquer língua só traduz corretamente e perfeitamente um termo de outra língua se reproduz todas as suas valências conceituais (ou seja, se cobre a mesma área semântica coberta pelo original). Naturalmente, isso raramente ocorre, especialmente quando se trata de termos gregos remetidos a termos de línguas modernas. De fato, sendo a língua grega fortemente sintética e as línguas modernas, ao contrário, muito analíticas, ocorre que os termos das línguas modernas cobrem apenas parcialmente a área semântica coberta pelos originais termos gregos. Particularmente o termo oúsía é um dos mais difíceis de traduzir em línguas modernas, justamente porque, em grego, é carregado de valências de tal modo distintas, que as línguas modernas não conseguem juntar e, portanto, não conseguem traduzir com um único termo. São, portanto, compreensíveis as razões que levam os tradutores a não se porem de acordo ao traduzir o termo oúsía a oscilar entre diferentes soluções e a mostrarem-se pouco satisfeitos com qualquer solução. Felizmente a língua italiana e a língua portuguesa, neste ponto, constituem uma exceção, porque nessas línguas o termo substância tem ampla utilização na linguagem comum (muito mais ampla do que em outras línguas modernas), e uma utilização que de algum modo cobre ou pode cobrir quase totalmente a área semântica coberta pelo termo oúsía no contexto aristotélico. O único defeito do termo substância é que ele não tem ligações lingüísticas com o termo ser, enquanto em grego o as tem (deriva de οὖσα, particípio do verbo εἶναι). Se quiséssemos manter o mesmo jogo de laços 38 O termo substância denota, além do sentido estrito já abordado, os possíveis sentidos de a) forma; b) matéria; c) composto de matéria e forma; d) figura da tábua das categorias. O sentido preponderante, contudo, será o de forma. A Tábua das Categorias é tema que esta dissertação abordará centralmente. Porque mencionadas neste capítulo, ora lhe apresentamos em mero adiantamento de informação como uma doutrina que aponta e distribui as diferentes significações do Ser de acordo com cada classe das figuras das categorias, e estas categorias superpõem-se em todos os grupos de significados do Ser. As figuras são em número de 1074, já incluída a própria substância: 1. Substância 2. Quantidade 3. Qualidade 4. Ação 5. Paixão 6. Estado (ou posse) 7. Posição 8. Lugar 9. Tempo 10. Relação A substância como significado de matéria tem um sentido fraco, o que o próprio autor reconheceu ao afirmar que "por isso a forma e o composto de matéria e forma parecem ser mais substância que a matéria" 75. Um outro sentido de substância empregado pelo Autor e exposto no Tratado das Categorias, de aspecto puramente lógico, respeita a Substâncias primárias e Substâncias secundárias, respectivamente, as coisas sensíveis individuais, concretas, e, de outro lado, os universais abstratos do gênero e espécie sobre o qual se pode inteligir as coisas. No paralelo linguístico, substância figuraria como sujeito das proposições, tal como "o que se sujeita ao predicado, ou que o suporta". Nessa acepção puramente lógica, é importante notar, substância não é dotada de realidade, não é ente real, é apenas inteligível conquanto e no sentido de que só "existe" na mente (ente de razão)76. lingüísticos deveríamos traduzir oúsía por "entidade" (em inglês "entity"; em alemão "Wesenheit", do particípio passado de sein,ge-wesen). Mas o termo "entidade" na nossa língua é demasiado genérico e, além disso, está longe de cobrir a área semântica do termo o e, portanto, não pode ser corretamente utilizado". 74 É importante destacar que em toda a Metafísica e mesmo na Física, o Autor apontou as categorias em número de oito (sem as categorias da posição e do estado). Só nos trabalhos de lógica é que as categorias se apresentam num número de 10. 75 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1029a 28. 39 Aristóteles, bem de ver, é expresso ao não outorgar realidade substancial aos universais: (a) Na realidade, parece impossível que algumas das coisas predicadas no universal sejam substâncias. Com efeito, a substância primeira de cada indivíduo é própria de cada um e não pertence a outros; o universal, ao contrário, é comum: de fato, diz-se universal aquilo que, por natureza, pertence a uma multiplicidade de coisas. De que, portanto, o universal será substância ? Ou de todas ou de nenhuma. Mas não é possível que seja de todas. E se for substância de uma única coisa, também as outras reduzir-seão a esta: de fato, as coisas cuja substância é uma só e a essência é única são uma coisa só. (b) Ademais, chama-se substância o que não é referido a um substrato; o universal, ao contrário, sempre se predica de um substrato. (...) (f) E, em geral, se o homem é substância e se são substâncias todas as coisas que se entendem nesse sentido segue-se que nenhuma das partes compreendidas na noção delas pode ser substância de alguma coisa, nem pode existir separada delas, em outra coisa; quero dizer o seguinte: não pode haver um <gênero> animal além das espécies animais particulares, e o mesmo vale para todas as partes contidas nas definições. (g) Dessas reflexões fica evidente que nada do que é universal é substância e nada do que se predica em comum exprime algo determinado, mas só exprime de que espécie é a coisa. Se não fosse assim, além de muitas outras dificuldades, surgiria também a do "terceiro homem"77. Os universais, assim, prestam-se à inteligência e as condições de pensar a realidade, sem, contudo, com ela se confundir nem mesmo quando empregado na atividade definitória. Definição, como já anotado, é a expressão verbal da essência, e melhor definida será qualquer essência pela sua ínfima espécie com o emprego dos universais, mas com ela não se confunde. Neste particular – de não outorgar aos universais status ontológico –, sua filosofia discrepa dos predecessores platônicos e é aspecto que o Autor deixa expresso. Inclusive, chega a apontar como errônea a concepção das ideias como substâncias, em clara refutação da teoria das formas de Platão, conforme anotou: 76 Reale anota precisamente que a Aristóteles os universais não gozam de estatuto de substância em sentido ontológico, de realidade: "Pois bem, o universal não é substância porque: a) não é algo que não se predica de outro e que é sujeito de predicação, mas, ao contrário, é sempre e somente algo que se predica de outro (o universal é, por definição, o que é apto a ser predicado de pluribus); b) não é algo determinado (τόδε τι), mas é um quale quid, isto é, não é algo determinado, mas algo abstrato (um τοιόνδε); c) não é algo separado (χωριστόν) pelas mesmas razões; d) sua unidade é apenas uma unidade abstrata; e) não é ato, mas potência (em sentido lógico)" in ob. citada, fls. 105. 77 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1038b8. 40 Portanto, é evidente que nenhum dos universais existe ao lado das coisas sensíveis e separadamente delas. Mas os que afirmam a existência das Formas, sob certo aspecto, têm razão de apresentá-las como separadas, se as formas são substâncias; mas, sob outro aspecto, não têm razão, porque chamam Forma a unidade que se refere a uma multiplicidade. E a raiz do erro deles está na incapacidade de explicar o que sejam essas substâncias incorruptíveis existentes à parte das coisas individuais e sensíveis. Eles afirmam as Idéias como especificamente iguais às coisas corruptíveis (de fato, não conhecemos essas substâncias corruptíveis): e falam de homem-em-si e de cavalo-emsi, simplesmente acrescentando às coisas sensíveis a expressão "em si" 78. 2.5 OS GRUPOS DE MODOS DO SER Como apresentado precedentemente, o Ser se diz em quatro Grupos de Modos: 1) o Ser por acidente; 2) o Ser por si; 3) o Ser como verdadeiro e falso; 4) o Ser como ato e potência. Sumarizamos, a seguir, cada um dos modos: 2.5.1 O MODO ACIDENTAL (ὂν κατὰ συμβεβηκός ens par accidens) Por acidente se entende vir com, tal como adjeto a algo. Por acidente é o equivalente ao por concomitância tratado na Física. 78 Ibidem, 1040b27. 41 Ou seja, é Ser que é sempre dependente de algo, no caso, da Substância, da qual os acidentes são afecções. Como é dependente e subordinado da Substância e esta dele prescinde e antecede, o acidente, evidentemente, é não necessário. Aristóteles define expressamente acidente nos Tópicos como "alguma coisa que pode se aplicar ou não se aplicar a qualquer coisa particular; por exemplo uma posição de sentado pode se aplicar ou não se aplicar a alguma coisa particular"79. Ainda, o Autor anota, na perspectiva linguística, uma definição de caráter residual de acidente ao asseverar que "acidente é aquilo que, enquanto pertencente ao sujeito, não é nem uma definição, nem um gênero, nem uma propriedade" 80 . Exemplos de acidente empregados pelo próprio Autor: o homem é músico, ou que o construtor de casas cura alguém, os quais bem aclaram a definição de acidente, eis que é evidente que há homens que são músicos, mas não é preciso ser músico para ser homem, pois há homens que não são músicos e nem por isso deixam de ser homens. Até porque infinito, o acidente, bem como sua causa (que também é acidental – no sentido de fortuita, pelo acaso –, e o Autor o identifica preponderantemente com a causa material, considerada por ele "caótica") não são objetos de ciência, a qual, conforme também já asseveramos precedentemente, só se ocupa do necessário. Nesse sentido, assevera o Autor que "enquanto de todas as outras coisas existem potências produtivas, dos acidentes não existe nenhuma arte, nem uma potência produtiva determinada. De fato, das coisas que são ou que se produzem por acidente também a causa é acidental 81. Aponta o Autor, inclusive, e na esteira da arguição da não possibilidade de ciência dos acidentes, que o Ser acidental é justamente a ocupação central dos tão combatidos Sofistas, os quais negam a objetividade, não têm qualquer compromisso ontológico e lógico e bem como se ocupam meramente com a aparência das coisas ao asseverar expressamente que "a dialética e a sofística indagam os acidentes dos seres, mas não enquanto seres, e não indagam o que é o ser em si e enquanto ser"82,83. 79 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos. Trad. Edson Bini. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP. Editora Edipro, 2010. 102b5-8. 80 Ibidem, 103b18-19. 81 Idem, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1027a5; 82 Ibidem, 1061b8. 83 Sobre isto, traz inclusive exemplos: "Se Corisco é diferente de Sócrates e Sócrates é homem, então Corisco não é homem". Ou seja, a falácia do "dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter" (falácia de generalização indevida). Em precisão, o exemplo não é de Aristóteles, o qual usou exemplos parecidos, inclusive com o nome Corisco e tema da 42 Ademais, o Filósofo expressamente também trata do Ser acidental como bem próximo ao próprio não-Ser ao ponto de asseverar pontualmente que "o acidente, de fato, revela-se como próximo ao não-ser. Isso é evidente também com base na seguinte argumentação: existe geração e corrupção dos seres que não são ao modo do acidente, ao contrário, não existe geração nem corrupção dos seres acidentais"84,85. Evidentemente, a significação clássica originária de acidente está jungida às substâncias sensíveis, as quais são dotadas de matéria e cujas afecções da matéria são justamente os acidentes, de forma que só o que é fenomênico é acidental. Segue-se, assim, que a expressão do Ser acidental se necessariamente sob as figuras das nove categorias exceto a substância, ao ponto de dizer que é lícito, num sentido, que sem estas não há o ser acidental ante ao seu caráter. 2.5.2 O MODO DO SER POR SI (ὂν καθ' αὐτό secundum quid) O Ser por si é o Ser por excelência, ou seja, o Ser no seu "sentido forte" e que denota o Ser da Substância e das demais categorias, variando-se o seu significado, sempre próprio, em conformidade com a categoria em que o Ser se revela. Isto está expresso pelo Autor: Ser por si são ditas todas as acepções do ser segundo as figuras das categorias: tantas são as figuras das categorias quantos são os significados do ser. Porque algumas das categorias significam a essência, outra a qualidade, outras a quantidade, outras a diferença. Extraímos o exemplo estampado de PELLEGRIN, PIERRE. Vocabulário de Aristóteles, Ed. Martins Fontes, verbete Acidente. 84 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1026b21-22 85 Brentano também bem comenta o particular ao exemplificar: "Obviamente, o construtor músico não tem, desde logo, uma geração que, se tem, por exemplo, o homem capaz de rir. O construtor se produz por uma geração, e o músico por outra, porém não há geração alguma conducente a que o construtor seja músico". (ob. citada, fls. 53). 43 relação, outras o agir ou o padecer; outras o onde e outras o quando. Segue-se que o ser tem significados correspondentes a cada uma destas86. Como já adiantado precedentemente, são dez as figuras das categorias, donde resulta que são dez os significados do Ser por si: 1. Substância 2. Quantidade 3. Qualidade 4. Ação 5. Paixão 6. Estado (ou posse) 7. Posição 8. Lugar 9. Tempo 10. Relação Especial primazia ontológica tem dentre as figuras das categorias, evidentemente e conforme já expusemos, a categoria da substância, pois como no sentido amplo é ordenadora dos vários grupos de significados do Ser, a substância, também enquanto figura das categorias, ordena todas as demais. Ou seja, em todas as coisas ditas com referência, são ditas com referência à Substância, pois dela são afecções, paralelamente, como numa relação de predicação ("S é P"), atribuindo-se a função de sujeito à substância e de predicado para as demais categorias87. No particular, o Autor também é expresso ao afirmar que "de fato, o ser significa, de um lado, essência e algo determinado, de outro, qualidade ou quantidade e cada uma das outras categorias"88. Mesmo sendo dito em tantos significados, é evidente que o primeiro dos significados do ser é a essência, que indica a substância (De fato, quando perguntamos a qualidade de alguma coisa, dizemos que é boa ou má, mas não que tem três côvados ou que é homem ao contrário, quando perguntamos qual é sua essência, não dizemos que é branca ou quente ou que tem três côvados, mas que é um homem ou que é um deus). Todas as outras coisas são ditas ser, enquanto algumas são quantidade do ser no primeiro significado, outras são qualidades dele, outras são afecções dele, outras, enfim, alguma outra determinação desse tipo. Por isso poderia também surgir a dúvida se o caminhar, o ser sadio e o estar sentado são, cada um deles, um ser ou um não-ser e, de modo semelhante, poder-se-ia levantar a dúvida para qualquer outro caso deste tipo: de fato, nenhum deles existe por si nem pode ser separado da substância; antes no máximo é ser quem caminha, quem está 86 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1017a23. 87 Como, aliás, sói ser o caso para todos os demais grupos de significados do Ser, que, como já dito, são Ser na exata medida em que têm relações estruturais para com a Substância e também, pois, se expressam sob a estrutura predicativa "S é P". 88 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1028b13. 44 sentado e quem é sadio. E estes, com maior razão, são seres porque seu sujeito é algo determinado (e justamente isso é a substância e o indivíduo), o qual está sempre contido nas predicações do tipo acima referido: de fato, o bom ou o sentado não se dizem sem ele. Portanto, é evidente que cada um daqueles predicados é ser em virtude da categoria da substância. Assim, o ser primeiro; ou seja, não um ser particular, mas o ser por excelência é a substância" 89 . A primazia do Ser por si da categoria da substância é de tal grau que há, inclusive, aparência de identidade da essência com a coisa individual, sensível, da qual é essência90. Nos quadrantes da lógica, a essas coisas individuais dá-se o nome de Substâncias Primárias, ou seja, aquelas cuja junção de particularidades impede que fossem produzir-se identicamente numa outra coisa. Por exemplo, Sócrates, esta dissertação, aquele cavalo, etc ... Tal como se dá ao ser acidental, o ser das demais categorias imprescinde do Ser da Substância (o que, aliás, também ocorre com o ser do verdadeiro e falso e do ato e potência), que lhes antecede, mas ambos os modos do ser não se confundem entre si nem são reduzíveis um ao outro, não obstante por vezes tenha o Autor chamado de acidentes as próprias outras categorias que não a substância propriamente dita. A desigualdade reside em que o ser acidental é não necessário no sentido de não ter que haver uma determinada singularidade (as quais são "por acaso" ou de outra forma não essencialmente havidas). Por exemplo: uma mesa não precisa ser necessariamente vermelha, ter 1,22 m e estar na casa de Sócrates no dia de ontem para existir como mesa. Reale, bem analisa o particular acima e mostra que inerência do acidente para com a substância se refere ao aspecto da casualidade da determinação singular, pois "quando Aristóteles fala de ser como acidente, não tem em vista o simples fato de ser inerente a outro ou ser em outro, mas a junção "casual", "fortuita", ou "ocasional" com outro e o ser em outro justamente nessa medida"91. Contudo, é de ver que a essência mesa não é sequer pensável se ela não tiver alguma qualidade (como cor e outras), alguma extensão (categoria da quantidade), estiver nalgum lugar (categoria do lugar) num certo tempo (categoria de mesmo nome). Ou seja, sem as noções das categorias, não haveria que sequer se falar em substâncias, particularmente quanto às sensíveis. 89 Ibidem, 1028b13. 90 "Com efeito, a coisa individual não parece ser diferente da própria substância, e dizemos que a essência é, justamente, a substância da coisa individual". Aristóteles, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1031a15. 91 REALE, Giovanni, in Aristóteles Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. São Paulo. Edições Loyola. 2005. p 81. 45 Evidencia-se claramente, assim, que o grupo de significados do Ser por si, mesmo quanto às 9 figuras que não a substância, distingue-se em prioridade ontológica quanto ao Ser acidental, sendo mesmo correto afirmar que justamente o Ser por si dessas 9 categorias é o fundamento de segunda ordem do Ser acidental. A exemplo: não houvesse a categoria da qualidade, não haveria o acidente vermelho ou azul aos objetos. A maior solidez das 9 categorias que não a substância em relação ao Ser acidental, assim, é apontada expressamente por Aristóteles, o qual inclusive a elas alude, num certo sentido, como substâncias derivadas, ou seja, tal como que, num certo sentido, elas são por si: Portanto só existe essência das coisas cuja noção é uma definição. (...) mas só existe definição quando uma noção exprime algo que é primeiro; e só é primeiro aquilo que não implica a predicação de alguma coisa a outra coisa. Portanto, não poderá haver essência de nenhuma das coisas que não sejam espécies últimas de um gênero, mas só daquelas: com efeito, é claro que só estas não se predicam de outras por participação, nem por afecção nem como acidente. Entretanto, para todas as outras coisas, desde que tenham um nome, haverá uma noção que exprima o seu significado: uma noção que indique como algo determinado refere-se a algo determinado; ou, em vez de uma noção genérica, haverá uma mais precisa. Destas coisas, porém, não haverá nem definição nem essência. Ou, antes, deveremos dizer que tanto a definição como o que é das coisas podem ser ditos segundo múltiplos significados. De fato, o "que é" significa, num sentido, a substância e algo determinado, noutro sentido significa cada uma das outras categorias: quantidade, qualidade e todas as restantes. E assim como o "é" se predica de todas as categorias, não, porém, do mesmo modo, mas da substância de modo primário e das outras categorias de modo derivado, assim também o que é se diz em sentido absoluto da substância, e de certo modo também das outras categorias92. É evidente que aquele que indica a essência de alguma coisa indica às vezes uma substância, às vezes uma qualidade e às vezes uma das outras categorias, pois quando um homem é posto diante de nós e dizemos que o que temos diante de nós é um homem ou um animal, enunciamos uma essência e indicamos uma substância; mas quando a cor branca é colocada diante de nós e dizemos que o que temos diante de nós é branco ou uma cor, enunciamos urna essência e indicamos uma qualidade. Analogamente, se a grandeza de um côvado é colocada diante de nós e dizemos que o que temos diante de nós é uma grandeza de um côvado, estaremos enunciando uma essência e indicando urna quantidade. É análogo com as outras categorias, pois cada urna dessas noções, tanto se asseverada a respeito de si mesma quanto se seu gênero for asseverado a respeito dela, indica uma essência; mas quando é asseverado a respeito de alguma outra coisa, não indica uma essência, mas uma qualidade, quantidade ou uma das outras categorias93. Barnes exemplifica sobre o particular com base numa afecção acidental contida na categoria da qualidade numa consideração em que esta, a qualidade, pode ser uma substância 92 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica, Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1030a6. 93 Idem, Tópicos. Trad. Edson Bini. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP. Editora Edipro, 2010. 103b36-40. 46 derivada, de forma que ela, a categoria da qualidade, é dependente da substância e, a seu turno, é o fundamento de segunda ordem do acidente da bobagem, sua subordinada. Tome um típico acidente, algo compreendido na categoria de qualidade. Tome a tolice. A tolice existe, não há como negar; e parece eminentemente possível pensar que a tolice seja um acidente. Pois a tolice é certamente um acidente dos tolos, ou, mais precisamente, de seres humanos tolos. Isto é, a tolice existe se e somente se certas substâncias existentes são tolas. A existência da tolice, portanto, deriva da existência de substâncias tolas ou é parasitária em relação a essa existência. Manifestamente, o que acabou de ser dito sobre a tolice vai igualmente se aplicar, mutatis mutandis, à sabedoria. Manifestamente, o que pode ser dito da tolice e da sabedoria pode ser dito das qualidades em geral: qualidades são acidentes, sua existência deriva ou tem seu foco na existência de substâncias dessa maneira - uma qualidade Q existe apenas na medida em que alguma substância tem o caráter Q. Análises similares são possíveis para outras categorias de entidade. Assim, a paternidade existe, e existe na medida em que uma substância gerou outra. A paternidade é uma relação; e em geral uma relação R existirá apenas na medida em que uma substância está numa relação R com outra. Relações são acidentes, sua existência tem seu foco na existência de substâncias. E assim por diante. Parece, pois, que se pode lidar com todas as entidades derivativas, se não de uma só pancada, de nove pancadas, uma para cada categoria derivativa. O que está envolvido na existência de Fs? Pata responder à questão, basta colocar Fs na sua categoria, C, e aplicar a explicação geral do que está envolvido na existência de Cs 94. Como a essência dá a determinação do que é o Ser, está claro que essência está em relação de ser reversível com a noção de "definição", entendida esta como o que expressa algo que é primeiro e só pode ser primeiro aquilo que de nada se predica (pois, do contrário, violar-seia a própria noção de substância que é não se predicar de nada), que são, pois, justamente as últimas espécies do gênero, as chamadas "ínfimas espécies". Ou seja, disso decorre evidente que as afecções de uma coisa não podem participar da definição desta coisa. Por exemplo, não há como definir "mesa quadrada". Poder-se-ia definir "mesa" e "quadrado", mas se se fosse tentar definir "mesa quadrada" estar-se-ia a violar o aspecto de Ser acidental95 que é ser quadrada a mesa e bem como também estar-se-ia, ante a ser composto o definiendum em situação, proibitiva logicamente, de que o definiendum fosse repetido no definiens. Nesse sentido, qual seja, o de predicar uma afecção a uma substância, resta evidente que a afecção predicada sempre será uma categoria apenas e que não a categoria da substância, nem 94 BARNES, Jonathan; Aristóteles. Aparecida, SP. Editora Ideias e Letras, 2009, p. 119. 95 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica, Edição. Local 1038b, 27: "as afecções não podem ser anteriores à substância nem pela noção, nem pelo tempo, nem pela geração: se o fossem, elas deveriam também ser separáveis dela". 47 mesmo por "derivação". Tal está bem claro em passagem do Autor96 em que expressa que o uso da entidade derivada com referência a algo que não ela própria está a referir à demais categorias que não a de substância97, pois cada uma dessas noções, tanto se asseverada a respeito de si mesma quanto se seu gênero for asseverado a respeito dela, indica uma essência; mas quando é asseverado a respeito de alguma outra coisa, não indica uma essência, mas uma qualidade, quantidade ou uma das outras categorias"98. Contudo, como "o que é" se pode perguntar das demais categorias, enquanto categorias, no sentido de dizer o gênero, no caso gênero do Ser, tal como "o que é a qualidade ?", "o que é a relação ?", etc ..., e como estas perguntas irão receber resposta dotada de significado, o Autor esclarece que este significado, contudo, não tem efeito de noção definitória, mas meramente uma noção genérica, donde decorre um sentido do "ente derivado" ("substância derivada"), que recebe um trato como substância, como se fosse, pois, passível de definição, mas num sentido segundo, para fins apenas de inteligibilidade e dizibilidade ou seja, lógicos -, mas sem os efeitos ontológicos de realidade que somente a figura substância propriamente dita goza. Ente derivado, num sentido, também é o ente ideal, ou seja o Ser dos universais, tratados como entes para a lógica, mas desprovidos de realidade, aspecto em que, pois, a filosofia de Aristóteles discrepa da filosofia de Platão, que atribuía essencialidade às formas como universais, tal como já aludimos. Ross se debruçou pontualmente sobre a temática: O ponto fundamental é o seguinte: o mundo que nos é dado na experiência é um mundo de coisas individuais concretas, agindo e reagindo umas sobre as outras. Ao contemplálas, tornamo-nos conscientes das características comuns a um grande número de indivíduos. Para Aristóteles, estas características são reais, objectivas, individuais. Não são, em qualquer sentido, obra do espírito, mais do que o eram as Formas para Platão. Mas Aristóteles convida-nos a atribuir-lhes apenas aquele modo de existência próprio aos universais, a saber, a existência como característica dos indivíduos. Não devemos colocar a hipótese de um mundo separado de universais. Nem devemos supor que podemos explicar o mundo, que é um mundo de mudança, pela mera operação de universais. 96 Idem, Tópicos. Trad. Edson Bini. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP. Editora Edipro, 2010. 103b 36-40. 97 Na língua portuguesa, o comentário acima transcrito equivale, em parte, ao fenômeno gramatical da substantivação, que consiste em tratar termos de outras classes gramaticais como se substantivos fossem para uso sintático de sujeito e objeto direto. Noutra parte, cuida da figura do substantivo abstrato. 98 Do quanto tratado neste ponto, se evidencia a diferença das concepções das doutrinas do Ser para Aristóteles e para Platão, pois ao segundo o Ser são as "formas em si" e alguma, por exemplo, é dita bela porque participa do "belo em si", hipótese essa dita da TRANSCENDÊNCIA do Ser em relação as coisas, as quais não são o Ser, mas apenas imagem do que o ser é. A Aristóteles, ao reverso, a hipótese do Ser é tem caráter de IMANÊNCIA, no sentido de dizer que o Ser está nas coisas. 48 (...) Considerai as coisas sensíveis simplesmente como possuindo limites duma certa forma e tereis os objectos da geometria. Mas é possível levar mais longe a abstracção. Podeis fazer a abstracção, não somente da «matéria sensível» das coisas sensíveis, como também da «matéria inteligível», da extensão 'dos objectos geométricos. Assim procedendo, obtereis a essência da linha recta, do círculo, etc., a saber, o princípio sobre o qual são construídos. Contudo, diria Aristóteles, o que constitui a diferença total entre o seu ponto de vista e o de Platão é o facto de não atribuir qualquer existência separada, nem ao resultado intermédio, nem ao resultado final da abstracção, enquanto os Platónicos a atribuem a ambos 99 . Aristóteles, a seu turno, deixa expresso: Portanto, é evidente que nenhum dos universais existe ao lado das coisas sensíveis e separadamente delas. Mas os que afirmam a existência das Formas, sob certo aspecto, têm razão de apresentá-las como separadas, se as formas são substâncias; mas, sob outro aspecto, não têm razão, porque chamam Forma a unidade que se refere a uma multiplicidade. E a raiz do erro deles está na incapacidade de explicar o que sejam essas substâncias incorruptíveis existentes à parte das coisas individuais e sensíveis. Eles afirmam as Idéias como especificamente iguais às coisas corruptíveis (de fato, não conhecemos essas substâncias corruptíveis): e falam de homem-em-si e de cavalo-emsi, simplesmente acrescentando às coisas sensíveis a expressão "em si" 100. 2.5.3 O MODO DO SER VERDADEIRO (ὂν ὠς ἁληθές ens tanquam verum) Há dois sentidos contidos no Grupo de Modos do Ser Verdadeiro. Um deles é o chamado de modo de Ser lógico ou gnosiológico, o sentido de Ser como Verdadeiro que se há na alma pela faculdade cognitiva do juízo101, de representação da realidade, cuja expressão lingüística é a proposição. 99 ROSS, David. Aristóteles. Lisboa. Publicações Dom Quixote, 1987. p. 162. 100 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica, Edição. Local 1040b 29. 101 "Tradicionalmente, o ato de estabelecer uma relação entre um sujeito e um predicado, ou a própria relação estabelecida, que se costuma simbolizar como "S é P"; por exemplo, Sócrates é mortal. Nesta acepção, só exprimem juízo as frases que tem a forma sujeito-predicado: "Está chovendo" ou "Sócrates é mais alto que Platão" não exprimem juízos. Numa acepção mais lata, um juízo é o que hoje se chama "afirmação", sofrendo da mesma ambiguidade ato-objeto: tanto se pode falar do ajuizar quando do objeto do juízo. O ato de ajuizar é o que hoje se 49 O outro sentido é chamado de Ser Existencial, também contido no âmbito da mente, e é relativo ao pensamento sobre a existência ou não e em que modo dos objetos do mundo das coisas. Tal como o próprio Ser, também a verdade, bem como seu oposto, o falso, são termos polívocos. A noção primária de verdade ao Autor é o da "concordância do conhecimento com a coisa"102, ou, em outros, termos é a noção correspondencial entre o pensamento e o mundo, tudo de forma que o nosso pensamento, quando correto, deve refletir ou representar as coisas como elas são, pois "cada coisa possui tanto de verdade quanto possui de ser"103. Assim, Ser, sob essa acepção, é identificado como o Ser do juízo verdadeiro e o seu oposto, o não-Ser, como o Ser do juízo falso, tudo num sentido de que "o verdadeiro é a afirmação do que é realmente unido e a negação do que é realmente separado; o falso é a contradição dessa afirmação e dessa negação"104. Exemplo: Sócrates é músico é verdadeiro se e tão somente se o indivíduo Sócrates é músico, ou seja, há no indivíduo Sócrates a qualidade acidental de músico, coisa que se sabe por constatação sensível. Nesta acepção do Ser Verdadeiro, no seu sentido primário, não se diz, pois, verdadeiro ou falso das "essências" ou entes simples, porque predicar de verdadeiro ou falso é exclusivo em relação a união e separação de termos diversos, ou seja, só ocorre no juízo105, o qual se dá na alma e se expressa pela predicação. A clareza da distinção do mundo das coisas e da alma está chama atitude proposicional; o objeto do juízo é uma proposição. Tradicionalmente, classificavam-se os juízos, quanto à modalidade, em apodíticos, assertivos e problemáticos." (BRANQUINHO, JOÃO et al in Enciclopedia de Termos Lógico-filosóficos, verbete "juízo". Editora Martins Fontes.). Doutra banda, Murilo Cardoso de Castro aponta que: "Aristóteles dizia que o juízo é uma das faculdades da alma dos animais (a outra é a faculdade motriz), sendo obra do pensamento e da sensação (De an., III, 9, 432 a 15). Em especial, atribuía ao intelecto a capacidade de julgar as qualidades sensíveis com o sensório e a substância das coisas com um meio diferente". Em sentido geral, "juízo" denota: "operação mental que articula termos ou conceitos, por meio de uma atribuição afirmativa ou negativa de um predicado (P) a um sujeito (S), intermediados por um verbo (redutível ao verbo ser) com papel de cópula ou ligação, segundo o modelo S é P (Dicionário Houaiss de Língua Portuguesa, verbete Juízo)". 102 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. fls. 67. 103 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 993b30. 104 Ibidem, 1027b20. 105 "Quanto ao ser como verdadeiro e ao não-ser como falso, devemos dizer que se referem à conjunção e à divisão de noções e ambos envolvem as duas partes da contradição. O verdadeiro é a afirmação do que é realmente unido e a negação do que é realmente separado; o falso é a contradição dessa afirmação e dessa negação. O modo pelo qual pensamos coisas unidas ou separadas, e unidas de modo a formar não uma simples seqüência, mas algo verdadeiramente unitário, é uma questão decorrente da que estamos tratando. De fato, o verdadeiro e o falso não se encontram nas coisas (como se o bem fosse o verdadeiro e o mal fosse o falso), mas só no pensamento; antes, referidos aos seres simples e às essências, eles não se encontram nem no pensamento " (in Aristóteles, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1027b19). 50 evidenciada na passagem que trazemos abaixo, a qual, doutra banda, evidencia que, apesar de distintas as acepções do Ser lógico e do Ser por si, há primazia deste último e que, bem como, é condição do primeiro, eis que as operações que a mente articula por união e separação têm por objeto justamente as das figuras das categorias. "Posto que a união e a separação estão na mente e não nas coisas, o ser entendido nesse sentido é um ser diferente daquele dos significados eminentes do ser, a saber: a essência, a qualidade, a quantidade ou as outras categorias que o pensamento separa ou reúne 106". No particular, anotou Reale: Falando mais exatamente: o ser como verdadeiro e o não-ser como falso não são mais que o pensamento que pensa a realidade nas suas diferentes categorias; melhor ainda, não são mais que operações de unir e separar o ser das categorias, movendo-se em sua base ontológica estrutural107. O termo verdade, em sentido derivado, se estende logo ao conceito e a representação sensível, e também às coisas mesmas, já que tudo isto está em estreita relação com aquele (com o sentido primário) 108. Quanto ao modo do Ser como verdadeiro no sentido existencial, o Autor bem o aponta na Metafísica, conforme transcrição: No que se refere ao ser no sentido de verdadeiro e ao não-ser no sentido de falso é preciso dizer que, num caso, tem-se o verdadeiro quando realmente existe união e temse o falso quando não existe. No outro caso, se o objeto existe, é de determinado modo que existe e se não existe desse modo, não existe de modo nenhum. E o verdadeiro consistirá simplesmente em pensar esses seres; enquanto, a respeito deles, não existe falso e nem engano, mas apenas ignorância; e ignorância não semelhante à cegueira, porque a cegueira corresponderia ao não ter absolutamente a faculdade de pensar109. 2.5.4 O MODO DO SER PELA POTÊNCIA E DO ATO (ὂν δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργεία ) 106 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1027b19. 107 REALE, Giovanni, in Aristóteles Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. São Paulo. Edições Loyola. 2005. p. 80. 108 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. p 70. 109 ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1051b33. 51 Aristóteles apresenta esse modo do Ser no Livro Cinco da Metafísica afirmando: Além disso, o ser ou o ente significa, por um lado, o ser em potência e, por outro, o ser em ato, e isso no âmbito de cada um dos significados acima mencionados. De fato, dizemos que vê tanto quem pode ver como quem vê em ato; e de maneira semelhante dizemos que sabe, tanto quem pode fazer uso do saber como quem faz uso dele em ato; e dizemos que está em repouso tanto quem já está em repouso como quem pode estar em repouso. Isso vale também para as substâncias: de fato, dizemos que um Hermes está na pedra e que a semi-reta está na reta, e dizemos que é trigo também o que ainda não está maduro 110 . Importante ver que o modo de Ser em ato ou potência é colocado num agrupamento próprio porque só compreensíveis um em função do outro, ou seja, são correlativos, tal que, sem a noção de um, não há a do o outro e vice-versa. Não obstante correlativos entre si, o Autor reconhece prioridades do ato sobre a potência, tanto quanto à noção quanto ao tempo, pois nosso conhecimento parte do mais imediato para o mediato (sendo que a noção de potência das coisas só se alcançará por meio de indução), bem como tudo que é em potência necessariamente antecede de algo que era anteriormente em ato e assim sucessivamente até o limite último, que é ato puro, o princípio Divino em função do qual se realiza o fim. Também de se ver que não existem fora das categorias (de cujo Ser dependem), ou seja, "são modos de ser que se apóiam no próprio ser das categorias, têm estruturalmente a mesma extensão da tábua das categorias e são diversos segundo se apoiem nas diferentes figuras das categorias 111". No dizer de Brentano, "o ente que se distribui nas figuras das categorias e no ato e potência se co-pertencem e estão unidos entre si na forma mais íntima"112. O próprio autor assentou que: "O ser ou é em ato, ou é em potência, ou é, ao mesmo tempo, em ato e em potência, seja na substância, seja quantidade, seja nas categorias restantes 113". Este modo do Ser é essencial à filosofia de Aristóteles para dar conta do seu sistema cosmológico, no qual assume que a substância sensível é sujeita à mudança114, aqui tomada 110 Ibidem, 1017b1. 111 REALE, Giovanni, in Aristóteles Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. São Paulo. Edições Loyola. 2005. p 77. 112 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. p. 83. 113 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1065b5. 114 Ibidem, 1069b5. 52 mudança como sujeição ao movimento em todas as suas modalidades, quais sejam: geração, corrupção, aumento, diminuição, alteração e deslocamento. Aliás, segundo a filosofia do Autor, o movimento está nas coisas sensíveis e este ocorre segundo as diferentes categorias do Ser, eis que: não existe nenhum movimento que esteja fora das coisas: de fato, a mudança sempre ocorre segundo as categorias do ser, e não há nada que seja comum a todas e que não se inclua numa das categorias. Cada uma das categorias, em todas as coisas, existe de dois modos diversos (a substância, por exemplo, à vezes é forma e às vezes é privação; na qualidade às vezes se tem o branco e às vezes se tem o preto; na quantidade às vezes se tem o completo e às vezes o incompleto; no movimento de translação se tem o alto e o baixo, ou o leve e o pesado), de modo que devem existir tantas formas de movimento e de mudança quantas são as categorias do ser. Ora, dado que ser em potência e ser em ato se distinguem segundo cada gênero de categoria, chamo movimento o ato do que é em potência, enquanto é em potência115. É de extremo relevo a transcrição acima in fine, na parte que destacamos, qual seja a da definição do movimento como a atualização do que é em potência, o que, dado que também a potência é Ser, se torna uma solução intelectual sofisticada e apta a resolver as aporias dos eleatas que cuja noção de Ser elidia qualquer dimensão de Ser não estática. O estreito vínculo do Grupo de modo do Ser segundo a potência e ato para com o ser segundo as figuras das categorias, ou seja, para com o grupo de modos do Ser por si, se evidencia ante a que como cada categoria cuida de um diferente significado de Ser, pressupõe uma distinta determinação da potência e que vem a ser em ato por alguma causa eficiente seja ela pela ação humana ou natural como por conta de um princípio ativo que também já é em potência. Num sentido, o Ser não vem do não-Ser, no que Aristóteles, como já anotado, concorda com os eleatas, mas o Ser sempre será em ato ou potência, sendo que ainda que sob "estado de potência" um substrato qualquer já é Ser. O ato variará desde uma forma pura caso de Deus – até a recepção duma forma por um substrato e será, ao mesmo tempo, em ato o que a forma lhe determina e será em potência o que pode vir-a-Ser determinado. Por exemplo, um bloco de argila é "um bloco de argila em ato" por que está revestido desta forma e é "uma cadeira em potência" porque sua matéria permite a recepção da forma cadeira. Atualizada a cadeira, esta, a seu turno, será "mesa em potência" bem como tantas outras múltiplas coisas mais em potência porque pode receber novas formas a dar 115 Ibidem, 1065b5-7. 53 nova inteligência substancial ao seu Ser, ou receber novas afecções do Ser, mantida a mesma substância. Não participa do grupo de modo do Ser do ato e potência, como, aliás, não estará contido em nenhum outro grupo dos modos de ser, aquilo que seja impossível de Ser. Esta impossibilidade é entendida não apenas como algo fora da realidade do mundo, mas sim como fora da possibilidade racional de ser, qual seja, não existe aquilo que é sujeito à contradição, ou, em outras palavras, que seja e não seja algo, ao mesmo tempo ou em relação à mesma coisa, tudo tal que o que nunca é em potência jamais poderá ser em ato. Aliás, o princípio de não contradição, de tão basilar, é mais que apenas um princípio lógico, e é, inclusive, um princípio ontológico, como a lei primordial do Ser, ao ponto de Wolf afirmar, com base em Aristóteles, que "o mundo não é contraditório. Eis aí sua característica mais geral e a menos duvidosa. Se fosse contraditório, não seria a ordem que permite pensar o real como um todo, não seria a estrutura comum à qual pertencem todas as coisas. Basta um único 'ser" contraditório, e é o fim do mundo"116. O sentido, pois, primário e simples de potência é o acima tratado, qual seja de aptidão ao movimento, nas suas diversas modalidades, sem implicar uma contradição. Há outros sentidos analógicos abarcados pelo termo, segundo apontado pelo próprio Autor, quais sejam "de realizar algo bem ou adequadamente", "de receber o movimento/mudança a dita potência passiva (de ser suscetível a algo possibilidade não no sentido lógico) " e "de ser não facilmente mutável"117. 2.6 TEORIA DA PREDICAÇÃO 116 WOLFF, Francis. Dizer o Mundo. Trad. Alberto Alonso Muñoz. Discurso Editorial. São Paulo, SP, 1.999. p 25. 117 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1019a15-ss. 54 Aristóteles promoveu muitas e profundas investigações sobre a linguagem, sobre os modos do dizer e as respectivas interseções para com o Ser. Um especial quadrante deste campo é a teoria da predicação, a qual guarda dimensões ontológicas, lógicas e gnosiológicas, tudo a partir da teoria maior do Ser, tal que os modos de dizer são determinados pelos próprios modos do Ser. Angioni, expõe que por predicação, entende-se o enunciado que (i) possui a forma "S é P" ou alguma forma equivalente e redutível àquela, (ii) pretende reportar-se a fatos dados no mundo e, assim, apresenta-se como pretensão de constatação ou registro desses fatos o que, como veremos, consiste em dizer que ela é uma pretensão de verdade118. Disso decorre que nos enunciados, também chamados de proposição (ainda, "enunciados apofânticos"119), passíveis à predicação ora tratada há de haver sujeito, a cópula (ou operador) "é" (podendo ser "não é") e o predicado. Por conta de sua pretensão de verdade (ou de objetividade), fica excluída da teoria da predicação a maior parte da linguagem ordinária, tais como comandos, ordens, pedidos, expressões espontâneas, etc ..., as quais, a despeito de ser dotadas de significação, não visam à retratar os fatos objetivos do mundo. Assim, fica claro que a teoria da predicação "se apresenta ao mesmo tempo, como uma ontologia: a teoria da predicação é uma teoria a respeito das correlações entre, de um lado, as estruturas objetivas pelas quais as coisas se dão no mundo e, de outro, as estruturas lógicolingüísticas pelas quais pretendemos constatá-las e remeter a elas" 120. A estrutura S é P, importante notar, é a expressão por proposições que, a seu turno, decorrem do juízo, dos estados da alma. Assim, não se vê diferença, ao nível do juízo, das proposições Sócrates corre de Sócrates é corredor, presente, subjacentemente, a estrutura S é P em ambas. O sujeito e o predicado, ainda que tomados isoladamente, ou seja, fora da estrutura do nexo da predicação, significam ou se referem a um conteúdo determinado simples e sem implicar qualquer consideração da verdade ou existência respectivas. 118 ANGIONI, Lucas. Introdução à Teoria da Predicação em Aristóteles. Campinas, SP. Editora Unicamp, 2006. p 17. 119 Equivalente a "declarativo"; 120 ANGIONI, Lucas. Introdução à Teoria da Predicação em Aristóteles. Campinas, SP. Editora Unicamp, 2006. p 20. 55 O verbo Ser a seu turno, não designa coisa alguma e só exerce a função de sintetizar o sujeito e predicado (caso da cópula "é") ou de separar o sujeito e predicado (caso da cópula "não é"), de forma que é apenas dotado de função estrutural tanto lógica-linguística como ontológicametafísica. No âmbito do paralelismo de expressão linguística, o sujeito e predicado não são passíveis de, isoladamente ser tratados como ente ante a que só se reconhece ente, ou ser, aos fatos complexos ou estados de coisas constituídos pela composição de dois elementos entre si, unidos pela cópula. Essa umbilical relação lógica-linguística e ontológica-metafísica faz impor que a teoria da predicação explique a expressão da realidade sob forma de composição, feita mentalmente, de fatos complexos, variando-se os pressupostos ontológicos de cada proposição, inobstante em qualquer delas, o arquétipo S é P seja constante. Ainda em outras palavras, será sempre mantida a estrutura lógica, mas variar-se-ão os pressupostos ontológicos. A primeira diferença de pressupostos ontológicos dá-se pela consideração de se os elementos compostos são heterogêneos (relação extrínseca) ou homogêneos (relação intrínseca) entre si quanto à essência. O primeiro caso remete-nos ao Ser acidental, ou por concomitância, já que por cuidar de elementos heterogêneos vinculados, um não auxilia na definição do Ser do outro, mas agrega conteúdo informativo novo não implícito à essência referida (o acidente). Por exemplo, a proposição Sócrates é músico informa uma qualidade incremental ao sujeito que não lhe decorre de per si, ou seja, o predicado está a falar de algo a mais, no caso de uma substância subjacente, já identificada, que recepciona o tal predicado. O segundo caso, versando elementos não heterogêneos, nos afasta do Ser acidental e nos remete ao grupo de modos do Ser por si, já que ante a não heterogeneidade, haverá necessária intersecção de extensão, ainda que parcial, entre os elementos combinados, tudo de forma que o predicado apenas analisa a estrutura interna do sujeito, quer totalmente (dando-lhe a definição) ou parcialmente (indicando elementos da definição). Ou seja, a rigor, neste caso, há só explicitação da análise da coisa dita, apta a apenas definir/identificar o sujeito em si, enquanto essência e não em prover incremento de conteúdo informativo, no sentido de alguma afecção singular. Em suma: no primeiro caso, agrega-se algo à substância/sujeito e os elementos são irredutíveis entre si – caso do predicado acidental –, e, no segundo caso, analisa-se a 56 substância/sujeito, e, em alguma medida, os elementos são redutíveis entre si – caso do predicado definitório. Para uma mais escorreita compreensão do predicado definitório, vale ver a definição de definição, dada pelo Autor nos Tópicos: Uma definição é uma frase que indica a essência de alguma coisa. A definição é afirmada ou como uma frase empregada no lugar de um termo, ou como uma frase empregada no lugar de uma frase, pois é possível também definir algumas coisas indicadas por uma frase. ... Isto porque, quando nos ocupamos de definições, passamos a maior parte de nosso tempo debatendo se as coisas são idênticas ou distintas. Em síntese, chamamos de definitório tudo que se subordina ao mesmo tipo de investigação ao qual se subordinam as definições121. O Autor expõe ainda que a definição perfeita de uma coisa deverá ser expressa pela apresentação da sua espécie última, a qual, a seu turno, é definida pelo gênero de que ela participa e predicado da diferença específica que cria a espécie. Por exemplo: Sócrates (substância primária) é homem e Homem é animal (gênero) racional (diferença), equivale, tudo a definir Sócrates é animal racional. Todas as demais substâncias primárias, Platão, este aluno etc., que forem predicadas de homem, serão tidas por iguais entre si, no sentido de que coincidem em essência e, pois, são homogêneos. Os iguais em essência, além de participar em comum dos elementos de sua definição de essência, quais sejam, a espécie, gênero e diferença, também têm em comum os efeitos da essência, as propriedades. Ou seja, os predicados ditos definitórios, do tipo homogêneo para com o seu sujeito, são divididos em: 1) gênero; 2) espécie; 3) diferença; e 4) próprios. Os predicados não definitórios, do tipo heterogêneo para com o seu sujeito, são sempre acidentais. Definição, pois, é o equivalente lógico-linguístico da substância/essência nos quadrantes da Metafísica. Os predicados ditos definitórios, conforme acima, evocam a noção de substância quanto à inteligibilidade do ser, e os predicados acidentais evocam-na quanto à condição de substrato das afecções. Passamos a discorrer sobre os tipos de predicados. 121 ARISTÓTELES. Tópicos. Trad. Edson Bini. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP. Editora Edipro, 2010. 102a1. 57 2.6.1 PREDICADO DEFINITÓRIO – SOBRE O GÊNERO E ESPÉCIE A linguagem e qualquer conhecimento imprescindem de um mínimo de generalização formal, pois, sem esta, as coisas haveriam de ser nominadas apenas por "nomes próprios" (os quais, esses sim, remetem à substância primária), que denotariam toda a essência de todas as coisas do mundo, situação impossível tanto pela infinitude delas como por contrastar com a noção de movimento das coisas do mundo, e mesmo por conta da estrutura do dizível, que é composta e não simples (S é P). A abstração e inteligibilidade se expressam pelo uso das substâncias ditas secundárias, quais sejam, gênero e espécie, também chamados por universais e desprovidos de realidade no sentido próprio, tal como já aludimos. Gênero e espécie são correlativos entre si, de forma que quando definimos gênero não prescindimos da referência à espécie e a recíproca é verdadeira. O primeiro indica ao mais geral, mais múltiplo e mais predicável quanto à pergunta o que é. A segunda indica o menos geral, o menos divisível, quanto à mesma pergunta o que é. Por mais múltiplo, conforme empregamos acima atribuído ao gênero, queremos dizer predicável de mais coisas. Num outro sentido, gênero é também mais uno que a espécie, pois o que faz é atribuir a maior unidade possível a uma maior multiplicidade de coisas. Essa maior unidade do gênero se dá nos gêneros do Ser, que coincidem com o Ser na acepção do Ser por si, ou seja, no grupo de modos do ser segundo as figuras das Categorias, sendo cada uma das figuras das categorias um gênero supremo do Ser das coisas, não redutíveis esta a outro gênero do ser. Porfírio de Tiro bem anota, no particular: com efeito, o ser não é um único gênero comum a todas as coisas, e todas as coisas não são do mesmo gênero em relação a um gênero supremo, como afirma Aristóteles. Convém admitir simplesmente, como nas Categorias, que os dez primeiros gêneros exerçam a função de dez primeiros princípios; e que, ainda que todos possam ser chamados "entes", é ao menos por homonímia e não por sinonímia que assim se denominarão. Com efeito, se o ente fosse uma espécie de gênero comum de todos os seres, todos seriam chamados seres de maneira sinonímica; ora, entre os dez primeiros 58 gêneros, a comunidade só se estende ao nome, mas não se aplica à definição expressa por esta denominação122. A espécie é a divisão do gênero em zonas menores de multiplicidade por acréscimo de mais característicos do ser, ou seja, por acréscimo de predicados (as chamadas diferenças específicas). Ao seu limite (que se chama ínfima espécie), a espécie é o primeiríssimo grau de abstração e generalização das coisas individuais, coincidente com a definição. Entre os gêneros supremos, ou seja, as figuras das categorias e as ínfimas espécies, há diversos níveis intermediários de divisão (ou de predicação) das coisas, de sorte que há termos ou conceitos que são gênero quanto aos demais que se sucedem e espécie quanto aos que lhe antecedem. Entre os níveis extremos, gênero e espécie se diferem na medida em que a coleção de indivíduos – ou de substâncias primeiras – abarcada pelo primeiro se divide em espécies e que a coleção de indivíduos abarcada pelo segundo se divide em número. Por exemplo, na ínfima espécie homem, Sócrates, Platão, Xenofante etc. só se diferem quanto a número. Quanto aos níveis intermediários, gênero é o que organiza a espécie e espécie é aquela que é ordenada pelo gênero. Tudo o que se predica da espécie se predica do gênero e a recíproca não é verdadeira. Por exemplo, dizemos homem é animal, mas não dizemos animal é homem. Ou seja, o menor se predica do maior e, acerca disso, Porfírio de Tiro anotou: Portanto, o indivíduo é contido pela espécie, e a espécie é contida pelo gênero: o gênero é uma totalidade, e o indivíduo é uma parte, a espécie é simultaneamente todo e parte, mas parte de uma outra coisa, e totalidade não de uma outra coisa, mas em outras coisas: o todo, com efeito, está em suas partes 123. Evidentemente, a relação entre gênero e espécie é de caráter homogêneo e, pois, nos fornece base à investigação da essência das coisas, da substância. O seu esquema formal é, pois, como se a verdade de que "x é S" implica que "x é P", de forma que necessariamente o sujeito está contido no predicado, ao paralelo de como a espécie está contida no gênero. 122 TIRO, PORFÍRIO DE. Isagoge. Trad. Bento Silva Santos. São Paulo. Editora Attar Editorial, 2002. 123 Ibidem, 45. 59 2.6.2 PREDICADO DEFINITÓRIO SOBRE A DIFERENÇA O termo diferença comporta várias acepções desde o uso comum até o uso científico ou filosófico, ao qual o sentido de diferença interessa numa maneira inteiramente própria, também denominada diferença específica ou diferença inseparável, que cuida de ser o predicado que implica uma alteridade ao sujeito, ou seja, implica-lhe uma essência determinada. Por exemplo, o predicado capaz de raciocinar atribuído ao gênero animal implica a espécie homem. O gênero, a espécie e a diferença têm relação de cunho umbilical com a causal formal, de essências e inteligibilidade das coisas, e são, pois, elementos dos predicados definicionais e, conforme o já exposto, expressam, pois, o ser na sua acepção de Ser por si, fornecendo conteúdo de sua essência. A diferença, a seu turno, se difere do gênero e da espécie também porque ela é predicado da questão como é a coisa e os dois últimos, como já anotado, é predicado da questão o que é a coisa. Porfírio de Tiro bem elucida, com exemplo, este particular: Os filósofos definem ainda a diferença do seguinte modo: a diferença é aquilo que se predica de muitas coisas diferindo pela espécie, relativamente à questão: "como é a coisa ?" Com efeito, se nos perguntarmos: "O que é o homem ?", é normal responder: "um animal", mas à questão: "Como é o homem ?", responderemos naturalmente: um animal dotado de razão e mortal 124 . Importante ver que tudo o que é predicado da diferença é predicado da espécie determinada ou subordinada por essa diferença, tal como tudo o que é predicado do gênero é predicado de todas as espécies subordinadas. Há antecedência, em si, na ordem gênero, diferença e espécie, de forma que, uma vez suprimido o anterior, suprime-se o posterior, mas a recíproca não é o caso. 2.6.3 PREDICADO DEFINITÓRIO SOBRE O PRÓPRIO 124 Ibidem, p 49. 60 O termo próprio denota noção de exclusividade, de sempre presente mesmo sem participar da essência e é com ela – a essência – convertível. A rigor, próprio comporta 4 sentidos, expressamente anotados por Aristóteles nos Tópicos: o que se predica de uma só espécie mas não necessariamente de toda a extensão da espécie. Por exemplo, ser médico aplicado à espécie homem, já que só indivíduos da espécie homem podem ser médicos mas nem todos o são; o que se dá em toda a espécie, mas não apenas nela. Exemplo: ter duas pernas aplicado a homem, já que todo indivíduo da espécie homem tem duas pernas, mas apenas os indivíduos desta espécie o tem; o que se dá em toda a espécie, mas somente em um tempo dos seus indivíduos. Exemplo: ter cabelos brancos na velhice; o que se dá, cumulativamente, a uma só espécie, a toda a espécie e a todo o tempo. Exemplo, a aptidão a rir atribuída à espécie homem. Pois só e todos os indivíduos da espécie homem têm aptidão a rir e em toda duração da vida 125 . O último sentido é denominado próprio no sentido estrito, o qual tem interesse científico, pois, mesmo a despeito de não ser elemento definicional, ele é rigorosamente convertível com a espécie de que é próprio. Exemplo: se há cavalo, há também capacidade de relinchar, e havendo capacidade de relinchar, há igualmente cavalo. 2.6.4 PREDICADO ACIDENTAL O acidente é predicado que se aplicado ao sujeito também lhe impõe diferenças (pelo que se predica da questão como é), não no mesmo sentido da diferença específica, mas sim no sentido de que atribui diferenças ao sujeito, porém sem lhe implicar qualquer transformação. Ou seja, os acidentes são predicados que não participam da fórmula definicional. 125 ARISTÓTELES, Tópicos. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP. Editora Edipro, 2010. 102a18-19. 61 O acidente como predicado expressa o Ser na sua acepção do Ser por acidente, já exposta precedentemente nesta dissertação. Tem forte associação com a causa material do ser, ou seja, existe predominantemente quanto aos indivíduos – as substâncias primeiras –, que são substâncias compostas por matéria e forma. 2.6.5 PREDICAÇÃO E CATEGORIAS Em resumo sobre as predicações, apresentamos o quadro abaixo126: Evidentemente, há ligação de cunho umbilical entre os tipos de predicação e a Doutrina das Categorias, ao ponto de Porfírio de Tiro assentar na clássica Isagoge que "para receber o ensinamento relativo às categorias de Aristóteles, é necessário saber o que seja 1) o gênero, 2) o 126 Extraído de THIRY, Philippe in Noções de Lógica, Ed. Edições 70, Lisboa, 2010. 62 que seja a diferença, 3) o que seja a espécie, 4) o que seja o próprio, 5) o que seja o acidente" 127. Doutra banda, com viés em sentido reverso, Bodeus aponta, a seu turno o caráter inerente das distinções categoriais à predicação, aponto de servir para a investigação da classificação de uma predicação. Conforme ele: "... São, portanto, distinções importantes de serem feitas quando se deve predicar ou verificar o mérito de uma predicação"128. Na mesma linha, assenta Angioni: "a doutrina das categorias tem por interesse principal estabelecer as condições gerais que tornam possível compreender a predicação e a estrutura do mundo que a predicação pretende expressar"129. Importante destacar que, a despeito da relação umbilical entre a Doutrina da Categorias e os tipos de predicado, eles não são convertíveis um no outro, não obstante se empregue, por vezes, as figuras categorias como num sentido de predicado de um sujeito, o que se faz apenas num sentido lato e não no sentido de relação lógica de predicados tal como expusemos anteriormente. No dito sentido lato as categorias se predicam diretamente das substâncias primárias, justamente aquelas que têm mais ser, atribuindo-lhes afecções (essenciais ou não) e condição de inteligibilidade. Estão, pois, contidas na predicação no seu sentido lógico, e são necessárias para classificação do predicado, mas insuficientes para uma classificação absolutamente direta entre uma figura das categorias e um tipo de predicado. Por exemplo, a qualidade negro, se predicada de um certo homem, implica um predicado acidental, concomitante, ao passo que a qualidade homem aplicada a um indivíduo implica um predicado definitório de espécie, donde decorre evidente a não redutibilidade entre as figuras das categorias e os tipos de predicado, não obstante aquelas sejam sempre componentes destes e sejam usadas para investigar o tipo de predicado, que se logrará ser apontado pela inteligência da substância identificada, quer como substrato ou em si. Consideradas em si mesmo, as figuras das categorias podem ser tidas como predicado definitório de gênero. Por exemplo: azul é qualidade, dobro é relação etc. Não obstante se reconheça o uso das proposições retro, elas não são substância no sentido próprio e sim entes não 127 TIRO, PORFÍRIO DE. Isagoge. Trad. Bento Silva Santos. São Paulo. Editora Attar Editorial, 2002. p 35. 128 BODEUS, Richard; Aristote Catégories; Ed. Les Belles Lettres; Paris, 2002, fls. XLV. 129 ANGIONI, Lucas. Introdução à Teoria da Predicação em Aristóteles. Campinas, SP. Editora Unicamp, 2006. p 32. 63 substanciais, ou entes por derivação (pois não existem o azul e o dobro senão concomitantemente às substâncias primárias), conforme já tratamos precedentemente. Para o Autor, não existem no mundo, apenas na mente. 64 3 O TRATADO DAS CATEGORIAS 3.1 CONTEÚDO OBJETIVO DO TRATADO DAS CATEGORIAS As intenções do Autor quanto ao objeto do Tratado das Categorias, ao reverso de expectativa nutrida pelo título, não se jungem nem dão conta plena do tema da Doutrina das Categorias, aspecto que foi bem observado por Bodeus ao dizer que se a impressão de que a ambição do autor desse texto era de redigir um tratado das categorias dificilmente resiste à observação obstinada dos simples fatos. Para ser um tratado das categorias, nossa obra contém, ao mesmo tempo, muito e muito pouco. Muito pouco porque apenas quatro das dez categorias são submetidas ao exame; muito porque, além desses quatro capítulos, há cinco outros que expõem assuntos diferentes130. Os outros cinco capítulos do Tratado das Categorias a que Bodeus alude são, em efeito, dedicados às noções de oposição, anterioridade, simultaneidade, o movimento e ter, temas que a doutrina, desde os escolásticos, passou a chamar de pós-predicamentos. Em precisão, além dos pós-predicamentos, há também no tratado em atenção os antepredicamentos, que abordam aspectos de equivocidade em geral dos termos linguísticos, compreendendo os homônimos, sinônimos e parônimos. Ou seja, entre os ante-predicamentos e os pós-predicamentos, o Estagirita versa as categorias, mas, tal como o referido estudioso francês apontou, o fez de forma insuficiente nessa peça do Corpus. Mesmo com o exame de quatro das categorias a substância, a qualidade, a quantidade e a relação o leitor do Tratado das Categorias não logra obter a compreensão plena da dimensão e força da doutrina das categorias, ainda que limitadamente às quatro categorias retro-apontadas. A perspectiva das Categorias, no tratado homônimo, é exclusivamente lógica e linguística, com um tratamento de predicado. Não que não exista plena correspondência das figuras das categorias apontadas nesse tratado e examinadas nos livros dedicados à da Metafísica, 130 BODEUS, Richard. Aristote Catégories. 12a Edição. Paris: Editora Les Belles Lettres, 2002, p. XLII. 65 mas apenas o alcance exposto nessa peça em atenção é menor. Aliás, de ver que não haveria como ser assaz distinto, eis que justamente a Metafísica é o fundamento, como pressuposto, da lógica aristotélica. Neste capítulo, temos a pretensão meramente de expor objetivamente uma síntese do conteúdo objetivo do Tratado das Categorias e quanto às categorias propriamente ditas. Maior abordagem de análise e sentido delas dar-se-á noutras partes desta dissertação. Logo após a apresentação dos ante-predicamentos, Aristóteles faz rápidos comentários sobre combinações de palavras, expressões e frases introduzindo abordagem à predicação e, nessa esteira, discorre, também rapidamente, sobre aspectos dos gêneros. Na sequência, o Estagirita apresenta as categorias, num número de 10, e que são, no viés do Tratado em atenção, tidas como palavras ou expressões não combinadas: Cada uma das palavras ou expressões não combinadas significa uma das seguintes coisas: o que (a substância), quão grande, quanto (a quantidade), que tipo de coisa (a qualidade), com o que se relaciona (a relação), onde (o lugar), quando (o tempo), qual a postura (a posição), em quais circunstâncias (o estado ou condição), quão ativo, qual o fazer (a ação), quão passivo, qual o sofrer (a paixão) 131 . O Autor esclarece que nenhum termo indicador das coisas é, em si, assertivo no sentido de ser passível de verdade ou falsidade e que só na combinação em forma de proposição poderse-á falar em verdade e falsidade. Na sequência, o Autor discorre sobre as categorias da substância, quantidade, relação e qualidade antes de passar à apresentação dos temas dos pós-predicamentos. Relativamente à categoria da posição, o Autor expressamente noticia que dela tratou incidentalmente quando analisou a relação. De forma meramente alusiva num ponto, mas sem exame propriamente dito, o Autor trata das categorias da ação e paixão132. Quanto às demais categorias (tempo, lugar e estado), o Autor se limita a dizer que elas são auto-evidentes133, a ponto de dispensar digressão de exame. 131 ARISTÓTELES. Categorias. Trad. Edson Bini. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP. Editora Edipro, 2010. 1a25. 132 Ibidem, 11b1: "A ação e a paixão apresentam contrários, bem como graus, ou seja, o aquecimento é o contrário do arrefecimento, como também o ser arrefecido o é do ser aquecido, ou, por outro lado, ser agradado é o contrário de ser desagradado. E desta forma que admitem os contrários. Adicionalmente, admitem graduação, pois podes aquecer ou ser aquecido mais ou menos. Segue-se que a ação e a paixão podem admitir variações de graduação". 133 Ibidem, 11b10: "Dessas categorias basta o que foi dito. Da postura ou posição nós tratamos ao nos ocuparmos antes da relação. Dissemos que esses termos obtêm seus nomes das posturas que a eles correspondem. Quanto às demais categorias, quais sejam, tempo, espaço e estado, são tão claras que não preciso dizer mais do que disse no 66 Abaixo, apresentamos a distribuição dos temas ao longo de todo o Tratado das Categorias: a) ante-predicamentos: explicação sobre a equivocidade (1a-2a10) b) categorias: substância (2a11-4b19); c) categorias: quantidade (4b20-6a35); d) categorias: relação (6a36-8b24); e) categorias: qualidade (8b25-11a37); f) pós-predicamentos: oposição (11b16-14a25); g) pós-predicamentos: anterioridade (14a26-b23); h) pós-predicamentos: simultaneidade (14b24-15a12); i) pós-predicamentos: movimento (15a13-b16); j) pós-predicamentos: ter (15b17-32). 3.1.1 SOBRE A SUBSTÂNCIA O Tratado das Categorias não aborda, como na Metafísica e em outras obras, a substância na sua dimensão de causa do ser, ou seja, aborda-a numa dimensão não científica, mais orientada aos usos do termo e noção em dimensão lógico-linguística. Nesse sentido, a própria definição de Substância dada no nosso tratado tem a sua dizibilidade como fator nuclear: "Substância, em sua acepção mais própria e mais estrita, na acepção fundamental do termo, é aquilo que não é nem dito de um sujeito nem em um sujeito" 134. Vê-se claramente que a definição estampada de substância conduz à noção de ente separado, tal como por si. Essa substância, que é substância propriamente dita, no sentido de real e singular, o Autor aponta como Substância primeira, por nós já referida, pois "formam a base de todas as próprio-inicio.., que o estado é indicado por expressões tais como "estar calçado", "armado" e [expressões] similares, enquanto o espaço (lugar) é indicado por frases como "no Liceu", etc". 134 Ibidem, 2a11. 67 outras coisas, as quais, por seu turno, serão seus predicados"135, ou seja, plenamente condizente com a visão realista. Aos gêneros e às espécies, e apenas a eles, o Autor dá o nome de Substâncias Segundas, as quais são não são dotadas de realidade no sentido ontológico próprio (são realidades não substanciais entes de razão), mas imprescindíveis às condições de conhecimento e de dizibilidade também conforme já expusemos. Prestam-se para definir as substâncias primárias e, pois, são a elas atribuíveis como predicado. Um ponto axial e digno de atenção é a apresentação, no Tratado das Categorias, do paralelismo expresso da estrutura da predicação (S é P) entre a Substância Primária e tudo o mais bem como entre a espécie e o gênero: "A espécie está relacionada ao gênero como o sujeito está relacionado ao predicado. Predicamos o gênero da espécie, mas nunca, com efeito, podemos predicar, inversamente, a espécie do gênero"136. São cinco os traços comuns às substâncias expressados por Aristóteles no Tratado das Categorias: Jamais estar presente num sujeito vale [como propriedade] para toda substância posto que o que chamamos de substância primária não pode nem estar presente num sujeito nem tampouco ser predicado de um. Categorias, (3a7) Toda substância parece determinada, o que é indiscutivelmente verdadeiro no que tange às substâncias primárias. O que cada uma denota é uma unidade. Quanto às substâncias secundárias, talvez a linguagem o faça assim parecer, como quando dizemos "animal", "homem", mas realmente não se trata disso, pois, ao contrário, o significado destas palavras é uma qualidade. Categorias, (3b10) As substâncias jamais têm contrários. Categorias, (3b24) Nenhuma substância, pelo que parece, apresenta graus ou admite um mais e um menos. Não quero dizer aqui que uma substância não possa ser mais verdadeiramente chamada de substância e menos verdadeiramente chamada de substância do que outras. De fato, dissemos que pode. Mas entendo que nenhuma substância como tal pode admitir graduação em si mesma. Por exemplo, a mesma substância homem não pode realmente ser mais ou menos homem na comparação consigo mesmo ou com um outro homem. Este homem não é mais homem do que aquele. Categorias, (3b33) O que, entretanto, se afigura ser o mais distintivo na substância é que, não obstante ela permaneça numericamente una e a mesma, é capaz de receber qualificações contrárias. Categorias, (4a10) 135 Ibidem, 2b18. 136 Ibidem, 2b18. 68 3.1.2 SOBRE A QUANTIDADE É propriedade de todas as quantidades, conforme expostas no Tratado das Categorias, que elas têm partes e, a partir de aspectos das suas partes, são classificadas em dois grupos: a) discretas ou contínuas, e b) cujas partes têm posições relativas às outras partes ou sem posição relativa entre elas. A distinção entre discreta e contínua se associa a haver ou não limite na união entre as partes. Por exemplo, o número 10 é discreto, pois ele é composto por dois cincos, sem saber onde começa um e o outro, ou mesmo é composto por um três e um sete, sem que nada se altere nem se conheça um limite de um e outro. Um sólido, ao reverso, é contínuo, pois sua divisão qualquer mostra os limites das partes divididas. Quanto à classificação das partes com posição relativa ou não, Aristóteles dá o exemplo de quantidade com posição relativa às partes de uma linha, que são claramente ordenadas umas com as outras. O Autor bem observa confusões de uso linguístico de aparência de quantidade, mas que não versam sobre ela. Cita exemplos como: a) uma expressão do tipo "uma grande quantidade de branco" não é da categoria da quantidade, mas sim da qualidade; b) grande, muito, pequeno etc. não são da categoria da quantidade, mas sim da categoria da relação. Expressam propriamente quantidade expressões do tipo: dois metros de comprimento, uma superfície, ou seja, aspectos absolutos e sem padrão externo de referência. Propriedade de quantidade, Aristóteles faz bem ver, é a comparação por padrão de igualdade/desigualdade, e não por semelhança/dessemelhança. Quantidades, pois, evidentemente não têm contrários. O que é realmente peculiar às quantidades é que as comparamos ou contrastamos em termos de igualdade ou com base em igualdade. Predicamos igual [e] desigual de todas as quantidades mencionadas. De um sólido, diz-se que é igual ou desigual a um outro; de um número, que é igual ou desigual a um outro. Também usamos esses termos falando do tempo na comparação de seus períodos. Igualmente para todas as outras quantidades que mencionamos anteriormente. E de nenhuma outra categoria, cumpre acrescer, exceto a quantidade, podemos afirmar esses dois termos (o igual e o desigual), pois nunca 69 dizemos ser este estado igual ou desigual àquele; dizemos que é semelhante ou diferente137. Resta bastante claro, pois, que a categoria da quantidade tem forte relação com a causa material. 3.1.3 SOBRE A RELAÇÃO Aristóteles apresenta a categoria da relação logo no início do Tratado das Categorias afirmando: Chamamos uma coisa de relativa quando desta se diz que é o que é por dependência de alguma outra coisa ou, se não, por estar relacionada a alguma coisa de alguma outra forma. Isto porque, de fato, quando chamamos uma coisa de maior com isso queremos dizer maior do que alguma coisa. Diz-se o dobro por este o ser de alguma outra coisa (o dobro significa dobro de alguma coisa). E isto se aplica a todos os termos semelhantes Entre outros termos relativos encontramos o estado, a disposição, a percepção, o conhecimento, a posição ou postura. Todos estes se explicitam mediante a referência a alguma coisa a que pertencem e de nenhuma outra maneira. Estado é um estado de alguma coisa, conhecimento é um conhecimento de alguma coisa, posição é uma posição de alguma coisa. Falamos, portanto, de termos relativos quando uma coisa sendo tal como é, é explicitada por um genitivo que se segue ou então por alguma frase ou expressão destinada a introduzir a relação. Por exemplo, chamamos uma colina de grande e queremos dizer grande por comparação a uma outra. E exclusivamente em função desta comparação que se chama uma colina de grande; e o que é similar é chamado de similar pela similaridade com alguma coisa. E o que ocorre com todos os termos desta natureza. E percebemos também que, enquanto estar deitado, estar de pé ou estar sentado, são efetivamente posições específicas, a posição ela mesma é um relativo. Deitar, levantar e sentar não são eles mesmos realmente posições; suas designações, entretanto, como parônimos, são derivadas das posturas que acabamos de mencionar138. Chamamos atenção ao ponto do enxerto acima acerca da invocação de argumento linguístico. O genitivo costuma estar presente com a expressão dos relativos, contudo, como se verá adiante, o aspecto linguístico, por vezes, denuncia o relativo e por vezes dificulta sua constatação. Aristóteles atenta à dificuldade de constatação do relativo por conta de dificuldade linguística, sendo de notar, ademais, que a expressão escorreita do relativo pode mesmo vir a 137 Ibidem, 6a26. 138 Ibidem, 6a36. 70 implicar a necessidade de cunhar novas palavras, posto o léxico, por vezes, ser insuficiente. Ele bem examina um exemplo com a expressão a asa de uma ave tal como se fosse tida a asa como um relativo numa consideração à primeira vista, pois, a seguir o quanto já exposto, a asa é asa de alguma coisa. Numa avaliação escorreita, contudo, asa há de ser termo relativo das coisas aladas e não de ave, pois é possível haver ave sem asa. Igual exemplo é dado pelos termos leme de um barco, que não trazem relativos, pois leme é relativo das coisas lemeadas, com a permissão do neologismo, e pode haver barco sem leme. Como um barco não é um barco de um leme, ocorre que um leme não é o leme de um barco. Relativos podem ou não ter contrários e, igualmente, podem ou não ter gradação. O que sempre ocorre com os relativos, como é óbvio, é ter um correlativo. Sem reciprocidade, não há relativo. Dessa forma, se eliminado um correlato, também se elimina o outro139. Na maioria das vezes, a reciprocidade dos relativos é simultânea, mas há casos em que tal não se dá e o Autor usa o exemplo do conhecimento nesse sentido, apontando que o objeto do conhecimento antecede a este. A categoria dos relativos é própria das substâncias segundas. As substâncias primárias, evidentemente, não podem ser relativas e justamente por isso se diz que o ser da relação é o ser no sentido mais fraco em perspectiva de carga ontológica. 3.1.4 SOBRE A QUALIDADE No Tratado das Categorias, Aristóteles dá partida na apresentação da categoria da qualidade já chamando atenção a sua intrínseca noção de modo, num sentido de modo pelo qual coisas são constatadas, num senso que remete às noções básicas de semelhança e dessemelhança 139 Ibidem, 7b1: "Por outro lado, suponhamos um correlativo nomeado incorretamente. Neste caso, se suprimirmos seus atributos, salvo aquilo em virtude do que era chamado de correlativo, toda a correlação se desvanecerá. Definamos como correlativo de escravo, homem, e como correlativo de asa, ave. Retira o atributo senhor de homem; então o, com efeito, a correlação que subsiste entre homem e escravo terá desaparecido; sem senhor não há escravo. Retira o atributo alado de ave, e então a asa não será mais um relativo, pois uma vez que não há alado, a asa não terá correlativo. E assim, em síntese, é preciso que indiquemos todos os termos correlativos com exatidão. Se houver um nome para ser manuseado, então a indicação se revelará fácil. Caso não exista já um nome, penso ser nosso dever inventar um. E evidente que quando os nomes estão corretos, todos os termos relativos são correlativos. 71 entre as coisas. Tal como para com muitas outras questões, o Autor também, logo de início, passa a examinar os vários sentidos de que o termo qualidade pode gozar: Entendo por qualidade aquilo em virtude do que as coisas são, de algum modo, qualificadas. A palavra qualidade tem muitas acepções. Um tipo de qualidade é constituído pelos estados e disposições. Os primeiros são diferentes das segundas por serem mais duradouros e estáveis. Compreendidos entre aquilo que chamamos de estados estão as virtudes e todos os gêneros de conhecimento, uma vez que o conhecimento é tido como duradouro e difícil de ser deslocado [do espírito], ainda que se possa, com efeito, adquiri-lo apenas numa modesta medida, a não ser que uma grande alteração seja produzida pela doença ou alguma outra coisa semelhante. E o mesmo vale para as virtudes, por exemplo, a justiça e a moderação, pois se admite que estas são difíceis de serem afastadas ou deslocadas. Disposições, entretanto, são qualidades de fácil mobilização e alteração, tais como o calor, o frio, a doença, a saúde e assim por diante. Um ser humano apresenta uma certa disposição de acordo com todas essas condições, mas rapidamente experimenta transformação. Num momento experimentando calor, pode logo experimentar frio; estando bem, pode logo ficar doente. O mesmo ocorre com todas as demais disposições, a menos que a disposição se tornasse uma segunda natureza mediante um longo lapso de tempo, revelando-se inveterada ou de difícil eliminação, caso em que poderíamos chamá-la de estado140. Outra classificação possível à qualidade é de passiva ou de afeição. O Autor a exemplifica com doçura, amargor, azedume, frieza, alvura, negrura, etc ... e elas são qualidades na medida em que as "as coisas que as encerram são qualificadas em função delas"141, o que evidencia o umbilical nexo da qualidade com a causa formal. A utilização do termo passiva não implica que a coisa detentora da qualidade é, em si, afetada por ela, mas sim o seu sentido escorreito é que o homem percebe a qualidade passivamente nos sentidos. Conforme exemplo do Autor, o mel é doce não quer dizer que o mel em si está afetado pela doçura, mas que o paladar humano a percebe no mel. Outra e derradeira classe possível às qualidades é no sentido de forma ou figura das coisas, tais como triangulares, quadradas etc. Uma atenção bem relevante a que o Autor destaca respeita aos exemplos de raro, denso, liso e áspero, que não são qualidades e sim posições das partes das coisas. Denso se diz da coisa cujas partes são compactadas; raro, se há intervalos. Liso se diz das coisas cujas partes se posicionam sem saliência; áspero quando ocorre o contrário. As qualidades admitem contrários na maioria das vezes. Como exemplos de casos que não admitem, seguem-se cores, tal como o vermelho. Nos casos em que admite contrários, se um contrário é uma qualidade, o outro também há de sê-lo. 140 Ibidem, 8b25. 141 Ibidem, 9a33. 72 Qualidades, via de regra, admitem graus, donde admitem comparações quanto à qualidade noutras coisas. Qualidade na acepção de figura ou forma, evidentemente, não admite graus, pois, por exemplo, não pode haver uma coisa mais quadrada que outra coisa quadrada. 3.2 SITUAÇÃO DO TRATADO DAS CATEGORIAS NO CORPUS ARISTOTELICUM E LINHA FALSA DE INTERPRETAÇÃO DAS CATEGORIAS Muito ao reverso de uma tradição existente por meros fins de facilidade de estudo, o Tratado das Categorias tem posição bastante enigmática no Corpus Aristotelicum. A tábua ou mesmo a Doutrina das Categorias, como já foi exposto precedentemente nesta dissertação, foi, com efeito, referida amiúde em várias obras do Corpus e para múltiplos fins, mas não consta uma só referência em todo o Corpus acerca do Tratado das Categorias. Além disso, o nosso tratado cuida de ser uma das raras obras em que Aristóteles não inicia com um preâmbulo no qual apresenta o problema e objetivos a tratar, bem como não discorre sobre o método empregado e suas consequências. Disto tudo, decorrem fortes dúvidas acerca do que motivara o Autor a escrever o Tratado das Categorias. Isto, aliás, se, com efeito, o tratado em alusão for autêntico, eis que há correntes de investigação sobre a especulação desta autenticidade (quer total ou parcial), tema esse, contudo, que não é parte desta dissertação. Para os fins desta, assumimos o Tratado das Categorias como integralmente autêntico. Conforme já apontamos, é natural supor que a expectativa prévia de qualquer leitor do Tratado das Categorias, inclusive pelo título, é que ele fosse um tratado sobre as categorias propriamente, no sentido de lhes examinar ampla e suficientemente, uma a uma, e delas tecer considerações de seus lineamentos e, inclusive, de sua dedução, expectativa essa que, também como já apontado, resta frustrada. 73 Tal expectativa também é reforçada por conta de toda uma tradição que vem desde o fim da Antiguidade, inclusive seguida por Andrônico de Rodes, em publicar as obras de Aristóteles numa sequência em que primeiro vêm os tratados de lógica, mais especificamente, do arranjo do Organon. Como é comezinho, a lógica não tem um conteúdo de estudo de uma realidade propriamente dita, mas sim conteúdo de estudo apenas dos esquemas formais de pensamento válido e dos quais todas as demais ciências teóricas valer-se-ão como pressuposto instrumental. O Tratado das Categorias, por seu turno, costuma, tradicionalmente até hoje, ser peça introdutória do próprio Organon, seguido, na ordem, pelos tratados da Interpretação, Primeiros Analíticos, Segundos Analíticos, Tópicos e Refutações Sofísticas, ou seja, nosso tratado trata-se habitualmente de um pórtico do pórtico. O Tratado da Intepretação cuida das proposições, as quais têm termos como suas partes ou elementos constituintes, pois cuidam dos termos "com ligação". Os Primeiros Analíticos versam sobre o silogismo, que é o estudo do raciocínio dedutivo formal e tem, a seu turno, como elementos as proposições. Os Segundos Analíticos versam, a sua vez, sobre o silogismo científico, que supõe uma complexidade incremental ao silogismo puramente formal e parte, inclusive, para o estudo da natureza do conhecimento e das condições de aceitação das premissas. Os Tópicos também se ocupam do silogismo, mas de tipo também especial, o dialético, o qual perquire tanto a busca de premissas para iniciar o silogismo dedutivo quanto também busca assentar vários princípios fundamentais, não passíveis de demonstração (por exemplo, o princípio de não contradição, que não é deduzido positivamente, mas apenas se demonstra a impossibilidade de sua refutação). As Refutações Sofísticas, ao cabo, prescrevem estudo para refutar as arguições sofísticas, aliás, justamente uma das razões de ser da lógica, que é um procedimento mental rigoroso para sustentar que há verdade objetiva no mundo (ou seja, o reverso da tese sofística) e que esta pode ser comunicada, expressa e ser objeto de apreensão intelectual e convencimento racional. Ou seja, a articulação interna do Organon corrobora um entendimento de apresentação da estrutura da lógica numa forma de ascensão de complexidade (numa noção de que do incompleto segue-se ao completo), como que partindo do menor elemento até estrutura mais complexa, pois o Tratado das Categorias cuida dos termos, que são, a seu turno, palavras ou a expressão linguística convencional dos conceitos mentais simples, isoladamente tomados – as 74 coisas ditas sem ligação – e, assim, partir-se-ia da menor unidade do pensamento até os empregos complexos da lógica na argumentação e contra os sofistas, tidos por astutos enganadores. Esse entendimento da apresentação da lógica – ou mesmo de sua articulação interna –, em particular quanto a situar o Tratado das Categorias de forma taxativa e absoluta no pórtico do Organon e, mais ainda, exatamente na articulação sequencial acima aludida, sofre, contudo, por excesso de trivialidade e não resiste a uma análise acurada do conteúdo do Tratado das Categorias. Além disso, despreza, doutra banda, o próprio histórico do nosso tratado, sem embargo de, ainda, conduzir a uma pseudointerpretação da Doutrina das Categorias, tal como se elas fossem limitadas e próprias à dimensão puramente lógica e linguística, em desprezo das suas primazes dimensões ontológica e metafísica, já que o nosso Filósofo já apresentava na Metafísica, obra ocupada da suprema ciência, ocupada não só do ser enquanto ser, mas também do divino e das explicações mais gerais e ordenadoras do mundo, inclusive cosmológicas, absolutamente as mesmas figuras das Categorias. Ao final, a Metafísica é o fundamento e pressuposto da lógica e de tudo o mais. De se ressaltar, outrossim, que as realidades lógicas não são realidades substanciais, já que são destas dependentes, ou, noutras palavras, meras abstrações destas. É de se ver que toda a filosofia de Aristóteles preconiza o real sob uma noção de totalidade orgânica, e as próprias figuras das categorias são um pilar deste todo. Mais ainda, não há que se confundir uma divisão ideal dos tratados para fins de aprendizado ou quanto à estruturação global das ciências com a divisão real, no sentido cronológico, que se tenha sucedido na sua elaboração pelo Autor, as quais devem ter-se dado em descompasso e cuja não atenção – à confusão – pode implicar distorção, ao menos parcial e limitadora, das dimensões próprias que o Autor planejou a seus tratados, no caso em atenção, ao Tratado das Categorias. Sobre o aspecto histórico, é importante apontar que foi Andrônico de Rodes quem batizou o Tratado das Categorias com este nome; antes era chamado por Antes dos Tópicos ou Antes dos Lugares, marcando uma referência ao tratado que o Autor dedica ao estudo do silogismo dialético, método que, como vimos, visa a busca de premissas que irão, a seu turno, alimentar os silogismos demonstrativos. Tudo sugere fortemente, pois, que o Tratado das Categorias originariamente não seria seguido da Interpretação, dos Primeiros Analíticos e dos 75 Segundos Analíticos para só então ser seguido dos Tópicos, aspecto esse por si só já de grande relevo para a escorreita perquirição dos propósitos do Autor com o tratado em exame. É possível observar, desde as tradições dos filósofos neoplatônicos, que o Tratado das Categorias tem-se prestado à função de tratado inicial não só da lógica, mas, ao final, de toda a filosofia, ante a observação que já fizemos acima sobre o estudo desta ser precedido do estudo daquela. Inclusive Porfírio de Tiro contribuiu com a célebre Isagoge muito a fortiori com esta visão, pois a própria Isagoge, a seu turno, cuidaria de ser uma introdução às categorias, ou seja, um pré-pórtico à lógica e, assim, mantida essa visão, à filosofia. Houve, na história da tradição, variações na disposição das obras lógicas. Ora postas num tríptico inicial do Tratado das Categorias, Interpretação e Primeiros Analíticos, ora com alteração para que estes últimos fossem precedidos dos Tópicos, tais arranjos e variações se deram pela influência da lógica estoica, esta sim bastante alinhada à visão já precedentemente aludida de tratar a arrumação da lógica numa perspectiva de ascensão de complexidade a partir de unidades elementares como constituinte de estruturas superpostas, e que o tríptico aludido seria voltado ao estudo até o limite das premissas. Esse tríptico, por si, independentemente de variação, apresenta, de qualquer forma, sujeição a fortes objeções quanto ao aspecto de coesão relacional entre si, pois, sob outra perspectiva, podem os três tratados ser vistos como estranhos uns aos outros. Bodeus observa: pelo menos uma coisa parece clara: é que a vontade de criar, no início do Organon, um tríptico inaugurado por C forjou um conjunto totalmente artificial, é nesse sentido que os três tratados que o constituem são visivelmente estranhos uns dos outros. Os Primeiros Analíticos apresentam um estudo formal dos silogismos, eles próprios definidos pela posição relativa dos termos contidos nas premissas e simbolizados por letras. Certamente, isso supõe um conhecimento pelo menos sumário do que se entende por « termo » ὅρος ou « premissa » πρότασις e aquele dos tipos de premissas. Porém, Aristóteles explica com precisão tudo isso nos três primeiros capítulos da obra, anunciados, aliás, por sua introdução. A obra é, portanto, perfeitamente suficiente por si só e não exige nenhum estudo preparatório. Da interpretação não pode, aliás, passar por este tipo de estudo preparatório. Ele, o tratado, nunca faz menção de silogismos, de premissas ou de termos. Por outro lado, diferentemente da lógica estoica que considera raciocínios complexos, decomponíveis em proporções complexas, em que é importante distinguir a natureza e que se decompõem em proposições simples, elas próprias decomponíveis, a teoria do silogismo formal, em Aristóteles, não necessita do mesmo modo de um estudo prévio das formas de premissas, que distingue apenas seu caráter universal ou particular, afirmativo ou negativo; e esses últimos, do tipo « B pertence a A, em que os termos variáveis são tratados simbolicamente, não necessitam também de um estudo prévio dos modos de atribuição (as distinções categoriais). Em suma, a unidade da ciência da linguagem e da silogística não aparece, portanto, em Aristóteles 76 como nos Estóicos e, sem essa unidade, desaparece a razão de proceder ao seqüenciamento dos elementos do tríptico142. Talvez se compreenda melhor o porquê de C ter sido comparado ao tratado Da interpretação. A primeira seção desta última obra (a seção chamada « linguística » : cap. 1-6) expõe, de fato, os elementos constitutivos e as fórmulas da linguagem racional, das quais algumas, as fórmulas declarativas, servem, na segunda parte, para um estudo da contradição. Ora, em C, as « coisas ditas sem conexão » (cap. 4-8) podem também, de uma certa maneira, estar entre os elementos constitutivos da linguagem racional e, de seu lado, o estudo dos opostos (cap. 10) trata também, e principalmente, da contradição entre afirmação e negação. Porém, além de essas aproximações serem superficiais e não implicarem uma articulação entre os dois tratados, ainda menos a precedência de C sobre Da interpretação, nenhuma dessas duas obras foi visivelmente concebida na perspectiva de introduzir os Primeiros Analíticos143. Em todo caso, se antevê inequívoco elo entre o Tratado das Categorias e os Tópicos, ao ponto de justificar uma consideração relevante e tomada sob a perspectiva de ordenação dos tratados internamente ao arranjo do Organon, não só no sentido de se questionar se o Tratado das Categorias deve preceder imediatamente ou não aos Tópicos, mas, inclusive, se representa a melhor disposição, no sentido de fiel ao intento do Autor de que os próprios tratados dos Primeiros Analíticos e Segundos Analíticos antecedam aos Tópicos. Isto porque os Primeiros Analíticos versam sobre o estudo propriamente da demonstração pelo raciocínio dedutivo. Dispô-los como precedentes aos Tópicos, que é dedicado à dialética (e, pois, também à busca das premissas e princípios indemonstráveis da razão), inclusive sob noção de introdutório a este, implica uma noção, ainda que tácita, de precedência ideal da dedução sobre a dialética, o que pode, com forte probabilidade, não representar o intento do Autor – inclusive, poderia ser até o oposto, ante a impossibilidade de demonstração dos primeiros princípios da razão. Pôr a questão acima em forma de problema seria como perguntar: torna-se filósofo primeiro conhecendo sobre a lógica, ou seja, sobre o necessário e verdadeiro, ou primeiro conhecendo sobre a dialética, que equivale a dizer sobre o provável e plausível? A busca da mais correta resposta ao problema retrocolocado é que auxilia a investigação quanto ao fiel ao intento do Autor na disposição da sua obra. 142 BODEUS, Richard. Aristote Catégories. 12a Edição. Paris: Editora Les Belles Lettres, 2002, p. XIX. 143 Ibidem, p. XIX. 77 Sobre o aspecto de conteúdo do Tratado das Categorias, já expusemos nesta dissertação o quanto ele frustra o leitor que esteja sob a influência da visão trivial, pois, como observa Bodeus, se a impressão de que a ambição do autor desse texto era de redigir um tratado das « categorias » dificilmente resiste à observação obstinada dos simples fatos. Para ser um tratado das « categorias », nossa obra contém, ao mesmo tempo, muito e muito pouco. Muito pouco porque apenas quatro das dez « categorias » são submetidas ao exame; muito porque, além desses quatro capítulos, há cinco outros que expõem assuntos diferentes144 Nesta última parte, o comentador refere-se à oposição, anterioridade, simultaneidade, o movimento e o ter. É de ver, outrossim, que os temas do Tratado das Categorias, em seu conjunto, cuidam de coisas ou realidades de aspectos disparatados entre si, não havendo como os classificar sob um nome comum. O que há de comum, é de ver, é, tão somente, que cada qual dos temas tem a qualidade de poder se entender de várias maneiras, e também é de ver que, em grande medida, o próprio método empregado no Tratado das Categorias é, em si, dialético e não dedutivo. Uma abordagem de cotejamento de conteúdo do Tratado das Categorias com o resto do Corpus que nos é conhecido nos remete, por primeiro, ao livro ∆ (quinto) da Metafísica, o qual trata de sete dos nove temas de que se ocupa o Tratado das Categorias, não abordando, tão somente, os temas do simultâneo e do movimento. Com efeito, são, entre vários outros, temas tratados no dito livro ∆ da Metafísica: 1. a substância (∆ 8); 2. os opostos (∆ 10); 3. o anterior (∆ 11); 4. a quantidade (∆ 13); 5. a qualidade (∆ 14); 6. os relativos (∆ 15); 7. o ter (∆ 23). Do cotejamento do conteúdo do Tratado das Categorias com o livro ∆ da Metafísica, se verifica-se que há "correspondências, de tão aproximativas, [que são] que atestam um fundo de 144 Ibidem, p. XLII. 78 considerações comuns"145. As diferenças, não de todo desprezíveis, contudo, que há por considerar não respeitam a conflito de conteúdo mas sim a aspectos de extensão e detalhes de cuja análise fica saliente que se centram em viés de linguagem e objetivos por tratar. O Tratado das Categorias emprega linguagem de caráter mais corrente ao passo que no livro ∆ da Metafísica, há emprego mais especializado da linguagem, como no uso científico, com viés causal. Aliás, vale ver que, em efeito, o livro ∆ da Metafísica trata de trinta temas como fazendo vezes de um "repositório lexigráfico" para toda a filosofia, inclusive para a Física e a cosmologia do Autor, donde razoável a distinção de linguagem, eis que o alcance de Tratado das Categorias é assaz mais circunscrito e com orientação mais centrada justamente na forma de falar (por exemplo, o livro ∆ da Metafísica não cuida das substâncias secundas, o que revela a prioridade substancial em relação aos fenômenos da fala, da atribuição). Ou seja, à evidencia, o Tratado das Categorias e o livro ∆ da Metafísica têm objetivos distintos ao ponto de não parecer haver uma articulação de intencionalidade entre eles. Em cotejamento com os Tópicos, a seu turno, a extensão em comum, bem como todo o viés de abordagem, com o Tratado das Categorias é muito significativa no sentido de aproximação. Bodeus listou numerosas correspondências de temas entre Tratado das Categorias e os Tópicos, várias que são, inclusive textuais, com o emprego in literis das mesmas palavras (em especial com o emprego dos mesmos exemplos), a saber: 1) Referente à substância: a tese de que o corpo (sujeito de inerência do branco: 2a31) é uma substância e uma substância de uma certa qualidade (a título de substância segunda) é uma afirmação de Tóp., V, 2, 130 b 3-4; a tese de que a substância não é suscetível de mais nem menos (3b33-34) é afirmada com a ajuda do mesmo exemplo (Tóp., II,11,115b9 = Tratado das Categorias, 3b37-38); a ideia de que a espécie, mais próximo da substância primeira, permite melhor conhecê-la que o gênero (2b8-9) é paralela àquela que o gênero, melhor que a diferença, permite ver a essência (Tóp., IV,6,128a25); e a afirmação de que a espécie e o gênero permitem ver um tipo de qualidade (3b15-16) é correlativa da afirmação de que a diferença específica, que pertence ao gênero, permite ver também um tipo de qualidade (Tóp., IV,2,122b16-17; VI,6,144a18-22). 2) Referente à quantidade: várias daquelas que são listadas a partir de 4b22 (o número, a linha, a superfície, o corpo) são igualmente evocadas (Tóp., I,16,108b30; IV,2,122b19; V,5,134b12-13; 8,138a16-19; VI,4,141b5-24), assim como o contínuo, um de seus gêneros (conforme 4b20), aquele das quantidades com que as partes estão em contato (cf. Tóp., IV,2,122b28-30). 145 Ibidem, p. XLIX. 79 3) Referente ao relativo: os inúmeros exemplos que servem para ilustrar os relativos (a partir de 6a33), em particular o dobro, a metade, a ciência, o estado e a disposição, etc. são mencionados várias vezes (cf. Tóp., IV,1,121a5; 3,124b15-35; 125a33 e seg.; V,6,135b17 e seg.); a célebre definição dos relativos (8a31-32) encontra-se em todas as letras (Tóp., VI, 4, 142a29-30; VI,8,145b3-6); a regra universal de reciprocidade (enunciada em 6b28) também consta em todas as letras (Tóp., VI,12,149b12); as diferenças de inflexão que (conforme 6b33 e seg.) caracterizam certos relativos são expostas nos mesmos termos (Tóp., IV,4,124b36-125a24) e são dadas, aqui como ali, como uma objeção aparente à regra de reciprocidade; mesmo a observação de que o animal é sensível corporalmente, sobre a qual Tratado das Categorias (7b38 e seg.) apóia a prioridade da sensíbilidade sobre o sentido, é uma observação que se lê nos Tópicos (IV,5,126a22-24). 4) Referente à qualidade: o branco, qualidade típica (a partir de 1a27), é muitas vezes mencionado nesse título (Tóp., II,2,109a38; IV,6,127a24; VI,12,149a38); as qualidades do primeiro gênero, estados e disposições (8b27) são frequentemente destacadas, com o exemplo favorito da ciência (Tóp., II,4,111a23; IV,1,121a1 e seg.; 3,124a31; VI,7,145a33 e seg.); a diferença assinalada entre o estado e a disposição (8b27) é também observada (Tóp., III, 1,116a12); a capacidade, qualidade do segundo gênero (9a14) e a afeição, qualidade do terceiro gênero (9a29) são também evocadas (Tóp., IV,5,125b20; VI,7,145a3, 33,35); a questão debatida de saber se a justiça é suscetível de mais ou menos (10b30-11a5) aparece na passagem (Tóp. IV,6,127b20-22); e mesmo o fato perturbador (relatado em 11a20-38) de que certas qualidades, como as ciências particulares, têm por gênero um relativo é um fato cuidadosamente notado (Tóp., IV,4,124b15-22; cf. 121a9). 5) Referente aos opostos: as quatro modalidades de oposição (listadas a partir de 11b17) estão expostas várias vezes, sempre com os mesmos exemplos (Tóp., I,14,105b33; II,2,109b17 e seg.; 8,113b5 e seg.; IV,3,124a35-b35; V,6,137b7); o mesmo ocorre, particularmente, com os contrários e suas características (Tóp., I,10,104a21, 32; II,7,112b27; IV,3,123b34-35; VI,9,147a22 e seg.), com os contraditórios (Tóp., I,15,106b13; IV,3,123b20), com os relativos (Tóp., IV,4,125a33 e seg.) e com a privação, oposta ao estado (Tóp., I,15,156b21; VI,3,141a11; 9,147b4, 26,28, etc.); o exemplo típico da cegueira (11b21; 12a36,b9, etc.) também é apresentado (Tóp., V,6,136a2-3; VI,6,143b34); a posição dos contrários nos gêneros ou como gêneros (14a19-25) é deduzida exatamente nos mesmos termos (Tóp., VII,2,153a35-36); a existência de intermediários entre os contrários (frequentemente tratada a partir de 12a2) é também considerada nos mesmos termos (Tóp., IV,3,123b19, 23, 25, 27, 29; 124a6; VIII, 3, 158b7, 39), assim como a necessidade para um dos contrários sem intermediários de pertencer ao sujeito (Tóp., II,6,112a24-25). 6) Referente à anterioridade: a anterioridade é objeto de inúmeras alusões (em particular, Tóp., V,4,133a12-13 e VI,6,144b9); a anterioridade natural (14b5) é expressamente mencionada (Tóp., IV,2,123a14-15); a anterioridade denominada aqui conforme a ordem (14a35) e que é ilustrada por aquela do elemento sobre a sílaba é também mencionada com a ajuda do mesmo exemplo (Tóp., VI,4,141b9); finalmente, a famosa anterioridade conforme a estima, considerada bastante comum (14b4) também encontra-se destacada (Tóp., III, 116b17). 7) Referente à simultaneidade: ela é também objeto de inúmeras alusões a propósito dos opostos e, em particular, dos contrários (Tóp., II,7,113a22; IV,3,123a21; VI,4,142a24-25); a noção de simultaneidade natural (sublinhada a partir de 14b1-2), assim tal qual (como em 14b33) a simultaneidade das espécies opostas na divisão de um mesmo gênero (Tóp., VI,6,143a36-b2). 8) Referente ao movimento: as espécies de movimento (listadas em 15a13 e seg.) são frequentemente lembradas, não somente segundo os mesmos esquemas, mas nos mesmos 80 termos (Tóp., II,4,11b6 e seg.; 9,114b16; III,6,120b1-2; IV,1,121a31 e seg.; 2,122a21,b31; 3,124a27-28). 9) Referente ao ter: distinguidas em 15b17 e seg., as diferentes modalidades do ter são expressas para considerar no caso de uma definição do estado e reciprocamente (Tóp., VI,9,147a12-13) 146. De ver, pois, que todos os assuntos do Tratado das Categorias147 são também tratados nos Tópicos por várias vezes e, inclusive, como já dito, com as mesmas expressões textuais e com o uso dos mesmos exemplos. As diferenças, quando existentes, não trazem conflito de conteúdo, só implicam distinção em extensão de profundidade de análise. Em Tópicos os temas são tratados em grau menor de profundidade, tudo numa forte sugestão, por estes fundamentos, da hipótese de ser o Tratado das Categorias precedente, tanto enquanto obra quanto idealmente, dos Tópicos e, mesmo, introdutório destes, até porque soam bem úteis ao método dialético as distinções categorias e o tema dos opostos. Bodeus expõe a hipótese: É possível, a partir daí, considerar de modo mais preciso as relações entre C e o projeto que os Tópicos constituem. A hipótese de que nossa obra, conforme seu título antigo (Τὰ πρὸ τῶν τόπων) seria uma espécie de introdução ao exposto dos « lugares » contido nos principais livros dos Tópicos é uma hipótese que não carece de probabilidade, pois, na passagem, o exposto dos « lugares », acabamos de vê-lo, menciona sumariamente inúmeros dados fornecidos por C148. Ora, comparados a C, os Tópicos efetuam freqüentemente observações breves, sem análise de detalhe149. O autor dos Tópicos dá, assim, o sentimento de que, por exemplo, as distinções « categoriais » e aquelas dos opostos são de certa forma importantes na aquisição de um método dialético, mas ele não propõe um estudo aprofundado, nem sistemático. Portanto, existe aí, diríamos, uma espécie de vazio, de ausência ou de lacuna. Aí está o motivo de termos a impressão de que o tratado das C vem oportunamente preencher esta lacuna e que ele reúne tematicamente, para examiná-las com profundidade, dados elementares dispersos nos Tópicos150. A hipótese de o Tratado das Categorias preceder os Tópicos idealmente e como obra não é a única acerca dos elos entre os dois tratados, pois há foro de razoabilidade em interpretação reversa na medida em que o livro I dos Tópicos apresenta as noções de predicações 146 Ibidem, p. LXVI. 147 Em efeito, nessa consideração não se considerou, tão somente, a parte inicial relacionada às definições de equívocos. 148 BODEUS, Richard. Aristote Catégories. Edição. Paris: Editora Les Belles Lettres, 2002, p. LXIX 149 Ibidem, p. LXIX 150 Ibidem, p. LXX 81 possíveis, as quais, conforme já salientamos, podem ser tidas como preliminares à detenção de doutrina das categorias. Também há a tese de que, com relação à parte do Tratado das Categorias – dos equívocos –, se levada a cotejamento com os Tópicos, dá azo à hipótese em sentido reverso, qual seja, a de que o Tratado das Categorias, ao menos em parte, tenha sido feito a partir de sumarização dos Tópicos. Isso se dá com base em que, entre outras considerações, o nosso Tratado, ao se iniciar com o tema dos equívocos e unívocos, já os apresenta com o emprego da noção de fórmula definitória, pressupondo, destarte, que o leitor já tivesse contato com o livro I dos Tópicos. Todas as hipóteses lançadas são forte competidoras entre si. O que emerge seguro, contudo, é que a posição tradicional de Tratado das Categorias ser pórtico ideal da lógica, a fortiori pórtico da parte demonstrativa da lógica, conforme expusemos, é visão longe de ser segura e não só pouco profícua como comprometedora ao escorreito entendimento de todo o próposito de alcance das figuras das categorias. 82 4 A DOUTRINA DAS CATEGORIAS 4.1 O QUE SÃO SUAS PRINCIPAIS CONTROVÉRSIAS SEUS SIGNIFICADOS E DIVERSOS ASPECTOS O que são exatamente as categorias, em termos de essência, é tema de que se ocupam comentadores de Aristóteles desde a Antiguidade, e há arguições de distintas ordens. Mais do que a polêmica sobre a essência, há muitas outras que circundam o tema das categorias, conexas em diferentes graus, tais como: (i) se o número de dez é ou não completo, pois, por vezes, o Autor se manifestou sobre elas em número menor, o que gera a especulação de que as dez categorias indicadas sejam apenas dez exemplos e que comportariam incremento151; (ii) se o Tratado das Categorias é ou não autêntico152; (iii) qual fio condutor teria guiado o Estagirita na dedução das categorias, tema este que é objeto central desta dissertação e cujo desenvolvimento implica uma digressão mínima sobre a essência das figuras categorias, pois são temas manifestamente conectados nas pesquisas. Quanto à discussão acerca da essência das Categorias, o tema já dividia os comentadores antigos que as consideravam palavras, ou predicados (num sentido de significar), ou pensamentos ou mesmo a realidade em si. Aliás, a vetusta discussão conhecida pela "querela dos universais" é fortemente imbricada com a perquirição da natureza das Categorias. Em todo caso, aos comentadores modernos são três as grandes linhas especulativas acerca da essência peculiar das figuras das categorias, quais sejam: a) as categorias como quadro 151 Para os fins desta dissertação, assumimos o número de 10 categorias como completo. 152 Conforme já asseverado, para todos os fins desta dissertação, assumimos o Tratado das Categorias como autêntico. 83 de classificação de conceitos; b) as categorias como conceitos, no sentido de conceitos tirados do nexo do juízo; c) as categorias como conceitos reais. 4.1.1 CATEGORIAS COMO QUADRO DE CLASSIFICAÇÃO Esta linha sustenta que as categorias são um quadro de classificação de conceitos; em outras palavras, um ponto de vista para registro e classificação de conceitos reais, sem, contudo, ser as mesmas, em si, conceitos. Tal abordagem, pois, se coaduna com uma perspectiva predominantemente lógica das categorias. Aderem a esta perspectiva Brandis e Zeller, ambos referidos por Brentano no clássico Sobre os múltiplos significados do ser segundo Aristóteles, que traz como enxertos: Referente a Brandis: As categorias não têm outra missão que não reunir as questões e determinações gerais que devemos aplicar para acolher em nosso pensamento todos e cada qual dos objetos, por exemplo, para alcançar as determinações conceituais de ditos objetos. São as formas ou gêneros da enunciação, extraídas desde o nexo proposicional e separadas dele, é dizer não são elas mesmas conceitos gerais reais e bem definidos153. Referente a Zeller: As categorias não pretendem descrever as coisas segundo sua constituição real, nem tampouco estabelecer os conceitos gerais requeridos para isso; se limitam, em efeito, a expor os diferentes aspectos que cabe ter em conta numa descrição semelhante; do ponto de vista do filósofo, sua missão não é fornecer conceitos reais, senão o quadro classificatório em que se devem registrar todos os conceitos reais154. As categorias não são elas mesmas imediatamente predicados, senão simplesmente designam o lugar que corresponde a certos predicados155. 153 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. p. 123. 154 Ibidem, p. 123. 155 Ibidem, p. 124. 84 Nesse passo, é relevante destacar que, à perspectiva em comento, as categorias atinem à organização de predicados, e não, no sentido estrito, à organização das modalidades de predicação, conforme já assentamos precedentemente156. 4.1.2 CATEGORIAS COMO CONCEITOS RELATIVOS AO JUÍZO Esta vertente propugna que as categorias são conceitos, mas não conceitos no sentido usual, tomados como simples representação da razão, e sim, mais precisamente, tomados numa particular relação para com o juízo, tais como elementos primários decorrentes duma decomposição ideal desse. No paralelo linguístico, equivaleria a tratar as categorias como predicados gerais, o que conduz a tratarmos essa linha como de abordagem gramatical. Tal posição é advogada por Trendelenburg desde Das Categorias em que sustenta também que, harmonicamente com a essência advogada, a própria dedução das categorias adviera da diversidade das relações gramaticais. Essa tese será mais bem examinada no curso desta dissertação Com isso, as categorias se nos apresentam como os conceitos gerais sob os quais caem os predicados da proposição simples ... As categorias são os predicados mais gerais157. É sabido que Aristóteles, para encontrar as categorias, precisou romper a conexão do discurso e não indica que, para formar o juízos, tenha composto noções. (...) Assim, pois, as próprias palavras de Aristóteles ensinam que as categorias nasceram da dissolução da enunciação, pelas quais é retomado o início158. 156 Tal como gênero, espécie, diferença, propriedade e acidente. 157 Trendelemburg, História da teoria das categorias apud BRENTANO, Sobre os Múltiplos Significados do Ser, fls. 124. 158 TRENDELEMBURG, Das Categorias. 85 Essa linha guarda provável coesão com entendimento que havia entre os medievais, tanto que traduziram κατηγορίαι como praedicamenta, ou seja, forte no viés da linguagem. 4.1.3 CATEGORIAS COMO CONCEITOS REAIS Esta abordagem sustenta que as categorias são conceitos reais159 em si e num sentido supremo com significação direta da diversidade da noção geral do Ser, o que evidencia uma perspectiva de cunho ontológico. Ou seja, até porque não seriam não conceitos no sentido de tirados do nexo dos juízos e tampouco consistentes de partes de relações meramente lógicas, assumiriam assim as categorias um caráter de diferentes conceitos supremos que se designam pelo nome comum ὄν 160, assentando um viés de distinção conceitual com distinção de significado, ou, mais ainda, com distinção por gênero de significado. As categorias oferecem os diferentes significados em que, do ponto de vista de Aristóteles, enunciamos o conceito de ser; designam os gêneros supremos tais que todo ser deve subordinar-se a alguma delas. Servem, portanto, para orientar-se no âmbito das coisas da experiência. (...) Segundo isso, ..... não significa só e exclusivamente que um conceito se acrescenta a outro como predicado, senão também, em geral, que um conceito se enuncia ou se diz em um significado determinado, sem que por isso se pense de modo algum sua relação com outro 161 . Essa posição é advogada por Bonitz, Brentano e Reale. Reale, a propósito, comenta sobre a infelicidade de apresentar essa perspectiva sob a expressão "conceito real", pugnando para que fosse vista, mais oportunamente, como uma "posição metafísica" 162. 159 Num certo sentido, a expressão "conceito real" pode parecer até mesmo insubsistente. 160 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. fls. 125. 161 Ibidem, fls. 125-126. 162 "O modo com que é indicada esta posição é muito infeliz e nos parece mais oportuno defini-la "posição metafísica", posição, isto é, daqueles que sublinham, nas categorias, o aspecto ontológico". In REALE, Giovanni. 86 4.2 ASPECTOS GERAIS SUPERPOSTOS OU CONTRASTANTES DAS CATEGORIAS Em comum, todas as três abordagens sobre a essência das categorias, sob viés subjetivo, repelem qualquer essência, o que, aliás, evidentemente feriria o realismo aristotélico. Mais ainda, comungam referência a conceito, no sentido de que versam diferentes formas de enunciação conceitual – perspectiva lógica – ou propriamente conceitos mesmos – as demais perspectivas. Brentano debruçou exata e extensamente sobre essa diversidade especulativa, tendo-a compreendido como completa e manifestado que sua preferência à perspectiva ontológica se dá sem embargo de não fulminar por absoluto as demais perspectivas, pois nelas o estudioso alemão constata haver elementos tanto corretos quanto conciliáveis com a sua linha especulativa preferida. Se resulta, pois, que neste ponto as interpretações já existentes, nitidamente distinguidas e contrapostas entre si, esgotam todas as possibilidades e excluem qualquer nova posição, devemos declarar sem vacilos que o terceiro ponto de vista nos parece preferível aos outros dois, não obstante apontemos que não podemos compartilhar na sua totalidade o modo em que esse ponto de vista tenha sido desenvolvido (com determinações adicionais que não são, em qualquer caso, independentes das resposta que se dê à questão), especialmente no meritório tratado de Bonitz citado mais acima. Ao contrário, também nas outras posições reconhecemos elementos corretos, que nos parecem perfeitamente conciliáveis com o terceiro163. O próprio Brentano, ademais, observa que mesmo os defensores de cada qual das outras linhas especulativas tinham por ânimo apenas afirmar sua linha meramente como preponderante Fio Condutor Gramatical e Fio Condutor Ontológico na Dedução das Categorias Aristotélicas. Revista de Filosofia Neo-Escolástica, 1957. 163 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. p. 128. 87 em relação às demais, sem qualquer pretensão de absolutismo excludente. Ou seja, é forçoso inferir que as categorias têm, cumulativamente, elementos lógicos, linguístico-gramaticais e ontológicos à luz de todos os intérpretes aludidos, nenhum deles servo da linha falsa de interpretação das categorias, à qual já aludimos. Aliás, esse caráter multidimensional das categorias lhes outorga o posto de efetivo internódio entre a lógica e a filosofia primeira, cujo alcance, a seu turno e conforme já exposto, se origina na filosofia segunda – a Física –, calcada na apreensão sensorial, das constatações fenomênicas. Ademais, todos os grupos de modo do ser, como já visto, se expressam nas categorias, de forma que a realidade se expressa por elas. Trendelenburg foi expresso no particular: Aristóteles, na medida em que quer manter estreitamente unidas a lógica e a filosofia primeira, talvez tenha posto as categorias entre ambas como um internódio (isto é, um espaço entre duas articulações). Transmitida a natureza do conhecimento, coisa que é realizada da melhor maneira pelos Analíticos, pode-se considerar que as categorias preparam o caminho para aquelas noções que, por serem as primeiras, regem a natureza toda e assim destas se passa para as causas que integram a realidade metafísica. Desse íntimo parentesco das categorias com os escritos metafísicos constata-se que se trata das mesmas noções tanto nas categorias quanto na metafísica164. Como já prenunciado nesta dissertação, existe uma linha falsa de interpretação das categorias limitando-as meramente aos quadrantes da lógica, tomadas apenas como "noções simples" e a partir das quais a lógica ascenderia a aspectos mais complexos. Isso decorre de que o Tratado das Categorias, também como já exposto, é tradicionalmente editado como livro vestibular do Organon; seguido do livro Da interpretação, que versa sobre a proposição; seguido dos dois livros dos Analíticos, que versam sobre silogismo e silogismo científico; seguidos do livro dos Tópicos, que versa sobre o silogismo dialético; seguido, ao cabo, do livro das Refutações sofísticas. Ao seu turno, sói também ser usual iniciarem-se os estudos filosóficos a partir da lógica. Como já observamos anteriormente, a organização do Organon conforme a sequência de tratados acima apontada decorre não de disposição ideal da doutrina lógica ou do todo da filosofia, mas apenas por conta de facilidade intelectual, sem que nem o mundo seja a composição de coisas (a qual só opera na mente), nem sejam as categorias figuras apenas da 164 TRENDELEMBURG, Das Categorias. 88 lógica. Trendelenburg, em aspecto em que é acompanhado por Reale e Brentano, assinalava claramente essa consideração. Entre os livros de Aristóteles, as categorias foram colocadas em primeiro lugar como se constituíssem o vestíbulo da filosofia. De fato, as categorias, pelas quais as noções são compreendidas por si e quase pelo corpo, são tratadas em separado porque pareciam ser as mais simples e constitutivas dos inícios do pensamento, das quais procederiam as restantes como coisas mais elaboradas e conjuntas. A destacar, neste ponto, que parece ter vigorado a mesma lei pela qual até aos dias de hoje muitos lógicos costumam ser levados a colocar as noções na primeira linha da sua arte, ou seja, noções são postas juntas como matéria para formar juízos e proposições, juízos são formulados para que surjam formas de conclusão, argumentando assim de forma mais engenhosa do que verdadeira Semelhante maneira de compor, embora recomendada por uma espécie de simplicidade, afasta-se, no entanto, totalmente da vida da natureza. Esta na verdade não compõe, mas gera, não aglutina as coisas, mas, tudo o que constrói, desenvolve-o como a partir de uma semente165. Brentano, no clássico Sobre os múltiplos significados do ser segundo Aristóteles, promove uma ampla exposição sobre 15 teses da doutrina especializada superpostas das várias linhas especulativas e demais aspectos das categorias. Inicia já advertindo o leitor da complexidade pela hibridez do tema e de que seu preterimento da perspectiva lógica se dá em termos, pois ele não a elide, apenas a vê como incompleta. Em efeito, o comentador alemão advoga que as categorias não são "apenas" um quadro de classificação de conceitos. Ou seja, de forma precisa, ele assume, sim, que são as categorias um quadro classificatório de conceitos, o que implica a necessidade, a seu ver, doutra banda, que também sejam as categorias conceitos em si como gêneros ordenadores. Nesse sentido: Dissemos "não somente como classificadores de conceitos". Não negamos, portanto, que constituam um quadro classificatório no qual devam se registrar todos os conceitos reais, determinando os lugares em que ditos conceitos se repartem. Mais ainda, também este último terá que se seguir necessariamente, se as categorias forem realmente conceitos genéricos universais. Pois todo gênero encerra dentro de um limite único, mais amplo, todas as espécies e indivíduos que a ele se subordinam: estes estão nele e ele é, em certa maneira, o lugar deles. Só que também o inverso parece necessário, a saber, que o lugar comum dos conceitos venha determinado por um gênero ou por um conceito universal análogo. Do que se segue, entendo, de maneira puramente racional, que se as categorias são, como eles dizem, o quadro de classificação de conceitos, não 165 Ibidem. 89 podem ser meramente um quadro de classificação de conceitos, senão que tenham que ser por sua vez conceitos elas mesmas166. Classificação, por si e como é evidente, evoca as noções de gênero, espécie e diferença, donde o claro eco com a afirmação de Porfírio de Tiro quanto a não prescindir a compreensão das categorias da Teoria da Predicação. De ver que o Ser e "apenas ser" é, pela multiplicidade já dita, um indeterminado, de ordem superior às categorias e que por elas se determina, tal como uma atualização de potência. Disto segue evidente que não é possível tratar o Ser puramente como um simples gênero ordenador de suas espécies, tal como se as figuras das categorias fossem, a seu turno, as espécies do Ser, pois espécie não determina o gênero e sim o oposto. Aristóteles, em efeito, asseverou expressamente que não se pode tratar o Ser nesse sentido simples167,168 de mero gênero ordenador de suas espécies. São numerosas as passagens, inclusive já trazidas a esta dissertação, em que o Autor alude a que o Ser é dito de várias maneiras, vários significados e modos de significado. Assim, resta evidente que se as categorias tivessem acima de si um simples gênero ordenador, todas predicar-se-iam, em certa extensão, sinonimamente, o que contradiz a própria partida, qual seja, a da multiplicidade de sentidos do ser, que, como se verá adiante, implica, relativamente ao ser das categorias, uma multiplicidade de forma de remissão ao ser separado ou o próprio ser separado (substância). 166 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. p. 131. 167 Cumpre também verificar se o opositor afirmou que algum predicado que acompanha tudo é gênero ou diferença, uma vez que há diversos predicados que acompanham tudo; ser, por exemplo e uno entre eles. Se então, ele apontou ser um gênero, obviamente seria o gênero de tudo, já que é predicado de tudo, pois o gênero não é predicado de coisa alguma, exceto do sua espécie. Consequentemente, uno também seria uma espécie de ser. O resultado é a espécie ser também predicada de tudo de que o gênero é predicado, uma vez que ser e uno são predicados de absolutamente tudo, ao passo que a espécie deve ser menos amplamente predicada Se, contudo, ele afirmou que o predicado que acompanha tudo é uma diferença, fica óbvio que a diferença será predicada numa extensão igual ou superior ao gênero, pois se o gênero também for um dos predicados que acompanham tudo, a diferença seria predicada numa extensão igual; entretanto, se o gênero não acompanhar tudo, [a diferença seria predicada] numa extensão superior ao gênero. (Tópicos. 2a. Edição. Bauru, SP. Editora Edipro, 2010. 127a27). 168 Mas não é possível que o Um e o Ser sejam gêneros. (Com efeito, existem necessariamente as diferenças de cada gênero, e cada uma delas é única. Por outro lado, é impossível que as espécies de um gênero se prediquem das próprias diferenças ou que o gênero separado de suas espécies se predique de suas diferenças. De onde se segue que, se o Ser e o Um são gêneros, nenhuma "diferença" poderá ser nem poderá ser uma) (in Aristóteles, Metafísica, 998b25). 90 Em suma, "o ser não é conceito único , pois se encontra em cada categoria do ser, de múltiplos significados"169, donde se segue a heterogeneidade das categorias. Como já asseverado precedentemente, o ser dos demais grupos de significado – acidente, potência e ato, e verdade e falsidade – se expressa sob as figuras das categorias, que dão modos às remissões de cada grupo, pois. Assim, resta claro que, como tudo o que é, o é sob uma das figuras das categorias, bem como tudo o que, como conceito, se subsume a apenas uma delas – aspecto sobre o qual vamos detalhar adiante –, forçoso é verificar que as categorias são, então, gêneros, tais como gêneros supremos do Ser, os mais universais possíveis, de forma que tudo é subordinado delas. Brentano, no particular, sintetizou que "o ser não deve ser tratado como gênero e o que corresponde a diferentes categorias não pode ter um gênero comum. Pelo contrário, as próprias categorias são gêneros de tudo que é subordinado a elas"170. De outra perspectiva, e, em consideração à natureza de gênero das figuras das categorias, é de ver que "o gênero se predica sinonimamente de todas as espécies"171. Nesse sentido, fica evidente que, no limite último de respostas à pergunta o que é, aplicada a qualquer coisa, chega-se a: é uma qualidade ou uma quantidade ou uma relação ou uma substância, etc ..., evidenciando-se a predicação sinônima da categoria como gênero às coisas a ela determinada até a substância primeira e bem como a irredutibilidade de uma à outra. Tal como se dá para com os demais grupos de modos do Ser, a diversidade de categorias não implica ausência de unidade entre elas, pois há, em efeito, uma unidade trans-genérica, do tipo por analogia172, tal como já abordamos quanto aos demais grupos de modos do ser. A referência da analogia, evidentemente, é à substância, com a qual as demais figuras das categorias mantêm diferentes remissões. Essa analogia se revela mais de qualidade que de proporção. As remissões à categoria da substância se evidenciam na medida em que, como aduzimos anteriormente, tudo o que é Ser ou é substância a ela respeita de alguma forma, de sorte que, sem o ser da substância, não há Ser algum. 169 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. p 133. 170 Ibidem, p 143. 171 Aristóteles, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1027b6. 172 "Além disso algumas coisas são unidade quanto ao número, outras quanto à espécie, outras quanto ao gênero, outras por analogia". Aristóteles, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1016b31. 91 Nesse sentido, verifica-se, como acima adiantado, que as categorias também se tomam como os predicados supremos da substância primeira, eis que, posto serem gêneros, predicam-se das espécies infraordenadas, que, a sua vez, predicam-se, como gênero, das suas espécies, descendo-se, pois, das substâncias segundas até as substâncias primeiras, que também se predicam das categorias. Ser predicado supremo da substância primeira implica ser predicado supremo também, por outra via, das substâncias segundas, que só "existem" dependentes das primeiras e como acidentes e/ou aspectos abstraídos daquelas. Diferente a forma de remissão pela figura da categoria, evidentemente, decorre ser diferente o sentido ou significado da categoria. Em maior precisão, as diferentes formas de remissão à substância alcançam, por exaustão, o número de três, tal como seres ou aspectos que: (i) estão na substância, ou seja, inerências, tais como princípios internos a elas; (ii) estão parcialmente na substância e parcialmente fora dela, tal como uma operação (ou atualização da potência); (iii) estão fora da substância, ou seja, são circunstâncias dela. Apontamos o quadro abaixo com as distinções das remissões/significados de cada qual das figuras das categorias – exceto a da substância, visto que lhe dedicamos um capítulo precedentemente. Categoria Forma de Remissão – Significado Qualidade É inerente à substância. Porta o caráter determinante e diferenciador da substância individual. Responde à pergunta como é ?. Tem forte vinculação com a causa formal ao ponto de determinar início e fim de um ente. Quantidade173 É inerente à substância primeira. Tal como a qualidade está para a forma, a quantidade está para a matéria. Associa-se com extensão. Responde à pergunta quão grande é ? Ação É categoria de operação. Identifica o princípio de um movimento. Responde à pergunta: o que faz ? Paixão É categoria de operação. Identifica o destino de um movimento. Responde à pergunta: do que padece ? Estado (ou posse) Intermediário entre duas coisas sem ser propriamente uma ação ou paixão. Responde à pergunta: de que se reveste ? Posição Responde à pergunta: como está ? Lugar Responde à pergunta onde está ? Tempo Responde à pergunta qual a sua duração ? Relação Está fora da substância. Tem a menor carga ou valor ontológico. Responde à pergunta a que se refere ? 173 "Quantidade se diz do que é divisível em partes imanentes e das quais cada uma é, por sua natureza, algo uno e determinado". ARISTÓTELES, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1020a7. 92 Tal como ordenadas acima, observa-se que as categorias seguem uma ordenação de caráter ontológico, partindo do, num sentido largo, "mais ser" ao "menos ser", como que de "dentro para fora", revelando, numa medida, a força do sensível como ponto de partida de todas as especulações da razão. Numa outra perspectiva, as ordenações seguem a um paralelo da sequência das quatro causas do ser já estabelecidas desde a Física, como se, grosso modo, à causa formal atine a qualidade, à causa material atine a quantidade, à causa eficiente atinem a ação, paixão, estado, posição, lugar e tempo e à causa final atine a relação. Nesse ponto, é pertinente atentar também a um paralelismo entre matéria-formacomposto e gênero, espécie e diferença, reforçando a distinção categorial como diferenças nas qualidades de remissões à substância, particularmente à substâncias primeiras, compostas de matéria e forma, o próprio ponto de partida do conhecimento ontológico. O gênero se aparenta preponderantemente à matéria, pois tal como o que é de um gênero se distingue e não se reduz ao que é de outro, o que é de uma matéria se distingue e não se reduz ao que é de outra. Doutra banda, de ver que a matéria, tal como um gênero, tem determinação vaga ou muito ampla, mas suficiente para, por si, limitar potências, ou, por outras palavras, para não receber certas atualizações. Por exemplo, qualquer ser cuja causa material seja o ferro não receberá a forma homem. Ou seja, são múltiplas, mas não ilimitadas as atualizações possíveis. Para o Ser cuja causa material seja o ferro podem advir determinações pela recepção em ato da forma, por exemplo, cadeira, prego, ferramenta etc. A espécie, a seu turno, está para a forma. Tal como a potência da matéria se atualiza pela recepção ou perda da forma, um indivíduo de um gênero é mais bem identificado pela indicação de sua espécie, como uma forma específica. Aliás, a rigor e como já apresentado, a melhor definição é a indicação da infima specie. No quadrante das substâncias sensíveis, que é o horizonte seguro da pertinência das categorias, a forma e a matéria se pressupõem, e o composto matéria e forma alcança o Ser substancial. Este, a seu turno, é o pressuposto indispensável do ser nas demais acepções, inclusive a acidental, a cuja expressão a simples recepção de forma não é suficiente, pois a forma pode ser recebida por diversas maneiras, como a cadeira pode ter diferentes qualidades acidentais (preta, azul, branca...), diferentes quantidades acidentais, como dimensão, diferentes localizações acidentais etc., e de onde se vê o paralelo entre a diferença e o composto. 93 Brentano aduz no particular: O sujeito não deve ser apenas sujeito de diferentes formas, mas que deve ser sujeito de diferente maneira; a forma não só deve ser uma forma distinta, mas uma forma recebida no sujeito de diferente maneira, uma forma que afeta ao mesmo de maneira diferente. Com isso, se a substância primeira é aquilo que está como sujeito na base de todos os acidentes, é claro então que dos gêneros supremos dos acidentes, cada um deles há de manifestar um modo diferente de inerência, uma remissão diferente à substância primeira, e que a diferença à remissão à substância primeira não apenas distingue substância de acidente, mas também as diferentes categorias acidentais entre si 174 . Ou seja, as categorias, na percepção de Brentano, se distinguem pelos diferentes modos de existência nas substâncias primeiras e disso decorre a asserção de que "o número e diversidade das categorias coincide com o número e diversidade dos modos em que se predica algo da substância primeira"175,176. Esse sentido de predicação acima, de expressar – ou predicar diretamente a um sujeito – uma figura das categorias, é também chamado de sentido próprio de predicação e não se confunde com as demais formas de predicar (tais como uma espécie de seu gênero ou diferença etc.). Pelo dito modo próprio se logra responder a todas as perguntas possíveis sobre uma substância primeira, provendo resposta essencial, quantitativa, qualitativa, situacional, relacional etc. De se ver que também as substâncias segundas podem ser predicadas, tal como podemos dizer que homem é racional, um corpo é alto etc., mas, sempre, de forma que um homem em concreto também pudesse ter esses predicados, pois afinal o homem concreto é o fundamento do homem universal. Idem quanto aos acidentes universais, que, a seu turno, só aceitam predicação no sentido de identidade real, da categoria de essência, do menos universal com o gênero. Por exemplo: branco é cor, cor é qualidade etc. Mais ainda com respeito a substâncias segundas, é de ver que elas – gênero e espécie – são conceitos, mas não são conceitos reais, pois elas não têm existência senão na mente. 174 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. p 152. 175 Ibidem, p 153. 176 Também substâncias segundas podem ser predicadas nesse modo, tal como podemos dizer que homem é racional, um corpo, alto, etc ..., mas, sempre, de forma que um homem em concreto pudesse ter esses predicados. Os acidentes universais, como substâncias num sentido derivado, só aceitam predicação no sentido de identidade real, de essência do menos universal com o gênero. Por exemplo: o branco é cor, cor é qualidade, etc ... Não se cogita do predicado acidental do acidente. 94 É importante ressaltar que a coincidência do número de categorias e modos próprios de predicação não implica afirmar que categorias sejam, na sua essência absoluta, modos de predicação, como se a predicação estivesse a criar o mundo. Essa coincidência, noutras palavras, só afirma que a diversidade ontológica verificada nas substâncias primeiras é passível de predicação própria também diversa, de forma paralela, na linha da condição de possibilidade da linguagem dizer o mundo. Como já asseverado e que deve sempre ser relembrado, há posição de que as categorias têm elementos das várias linhas especulativas de sua essência, inobstante há divergência quanto aos aspectos essenciais preponderantes. Nessa perspectiva de predicado, as categorias denotam o gênero supremo de predicado das coisas, ou seja, um abstrato, sem embargo de denotar também enunciações de determinações concretas existentes nas substâncias primeiras. Pode-se predicar qualitativamente porque há coisas com qualidades, pode-se predicar quantitativamente porque há coisas com extensão e assim sucessivamente. Como adiantado acima, essa predicação dita própria, diretamente ligada ao real, não se confunde com as outras modalidades de predicação, que denotam o grau de força definitória, quais sejam, as que denotam gênero, espécie, propriedade, diferença e acidente conforme já estudado precedentemente em capítulo próprio nesta dissertação. A predicação própria tem caráter real, no sentido de que expressa modos de existência concreta na substância primeira, ou seja, diretamente um fundamento in re e as demais predicações, a seu turno, versam idealizações, têm interesse distinto e, pois, respondem a questões também distintas daquelas respondidas pela predicação própria. Por exemplo, restam evidentes as distinções entre perguntas: a) qual a cor ou tamanho do homem (ou, mais precisamente, de Sócrates)?, e b) qual o gênero ou espécie do homem? Com vênia à redundância, as primeiras claramente se associam a modos de existências de coisas – e perceptíveis sensorialmente –, tendendo à predicação própria como acima apontado, e as segundas, a seu turno, versam universalizações existentes apenas na mente. Os aspectos de unidade e inter-relação entre a classificação entre gênero, espécie, diferença, propriedade e acidente também resta destacadamente distinto se comparado com as inter-relações correntes entre as figuras das categorias. Os primeiros são, em grande medida, correlativos, de forma a depender uns dos outros para sua cunhagem conceitual ao passo que tal não se dá para com as figuras das categorias, 95 unidas apenas sobre analogia de referência à substância, aspecto que Brentano bem aponta ao aduzir comentário acerca de que a espécie se compõe de gênero e diferença dizendo que "gêneros distintos têm distintas diferenças. Pois se gêneros distintos não coincidem em suas diferenças, não podem, tampouco, obviamente, conter espécies iguais, pois estas o que fazem é, precisamente, acrescentar ao gênero a diferença" 177 . Brentano observa expressamente que a diferença das categorias é necessariamente de caráter conceitual e que disto, num certo sentido, não segue necessariamente uma distinção real. Dizemos, pois, em primeiro lugar: a diferença das categorias deve ser conceitual, não pode suceder que uma mesma coisa, segundo um mesmo conceito, ou que muitas coisas, na medida em que lhes corresponde um mesmo conceito, se subordinam diretamente a séries categoriais diferentes 178 . Importante salientar que o termo identidade ou seus opostos diferença ou distinção são termos polívocos e podem denotar tanto identidade objetiva, no sentido de real, quanto conceitual, no sentido de ideal. Como dito acima, a impossibilidade de um mesmo conceito se subsumir a mais de uma categoria não alcança a impossibilidade de um mesmo objeto real se subsumir em duas categorias, pois a realidade e a conceituação dessa não se confundem; há vários casos em que a teorização dá vários conceitos a uma mesma realidade objetiva. Um exemplo lúcido bem nesse sentido pode ser dado por um chute. Se uma pessoa chutar outra, a realidade objetiva em si considerada é exatamente um chute de alguém em outro alguém. Conceitualmente, contudo, podem-se ver tanto ação – de quem chutou – quanto paixão – de quem recebeu o chute. Há passagem de Aristóteles em que ele evidencia o uso da distinção conceitual mantida a identidade objetiva: E é evidente que o movimento está na coisa movida pois ele é ato dela, sob a ação do movente. Mas o ato do movente não é diferente do ato da coisa movida; com efeito, o movimento deve ser ato de ambos. Quando considerado em potência, ele é motor; quando considerado em ato, ele é movente, e sua atividade atualiza a coisa que é movida, de modo que o ato é o mesmo em ambos, assim como é a mesma a distância de 177 BRENTANO, Franz; Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Editora Encuentro, 2007. p 165. 178 Ibidem, p 164. 96 um a dois e de dois a um ou a distância de subida e a de descida, mesmo não sendo a mesma realidade. Tal é, portanto, a relação entre movente e movido179. Resta-nos evidente, dessa forma, que o edifício aristotélico se funda na existência de substâncias, dotadas de realidade no sentido ontológico, e as demais categorias, todas, versam conceitos acerca daquelas, ou ainda mais precisamente, conceitos e gêneros ordenadores de conceitos. 4.3 A CRÍTICA DE KANT As categorias de Aristóteles foram amiúde estudadas desde a Antiguidade, sem que, contudo, sofressem abalo significativo em suas grandes estruturas até o advento da filosofia de Kant. Batizada de Revolução Copernicana, promoveu forte guinada na perspectiva não só do tema das categorias, mas, em efeito, de toda a racionalidade, dando início à escola que veio a se chamar de idealismo alemão. Em apertado resumo de sua filosofia, Kant preconiza que todo o nosso conhecimento advém da (i) sensibilidade – faculdade de recepção de representações dos objetos – ou do (ii) entendimento – produção, ou pensamento, por conceitos, de representações dos objetos. A distinção efetiva entre sensibilidade e entendimento, contudo, não implica autonomia de uma em relação à outra, mas, ao contrário, interdependência, tanto que o filósofo alemão afirma que: Sem a sensibilidade nenhum objeto nos seria dado, e sem o entendimento nenhum seria pensado. Pensamentos sem conteúdo são vazios, intuições sem conceitos são cegas. Por isso, tornar sensíveis os seus conceitos (i.e., acrescentar-lhes o objeto na intuição) é tão necessário quanto tornar compreensíveis suas intuições (i.e., colocá-las sob conceitos). Ambas as faculdades ou capacidades também não podem trocar suas funções. O 179 Aristóteles, Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. 1066b30. 97 entendimento não pode intuir nada, e os sentidos nada podem pensar. Somente na medida em que eles se unifiquem pode surgir um conhecimento180. A diferença da perspectiva da especulação kantiana para com o edifício aristotélico, contudo, é grande, como se pode notar dos simples, mas profundos exemplos quanto aos conceitos aristotélicos, e mesmo categorias, de tempo e espaço181, alcançáveis a Aristóteles pela razão a partir da experiência. Para Kant, não são sequer conceitos, e sim intuições sensíveis puras, de caráter plenamente a priori, tal como moldes formais inatos no homem e que são mesmo pré-condicionantes e lineadores das sensações e pensamentos sobre as representações dos objetos do mundo, fixando contornos, pois, a toda pretensão de cognição. Forçoso, pois, concluir que a nova perspectiva coloca no centro das especulações o questionamento da razão humana e seus limites à apreensão da realidade, tomado esse limite sempre como a representação dos objetos – fenômenos –, e não num sentido objetivo próprio da realidade, pois, como aduz Kant, "não podemos fazer das condições da sensibilidade condições de possibilidade das coisas, mas apenas de seus fenômenos"182, ",183 discrepando, a toda evidência, do edifício realista do estagirita, que não prega essa distinção abrupta entre fenômeno e a coisa relacionada e tampouco problematiza, nesse viés e nível, os limites da cognição do homem sobre as coisas do mundo. Kant dedica a ciência da Estética ao estudo das intuições, e ao estudo do entendimento, ele aponta a ciência da Lógica. Os conhecimentos da Estética tanto quanto da Lógica podem ser empíricos ou puros, quer dependam da experiência ou sejam em caráter a priori. A seu turno, o conhecimento por meio do qual nós sabemos que e como certas representações (intuições e conceitos) são aplicáveis ou possíveis inteiramente a priori 184 chamar-se-á de transcendental185. Kant é explícito no particular dos conhecimentos transcendentais e do escopo da lógica respectiva: Uma tal ciência, que determine a origem, o alcance e a validade objetiva de tais conhecimentos, teria de denominar-se lógica transcendental, pois lida apenas com leis do 180 KANT, Immanuel. Crítica da Razão Pura. Trad. Fernando Costa Mattos. Editora Vozes. Petrópolis. 2012. B75. 181 em maior precisão, à categoria de "lugar"; 182 KANT, Immanuel. Crítica da Razão Pura. Trad. Fernando Costa Mattos. Editora Vozes. Petrópolis. 2012. B43. 183 Ibidem, B43. 184 Ibidem, B81 185 Em outras palavras, é a demonstração de que certo conhecimento é em caráter a priori e aplicável a toda representação que é dita transcendental e não o conteúdo do conhecimento a priori em si. 98 entendimento e da razão, mas somente na medida em que se refira a priori a objetos e não, como a lógica geral, a conhecimentos racionais tanto puros como empíricos, sem distinção186. Para o pensador alemão, o campo da lógica transcendental é, por sua vez, dividido em analítica transcendental e dialética transcendental. A primeira se debruça sobre sobre "os elementos do conhecimento puro do entendimento e os princípios sem os quais objeto algum pode ser pensado" 187 e na sua apresentação Kant re-assenta que o caráter de que todo o conhecimento do entendimento se dá necessariamente por meio de conceitos, sem o que não há como haver sequer pensamento. Conceitos, a seu turno, se baseiam em funções ordenadoras das representações, verificadas, tais funções, na espontaneidade do pensamento. A função que outorga unidade a várias representações diversas entre si, reunindo-as é o juízo, sendo de notar que, por exposição em redundância, as faculdades de julgar e pensar coincidem. A rigor, o juízo, a Kant, é "o conhecimento mediato de um objeto, portanto, a representação da representação do mesmo"188. O caráter de mediato do juízo decorre de que por meio dele se empregam representações mais elevadas (no sentido de não imediatas) combinadas. À guisa de exemplo, o Filósofo aponta o juízo todos os corpos são divisíveis, sobre o qual tece detalhamentos: O conceito de divisível se refere a diversos outros conceitos; dentre estes, porém, ele se refere particularmente, aqui, ao conceito de corpo, e este, por seu turno, a certos fenômenos que se apresentam a nós. Estes objetos, portanto, são representados mediatamente por meio do conceito de divisibilidade 189 . Tal como atine à lógica geral, assumida abstração plena do conteúdo dos juízos e tendo em vista apenas a sua perspectiva formal-funcional, o filósofo de Königsberg os agrupa em quatro classes, cada qual com três sub-classes contidas: 1) Quantidade 2) Qualidade 3) Relação 4) Modalidade Universais Afirmativos Categórios Problemáticos 186 KANT, Immanuel. Crítica da Razão Pura. Trad. Fernando Costa Mattos. Editora Vozes. Petrópolis. 2012. B82. 187 Ibidem, B87. 188 Ibidem, B93. 189 Ibidem, B94. 99 Particulares Negativos Hipotéticos Assertóricos Singulares Infinitos Disjuntivos Apodíticos Numa perspectiva, agora, não de cunho de lógica geral, a qual se vale dos conceitos já tomados como unidade num juízo, mas numa perspectiva de lógica transcendental com vistas a demonstrar o caráter a priori de conhecimentos gerais do entendimento, sem o que a lógica geral, juízos e mesmo a própria experiência não seriam possíveis, Kant, partindo da forma lógica dos juízos, apresenta uma dedução dos conceitos puros do entendimento, os quais ele também batiza por Categorias. Nessa dedução, Kant evoca a noção de síntese, a qual ele apresenta como uma função cega mas indispensável da alma, mais especificamente da imaginação e que enlaça, sob unificação do entendimento, diversidades tanto puras (como espaço e tempo) quanto empíricas, fixando-lhes unidade, tal como uma matéria apta a dar conteúdo aos conceitos. Sob outras palavras, podem-se expor as categorias como a elevação da síntese a conceitos (com atenção a que estes, em efeito, já existem a priori no entendimento), gerando-se, daí, o início de conhecimento propriamente dito (discursivo) e de tal forma que existem tantas categorias quantas são as funções lógicas em todos os juízos possíveis. Kant apresenta, pois, 12 categorias, paralelas às funções do juízo conforme quadros: 1) Quantidade Função Lógica Conceito Puro Universais Unidade Particulares Pluralidade Singulares Totalidade 2) Qualidade Função Lógica Conceito Puro Afirmativos Realidade Negativos Negação Infinitos Limitação 3) Relação Função Lógica Conceito Puro Categórios Inerência e Subsistência Hipotéticos Causa e Efeito Disjuntivos Comunidade entre Agente e Paciente 4) Modalidade Função Lógica Conceito Puro Problemáticos Possibilidade-Impossibilidade Assertóricos Existência-Inexistência Apodíticos Necessidade-contingência Na apresentação da sua dedução transcendental das categorias, Kant expressamente reconhece que tem os mesmos propósitos que Aristóteles tinha na persecução de uma tábua completa dos conceitos puros190, mas dissente no modo de executar. Sobre, aliás, essa dissenção, 190 Ibidem, B105. 100 Kant foi taxativo em criticar Aristóteles quanto à dedução das categorias, cuja execução teria se dado rapsodicamente, o que implica impossibilidade de verificação de sua completude e sem embargo, ainda, de haver outras incorreções na sua tábua . O Filósofo alemão textualmente expôs: Essa divisão surgiu sistematicamente a partir de um princípio comum, qual seja a faculdade de julgar (que não é outra coisa senão a faculdade de pensar), e não rapsodicamente a partir de uma investigação aleatória dos conceitos puros – conceitos cuja completude não se pode ter certeza se ela for obtida apenas por indução, sem se lembrar que deste modo não se pode discernir jamais porque precisamente estes conceitos, e não outros, residem no entendimento puro. O tirocínio de Aristóteles, de investigar esses conceitos fundamentais, foi digno de um homem perspicaz. Como ele não tinha nenhum princípio, no entanto, ele os reuniu tal como iam lhe aparecendo, e descobriu inicialmente dez deles, aos quais denominou categorias (predicamentos). Na sequência ele acreditou ter encontrado mais cinco deles, e os juntou aos primeiros sob o nome de pós-predicamentos. Mas sua tábua permaneceu ainda incompleta. Além disso, há nela alguns modi da sensibilidade pura (quando, ubi, situs, bem como prius, simul) e um empírico (motus) que não pertencem em absoluto a esse registro originário do entendimento; ou então são incluídos os conceitos derivados sob os originários (actio, passio), e alguns destes últimos faltam por completo 191 . 4.4 A DEDUÇÃO DAS CATEGORIAS, TESE DE TRENDELENBURG PELO FIO CONDUTOR GRAMATICAL E REFUTAÇÃO DE REALE PELO FIO CONDUTOR ONTOLÓGICO De partida no artigo Fio condutor gramatical e fio condutor ontológico na dedução das categorias aristotélicas192, Reale conta que a crítica kantiana, seguida pelos subsequentes pensadores idealistas, motivou um forte movimento de retomada da leitura de Aristóteles na Alemanha do século IX, movimento esse iniciado por Trendelenburg, seguido de Brentano, Bonitz, e outros. 191 Ibidem, B106. 192 Publicado em Rivista di filosofia neoescolastica, Edição de Janeiro/Fevereiro de 1957, Fasc. I, pp. 423ss. 101 O estudioso italiano conta sobre os méritos desse movimento no sentido de, independentemente de posição sobre a crítica, ter buscado avaliações das categorias aristotélicas em várias direções especulativas novas, chegando a resultados inesperados. Essas direções, também meritoriamente, já não incorriam na linha falsa de interpretação das categorias, limitando-as à logica, conforme já apontado precedentemente. As novas abordagens também preteriam perspectivas de cunhos meramente histórico ou genético, métodos esses que poderiam pecar em tratar como se contradições fossem as antinomias estruturais, frequentes nas obras do Autor, que usualmente trazia "diversas colocações de um problema, visto por diferentes pontos de vista, que são diversos aspectos complementares da mesma solução"193. Ou seja, cuidaram de novas investigações tomando a totalidade do sistema aristotélico e com perquirições da posição das categorias neste. O citado precursor dessa retomada de estudos aristotélicos, Trendelenburg, dedicou duas obras ao tema das categorias, Das Categorias (1833) e História da doutrina de categorias (1836), e inovou na abordagem sobre o tema do fio condutor. Conforme Reale, Trendelenburg "se convenceu de que Aristóteles possuía um fio condutor para a dedução das categorias e que seria injusto lhe atribuir (como fazem Kant e Hegel) uma falta, por conta das lacunas de que trata os escritos"194. Para esse estudioso alemão, o fio condutor em lume seria de índole gramatical. Em efeito, Trendelenburg assevera expressamente, já no proêmio Das Categorias, que "é sabido que Aristóteles, para encontrar as categorias, precisou romper a conexão do discurso"195, asserto esse que é parafraseado e sintetizado por Reale, ao aludir ao pensamento do estudioso alemão, como que: "as categorias surgiriam das considerações gramaticais e, precisamente, da análise e decomposição da proposição simples e, portanto, corresponderiam exatamente às partes do discurso"196. 193 REALE, Giovanni. Fio Condutor Gramatical e Fio Condutor Ontológico na Dedução das Categorias Aristotélicas. Revista de Filosofia Neo-Escolástica, 1957. 194 Ibidem. 195 TRENDELEMBURG, Das Categorias. 196 REALE, Giovanni. Fio Condutor Gramatical e Fio Condutor Ontológico na Dedução das Categorias Aristotélicas. Revista de Filosofia Neo-Escolástica, 1957. 102 Importante salientar neste ponto que a Trendelenburg o pensamento, tal como a natureza, é um todo conjugado e desenvolvido como que "a partir de uma semente"197, denotando um sentido de totalidade. A noção é unidade, a seu turno, é produto da arte humana. Como tal, ou seja, como um todo, o pensamento precede, pois, a suas partes, as quais são alcançáveis pela mente humana pela decomposição puramente ideal desse todo – extrativa das noções como seus elementos e não que o todo, a seu turno, é que seja supostamente obtido a partir da composição das partes como elaboração dos elementos. Ele evidencia isso em Das Categorias ao asseverar que, conforme já aludido precedentemente, o assento do Tratado das Categorias no pórtico da lógica se dá apenas por maior facilidade de aprendizagem e ao expressamente advertir que uma vez que a mente remova o laço natural dos pensamentos "devese cuidar para que não pareça desligado pela lei da natureza o que se acha separado pela agitação da mente". Noutra passagem, de caráter bem mais enfático, Trendelenburg assinala que "nem se pode pensar que esses elementos existam por si e conexos produzam a enunciação, mas que são tirados da enunciação". Em reforço à arguição de que não consta da lei do pensamento a composição de noções, Trendelenburg faz observar expressamente em Das Categorias que se os juízos fossem obtidos da composição elaborada das noções, toda a lógica haveria de ser alicerçada pelas Categorias. No entanto, isso não se dá, pois tanto os tratados dos Analíticos e Intepretação ignoram esse fundamento e seguem seu rumo autonomamente em relação às Categorias. Mais ainda, Trendelenburg sustenta expressamente que "os dez gêneros das categorias têm origem na enunciação dividida em partes",198 também com arrimo na consideração do Ser do verdadeiro e falso, com respeito ao que Aristóteles enfatizara: que dele só se pode falar em havendo a conexão das noções e que sem esta, ainda que as noções desconectadas signifiquem algo, se são ou não são, tal não é afirmado ou negado. Essa exata abordagem, retroexposta e decorrente do fundamento do Ser do verdadeiro e falso, Trendelenburg utiliza para asseverar que "na perspectiva da fonte e do princípio, as categorias se mostram alheias à divisão das próprias coisas. Como tanto a conexão quanto a separação das noções não são postas nas coisas e sim no pensamento, do mesmo modo as que nascem da subtração da conexão não terão certamente nas 197 TRENDELEMBURG, Das Categorias. 198 REALE, Giovanni. Fio Condutor Gramatical e Fio Condutor Ontológico na Dedução das Categorias Aristotélicas. Revista de Filosofia Neo-Escolástica, 1957. 103 coisas o lugar próprio"199. Fica bastante ressaltado, pois, o caráter de conceito das categorias; é tomado numa acepção ligada ao juízo, não obstante textualmente Trendelenburg utilize o termo "enunciação", ou seja, da expressão linguística do juízo. A origem das categorias é tributada expressamente por Trendelenburg à gramática, o que, contudo, não implica, em sua própria visão, a sua não natureza de noção lógica, o que é expressamente salientado: A força do engenho aristotélico brilha em toda a parte de maneira que, embora partisse da forma, logo, abandonada a forma, é arrebatado à natureza mesma da coisa. Assim se procederá para mostrar quanto, no tocante à origem, se é lícito dizer, devem às categorias à gramática e quanto, ao contrário, devem à condição lógica das noções200. Noutra passagem, o estudioso alemão reafirma, em outras palavras, o mesmo aspecto de conteúdo imbricado de noções lógicas das categorias como transcendente às formas da língua. A natureza do gênio aristotélico não consentia que fosse confinado nas meras formas da língua. Tudo o que parecer ter encontrado seguindo os vestígios destas, após deixar de lado as formas, cultivou a fundo, pesquisando atentamente as condições mesmas das noções201. É livre de dúvidas, pois, que o estudioso alemão, sob quaisquer perspectivas das categorias não lhes retira o ressaibo da lógica. Simples leitura da tábua das categorias nos remete à constatação de que estas têm paralelo inequívoco para com as figuras da gramática, conforme indicaremos com comentários que o próprio Trendelenburg apontou em Das Categorias. A categoria da Substância se associa à figura gramatical do Substantivo. De se ver que, tal como a substância suporta a realidade, o substantivo, como sujeito, está submetido como núcleo à enunciação. Substantivos abstratos se ligam às categorias da Qualidade e Relação. Trendelenburg já considerava as substâncias tanto primeiras quanto segundas. A categoria da Quantidade está associada à figura do Numeral ou de um adjetivo ligado a número. 199 Ibidem. 200 Ibidem. 201 Ibidem. 104 A categoria da Qualidade tem forte intimidade com a figura gramatical do Adjetivo, podendo o adjetivo assumir forma substantivada em caso de substâncias segundas. As categorias da Ação, Paixão, Estado (ou posse) e Posição, a seu turno, referem-se, respectivamente, a verbos, respectivamente na voz ativa, na voz passiva, no pretérito perfeito e intransitivo. As categorias de Tempo e Lugar associam-se às figuras dos advérbios de mesmos nomes. A categoria da Relação sempre remete a Substantivo Abstrato. Ela imprescinde da existência de um genitivo. Aliás, particularmente com a categoria da relação, Trendelenburg ressalta de forma demasiada sua tese da origem gramatical das categorias ante a que o próprio Aristóteles invocou no Tratado das Categorias argumento de cunho gramatical para o reconhecimento da categoria da relação, pois segundo o Estagirita falamos "de termos relativos quando uma coisa sendo tal como é, é explicitada por um genitivo que se segue ou então por alguma frase ou expressão destinada a introduzir a relação"202. É bastante evidente que há várias imprecisões quanto à correspondência sintática das categorias para com as figuras gramaticais. Sobre esse aspecto, Brentano (que não adere à tese em lume de Trendelenburg) julgou não elidir, por si só, o senso preponderante de harmonia203 entre as figuras das categorias e as figuras da gramática, senso esse que não fica desfigurado por simples existência de excepcionalidades: Porém, toda regra gramatical sofre exceções, sem por isso deixar de ser regra, e tal coisa, nem pode fazer Aristóteles errar e nem poderá nos enganar. Se alguém aponta uma exceção tanto que exceção, deve ser consciência da regra mesma, e quando alguém está prevenido a não se deixar enganar por algo, num caso concreto, reconhece com isso mesmo que tal coisa vale em geral como princípio regente e, precisamente por isso, demanda em casos excepcionais que neles se veria decepcionada.204 A maior dificuldade de harmonia entre cada qual das categorias para com as figuras da gramática, de se ver, dá-se com a categoria da Substância, o que Trendelenburg admite 202 ARISTÓTELES. Categorias. Tradução: Edson Bini. 2. ed. Bauru, SP: Edipro, 2010. 6b6. 203 Mesmo a despeito de Brentano preterir a linha gramatical pela linha ontológica por outros motivos. 204 BRENTANO, Franz. Sobre Los Múltiples Significados Del Ente Según Aristoteles. Madrid: Encuentro, 2007. p. 216. 105 expressamente ao asseverar que "a explicação desta categoria caminha toda na direção da lógica de modo que a gramática acaba ficando de lado"205. A dificuldade, aliás, é evidente na medida em que a associação das categorias às figuras gramaticais lhes dá inevitável ressaibo de predicado e a substância não é propriamente afirmada das coisas, mas o reverso que se dá. No sentido da perspectiva lógica contida no espírito da tese de Trendelenburg e com ânimo de robustecê-la, Otto Apelt, lembrado por Reale, agrega-lhe pequena alteração pugnando que o todo a que servisse de base à decomposição fosse precisamente o juízo e não a proposição. Reale anota no particular: Ao substituir, na formulação da tese de Trendelenburg, "proposição" (Satz) por "juízo" (Urteil), será possível obter a posição do Apelt: as categorias advêm não da decomposição da proposição, mas do juízo. As categorias não são, portanto, de origem gramatical, mas de origem lógica, não de significado gramatical, mas significado lógico e, portanto, para compreendê-las, é necessário tomar a proposição em seu sentido lógico, isto é, no juízo206. Reale conta que a tese de Trendelenburg gozou de súbita e forte aceitação seguida à sua divulgação, a qual, contudo, veio a minguar logo após com o seu consequente descarte pelos estudiosos. Ele próprio refuta a tese de Trendelenburg, mesmo com o reparo proposto por Apelt, e pugna que Aristóteles tenha tido sim um fio condutor para a dedução das categorias, mas que tal fio tenha sido de cunho ontológico, no sentido de dizer que tenha vindo das considerações a partir da substância primeira, especificamente pelos modos de realização do sínolo matéria e forma. Um dos primeiros apontamentos de Reale lançado no artigo Filo conduttore grammaticale e filo conduttore ontologico nella deduzione delle categorie aristoteliche contra a tese de Trendelenburg antes de ele passar à exposição e sua proposta pelo fio ontológico consiste em expor que, independentemente de razoabilidade, Trendelenburg não especificou taxativamente se sua tese tinha um caráter histórico ou especulativo ideal, sendo certo que a tese poderia ter recebido outros contornos se jungida à perspectiva histórica, a qual, contudo, tem 205 REALE, Giovanni. Fio Condutor Gramatical e Fio Condutor Ontológico na Dedução das Categorias Aristotélicas. Revista de Filosofia Neo-Escolástica, 1957. 206 Ibidem. 106 menor relevo filosófico, sem embargo de notar que na perspectiva filosófica a tese não se sustenta: Agora, se com a proposta do fio condutor gramatical, o nosso estudioso quisesse se ater simplesmente ao primeiro ponto de vista, isto é, a uma pesquisa meramente histórica e biográfica, a tese teria adquirido imediatamente outro significado. Que Aristóteles tenha descoberto as categorias, psicologicamente motivado por observações de natureza gramatical, é afirmação absolutamente inócua e que, entendida exatamente nestes limites, poderia ter, talvez, a sua parte verdadeira, e poderia ser aceita, contemporaneamente, por quem entende de forma diferente o valor e a natureza das categorias. Trendelenburg, sobrepondo os dois problemas, atribuiu ao fio condutor gravidade maior, fazendo com que este ascendesse, ainda que com qualquer reserva, a uma posição reguladora da dedução, ainda que no sentido estritamente filosófico, pelo que a tenacidade dos críticos, quanto à tese, é compreensível e motivado. Aqui, o primeiro aspecto do problema, que definimos como "biográfico", não nos interessa. Em vez disso, somos obrigados a esclarecer o segundo aspecto, que é filosófico e, neste caso, parece resolver claramente no sentido negativo a tese da origem gramatical de Aristóteles207. No aspecto puramente filosófico idealista, Reale faz ver, de início, sua consideração quanto à divisão em três perspectivas da natureza das Categorias, conforme preconizado por Brentano e já acima exposto: ele reduz as perspectivas a duas, as perspectivas lógica e ontológica. Reale funde as considerações de essência das categorias como mero quadro de classificação de conceitos; as considerações de essência das categorias como conceitos extraídos dos nexos quer da proposição ou do juízo, as quais são redutíveis a uma classificação só e que ele chama de lógica, pois, "de fato, tanto quem entende as categorias como estruturas ou pontos de vista para subsunção dos conceitos, como quem entende as categorias como predicados, é sobre o aspecto lógico que se parte"208. Tal como Brentano, Reale se alinha com a perspectiva de que as categorias sejam conceitos reais e de cunho ontológico, ligadas, pois, ao quadrante dos conceitos metafísicos do ser, determinantes das demais possíveis dimensões que as categorias tenham noutros quadrantes. É como dizer que as categorias são, em efeito, elementos da lógica e relacionadas com as condições linguísticas, mas que tais perspectivas são insuficientes para dar cabo à plena compreensão delas, compreensão essa que só se alcança com as considerações das categorias como figuras da metafísica e, a partir deste ponto determinante, com os desdobramentos de todos os seus aspectos 207 Ibidem. 208 Ibidem. 107 em ciências subordinadas – inclusive quanto à lógica –, conforme exposições que já provemos precedentemente. Ao fim, o fundamento da lógica é a metafísica. De notar que, a assim não ser, não seriam as categorias expressamente tratadas nas obras da Metafísica, tal como, mas não apenas, o são no livro quinto, de forma expressa: Ser por si são ditas todas as acepções do ser segundo as figuras das categorias: tantas são as figuras das categorias quantos são os significados do ser. Porque algumas das categorias significam a essência, outras a qualidade, outras a quantidade, outras a relação, outras o agir ou o padecer; outras o onde e outras o quando. Segue-se que o ser tem significados correspondentes a cada uma destas. De fato, não existe diferença entre as proposições "o homem é vivente" e "o homem vive", e entre "o homem é caminhante ou cortante" e "o homem caminha ou corta"; e o mesmo vale para os outros casos.209 O próprio Trendelenburg, aliás, acata que as categorias "cuidam de ser as mesmas noções tanto nas categorias quanto na Metafísica",210 aspecto pelo qual, dentre outros, Reale virá a asseverar que a proposta de Trendelenburg não se sustenta pelos próprios argumentos que ele usa, os quais acabam mesmo por aniquilar a tese do fio condutor gramatical. Ao ver do estudioso italiano, a tese pelo fio gramatical somente outorga um ponto de vista de mera generalidade e não suporta considerações específicas. No particular, vale ressaltar a já estampada inconclusão da categoria da Substância como deduzida das formas gramaticais, sem prejuízo de outras. O próprio Trendelenburg, como já anotado, a via como conduzida pela lógica, mas é o caso de ressaltar, no ponto, que Substância, mais que figura da lógica, é conceito eminentemente metafísico. Não sem razão, destarte, a tese pelo fio condutor gramatical encontra aqui grande embaraço. De que a falhar a tese quanto à categoria principal, segue-se inaplicável às demais que têm como pressuposto a substância. Numa escala maior e já sugerida acima, no edifício de Aristóteles, a ruir a metafísica, rui-se a lógica. Outro argumento de refutação empregado por Reale contra o fio condutor gramatical e/ou lógico, e bastante forte a nosso sentir, reside nas considerações acerca do Ser no grupo de sentidos de acepção da verdade. 209 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica. Tradução: Marcelo Perine. 2. ed. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2005. 1017a25. 210 TRENDELENBURG. Das Categorias. 108 Neste grupo de significados, e conforme já bastante exposto precedentemente, Ser é o ser verdadeiro, que se dá nos casos em que o juízo corresponde com a realidade. A falsidade, a seu turno, tem o mesmo trato do não ser. Ou seja, isto posto, resta evidente que o juízo há de carregar necessariamente umbilical referência à realidade, sem o que se estaria a operar no domínio do não ser, tudo de forma que inexoravelmente a realidade é a medida do juízo, e não se pode falar em juízo verdadeiro sem falar em realidade. Por causa disso, o estudioso italiano faz observar que Trendelenburg há de reconhecer que as categorias, tratadas como partes do juízo, hão de carregar necessariamente um valor ontológico independentemente de origem gramatical ou de função lógica. Reale foi absolutamente taxativo no particular: Aqui já temos um exemplo claro: se as categorias adquirem plenamente um sentido na proposição e no juízo, como de tudo que fazem parte, e se a medida (das Maas) do juízo é a realidade e, do contrário, se estas apresentam este "reale Bedentung" (significado real), este "objective Bedeutung" (significado objetivo), não deverá buscar sua origem, bem como o seu fundamento, na própria realidade, ou melhor, na consideração da realidade e da estrutura, em vez da decomposição da proposição ? 211 Fica, assim, objetada a arguição de Trendelenburg no passo de comentários sobre o Ser no sentido do verdadeiro e falso, em que ele dá viés reverso de interpretação, justamente para afirmar que como a conexão das noções se dá na mente e não nas coisas, estariam as categorias fora do mundo das coisas212, sem, contudo, chegar a alcançar que em que pese estar na mente, têm no real a medida de objetividade. Da objeção decorre que, ao limite, pois, num sentido, a natureza última do juízo não pode ser noções em si, mas realidade. Aristóteles, no ver de Reale, não se permitiria incorrer em erros de nominalismo, máxime na medida em que comungava da posição da natureza meramente convencional dos nomes, os quais são, por si, desprovidos de substrato de realidade. Reale insiste que há erro de Trendelenburg na defesa do fio condutor gramatical também pelo aspecto de que está a incorrer num nominalismo falacioso com figura de linguagem, como a tratar que uma figura da gramática, por si, conduzisse a uma categoria, o que é bastante frágil, 211 REALE, Giovanni. Fio Condutor Gramatical e Fio Condutor Ontológico na Dedução das Categorias Aristotélicas. Revista de Filosofia Neo-Escolástica, 1957. 212 "Como tanto a conexão quanto a separação das noções não são postas nas coisas e sim no pensamento, do mesmo modo as que nascem da subtração da conexão não terão certamente nas coisas o lugar próprio." In: TRENDELENBURG, Das Categorias. 109 máxime porque o conceito há de perseguir realidade e, como já vimos precedentemente, uma mesma realidade poderia conduzir a vários conceitos (caso da ação e paixão). Aristóteles, aliás, bem anota, nas Refutações Sofísticas, uma falácia a que a consideração de Trendelenburg, no particular, poderia se subsumir "nas falácias ligadas à figura de linguagem, o erro se deve à similaridade da linguagem, pois é difícil distinguir qual tipo de coisas pertence às mesmas categorias e quais a diferentes categorias. Com efeito, aquele que pode realizar esta distinção se coloca sumamente próximo da contemplação da verdade"213. Ou seja, no dizer direto do próprio Estagirita, a linguagem não tem paralelo direto com categoria. Outro argumento destrutivo forte de Reale respeita à semântica escorreita a empregar ao do termo πτώσεις o qual Trendelenburg tomou com sentido de predicado. Conta Reale, com arrimo em Bonitz, o qual aponta como o maior conhecedor do léxico aristotélico, que, em efeito, o termo πτώσεις comporta a acepção de "predicado", mas não exclusivamente e só na medida de um dado viés deste termo, cuja valência central respeita ao significado de "Modificações". Este, em relação às categorias, há de ser visto como "modificações do ser" ou "modos de determinações do ser", ou seja, com um espectro semântico mais amplo que com referência meramente gramático-linguística e retornando ao seio metafísico das categorias, pois a explicação do movimento nas diferentes figuras das categorias é tema tratado na Metafísica, a Filosofia Primeira. A proposição de Reale, para dar cabo à dedução das categorias por Aristóteles, como já adiantado, é pela perspectiva de um fio ontológico. O sentido mais preciso desse fio que Reale preconiza foi por ele expresso como: o que "deve ter guiado Aristóteles à descoberta e dedução é de natureza ontológica e é dado precisamente pela consideração sobre a estrutura da substância sensível como sínolo de matéria e forma e sobre modos onde o encontro daquelas duas se realiza"214. Como já expusemos precedentemente, a Filosofia Primeira é aquela que é primeira por si, no sentido de disposição ontológica. A Filosofia Segunda, a seu turno, é a primeira no sentido de acesso ao conhecimento e posterior à Filosofia Primeira enquanto disposição e organização de toda a estrutura da realidade; já na dedução da Filosofia Segunda, está presente a abordagem ontológica, a partir da doutrina das causas, entre as quais a material e formal, base à visão 213 ARISTÓTELES. Refutações sofísticas. Tradução: Edson Bini. 2. ed. Bauru, SP: Edipro, 2010. 169a29. 214 REALE, Giovanni. Fio Condutor Gramatical e Fio Condutor Ontológico na Dedução das Categorias Aristotélicas. Revista de Filosofia Neo-Escolástica, 1957. 110 estruturada e orgânica da realidade, e cujo ápice de elaboração – o que não se confunde com a inovação – vai se confirmar na Metafísica, que é o próprio esplendor maior da Física. Que Aristóteles chegou às conclusões metafísicas partindo da física, com observações dos fenômenos imediatos é trivialidade. A Reale está claro, e ele assenta expressamente, que as categorias voltam-se e limitamse ao horizonte ontológico do ser sensível, no sentido de dizer das substâncias dotadas de matéria e sujeitas ao movimento, não se devendo olvidar, doutra banda e tal como já apontamos precedentemente, que todos os problemas do ser são os problemas da substância. Vide o quanto Reale é de todo expresso nesse sentido da validade das categorias apenas para o ser enquanto sensível: A prova de que as categorias valem somente para o sensível é simples: em todos os escritos de Aristóteles, estas são apresentadas como existentes somente em um sínolo de matéria e forma, enquanto o transcendente é, por definição, ἂνευ ὒλης, sem matéria, ato puro, οὐσια, isto é, εἰδος τὸ δὲ τί ἧν εἰναι οὐχ ἒχει ὒλην τὸ πρῶτον. No transcendente falta mesmo aquele encontro εἰδος-ὒλη no qual e para o qual surgem as categorias, e todo o ser se absorve no τὸ τί ἧν εἰναι. De resto, a mais bela confirmação desta tese se encontra no livro décimo segundo, onde, determinando a essência da divindade, Aristóteles nega que o Absoluto tenha aqueles caracteres que são precisamente ligados às categorias. A substância divina não tem tamanho (μέγειθος), não tem parte (ἀμερής), é indivisível (ἀδιαίρετος), portanto, faltando estes caracteres, as categorias do ποσόν e do ποῦ se tornam insignificantes. A substância transcendente é, além disso, eterna (ἀιδιος) e χινεῖ τὸν ἂπειρον χρόνον e portanto, como tal, exclui a categoria do ποτέ que se configura como tempo finito (quando). Além disso, sendo motor imóvel e substância sempre em ato, exclui por si tanto a categoria do πάσχειν (Deus é οὐ χιγούμενον ο ἀπαιτές), como ainda a categoria do ποιεῖν (de fato, é ἀχίνητον) e move como o objeto do amor move o amante: χινεὶ ὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον215. Como também já exposto anteriormente, o ser da substância é o ser forte e que precede aos das demais figuras das categorias, as quais só existem na substância, como suportados por um substrato ou subjacente, o qual se determina por meio de modos possíveis de determinação. O ser acidental, como já asseverado, é indeterminado, tomado no sentido de que a sua singularidade não goza de causa, mas há modos para a realização mesmo do indeterminado. Sem algum acidente qualquer, também como já asseverado, a substância sensível não é sequer pensável e sem ela como ponto de partida, nem às substâncias transcendentais o homem acessaria. 215 Ibidem. 111 No dizer de Reale, "o acidente é a representação concreta e a realização empírica da categoria e, como tal, é variável na constante da categoria"216. As determinações são formais e determinam a matéria, como já amplamente exposto. As categorias, nessa esteira, são categorias formais que não se confundem com a sua realização empírica, até porque se assim não fosse delas não se poderia dizer como conceitos. São elementares as categorias formais, ao passo que, como num exemplo tirado de Reale, uma esfera não se torna esfera por nenhuma figura da categoria; o que pode vir a ser e deixar de ser é uma "esfera de bronze". Não é, de qualquer forma, a esfera que se tornou de bronze, mas o bronze que está como esfera. Ou seja, as categorias em si não agem nem padecem, só as determinações singulares o fazem. A substância sensível, doutra banda, também como já exposto precedentemente, se caracteriza pelo sínolo de matéria e forma e a partir destas vão-se deduzindo as categorias. Reale assenta expressamente isso: As categorias seguem – em sua ordem de dedução – a substância, proporcionalmente à sua "carga" ontológica. Assim, para o quanto escreve Trendelenburg: o quantum não é substância, mas a substância é aquela da qual se originam determinações quantitativas, sendo esta a primeira a ser atribuída. Em consequência dos conceitos, o quantum advém indiretamente com a substância, e esta fundamenta-se em sua própria origem. E para o qual: somente onde a οὐσια da última substância necessária acontece, cujos materiais são retirados, onde a forma absoluta é determinada individualmente, é que acontece a qualidade indireta da substância. Como se da matéria da substância se originasse o quantum, origina-se a forma da qualidade. E para a realização: a relatividade da qual poucas substâncias advêm, é colocada pela substância ao mais longínquo e escondida a fonte e quantum. Enfim, o mesmo procedimento é seguido com as seis categorias restantes. Estes mesmos passos provam, além disso, que não só a sequência das categorias é guiada pelo critério do πρότερον τῦ φύσει, mas ainda a mesma determinação da sua natureza geral e da essência específica217. Em outras palavras ao que adiantamos da tese de Reale e por palavras, aliás, do próprio, "o fio condutor investigado não é mais que a consideração da estrutura da substância enquanto sensível e das condições da sua expansão real: matéria e forma são concebíveis, em seu sínolo, somente nas expansões da quantidade, qualidade, espaço e tempo, ação e paixão. Isto que implica a união de matéria e forma: eis o critério e a regra da dedução das categorias".218 216 Ibidem. 217 Ibidem. 218 Ibidem. 112 5 CONCLUSÃO Que falar sobre as Categorias de Aristóteles é falar sobre multiplicidades, senão mesmo sobre ambiguidades, é pacífico desde as primeiras interpretações – ainda sob a falsa linha interpretativa que as tratava limitadamente como figuras da lógica. Mesmo neste quadrante, muito já se debateu sobre a sua diversidade de essência, ou, mais precisamente, sobre a superposição de diversidades, no sentido de se elas são palavras, a realidade em si ou pensamentos. Em todo caso, é avanço, sem possibilidade de retrocesso, das interpretações correntes das Categorias em tê-las como ensaio de Metafísica e, nesse sentido, peças de internódio a permear todas as dimensões da realidade. Tão somente a não exposição, ao menos nas obras que chegaram a nós, por Aristóteles acerca da sua dedução da tábua das Categorias, bem ao reverso do que fizera noutros ensaios, como, por exemplo, a dedução das quatro causas apontadas detalhadamente na Física, legitima a crítica kantiana. Afinal, a fixação do rol das categorias é por demais relevante para ser meramente um pressuposto tácito. Não se deve olvidar, contudo, que a crítica de Kant a Aristóteles quanto à dedução das categorias representa, ao fundo, não uma crítica a uma doutrina ou a um procedimento pontual dentro de um sistema filosófico, mas, em efeito, uma expressão crítica vinda de uma nova forma de racionalidade. A tensão, no particular, é corolário do debate entre o realismo e o idealismo, tema dos mais profundos, densos e extensos em toda a história da Filosofia. Não por outro motivo, claro, é que o campo de disputa seria ocupado pela doutrina das categorias, eis que para quaisquer dos sistemas ela é básica ao fluxo de inteligência e expressão desta. Não terá tido Aristóteles um fio condutor para a dedução das Categorias? Sob qualquer aspecto, a adequada resposta há de perseguir investigação acerca da existência efetiva de um princípio ideal e objetivo para a dedução das Categorias de Aristóteles, sendo de menor importância a pergunta tomada numa perspectiva meramente histórica ou biográfica do Filósofo. Nesse último particular, convence-nos a abordagem de Reale acerca de que afirmar que ter 113 Aristóteles recebido influência psicológica e biográfica dos conhecimentos de gramática é aspecto até mesmo em boa parte trivial, mas não esgota a questão filosófica. A despeito de todo mérito da tese de Trendelenburg, acompanhamos Reale quanto a que a força da aparência esvanece-se com o exame aprofundado do seu arrazoado, seguindo-se a linha de refutação empreendida pelo próprio Reale e exposta nesta dissertação. Particularmente, mas não apenas, nossa adesão à refutação de Reale à Trendelenburg deve-se muito às considerações de que, em qualquer perspectiva, o próprio estudioso alemão pruma uma noção de preponderância do caráter lógico das noções tiradas do ordenamento gramatical das orações do que das figuras da gramática propriamente ditas. Não poderia, aliás, ser diferente, sob pena de incorrer em mero nominalismo. É certo que o próprio Aristóteles já atentou em várias passagens a erros decorrentes de considerações nominais em detrimento de reais. Afinal, a lógica tem que estar subserviente à realidade e, a seu turno, a gramática subserviente à lógica e não o reverso. Nessa esteira, e, mais ainda, feito um reparo consistente em tratar o sentido de proposições como juízo, o que, conforme apontado ao longo da dissertação, recebeu tratamento impreciso por Aristóteles, a remissão da tese de Trendelenburg à objetividade dos fatos do mundo é inconteste, eis que a medida do Ser, na acepção Aristotélica do Ser para o Juízo, dá-se pela concordância do pensamento para com a realidade. Fora disso, estar-se-á perante o falso, que é justamente o não Ser. Não vemos exagero na crítica de Reale a Trendelenburg ao afirmar que a tese deste não se suporta sob seu peso, ressaltando uma justíssima ponderação do estudioso italiano, pois a remissão da tese de Trendelenburg à realidade como condição a que as categorias tenham a justa medida e sentido subverte a pretensão originária da tese, salvo se vista essa exclusivamente na perspectiva histórica. A seu turno, a proposição de Reale pela existência de um fio condutor, nos termos antes destacados, de um princípio objetivo apto a suportar a dedução da tábua das categorias tal como ela está apontada, e sendo o fio condutor de índole ontológica com arrimo último nos modos da junção matéria e forma das substâncias sensíveis, nos convence como abordagem moderada, bem demonstrada, condizente com o todo do edifício aristotélico. Merece nossa adesão. Não se deve olvidar que foi na Física que Aristóteles apresentou sua doutrina das quatro causas, claramente advindas da observação das substâncias sensíveis e que se prestam de alicerce 114 indispensável, pois umbilical, à formulação da concepção polivalente do ser. Noutras palavras, que não há ser sem causa e todo ser é causa e, mais ainda, que causas são quatro, são noções que irão impregnar e determinar toda a filosofia de Aristóteles. A doutrina do Ser por si, que se ocupa das figuras das categorias, há de beber na fonte da doutrina das Quatro Causas e ter sentido justamente pelos pressupostos causais assumidos, que orientam a primeira divisão do Ser lançada por Aristóteles, que cuida da divisão entre o Ser Acidental e o Ser por Si, tendo por norte a consideração de modo causal, de determinação fortuita ou necessária. Os acidentes, de lembrar, não subsistem se suprimidas as substâncias, tanto que só são por concomitância. Quanto ao Ser por si, o da figura das categorias, inobstante a expressão "por si", só tem sentido forte, pleno, na figura da Substância, a qual é pressuposto indispensável de todas as demais categorias e de toda a ontologia de Aristóteles. "Por si", para as demais categorias que não a substância, tem sentido de denotar apenas que seriam constantes em contraste ao ser acidental, observado a partir da realização empírica. Assim, tal como a substância é causa para as demais categorias, estas são causa de segunda ordem para os acidentes. Voltando, assim, a atenção à umbilical ligação causa e ser, bem como a de ascensão do conhecimento a partir do mais imediato ao mais geral, vemos que a razoabilidade, pois, da proposição de Reale da suficiência do fio condutor ontológico das categorias no sentido de decorrentes da observação dos modos de realização concreta das substâncias sensíveis do mundo se evidencia. Doutra banda, de ver que haveria de ser também evidente uma harmonia para com as figuras da linguagem. A causa final da linguagem é falar sobre o mundo, donde não é de se estranhar semelhança entre a estrutura da linguagem e a estrutura do mundo, pois do contrário o mundo não seria dizível. Da harmonia, contudo, não se segue confusão com gênese, máxime porque o não Ser, ou, noutras palavras, o não mundo, também é dizível. 115 REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ANGIONI, Lucas. 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Três formulações do objeto da Metafísica de Aristóteles. 1a. Edição. Rio de Janeiro. Editora Contraponto. 2008. FARIA, Maria do Carmo Bitencourt de. Aristóteles, a plenitude como horizonte do ser. 2a Edição. São Paulo. Editora Moderna, 2006. KANT, Immanuel. Crítica da Razão Pura. Trad. Fernando Costa Mattos. Editora Vozes. Petrópolis. 2012. PELLEGRIN, PIERRE. Vocabulário de Aristóteles. Trad. Claudia Berliner. São Paulo. Ed. Martins Fontes. 2010. 116 REALE, Giovanni. Fio Condutor Gramatical e Fio Condutor Ontológico na Dedução das Categorias Aristotélicas. Revista de Filosofia Neo-Escolástica, 1957. ______. Aristóteles Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. São Paulo. Edições Loyola. 2005Metafísica. Trad. Marcelo Perine. 2a. Edição. São Paulo. Edições Loyola, 2005. ROSS, David. Aristóteles. Lisboa. Publicações Dom Quixote, 1987. SANTOS, Mario Ferreira dos; Dicionário de Filosofia, consultado via web http://www.tirodeletra.com.br/ensaios/Dicionario-Substancia.htm em 12/07/12. 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Homo oeconomicus, or economic man, an 'abstraction used by some economists for one who manages his private income and expenditure strictly and consistently in accordance with his own material interests' (Oxford Dictionary); this expression, widespread from the last decades of nineteenth century on, was 'often employed by critics of political economy especially directed against the English economists who founded the Classical school', first of all by exponents of the historical school, who used to 'reproach them with having based a science of economics on the conception of an abstract man' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed.). An obvious pedigree traces the ancestor of homo oeconomicus to the Hobbesian man, led by the twin stimuli of pleasure and pain, and endowed with a reason limited to a calculus of the better means to a given end. Hobbes's psychology, made slightly more complex, was still J. Bentham's psychology, and it became the dower brought by J.S. Mill to political economy. A die-hard mythology notwithstanding, homo oeconomicus was absent from the early classical political economy. In fact, A. Smith, T.R. Malthus, and D. Ricardo envisaged the economy as the field where 'classes', not individuals interact. Smith's psychology described human beings, in their wealth-seeking activities no less than when pursuing honour and fame, as the victims of 'deception' and the prey of 'folly', a folly made less dangerous by the coming of commercial society (as contrasted with feudal society) only in so far as in this society unwise men are more likely to ruin only themselves. The 'rational' plans of entrepreneurs or 'projectors' are rational only in the mean-ends relationship, but irrational in their ultimate goals; the 'propensity to truck and barter' does not arise out of any means-ends rational calculus, but only out of our fondness of 'persuading' as an end in itself; and the 'desire of bettering our condition', though a calm and reliable passion, likely to be mistaken for reason, takes origin from deception and an unreasonable overrating of the pleasures offered by wealth as a key to status (Cremaschi, 1984, ch. 3). For Malthus and Ricardo the basic characteristic of human nature is the desire of 'the joys of family', lying at the root of the law of population; besides, human beings always face an alternative between idleness and luxury; a point on which Malthus and Ricardo disagree was whether there is a 'desire of accumulation' (accepted by Ricardo and ruled out by Malthus) that could play the same role as a desire of luxury in making an overproduction crisis impossible. 2 The early history of the 'word' homo oeconomicus is rather obscure. The history of the 'thing' is less dubious. In fact, an avowedly hypothetical model of man as a rational and selfregarding wealth-maximiser was first created by J.S. Mill: on the one hand, he heavily leaned on Benthamite psychology; on the other, he ascribed the creation of his model to earlier political economists. Political economy Mill stresses - 'does not treat the whole of man's nature as modified by the social state, not the whole conduct of man in society' (Mill, 1844, p. 137). It 'considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth' (ibid., p. 138). It is concerned with man 'solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.... It makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive; except... aversion to labour, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences' (ibid., pp. 137-8). Mill's basic idea was repeated by J. E. Cairnes (1857, p. 56). The word 'economic man' shows up in English with Marshall, who believed that the critics had misunderstood the classics' view of man, but also that the latter had sometimes misrepresented man as an economic actor. 'Perhaps the earlier English economists he writes confined their attention too much to the motives of individual action' (Marshall, 1890, p. 25). He adds that 'economists study the actions of individuals, but study them in relation to social rather than individual life.... In all this they deal with man as he is: not with an abstract or 'economic' man; but a man of flesh and blood. They deal with a man who is largely influenced by egoistic motives in his business life to a great extent... but who is also neither above vanity and recklessness, nor below delight in doing his work well for his own sake' (ibid., p. 26). Yet, economists study man 'as he is', but 'in those aspects of life' i.e., business life in which human motivations are 'so regular' that they 'can be predicted' (ibid., p. 27). F.Y. Edgeworth makes a point similar to Marshall's, suggesting that the simplified model is useful for a heuristic purpose, namely in order to allow for an analogical transfer of a conceptual apparatus from the physical to the social sciences. It is true that the 'first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest' (Edgeworth 1881, p. 16), but 'the conception of Man as pleasure machine' is justified mainly in so far as it 'may justify and facilitate the employment of mechanical terms and Mathematical reasoning in social sciences' (ibid., p. 15). 3 Sidgwick adds that much confusion has arisen from lack of distinction between two different propositions: the first, 'being important as a premise in the deductive reasonings of the science' is the proposition 'that the 'economic man' that is, the human being that Political Economy assumes to be normal always prefers a greater apparent gain to a less, and prefers to attain any desired result with the least possible apparent expenditure' (Sidgwick, 1883, p. 36); the second is the proposition 'that the best possible results will be attained, so far at least as the production and distribution of wealth are concerned, if the individual is left free to regulate his own activities' (ibid.). The first, Sidgwick adds, has nothing to do with economic ideals or rules of governmental action, while the second carries a maxim of policy, basically the quintessence of what was called in German Manchesterismus or (quite misleadingly) Smithianismus, or also 'political individualism'. The need for a careful distinction between a methodologically individualistic approach in economic theory and 'political individualism', i.e., the doctrine of the spontaneous harmony of interest, was stressed by British writers. Political economy, according to W. Bagehot, works with a simplified description of human nature, for it assumes 'that every man who makes anything makes it for money', and, even if we know 'that men are not like this', yet we assume this view of human nature 'for simplicity's sake, as an hypothesis'. But this 'deceives many excellent people' who 'have very indistinct ideas what an abstract science is'; in fact, the political economists 'considered not the whole of human nature, but only a part of it.... They dealt not with man, the moral being, but with man, the moneymaking animal' Bagehot, 1880, pp. 6-7). And yet, Bagehot adds, even though Manchesterismus was not the doctrine professed by the best classical economists, it was not merely a strawman created by German and British writers who disliked political economy, but 'the cultivators of the abstract science itself... did not always in practice remember' its 'remoteness to practice' (ibid.). The word 'economic man' had in fact arisen to popularity among historicist and romantic critics of British political economy. It was probably first used in its Latin version by German writers of the 'historical school' (and in this version it became later popular with anthropologists). Its use was typically connected with a mixing up of two different lines of criticism, an epistemological (historicist or 'universalist') criticism, and a moral one. This implied blurring that distinction between science and art which Mill had tried to draw. As a matter of 4 fact, 'political economy' was often seen as a social philosophy and a political program both by its critics and by many of its proponents. The camp of the critics ranged from British romantic writers such as Carlyle and proponents of 'Christian political economy' reaching German historicists and Continental neo-Thomist philosophers. According to the more sweeping formulations of the criticism, homo oeconomicus was but one more piece in the mosaic of modern civilization, deriving from a loss of the authentic view of man and society and bringing the creation of the 'individual'. That is, Luther created a theological, Descartes a philosophical, Locke a political 'individualism', and Adam Smith the economic follow-up of the latter. Four issues that were involved in the romantic, historicist, and anti-modern criticism (and requiring to be disentangled) are a refusal of 'political individualism' (or of Smithianismus), methodological individualism (or poking fun at Robinson Crusoe stories), a refusal of 'psychological rationalism' (or a stress on emotive and cultural motives underlying human action), and a refusal of egoistic hedonism (always confused with utilitarianism as such). For twentieth-century economists, after the 'marginalist revolution' and the dismissal of cardinalism, homo oeconomicus indicates an instrumentally rational economic agent who has (i) a complete and consistent ordering of preferences; (ii) perfect information; (iii) full computing power. Various kinds of criticism by influential insiders such as H.A. Simon (to the assumptions of a full computing power and of a perfect information) and A. Sen (to a unified ordering of preferences) notwithstanding, homo oeconomicus has colonized the whole habitat of the social sciences, from politics to love. A line of criticism staged by outsiders, the anthropologists, involves also classical political economy: B. Malinowski has contended that the gift economy of the Pacific islanders is shaped by rules other than those of maximization of wealth or utility; M. Mauss has argued that the 'gift' is a root phenomenon in human cultures not to be explained away by reduction to some kind of exchange; K. Polanyi has proposed a 'substantivist' view of economies as processes of exchange of material resources between societies and their natural habitat that avoids any consideration of the individual's rational behaviour. More recent lines of criticism discuss homo oeconomicus within the framework of allencompassing diagnoses of modern western civilization such as have been formulated by L. Dumont, J. Derrida, M. Foucault, J.-F. Lyotard. The image of homo oeconomicus is said to be 5 ideological in a Marxian sense, in so far as it mistakes the particular and contingent for the universal and natural: it is sexist, leaving women's reproductive activity out of the picture (Ferber and Nelson, 1993), or ethnocentric, having absolutized a western tendency of the self to dominate nature (Dixon, 1976). Last but not least, the 'antiutilitarian movement in the social sciences' heralded by A. Caillé (the odd name chosen for the movement notwithstanding) has added that homo oeconomicus is just one facet of modernity's (quite implausible) image of man and society, an image bound to be overcome by theories of complexity (Caillé, 1988). When taken at its best, recent criticism deserves being taken seriously: unlike aprioristic nineteenth century refusals, it may be read as advancing a claim of inadequacy of homo oeconomicus as a model of (wo)man's action, and pointing at a vacuous or ideological character of any social theory built on such a model of human action. And yet, a counter-objection is that, even if root metaphors of any science are always permeated by philosophical assumptions, world-views, and ideologies, scientific theories (qua scientific) are also always under empirical constraints; this implies that, even if moulded by biased assumptions, at least up to the next paradigm shift, they may decently fulfil their task. To sum up: while the paradigm of homo oeconomicus is on its way to successfully colonizing the whole field of the social sciences, a concurrent paradigm of complexity is possibly taking shape. It is as well to be prepared to a possibly long period of warlike coexistence. Sergio Cremaschi Bagehot, W. ([1880] 1973), Economic Studies, Clifton, N. J.: Kelley. Cairnes, J. E. ([1857] 1965), The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy, New York: Kelley. Caillé, A. (1988), Critique de la raison utilitaire. Manifeste du Mauss, Paris: Editions de la Découverte. Cremaschi, S. (1984), Il sistema della ricchezza. Economia politica e problema del metodo in Adam Smith, Milano: Angeli. Dixon, V. (1976), 'World Views and Research Methodology', in African Philosophy: Assumptions and Paradigms for Research on Black Persons, ed. L.M. King, V. Dixon, W.W. Nobles, Los 6 Angeles: Fanon Center. Edgeworth, F. Y. ([1881] 1932), Mathematical Psychics, London: London School of Economics. Ferber, M.A. and Nelson, J.A. ed. (1993), Beyond Economic Man, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Marshall, A. ([1890] 1961), Principles of Economics, London: Macmillan. Mill, J. S. ([1844] 1974), Essays on some unsettled questions of political economy, Clifton, N. J.: Kelley. Sidgwick, H. ([1883] 1901), The Principles of Political Economy, 3d ed. London: Macmillan.

Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva1 [email protected] WhatsApp: (81) 97109-4655 Teoria Democrática Moderna Em meados do século XVI, surgiu a ideia de autonomia do indivíduo, que deu origem ao individualismo e ao liberalismo político. A concepção de democracia que se desenvolveu com base nesses princípios assumiu um perfil bastante diferente daquele utilizado na Grécia antiga. Se antes a democracia estava diretamente ligada à ideia de igualdade, em sua nova versão passou a ser relacionar primordialmente com a ideia de liberdade. Em decorrência dos ideais desenvolvidos naquele momento histórico, o principal dilema político fundamentava-se na limitação de poder do soberano (que às vezes se confundia com o próprio Estado) e na ampliação das liberdades individuais, como o direito a dispor da propriedade material e a defender-se judicialmente. Até hoje, grande parte do debate político tem como tema a defesa dos ideias liberais ou a crítica a eles. Na perspectiva do filósofo inglês Thomas Hobbes, a constituição e o funcionamento de uma sociedade pressupõem que os indivíduos cedam, por transferência, seus direitos naturais (mantendo somente o direito de conservarem sua vida) ao soberano. O autor entendia que os seres humanos, em estado de natureza (isto é, compartilhando do direito a tudo o que existe, em razão de não haver limitação legal), tendem a agir pela força e pela violência para conseguir o que desejam, o que acabaria provocando uma guerra contínua entre todos. Para Hobbes, a justificativa para o poder absoluto dos reis residia na compreensão de que os homens em estado de natureza se encontrariam em constante conflito. Na foto, palácio na Arábia Saudita, em 2012, uma das poucas monarquias absolutas da atualidade. 1 Tecnólogo em Agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim. Formado em magistério pela Escola Estadual Frei Cassiano Comacchio. Tecnólogo em Biologia, Filosofia e Sociologia pelo Colégio de Aplicação da UFPE. Por isso, para disciplinarem a si mesmos e garantirem o bem-estar físico e material, seria necessário que os indivíduos firmassem um contrato social regulado por uma autoridade soberana. Hobbes manifestou preferência pela monarquia absolutista, pois acreditava que as assembleias e os Parlamentos estimulam os conflitos graças às disputas entre diferentes facções e partidos. O poder absoluto defendido por Hobbes se justificava pela transferência dos direitos dos indivíduos ao soberano. É um nome desse contrato social que o poder deve ser exercido, e não para a realização da vontade pessoal do soberano. Por conta dessa perspectiva, Hobbes não pode ser considerado defensor da democracia. Entretanto, seu pensamento é importante, pois serve de parâmetro para as reflexões sobre a organização do poder construídas posteriormente. No século XVII, John Locke, também filósofo inglês, propôs uma reflexão bem diferente das de Hobbes. Para ele, o poder soberano deve permanecer nas mãos dos cidadãos, que são os melhores juízes dos próprios interesses. Cabe ao governante retribuir a delegação de poderes ao garantir as prerrogativas individuais: segurança jurídica e propriedade privada. Assim, o contrato social teve como função garantir os direitos naturais para todos. Esse pensamento é uma das bases do liberalismo político. Entretanto, deve ser ressaltado que sua implantação não permitiu a construção da igualdade propagada por Locke, mas foi uma das estruturas de consolidação do poder da burguesia. As ideias de Locke são uma das referências para o desenvolvimento da democracia representativa. Na imagem, vemos o palácio de Westminster, em Londres, onde estão situadas as casas do Parlamento e ocorrem as principais decisões políticas do Reino Unido. Para Locke, o princípio da maioria é fundamental para o funcionamento das instituições políticas democráticas, assim como as leis, que devem valer para todos. Por isso, segundo o filósofo, a elaboração das leis precisa estar a cargo de representantes escolhidos pelo povo, que exerceriam o papel de legisladores no interesse da maioria: o regime político proposto por Locke é, portanto, uma democracia representativa. O escritor e filósofo político suíço Jean-Jacques Rousseau se preocupou com o problema da legitimidade da ordem política. Para ele, a desigualdade ocasionada pelo advento da propriedade privada é a causa de todos os sentimentos de ruins do ser humano. No contrato social, é preciso definir a questão da igualdade e do comprometimento de todos com o bem comum. Se a vontade individual é particular, a do cidadão, que vive em sociedade e tem consciência disso, deve ser coletiva e voltada para o bem comum. A participação política é, portanto, ato de deliberação pública que organiza a vontade geral, ou seja, traduz os elementos comuns a todas as vontades individuais. Esse seria, portanto, o núcleo do conceito de democracia. Em seu livro Do Contrato Social2, Rousseau afirma que a democracia só pode existir se for diretamente exercida pelos cidadãos, sem representação política, pois a vontade geral não poderia ser representada, apenas exercida diretamente. Para Rousseau, a democracia direta é o único sistema legítimo de autoridade e de ato político.3 Em O espírito das leis, o filósofo e político Montesquieu, afirmou que igualdade na democracia é algo muito difícil de garantir plenamente. Partindo do princípio de que é necessário um controle externo para que os sistemas políticos funcionem bem, esse pensador defende a criação de regras que estabeleçam limites aos detentores do poder a fim de manter a liberdade dos indivíduos. Por isso, propôs a divisão da esfera administrativa em três poderes ou funções independentes entre si: o Legislativo, o Executivo e o Judiciário. De maneira resumida, cabem ao poder Legislativo as funções de fiscalizar o poder Executivo, votar leis de interesse público nas instâncias relativas (municipal, estadual e federal) e, em situações específicas, julgar autoridades como o presidente da República ou os próprios membros do Parlamento. O Executivo é o poder do Estado que, nos moldes da Constituição de um país, tem por atribuição governar a nação e administrar os interesses públicos, colocando em prática políticas públicas e leis, e garantindo o acesso aos direitos. Por fim, o poder Judiciário é exercido pelos juízes, que têm a capacidade e a prerrogativa de julgar com base nas regras constitucionais e nas leis criadas pelo poder legislativo. 2 Contrato Social Acordo entre os membros de um grupo, pelo qual reconhecem igual autoridade de um conjunto de regras, de um regime político ou de iluminação governante sobre todos. 3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), escritor e filósofo político suíço, é considerado um dos grandes precursores do Iluminismo. Foi para Paris em 1742, onde passou a conviver com filósofos iluministas, como Diderot e Condillac. Escreveu diversos verbetes na Enciclopédia, coordenada por Diderot. Seu livro Do Contrato Social (publicado originalmente em 1762) foi uma das obras que marcaram o ideário da Revolução Francesa. Para ele, a democracia só existe se for exercida diretamente pelos cidadãos. Para Montesquieu, a democracia não pode prescindir da divisão entre os poderes. Na imagem, foto da Praça dos Três Poderes, em Brasília (DF), 2013. A democracia, na perspectiva de Montesquieu, seria garantida pelo equilíbrio entre os três poderes, assegurando assim maior liberdade aos indivíduos. A liberdade, porém, só existiria com moderação, o que equivaleria a fazer tudo o que as leis permitissem (pois, se um cidadão pudesse fazer tudo o que as leis proibissem, não teria mais liberdade, por que todos poderiam fazer o mesmo). Karl Marx e Friedrich Engels acreditavam que um governo democrático seria inviável numa sociedade capitalista, pois a regulação democrática da vida não poderia se realizar com as limitações impostas pelas relações capitalistas de produção. Seria necessário, portanto, mudar as bases da sociedade para criar possibilidade de uma política democrática. Para entender a posição desses autores com relação à democracia, é necessário entender como eles percebem a função do Estado na sociedade capitalista. Para Marx e Engels, os princípios que protegem a liberdade dos indivíduos e defendem o direito à propriedade tratam as pessoas como iguais apenas formalmente. O movimento em favor do sufrágio universal e de igualdade política é reconhecido por Marx como um passo importante, mas, segundo esse autor, seu potencial emancipador está limitado pelas desigualdades de classe. Desse modo, as democracias liberais seriam cerceadas pelo capital privado, que restringiria sistematicamente as opções políticas. De acordo com esse olhar, a liberdade nas democracias capitalistas é, portanto, puramente formal, pois a desigualdade de classe prevalece. Nas palavras de Marx: "Na democracia liberal, o capital governa". REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS HOBBES, T. Leviatã. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1974. (Coleção Os Pensadores). LOCKE, J. Segundo tratado sobre o governo civil. São Paulo: Martin Claret, 2002. MARX, K. O capital: crítica a economia política. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1974. (Coleção Os Pensadores). MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. O manifesto do partido comunista. 5. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1999. ROUSSEAU, J. J. O contrato social e outros escritos. São Paulo: Cultrix, 1971. SILVA, A. et al. Sociologia em movimento. 2. ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016.

DOMAINS OF DISCOURSE By Philip RUGLY and Charles SAYWARD 1. Consider the following argument. Suppose there is a domain of discourse of English. Then everything of which any predicate of English is true is a member of that domain. But if English has a domain of discourse, then, since 'is a domain of discourse of English' it itself a predicate of English and true of that domain, that domain is a member of itself. But nothing is a member of itself. Thus, English has no domain of discourse. We can put the argument this way. First note that the schema S (x) (y) «Fx & y is a domain of discourse of English) -> x is a member of y) holds for any replacement of 'F' by a predicate of English (an expression of English true or false of anything). For if English has a domain of discourse then it includes everything of which any predicate of English is true. Now, the expression 'is a domain of discourse of English' is a predicate of English for it is true or false of things, e.g., it is false of the set of arabic numerals. Thus, we obtain from the above schema the truth (I) (x) (y) «x is a domain of discourse of English & y is a do- main of discourse of English) --> y is a member of x) But, (2) (x) x is not a member of x And from (1) and (2) it follows that (3) (x) x is not a domain of discourse of English i.e., English has no domain of discourse. 2. Essential to the above argument is that 'is a domain of discourse of English' is a predicate of English, otherwise (l) is not obtainable from schema S. This might be challenged. After all, a fairly common view is that if a sentence X belongs to a certain language L a sentence saying X is true in L or false in L does not itself belong to L, but to another 174 Ph. HUGLY AND Ch. SAYWARD language, I.:s metalanguage. Sometimes this view is attributed to Tarski. For example, Prior says: Further, Tarski argues, a sentence asserting that some sentence S is a true sentence of some language L cannot itself be a sentence of the language L, but must belong to a metalanguage in which the sentences of L are not used but mentioned. ([1], p. 223) We think Prior is wrong in attributing this view to Tarski. Tarski held natural languages to be inconsistent in part because he held that natural languages do contain their own semantical locutions. e) In any event, the view Prior articulates (whether held by Tarski or not) is relevant to the argument in section 1. If natural languages do not con- tain their own seman tical locutions and if 'is a domain of discourse of English' is a seman tical locution, then that expression does not belong to English, and, consequently, (1) is not obtainable from S. This view seems to us to be out of touch with reality. Whatever the lessons of the semantical paradoxes, that 'is true in English' and 'is a do- main of discourse of English' do not belong to English cannot be. one of those lessons. Just consider 'Two is even' is true in English. It is not true in German, though, since it is not a sentence of German. These sentences are true. True in what language? Well, what language are they written in? English, of course. These sentences are true in English. There is nothing sophisticated about this point. Indeed, it really amounts to pointing out that what is written in a particular natural language is written in that language. 3. Is the supposition that English is a language which contains the predicate 'is a domain of discourse of English' crucial to seeing that English has no domain of discourse? To be sure, this supposition (or, as it seems to us, this fact) is used in getting (3), the conclusion that English has no (1) Alfred TARSKI 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', Logic, Semantics and Matamathematics, Oxford University Press (1956), 164-166. This putative consequence of the liar paradox has been challenged by Hugly and Sayward in 'Is English Inconsistent'?, Erkenntis, Vol. 15, No, 3, 343-347. 175 AND Ch. SAYWARD netimes this view is attributed to Tarski. :ntence asserting that some sentence S is mguage L cannot itself be a sentence of belong to a metalanguage in which the ed but mentioned. ([1], p. 223) Jtributing this view to Tarski. Tarski held istent in part because he held that natural 'n semantical locutions. C) articulates (whether held by Tarski or not) ection 1. If natural languages do not con- ltions and if 'is a domain of discourse of on, then that expression does not belong , (1) is not obtainable from S. ~ out of touch with reality. Whatever the doxes, that 'is true in English' and 'is a do- , do not belong to English cannot be one ~r ~nglish. It is not true in German, though, ~ of German. 'ue in what language? Well, what language f course. These sentences are true in English. i about this point. Indeed, it really amouñs written in a particular natural language IS ish is a language which contains the predicate English' crucial to seeing that ~nglish has be sure, this supposition (or, as It seems to ng (3), the conclusion that English has no of Truth in Formalized Languages', LCJgic, Semantics . p (1956) 164-166 This putative consequence verslty ress , . . .,? ged by Hugly and Sayward in 'Is Enghsh InconSistent ., DOMAINS OF DISCOURSE domain of discourse. But might one get to the same conclusion without having to rely on this supposition? Here is an argument for an affirmative answer. Let L be any language which can express the membership relation. Now, if the axiom of regularity is true, then L has no domain of discourse. For if L did have such a do- main that domain must member all the classes there are. But that do- main is itself a class. So it must member itself. This is contradicted by the axiom of regularity. Now English is certainly a language which can express the membership relation. Thus English has no domain of discourse. From this it looks as if one might get to (3) without relying upon the supposition that 'is a domain of discourse of English' is a predicate of English. For the argument just given does not rely upon that supposition. But it relies upon another supposition which is a good deal less plausi- ble. This is the supposition that English can express the membership rela- tion, or, more deeply, that there is such a relation as the membership relation. The idea here is that we so use the language of classes that (i) our variables range over all the classes there are, and (ii) the epsilon denotes the membership relation defined on all the classes there are. But is there any such maximal range or any such maximal relation? There is a good deal of plausiblity in the contrary view of the matter, namely, that for any range there is a more inclusive one and that for any membership rela- tionship there is a more inclusive one. In saying this we are not taking sides on this very complicated issue. Our point is simply that the argument for (3) that relies upon (i) and (ii) is a good deal more problematic than the argument articulated in section 1. A concluding remark. Both arguments just reviewed assume what the axiom of regularity implies, that no class is a member of itself. But this is not a point of logic. Nor is it settled by consistency conditions on set theory. How is it settled? A realist about sets would claim that how things are with sets settles the matter even though we are currently or even per- manently unable to see what the sets there are themselves disclose on this point. But we are not realists. The point of our argument really is to show that ifwe appeal to domains of discourse in our formal seman tical theoriz- ing about a natural language such as English, then we must employ a set theory which not only fails to affirm the axiom of regularity, but actual- ly denies it. And thatwill have further consequences. For example, reflect on the fact that the 'all' of last resort is the natural language 'all' our 'all' of English. Here 'all' means all. So suppose we allow self-membering 176 Ph. HUGLY AND Ch. SA YW ARD classes, with the domain of discourse of English as one such class. Then there is a universal class, namely the domain of discourse of English. So, the set theory we must employ if we are to grant English a domain of discourse will, e.g., deny either that each set yields its power set or that each set is outnumbered by its power set. Further, that theory must deny the axiom of separation. For 'x is not a member of x' will be admissable and yet cannot, on pain of contradiction, separate out a class from a universal class. It is to such accumulations of inconveniences of theory that we would ultimately appeal in arguing that our formal semantical theorizing about natural languages such as English must forgo domains of discourse. Philip HUOlY andUniversity of Nebraska-Lincoln Charles SAYWI\RDDept. of Philosophy 1010 Oldfather Hall Lincoln NE 68588-0321 USA REFERENCE [I] Prior, A. N., 'Correspondence Theory of Truth', The Encyclopedia of Philosoplly, Vol. 2, edited by Paul Edwards, Collier-l'v1acmillan (1967): 223-232.

Presentism and Ockham's Way Out Alicia Finch and Michael Rea Presentism is, roughly, the thesis that only present objects exist; eternalism is, roughly, the thesis that past, present, and future objects exist. Ockham's way out purports to be a way out of fatalist arguments for the impossibility of free action. Fatalist arguments come in two varieties: logical and theological. Arguments for logical fatalism run something like this:! Let t!1B = a time that obtained exactly 1 billion years ago. Let pS abbreviate: one billion years after t!1B, S will perform A. Let qS abbreviate: pS was true at t!1B. Let rS abbreviate: S performs A now. Let tS abbreviate: it is now exactly one billion years after t!1B. 1. (qS & tS) is true, and S does not have, and never had, any choice about (qS & tS). 2. ! [(qS & tS) " rS]. 3. Therefore, rS is true and S does not have, and never had, any choice about rS. We are grateful to Michael Bergmann, Alvin Plantinga and Dean Zimmerman for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, and we are especially grateful to Michael Bergmann for many helpful conversations and extended correspondence about the issues discussed herein. Alicia Finch's work on this paper was supported by the Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion; Michael Rea's work on this paper was supported by an NEH Summer Stipend. ! Those familiar with the literature on fatalism will note that fatalist arguments more commonly open with a premise like this: (1#) It is true at t!1B that S performs A at t and S does not have, and never had, any choice about the proposition that it is true at t!1B that S performs A at t. And, of course, subsequent premises would then have to be modified accordingly. For present purposes, however, we have chosen to work with a 'presentist-friendly' version of the standard fatalist argument-that is, a version that takes tense seriously and that doesn't implicitly presuppose (as 1# does-for example, by employing the locution 'it is true at t!1B') that non-present times exist. 2 Alicia Finch and Michael Rea Arguments for theological fatalism are similar, but they replace qS with something like: kS: God knew at t!1B that pS was true. They then go on to derive the same conclusion: that for any agent S and act A, S does not have, and never had, any choice about the proposition that S performs A. Of course, it is trivially true that if an agent does not have and never had a choice about the proposition that she performs a particular act, then the agent does not perform the act freely. So, the fatalist's conclusion is that no agent acts freely. Ockham's way out of the problem of fatalism is of interest to libertarians with respect to the metaphysics of free will. A libertarian is one who accepts the theses that: (a) agents perform free acts in the actual world and (b) agents cannot perform free acts if determinism is true." Non-libertarians who accept (a) accept compatibilism, where compatibilism is the thesis that (c) even if determinism is true, agents might perform free acts. Fatalist arguments present no special problem for compatibilists. Whatever considerations can be marshalled in support of the position that: (C) An agent S might act freely even if the combination of the state of the world in the distant past and the laws of nature is inconsistent with S's acting other than she does. can also be marshalled in support of the position that: (C#) An agent S might act freely even if the past truth of future contingents# is inconsistent with S's acting other than she does. as well as the position that: (C##) An agent S might act freely even if divine foreknowledge$ of S's act is inconsistent with S's acting other than she does. So, the proponent of free will who needs a way out of fatalism is the libertarian. " Determinism is the thesis that the proposition P0 that expresses the complete state of the world at some time in the distant past (at, say, t!1B) and the proposition L that expresses the entirety of the laws of nature entails every true proposition whatever-including, of course, every proposition about which acts agents perform at various times. # The relevant 'future contingent' in our argument is pS. The argument from logical fatalism is sometimes referred to as the argument from future contingents. $ kS is a proposition about divine foreknowledge: God knows that S will perform A 1 billion years before she does so. The argument from theological fatalism is sometimes called the argument from, or problem of, divine foreknowledge. Presentism and Ockham's Way Out 3 What way out does Ockham offer? Ockham offers us a distinction between hard facts and soft facts about the past. While the distinction is somewhat difficult to characterize, the rough idea is that a hard fact about the past is entirely about the past whereas a soft fact is not: a hard fact about, say, t!1B is a fact whose obtaining is entirely independent of whatever might happen after t!1B, whereas a soft fact about t!1B somehow depends on, involves, or includes events that take place at later times.% This distinction is supposed to help the libertarian respond to the fatalist by allowing her to insist that past facts about future contingents, as well as past facts about divine foreknowledge, are soft, and therefore dependent in some way upon events that lie in their future. Once this dependence is granted, there is no longer any clear obstacle to saying that present agents can have a choice about such facts. Some will find Ockhamism incredible. And why not? At first blush, the view seems to imply that agents have the power to change the past. Ockhamists say that their view implies no such power. But even if they are right about this, their insistence that facts about the past can depend in some way upon the present acts of purportedly free agents might, all by itself, seem problematic enough. Our goal in this paper is to show that whether this claim is problematic depends crucially on whether presentism or eternalism is true. We will proceed as follows. In the next section, we will lay out the fatalist's argument more clearly, making sure to clarify which dialectical moves are available to the libertarian. We will then offer a more robust presentation of Ockhamism, responding to obvious objections and teasing out the implications of the view. At this point, we will discuss presentism and eternalism in more detail. We will then present our argument for the claim that the libertarian cannot take Ockham's way out of the fatalism argument unless she rejects presentism. Finally, we will consider and dispense with objections to our argument. In the end, it ought to be clear that the libertarian must make a choice between Ockham's way out and presentism. I . FATALISM There is a great deal of debate about whether the two types of fatalist argument are logically equivalent: some say that they are, while others % For a good start into the literature on Ockhamism and the hard-fact/soft-fact distinction, see John Martin Fischer (ed.), God, Freedom, and Foreknowledge (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989). 4 Alicia Finch and Michael Rea insist that the theological argument is stronger. Given that we are arguing that the presentist libertarian cannot use Ockham's way out of fatalism, and given that no one seems to think that the logical fatalist argument is more difficult to quash than its theological analogue, we will hereafter focus our attention on the logical fatalist version of the argument. Moreover, we will hereafter drop the 'logical' qualifier and use the terms 'fatalism' and 'fatalist argument' to refer to the logical versions of each. The fatalist argument as we have presented it relies on two premises and a somewhat controversial rule of inference. We will first consider the rule of inference, then the premises, in order to see which avenues of response are available for the libertarian confronted with the fatalist argument. We can present the rule of inference more elegantly if we employ the following abbreviation: NS p abbreviates: p and S does not have, and never had, any choice about whether p is true. With this, it becomes clear that the fatalist relies on the following inference principle (substituting (qS & tS) and rS for p and q, respectively): [NS p & ! (p " q)] entails NS q. This sort of principle will be familiar to participants in the debate over the compatibility of causal determinism and free action. In his famed 'Modal Version of the Consequence Argument' for the incompatibility of determinism and free action, Peter van Inwagen stipulates that: N p abbreviates: p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p is true. He then introduces 'Principle !', the rule of inference according to which: (!) [N p & N (p " q)] entails N q. Though van Inwagen's original ! is demonstrably invalid, many '!-style' inference principles are on offer and, at the very least, the following principle has remained immune to counter-example: (!!) [N p & !(p " q)] entails N q. Principle !! is relevantly similar to the inference principle we employed in presenting the fatalist's argument. Granted, our presentation of the fatalist's argument relies on a version of ! that relativizes the N-operator to a particular agent S. However, the fatalist's rule of inference is clearly of the '!-style'. We will christen it '!S,!': Presentism and Ockham's Way Out 5 (!S,!) [NS p & ! (p " q)] entails NS q Given that !! is valid only if !S,! is, libertarians-qua-incompatiblists who are inclined to accept !! ought to be inclined to accept !S,! as well. But it is a vexed question whether the libertarian-qua-incompatiblist must endorse the modal version of the Consequence Argument, let alone !!. For this reason, it is fortunate that the issue is irrelevant in the present context. Our purpose in this paper is to consider Ockham's way out of fatalism and Ockham's way out does not depend on a denial of the validity of !-style inference principles. It is worth noting, though, that !S,! certainly seems to be valid and that, given its association with arguments for the incompatibilist component of libertarianism, it would seem to be in the libertarian's best interest to find a way out of fatalism that does not require a rejection of that principle. Since Ockham's way out does not involve a rejection of Principle !S,!'s validity, it obviously involves a rejection of one of the fatalist's premises. Moreover, the Ockhamist qua Ockhamist has no objection to either the first conjunct of the fatalist's first premise: 1a. (qS & tS) is true (i.e., the conjunction of the proposition that it was true at t!1B that one billion years after t!1B, S will perform A and the proposition that it is exactly one billion years after t!1B is true). or to the second premise of the fatalist's argument: 2. ! [(qS & tS) " rS] While some libertarians reject both 1a and 2 on the grounds that the locution 'true at t!1B' is nonsensical, and other libertarians reject 1a on the grounds that qs is false given that bivalence fails for future-tensed propositions, neither strategy is part of Ockham's way out. Ockham's way out of fatalism is to assert the falsity of the second conjunct of the fatalist's first premise: 1b. S does not have, and never had, any choice about (qS & tS). Moreover, the Ockhamist thinks that S has, or had, a choice about the truth of the conjunction (qS & tS) in virtue of the fact that S has, or had, a choice about the truth of qS: it is no part of the Ockhamist's position to assert that an agent has, had, or might have a choice about the passage of time. In the next section, we will explain the Ockhamist's strategy in some detail, dispensing with the obvious objections along the way. But first we must offer a few words about the locution 'S has a choice about whether p is true' or, what is the same thing, 'S has a choice about whether it is true 6 Alicia Finch and Michael Rea that p'. We take it as trivially true that S has a choice about whether it is true that p if and only if: a. S is able to render p false. b. S can render p false. c. S has the power to render p false. and: d. S has power over the truth value of p. This assumption is standard both in the free-will literature generally and in the literature on fatalism in particular. Given this, and given that it will be far easier to explain the Ockhamist's position if we talk in terms of the ability to render a proposition false rather than in terms of having a choice about a proposition, we will employ the former terminology from here on out. Thus, for example, instead of focusing on the Ockhamist's denial of: 1b. S does not have, and never had, any choice about (qS & tS). we will instead focus our attention on the Ockhamist's denial of the equivalent proposition that: 1b#. S does not have, and never had, the power to render (qS & tS) false. II . OCKHAM'S WAY OUT As we have just seen, Ockham's way out of the fatalist argument is to reconcile the affirmation of: 1a. (qS & tS) is true. with a denial of: 1b#. S does not have, and never had, the power to render (qS & tS) false. Given that the Ockhamist does not attribute to S any power over the passage of time, it might seem that 1a and the denial of 1b# are reconcilable only if agents have the power to change the past; however, the Ockhamist emphatically denies that this is so. Indeed, the very heart of Ockhamism is the insistence that there is an analysis of 'power to render a proposition false' such that an agent might have this power over qS without having the ability to change the past. When Ockhamists give an account of the power to render a contingent proposition false, they include a condition similar to this: Presentism and Ockham's Way Out 7 (P) S has the power to render p false only if there is an action X such that (i) S has the power to perform X and (ii) necessarily, if S performs X, then p is false.& We can see how this partial account of 'S has the power to render P false' aids the Ockhamist's response to the fatalist if we recall our terminological stipulations: pS = the proposition that, one billion years after t!1B, S will perform A. qS = the proposition that pS was true at t!1B. Given this, it obviously follows that the affirmation of the following proposition entails the denial of the fatalist's (1b#): (O) S has the power to render qS false. Moreover, if the Ockhamist cashes out (O) by applying the condition on 'power to render p false' given in (P), the Ockhamist denial of (1b#) implies: (O#) There is an action X such that (i) S has the power to perform X and (ii) necessarily, if S performs X, then qS is false. Obviously enough, the relevant act X will be some act distinct from A-perhaps the very act of refraining from A-such that S's performance of X entails that S refrains from performing A one billion years after t!1B. So, according to the Ockhamist, because S performs A now, it is and always has been the case that, at t!1B, it was true that S will perform A exactly one billion years later. However, S has both the power to perform A and the power to refrain from performing A; and given the latter power, S therefore also has the power to render qS false-contra 1b#. Thus, 1b# is false. And now the distinction between hard and soft facts becomes relevant. Recall that hard facts about the past are, roughly, facts that obtain wholly independently of whatever events lie in their future; soft facts are facts that are not so independent. According to the Ockhamist, qS expresses a soft fact about the past; for the truth of qS depends partly on the way in which S exercises her power now, one billion years after t!1B. But if the truth of qS depends partly on what S does now, then there is no clear obstacle to saying that S has the power to render qS false. To be sure, this is no argument for the conclusion that S does have this power; but offering such an argument is & While there may be some Ockhamists who would prefer to tweak this condition a bit, a commitment to Ockhamism requires a commitment to an analysis of 'power to render P false' that includes a condition relevantly similar to it. We will thus proceed on the assumption that (P) is part of the Ockhamist's response to the fatalist: nothing of importance will hinge on the details of any particular analysis of 'power to render false'. 8 Alicia Finch and Michael Rea not the Ockhamist's goal. Ockhamism is entirely a defensive manoeuvre.' And, at this juncture in the dialectic, if the fatalist wants to carry on with her insistence that S lacks that power, she owes the Ockhamist further argument. What more can the fatalist offer? The only way forward is to try to defend 1b# -or, more to the point, to defend the truth of the claim that the Ockhamist denies: 1b#qs S does not have, and never had the power to render qS false. Towards doing so, the fatalist can begin by noting that all parties to the debate will admit that: i. qS is a proposition that expresses a fact about the past-indeed, a fact about t!1B, a time 1 billion years prior to the present time. But (i) implies: ii. qS was true before S came into existence. Moreover, the Ockhamist herself will agree that: iii. qS cannot change its truth value. But, surely, the fatalist will say, nothing could be more obvious than that (ii) and (iii) imply: 1b#qs S does not have, and never had the power to render qS false. This is the pith of the fatalist's support for 1b#qs: S did not exist at t!1B and qS is (and has been, at least since t!1B) unchangeably true.( But if an agent did not yet exist when a proposition was (already) unchangeably true, the agent cannot have (and can never have had) the power to render the proposition false. Thus, if qS was true a billion years before S ever existed, and if qS has been unchangeably true for as long as it has been true at all, then S does not have, and never has had, the power to render qS false. Hence, 1b#qs is true. Given that the Ockhamist assents to (ii) and (iii), the dialectical standoff is this: the Ockhamist rejects the inference from (ii) and (iii) to (1b#qs); the ' For this reason, there is nothing question-begging in the Ockhamist's strategy. She cannot be accused of assuming what she is trying to prove because she is not trying to prove anything. Rather, her strategy is simply to assume what the fatalist denies-that S has the power to perform some act other than A-and to expose the fact that the fatalist still has not offered any reason for thinking that S lacks precisely those powers that she must possess in order for that assumption to be true. ( Whether qS was true-and unchangeably so-prior to t!1B depends on how seriously one wants to take the tense of the verb in qS. Out of respect for the presentist position, we are throughout taking tense as seriously as possible. Presentism and Ockham's Way Out 9 fatalist takes the opposite view. So, the issue, then, is which of the following two claims is more plausible: I. (ii) and (iii) imply (1b#qs) or II. S has the power to perform an act other than A. In the next section, we will argue that the Ockhamist can easily reject (I) in favour of (II) provided that she is an eternalist. We will further argue that if the Ockhamist commits to presentism, her position is untenable. Thus, we will conclude that if libertarians want to employ Ockham's way out as a way of responding to fatalist arguments, they must abandon presentism. III . PRESENTISM, ETERNALISM, AND OCKHAM'S WAY OUT As we have said, presentism is (roughly) the thesis that only present objects exist while eternalism is (again, roughly) the thesis that everything that ever did or ever will exist does exist. A more precise expression of presentism is: it has always been and always will be the case that there are no actual but non-present objects.) Eternalism can be more precisely characterized as the thesis that past, present, and future objects (and, by extension, events) exist; the phrase 'everything that exists' refers not only to things that occupy the present time, but also to objects that occupy past and future times. According to the eternalist, past, present, and future events bear relations of earlier-than, simultaneous-with, and later-than to one another, but each time has the same ontological status. So, on the presentist view, all of reality-all that exists simpliciter -is what exists now, whereas on the eternalist view, what exists simpliciter includes everything that exists at every time. But what is a 'time'? The literature on presentism and eternalism includes at least two different ways of answering this question. On the one hand, times may be thought of as abstract states of affairs; on the other hand, ) The 'always' quantifier is added so that presentism does not turn out to be true at the beginning of time (if time had a beginning) and false thereafter. The actuality qualifier is added so that presentism does not imply the falsity of David Lewis's brand of possibilism, according to which there are objects that do not exist in the actual world and therefore do not exist in our present time by virtue of not existing in our space-time at all (David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Mass.: Blackwell, 1986). Given that we are assuming that every event involves an object, we take it that insofar as presentists and their rivals differ about the existence of past and future objects they also differ about the existence of past and future events. We also assume that every event with non-zero duration is composed of momentary events. 10 Alicia Finch and Michael Rea they may be thought of as concrete events. Abstract times are analogous to abstract possible worlds. Abstract times might fruitfully be thought of as present-tense maximal states of affairs. Intuitively, and very roughly, a present-tense maximal state of affairs is a total state of the world at an instant, minus all of the pastand future-tense truths. More rigorously: Say that a state of affairs S is future directed just in case either S's obtaining entails that some contingent thing will exist or S's obtaining entails that no contingent thing will exist; and then define a past-directed state of affairs in the obviously parallel way.!* Then a state of affairs S is present-tense maximal if and only if, for every atomic state of affairs S# that is neither future-directed nor past-directed, either S includes S# or S precludes S#.!! A concrete time might then be thought of as the event of some particular abstract state of affairs obtaining. For convenience, we will assume that times are concrete events. On this assumption, the presentist denies that there are past or future times whereas the eternalist says that there are. And now let us begin to consider how the eternalist and the presentist each fare when confronted with the fatalist's argument. Recall that the Ockhamist must explain why: ii. qS was true before S came into existence and iii. qS cannot change its truth value fail to imply 1b#qs S does not have, and never had the power to render qS false. The eternalist Ockahmist blocks this inference by pointing out that it seems plausible only if one assumes the truth of the suppressed premise that: ii#. qS was true before S came into existence only if there was a time t# such that (a) qS was true at t#, and (b) it was false at t# and at every time prior to t# that S exists. The eternalist Ockhamist then points out that the truth of eternalism implies that, given that there is some time or other at which it is true that S exists, condition (b) in (ii#) cannot be satisfied. !* 'Contingent things' might be objects or events; and we assume that an event exists when and only when it occurs. !! We shall assume that states of affairs that include laws of nature will not be atomic. One state of affairs includes another just in case the obtaining of the first state of affairs entails the obtaining of the second. One state of affairs precludes another just in case the obtaining of the first entails that the second does not obtain. Presentism and Ockham's Way Out 11 Moreover, the eternalist Ockhamist can go on to point out that, just as it has always been true that S performs A one billion years later than t!1B, so too it has always been true that S exists. To say that S did not exist at t!1B is not to say that, at t!1B it was false that S exists. Rather, it is just to say that none of the events of S's life are located at t!1B. Thus, given that it was true at t!1B that S exists, it is hard to see any obstacle to saying that the truth of qS is ontologically dependent on S's actual performance of A at the present time. Indeed, from an eternalist point of view, qS is quite plausibly viewed as just an alternative (if rather oblique) way of expressing the conjunction of rS and tS: i.e., S performs A now and it is now one billion years after than t!1B. And since everyone will agree that it is plausible to say that the truth of this latter proposition depends on what S does (in particular, rS clearly depends on S), rather than the other way around, so too everyone should agree that qS depends on what S does. Thus, the eternalist Ockhamist can tell the following story: since qS depends for its truth value on what S actually does at the present time, it makes perfect sense to say that S performs A freely and that S has (or had) the power to render qS false. S's performing A at t is, we might say, 'ontologically prior,' even if not temporally prior, to the truth (at t!1B) of the proposition that S will perform A one billion years later than t!1B. Thus, on this way of thinking about why the inference from (ii) and (iii) to (1b#qs) fails, the fatalist simply gets things the wrong way around: the fatalist assumes that since the truth (at t!1B) of 'S will perform A one billion years later than t!1B' is temporally prior to S's performance of A, its truth is ontologically prior as well; but this is precisely what the eternalist Ockhamist denies.!" Of course, it would be nice if the eternalist Ockhamist could give a thorough explication of the notions of 'ontological dependence' and 'ontological priority' that figure in her response to the fatalist. As it is, it is simply not clear whether such dependence or priority is best thought of in terms of explanation, or supervenience, or causation, or what. But it seems that, in the present case, the eternalist Ockhamist need not work this out completely. Indeed, it seems that she can point out that, ordinarily, we do not think that the truth of the proposition that S !" Of course, the eternalist Ockhamist need not deny that there are concrete events that are both temporally and ontologically prior to other events. For instance, the eternalist Okchamist need not deny that there are causal events that are both temporally and ontologically prior to their effects. Indeed, the eternalist Ockhamist qua eternalist Ockhamist is not committed to any unusual claims about the relations between concrete events. What sets her apart is her conception of the relationship between the truth value of contingently true propositions and the concrete events on which their truth values depend. 12 Alicia Finch and Michael Rea performs A is ontologically prior to S's performance of A. Indeed, we are fully prepared, in the ordinary case, to think that the proposition that S performs A is ontologically dependent on S's performance of A and, moreover, that S's performance of A is ontologically prior to the truth of the proposition that S performs A. The eternalist Ockhamist's point is that, however we ordinarily understand the relationship between true propositions about agents' actions and the agents' actions themselves, this is how we should understand the relationship between true propositions like qS and S's performance of A at t. The action comes first, in some ontologically significant sense of 'first', and the truth of the proposition succeeds it. Note too that the eternalist Ockhamist can make her points about the ontological dependence of past truths like qS on present acts of free agents in any number of ways. If she relies on the distinction between hard and soft facts, she can say that a fact F is soft (simpliciter) just in case (i) F is contingent and (ii) F is not included in any present-tense maximal state of affairs; and F is a hard fact about the past (from the point of view of a time t) just in case F is included in some present tense maximal state of affairs that obtains earlier than t. She can then add, as seems plausible, that soft facts about the past are ontologically posterior to and dependent on the hard facts about the past. Moreover, the eternalist Ockhamist might offer, as a heuristic device, the image of two 'levels' of reality: first, there's the level of hard facts, which includes the concrete events that bear relations of temporal simultaneity, priority and posteriority to one another; then there is the level of reality that includes soft facts, the temporal relations among concrete events. Alternatively, the eternalist Ockahmist might think in terms of two distinct 'ontological moments': what's ontologically 'first' is the moment that includes all the concrete events and the relations of temporal simultaneity, priority, and posteriority that they bear to one another; what's ontologically 'second' is the moment at which all the contingent propositions about the course of concrete events are true. But we must not allow this notion of ontological moments to confuse us: on the eternalist scheme, every concrete event that ever takes place in the course of history exists simpliciter just as every true proposition that describes the concrete course of events has its truth value simpliciter. On this scheme, a principle of unrestricted bivalence holds at all times, and every true contingent proposition is ontologically dependent on the course concrete events that exists simpliciter. At this point, we hope that it is obvious that the presentist Ockhamist cannot tell the same story as the eternalist about the failure of the inference from: Presentism and Ockham's Way Out 13 ii. qS was true before S came into existence. and iii. qS cannot change its truth value. to 1b#qs S does not have, and never had, the power to render qS false. The presentist, after all, insists that the only time that exists simpliciter is the present time. She believes that the only concrete events that exist simpliciter are the events that are currently taking place and the only concrete objects that exist simpliciter are those that exist now; she cannot abide an ontological distinction between what exists simpliciter and what exists at the present time. So, according to the presentist, S's performance of A exists only if S is performing A at the present time. Since the presentist denies that S's performing A exists when other times-times at which S is not performing A-are present, she obviously cannot say that the truth value of qS depends on anything that S is doing or has done. For, again, qS was true (and unchangeably so) nearly a billion years before S ever existed; so its truth value does not depend on S's existence. Moreover, it seems clear that if presentism is true, then temporal priority implies ontological priority. So, not only are earlier events ontologically prior to later events, but the truth of propositions true at earlier times is ontologically prior to later events. The presentist, therefore, must affirm the suppressed premise that the eternalist denied: ii#. qS was true before S came into existence only if there was a time t# such that (a) qS was true at t#, and (b) it was false at t# and at every time prior to t# that S exists. But (ii), (ii#) and (iii) together seem to imply: iv. The unchangeable truth of qS is temporally prior to and therefore ontologically prior to S's existence. Moreover, it obviously follows from (iv) that: iv#. The unchangeable truth of qS does not depend on S or any of S's actions. And it is difficult to deny that: v#. If the unchangeable truth value of qS does not depend on S or anything that S does, S does not have the power to render qS false. But, of course, (iv#) and (v#) together imply 1b#qs. Thus, in short, the truth of (iv) seems to lead ineluctably to the truth of 1b#qs. Given that this is 14 Alicia Finch and Michael Rea so, and given that Ockham's way out of fatalism depends crucially on S's having the power to render qS false, the presentist Ockhamist must deny the truth of (iv). But to deny the truth of (iv) is to affirm the truth of: (M) Possibly: there is a time t, proposition p, and agent S such that at t, S has the power to render p false, and S does not exist at t. Meinongians may not balk at M's clear implication that non-existent things can be quantified over and can have and even exercise powers; but the rest of us will. And if it turns out that presentists can ward off fatalist arguments only by becoming Meinongians, most of us will be inclined to say, 'So much the worse for presentism'. At any rate, so we say. Thus we conclude that presentists cannot, in the end, rely on the Ockhamist strategy as a way out of fatalism. IV. AN OBJECTION But is this really fair to the presentist? After all, presentists have developed various strategies for accommodating the truth of sentences that apparently make reference to merely past or merely future objects; and they have likewise developed strategies for making sense of apparent assertions of cross-time relations (such as causal relations). So a natural thought at this junction is that perhaps these same strategies might help presentists who are attracted to Ockhamism to avoid the sorts of objections that we have been lodging against the conjunction of those two positions. Perhaps the most promising strategy for accommodating the sorts of sentences just mentioned is what might be called the 'essence strategy'. We will briefly consider what this strategy amounts to and how it might be adapted as a response to the fatalist. We will then argue that the essence strategy fails to provide the presentist Ockhamist with a satisfactory response to the fatalist's argument. Though we acknowledge that there are other strategies on offer for accommodating apparent reference to merely past and future objects and for making room for apparent assertions of cross-time relations, we omit consideration of these because they all strike us as being subject to the same sorts of objections that we will raise against the essence strategy. The essence strategy is just an extension of a familiar strategy for handling apparently problematic modal claims like: (L) Possibly, David Letterman does not exist. On the standard semantics for modal claims, L implies: Presentism and Ockham's Way Out 15 (L#) There is a possible world in which it is true that David Letterman does not exist. The trouble, however, is that it looks as if the proposition that Letterman does not exist cannot be true in any world because in worlds where Letterman does not exist, he is not available to be a subject of predication. In other words: the proposition that Letterman does not exist is true only if it is about Letterman; but if it is about Letterman, then it cannot be true; for only existing things can stand in relations (and 'aboutness' is a relation). Thus, many philosophers are inclined to treat (L) as equivalent to not (L#) but to: (L##) There is a possible world in which nothing exemplifies an essence of David Letterman. An essence of David Letterman is a property that is essential to Letterman and that cannot be exemplified by anything distinct from Letterman. The attraction of understanding (L) as equivalent to (L##) should be obvious: properties are abstract objects, so they exist necessarily; thus, they are guaranteed to be available in every world to be subjects of predications. Whereas it is deeply problematic to suppose that 'Letterman does not exist' is about Letterman himself in worlds in which that proposition is true, it is wholly unproblematic to suppose that it is instead a proposition about Letterman's essence-equivalent to something like 'Letterman's essence is not exemplified'. So goes the essence strategy for modal claims. And, of course, the presentist can adopt it to accommodate both sentences that seem to be about merely past or future objects, as well as sentences that appear to imply that there are objects that stand in diachronic relations to one another. The trick is simple: treat the problematic sentences as equivalent to claims about (necessarily existing) essences rather than as claims about concrete objects. Thus, 'Abraham Lincoln was tall' will get treated as equivalent to something like 'The property of being identical to Abraham Lincoln was exemplified by a tall person.' Likewise, 'Many philosophers admire Aristotle,' will get treated as equivalent to a claim about an essence of Aristotle, the causal relations between the exemplifier of that essence, things that coexisted with him, later things that coexisted with them, and, ultimately, various feelings of admiration in contemporary philosophers. The details of this story do not much matter in the context at hand. What matters for our purposes is just the basic fact that, on the essence strategy, sentences that appear to refer overtly or covertly to non-existent 'things' will get treated as expressing propositions about necessarily existing properties rather than propositions about concrete objects. 16 Alicia Finch and Michael Rea The question, however, is whether the essence strategy will be of any help to the presentist in rendering plausible the claim that: (M) Possibly: there is a time t, proposition p, and agent S such that at t S has the power to render p false, and S does not exist at t. Obviously the proponent of the essence strategy won't want to employ the strategy in so ham-fisted a way as to make (M) imply that S's essence has power over the truth value of p. For, after all, essences, being properties, can't have such powers. Rather, the most natural way of employing the strategy would be to begin by arguing that: (R1) S has the power to render p false is (in some contexts, anyway) equivalent to something like: (R1E) S's essence will be exemplified by something that has the power to render p false. Likewise, then, (E1) E does not exist may be treated as equivalent to: (E1E) S's essence is not currently exemplified. So, then, (M) becomes: (ME) Possibly: there is a time t, proposition p, and essence SE such that it is true at t that SE will be exemplified by something that has the power to render p false, and SE is not exemplified at t. Unlike (M), (ME) carries no commitment to the claim that non-existent 'things' can have or exercise powers, or stand in relations. Thus ME has the virtue of avoiding what was the primary objection to M. The trouble, however, is that even if we grant that ME is on better footing than M, we still must acknowledge that the fatalist can offer against ME almost the exact same argument (with only minor alternations) that she offers against 1b#qs. Thus: v. qS was true at a time prior to SE's being exemplified. vi. qS cannot change its truth value. Therefore: vii. SE cannot be exemplified by something that has the power to render qS false. Eternalists could (if they wished) resist this argument in just the same way that they would resist the earlier argument from (ii) and (iii) to 1b#qs. But Presentism and Ockham's Way Out 17 the basic problem for the presentist remains: qS is unchangeably true before it is ever true that S exists; thus, it is difficult to see how S could possibly have power over the truth value of qS. Asserting ME -presumably with an eye to saying that it was true one billion years ago that S's essence will be exemplified by someone who has the power to render qS false-does not demonstrate how S could have power over the truth value of qS. Rather, it simply asserts that it can. This is not argument; it is merely contradicting the fatalist's conclusion. So, the essence strategy seems unpromising. Again, there are other strategies upon which a presentist might try to draw; but, as we said earlier, all of those strategies are subject to similar objections. This is because every extant strategy for accommodating sentences that appear either to refer to merely past or merely future things or to posit cross-time relations between objects will share one thing common with the essence strategy: they will imply that, for times at which S does not exist, a sentence like 'at t, S has the power to render p false' is to be understood as expressing a proposition that is either (a) false; (b) about a non-existent object; or (c) about something other than S. But-for exactly the reasons discussed in our treatment of the essence strategy-none of these alternatives will issue in a translation of M that will help us to see how S could have the power to render qS false at those times prior to S's ever having existed. And so we conclude that eternalists are able to adopt Ockham's way out of fatalism while presentists cannot. At this point, at least one of us wishes to leave open the possibility that the presentist can offer a successful response to the fatalist's argument. But we must conclude that the response that some consider the best response available-Ockham's way out-is unavailable to the presentist.

Dialogue XLVI (2007), 781-96 © 2007 Canadian Philosophical Association / Association canadienne de philosophie Escape from Reason: Labels as Arguments and Theories SLAVA SADOVNIKOV York University I would like to thank Professor Neil McLaughlin for his critical comment and Dialogue for the opportunity to reply. In my earlier article I argued that Erich Fromm's theories in his Escape from Freedom are thoroughly inconsistent, irrefutable (uncriticizable), and hence unempirical, and that his chief method consists in applying psychoanalytic terms to familiar things, adding nothing to social explanations. McLaughlin's case for the theoretical relevance of either Escape or of Freudian social theory generally proves counter-productive. He offers very weak criteria for theory acceptance and often takes mere labels to be explanatory theories. He does so particularly in his promotion of the concept of ambivalence. I will engage the proposed case study and explain why the use of "ambivalence" in psychoanalysis (especially by Bleuler or Freud) and sociology (by Smelser and his followers) is untenable. I point to a notable conflict between McLaughlin's rationalist and other intentions, and will show how he shares the approach to social theories that makes for the state of affairs in the humanities which he deplores. McLaughlin goes beyond the topic of my argument to raise important questions about current practices of social theorizing, criticism, and teaching. I disagree with most of what he says, and my reply will illustrate the spread and damage of the dogmatic approach, which consists in looking for "confirmations," or mere labelling, and the importance of critical checks. 782 Dialogue To Begin McLaughlin begins by stressing three points on which he says we agree: (1) the sway of empty talk in social knowledge and the urgent need for a rational debate in it; (2) the current relevance of Karl Popper's critical thought; and (3) the empirical inadequacy of Fromm's Escape . I am entirely content with McLaughlin's three points, but entirely disagree with his treatment of them. The first two points, rational debate and Popper's relevance, led me to reject Escape as a theoretical failure, whereas my critic seems to regard the book as a theoretical gold mine. Given the disparity of our conclusions, I shall discuss here certain problems I see in his handling of the two problems. As to the third point, I must say that the inadequacy of Fromm as an historian was never discussed in my earlier article; methodologically and philosophically this would be of little interest. Together with McLaughlin, I defer to the professional historians who have shown that Fromm's account of the rise of Nazism is faulty. 1 Inasmuch as I appreciate McLaughlin's emphasis on the empirical flaws of Escape , the failings of Fromm's historical explanation has no bearing on my argument. I explicitly focused in my article on his methodological and theoretical flaws, which McLaughlin denies. Surprisingly, he does not discuss the content of Fromm's book-and my biggest fear was that I somehow misrepresented Fromm's convoluted arguments-but, instead, finds three external sources of the book's promise: Fromm's later study of Mexican peasants, McLaughlin's own understanding of the concept of "classic," and the alleged motives that drive my critique. After briefly responding to McLaughlin's three points, I shall address the more substantial questions he raises. How Much Context Do We Need to Criticize? I criticized Escape under the assumption that it was an independent theoretical work, and I even provided, in a separate section, a brief historical background. Still, McLaughlin complains that I fail to place Escape in its author's "larger academic agenda," thus missing "the core point of the book." Regrettably, he does not say what is wrong with my exposition or criticism; moreover, he never says what its "core point" is. Even had I focused on Escape alone, this should not have been a problem by McLaughlin's own lights, for he begins by lamenting the frustrating current practice where adherents of fashionable theories appeal to some never-achievable "full context" to safeguard their ideas from critical scrutiny. It must be fine then to deal with Escape separately, especially since McLaughlin himself hails this book (but not all of Fromm's works) as a classic, and in the past praised and criticized it as an independent piece. 2 After all, if we consider it a self-contained analysis of, in Fromm's own words, "those dynamic factors in the character structure of modern Escape from Reason 783 man, which made him want to give up freedom in Fascist countries" (1964, p. 6), we will only do justice to Fromm's own intentions. McLaughlin goes to great length to explain Escape 's correct context, concluding that my scant awareness of biographical facts makes me misrepresent Fromm's view. What this view is McLaughlin does not say, and my claim that Fromm indeed has no consistent view on history, or even a well-articulated theory, remains unchallenged. McLaughlin thinks it unfair of me to critique Fromm's untestable theories without discussing his later research. He himself turns to Fromm's and Michael Maccoby's 1970 Social Character in a Mexican Village for support and to help him disclose Escape 's true message. But McLaughlin is anything but specific. Just what is the social character of Mexican peasants, and what is its relevance? How did the authors formulate their hypotheses and predictions? What alternative suppositions were considered? In fact, the "larger agenda" that McLaughlin has recreated is of no help in shedding light on Escape . The argument from incomplete context, a debate which McLaughlin claims to advance, if adopted can make rational debate impossible; it is all too easy to get rid of inconvenient objections in the name of the harmless idea of context. Sufficiently articulate and consistent ideas can be criticized on their own merits: insofar as McLaughlin has expressed his view clearly, I do not have to wait until he has said indefinitely more on the subject before concluding that his argument from, and for, full context is already unsound. On Classics, or Whatever You Label Them McLaughlin says that our differences regarding the value of Fromm's Escape have much to do with our disparate views of what it means for a book to be a "classic." At stake here, however, is not Escape 's status as a classic but its theoretical worth, something I feel is rather lacking. Of greater importance, surely, than the label itself are the reasons for attaching it. McLaughlin brings in the examples of Weber's Protestant Ethic and Durkheim's Suicide , both of which have empirical flaws, yet are commonly regarded as classics-the implication being that Escape with its empirical blunders is just as classical a classic as those two books. A crucial difference between these two books and Escape is that the former have earned the title of classic not only for their rich theoretical contributions, but also for the meticulous empirical investigations Weber and Durkheim used as bases upon which they would build and revise their accounts. This is why the problems they raised were open to continuing debates, further development, and even correction or modification. Escape 's theories, on the other hand, are mostly uncriticizable , and where they allow criticism the theories prove false, as McLaughlin himself shows. 784 Dialogue Are there better reasons for some to have referred to Escape as a classic? Surely Fromm raises important theoretical questions, but so do children in a classroom. We expect of a theorist fruitful answers, and the answers found in that book are unsatisfactory; it remains McLaughlin's burden to prove otherwise. Instead of showing exactly how Fromm's method may help us, McLaughlin keeps begging the question by repeating promises that have been heard for decades, and by claiming that psychoanalysis should be used in international politics. Insofar as I see why diplomats or the military might in principle find psychoanalysis useful in their practice, I find the because-it-is-a-classic reason inadequate. Sociologically, McLaughlin gives a one-sided account of the ways texts become regarded as classics, focusing on and praising Escape 's content when it is only arbitrary and confusing. It makes one wonder why people praise it. I will not expand on a sociology of a book's reception, but what I can do is connect this issue with another concern of McLaughlin's, namely, the concept of ambivalence. Intentions Reconsidered: Why Popper? McLaughlin deplores the state of critical debate in the humanities and the flood of sloppy social theorizing, but his own efforts founder on conflicts between his aims. He professes his dedication to rationality, growth of empirical knowledge, and critical debate, prompting him to declare the relevance of Popper's thought and admire Alan Sokal's hoax. Yet, when it comes to evaluating theories, these intentions give way to others, in particular, to the aim of preserving favourite ideas no matter what. Starting with the importance of Popper's thought and insistence on falsifiability, McLaughlin ends up discarding it or labelling it as being narrow, dated, or dogmatic whenever it gets inconvenient. 3 A word of clarification is required here. Popper's emphasis on consistency and refutability is by no means original. Still, the expression "the Popperian perspective" is appropriate. Even though Popper shares with logical positivists some significant views, e.g., about the aims of science, he demonstrates how their confirmationist (and inductivist) views of science belie these aims. More generally, confirmationism, i.e., attempts to assert one's pet views, naturally promotes any view and dooms fair debate, having profound implications both in knowledge and politics. It is the uncritical, dogmatic, or "inductive" attitude towards science that leads to the adoption of the confirmationist method criticized here: "The trouble about people-uncritical people-who hold a theory is that they are inclined to take everything as supporting or 'verifying' it, and nothing as refuting it" (Popper 1996b, p. 233). McLaughlin speculates that I betray an "ideological bias by making the case for Hayek's The Road to Serfdom ." Perhaps he sees more deeply into my motives than I can, so I will try to elucidate my point : There is a Escape from Reason 785 fundamental ideological and political agreement between Hayek and Fromm ( just as there is between McLaughlin and myself ). It is their antitotalitarian stance that drives them also to try to explain the rise of Nazism, to get at its causes; likewise, my critic restates the relevance of this problem in his article. The crucial difference between Hayek and Fromm, then, is that one gives an explanation of the rise of Nazism through the growth of certain ideas-an explanation that makes much empirical sense (indeed, I did not claim more than this about Hayek)-whereas the other explains the same events through "character types," an account that spectacularly fails. McLaughlin aptly, and very much in the Hayekian and Popperian spirit, said the same thing himself more than a decade ago: "Fromm puts far too little emphasis on the role of ideas in the emergence of Nazism" (1996, p. 259). Unlike McLaughlin, I do not find this kind of criticism dogmatic, biased, or dated. Labels as Arguments and Theories Nor did I question the use of psychoanalysis in the social sciences, as McLaughlin suggests; rather, my target was Fromm's particular abortive attempt, and from his failure I did not make any generalizations. His case was but an illustration of the way we can and (if we are to be instrumentally rational) should treat theories. It is all about the critical attitude and method, not particular theories. The critical approach does not preclude the possibility that some testable, unambiguous, and well-corroborated psychoanalytical theories will at last help us better explain the social world. I argue not against such a possibility but against the way enthusiasts of these would-be theories advertise them. The way McLaughlin shows the rosy prospects of psychoanalytical social theory boils down to this: there are people who labour at it. He reports on Neil Smelser's lifelong elaborations of psychoanalytical sociology, which prescribed the use of Freudian theories. Then he presents a "powerful" psychoanalytical theory of creativity of Michael Farrell, commenting on how the theorist "usefully utilizes psychoanalytic insights," though McLaughlin does not specify them. He correctly expects that I might not view his examples as scientific. Their problems begin well before that. First, due to their informative emptiness, or tautological character, all they amount to is rewordings of everyday assumptions. Second, due to their vagueness these accounts are compatible with any outcomes; in other words, they lack explanatory and predictive power. The proposed ideas are too inarticulate to subject to intersubjective criticism, and to call them empirical or scientific theories would be, no matter how comforting, a gross misuse of words. On the constructive side, a psychoanalytic theorist may be challenged to unambiguously formulate her suppositions and specify conditions of 786 Dialogue their disproof, to leave out what we already well know and smooth out internal inconsistencies, and revise the theories in view of easily available counter-examples and competing accounts. Only after having done this can one present candidate theories to public criticism and thus make them part of science, and fruitfully discuss their further refinements. Another suggestion is not to label them "powerful theories," "classics," or anything else before their real scrutiny begins. That criticism and disagreement are indispensable for science is not a "Popperian orthodoxy," although Popper does champion this idea; it is the pivot of the tradition (which we owe to the Greeks) which identifies rationalism with criticism. 4 McLaughlin ostensibly bows to the critical tradition but does not put it to use. Instead of critical evaluation of the theories in question he writes of "compelling case," "powerful analytic model," and "useful conceptual tool." On the methodological side of the issue, we should inquire into the mode of thinking common to Fromm and all adherents of confirmationism. The trick consists in mere replacement of familiar words with new, more peculiar ones; customary expressions are substituted by "instrumental intimacy," "collaborative circles," and "idealization of a self-object." Since the new, funnier, and pseudo-theoretical tag does the job of naming just as well, it "shows how" things work. The new labels in the cases criticized here do not add anything to our knowledge; nor do they explain. We have seen Fromm routinely abuse this technique. The vacuity of Fromm's explanations by character type was the central point in my analysis of Escape , yet McLaughlin conveniently ignores it and, like Fromm, uses the method of labelling as somehow supporting his cause. The widely popular practice of mistaking new labels for explanations has been exposed by many methodologists in the history of philosophy, but probably the most famous example of such critique comes from Molière. In the now often-quoted passage, his character delivers a vacuous explanation of opium's property to induce sleep by renaming the property with an offhand Latinism, "virtus dormitiva." The satire acutely points not only at the impostor doctor's hiding his lack of knowledge behind foreign words, but also at the emptiness of his alleged explanation. (Pseudo-theoretical literature is boring precisely because of its "dormitive virtue," its shuffling of labels without rewarding inquiring minds.) Let me review notable criticisms of this approach in the twentieth century by Hempel, Homans, and Weber leaving aside their forerunners. This problem was discussed in the famous debate between William Dray and Carl Hempel. Dray argues, contra the nomological account of explanation, that historians and social scientists often try to answer the question, "What is this phenomenon?" by giving an "explanation-by-concept" (Dray 1959, p. 403). A series of events may be better understood if we call it "a social revolution"; or the appropriate tag may be found in the expressions Escape from Reason 787 "reform," "collaboration," "class struggle," "progress," etc.; or, to take Fromm's suggestions, we may call familiar motives and actions "sadomasochistic," and any political choice save the Marxist "escape from freedom." Hempel agrees with Dray that such concepts may be explanatory, but they are so only if the chosen labels or classificatory tags refer to some uniformities, or are based on nomic analogies. In other words, our new label has explanatory force if it states or implies some established regularity (Hempel 1970, pp. 453-57). For example, you travel to a foreign country and, strolling along the street, see a boisterous crowd. Your guide may explain the crowd with one of several terms: that it is the local soccer team's fans celebrating its victory, or it is a local religious festival, or a teachers' strike, etc. The labels applied here-celebration, festival, strike- have explanatory value, because we know that things they refer to usually manifest themselves in noisy or unruly mass gatherings. If, on the other hand, by way of explaining the boisterous crowd the guide had invoked some hidden social or psychological forces, or used expressions such as embodiment, mode of production, de-centring, simulacra, otherness, etc., its causes would remain obscure. If she had referred to psychoanalytic "character types" (say, Fromm's authoritarian, anal, or necrophiliac types), the explanation would not make much sense either. Nothing prevents us nevertheless from unconditionally attaching all these labels to any event. The mistake McLaughlin and confirmationists persistently make is in thinking that labelling social phenomena alone does theoretical and explanatory work. 5 George Homans observed the prevalence of this trick some decades ago: Much modern sociological theory seems to us to possess every virtue except that of explaining anything. . . . The theorist shoves various aspects of behavior into his pigeonholes, cries "Ah-ha!" and leaves it at that. Like magicians in all times and places, the theorist thinks he controls phenomena if he is able to give them names, particularly names of his own invention. (1974, pp. 10-11) Homans repeatedly stresses in his works that mere naming of behavioural properties does not produce explanations or theories. Our propositions have to state specifically what relations hold between the properties , thus enabling us both to test and to explain them causally. Many writers use labels as arguments, and "positivist" has become one of the pejorative epithets in the humanities debates. 6 Due to Homans's agreement with Hempel, one may classify him as a positivist and on this ground reject his views-as, e.g., McLaughlin does with Popper, and, by labelling my criticism Popperian, tends to dismiss my reasons too. Perhaps I should then use a kind of argument to which McLaughlin is more amenable. He considers Max Weber a classic worth permanent reconsid- 788 Dialogue eration, and this thinker cannot be suspected of positivist liaisons. Weber contends against the view that the knowledge of universal propositions, the construction of abstract concepts, the knowledge of regularities and the attempt to formulate " laws " have no scientific justification in the cultural sciences. Quite the contrary, if the causal knowledge of the historians consists of the imputation of concrete effects to concrete causes, a valid imputation of any individual effect without the application of " nomological " knowledge -i.e., the knowledge of recurrent causal sequences-would in general be impossible. (Weber 1949, p. 79) To illustrate the present spread and intellectual damage of labelling-astheorizing, and of the dogmatic approach in general, I will consider now an instructive case directly relevant to this exchange. Indulging in Ambivalence: "Escape from Critical Accountability" McLaughlin believes that Freud is "dogmatic" but in contrast sees those social theorists as innovative who borrow his most controversial psychoanalytic insights, particularly Neil Smelser. True, Smelser has made much use of "ambivalence" in his social theorizing, attaching it to anything he happens to muse about. This delights McLaughlin and many other literati. Let us look more closely into why. First, a very short background of the term is appropriate. The word "ambivalence" was abused at its very conception when it was coined in 1911 by Eugen Bleuler to describe one of the "fundamental symptoms" of a group of psychoses he called "schizophrenia" (1969, pp. 9, 53). He differentiates three forms of ambivalence, though they "are not easily distinguished from one another": Affective : e.g., "the husband both loves and hates his wife"; Ambivalence of will : "the patient wishes to eat and does not wish to eat"; Intellectual : "a patient says in the same breath: 'I am Dr. H.; I am not Dr. H'" (ibid., pp. 53-54). Two problems are prominent in Bleuler's account of ambivalence. First, he indiscriminately applies the same symptom to all people (ibid., p. 13). Ambivalence is not a symptom of the mentally ill but our commonest feature, and Bleuler explicitly speaks of "normal ambivalence" (ibid., p. 376). Describing healthy and ill persons by the same terms does not make for better diagnostics or treatment; nor does it make theoretical terms accurate. Second, in his applications of "ambivalence," he commits a double reduction: he picks a pair of seemingly conflicting aspects of a complex thing called attitude, and then focuses only on the two aspects' extremes. Otherwise, he chooses just one aspect and stresses its extremes. It is unlikely, however, that one can adequately describe in terms of ambivalence any attitude, maybe not even of a schizophrenic. 7 Escape from Reason 789 The inadequacy of this construct is especially vivid in the example of attitudes towards people or things we know well. It is not the case that a person cannot love and hate another at the same time; equally it is not the case that this description may remotely describe even a small fraction of the richness of their feelings, volitions, or thoughts. Yet, in his analysis of attitudes, Bleuler has only two points on his measuring scales, whereas possible counter-examples are easily dissolved in confirmationist adhocs. 8 Binary descriptions such as "love–hate" better fit the working of computers but, unfortunately, since Bleuler, such false dilemmas have haunted the use of the term. It is natural for us to have different and complex feelings and views towards any object, and some of them may well be expressed best in conflicting terms. One may, for example, like a certain food's look but dislike its smell. One may also find here tri-valence, or quadri-valence, etc., just as easily as ambivalence: it will suffice to mention the food's taste, name, price, package, producer, and one's corresponding feelings to these properties. This way we will certainly diagnose tri-valence or quadri-valence, depending on which we see as a "fundamental symptom" of behaviour. To repeat the trivial, there are numberless aspects to any object, and about each we feel, will, and think differently. Of special interest for this discussion is that the two said ploys, i.e., the indiscriminate (ab/normal) application of ambivalence and reduction of attitudes, are used as confirmationist tricks. Sometimes Bleuler combines the two: "Even for the healthy everything has its two sides. The rose has its thorns," etc. (1969, p. 374). Whatever psychological features you ascribe to the human psyche, they will be easily confirmed in any person by using this technique. Freud went farther and confirmed them in cultures. Sigmund Freud borrows the neologism "ambivalence" and makes much out of it in his social theorizing. To Bleuler's reduction of attitudes and fusion of the ab/normal, he adds a third kind of abuse, the psychological identification of individuals and groups. This identification is stated in the subtitle of his Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics . Freud believes that "savages" stand "very near" to our prehistoric ancestors, and, If that supposition is correct, a comparison between the psychology of primitive peoples . . . and the psychology of neurotics, as it has been revealed by psychoanalysis, will be bound to show numerous points of agreement. (1950, p. 1) The conclusion is plainly unwarranted, but it is used by the theorist to make any desired comparisons and parallels. 9 Just as Bleuler did, Freud looks for, and surely finds, ambivalence everywhere. The term is crucial in 790 Dialogue particular for his theory of the Oedipal complex and child-parent relations, which eventually account for the origin of basic human institutions. Freud's psychoanalysis of culture in Totem and Taboo is rather contradictory and is supported by labelling, historical stretches, and, as he himself admits, allegories. Freud begins with the promise that his psychoanalytic reading of religion does not reduce it to a single source (1950, p. 100), and yet he ends up with a reductionist "hypothesis which may seem fantastic" (ibid., p. 141) but advantageous compared to other theories: "the beginning of religion, morals, society and art converges in the Oedipus complex" (ibid., p. 156). His argument is roughly this. Totemism seems to be common to all known cultures as the initial form of their religious experience; Freud reviews existing explanations of its origin and finds them lacking. His own starts with Darwin's suggestion, made by an analogy between human beings and animals, that long ago humans lived in small groups, where the strongest male would own all females and control younger males. Freud also finds a parallel between children and "savages" in their treatment of animals "as their full equals"; in some cases, children develop an animalphobia to certain animal species, and this fear is "in reality [a boy's] fear of his father displaced onto dogs." Children's attitudes towards parents in general are seen as, i.e., reduced to, an "ambivalent emotional attitude" (ibid., pp. 127-28). Now, why is a dog "displacement" for a father? Words such as "displacement," "substitution," and "surrogate" are key for grasping the method of the author of Totem and Taboo ; it is at bottom confirmationist and essentialist, as the argument usually has the form, "A is in reality (or in fact) B," where B is the needed label. Using this method, Freud classifies neurotic children's communication with animals as a reappearance of totemism (perhaps assuming its innate character). Then he finds random verbal similarities between child psychology and that of our ancient ancestors, the pivotal parallel being that both modern children's relations to animals and totemism "in the inconceivably remote past" are products of the Oedipal complex (ibid., p. 132). This common origin makes them ambivalent. 10 Human civilization may be traced back to an event (or, more charitably toward Freud's story, a supposed past practice), which he calls "the elimination of the primal father" by his sons. Totem came to be a substitute for the killed father: "The dead father became stronger than the living one had been. . . . The animal struck the sons as a natural and obvious substitute for their father" (ibid., pp. 143-44). The killing of the father proved to be a cultural Big Bang, as the symbolic Father turned into human culture and its basic institutions (thus doubling the job of living fathers). Through the long historical chain-father (parents), totem, institutions- Escape from Reason 791 ambivalence has been passed on as a defining trait of our psychological make-up, Freud thinks (ibid., pp. 141-55). Sometimes ambivalence would turn into univalency: "their bitterness against their father . . . grew less, and their longing for him increased; and it became possible for an ideal to emerge which embodied the unlimited power of the primal father" (ibid., p. 148). Freud is fine with occasional pitfalls in his grand scheme: "It would be foolish to aim at exactitude in such questions as it would be unfair to insist upon certainty" (ibid., p. 143). Historical and cultural psychoanalysis, he seems to imply, has the same deficiency as any respectable science, i.e., lack of ultimate precision and certainty. The traditional objections, however, are directed not against the uncertainty of his theories but rather against their arbitrariness and his all-confirmatory methodology in supporting them. We see now that Smelser's "sociological manifesto," as McLaughlin put it, was in fact outlined long ago, as was his methodology. Smelser's chief target is rational-choice theory, and he sees his mission in "liberating ourselves to a degree from the worldview implied in the enduring distinctions among the rational, the nonrational, and the irrational" (1998, p. 171). Inspired by Freud, he sees ambivalence as a "psychological foundation of behavior," and, contra rationalists, he puts forward "the postulate of ambivalence, the combination of attraction and repulsion, of love and hate. Ambivalence is inclusive in that it can focus on people, objects, and symbols. Experience alone demonstrates the importance of this phenomenon" (ibid., p. 174). Thus, Smelser faithfully follows Bleuler's and Freud's handling of "ambivalence," i.e., finding it wherever he looks for it. To present his approach as more respectable, he makes Robert Merton his confirmationist ally (ibid., p. 175). To be fair to Merton, however, the reader should not be led to believe that Merton shares with Smelser anything more than the use of "ambivalence." 11 Surprisingly, Smelser himself seems to follow his own "postulate of ambivalence," thinking that we should not take Freud's theories and method too seriously (1998, p. 246). It is not good to do ambivalence of everything, he says, but he does it nonetheless. In Bleuler's classification, Smelser's thinking would fall under "intellectual ambivalence," something perhaps more commonly known as inconsistency. A quick illustration will help us better appreciate how much this contradictory thinking permeates today's pseudo-theoretical work. Alexander, Marx, and Williams, the editors of a recent Festschrift (2004) for Smelser, celebrate their teacher as a man and scholar, and eagerly promote his notion of ambivalence. Even in spite of Smelser's above methodological warning, the editors of the Festschrift are more receptive to his labelbuilding grand message: "There is almost no facet of our existence as sociologists about which we do not show ambivalence" (2004, p. 5). The authors fail to see the tension between Smelser's (self-)criticism of the any- 792 Dialogue thing-of-everything approach and his using it, and go on to make theoretical virtue of his "penchant for combining opposites" (ibid., pp. 4-5). The real issues we face are determinate enough, and social theory does not have to be sillier than common-sense explanations. True, some of our beliefs and attitudes are complex and may be described by different and even contradictory terms-still it is not in any way illuminating to proclaim, "I told you, it is all ambivalent!" every time we observe complex behaviour. The utter emptiness of "ambivalence" is aggravated by a popular superstition that the complexity of our attitudes is a sure sign of their irrational character. This is supposed to prop up another misconception that sociology should be blended with if not replaced by psychoanalysis. Alexander, Marx, and Williams say that parts of the book "demonstrate that accepting ambivalence as an indelible part of the human condition is key to achieving a deeper and richer understanding of social life" (2004, p. 20). The theorists seem unaware that cherry-picking cases of behaviour to fit our pet labels does not add a bit to our understanding, but only impedes it. The damaging effect of labelling-as-theorizing, this caricature of responsible research, is not only in the spread of ideas about which we cannot rationally argue: as harmful is the spreading ethic of uncritical scholarship. 12 As Adolf Grünbaum wrote in a recent essay about the "hermeneutic" (as opposed to empirical) reconstruction of psychoanalysis, its adherents "see it as buying absolution for their theory and therapy from the criteria of validation mandatory for causal hypotheses in the empirical sciences"; pursuing this policy, they "want to escape from critical accountability"; they do not produce explanatory theories but tend to "foster ideological hostility to scientific thought in the social sciences and in psychology" (Grünbaum 2004, pp. 146-58). As concerns the side matter of classics, one may be tempted to characterize as ambivalent the position of those who hail criticism but at the same time canonize theories for intellectually irrelevant reasons. Using the term "ambivalence," however, one will commit Bleuler's original sin of reduction. It is better to say that this practical inconsistency results from getting too many irrelevant aims and agendas involved in theoretical questions and from the failure to use critical thinking. To Conclude Religious people who tend to see holy faces in unexpected places, say on a piece of toast or on walls, are often mocked, maybe because this inclination is seen as revealing their irrational beliefs and prejudices. Still, such people have at least something like an empirical criterion, however vague, for their insights, namely, visual similarity. Yet, compared to the practice of labelling something with funny words and proclaiming these words "powerful theories," finding visual resemblance in odd places is a relatively harmless business. Escape from Reason 793 Regrettably, labelling-as-theorizing, and the dogmatic approach in general, has established itself as respectable academic practice. We discourage name-calling among children, but hail as theoretical ingenuity academic labelling-as-theorizing, a practice that is not harmless, but which impairs our attempts to grasp, sensibly discuss, and handle actual problems. 13 I am glad the subject of this exchange has gone beyond Popper and Fromm in order to highlight some persistent delusions current in social theorizing and remind us of the relevance of the old rationalist (critical) tradition. Ideas must prove their worth by undergoing critical scrutiny. Disregard of the critical tradition, and closing down discussion by applying labels to things, has ruinous consequences for understanding. 14 Notes 1 See, for instance, Kagan, Ozment, and Turner: "His [Hitler's] support appears to have come from across the social spectrum and not simply from the lower middle class, as was once thought to be the case" (2001, pp. 975-76). Fromm errs in his emphasis of the role of big capital too: "German big business once received much of the credit for the rise of Hitler. There is little evidence, however, that business contributions made any crucial difference to the Nazis' success or failure" (ibid.). These two empirical correctives of old interpretations undermine the emphases of certain theories on either psychological or economic factors in the development of fascism, but I will not develop this point in detail. 2 See especially McLaughlin 1996 for his specific and explicit criticism of Fromm's book (pp. 242-59). 3 Aggravating this inconsistency is McLauchlin's perseverance in matters he knows from secondary sources at best: his exposition of Popper's ideas is unreliable, and the reader should not be misled by the title of McLaughlin's article. Eventually, McLaughlin simply calls Popper dogmatic in the tradition of Freud and Marx, but fails to explain how. 4 On the continuity between the tradition of ancient criticism and that of the modern one, see, e.g., Peter Gay (1973), esp. Vol. 1's Preface and Book 1. 5 As a quick illustration of the spread of the method of labelling, one may mention dozens of characterizations of the society we live in: modern, postmodern, industrial, post-industrial, informational, oppressive, insane, digital, affluent, global, etc. These labels, which highlight one of countless aspects of group or even individual behaviour, are often presented as "theories of society," yet few of them have explanatory force. See also William Outhwaite's observation, "The latest diagnoses of postmodernity and postindustrialism look remarkably like early accounts of modernity and industrialism" (2002, p. xvi). Another characteristic example of this method is the currently popular "theoretical" question among political scientists, Is America a new Empire? 6 See, e.g., Loïc Wacquant: " 'positivism' has become a term of polemical indictment, if not abuse, in contemporary social science-few sociologists today would claim or welcome the label" (2002, p. 507). Cf. Anthony Giddens: 794 Dialogue " 'Positivism' over recent years has become more a term of abuse than a technical term of philosophy" (1995, p. 136). 7 Eric Hobsbawm witnesses the tendency to commit similar reductions in political and ideological debates: "Playing the game of binary opposites is equally tempting and equally misleading in politics. Nothing seems simpler than to contrast tyranny and freedom" (1992, p. 60). 8 "The healthy, too, feels something like 'two souls in his breast'; and he, too, would be less inclined to speak so much of sin if it did not also have some pleasant connotations. The double evaluation rests not so much in the experience itself as in the double attitude toward that experience" (Bleuler 1969, p. 375; cf. Bleuler's 1924, esp. p. 125). That his analysis is thoroughly confirmationist is seen in observations such as this: "In the normals hate and love often transform themselves into each other" (1969, p. 375). 9 See Robert Paul: "In Freud's own thinking, the parallels he drew between obsession and civilization rested on the assumption that the history of civilization could be compared to a human lifetime, and that the customs of people closer to the childhood of the race could be understood on the analogy of the fantasies, conflicts, and phase-appropriate neuroses of individual childhood. These views are no longer tenable; nonetheless we must take them as the basis for reading Freud's work" (1991, p. 271). 10 "Psycho-analysis has revealed that the totem animal is in reality [ sic ] a substitute for the father. . . . The ambivalent emotional attitude, which to this day characterizes the father-complex in our children and which often persists into adult life, seems to extend to the totem animal in its capacity as substitute for the father" (Freud 1950, p. 141). 11 Importantly, Merton is not guilty of his forerunners' methodological sins, as one might infer from Smelser. He does not reduce attitudes à la Bleuler to two aspects or their extremes, and he is careful enough to characterize individual ambivalence not as mere oppositions but as "mingled feelings, mingled beliefs, and mingled actions" (1976, p. 3). He does not universalize ambivalence as our psychological basic trait, and constantly uses qualifiers such as "some," "often," and "may." Finally, unlike Smelser, he does not use the method of labelling to find ambivalence (i.e., mingled attitudes) everywhere. 12 A colleague, Igor Gontcharov, suggests that this sort of "theorizing" is a gruesome reality in the humanities today; in particular, psychoanalytic concepts are used outside the analytic situation (e.g., in sociology, literary theory, or support therapy), and this effectively destroys the foundation of their critical use. 13 One could witness the damaging effect of this kind of thinking on debates of high practical import in a panel on border security (sponsored by the Munk Centre for International Studies, Toronto; also aired live as Diplomatic Immunity on TVO, May 5, 2006). One of the panelists, representing academia, kept branding Canadian policies on immigration as "racist," the country as a "police state," and its legal regulations as "apartheid." The only meaningful objection one of her fellow panelists could make was that with the use of such labels, it was Escape from Reason 795 "impossible to have a rational discussion." See also Edward Thompson's observation of some of his fellow Marxists' anti-rational polemical practice: "If one offered to argue, one was answered, not with arguments but with labels ('moralism,' 'empiricism,' 'liberal' illusions), or, commonly, with a biological dismissal (the 'generation game') which foreclosed further argument" (1978, p. ii). 14 I am grateful to Prof. Ian C. Jarvie and to Dialogue 's referees for their suggestions. I also benefited from discussions with Igor Gontcharov, even though he much disagreed with me, and with Richard Frieman. My thanks also go to David McKim at York University's Centre for Academic Writing for assistance, and to Roberta Gerwing of Dialogue for her helpful editing of my text. I dedicate this article to my daughter Maria, who was born on September 5, 2007. References Alexander, Jeffrey C., Gary T. Marx, and Christine L. Williams, eds. 2004 Self, Social Structure, and Beliefs: Explorations in Sociology . Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Bleuler, Eugen 1924 Textbook of Psychiatry . Translated and edited by A. A. Brill. New York: Macmillan. 1969 Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias . Translated by Joseph Zinkin. New York: International University Press. Dray, William 1959 "'Explaining What' in History." In Theories of History . Edited by Patrick Gardiner. New York: Free Press, pp. 403-408. Freud, Sigmund 1950 Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics . New York: W. W. Norton. Fromm, Erich 1964 Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Fromm, Erich, and Michael Maccoby 1996 Social Character in a Mexican Village. Edison, NJ: Transaction. Originally published in 1970. Gay, Peter 1973 Enlightenment: An Interpretation . Vol. 1, The Rise of Modern Paganism . London: Wildwood House. Giddens, Anthony 1995 Politics, Sociology and Social Theory: Encounters with Classical and Contemporary Social Thought . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Grünbaum, Adolf 2004 "The Hermeneutic Versus the Scientific Conception of Psychoanalysis." In Psychoanalysis at the Limit: Epistemology, Mind, and the Question of Science . Edited by Jon Mills. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 139-60. 796 Dialogue Hempel, Carl G. 1970 Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science . New York: Free Press. Hobsbawm, Eric 1992 "The Crisis of Today's Ideologies." New Left Review, 1, 192: 55-64. Homans, George 1974 Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. Rev. ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Kagan, Donald, Steven Ozment, and Frank Turner 2001 The Western Heritage. 7th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall. McLaughlin, Neil 1996 "Nazism, Nationalism, and the Sociology of Emotions: Escape from Freedom Revisited." Sociological Theory, 14, 3: 241-61. Merton, Robert K. 1976 "Sociological Ambivalence." In his Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays. New York: Free Press. Outhwaite, William 2002 "Introduction." In The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought. Edited by William Outhwaite. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. xv-xvi. Paul, Robert A. 1991 "Freud's Anthropology: A Reading of the 'Cultural Books.'" In The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Edited by Jerome Neu. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 267-86. Popper, Karl R. 1996a "Reason or Revolution?" In his The Myth of the Framework. Edited by Mark Notturno. New York: Routledge, pp. 65-81. 1996b Realism and the Aim of Science. New York: Routledge. Smelser, Neil 1998 The Social Edges of Psychoanalysis. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Thompson, Edward P. 1978 The Poverty of Theory, and Other Essays. New York and London: Monthly Review Press. Wacquant, Loïc J. D. 2002 "Positivism." In The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought. Edited by William Outhwaite. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 507-10. Weber, Max 1949 The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Translated and edited by E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331021490 BOOK. « EPRB Paradox Resolution. A New Quantum Mechanical Formalism Based on the Probability Representation of Quantum States. Bell inequalities revisited» Preprint * February 2019 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.14240.43521 CITATIONS 0 READS 61 3 authors: Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: Cognitive Fractal Radar and Fractal Radio Physics. View project Quantum field theory in curved distributional spacetime View project Jaykov Foukzon Technion Israel Institute of Technology 244 PUBLICATIONS 257 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Elena R. Men'kova All-Russian Research Institute for Optical and Physical Measurements 110 PUBLICATIONS 86 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE A. A. Potapov Russian Academy of Sciences 412 PUBLICATIONS 498 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE All content following this page was uploaded by Jaykov Foukzon on 11 February 2019. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface....................................................................... 7 Introduction................................................................. 8 I.1. Bell's type inequalities violations.................................. 8 I.2. A new quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states........................ 19 I.3. EPR Paradox resolution by using Postulate of EPRNonlocality.................................................................... 31 I.4. EPR-B Paradox resolution and Postulate of EPR-BNonlocality.................................................................... 36 Chapter I. The postulate of EPR-B nonlocality................................................................... 43 I.1. The EPR paradox..................................................... 43 I.2. Einstein's 1927 gedanken experiment ........................... 43 I.3. The continuous variable EPR paradox EPR-Reid's criteria......................................................................... 46 I.3.1. The weak postulate of nonlocality for continuous variables...................................................................... 49 I.3.2. The strong postulate of nonlocality for continuous variables....................................................................... 50 I.4. The EPR-Bohm paradox. Reid's criteria for EPR-Bohm paradox ....................................................................... 58 I.4.1. The weak postulate of nonlocality. Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations........................................................ 60 I.4.2. The strong postulate of nonlocality ............................. 61 2 Chapter II. A new quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states and observables................................................................. 64 II.1. Generalized Postulates for Continuous Valued Observables ..................................................................... 64 II.2. The nonclassical collapse models with spontaneous localizations based on generalized measurement postulates... 74 II.2.1. Quantum Mechanics with Nonclassical Spontaneous Localizations................................................................. 74 II.2.2. The generalization of nonclassical collapse models.......................................................................... 77 Chapter III. Einstein's 1927 gedanken experiment revisited...................................................................... 81 III.1. Single-photon space-like antibunching......................... 81 III.2. The measure algebra of physical events in Minkowski space-time............................................................................ III.2.1. Beamsplitter transformation.................................... III.2.2. Splitting a two-photon state..................................... 86 91 94 III.3. Einstein's 1927 gedanken experiment explained............. 99 Chapter IV. The EPR paradox resolution........................ 110 IV.1. The relaxed locality principle..................................... 110 IV.2. Generalized EPR argument and postulate of nonlocality.................................................................... 116 IV.2.1. The EPR-Reid criterion.......................................... 117 IV.2.2. The Postulate of Nonlocality and signature of the EPR paradox........................................................................ 126 IV.2.3. The EPR-nonlocality criteria.................................... 131 IV.3. Nonlocal Schrödinger equation implies the Postulate of Nonlocality................................................................... 132 3 IV.4. Position-momentum entangled photon pairs in non-linear wave-guide................................................................... 141 IV.5. Position-momentum entangled photon pairs and the experimental verification of the postulate of nonlocality.......... 147 IV.6. The EPR Paradox Resolution by using quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states.......................................................... 154 IV.6.1. Preliminaries....................................................... 154 IV.6.2. The EPR Paradox Resolution................................. 157 Chapter V. EPR-B Paradox Resolution............................ 163 V.1. EPR-B experiment................................................... 163 V.2. EPR-B paradox resolution.......................................... 170 V.2.1. First step EPR-B: Spin measurement of A.................. 172 V.2.2. Second step EPR-B: Spin measurement of B.............. 174 V.2.3. Resolution of the EPR-B experiment in de BroglieBohm interpretation by the "relaxed locality principle"............ 175 V.2.3.1. Step 1: spin measurement of A in de Broglie-Bohm interpretation................................................................. 176 V.2.3.2. Step 2: Spin measurement of B  in de BroglieBohm interpretation........................................................ 177 V.2.3.2.1. The prediction of the result of the spin measurement of B  under assumption of canonical postulate of locality..................................................................... 177 V.2.3.2.2. The prediction of the result of the spin measurement of B  under assumption of postulate of nonlocality.................................................................... 178 V.2.4. Physical explanation of non-local influences using the relaxed principle of locality............................................... 179 V.3. EPR-B paradox resolution by using quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states.......................................................................... 180 V.3.1. Preliminaries........................................................ 180 V.3.2. The EPR-B paradox resolution................................. 193 4 Chapter VI. Schrödinger's cat measured spin. Schrödinger's cat paradox resolution............................. 208 VI.1. Stern-Gerlach experiment revisited............................. 208 VI.2. Schrödinger's cat which measures spin. Schrödinger's cat paradox resolution..................................................... 220 Chapter VII. The Bell inequalities revisited.......................... 223 VII.1. Bell theorem without the hypothesis of locality and without the introduction of hidden variables......................... 223 VII.1.1. Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality......... 223 VII.1.2. Clauser Horne inequality....................................... 228 VII.1.3. Violation of Bell's inequality under strict Einstein locality conditions........................................................... 232 VII.1.4. CHSH theorem without the hypothesis of locality........ 240 VII.1.5. CHSH theorem without the introduction of hidden variables...................................................................... 244 VII.2. Physical nature of the violation of the Bell inequalities................................................................... 246 VII.2.1. Physical interpretation of the Bell test experiment under EPR-B nonlocality postulate.................................... 246 VII.2.2. EPR-B nonlocality is the physical nature of the violation of the Bell inequalities.......................................... 266 VII.2.3. Canonical Local Realistic Hidden Variable Theory......................................................................... 269 VII.2.4. Local Hidden Variable Theory revisited. Generalized Local Hidden Variable Theory Validity of CHSH-inequality for correlations taking into account EPR-B nonlocality.................................................................... 272 VII.3. Bell inequalities revisited.......................................... 276 VII.3.1. Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality revisited. Validity of revised CHSH inequality....................... 276 VII.3.2. Clauser-Horne inequality revisited. Validity of revised Clause-Horne inequality.................................................. 282 5 VII.3.3. Revised CHSH inequality without the hypothesis of locality......................................................................... 287 VII.3.4. Revised CHSH inequality without the introduction of hidden variables............................................................. 294 VII.4. Leggett inequality revisited....................................... 298 VI.4.1. Classical Leggett inequality.................................... 298 VII.4.2. Derivation of the canonical Leggett inequality............ 310 VII.4.3. Leggett inequality revisited. Validity of revised Leggett inequality..................................................................... 317 Appendices................................................................. 329 Appendix A. Heisenberg's noise-disturbance uncertainty principle................................................................................ 329 Appendix B. Conditional probability density functions...... 335 Appendix C. Fourier transform and Heisenberg uncertainty principle................................................... 336 References................................................................... 337 6 7 PREFACE This book is devoted to the presentation of the new quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states. In the 20s and 30s it became evident that some properties in quantum mechanics can be assigned only to the quantum mechanical system, but not necessarily to its constituents. This led Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) to their remarkable 1935 paper where they concluded that quantum mechanics is not a complete theory of nature (EPR paradox). In order to avoid the contradiction which arises from instantaneous action at a distance mentioned above we introduce an extension of the canonical relativity by using measure algebra of physical events in Minkowski space-time. The canonical QM formalism is extended by additional new postulate of EPRB nonlocality for continuous and discrete observables, chapter I. The postulate of EPRB nonlocality is supported by new quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states. Chapter II is devoted to the new quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states. Chapter III is devoted to the Einstein's 1927 gedanken experiment resolution. Chapter IV is devoted to the EPR paradox resolution. Chapter V is devoted to the EPR-B paradox resolution. Chapter VI is devoted to the Schrödinger's cat (measured spin) paradox resolution. Chapter VII is devoted to the Bell inequalities revisited. Remind that the canonical arguments which were presented by many authors, namely, that violations of Bell type inequalities signal us that the classical Kolmogorovian model of probability is inapplicable to quantum phenomena. We claimed that the canonical assumption, under which Bell type inequalities were derived, is not supported by real physical nature of the EPRB experiments. The fundamental physical nature violations of the canonical Bell type inequalities explained by Postulate of EPR-Nonlocality and Heisenberg noise-disturbance uncertainty relations. 8 INTRODUCTION I.1. Bell's type inequalities violations The canonical argument which were presented by many authors, namely, that violations of Bell type inequalities [1], [2] signal us that the classical model of probability [3] (Kolmogorov, 1933) is inapplicable to quantum phenomena. It well known that any attempt to explain to these violations by some additional value e.g., to philosophize about (non)locality and (un)reality, is not helpful [4], [5], [6]. Remind that one of the Bell's assumptions in the original derivation of his inequalities was the hypothesis of locality, i.e., of the absence of the influence of two remote measuring instruments on one another. That is why violations of these inequalities observed in experiments are often interpreted as a manifestation of the nonlocal nature of quantum mechanics, or a refutation of local realism. Let   ,,P be a Kolmogorov probability space. For two random variables A, B :    we set EAB    ABdP 1.1 Theorem I.1.1. (CHSH-inequality). Let Ai,Bj, i; j  1,2 , be random variables with values in 1,1 . Then the corresponding combination of correlation satisfies the CHSH-inequality: S  EA1B1   EA1B2   EA2B1   EA2B2   2. 1.2 Theorem I.1.2. (Bell's no-go theorem [2]). Bell's no-go theorem says that Bell type inequalities, e.g., the CHSH-inequality (1.2), which are derived in Kolmogorovian model of probability are violated for correlations calculated in the quantum probability model. 9 Remark I.1.1. By using Bell's no-go theorem many authors were concluded that the Kolmogorovian model of probability has to be rejected in general as inapplicable to these correlations in any cases, see for example [4]-[8]. In papers [7]-[9] authors claimed that the fair sampling assumption is not supported by real EPRB experiments. In papers [8]-[9] complete, probability spaces consistent with EPR-Bohm-Bell experimental data by taking into account random choice of settings, were obtained. Fig. I.1.1. Timing-experiment with optical switches(C 1 and C 2 ). Adopted from [10] The switch C 1 followed by the two polarizers in orientations a and a' is equivalent to a single polarizer switched between the orientations a and a . A switching occurs approximatively each 10 ns. A similar setup, independently driven, is implemented on the second side. In experiment, the distance L between the switches was large enough (13 m) that the time of travel of a signal between the switches at the velocity of light (43 ns) was significantly larger than the delay between two switchings (about 10 ns) and the delay between the emission between the two photons (5 ns average). Let us consider now an experiment taking into account random choice of settings [9]. (a) There is a source of entangled photons. 10 (b) There are 4 PBSs and corresponding pairs of detectors for each PBS, totally 8 detectors. PBSs are labeled as i  1,2 (at the left-hand side, LHS) and j  1,2 (at the right-hand side, RHS). (c) Directly after source there are 2 distribution devices, one at LHS and one at RHS. At each instance of time, t  0,,2. . . each device opens the port to only one (of two) optical fibers going to the corresponding two PBSs. For simplicity, we suppose that each pair of ports i, j,1,1,1,2,2,1,2,2, can be opened with equal probabilities Pi, j  1/4. We introduce the observables measured in this experiment. They are modifications of the polarization observables ai , i  1,2, and bj , j  1,2, We define the "LHS-observables": (1) Ai  1, i  1,2 if the corresponding (up or down) detector is coupled to i-th PBS (at LHS) fires and the i-th channel is open, (2) A i  0 if the i-th channel (at LHS) is blocked, (3) in the same way we define the "RHS-observables": Bj  0,1, corresponding to PBSs j  1,2. Remark I.1.2. [9]. Thus unification of 4 incompatible experiments of the CHSH-test into a single experiment modifies the range of values of polarization observables for each of 4 experiments; the new value, zero, is added to reflect the random choice of experimental settings. We emphasize that this value has no relation to the efficiency of detectors. In this model we assume that detectors have 100% efficiency. The observables take the value zero when the optical bers going to the corresponding PBSs are blocked. Let ,,P be an arbitrary probability space and let 0  ,0  ,P0   0 and  let be arbitrary random variable  :   . Then the conditional expectation of the random variable  conditioned to the event 0 is defined as follows: E|0    dP0, 1.3 11 where the conditional probability P0 is defined by Bayes formula P0X  PX|0   PX 0  P0  1.4 Let us now consider the sample space of points  :   1 , 0,1  ,0,1 , 0,0,2  ,0,2 ,1  ,0,0,2 ,0,2  , 1.5 where ,  1,1. We define the following probability measure on  : P1 , 0,1  , 0  1 4 p111 ,1  ,P1 , 0,0,2    1 4 p121 ,2   P0,2 ,1  , 0  1 4 p212 ,1  ,P0,2 , 0,2    1 4 p222 ,2   1.6 where p ij is any collection of probabilities, i.e., pij  0,, pij,  1,,  1,1. 1.7 We define random variables Ai,Bj : A11 , 0,1  , 0  A11 , 0,0,2    1 ,A20,2 ,1  , 0  A20,2 , 0,2    2 , B11 , 0,1  , 0  B11 , 0,0,2    1  ,B20,2 ,1  , 0  B20,2 , 0,2    2  1.8 and we put these variables equal to zero in other points. We define the random variables which are responsible for selections of pairs of ports to PBSs. For the device at LHS: L1 ,0,0,2    L1 ,0,1  ,0  1,L0,2 ,0,2    L0,2 ,1  ,0  2. 1.9 For the device at RHS: 12 R1 ,0,1  ,0  R0,2 ,1  ,0  1,R0,2 ,0,2    R1 ,0,0,2    2. 1.10 We choose now 0  ij  |L  i,R  j. We set ECAiBj  EAiBj|L  i,R  j    AiBjdPij, 1.11 and SC  EA1B1 |L  1,R  1  EA1B2 |L  1,R  2  EA2B1 |L  2,R  1  EA2B2 |L  2,R  2. 1.12 Theorem I.1.3. [9]. (CHSH-inequality for conditional correlations.) Let Ai,Bj, i, j  1,2 , be random variables defined by Eq. (1.8). Then the corresponding combination of conditional correlation SC satisfies the inequality: SC  4. 1.13 However in papers [9], [10], [11], Bell's type inequality were derived in its traditional form, without resorting to the hypothesis of locality and hidden-variable theory the only assumption being that the probability distributions are nonnegative. The starting point of these papers that is a recognition of the existence of a positive-definite probability distribution function. Let A,A,B,B be random variables with values in the set 1,1, i.e., A  1,A  1,B  1,B  1. 1.14 Assume that there exists joint probability distribution function PA,A,B,B of A,A,B,B defining probabilities for each possible set of 13 outcomes such that:  A,A ,B,B  PA,A ,B,B   1,PA,A ,B,B   0, 1.15 and PA,A,B,B   PA,A,B,B  PA,B,B. 1.16 The main point of papers [9], [10], [11] also be a recognition of the existence of a positive-definite probability distribution function without any reference to the full classical Kolmogorovian model of probability [3]. We abbreviate now for short [11]: P1  PA,A ,B,B      PA  1,A   1,B  1,B  1, P2  PA,A ,B,B      PA  1,A   1,B  1,B  1, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P16  PA,A ,B,B      PA  1,A   1,B  1,B  1. 1.17 For the quantities AB, A B, AB  and A B  using Eq. (1.17) one obtains the representatives AB  PAB   PAB   PAB   PAB , etc., 1.18 where PAB   PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B    , etc. 1.19 Theorem I.1.4. [11]. Assume that there exists joint probability distribution function PA,A ,B,B of A,A,B,B such that Eq. (1.15) Eq .(1.16) is satisfied. Then Bell inequality of the form 14 |AB  AB  AB   AB |  2. 1.20 holds. Remark I.1.3. We claim that the even general assumption given by Eqs.(1.15) - (1.16) is not supported by fundamental physical nature of the EPRB experiments. This fundamental physical nature formally explained by (i) Postulate of EPR-Nonlocality (see subsection I.4) and by (ii) Heisenberg noise-disturbance uncertainty relation, (see Appendix A). Remind that in a typical Bell experiment, (see Fig. I.1.2), two particles A and B which may have previously interacted for instance they may have been produced by a common source are now spatially separated and are each measured by one of two distant observers, Alice and Bob. Fig. I.1.2. Scheme of a "two-channel" Bell experiment Alice may choose one out of several possible measurements to perform on her system and we let x denote her measurement choice. For instance, x may refer to the position of a knob on her measurement apparatus. Similarly, we let y denote Bob's measurement choice. Once the measurements are performed, they yield random outcomes a and b on the two systems. The 15 actual values assigned to the measurement choices x,y and outcomes a,b are purely conventional; they are mere macroscopic labels distinguishing the different possibilities. These outcomes a and b are thus in general governed by a Kolmogorovian probability distribution pab|xy, which can of course depend on the particular experiment being performed. The assumption of locality implies that we should be able to identify a set of past factors, described by some variables λ, having a joint causal influence on both outcomes, and which fully account for the dependence between a and b. Once all such factors have been taken into account, the residual indeterminacies about the outcomes must now be decoupled, that is, the Kolmogorovian probabilities for a and b should factorize: pab|xy,  pa|x,pb|y,. 1.21 The different values of across the runs should thus be characterized by a probability distribution qλ. Combined with the above factorability condition, we can thus write pab|xy    dqpa|x,pb|y,, 1.22 where we also implicitly assumed that the measurements x and y can be freely chosen in a way that is independent of , i.e., that qλ|x,y  qλ . Let us consider for simplicity an experiment where there are only two measurement choices per observer x,y  0,1 and where the possible outcomes take also two values labelled a,b  1,1. Let axby  be the expectation value of the product ab for given measurement choices x,y : λ λ 16 axby   a,b abpab|xy. 1.23 Consider the following expression S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 , 1.24 which is a function of the probabilities pab|xy. If these probabilities satisfy the locality decomposition (1.21), we necessarily have that S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1   2, 1.25 which is known as the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [12]. Remark I.1.4. Note that particles A and B in real EPRB experiments cannot collapse simultaneously. Taking into account postulate of EPR-Nonlocality (see subsection I.4) and Heisenberg noisedisturbance uncertainty relation we obtain that random outcomes a and b mentioned above in real EPRB experiments they is not simply random variables a and b but time dependent random functions at1 and bt2. Remark I.1.5. These time dependent outcomes at1 and bt2 are thus in general governed by a time dependent Kolmogorovian joint probability distribution pa, t1 ;b, t2 |x t1yt2, which can of course depend on the particular experiment being performed. By repeating the experiment a sufficient number of times and collecting the observed data, one can get a fair estimate of such time dependent Kolmogorovian joint probabilities distribution. The assumption of locality implies that we should be able to identify a set of past factors, described by some variables λ, having a joint causal influence on both outcomes at1 and bt2, and which fully account for the dependence between a t1 and bt2 . Once all such factors have been taken into account, the residual indeterminacies about the outcomes must now be decoupled, that is, the time 17 dependent Kolmogorovian joint probabilities for a and b should factorize: pa, t1 ;b, t2 |xy,  pa, t1 |x,pb, t2 |y,. 1.26 The variable will not necessarily be constant for all runs of the experiment, even if the procedure which prepares the particles to be measured is held fixed, because may involve physical quantities that are not fully controllable. The different values of across the runs should thus be characterized by a probability distribution qλ, t1 , t2. Combined with the above factorability condition, we can thus write instead (1.22) pa, t1 ;b, t2 |xy    dq, t1 , t2 pa, t1 |x,pb, t2 |y,, 1.27 where we also implicitly assumed that the measurements x t1 and yt2 can be freely chosen in a way that is independent of , i.e., that qλ, t1 , t2 |x t1 ,yt2  qλ, t1 , t2 . Let us consider for simplicity an experiment where there are only two measurement choices per observer x t1 ,yt2  0,1 and where the possible outcomes take also two values labelled at1 ,bt2  1,1. Let at1x t1 bt2y t2 be the expectation value of the product at1bt2 for given measurement choices x t1 ,yt2 : at1x t1 bt2y t2  a,b abpab, t1 , t2 |x t1yt2. 1.28 We assume now that t1 , t2   2 ,    ,0    1, pab, t1 , t2 |x t1 yt2  pab, t1  t2 |x t1 yt2  |t1  t2 |    |t1  t2 |  0, q, t1 , t2   q, t1  t2   |t1  t2 |    |t1  t2 |  0 . 1.29 λ λ λ λ 18 Thus at1x t1 bt2y t2  a,b abpab, t1  t2 |x t1yt2. 1.30 We denote at1x t1 bt2y t2  axby  1.31 iff |t1  t2 |  0, at1x t1 bt2y t2  axby  1.32 iff |t1  t2 |   and t1  t2 , at1x t1 bt2y t2  axby  1.33 iff |t1  t2 |   and t1  t2 , axby   axby   axby   axby . 1.34 Consider now the following expression S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 , 1.35 which is a function of the probabilities pab, t1 , t2 |x t1yt2. If these probabilities satisfy the locality decomposition (1.26) and Eq. (1.28), we necessarily have that S  S  S  S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1   6, 1.36 where 19 S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 , S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 , S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 . 1.37 Remark I.1.6. Note that in contrast with CHSH-inequality for conditional correlations (1.13) the inequality (1.36) is obtained without any references to random choice of settings x t1 and yt2 . I.2. A new quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states Definition I.2.1. In probability theory, the sample space (observation space) of an experiment or random trial is the set of all possible outcomes or results of that experiment. A sample space is usually denoted using set notation, and the possible outcomes are listed as elements in the set. It is common to refer to a sample space by the label Ω. Remark I.2.1. A well-defined sample space (observation space) is one of three basic elements in a probabilistic model (a probability space   ,,P); the other two are a well-defined set of possible events (a sigma-algebra ) and a probability assigned to each event (a probability measure function P). A simple example of a sample phase space and corresponding probability space closer to our Stern-Gerlach experiment is a coin toss. Consider 1000 coin tosses. If the coin is tossed without bias, you will find close to 500 heads and 500 tails, corresponding to prob heads  0.5 and prob tails  0.5. Here the sample space consists of the 1000 detailed trajectories of the toss, which your eye cannot follow, but which if analyzed by a very fast computer could predict which toss would give a head and which a tail (Fig. I.2.1). Again, the probabilities are just reflections of our ignorance of the details, but the details are there. So we have the questions are there hidden details underlying the probabilities in quantum 20 mechanics? Is there a hidden sample space and corresponding probability space? Fig. I.2.1. A sample space. Trajectories in a coin toss. Adapted from [7] In the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation: a particle has an initial position and follows a path whose velocity at each instant is given by a classical equation. On the basis of this assumption we conduct a simulation experiment by drawing random initial positions of the electrons in the initial wave packet ("quantum equilibrium hypothesis"). Fig. I.2.2 shows, after its initial starting position, 100 possible quantum trajectories of an electron passing through one of the two slits: We have not represented the paths of the electron when it is stopped by the first screen. Fig. I.2.3 shows a close-up of these trajectories just after they leave their slits. Remark I.2.2. The different trajectories explain both the impact of electrons on the detection screen and the interference fringes. This is the simplest and most natural interpretation to explain the impact positions: "The position of an impact is simply the position of the particle at the time of impact." This was the view defended by Einstein at the Solvay Congress of 1927. The position is the only measured variable of the experiment. 21 Fig. I.2.2. A sample space in Bohmian QM. 100 electron trajectories for the Jӧnsson experiment. Adapted from [8] Fig. I.2.3. Close-up on the 100 trajectories of the electrons just after the slits. Adapted from [8] 22 Fig. I.2.4. Ten silver atom trajectories within initial spin orientation θ0 = π/3 and initial position z0; arrows represent the spin orientation θ(z, t) along the trajectories. Adapted from [8] Fig. I.2.4 presents, for a silver atom with the initial spinor orientation (θ0 = π/3, ɸ0=0), a plot in the (Oyz) plane of a set of 10 trajectories whose initial position z0 has been randomly chosen from a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ0. The spin orientations θz, t are represented by arrows. Now let us consider a mixture of pure states where the initial orientation (θ0 ,φ0 ) from the spinor has been randomly chosen. These are the conditions of the initial Stern and Gerlach experiment. Fig. I.2.5 represents a simulation of 10 quantum trajectories of silver atoms from which the initial positions z0 are also randomly chosen. 23 Fig. I.2.5. Ten silver atom trajectories where the initial spin orientation  0 0,  has been randomly chosen; arrows represent the spin orientation θ(z, t) along the trajectories. Adapted from [8] Definition I.2.2. A probability space consists of three parts: 1. A sample space (observation space) Ω, which is the set of all possible single outcomes   . 2. A set of events , where each event is a set containing  or more outcomes. 3. The assignment of probabilities to the events; that is, a function P from events to probabilities. An outcome is the result of a single execution of the model. Since individual outcomes might be of little practical use, more complex events are used to characterize groups of outcomes. The collection of all such events is a -algebra . Finally, there is a need to specify each event's likelihood of happening. This is done using the probability measure function, P :  0,1. Remark I.2.3. Note that: (i) In conventional quantum mechanics we dealing with a probabilities without any probability space   ,,P. σ 24 (ii) However a wave function  in quantum mechanics is a description of the quantum state | of a quantum system . The wave function is a complex-valued probability amplitude, and the probabilities for the possible results of measurements of an observable Q  Q (represented by operator Q) made on the quantum system  in state | can be derived from a wave function  . (iii) From (ii) it follows that there exists an probability space   ,,P and random variable Q Q| : Ω  E, i.e. X Q| is a measurable function from the set of possible outcomes Ω to some set E. Example. We now, consider as an example, the simple case of a non-relativistic single particle, without spin, in one spatial dimension. Note that: (i) The state of such a particle is completely described by its position-space wave function, x where x is the position of a particle. This is a complex-valued function of real variable x. For one spinless particle in 1D, if the wave function is interpreted as a probability amplitude, the square modulus of the wave function, the positive real number |x|2  xx  x 2.1 is interpreted as the probability density that the particle is at x . (ii) If the particle position is measured, its location cannot be determined from the wave function, but is described by a probability distribution. The probability that its position x will be in the interval a  x  b is the integral of the density over this interval: Pa  x  b   a b |x|2dx. 2.2 This leads to the normalization condition 25    |x|2dx  1 2.3 because if the particle is measured, there is 100% probability that it will be somewhere. (iii) Assume that particle is in state |. From a statement (ii) it follows that the coordinate x of the particle wave function, x under measurement by a measuring device is a random variable x  Xx|, Xx|Ω|  E | which is well defined on a probability space  |  | ,| ,P. 2.4 (iv) However in conventional quantum mechanics as mentioned above such probability space |  | ,| ,P is missing. Remark I.2.4. For a given system, the set of all possible normalizable wave functions (at any given time) forms an abstract mathematical vector space, meaning that it is possible to add together different wave functions, and multiply wave functions by complex numbers. Note that: (i) Technically, because of the normalization condition, wave functions form a projective space Hp rather than an ordinary infinitedimensional vector space H. Also H is a Hilbert space, because the inner product of two wave functions 1 and 2 can be defined as the complex number 1 |2      1x2xdx. 2.5 (ii) Hp  S   H. (iii) The all values of the wave function x are components of a vector |. There are uncountably infinitely many of them and integration is used in place of summation. In Bra-ket notation, this 26 vector is written |     dxx|x , 2.6 where x  |x  x   x. Let us consider QM system which consists of one particle with a wave function x, x  a,b, such that supp x  a,b and   |x|2dx  1. We go to construct now corresponding probability space |  | ,| ,P. In one dimension, the position x of such a particle can range over the values a  x  b. Consider now the measurement of coordinate of such QM particle. Obviously a sample space for such a coordinate measurement is Ω|  a,b  a,b. Note that in practice observable x is measured to an accuracy x determined by the measuring device. Thus xx1x2x  x1 ,x  x2   a,b  x  x1 ,x  x2   |  and therefore -algebra a,b  Ba,b is the Borel algebra on the set a,b. Let B be the Borel algebra B  ab a,b , we choose the probability measure PB :B 0,1 of the form PBA   A xdx, 2.7 where A  B ,  xdx  1 and dx is the Lebesgue measure. Definition I.2.3. We choose the probability measure P|:B  0,1 corresponding to a wave function x,x2 2  1, in the following form: σ 27 P|A   A |x|2dx, 2.8 where A  B and dx is the Lebesgue measure. Definition I.2.4. A random variable X | : Ω|  E | is a measurable function from the set of possible outcomes Ω to some set E | . The technical axiomatic definition requires Ω | to be a probability space and E | to be a measurable space. Note that although X | is usually a real-valued function X | : Ω|  a,b, it does not return a probability. The probabilities of different outcomes or sets of outcomes (events) in our case are already given by the probability measure P| with which Ω | is equipped above. Definition I.2.5. (Real-valued random variables.) In a case mentioned above the observation space is a set a,b. Recall, ,B,PB  is the probability space. For real observation space, the function X | : Ωa,b  a,b is a real-valued random variable, i.e. aba  b|a  X |  b  a,b . Definition I.2.6. Let |  H. We define now a signed measure P|A  : B    by formula P|A A   A xp |A xdx, 2.9 where p|A x  |x|A | 2 . Remark I.2.5. We assume now that ,,P  ,B,PB  and P|  PB , i.e. P | is absolutely continuous with respect to P . By RadonNicodym theorem there exists a random variable X | :    such that for any A  B : P|A   A X |dPB, 2.10 28 Using Eq. (2.10) we define random variable X | : Ω|   by formula X |  dP| dPB . 2.11 Definition I.2.7. The cumulative distribution function of a real-valued random variable X |  is the function given by FX | x  P  B |X |   x , 2.12 where the right-hand side represents the probability that the random variable X |  takes on a value less than or equal to x. The probability that X |  lies in the semi-closed interval a1 ,b1  a,b, where a1  b1 , is therefore P|a1  X |  b1   FX | b1   FX |a1 . The CDF of any continuous random variable X |  X | can be expressed as the integral of its probability density function pX| x as follows: FX | x    x pX | tdt    x |t|2dt. 2.13 From Eq. (2.9) Eq. (2.10) we obtain EX |   a,b X |dP     xpX | xdx. 2.14 Using canonical QM-abbreviation |     |x x|dx, 2.15 29 where x|  x, |  S  H, from Eq. (2.14) Eq. (2.15) we obtain  |x |    X |dP     xpX | xdx. 2.16 where  x |  x|. Remark I.2.6. We assume now that: (i) for any x  H : (a)   |X | |dP  , (b)   X | 2 dP  , (ii) for any x  H : X |  1,2dP  1dP 2dP. Definition I.2.8. We will write the Eq. (1.16) in the following form  |x |    Xx |dP     xpXx | xdx, 2.17 where  x |  x|. This form remind that continuous random variable X |x  X |x corresponds to the coordinate of a particle with a state vector |. Remark I.2.7. We assume that particle A is initially in the state |A   H. We assume now that: if on performing a measurement of x on particle A with an accuracy x, and the result is obtained in the range xA  x,xA  x at instant t, then unconditional measure PB immediately after the measurement at instant t collapses to conditional measure P A X||A xA,x, where X  B : P  A X |A x A,x  PB X  X  A x A,x PB X  A x A,x , 2.18 30 and where X  A xA,x  |xA  x  X |A   xA  x. Remark I.2.8. (i) From Eq. (2.18) it follows that unconditional probability density function pAx  |x|A | 2 immediately after the measurement at instant t collapses to the following conditional probability density function pA x|X  A x A,x  pAx PB X  A x A,x  x  X  A x A,x 0  x  X  A x A,x 2.19 (ii) From Eq. (2.18) it follows that immediately after the measurement on particle B at instant t a wave function Ax  x|A  collapses to the following wave function A coll x  Ax PB X  A x A,x  x  X  A x A,x 0  x  X  A x A,x. 2.20 Remark I.2.9. Note that in contrast with the usual 'Copenhagen' interpretation in quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states, coordinate of a particle with a state vector | that continuous random variable X |x  X |x and such a random variable in contrast with a state vector | does not collapses under the measurement. However unconditional measure PB immediately after the measurement at instant t collapses to conditional measure PBX||A xA,x (is given by Eq.(2.18)) on whole probability space   ,B,PB . Remark I.2.10. Thus immediately after measurement on any particle A probability space   ,B,PB  collapses to probability space  A  ,B ,PB X |A xA,x 31 ,B,PB  collaps  ,B,P  A X |A xA,x . 2.21 I.3. EPR Paradox resolution by using Postulate of EPRNonlocality In the 20s and 30s it became evident that some properties in quantum mechanics can be assigned only to the quantum mechanical system, but not necessarily to its constituents. This led Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) to their remarkable 1935 paper where they concluded that quantum mechanics is not a complete theory of nature (EPR paradox). The conclusion was derived from some common sense requirements that EPR postulated: 1. Completeness: Each element of realism should have its correspondence in a theory. 2. Realism: If a property can be assigned to a physical system with certainty then there exists an element of realism that corresponds to this property. 3. Locality: Measurements of different elements of realism in spatially separated systems can not influence each other. In original paper [13], Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen describe two particles A and B with perfectly correlated position xB  xA  x0 3.1 and perfectly anti-correlated momentum pB  pA, 3.2 see Fig. I.3.1. 32 Fig. I.3.1. Particles A and B with correlated position and anticorrelated momentum EPR originally argued as follows. Consider two spatially separated subsystems at A and B. EPR considered two observables x (the position) and  p (momentum) for subsystem A, where x and  p do not commute, so that C  0 x,p  2C. 3.3 Suppose now that one may predict with certainty the result of measurement x based on the result of a measurement performed at B. Also, for a different choice of measurement at B, suppose one may predict the result of measurement  p at A . Such correlated systems are predicted by quantum theory. Assuming local realism EPR deduce the existence of an element of reality, x , for the physical quantity x and also an element of reality,  p , for  p . Local realism implies the existence of two hidden variables x and  p that simultaneously predetermine, with no uncertainty, the values for the result of an x or  p measurement on subsystem A , should it be performed. This hidden variable state for the subsystem A alone is not describable within quantum mechanics, since simultaneous eigenstates of x and  p do not exist. Hence, EPR argued, if quantum mechanics is to be compatible with local realism, we must regard quantum mechanics to be incomplete. In the idealized entangled state proposed by EPR, |EPR     |x,xdx     |p,pdp 3.4 33 the positions and momenta of the two particles are perfectly correlated. Note that: this state is non-normalizable and cannot be realized in the laboratory. When coordinates x A and pA are measured in independent realizations of the same state, the correlations allow for an exact prediction of x B and pB . EPR assumed that such exact predictions necessitate an element of reality which predetermines the outcome of the measurement. Quantum mechanics however prohibits the exact knowledge of two noncommuting variables like x B and pB , since their measurement uncertainties are subject to the Heisenberg relation xBpB  /2. 3.5 Remark I.3.1. A most critical component of the EPR argument was the principle of EPR-locality. Indeed, one may regard the EPR paradox as a statement of the mutual incompatibility of EPR-locality, entanglement, and completeness. We accept now the following postulate: The postulate of nonlocality for continuous variables. The Heisenberg uncertainty relations xApA  1 3.6 cannot be violated in any cases: (i) according to quantum mechanics, the Heisenberg uncertainty relations (1.3.4) cannot be violated if the coordinate x A and momentum pA of the particle A are measured directly by measurements performed on the particle A, (ii) the Heisenberg uncertainty relations (3.8) cannot be violated even if the coordinate xA and momentum pA of the particle A are measured indirectly, i.e. by using measurement on particle B , as 34 required in EPR gedanken experiment, (iii) in any cases true coordinate x A and momentum pA of the particle A cannot be predicted simultaneously with a sufficiently small uncertainty x A and pA such that the Reid's inequality [14]: xApA  1 3.7 based on local realism cannot be satisfied, i.e., always xApA  1. 3.8 Remark I.3.2. Obviously under postulate of nonlocality EPR paradox disappears. However postulate of nonlocality is supported by quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states. Using probability representation Eq. (2.11) of quantum states |A  and |B  from Eq. (3.4) we obtain X |B   X |A   x0 ,a.s. 3.9 We assume that particle A is initially in the state |A   H. We assume now that a measurement of x performing on particle B with an accuracy x, and the result is obtained in the range xB  x,xB  x at instant t. Then from Eq.(3.9) we obtain |x B  x  X |B   x B  x  |x B  x 0   x  X |B   x 0  x B  x 0   x  |x A  x  X |A   x A  x. 3.10 We let now for short 35 X B x B ,x  |x B  x  X |B   x B  x, X  A x A,x  |x A  x  X |A   x A  x. 3.11 Then from Eq. (3.10) Eq. (3.11) we obtain X B xB ,x  X  A xA,x. 3.12 Since event X B xB ,x   was occurred by performing a measurement on particle B, then unconditional measure PB immediately after measurement at instant t collapses to conditional measure P B X||B xB ,x, where X  B and therefore from Eq.(2.18) we obtain PX B X  A x A,x X B x B ,x  PB X B x B ,x  X  A x A,x PB X B x B ,x  PB X B x B ,x  X  A x A,x PB X B x B ,x  PB X B x B ,x PB X B x B ,x  1. 3.13 Therefore since event X B xB ,x   was occurred by performing a measurement on particle B immediately after measurement event X  A xA,x occurs with a probability = 1. From Eq. (3.13) it follows that unconditional probability density function pAx  |x|A | 2 immediately after measurement at instant t collapses to the following conditional probability density function pA x|X  A x A,x  pAx PB X  A x A,x  x  X  A x A,x 0  x  X  A x A,x 3.14 36 a wave function Ax  x|A  collapses to the following wave function A coll x  Ax PB X  A x A,x  x  X  A x A,x 0  x  X  A x A,x. 3.15 From Theorem C.1, (see Appendix C) it follows that a wave function Ap  p|A  collapses in accordance with Heisenberg uncertainty relations (3.6). I.4. EPR-B Paradox resolution and Postulate of EPR-B-Nonlocality Entangled states are very interesting states because they exhibit correlations that have no classical analog. They are of particular importance in quantum computation and quantum information. As an example let us take the entangled bi-partite pure state: 1  1 2 |01AB  |10AB   HA  HB . 4.1 Obviously this state can not be decomposed as a simple product state |qA |pB,q,p  0,1. Remark I.4.1. Note that 1 mentioned above is one of the so-called four Bell states: 1  1 2 |01AB  |10AB ,2  1 2 |01AB  |10AB , 3  1 2 |00AB  |11AB ,4  1 2 |00AB  |11AB . 4.2 37 They form a convenient basis of bi-partite quantum states of twodimensional Hilbert spaces. The state is maximally entangled, i.e. when we trace over the state B then the reduced density operator A of the system will be a multiple of the identity operator. This means that if we measure in system A in any basis the result will be completely random (0 or 1 with equal probability 1/2). Remark I.4.2. However, there is a perfect correlation: Whenever we measure with certainty 1 in system A then we will measure 0 in system B with certainty and vice versa. Remark I.4.3. However, despite the randomness, the choice of basis for measurement in system A clearly has a nonlocal effect on the state of the system B: it gives it a definite orientation in the basis |0B, |1B , which it did not have before the measurement. Remark I.4.4. Obviously the process described above is nonlocal: the state changes instantly even though the systems A and B could be space-like separated. We are accustomed to saying that this sort of instantaneous action at a distance is forbidden by canonical relativity. Remark I.4.5. In order to avoid the contradiction which arises from instantaneous action at a distance mentioned above we introduce an extension of the canonical relativity by using measure algebra of physical events in Minkowski space-time, see Chapter III.2. Definition I.4.1. A measure algebra   B,P with a probability measure P, is a Boolean algebra B with a countably additive probability measure. Definition I.4.2. (i) A measure algebra of physical events ph  B,P with a probability measure P, is a Boolean algebra of physical events B with an countably additive probability measure. (ii) A Boolean algebra of physical events can be formally defined as a set B of elements a,b, . . . with the following properties: 1. B has two binary operations,  (logical AND, or "wedge") and  (logical OR, or "vee"), which satisfy: 38 the idempotent laws: (1) a  a  a  a  a, the commutative laws: (2) a  b  b  a, (3) a  b  b  a, and the associative laws: (4) a  b  c  a  b  c, (5) a  b  c  a  b  c. 2. The operations satisfy the absorption law: (6) a  a  b  a  a  b  a. 3. The operations are mutually distributive (7) a  b  c  a  b  a  c, (8) a  b  c  a  b  a  c. 4. B contains universal bounds 0 and 1 which satisfy (9) 0  a  0, (10) 0  a  a, (11) 1  a  a, (12) 1  a  1. 5. B has a unary operation a (or a  ) of complementation (logical negation), which obeys the laws: (13) a  a  0, (14) a  a  1 . All properties of negation including the laws below follow from the above two laws alone. 6. Double negation law: a  a . 7. De Morgan's laws: (i) a  b  a  b, (ii) a  b  a  b. 8. Operations composed from the basic operations include the following important examples: The first operation, a  b (logical material implication): (i) a  b  a  b. The second operation, a  b, is called exclusive. It excludes the possibility of both a and b (ii) a b  a  b  a  b. The third operation, the complement of exclusive or, is equivalence or Boolean equality: (iii) a  b  a  b . 9. B has a unary predicate Occa, which meant that event a has occurred, and which obeys the laws: (i) Occa  b  Occa  Occb, (ii) Occa  b  Occa  Occb, (iii) Occa  Occa. 39 Definition I.4.3. (i) Let B be a Boolean algebra of physical events. A Boolean algebra BM4 of physical events in Minkowski spacetime M4  1,3 that is cartesian product BM4  B M4 . (ii) Let BM4 be a Boolean algebra of physical events in Minkowski spacetime. A measure algebra of physical events M4 ph  BM4 ,P in Minkowski spacetime that is a Boolean algebra BM4 with a probability measure P such that A A  M4 ph B B  M4 ph A  B  PA  PB, APA  PAOc . 4.3 (iii) Let BM4 be Boolean algebra of the all physical events in Minkowski spacetime and let M4 ph be an measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P with a probability measure P. We denote such physical events by Ax,Bx, . . . etc., where x  t,x1 ,x2 ,x3   M4 or A,B, . . . etc. (iv) We will write for a short AOcx,BOcx, . . . etc., instead OccAx,OccBx, . . . etc. Remark I.4.6. Note that Boolean algebra BM4 of physical events in Minkowski spacetime obviously contains a pairs Ax1 ,Bx2  of a Boolean equivalent events Ax1  and Bx2  such that x1x2Ax1   Bx2 , 4.4 i.e., Boolean equality Ax1   Bx2  always holds even the events Ax1  and Bx2  are space-like separated. Definition I.4.4. A probability measure P on a measure space , gives a probability measure algebra   ,,P  on the Boolean algebra of measurable sets modulo null sets, i.e., sets P measure zero. Remark I.4.7. We assume now that a measure algebra 40 M4 ph  BM4 ,P admit a representation  : M4 ph  ,,P  of the measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P in a probability measure algebra   ,,P , such that (ii) PX  P1X for any X  . Definition I.4.5. Given two events Ax1  and Bx2  from the measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P the conditional probability of Ax1  given Bx2  is defined as the quotient of the probability of the joint of events Ax1  and Bx2  , and the probability of B : PAx1 |Bx2   PAx1   Bx2  PBx2  4.5 where PBx2   0. Remark I.4.8. Assume that: (i) BOcx2 , then since event Bx2  is occurred, unconditional probability measure P on algebra BM4 collapses to the conditional probability measure PBOc Ax1   PAx1 |BOcx2   PAx1 |Bx2   PAx1   Bx2  PBx2  4.6 and measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P collapses to the measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,PBOc  . (ii) BOcx2  and Ax1   Bx2 , then PBOc Ax1   PAx1 |B Ocx2   PAx1   Bx2  PBx2   PBx2  PBx2   1, 4.7 i.e., PBOc Ax1   1 and therefore, since event Bx2  is occurred in point x2 , the event Ax1  is occurred with probability 1 in point x2 even points x1 and x2 are space-like separated. Remind that Bohm [15] considered two spatially-separated spin-1/2 particles at A and B produced in an entangled singlet state (often referred to as the EPR-Bohm state or the Bell-state): 41 |  1 2 1 2 A  1 2 B   1 2 A 1 2 B 4.8 Here | 1 2 A are eigenstates of the spin operator  J z A , and we use  J z A ,  J x A ,  J y A to define the spin-components measured at location A . The spin-eigenstates and measurements at B are defined similarly. By considering different quantization axes, one obtains different but equivalent expansions of | in Eq. (4.4), just as EPR suggested. Fig. I.4.1. The Bohm gedanken EPR experiment. Two spin-1/2 particles prepared in a singlet state from the source into spatially separated regions A and B, and give anti-correlated outcomes for Jθ A and JB, where θ is x, y or z Bohm's paradox is based on the existence, for Eq. (4.1), of a maximum anti-correlation between not only  J z A and  J z B , but  J y A and  J y B , and also  J x A and  J x B . An assumption of local realism would lead to the conclusion that the three spin components of particle A were simultaneously predetermined, with absolute definiteness. Since no such quantum description exists, this is the situation of an EPR paradox. We accept now the following postulate: The postulate of nonlocality for observables with discrete values. The Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations 42 JxAJyA  JzA  /2,JxAJzA  JyA  /2,JzAJyA  JxA  /2 4.9 cannot be violated in any cases: (i) if the three spin components of the particle A are measured directly by measurements performed on the particle A, (ii) and even if some spin components of the particle A are measured indirectly as required in Bohm gedanken EPR experiment. Remark I.4.11. Obviously under postulate of nonlocality EPR paradox disappears. However postulate of nonlocality supported by quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states, see Chapter V.3. 43 Chapter I THE POSTULATE OF EPR-B NONLOCALITY I.1. The EPR paradox In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) originated the famous EPR paradox [6]. This argument concerns two spatially separated particles which have both perfectly correlated positions and momenta, as is predicted possible by quantum mechanics. The EPR paper spurred investigations into the nonlocality of quantum mechanics, leading to a direct challenge of the philosophies taken for granted by most physicists. The EPR conclusion was based on the assumption of local realism, and thus the EPR argument pinpoints a contradiction between local realism and the completeness of quantum mechanics. I.2. Einstein's 1927 gedanken experiment Einstein never accepted orthodox quantum mechanics because he did not believe that its nonlocal collapse of the wave function could be real. When he first made this argument in 1927 [7], he considered just a single particle. The particle's wave function was diffracted through a tiny hole so that it `dispersed' over a large hemispherical area before encountering a screen of that shape covered in photographic film. Since the film only ever registers the particle at one point on the screen, orthodox quantum mechanics must postulate a `peculiar mechanism of action at a distance, which prevents the wave... from producing an action in two places on the screen'. That is, according to the theory, the detection at one point must instantaneously collapse the wave function to nothing at all other points. 44 Remark 1.2.1. It was only in 2010, nearly a century after Einstein's original proposal, that a scheme to rigorously test Einstein's `spooky action at a distance' [7], [8] using a single particle (a photon), as in his original conception, was conceived [9]. In this scheme, Einstein's 1927 gedanken experiment is simplified so that the single photon is split into just two wave packets, one sent to a laboratory supervised by Alice and the other to a distant laboratory supervised by Bob. However, there is a key difference, which enables demonstration of the nonlocal collapse experimentally: rather than simply detecting the presence or absence of the photon, homodyne detection is used. This gives Alice the power to make different measurements, and enables Bob to test (using tomography) whether Alice's measurement choice affects the way his conditioned state collapses, without having to trust anything outside his own laboratory. Fig. 1.2.1. Simplified version of Einstein's original gedanken experiment. Adapted from [10] A single photon is incident on a beam splitter of reflectivity R and then subjected to homodyne measurements at two spatially separated locations. 45 Alice is trying to convince Bob that she can steer his portion of the single photon to different types of local quantum states by performing various measurements on her side. She does this by using different values of her LO phase, and extracting only the sign s  , of the quadrature she measures. Meanwhile, Bob scans his LO and performs full quantum-state tomography to reconstruct his local quantum state. He reconstructs unconditional and conditional local quantum states to test if his portion of the single photon has collapsed to different states according to Alice's LO setting θ, and result s see Fig . 1.2.1. The key role of measurement choice by Alice in demonstrating `spooky action at a distance' was introduced in the famous EinsteinPodolsky-Rosen (EPR) paper [6] of 1935. In its most general form, this phenomenon has been called EPR-steering, to acknowledge the contribution and terminology of Schrödinger [11], who talked of Alice `steering' the state of Bob's quantum system. From a quantum information perspective, EPR-steering is equivalent to the task of entanglement verification when Bob (and his detectors) can be trusted but Alice (or her detectors) cannot. This is strictly harder than verifying entanglement with both parties trusted [12], but strictly easier than violating a Bell inequality [13], where neither party is trusted [12]. Remark 1.2.2. A recent experimental test of entanglement for a single photon via an entanglement witness has no efficiency loophole [14], however, it demonstrates a weaker form on nonlocality than EPR-steering. In [10], it was demonstrated experimentally that there exists Einstein's elusive `spooky action at a distance' for a single particle without opening the efficiency loophole without claim to have closed the separation loophole. That is the one-sided device-independent verification of spatial-mode entanglement for a single photon. θ 46 I.3. The continuous variable EPR paradox. EPR-Reid's criteria We remind that EPR treated the case of a non-factorizable pure state | which describes the results for measurements performed on two spatially separated systems at A and B (Fig. 1.3.1). Nonfactorizable means entangled, that is, we cannot express | as a simple product |  |A  |B , where |A and |B are quantum states for the results of measurements at A and B, respectively. Fig.1.3.1. The original EPR gedanken experiment. Two particles move from the source into spatially separated regions A and B, and yet continue to have maximally correlated positions: xA+x0=xB and anti-correlated momenta: pA=-pB. Adapted from [15] In the first part of their paper, EPR point out in a general way the problematic aspects of such entangled states. The key issue is that one can expand | in terms of more than one basis, that corresponds to different experimental settings, which we parametrize by  . Let us consider the state |   dx|x ,A  |ux ,B , 1.3.1 where the x eigenvalue could be continuous or discrete. The parameter setting  at the detector B is used to define a particular orthogonal measurement basis |ux ,B . On measurement at B, that 47 projects out a wave-function |x ,A at A , the process called reduction of the wave packet. Remark 1.3.1. The locality assumption postulates no action-at-adistance, so that measurements at a location B cannot immediately disturb the system at a spatially separated A location. Remark 1.3.2. The problematic issue is that different choices of measurements  at B will cause reduction of the wave packet at A in more than one possible way. EPR states that, as a consequence of two different measurements at B, the second system may be left in states with two different wave functions. Yet, no real change can take place in the second system in consequence of anything that may be done to the first system. The problem was established by EPR by a specific example, shown in Fig.1.3.1. EPR considered two spatially separated subsystems, at A and B, each with two observables x and p where x and p are noncommuting quantum operators, with commutator x,p   xp  px  2C  0. 1.3.2 The results of the measurements x and p are denoted x and p respectively, and this convention we follow throughout the paper. We note that EPR assumed a continuous variable spectrum and considered wave function  defined in a position representation by x,xB    eip/xxBx0 dp , 1.3.3 where x 0 is a constant implying space-like separation. Here the pairs x and p refer to the results for position and momentum measurements at A , while x B and pB denote the position and 48 momentum measurements at B. We leave off the superscript for A system, to emphasize the inherent asymmetry that exists in the EPR argument, where one system A is steered by the B other. Remark 1.3.3. According to canonical quantum mechanics, one can predict with certainty that a measurement x will give result xB  x0 , if a measurement x B , with result x B , was already performed at B. One may also predict with certainty the result of p measurement, for a different choice of measurement at B. If the momentum at B is measured to be p , then the result for p is p . These predictions are made without disturbing the second system at A , based on the assumption, implicit in the original EPR paper, of locality. Remark 1.3.4. The locality assumption can be strengthened if the measurement events at A and B are causally separated (such that no signal can travel from one event to the other, unless faster than the speed of light). Remark 1.3.5. The remainder of the EPR argument may be summarized as follows. Assuming local realism, one deduces that both the measurement outcomes, for x and p at A , are predetermined. The perfect correlation of x with xB  x0 implies the existence of an element of reality for the x measurement. Similarly, the correlation of p with pB implies an element of reality for p . Although not mentioned by EPR, it will prove useful to mathematically represent the elements of reality for x and p by the respective variables xA and p A , whose possible values are the predicted results of the measurement. Remark 1.3.6. To continue the argument, local realism implies the existence of two elements of reality, xA and p A , that simultaneously predetermine, with absolute definiteness, the results for measurement x or p at A . These elements of reality for the localized 49 subsystem A are not themselves consistent with quantum mechanics. Simultaneous determinacy for both the position and momentum is not possible for any quantum state. Hence, assuming the validity of local realism, one concludes quantum mechanics to be incomplete or even inconsistent! Remark 1.3.7. We claim that any assumption of local realism is completely wrong. Such a claim meant as minimum the weak postulate of nonlocality. I.3.1. The weak postulate of nonlocality for continuous variables The Heisenberg uncertainty relations xApA  1 1.3.4 cannot be violated in any cases: (i) of course, according to quantum mechanics, the Heisenberg uncertainty relations (1.3.4) cannot be violated if the coordinate x A and momentum pA of the particle A are measured directly by measurements performed on the particle A, (ii) the Heisenberg uncertainty relations (1.3.4) cannot be violated even if the coordinate xA and momentum pA of the particle A are measured indirectly, i.e. by using measurement on particle B , as required in EPR gedanken experiment, (iii) in any cases true coordinate x A and momentum pA of the particle A cannot be predicted simultaneously with a sufficiently small uncertainty x A and pA such that the Reid's inequality [16]: xApA  1 1.3.5 50 based on local realism would be satisfied, i.e., always xApA  1. 1.3.6 We claim strictly stronger assumptions of nonlocality than mentioned above. I.3.2. The strong postulate of nonlocality for continuous variables Let | t x  A and | t x  B be a state vector in x -representation at instant t of the particle A and particle B correspondingly. Let  t p  A and  t p  B be a state vector in p -representation at instant t of the particle A and particle B correspondingly. Let t Ax  x |t x  A ,t Bx  x |t x  B be a wave functions in x representation of the particle A and particle B correspondingly. Let t Ap  p|t p  A ,t Bp  p|t p  B be a wave functions in p representation of the particle A and particle B correspondingly. Let t A/BxA,xB  be corresponding two-particle wave function in x representation and let t A/BpA,pB  be corresponding two-particle wave function in p -representation. We claim that: (i) whenever a measurement of the coordinate x of a particle B is performed at instant t with result x B  xB  ,xB  ,  1, then: (a) according to quantum mechanics a state vector | t x  B collapses at instant t to the state vector  t,,,xB x B ~  LxB B ,|t x  B 1.3.7 51 given by law (1.2.20), where  Lx B B , is a norm-reducing, positive, self-adjoint, linear operator in the 2 -particle non projective Hilbert space H, representing the localization of particle B around the point x B , (see subsection II.2.); (b) according to postulate of nonlocality a state vector | t x  A immediately collapses at instant t to the state vector  t,,,xA x A ~  LxBx0 A ,| t x  A 1.3.8 given by law (1.2.20) and this is true independent of the distance in Minkowski space-time M4  1,3 that separates the particles. Thus | t x  B col lapse   t,,,xB x B  |t x  A col lapse   t,,,xBx0 x A 1.3.9 (ii) under conditions given by Eq. (1.3.7) Eq. (1.3.9) two-particle wave function t A/BxA,xB  collapses at instant t by law t A/BxA,xB  col lapse   LxBx0 A  LxB B ,t A/BxA,xB  1.3.10 (iii) whenever a measurement of the momentum pB of a particle B is performed at instant t with result p B  pB  ,pB  ,  1, then: (a) according to quantum mechanics a state vector  t p  B collapses at instant t to the state vector  t,,,p B p B ~  Lp B B , t p  B , 1.3.11 where  Lp B B , is a norm-reducing, positive, self-adjoint, linear operator in the 2 -particle non projective Hilbert space H, representing the localization of momentum of the particle B 52 around the value pB . The localization operators  Lp B B , have been chosen to have the following form:  Lp B B ,  1  3/4 exp  1 2 p  pB 2 1.3.12 where   0,1 and lim0   . (b) according to postulate of nonlocality a state vector  t p  A immediately collapses at instant t to the state vector  t,,,xA p A ~  Lp B A , t p  A 1.3.13 and this is true independent of the distance in Minkowski space-time M4  1,3 that separates the particles. Thus  t p  B col lapse   t,,,p B p B   t p  A col lapse   t,,,pB p A 1.3.14 (iv) under conditions given by Eq. (1.3.11) Eq. (1.3.13) two-particle wave function t A/BpA,pB  collapses at instant t by the law t A/BpA,pB  col lapse   LpB A  LpB B , t A/BpA,pB . 1.3.15 Remark 1.3.8. Let p t A and p t B be the momentum at instant t of the particle A and particle B correspondingly. Note that whenever a measurement of the coordinate x of a particle B is performed at instant t with the accuracy xB  1 then: (i) immediately after this measurement the momentum p t B at instant t changed according to quantum mechanics by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations (1.3.4); (ii) immediately after this measurement the momentum p t A at instant 53 t changed according to postulate of nonlocality by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations (1.3.4). Remark 1.3.9. Let x t A and x t B be the coordinate at instant t of the particle A and particle B correspondingly. Note that whenever a measurement of the momentum p of a particle B is performed at instant t with the accuracy pB  1 then: (i) immediately after this measurement the coordinate x t B at instant t changed according to quantum mechanics by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations (1.3.4); (ii) immediately after this measurement the momentum at instant changed according to postulate of nonlocality by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations (1.3.4). Remark 1.3.10. Schrödinger [11] pointed out that the EPR twoparticle wave function in Eq. (1.3.3) was verschränkten which he later translated as entangled i.e., not of the separable form AB . Schrödinger considered as a possible resolution of the paradox that this entanglement degrades as the particles separate spatially, so that EPR correlations would not be physically realizable. Definition 1.3.1.Quantum inseparability (entanglement) for a general mixed quantum state is defined as the failure of    dP A   B , 1.3.16 where  dP  1 and  is the density operator. Here  is a discrete or continuous label for component states, and  A and  B correspond to density operators that are restricted to the Hilbert spaces A and B respectively. x t A t 54 Remark 1.3.11. The definition of inseparability extends beyond that of the EPR situation, in that one considers a whole spectrum of measurement choices, parametrized by  for those performed on A system, and by  for those performed on B. We use canonical notation x  A and x  B to describe all measurements at A and B. Denoting the eigenstates of x  A by |x  A , we define PQxA |,  xA |  A |x A and PQx B |,  x B |  B |x B , which are the localized probabilities for observing results x  A and x  B respectively. The separability condition (1.3.9) then implies that joint probabilities Px A,x B are given as [16]: Px A,x B    dPPQx A |PQxB | . 1.3.17 Remark 1.3.12. We note the canonical restriction 2xA |2pA |  1 1.3.18 where 2xA | and 2pA | are the variances of PQx  A|, for the choices  corresponding to position x and p momentum, respectively. Thus, 2xA |2pA |  1 1.3.19 is an EPR criterion, meaning that this would imply an EPR "paradox". Remark 1.3.13. Note that the original EPR state of Eq. (1.3.3) is not separable. Suppose that, based on a result x B for the measurement at B , an estimate x estxB  is made of the result x at A. We may define the average error  infx of this inference as the root mean square (RMS) of the deviation of the estimate from the actual value, so that [16-18]: 55 inf 2 x   dxdxBPtx,xB x  x estxB 2 . 1.3.20 An inference variance  inf 2 p is defined similarly, i.e. inf 2 p   dpdpBPtp,pB p  pestpB 2 . 1.3.21 Remark 1.3.14. Let t A/BxA,xB  be corresponding two-particle wave function in x -representation and let t A/BpA,pB  be corresponding two-particle wave function in p -representation. Note that: (i) Ptx,x B  is the joint probability of obtaining an outcome x at A and x B at B at t instant is of the form Ptx,xB   t A/BxA,xB  2 , 1.3.22 (ii) Ptp,p B  is the joint probability of obtaining an outcome p at A and pB at B at t instant is of the form Ptp,pB   t A/BpA,pB  2 . 1.3.23 The best estimate, which minimizes  infx , is given by choosing x est for each x B to be the mean x|xB  of the conditional distribution Ptx|xB  . This is seen upon noting that for each x B result, we can define the RMS error in each estimate as inf 2 t,x|xB    dxP tx|xB x  x estxB 2 . 1.3.24 The average error in each inference is minimized for x est  x|xB , when each inf 2 t,x|xB  becomes the variance 2t,x|xB of Ptx|x B  . We thus define the minimum inference error  infx for position, 56 averaged over all possible values of x B , as VA|B x  min inf 2 x   dxBPtxB 2t,x|xB  , 1.3.25 where Px B  is the probability density for a result x B upon measurement of xB . This minimized inference variance is the average of the individual variances for each outcome at B . Similarly, we can define a minimum inference variance VA|B p for momentum, i.e. VA|B p  min inf 2 p   dpBP tpB 2t,p|pB  . 1.3.26 Remark 1.3.15. Let t A/BxA,xB  be corresponding two-particle wave function in x -representation and let t A/BpA,pB  be corresponding two-particle wave function in p -representation. Note that: (i) according to local realism the conditional distributions densities Plocx|xB  and Plocp|p B  vary given by formulae Plocx|xB  ~  LxB B ,t A/Bx,xB  1.3.27 and Plocp|pB  ~  Lp B B , t A/BpA,pB . 1.3.28 (ii) distribution densities Ploct,x B  and Ploct,p B  are given by formulae Ploct,xB   dxP loct,x|xB  1.3.29 and P loct,pB   dpP loct,p|pB . 1.3.30 57 Remark 1.3.16. Let t A/BxA,xB  be corresponding two-particle wave function in x -representation and let t A/BpA,pB  be corresponding two-particle wave function in p -representation. Note that: (i) according to postulates of nonlocality the conditional distributions densities Pn .loct,x|x B  and Pn .loct,p|p B  are given by formulae Pn .loct,x|xB    LxBx0 A  LxB B ,t A/Bx,xB  1.3.31 and Pn .loct,p|pB  ~  Lp B A  Lp B B ,t A/Bp,pB , 1.3.32 see Eq. (1.3.10) and Eq. (1.3.15) respectively. (ii) distributions Pn .loct,x B  and Pn .loct,p B  are given by formulae Pn .loct,xB   dxPn .loct,x|xB  1.3.33 and Pn .loct,p|B   dpPn .loct,p|pB  1.3.34 Thus we can define corresponding RMS errors as  loc.inf 2 t,x|x B    dxP loct,x|xB x  x estx B 2  loc.inf 2 t,p|pB    dxP loct,p|pB p  x estpB 2 1.3.35 and n .loc.inf 2 t,x|x B    dxP loct,x|x B x  x estx B 2 , n .loc.inf 2 t,p|pB    dxP loct,p|pB p  x estpB 2 1.3.36 respectively. We thus define the minimum inference error  infx for position, averaged over all possible values of x B and pB as min  loc.inf 2 x   dxBP loct,x B  loc.2 t,x|xB  , min  loc.inf 2 p   dpBP loct,pB  loc.2 t,p|pB  1.3.37 58 and min n .loc.inf 2 x   dx BPn .loct,x B n .loc.2 t,x|x B  , min n .loc.inf 2 p   dpBPn .loct,pB n .loc.2 t,p|pB . 1.3.38 respectively. From Eq. (1.3.37) and Eq. (1.3.38) we obtain the EPRnonlocality criteria min loc.inf. 2 x  min n .loc.inf. 2 x   dx BP loct,x B  loc.2 t,x|x B   Pn .loct,x B n .loc.2 t,x|x B   0, min loc.inf. 2 p  minn .loc.inf. 2 p   dpBP loct,pB  loc.2 t,p|pB   Pn .loct,pB n .loc.2 t,p|pB   0 1.3.39 and minloc.inf. 2 x minloc.inf. 2 p  min n .loc.inf. 2 x n .loc.inf 2 p  0. 1.3.40 I.4. The EPR-Bohm paradox. Reid's criteria for EPRBohm paradox Bohm [19]-[20] considered two spatially-separated spin-1/2 particles at A and B produced in an entangled singlet state (often referred to as the EPR-Bohm state or the Bell-state): |  1 2 1 2 A  1 2 B   1 2 A 1 2 B 1.4.1 Here | 1 2 A are eigenstates of the  J z A spin operator, and we use  J z A ,  J x A ,  J y A to define the spin-components measured at location A . The spin-eigenstates and measurements at B are defined similarly. By considering different quantization axes, one obtains different but equivalent expansions of | in Eq. (1.3.1), just as EPR suggested. 59 Fig. 1.4.1. The Bohm gedanken EPR experiment. Two spin-1/2 particles prepared in a singlet state from the source into spatially separated regions A and B, and give anti-correlated outcomes for Jθ A and JB, where θ is x, y or z. Adapted from [16] Bohm's paradox is based on the existence, for Eq. (1.9.1), of a maximum anti-correlation between not only  J z A and  J z B , but  J y A and  J y B , and also  J x A and  J x B . An assumption of local realism would lead to the conclusion that the three spin components of particle A were simultaneously predetermined, with absolute definiteness. Since no such quantum description exists, this is the situation of an EPR paradox. Remark 1.4.1.Bohm's paradox is based on the existence, for Eq.(1.4.1), of a maximum anti-correlation between not only  J z A and  J z B , but  J y A and  J y B , and also  J x A and  J x B . Remark 1.4.2. Note that an assumption of local realism would lead to the conclusion that the three spin components of particle A were simultaneously predetermined, with absolute definiteness. Since no such quantum description exists, this is the situation of an EPR paradox. Remark 1.4.3. Criteria sufficient to demonstrate Bohm's EPR paradox can be derived using Reid's canonical inferred uncertainty approach [16]. Using the Heisenberg spin uncertainty relation JxAJyA  JzA  /2, 1.4.2 60 one obtains the following canonical spin-EPR criterion that is useful for the Bell state given by Eq. (1.4.1) infJxAinfJyA  1 2  Jz B PJzB  JzA  Jz B . 1.4.3 Here Jz A  Jz B is the mean of the conditional PJz A |Jz B  distribution. Calculations for Eq. (1.4.1) including the effect of detection efficiency  reveals this EPR criterion to be satisfied for   0.62. The concept of spin-EPR has been experimentally tested in the continuum limit with purely optical systems for states with Jz A   0. In this case the EPR criterion linked closely to definition of spin squeezing infJxAinfJyA  JzA  . 1.4.4 Remark 1.4.4. We claim that any assumption of local realism is completely wrong. The three spin components of particle A were simultaneously predetermined, does not with absolute definiteness but only with uncertainties which required by Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations (1.4.5). Such claim meant as minimum the weak postulate of nonlocality. I.4.1. The weak postulate of nonlocality Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations The Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations JxAJyA  JzA  /2,JxAJzA  JyA  /2,JzAJyA  JxA  /2 1.4.5 does not violate in any cases: (i) if the three spin components of the particle A are measured directly by measurements performed on the particle A, (ii) and even if some spin components of the A particle are 61 measured indirectly as required in Bohm gedanken EPR experiment. Think of the following situation: a particle with zero spin decays into two particles (A and B), each with 1/2-spin. Due to the fact that spin angular momentum must be conserved during the decay, if initially the total spin angular momentum was zero, then after the decaying process it must still be zero. Therefore, particles A and B have opposite spin. Take as an example the dissociation of an exited hydrogen molecule into two hydrogen atoms. If the decaying mechanism does not change total angular momentum, then the spins on the hydrogen atoms will be anti-correlated. Remark 1.4.5. Whenever a measurement of the spin of A is found to be positive with respect of the z -axis (we shall note this state as |z, then, under local realism, we could infer that the spin of the B particle must be negative |z, and this is true independent of the distance that separates the particles. The spin of these particles are then entangled. Remark 1.4.6. We claim again that any assumption of local realism is completely wrong. I.4.2. The strong postulate of nonlocality Let | t A and | t B are states at instant t of the particle A and particle B correspondingly. Let |z,A/B be eigenstates of the spin operator SA/B z : SA/B z  1 0 0 1 1.4.6 We claim that: (i) whenever a measurement of the spin of a particle A is performed at instant t1  t and particle A is found in the state |z, i.e., a state | t1 A collapses at instant t1 to the state |z,A with respect of the 62 Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations (1.4.5), then a state | t1 B immediately collapses at instant t1 to the state |z,B with respect of the Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations (1.4.5), and this is true independent of the distance in Minkowski space-time that separates the particles: |t1 A col lapse  |z,A  |t1 B col lapse  |z,B 1.4.7 (ii) whenever a measurement of the spin of a particle A is performed at instant t1  t and particle A is found in the state |z, i.e., a state | t1 A collapses at instant t1 to the state |z,A with respect of the Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations (1.4.5), then a state | t1 B immediately | t B collapses at instant t1 to the state |z,B with respect of the Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations (1.4.5), and this is true independent of the distance in Minkowski space-time that separates the particles: |t1 A col lapse  |z,A  |t1 B col lapse  |z,B 1.4.8 Note that, we can not predict which spin will be positive (or negative) with respect of the z -axis, so the state that describes the spins of the particles could be for instance the spin singlet state |  1 2 |  | 1.4.9 We have 50% probability for the spin of particle A to be positive (and the spin of B negative) and 50% probability of it being the other way around. Remark 1.4.7. So far we have assumed that we are performing a measurement along the z -axis, but measurements are not restricted to this particular election, we could measure for instance the spin of 63 particle A along the a -axis and the spin of B along the b -axis. Let us see what happens if we decide to measure the spin along the x axis: a  b  x . As it known for 1/2-spins, the spin operator SA/B x can be represented by the 2  2 Hermitian matrix SA/B x  0 1 1 0 1.4.10 By performing a change of basis we can rewrite the state | in terms of the eigenstates of the spin operator SA/B x : |u  1 2 |  |, |v   1 2 |  |, 1.4.11 and using Eq. (1.4.10), we can rewrite the state | as |  1 2 |vu  |uv . 1.4.12 The strong postulate of nonlocality in this case takes the form similarly mentioned above. Just like before, by choosing to measure the spin of A along the x -axis we can determine its value and infer the value of the spin of particle B B  B in the state | x,B  |ux,B  |x,B without the need to measure it (and vice versa). Furthermore, it turns out that this is the case independent of the election of the axis we choose to measure! (Provided that a  b  v ). This is exactly the same situation such that a simple choice of the axis along which to measure the spin A allow us to establish the value of the spin of B along this same axis without the need to measure it. And this is also the case (as we already saw) for physical properties described by non-commuting operators (Sx and Sz do not commute). 64 Chapter II A NEW QUANTUM MECHANICAL FORMALISM BASED ON THE PROBABILITY REPRESENTATION OF QUANTUM STATES AND OBSERVABLES II.1. Generalized Postulates for Continuous Valued Observables Suppose we have an n -dimensional physical quantum system. I. Then we claim the following: Q.I.1. Any given n -dimensional quantum system is identified by a set Q : Q  H,,,2,1 ,H,G, |t  where: (i) H that is some infinite-dimensional complex Hilbert space, (ii)   ,,P that is complete probability space , (iii)   n , that is measurable space , (iv) 2,1 that is complete space of complex valued random variables X: Ω → Cn such that   XdP  ,   X2dP   2.1.1 (v) G : CHH 2,1 that is one to one correspondence such that 65  |Q|    G Q, |  dP  E G Q|  , G  1, |   1 2.1.2 for any |  H and for any Hermitian adjoint operator Q : H  H such that ?? ∈HC∗(H), where CH is C algebra of the Hermitian adjoint operators in H and H an commutative subalgebra of CH. (vi) | t  is a continuous vector function |t  :   H which represented the evolution of the quantum system Q. Q.I.2. For any |1 , |2   H and for any Hermitian operator Q : H  H such that 1 Q 2  2 Q 1  0 2.1.3 the equality holds G Q|1   |2    G Q|1    G Q|2  . 2.1.4 Definition 2.1.1. A random variable X :   E is a measurable function from the set of possible outcomes  to some E set. Definition 2.1.2. Given a probability space   ,,P and a measurable space   n , , any n -valued stochastic process that is a collection of n -valued random variables on  , indexed by a totally ordered set T ("time"). That is, a stochastic process X t is a collection Xt|t  T, where each X t is an n -valued random variable on . The space n is then called the state space of the process. Q.I.3. Suppose that the evolution of the quantum system is represented by continuous vector function |t  :   H. Then any process of continuous measurements on measuring observable Q 66 for the system in state | t  one can to describe by an continuous n valued stochastic process X t  X t ; Q t  X Qt  given on the probability space ,,P and the measurable space n , . Remark 2.1.1. We assume now for short but without loss of generality that n  1. Remark 2.1.2. Let X be random variable X  2,1 such that X  G|, then we denote such random variable by X |. The probability density of X | random variable we denote by p|q,q  . Definition 2.1.3. The classical pure states correspond to vectors v  H of v1 norm. Thus the set of all classical pure states corresponds to the unit sphere S  H in a H Hilbert space. Definition 2.1.4. The projective Hilbert space PH of a complex Hilbert space H is the set of equivalence classes v of vectors v in H, with v  0, for the equivalence relation given by v Pw  v w for some non-zero complex number   . The equivalence classes for the relation P are also called rays or projective rays. Remark 2.1.3. The physical significance of the projective Hilbert space PH is that in canonical quantum theory, the | and | states represent the same physical state of the quantum system, for any   0 . It is conventional to choose a state | from the ray | so that it has unit norm |  1. 67 Remark 2.1.4. In contrast with canonical quantum theory we have used instead contrary to P equivalence relation Q, a H Hilbert space, see Definition 2.1.7. Definition 2.1.5. The non-classical pure states correspond to the vectors v  H of a v1 norm. Thus the set of all non-classical pure states corresponds to the set H\S  H in the H Hilbert space. Suppose we have an observable Q of a quantum system that is found through an exhaustive series of measurements, to have a set  of values q   such that   i1 m 1 i ,2 i ,m  2, 1 i ,2 i   1 j ,2 j  , i  j. Note that in practice any observable Q is measured to an accuracy q determined by the measuring device. We represent now by |q the idealized state of the system in the limit q  0, for which the observable definitely has the value q. II. Then we claim the following: Q.II.1. The states |q : q   form a complete set of  -function normalized basis states for the state space H of the system. That the states |q : q   form a complete set of basis states means that any state |  H of the system can be expressed as: |    c qdq, 2.1.5 where supp cq   and while  -function normalized means that q|q   q  q from which follows cq  q| so that |    |qq|dq. 2.1.6 The completeness condition can then be written as 68   |qq|dq   1H . 2.1.7 Q.II.2. For the system in state | the probability Pq,q  dq; | of obtaining the result q   lying in the range q,q  dq   on measuring observable Q is given by Pq,q  dq; |  p | qdq 2.1.8 for any |  H . Remark 2.1.5. Note that in general case p|q  |cq| 2 . Q.II.3. The observable Q is represented by a Hermitian operator Q : H H whose eigenvalues are the possible results q : q  , of a measurement of Q , and the associated eigenstates are the states |q : q  , i.e. Q |q  q|q,q  . Remark 2.1.6. Note that the spectral decomposition of the operator Q is then Q   q|qq|dq. 2.1.9 Definition 2.1.6. A connected set in  is a set X   that cannot be partitioned into two nonempty subsets which are open in the relative topology induced on the set. Equivalently, it is a set which cannot be partitioned into two nonempty subsets such that each subset has no points in common with the set closure of the other. Definition 2.1.7. The well localized pure states | with a support   1 ,2  correspond to vectors of the norm 1 and such that: supp cq   is a connected set in  . Thus the set of all well 69 localized pure states corresponds to the unit sphere S   S  H in the Hilbert space H  H. Suppose we have an observable Q of a system that is found through an exhaustive series of measurements, to have a continuous range of values q : 1  q  2 . III. Then we claim the following: Q.III.1. For the system in well localized pure state | such that: (i) |  S and (ii) supp cq  q|cq  0 is a connected set in , then the probability Pq,q  dq; | of obtaining the result q lying in the range q,q  dq on measuring observable Q is given by Pq,q  dq; |  |q||2dq  |cq| 2 dq. 2.1.10 Q.III.2. p|qdq  |q|| 2dq  |cq| 2 dq. Q.III.3. Let |1  and |2  be well localized pure states with 1  1 1 ,2 1  and 2  1 2 ,2 2  correspondingly. Let X1  X |1  and X2  X |2  correspondingly. Assume that 1 2   (here the closure of i, i  1,2 is denoted by i, i  1,2) then random variables X1 and X2 are independent. Q.III.4. If the system is in well localized pure state | the state | described by a wave function q,  q|| and the value of observable Q is measured once each on many identically prepared system, the average value of all the measurements will be 70 Q     q|q,|2dq   |q,|2dq . 2.1.11 The completeness condition can then be written as |qq|dq   1H . Completeness means that for any state |  S it must be the case that |q|| 2dq  0, i.e. there must be a non-zero probability to get some result on measuring observable Q. Q.III.5. (von Neumann measurement postulate) Assume that (i) |  S and (ii) supp cq   is a connected set in  . Then if on performing a measurement of Q with an accuracy q, the result is obtained in the q  1 2 q,q  1 2 q range, then the system will end up in the state Pq,q|  |Pq,q|   |qq  |q/2 |q q ||dq  |qq  |q/2 |q |||2dq . 2.1.12 IV. We claim the following: Q.IV.1. For the system in state |a  a|  H, where: (i) |  S, |a|  1, (ii) supp cq is a connected set in  and (iii) |  1 2 cq|qdq 71 G Q| a  |a|2G Q| . 2.1.13 Q.IV.2. Assume that the system in state |a  a|  H, where (i) |  S, |a|  1, (ii) supp cq is a connected set in  and (iii) |  1 2 cq|qdq. Then if the system is in state |a described by a wave function aq;  q||a and the value of observable Q is measured once each on many identically prepared system, the average value of all the measurements will be Q     q|aq;|2dq. 2.1.14 Q.IV.3. The probability Pq,q  dq; |adq of obtaining the result q lying in the range q,q  dq on measuring Q is Pq,q  dq; |adq  |a|2 cq|a|2  2 dq. 2.1.15 Remark 2.1.7. Note that Q.IV.3 immediately follows from Q.IV.1 and Q.III.2. Q.IV.4. (Generalized von Neumann measurement postulate) If on performing a measurement of observable Q with an accuracy q, the result is obtained in the q  1 2 q,q  1 2 q range, then the system immediately after measurement will end up in the state 72 Pq,q|a  |Pq,q|   |qq  |q/2 |q q ||adq   |qq  |q/2 |q |||2dq  a  |qq  |q/2 |q q ||dq  |qq  |q/2 |q |||2dq  H. 2.1.16 V. We claim the following: Q.V.1. Let |a1,a21 ,2   |1 a11   |2 a22   H1,2  H1 H2  H, where (i) |i a ii   ai|ii   Hi , |i   |ii   Si  , |ai |  1, i  1,2; (ii) supp ciiq, i  1,2 are the connected sets in ; (iii) suppc11 q  suppc22 q   and (iv) |ii   1 2 ciiq|qdq, i  1,2. Then if the system is in a state |a1,a21 ,2  described by a wave function a1,a2q;1 ,2   q||a1,a21 ,2 ,q  1 2 and the value of observable Q1,2 is measured once each on many identically prepared system, the average value of all the measurements will be Q1,2    12 q|a 1,a 2q;1 ,2 |2dq. 2.1.17 Q.V.2. The probability of getting a result q with an accuracy q such that q  1 2 q,q  1 2 q  suppc1q or q  1 2 q,q  1 2 q  suppc2q given by  |qq  |q/2 |q ||1 a 11 | 2  |q ||2 a 22 | 2 dq. 2.1.18 73 Remark 2.1.8. Note that Q.IV.3 immediately follows from Q.III.3. Q.V.3. Assume that the system is initially in the state |a1,a21 ,2 . If on performing a measurement of Q1,2 with an accuracy q, the result is obtained in the q  1 2 q,q  1 2 q range, then the state of the system immediately after measurement given by Pqi,q|a 1,a 2 1 ,2   |Pqi,q|   |q iq  |q/2 |q q  ||1 a 11   |q q ||2 a 2 2 dq  |q iq  |q/2 |q ||11 | 2  |q ||22 | 2 dq    |q iq  |q/2 a1 |q q  ||11   a2 |q  q ||22 dq  |q iq  |q/2 |q ||11 | 2  |q ||22 | 2 dq   H i , qi   i, i  1,2. 2.1.19 Definition 2.1.8. Let H1,2 be H1,2  H1  H2 . Definition 2.1.9. Let |a  be a state |a   a|, where |  S, |a|  1 and |  1 2 cq|qdq. Let |a  be an state such that |a   S. States |a  and |a  is a Q -equivalent: | a  Q |a  iff Pq,q  dq; |a   |a|2 cq|a|2  2 dq  Pqq  dq; |a dq 2.1.20 Q.V.4. For any state |a   a|, where |  S, |a|  1 and |   1 2 cq|qdq there exists a state |a   S such that: | a  Q |a . Definition 2.1.10. Let |a  be a state |a   a|, where |  S, |a|  1 and |  1 2 cq|qdq. Let |a  be a state such that |a   S. States |a  and |a  is a Q-equivalent ( | a   Q |a  ) iff: 74 a | Q|a   a | Q|a . Q.VI. For any state |a   a|, where |  S, |a|  1 and |   1 2 cq|qdq there exists a state |a   S such that: |a   Q |a  II.2. The nonclassical collapse models with spontaneous localizations based on generalized measurement postulates The nonclassical collapse models attempt to overcome the difficulties that standard quantum mechanics meets in accounting for the measurement (or macro-objectification) problem, an attempt based on the consideration of nonlinear and nonlocal stochastic modifications of the Schrödinger equation. The proposed new nonlocal dynamics is characterized by the feature of not contradicting any known fact about microsystems and of accounting, on the basis of a unique, universal dynamical principle, for wave packet reduction and for the classical behavior of macroscopic systems. II.2.1. Quantum Mechanics with Nonclassical Spontaneous Localizations Quantum Mechanics with Nonclassical Spontaneous Localizations is based on the following assumptions: (1) Each particle of a system of n distinguishable particles experiences, with a mean rate λi, a sudden spontaneous localization process. (2) In the time interval between two successive spontaneous 75 processes the system evolves according to the usual Schrödinger equation. (3) Let |cl be the classical pure state correspond to a vector |cl  S  H in a nonprojective Hilbert space H, see Subsection II.1, Def. 2.1.1-2.1.2. Then the sudden spontaneous process is a localization given by: |cl ,-localization  ,,x i  cl ,,x i  cl ,x  3 ,  0,1,  1, 2.2.1 where ,,x i  cl   Lx i ,|cl. 2.2.2 Here  Lx i , is a norm-reducing, positive, self-adjoint, linear operator with a symbol Lxi , in the n -particle nonprojective H Hilbert space, representing the localization of particle i around the point x. Definition 2.2.1. Such localization as mentioned above is called ,localization or , -collapse of the state |cl. (4) The probability density pix,, for the occurrence of the localization at point x is assumed to be pix,,  ,,x i  cl 2  3 ,,x i  cl 2 d3x . 2.2.3 (5) Let |n.cl be the nonclassical pure state correspond to a vector |   |  H\S, where |  S, ||  1, see subsection II.1, Def. 2.1.10. Then the sudden spontaneous process is a localization given by: 76 |n.cl ,localization   ,,x i  n.cl ,,x i  n.cl ,x  3 , 2.2.4 where ,,x i  n.cl   Lx i ,|n.cl. 2.2.5 Definition 2.2.2. Such localization as mentioned above is called ,localization or ,-collapse of the state |n.cl. (6) The probability density pix,,,,  for the occurrence of the localization at point x  3 in accordance to postulate Q.IV.3 (see Subsection II.1, Eq.(2.1.15)) is assumed to be pix,,,,   ||6 ,,| |2x i n.cl 2  3 ,,x i  cl 2 d3x . 2.2.6 (7) The localization operators  Lx i , have been chosen to have the form:  Lx i ,  1  3/4 exp  1 2 q i  x2 iff q i  x    1, 0 iff q i  x  . 2.2.7 Here   0,1  d3xLxi , 2  1 and lim0   . Remark 2.2.1. In one dimension case it follows that  Lx i ,  1  1/4 exp  1 2 q i  x2 iff |qi  x |    1, 0 iff |qi  x |  . 2.2.8 Remark 2.2.2. Note that from Eq. (2.2.3) and Eq. (2.2.7) it follows that a probability density pix,,,,  for the occurrence of the 77 localization inside sphere Sx,  qi   3 |q i  x   is given by pix,,  ,,x i  cl 2 , ,,   3 ,,x i  cl 2 d3x, ,,x i  cl 2  1  3/2  q ix d3qi iqi exp  1  q i  x2 ,  iqi   qi || i cl, 2.2.9 and therefore pix,  0 lim pix,,  0 lim 1, 1  3/2  qix d3qi iqi exp  1  q i  x2   ix. 2.2.10 Remark 2.2.3. In one dimension case it follows that a probability density pix,,,  for the occurrence of the localization inside interval x  ,x   is given by pix,,  ,,x i  cl 2  1  1/2  |q ix | d3qi iqi exp  1 qi  x2 ,  iqi   qi || i cl, 2.2.11 and therefore pix,  0 lim pix,,   0 lim1, 1  1/2  |q ix | dqi iqi exp  1 qi  x2   ix. 2.2.12 II.2.2. The generalization of nonclassical collapse models (1) Let |t cl, t  0,T be the classical pure states correspond to a vector-function |t cl : 0,T  S   S such that 78 |t cl S   H , t  0,T, where is a nonprojective H Hilbert space, see Subsection II.1, Def.2.1.1-2.1.2. Then the sudden spontaneous process is the localization along classical trajectory xt : 0,T  3  3 given by: | t cl ,,x tlocalization   t,,,x t i  cl  t,,,x t i  cl ,   0,1,  1,xt  3 , t  0,T, 2.2.13 where t,,,x t i  cl   Lx t i ,|t cl. 2.2.14 Here  Lx t i , is a norm-reducing, positive, self-adjoint, linear operator with a symbol Lx t i , in the n -particle nonprojective H Hilbert space, representing the localization of particle i at each instant t  0,T around the point x t. Definition 2.2.3. Such localization as mentioned above is called ,,xt -localization or ,,xt -collapse of the state | t cl. (2) The probability density pit,xt,, for the occurrence of the localization at point x t at instant t is assumed to be pit,xt,,   t,,,x t i  cl 2 t,, ,t,,   3 ,,x t i  cl 2 d3x. 2.2.15 (3) Let | t n.cl be the nonclassical pure state corresponding to a vector-function t   |t   H\S, where | t   S, ||  1, t  0,T , see Subsection II.1, Def.2.1.10. 79 Then the sudden spontaneous process is the localization along classical trajectory xt : 0,T  3  3 given by: | t n.cl ,,x tlocalization    t,,,x t i  n.cl  t,,,x t i  n.cl , xt 3 , t  0,T 2.2.16 where t,,,x t i  n.cl   Lx t i ,|t n.cl. 2.2.17 Definition 2.2.4. Such localization as mentioned above is called ,,xt -localization or ,,xt -collapse of the state |n.cl. (4) The probability density pit,xt,,,,  for the occurrence of the localization at point x t  3 at instant t  0,T in accordance to postulate Q.IV.3 (see Subsection II.1, Eq. (2.1.14)) is assumed to be pit,xt,,,,   ||6  t,,,| |2x t i n.cl 2 t,, ,t,,   3 ,,x t i  cl 2 d3x. 2.2.18 (5) The localization operators  Lx t i , have been chosen to have the form:  Lx t i ,  1  3/4 exp  1 2 q i  xt 2 iff qi  xt    1, 0 iff q i  xt  . 1.2.19 Here   0,1 and lim0   . Remark 2.2.4. In one dimension case it follows that  Lx t i ,  1  1/4 exp  1 2 q i  x t 2 iff |qi  x t |    1, 0 iff |qi  x t |  . 2.2.20 80 Remark 2.2.5. Note that from Eq. (2.2.18) and Eq. (2.2.19) it follows that a probability density pit,xt,,,,  for the occurrence of the localization at instant t inside sphere Sxt,  qi   3 |q i  xt   is given by pit,xt,,   t,,,x t i  cl 2 t,,  t,,,x t i  cl 2  1  3/2  q ix t d3qi t iq i exp  1  q i  xt 2 ,  t iqi   qi |  t i  cl , 2.2.21 and therefore pit,x,  0 lim pit,x,,   0 lim1t,, 1  1/2  |q ix | dqi iqi exp  1 qi  x t 2   ix t . 2.2.22 81 Chapter III III. EINSTEIN'S 1927 GEDANKEN EXPERIMENT REVISITED III.1. Single-photon space-like antibunching During the famous 5-th Solvay conference in 1927, Einstein [7] considered a single particle which, after diffraction in a pin-hole encounters a detection plate (e.g. in the case of photons, a photographic plate), see Fig 3.1.1. We simplify this thought experiment, though keeping the essence, by replacing the detection plate by two detectors. Einstein noted that there is no a question that only one of them can detect the particle, otherwise energy would not be conserved. However, he was deeply concerned about the situation in which the two detectors are spacelike separated, as this prevents according to relativity any possible coordination among the detectors: It seems to me, Einstein continued, that this difficulty cannot be overcome unless the description of the process in terms of the Schrödinger wave is supplemented by some detailed specification of the localization of the particle during its propagation. I think M. de Broglie is right in searching in this direction. But what happened to Einstein's original Gedanken experiment? This simple with today's technology experiment had been done originally by T. Guerreiro, B. Sanguinetti, H. Zbinden N. Gisin, and A. Suarez, see [21]. This experiment consists in verifying that when a single photon is thrown at a beam splitter, it is detected in only one arm, i.e. the probability PAB of getting a coincidence between the two detectors A and B is much smaller than the product of the probabilities of detection on each side PA  PB, as would be expected in the case of uncorrelated events. 82 Fig. 3.1.1. Einstein's 1927 gedanken experiment. A and B are points on the photographic plate, for which the events of detection can be space-like separated from each other. Adapted from [7] The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 3.1.2 and consists of a source of heralded single photons which is coupled into a single mode fiber and injected into a fiber beam splitter (BS). Each of the two outputs of the beam splitter goes to a single photon detector (IDQ ID200), A detector being close to the source and B detector being separated by a distance of approximately 10 meters. Fig. 3.1.2. Experimental setup: photon pairs regenerated by Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion at the wavelengths of 1550 nm and 810 nm. These pairs are splitted by a dichroic mirror (DM), and 810 nm photon is sent to detector D, used to herald the presence of the 1550 nm photon that follows to the beam splitter (BS). Arbitrary electronic delays were applied before TDC to ensure the coincidence peak would remain on scale. Adapted from [21] 83 If we ensure that the fiber lengths before each detector are equal by inserting a 10 m (50 ns) fiber delay loop before detector A, the detections will happen simultaneously in some reference frame, thus being space-like separated (a signal would take 33 ns to travel between the two detectors at the speed of light; simultaneity of detection is guaranteed to within 1ns by the matched length of fiber both before and inside the detectors). It is also possible to make the detections time-like separated by removing the 10m delay line from detector A and adding it to detector B. Fig. 3.1.3. Spacetime diagrams for spacelike (i) and timelike (ii) configurations. A and B represent the locations of the detectors. Adapted from [21] First, one measures the probabilities of detecting a photon at detector A or at detector B given that a heralding photon has been detected at H. We denote RHA the total number of coincident counts at detector H and detector A during the time of measurement, and RHA the total number of counts at detector H alone during the same measurement; RHB and RHB denote similar quantities for the measurement with H and B. Next we measure the probability of detectors A and B clicking at the same time, again given a heralding signal. RHAB denotes the number 84 of triple coincident counts at the detectors H, A and B, and RHAB denotes the total number of counts at detector H alone during the same measurement. All these quantities are measured directly for both a space-like configuration and a time-like configuration. Fig. 3.1.4. Coincidences between the heralding detector and each of the detectors A (red) and B (blue) with spacelike separation, measured in a window of 1 ns during a time period of 10 minutes. RHA=9.49×104/10 min, RHB=6.39×104/10 min. The noise is on average: RN=50/10 min. Adapted from [21] Fig. 3.1.5. Coincidences between the heralding detector and each of the detectors A (red) and B (blue) with timelike separation, measured in a window of 1 ns during a time period of 10 minutes. RHA=9.90×104/10 min, RHB=6.22×104/10 min. Adapted from [21] 85 The raw TDC data is shown in Figures 3.1.4-3.1.5 and the results are summarized in Table 3.1.1. Table 3.1.1. Summary of results. Values obtained for the different counting rates and corresponding probabilities defined in the text, measured with spacelike and timelike separation. Adapted from [21] The number of counts given by detector noise and two-photon events can be estimated by looking at the counts away from the peak. As an example, for the space-like configuration (Figure 3.1.4) in a window of 1 ns the noise rate is on average RHN = 50/10 for a 10 minutes integration time [21]. This corresponds to a noise probability PN = 9*10 6 (1.310 6 ). From the values in Table 1 one derives the following probability values for spacelike separation: PA SL  PB SL  1.86  0.01*104 , PAB SL  0.002  0.001*104 . 3.1.1 For timelike separation one derives the values: 86 PA TL*PB TL  1.65  0.01*104 , PAB TL  0.002  0.001*104 . 3.1.2 For the probability PN SL that A and B detect photons coming from different pairs (noise) one derives the value: PN SL1,1  PN SL*PA SL  PN SL*PB SL  0.0025  0.0026*104 3.1.3 III.2. The measure algebra of physical events in Minkowski space-time Definition 3.2.1. [22]. A measure algebra   B,P with a probability measure P, is a Boolean algebra B with a countably additive probability measure. Definition 3.2.2. (i) A measure algebra of physical events ph  B,P with a probability measure P, is a Boolean algebra of physical events B with a countably additive probability measure. (ii) A Boolean algebra of physical events can be formally defined as a set B of elements a,b, . . . with the following properties: 1. B has two binary operations,  (logical AND, or "wedge") and  (logical OR, or "vee"), which satisfy: the idempotent laws:(1) a  a  a  a  a, the commutative laws:(2) a  b  b  a, (3) a  b  b  a, and the associative laws: (4) a  b  c  a  b  c, (5) a  b  c  a  b  c. 2. The operations satisfy the absorption law: (6) a  a  b  a  a  b  a. 3. The operations are mutually distributive 87 (7) a  b  c  a  b  a  c, (8) a  b  c  a  b  a  c. 4. B contains universal bounds 0 and 1 which satisfy (9) 0  a  0 , (10) 0  a  a , (11) 1  a  a , (12) 1  a  1. 5. B has an unary operation a (or a  ) of complementation (logical negation), which obeys the laws: (13) a  a  0, (14) a  a  1. All properties of negation including the laws below follow from the above two laws alone. 6. Double negation law: a  a . 7. De Morgan's laws: (i) a  b  a  b, (ii) a  b  a  b. 8. Operations composed from the basic operations include the following important examples: The first operation, a  b (logical material implication): (i) a  b  a  b. The second operation, a  b, is called exclusive. It excludes the possibility of both a and b (ii) a b  a  b  a  b. The third operation, the complement of exclusive or, is equivalence or Boolean equality: (iii) a  b  a  b . 9. B has a unary predicate Occa , which meant that event a has occurred, and which obeys the laws: (i) Occa  b  Occa  Occb, (ii) Occa  b  Occa  Occb, (iii) Occa  Occa. 88 Remark 3.2.1. A probability measure P on a measure space , gives the probability measure algebra   ,,P on the Boolean algebra of measurable sets modulo null sets. Definition 3.2.3. (i) Let B be a Boolean algebra of physical events. A Boolean algebra BM4 of physical events in Minkowski space-time M4  1,3 that is Cartesian product BM4  B M4 . (ii) Let BM4 be a Boolean algebra of physical events in Minkowski space-time. A measure algebra of physical events M4 ph  BM4 ,P in Minkowski space-time that is a Boolean algebra BM4 with a probability measure P. (iii) Let BM4 be Boolean algebra of the all physical events in Minkowski space-time and let M4 ph be a measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P with a probability measure P. We denote such physical events by Ax,Bx, . . . etc., where x  t,x1 ,x2 ,x3   M4 or A,B, . . . etc. (iv) We will write for a short AOcx,BOcx, . . . etc., instead OccAx,OccBx, . . . etc. Definition 3.2.4. Let AutPBM4  be a set of the all measurepreserving automorphism of BM4 . This is a group, being a subgroup of the group AutBM4  of all Boolean automorphism of BM4 . Let P   be Poincaré group. Remark 3.2.2. We assume now that: any element   ,a  P  induced an element   AutPBM4  by formula   Ax  Ax  a  BM4 . Definition 3.2.5. Given two events A and B from the algebra 89 M4 ph  BM4 ,P the conditional probability of A given B is defined as the quotient of the probability of the joint of events A and B, and the probability of B : PA|B  PA  B PB  PAB PB  PA|B , 3.2.1 where PB  0. Definition 3.2.6. (i) Events A and B from the algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P are defined to be statistically independent or uncorrelated iff PAB  PA  PB, 3.2.2 where PB  0, then this is equivalent to the statement that PA|B  PA. Similarly if PA is not zero, then PB|A  PB is also equivalent. (ii) Events A and B from the algebra   BM4 ,P are defined to be statistically almost independent or almost uncorrelated iff PAB  PA  PB , PAB  PA  PB  A,B, 0  A,B  PA  PB . 3.2.3 Remark 3.2.3. Note that PAB  PA  PB  PAB. 3.2.4 Although mathematically equivalent, this may be preferred philosophically; under major probability interpretations such as the subjective theory, conditional probability is considered a primitive entity. Further, this "multiplication axiom" introduces the symmetry with the summation axiom for mutually exclusive events, i.e. PAB  PA  PB  P AB. 3.2.5 90 Definition 3.2.7. (i) Events A1 ,A2 , . . . ,An  M4 ph  BM4 ,P are said to be exactly mutually exclusive if the occurrence of any one of them implies the non-occurrence of the remaining n  1 events. Therefore, two mutually exclusive events cannot both occur. Formally said, the conjunction of each two of them is 0 (the null event): A  B  0 . In consequence, exactly mutually exclusive events A and B have the property: (ii) Events A1 ,A2 , . . . ,An  M4 ph  BM4 ,P are said to be almost mutually exclusive if A1 ,A2 , . . . ,An have the property: PA1  A2 . . .An   0, PA1  A2 . . .An   PA1   PA2     PAn . 3.2.7 In consequence, almost mutually exclusive events A and B have the property: PA  B  0, PA  B  PA  PB. 3.2.8 Remark 3.2.4. Let Aph ,Bph be events such that detectors A, B detect photon at an instants t1 and t2 correspondingly. Note that (3.1.1) and (3.1.2) show that whether the separation between the detectors is timelike or spacelike, the number of coincidences is three orders of magnitude smaller than what would be expected had the events been statistically almost uncorrelated, i.e., PAB  PA  PB, see Def.3.2.6 (ii). Remark 3.2.5. Let Aph ,Bph be events such that detectors A, B detect photon at an instants t1 and t2 correspondingly. Note that: (i) from Eq. (3.1.1) probability value for spacelike separation follows: PA  B  0. 3.2.6 91 P AphBph SL  0.002  0.001*104  0, 3.2.9 (ii) from Eq. (3.1.2) probability value for timelike separation follows: P AphBph TL  0.002  0.001*104  0. 3.2.10 Therefore in both cases the property (3.2.6) are violated, i.e. PAphBph  0 but however in both cases the property (3.2.8) is satisfied 0.002  0.001*104  P AphBph SL  P Aph SL  P Bph SL  1.86  0.01*104 , 0.002  0.001*104  P AphBph TL  P Aph TL  P Bph TL  1.65  0.01*104 3.2.11 and therefore in both cases the events Aph ,Bph are almost mutually exclusive events. III.2.1. Beamsplitter transformation A beamsplitter is the most simple way to mix two modes, see Fig.3.2.1. From classical electrodynamics, one gets the following amplitudes for the outgoing modes: a1 a2 in  A1 A2 out  t r r t  a1 a2 in . 3.2.12 Fig. 3.2.1. Mixing of two models by a beamsplitter 92 The recipe for quantization is now: `replace the classical amplitudes by annihilation operators'. If the outgoing modes are still to be useful for the quantum theory, they have to satisfy the commutation relations: Aiout,Ajout  ij 3.2.13 These conditions give constraints on the reflection and transmission amplitudes, for example |t |2  |r|2  1. We are now looking for an unitary operator S [the S -matrix] that implements this beamsplitter transformation in the following sense: Ai  SaiS, i  1,2. 3.2.14 Let us start from the general transformation (summation over double indices) ai  Ai  Bijai, a  A  Ba 3.2.15 where we have introduced the matrix and vector notation. Using this S -matrix one can also compute the transformation of the states: |out  S|in. For the unitary transformation, we make the ansatz S  expiJkiak ai 3.2.16 with Jkl a Hermitian matrix (ensuring unitarity). The action of this unitary on the photon mode operators is now required to reduce to ai  Ai  SaiS Bijaj. 3.2.17 93 We compute this `operator conjugation' by using a differential equation: dA i d  iJkiA i. 3.2.18 This is a system of linear differential equations with constant coefficients, so that one obtains a solution A  expiθJ. 3.2.19 We thus conclude that the so-called generator J of the beam splitter matrix is fixed by equation B  expiθJ. 3.2.20 If the transformation B is part of a continuous group and depends on as a parameter, we can expand it around unity. Doing the same for the matrix exponential, we get B  1  iθJ . . . . 3.2.21 Equation (3.2.21) explains the name generator for the J matrix: it actually generates a subgroup of matrices B  Bθ parametrized by the angle. The unitary transformation we are looking for is thus determined via the same J generator. For the two-mode beam splitter, an admissible transformation is given by Bθ  t r r t   cos isin isin cos 3.2.22 The factor i is just put for convenience so that the reflection amplitudes are the same for both sides, r  r, as expected by θ θ 94 symmetry. Expanding for small , the generator is J  0 1 1 0  1 3.2.23 and so that the unitary operator for this beamsplitter is S  expia1 a2  a2 a1 . 3.2.24 herefore, the effective Hamiltonian of the beam splitter is given by Heff  a1  a2  a2  a1 . 3.2.25 III.2.2. Splitting a two-photon state Let us consider two single photon states |in  |1,1 incident on the beam splitter such that mentioned above. Then |  |out  S|in  Sa1  SSa2  SS|0, 0  a1  cosθ  ia2  sinθa2  cosθ  ia1  sinθ|0,0  |2,0  |0,2 sinθ 2  |1,1cosθ. 3.2.26 Let H be a complex Hilbert space such that |cl  H,   0,1  0,1 ,,xi cl  H , ,,x i  cl  Lxi ,|cl. 3.2.27 By postulate Q.I.1 (see section II.1) quantum system with Hamiltonian given by Eq. (3.2.25) is identified with a set θ 95   H,Heff ,,,2,1,G, |t  , where (i) H that is a complex Hilbert space defined above, (ii)   ,,P that is complete probability space, (iii)   n , that is measurable space , (iv) 2,1 that is complete space of random variables X :   n such that   XdP  ,   X2dP  , 3.2.28 (v) G : H  2,1 that is one to one correspondence such that |Q|    G Q|  dP  E G Q|  3.2.29 for any |  H and for any Hermitian operator Q : H  H, (vi) | t  is a continuous vector function |t  :   H which represented the canonical evolution of the quantum system . Remark 3.2.6. Note that M4 ph    M4  ,,P  M4 , where  is a probability measure algebra   ,,P on the Boolean algebra of measurable sets modulo null sets, see Remark 3.2.1. Let BM4 be Boolean algebra of the all physical events in Minkowski space-time M4 and let M4 be a measure algebra M4  BM4 ,  P with a probability measure  P, see Definition 3.2.2 (7). We assume now that there exists subalgebra M4 #  M4 and isomorphism  : M4 #  M4 ph such that for any event Ax  M4 # ,x  t,x1 ,x2 ,x3   M4 (see Definition 3.2.2): 96 Ax  Ax,  PAx  PAx  PAx. 3.2.30 Proposition 3.2.1. Suppose that A and B are events in measure algebra M4  BM4 ,  P . Then following properties is satisfied: 1.PA|B  PA  PB|A  PB  PA  B  PAPB 2.PA|B  PA  PB|A  PB  PA  B  PAPB 3.PA|B  PA  PB|A  PB  PA  B  PAPB 3.2.31 Proposition 3.2.2. Suppose that A and B are events in measure algebra M4  ,,P. Then following properties is satisfied: 1.PA|B  PA  PB|A  PB  PA  B  PAPB 2.PA|B  PA  PB|A  PB  PA  B  PAPB 3.PA|B  PA  PB|A  PB  PA  B  PAPB 3.2.32 Definition 3.2.8. In case (1), A and B are said to be positively correlated. Intuitively, the occurrence of either event means that the other event is more likely. In case (2), A and B are said to be negatively correlated. Intuitively, the occurrence of either event means that the other event is less likely. In case (3), A and B are said to be uncorrelated or independent. Intuitively, the occurrence of either event does not change the probability of the other event. Remark 3.2.7. Suppose that A and B are events in measure algebra 97 M4  ,,P. Note from the result above that if A  B or B  A then A and B are positively correlated. If A and B are disjoint then A and B are negatively correlated. Proposition 3.2.3. Suppose that A and B are events in measure algebra M4  BM4 ,  P . Then: (i) A and B have the same correlation (positive, negative, or zero) as A and B. (ii) A and B have the opposite correlation as A and B (that is, positive-negative, negative-positive, or zero-zero). Proposition 3.2.4. Suppose that A and B are events in measure algebra M4  ,,P. Then: (i) A and B have the same correlation (positive, negative, or zero) as Ac and Bc . (ii) A and B have the opposite correlation as A and Bc (that is, positive-negative, negative-positive, or zero-zero). Definition 3.2.9. Let Ax1   At1 ,r1  and Bx2   Bt2 ,r2  be the events Ax1   M4 # which occur at instant t1 and Bx2   M4 # at instant t2 correspondingly. Let x1,2 be a vector: x1,2  ct1  t2 ,r1  r2  ct1,2 ,r1,2 , t1,2  t1  t2 ,r1,2  r1  r2 . Vectors x1,2  ct1,2 ,r1,2  are classified according to the sign of c2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 . A vector is (i) timelike if c 2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 , (ii) spacelike if c 2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 , and null or lightlike if 98 (iii) c 2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 . Pairs of events At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2   M4 # M4 # are classified according to the sign of c 2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 : (i) a pair At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2  is timelike separated if c 2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 , and we denoted such pairs by At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2 t.l .s. ; (ii) a pair At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2  is spacelike separated if c 2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 ; and we denoted such pairs by At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2 s.l .s. ; (iii) a pair At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2  is null or lightlike separated if c 2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 , and we denoted such pairs by At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2 l .l .s. . Definition 3.2.10. (i) Let M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  t.l .s. be a set of the all timelike separated pairs At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2 t.l .s. which are corresponding to a given vector t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2   M4  M4 , i.e., M4 # ,t1 ,r1 , t2 ,r2  s.l .s.  At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2   M4 # M4 # c2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 . 3.2.33a (ii) Let M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  s.l .s. be a set of the all spacelike separated pairs At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2 s.l .s. which is corresponding to a given vector t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2   M4  M4 , i.e., M4 # ,t1 ,r1 , t2 ,r2  s.l .s.  At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2   M4 # M4 # c2 t1,2 2  r1,2 2 . 3.2.33b Remark 3.2.8. Let M4 # ,t,r1 ,t,r2  s.l .s. be a set of all pairs At,r1 ,Bt,r2  , which corresponds to a given vector t,r1 ,t,r2   M4  M4 , r1  r2 , i.e., 99 M4 # ,t,r1 , t,r2  s.l .s.  At,r1 ,Bt,r2   M4 # M4 # 0  r1,2 2 , r1,2  r1  r2 . 3.2.34 Such pairs obviously are spacelike separated. Note that tr1r2r1  r2  M4 # ,t,r1 , t,r2  s.l .s.   . 3.2.35 Definition 3.2.11. Let At1  Ax1   At1 ,xA  and Bt2  Bx2   Bt2 ,xB  be a symbols such that A t1 and Bt2 represent there is detection events Ax1   M4 # at instant t1 and Bx2   M4 # at instant t2 correspondingly, where symbols x A and x B represent the locations of the detectors A and B correspondingly (see Fig. 3.1.3). We assume that At1 ,Bt2   M4 # ,t1 ,xA ,t2 ,xB  s.l .s. . 3.2.36 Remark 3.2.9. We assume now without loss of generality that t1  t2  t, note that such assumption valid by properties: Ax1   M4 # and Bx2   M4 # , required above, see Remark 3.2.2. III.3. Einstein's 1927 gedanken experiment explained In classical case considered by A. Einstein in his 1927 gedanken experiment, by postulates of canonical QM, both events A t  M4 # and B t  M4 # cannot occur simultaneously, i.e. that is mutually exclusive events with a probability  1, and therefore At  Bt  0. Such exactly mutually exclusive events have the property:  PAt  Bt  0, 3.3.1 100 see Definition 3.2.6. We remind that the probability density pphx,, for the occurrence of a photon localization at point x is assumed to be pph x,,  ,,x ph  cl 2 ,   0,1,  0,1, 3.3.2 where ,,x ph cl  Lx, ph  cl . 3.3.3 and where the localization operators Lx, have been chosen to have the form:  Lx  q,,  1  1/4 exp  1 2 q  x2 iff |q  x |    1, 0 iff |  q  x |  . 3.3.4 see subsection II.2.1. Remark 3.3.1. Note that: (i) from (3.2.27) it follows that ,,x ph  cl  H, (ii) from (3.3.3) and (3.3.4) where   1 it follows that pph x,,  ,,x ph  cl 2   dq ,,xph  |qq| ,,xph    dq Lxq,,ph  |qq| Lxq,,ph    dqLx2q,,ph  |qq| ph   x | ph cl 2  O   x | ph  cl 2 ,   1,  0,1, 3.3.5 101 It follows from postulate Q.I.3 that there exists unique random variable X ;  ph cl given on a probability space ,,P and a measurable space n , by formula X ; ph cl  X ph   G  ph cl 3.3.6 The probability density of random variable X ph  we denote by p ph q,q  . Remark 3.3.2. From postulate Q.II.2 (see subsection II.1) it follows that for the system in state  ph cl the probability P q,q  dq; ph cl of obtaining the result q lying in the range q,q  dq on measuring observable  q is given by P q,q  dq; ph cl  p ph cl qdq  c phcl q 2  q ph cl 2 3.3.7 Now we go to explain Einstein's 1927 gedanken experiment. Let Apht,xA  and Bpht,xA  be events such that detectors A, B detect photon at an instant t correspondingly. By properties (3.2.31) we obtain P A pht,x A   PAph t,x A    PApht,x A , P B pht,x B   PBph t,x B    PBpht,x B . 3.3.8 Note that A t  A pht,x A    |x A    X ph   x A   , Bt  B pht,x B    |x B    X ph   x B   ,   0,,  1, 3.3.9 102 where a small parameter   |xA  xB | is dependent on the measuring device. Thus by general definition of random variable one obtains directly A pht,xA   B pht,xB    3.3.10 and therefore P A pht,xA   B pht,xB   0 3.3.11 The property (3.3.11) follows directly from (3.3.8). Fig. 3.3.1. The plot of the random variable X ph . A t  A pht,x A ,Bt  B pht,x B ,A t  Bt   103 Remark 3.3.3. Let M4 # ,t,xA ,t,xB  s.l .s. be a set of the all pairs At,xA ,Bt,xB  which is corresponding to a given vector t,xA,0,0,t,xB,0,0  M4  M4 , xA  xB, i.e., M4 # ,t,x A , t,x B  s.l .s.  At,x A ,Bt,x B   M4 # M4 # 0  x A  x B 2 . 3.3.12 Such pairs obviously are spacelike separated. Note that txAxBxA  xB  M4 # ,t,xA , t,xB  s.l .s.   . 3.3.13 Now we will go to explain non zero result  PAt  Bt  0 given above by (3.1.1) and (3.1.2):  PA tB t TL  0.002  0.001*104 ,PA t TL*PB t TL  1.65  0.01*104 ,  PA tB t SL  0.002  0.001*104 .PA tB t SL  0.002  0.001*104 . 3.3.14 We consider this problem in general case. Remark 3.3.4. Note that: (i) a probability density px,A,,  for the occurrence of the localization inside interval x  ,x   in arm with detector A (see Fig.3.1.2.) is given by formula px,A ,  |A,,x cl 2 A , , 3.3.15 where 104 |A,,x cl 2  1 AA 1/2  |qx | dq|q|2 exp  1 A q  x2 , q  q||, A ,     |A,,x cl 2 dx, 3.3.16 and where parameter A depends on arm with detector A. (ii) a probability density px,B,,  for the occurrence of the localization inside interval x  ,x   in arm with detector B (see Fig.3.1.2) is given by formula px,B ,  |B,,x cl 2 B , , 3.3.17 where and where parameter B depends on arm with detector B. Remark 3.3.5. Note that parameter  in formula (3.3.18) of course depends on measurement device and there no exist two equivalent devices such that A  B. We assume now that A  B  1, 0  |A  B |,    |x|2  dx  , 3.3.19 |B,,x cl 2  1 BB 1/2  |qx | dq|q|2 exp  1 B q  x2 , q  q||, B ,     |B,,x cl 2 dx, 3.3.18 105 From Eq. (3.3.16) and Eq. (3.3.19) by using Laplace approximation, we obtain: From Eq. (3.3.18) and Eq. (3.3.19) by using Laplace approximation, we obtain: |B,,x cl 2  1 BB 1/2  |qx | dq|q|2 exp  1 B q  x2  |x|2  BO |x|2   |x|2  Bc1 B |x|2  , B ,     |B,,x cl 2 dx  1  c2 BB ,c2 B  O    |x|2  dx . 3.3.21 From Eq. (3.3.15) and Eq. (3.3.17) we obtain px,A ,  |A,,x cl 2 A ,  |x|2  Ac1 A |x|2  1  c2 AA , . 3.3.22a From Eq. (2.2.54) and Eq. (2.2.57) we obtain px,B ,  |B,,x cl 2 B ,  |x|2  Bc1 B |x|2  1  c2 BB , . 3.3.22b Definition 3.3.1. We define now the probability measures P|A,,x A t and P|B,,x A t by formulae |A,,x cl 2  1 AA 1/2  |qx | dq|q|2 exp  1 A q  x2   |x|2  AO |x|2   |x|2  Ac1 A |x|2  , A ,     |A,,x cl 2 dx  1  c2 AA ,c2 A  O    |x|2  dx . 3.3.20 106 P|A,,x A t    A t px,A ,dx, P|B,,x A t    A t px,B ,dx, 3.3.23 where At  a,b and dx is the Lebesgue measure and a,b  Ba,b is the Borel algebra on a set a,b. Definition 3.3.2. We assume now that P A,,x  P and P B,,x  P, i.e. P | is absolutely continuous with respect to P . By RadonNicodym theorem we obtain for any At  a,b : P A,,x A t    A t X A,,x dP, X A,,x   dP A,,x dP , P A,,x A t    A t X A,,x dP, X A,,x   dP A,,x dP . 3.3.24 We write below for a short X 1  X A,,x ,X 2  X B,,x . 3.3.25 Remark 3.3.6. We assume now without loss of generality that X 2  X 1  0 a.s. 3.3.26 see Fig . 3.3.1. Let us consider now the quantity 107 1,2    |X1  X2|dP    X 2  X 1dP. 3.3.27 We assume now that    x|x|2dx  ,   x |x|2  dx  , 3.3.28 From Eq. (3.3.27) by using Eq. (3.3.21) and Eq. (3.3.22) we obtain 1,2    xpx,B ,dx    xpx,A ,dx  1 1  c2 BB   x |x|2  Bc1 B |x|2  dx   1 1  c2 AA   x |x|2  Ac1 A |x|2  dx  1  c2 BB    x |x|2  Bc1 B |x|2  dx  1  c2 AA    x |x|2  Ac1 A |x|2  dx  Bc1 B   x |x|2  dx  c2 BB   x|x|2dx  B 2 c1 Bc2 B   x |x|2  dx  Ac1 A   x |x|2  dx  c2 AA   x|x|2dx  A 2 c1 Ac2 A   x |x|2  dx  Bc1 B  Ac1 A  B 2 c1 Bc2 B  A 2 c1 Ac2 A    x |x|2  dx  c2 AA  c2 BB    x|x|2dx  1c2 AA  c2 BB   2Bc1 B  Ac1 A , 3.3.29 where 1    x|x|2dx,2    x |x|2  dx. 3.3.30 Lemma 3.3.1. Let ,Σ,P be a measure space, and let f be a realvalued measurable function defined on  . Then for any real number t  0 : P  ||f|  t  1 t  |f|t f  dP. 3.3.31 108 From inequality (3.3.31) and Eq. (3.3.29) we obtain P    : |X 1  X 2|  t  1t  X 1 X 2  t |X 1  X 2|dP  1 t2   X 1  X 2  1,2 t  1c2 AA  c2 BB   2Bc1 B  Ac1 A  t . 3.3.32 We define now and chose in (3.3.31) number t  xB  xA  1. Fig. 3.3.2. The plot of the random variables X 1 and X 2. A t  A pht,xA ,Bt  B pht,xB ,A t  Bt  C t A t  A pht,x A    |x A    X 1  x A  , Bt  B pht,x B    |x B    X 2  x B  , 3.3.33 109 Note that PAt  Bt  PC t, 3.3.34 see Fig . 3.3.2. From Eq. (3.3.32) Eq. (3.3.34) it follows that PA t  Bt   1c2 AA  c2 BB   2Bc1 B  Ac1 A  xB  xA 2  1. 3.3.35 110 Chapter IV THE ERP PARADOX RESOLUTION IV.1. The relaxed locality principle The Special Theory of Relativity limits the speed at which any physical influences and any real information can travel to the speed of light, c. The Einstein's principle of locality (EPL): any effects do not propagate faster than the speed of light, i.e. speed of light is a limiting factor. The principle of locality claimed that: (i) Any physical event At1 ,r1  which has occurred at point At1 ,r1   M4 (see Chapt. III, Definition 3.2.9) cannot cause (by physical interaction) a physical event Bt2 ,r2  (result) which has occurred at point Bt2 ,r2   M4 in a time less than T  D/c, where D, is the distance between the points. (ii) Any physical event At,r1  which has occurred at point At,r1   M4 cannot cause a simultaneous physical event Bt,r2  (result) which has occurred at another point Bt,r2   M4 . (iii) Any real physical information about physical event At1 ,r1  at point At1 ,r1  cannot be obtained by observer at point Bt2 ,r2  in a time less than T  D/c, where D, is the distance between the points. Definition 4.1.1. Let M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  t.l .s.  be a set of the all timelike separated pairs of events At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2 t.l .s.  M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  t.l .s. , (see Chapt. III, Definition 3.2.10(i)) such that t2  t1 and AOct1 ,r1   BOct2 ,r2 . Note that M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  t.l .s.   M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  t.l .s. . Remark 4.1.1. Note that the claim (i) obviously meant that 111 t1  t2 At1 ,r1 Bt2 ,r2  AOct1 ,r1   BOct2 ,r2   At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2   M4 # ,t1 ,r1 , t2 ,r2  t.l .s. . 4.1.1 Remark 4.1.2. In spacetime diagram, see Fig. 4.1.1, the interval sAB 2 is "time-like", i.e. there is a frame of reference in which events A and B occur at the same location in space, separated only by occurring at different times. If A precedes B in that frame, then A precedes B in all frames. It is hypothetically possible for matter (or information) to travel from A to B, so there can be a causal relationship (with A the cause and B the effect). Fig. 4.1.1. Spacetime diagram Remark 4.1.3. Note that: (i) the interval sAC 2 in the diagram, see Fig. 4.1.1, is "space-like"; i.e. there is a frame  t of reference in which events At,r1  and Ct,r2  occur simultaneously at instant t , separated only in space. There are also frames in which A precedes C and frames in which C precedes A. 112 (ii) If it were possible for a cause-and-effect relationship to exist between events A and C, then paradoxes of causality would result. For example, if A was the cause, and C the effect, then there would be frames of reference in which the effect preceded the cause. Although this in itself will not give rise to a paradox, one can show that faster than light signals can be sent back into one's own past. A causal paradox can then be constructed by sending the signal if and only if no signal was received previously. (iii) Obviously there exist space-like separated pairs of physical events At,r1 ,Bt,r2 s.l .s. such that the events At,r1  and Ct,r2  always occur only simultaneously at any instant t i.e., AOct,r1   COct,r2 . 4.1.2 Example 4.1.1. Let us consider two synchronized clock A and B which at rest on given inertial frame F I . Assume that clock A at rest in point r1 and clock B at rest in point r2 correspondingly. Fig. 4.1.2. Clock A and clock B which at rest on given inertial frame F I . 113 Let At,r1  be the event which consists that time on clock A is t at time t according to clock A and let Bt,r1  be the event which consists that time on clock B is t at time t according to clock B. It is clear that AOct,r1   BOct,r2 . Definition 4.1.2. Let M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  s.l .s.  be a set of the all spacelike separated pairs of events At1 ,r1 ,Bt2 ,r2 s.l .s.  M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  s.l .s. , (see Chapt. III, Definition 3.2.10 (ii)) such that AOct1 ,r1   BOct2 ,r2 . 4.1.3 Remark 4.1.4. Note that the condition (4.1.3) does not violate the Einstein's principle of locality and gives only an additional properties of the algebra M4 # . Remark 4.1.5. Note that from (4.1.3) it follows that M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  s.l .s.   M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  s.l .s. . On the basis of this Gedanken experiment, which is also realized by photons, the EPR-paradox can be derived if the following two principles are taken as postulates. 1. The principle of reality R : If the value A i of an observable A can be determined without altering the quantum system S, then any property PA i which corresponds to this value of A pertains to the system S. 2. The principle of locality L : 2.1. If two quantum systems S1 and S2 cannot interact with each other, then a measurement with respect to one system cannot alter the other system and therefore we can assume the existence of state vectors |S1  and |S2 . 2.2. Let x 1 and  x 2 be two observables measured with respect to systems S1 and S2 mentioned above. Then by result of measurement of the quantity x2  S2 |  x 2 |S2  at instant t, it is impossible to get any information on result of measurement of the 114 quantity x1  S1 |  x 1 |S1  at the same instant t. We assume now the relaxed principle of locality. Intuitively this principle says that for even spacelike separated entangled quantum systems S1 and S2 any measurement at instant t with respect to system S1 always immediately alter the other system S2 at the same instant t. But no additional information about the system S1 can be found out upon measurement on the system S2 except the canonical information which can be predicted by using correlation relations which follows from concrete type of entanglement. 3. The relaxed principle of locality Lrel : 3.1. Any spacelike separated quantum systems S1 and S2 cannot interact with each other and therefore we can assume the existence of state vectors |S1  and |S2  correspondingly. 3.2. Let S12t,r1  and S21t,r2  be two spacelike separated entangled quantum systems located in points t,r1  and t,r2  correspondingly. (i) Assume that a state vector |S12t,r1  suddenly collapses at instant t to state vector S12 s-col t,r1  : |S12t,r1  scol lapse  S12 s-col t,r1  , 4.1.4 then a state vector |S21t,r2  immediately collapses to state vector S21 col t,r2  : |S21t,r2  col lapse  S21 col t,r2  4.1.5 (ii) Assume that a state vector |S12t,r1  after measurement immediately collapses at instant t to state vector S12 m -col t,r1  : |S12t,r1  m col lapse  S12 m -col t,r1  , 4.1.6 then a state vector |S21t,r2  immediately collapses to state vector 115 S21 col t,r2  : |S21t,r2  col lapse  S21 col t,r2  4.1.7 (iii) Let S12 s-col t,r1  and S21 col t,r2  be a physical events defined by formulae (4.1.4) and (4.1.5) correspondingly, then Occ S12 s-col t,r1   Occ S21 col t,r2  , 4.1.8 (see Chapt. III, Definition 3.2.8(2)). (iv) Let S12 m -col t,r1  and S21 col t,r2  be a physical events defined by formulae (4.1.6) and (4.1.7) correspondingly, then Occ S12 m -col t,r1   Occ S21 col t,r2  , 4.1.9 3.3. No any additional information about the system S1 upon measurement at instant t can be found out upon measurement on the system S2 upon measurement at instant t except the canonical information which can be predicted by using correlation relations which follows from concrete type of entanglement. Remark 4.1.6. Note that conditions (1.1.8) - (1.1.9) are very similarly to condition (4.1.3) and give only an additional properties of the algebra M4 # . Remark 4.1.7. Note that from (4.1.8) it follows that S12 s-col t,r1 ,S21 col t,r2   M4 # ,t1 ,r1 , t2 ,r2  s.l .s.  4.1.10 from (4.1.9) it follows that S12 m-col t,r1 ,S21 col t,r2   M4 # ,t1 ,r1 ,t2 ,r2  s.l .s.  4.1.11 116 Remark 4.1.8. Note that: (i) collapse of a state vector |S21t,r2  given by (4.1.5) occurs without any interaction between quantum systems S12  and S21  but only by property given by formulae (4.1.8); (ii) collapse of a state vector |S21t,r2  given by (4.1.7) occurs without any interaction between quantum systems S12  and S21  but only by property given by formulae (4.1.9). Remark 4.1.9. We find that the EPR-paradox can be resolved by nonprincipal and convenient relaxing of the Einstein's locality principle. However it follows also, that the nonlocalities which are introduced above cannot be explained within the conventional quantum theory. IV.2. Generalized EPR argument and Postulate of Nonlocality Entanglement is one of the most interesting properties of quantum mechanics, and is an important ingredient of quantum information protocols such as quantum dense coding and quantum computation. In the Schrödinger picture, a necessary and sufficient criterion for the emergence of entanglement is that the state describing the entire system is inseparable, i.e. the wave function of the total system cannot be factored into a product of separate contributions from each sub-system. Using the Heisenberg approach, a sufficient criterion for the presence of entanglement is that correlations between conjugate observables of two subsystems allow the statistical inference of either observable in one sub-system, upon a measurement in the other, to be smaller than the standard quantum limit, i.e. the presence of non-classical correlations. The latter approach was originally proposed in the paper of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [1]. These two different pictures result in two distinct methods of characterizing entanglement. One is to identify an observable signature of the mathematical criterion for wave function 117 entanglement, i.e. inseparability of the state. The second looks directly for the onset of non-classical correlations. For pure states these two approaches return the same result suggesting consistency of the two methods. However, when decoherence is present, causing the state to be mixed, difference scan occur. IV.2.1. The EPR-Reid criterion We remind now EPR-Reid criterion [2]-[5]. EPR originally argued as follows. Consider two spatially separated subsystems at A and B. EPR considered two observables x (the position) and  p (momentum) for subsystem A, where x and  p do not commute, so that (C is nonzero) x,p  2C. 4.2.1 Suppose now that one may predict with certainty the result of measurement x based on the result of a measurement performed at B. Also, for a different choice of measurement at B, suppose one may predict the result of measurement  p at A . Such correlated systems are predicted by quantum theory. Assuming local realism EPR deduce the existence of an element of reality, x , for the physical quantity x and also an element of reality,  p , for  p . Local realism implies the existence of two hidden variables x and  p that simultaneously predetermine, with no uncertainty, the values for the result of an x or  p measurement on subsystem A , should it be performed. This hidden variable state for the subsystem A alone is not describable within quantum mechanics, since simultaneous eigenstates of x and  p do not exist. Hence, EPR argued, if quantum mechanics is to be compatible with local realism, we must regard quantum mechanics to be incomplete. We remind that in original publication [1] Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen describe two particles A and B with correlated position 118 xB  xA  x0 4.2.2 and anti-correlated momentum pB  pA, 4.2.3 (see Fig. 4.2.1). Fig. 4.2.1. Particles A and B with correlated position and anticorrelated momentum In the idealized entangled state proposed by EPR, |EPR     |x,xdx     |p,pdp the positions and momenta of the two particles are perfectly correlated. Note that: this state is non-normalizable and cannot be realized in the laboratory. When coordinates x A and pA are measured in independent realizations of the same state, the correlations allow for an exact prediction of x B and pB . EPR assumed that such exact predictions necessitate an element of reality which predetermines the outcome of the measurement. Quantum mechanics however prohibits the exact knowledge of two noncommuting variables like x B and pB , since their measurement uncertainties are subject to the Heisenberg relation 119 xBpB  /2. 4.2.4 Classical notion of EPR correlations was generalized to a more realistic scenario, yielding a Reid criterion [6] for the uncertainties x inf B and pinf B of the inferred predictions for x B and pB . The EPR criterion is met if these uncertainties violate the Heisenberg inequality for the inferred uncertainties x inf B pinf B  /2. Reid extended classical EPR argument to situations where the result of measurement x at A cannot be predicted with absolute certainty [2]-[5]. The assumption of local realism allows us to deduce the existence of an element of reality of some type for x at A , since we can make a prediction of the result at A , without disturbing the subsystem at A , under the locality assumption. Let   x A ,  x B be a wave function of composite system A  B. Let x i B be the result of a measurement, x B say, performed at B, where i is used to label the possible results, discrete or otherwise, of the measurement x B . As a result of the measurement of the coordinate, we have a new wave function of composite system A  B which is given by Eq. (4.2.3) (see Remark 4.2.1) x iB x,  x B  x iB  x A,  x B  Rx B  x i B x A,x B  Rx B  x i B x,x B 4.2.5 and therefore adjoint probability density px iB x,  x B  p x,x B x i B at instant at once after measurement is given by px iB x,  x B  p x,x B x i B  Rx B  x i B x,x B 2 4.2.6 Then the conditional probability density px iBx  px|x i B  conditional on a result x i B for QM measurement at B is given by 120 px iBx  px|x i B      px iB x,  x B d  x B     d  x B x iB x,  x B 2     d  x B Rx B  x i B x,x B 2 . 4.2.7 The predicted results for the measurement at A , based on the measurement at B, are however no longer a set of definite numbers with zero uncertainty, but become fuzzy, being described by a set of distributions Px|x i B  giving the probability of a result for the measurement at A, conditional on a result x i B for measurement at B. We define  i 2x to be the variance of the conditional distribution Px|x i B . Similarly we may infer the result of measurement  p at A , based on a (different) measurement,  p B say, at B. Denoting the results of the measurement  p B at B by p j B , we then define the probability distribution, P p|pj B which is the predicted result of the measurement for  p at A conditional on the result p j B for the measurement  p B at B. The variance of the conditional distribution P p|pj B is denoted by  j 2p. Remark 4.2.1. We remind now that the QM-measurement is represented by the canonical scheme | a   |a    a  |,daa  a   1,pa   a 2  |a  a  |, 4.2.8 where pa  is a corresponding probability density. To obtain the probability that the parameter a  turns out to belong to the set  one has to integrate over this set: Pa      dapa  . 4.2.9 121 If the state | is represented by the wave function a the operator a  describing the measurement giving the result a  will be taken in the following form a a  Ra  aa, 4.2.10 where Ra is a function with a support concentrated in some vicinity of zero and representing the 'fuzziness' of the measurement. It is a characteristic function of the measurement and may, for example, be (and typically is) a Gaussian function. The width of this function corresponds to the resolution of the measurement. Normalization daa   a   1 of the operators a  is provided by the corresponding normalization of the function Ra as follows: da|R2a|  1. 4.2.11 If the measurement is described by the Gaussian function Ra  exp  a  a 2 42 4.2.12 it is a minimally disturbing measurement of the coordinate a  with resolution  [7]. Remark 4.2.2. Consider the momentum representation p of the initial wave function q p  1 2  dqqexp  i  pq . 4.2.13 As a result of the measurement of the coordinate, 122 q q  Rq  qq  q q, 4.2.14 we have a new wave function and its momentum representation has the form q p  dp  Rq p  pp , 4.2.15 where  Rq p is a momentum representation of the function Rq q. Note that  Rq p   Rpexp  i  pq ,  Rp  1 2  dqRqexp  i  pq . 4.2.16 Remark 4.2.3. Consider now a coordinate measurement having a Gaussian characteristic function of width of the order of  Rq  exp  q 2 42 . 4.2.17 Then the momentum representation of this function (characterizing the structure of the momentum uncertainty / acquired in the measurement) is also Gaussian with width of the order of / :  Rp  exp p 2   2 . 4.2.18 For a given experiment one could in principle measure the individual variances  i 2x of the conditional distributions Px|x i B (and also  j 2p for the Pp|pj B). Obviously if each of the variances  i 2x and  j 2p satisfy i 2x  0 and j 2p  0 this would imply the demonstration of the original 123 EPR paradox. This situation however is not practical for continuous variable measurements. Instead of considering the problem of simultaneous eigenstates as originally proposed by EPR, one can suggest a different and experimentally realizable criterion based on the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: xp  C. For the sake of notational convenience we now consider in the remainder of this subsection that appropriate scaling enables x and p to be dimensionless and C  1. EPR correlations however would be demonstrated in a convincing manner if the experimentalist could measure each of the conditional distributions Px|x i B and establish that each of the distributions is very narrow, in fact constrained such that [2]-[5]: Px|x i B  0 iff |x  i| , Pp|pj B  0 iff |p  j| . 4.2.19 Here i is the mean value of the conditional distribution Px|x i B and  j is the mean value of the conditional distribution Pp|pj B. In this case the assumption of local realism would imply, since the measurement x B at B will always imply the result of x at A to be within the range i  x , that the result of the measurement at A is predetermined to be within a bounded range of width 2 . In a straightforward extension of EPR's argument, we replace the words predict with certainty with predict with certainty that the result is constrained to be within the range i  , and then define an element of reality with this intrinsic bounded by fuzziness  . We now consider the situation where an experimenter has demonstrated that for every outcome x i B (and p j B ) for the measurement x B (and p B ) performed at B, the variance  ix (and  jp ) of the appropriate conditional distribution satisfies ix  1,jp  1 4.2.20 124 for any i, j  . The measurement at B always allows an inference of the result at A to a precision better than given by the uncertainty bound 1 . Remark 4.2.4. In this case we do not predict a result at A with certainty, as in EPR's original paradox. The measurement x B at B however does predict by Eq. (4.2.3) [or by Eq. (4.2.9) in general case] with a certain probability constraints on the result for x at A . Remark 4.2.5. Following the EPR argument, which assumes no action-at-a-distance, so that the measurement at B does not cause any instantaneous influence to the system at A , one can attribute a probabilistic predetermined element of reality to the system at A . Remark 4.2.6. There is a similar predicted result for the measurement p at A based on a result of measurement at B, and a corresponding predetermined description based again on the noaction-at-a-distance assumption. Remark 4.2.7. The important point in establishing the EPR paradox for this more general yet practical situation is that under the EPR premises the predetermined statistics (or generalised elements of reality) for the physical quantities x and p are attributed simultaneously to the subsystem at A . Assuming no action-at-a-distance, the choice of the experimenter (Bob) at B to infer information about either x or p cannot actually induce the result of the measurement at A . As there is no disturbance created by Bob's measurement, the (appropriately extended) EPR definition of realism is that the prediction for x is something (a probabilistic element of reality) that can be attributed to the subsystem at A , whether or not Bob makes his measurement. Remark 4.2.8. This is also true of the prediction for p , and therefore the two elements of reality representing the physical quantities x and p exist to describe the predictions for x and p simultaneously. The paradox can then be established by proving the impossibility of such a simultaneous level of prediction for both x and p for any quantum description of the subsystem A alone. By this we mean 125 explicitly that there can be no procedure allowed, within the predictions of quantum mechanics, to make simultaneous inferences by measurements performed at B or any other location, of both the result x and p at A , to the precision indicated by ix  1, jp  1. Remark 4.2.9. Recall that the inference of the result at A by measurement at B is actually a measurement of x performed with the accuracy determined by the  ix . However simultaneous measurements of x and p to the accuracy (4.2.9) are not possible (predicted by quantum mechanics). The reduced density matrix describing the state at A after such measurements would violate the H.U.P. (Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle). A simpler quantitative, experimentally testable criterion for EPR was proposed by Reid in 1989 see, for example, [2]-[5]. The 1989 inferred H.U.P. criterion is based on the average variance of the conditional distributions for inferring the result of measurement x (and also for p ). The EPR paradox is demonstrated when the product of the average errors in the inferred results for x and p violates the corresponding H.U.P. The spirit of the original EPR paradox is present, in that one can perform a measurement on B to enable an estimate of the result x at A (and similarly for p ). Abbreviation 4.2.1. For the sake of notational convenience we now abbreviate in the remainder of the book: loc.ix and loc.ip instead  ix and  jp for the variance  ix and  jp which were calculated under assumption no action-at-a-distance, see Remarks 4.2.5 4.2.6. We define now [2]:  loc.inf. 2 x   i Px i B  loc.i 2 x,  loc.inf. 2 p   j P pj B  loc.j 2 p. 4.2.21 Here loc.inf. 2 x is the average variance for the prediction (inference) under assumption no action-at-a-distance of the result x for x at A , conditional on a measurement x B at B. Here i   labels all outcomes of the measurement x at A , and i and  ix are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the conditional distribution 126 Px|x i B, where x i B is the result of the measurement x B at B. We define a loc.inf. 2 p similarly to represent the weighted variance for the prediction (inference) under assumption no action-at-a-distance of the result p at A , based on the result of the measurement at B. Here Px i B is the probability for a result x i B upon measurement of x B , and Ppj is defined similarly. The Reid's criterion to demonstrate the EPR "paradox", the Reid's local signature of the EPR paradox, is loc.inf. 2 x loc.inf. 2 p  1. 4.2.22 This criterion is a clear criterion for the demonstration of the EPR "paradox", by way of the argument presented above. Such a prediction (4.2.21) for x and p with the average inference variances given, cannot be achieved by any quantum description of the subsystem alone. This EPR criterion has been achieved experimentally. IV.2.2. The Postulate of Nonlocality and signature of the EPR paradox Remark 4.2.10. A most critical component of the EPR argument was the principle of locality. Indeed, one may regard the EPR paradox as a statement of the mutual incompatibility of locality, entanglement, and completeness. Experimental tests of Bell's inequalities have indicated that quantum mechanics is complete by ruling out the possibility of hidden variables. Therefore, it is generally agreed that the assumption of locality is invalid for entangled states: measurement of either particle of an entangled system projects both particles onto a state consistent with the result of measurement, regardless of how far apart the particles are. In the situation proposed by EPR, the position or momentum of the unmeasured 127 particle becomes a reality if and only if, the corresponding quantity of the other particle is measured. Remark 4.2.11. The assumption of nonlocality allows us to deduce the existence of a fuzzy element of reality of some type for x at A , since we can make a prediction of the result at A , but with some disturbing of the subsystem at A , under the measurement,  x B say, performed at B. This prediction is subject to the result x i B of a measurement, x B say, performed at B, where i is used to label the possible results, discrete or otherwise, of the measurement  x B . We accept now the following postulate: Postulate of Nonlocality (i) Let A and B two entangled particles. Let   x A ,  x B be a wave function of composite system A  B. Let x i B be the result of a measurement, x B say, performed at B, where i is used to label the possible results, discrete or otherwise, of the measurement x B . As a result of the measurement of the coordinate, we have a new wave function of composite system A  B which [in contrast with Eq.(4.2.5)] is given by x iB  x A ,  x B  R2  x A  x i Ax i B R1  x B  x i B x A ,x B , x i Ax i B   x 0  x i B . 4.2.23 (ii) Let A and B are two entangled particles. Let   p A ,  p B be a wave function of composite system A  B. Let p j B be the result of a measurement,  p B say, performed at B, where j is used to label the possible results, discrete or otherwise, of the measurement  p B . As a result of the measurement of the coordinate, we have a new wave function of composite system A  B which is given by 128 p jB  p A ,  p B   R2  p A  pj A pj B   R1  p B  pj B pA ,pB , pj A pj B  pj B . 4.2.24 Remark 4.2.12. The spirit of the original EPR paradox now is present, in that the canonical EPR correlations (4.2.2) and (4.2.3) well preserved. Remark 4.2.13. Note that EPR correlations x i Ax i B   x0  x i B and pj A pj B  pj B however would be demonstrated in a convincing manner if the experimentalist could measure each of the conditional distributions Px|x i B and establish that each of the distributions is very narrow, in fact constrained so that [2]-[5] px|x i B  0 iff |x  i| , pp|pj B  0 iff |p  j| , Px|x i B  0 iff |x  i| , Pp|pj B  0 iff |p  j| . 4.2.25 Here i is the mean of the conditional distribution Px|x i B and  j is the mean of the conditional distribution Pp|pj B. Remark 4.2.14. We assume now that a coordinate and momentum measurements have a Gaussian characteristic function of width of the order of 2 R1x  R2x  Rx  exp  x 2 42  R1p   R2p   Rp  exp  p 2 42 4.2.26 In this case the Postulate of Nonlocality would imply, since the measurement x B at B will always imply the result of x at A to be within the range i  x , that the result of the measurement at A is predetermined to be within a bounded range of width 2 . In a straightforward extension of EPR's argument, we replace the words 'predict with certainty' with 'predict with certainty that the result is 129 constrained to be within the range i   '. We now consider the situation where an experimenter has demonstrated that for every outcome x i B (and p j B ) for the measurement x B (and p B ) performed at B, the variance  ix (and  jp) of the appropriate conditional distribution satisfies ix  1,jp  1 4.2.27 for all i, j. The measurement at B always allows an inference of the result at A to a precision better than given by the uncertainty bound 1. In this case we do not predict a result at A with certainty, as in EPR original paradox. The measurement x B at B however does predict with a certain probability constraints on the result for x at A. Remark 4.2.15. Note that adjoint probability density p  x A,  x B x i B at instant at once after measurement [in contrast with Eq. (4.1.6)] is given by p  x A ,  x B x i B  x iB  x A ,  x B 2  Rx A  x i Ax i B Rx B  x i B x A ,x B 2 , x i Ax i B   x 0  x B  i. 4.2.27a Then the conditional probability density px iBx  px|x i B  depending on a result x i B for QM measurement at B is given by px iBx  px|x i B      px iB x,  x B d  x B     d  x B x iB x,  x B 2     d  x B Rx A  x i Ax i B Rx B  x i B x,x B 2 . 4.2.28 There is a similar predicted result for the measurement  p at A based on a result of measurement at B, and a corresponding 130 predetermined description based on the QM constraints p jB  p A ,  p B   RpA  pj A pj B   RpB  pj B pA ,pB , pj A pj B  pB . 4.2.29 The spirit of the original EPR "paradox" is present, in that one can perform a measurement on B to enable an estimate of the result x at A (and similarly for  p ). Abbreviation 4.2.2. For the sake of notational convenience we now abbreviate in the remainder of the book: nonloc.ix and nonloc.ip instead  ix and  jp for the variance  ix and  jp which were calculated under nonlocality assumption (postulate) by conditional probability density given by Eq. (4.1.28). We define now nonloc.inf. 2 x   i Px i B nonloc.i 2 x, nonloc.inf. 2 p   j P pj B nonloc.j 2 p. 4.2.30 Here nonloc.inf. 2 x is the average variance for the prediction (inference) of the result x for  x at A, conditional on a measurement  x B at B. Here i labels all outcomes of the measurement x at A, and μi and  ix are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the conditional distribution Px|x i B, where x i B is the result of the measurement  x B at B. We define a nonloc.inf. 2 p similarly to represent the weighted variance for the prediction (inference) of the result  p at A, based on the result of the measurement at B. Here Px i B is the probability for a result x i B upon measurement of  x B , and Ppj B is defined similarly. The criterion to demonstrate the EPR paradox, the signature of the EPR paradox, is the criterion to demonstrate the EPR paradox, the nonlocal signature of the EPR paradox, is given by 131 nonloc.inf. x nonloc.inf. p  1. 4.2.31 This criterion is a clear criterion for the demonstration of the EPR paradox, by way of the argument presented above. Such a prediction for x and p with the average inference variances given, cannot be achieved by any quantum description of the subsystem alone. IV.2.3. The EPR-nonlocality criteria Remark 4.2.16. The principle of locality was a critical component of the EPR argument. Actually the EPR paradox is regarded as a statement of the mutual incompatibility of locality, entanglement, and completeness. Experimental studies of Bell's inequalities have shown that quantum mechanics is complete by ruling out the possibility of hidden variables. Consequently it is usually accepted that the assumption of locality is invalid for entangled states: measurement of either particle of an entangled system projects both particles onto a state corresponding with the measurement result, irrespective of how far apart these particles are. In the situation proposed by EPR, the position or momentum of the unmeasured particle becomes a reality if and only if, the corresponding quantity of the other particle is measured. Since only one quantity or the other is measured, the position and the momentum of the unmeasured particle need not be simultaneous realities. In this way the EPR paradox also is resolved. From Eq. (4.2.21) and Eq. (4.2.30) we obtain the EPR-nonlocality criteria  loc.inf. 2 x  nonloc.inf. 2 x   i Px i B  loc.i 2 x  nonloc.i 2 x   0,  loc.inf. 2 p  nonloc.inf. 2 p   j P pj B  loc.j 2 p  nonloc.j 2 p  0, 4.2.32 132 and nonloc.inf. x nonloc.inf. p  loc.inf. x loc.inf. p  0. 4.2.33 These EPR-nonlocality criteria has been achieved experimentally [8], [9], (see subsection IV.5, Remark 4.5.3 Remark 4.5.4). IV.3. Nonlocal Schrödinger equation implies the Postulate of Nonlocality In this subsection we obtain nonlocal Schrödinger equation (NSE) which corresponding to position-momentum entangled pairs A and B (see Fig. 4.2.1) with well correlated position xB   xA   x0 4.3.1 and anti-correlated momentum pB  pA . 4.3.2 Remark 4.3.1. As pointed out in subsection IV.2 it is generally agreed that the assumption of locality is invalid for entangled states: measurement of either particle of an entangled system projects both particles onto a state consistent with the result of measurement, regardless of how far apart the particles are. It allow us to use special nonlocal generalization of the canonical Schrödinger equation. Remark 4.3.2. As pointed out in [10], [11] from nonlocal Schrödinger equation one obtains collapsed wave function corresponding to GRW collapse model. It allow us to use similar nonlocal Schrödinger equation also for entangled states. Remark 4.3.3. The spirit of the original EPR paradox is present, in 133 that the canonical EPR correlations (4.3.1) and (4.3.2) give a boundary conditions for the solutions of the nonlocal Schrödinger equation. Remark 4.3.4. In this subsection we denote (i) xA  x1 ,xB  x2 , (ii) xA  x 1 , xB   x 2   x 1  x0 . Definition 4.3.1. Let us consider the time-dependent canonical Schrödinger equation i x 1 ,x 2 , t t  Hx 1 ,x 2 , t, t  0,T, x 1 ,x 2  2 . 4.3.3 Let x1 ,x2 , t be a classical solution of the time-dependent Schrödinger equation (4.3.3). The time-dependent Schrödinger equation (4.3.3) is a weakly well preserved (in sense of Colombeau generalized functions) by corresponding to x1 ,x2 , t collapsed Colombeau generalized wave function  #x1 ,x2 , t,  0,1, where #x 1 ,x 2 , t  x 1 ,x 2 , t;  x 1t,  x 2t   1,2x 1 ,  x 1t,x 2 ,  x 2t;,x 1 ,x 2 , t 1,2  x 1t,  x 2t;,x 1 ,x 2 , t2  , 1,2x 1 ,  x 1 ,x 2 ,  x 2 ;,  i1 2  ix i,  x i;,,  ix,  x it;,  2  1/4 exp  x i   x it2 22 iff x i   x i  , 0 iff x i   x i  . i  1,2. 4.3.4 in region   2 if there exists a solution x1 ,x2 , t of Schrödinger equation (4.2.1) such that the estimate 134  D i #x 1 ,x 2 , t t  H#x 1 ,x 2 , t dx 1dx 2   O , t  0,T,x 1 ,x 2D, 4.3.5 with 1/2  , is satisfied. Definition 4.3.2. Equation (4.3.5) with a following boundary conditions x B t  x A t   x 0 , x A t    x A #x A ,x B , t 2dx Adx B  , x B t   x B #x A ,x B , t 2dx Adx B  , 4.3.6 that is time-dependent nonlocal Schrödinger equation corresponding to EPR entangled state. Definition 4.3.3. (i) The time-dependent integral equation (4.3.5) with a boundary conditions (4.3.6) is called the time-dependent nonlocal Schrödinger equation of the order  corresponding to EPR entangled state. (ii) Such collapsed wave function #x1 ,x2 , t,  as mentioned in Definition 4.3.2 is called the  solution of the nonlocal Schrödinger equation (4.3.5)-(4.3.6) of the order . Definition 4.3.4. Let us consider the time-independent canonical Schrödinger equation Hx1 ,x2   0,x1 ,x 2  2 . 4.3.7 Let x1 ,x2  be a classical solution of the time-independent Schrödinger equation (4.3.7). The time-independent Schrödinger equation (4.3.7) is a weakly well preserved (in sense of Colombeau generalized functions) by corresponding to x1 ,x2  Colombeau generalized collapsed wave function  #x1 ,x2 ,  0,1, where 135 #x 1 ,x 2 ,  x 1 ,x 2 ;  x 1 ,  x 2 ,   1,2x 1 ,  x 1 ,x 2 ,  x 2 ;,x 1 ,x 2  1,2  x 1 ,  x 2 ;,x 1 ,x 2 2  , 1,2x 1 ,  x 1 ,x 2 ,  x 2 ;,  i1 2  ix i,  x i;,,  ix,  x i;,  2  1/4 exp  x i   x i 2 22 iff x i   x i  , 0 iff x i   x i  . 4.3.8 in region   2 if there exists a solution x1 ,x2  of Schrödinger equation (4.3.7) such that the estimate  D H#x 1 ,x 2 dx 1dx 2   O , x 1 ,x 2 D, 4.3.9 with 1/2  , is satisfied. Definition 4.3.5. Equation (4.3.9) with boundary conditions x B  x A   x 0 , x A    x A #x A ,x B  2dx Adx B  , x B   x B #x A ,x B  2dx Adx B  , 4.3.10 that is time-independent nonlocal Schrödinger equation corresponding to EPR entangled state. Definition 4.3.6. (i) The time-independent integral equation (4.3.9) with a boundary conditions (4.3.10) is called the time-independent nonlocal Schrödinger equation of the order  corresponding to EPR entangled state. 136 (ii) Such collapsed wave function #x1 ,x2  as mentioned in Definition 4.3.5 is called the  solution of the nonlocal Schrödinger equation (4.3.9) - (4.3.10) of the order . Lemma 4.3.1. Let  be a function    0 a x1 expxfxdx, 4.3.11 where   1, 0  a  ,0  ,0  . Assume that fx is continuous on 0,a. Then   1   f0  o1 / 4.3.12 Lemma 4.3.2. Let fx be a function such that f  C2x  x0  and f  C2x  x0 . Then f x  f x xx0  f x0 x  x 0 , f x  f x xx0  f  x0 x  x 0   fx0 x  x 0 , f x0  fx 0  0  fx 0  0, f  x0  f x 0  0  f x 0  0. 4.3.13 Theorem 4.3.1. Assume that there exists a classical solution x1 ,x2  of the Schrödinger equation (4.3.7) such that x1,x2 D sup |x 1 ,x 2 |  O1/2 , x1,x2 D sup |x 1 ,x 2 /x 1 |  O3/2 , x1,x2 D sup |x 1 ,x 2 /x 2 |  O3/2 . 4.3.14 Then any collapsed wave function #x is given by Eq. (4.3.8) with /  , 1/4    1/2 that is  -solution of the time-independent 137 nonlocal Schrödinger equation (4.3.9)-(4.3.10) of the order . Proof. The Schrödinger equation (4.3.7) has the following form Hx 1 ,x 2   2 2x 1 ,x 2  x 1 2  2 2x 1 ,x 2  x 2 2  Vx 1 ,x 2 x 1 ,x 2   0. 4.3.15 Let #x1 ,x2  be a function  #x1 ,x2   Rx1 ,  x 1Rx2 ,  x 2x1 ,x2 , 4.3.16 where Rx i,  x i  2  1/4 exp  x i   x i 2 22 iff x i   x i  , 0 iff x i   x i  . 4.3.17 From Eq. (4.3.17) by using Eq. (4.3.13) we obtain Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1  1/41x 1   x 1 exp  x 1   x 1 2 2   Rx 1 ,  x 1x 1 x 1   x 1    Rx 1 ,  x 1x x 1   x 1  , 2Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 2  1/41 exp  x 1   x 1 2 2  1/42x 1   x 1 2 exp  x 1   x 1 2 2  Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 x x 1   x 1    Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 x x 1   x 1    Rx 1 ,  x 1 x  x 1   x 1    Rx 1 ,  x 1 x  x 1   x 1   4.3.18 and 138 Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2  1/41x 2   x 2 exp  x 2   x 2 2 2   Rx 2 ,  x 2x 1 x 2   x 2    Rx 2 ,  x 2x x 2   x 2  , 2Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 2  1/41 exp  x 2   x 2 2 2  1/42x 2   x 2 2 exp  x 2   x 2 2 2  Rx 2 ,  x 2  x 2 x x 2   x 2    Rx 2 ,  x 2  x 2 x x 2   x 2    Rx 2 ,  x 2x  x 2   x 2    Rx 2 ,  x 2x  x 2   x 2  . 4.3.19 From Eq. (4.3.16) by differentiation we obtain 2#x 1 ,x 2  x 1 2  2Rx 1 ,  x 1Rx 2 ,  x 2x 1 ,x 2  x 1 2   x 1 x 1 ,x 2 Rx 2 ,  x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1  Rx 1 ,  x 1Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 1 ,x 2  x 1  2 x 1 ,x 2  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1  x 1 ,x 2 Rx 2 ,  x 2 2Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 2  Rx 1 ,  x 1Rx 2 ,  x 2 2x 1 ,x 2  x 1 2 4.3.20 and 2#x 1 ,x 2  x 2 2  2Rx 1Rx 2 ,  x 2x 1 ,x 2  x 2 2   x 2 x 1 ,x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2  Rx 1 ,  x 1Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 1 ,x 2  x 2  2 x 1 ,x 2  x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2  x 1 ,x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 2Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 2  Rx 1 ,  x 1Rx 2 ,  x 2 2x 1 ,x 2  x 2 2 . 4.3.21 139 By substitution Eq. (4.3.15) and Eq. (4.3.20) Eq. (4.3.21) into LHS of the Eq. (4.3.9) we obtain   H #x 1 ,x 2 dx 1dx 2    dx 1dx 2Rx 1 ,  x 1Rx 2 ,  x 2  2 2x 1 ,x 2  x 1 2  2 2x 1 ,x 2  x 2 2  Vx 1 ,x 2 x 1 ,x 2    2   dx 1dx 2  2 x 1 ,x 2  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1  x 1 ,x 2 Rx 2 ,  x 2 2Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 2   2   dx 1dx 2  2 x 1 ,x 2  x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2  x 1 ,x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 2Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 2   1,  2,. 4.3.22 Now we go to estimate the quantities 1,  2   dx 1dx 2  2 x 1 ,x 2  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1  x 1 ,x 2 Rx 2 ,  x 2 2Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 2 4.3.23 and 2,  2   dx 1dx 2  2 x 1 ,x 2  x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2  x 1 ,x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 2Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 2 4.3.24 From Eq. (4.3.23) using Eq. (4.3.14) we obtain 140 |1,|  2   dx 1dx 2  2 x 1 ,x 2  x 1 Rx 1 ,  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 1  |x 1 ,x 2 |Rx 1 ,  x 1 2Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 1 2  2O1/2    Rx 2 ,  x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 dx 1dx 2   O3/2    Rx 2 ,  x 2 2Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 2 dx 1dx 2   2O1/2    Rx 2 ,  x 2dx 2   Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 dx 1  O3/2    Rx 2 ,  x 2dx 2   2Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 2 dx 1     Rx 2 ,  x 2dx 2 2O1/2    Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 dx 1  O3/2    2Rx 1 ,  x 1 x 1 2 dx 1 . 4.3.25 From Eq. (4.3.24) using Eq. (4.3.14) we obtain |2,|  2   dx 1dx 2  2 x 1 ,x 2  x 2 Rx 1 ,  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2  |x 1 ,x 2 |Rx 1 ,  x 1 2Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 2  2O1/2    Rx 1 ,  x 1 Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 dx 1dx 2  O3/2    Rx 1 ,  x 1 2Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 2 dx 1dx 2 2O1/2    Rx 1 ,  x 1dx 1   Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 dx 2  O3/2    Rx 1 ,  x 1dx 1   2Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 2 dx 2    Rx 1 ,  x 1dx 1 2O1/2    Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 dx 2  O3/2    2Rx 2 ,  x 2 x 2 2 dx 2 . 4.3.26 Having substituted Eq. (4.3.18) into Eq. (4.3.25) and Eq. (4.3.19) into Eq. (4.3.26) and having applied Lemma 4.3.1 we have finalized the proof of the Eq. (4.3.9). We assume now that 141     |x1 ,x 2 |2dx 1dx2  1. 4.3.27 From Eq. (4.3.27) and Eq. (4.3.17) by Lemma 4.3.1 we obtain     R 2x 1 ,  x 1R 2x 2 ,  x 2|x 1 ,x 2 |2dx 1dx2  1 4.3.28 From Eq. (4.3.16) Eq. (4.3.17) by Lemma 4.3.1 we obtain x A     x 1#x 1 ,x 2 dx 1dx 2    x 1R2x 1 ,x 1R2x 2 ,x 2|x 1 ,x 2 |2dx 1dx 2  x 1 , x B     x 2#x 1 ,x 2 dx 1dx 2    x 2R2x 1 ,x 1R2x 2 ,x 2|x 1 ,x 2 |2dx 1dx 2  x 2 . 4.3.29 We choose now: x 1  xA,  x 2  xB  xA  x0 , then a boundary condition xB  xA   x0 given by Eq. (4.3.10) is satisfied. IV.4. Position-momentum entangled photon pairs in non-linear wave-guide The physical system where we expect the entangled photon states to appear include: (A) a Kerr-type nonlinear single-mode wave-guide characterized by strong photon-photon coupling [12] or (B) a chain of coupled non-linear resonators. For two photons with momenta k1  k0  δkandk2  k0  δk and dispersion ωk0  δk  ωk0  vδk  βδk2 /2, 4.4.1 where v is the photon group velocity, the variation of the energy of a photon pair is 142 2ω  ωk0  δk  ωk0  δk  2ωk0  βδk2 . 4.4.2 As the photon-photon interaction conserves both energy and longitudinal momentum, the two-photon states propagating along the non-linear transmission line can be described by the Fock function |ψ2k0   dk1dk2δk1  k2  2k0fk1  k2|k1 ,k2  4.4.3 Fig. 4.4.1. Entangled two-photon states in non-linear wave guides. Adapted from [12] (a) Spectrum of a two-photon state, E  E  2ωk0|β|/κ2 , with total momentum 2k 0 in a wave-guide with quadratic dispersion (4.3.1) for β  0,κ  0 (left) and β  0,κ  0 (right). Solid line corresponds to the continuous spectrum, while the single eigenvalue corresponding to the entangled state is shown by dashed line. (b) Wigner function of the two-photon entangled state. It takes negative values, which is a hallmark of non-Gaussian entangled states. 143 To demonstrate the principle of position-momentum entanglement of photons in Kerr-nonlinear systems, we, first, consider the entangled photon pairs in non-linear optical wave-guides. Classically, Kerr nonlinearity in an isotopic medium manifests itself in the third-order polarisation P3  3E EE  αE EE, where + and correspond to positive and negative frequency parts, E is the electric field, 3 is the susceptibility of the medium 3=xyxy 3 , α xxyy 3 /23. Quantizing electromagnetic field, integrating over transverse degrees of freedom, and neglecting magneto-optical effects (α  0) leading to entanglement over polarization degrees of freedom, one obtains the following Hamiltonian (  c  1): H  H0  Hint,H0  k kωkak  ak, Hint  k L  k1,k2,k3,k4 δk 1  k 2 ,k 3  k 4ak4  ak3  ak1 ak2 , 4.4.4 where akak   is the annihilation (creation) operator of a photon with longitudinal momentum k and energy ω k , L is the length of the system. The non-linear term Hint in Eq. (4.4.3) describes photonphoton interaction with coupling κ  πω2χ3/2nr4A0 , where n r is the refraction index, A is the area occupied by the wave-guide mode and 0 is the vacuum permittivity. Hamiltonian (4.4.3) can be diagonalized exactly in the case of 2ω  δk2 . We consider a sector of the Hilbert space, which consists of all the two-photon states with the total pair momentum 2k 0 and assume the effective mass approximation for the wave-guide dispersion given by Eq. (4.4.1). In the coordinate domain, ax  1/ L k ak expik  k0x, the Hamilton Eq.(4.4.3) takes the form H  dx ωk0 axax  ivaxxax  12 βax 2ax  1 2 dx 1dx 2ax1 ax2 Ux1  x 2ax1ax2 , 4.4.5 where Ux1  x2  2κδx1  x2. For a two-photon state, described by the wave-function 144 t A/Bx 1 ,x 2   ψ  dx 1dx 2 fx 1 ,x 2ax1 ax2 |0, 4.4.6.a one obtains the following Schrödinger equation: 2ωk0  ivx1  x2  1 2 βx1 2  x2 2   2κδx 1  x 2fx1 ,x 2  Efx 1 ,x 2, 4.4.6.b where E is the energy of a two-photon state. Equation (4.4.6b) has scattering state solutions, which correspond to the continuous spectrum of non-interacting photons with energies given by Eq.(4.4.2) (See Fig. 4.4.1(a)). When the curvature of the wave-guide dispersion and the photon coupling constant κ are of opposite signs, βκ  0, there exists a bound state solution with fx 1 ,x 2  ξ 2L exp|x 1  x 2 |ξ,ξ  |κ/β| 4.4.7 The energy of this state is split from the continuum of weakly correlated scattering states, as we show in Fig. 4.4.1(a), and it is given by Eb  2ωk0  κ2 /β, 4.4.8 as expected from binding of a one-dimensional massive particle to an attractive -functional potential well [13]. In the momentum domain, the two-photon bound state wave-function is given by Eq.(4.4.3) with fk 1  k 2  8ξ3/2 2L k 1  k 22  4ξ2 4.4.9 The state (4.4.9) can be characterised by the Wigner function defined as the expectation value β δ 145 Wx1 ,k1 ;x2 ,k2  π2ψ|Πx1 ,k1 Πx2 ,k2|ψ of the parity operator Πx,k   dζe2ixζakζ  |00|akζ. After straightforward calculations, one obtains Wx 1 ,k 1 ;x 2 ,k 2  ξ2e2ξ|δx| 2π2δk 2  ξ2 cos2δk|δx|  ξ δk sin2δk|δx|δk 1  k 2 ;2k 0, 4.4.10 where δx  x1  x2 . This function is negative for cos2δk|δx|  ξ/δksin2δk|δx|  0, as shown in Fig. 4.4.1(b), which implies that the state (4.4.9) is entangled in position-momentum degrees of freedom. Moreover, for ξ  , the two-photon wavefunction approaches the ideal Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen state in which position and momenta are perfectly (anti-) correlated: ψ  dδk|k0  δk,k0  δk  dxe2ik0x |x,x. Alternatively, to demonstrate that the state (4.4.9) is entangled in position-momentum degrees of freedom, one can find the uncertainties x1  x2 and k1  k2 calculated over the joint probability distributions Px1 ,x2 and Pk1 ,k2 respectively, for which, the separability criterion: x2  x12k2  k2  1, 4.4.11 can be applied. Although, the states for which the inequality (4.4.11) is violated are inseparable, they do not necessarily lead to EPR paradox. In order for an EPR "paradox" to arise, correlations must violate a more strict inequality: 146 x2  x12k1  k22  1/4, 4.4.12 which can be accessible experimentally. Nonlocal Schrödinger equation (4.3.9) corresponding to Schrödinger equation (4.4.6) (see subsection IV.3) is   dx 1d x 2 2ωk0  ivx1  x2  12 βx1 2  x2 2   2κδx 1  x 2f #x 1 ,x 2  Efx 1 ,x 2  0, 4.4.13 where f #x1 ,x2 is given by Eq. (4.3.8). Remark 4.4.1. Note that. We assume now the canonical postulate of locality. Then: (a) Whenever a measurement of the coordinate x 2 of a particle B is performed at instant t with the result x 2 B  x2  ,x2  ,  1 according to quantum mechanics a state vector | t x2  B collapses at instant t to the state vector  t,,,xB x2 B ~  LxB B ,|t x2  B , 4.4.14 see Chapter I. (b) Under conditions given by Eq. (4.4.14) two-particle wave function t A/Bx1 ,x2  given by Eq. (4.4.6b), collapses at instant t by the law t A/Bx1 ,x2  col lapse   LxB B ,t A/Bx 1 ,x2 . 4.4.15 Remark 4.4.2. Note that. We assume now the postulate of nonlocality. Then: (i) Whenever a measurement of the coordinate x 1 of a particle B is performed at instant t with the result xB  x1  ,x1  ,  1. Then: (a) According to quantum mechanics a state vector | t x  B collapses at instant t to the state vector  t,,,xB x1 B ~  LxB B ,|t x1  B , 4.4.16 147 where  LxB B , is a norm-reducing, positive, self-adjoint, linear operator in the 2 -particle non projective Hilbert space H, representing the localization of particle B around the point x B , see Chapter I. (b) According postulate of nonlocality (see Chapter I) a state vector | t x2  A immediately collapses at instant to the state vector  t,,,xA x1 A ~  LxBx0 A ,|t x1  A 4.4.17 and this is true independent of the distance in Minkovski spacetime M4  1,3 that separates the particles. Thus |t x  B col lapse   t,,,xB x B  |t x  A col lapse   t,,,xBx0 x A . 4.4.18 (ii) Under conditions given by Eq. (4.4.16) Eq. (4.4.18) two-particle wave function t A/Bx1 ,x2  given by Eq. (4.4.6b) collapses at instant t by the law t A/Bx1 ,x 2  col lapse   LxBx0 A  LxB B ,t A/Bx1 ,x2 . 4.4.19 IV.5. Position-momentum entangled photon pairs and the experimental verification of the postulate of nonlocality In paper [14] it is reported on a demonstration of the EPR paradox using position-entangled and momentum-entangled photon pairs produced by spontaneous parametric down conversion. Transverse correlations from parametric down conversion have been studied both theoretically and experimentally. It was find experimentally that the position and momentum correlations are strong enough to allow the position or momentum of a photon to be inferred from that of its partner with a product of variances  0.012 , which violates the 148 separability bound by 2 orders of magnitude. In the idealized entangled state proposed by EPR, the positions and momenta of the two particles are perfectly correlated. However such idealized entangled state is non-normalizable and cannot be realized in the laboratory. However, the state of the light produced in parametric down conversion can be made to approximate the EPR state under suitable conditions. In parametric down conversion, a pump photon is absorbed by a nonlinear medium and reemitted as two photons (conventionally called signal and idler photons), each with approximately half the energy of the pump photon. Considering only the transverse components, the momentum conservation of the down conversion process requires p1  p2  pp , where 1,2, and p refers to the signal, idler, and pump photons, respectively. Provided the uncertainty in the pump transverse momentum is small, the transverse momenta of the signal and idler photons are highly anticorrelated. The exact degree of correlation depends on the structure of the signal idler state. In the regime of weak generation, this state has the form |1,2  |vac  dp1dp2Ap1 ,p2 |p1 ,p2 , 4.5.1 where vac denotes the vacuum state and the two-photon amplitude Ap 1 ,p 2  is Ap 1 ,p 2   Epp1 ,p2  expikzL  1 ikz . 4.5.2 Here is the coefficient of the nonlinear interaction, Ep is the amplitude of the plane-wave component of the pump with transverse momentum p1p2 ,L is the length of the nonlinear medium, and 149 kz  kp,z  k1,z  k2,z (where k  p/) is the longitudinal wave vector mismatch, which generally increases with transverse momentum and limits the angular spread of signal and idler photons. The vacuum component of the state makes no contribution to photon counting measurements and may be ignored. Also, there is no inherent difference between different transverse components; so without loss of generality, we consider the scalar position and momentum. The narrower the angular spectrum of the pump field and the wider the angular spectrum of the generated light, the more closely the integral (4.4.1) approximates dp1dp2p1  p2 |p1 ,p2   |EPR and the stronger the correlations in the position and momentum become. The experimental setup used to determine position and momentum correlations is portrayed in Fig. 4.5.1(a)-(b). The idea is to measure the positions and momenta by measuring the down converted photons in the near and far fields, respectively [15]. The source of entangled photons is spontaneous parametric down conversion generated by pumping a 2 mm thick type-II-bariumborate (BBO) crystal with a 30 mW, cw, 390 nm laser beam. A prism separates the pump light from the down converted light. The signal and idler photons have orthogonal polarizations and are separated by a polarizing beam splitter. In each arm, the light passes through a narrow 40 m vertical slit, a 10 nm spectral filter, and a microscope objective. The objective focuses the transmitted light onto a multimode fiber which is coupled to an avalanche photodiode singlephoton counting module. The spectral filter ensures that only photons with nearly equal energies are detected. 150 Fig. 4.5.1(a). Experimental setup for measuring position photon correlations. Position correlations are obtained by imaging the birth place of each photon of a pair onto a separate detector. Adapted from [14] Fig. 4.5.1(b). Experimental setup for measuring correlations in transverse momentum. Correlations in transverse momentum are obtained by imaging the propagation direction of each photon of a pair onto a separate detector. Adapted from [14] 151 To measure correlations in the positions of the photons, a lens of focal length 100 mm (placed prior to the beam splitter) is used to image the exit face of the crystal onto the planes of the two slits [Fig.4.5.1(a)]. One slit is fixed at the location of peak signal intensity. The other slit is mounted on a translation stage. The photon coincidence rate is then recorded as a function of the displacement of the second slit. To measure correlations in the transverse momenta of the photons, the imaging lens is replaced by two lenses of focal length 100 mm, one in each arm, at distance f from the planes of the two slits [Fig.4.5.1(b)]. These lenses map transverse momenta to transverse positions, such that a photon with transverse momentum k comes to a focus at the point x  fk/k in the plane of the slit. Again, one slit is fixed at the location of the peak count rate while the other is translated to obtain the coincidence distribution. By normalizing the coincidence distributions, the conditional probability density functions px2 |x1  and pp2 |p1  were obtained (see Fig. 4.5.2-4.5.3). These probability densities are then used to calculate the uncertainty in the inferred position or momentum of photon 2 given the position or momentum of photon 1: x 2 2x 1    x 22px 2 |x 1 dx 2   x 2px 2 |x 1 dx 2 2 , p2 2p1    p22pp2 |p1 dx 2   p2pp2 |p1 dx 2 2 . 4.5.3 Because of the finite width of the slits, the raw data in Fig. 4.5.24.5.3 describe a slightly broader distribution than is associated with the down conversion process itself. By adjusting the computed values of x 2 and p2 to account for this broadening (an adjustment smaller than 10%), we obtain the correlation uncertainties x2  0.027 mm and Δp2 3.7 mm 1 . 152 Fig. 4.5.2. The conditional probability distribution of the relative birthplace of the entangled photons. The solid line is the theoretical prediction and the dots are the experimented data. Adapted from [14] Fig. 4.5.3. The conditional probability distribution of the relative transverse momentum of the entangled photons. The solid line is the theoretical prediction and the dots are the experimented data. Adapted from [14] 153 The widths of the distributions determine the uncertainties in inferring the position or the momentum of one photon from that of the other. The experimentally measured variance product is then [14] expx2 2x1 expp2 2p1   0.012 . 4.5.4 Also shown in Fig. 4.5.2-4.5.3 are the predicted probability densities. These curves contain no free parameters and are obtained directly from the two-photon amplitude Ap1 ,p2  [14], which is determined by the optical properties of BBO and the measured profile of the pump beam. Figure 4.5.2 indicates that the correlation widths obtained are intrinsic to the down conversion process and are limited only by the degree to which it deviates from the idealized EPR state (4.5.1). The value of p2  p1  is limited by the finite width of the pump beam. The pump photons in a Gaussian beam of width w have an uncertainty /2w in transverse momentum which, due to conservation of momentum, is imparted to the total momentum p1  p2 of the signal and idler photons. The value of x2  x1  is limited by the range of angles over which the crystal generates signal and idler photons. If the angular width of emission is  , then the principle of diffraction indicates that the photons cannot have a smaller transverse dimension than ~k s,i1 . Careful analysis based on the angular distribution of emission yields x2  x1   1.88k s,i1 [14]. With the measured beam width of w  0.17 mm and predicted angular width 0.012 rad, the theory predicts [14]: th x2 2x1 th p2 2p1   0.00362 . 4.5.5 Remark 4.5.1. This is somewhat smaller than the experimentally calculated value of 0.012 , even though the data appear to closely match the theoretical curves expx2 2x1 expp2 2p1   th x2 2x1 th p2 2p1   0.012  0.00362  0.00642 . 4.5.6 Remark 4.5.2. The reason for this discrepancy is that the experimental distributions have small (1% of the peak) but very broad wings. 154 Remark 4.5.3. The origin of these uncoincidence counts is unknown [14]. Remark 4.5.4. In paper [14] it was assumed that these counts are perhaps due to scattering from optical components. If these counts are treated as a noise background and subtracted, the experimentally obtained uncertainties come into somewhat better agreement with the theoretically predicted values, yielding an uncertainty product of 0.0042 : EPR nonloc.x2  x1 ,p2  p1   expx2 2x1 expp2 2p1   th x2 2x1 th p2 2p1   0.0062 . 4.5.7 Thus final value of uncoincidence counts is EPR nonloc.x2  x1 ,p2  p1   0.0062 . 4.5.8 Remark 4.5.5. Note that the separability criterion derived by Mancini et al. [16] is more useful here. We remind that it states that separable systems satisfy the joint uncertainty product x2  x1 p2  p1   2 , 4.5.9 where the uncertainties are calculated over the joint probability distributions Px1 ,x2  and Pp1 ,p2 , respectively. In these experiments the widths of the conditional probability distributions are P. Therefore the results of [14] constitute a 2-order-of-magnitude violation of Mancini's separability criterion as well as a strong violation of EPR criterion. IV.6. The EPR Paradox Resolution by using quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states IV.6.1. Preleminaries We remind that any given n -dimensional quantum system is identified by a set Q : 155 Q  H,,,2,1 ,H,G, |t  4.6.1 where: (i) H that is some infinite-dimensional complex Hilbert space, (ii)   ,,P that is complete probability space , (iii)   n , that is measurable space , (iv) 2,1 that is complete space of complex valued random variables X :   n such that   XdP  ,   X2dP  , 4.6.2 see Chapter II subsection II.1 postulate Q.I.1. Remark 4.6.1. Let BM4 be a Boolean algebra of physical events in Minkowski spacetime and let M4 ph  BM4 ,P be a measure algebra of physical events in Minkowski spacetime, i.e., M4 ph that is a Boolean algebra BM4 with a probability measure P, see Chapter III subsection III.2, Definition 3.2.3. We remind that we denote such physical events by Ax,Bx, . . . etc., where x  t,x1 ,x2 ,x3   M4 or A,B, . . . etc., and we write for a short AOcx,BOcx, . . . iff there physical events Ax,Bx. . . were occured. Remark 4.6.2. We assume that particle A is initially in the state |A   H. Let Aq, t  A |A ,Q,q,q, t  BM4 be a physical event which consists of the performing a measurement of the observable Q   q 1 q 2 q|qq|dq with the accuracy q, and the result is obtained in the range q  q,q  q at the instant t. We assume that A |A ,Q,q,q, t  M4 ph . Remark 4.6.3. Note that: if the physical event was occurred then immediately after the measurement at the instant A |A ,Q,q,q, t t 156 unconditional measure collapses to conditional measure P X A |A ,Q,q,q, t , where X  M4 ph : P X A |A ,Q,q,q, t  P X  A |A ,Q,q,q, t P A |A ,Q,q,q, t . 4.6.3 Remark 4.6.4. Remind if we are to suppose that a particle at a definite position x is to be assigned a state vector |x  H, and if further we are to suppose that the possible positions are continuous over the range , and that the associated states are complete, then we are lead to requiring that any state |A  of the particle must be expressible as |A      |x x|A dx 4.6.4 with the states |x  by  -function normalised, i.e. x|x    x  x . Definition 4.6.1. Let B   a,b  a,b where a,b  Ba,b is the Borel algebra on a set a,b. Let |  H. We define now a signed measure P|A  : B    by formula P|A A   A xp |A xdx, 4.6.5 where p|A x  |x|A | 2 . Remark 4.6.5. We assume now that ,,P  ,B,PB  and P|  PB , i.e. P | is absolutely continuous with respect to P .By RadonNicodym theorem we obtain for any A  a,b : P|A   A X |dP, 4.6.6 P 157 i.e. X |  dP| dP . 4.6.7 Remark 4.6.6. We assume now that: (i) a measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P admits a representation  : M4 ph  ,B,PB  of the measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P in the measure algebra B  ,B,PB , such that (ii) PBX  P 1X for any X  B and (iii) for any physical event such that A |A ,Q,q,q, t  M4 ph (see Remark 4.6.2) the following condition holds  A |A ,Q,q,q, t  |q  q  X |A   q  q, 4.6.8 where |q  q  X |A   q  q  B . IV.6.2.The EPR Paradox Resolution The classical weak EPR argument We briefly remind now the EPR argument [1]. Suppose that a system of two identical particles is prepared in a state such that their relative distance is large and constant |r1  r2 |  L  x0 , i.e., they are space-like separated, and the total momentum is zero p 1  p 2  0 (see Fig. 4.6.1). This preparation is, in principle, possible because the two observables, say x 1  x 2 and p 1  p 2 , are compatible, i.e., both of them can be set to certain values with certainty on the same state. Correspondingly according to quantum mechanics they are in fact represented by commuting operators [1]. 158 Fig. 4.6.1. Schematic representation of EPR thought experiment Remark 4.6.7. Then one can measure the value of either of the two incompatible single particle observables, say x 1 or p1 and correspondingly deduce the value of either x2  x0  x1 or p2  p1 without interacting with particle 2. Because of this they correspond, according to the EPR argument, to elements of reality of the state of particle 2 that are independent of measurements and should be predictable by the theory [1]. On the other hand, quantum mechanics cannot predict the value of both x 2 and p2 on the same state, because they are incompatible observables and this would be in contrast to Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Remark 4.6.8. Thus, to conclude EPR, there are elements of reality of a state that cannot be predicted by the theory and therefore the theory is incomplete [1]. The strong EPR argument Remark 4.6.9. Note then in additional to canonical EPR thought experiment: (i) one can measure at instant t the value of single particle 1 observable, say x 1 t and deduce the value x2 t  x0  x1 t of particle 2 at instant t without interacting with particle 2 which at instant t is in a state, say 2 t . Such a measurement however is not disturbed by the particle 2 and thus is not altered by its state 2 t and therefore the value of single particle 2 observable, say p2 is the same as before the measurement on particle 1. Therefore one can measure the value in the state exactly without any p2 t 2 t 159 uncertainty. On the other hand, Heisenberg uncertainty principle predicts that the position and the momentum of any particle cannot both be measured or predicted exactly, at the same time , even in the theory. Let A and B be two particles A and B with a state vector |A  |A      |x x|A dx 4.6.9 and with a state vector |B  |B      |x x|B dx 4.6.10 respectively, and with perfectly correlated position xB  xA  x0 4.6.11 and perfectly anti-correlated momentum pB  pA. 4.6.12 We define now a signed measures P|A  : B    and P|B  : B    by formulas P|A A   A xp |A xdx, 4.6.13 and P|B A   A xp |B xdx, 4.6.14 where p|A x  |x|A | 2 and p|B x  |x|B | 2 respectively. Remark 4.6.10. We assume now that ,,P  ,B,P and (i) P|A   P, (ii) P|B   P. We define now random variables X |A  and X |B  by formulas x 2 t p2 t t 160 X |A   dP|A  dP ,X |B   dP|B  dP 4.6.15 respectively. Notice that from Eq. (4.6.11), Eq. (4.6.13)-(4.6.14) and Eqs.(4.6.15) it follows that X |B   X |A   x0 ,a.s. 4.6.16 Let B |B ,X,xB ,x, t  BM4 be a physical event which consists of performing a measurement of the observable X  x1 x2 x|x x |dx with an accuracy x, and the result is obtained in the range xB  x,xB  x at instant t. Remark 4.6.11. Note that: if the physical event was occurred then immediately after the measurement at the instant unconditional measure collapses to conditional measure P X B |B ,X,xB ,x, t , where X  M4 ph : P X B |B ,X,x B ,x, t  P X  B |B ,X,x B ,x, t P B |B ,X,x B ,x, t , 4.6.17 see Remark 4.6.3. Notice that: (i) from Eq. (4.6.8) it follows that  B |B ,X,xB ,x, t  X B xB ,x, 4.6.18 where we write for short X B xB ,x instead |xB  x  X |B   xB  x, i.e. B |B ,X,xB ,x, t t P 161 X B xB ,x  |xB  x  X |B   xB  x, 4.6.19 see Remark 4.6.2; (ii) from Eq. (4.6.11), Eq. (4.6.16) and Eq. (4.6.19) it follows that X B x B ,x  |x B  x  X |B   x B  x  |x B  x 0   x  X |B   x 0  x B  x 0   x  |x A  x  X |A   x A  x  X B x A,x, 4.6.20 and thus X B xB ,x  X B xA,x 4.6.21 (iii) from Eq. (4.6.17) - (4.6.19) it follows that: (i) unconditional measure PB immediately after the measurement at instant t collapses to conditional measure PBX||B xB ,x, where X  B : PB X |B xB ,x  PB X  X B x B ,x PB X B xB ,x . 4.6.22 Remark 4.6.12. (i) From Eq. (4.6.22) it follows that the unconditional probability density function pBx  |x|B |2 immediately after the measurement at instant t collapses to the following conditional probability density function as pB x|X B x B ,x  pBx PB X B x B ,x  x  X B x B ,x 0  x  X B x B ,x 4.6.23 see Appendix B. (ii) From Eq. (4.6.21) and Eq. (4.6.22) it follows that the unconditional probability density function pAx  |x|A |2 immediately after the measurement at instant t collapses to the following conditional probability density function as 162 pA x|X  A x A,x  pAx PB X  A x A,x  x  X  A x A,x 0  x  X  A x A,x 4.6.24 From Eq. (4.6.23) it follows that a wave function Bx  x|B  immediately after the measurement at instant t collapses to the following wave function B coll x  Bx PB X B x B ,x  x  X B x B ,x 0  x  X B x B ,x 4.6.25 From Eq. (4.6.24) it follows that immediately after the measurement on particle B at instant t a wave function Ax  x|A  collapses to the following wave function A coll x  Ax PB X  A x A,x  x  X  A x A,x 0  x  X  A x A,x 4.6.26 Thus the measurement on particle B alters a wave function Ax even if particles A and B are space-like separated and therefore EPR paradox disappears. 163 Chapter V ERP-B PARADOX RESOLUTION V.1. EPR-B experiment The EPR-B, the spin version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment proposed by Bohm, see [17], [18] Bohm: "We consider a molecule of total spin zero consisting of two atoms, each of spin one-half. The wave function of the system is therefore   1/ 2 12  12 where 1 refers to the wave function of the atomic state in which one particle (A) has spin /2, etc. The two atoms are then separated by a method that does not influence the total spin. After they have separated enough so that they cease to interact, any desired component of the spin of the first particle A is measured. Then, because the total spin is still zero, it can immediately be concluded that the same component of the spin of the other particle B is opposite to that of A. If this were a classical system, there would be no difficulty in interpreting the above results, because all components of the spin of each particle are well defined at each instant of time. Thus, in the molecule, each component of the spin of particle A has, from the very beginning, a value opposite to that of the same component of B; and this relationship does not change when the atom disintegrates. In other words, the two spin vectors are correlated. Hence, the measurement of any component of the spin of A permits us to conclude also that the same component of B is opposite in value. The possibility of obtaining knowledge of the spin of particle B in this way evidently does not imply any interaction of the apparatus with particle B or any interaction between A and B. In quantum theory, a difficulty arises, in the interpretation of the 164 above experiment, because only one component of the spin of each particle can have a definite value at a given time. Thus, if the x component is definite, then the y and z components are indeterminate and we may regard them more or less as in a kind of random fluctuation. In spite of the effective fluctuation described above, however, the quantum theory still implies that no matter which component of the spin of A may be measured the same component of the spin of B will have a definite and opposite value when the measurement is over. Of course, the wave function then reduces to 12 or 12, in accordance with the result of the measurement. Hence, there will then be no correlations between the remaining components of the spins of the two atoms. Nevertheless, before the measurement has taken place (even while the atoms are still in flight) we are free to choose any direction as the one in which the spin of particle A (and therefore of particle B) will become definite. In order to bring out the difficulty of interpreting the result, let us recall that originally, the indeterminacy principle was regarded as representing the effects of the disturbance of the observed system by the indivisible quanta connecting it with the measuring apparatus. This interpretation leads to no serious difficulties for the case of a single particle. For example, we could say that on measuring the z component of the spin of particle A, we disturb the x and y components and make them fluctuate. This point of view more generally implies that the definiteness of any desired component of the spin is (along with the indefiniteness of the other two components) a potentiality which can be realized with the aid of a suitably oriented spinmeasuring apparatus. In the case of complementary pairs of continuous variables, such as position and momentum, one obtains from this point of view the well known wave-particle duality. In other words, the electron, for example, has potentialities for mutually incompatible wave-like and particle-like behavior, which are realized under suitable external conditions. In the laboratory those conditions are generally determined by the measuring apparatus although, more generally, 165 they may be determined by any arrangement of matter with which the electron interacts. But in any case, it is essential that there must be an external interaction, which disturbs the observed system in such a way as to bring about the realization of one of its various mutually incompatible potentialities. As a result of this disturbance, when any one variable is made definite, other (noncommuting) variables must necessarily become indefinite and undergo fluctuation. Evidently, the foregoing interpretation is not satisfactory when applied to the experiment of ERP. It is of course acceptable for particle A alone (the particle whose spin is measured directly). But it does not explain why particle B (which does not interact with A or with the measuring apparatus) realizes its potentiality for a definite spin in precisely the same direction as that of A. Moreover, it cannot explain the fluctuations of the other two components of the spin of particle B as the result of disturbances due to the measuring apparatus. In this subsection we explain EPR-B experiment using reduction to a sort of generic EPR correlations for two particles A and B with maximally correlated position zA and zB . This explanation avoids the EPR-Bohm paradox. Fig. 5.1.1. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiment 166 Fig. 5.1.1 presents the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiment. A source S created in O pairs of identical atoms A and B, but with opposite spins. The atoms A and B split following the y -axis in opposite directions, and head towards two identical Stern-Gerlach apparatus EA and EB . The electromagnet EA "measures" the spin of A along the z-axis and the electromagnet EB "measures" the spin of B along the z -axis, which is obtained after a rotation of an angle  around the y -axis. Remark 5.1.1. So far we have consistently made use of the idea that if we know something definite about the state of such a physical system, say that we know z component of the spin of a particle is Sz   1 2 , then we assign to the system the state |Sz    1 2  , or, more simply, |. Remark 5.1.2. We can also note that these two states | and | are mutually exclusive, i.e. if an atom is in the state |, then the result Sz   1 2  is never observed, and furthermore, we note that the two states | and | cover all possible values for Sz. Remark 5.1.3. When we say that we `know' the value of some physical observable of a quantum system, we are presumably implying that some kind of measurement has been made that provided us with this knowledge. Furthermore, it is assumed that in the process of acquiring this knowledge, the system, after the measurement has been performed, survives the measurement, and moreover if we immediately remeasured the same quantity, we would get the same result. This is certainly the situation with the measurement of spin in the Stern-Gerlach experiment. If an atom emerges from one such a set of apparatus in a beam which indicates Sz  1 2  for that atom, and we passed the atom through a second apparatus, also with its magnetic field oriented in the z direction, we would find the atom emerging in the Sz  1 2  beam once again. Under such circumstances, we would be justified in saying that the atom has been prepared in the state 167 Sz  1 2  , etc. Definition 5.1.1. Assume that atom A has been prepared in the state Sz  1 2  , Sz   1 2  , etc. Then we will say that these events Sz  1 2  , Sz   1 2  , etc. occur. We will denote these events by symbols Sz  1 2  A , Sz   1 2  A , etc., or 1 2  A ,  1 2  A , etc. Definition 5.1.2. Assume that we know exactly that atom A is in the state 1 2  ,  1 2  , etc. Then we will say that these events 1 2  ,  1 2  , etc. occur and we will denote these events again by symbols 1 2  A ,  1 2  A , etc. Definition 5.1.3. Assume that these events 1 2  A ,  1 2  A , etc. occur in the point x  t,x1 ,x2 ,x3   t,r  M4 of Minkowski spacetime M4 . Then we will denote these events by symbols 1 2  x A ,  1 2  x A , etc. or 1 2  tA,zA  A ,  1 2  tA,zA  A , etc. Assumption 5.1.1. We claim for any x  M4 that: 1 2  x A  M4 ,  12  x A  M4 ,etc. 5.1.1 Here M4 is a measure algebra M4  BM4 ,P with a probability measure P, see Chapt. III, subsection III.2, Definition 3.2.3. Remark 5.1.4. Note that for any x  M4 and for any atom A these events 1 2  x A ,  1 2  x A are mutually exclusive, see Remark 5.1.2, and therefore for any x  M4 P 1 2  x A   12  x A  0. 5.1.2 Remark 5.1.5. We remind that if an atom is prepared in an arbitrary initial state |S, then the probability amplitude of finding it in some other state |S   is given by S|S  S||S  S||S 5.1.3 which leads, by the cancellation trick to 168 |S  ||S  ||S 5.1.4 and therefore the states | form a complete set of orthonormal basis states for the state space of the system. Suppose we have an n -dimensional quantum system which contains only a quantum observable with discrete values such as Sz, etc. Then we claim the following: Q d .V.1. Any given n -dimensional quantum system which contains only a quantum observable with discrete values such that mentioned above is identified by a set Qd: Q d  Hd,d,d,2,1 d ,Gd, |t  , 5.1.5 where: (i) Hd that is some finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space, (ii) d  d,d,Pd that is complete probability space , (iii) d  n ,d that is measurable space , (iv) 2,1 d d that is complete space of discrete complex valued random variables Xd : d  n such that  d XddPd  ,  d Xd 2dPd   5.1.6 (v) Gd : Hd 2,1d that is one to one correspondence such that |Qd|   d Gd Qd|  dPd  Ed Gd Qd|  5.1.7 for any |  Hd and for any Hermitian operator with discrete spectrum Qd : Hd  Hd, where Qd   Hd  CHd,CHd is C algebra of the Hermitian adjoint operators in Hd and  Hd is commutative subalgebra of CHd. (vi) | t  is a continuous vector function |t  :   Hd which represented the evolution of the quantum system Qd. Q d .V.2. For any |1 , |2   Hd and for any Hermitian operator 169 Q d : Hd  Hd such that 1 Qd 2  2 Qd 1  0 5.1.8 the equality is valid Gd Qd|1   |2    Gd Qd|1    Gd Qd|2  . 5.1.9 Remark 5.1.6. Let Sz  and Sz  be discrete random variables Sz  : d  1,1, Sz  : d  1,1 correspondingly such that: (i) Sz   G|, (ii) Pd1   1,where 1  |Sz   1 , (iii) Pd1   0,where 1  |Sz   1 and (i) Sz   G|, (ii) Pd1   1,where 1  |Sz   1 , (iii) Pd1   0,where 1  |Sz   1 . 5.1.10 Let Qc be any n -dimensional quantum system which contains only a quantum observable with continuous values. We remind that such a quantum system is identified with a set Q Q  H,,,2,1 ,G, |t . 5.1.11 Definition 5.1.4. We define now a composite quantum system Qc,d which contains both sort of quantum observables by a set Qc,d Q c,d  Hc,d,c,d,c,d,2,1 c,d ,Gc,d, |t  5.1.12 where: (i) Hc,d  Hc  Hd that is composite complex Hilbert space, (ii) c,d  c,d,c,d,Pd that is complete probability space , with c,d  c d,c,d  c d,c,d  c d,2,1 c,d  2,1 c  2,1 d ,Gc,d  Gc  Gd, (iii) c,d  n ,c,d that is measurable space with с,d  с  d, 170 (iv) 2,1 c,dd that is complete space of random variables Xc,d : c,d  n such that  c,d Xc,ddPc dPd  ,  c,d Xc,d 2dPc dPd  ,  c,d 5.1.13 (v) Gc,d : Hc,d 2,1 c,dd that is one to one correspondence such that |Qc,d|   c,d Gc,d Qc,d|  dPc dPd  Ec,d Gc,d Qc,d|  5.1.14 for any |  Hc,d and for any Hermitian operator Qc,d : Hc,d  Hc,d, where Qc,d  Hc,d  CHc,d,CHc,d is C -algebra of the Hermitian adjoint operators in Hc,d and Hc,d is commutative subalgebra of CHc,d. (vi) | t  is a continuous vector function |t  :   Hd which represented the evolution of the quantum system Qc,d. V.2. EPR-B paradox resolution The usual conclusion of EPR-B experiment is to reject the non-local realism for two reasons: the impossibility of decomposing a pair of entangled atoms into two states, one for each atom, and the impossibility of interaction faster than the speed of light. Remark 5.2.1. We find that the EPRB-paradox can be resolved by nonprincipal and convenient relaxing of the Einstein's locality principle, that is the "relaxed locality principle" introduced in Chapter IV.1. Remark 5.2.2. The solution to the entangled state is obtained by resolving the Pauli equation from an initial singlet wave function with a spatial extension as: 171 0rA ,rB  1 2 frAfrB|A  |B   |A  |B , 5.2.1 The initial wave function of the entangled state is the singlet state (5.2.1) with fr  20 2 1 2 e  x 2  y2  z2 40 2 iff r  , 0 iff r   r  x,y, z,0  1,  1 5.2.2 and where |A  and |B  are the eigenvectors of the operators  zA and zB : zA |A   |A ,zB |B   |B . 5.2.3 Remark 5.2.3. We treat the dependence with y strictly quasiclassically, i.e., with speed vyA v0 ,0 A  for A and vy B v0 ,0 B  for B such that P y  vyA v0 ,0 A t    1, P y  vyA v0 ,0 A t    0, P y  vyB v0 ,0 B t    1, P y  vyB v0 ,0 B t    0,   1, 5.2.4 where vy A v0 ,0 A   0A  v0 ,vy B v0 ,0 B   0B  v0 , 0A   cos2 0 A 2 ,0A   sin2 0 A 2 , 0B   cos2 0 B 2 ,0B   sin2 0 B 2 . 5.2.5 The wave function rA,rB, t of the two identical particles A and B, electrically neutral and with magnetic moments 0 , subject to magnetic fields EA and EB , admits on the basis of |A  and |B  four components a,brA,rB, t and satisfies the two-body Pauli equation 172 i a,bt t    2 2m A   2 2m B a,bt  Bj EA jcac,bt  Bj EB  jd ba,dt 5.2.6 with the initial conditions: a,b0,rA,rB  0 a,brA,rB, 5.2.7 where 0 a,brA,rB corresponds to the singlet state (5.2.1). Below we explain the EPR-B experiment by using nonlocal two-body Pauli equation  drAdrB  dt i  #a,bt, t ,rA ,rB  t    2 2m A   2 2m B #a,bt, t ,rA ,rB  Bj EA jca#c,bt, t ,rA ,rB   Bj EB  jd b#a,dt, t ,rA ,rB   O , drA  dx AdyAzA ,drB  dx BdyBzB 5.2.8 with a boundary condition drAdrBzAt1  #t1 , t ,rA ,rB 2  drAdrBzBt2  #t2 , t ,rA ,rB 2 . 5.2.9 One of the difficulties of the canonical interpretation of the EPR-B experiment is the existence of two simultaneous measurements. By doing these measurements one after the other, the interpretation of the experiment will be facilitated. That is the purpose of the two-step version of the experiment EPR-B studied below. V.2.1. First step EPR-B: Spin measurement of A Consider that at time t0 the particle A arrives at the entrance of electromagnet EA . Remark 5.2.4. We assume that a particle A collapses in a magnetic field EA at some instant t  into two particles A  and A  , i.e. the spinor z,y, t collapses in a magnetic field EA at some instant t  into 173 two spinors z,y, t, t , and z,y, t, t , given by Eq. (6.1.9a)- (6.1.9b), see Assumption 5.1.1. Remark 5.2.5. The particles A  and A stay within the magnetic field for a time t   t  lv0 . Thus after exit of the magnetic field EA , at time t1  t0  t  t, the wave functions z,y, t0  t  t, and z,y, t0  t  t, become rA,rB , t0  t  t  frB   f rA, t|A  |B  5.2.10.a and rA,rB , t0  t  t  frB   f rA, t|A  |B  5.2.10.b respectively, with f r, t  cos 0 2 fx, z  z  utexp i muz  t f r, t  sin 0 2 fx, z  z  utexp i muz  t 5.2.11 wherez and u are given by z  BB0  t2 2m  105m, u  BB0  t m  1m/s. 5.2.12 Remark 5.2.6. We deduce that: the beam of particle A is divided into two A  and A  , and the beam of particle B is divided into two B  and B  . Remark 5.2.7. Our first conclusion is: the position of B  and B  does not depend on the spin measurement of A  and A  , only the spins are involved. We conclude from equation (5.2.10) that the spins of A  and B  (A  and B  ) remain opposite throughout the experiment. These are the two properties used in the relaxed causal interpretation. Remark 5.2.8. By "relaxed locality principle" and decoherence it follows that the interaction between A , A  , B , and B  is absent, we assume the existence of wave functions 174 0 ArA,0 A,0 A,0 ArA,0 A,0 A,0 BrB ,0 B,0 B,0 BrB ,0 B,0 B. 5.2.13 V.2.2. Second step EPR-B: Spin measurement of B The second step is a continuation of the first one and corresponds to the EPR-B experiment broken down into two steps. On a pairs of particles A , B  and A  , B  in a singlet state, first we made the Stern and Gerlach measurement on the A  and A  atom at instant t1 between t0 and t0  t  tD : t0  t1  t0  t  tD. 5.2.14 Secondly, we make the Stern and Gerlach measurement on the B  and B  atom with an electromagnet EB forming an angle  with EA at instant t2 between t0  t  tD and t0  2t  tD : t0  t  tD  t2  t0  2t  tD 5.2.15 At the exit of magnetic field EA , at time t0  t  tD, the pair of particles wave functions is given by Eq. (5.2.10a) and Eq. (5.2.10b) respectively. Immediately after the measurements of A  and A  , still at time t0  t  tD, the wave functions of B  and B  depend on the measurements  of A respectively such that: B/ArB, t0  t  t1  frB|B , 5.2.16.a and B/ArB, t0  t  t1  frB|B . 5.2.16.b Then, the measurement of B  and B  at time t2  t0  2t  tD yields, in this two-step version of the EPR-B experiment, the same results for spatial quantization and correlations of spins as in the EPR-B experiment. 175 V.2.3. Resolution of the EPR-B experiment in de Broglie-Bohm interpretation by the "relaxed locality principle" We assume, at the creation of the two entangled particles A and B, that each of the two particles A and B has an initial wave function with opposite spins: 0 ArA ,0 A ,0 A  frA cos 0 A 2 |A   sin 0 A 2 ei0 A |A  5.2.17 and 0 BrB ,0 B ,0 B  frB cos 0 B 2 |B   sin 0 B 2 ei0 B |B   frB cos  2  0 A 2 |B   sin  2  0 A 2 ei 0 A |B   0 BrB ,0 B ,0 B  frB sin 0 A 2 |B   cos 0 A 2 ei0 A |B  5.2.18 with 0 B    0 A and 0 B  0 A  . The two particles A and B are statistically prepared as in the Stern and Gerlach experiment. Then the Pauli principle tells us that the two-body wave function must be antisymmetric; after calculation we find the same singlet state (5.2.1): 0rA,A,A,rB ,B ,B  ei A frAfrB  |A  |B   |A  |B . 5.2.19 Thus, we can consider that the singlet wave function is the wave function of a family of two fermions A and B with opposite spins: the direction of initial spin A and B exists, but is not known. It is a local hidden variable which is therefore necessary to add in the initial conditions of the model. Here, we assume that at the initial time we know the spin of each particle (given by each initial wave function) and the initial position of each particle. 176 V.2.3.1. Step 1: spin measurement of A in de BroglieBohm interpretation In Eq. (5.2.19) particle A can be considered independent on B. We can therefore give it the wave function ArA , t0  t  t  cos 0 A 2 f rA , t|A   sin 0 A 2 ei0 A f rA , t|A  5.2.20 which is the wave function of a free particle in a Stern Gerlach apparatus and whose initial spin is given by 0 A ,0 A . For an initial polarization 0 A ,0 A  and an initial position z0 A , we obtain, in the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation [17] of the Stern and Gerlach experiment, an evolution of the position zAt and of the spin orientation of A ,AzAt, t, see [19]. The case of particles B  is different. B  follows a rectilinear trajectories with yBt  vy v0 ,0 t, zBt  z0 B and xBt  x0 B . By contrast, the orientation of its spin moves with the orientation of the spin of A  : Bt    AzAt, t 5.2.21 and Bt  AzAt, t  . 5.2.22 Remark 5.2.9. Let At,rAt, AzAt, t, AzAt, t denote events such that: "at instant t particles A  obtain the position coordinates rAt  xAt,yAt,zAt and spin orientation  At  AzAt, t and At  AzAt, t. Let Bt,rBt, BzBt, t denote events such that: "at instant t particles B obtain the position coordinates rBt  xBt,yBt,zBt and spin orientation  B  BzBt, t and BzBt, t. Then in accordance with the relaxed principle of locality (see 177 subsection IV.1) we assume that At1 ,rAt, A,At,Bt,rB t, B t,B t s.l .s .   M4 # ,t1 ,r1 , t2 ,r2  s .l .s.  , 5.2.23 see subsection IV.1, Definition 4.1.2. We can then associate the wave functions: BrB, t0  t  t  frBcos Bt 2 |B  5.2.24 and BrB, t0  t  t  frBsin Bt 2 ei Bt|B  5.2.25 These wave functions are specific, because they depend upon initial conditions of A (position and spin). The orientation of spin of the particles B  is driven by the particles A  respectively through the singlet wave functions. V.2.3.2. Step 2: spin measurement of B  in de BroglieBohm interpretation V.2.3.2.1. The prediction of the result of the spin measurement of B  under assumption of canonical postulate of locality At the time t0  t  tD , immediately after the measurement of A, Bt0  t  tD   or 0 in accordance with the value of AzAt, t and the wave functions of B  are given by Eq. (5.2.16a) and Eq.(5.2.16b) respectively. The frame Ox yz corresponds to the frame Oxyz after a rotation of an angle  around the y -axis (see Fig. 5.1.1). B corresponds to the 178 B  -spin angle with the z -axis, and  B to the B-spin angle with the z -axis, then  Bt0  t  tD     or  . In this second step, we are exactly in the case of a particle in a simple Stern and Gerlach experiment (with magnet EB ) with a specific initial polarization equal to    or  and not random like in step 1. Then, the measurement of B, at time t0  2t  tD), gives, in this interpretation of the two-step version of the EPR-B experiment, the same results as in the EPR-B experiment above. Thus we obtain EPR-B paradox again in de Broglie-Bohm interpretation. Remark 5.2.10. Note that the derivation EPR-B paradox in the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation completely based on the canonical postulate of locality. V.2.3.2.2. The prediction of the result of the spin measurement of B  under assumption of postulate of nonlocality We assume now a weak or strong postulate of nonlocality, see subsections I.4.1-I.4.2. At the time t1  t0  t  tD , immediately after the spin measurement of A  , Bt0  t  tD   or 0 in accordance with the value of AzAt, t and the wave functions of B  are given by Eq. (5.2.16a) and Eq.(5.2.16b) respectively. Remark 5.2.11. In accordance with the postulate of nonlocality it follows: (i) Whenever a measurement of the spin of a particle A  is performed at instant t1 and particle A  is found in the state |z, i.e., a state | t1 A collapses at instant t1 to the state |z,A with respect of the Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations, then a state | t1 B  179 immediately collapses at instant t1 to the state |z,B  with respect of the Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations, and this is true independent of the distance in Minkowski spacetime that separates the particles, e.g., |t1 A col lapse  |z,A  |t1 B  col lapse  |z,B  5.2.26 In accordance with Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations (1.4.5) spin of a particle B obtains an uncertainty along direction Oz (see Fig. 5.1.1) and therefore EPR-B paradox disappears. (ii) Whenever a measurement of the spin of a particle A is performed at instant t1 and particle A  is found in the state |z, i.e., a state | t1 A collapses at instant t1 to the state |z,A with respect of the Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations (1.4.5), then a state | t1 B  immediately collapses at instant t1 to the state |z,B  with respect of the Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations (1.4.5), and this is true independent of the distance in Minkowski spacetime that separates the particles, e.g., |t1 A col lapse  |z,A  |t1 B col lapse  |z,B. 5.2.27 In accordance with Heisenberg spin uncertainty relations (1.4.5) spin of a particle B obtains an uncertainty along direction Oz (see Fig. 5.1.1) and therefore EPR-B paradox disappears. V.2.4. Physical explanation of non-local influences using the relaxed principle of locality From the wave function of two entangled particles, we find spins, trajectories and also a wave function for each of the two particles. In this interpretation, the quantum particle has a local position like a classical particle, but it has also a non-local behavior through the wave function. So, it is the wave function that creates the non 180 classical properties. We can keep a view of a local realist world for the particle, but we should add a non-local vision through the wave function. As we saw in step 1, the non-local influences in the EPR-B experiment only concern the spin orientation, not the motion of the particles themselves. Indeed only spins are entangled in the wave function but not positions and motions like in the initial EPR experiment. This is a key point in the search for a physical explanation of non-local influences. V.3. EPR-B paradox resolution by using quantum mechanical formalism based on the probability representation of quantum states V.3.1. Preleminaries We remind now EPR-B argument [17] in original D. Bohm formulation: "The Hypothetical Experiment of Einstein, Rosen, and Podolsky. We shall now describe the hypothetical experiment of Einstein, Rosen, and Podolsky. We have modified the experiment somewhat, but the form is conceptually equivalent to that suggested by them, and considerably easier to treat mathematically. Suppose that we have a molecule containing two atoms in a state in which the total spin is zero and that the spin of each atom is /2. Roughly speaking, this means that the spin of each particle points in a direction exactly opposite to that of the other, insofar as the spin may be said to have any definite direction at all. Now suppose that the molecule is disintegrated by some process that does not change the total angular momentum. The two atoms will begin to separate and will soon cease to interact appreciably. Their combined spin angular momentum, however, remains equal to zero, because by hypothesis, no torques have acted on the system. Now, if the spin was a classical angular momentum variable, the interpretation of this process would be as follows: while the two atoms were together in the form of a molecule, each component of 181 the angular momentum of each atom would have a definite value that was always opposite to that of the other, thus making the total angular momentum equal to zero. When the atoms separated, each atom would continue to have every component of its spin angular momentum opposite to that of the other. The two spin-angularmomentum vectors would therefore be correlated. These correlations were originally produced when the atoms interacted in such a way as to form a molecule of zero total spin, but after the atoms separate, the correlations are maintained by the deterministic equations of motion of each spin vector separately, which bring about conservation of each component of the separate spin-angularmomentum vectors. Suppose now that one measures the spin angular momentum of any one of the particles, say No. 1. Because of the existence of correlations, one can immediately conclude that the angularmomentum vector of the other particle (No. 2) is equal and opposite to that of No. 1. In this way, one can measure the angular momentum of particle No. 2 indirectly by measuring the corresponding vector of particle No. 1. Let us now consider how this experiment is to be described in the quantum theory. Here, the investigator can measure either the x,y, or z component of the spin of particle No. 1, but not more than one of these components, in any one experiment. Nevertheless, it still turns out as we shall see that whichever component is measured, the results are correlated, so that if the same component of the spin of atom No. 2 is measured, it will always turn out to have the opposite value. This means that a measurement of any component of the spin of atom No. 1 provides, as in classical theory, an indirect measurement of the same component of the spin of atom No. 2. Since, by hypothesis, the two particles no longer interact, we have obtained a way of measuring an arbitrary component of the spin of particle No. 2 without in any way disturbing that particle. If we accept the definition of an element of reality suggested by ERP, it is clear that after we have measured  z for particle 1, then  z for particle 2 must be regarded as an element of reality; existing separately in 182 particle No. 2 alone. If this is true, however, this element of reality must have existed in particle No. 2 even before the measurement of  z at for particle No. 1 took place. For since there is no interaction with particle No. 2, the process of measurement cannot have affected this particle in any way. But now let us remember that, in each case, the observer is always free to reorient the apparatus in an arbitrary direction while the atoms are still in flight, and thus to obtain a definite (but unpredictable) value of the spin component in any direction that he chooses. Since this can be accomplished without in any way disturbing the second atom, we conclude that if criterion of ERP is applicable, precisely defined elements of reality must exist in the second atom, corresponding to the simultaneous definition of all three components of its spin. Because the wave function can specify, at most, only one of these components at a time with complete precision, we are then led to the conclusion that the wave function does not provide a complete description of all elements of reality existing in the second atom." Actually, most experiments have been performed using polarization of photons. The quantum state of the pair of entangled photons is not the singlet state.The polarization of a photon is measured in a pair of perpendicular directions. Relative to a given orientation, polarization is either vertical (denoted by V or by  ) or horizontal (denoted by H or by  ). The photon pairs are generated in the quantum state |EPRB   1 2 |Vs  |Vi  |Hs  |Hi 5.3.1 where |V and |H denotes the state of a single vertically or horizontally polarized photon, respectively, relative to a fixed and common reference direction for both particles.This state cannot be factored into a simple product of signal and idler states: |EPRB  |As  |Bi 5.3.2 for any choice of |As and |Bi . This means the state of one particle 183 cannot be specified without making reference to the other particle. Such particles are said to be entangled and |EPRB is an entangled state. If we measure the polarizations of signal and idler photons in the H,V basis there are two possible outcomes: both vertical or both horizontal. Each occurs half of the time. We could instead measure the polarizations with polarizers rotated by an angle  . We use the rotated polarization basis |V   cos|V  sin|H, |H   sin|V  cos|H, 5.3.3 where |V  describes a state with polarization rotated by  from the vertical, while |H  is  from the horizontal. In this basis the state is |EPRB   1 2 |V  |V   |H  |H . 5.3.4 Remark 5.3.1. After the signal photon is measured the idler is equally likely to be V or H . A measurement of its polarization, at any angle , finds V or H with probability PV ,  1 2 |V|V |2  1 2 |V|H |2   1 2 cos2    sin2    1 2 , PH ,  1 2 |H|V |2  1 2 |H|H |2  1 2 . 5.3.5 Remark 5.3.2. Let ,, be a measure space and f be a Borel function. Note that A   A fd,A   5.3.6 is a signed measure satisfying A  0  A. We say is absolutely continuous with respect to (w.r.t.) and write  ν . Theorem (Radon-Nikodym). Let X be a set, let  be a  -algebra of λ ν λ 184 subsets of X , let  be a  -nite measure defined on , and let  be a signed defined on . Suppose that   . Then there exists a function f : X   on X that is integrable w.r.t. the measure  and that satisfies Eq. (5.3.6) for all A  . Moreover any two functions with this property are equal almost everywhere (a.e.) on X. Remark 5.3.3. If X fdν  1 for any f ≥ 0 a. e. ν, then is a probability measure and f is called its probability density function (p.d.f.) w.r.t. . Remark 5.3.4. Remind that: (i) A random variable X is a measurable function from a probability space ,,P to the reals , i.e., it is a function X :    such that for every Borel set B  B : X1B  X  B  , where we use the shorthand notation X  B    |X  B and where B is Borel algebra of the all Borel subset B of . (ii) If X is a random variable, then for every Borel subset B of of ,X1B   and we can define a function on Borel sets by PXB  PX1B. 5.3.7 (iii) This function PX : B   is in fact a probability measure, and and ,B,X is a probability space. (iv) The measure PX is called the distribution of the random variable X . If X gives measure one to a countable set of reals, then X is called a discrete random variable. (v) Let X be a discrete random variable.Then the probability mass function fX : AA    0,1 for X is defined as fXx  P  |X  x. 5.3.8 The total probability for all hypothetical outcomes x : xA fXx  1. (vi) Let ,,P be a probability space mentioned above, see Remark 5.3.4. The distribution PX is often given in terms of the λ ν 185 cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) FX defined by FXx  PX  x. Remark 5.3.5. For any probability measure PX on ,B  corresponding to a random variable X (or to a c.d.f. FX ) if PX has a p.d.f. pX w.r.t. a measure P, then pX is also called the p.d.f. of FX or X w.r.t. P. Remark 5.3.6. (Discrete c.d.f. and p.d.f.). Let a1  a2 . . . an be a sequence of real numbers and let pi, i  1,2, . . . ,n be a sequence of positive numbers such that i1 n pi  1. Then Fx   i1 m pi ai  x  ai1 , i  1,2, . . . ,n  1 0   x  a1 5.3.9 is a stepwise c.d.f. It has a jump of size p i at each a i and is flat between a i and ai1 . Such a c.d.f. is called a discrete c.d.f. The corresponding probability measure PF is PFA  i|a iA pi,A  . 5.3.10 Remark 5.3.7. Remind that the counting measure  on a measurable space , is the positive measure A  |A| if A is finite  if A is infinite 5.3.11 for all A  Σ, where |A| denotes the cardinality of the set A. Let ν be the counting measure on . Then PFA   A fFdν  a iA fFai ,A  , 5.3.12 where fFai  pi, i  1,2, . . . . That is, fF is the p.d.f. of PF or F w.r.t. ν. Hence, any discrete c.d.f. has a p.d.f. w.r.t. counting measure. A p.d.f. w.r.t. counting measure is called a discrete p.d.f. 186 Definition 5.3.1. Let ,,P be a probability space and X is a discrete random variable X :   . The conditional probability of event A   given X,y is defined as PA|X  y  PA  X  y PX  y  P A  X 1y P X 1y , 5.3.13 where P X 1y  0. Definition 5.3.2. (I) Let X |V be a discrete random variable X |V :    with the probability mass function (see Remark 5.3.4.v) fX |V defined by fX |V x  1 2 if x  1 1 2 if x  0 5.3.14 Thus there exist: (i) 1,   such that 1,  XX |V 1 1 and P1,  1/2, (ii) 2,   such that 2  XX |V 1 0 and P2,  1/2, (iii) 1,  \2, mod,P  0. (II) Let X |H be a discrete random variable X |H :    such that   1,X |H  1  X |V. 5.3.15 Therefore 1,  XX |H 1 0,2,  XX |H 1 1 and the probability mass function f X |H is f X |H x  1 2 if x  1 1 2 if x  0 5.3.16 Remark 5.3.8. Let BM4 be a Boolean algebra of physical events in Minkowski spacetime and let M4 ph  BM4 ,P be measure algebra of 187 physical events in Minkowski spacetime, i.e., M4 ph that is a Boolean algebra BM4 with a probability measure P, see Chapter III subsection III.2, Definition 3.2.3. We remind that we denote such physical events by Ax,Bx, . . . etc., where x  t,x1 ,x2 ,x3   M4 or A,B, . . . etc., and we write for a short AOcx,BOcx, . . . iff there physical events Ax,Bx. . . were occured. Definition 5.3.3. Let  be the measurement operator corresponding to measurments the photon polarization (see Appendix A) in polarization basis |V , |H , see Eq. (5.3.3). Let A|A  ,, t  BM4 be a physical event which consists on performing a measurement with absolute certainty of the observable  at instant t. Remark 5.3.9. We assume that: (i) particle A is initially in the state |A    1 2 |V   |H , (ii) A|A  ,, t  M4 ph . Remark 5.3.10. Note that: (i) if there physical event A|A  ,, t was occurred then immediately after the measurement at the instant t a particle A will be in the state V A   |V  or in the state H A   |H , (ii) immediately after the measurement at the instant t the unconditional measure P collapses to the conditional measure P X AOc|A  ,, t  PX  AOc|A  ,, t PAOc|A  ,, t , 5.3.17 where X  M4 ph . Remark 5.3.11. Let A|A , t be a physical event which consists that a particle A at the instant t is in the state |A . Note that: (i) A Oc|A  ,, t  AOc VA , t  AOc HA , t, P X AOc|A  ,, t : 188 (ii) A Oc VA , t  AOc HA , t  M4 ph , (iii) from (i), (ii) and (5.3.17) it follows that: P X AOc|A  ,, t  P X A VA , t  PX  A VA , t PA VA , t 5.3.18 or P X AOc|A  ,, t  P X A HA , t  PX  A HA , t PA HA , t , 5.3.19 where X  M4 ph . Remark 5.3.12. We assume now that: (i) a measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P admits a representation  : M4 ph  ,B,PB  of the measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P in the measure algebra B  ,B,PB , such that (ii) PBX  P 1X for any X  B and (iii) for physical events A V A , t  M4 ph and A H A , t  M4 ph (see Remark 5.3.10) the following conditions hold AOc VA , t  1, 5.3.20 and AOc HA , t  2,, 5.3.21 where 1,  XX |V 1 1 and 2,  XX |H 1 1, see Definition 5.3.2. Remark 5.3.13. We note that the product of the noise in a polarization measurement in the polarization basis  V A , HA  and the polarization disturbance in the polarization basis  V A , H A  caused by that measurement should be no less than , : ,  1 2 |A  |,|A  |  0, 5.3.22 see Appendix A. Note that Heisenberg's noise-disturbance 189 uncertainty relation for the case of the polarization measurement is: for any apparatus A to measure an observable , the relation , |A  ,A, |A  ,A  1 2 |A  |,|A  |  , 5.3.23 holds for any input state |A   and any observable  , where ,A  ,A stands for the noise of the  measurement in the state A  using apparatus A and ,A  ,A stands for the disturbance of  in the state A  caused by apparatus A. We refer to the above relation as the Heisenberg noise-disturbance uncertainty relation in polarization measurements, see Appendix A. Remark 5.3.14. We use the rotated polarization basis |V , |H  with uncertainty   , |A  ,A |V   |V |        , |V   cos |V  sin|H, |H   |H |        , |H   sin |V  cos |H 5.3.24 where |V  describes states with polarization rotated by any     ,    from the vertical, while |H  is  from the horizontal. We abbreviate for short |V   cos   |V  sin   |H, |H   sin   |V  cos   |H, Remark 5.3.15. After the signal photon is measured the idler is equally likely to be V or H . A measurement of its polarization, at any angle   :           , finds V or H with probability 190 PV ,    1 2 |V |V |2  1 2 |V |H |2   1 2 cos2       sin2       1 2 , PH ,    1 2 |H |V |2  1 2 |H |H |2  1 2 . 5.3.25 where   , |A  ,A,   , A  ,A and A   1 2 |V   |H . Definition 5.3.4. (I) Let X |V  be a discrete random variable X |V  :    with the probability mass function (see Remark 5.3.4.v) fX V defined by fX V x  1 2 if x  1 1 2 if x  0 5.3.26 Thus there exist: (i) 1,   such that 1,  XX V 1 1 and P1,   1/2, (ii) 1,   such that 2,  XX V 1 0 and P2,   1/2, (iii) 1,  \2, mod,P  0. Thus there exist: (i) 1,   such that 1,  XX |V 1 1 and P1,   1/2, (ii) 2,   such that 2,  XX |V 1 0 and P2,   1/2, (iii) 1,  \2, mod,P  0. (III) Let X |H  be a discrete random variable X |H  :    such that   1, X |H   1  X |V . 5.3.27 Therefore 1,  XX H 1 0,2,  XX H 1 1 and the probability mass function f X H is 191 f X H x  1 2 if x  1 1 2 if x  0 5.3.28 Remark 5.3.16. Let BM4 be a Boolean algebra of physical events in Minkowski spacetime and let M4 ph  BM4 ,P be a measure algebra of physical events in Minkowski spacetime, i.e., M4 ph that is a Boolean algebra BM4 with a probability measure P, see Chapter III subsection III.2, Definition 3.2.3. We remind that we denote such physical events by Ax,Bx, . . . etc., where x  t,x1 ,x2 ,x3   M4 or A,B, . . . etc., and we write for a short AOcx,BOcx, . . . iff there physical events Ax,Bx. . . were occured. Definition 5.3.5. Let  be the measurement operator corresponding to measurements of the photon polarization (see Appendix A) in the polarization basis |V , |H , see Eq. (5.3.3). Let A|A  ,,, t  BM4 be a physical event which consists of the performing a measurement (on the particle A at the instant t ) of the observable  with accuracy   , |A  ,A, where the particle A is initially in the state A  at the instant t. Here   ,,A stands for the noise of the A measurement in the state  using apparatus A and   ,,A stands for the disturbance of  in the state  caused by apparatus A. Remark 5.3.17. We assume that: (i) the particle A is initially in the state |A    1 2 |V   |H , (ii) A|A  ,,, t  M4 ph . Remark 5.3.18. Note that: (i) if the physical event A|A  ,,, t was occurred then immediately after the measurement at the instant t the particle A would be in the state V A   |V  or in the state 192 H A   |H , (ii) immediately after the measurement at the instant t unconditional measure P collapses to conditional measure P X A Oc|A  ,,, t : P X AOc|A  ,,, t  PX  AOc|A  ,,, t PAOc|A  ,,, t , 5.3.29 where X  M4 ph . Remark 5.3.19. Let A|A , t be a physical event which consists of that a particle A at the instant t is in the state |A . Note that: (i) A Oc|A  ,,, t  AOc V A , t  AOc H A , t, (ii) A Oc V A , t  AOc H A , t  M4 ph , (iii) from (i), (ii) and (5.3.17) it follows that: P X AOc|A  ,,, t  PX  A V A , t PA V A , t 5.3.30 or P X AOc|A  ,,, t  PX  A H A , t PA H A , t , 5.3.31 where X  M4 ph . Remark 5.3.20. We assume now that: (i) a measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P admits a representation  : M4 ph  ,B,PB  of the measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P in the measure algebra B  ,B,PB , such that (ii) PBX  P 1X for any X  B and (iii) for physical events A V A , t  M4 ph and A H A , t  M4 ph (see Remark 5.3.18) the following conditions hold 193 AOc V A , t  X |V A 1 1  1, 5.3.32 and AOc H A , t  X |H A 1 1  2,, 5.3.33 where 1,  XX V 1 1 and 2,  XX |H 1 1. V.3.2. The EPR-B Paradox Resolution Remind that in the well-known Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedanken experiment with photons (Fig. 5.3.1), a source emits pairs of photons in a nonfactorizing state: |EPRB   1 2 |V 1  |V 2  |H 1  |H 2 . 5.3.34 After the particles have been space-like separated, one performs correlated measurements of their polarizations along arbitrary directions a and b . Two photons in a singlet state are space-like separated. The linear polarizations of photon 1 and photon 2 are measured along a and b . Quantum mechanics predicts strong correlations between these measurements. Fig. 5.3.1. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedanken experiment with photons 194 Quantum mechanics predicts that by a measurement of the linear polarization of photon 1 using a noiseless measuring apparatus A one obtais definite outcome exactly only |V 1 or |H 1 . In the canonical Copenhagen interpretation QM predicts that the state |EPRB has collapsed, at the moment of measurement, from |EPRB to either |V 1  |V 2 or |H 1  |H 2 . Remark 5.3.21. The process described above seems to be nonlocal: the state changes instantly even though the particles could be space-like separated. We are accustomed to saying that this sort of instantaneous action at a distance is forbidden by relativity. Assume that the state |EPRB has collapsed to |V 1  |V 2 . Thus in the canonical Copenhagen interpretation result of the measurement of the polarizations of photon 1 predicts exactly the polarization of photon 2. This means that if we measure the linear polarization of photon 1 (using a noiseless measuring apparatus A) in any basis |V1 , |H2 the result will be completely random ( |V1 or |H1 with equal probability 1/2). Remark 5.3.22. However, there is a perfect correlation: whenever we measure with certainty the linear polarization of photon 1 with outcome say |V1 (using a noiseless measuring apparatus A) then we will measure with certainty (using a noiseless measuring apparatus B) the linear polarization of photon 2 exactly with outcome |V2 . Remark 5.3.23. We note that such a perfect correlation implies that the corresponding probability mass functions: f X |V1 , f X |H1 f X |V2 and f X |H2 (see Definition 5.3.2) are perfectly contracted for any , by the following equations: f X |V1 x  f X |V2 x, 5.3.35 and f X |H1 x  f X |H2 x, 5.3.36 195 where f X |H1 x  1  f X |V1 x. Now we go to prove that Eqs. (5.3.35) - (5.3.36) hold without any instantaneous action at a distance. Remark 5.3.24. We assume now that: (i) photon 1 is initially in the state |1    1 2 |V 1  |H 1 , (ii) A|1  ,, t  M4 ph , see Remark 5.3.9. If the measurement of the linear polarization of photon 1 (using a noiseless measuring apparatus A) was performed at the instant t , i.e., A Oc|A  ,, t after the measurement at the instant t the unconditional measure P collapses to the conditional measure P X AOc|1  ,, t  P X AOc|V 1 , t  PX  AOc|V 1 , t PA|V 1 , t 5.3.37 or collapses to the conditional measure P X AOc|1  ,, t  P X AOc|H 1 , t  P X  AOc HA 1 , t PA|H 1 , t , 5.3.38 where X  M4 ph , see Remark 5.3.19. Remark 5.3.25. We assume now that: (i) immediately after the measurement at the instant t the particle 1 is in the state |V 1 . In this case immediately after the measurement at the instant t the unconditional measure P collapses to the conditional measure P X A|V 1 , t which is given by P X AOc|V 1 , t  PX  AOc|V 1 , t PA|V 1 , t 5.3.39 where X  M4 ph , (ii) immediately after the measurement at the instant t the particle 1 is in the state |H 1 . In this case immediately after the measurement at the instant t the unconditional measure P collapses to the 196 conditional measure P X A Oc|V 1 , t given by P X AOc|H 1 , t  PX  AOc|H 1 , t PA|H 1 , t , 5.3.40 where X  M4 ph . (1) From Eq. (5.3.39) and Eq. (5.3.20) Eq. (5.3.21) we obtain P A|H 2 , t A Oc|V 1 , t  PA|H 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t PA|V 1 , t  PBA|H 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t PBA|V 1 , t  PB2,  1,  PB1,   PB PB1,   0. 5.3.41 Therefore A Oc|H 2 , t and A Oc|V 1 , t are mutually exclusive (disjoint) physical events, i.e., they cannot both occur simultaneously: AOc|H 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t  M4 ph . 5.3.42 (2) From Eq. (5.3.39) and Eq. (5.3.20) Eq. (5.3.21) we obtain P A|V 2 , t A Oc|V 1 , t  PA|V 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t PA|V 1 , t  PBA|V 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t PBA|V 1 , t  PB1,  1,  PB1,   PB1,  PB1,   1. 5.3.43 Therefore physical events A Oc|V 2 , t and A Oc|V 1 , t always occur simultaneously even particle 1 and particle 2 are space-like separated: AOc|V 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t. 5.3.44 (3) From Eq. (5.3.40) and Eq. (5.3.20) Eq.(5.3.21) we obtain 197 P A|H 2 , t A Oc|H 1 , t  PA|H 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t PA|H 1 , t  PBA|H 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t PBA|H 1 , t  PB2,  2,  PB1,   PB2,  PB2,   1. 5.3.45 Therefore physical events A Oc|H 2 , t and A Oc|H 1 , t always occur simultaneously even particle 1 and particle 2 are space-like separated: AOc|H 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t. 5.3.46 (4) From Eq. (5.3.40) and Eq. (5.3.20) Eq.(5.3.21) we obtain P A|V 2 , t A Oc|H 1 , t  PA|V 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t PA|H 1 , t  PBA|V 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t PBA|H 1 , t  PB1,  2,  PB2,   PB PB2,   0. 5.3.47 Therefore A Oc|H 2 , t and A Oc|V 1 , t are mutually exclusive (disjoint) physical events, i.e., they cannot both occur simultaneously: AOc|V 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t  M4 ph . 5.3.48 Remark 5.3.26. Under rigorous consideration using Heisenberg noise-disturbance uncertainty relation (see Appendix A) quantum mechanics predicts that by a measurement of the linear polarization of photon 1 using measuring apparatus A one obtains definite outcome exactly only |V 1 or |H 1 , where   ,1 ,A stands for the noise of the  measurement in state 1  using apparatus A, see Appendix A, Eq. (A.13). In the canonical Copenhagen interpretation QM predicts that the state |EPRB has collapsed, at the moment of the measurement, from |EPRB to either |V 1  |V 2 or |H 1  |H 2 . 198 Remark 5.3.27. However, there is a perfect correlation: whenever we measure with uncertainty  the linear polarization of photon 1 with outcome say |V 1 using measuring apparatus A then we will measure with uncertainty  (using a similar measuring apparatus B with ,1 ,A   ) the linear polarization of photon 2 exactly with outcome |V 2 . Remark 5.3.28. We note that such a perfect correlation implies that the corresponding probability mass functions: f X V 1 , f X H 1 f X V 2 and f X H 2 (see Definition 5.3.4) are perfectly contracted for any , by the following equations: f X V 1 x  f X V 2 x, 5.3.49 and f X H 1 x  f X H 2 x, 5.3.50 where f X H 1 x  1  f X V 1 x. Now we go to prove that Eqs. (5.3.49) - (5.3.50) hold without any instantaneous action at a distance. Remark 5.3.29. We assume now that: (i) photon 1 is initially in the state |1    1 2 |V 1  |H 1 , (ii) A|1  ,,, t  M4 ph , where   ,1 ,A stands for the noise of the  measurement in state 1  using apparatus A. If the measurement of the linear polarization of photon 1 using measuring apparatus A was performed at the instant t , i.e., AOc|A  ,,, t after the measurement at the instant t the unconditional measure P collapses to the conditional measure P X AOc|1  ,, t  P X AOc|V 1 , t  PX  AOc|V 1 , t PA|V 1 , t 5.3.51 199 or collapses to the conditional measure P X AOc|1  ,, t  P X AOc|H 1 , t  P X  AOc H A  1 , t PA|H 1 , t , 5.3.52 where X  M4 ph , see Remark 5.3.19. Remark 5.3.30. We assume now that: (i) immediately after the measurement at the instant t the particle 1 is in the state |V 1 . In this case immediately after the measurement at the instant t the unconditional measure P collapses to the conditional measure P X A|V 1 , t given by P X AOc|V 1 , t  PX  AOc|V 1 , t PA|V 1 , t 5.3.53 where X  M4 ph , (ii) immediately after the measurement at the instant t the particle 1 is in the state |H 1 . In this case immediately after the measurement at the instant t the unconditional measure P collapses to the conditional measure P X A Oc|H 1 , t given by P X AOc|H 1 , t  PX  AOc|H 1 , t PA|H 1 , t , 5.3.54 where X  M4 ph . (1) From Eq. (5.3.53) and Eq. (5.3.32) Eq.(5.3.33) we obtain P A|H 2 , t A Oc|V 1 , t  PA|H 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t PA|V 1 , t  PBA|H 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t PBA|V 1 , t  PB2,  1,  PB1,   PB PB1,   0. 5.3.55 Therefore A Oc|H 2 , t and A Oc|V 1 , t are mutually exclusive 200 (disjoint) physical events, i.e., they cannot both occur simultaneously: AOc|H 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t  M4 ph . 5.6.56 (2) From Eq. (5.3.39) and Eq. (5.3.20) Eq. (5.3.21) we obtain P A|V 2 , t A Oc|V 1 , t  PA|V 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t PA|V 1 , t  PBA|V 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t PBA|V 1 , t  PB1,  1,  PB1,    PB1,  PB1,   1. 5.3.57 Therefore physical events A Oc|V 2 , t and A Oc|V 1 , t always occur simultaneously even particle 1 and particle 2 are space-like separated: AOc|V 2 , t  A Oc|V 1 , t. 5.3.58 (3) From Eq. (5.3.40) and Eq. (5.3.20) Eq.(5.3.21) we obtain P A|H 2 , t A Oc|H 1 , t  PA|H 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t PA|H 1 , t  PBA|H 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t PBA|H 1 , t  PB2,  2,  PB1,   PB2,  PB2,   1. 5.3.59 Therefore physical events A Oc|H 2 , t and A Oc|H 1 , t always occur simultaneously even particle 1 and particle 2 are space-like separated: AOc|H 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t. 5.3.60 (4) From Eq. (5.3.40) and Eq. (5.3.20) Eq. (5.3.21) we obtain 201 P A|V 2 , t A Oc|H 1 , t  PA|V 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t PA|H 1 , t  PBA|V 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t PBA|H 1 , t  PB1,  2,  PB2,   PB PB2,   0. 5.3.61 Therefore A Oc|H 2 , t and A Oc|V 1 , t are mutually exclusive (disjoint) physical events, i.e., they cannot both occur simultaneously: AOc|V 2 , t  A Oc|H 1 , t  M4 ph . 5.3.62 Definition 5.3.6. Let  be the measurement operator corresponding to measurements of the photon polarization (see Appendix A) in the polarization basis |V , |H  and let  be the measurement operator corresponding to measurements of the photon polarization in the polarization basis |V, |H see Eq.(1.3.3). We assume that particle 1 is initially in the state |1  . Let A|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t  BM4 be a physical event which consists of: (i) performing a measurement (on particle A at instant t ) of the observable  with accuracy   , |A  ,A, where particle A is initially in the state A  at the instant t, (ii) immediately after the measurement on particle 1 at the instant t the particle 1 is in the state 1  , (iii) performing a measurement (on particle 1 at the instant t ) of the observable  with accuracy   , |A  ,A particle A obtains disturbance   , 1  ,A of the observable  in the state 1   caused by apparatus A. Definition 5.3.7. (I) Let X V,  be a discrete random variable X V, :    with the probability mass function (see Remark 5.3.4.v) fX V, defined by 202 fX V, x  1 2 if x  1 1 2 if x  0 5.3.63 Thus there exist: (i) 1,,   such that 1,,  XX V, 1 1 and P1,,   1/2, (ii) 1,,   such that 2,,  XX V, 1 0 and P2,,   1/2, (iii) 1,,  \2,, mod,P  0. Thus there exist: (i) 1,,   such that 1,,  XX V, 1 1 and P1,,   1/2, (ii) 2,,   such that 2,,  XX V, 1 0 and P2,,   1/2, (iii) 1,,  \2,, mod,P  0. (II) Let X H,  be a discrete random variable X H, :    such that   1,,  X H,   1  X V,  . 5.3.64 Therefore 1,,  XX H, 1 0,2,,  XX H, 1 1 and the probability mass function f X H, is f X H, x  1 2 if x  1 1 2 if x  0 5.3.65 Remark 5.3.31. Let BM4 be a Boolean algebra of physical events in Minkowski spacetime and let M4 ph  BM4 ,P be a measure algebra of physical events in Minkowski spacetime, i.e., M4 ph that is a Boolean 203 algebra BM4 with a probability measure P, see Chapter III subsection III.2, Definition 3.2.3. We remind that we denote such physical events by Ax,Bx, . . . etc., where x  t,x1 ,x2 ,x3   M4 or A,B, . . . etc., and we write for a short AOcx,BOcx, . . . iff the physical events Ax,Bx. . . were occurred. Remark 5.3.32. We assume that: (i) particle 1 is initially in the state |1    1 2 |V   |H , (ii) A|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t  M4 ph . Remark 5.3.33. Note that: (i) if the physical event A|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t was occurred then immediately after the measurement at the instant t particle 1 will be in the state V, 1  |V,  or in the state H, 1  |H, , (ii) immediately after the measurement at the instant t unconditional measure P collapses to conditional measure P X AOc|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t : P X AOc|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t   PX  AOc|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t PAOc|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t , 5.3.66 where X  M4 ph . Remark 5.3.34. Let A|1 , t be a physical event which consists of that at the instant particle 1 is in the state |1 . Note that: (i) A Oc|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t  AOc V, 1 , t  AOc H, 1 , t , (ii) A Oc V, 1 , t  AOc H, A , t  M4 ph , (iii) from (i), (ii) and (5.3.66) it follows that: P X AOc|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t  P X  A V, 1 , t P A V, 1 , t 5.3.67 or t 204 P X AOc|1  ,,; 1  ,,, t  P X  A H, 1 , t P A H, 1 , t , 5.3.68 where X  M4 ph . Remark 5.3.35. We assume now that: (i) a measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P admits a representation  : M4 ph  ,B,PB  of the measure algebra M4 ph  BM4 ,P in the measure algebra B  ,B,PB , such that (ii) PBX  P 1X for any X  B and (iii) for physical events A V, 1 , t  M4 ph and A H, 1 , t  M4 ph (see Remark 5.3.33) the following conditions hold  AOc V, 1 , t  X V, A 1 1  1,, 5.3.69 and  AOc H, 1 , t  X H, 1 1 1  2,, , 5.3.70 where 1,,  XX V, 1 1 and 2,,  XX H, 1 1. Remark 5.3.36. We assume now that: (i) immediately after the measurement at the instant t particle 1 is in the state |V, 1 . In this case immediately after the measurement at the instant t unconditional measure P collapses to conditional measure P X A |V, 1 , t given by P X AOc |V, 1 , t  P X  AOc |V, 1 , t P A |V, 1 , t 5.3.71 where X  M4 ph , (ii)immediately after the measurement at the instant t particle 1 is in 205 the state |H 1 . In this case immediately after the measurement at the instant t unconditional measure P collapses to conditional measure P X A Oc |H, 1 , t given by P X AOc |H, 1 , t  P X  AOc |H, 1 , t P A |H, 1 , t , 5.3.72 where X  M4 ph . (1) From Eq. (5.3.71) and Eq. (5.3.69) - (5.3.70) we obtain P A |H, 2 , t A Oc |V, 1 , t  P A |H, 2 , t  A Oc |V, 1 , t P A |V, 1 , t  PB  A |H, 2 , t   A Oc |V, 1 , t PB  A |V, 1 , t  PB2,,  1,,  PB1,,   PB PB1,,   0. 5.3.73 Therefore A Oc |H, 2 , t and A Oc |V, 1 , t are mutually exclusive (disjoint) physical events, i.e., they both cannot occur simultaneously: AOc |H, 2 , t  A Oc |V, 1 , t  M4 ph . 5.3.74 (2) From Eq. (5.3.71) and Eq. (5.3.69) Eq.( 5.3.70) we obtain P A |V, 2 , t A Oc |V, 1 , t  P A |V, 2 , t  A Oc |V, 1 , t P A |V, 1 , t  PB  A |V, 2 , t   A Oc |V, 1 , t PB  A |V, 1 , t  PB1,,  1,  PB1,,   PB1,,  PB1,,   1. 5.3.75 206 Therefore physical events A Oc|V 2 , t and A Oc|V 1 , t always occur simultaneously even particle 1 and particle 2 are space-like separated: AOc |V, 2 , t  A Oc |V, 1 , t . 5.3.76 (3) From Eq. (5.3.72) and Eq. (5.3.69) - (5.3.70) we obtain P A |H, 2 , t A Oc |H, 1 , t  P A |H, 2 , t  A Oc |H, 1 , t P A |H, 1 , t  PB  A |H, 2 , t   A Oc |H, 1 , t PB  A |H, 1 , t  PB2,,  2,  PB1,,   PB2,  PB2,,   1. 5.3.77 Therefore physical events A Oc|H 2 , t and A Oc|H 1 , t always occur simultaneously even particle 1 and particle 2 are space-like separated: AOc |H, 2 , t  A Oc |H, 1 , t . 5.3.78 (4) From Eq. (5.3.40) and Eq. (5.3.20) Eq. (5.3.21) we obtain P A |V, 2 , t A Oc |H, 1 , t  P A |V, 2 , t  A Oc |H, 1 , t P A |H, 1 , t  PB  A |V, 2 , t   A Oc |H, 1 , t PB  A |H, 1 , t  PB1,,  2,,  PB2,,   PB PB2,,   0. 5.3.79 207 Therefore A Oc |H, 2 , t and A Oc |V, 1 , t are mutually exclusive (disjoint) physical events, i.e., they both cannot occur simultaneously: AOc |V, 2 , t  A Oc |H, 1 , t  M4 ph . 5.3.80 208 Chapter VI SCHRӦDINGER'S CAT MEASURED SPIN. SCHRӦDINGER'S CAT PARADOX RESOLUTION VI.1. Stern-Gerlach experiment revisited In 1922, by studying the deflection of a beam of silver atoms in a strongly inhomogeneous magnetic field (Fig. 6.1.1) Otto Stern and Walter Gerlach obtained an experimental result that contradicts the common sense prediction: the beam, instead of expanding, splits into two separate beams giving two spots of equal intensity N and N on a detector, at equal distances from the axis of the original beam. Historically, this is the experiment which helped establish spin quantization. Theoretically, it is the seminal experiment posing the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics. Fig. 6.1.1. Schematic configuration of the Stern-Gerlach experiment. Adapted from [19] z,y, t|t0   0z,y  1 0z2 0y. 6.1.1 209 We assume now that both density 0z and 0y is very narrow, in fact constrained such that 1 0z  1 0z,  0 iff |x| , 2 0y  2 0y,  0 iff |y| , 6.1.2 and 1 0z  1 0z,  2 00 2 1 4 e  z 2 4 0 2 cos 0 2 ei 0 2 sin 0 2 ei 0 2 iff |z| , 1 0z, 2 2  1; 2 0y  2 0y,  2 00 2 1 4 e  y 2 4 0 2 iff |y| , 2 0y, 2 2  1 0  1. 6.1.3 Silver atoms contained in the oven E (Fig. 6.1.1) are heated to a high temperature and escape through a narrow opening. A second aperture, T, selects those atoms whose velocity, v0 , is parallel to the y-axis. The atomic beam crosses the gap of the electromagnet A1 before condensing on the P1 detector. Before crossing the electromagnet, the magnetic moment of each silver atom is oriented randomly (isotropically). In the beam, we represent each atom by its wave function; one can assume that at the entrance to the electromagnet, A1 , and at the initial time t  0, each atom can be approximatively described by a quasi-Gaussian spinor in plain z,y given by Eqs. (6.1.1-6.1.3) corresponding to a pure state. As it will be proved later the variable y will be treated strictly quasiclassically, i.e. almost classically, with P y  vyv0 ,0 t    1, P y  vyv0 ,0 t    0 6.1.4 and 0  0   104m, where 0  corresponds to the size of the slot T along the z-axis and where the expression of the functions vy v0 ,0  210 and vy v0 ,0  will be given later. The approximation by a quasi-Gaussian initial spinor will allow explicit calculations. Because the slot is much wider along the x axis, the variable z will be also treated strictly quasiclassically with P z  z  vzu,0 t    1, P z  vzu,0 t    0, 6.1.5 where the expression of the functions vz u,0 ,u  BB0  t m will be given later. In order to obtain an explicit solution of the SternGerlach experiment, we take for the silver atom, we have m  1.8  1025kg,v0  500 m/s (corresponding to the temperature T  1000°K). In Eq. (6.1.3.) and in Fig. 6.1.2., 0 and 0 are the polar angles characterizing the initial orientation of the magnetic moment, 0 corresponds to the angle with the z-axis. The experiment is a statistical mixture of pure states where the 0 and the 0 are randomly chosen: 0 is drawn in a uniform way from 0, and that 0 is drawn in a uniform way from 0,2. Fig. 6.1.2. Orientation of the magnetic moment θ0 and φ0 are the polar angles characterizing the spin vector in the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation. Adapted from [19] 211 Assumption 6.1.1. We assume that a particle collapses in a magnetic field B at some instant t  by two particles, i.e. the spinor z,y, t collapses in a magnetic field B at some instant t  by two spinors z,y, t, t , and z,y, t, t , given by Eq. (6.1.9a) Eq .(6.1.9b). Note that such a collapse obviously occurs except spinors such that: 2 1  z  z   x , etc. Remark 6.1.1. Note that the standard assumption consists of that spinor collapses on detector P1 with respect to the Born rule. Thus the evolution of the spinor z,y, t, t    z,y, t, t   z,y, t, t   in a magnetic field B is then given by the nonlocal Pauli equation: i  dzdy  dt z,y, t, t   t  dzdy  dt z,y, t, t   t     2 2m  dt  dzdy z,y, t, t   z,y, t, t    B  dt  dzdyB z,y, t, t   z,y, t, t   6.1.6 where B  e 2me is the Bohr magneton and where   x,y,z corresponds to the three Pauli matrices. Remark 6.1.2. First the particle enters an electromagnetic field B directed along the z-axis, Bx  B0  x,By  0,Bz  B0  B0  z, with B0  5 Tesla, B0   Bz  10 3 Tesla/m over a length l  1 cm. Remark 6.1.3. In exiting the magnetic field, the both particles are free until they reach the detector P1 placed at distance D  20 cm. The particles stay within the magnetic field for a time t with t  lv0 . 6.1.7 Assumption 6.1.2. We assume now for simplification that 212 t   t. 6.1.8 Thus during this time t  0, t   0,t, the spinor z,y, t, t , is: z,y, t, t ,  z,y, t, t , z,y, t, t ,  z, t, t ,y, t, t , z, t, t ,y, t, t , , 6.1.9.a where z, t, t ,  cos 0 2 ei 0 2 20 2 1 2 exp  z  BB0  2m t2 2 40 2  exp i BB0  tz  B 2 B0 2 6m t3  BB0 t  0.50  iff z  BB0  2m t2  , z, t,  0 iff z  BB0  2m t2  , z, t, t ,  isin 0 2 ei 0 2 20 2 1 2 exp  z  BB0  2m t2 2 40 2  exp i BB0  tz  B 2 B0 2 6m t3  BB0 t  0.50  iff z  BB0  2m t2  , z, t, t ,  0 iff z  BB0  2m t2  ; y, t, t ,  20 2 1 2 exp  y  v0 t 2 40 2 iff |y  v0 t| , y, t, t ,  0 iff |y  v0 t|  . 6.1.9.b After the magnetic field, at time t  t t  0 in the free space, the both spinors become: z,y, t  t ,  z,y, t  t,  z, t  t,y, t  t, 6.1.10 213 and z,y, t  t ,  z,y, t  t,  z, t  t,y, t  t,. 6.1.11 Here z, t  t,  cos 0 2 20 2 1 2 exp  z  z  ut 2 40 2 ei muz  iff |z  z  ut |  , 0 iff |z  z  ut |   6.1.12 and z, t  t,  sin 0 2 20 2 1 4 exp  z  z  ut 2 40 2 ei muz  iff |z  z  ut |  , 0 iff |z  z  ut |  , 6.1.13 and y, t,  20 2 1 4 exp  y  v0t  t 2 40 2 iff |y  v0t  0 t| , y, t,  0 iff |y  v0t  t| . 6.1.14 where z  BB0  t2 2m , u  BB0  t m . 6.1.15 From Eq. (6.1.10) Eq. (6.1.12) and Eq. (6.1.14) we obtain z,y, t  t,  cos 0 2 20 2 1 2 exp  z  z  ut 2 40 2 ei muz   exp  y  v0t  t 2 40 2 iff |z  z  ut |   and |y  v0t  t|  0 otherwise 6.1.16 From Eq. (6.1.16) by the postulate for the probability density with respect to observable z we obtain the expression 214 c |z, t  20 2 1 2 exp  z 0   z  ut 2 20 2 iff z 0   z  ut   0 otherwise 0   cos2 0 2 6.1.17 and with respect to observable y we obtain the expression c |y, t  20 2 1 2 exp  y 0   v0t  t 2 40 2 iff y 0   v0t  t   0 otherwise 0   cos2 0 2 6.1.18 and therefore the corresponding particle moves by the strictly quasiclassical law P zt  z  vzu,0 t    1, P zt  z  vzu,0 t    0, P yt  vyv0 ,0 t  t    1, P yt  vyv0 ,0 t  t    0, z   0  z , vz 0   0  u,vy 0   0  v0 . 6.1.19 From Eq. (6.1.11), Eq. (6.1.13) and Eq. (6.1.14) we obtain 215 z,y, t  t,  sin 0 2 20 2 1 4 exp  z  z  ut 2 40 2 ei muz   exp  y  v0t  t 2 40 2 iff |z  z  ut |   and |y  v0t  0 t|  0 otherwise 6.1.20 From Eq. (6.1.20) by the postulate for the probability density with respect to observable z we obtain the expression c |z, t  20 2 1 2 exp  z 0   z  ut 2 20 2 iff z0   z  ut   0 otherwise 0   sin2 0 2 6.1.21 and with respect to observable y we obtain the expression c |y, t  20 2 1 2 exp  y 0   v0t  t 2 40 2 iff y 0   v0t  0 t   0 otherwise 0   sin2 0 2 6.1.22 and therefore the corresponding particle moves by the strictly quasiclassical law P zt  z  vzu,0 t    1, P zt  z  vzu,0 t    0, P yt  vyv0 ,0 t  t    1, P yt  vyv0 ,0 t  t    0, z   0  z , vz u,0   0  u,vy v0 ,0   0  v0 . 6.1.23 216 All interpretations are based on the Eq. (6.1.18) - (6.1.21). One deduce from Eq. (6.1.18) - (6.1.21) the probability density of a pure state in the free space after the electromagnet: 0z,y, t  t  20 2 1 2 0z, t  0 t  exp  y 0   v0t  t 2 40 2 ; 0z, t  t  20 2 1 2 cos2 0 2 20 2 1 2 exp   z 0   z  ut2 20 2  sin2 0 2 20 2 1 2 exp   z0   z  ut2 40 2 . 6.1.24 The decoherence time tdec, where the two spots N and N are separated, is then given by the equation: tdec  30  z u0   0    30  zu . 6.1.25 This decoherence time is usually the time required to diagonalize the marginal density matrix 0 S t, of spin variables associated with a pure state 0 S t,  |z,y, t  t,|2dzdy z,y, t  t,z,y, t  t,dzdy z,y, t  t,z,y, t  t,dzdy |z,y, t  t,|2dzdy 6.1.26 For t  tdec , the product z,y, t  t,z,y, t  t, is null and the density matrix 0 S t, is diagonal. We then obtain atoms with a spin oriented only along the z -axis (positively or negatively). Let us consider the spinor z,y, t  t, given by Eq. (6.1.10) - (6.1.15). Remark 6.1.4. Experimentally, we do not measure the spin directly, but the z position of the particle impact on the detector P1 (Fig.6.1.3.). 217 Fig. 6.1.3. Silver atom impacts on the detector P1. Adapted from [19] Remark 6.1.5. Note that if we measure the z -position of the particle at the instant t, we also measure the y -position of the particle at the same instant t. Remark 6.1.6. Let PtD  ,D,yt be the probability of obtaining the result y t  at the instant t, lying in the range D  ,D on measuring observable y in respect to spinor z,y, t  t,. From Eq. (6.1.19) we obtain PtD  ,D  ,yt   1 iff yt  D and yt  vyv0 ,0 t  t  . 6.1.27 From Eq. (6.1.27) it follows that: 218 PtD  ,D  ,yt   1 if t  tD  D vy v0 ,0   D v0 cos 2 0 2 . 6.1.28 Remark 6.1.7. Let Pt  z   ,  z   ,zt  be the probability of obtaining the result zt  at the instant t, lying in the range   z   ,  z   ,  z   N on measuring observable z in respect to spinor z,y, t  t,. From Eq.(6.1.19) we obtain Pt  z   ,  z   , zt    1 iff zt  z  and |zt  z  vzu,0 t |  . 6.1.29 From Eq. (6.1.29) it follows that: Pt  z   ,  z   , zt    1 if t  tz     z  vz u,0    z  ucos2 0 2 . 6.1.30 Remark 6.1.8. Note that from Remark 6.1.6 it follows that t  z   tD and therefore from Eq. (6.1.28) and Eq. (6.1.30) one obtains  z  ucos2 0 2  D v0 cos 2 0 2   z  u  D v0 6.1.31 as it should be, because the equality  z  u  D v0 is required by the condition of the Stern-Gerlach experiment. Remark 6.1.9. Let PtD  ,D,yt be the probability of obtaining the result y t  at the instant t, lying in the range D  ,D on measuring observable y in respect to spinor z,y, t  t,. From Eq. (6.1.23) we obtain 219 PtD  ,D  ,yt   1 iff yt  D and yt  vyv0 ,0 t  t  . 6.1.32 From Eq. (6.1.32) it follows that: PtD  ,D  ,yt   1 if t  tD  D vy v0 ,0   D v0 sin 2 0 2 . 6.1.33 Remark 6.1.10. Let Pt  z   ,  z   ,zt  be the probability of obtaining the result zt  at the instant t, lying in the range   z   ,  z   ,  z   N on measuring observable z in respect to spinor z,y, t  t,. From Eq.(6.1.32) we obtain Pt  z   ,  z   , zt    1 iff zt  z  and |zt  z  vzu,0 t |  . 6.1.34 From Eq. (6.1.29) it follows that: Pt  z   ,  z   , zt    1 if t  tz    |  z  | vz u,0   |  z  | u sin2 0 2 . 6.1.35 Remark 6.1.11. Note that from Remark 6.1.5 it follows that tz   tD and therefore from Eq. (6.1.33) and Eq. (6.1.35) one obtains |  z  | usin2 0 2  D v0 sin 2 0 2   z  u  D v0 6.1.36 as it should be, because the equality |  z  | u  D v0 is required by the condition of the Stern-Gerlach experiment. 220 VI.2. Schrödinger's cat which measures spin. Schrödinger's cat paradox resolution Another known in literature special sort of the Schrödinger cat paradox can be simply illustrated with the famous Stern-Gerlach experiment (Fig. 6.1.1). Silver atoms boiled off from a furnace are sent through a non-uniform magnetic field, and impinge on a photographic plate. Instead of a continuous distribution of spots, one sees two spots, corresponding to spin up and spin down relative to the magnetic field axis. Each atom goes up OR down, but one cannot predict which in any given run the results of the experiment are probabilistic. There is a 50% chance of an atom going up, and a 50% chance that it will go down. Fig. 6.1.4. Stern-Gerlach experiment. Adapted from [20] Remark 6.2.1. We remind that from the point of view of the Schrödinger equation of the quantum theory, this result has no any rigorous explanation. Remark 6.2.2. In the quantum theory, the state of the particle is described by its wave function, and the Schrödinger equation says that at a post-measurement final time t f , the wave function is related to that at a pre-measurement initial time t i , by known deterministic relation 221 t f   Ut f , t i t i , Ut f , t i   exp iHt f  t i  with the transition unitary operator U completely specified by the Hamiltonian H . To explain what is observed, the Schrödinger equation must be supplemented by the reduction postulate and the Born rule. This state that the wave function only gives a description of probabilities when a measurement is made, with the probabilities for an 'up' outcome and a 'down' outcome given by the squares of the coefficients of the corresponding components in the initial wave function t i , with the sum of the 'up' and 'down' probabilities equal to one. The reduction postulate and the Born rule are an add-on to the Schrödinger equation. According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger equation is applied when a microscopic system, the silver atom, is time-evolving in isolation. But when the atom interacts with a macroscopic measuring apparatus, as in the Stern-Gerlach setup, you have to use the reduction postulate and the Born rule. Fig. 6.1.5. The Stern-Gerlach apparatus with a Schrödinger cat as the outcome registration. Adapted from [20] 222 Remark 6.2.3. This situation leads to puzzles that have been debated for over eighty years. If quantum mechanics describes the whole universe, then why can't one use the Schrödinger equation to describe the system consisting of the silver atom plus the measuring apparatus? But we never see a superposition state of the atom plus apparatus. This is the Schrödinger's famous cat paradox. Arrange the experiment so that an up outcome triggers a mechanism that kills the cat, while a down outcome keeps the cat alive. Of course we don't do this, but if we were to do it, we would always see a live cat OR a dead one, never a superposition of the two (Fig. 6.1.5). So we have the problem of definite outcomes: where does the either or dichotomy arises? Let us consider again the Schrödinger's cat which measures spin by using the Stern-Gerlach apparatus, see (Fig. 6.1.4). When a measurement is made, with the up outcome Schrödinger's cat is dead. When a measurement is made, with the down outcome Schrödinger's cat is alive. As it is known many years that conventional QM with canonical explanation of the Stern-Gerlach experiment cannot give predicable and definite outcomes for Schrödinger's cat which measures spin. Theorem 6.2.1. Any spinor z,y, t, t   z,y, t, t   6.2.1 given by Eq. (6.1.9a) - (6.1.9b) with 0 such that cos 0 2  0 always kills the Schrödinger's cat at the instant t : t  D v0 cos 2 0 2 . 6.2.2 Proof. Immediately from Eq. (6.1.31) and Eq. (6.1.36). 223 Chapter VII THE BELL INEQUALITIES REVISITED One of the Bell's assumptions in the original derivation of his inequalities was the hypothesis of locality, i.e., the absence of the influence of two remote measuring instruments on one another. That is why violations of these inequalities observed in experiments are often interpreted as a manifestation of the nonlocal nature of quantum mechanics, or a refutation of a local realism. In [1], [2] Bell's inequality was derived in its traditional form, without resorting to the hypothesis of locality and without the introduction of hidden variables, the only assumption being that the probability distributions are nonnegative. This can therefore be regarded as a rigorous proof that the hypothesis of locality and the hypothesis of existence of the hidden variables not relevant to violations of Bell's inequalities. The physical meaning of the obtained results is examined. Physical nature of the violation of the Bell inequalities is explained (see VII.2) under EPR-B nonlocality postulate. VII.1. Bell theorem without the hypothesis of locality and without the introduction of hidden variables VII.1.1. Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality In a typical Bell experiment, two systems which may have previously interacted for instance they may have been produced by a common source are now spatially separated and are each measured by one of two distant observers, Alice and Bob (see Fig.7.2.1). Alice may choose one out of several possible measurements to perform on her system and we let x denote her measurement choice. For instance, x may refer to the position of a knob on her measurement apparatus. Similarly, we let y denote 224 Bob's measurement choice. Once the measurements are performed, they yield outcomes a and b on the two systems. Remark 7.1.1. The actual values assigned to the measurement choices x,y and outcomes a,b are purely conventional; they are mere macroscopic labels distinguishing the different possibilities. Remark 7.1.2. From one run of the experiment to the other, the outcomes a and b that are obtained may vary, even when the same choices of measurements x and y are made. Assumption 7.1.1. These outcomes a and b are thus in general governed by a Kolmogorovian probability distribution pab|xy, which can of course depend on the particular experiment being performed. By repeating the experiment a sufficient number of times and collecting the observed data, one can get a fair estimate of such Kolmogorovian probabilities [3]-[4]. Assumption 7.1.2. When such an experiment is actually performedsay , by generating pairs of spin 1/2 particles and measuring the spin of each particle in different directions it will in general be found that pab|xy  pa|xpb|y, 7.1.1 implying that the outcomes on both sides are not statistically independent of each other. Even though the two systems may be separated by a large distance – and may even be space-like separated the existence of such correlations is nothing mysterious. In particular, it does not necessarily imply some kind of direct influence of one system on the other, for these correlations some dependence relation between the two systems which was established when they interacted in the past may simply reveal. This is at least what one would expect in a local theory. 225 Let us formulate the idea of a local theory more precisely. Assumption 7.1.3. The assumption of locality implies that we should be able to identify a set of past factors, described by some variables λ, having a joint causal influence on both outcomes, and which fully account for the dependence between a and b. Once all such factors have been taken into account, the residual indeterminacies about the outcomes must now be decoupled, that is, the Kolmogorovian probabilities for a and b should factorize: pab|xy,  pa|x,pb|y,. 7.1.2 Remark 7.1.3. This factorability condition simply expresses that we have found an explanation according to which the probability for a only depends on the past variables and on the local measurement x , but not on the distant measurement and outcome, and analogously for the probability to obtain b . The variable will not necessarily be constant for all runs of the experiment, even if the procedure which prepares the particles to be measured is held fixed, because may involve physical quantities that are not fully controllable. The different values of across the runs should thus be characterized by a probability distribution qλ. Combined with the above factorability condition, we can thus write pab|xy    dqpa|x,pb|y,, 7.1.3 where we also implicitly assumed that the measurements x and y can be freely chosen in a way that is independent on , i.e., that qλ|x,y  qλ . This decomposition now represents a precise condition for locality in the context of Bell experiments. Remark 7.1.4. Note that no assumptions of determinism or of a classical behaviour are being involved in the condition (7.1.3): we λ λ λ λ λ 226 assumed that a (and similarly b ) is only probabilistically determined by the measurement x and the variable , with no restrictions on the physical laws governing this causal relation. Locality is the crucial assumption behind (7.1.3). In relativistic terms, it is the requirement that events in one region of space-time should not influence events in space-like separated regions. Let us consider for simplicity an experiment where there are only two measurement choices per observer x,y  0,1 and where the possible outcomes take also two values labelled a,b  1,1. Let axby  be the expectation value of the product ab for given measurement choices x,y : axby   a,b abpab|xy. 7.1.4 Consider the following expression S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 , 7.1.5 which is a function of the probabilities pab|xy. If these probabilities satisfy the locality decomposition (7.1.3), we necessarily have that S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1   2, 7.1.6 which is known as the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [5]. To derive this inequality, we can use (7.1.3) in the Definition (7.1.4) of axby , which allows us to express this expectation value as an average axby     dqdqax by  7.1.7 of a product of local expectations λ 227 ax   a apa|x, 7.1.8 and by   b bpb|y, 7.1.9 taking values in 1,1. Inserting these expressions (7.1.7) - (7.1.9) in Eq. (7.1.5), we can write S    dqS, 7.1.10 where S  a0 b0   a0 b1   a1 b0   a1 b1 . 7.1.11 Since a0 , b0   1,1, this last expression is smaller than Sλ  Sλ  Sλ   |b0   b1  |  |b0   b1  |. 7.1.12 Without loss of generality, we can assume that b0   b1   0 which yields Sλ  2b0   2 and thus S  2. Consider now the quantum predictions for an experiment in which the two systems measured by Alice and Bob are two qubits in the singlet state   1 2 |01  |10, where we have used the shortcut notation |ab  |a |b, and where |0 and |1 are conventionally the eigenstates of σz for the eigenvalues 1 and 1 respectively. Let the measurement choices x and y be associated with vectors x and y corresponding to measurements of x  σ on the first qubit and of y  σ on the second qubit, where σ  σ1 ,σ2 ,σ3 denotes the Pauli 228 vector. According to the quantum theory we (then) have the expectations axby    x y . Let the two settings x  0,1 correspond to measurements in the orthogonal directions  e 1 and  e 2 respectively and the settings y  0,1 to measurements in the directions  1 2 e1   e2 and 1 2 e1   e2 . We then have a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   1 2 and  a1b1    1 2 whence S  2 2 7.1.13 in contradiction with CHSH inequality (7.1.6). VII.1.2. Clauser Horne Inequality Suppose that some observable of the two particles is registered as a count in a detector. If the composite state consists of two photons, the detector registers a hit if the polarization is along some direction. The inequality will be determined by counting. There will be a total of N events, with N1a counts in detector 1 when it is set to select a and N2b counts in detector 2 when it is set to select b. The number of coincidences of the two detectors with settings a and b respectively is N12a,b. The probabilities are p1a  N1a N ,p2  b  N2b N ,p12  a  N12a,b N . 7.1.14 Remember that in the Bell formulation, the hidden variable determined absolutely the value of the polarization for a particular measurement. Then 229 p1a   dwp1a,,p2b   dwp2b,, p12a,b,  p1a,p2b,, p12a,b   dwp1a,p2b,. 7.1.15 Remind that for any four real numbers x,x ,y,y  0,1 the inequality holds xy  xy  x y  x y  x   y. 7.1.16 We denote now x  p1a,,y  p2b,,x   p1a,,y  p2b,, 7.1.17 and substitute into inequality (7.1.16) we get p1a,p2b,  p1a,p2b,  p1a,p2b,  p1a,p2b,   p1a,  p2b,. 7.1.18 Next multiplying by w and integrating over all  we get p12a,b  p12a,b  p12a,b  p12a,b  p1a  p2b. 7.1.19 Consider now the quantum predictions for an experiment with 2 photons. An atomic s-state with zero total angular momentum and even parity decays in two steps. Photon 1 is emitted in the E1 transition from the S-state to a P -state with m  1,0. Photon 2 is emitted in the second E1 transition to the ground state. The initial state of the atom also has zero angular momentum and even parity. Therefore the photons which are emitted back to back have the same helicity, so that their total angular momentum is zero. 230 The two photons have different energies, 1 and 2 . The helicity of each of the photons is determined by the intermediate state. If the intermediate state is m  1 then the helicity of both photons is odd and if m  1 then the helicities are even. The energy of the intermediate state is degenerate. There is no magnetic field that might split the energies of the m  1,0 levels. The final pure photon state is therefore the linear combination |  1 2 |1 |1  |1 |1. 7.1.20 It will be more interesting if the measurements of the photon polarizations are in the linear basis. Then we can look for correlations of the measurement of linear polarization by detector 1 along a and by 2 along b. So let us write | in the linear polarization basis. The linear and circular polarization bases are related according to |x,y,k   1 2 |1  i|1 7.1.21 and |x,y,k   1 2 |1  i|1. 7.1.22 Thus we can rewrite |  1 2 |x 1  |x 2  |y1  |y2 . 7.1.23 Evidently if detector 1 measures horizontal polarization then so will detector 2, etc. In general we want to measure the correlation p121 ,2 , that is the probability that we get a count on detector 1 with polarization axis 1 coincident with a count in detector 2 with polarization axis 2 . The observable is the operator 231 1 ,2   |1 1 |2 21 |12 |2 . 7.1.24 Assume now that 1 ,2   1  2 , 7.1.25 since there is zero angular momentum in the final state, there is rotation symmetry so the observable can only depend on the difference of the polarization angles. The expectation value of  is 1  2   |1  2 |  1 2 x |1x |2  y|1y|2 |1 1 |2 21 |12 |2|x 1 |x 2  |y1 |y2 . 7.1.26 Note that x|  cos, y|  sin. Finally one obtains 1  2   14 1  cos21  2 . 7.1.27 The Clauser Horne inequality is N12a,b  N12b,a  N12a,b  N12a,b N1a  N2b  1. 7.1.28 Assume now that a,b,a,b are all separated by the angle  then N12  N12  N12  N123 N1a  N2b  3N12  N123 N1a  N2b  1. 7.1.29 Next relate coincidences to expectation values. Note that N12  N||. As regards the singles counts N1a and N2b , we know that the number of counts must be independent of the direction of a  or b and that for any direction N1  1 2 N , since half the photons will be polarized along and direction. Therefore the 232 inequality (7.1.29) becomes   3 4 1  cos2  1 4 1  cos6 1 2  1 2  1 2  3 4 cos2  1 4 cos6  1. 7.1.30 The inequality (7.1.30) is maximally violated if    8 :   8  1 2  3 2 4  1 2 2  1.2 7.1.31 which is not less than 1. VII.1.3. Violation of Bell's inequality under strict Einstein locality conditions The assumption of locality in the derivation of Bell's theorem requires that the measurement processes of the two observers are space-like separated (Fig. 7.1.1). This means that it is necessary to freely choose a direction for analysis, to set the analyzer and finally to register the particle such that it is impossible for any information about these processes to travel via any (possibly unknown) channel to the other observer before he, in turn, finishes his measurement. Selection of an analyzer direction has to be completely unpredictable which necessitates a physical random number generator. A numerical pseudo-random number generator can not be used, since its state at any time is predetermined. Furthermore, to achieve complete independence of both observers, one should avoid any common context as would be conventional registration of coincidences as in all previous experiments. Rather the individual events should be registered on both sides completely independently and compared only after the measurements are finished. This requires independent and highly accurate time bases on both sides. In our experiment for the first time any mutual influence between the two observations is excluded within the realm of Einstein locality. 233 To achieve this condition the observers Alice and Bob were spatially separated by 400 m across the Innsbruck university science campus. In [5] polarization entangled photon pairs which were sent to the observers through optical fibers were used. About 250 m of each 500 m long cable was laid out and the rest was left coiled at the source. This, we remark, has no influence on the timing argument because the optical elements of the source and the locally coiled fibers can be seen as jointly forming the effective source of the experiment (Fig. 7.1.1). Remark 7.1.5. The difference in fiber length was less than 1m which means that the photons were registered simultaneously within interval 5ns. Fig. 7.1.1. Spacetime diagram of Bell experiment [5] Selecting a random analyzer direction, setting the analyzer and finally detecting a photon constitute the measurement process. This 234 process on Alice's side must fully lie inside the shaded region which is, during Bob's own measurement, invisible to him as a matter of principle. For setup this means that the decision about the setting has to be made after point "X" if the corresponding photons are detected at spacetime points "Y" and "Z" respectively. In this experiment the measurement process (indicated by a short black bar) including the choice of a random number only took less than a tenth of the maximum allowed time. The vertical parts of the kinked photon world lines emerging from the source represent the fiber coils at the source location. The source of polarization entangled photon pairs is degenerate type-II parametric down-conversion where a BBO-crystal was pumped with 400 mW of 351nm light from an Argon-ion-laser. A telescope was used to narrow the UV-pump beam, in order to enhance the coupling of the 702 nm photons into the two single mode glass fibers. On the way to the fibers, the photons passed a half-wave plate and the compensator crystals necessary to compensate for in-crystal birefringence and to adjust the internal phase of the entangled state |  1/ 2|H1 |V2  e i |V1 |H2 , which was chosen   . Remark 7.1.6. The horizontal and the vertical polarization jointly define a basis denoted by  z, which can take on the values |H or |V . The modulation systems (high-voltage amplifier and electro-optic modulator) had a frequency range from DC to 30 MHz. In operating the systems at high frequencies a reduced polarization contrast of 97% (Bob) and 98% (Alice) was observed. This, however, is no real depolarization but merely reflects the fact that we are averaging over the polarization rotation induced by an electrical signal from the high-voltage amplifier, which is not of perfectly rectangular shape. 235 Fig. 7.1.2. One of the two observer stations [5] A random number generator is driving the electro-optic modulator. Silicon avalanche photodiodes are used as detectors. A time tag is stored for each detected photon together with the corresponding random number 0 or 1 and the code for the detector + or corresponding to the two outputs of the Wollaston prism polarizer. All alignments and adjustments were pure local operations that did not rely on a common source or on communication between the observers. The actual orientation for local polarization analysis was determined independently by a physical random number generator. This generator has a light-emitting diode (coherence time tc  10 fs) illuminating a beam splitter whose outputs are monitored by photomultipliers. The subsequent electronic circuit sets its output to 0(1) upon receiving a pulse from photomultiplier 0(1). Remark 7.1.7. Events where both photomultipliers register a photon within △t ≤ 2 ns are ignored [5]. 236 Fig. 7.1.3. (i) t1 t2 = 0, (ii) t1 t2 = δ > 0, (iii) t1 t2 = -δ < 0 A down-converter (one way to produce an entangled pair) throws two entangled photons 1 and 2 in opposite directions. Polarization of the photons 1 and 2 is measured by polarizers I and II respectively. Remark 7.1.8. Assume that photon 1 collapses in polarizer I at instant t1 and photon 2 collapses in polarizer II at instant t2 respectively. Note that in general case t1  t2 even if photons 1 and 2 were registered simultaneously (within 5ns interval, see Remark 7.1.5). Notice that obviously there exist only three possibilities: (i) t1  t2  0, (ii) t1  t2  min    0, (iii) t1  t2  min    0. We have chosen here min  const  . The resulting binary random number generator has a maximum toggle frequency of 500 MHz. By changing the source intensity the mean interval was adjusted to about 10 ns in order to have a high primary random bit rate. Certainly this kind of random-number generator is not necessarily evenly distributed. For a test of Bell's inequality it is, however, not necessary to have perfectly even distribution, because all correlation functions are normalized to the total number of events for a certain combination of the analyzers' settings. Still, we kept the distribution even to within 2% in order to obtain an approximately equal number of samples for each setting. The distribution was adjusted by equalizing the number of counts of the two photomultipliers through changing their internal photoelectron amplification. Due to the limited speed of the 237 subsequent modulation system it was sufficient to sample this random number generator periodically at a rate of 10 MHz. There are many variants of Bell's inequalities. In G. Weihs, T. Jennewein experiment [5] a version first derived by Clauser et al. [4] (CHSH) was used since it applies directly to Zeilinger's experimental configuration. The number of coincidences between Alice's detector i and Bob's detector j is denoted by C ij, with i, j  , where  and  are the directions of the two polarization analyzers and  and  denote the two outputs of a two-channel polarizer respectively. If we assume that the detected pairs are a fair sample of all pairs emitted, then the normalized expectation value E, of the correlation between Alice's and Bob's local results is E,  C,  C,  C,  C,/N, 7.1.32 where N is the sum of all coincidence rates. Remark 7.1.9. We define now: (i) Cij ,  Cij,, t1 , t2 , where t1  t2  0; (ii) Cij ,  Cij,, t1 , t2 , where t1  t2  ; (iii) Cij ,  Cij,, t1 , t2 , where t1  t2  . Remark 7.1.10. Note that C ij,  C ij ,  C ij ,  C ij ,. 7.1.33 In a rather general form the CHSH inequality reads S,,,  |E,  E,|  |E,  E,|  2. 7.1.34 Quantum theory predicts a sinusoidal dependence for the coincidence rate C QM,  sin2   7.1.35 238 on the difference angle of the analyzer directions in Alice's and Bob's experiments. The same behavior can also be seen in the correlation function EQM,  cos2  . 7.1.36 Thus, for various combinations of analyzer directions ,,, these functions violate CHSH inequality. Maximum violation is obtained using the following set of angles Smax QM  SQM0, 45, 22.5, 67.5  2 2  2.82  2. 7.1.37 If, however, the perfect correlations (    0 or 90  ) have a reduced visibility V ≤ 1 then the quantum theoretical predictions for E and S are reduced as well by the same factor independent of the angle. Thus, because the visibility of the perfect correlations in this experiment was about 97% and was expected S to be not higher than 2.74 if alignment of all angles is perfect and all detectors are equally efficient. Various measurements with the described setup were performed [5]. The data presented in Fig. 7.1.4 are the result of a scan of the DC bias voltage in Alice's modulation system over a 200 V range in 5 V steps. At each point a synchronization pulse triggered a measurement period of 5 s on each side. From the timetag series we extracted coincidences after all measurements had been finished. Fig. 7.1.4 shows four of the 16 resulting coincidence rates as functions of the bias voltage. Each curve corresponds to a certain detector and a certain modulator state on each side. A nonlinear χ2 fit showed perfect agreement with the sine curve predicted by quantum theory. Visibility was 97% as one could have expected from the previously measured polarization contrast. No oscillations in the singles count rates were found. We want to stress again that the accidental coincidences have not been subtracted from the plotted data. 239 Fig. 7.1.4. Four out of sixteen coincidence rates between various detection channels as functions of bias voltage (analyzer rotation angle) on Alice's modulator. A+1/B−0, for example, are the coincidences between Alice's "+" detector with switch having been in position "1" and Bob's "−" detector with switch position "0". The difference in height is explained by different efficiencies of the detectors In order to give quantitative results for the violation of Bell's inequality with better statistics, experimental runs were performed with the settings 0, 45 for Alice's and 22.5,67.5 for Bob's polarization analyzer. A typical observed value of the function S in 240 such a measurement was S 2.73  0.02 for 14700 coincidence events collected in 10s. This corresponds to a violation of the CHSH inequality of 30 standard deviations assuming only statistical errors. If we allow for asymmetries between the detectors and minor errors of the modulator voltages this result agrees very well with the quantum theoretical prediction. VII.1.4. CHSH theorem without the hypothesis of locality One of the Bell's assumptions in the original derivation of his inequalities was the hypothesis of locality, i.e., of the absence of the influence of two remote measuring instruments on one another. That is why violations of these inequalities observed in experiments are often interpreted as a manifestation of the nonlocal nature of quantum mechanics, or a refutation of local realism. In [1, 2], CHSH inequality was derived in its traditional form, without resorting to the hypothesis of locality, the only assumption being that the probability distributions are nonnegative. This can therefore be regarded as a rigorous proof that the hypothesis of locality is not relevant to violations of CHSH inequalities. Let A,A,B,B be random variables with values in the set 1,1, i.e., A  1,A  1,B  1,B  1. 7.1.38 Assume that there exist joint probability distribution functions WA,A,B,B, of A,A,B,B defining probabilities for each possible set of outcomes such that: (i) PA,A,B,B  0,PA,B,B  0,PA,B,B  0,etc., 7.1.39 241 (ii)  A,A ,B,B  PA,A ,B,B   1,  A,A ,B,B  PA,B,B   1,  A,A ,B,B  PA ,B,B   1,etc., 7.1.40 (iii) PA,A ,B,B   PA,A ,B,B   PA ,B,B   PA,A ,B,B , PA,A ,B,B   PA,A ,B,B   PA ,B,B   PA,A ,B,B , etc. 7.1.41 From (7.1.41) one obtains 0  PA,B,B   PA,A ,B,B   PA,A ,B,B   PA ,B   PA ,B  PA ,B   PB  PA ,B. 7.1.42 Similarly one obtains 0  PA,B,B   PA,B  PA,B,B   PA  PA,B  PA,B   PA,B,B  7.1.43 and therefore PA,B,B  PA  PA,B  PA,B . 7.1.44 From (7.1.42) and (7.1.44) we obtain 0  PA,B,B   PA,B,B   PA ,B   PB  PA ,B  PA  PA,B  PA,B  7.1.45 and therefore 0  PA ,B   PB  PA ,B  PA  PA,B  PA,B    PA  PB  PA,B  PA ,B  PA,B   PA ,B . 7.1.46 242 From (7.1.46) one obtains A,A,B,B   PA,B  PA,B  PA,B   PA,B   PA  PB  0. 7.1.47 Note that PB,B  PB  PB,B 7.1.48 and PB,B  PB  PB,B  1  PB  PB,B. 7.1.49 From (7.1.49) and (7.1.48) we obtain PB,B  1  PB  PB  PB,B . 7.1.50 Note that 0  PA,B,B  PB,B   PA,B,B . 7.1.51 Inserting (7.1.43) and (7.1.50) into (7.1.51) we obtain 0  1  PA  PB  PB   PA,B  PA ,B  PA,B   PB,B   PA,B,B   1  PA  PB  PB   PA,B  PA ,B  PA,B,B . 7.1.52 Note that PA,B,B   PA,A ,B,B   PA,A ,B,B   PA ,B  PA ,B    PA ,B  PB   PA ,B . 7.1.53 From (7.1.53) we obtain 243 0  1  PA  PB  PB  PA,B  PA,B  PA,B  PA,B. 7.1.54 From (7.1.54) and (7.1.47) we obtain 1  A,A,B,B  0. 7.1.55 Note that the following representation of the quantities AB, AB, AB , AB  holds AB  PAB   PAB   PAB   PAB , etc., 7.1.56 where PAB   PA  1,B  1,PAB   PA  1,B  1,etc. 7.1.57 From (7.1.56) and (7.1.57) we obtain AB  A B  AB   A B                     . 7.1.58 From (7.1.55) we obtain 2            0 7.1.59 and 0            2. 7.1.60 From (7.1.59) and (7.1.60) we obtain 2                      2. 7.1.61 244 From (7.1.58) and (7.1.61) finally we obtain |AB  AB  AB   AB |  2. 7.1.62 VII.1.5. CHSH theorem without the introduction of hidden variables A hidden-variable theory is the traditional, but not unique, basis for constructing various types of Bell's theorem. The starting point may also be a recognition of the existence of a positive-definite probability distribution function. This assumption alone is used to formulate and prove Bell's paradoxes of different types [6, 7]. Let A,A,B,B be random variables with values in the set 1,1, i.e., A  1,A  1,B  1,B  1. 7.1.63 Assume that there exists joint probability distribution function PA,A,B,B of A,A,B,B defining probabilities for each possible set of outcomes such that: PA,A,B,B   0, 7.1.64 and  A,A ,B,B  PA,A ,B,B   1, 7.1.65 and PA,A,B,B  PA,A,B,B   PA,B,B . 7.1.66 245 Let us consider Bell inequality of the form   1 2 |AB  A B  AB   A B |  1. 7.1.67 It is well known [1], [6] that under assumptions (7.1.64)-(7.1.66) Bell inequality is directly provable without any reference to Kolmogorov probability space ,,P. We abbreviate now for short [1, 6]: P1  PA,A ,B,B      PA  1,A   1,B  1,B  1, P2  PA,A ,B,B      PA  1,A   1,B  1,B  1, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P16  PA,A ,B,B      PA  1,A   1,B  1,B  1. 7.1.68 For the quantities AB, AB, AB  and A B  using Eq. (7.1.68) one obtains the representatives AB  PAB   PAB   PAB   PAB , etc., 7.1.69 where PAB   PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B    , etc. 7.1.70 Substituting Eq. (7.1.69) into the expression AB  AB  AB   AB  one obtains 246   1 2 AB  A B  AB   A B   PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B      PA,A ,B,B    . 7.1.71 From (7.1.64) - (7.1.65) it obviously follows that 1    1, and therefore Bell inequality (7.1.67) holds. VII.2. Physical nature of the violation of the Bell inequalities VII.2.1. Physical interpretation of the Bell test experiment under EPR-B nonlocality postulate Actually, most experiments have been performed using polarization of photons. The quantum state of the pair of entangled photons is not the singlet state. The polarization of a photon is measured in a pair of perpendicular directions. Relative to a given orientation, polarization is either vertical (denoted by V or by ) or horizontal (denoted by H or by ). The photon pairs are generated in the quantum state |EPR   1 2 |Vs  |Vi  |Hs  |Hi , 7.2.1 where |V and |H denote the state of a single vertically or horizontally polarized photon, respectively (relative to a fixed and common reference direction for both particles) and subscripts s and i indicate signal or idler photon respectively. 247 The source S produces pairs of "photons" sent in opposite directions. Each photon encounters a two-channel polariser whose orientation (a or b) can be set by the experimenter. Emerging signals from each channel are detected and coincidences of four types (  , ,  and  ) are counted by the coincidence monitor. This state cannot be factored into a simple product of signal and idler states: |EPR  |As  |Bi for any choice of |As and |Bi . This means the state of one particle cannot be specified without making reference to the other particle. Such particles are said to be "entangled" and |EPR  is an entangled state. If we measure the polarizations of signal and idler photons in the H,V basis there are two possible outcomes: both vertical or both horizontal. Each occurs half of the time. We could instead measure the polarizations with polarizers rotated by an angle  . We use the rotated polarization basis |V   cos|V  sin|H, |H   sin|V  cos|H. 7.2.2 Here |V  describes a state with polarization rotated by  from the vertical, while |H  is  from the horizontal. In this basis the state is |EPR   1 2 |V s|V i  |H s|H i . 7.2.3 Remark 7.2.1. We will denote the events corresponding to coincidences (at the instant t ) of four types  , , ,  on the coincidence monitor by symbols ,; t,,; t,,; t,,; t or by symbols a,b;t,a,b;t,a,b;t,a,b;t respectively or simply a,b,a,b,a,b,a,b . 248 Fig. 7.2.1. Scheme of a "two-channel" Bell test Remark 7.2.2. Clearly, if we measure in this rotated basis we get the same results: half the time both are |V  and half of the time both are |H . Knowing this, we can measure the signal polarization and infer with certainty the idler polarization. This is the situation EPR described, but we have used polarizations instead of position and momentum. Remark 7.2.3. Note that there is an uncertainty relationship between polarizations in different bases. Knowledge of a photon polarization after the measurement such a polarization in the V0  ,H0  basis implies complete uncertainty of its polarization in the V45  ,H45  basis, for example. 249 Fig. 7.2.2. Schematic of experimental setup [8] Symbols: LD Laser Diode, CL Collimating Lens, BF Blue Filter, BA Beam Aperture, LP Laser Polarizer, QP Quartz Plate, MI Mirror, CR Downconversion Crystals, RA Rail, PA Polarizer A, PB Polarizer B, ID Iris Diaphragm, RF Red Filter, FL Focusing Lens, CA Cage Assembly, DA Detector A, DB Detector B, ST Beam Stop. Figure 7.2.2 shows a schematic of an experimental setup to produce polarization entangled photons [8]. A 5 mW free-running InGaN diode laser produces a beam of violet (405 nm) photons which passes through a blue filter, a linear polarizer, and a birefringent plate before reaching a pair of beta barium borate (BBO) crystals. In the crystals, a small fraction of the laser photons spontaneously decays into pairs of photons by the process of spontaneous parametric downconversion (SPD). In a given decay the downconverted photons emerge at the same time and on opposite sides of the laser beam. The detectors, two single-photon counting modules (SPCMs), are preceded by linear polarizers and red filters to block any scattered laser light. Even so, it is necessary to use coincidence detection to separate the downconverted photons from the background of other photons reaching the detectors. Because the photons of a downconverted pair are produced at the same time 250 they cause coincident, i.e., nearly simultaneous, firings of the SPCMs. Coincidences are detected by a fast logic circuit and recorded by a personal computer. The detection components (SPCMs, irises, lenses and filters) are mounted on rails which pivot about a vertical axis passing through the crystals. This allows the detection of SPD photons at different angles with minimal realignment. The rails were positioned at A  B  2.5 and the focusing lenses adjusted for maximum singles rates. With the irises fully open and polarizers both set to vertical, more than 300 counts per second were observed [8]. Fig. 7.2.3. Two-crystal down conversion source The crystals are 0.1 mm thick and in contact face-to-face, while the pump beam is approximately 1 mm in diameter. Thus the cones of downconverted light from the two crystals overlap almost completely. These BBO crystals are cut for Type I phase matching, which means that the signal and idler photons emerge with the same polarization, which is orthogonal to that of the pump photon. Each crystal can only support downconversion of one pump polarization. The other polarization passes through the crystal unchanged. We 251 use two crystals, one rotated 90 from the other, so that either pump polarization can downconvert according to the rules |Vp  |Hs|Hi, |Hp  expi|Vs|Vi. 7.2.4 where  is a phase due to dispersion and birefringence in the crystals. The geometry is shown schematically in Figure 7.2.3. To create an entangled state, we first linearly polarize the laser beam at an angle  l from the vertical and then shift the phase of one polarization component by  l with the birefringent quartz plate. The laser photons (pump photons) are then in the state |pump   cos l|Vp  expi lsin l|Hp 7.2.5 when they reach the crystals. The downconverted photons emerge in the state |DC  cos l|Hs|Hi  expisin l|Vs|Vi 7.2.6 where    l   is the total phase difference of the two polarization components [8]. Remark 7.2.4. This state is an entangled state and is already quite adjustable. Further modifications can be made with ordinary optical components. For example, if  l  /4 ,    then a half-wave plate in the signal beam could be used to switch the signal polarization |Hs  |Vs to produce |DC    |Vs|Hi  |Hs|Vi/ 2 . By placing polarizers rotated to angles  and  in the signal and idler paths, respectively, we measure the polarization of the downconverted photons. For a pair produced in the state |DC , the probability of coincidence detection is 252 PVV,  |V |sV |i|DC| 2 . 7.2.7 The VV subscripts on P indicate the measurement outcome VV , both photons vertical in the bases of their respective polarizers. More generally, for any pair of polarizer angles ,, there are four possible outcomes, VV,VH,HV and HH indicated by VV,VH,HV and HH, respectively. Using the basis of equation (7.2.2), we find PVV,  |sinsincos l  expicoscossin l | 2 7.2.8 or PVV,  sin2sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  14 sin2sin2sin2 l cos. 7.2.9 A special case occurs when |DC  |EPR , i.e., when  l  /4 and   0. In this case PVV,  12 cos 2  , 7.2.10 which depends only on the relative angle    . The last term in Eq. (7.2.9) is a cross term which accounts for the interference between the H,H and V,V parts of the state. The  in this term is, through its dependence on  , a complicated function of pump photon wavelength, signal photon wavelength and angle as well as crystal characteristics. Because the laser has a finite line width and we collect photons over a finite solid angle and wavelength range, we collect a range of  . To account for this, we replace cos by its average cos  cosm to get PVV,  sin2sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  14 sin2sin2sin2 l cosm 7.2.11 In the experiment, a fixed interval T of data acquisition (typically in the range 0.5 seconds to 15 seconds) was chosen and the number of coincidences N, during that interval was recorded [8]. 253 Assuming a constant flux of photon pairs, the number collected will be N,  A sin2sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  14 sin2sin2sin2 l cosm  C 7.2.12 where A is the total number of entangled pairs produced and C is an offset to account for imperfections in the polarizers and alignment of the crystals. This is necessary to account for the fact that some coincidences are observed even when the polarizers are set to   0,  90  . Remark 7.2.5. We emphasize that (7.2.9) and (7.2.10) hold iff the measurements on photon ν 1 and photon ν 2 occur simultaneously, i.e., photon ν 1 and photon ν 2 collapse in polarizers I and II respectively at an instant t  t1  t2 , t  0,T, (see Remark 7.1.8) and we will denote such events by ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  or simply ν1 ,ν2. Remark 7.2.6. We will denote such entangled pairs of photons also by ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  or simply ν1 ,ν2 and we will denote the total number of entangled pairs ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  produced during interval T by AT . The number of coincidences during interval T corresponding exactly to entangled pairs ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  we will denote by NT ,. We rewrite now Eq. (7.2.11) in the following form: PVV  ,| ν 1 t1 ,ν 2 t2   PVV  , t1 ;, t2 | ν 1 t1 ,ν 2 t2   sin2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  14 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm 7.2.13 254 Remark 7.2.7. Note that PVV  , t1 ;, t2 | ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  is the conditional probability of the event ,; t (see Remark 7.2.1) under condition that the event ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  was occured at instant t  t1  t2 . We rewrite now Eq. (7.2.12) in the following form: NT ,  AT  sin2sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  14 sin2sin2sin2 l cosm  C1 7.2.14 Remark 7.2.8. Let us now consider the complete set of probabilities pa, t1 ;b, t2  of joint detections of ν 1 and ν 2 in the channels  or  of polarisers I or II, in orientations a and b, see Fig. 7.2.4. The canonical Quantum Mechanical predictions for the the joint detection probabilities are pa, t1 ;b, t2   pa, t1 ;b, t2   12 cos 2a,b, pa, t1 ;b, t2   pa, t1 ;b, t2   12 sin 2a,b, t1  t2 . 7.2.15 We emphasize that (7.2.15) holds iff the measurements on photon ν 1 and photon ν 2 occur simultaneously, i.e., iff photon ν 1 and photon ν 2 collapse in polarizers I and II respectively at instant t  t1  t2 , see Remark 7.1.8. Remark 7.2.9. Suppose now that the measurement on photon ν 1 occurs first, at instant t1 , and gives the result , with the polarizer I in the orientation a and therefore the measurement on photon ν 2 occurs at instant t2 , where t1  t2    0, (see Remark 7.1.8) and we will denote such events (i.e., if photon ν 1 collapses in polarizer I at instant t1 and photon ν 2 collapses in polarizer II at instant t2 , where t1 , t2  0,T respectively) by ν 1 t1 ,ν2 t2 , or simply ν1 ,ν2. 255 Remark 7.2.10. We will denote such entangled pairs of photons also by ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2 , t1 , t2  0,T, or simply ν1 ,ν2. Fig. 7.2.4. Schematic of the experiment testing EPR non-locality. (i) 1 2 0t t  , (ii) 1 2 0t t    , (iii) 1 2 0t t     Entangled photons from the source are sent to two fast switches, that direct them to polarizing detectors. The switches change settings very rapidly, effectively changing the detector settings for the experiment while the photons are in flight. ν1 ,ν2  describing the pair is obtained by projection of the initial state vector |ν1 ,ν2   1 2 |x,x  |y,y, where |x  and |y are linear polarizations states, onto the eigenspace associated to the result  : this two dimensional eigenspace has a basis |a,x, |a,y. Using the corresponding projector, one finds after a little algebra ν1 ,ν2   |a,a. 7.2.16 This means that (i) immediately after the first measurement, photon ν 1 takes the polarization |a: this is obvious because it has been measured with a polarizer oriented along a , and the result  has been found, (ii) the distant photon ν 2 , which has not yet interacted with any polarizer, at instant t1 has also been projected exactly into 256 the state |a with a well defined polarization, parallel to the one found for photon 1 . Remark 7.2.11. Note that the standard Heisenberg's uncertainty principle predicts that if the polarization of the photon ν 2 along the direction a becomes certainty, i.e., known exactly, all information about the polarization of the photon ν 2 along the direction b becomes uncertainty, i.e., it will be completely lost. In order to overcome this problem we apply Heisenberg's noise disturbance uncertainty relation, see Appendix A. This relation is generally formulated as follows: for any apparatus A to measure an observable A, the relation A,,AB,,A  1 2 ||A,B|| 7.2.17 holds for any input state  and any observable B, where A,,A stands for the noise of the A measurement in state  using apparatus A and B,,A stands for the disturbance of B in state  caused by apparatus A. From (7.2.17) one obtains a ,12 ,PIb,12 ,PI  12 |12 |a ,b |12 |, 7.2.18 where the measurement operators a and b measure the polarization in the a -direction and b-direction respectively and where |12   |ν1 ,ν2 . Remark 7.2.12. Note that after the measurement on the photon ν 1 along the direction a the polarization of the photon ν 1 along the direction b obtains finite uncertainty b  b,12 ,PI. Thus for the joint detection probabilities pa, t1 ;b, t2  instead classical Eq. (7.2.15) by using the weak postulate of nonlocality, 257 (see subsection I.4.1) we obtain p  a, t1 ;b, t2   p a, t1 ;b, t2   12 cos 2a a ,b b , p  a, t1 ;b, t2   p a, t1 ;b, t2   12 sin 2a a ,b b . 7.2.19 Where a  a ,12 ,PI, t1  t2    0. Remark 7.2.13. Suppose now that the measurement on photon ν 2 occurs first, at instant t2 , and gives the result , with the polarizer I in the orientation a and therefore the measurement on photon ν 1 occurs at instant t1 , where t1  t2    0, (see Remark 7.1.8) and we will denote such events (i.e., if photon ν 1 collapses in polarizer I at instant t1 and photon ν 2 collapses in polarizer II at instant t2 respectively, where t1  t2    0, t1 , t2  0,T ) by ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  or simply ν1 ,ν2. Remark 7.2.14. We will denote such entangled pairs of photons by ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2 , t1 , t2  0,T or simply ν1 ,ν2. Remark 7.2.15. Note that after the measurement on the photon ν 2 along the direction b the polarization of the photon ν 1 along the direction a obtains finite uncertainty a  a ,12 ,PII. Thus for the joint detection probabilities p a, t1 ;b, t2  instead classical Eq.(7.2.15) by using the weak postulate of nonlocality, (see subsection I.4.1) we obtain p  a, t1 ;b, t2   p a, t1 ;b, t2   12 cos 2a a ,b b, p  a, t1 ;b, t2   p a, t1 ;b, t2   12 sin 2a a ,b b , 7.2.20 258 where b  b,12 ,PII, t1  t2    0. Remark 7.2.16. Note that similarly as above, instead Eq. (7.2.11) and Eq. (7.2.12) we obtain: (I) PVV  ,  PVV  , t1 ;, t2   |V |sV |i|DC| 2 , 7.2.21 PVV  ,  PVV  , t1 ;, t2   sin2  sin2cos2 l  cos2  cos2 sin2 l  14 sin2  sin2sin2 l cosm 7.2.22 where t1  t2    0 and NT ,  AT sin2   sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2   sin2sin2 l cosm  C2  AT sin2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm  AT C,, l,m ,,  C2 , 7.2.23 where AT  is the total number of entangled pairs ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  produced during interval T and NT , is the number of coincidences corresponding to entangled pairs ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  produced during interval T. Remark 7.2.17. Note that PVV  , t1 ;, t2 | ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  is the conditional probability of the event ,; t2 (see Remark 7.2.1) under condition that the event ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  was occurred at instant t  t2 . (II) PVV  ,  PVV  , t1 ;, t2   |V |sV |i|DC| 2 , 7.2.24 259 PVV  ,  PVV  , t1 ;, t2   sin2  sin2cos2 l  cos2  cos2 sin2 l  14 sin2  sin2sin2 l cosm 7.2.25 where t1  t2    0 and NT ,  AT sin2   sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2   sin2sin2 l cosm  C3  AT sin2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm  AT C,, l,m ,,   C3 , 7.2.26 where AT  is the total number of entangled pairs ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  produced during interval T and NT , is the number of coincidences corresponding to entangled pairs ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  produced during interval T. Remark 7.2.18. Note that PVV  , t1 ;, t2 | ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  is the conditional probability of the event ,; t1 (see Remark 7.2.1) under condition that the event ν1 t1 ,ν2 t2  was occurred at instant t  t1 . From Eq. (7.2.14), (7.2.23) and (7.2.26) we obtain (I) PVV   PVV  ,   PVV  ,  ν 1 ,ν 2   NT , AT   AT   AT   AT  AT   AT   AT  sin 2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  1 4 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm  C, 7.2.27 260 where PVV  , is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true. (II) PVV  ,   PVV  ,  ν 1 ,ν 2   NT , AT   AT   AT   AT  AT   AT   AT  sin 2   sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2   sin2sin2 l cosm  C  AT sin2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm  C,, l,m ,,, 7.2.28 where PVV  , is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true. (III) PVV  ,   PVV  ,  ν 1 ,ν 2   NT , AT   AT   AT   AT  AT   AT   AT  sin 2   sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2   sin2sin2 l cosm  C  Asin2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm  C,, l,m ,, , 7.2.29 where PVV  , is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true. From Eq. (7.2.27), (7.2.28) and (7.2.29) we obtain PVV  PVV,  PVV  ,  PVV  ,  PVV  ,, 7.2.30 where PVV, is the unconditional probability of the event ,. 261 Remark 7.2.19. Note that PVH  ,  |V |sH |i|DC | 2 ,PHV  ,  |V |sH |i|DC | 2 , PHH  ,  |H |sH |i|DC | 2 , PVV  ,  |V |sV |i|DC | 2 , PVV  ,  |V |sV |i|DC | 2 7.2.31 From Eqs. (7.2.31) similarly as above we obtain (I) PVH  PVH,  PVH  ,  PVH  ,  PVH  ,, 7.2.32 where (i) PVH  PVV, is the unconditional probability of the event ,, (ii) PVH  , is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true, (iii) PVH  , is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true, (iv) PVH  , is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true, (II) PHV  PHV,  PHV  ,  PHV  ,  PHV  ,, 7.2.33 where (i) PHV  PHV, is the unconditional probability of the event ,, (ii) PHV  , is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true, (iii) PHV  , is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true, 262 (iv) PHV  , is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true, (III) PHH  PHH,  PHH  ,  PHH  ,  PHH  ,, 7.2.34 where (i) PHV  PHV, is the unconditional probability of the event ,, (ii) PHH  ,  is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true, (iii) PHH  ,  is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true, (iv) PHH  ,  is the joint probability of both events , and ν1 ,ν2 being true. From Eq. (7.2.14), (7.2.23) and (7.2.26) we obtain where AT  AT   AT   AT  is the total number of entangled pairs produced and NT tot,  NT ,  NT ,  NT ,  AT  sin2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  14 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm  C1  AT sin2   sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2   sin2sin2 l cosm  C2  AT sin2   sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l   1 4 sin2   sin2sin2 l cosm  C3  AT   AT   AT     sin2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  14 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm  AT C2,, l,m ,,  AT C3,, l,m ,,   C  AT sin 2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  14 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm  AT C2,, l,m ,,  AT C3,, l,m ,,   C1  C2  C3  AT sin 2 sin2cos2 l  cos2cos2sin2 l  14 sin2 sin2sin2 l cosm  C, 7.2.35 263 C  AT C2,, l,m ,,  AT C3,, l,m ,,  C1  C2  C3 . 7.2.36 Remark 7.2.20. To create the state |EPR  or something close to it, it is necessarily to adjust the parameters which determine the laser polarization. First one adjusts  l to equalize the coincidence counts N0, 0 and N90,90 . Next one set  l by rotating the quartz plate about a vertical axis to maximize N45,45 . When performing these optimizations, one typically collects a few hundred photons per point which requires an acquisition window of a few seconds. Remark 7.2.21. A rough idea of the purity of the entangled state can be found by measuring N0,0, N90,90,N45,45 and N0, 90 . Using the model of Eq. (7.2.19), one obtains C  N0,90, 7.2.37 A  N0, 0  N90, 90  2C, 7.2.38 tan2 l  N90, 90  C N0, 0  C , 7.2.39 cosm  1 sin2 l 4 N45, 45  C A  1 . 7.2.40 In a typical acquisition, after optimizing  l and  l we find, with T  10 seconds, N0,0  293 , N90,90  307 , N0,90  22 ,and N45,45  286 . These give C  22,A  556, l  46, and m  26 . More extensive data are shown in Fig. 7.2.5 along with a fit to Eq. (7.2.19). The best fit parameters, C  31,A  539, l  46 and m  26 are in good agreement with the rough estimates made with just four points. 264 Fig. 7.2.5a Experimental polarization correlations.   0 (open circles) and   45 (filled circles) Fig. 7.2.5b. Experimental polarization correlations.   90 (open circles) and   135 (filled circles) 265 Fig. 7.2.5a shows   0 (open circles) and   45 (filled circles). Fig.7.2.5b shows   90 (open circles) and   135 (filled circles). Error bars indicate plus/minus one standard deviation statistical uncertainty. Curves are a fit to Eq. (7.2.19). Remark 7.2.22. Remind that in his comment on Bohr's lecture, Einstein noted that quantum mechanics allows a measurement of one particle to influence the state of another. To illustrate this for polarizations, we consider again the state |EPR  of Eq. (7.2.3). If the signal photon is measured with a polarizer set to  , the result will be H or V , each occurring half the time. In the usual Copenhagen interpretation the state has collapsed, at the moment of measurement, from |EPR  to either |V s|V i or |H s|H i . But the mere choice of  does not determine the state of the idler photon; it is the (random) outcome of the measurement on the signal photon that decides whether the idler ends up as |V i or |H i . Despite the randomness, the choice of  clearly has an effect on the state of the idler photon: it gives it a definite polarization in the |V i, |H i basis, which it did not have before the measurement. Remark 7.2.23. After the signal photon is measured the idler is equally likely to be V or H . A measurement of its polarization, at any angle  , finds V with the probability PV  12 |Vb |V | 2  1 2 |Vb |H | 2   1 2 cos2b    sin2b    12 . 7.2.41 This gives no information about the choice of α. It is also the probability we would find if the signal photon had not been measured. 266 VII.2.2. EPR-B nonlocality is the physical nature of the violation of the Bell inequalities Remind that classical CHSH constrains the degree of polarization correlation under measurements at different polarizer angles. The proof involves two measures of correlation, see subsection VII.2.3. The first measure is E,  PVV,  PHH,  PVH,  PHV,. 7.2.42 This incorporates all possible measurement outcomes and varies from 1 when the polarizations always agree to 1 when they always disagree. Fig. 7.2.6. Polarizer angles for maximal SQM The second measure is S  Ea,b  Ea,b  Ea,b  Ea,b, 7.2.43 where a,a,b,b are four different polarizer angles. S does not have a clear physical meaning. Its importance comes from the fact that Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt proved 267 |SHVT|  2 7.2.44 (see subsection VII.2.3) for any classical Hidden Variable Theory (HVT) and arbitrary a,a,b,b . Remark 7.2.24. Quantum mechanics under (i) canonical Copenhagen interpretation, and (ii) canonical SRT (Special Relativity Theory) locality for certain settings, can violate this inequality. If we choose the polarizer angles, a  45, a  0, b  22.5 and b  22.5 , as shown in Fig. 7.2.6, then, using Eq. (7.2.15) SQM  2 2 . 7.2.45 This result is specific to the state |EPR  . Other states give lower S values. It is interesting to note that for these angles our simple HVT (see subsection VII.2.3) gives SHVT  2. 7.2.46 The CHSH (Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt) inequality shows that no theory which is both local and realistic (or `complete' in the EPR sense) will ever agree with quantum mechanics. Remark 7.2.25. Note that derivation of the CHSH inequality essentially depends on SR locality condition, see Remark 7.2.27. In subsection VII.2.4 we introduced generalized HVT (GHVT) based on EPR-B nonlocality condition. For such GHVT we derive the revised CHSH inequality |SGHVT|  4. 7.2.47 To find the probabilities P that make up E , we need four values of N, specificially 268 PVV,  NT tot,/NT tot,PVH,  NT tot,/NT tot, PHV,  NT tot,/NT tot,PHH,  NT tot,/NT tot, NT tot  NT tot,  NT tot,  NT tot,  NT tot,, 7.2.48 where N tot is the total number of pairs detected during interval of time 0,T and , are the polarizer settings   90,   90 . This requires counting coincidences for equal intervals with the polarizer set four different ways. The quantity E, requires four N measurements E,  NT tot,  NT tot,  NT tot,  NT tot, NT tot,  NT tot,  NT tot,  NT tot, 7.2.49 and S  Ea,b  Ea,b  Ea,b  Ea,b requires sixteen. Remark 7.2.26. By consideration above (see Eq. (7.2.35)) based on EPR-B nonlocality condition we find that the quantities: NT tot,,NT tot,,NT tot,,NT tot, have the representations NT tot,  NT ,  NT ,  NT ,, NT tot,  NT ,  NT ,  NT ,, NT tot,  NT ,  NT ,  NT ,, NT tot,  NT ,  NT ,  NT ,. 7.2.50 These representations have the rigorous physical meaning and they are essentially important for derivation of the revised CHSH inequality (7.2.47), see subsection VII.2.4. Remark 7.2.27. Remind that any classical Bell's type inequality was derived under the condition of SR locality and the canonical Copenhagen interpretation of QM. We consider now again the state |EPR  of Eq. (7.2.3). If the signal photon 1 is measured at instant t1 with a polarizer I set to  , the 269 result will be H or V , each occurring half the time. In the usual Copenhagen interpretation the state |EPR  has immediately collapsed, at the moment of measurement, from |EPR  to either |V s|V i or |H s|H i . We assume now for definiteness that the state |EPR  collapsed to |V s|V i and thus the state of the idler photon 2 is |V i. In agreement with a strong SR locality the idler photon 2 is not disturbed and its polarization can be measured with a polarizer II at instant t2 such that t2  t1 . Thus under the canonical physical interpretation of the Bell test experiment given in physical literature [8] it is not important which event was occurred: 1 t1 ,2 t2 , 1 t1 ,2 t2  or 1 t1 ,2 t2 , before the corresponding coincidence is revealed with detectors A and B. Remark 7.2.28. We emphasize that the violation of the classical CHSH inequality (7.2.44) confirms EPR-B nonlocality condition. VII.2.3. Canonical Local Realistic Hidden Variable Theory Einstein believed that a theory could be found to replace quantum mechanics, one which was complete and contained only local interactions. Here we describe such a theory, a local realistic hidden variable theory (HVT) [8]. In a such HVT, each photon has a polarization angle  , but this polarization does not behave like polarization in quantum mechanics. When a photon meets a polarizer set to an angle  , it will always register as V if  is closer to  than to   /2 , i.e., PV HVT,  1 |  | /4 1 |  | 3/4 0 otherwise. 7.2.51 In each pair, the signal and idler photon have the same polarization 270 s  i   . As successive pairs are produced  changes in an unpredictable manner that uniformly covers the whole range of possible polarizations. The quantity  is the hidden variable, a piece of information that is absent from quantum mechanics. HVTs do not have the spooky features of quantum mechanics. The theory is local: measurement outcomes are determined by features of objects present at the site of measurement. Any measurement on the signal (idler) photon is determined by s and  ( i and ). The theory is also realistic: All measurable quantities have definite values, independent of our knowledge of them. Furthermore, the theory specifies all of these values (for a given  ), so it is complete in Einstein's sense of the word. Finally, there is no requirement that  be random; it could be that  is changing in a deterministic way that remains to be discovered. Fig. 7.2.7. Predicted polarization correlations for a quantum mechanical entangled state (solid curve) and a hidden-variable theory (dashed line) To compare this theory to quantum mechanics, we need a prediction for the coincidence probability PVV HVT, . A coincidence occurs when  is in a range such that both  and  are close to  . The probability of this is 271 PVV HVT,  1  0  PV HVT,PV HVT,d  1 2  |  | . 7.2.52 This function and the corresponding quantum mechanical probability from Eq. (7.2.10) are plotted in Fig. 7.2.7. The predictions are fairly similar. Where they disagree quantum mechanics predicts stronger correlations (or stronger anti-correlations) than the HVT. Remind that for any canonical HVT, the distribution of the hidden variable  is described by a function  , where   0 and d  1. The assumptions of locality and realism are embodied in the following: It is assumed that for the signal photon the outcome of a measurement is determined completely by  and the measurement angle  . These outcomes are specified by the function A, , which can take on the values 1 for detection as V and 1 for detection as H . Similarly, a function B, describes the outcomes for the idler photon as 1 for V and 1 for H . A HVT would specify the functions ,A and B. The probability of a particular outcome, averaged over an ensemble of photon pairs, is given by an integral. In particular PVV,   1A,2 1B, 2 d,PVH,   1A,2 1B, 2 d, PHV,   1A,2 1B, 2 d,PHH,   1A,2 1B, 2 d. 7.3.53 Let E, be E,  PVV,  PHH,  PVH,  PHV,. 7.2.54 It is easy to see that E,, given in Eq. (7.2.54), is E,  A,B,d. 7.2.55 272 We define now the quantity s , which describes the polarization correlation in a single pair of particles: s,a,a,b,b  A,aB,b  A,aB,b  A,aB,b  A,aB,b  A,aB,b  B,b  A,aB,b  B,b, 7.2.56 where a,a,b,b are four angles. Note that s can only take on the values 2. The average of s over an ensemble of pairs is s,a,a,b,b   s,a,a,b,bd  Ea,b  Ea,b  Ea,b  Ea,b  Sa,a,b,b. 7.2.57 Because s can only take on the values 2, its average S must satisfy 2  S  2 , which is the Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt inequality |S|  2. 7.2.58 VII.2.4. Local Hidden Variable Theory revisited. Generalized Local Hidden Variable Theory Validity of CHSH-inequality for correlations taking into account EPR-B nonlocality For any GHVT, the distribution of the hidden variable  is described by a function , t1 , t2 , where , t1 , t2  0 7.2.59 and , t1 , t2d  1. 7.2.60 The assumptions of EPR-B nonlocality and realism are embodied in 273 the following: It is assumed that for the signal photon the outcome of a measurement is determined completely by  and the measurement angle  . These outcomes are specified by the function A,, t1 , which can take on the values 1 for detection as V and 1 for detection as H . Similarly, a function B,, t2 describes the outcomes for the idler photon as 1 for V and 1 for H . A GHVT would specify the functions ,A and B. The probability of a particular outcome, averaged over an ensemble of photon pairs, is given by an integral. In particular PVV, t1 ;, t2   1  A,, t1  A,, t2 2 1  B,, t1  B,, t2 2 , t1 , t2d, PVH, t1 ;, t2   1  A,, t1  A,, t2 2 1  B,, t1  B,, t2 2 , t1 , t2d, PHV, t1 ;, t2   1  A,, t1  A,, t2 2 1  B,, t1  B,, t2 2 , t1 , t2d, PHH, t1 ;, t2   1  A,, t1  A,, t2 2 1  B,, t1  B,, t2 2 , t1 , t2d. 7.2.61 Let E, t1 ;, t2 be E, t1 ;, t2  PVV, t1 ;, t2  PHH, t1 ;, t2  PVH, t1 ;, t2  PHV, t1 ;, t2. 7.2.62 It is easy to see that E, t1 ;, t2 , given in Eq. (7.2.62), is 274 E, t1 ;, t2  A,, t1  A,, t2B,, t1  B,, t2, t1 , t2d  A,, t1B,, t1, t1 , t2d  A,, t1B,, t2, t1 , t2d  A,, t2B,, t1, t1 , t2d  A,, t2B,, t2, t1 , t2d  A,, t1B,, t2, t1 , t2d  A,, t2B,, t1, t1 , t2d  A,, t1B,, t1, t1 , t2d  A,, t2B,, t2, t1 , t2d 7.2.63 We assume now for simplicity that: (i) |t1  t2 |    0, i.e. t1  t2   t1  t2   t1  t2  and (ii) A,, t1B,, t1, t1 , t2d  0,A,, t2B,, t2, t1 , t2d  0. 7.2.64 From Eq. (7.2.63) and Eq. (7.2.64) we obtain E, t1 ;, t2  A,, t1B,, t2, t1 , t2d  A,, t2B,, t1, t1 , t2d 7.2.65 We assume now for definiteness that: t1  t2 and rewrite Eq. (7.2.65) in the following form E, t1 ;, t2  E1, t1 ;, t2  E2, t1 ;, t2 E1, t1 ;, t2  A,, t1B,, t2, t1 , t2d, E2, t1 ;, t2  A,, t2B,, t1, t1 , t2d. 7.2.66 The second measure Sa,a,b,b; t1 , t2  now is 275 Sa,a,b,b; t1 , t2   S1a,a,b,b; t1 , t2   S2a,a,b,b; t1 , t2   Ea, t1 ;b, t2  Ea, t1 ;b, t2  Ea, t1 ;b, t2  Ea, t1 ;b, t2  E1, t1 ;, t2  E1a, t1 ;b, t2  E1a, t1 ;b, t2  E1a, t1 ;b, t2  E2a, t1 ;b, t2  E2a, t1 ;b, t2  E2a, t1 ;b, t2  E2a, t1 ;b, t2, 7.2.67 where S1a,a,b,b; t1 , t2   E1, t1 ;, t2  E1a, t1 ;b, t2  E1a, t1 ;b, t2  E1a, t1 ;b, t2, S2a,a,b,b; t1 , t2   E2a, t1 ;b, t2  E2a, t1 ;b, t2  E2a, t1 ;b, t2  E2a, t1 ;b, t2. 7.2.68 Note that S1a,a,b,b; t1 , t2    s1,a,a,b,b; t1 , t2 , t1 , t2d, S2a,a,b,b; t1 , t2    s2,a,a,b,b; t1 , t2 , t1 , t2d, 7.2.69 where s1,a,a,b,b; t1 , t2   A,a, t1B,b, t2  A,a, t1B,b, t2  A,a, t1B,b, t2  A,a, t1B,b, t2  A,a, t1B,b, t2  B,b , t2  A,a, t1B,b, t2  B,b, t2 7.2.70 and s2,a,a,b,b; t1 , t2   A,a, t2B,b, t1  A,a, t2B,b, t1  A,a, t2B,b, t1  A,a, t2B,b, t1  A,a, t2B,b, t1  B,b, t1  A,a, t2B,b, t1  B,b, t1. 7.2.71 Remark 7.2.29. Note that s1,a,a,b,b;t1 , t2  and s2,a,a,b,b;t1 , t2  can only take on the values 2 and therefore its averages 276 S1a,a,b,b; t1 , t2  and S2a,a,b,b; t1 , t2  must satisfy 2  S1  2,2  S2  2. 7.2.72 From Eq. (7.2.67) we obtain SGHVTa,a,b,b; t1 , t2   |S1a,a,b,b; t1 , t2   S2a,a,b,b; t1 , t2 |  |S1a,a,b,b; t1 , t2 |  |S2a,a,b,b; t1 , t2 | 7.2.73 Thus from Eq. (7.2.72) and (7.2.73) finally we obtain SGHVT  4. 7.2.74 VII.3. Bell inequalities revisited VII.3.1. Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality revisited. Validity of revised CHSH inequality In a typical Bell experiment, two systems which may have previously interacted for instance they may have been produced by a common source are now spatially separated and are each measured by one of two distant observers, Alice and Bob (see Fig.7.2.1). Alice may choose one out of several possible measurements to perform on her system and we let x t1 denote her measurement choice at instant t1 . For instance, x t1 may refer to the position of a knob on her measurement apparatus at instant t1 . Similarly, we let yt2 denote Bob's measurement choice. Once the measurements are performed, they yield outcomes a t1 and b t2 on the two systems. Remark 7.3.1. The actual values assigned to the measurement choices x t1 ,yt2 and outcomes at1 ,bt2 are purely conventional; they are mere macroscopic labels distinguishing the different possibilities. 277 Remark 7.3.2. From one run of the experiment to the other, the outcomes a t1 and b t2 that are obtained may vary, even when the same choices of measurements x t1 and yt2 are made. Assumption 7.3.1. These outcomes a t1 and b t2 are thus in general governed by a Kolmogorovian probability distribution pa, t1 ;b, t2 |x t1yt2, which can of course depend on the particular experiment being performed. By repeating the experiment a sufficient number of times and collecting the observed data, one can get a fair estimate of such Kolmogorovian probabilities. Assumption 7.3.2. The assumption of locality implies that we should be able to identify a set of past factors, described by some variables λ, having a joint causal influence on both outcomes, and which fully account for the dependence between a t1 and bt2 . Once all such factors have been taken into account, the residual indeterminacies about the outcomes must now be decoupled, that is, the Kolmogorovian joint probabilities for a t2 and b t2 should factorize: pa, t1 ;b, t2 |xy,  pa, t1 |x,pb, t2 |y,. 7.3.1 Remark 7.3.3. This factorability condition simply expresses that we have found an explanation according to which the probability for a t1 only depends on the past variables and on the local measurement x t1 , but not on the distant measurement and outcome, and analogously for the probability to obtain b t2 . The variable will not necessarily be constant for all runs of the experiment, even if the procedure which prepares the particles to be measured is held fixed, because may involve physical quantities that are not fully controllable. The different values of across the runs should thus be characterized by a probability distribution qλ, t1 , t2. Combined with the above factorability condition, we can thus write λ λ λ λ 278 pa, t1 ;b, t2 |xy    dq, t1 , t2 pa, t1 |x,pb, t2 |y,, 7.3.2 where we also implicitly assumed that the measurements x t1 and yt2 can be freely chosen in a way that is independent of , i.e., that qλ, t1 , t2 |x t1 ,yt2  qλ, t1 , t2 . This decomposition now represents a precise condition for locality in the context of Bell experiments. Let us consider for simplicity an experiment where there are only two measurement choices per observer x t1 ,yt2  0,1 and where the possible outcomes take also two values labelled at1 ,bt2  1,1. Let at1x t1 bt2y t2 be the expectation value of the product at1bt2 for given measurement choices x t1 ,yt2 : at1x t1 bt2y t2  a,b abpab, t1 , t2 |x t1 yt2. 7.3.3 Assumption 7.3.3. We assume now that t1 , t2   2 ,    ,0    1, pab, t1 , t2 |x t1 yt2  pab, t1  t2 |x t1 yt2  |t1  t2 |    |t1  t2 |  0, q, t1 , t2   q, t1  t2   |t1  t2 |    |t1  t2 |  0 . 7.3.4 Thus at1x t1 bt2y t2  a,b abpab, t1  t2 |x t1yt2. 7.3.5 Remark 7.3.4. We denote at1x t1 bt2y t2  axby  7.3.6 iff |t1  t2 |  0. We denote λ 279 at1x t1 bt2y t2  axby  7.3.7 iff |t1  t2 |   and t1  t2 . We denote at1x t1 bt2y t2  axby  7.3.8 iff |t1  t2 |   and t1  t2 . We denote axby   axby   axby   axby . 7.3.9 Consider the following expression S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 , 7.3.10 which is a function of the probabilities pab|xy. If these probabilities satisfy the locality decomposition (7.3.2) and Eq. (7.3.4), we necessarily have that S  S  S  S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1   6, 7.3.11 where S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 , S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 , S  a0b0   a0b1   a1b0   a1b1 . 7.3.12 To derive this inequality, we can use (7.3.2) and Eq. (7.3.4) in the definitions (7.3.6) - (7.3.8) of a0b0 , axby  and axby  which allows us to express these expectation values as averages: (i) 280 axby     dq, t1  t2 ax  by   , 7.3.13 where t1  t2  0, and where we denote at1x t1   ax  , bt2y t2   by   , (ii) axby     dq, t1  t2 ax  by   , 7.3.14 where t1  t2 and t1  t2  , and where we denote at1x t1   ax  , bt2y t2   by   , (iii) axby     dq, t1  t2 ax  by   , 7.3.15 where t1  t2 , t1  t2  , and where we denote at1x t1   ax  , bt2y t2   by   , of a product of corresponding local expectations: ax     a apa, t1 |x,, by     b bpb, t2 |y,, 7.3.16 and ax     a apa, t1 |x,, by     b bpb, t2 |y,, 7.3.17 and ax     a apa, t1 |x,, by     b bpb, t2 |y,, 7.3.18 281 taking values in 1,1. Inserting this expressions (7.3.16)-(7.3.18) in Eqs. (7.3.12), one obtains S    dq, 0S  , S    dq,S  , S    dq,S, 7.3.19 where S   a0  b0    a0  b1    a1  b0    a1  b1  , S   a0   b0    a0   b1    a1   b0    a1   b1   , S   a0  b0    a0  b1    a1  b0    a1  b1  , 7.3.20 Since a0 , b0   1,1, these last expressions are smaller than  Sλ  ,  S  and  S  correspondingly, where Sλ    Sλ   |b0    b1   |  |b0    b1   |, S    S   |b0    b1   |  |b0    b1   |, S    S   |b0    b1   |  |b0    b1   |. 7.3.21 Without loss of generality, we can assume that b0    b1    0, b0    b1    0, b0    b1    0, 7.3.22 which yields Sλ   2b0    2,S  2b0    2,S  2b0    2 7.3.23 and thus S  2,S  2,S  2. 7.3.24 From (7.3.24) we obtain 282 S  S  S  S  6. 7.3.25 The inequality (7.3.25) finalized the proof. VII.3.2. Clauser-Horne inequality revisited. Validity of revised Clauser-Horne inequality The inequality will be determined by counting during the large time t. There will be a total of N t events, with N1a, t counts in detector 1 by the time t when it is set to select a and N2b, t counts in detector 2 by the time t when it is set to select b . The number of coincidences of the two detectors with settings a and b respectively is N12a,b, t. The probabilities are p1a, t  N1a, t N t ,p2b, t  N2b, t N t ,p12a,b, t  N12a,b, t N t , p12a,b, t  N12a,b, t N t ,p12a,b, t  N12a,b, t N t ,p12a,b, t  N12a,b, t N t . 7.3.26 Remember that in the Bell formulation, the hidden variable determined absolutely the value of the polarization for a particular measurement. Then p1a, t1   dwp1a, t1 ,,p2b, t2   dwp2b, t2 ,, p12a,b, t1 , t2 ,  p1a, t1 ,p2b, t2 ,, p12a,b, t1 , t2   dwp1a, t1 ,p2b, t2 ,, 7.3.27 where t1 , t2  0, t. Remind that for any four real numbers x,x ,y,y  0,1 the inequality holds xy  xy  x y  x y  x   y. 7.3.28 283 We denote now x  p1a, t1 ,,y  p2b, t2 ,,x   p1a, t1 ,,y  p2b, t2 ,, 7.3.29 and substitute into inequality (7.3.28), we get p1a, t1 ,p2b, t2 ,  p1a, t1 ,p2b, t2 ,  p1a, t1 ,p2b, t2 ,  p1a, t1 ,p2b, t2 ,  p1a, t1 ,  p2b, t2 ,. 7.3.30 Next, multiply by w and integrate over all  we get p12a,b, t1 , t2  p12a,b, t1 , t2  p12a,b, t1 , t2  p12a,b, t1 , t2   p1a, t1  p2b, t2. 7.3.31 Remark 7.3.5. We assume now that t1 , t2   2 ,    ,0    1, p12a,b, t1 , t2  p12a,b, t1  t2  |t1  t2 |    |t1  t2 |  0, p12a,b, t1 , t2  p12a,b, t1  t2  |t1  t2 |    |t1  t2 |  0, p12a,b, t1 , t2  p12a,b, t1  t2  |t1  t2 |    |t1  t2 |  0, p12a,b, t1 , t2  p12a,b, t1  t2  |t1  t2 |    |t1  t2 |  0. . 7.3.32 Where t1 , t2  0, t. Remark 7.3.6. We denote p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.33 iff t1  t2  0. We denote p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.34 iff t1  t2   and t1  t2 . We denote 284 p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.35 iff t1  t2   and t1  t2 . Remark 7.3.7. We denote p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.36 iff t1  t2  0. We denote p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.37 iff t1  t2   and t1  t2 . We denote p12a,b, t  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.38 iff t1  t2   and t1  t2 . Remark 7.3.8. We denote p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.39 iff t1  t2  0. We denote p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.40 iff t1  t2   and t1  t2 . We denote p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.41 iff t1  t2   and t1  t2 . Remark 7.3.9. We denote p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.42 iff t1  t2  0. We denote p12a,b, t1 , t2  p12  a,b 7.3.43 iff t1  t2   and t1  t2 . We denote p12a,b, t1  t2  p12  a,b 7.3.44 iff t1  t2   and t1  t2 . Remark 7.3.10. We denote 285 p12a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b, p12a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b, p12a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b, p12a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b. 7.3.45 From (7.3.31) - (7.3.32) we obtain p12a,b, t1  t2  p12a,b, t1  t2  p12a,b, t1  t2  p12a,b, t1  t2   p1a, t1  p2b, t2, 7.3.46 where |t1  t2 |    |t1  t2 |  0. From (7.3.46) we obtain: (i) p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b   p1a, t1  p2b, t2, 7.3.47 where t1  t2  0; (ii) p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b   p1a, t1  p2b, t2, 7.3.48 where t1  t2   and t1  t2 ; (iii) p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b   p1a, t1  p2b, t2, 7.3.49 where t1  t2   and t1 < t2. From (7.3.47) we obtain (i) 286 p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b   t1 lim p1a, t1  t2 lim p2b, t2  p1a  p2b, 7.3.50 where we denote p1a  t1 lim p1a, t1,p2b  t2 lim p2b, t2; (ii) p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b   t1 lim p1a, t1  t2 lim p2b, t2  p1a  p2b, 7.3.51 where we denote p1a  t1 lim p1a, t1,p2b  t2 lim p2b, t2; (iii) p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b   t1 lim p1a, t1  t2 lim p2b, t2  p1a  p2b, 7.3.52 where we denote p1a  t1 lim p1a, t1,p2b  t2 lim p2b, t2; From (7.3.50) - (7.3.52) we obtain (i) p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p1a  p2b, 7.3.53 (ii) p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p1a  p2b, 7.3.54 (iii) p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p1a  p2b. 7.3.55 From (7.3.53) - (7.3.55) we obtain 287 p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b  p12  a,b   3p1a  3p2b, 7.3.56 From (7.3.53) by Eqs. (7.3.45) we obtain p12a,b  p12a,b  p12a,b  p12a,b  3p1a  3p2b. 7.3.57 The revised Clauser Horne inequality is N12a,b  N12b,a  N12a,b  N12a,b N1a  N2b  3. 7.3.58 Assume now that a,b,a,b are separated by the angle  then N12  N12  N12  N123 N1a  N2b  3N12  N123 N1a  N2b  3. 7.3.59 Next relate coincidences to expectation values. Note that N12  N||. As regards the singles counts N1a and N2b , we know that the number of counts must be independent of the direction of a  or b and that for any direction N1  1 2 N , since half the photons will be polarized along the direction. Therefore, the inequality (7.3.59) becomes   3 4 1  cos2  1 4 1  cos6 1 2  1 2  1 2  3 4 cos2  1 4 cos6  3. 7.3.60 The inequality (7.3.60) is not violated even if    8 :  max     8  1 2  3 2 4  1 2 2  1.2, 7.3.61 which of course is less than 3. 288 VII.3.3. Revised CHSH inequality without the hypothesis of locality Let At,At ,Bt,Bt , t      ,0    1, be stochastic processes defined on a common probability space ,,P with values in the set 1,1, i.e., At  1,At   1,Bt  1,Bt   1, t  0,T. 7.3.62 Assume that there exist joint probability distribution functions WAt1 ,At2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4  , of At1 ,At2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4  (where |t i  t j |  0  |t i  t j |  , i, j  1,2,3,4 ) defining probabilities for each possible set of outcomes such that: (i) PAt1 ,At2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    0,PAt1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    0,PAt2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    0,etc., 7.3.63 (ii)  A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4  PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    1,  A t1 ,B t3 ,B t4  PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    1,  A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4  PA t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    1, etc., 7.3.64 (iii) PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4  , PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4  , etc. 7.3.65 From (7.3.65) one obtains 289 0  PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4     PA t2  ,Bt4    PA t2  ,Bt3   PA t2  ,Bt4    PBt3   PA t2  ,Bt3 . 7.3.66 Similarly one obtains 0  PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,Bt3   PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1   PA t1 ,Bt3   PA t1 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4   7.3.67 and therefore PAt1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PAt1   PAt1 ,Bt3   PAt1 ,Bt4  . 7.3.68 From (7.3.66) and (7.3.68) we obtain 0  PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t2  ,Bt4    PBt3   PA t2  ,Bt3   PA t1   PA t1 ,Bt3   PA t1 ,Bt4   7.3.69 and therefore 0  PA t2  ,Bt4    PBt3   PA t2  ,Bt3   PA t1   PA t1 ,Bt3   PA t1 ,Bt4     PA t1   PBt3   PA t1 ,Bt3   PA t2  ,Bt3   PA t1 ,Bt4    PA t2  ,Bt4  . 7.3.70 From (7.3.70) one obtains A t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,Bt3   PA t2  ,Bt3   PA t1 ,Bt4    PA t2  ,Bt4    PA t1   PBt3   0. 7.3.71 Note that PBt3 ,Bt4    PBt3   PBt3 ,Bt4   7.3.72 290 and PBt3 ,Bt4    PBt4    PBt3 ,Bt4    1  PBt4    PBt3 ,Bt4  . 7.3.73 From (7.3.73) and (7.3.72) we obtain PBt3 ,Bt4    1  PBt3   PBt4    PBt3 ,Bt4  . 7.3.73a Note that 0  PAt1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PBt3 ,Bt4    PAt1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4  . 7.3.74 Inserting (7.3.67) and (7.3.73a) into (7.3.74) we obtain 0  1  PA t1   PBt3   PBt4    PA t1 ,Bt3   PA t2  ,Bt3   PA t1 ,Bt4    PBt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    1  PA t1   PBt3   PBt4    PA t1 ,Bt3   PA t2  ,Bt3   PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4  . 7.3.75 Note that PA t1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PA,A ,B,B    PA t2  ,Bt3   PA t2  ,Bt4    PA t2  ,Bt3   PBt4    PA t2  ,Bt4  . 7.3.76 From (7.3.76) we obtain 0  1  PA t1   PBt3   PBt4    PA t1 ,Bt3   PA t2  ,Bt3   PA t1 ,Bt4    PA t2  ,Bt4  . 7.3.77 From (7.3.77) and (7.3.71) we obtain 1  At1 ,At2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    0. 7.3.78 291 (I)Let us define the following quantities: AB , AB, AB , AB  AB  PAB     PAB     PAB     PAB   , A B  P A B     P A B     P A B     P A B   , AB   P AB      P AB      P AB      P AB    , A B   P A B      P A B      P A B      P A B    , 7.3.79 where PAB     PA t1  1,Bt3  1  t1  t3  0, PAB     PA t1  1,Bt3  1  t1  t3  0, PAB     PA t1  1,Bt3  1  t1  t3  0, PAB     PA t1  1,Bt3  1  t1  t3  0, P A B     PA t2   1,Bt3  1  t2  t3  0, etc. 7.3.80 From Eqs. (7.3.71), (7.3.79) and (7.3.80) we obtain AB  A B  AB   A B                     . 7.3.81 From (7.3.78) we obtain 2            0 7.3.82 and 0            2 7.3.83 From (7.3.82) and (7.3.83) we obtain 2                      2. 7.3.84 292 (II)Let us define the following quantities: AB , AB, AB , AB  AB  PAB     PAB     PAB     PAB   , A B  P A B     P A B     P A B     P A B   , AB   P AB      P AB      P AB      P AB    , A B   P A B      P A B      P A B      P A B    , 7.3.85 where PAB     PA t1  1,Bt3  1  t1  t3  , PAB     PA t1  1,Bt3  1  t1  t3  , etc. 7.3.86 From Eqs. (7.3.71), (7.3.85) and (7.3.86) we obtain AB  A B  AB   A B                     . 7.3.87 From (7.3.78) we obtain 2            0 7.3.88 and 0            2 7.3.89 From (7.3.88) and (7.3.89) we obtain 2                      2. 7.3.90 (III) Let us define the following quantities: AB , AB, AB , AB  : 293 AB  PAB     PAB     PAB     PAB   , A B  P A B     P A B     P A B     P A B   , AB   P AB      P AB      P AB      P AB    , A B   P A B      P A B      P A B      P A B    , 7.3.91 where PAB     PA t1  1,Bt3  1  t1  t3  , PAB     PA t1  1,Bt3  1  t1  t3  , etc. 7.3.92 From Eqs. (7.3.71), (7.3.91) and (7.3.92) we obtain AB  A B  AB   A B                     . 7.3.93 From (7.3.78) we obtain 2            0 7.3.94 and 0            2. 7.3.95 From (7.3.94) and (7.3.95) we obtain 2                      2. 7.3.96 (IV) Let us define the following quantities:    ,   ,    and     294                   ,                   ,                   ,                 . 7.3.97 From Eq. (7.3.97) and the inequalities (7.3.96), (7.3.90) and (7.3.84) we obtain 6                      6. 7.3.98 (V) Let us define the following quantities: AB, AB AB  AB  AB  AB, A B  A B  A B  A B, AB   AB   AB   AB , A B   A B   A B   A B . 7.3.99 From Eqs. (7.3.93), (7.3.87), (7.3.84), (7.3.97) and (7.3.99) we obtain AB  A B  AB   A B                     . 7.3.100 From inequality (7.3.98) and Eq. (7.3.100) finally we obtain |AB  AB  AB   AB |  6. 7.3.101 VII.3.4. Revised CHSH inequality without the introduction of hidden variables Let At,At ,Bt,Bt , t      ,0    1, be stochastic processes defined on a common probability space ,,P with values in the 295 set 1,1, i.e., At  1,At   1,Bt  1,Bt   1, t  0,T. 7.3.102 Assume that there exist joint probability distribution functions PAt1 ,At2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4  , of At1 ,At2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4  (where |t i  t j |  0  |t i  t j |    0, i, j  1,2,3,4 ) defining probabilities for each possible set of outcomes such that: (i) PAt1 ,At2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    0,PAt1 ,Bt3 ,Bt4    0,PAt2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    0,etc., 7.3.103 and  A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4  PA t1 ,A t2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    1, 7.3.104 and PAt1 ,At2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PAt1 ,At2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4    PAt2  ,Bt3 ,Bt4  . 7.3.105 We abbreviate now for short: 296 and PA t1B t3     PA t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4       PA t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4       PA t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4       PA t1 ,A t2 ,B t3 ,B t4      t1  t3 , etc., 7.3.107 PA t1B t3     PA t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4       PA t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4       PA t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4       PA t1 ,A t2 ,B t3 ,B t4      t1  t3  , etc., 7.3.108 P A,A ,B,B        P A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4        PA t1  1,A t2   1,Bt3  1,Bt4   1  t1  t3 , P A,A ,B,B        P A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4        PA t1  1,A t2   1,Bt3  1,Bt4   1  t1  t3 , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P A,A ,B,B        P A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4        PA t1  1,A t2   1,Bt3  1,Bt4   1  t1  t3 ; P A,A ,B,B        P A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4        PA t1  1,A t2   1,Bt3  1,Bt4   1  t1  t3  , P A,A ,B,B        P A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4        PA t1  1,A t2   1,Bt3  1,Bt4   1  t1  t3  , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P A,A ,B,B        P A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4        PA t1  1,A t2   1,Bt3  1,Bt4   1  t1  t3  ; P A,A ,B,B        P A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4        PA t1  1,A t2   1,Bt3  1,Bt4   1  t1  t3  , P A,A ,B,B        P A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4        PA t1  1,A t2   1,Bt3  1,Bt4   1  t1  t3  , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P A,A ,B,B        P A t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4        PA t1  1,A t2   1,Bt3  1,Bt4   1  t1  t3  ; 7.3.106 297 PA t1B t3     PA t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4       PA t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4       PA t1 ,A t2  ,B t3 ,B t4       PA t1 ,A t2 ,B t3 ,B t4      t1  t3  , etc. 7.3.109 For the quantities (i) AB , AB, AB , AB ; (ii) AB , AB, AB , AB ; and (iii) AB , AB, AB , AB  , using Eqs. (7.3.107) - (7.3.109) one obtains the representatives AB  PAB     PAB     PAB     PAB   , etc., AB  PAB     PAB     PAB     PAB   , etc., AB  PAB     PAB     PAB     PAB   . 7.3.110 Substituting Eqs. (7.3.110) into expressions   1 2 AB  A B  AB   A B  ,   1 2 AB  A B  AB   A B  ,   1 2 AB  A B  AB   A B  , 7.3.111 one obtains   1 2 AB  A B  AB   A B    P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B      ; 7.3.112 298   1 2 AB  A B  AB   A B    P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B      ; 7.3.113   1 2 AB  A B  AB   A B    P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B        P A,A ,B,B      . 7.3.114 From (7.3.103)-(7.3.105) it obviously follows that  2    2,2    2,2    2. 7.3.115 Thus we obtain   2, | |  2, | |  2. 7.3.116 We define now the quantityes        7.3.117 and 299 AB  AB  AB  AB, A B  A B  A B  A B, AB   AB   AB   AB , A B   A B   A B   A B . 7.3.118 From (7.3.116) and (7.3.117) we obtain ||  |     |  | |  | |  | |  6. 7.3.119 From (7.3.117) and (7.3.118) we obtain         AB  AB  AB   AB . 7.3.120 From (7.3.119) and (7.3.120) finally we obtain |AB  AB  AB   AB |  6. 7.3.121 VII.4. Leggett inequality revisited VII.4.1. Classical Leggett inequality Leggett have introduced the class of non-local models and formulated an incompatibility theorem [8]. Such models were extended so as to make them applicable to real experimental situations and also to allow simultaneous tests of all local hiddenvariable models. Finally, an experiment was performed that violates the new inequality and hence excludes a broad class of non-local hidden-variable theories [9]. These theories are based on the following assumptions: (1) all measurement outcomes are determined by pre-existing properties of particles independent of the measurement (realism); (2) physical 300 states are statistical mixtures of subensembles with definite polarization, where (3) polarization is defined such that expectation values taken for each subensemble obey Malus' law (that is, the well-known cosine dependence of the intensity of a polarized beam after an ideal polarizer). These assumptions are in a way appealing, because they provide a natural explanation of quantum mechanically separable states (polarization states indeed obey Malus' law). In addition, they do not explicitly demand locality; that is, measurement outcomes may very well depend on parameters in space-like separated regions. As a consequence, such theories can explain important features of quantum mechanically entangled (non-separable) states of two particles: first, they do not allow information to be transmitted faster than the speed of light; second, they reproduce perfect correlations for all measurements in the same bases, which is a fundamental feature of the Bell singlet state; and third, they provide a model for all thus far performed experiments in which the Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt (CHSH) inequality was violated. A general framework of such models is the following: assumption (1) requires that an individual binary measurement outcome A for a polarization measurement along direction a (that is, whether a single photon is transmitted or absorbed by a polarizer set at a specific angle) is predetermined by some set of hidden-variables  , and a three-dimensional vector u , as well as by some set of other possibly non-local parameters  (for example, measurement settings in space-like separated regions) that is, A  A,u,a, . According to assumption (3), particles with the same u but with different  build up subensembles of 'definite polarization' described by a probability distribution u . The expectation value Au , obtained by averaging over  , fulfills Malus' law, that is, 301 Au   duA,u,a,  u  a. Finally, with assumption (2), the measured expectation value for a general physical state is given by averaging over the distribution Fu of subensembles, that is, A   duFuAu . Let us consider a specific source, which emits pairs of photons with well-defined polarizations u and v to laboratories of Alice and Bob, respectively. The local polarization measurement outcomes A and B are fully determined by the polarization vector, by an additional set of hidden variables  specific to the source and by any set of parameters  outside the source. For reasons of clarity, we choose an explicit non-local dependence of the outcomes on the settings a and b of the measurement devices. Note, however, that this is just an example of a possible non-local dependence, and that one can choose any other set out of  . Each emitted pair is fully defined by the subensemble distribution u,v . In agreement with assumption (3) we impose the following conditions on the predictions for local averages of such measurements (all polarizations and measurement directions are represented as vectors on the Poincaré sphere [10]): Au   du,vAa,b,  u  a, 7.4.1 Bv   du,vBb,a,  v  b. 7.4.2 It is important to note that the validity of Malus' law imposes the nonsignalling condition on the investigated non-local models, as the local expectation values do only depend on local parameters. The correlation function of measurement results for a source emitting well-polarized photons is defined as the average of the products of the individual measurement outcomes: ABu,v   du,vAa,b,Bb,a, 7.4.3 302 For a general source producing mixtures of polarized photons the observable correlations are averaged over a distribution of the polarizations Fu,v , and the general correlation function E is given by: E  AB   dudvFu,vABu,v 7.4.4 It is a very important trait of this model that there exist subensembles of definite polarizations (independent of measurements) and that the predictions for the subensembles agree with Malus' law. It is clear that other classes of non-local theories, possibly even fully compliant with all quantum mechanical predictions, might exist that do not have this property when reproducing entangled states. There the non-local correlations are a consequence of the non-local quantum potential, which exerts suitable torque on the particles leading to experimental results compliant with quantum mechanics. In that theory, neither of the two particles in a maximally entangled state carries any angular momentum at all when emerging from the source [11]. In contrast, in the Leggett model, it is the total ensemble emitted by the source that carries no angular momentum, which is a consequence of averaging over the individual particles' well defined angular momenta (polarization). The theories described here are incompatible with quantum theory. Remind the basic idea of the incompatibility theorem [8] uses the following identity, which holds for any numbers A  1 and B  1 : 1  |A  B| AB  1  |A  B|. 7.4.5 One can apply this identity to the dichotomic measurement results A  Aa,b,  1 and B  Bb,a,  1 . The identity holds even if the values of A and B mutually depend on each other. For example, the 303 value of a specific outcome A can depend on the value of an actually obtained result B. In contrast, in the derivation of the CHSH inequality it is necessary to assume that A and B do not depend on each other. Therefore, any kind of non-local dependencies used in the present class of theories are allowed. Taking the average over the subensembles with definite polarizations we obtain: 1   du,v|A  B|  du,vAB  1   du,v|A  B| 7.4.6 Denoting these averages by bars, one arrives at the shorter expression: 1  |A  B|  AB  1  |A  B|. 7.4.7 As the average of the modulus is greater than or equal to the modulus of the averages, one gets the set of inequalities: 1  |A  B| AB  1  |A  B|. 7.4.8 By inserting Malus' law, equations (7.4.1) and (7.4.2), in equation (7.4.8), and by using expression (7.4.4), one arrives at a set of inequalities for experimentally accessible correlation functions (for a detailed derivation see Appendix B). In particular, if we let Alice choose her observable from the set of two settings a1 and a2 , and Bob from the set of three settings b  1 , b  2 and b  3  a2 , the following generalized Leggett-type inequality is obtained: SNLHV  |E11  E230||E22  E230| 4  4 |sin  2 |, 7.4.9 where Ekl is a uniform average of all correlation functions, defined in the plane of ak and b  l , with the same relative angle  ; the 304 subscript NLHV stands for 'non-local hiddenvariables'. For the inequality to be applied, vectors a1 and b  1 necessarily have to lie in a plane orthogonal to the one defined by a2 and b  2 . This contrasts with the standard experimental configuration used to test the CHSH inequality, which is maximally violated for settings in one plane. Fig. 7.4.1. Testing non-local hidden-variable theories [9] (a) Diagram of a standard two-photon experiment to test for hidden variable theories. When pumping a nonlinear crystal (NL) with a strong pump field, photon pairs are created via spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) and their polarization is detected with single-photon counters (PC). Local measurements at A and B are performed along directions a and b on the Poincaré sphere, respectively. Depending on the measurement directions, the obtained correlations can be used to test Bell inequalities (b) or Leggett-type inequalities (c). (b) Correlations in one plane. Shown are measurements along directions in the linear plane of the Poincaré sphere (H (V) denotes horizontal (vertical) polarization). The original experiments by Wu and Shaknov [12] and Kocher and Commins [13], designed to test quantum predictions for correlated photon pairs, measured perfect correlations (solid lines). Measurements along the dashed line allow a Bell test, as was first performed by Freedman and Clauser [14]. (c) Correlations in orthogonal planes. All current experimental 305 tests to violate Bell's inequality (CHSH) are performed within the shaded plane. Out-of-plane measurements are required for a direct test of the class of non-local hidden-variable theories, as was first suggested by Leggett [15]. The situation resembles in a way the status of the Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) paradox before the advent of Bell's theorem and its first experimental tests. The experiments of Wu and Shaknov [12] and of Kocher and Commins [13] were designed to demonstrate the validity of a quantum description of photon-pair correlations. As this task only required the testing of correlations along the same polarization direction, their results could not provide experimental data for the newly derived Bell inequalities (Fig. 7.4.1a, b). Curiously, as was shown by Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt, only a small modification of the measurement directions, such that nonperfect correlations of an entangled state are probed, was sufficient to test Bell's inequalities. The seminal experiment by Freedman and Clauser [14] was the first direct and successful test. Today, all Bell tests that is, tests of local realism are performed by testing correlations of measurements along directions that lie in the same plane of the Poincaré sphere. Similar to the previous case, violation of the Leggett-type inequality requires only small modifications to that arrangement: To test the inequality, correlations of measurements along two orthogonal planes have to be probed (Fig. 7.4.1c). Therefore, the existing data of all Bell tests cannot be used to test the class of nonlocal theories considered in [14]. Quantum theory violates inequality (7.4.9). Consider the quantum predictions for the polarization singlet state of two photons, |AB  1 2 |HA |VB  |VA |HB  , where, for example, |HA denotes a horizontally polarized photon propagating to Alice. The quantum correlation function for the measurements ak and b  l performed on 306 photons depends only on the relative angles between these vectors, and therefore Ekl  ak  bl  cos . Thus the left hand side of inequality (7.4.9), for quantum predictions, reads |2cos  1| . The maximal violation of inequality (7.4.9) is for max  18.8 . For this difference angle, the bound given by inequality (7.4.9) equals 3.792 and the quantum value is 3.893. Although this excludes the nonlocal models, it might still be possible that the obtained correlations could be explained by a local realistic model. In order to avoid that, we have to exclude both local realistic and non-local realistic hiddenvariable theories. Note however that such local realistic theories need not be constrained by assumptions (1) - (3). The violation of the CHSH inequality invalidates all local realistic models. If one takes SCHSH  |E11  E12  E21  E22 |  2 7.4.10 the quantum value of the left hand side for the settings used to maximally violate inequality (7.4.9) is 2.2156. The correlation function determined in an actual experiment is typically reduced by a visibility factor V to Eexp  Vcos owing to noise and imperfections. Thus to observe violations of inequality (7.4.9) (and inequality (7.4.10)) in the experiment, one must have a sufficiently high experimental visibility of the observed interference. For the optimal difference angle max  18.8 , the minimum required visibility is given by the ratio of the bound (3.792) and the quantum value (3.893) of inequality (7.4.9), or  97.4%. We note that in standard Bell-type experiments, a minimum visibility of only  71% is sufficient to violate the CHSH inequality, inequality (7.4.10), at the optimal settings. For the settings used here, the critical visibility reads 2/2.2156  90.3%, which is much lower than 97.4%. 307 Fig. 7.4.2. Experimental set-up [9] A 2-mm-thick type-II barium-borate (BBO) crystal is pumped with a pulsed frequencydoubled Ti: sapphire laser (180 fs) at  = 395 nm wavelength and ~150 mW optical c.w. power. The crystal is aligned to produce the polarization-entangled singlet state |AB  1 2 |HA |VB  |VA |HB  . Spatial and temporal distinguishability of the produced photons (induced by birefringence in the BBO) are compensated by a combination of half-wave plates /2 and additional BBO crystals (BBO/2), while spectral distinguishability (due to the broad spectrum of the pulsed pump) is eliminated by narrow spectral filtering of 1 nm bandwidth in front of each detector. In addition, the reduced pump power diminishes higher-order SPDC emissions of multiple photon pairs. This allows us to achieve a twophoton visibility of about 99%, which is well beyond the required threshold of 97:4%. The arrows in the Poincaré spheres indicate the measurement settings of Alice's and Bob's polarizers for the maximal violation of inequality (7.4.9). Note that setting b 2 lies in the y  z plane and therefore a quarter-wave plate has to be 308 introduced on Bob's side. The coloured planes indicate the measurement directions for various difference angles  for both inequalities. In the experiment [9] (see Fig. 7.4.2), a pairs of polarization entangled photons was generated via SPDC. The photon source is aligned to produce pairs in the polarization singlet state. We observed maximal coincidence count rates (per 10 s), in the H/V basis, of around 3,500 with single count rates of 95,000 (Alice) and 105,000 (Bob), 3,300 coincidences in the 45 basis (75,000 singles at Alice and 90,000 at Bob), and 2,400 coincidences in the R/L basis (70,000 singles at Alice and 70,000 at Bob). The reduced count rates in the R/L basis are due to additional retarding elements in the beam path. The two-photon visibilities are approximately 99.0  1.2% in the H/V basis, 99.2  1.6% in the 45 basis and 98.9  1.7% in the R/L basis, which to our knowledge is the highest reported visibility for a pulsed SPDC scheme. So far, no experimental evidence against the rotational invariance of the singlet state exists. We therefore replace the rotation averaged correlation functions in inequality (7.4.9) with their values measured for one pair of settings (in the given plane). In terms of experimental count rates, the correlation function Ea,b for a given pair of general measurement settings is defined by Ea,b  N  N  N  N N  N  N  N 7.4.11 where NAB denotes the number of coincident detection events between Alice's and Bob's measurements within the integration time. We ascribe the number 1, if Alice (Bob) detects a photon polarized along a b  , and 1 for the orthogonal direction a b  . For example, N denotes the number of coincidences in which Alice obtains a and Bob b . Note that Eak,bl  Ekl , where  is the 309 difference angle between the vectors a and b on the Poincaré sphere. To test inequality (7.4.9), three correlation functions (Ea1 ,b1 , , Ea2 ,b2 , Ea2 ,b3) have to be extracted from the measured data. We choose observables a1 and b  1 as linear polarization measurements (in the x z plane on the Poincaré sphere; see Fig. 7.4.2) and a2 and b2 as elliptical polarization measurements in the y z plane. Two further correlation functions (Ea2 ,b1 and Ea1 ,b2) are extracted to test the CHSH inequality (7.4.10). The first set of correlations, in the x z plane, is obtained by using linear polarizers set to 1 and 1 (relative to the z axis) at Alice's and Bob's location, respectively. In particular, 1  45 , while 1 is chosen to lie between 45 and 160 (green arrows in Fig. 7.4.2). The second set of correlations (necessary for CHSH) is obtained in the same plane for 2  0/90 and 1 between 45 and 160 . The set of correlations for measurements in the y z plane is obtained by introducing a quarter-wave plate with the fast axis aligned along the (horizontal) 0 direction at Bob's site, which effectively rotates the polarization state by 90 around the z-axis on the Poincaré sphere (red arrows in Fig. 7.4.2). The polarizer angles are then set to 2  0/90 and 2 is scanned between 0 and 115 . With the same 2 and 1  45 , the expectation values specific only for the CHSH case are measured. The remaining measurement for inequality (7.4.9) is the check of perfect correlations, for which we choose 2  3  0 , that is, the intersection of the two orthogonal planes. Fig. 7.4.3 shows the experimental violation of inequalities (7.4.9) and (7.4.10) for various difference angles. Maximum violation of inequality (7.4.9) is achieved, for example, for the settings 1 ,2 ,1 ,2 ,3  45,0,55,10,0 . 310 Fig. 7.4.3. Experimental violation of the inequalities for non-local hidden-variable theories (NLHV) and for local realistic theories (CHSH) (a) Dashed line indicates the bound of inequality (7.4.9) for the investigated class of nonlocal hidden variable theories. The solid line is the quantum theoretical prediction reduced by the experimental visibility. The shown experimental data were taken for various difference angles  (on the Poincaré sphere) of local measurement settings. The bound is clearly violated for 4    36. Maximum violation is observed for max  20. (b) At the same time, no local realistic theory can model the correlations for the investigated settings as the same set of data also violates the CHSH inequality (7.4.10). The bound (dashed line) is overcome for all values  around max , and hence excludes any local realistic explanation of the observed correlations in a. Again, the solid line is the quantum prediction for the observed experimental visibility. Error bars indicate s.d. The following expectation values for a difference angle   20 (the errors are calculated assuming that the counts follow a poissonian distribution) were obtained [9]: Ea1 ,b1  0.9298  0.0105 , Ea2 ,b2  0.942  0.0112 , Ea2 ,b3  0.9902  0.0118 . This results in 311 SNLHV  3.8521  0.0227 , which violates inequality (7.4.9) by 3.2 standard deviations (see Fig. 7.4.3). At the same time, we can extract the additional correlation functions Ea2 ,b1  0.3436  0.0088 , Ea1 ,b2  0.0374  0.0091 required for the CHSH inequality. We obtain SCHSH  2.178  0.0199 , which is a violation by  9 standard deviations. The stronger violation of inequality (7.4.10) is due to the relaxed visibility requirements on the probed entangled state. VII.4.2. Derivation of the Canonical Leggett inequality With the assumption that photons with well defined polarization obey Malus' law: A  u  a, B  v  b, 7.4.12 the upper bound of Eq. (7.4.8) becomes: AB  1  |u  ak  v  bl|, 7.4.13 where ak and bl are unit vectors associated with the k -th measurement setting of Alice and the l -th of Bob, respectively. Taking the average over arbitrary polarizations we obtain Ekl HVT  1   dudvFu,v|u  ak  v  bl|, 7.4.14 where Ekl HVT is the correlation function which can be experimentally measured when Alice chooses to measure ak and Bob chooses bl . Let us denote by ukl and v kl the length of projections of vectors u and v onto the plane spanned by ak and bl . Since one can decompose vectors u and v into a vector orthogonal to the plane of the settings and a vector within the plane the scalar products read 312 u  ak  ukl cosa k  u,v  bl  v kl cosb l  v, 7.4.15 where all the  angles are relative to some axis within the plane of the settings; angles u and v describe the position of the projections of vectors u and v , respectively, whereas angles a k and b l describe the position of the setting vectors. With this notation the inequality (7.4.14) becomes: Ekl HVT  1   dudvFu,v|ukl cosa k  u  v kl cosb l  v|. 7.4.16 The magnitudes of the projections can always be decomposed into the sum and the difference of two real numbers ukl  n1  n2 and v kl  n1  n2 . We insert this decomposition into the last inequality, and hence the terms multiplied by n1 and n2 are cosa k  u  cosb l  v  2sin a k  b l  u  v 2 sin a k  b l  u  v 2 7.4.17 and cosa k  u  cosb l  v  2cos a k  b l  u  v 2 cos a k  b l  u  v 2 , 7.4.18 respectively. We make the following substitution for the measurement angles kl  a k  b l 2 ,kl  a k  b l , 7.4.19 and parameterize the position of the projections within their plane by 313 uv  u  v 2 , uv  u  v. 7.4.20 Using these new angles one obtains that Ekl HVTkl,kl  1  2  dudvFu,v|n2 cos kl  uv 2 coskl  uv  n1 sin kl  uv 2 sinkl  uv|, 7.4.21 where in the correlation function Eklkl,kl we explicitly state the angles it is dependent on. The expression within the modulus is a linear combination of two harmonic functions of kl  uv , and therefore is a harmonic function itself. Its amplitude reads n2 2 cos2 kl  uv 2  n1 2 sin2 kl  uv 2 , 7.4.22 and the phase is some fixed real number  Ekl HVTkl,kl  1  2  dudvFu,v n22 cos2 kl  uv 2  n1 2 sin2 kl  uv 2  |coskl  uv  |. 7.4.23 In the next step we average both sides of this inequality over the measurement angle kl  a k  b l 2 . This means an integration over kl  0,2 and a multiplication by 1 2 . The integral of the kl dependent part of the right-hand side of (7.4.23) reads: 1 2  0 2 dkl|coskl  uv  | 2 . 7.4.24 By denoting the average of the correlation function over the angle kl as: 314 Ekl HVTkl  1 2  0 2 dklEklkl,kl, 7.4.25 one can write (7.4.23) as Ekl HVTkl  1  4  dudvFu,v n2 2 cos2 kl  uv 2  n1 2 sin2 kl  uv 2 7.4.26 This inequality is valid for any choice of observables in the plane defined by ak and bl . One can introduce two new observable vectors in this plane and write the inequality for the averaged correlation function Ek l HVT k l   of these new observables. The sum of these two inequalities is Ekl HVTkl  Ek l  HVT k l     2  4  dudvFu,v  n2 2 cos2 kl  uv 2  n1 2 sin2 kl  uv 2   n2 2 cos2  k l  uv 2   n1 2 sin2  k l  uv 2  7.4.27 One can use the triangle inequality ||x  y|| ||x||||y||, x 1  y12  x 2  y22  x 1 2  x 2 2  y1 2  y2 2 , 7.4.28 for the two-dimensional vectors x  x1 ,x2 and y  y1 ,y2 , with components defined by x 1  n2 cos kl  uv 2 , y1  n2 cos  k l   uv 2 , 7.4.29 and 315 x 2  n1 sin kl  uv 2 , y2  n1 sin  k l   uv 2 . 7.4.30 One can further estimate this bound by using the following relations cos kl  uv 2  cos  k l   uv 2  sin kl  k l  2 7.4.31 and sin kl  uv 2  sin  k l   uv 2  sin kl  k l  2 . 7.4.32 This estimate follows if one uses the formula for the sine of the difference angle to the right-hand side argument kl  k l  2  kl  uv 2   k l   uv 2 . Namely, sin kl  k l  2  sin kl  uv 2 cos  k l    uv 2  cos kl  uv 2 sin  k l   uv 2  sin kl  uv 2 cos  k l   uv 2  cos kl  uv 2 sin  k l    uv 2 . 7.4.33 After these estimates, the lower bound of Ekl  Ek l (following form the left-hand side inequality in (7.4.8)) is equal to minus the upper bound, and thus one can apply the upper bound to the modulus of the left hand side of (7.4.27). This is because the only formal difference between expressions in the estimates seeking the lower bound of the averaged Eq. (7.4.8) compared to those seeking the upper bound boils down to the interchange between n1 and n2 . After applying (7.4.31) and (7.4.32), this makes no difference anymore. One can shortly write 316 |Ekl HVTkl  Ek l HVT k l  | 2  4 sin kl  k l  2  dudvFu,v n22  n12 . 7.4.34 Going back to the magnitudes: |Ekl HVTkl  Ek l HVT k l  | 2  2 2 sin kl  k l  2  dudvFu,v ukl2  v kl2 . 7.4.35 This inequality is valid for any choice of the plane of observables. The bound involves only the projections of vectors u and v onto the plane of the settings. The integrations in the bound can be thought of as a mean value of expression ukl 2  v kl 2 averaged over the distribution of the vectors. For the plane orthogonal to the initial one the inequality is |Epq HVTpq  Ep q  HVT p q   |  2  2 2 sin pq  p q   2  dudvFu,v upq2  v pq2 , 7.4.36 where upq and v pq denote the projections of vectors u and v , respectively, onto the plane spanned by the settings ap and b  q (which is by construction orthogonal to the plane spanned by ak and bl ). We add the inequalities for orthogonal observation planes, (7.4.35) and (7.4.36), and choose k l    p q    0 and kl  pq   . This gives |Ekl HVT  E k l  HVT0||EpqHVT  Ep q  HVT0| 4  2 2 sin  2  dudvFu,v ukl2  v kl2  upq2  v pq2 7.4.37 We apply the triangle inequality (7.4.28) to the expression within the bracket. These time vectors x and y have the following components: 317 x  ukl,upq,y  v kl,vpq. 7.4.38 The integrand is bounded by: ukl 2  v kl 2  upq2  v pq2  ukl  upq2  v kl  v pq2 . 7.4.39 Let us consider the term involving vector u only. Since the lengths are positive ukl  upq2  ukl 2  upq2 . 7.4.40 Recall that ukl and upq are projections onto orthogonal planes. One can introduce normal vectors to these planes, nkl and npq , respectively, and write nkl  u2  ukl 2  1,npq  u2  upq2  1. 7.4.41 Note that the scalar products are two components of vector u in the Cartesian frame build out of vectors nkl , npq , and the one which is orthogonal to these two. Since vector u is normalized one has: nkl  u2  npq  u2  1, 7.4.42 which implies for the sum of equations (7.4.41) ukl 2  upq2  1. 7.4.43 The same applies to vector v and one can conclude that ukl 2  v kl 2  upq2  v pq2  2 . 7.4.44 318 Since the weight function Fu,v is normalized, the final Laggett type inequality is Ekl HVT  E k l HVT0||EpqHVT  Ep q  HVT0  4  4 sin  2 . 7.4.45 VII.4.3. Leggett inequality revisited. Validity of revised Leggett inequality A general framework of such models is the following: assumption (1) requires that an individual binary measurement outcome A t1 for a polarization measurement at instant t1 along direction a (that is, whether a single photon is transmitted or absorbed at instant t1 by a polarizer set at a specific angle) is predetermined by some set of hidden-variables , and a three-dimensional vector u , as well as by some set of other possibly non-local parameters  (for example, measurement settings in space-like separated regions) that is, At1,u,a,  A,u,a,, t1 . According to assumption (3), particles with the same u but with different  build up subensembles of 'definite polarization' described by a probability distribution u, t1 . The expectation value At1u  Au, t1, obtained by averaging over  , fulfils Malus' law, that is, At1u   du, t1A,u,a,, t1  u  a . Finally, with assumption (2), the measured expectation value for a general physical state is given by averaging over the distribution Fu, t1 of subensembles, that is, At1   duFu, t1At1u . Let us consider a specific source, which emits pairs of photons with well-defined polarizations u and v to laboratories of Alice and Bob, respectively. The local polarization measurement outcomes A t1 and Bt2 are fully determined by the polarization vector, by an additional set of hidden variables  specific to the source and by any set of parameters  outside the source. For reasons of clarity, we choose an explicit non-local dependence of the outcomes on the settings a 319 and b of the measurement devices. Note, however, that this is just an example of a possible non-local dependence, and that one can choose any other set out of  . Each emitted pair is fully defined by the subensemble distribution u,v, t1 , t2 . In agreement with assumption (3) we impose the following conditions on the predictions for local averages of such measurements (all polarizations and measurement directions are represented as vectors on the Poincaré sphere [10]): At1u   du,v, t1 , t2Aa,b,, t1  u  a, 7.4.46 Bt2v   du,v, t1 , t2Bb,a,, t2  v  b. 7.4.47 It is important to note that the validity of Malus' law imposes the nonsignalling condition on the investigated non-local models, as the local expectation values do only depend on local parameters. The correlation function of measurement results for a source emitting well-polarized photons is defined as the average of the products of the individual measurement outcomes: At1 Bt2u,v  ABu,v, t1 , t2   du,v, t1 , t2Aa,b,, t1Bb,a,, t2 7.4.48 For a general source producing mixtures of polarized photons the observable correlations are averaged over a distribution of the polarizations Fu,v, t1 , t2 , and the general correlation function Et1 , t2  is given by: Et1 , t2   At1Bt2F   dudvFu,v, t1 , t2ABu,v, t1 , t2 7.4.49 It is a very important trait of this model that there exist subensembles of definite polarizations (independent of measurements) and that the predictions for the subensembles agree with Malus' law. There the non-local correlations are a consequence 320 of the non-local quantum potential, which exerts suitable torque on the particles leading to experimental results compliant with quantum mechanics. In that theory, neither of the two particles in a maximally entangled state carries any angular momentum at all when emerging from the source [11]. In contrast, in the Leggett model, it is the total ensemble emitted by the source that carries no angular momentum, which is a consequence of averaging over the individual particles' well defined angular momenta (polarization). Assumption 7.4.1. We assume now that |t1  t2 |    0, and ABu,v, t1 , t2  ABu,v, t1  t2, Fu,v, t1 , t2  Fu,v, t1  t2, Et1 , t2   Et1  t2 . 7.4.50 Remark 7.4.1. We abbreviate now for short A t1 Bt2u,v  ABu,v  iff t1  t2    0, A t1 Bt2u,v  ABu,v  iff t1  t2    0, Et1 , t2   E iff t1  t2    0, Et1 , t2   E iff t1  t2    0. 7.4.51 We take a source which distributes pairs of well-polarized photons. Different pairs can have different polarizations. The size of a subensemble in which photons have polarizations u and v is described by the weight function Fu,v, t1 , t2  Fu,v, t1  t2 . All polarizations and measurement directions are represented as vectors on the Poincaré sphere. In every such subensemble individual measurement outcomes are determined by hidden variables . The hidden variables are allocated according to the distribution u,v, t1 , t2  u,v, t1  t2 . For any dichotomic measurement results, At1  1 and Bt2  1 , the following identity holds: 321 1  |At1  Bt2 | At1Bt2  1  |At1  Bt2 |. 7.4.52 If the signs of A t1 and Bt2 are the same |At1  Bt2 | 2 and |At1  Bt2 | 0 , and if At1  Bt2 then |At1  Bt2 | 0 and |At1  Bt2 | 2 . Any kind of nonlocal dependencies is allowed, i.e. At1  Aa,b ,u,v,, t1 . . . . and Bt2  Ba,b ,u,v,, t2 . . . . . Taking the average over the subensemble with definite polarizations gives 1   du,v, t1 , t2|A t1  Bt2 |   du,v, t1 , t2A t1 Bt2  1   du,v, t1 , t2|A t1  Bt2 |, 7.4.53 which in an abbreviated notation, where the averages are denoted by , is 1  |At1  Bt2 |  At1Bt2   1  |At1  Bt2 |. 7.4.54 As the average of the modulus is greater than or equal to the modulus of the averages, one gets the set of inequalities: 1  |At1   Bt2 |  At1Bt2   1  |At1   Bt2 |. 7.4.55 From now on only the upper bound will be considered, however all steps apply to the lower bound as well. With the assumption that photons with well defined polarization obey Malus' law At1   u  a, Bt2   v  b , 7.4.56 the upper bound of the inequality (7.4.55) becomes At1Bt2   1  |u  ak  v  bl|, 7.4.57 322 where ak and bl are unit vectors associated with the k -th measurement setting of Alice and the l -th of Bob, respectively. Taking the average over arbitrary polarizations we obtain Eklt1 , t2   1   dudvFu,v, t1 , t2|u  ak  v  bl|. 7.4.58 Remark 7.4.2. We assume now that t1  t2    0 and by using (7.4.50) – (7.4.51) we rewrite now the inequalities (7.4.57) and (7.4.58) as AB  1  |u  ak  v  bl| 7.4.59 and Ekl   1   dudvFu,v,|u  ak  v  bl|. 7.4.60 respectively. Remark 7.4.3. We assume now that t1  t2    0 and by using (7.4.50)-(7.4.51) we rewrite now the inequalities (7.4.57) and (7.4.58) as AB  1  |u  ak  v  bl| 7.4.61 and Ekl   1   dudvFu,v,|u  ak  v  bl|. 7.4.62 respectively. Remark 7.4.4. We define now the full avereges Ekl GHVT as Ekl GHVT  Ekl   Ekl  , 7.4.63 323 where Ekl GHVT is the correlation function which can be experimentally measured when Alice chooses to measure ak and Bob chooses bl . Let us denote by ukl and v kl the length of projections of vectors u and v onto the plane spanned by ak and bl . Thus from the inequalities (7.4.60) and (7.4.62) by using Eq. (7.4.63) we obtain Ekl GHVT  2   dudvFu,v|u  ak  v  bl|, Fu,v,  Fu,v,  Fu,v,. 7.4.64 Сompare the inequality (7.4.64) with the inequality (7.4.14). Let us denote by ukl and v kl the length of projections of vectors u and v onto the plane spanned by ak and bl . Since one can decompose vectors u and v into a vector orthogonal to the plane of the settings and a vector within the plane the scalar products read u  ak  ukl cosa k  u,v  bl  v kl cosb l  v, 7.4.65 where all the  angles are relative to some axis within the plane of the settings; angles u and v describe the position of the projections of vectors u and v , respectively, whereas angles a k and b l describe the position of the setting vectors. With this notation the inequality (7.4.64) becomes Ekl GHVT  2   dudvFu,v,|ukl cosa k  u  v kl cosb l  v|. 7.4.66 Сompare the inequality (7.4.66) with the inequality (7.4.16). The magnitudes of the projections can always be decomposed into the sum and the difference of two real numbers ukl  n1  n2 and v kl  n1  n2 . We insert this decomposition into the last inequality, and hence the terms multiplied by n1 and n2 are 324 cosa k  u  cosb l  v   2sin a k  b l  u  v 2 sin a k  b l  u  v 2 7.4.67 and cosa k  u  cosb l  v   2cos a k  b l  u  v 2 cos a k  b l  u  v 2 , 7.4.68 respectively. We make the following substitution for the measurement angles kl  a k  b l 2 ,kl  a k  b l , 7.4.69 and parameterize the position of the projections within their plane by uv  u  v 2 ,uv  u  v. 7.4.70 Using these new angles one obtains that Ekl GHVTkl,kl  2  2  dudvFu,v,|n2 cos kl  uv 2 coskl  uv  n1 sin kl  uv 2 sinkl  uv|, 7.4.71 where in the correlation function Eklkl,kl we explicitly state the angles it is dependent on. Сompare the inequality (7.4.71) with the inequality (7.4.21). The expression within the modulus is a linear combination of two harmonic functions of kl  uv, and therefore is a harmonic function itself. Its amplitude reads n2 2 cos2 kl  uv 2  n1 2 sin2 kl  uv 2 , 7.4.72 325 and the phase is some fixed real number  Ekl GHVTkl,kl  2  2  dudvFu,v, n22 cos2 kl  uv2  n1 2 sin2 kl  uv 2  |coskl  uv  |. 7.4.73 In the next step we average both sides of this inequality over the measurement angle kl  a k  b l 2 . This means an integration over kl  0,2 and a multiplication by 1 2 . The integral of the kl dependent part of the right-hand side of (7.4.73) reads: 1 2  0 2 dkl|coskl  uv  |  2 . 7.4.74 By denoting the average of the correlation function over the angle kl as: Ekl GHVTkl  1 2  0 2 dklEkl GHVTkl,kl, 7.4.75 one can write (7.4.73) as Ekl GHVTkl  2  4  dudvFu,v, n2 2 cos2 kl  uv 2  n1 2 sin2 kl  uv 2 7.4.76 This inequality is valid for any choice of observables in the plane defined by ak and bl . One can introduce two new observable vectors in this plane and write the inequality for the averaged correlation function Ek l GHVT k l   of these new observables. The sum of these two inequalities is 326 Ekl GHVTkl  Ek l  HVT k l     4  4  dudvFu,v,  n2 2 cos2 kl  uv 2  n1 2 sin2 kl  uv 2   n2 2 cos2  k l    uv 2  n1 2 sin2  k l    uv 2 . 7.4.77 One can use the triangle inequality ||x  y|| ||x||||y||, x 1  y12  x 2  y22  x 1 2  x 2 2  y1 2  y2 2 , 7.4.78 for the two-dimensional vectors x  x1 ,x2 and y  y1 ,y2 , with components defined by x 1  n2 cos kl  uv 2 , y1  n2 cos  k l   uv 2 , 7.4.79 and x 2  n1 sin kl  uv 2 , y2  n1 sin  k l   uv 2 . 7.4.80 One can further estimate this bound by using the following relations cos kl  uv 2  cos  k l   uv 2  sin kl  k l  2 7.4.81 and sin kl  uv 2  sin  k l   uv 2  sin kl  k l  2 . 7.4.82 This estimate follows if one uses the formula for the sine of the 327 difference angle to the right-hand side argument kl  k l  2  kl  uv 2   k l   uv 2 . Namely, sin kl  k l  2  sin kl  uv 2 cos  k l    uv 2  cos kl  uv 2 sin  k l   uv 2  sin kl  uv 2 cos  k l   uv 2  cos kl  uv 2 sin  k l    uv 2 . 7.4.83 After these estimates, the lower bound of Ekl GHVT  E k l GHVT (following form the left-hand side inequality in (7.4.55)) is equal to minus the upper bound, and thus one can apply the upper bound to the modulus of the left hand side of (7.4.27). This is because the only formal difference between expressions in the estimates seeking the lower bound of the averaged Eq. (7.4.55) compared to those seeking the upper bound boils down to the interchange between n1 and n2 . After applying (7.4.81) and (7.4.82), this makes no difference anymore. One can shortly write Ekl GHVTkl  Ek l GHVT k l    4  4 sin kl  k l  2 dudvFu,v, n22  n12 . 7.4.84 Going back to the magnitudes: |Ekl GHVTkl  Ek l GHVT k l  | 4  2 2 sin kl  k l  2  dudvFu,v, ukl2  v kl2 . 7.4.85 The inequality (7.4.85) is valid for any choice of the plane of observables. The bound involves only the projections of vectors u and v onto the plane of the settings. The integrations in the bound can be thought of as a mean value of expression ukl 2  v kl 2 averaged over the distribution of the vectors. For the plane orthogonal to the initial one the inequality is 328 |Epq GHVTpq  Ep q  GHVT p q   |  2  2 2 sin pq  p q   2  dudvFu,v, upq2  v pq2 , 7.4.86 where upq and v pq denote the projections of vectors u and v , respectively, onto the plane spanned by the settings ap and b  q (which is by construction orthogonal to the plane spanned by ak and bl ). We add the inequalities for orthogonal observatin planes, (7.4.85) and (7.4.86), and choose k l    p q    0 and kl  pq   . This gives Ekl GHVT  E k l  GHVT0||EpqGHVT  Ep q  GHVT0 |  8  2 2 sin  2  dudvFu,v, ukl2  v kl2  upq2  v pq2 7.4.87 We apply the triangle inequality (7.4.78) to the expression within the bracket. These time vectors x and y have the following components: x  ukl,upq, y  v kl,vpq. 7.4.88 The integrand is bounded by: ukl 2  v kl 2  upq2  v pq2  ukl  upq2  v kl  v pq2 . 7.4.89 Let us consider the term involving vector u only. Since the lengths are positive ukl  upq2  ukl 2  upq2 . 7.4.90 Recall that ukl and upq are projections onto orthogonal planes. One can introduce normal vectors to these planes, nkl and npq , respectively, and write 329 nkl  u2  ukl 2  1,npq  u2  upq2  1. 7.4.91 Note that the scalar products are two components of vector u in the Cartesian frame build out of vectors nkl , npq , and the one which is orthogonal to these two. Since vector u is normalized one has: nkl  u2  npq  u2  1, 7.4.92 which implies for the sum of equations (7.4.90) ukl 2  upq2  1. 7.4.93 The same applies to vector v and one can conclude that ukl 2  v kl 2  upq2  v pq2  2 . 7.4.94 Since the weight function Fu,v is normalized, the final Laggett type inequality is Ekl GHVT  E k l GHVT0||EpqGHVT  Ep q  GHVT0  8  4 sin  2 . 7.4.95 330 APPENDICES Appendix A HEISENBERG'S NOISE-DISTURBANCE UCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE In the wave description of a photon, polarization can be visualized as the way the wave is rotated. A photon possesses horizontal |H or vertical |V polarization, but until its polarization is measured, these two states are said to be in a superposition, described by |  |H  |V A.1 where ,   and ||2 is the probability of finding the photon in state |H and ||2 in state |V. The horizontal and the vertical polarization jointly define a basis denoted by  z , which can take on the values |H or |V. However, the polarization can be described in an additional basis as well, the  x basis, which is shifted 45 in positive direction, see Fig. A.1. Fig. A.1. A graphical representation of the bases  z and  x 331 Just like the particle superposition consists of |H and |V in  z basis, the two new states |H  and |V  will describe the particle superposition in the  x basis as |  |H   |V  A.2 where ||2 describes the probability of finding the photon in state |H  and ||2 is state |V . An analogy to the intrinsic property spin is the polarization of photons. Since the polarization is just another example of an intrinsic property a particle could exhibit, one can repeat the SternGerlach experiment with the use of photons. Like the spin of the electron, one can write a polarization state of one basis as a superposition constituting the eigenstates of the other basis. The eigenstates obtained in the  z basis are given by |H  1 2 |H   |V , |V  1 2 |H   |V . A. 3 while polarization states in the  x basis are described by |H   1 2 |H  |V, |V   1 2 |H  |V. A. 4 Every SG (Stern-Gerlach) apparatus is replaced by three half wave plates (HWP) and a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) in between, see Fig. A.2. This setup will have the same effect on a photon as the SG-apparatus had on the electrons since it measures the polarization of the photon which thereby collapses into one of the eigenstates. A mathematical description of the setup, in order to 332 explain the expectation value which will make us able to predict the paths of the photons throughout the measurements, follows below. Fig. A.2. A representation of a setup corresponding to a SGapparatus The HWP rotates the polarization of the transmitted light and thereby shifts between the two bases. The HWP is described mathematically by the operator  R  cos2 sin2 sin2 cos2 A. 5 and when set to basis  z :  0 , and when set to  x :   22.5. The PBS divides the incident beam into two output beams and can mathematically be described as the operator P  1 0 0 1 . A. 6 333 In this instance the matrix representing the measurement operator  z in the  z basis is derived by z   R0 P  R0  . A. 7 Similarly, the matrix representing the measurement operator x in the  x basis is derived by x   R22.5 P  R22.5  . A. 8 Though the expressions above look alike, note that does not take on the same values when set to measure  z and  x . The measurement operator  z measures the polarization in the z -direction. Hence the photon will always be thrown into one of the eigenstates |H or |V. When measured in x , it will always be thrown into |H  or |V . Thus, one can say that the states are eigenstates to the respective operator. The two operators  z and x are represented by z  1 0 0 1 ,x  0 1 1 0 . A. 9 Notice that z,x   2 0 1 1 0  2C. A. 10 The Robertson uncertainty relation is given by z x   1 2 |z,x |  C. A. 11 Or in general case 334 A,B,  1 2 ||A,B|| A. 12 for any observables A,B and any state , where the standard deviation X, of an observable X in state  is defined by 2X,  |X 2 |  |X|2 . This relation was proven mathematically from fundamental postulates of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, this relation describes the limitation on preparing microscopic objects but has no direct relevance to the limitation of accuracy of measuring devices. It is a common understanding that the uncertainty principle implies or is implied by a limitation on measuring a system without disturbing it as a position measurement typically disturbs the momentum. However, the limitation has eluded a correct quantitative expression on the trade-off between noise and disturbance. Heisenberg noise-disturbance uncertainty relation By the  -ray thought experiment, Heisenberg [10, 16] argued that the product of the noise in a position measurement and the momentum disturbance caused by that measurement should be no less than /2. This relation is generally formulated as follows: for any apparatus A to measure an observable A, the relation A,,AB,,A  1 2 ||A,B|| A. 13 holds for any input state  and any observable B, where A,,A stands for the noise of the A measurement in state  using apparatus A and B,,A stands for the disturbance of B in state  caused by apparatus A. We refer to the above relation as the Heisenberg noise-disturbance uncertainty relation. 335 Heisenberg uncertainty relation for joint measurements Very similarly to the above relation (A.13), the Heisenberg uncertainty relation for joint measurements is generally formulated as follows: for any apparatus A with two outputs for the joint measurement of A and B, the relation A,,AB,,A  1 2 ||A,B|| A. 14 holds for any input state, where X,,A stands for the noise of the X measurement in state  using apparatus A for X  A,B . This relation was proven under the joint unbiasedness condition requiring that the (experimental) mean values of the outcome x A of the A measurement and the outcome yB of the B measurement should coincide with the (theoretical) mean values of observables A and B, respectively, on any input state  . It is a common opinion that currently available measuring devices satisfy this relation [12]-[14]. 336 Appendix B CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTIONS If X is given to be a continuous random variable with a defined density function say f(x) and E is an event which has positive probability then we define the conditional density function as fx|E  fx PE  x  E 0  x  E B. 1 337 Appendix C FOURIER TRANSFORM AND HEISENBERG UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE Definition C.1. Given any 1,2 function f, where 1,2  1 2, we define two operators as follows: (1) fx   f p  fp    fxexp2ixpdx, (2) fp  1fx    fpexp2ixpdp. Theorem C.1. (Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle). Let   1,2 with the condition   |x|2dx  1. 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(Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1983). [11] M. Born and E. Wolf, Principles of Optics: Electromagnetic Theory of Propagation, Interference and Diffraction of Light (Pergamon, Oxford, 1964), 2nd ed. [12] C. S. Wu and I. Shaknov, Phys. Rev. 77, 136 (1950). [13] C. A. Kocher and E. D. Commins, Phys. Rev. Lett. 18, 575 (1967). [14] S. J. Freedman and J. F. Clauser, Phys. Rev. Lett. 28, 938 (1972). [15] A. J. Leggett, Found. of Phys. 33, 1469 (2003). [16] Heisenberg, W. The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory, (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930; Dover,New York, 1949, 1967). View publication stats

Gladys L. Portuondo, "Jaspers, Husserl, Kant: Boundary Situations as a Turning-Point," Existenz 11/1 (2016), 51-56 First posted 11-29-2016 Volume 11, No 1, Spring 2016 ISSN 1932-1066 Jaspers, Husserl, Kant Boundary Situations as a Turning-Point Gladys L. Portuondo Independent Scholar, Los Angeles, CA [email protected] Abstract: The essay addresses the meaning of boundary situations in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers, as a turning point drawing on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy, and as a key for the comprehension of some of the differences in Karl Jaspers' philosophy regarding the thought of Husserl and Kant, respectively. For Jaspers, the meaning of boundary situations as a structure of Existenz underlines the possibility of risk in the individual historicity. Taking risks breaks the flow of reflection and, at the same time, appeals to an opening of ethics-without sacrificing the universality of Kant's categorical imperative. From Jaspers' point of view, Husserl's phenomenology does not open the possibility of self-transformation of the self, nor contributes it to the unfolding of the "inner action" of the transcending thinking, and since the boundary situations break the flow of the selfreflective consciousness, tensions arising between consciousness and Existenz remain beyond the scope of Husserl's phenomenology. Similarly, as seen from Jaspers' position the meaning of Kant's transcendental method has become different after the clarification by the Existenz, which not only shows that thought is at stake in boundary situations, but also that Existenz at the same time puts its potentiality and its fate at stake. Keywords: Jaspers, Karl; Kant, Immanuel; Husserl, Edmund; phenomenology of consciousness; ill consciousness; selfreflective consciousness; boundary situations; transcending-thinking; transcendental method; existential clarification; individual historicity. same objection to Husserl as he does to Descartes for they both attempt to validate the mathematics-based criteria of evidence and certainty for philosophy. Departing from his clinical expertise as a psychiatrist, Jaspers confronted the "deviations" of the pathologic psyche with the claims of coherence and meaning made by the phenomenology of consciousness,2 given de Los Andes, Revista Filosofia 25 (2014) 111-120. Thanks also to Helmut Wautischer and his editorial team from Existenz for their helpful editorial comments and suggestions regarding the revised present version. 2 See César Moreno, "De la excepción a la metafísica (Jaspers)," Madrid, Spain: Enclaves Fundamentales, Jaspers has emphazised that the philosophy of consciousness adopts a "contemplative" meaning on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.1 He raises the 1 A detailed account of this topic is in Gladys L. Portuondo, La existencia en busca de la razón (Apuntes sobre la filosofía de Karl Jaspers) [Existence in Search of Reason (Notes on Karl Jaspers' Philosophy)], Saarbrücken, Germany: Editorial Académica Española, Lambert Academic Publishing GmbH & Co. KG, 2012. With thanks to Pedro CoutinChurchman and Lauren Robinson Coutin for their help in correcting my English translation of the first English version of this article which was originally published in Spanish: "Jaspers, Husserl, Kant: las situaciones-límite como 'punto de giro'," Mérida-Venezuela: Universidad 52 Gladys L. Portuondo http://www.existenz.us Volume 11, No. 1, Spring 2016 the possibility for self-transformation of the self, nor contributes to the unfolding of the "inner action" of the transcending thinking-which according to Jaspers is a necessary condition for philosophizing. Transcending thinking is the place to which existential clarification belongs as the inclusive philosophical realm of boundary situations, and the place where the turning in Jaspers' philosophy occurs regarding to Husserl's phenomenology.7 "Actually," Jaspers states, there exists a radical difference between the phenomenology of consciousness and the illumination of Existenz...it is described...as the leap from observing to philosophizing, that is, from knowing something to inner action through thinking. [RC 819] This method does not mean reaching some understanding (Verstehen) of the ill psyche;8 that is to say, an interpretation of the connections that exist between mental states and the relationships and motivations that encourage them (PA 18). For Jaspers, who first introduced phenomenology into psychiatry,9 this only constitutes an empirical method for defining and distinguishing mental states. Although since his Cartesian Meditations (1931) Husserl had shown his interest in the world of human beings- as a field of transcendental intersubjectivity and an opening of space to the lifeworld (Lebenswelt)- it could be said, when seen from the position of Jaspers, that tensions were arising from the boundary situations between consciousness and Existenz as they remain marginalized in Husserl's phenomenology.10 This is 7 Boundary situations as a "turning point" mean in the present context, firstly, an as critical as possible vision of Husserl's phenomenology and Kant's transcendental method by virtue of a displacement of philosophizing toward the existential realm, and, secondly, an enlargement of the contents of the philosophical perspective. In our view, boundary situations constitute in Jaspers' philosophy the main incitement for turning to the realm of Existenz. 8 The method of Verstehen or verstehende Psychologie was originally unfolded in Jaspers' General Psychopathology and, later, in his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. 9 Jaspers first discussion to using phenomenology in the context of psychiatry appears in 1912 in "Die phänomenologische Forschungsrichtung in der Psychopathologie," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie 9/1 (December 1912), 391-408. 10 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, transl. Dorion Cairns, that the pursuit of truth in itself does not address a proper understanding of an ill consciousness due to the foundation of philosophy as a "rigorous science." Since the scope of the phenomenology of consciousness as a method is restricted to describing particular phenomena,3 Jaspers decided to widen its scope and to use it to also describe the experiences of mentally ill people.4 He considers this latter only a subordinated method for providing descriptions,5 and therefore as a method that is mainly suited for scientific research.6 Thus, even though he accepts it under no circumstances as a philosophical method, phenomenology allows him nevertheless to objectively represent phenomena of mental life, but it neither opens Fenomenología y Filosofía Existencial 1 (Editorial Síntesis 2000), 167-87, here p. 170. [Henceforth cited as EMJ] 3 "Actually there exists a radical difference between the phenomenology of consciousness and the illumination of Existenz. This difference would be badly designated if one were to call it a return from consciousnes to what lies before consciousness and supports it: it is described more correctly as the leap from observing to philosophizing, that is, from knowing something to inner action trough thinking." Karl Jaspers, "Reply to my Critics," The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. Paul A. Schilpp, La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company 1981, pp. 747-869, here p. 819. [Hencefort cited as RC] 4 "Not only hallucinations, but also delusions, modes of ego-consciousness, and emotions could, on the basis of the patients' own descriptions, be described so clearly that they became recognizable with certainty in other cases." Karl Jaspers, "Philosophical Autobiography, " The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. Paul A. Schilpp, La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company 1981, pp. 1-94, here p. 18. [Henceforth cited as PA] 5 See Karl Jaspers, Psicopatología General, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1993, p. 58. In the English version, see: "It is wrong to call this book 'the principal text of phenomenology.' The phenomenological attitude is one point of view and one chapter has been devoted to it in some detail as the viewpoint is a new one. But the whole book is directed to showing that it is only one point of view among many and holds a subordinate position at that." German text: Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, Vol. 1, transl. J. Hoenig and Marian W. Hamilton, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1997, p. 48. 6 "It was proved to be possible and fruitful to describe the inner experiences of patients as phenomena of consciousness....Phenomenology became a method for research" (PA 18). Jaspers, Husserl, Kant: Boundary Situations as a Turning-Point 53 Existenz: An International Journal in Philosophy, Religion, Politics, and the Arts because the boundary situations break the flow of the self-reflective consciousness. If we follow Jaspers, then it is difficult not to take into consideration that the inherent limit of phenomenology as a philosophy of consciousness makes it impossible to move towards the philosophy of existence, since the latter must be inclusive with regard to all human potentialities. Jaspers' relationship with Husserl's phenomenology takes into account two basic circumstances: first, Existenz goes beyond consciousness (and also comprehends it), however phenomenology stays within the scope of the latter;11 second, Jaspers' philosophy calls for an ethical dimension of philosophizing leading thought to practical life-wherein the contemplative dimension of reflexivity is exceeded by the torn condition of the existent. Drawing on Kant's transcendental method in so far as it aims to transcend what is objective (RC 792), Jaspers recognizes in this method the specific characteristic of the philosophical method which is distinct from the scientific method. Jaspers believes Kant reveals the way to Existenz, as it is open to self-reflection by the acknowledgment of: (1) the philosophical orientation toward the world without falling prey to deceptive illusions, as the way of science and knowledge of what is objective and as a basic condition of philosophizing; (2) the way of thinking which transforms the world into freedom and showing thereby that the world cannot be closed in on itself-being also incomprehensible as a whole for objective knowledge. Additionally, Jaspers states that the effort to transcend the subject-object split runs through science and objective knowledge. Kant keeps a similar stance regarding the relationship between science and philosophy, and he points out in Kant the idea of the world via antinomies and fallacies as a result of identifying it with a wholeness that incorrectly claims to exhaust the being of the world in its objectivity.12 For him, Kant would have taken a The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1977. 11 César Moreno, "Formas de lucidez. De las cosas mismas a la existencia," Madrid, Spain: Enclaves Fundamentales, Fenomenología y Filosofía existencial 1 (Editorial Síntesis 2000), 15-46, here p. 35. 12 Karl Jaspers, "Doctrina de Kant sobre las Ideas", in Conferencias y ensayos sobre historia de la filosofía, Madrid, Spain: Editorial Gredos 1972, pp. 114-40, here pp. 114-5. [Henceforth cited as DKI, my translation] German text: Karl Jaspers, "Kants Ideenlehre," in Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, Berlin, Germany: Springer Verlag 1971, pp. 463-86. decisive step towards the possibility of the philosophy of existence, by providing the methodical foundation for the idea of the phenomenality in correspondence with our existence within the subject-object duality, the latter as subordinated as forms of intuition to space and time as forms of intuition, and to categories as considered as forms of thinking.13 Yet, while he defines the scope of the subject as incommensurable with the object's objectivity-which is rather set according to this scope as its necessary reference-Kant conceives the subject, at the same time, according to an universal human condition by addressing the structures of reason for all possible rational subjects.14 But the subject, conceived like this, stands in contrast with the singularity and uniqueness of the individual historicity, which decides and acts within the scope of possibilities as they are conditioned according to the occurrence of boundary situations. However, Jaspers follows Kant and emphasizes that it is impossible to think, unless that which is thought is objectified-and he also states that all the objectifications must be methodically canceled by the ceaseless transcending-thinking via contradictions and circular argumentations, expressing the elusiveness of what transcends the framework of the subject-object split, and leading thought to the limits of the thinkable. But in this case, according to Jaspers, these are limits (boundaries) as they are given within thought. Yet boundary situations cannot be the object of neither knowledge nor logical reasoning, but rather they only 13 Karl Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, transl. Ralph Mannheim, Philosophical Library, New York, 1949, p. 14. 14 Jaspers examines Kant's Theory of Ideas by highlighting the ideas' special feature of being a content of the reason which surpasses the subject-object split. Jaspers also examines Kant's comments on the problem of "the one being," the individual, and by pointing out such a problem as not existing for the theory of categories (as it is unreachable to the understanding), Jaspers stresses that it is situated at a central place in the theory of ideas. He comments that for Kant, "the determination of all isolated entity is just an infinite task which is founded on the idea of totality of the experience," as well as "every individual is infinite" because "it is an idea as far as it becomes an object of knowledge" (DKI 128). But Kant refers to the problem of the individual in the realm of reason, and does not in the realm of the Existenz. 54 Gladys L. Portuondo http://www.existenz.us Volume 11, No. 1, Spring 2016 simultaneously he also thinks this conversion responds to the reality and the meaning of historicity, what Kant did not understand-so, following Jaspers, is that he had lost sight of the ethics of responsibility, with the aid of which Max Weber later develops his thinking later. Then, Jaspers stresses: What, from the point of view of a philosophy of history, he [Kant] permits is merely the attempt to write a history in which it is shown in how far and in how far not -measured by the ideal of reasonthe events and transformations which occurred were advantageous, and how all this is connected. [RC 755] The dialectic of historicity (as an existential condition according to Jaspers) manifests itself in the the judgement is usually missing, it is not unusual to find highly educated men who, when using their scientific ability, let it display that irremediable lack [of the gift]" (CFP 17). Arendt refers the quote to Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B172-B173, transl. to Spanish: Crítica de la Razón Pura, Madrid: Alfaguara: Alfaguara, 1978. See the full quote in the official English version in: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and transl. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1998, pp. 268-9 as follows: "A dull or limited head, which is lacking nothing but the appropriate degree of understanding and its proper concepts, may be well trained through instruction, even to the point of becoming learned. But since it would usually still lack the power of judgement (the secunda Petri), it is not at all uncommon to encounter very learned men who in many fine pathological, juridical, or political rules in his head, of which he can even be a thorough teacher, and yet can easily stumble in their application, either because he is lacking in natural power of judgement (though not in understanding), and to be sure understands the universal in abstracto but cannot distinguish whether a case in concreto belongs under it, or also because he has not received adequate training for this judgement through examples and actual business." Arendt points out the significance of this issue for "a group of questions facing modern thought, particularly the problem of theory and practice, and for all the attempts to achieve a more or less plausible theory of ethics" (CFP 18). In his "Reply to my Critics", Jaspers states in his comment to Walter Kaufmann that Kaufmann's view, according to which "he thinks that I stand above all on the ground of the Critique of Practical Reason," is hardly correct. Rather Jaspers says that, although he knows this work, he has "repeatedly and thoroughly studied, and again and again thought through, only the other two Critiques" (RC 857). drive the existential clarification. In a similar way, one can say that while Kant's transcendental philosophy has adopted as a starting point the experience of knowledge's fulfillment according to the modern scientific reason-and it also critically examines the conditions for this possibility- Jaspers' criticism begins with the de-realization, so to speak, of the empirical existence (Dasein) in a world in which the distinctive feature is the crisis. And it also examines the potential conditions of Existenz through the praxis, as they are unfolded by the existential clarification and communication. For Jaspers, the order of the Existenz cannot be found in any other than that of the very Existenz and it has an indirect meaning only,15 for the being of Existenz is mere possibility. When transcending-thinking "thinks about objects through non-objective ways; jumps over our own shadow by thought; thinks by methods using understanding and going beyond understanding" (RC 794), it performs the "basic philosophical operation" and makes it possible to change the attitude of consciousness, i.e., its conversion.16 Jaspers considers thinking's conversion as a part of the formal transcending, or what amounts to the same thing, it is in accordance with the "order of reason."17 But 15 Jaspers' referrals to the indirect meaning of different notions-for instance, the ciphers of transcendence, or the concepts and phenomenological descriptions of the Existenz-underline the impossibility to find an objective referent for these notions, given that they belong to a realm which exceeds the subject-object split within which knowledge is objectified. 16 The subject of the conversion of consciousness takes a core position in Karl Jaspers' thinking. A valuable study about the meaning of this conversion under the conditions of the Technological Revolution in the Modern Age can be found in Gregory J. Walters, Karl Jaspers and the Role of "Conversion" in the Nuclear Age, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988. 17 The "conversion of thinking" in Kant unfolds in the realm of logical operations, which do not include the judgment, as Hannah Arendt pointed out. She stresses that the judgment deals with the particular and has no place into Kant's moral philosophy. See Hannah Arendt's 1970 lectures Das Urteilen: Texte zu Kants politischer Philosophie, Piper, München, 1985. In Spanish, Hannah Arendt, Conferencias sobre la filosofía política de Kant, transl. Carmen Corral, Buenos Aires: Paidós 2003, pp. 16, 35. [Henceforth cited as CFP, my translation] Arendt quotes Kant: "A blunt or limited head...may reach by studying the very erudition by means of training. But considering that, in such a case, Jaspers, Husserl, Kant: Boundary Situations as a Turning-Point 55 Existenz: An International Journal in Philosophy, Religion, Politics, and the Arts objective history of the empirical existence (Dasein), it allows to identify any historic situation of what is empirically given as a boundary, and also creates the conditions for any historic existential possibility. "In any case," Jaspers points out, what happens depends on man. There is nothing that might be considered as unavoidable, as fateful....Within us is what gets to be, and within every individual, definitely, although no individual can decide where it goes history's guidance.18 With regard to the human experience of boundary situations, it appears that the heterogeneity of the individual historicity is irreducible to the Kantian universal subject, not only due to its historical empirical manifestations, but also due to its existential potentiality. For Jaspers, boundary situations (Grenzsituationen) do not constitute themselves a content of thought, but rather are the expression of the discontinuity and of the boundaries of the potential Existenz. If the factual situation defines the empirical existence (Dasein), the boundary situation defines the Existenz: According to Jaspers, to exist and to experience boundary situations "are the same thing,"19 and "the authentic function of the boundary" (F2 67-8) is to point out the Transcendence, while remaining immanent. Boundary situations have a historical (geschichtliche) characteristic for the potential Existenz and this is unique for the individual, although one cannot modify or suppress it, but can clarify it by way of active participation in it. The task of philosophy consists in the clarification of the Existenz according to the existential physiognomy of the individual, to the extent that it can open up and encourage the possibility of (self-) reflection within boundary situations and by making it possible to establish its scope. Death, guilt, struggle, suffering, and foundering as boundary situations express the finitude of the Existenz and, at the same time, its potentiality. Their meaning can only be communicated in a paradoxical way, as opposed to the empirical existence-to which the Existenz, however, has to hold onto, given that this is its only means to 18 Karl Jaspers, Origen y meta de la historia, Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1953, p. 166. [My translation] German text: Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, München: Piper, 1949. 19 Karl Jaspers, Filosofía, two volumes edition by Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1959, Vol. 2, p. 67. [Henceforth cited as F followed by volume number. My translation] German text: Karl Jaspers, Philosophie, 3 Vols., Berlin, Germany: Springer Verlag, 1932. manifest itself. In Jaspers' view, the meaning of Kant's transcendental method has changed through the clarification by the Existenz, yet it remains an essential condition for this clarification. Following Jaspers, Kant's transcendental philosophy is at the centre of the question regarding the possibility by proposing the well-known, three metaphysical questions, related to knowing, doing, and believing. Departing from them, Jaspers' philosophy founded the method of transcending as transcendental possibility, whereby transcending does not allow to grasp any being, "but clarifies one feature of our empirical existence, in general" (F2 408). Further, his conception concerning the existential clarification contributes to the expansion of the transcendental method because it takes into account not only the realm of transcending into thinking-where Transcendence can be represented as an Idea-but also, at the same time, it refers to the transcending in the sense of an existential potentiality, just there where thought no longer transcends; that is, in the boundary situations. It is in this sense that the notion of boundary situations in Jaspers' philosophy represents a turning point directed towards the realm of Existenz regarding the philosophy of Kant, and the criteria that opens up a new scope for philosophical reflection. It is not only apparent for the transcending thinking through the existential clarification that thought is at stake in boundary situations, but also that the Existenz puts at the same time at stake its potentiality and its fate. Self-reflection gives way, within the existential clarification, to the acceptance of or acquiescence to the judgments (affirmative or negative), and to resolutions through action. Jaspers stresses that the time of resolution always involves with regard to the Existenz the possibility of risk; in this way, from the point of view of the existential clarification, the scope of any rational ethics would be objectionable, if it is considered as a sufficient warranty for the right course of action-in any case, it can only support the restricted possibility for the prudent action, "since Existenz must decide on time and it cannot, arbitrarily and without interruption, check for the sake of prudence", says Jaspers, as "time compels":20 Existenz cannot wait...it must decide instantly each 20 Karl Jaspers, La fe filosófica ante la revelación, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1968, p. 407. [Henceforth cited as FFR with my translation] German text: Karl Jaspers, Der Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Christlichen Offenbarung, Basel, Stuttgart: Helbin & Lichtenhahn, 1960. 56 Gladys L. Portuondo http://www.existenz.us Volume 11, No. 1, Spring 2016 time, then it should run what only after an endless cognition would be clear and apparent, at the end of time...Existenz has to risk itself. And yet at the decision, at resoluteness, it stays on expectation of whichever comes. [FFR 407] From the perspective of the temporality and historicity of the Existenz, Jaspers questions the Kantian claim, "do not risk anything, because of the material safety, to the possibility of being unfair" (FFR 407). This claim seems to be contradictory to the temporary condition of the human being, in which what is decided in a single instant is decided for eternity. Jaspers remarks, the Existenz knows that when acting, it might be unfair; or it may also fails to do the required action when it remains unmoved, regardless whether it by some event gets involved either directly or indirectly. From this could be inferred that, for Jaspers, the Existenz is not able to avoid its guilty condition via some rational ethics. Boundary situations draw the unique outlines for the Existenz together with the transcending thinking, and this latter moves in circles; it seeks to break the siege by objectivities and boundaries; it is directed towards non-objectiveness, and it creates room for the potential Existenz. Jaspers goes further regarding the transcendental method, because clarification of Existenz is the goal for the transcending-thinking, which opens the possibility for the subject to become itself. And this constitutes "the ages-old secret of self-consciousness" (RC 799). So the "method of transcending" does not only have a critical meaning for Jaspers' philosophy, but it also has an existential aim: "The general transcending, which is philosophically communicated, does not match with the existential transcending to oneself, and while it is true that philosophical thinking awakes it or corroborates it, this is not, in turn, carried out by it" (F1 55). In this way, philosophy cannot offer the protection needed in order to avoid every risk for the existential transcending. Kant's method offers Jaspers a key to addressing the potential Existenz toward the performing role which corresponds to it; that is, to put at stake its potentiality; in such a case, a new attitude is required for the consciousness in the shape of a conversion or "re-birth of thinking" (RC 794) by appealing to the existential communication and clarification. The "basic philosophical operation" is carried out as a leap to a new level of thinking; and it is reached when, at the same time, the self-transformation for the subject who thinks is reached by so doing. The conversion of the way of thinking from intellectual thinking to comprehensive reason21-not only in the realm of theory, but also by way of its implications for practical action-is not a spontaneous process but rather, it transcends mere reflection via a willful decision, involving it in communicative participation. For Jaspers, the clarifying-thinking is an answer to a call from an ethical dimension, which is inherent in the unavoidable risk of existential realization. Jaspers has exposed reason to all the risks of the Existenz. The existential clarification has been conceived by him not as an overcoming, but as an expression of the discontinuities, paradoxes, and boundaries, by which the problematic path of communicative and comprehensive reason unfolds. The encounter of the reason with the Existenz is never final, nor does it lead towards some sort of reconciliation in an impossible identity. Reason does not purport, as a retrospective view, to deliver judgment on the Existenz: Unlike Minerva's owl, it does not lift its wings at the nightfall. In an endless approximation, reason shows those polar conditions, without which the human condition cannot be realized. The existential clarification does not attempt to declare a theory of the being of the Existenz, but rather a criticism on human experiences-leading to the encounter with the Transzendenz. Since only the self can execute this process, the basic philosophical operation always has an individual character, yet it is only achievable by means of communication. So, the conversion of consciousness has an inherent social dimension, which is linked to the historic conditions of the boundary situations, and also to the shared experiences of communities. And as Jaspers has pointed out, the change in attitude of the consciousness-which is generated by the potential Existenz while facing risks undergoing attempts to reach its realization-represents not only the entrance to the freedom of philosophizing, but it also lays bare the possibility for the failure on par with the unfettered conversion of thinking and existing. 21 The notion of "comprehensive reason," which is one of the cornerstones of Jaspers' philosophy, can be briefly construed, as the constant expansion of reason through the unlimited transcending of thought.

International Journal of Academic and Applied Research (IJAAR) ISSN: 2000-005X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 43-45 http://www.ijeais.org/ijaar 43 Radioactivity of Mollusks and Of Pisces in the Zarafshan River Basin Orifjon Mamatkulov Bahromovich 1 , Akhmedova Guljanon 2 , Azam Khudaiberdiev Tursunovich 3 , Lochin Тirkashovich Nurmuradov 4 , Shakhboz Khasanov Khasanovich 5 1 Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Associate Professor of Nuclear Physics Department, Samarkand State University, Samarkand, Uzbekistan. 2 Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Associate Professor of Nuclear Physics Department, Samarkand State University, Samarkand, Uzbekistan. 3 Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of Natural Sciences and general professional disciplines, Tashkent University of Information Technologies Karshi branch, Karshi, Uzbekistan. 4 Doctoral student of Nuclear Physics Department, Samarkand State University, Samarkand, Uzbekistan. 5 Master student of Nuclear Physics Department, Samarkand State University, Samarkand, Uzbekistan. E-mail address: [email protected] Abstract: In the present work with the help of the scintillation gamma spectrometry method the specific activity of molluscs and pisces in the Zarafshan river basin was determined. Key words: algae, natural radionuclides, technogenic, migration, metabolic. 1. INTRODUCTION In natural waters determined natural radionuclides (NRN) of uranium-238, thorium-232, Radium-226, Radon222, polonium-210, radium-228, radium-224, uranium-234 and natural radioactive isotopes potassium-40, rubidium -87. The concentration of NRN in water varies over a very wide range and mainly depends on the species composition of the radionuclide and soil which water comes in contact with [1, p. 32-33]. In addition, nuclear and underwater tests carried out by different countries, radioactive waste disposal in rivers, accidents at the nuclear power plants have led to environmental pollution, including reservoirs with technogenic radionuclides of 137 Cs, 90 Sr, 144 Ce and others. Technogenic radionuclides 137 Сs and 90 Sr in water are in a highly dispersed and soluble form, which contributes to their intensive participation in the metabolic processes of biotic systems. Radioactive substances in aqueous media, algae, aqueous sediments can be perceived by aquatic ecosystems, as well as other mineral elements, through the food chain and by way of absorption on boundary tissues. Some algae serve as food for molluscs. Algae can accumulate natural radionuclides from both water and aqueous sediments. Radioactive elements in the body of aquatic animals accumulate in different magnitudes and this depends on the content of radionuclides in the water, in the bottom and in algae, on the properties and the external structure of the ecosystems themselves. For example, the concentration of radium-226 and uranium in marine plankton reaches 100 pCi / kg, and the thorium content does not exceed 25 pCi / kg of fresh tissue. Intensive accumulation of radionuclides in molluscs was noted [2, p. 236 248]. In the present work, the specific radioactivity of natural radionuclides 226 Ra, 232 Th and 40 K by the help of the scintillation gamma spectrometry in molluscs and fished out fish from the Zarafshan river basin was determined. Fish (Сyprinidae) entirely and molluscs dried, ground, weighed and packed in 1-litre Marinelli beaker. The weight of the samples was 1000-1200 grams. The measurements of the gamma spectra of the samples were performed in Marinelli beaker geometry on γspectrometer with NaI(Tl) scintillation detector, Ø63 × 63 mm, an energy resolution of 10% on a gamma line 60 Со with an energy of E = 1332 keV. Registration and processing of the spectra were done on IВМ PC with automatic writing of the spectra into the computer memory every hour which allowed to control the stability of spectrometer and correct the spectra when necessary. Measurement time was t=2 h. The identification detected in the photopeak spectra was carried out by energy, taking into account quantum yields, half-lives, and the position of photopeaks in the spectra. In all measured gamma spectra of the samples, a photopeak with an energy of 1460 keV of the natural radionuclide 40 K, as well as photopeaks belonging to the radionuclides of the uranium-thorium families is clearly manifested. The specific activity of radionuclides detected in the spectra was calculated by the relative method. Volumetric standard sources OMACH Ra, 232 Th, 40 K and 137 Cs were used for calibration of the spectrometer in registration efficiency for γradiation of samples and for decomposition of the spectra into components. The standard sources were Marinelli beakers with the precision 0.95. International Journal of Academic and Applied Research (IJAAR) ISSN: 2000-005X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 43-45 http://www.ijeais.org/ijaar 44 What stands out from the results of studies that in mollusks 226 Ra was <10.02, 232 Th was <7.99, 40 K was <68.28 and 137 Cs was <3.9; Fish: 226 Ra was <5.55, 232 Th was <2.59, 40 K was <59.74, 137 Cs was <12.22. Here the "<" sign corresponds to the sensitivity of the spectrometer for a given measurement time. 2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION From the data presented above it can be seen that, the radioactivity of mollusks and fish is mainly caused by the natural radioactive isotope of potassium-40 and partly by radionuclides of the uranium and thorium series, as well as by the technogenic radionuclide cesium-137. The difference in the specific activity of potassium-40 in fish and in mollusks is not significant. The accumulation of natural radionuclides 226 Ra, 232 Th, 40 K by mollusks exceeds than fish. The specific gamma activity of radium-226 in water is 4.4 Bq / kg. Like other radioactive elements, radium, found in igneous rocks, when eroded in a significant amount, pass into natural solutions and is transferred to the lake, seas, rivers, and oceans, where it partially remains dissolved in water, partly together with silt and other sediments are precipitated on the bottom of reservoirs [4, p. 45 53]. However, thorium compounds are practically insoluble. Thorium migrates mainly in water flows in a suspended and colloidal state [4, p. 45 53]. Thorium is characterized by weak migration with the formation of chemical compounds. In addition, the radionuclide content in river-waters is significantly influenced by the characteristics of the channel, the flow rate, temperature, chemical composition and degree of water salinity. For different rivers, these features are not identical. There is a high content of radionuclides 226 Ra, 232 Th, and 40 K in aqueous sediments in relation to their content in reservoirs. Apparently, this phenomenon is explained by the fact that in an aqueous medium, potassium due to adsorption, is predominantly retained on particles of sediments. The minerals of thorium in natural waters dissolve much less than the minerals of uranium. Therefore, thorium is contained in waters hundreds of times less than uranium. Consequently, the thorium content in the aqueous sediments should be just over. Thorium goes into aqueous sediments not from solutions, but through the weathering of the igneous rocks in which it was originally present. The increased accumulation of natural radionuclides by mollusks that settle on the bottom of reservoirs is apparently due to the accumulation of radionuclides. The accumulation of radionuclides in fish is caused both from water and from aquatic animals, which are eaten by fish as food. As can be seen from the table, there is a significant difference in the specific activity of technogenic radionuclide 137 Cs in fish and mollusks. The specific activity of 137 Cs in fish is 3 times higher than in mollusks. Apparently, this can be explained as follows. Technogenic radionuclide 137 Cs and 90 Sr formed after nuclear explosions in water are highly dispersed and soluble, which contributes to their intensive participation in the metabolic processes of biotic systems. A significant part of the explosion products is in water in a soluble state, which is why it can remain in the upper layers of water for a long time [3, p. 18 21]. It has been established that aquatic animals have a pronounced ability to selectively accumulate in their tissues individual radionuclides, which is due to their functional properties. For example, the concentration ratio of 90 Sr with brown algae ranges from 20 to 40. Strontium green algae practically do not accumulate. Marine phytoplankton intensively concentrates 60 Со and 65 Zn. However, 137 Cs is hardly perceived by them. Invertebrate animals have the ability to assimilate radioactive substances from water during its filtration. Accumulation of invertebrate radioisotopes also occurs when eating contaminated food, the accumulation coefficient of 137 Cs in the tissues of bivalve mollusks is 20-50. 137 Cs is deposited mainly in the muscles of the mollusks. The penetration of radioactive substances into the body of fish occurs through the gills, skin, as well as the digestive tract when eating contaminated feed and swallowing water. On integumentary tissues there is a deposition of radionuclides without their pronounced separation. A number of authors carried out radiochemical analyzes of fish tissues and showed that 137 Cs mainly accumulates in muscles and in some parenchymal organs. It has been established that the level of contamination of the internal tissues of fish with radionuclides is lower than the specific activity of water. And only the gills, fins and head accumulated 137 Cs and 90 Sr in quantities several times higher than the specific activity of water [3, p. 18 21]. Intensively accumulated by internal and integumentary tissues. 3. CONCLUSION And so, one can understand the difference in specific activity of 137 Cs in mollusks and fish, if we consider that aquatic organisms have the ability to selectively accumulate in their tissues individual radionuclides, which is due to their functional properties. In addition, the intensity of accumulation of radionuclides on the surface tissues of aquatic animals depends largely on their area. Adsorption is especially effective in forms that have a large body surface. Fish have a relatively larger area than mollusks. And so in our experiments the radioactivity of fish is measured entirely, including the gill, fin, and head. The source of radioactive contamination of water cannot be persistent and quickly destroyed, which in turn reduces the risk of radioactive contamination of fish and other aquatic organisms. REFERENCES: [1] Safarov, А.А; Salimov, M.I; Usmonov, T.M. Total alpha and beta activity of drinking water in the Tashkent region of International Journal of Academic and Applied Research (IJAAR) ISSN: 2000-005X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April – 2019, Pages: 43-45 http://www.ijeais.org/ijaar 45 Uzbekistan; Scientific Journal of Samarkand State University. 2016, 99, 32 33. [2] Pertsov, А.А. Ionizing radiation of the biosphere; Atomizdat: Moscow, 1973, 218, 26 97, 220, 236 248. [3] Kogan, R.M; Nazarov, I.M. Fundamentals of gammaspectrometry of natural media; Atomizdat: Moscow, 1976, 18 21. [4] Saukov, А.А. The Earth's Radioactive Elements; Atomizdat: Moscow, 1961, 45 53.

Please cite the published version. This paper is forthcoming in late 2013 in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CXIII(3), pp. 391-401. MODAL HUMEANISM AND ARGUMENTS FROM POSSIBILITY MARGOT STROHMINGER Sider (2011, 2013) proposes a reductive analysis of metaphysical modality-'(modal) Humeanism'-and goes on to argue that it has interesting epistemological and methodological implications. In particular, Humeanism is supposed to undermine a class of 'arguments from possibility', which includes Sider's (1993) own argument against mereological nihilism and Chalmers's (1996) argument against physicalism. I argue that Sider's arguments do not go through, and moreover that we should instead expect Humeanism to be compatible with the practice of arguing from possibility in philosophy. Sider (2011, ch. 12) proposes a new reductive analysis of metaphysical modality1, 'modal Humeanism'. For the Humean, 'necessity does not carve at the joints'; the necessary statements are just a hodgepodge of certain kinds of truths, which is not particularly interesting or unified (2011, p. 269). Instead, which statements are necessary is determined by 'the way "necessarily" is typically used-by philosophers, in the sense of metaphysical necessity anyway' (2013, p. 276). We can use deductive consequence to state Humeanism more precisely. Specifically, we can state the Humean analysis of necessity as the claim that what it is for the statement p to be necessary is for p to be a deductive consequence of a set of 'modal axioms', A (Sider 2011, pp. 271-2): (H) p =def A ⊢ p.2 A corresponding Humean analysis of possibility follows from (H) by the duality of possibility and necessity. What it is for the statement p to be possible is for ¬p to not be a deductive consequence of A: (H) p =def A ⊬ ¬p. Here the modal axioms A are just certain kinds of truths. For example, A includes truths of several kinds: mathematical statements, 'definitional' statements (which are analytic if true), 'statements of fundamental metaphysics', attributions of deep explanatory features to natural kinds (e.g. 'Gold has atomic number 79'), and identities involving names (Sider 2011, §§12.3-5, 12.8, 12.10). Sider hopes to extract a methodological conclusion from Humeanism. Basically, his strategy is to argue that Humeanism has implications for the epistemology of modality, which in turn has implications for philosophical methodology. Sider's conclusion is supposed to apply to at least to one class of statements: 'statements of fundamental 1 In the remainder of the paper all reference to modality is to metaphysical modality. 2 Perhaps the most standard combination of views is that necessity is a property of propositions while deductive consequence is a relation between sentences. Then, strictly speaking, the analysis should be stated thusly: what it is for the proposition expressed by the sentence 'p' to be necessary is for 'p' to express a truth and for 'p' to be a deductive consequence of A. I will assume that the issue is orthogonal to the debate here, and for simplicity let context decide whether my talk of 'statements' or 'claims' should be understood as referring to sentences or propositions. 2 metaphysics' or simply 'metaphysical' statements (2011, p. 274; 2013, p. 276). They are non-contingent statements that concern 'fundamental and abstract matters' without being definitional (2011, pp. 274-5). We can state Sider's epistemological and methodological conclusions as (T1) and (T2) (cf. Sider 2011, pp. 277-8, 2013, p. 275). (T1) Evidence of actuality precedes evidence of possibility in metaphysics. Someone S can't know whether p by an argument from possibility if p is 'metaphysical'. (T2) No arguments from possibility in metaphysics. Arguments from possibility against p can be discounted from first-order, 'nonmodal' debates if p is 'metaphysical'. Here an argument from possibility has (or can be reconstructed as having) the following form, where ¬p or some other nonmodal claim inconsistent with p is not used to support (1) in the first place: (1) ¬p (2) p→p So, ¬p.3 Sider provides his own (1993, 2001) argument against (mereological) nihilism and Chalmers's (1996) argument against physicalism as examples of arguments from possibility that (T2) bans (2011, p. 277). Sider (likewise, Chalmers) there argues that nihilism (physicalism) is possibly false in order to conclude that the thesis is actually false. Stepping back, Sider's strategy for defending (T2) involves defending Humeanism and then using his reductive analysis to defend (T1). In what follows, I won't question whether Humeanism is true. Rather, I will call into doubt that (T1) is even an epistemological implication of Humeanism. To do this, I first show why three arguments from Humeanism to (T1) suggested by Sider's discussion don't work, and then argue that we shouldn't expect any argument that relies essentially on Humeanism to vindicate (T1). The first argument from Humeanism to (T1) relies on some picture-thinking, which might at first seem attractive. For this reason, I consider it even though Sider (2013) disavows the argument that it seems to motivate. Consider the following passages: Humeanism undermines our reason for accepting the possibility in question. Intuitively, this is because for propositions of fundamental metaphysics, possibility boils down to the actual falsity of rivals. (2011, p. 277) Given the Humean theory, to be necessary is to be true and to fall under a type on the list. But proposition of metaphysics is one of the types on the list. So for a proposition of metaphysics such as nihilism, necessity just boils down to truth. But then, the only way to support the claim that nihilism isn't necessary is to argue directly that nihilism is false, in which case the argument from possibility plays no distinctive role. (2013, p. 277) The suggestion seems to be that the only way we can figure out whether p is necessary (possible,...) will involve asking whether the Humean's corresponding analysans is true. When p is a metaphysical statement such as nihilism, it is clear that either it or its negation follows from A. We will then have to figure out whether nihilism is true before we can figure out whether it is possible. Our assessment of possibility in an argument from possibility does not involve first asking whether p, though, since by definition, the possibility premise ¬p does not rely on ¬p. 3 Perhaps (T1) and (T2) slightly overstate the view Sider has in mind. In particular, I take it Sider should allow that someone can learn that p by expert testimony and then use p (and ¬p→¬p) as evidence for p. In what follows, I won't be relying on such cases to challenge Sider's view. 3 This suggestion assumes that the order of knowledge reflects the direction of the analysis, which need not be true. To see why, consider some other reductive analysis of modality, such as one in terms of essence (Fine 1994). The essence-based analysis is compatible with the view that modal claims can sometimes serve as evidence for claims about essence. Moreover, suppose that we arrived at our modal beliefs without reasoning about essences; we shouldn't say that coming to believe the essence-based analysis automatically threatens our earlier modal beliefs. As Sider points out, 'epistemic features do not in general transmit across "what it is to be F is to be G"' (2013, p. 279). There doesn't seem to be anything more to the above passages than an argument that rests on this false assumption, though. Accordingly, we can move on to other arguments. Sider also argues that Humeanism undermines the view that conceivability is a guide to possibility in metaphysics (2013, pp. 280-1). The slogan that conceivability is a guide to possibility can be made precise in several ways. If we restate the slogan as CONCEIVABILITY, for example, we can formulate Sider's conclusion as (T3). CONCEIVABILITY If S conceives that p, then S thereby has prima facie justification to believe that p. (T3) Conceivability is not a guide to possibility in metaphysics. Someone S's conceiving that p does not provide S with prima facie justification to believe that p if p is 'metaphysical'. Sider's Humean might attempt to use (T3) in an argument for (T1). Let's bracket for the moment whether Humeanism motivates (T3). Is (T3) enough to ensure (T1)? Only if it is assumed that the only method at our disposal for evaluating whether p is possible in the absence of knowing that p is conceiving that p. This is about as controversial as CONCEIVABILITY itself. Alternative epistemologies of modality suggest that there are other ways of figuring out whether p is possible in the absence of knowing that p. Instead, it could be that a maxim in terms of intuitions of possibility such as POSSIBILITY INTUITION is preferable (e.g. Bealer 2002). POSSIBILITY INTUITION If S has an intuition that p, then S thereby has prima facie justification to believe that p. According to other alternatives, highly constrained imaginative exercises replace merely conceiving or imagining that p. One such alternative falls out of Williamson's (2007, ch. 5) account in terms of counterfactual supposition and development. These alternatives seem to be compatible with the claim that we can sometimes acquire evidence of possibility without relying on evidence of actuality, even in metaphysics; so (T1) will be false whether or not (T3) is. If (T3) is true, then only (T4) follows. (T4) No arguments from conceivability in metaphysics. Arguments from conceivability against p can be discounted from first-order, 'nonmodal' debates if p is 'metaphysical'. Here an argument from conceivability is an argument from possibility in which the possibility premise, ¬p, is asserted on the basis of the arguer's conceiving ¬p (or some suitably related proposition or scenario). Just as (T3) is weaker than (T1), (T4) is weaker than (T2). A ban on arguments from conceivability still leaves open the permissibility of relying on arguments from possibility in which the possibility premise is asserted on the basis of some method other than conceivability. Of course many of the standard examples of arguments from possibility are also arguments from conceivability. In Sider's own examples in particular, the conceivability of gunk (likewise, zombies) is used in support of the possible falsity of nihilism (physicalism). So, the second argument can't work because even if (T3) is true, a claim as strong as (T1) doesn't follow. 4 Finally, we can consider what I take to be Sider's main argument (2013, pp. 279-80). It concerns (3), which the Humean analyzes as (4). (3) Atomism is not necessary. (4) Atomism is not a deductive consequence of A. Sider invites us to consider a scenario in which you don't initially endorse Humeanism or have any reason to believe that atomism is false. You do, however, believe that atomism is necessary if true. You then judge that gunk is possible, and thereby that (3) is true (we can otherwise leave open how you assess (3) so long as your reason is not that atomism is false, or one of its rival theses true). Next, you come to endorse Humeanism. Because (3), the claim that atomism is necessary if true, and Humeanism evidently entail (4), you should either infer (4), or abandon one of your beliefs. Sider thinks that the only reasonable response is to abandon belief in (3): 'Unless your reasons for coming to believe the Humean view somehow give you reason to believe [(4)] (and how could they?), you should surely then abandon your former belief that atomism isn't necessary' (2013, p. 280). Sider doesn't offer a reason for thinking that the response of inferring (4) is absurd, though. He only raises the rhetorical worry, 'how could they?'. Suppose that Sider is right that inferring (4) is absurd. This is not enough for Sider's purposes. Sider requires that the response of inferring any claim of the form (4ʹ′) from one of the form (3ʹ′) is absurd when p is 'metaphysical': (3ʹ′) It is not necessary that p. (4ʹ′) p is not a deductive consequence of A. There is a competing explanation for why inferring (4) is, or at least seems, absurd. I take it that many of us doubt that we have a reason to believe that gunk is possible, for reasons that have nothing to do with Humeanism.4 After all, the possibility of gunk was controversial before Humeanism entered the menu of options for analyzing modality. Equally, though, there seem to be cases where the response of inferring (4ʹ′) from (3ʹ′) does not seem absurd. Many less controversial thought experiments in philosophy can also be reconstructed as arguments from possibility.5 They provide a challenge for this argument as well as Sider's position more generally. For example, Gettier (1963) cases can be reconstructed as arguments from possibility against the claim that knowledge is identical to justified true belief, which provides one way of construing the justified true belief analysis of knowledge (cf. Williamson 2007, ch. 6). Similarly, Putnam's (1975) Twin-Earth cases can be reconstructed as arguments from possibility against a version of functionalism, which claims that the state of associating a certain meaning with a word is identical to a certain brain-state.6 Sider can say one of two things about arguments from possibility such as these. The first option is to admit that these arguments from possibility, like his examples, should be discounted from philosophical debates. This looks unattractive. In these cases, it looks perfectly reasonable to infer ¬p and-assuming Humeanism-(4ʹ′) on the basis of (3ʹ′). In other words, it would be reasonable for someone to conclude that the JTB analysis (say) 4 Williams (2006) motivates one strategy for resisting the claim that gunk is possible. 5 It is then a further question whether the possibility premise in such an argument rests on some further modal premises or not. Williamson (2007), Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009) and Malmgren (2011) offer competing proposals about what the further modal premises are in the case of the Gettier argument. 6 Thanks to Juhani Yli-Vakkuri for suggesting this example. 5 is not a deductive consequence of A after converting to Humeanism-rather than abandoning her earlier belief that the analysis is not necessary. The second option is to concede that these arguments from possibility should not be discounted, but that they are importantly different from Sider's own examples. In particular, Sider would have to say that Humeanism undermines all arguments from possibility targeting metaphysical statements, but that they don't undermine others, including my examples. On Sider's characterization of 'statements of fundamental metaphysics', lots of philosophical theses should count. (For this reason, the label sounds overly restrictive.) The worry is that the statements targeted by the Gettier and Putnam arguments fit Sider's characterization as well, or nearly as well, as Sider's preferred examples like physicalism. Suppose that we instead reclassify my examples of statements as necessary if true without being 'metaphysical'. It's not clear why this will help. It will only help if Humeanism doesn't undermine arguments from possibility against other statements that are necessary if true to the same extent. Sider suggests that perhaps the Humean should not discount arguments from possibility against definitional statements (2013, p. 280). This makes it look like my examples will have to be reclassified as statements that are definitional, or analytic if true. It's controversial whether even philosophical 'analyses' such as the JTB analysis of knowledge are analytic if true.7 Moreover, the grounds that Sider uses to argue that certain claims in metaphysics are not definitional apply equally to my examples: 'They are the subject of controversy, and so are not construed as definitional of the terms they contain' (2011, p. 274). Finally, there are countless other examples of thought experiments in philosophy, which can be reconstructed as arguments from possibility.8 In each case, Sider will have to claim either that the argument targets a statement that is not 'metaphysical' (presumably definitional), while at the same time maintaining that nihilism and physicalism are, or else maintain that it should be discounted. More generally, I doubt that one of the two options will always be plausible. Sider's position loses it force once other less controversial arguments from possibility are considered. So far I have argued that Sider's attempts to motivate (T1) and in turn (T2) using Humeanism don't succeed. Perhaps some other argument from Humeanism can be used to establish (T1) and (T2). I want to suggest that we shouldn't expect any argument that relies essentially on Humeanism to establish (T1)-(T4). Throughout, Sider presupposes that converting to Humeanism gives us a new reason for these conclusions. This is evident from the way he states his position: 'The Humean treatment about the necessity of laws of metaphysics undermines "arguments from possibility" for conclusions in fundamental metaphysics' (2011, p. 277). Whether they give us a new reason depends on what picture of modality we have before encountering Humeanism. They won't supply us with a new reason if we endorse a 'standard' picture of modality. According to it, the same kinds of propositions are necessary (contingent, possible,...) as the Humean analysis predicts. (Think of the standard picture as neutral on which analysis of modality, if any, is correct.) If Humeanism does not change our views about which propositions have which modal statuses, then how can it have revisionary methodological and epistemological conclusions? The same methods of figuring out the modal status of propositions (whatever they are) will remain reliable and thus should remain in place. As a result, we shouldn't expect there to be any arguments for (T1)-(T4) that rely essentially on Humeanism to be possible. They could just be restated as relying on the standard picture of modality. 7 Williamson (2007) provides an attack. 8 For some potential examples, see Bealer 1996, p. 4. 6 The same range of epistemological and methodological positions seems to be available to the Humean as to anyone with the standard picture of modality. Among those with a more or less standard picture, the consensus is that (T1) is false. Even van Inwagen's (1998) "modal skepticism" is modest by comparison to (T1) as it only dismisses certain modal arguments in philosophy; Gettier arguments are excluded, for example (p. 81, n. 1). If anything, the Humean should reject (T1) rather than embrace it. She should think that at least some arguments from possibility in philosophy are permissible. The Gettier and Twin-Earth arguments mentioned above are plausible candidates. (T3) is much more controversial among those with the standard picture of modality.9 Perhaps the Humean should endorse (T3), but the arguments for and against do not have anything to do with Humeanism per se. Rather, they turn on which propositions are conceivable, which propositions are possible, and what kind of positive epistemic status ('guide') is at issue. One of Sider's (2013) aims is to establish that arguments that start by claiming the possibility of gunk do not present a challenge to nihilism. His strategy for reaching this conclusion is to use Humeanism to argue that, in general, arguments from possibility should not be used in fundamental metaphysics. I'll close by sketching a much less contentious-and I think more promising-route to the conclusion that extant arguments from the possibility of gunk do not present a challenge to nihilism. Suppose that we don't know at present whether gunk is possible, at least not unless we know that gunk is actual. In other words, we don't know that nihilism is false by an argument from possibility. The exact form the argument for this claim takes will depend on our preferred epistemology of modality, but here are two suggestions. It could be that even if we have a prima facie reason to believe that gunk is possible, the existence of enough epistemic peers in disagreement defeats this reason. Second, perhaps our methods for assessing modal claims do not yield a clear verdict in this case. Williamson suggests that the claim that zombies are possible may be like that (2007, p. 164), and perhaps the claim that gunk is possible is similar. The obvious advantage of this route to dismissing merely possible gunk is that it does not require the existence of an argument from Humeanism to (T1), which I already cast doubt on. Moreover, while this approach is available to the Humean, it is also available to those of us who don't accept Sider's analysis of modality.10 Again, this reinforces my earlier point. We can't derive methodological and epistemological views from Humeanism in any straightforward way. Even if Humeanism is true, arguments from possibility continue to raise difficult issues.11 Arché Research Centre University of St Andrews 17-19 College Street St Andrews KY16 9AL UK [email protected] 9 Though Yablo (1993) provides an influential defense of CONCEIVABILITY, which seems intended as compatible with the standard picture of modality. 10 Sider (2013, pp. 275, 281-2) also sketches some strategies for dismissing the possibility of gunk, which do not assume Humeanism. 11 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Universities of Oxford, Manchester and Stirling. Thanks to Jessica Brown, Torfinn Huvenes, Ted Sider, Brian Weatherson, Tim Williamson, Al Wilson, an anonymous referee and especially to John Hawthorne and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri. 7 REFERENCES Bealer, George 1996: 'On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge'. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, pp. 1-34. -2002: 'Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance'. In Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, pp. 71-125. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, David J. 1996: The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fine, Kit 1994: 'Essence and Modality'. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, pp. 1-16. Gettier, Edmund 1963: 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?'. Analysis, 23(6), pp. 121-3. Ichikawa, Jonathan, and Benjamin Jarvis 2009: 'Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction'. Philosophical Studies, 142(2), pp. 221-46. Malmgren, Anna-Sara 2011: 'Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements'. Mind, 120(478), pp. 263-327. Putnam, Hilary 1975: 'The Meaning of "Meaning"'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7, pp. 131-93. Sider, Theodore 1993: 'Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk'. Analysis, 53(4), pp. 285-9. -2001: Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. -2011: Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Clarendon Press. -2013: 'Against Parthood'. In Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 8, pp. 237-93. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Inwagen, Peter 1998: 'Modal Epistemology'. Philosophical Studies, 92(1/2), pp. 67-84. Williams, J.R.G. 2006: 'Illusions of Gunk'. Philosophical Perspectives, 20, pp. 493-513. Williamson, Timothy 2007: The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. Yablo, Stephen 1993: 'Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53(1), pp. 1-42.

Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science preprint version June 15, 2019 DOI: coming soon The Small Number System Eric Margolis Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia Abstract I argue that the human mind includes an innate domain-specific system for representing precise small numerical quantities. This theory contrasts with object-tracking theories and with domain-general theories that only make use of mental models. I argue that there is a good amount of evidence for innate representations of small numerical quantities and that such a domain-specific system has explanatory advantages when infants' poor working memory is taken into account. I also show that the mental models approach requires previously unnoticed domain-specific structure and consequently that there is no domain-general alternative to an innate domain-specific small number system. 1. Introduction Researchers who study numerical cognition commonly hold that there are two representational systems that are critical to the origins of numerical concepts-one that is approximate and capable of representing large numerical quantities and one that is precise and limited to small numbers of entities (e.g., Spelke 2003; Carey 2009; vanMarle et al. 2016). Moreover, it is often claimed that the second of these isn't fundamentally a system for representing number, despite the fact that it is often referred to as a "small number system". While it operates on small numbers of entities (up to three or four) and is incapable of dealing with larger numbers, it is generally thought to start out as a domain-general system or a least as a system that doesn't require any innate structure that is specific to the domain of number. In this paper, I argue that the small number system should be understood, instead, to have innate domain-specific structure. I begin by showing that we need to postulate a richer system of representation than one that is confined to object tracking. I then go on to argue that the proposal of an innate system for representing a few small numerical quantities stands up well against the proposal that the small number system is fundamentally a general-purpose capacity for working 2 with mental models. I also argue that the mental models proposal ends up requiring an innate capacity for performing assessments of one-to-one correspondence. As a result, we are left with two broadly nativist options-one that relies on an innate system for representing small numerical quantities and one that relies on an innate system for comparing small numbers of items for numerical equivalence. 2. The Subitizing Module and Some Initial Objections to Its Innate Representations Let's begin with an unabashedly nativist approach to the small number system. This is the proposal that there is an innate domain-specific system for representing a few precise numerical quantities-for representing precisely one, two, and three (cf. Hurford 1987; Margolis and Laurence 2008; Barner 2017). If you were to see a pair of shoes on the floor, it would register the twoness of the shoes. Or if you were to hear the tap-tap-tap of someone knocking on the door, it would register the threeness of the knocks. By hypothesis, this domain-specific system represents numerical quantity as such and is restricted to the small number range. I will refer to this system as the subitizing module (or SuM), since the term subitizing evokes a process for representing numerical quantity that is distinctive to the small-number range and that doesn't involve counting. In paradigmatic cases of subitizing, it's as if you can directly perceive certain numerical quantities but only in the small number range. In what way does SuM represent its numerical quantities? My proposal, following Margolis and Laurence (2008), is that it includes a small stock of discrete representations that are causally responsive to particular numerical quantities and that have the function of responding to these quantities. Although there are a number of ways this could be implemented, the most straightforward is by means of a neural network that takes input from systems that individuate entities in different modalities and whose output nodes are selectively responsive to particular numerical quantities. To bring this about, the connections mediating the spread of activation would have to be weighted in such a way that the activation of any single input node suffices to activate the "one" output node, the activation of any two input nodes suffices to activate the "two" output node, etc., where each output node's activation also inhibits the activation of the other output nodes. Under this arrangement, n individuated entities would cause the activation of a unique symbol corresponding to that precise quantity. 3 More structure could be built into SuM, but this is the minimal amount that I will consider essential to its representation of one, two, and three. Notice that on this minimal account, the symbols for small numerical quantities needn't be inherently ordered, and there needn't be a procedure that ensures that three is represented as more than two, or two as more than one (unlike conventional counting terms). Yet this minimal structure is enough to put children in a position to learn about some of the basic relations between differing small numerical quantities. They could do this by using SuM in the context of observing addition and subtraction events, or by creating these changes themselves and attending to the numerical effects that SuM allows them to represent. For example, attending to two toys would generate the representation for two, and seeing one of these removed would generate the representation for one both for the quantity removed and for the quantity that remains. Observing changes like this might allow children to infer that the difference between one and two is itself one and hence that two is the larger numerical quantity. Another possibility, of course, is that SuM builds in some of this structure from the start. The present point is simply that the defining feature of SuM is its small stock of discrete symbols that represent numerical quantity as such. Despite the fact that many researchers hold that there is some kind of representational system that is responsive to small numbers of items, few accept that it takes the form of SuM-that it is a domain-specific system for representing particular numerical quantities. Why is that? One of the main reasons is that a system like SuM is thought to be too speculative. According to this objection, it is one thing to suppose that there is an innate system like SuM in order to explain how children come to be in a position to acquire concepts for precise numerical concepts, but it is another matter entirely whether there is empirical evidence for SuM's innate numerical representations. If there aren't any data to suggest that infants can represent one, two, and three, there is no concrete reason to believe that they actually do. Resistance to innate representations for small numerical quantities has also grown in recent years in response to what many researchers see as a problem that was endemic to earlier work in developmental psychology, namely, the failure to fully take into account the nonnumerical properties that correlate with number. Discrete number correlates with a variety of continuous properties. A group of three plums differs in number from a group of two plums, but also takes up more space, has more total surface area, and so on. While early research on infants' numerical 4 abilities did take steps to ensure that infants weren't merely responding to differences in these sorts of continuous properties, there have been questions about whether these measures went far enough. One landmark study that has fueled these doubts focused on the contour length of small numbers of geometrical figures (i.e., the sum of their perimeters) (Clearfield and Mix 1999). Infants were first shown different arrangements of either two or three same-size squares until they habituated to the stimuli. Notice that because the squares were all the same size, number was deliberately confounded with contour, as the three squares were guaranteed to have more contour than the two squares. The infants were then shown alternating instances of two and three squares where the stimuli with the number they had seen before had a new amount of contour, while the stimuli with the new number had the old amount of contour. The key finding was that the infants dishabituated to the change in contour but not to the change in number, suggesting that perhaps infants who had seemed to respond to numerical quantity in previous work were merely responding to continuous properties of the stimuli. Finally, if we turn to language learning, there is a pattern of development that may appear to conflict with the proposal that there are innate representations for precise small numerical quantities. This is that learning the meanings of the first few natural language counting terms isn't easy for children and that children reliably learn them in order. One might have thought if children have innate representations for one, two, and three, then learning the words that pick out these quantities would be relatively easy and that there would be no intrinsic constraints on the order in which they can be learned. It would just be a matter of mapping three word forms to three independent and readily available representations. On the other hand, if representations for one, two, and three have to be constructed in the course of language learning, it would make sense that learning these words is challenging and that they are acquired in order, since the construction of these representations would involve increasing complexity as the numerical quantities get larger. 3. Object Tracking In this section, I want to look at the first of two alternatives to the SuM theory's account of the small number system. According to this first theory, infants may have a system of representation that is confined to small numbers of items, but this isn't a system for representing numerical 5 quantity. It's simply a mechanism of attention that the visual system uses to track small numbers of objects (Leslie et al. 1998, Scholl and Leslie 1999). Object-based approaches to visual attention differ from approaches in which attention is taken to function like a spotlight that directs limited processing resources to a focal region in the visual field. On an object-based model, what happens instead is that attention attaches to individual objects and temporarily sticks to each object regardless of whether it moves. On Leslie et al.'s model, this is implemented by the object-indexing system, which incorporates up to four symbols-i.e., four indexes-that act like pointers in that each picks out the object it is responsible for without necessarily relying on a representation of its features (color, texture, etc.). Rather, these indexes track their objects in the first instance on the basis of their spatialtemporal properties and can do so even when an object is briefly occluded. Scholl and Leslie note that there is large body of evidence showing that object-based attention is an important aspect of mid-level visual processing in adults. For example, in the motion-object tracking task, subjects view a computer-generated image of a number of identical looking objects, a subset of them are briefly highlighted, and then all of the objects begin to move in quasi-random directions (Pylyshyn and Storm 1988). After a while they stop, and subjects have to say which are the ones that had been highlighted. This may sound like it is difficult to do. After all, the target objects look exactly the same as the distractors (e.g., they might all be black squares), and each moves independently of the others along its own erratic path. But people are fairly good at identifying the target items so long as they are not asked to keep track of more than about four. The object-indexing model can explain these and related results on the assumption that it has just a small number of indexes at its disposal and they operate in parallel, tracking their objects without having to identify them by their features. For present purposes, what matters is how the object-indexing system promises to explain infants' apparent numerical abilities. The focus of Scholl and Leslie's model is Wynn's influential claim that infants can do simple arithmetic as it relates to events with small numbers of seen objects (Wynn 1992). This research employed a violation of expectation procedure in which five-month-olds were shown addition and subtraction events with correct or incorrect outcomes. Looking longer at an incorrect outcome is a sign that infants find it to be unexpected and, for Wynn, that they appreciate the numerical significance of the events they are witnessing. 6 In one experiment, some infants saw a single doll placed on an empty stage, which was then hidden behind a screen, followed by a hand placing a second doll behind the screen-that is, a 1+1 event. Other infants saw a similar 2-1 event. Then, in the test condition, the screen was removed to reveal either one or two dolls. The result was that infants looked longer at one doll for the 1+1 event and at two dolls for the 2-1 event, suggesting that they found these incorrect outcomes to be unexpected. But does this mean that infants really appreciate that 1+1=2? According to Scholl and Leslie, the infants' looking-time can be explained without postulating any numerical representation per se. They propose instead that it results from the effect that these events have on the assignment and maintenance of the indexes that track the dolls (1999, 34). Take the 1+1 event. In this case, one index is initially activated to track the doll that is visible on the stage. After the screen comes up, this first index maintains a link with the now hidden object and a second index is activated to accommodate the second doll that is placed behind the screen. As a result, by the time the screen is removed and just a single object is revealed, there is an extra index that has lost track of its object, and this causes an increase in attention to search for the missing object. In contrast, when the screen is removed and two objects are revealed, no extra attention is needed. In short, the 1+1=1 event leads to longer looking not because infants appreciate the relevant arithmetic facts; infants look longer at the incorrect outcome because of the demands that are placed on attention given the way the object-indexing system works. Many theorists who talk about the existence and significance of a small-number system seem to have something like this deflationary model in mind. To mention just one recent example, in a paper with the subtitle "Contributions of the Object-Tracking and Approximate Number systems", vanMarle and colleagues point to the object-indexing system as the main alternative to the approximate number system in theories that aim to explain how children learn the meanings of natural language counting terms: More recent work ... suggests an alternative account in which the verbal labels are mapped onto episodic object representations in another core mechanism-the object tracking system (OTS). This system consists of a set of indexes that 'point' 7 to objects in the world, keeping track of them as they move through space ... (vanMarle et al. 2016, 1-2) As vanMarle et al. see things, the main lesson regarding the limits of the approximate number system and the object-indexing system is that neither on its own can explain how children learn the significance of counting. Instead, these systems must work together, where the objectindexing system's unique contribution is to produce "exact representations, but only for small numbers of individuals and without cardinal value" (vanMarle et al. 2016, 2). Unfortunately, it has never been clear how the object-indexing system's representations can combine with the representations of the approximate number system to produce the precise numerical representations needed to interpret the counting terms (Laurence and Margolis 2005). But even putting this puzzling theoretical matter to the side, the object-indexing system falls short in that it cannot accommodate the full range of findings associated with the representation of small numbers of items. This is because some of these include sensory conditions where visual cues are absent or impoverished, or where object tracking isn't viable or not even relevant to the situation at hand. Consider a study that resembles Wynn's but where infants were given addition events that require the interpretation of intermodal cues (Kobayashi et al. 2004). Five-month-olds were presented with computer-generated events in which, when an object dropped from the top of the display, a tone was heard exactly at the point at which it hit the bottom. The general impression of these events is that the tone occurs as a result of the object impacting the ground. Initially the infants were familiarized with the sorts of events they would be tested on. They saw a screen conceal the bottom half of the display, and either two objects or three objects fell one at a time, so that they became hidden behind the screen, with a tone always occurring at the hidden point of impact. After the sequence was finished, the screen dropped to reveal the expected number of objects, either two or three. Next came the test trials. At the start of the test trials, rather than dropping from the top of the display, a single object moved horizontally along the bottom until it arrived at the center. Then a tall screen came up, obstructing the infants' view of the object as well as the entire center of the monitor along the vertical axis, and either one or two tones were heard. Finally, the screen came down to reveal the correct number of objects (1+1=2) or an 8 incorrect number (1+1+1=2). The crucial finding was that the infants looked significantly longer at the incorrect outcome, suggesting they found it to be unexpected. Notice that this looking-time pattern cannot be explained by the different amounts of attention that are required by object-indexing. In both the 1+1 and the 1+1+1 events, only one item was in a position to trigger a visual index (1 seen object + n tones). Given the experimental setup, infants had to deduce that a tone indicates that an object behind the screen dropped to the ground; they couldn't actually see the object. It's also unlikely that the looking-time pattern can be explained either in terms of infants' response to a nonnumerical continuous property or their reliance on the approximate number system's representation of the events. The multimodal experimental design excluded any possibility of successfully responding solely to a continuous property like the seen amount of surface area that was placed behind the screen-again, this was identical across the two conditions. And while the approximate number system is functional in five-month-olds, it doesn't have the required discriminative capacity to succeed on this task until infants are significantly older than five months of age. It isn't until infants are nine months old that it has matured enough to distinguish between numerical quantities in a 2:3 ratio (Xu and Spelke 2000; Xu et al. 2005). Work with animals also suggests that object-indexing offers an inadequate account of the small number system. Consider a study in which honeybees were successfully trained to select between two numbers of geometrical figures in a delayed match-to-sample task (Gross et al. 2009). Upon entering the training apparatus, a bee would see the sample stimulus with two or three elements and have to fly a meter down a tunnel before encountering two further stimuli- one with two elements, one with three-each of which marked a different exit but where only the numerical match was rewarded. Later, in the test trials, the bees were able to generalize correctly, selecting the numerical match for novel stimuli using patterns that carefully controlled for nonnumerical continuous properties. The bees were even able to select the matching number in the face of misdirecting cues, such as a sample that included a color that only appeared in the numerical mismatch. What they couldn't do was generalize correctly outside of the smallnumber range-they failed on 4v6, 4v5, and 5v6. To appreciate why object-indexing can't explain these results, it helps to picture things from the bees' perspective. They fly past the sample (e.g., two yellow stars) only to encounter two further stimuli in the choice chamber (e.g., 9 one composed of two blue dots and the other of three). The yellow stars are a full meter in front of the blue dots-equivalent to dozens of bee body-lengths-and all of the stimuli are completely static. Hence there are absolutely no cues that the elements composing the stimuli in the choice chamber are one and the same as those previously encountered. All the bees have to go on are the numerical properties of the stimuli, for example, the fact that the correct match is numerically equivalent to the sample. In sum, object-indexing can't be the whole story about the representation of small numbers of items. It may provide some of the crucial input to the small number system since it can individuate the entities that the small number system responds to, at least when these are confined to vision. But the representation of small numbers of items isn't unique to vision. And even within vision, there are responses that are limited to small numbers of items where object tracking isn't called for and that don't turn on the continuous properties of the stimuli. 4. Mental Models We have seen that the object-indexing account of the small number system won't do. But there is another alternative to SuM that isn't restricted to visual representation or to attentional mechanisms for tracking objects. According to this alternative, the small number system is fundamentally a domain-general capacity to construct and manipulate mental models. The core idea of this approach is that infants respond to perceived small numbers of objects with a mental model that is composed of distinct symbols-one per item-and that this can be held in working memory for a brief amount of time and can support a variety of inferences about the represented group. One particularly important use of a mental model is to interpret quantitative changes as an event unfolds, including changes in numerical quantity. This can be done by comparing the model held in working memory to what is perceived at a later time and checking for whether these correspond one-to-one. Simon (1997) has proposed an account along these lines to explain Wynn's addition and subtraction results. According to Simon, the reason infants look longer at the incorrect arithmetic outcome (e.g., 1+1=1) isn't because they have arithmetic abilities, and it isn't because extra attention is needed to deal with an index that has lost contact with its object. Rather, they look longer because they recognize that the model in working memory contains an element for which there is no corresponding doll. There is a 10 mismatch between the model and the aspect of the world it is directed towards when the two are compared for one-to-one correspondence. Le Corre and Carey offer a similar account (Le Corre and Carey 2007; Carey 2009). They refer to their proposed system as a system for parallel individuation to emphasize that it isn't inherently a visual system (although it often operates on visual input) and to emphasize that it represents small numbers of individuals via correspondingly distinct representations making up a mental model. For example, if an infant sees three balls, then the model contains three symbols, each one corresponding to one of the balls, with no symbol explicitly representing that there are three. Likewise, if an infant hears three honks, a similar three-symbol model may be formed, with each symbol corresponding to one of the sounds. Parallel individuation is a richer system of representation than an object-based attentional system not only because it isn't confined to any single modality, but because its symbols needn't be involved in online tracking. Carey notes, for example, that sometimes a two-symbol model will result from seeing pairs composed of different individuals and not from repeated sightings of the same individuals. In such cases, "a workingmemory model of two objects must be abstracted from these ... arrays" (2009, 143). At the same time, parallel individuation has the same set-size limitation as object-indexing in that it can only create models that are formed from a small number of symbols. This limitation on model size is supposed to derive from the capacity limit on working memory and is thought to increase in the first year of life as the working memory system matures (Carey 2009, 83). An important motivation for proponents of the mental models approach is that it promises to explain children's early numerical abilities without having to postulate innate number-specific structure, including innate numerical representations. As Simon puts it, "the earliest form of numerical behavior of which infants are capable arises from the deployment of some very general information processing characteristics of human cognitive architecture". He describes the foundational competences that underlie infants' success on numerical tasks as being "nonnumerical" on the assumption that "they did not evolve specifically for the purpose of number processing" (1997, 350). Likewise, while Carey holds that the parallel individuation system supports numerical quantitative assessments-because mental models are suited to figure in assessments of one-toone correspondence-it is still a domain-general system: 11 The purpose of parallel individuation is to create working-memory models of small sets of individuals, in order to represent spatial, causal, and intentional relations among them. Unlike analog magnitude number representations, the parallel individuation system is not a dedicated number representation system. Far from it. The symbols in the parallel individuation system explicitly represent individuals. (Carey 2009, 151; italics added) In this passage, Carey makes clear that working-memory models are meant to serve purposes that have nothing at all to do with numerical quantity. Also, for Carey, the parallel individuation system supports quantitative comparisons that are not numerical. It does this by encoding some of an object's continuous properties (e.g., its amount of surface area) and associating this information with the symbol for the object in a working memory model. An operation can add the value for this continuous property to the value that is bound to the other model elements to represent the total amount for the represented group. Then it can compare this summed value to the summed value for another small group to determine whether they have the same amount or whether one has more than the other. This may seem somewhat convoluted. Why can't infants directly evaluate which has more surface area? Why do the continuous properties for each item have to be bound to a model element? The answer, for Carey, is that this arrangement is required by the data. It makes sense of cases where quantitative performance has the set-size signature of working memory-which is confined to a small number of items-but where performance is still driven by the continuous properties of the stimuli. For example, in one experiment, infants saw a certain number of crackers placed in one container, and another number placed in a second container, and the question was which container they would approach (Feigenson et al. 2002). Infants went for the larger quantity for 1v2 and for 2v3, but not when four or more crackers were involved (e.g., 2v4). Further, when the smaller number of crackers had the larger total amount of surface area, they chose the smaller number; and when different numbers had the same amount of total surface area, they showed no preference. So while the parallel individuation system would seem to explain why these infants' performance is capped at three crackers, the comparisons guiding these foraging choices are 12 nonnumerical. The crucial comparison is defined over the continuous properties that are bound to the model elements, allowing infants to compare the total amount of cracker in the two containers. In contrast, in a related study with monkeys who saw different numbers of apple slices placed into two containers, the monkeys succeeded by choosing the larger number and not simply the larger total volume of apple (Hauser et al. 2000). Here too the parallel individuation system is supposed to be operative, since the monkeys only succeeded with smaller numbers. But because they chose the larger number even when this was arranged to produce a smaller total amount of apple, Carey and her colleagues suggest that the monkeys must have used number as a heuristic to obtain the larger amount. In other words, they constructed two mental models-one for the slices in each container-and compared them one-to-one, choosing the container that had slices with no corresponding match in the other container. Carey interprets other related work with infants to show that, under certain conditions, they use the parallel individuation system to perform assessments of numerical equivalence just like monkeys. In one study, which used small toys instead of food items, 12.5-month-olds were shown small numbers of toys placed in a box and were then given the opportunity to retrieve them (Feigenson and Carey 2003). The crucial measure was how much they would continue to search the box after a given number or amount had already been retrieved. Suppose infants saw three toys placed in the box. Would they subsequently search the box after seeing that only two were removed, or once one larger toy (equivalent in surface area to the sum of the three) had been removed? In this case, infants disregarded the size of the objects and continued to search when the number retrieved was less than the number that had been placed in the box. For Carey, this means that "the match must have been subserved by a computation of 1-1 correspondence" (Carey 2009, 142). We have seen that Simon appeals to one-to-one correspondence in explaining how infants succeeded on Wynn's addition and subtraction task. Presumably, proponents of the mental models approach would say much the same thing regarding the multimodal addition task mentioned in the previous section. The proposal would be that the infants succeeded on this task by constructing a mental model of the objects behind the screen, and that they introduced new model elements not only for the object that they saw but also for the objects they heard and had to infer were behind the screen. Then when the screen was removed, they compared the model in 13 working memory for one-to-one correspondence with the model of the visible outcome. When the two didn't correspond (in the 1+1+1=2 condition), this mismatch was unexpected and caused them to look longer. Finally, I will mention one last study that will be relevant when we compare the mental models approach to the SuM theory in the next section. This study was, in effect, an attempted replication of the Clearfield and Mix experiment mentioned in section 2 and hence a test for whether infants can only respond to the continuous properties of stimuli (Cordes and Brannon 2009). The basic experimental design, as before, was to habituate infants to two or three samesize squares, and then to show them both the same number with a new contour and the same contour with the old number. This time, with a larger number of subjects tested, seven-montholds did respond to numerical changes as well as contour changes.1 How would the mental models approach explain this result? The explanation would have two parts. The first is that infants constructed a mental model during the habituation phase of the experiment, and that each habituation trial reinforced the same twoor three-symbol model so that it was held in working memory. Second, in the test trials, infants constructed models for the alternating stimuli too, and compared these to the one held in memory. In the new contour / old number condition, they compared the sum of the continuous properties that were bound to the models' elements. This would have caused them to notice the contour change, hence the longer looking time relative to the habituation trials. In the old contour /new number condition, they compared the models for one-to-one correspondence. This would have caused them to notice that they don't match one-toone, and would also have led to longer looking time relative to the habituation trials. In this section, we have seen that the mental models approach to the small number system has a lot going for it. In contrast with the object-indexing approach, it can deal with cases where visual object tracking isn't possible or isn't relevant to the situation at hand. And from the point of view of its proponents, a further attraction of this approach is that it also doesn't postulate a domain-specific system to explain infants' numerical abilities. Later, in section 6, I will 1 There was an important difference regarding how the two research teams analyzed their data. Clearfield and Mix limited the analyzed looking-time in each trial to ten seconds (in contrast with Cordes and Brannon's sixty seconds) and only included data from the first two test trials (in contrast with Cordes and Brannon using data from all of the test trials). As Cordes and Brannon point out, their own method of analysis is standard in the infancy literature and consequently preferable for making comparisons with other habituation studies. 14 challenge this assumption; I will argue that the mental models approach actually requires its own fair share of domain-specific structure. But first I want to return to the charge that the SuM theory is too speculative. 5. SuM Meets the Data As noted earlier, many researchers hold that there is no evidence for an innate domain-specific system for representing small numerical quantities as such. In this section, I argue that, in fact, many findings are consistent with the SuM theory. As we will see, the SuM theory can explain most of the data regarding the way that infants and animals respond to small numbers of items, and it may even be more promising than the mental models approach in some cases. At the very least, it should be viewed as an open empirical question whether the small number system starts out as a system that can support assessments of one-to-one correspondence or as a system that represents particular numerical quantities. Let's begin by looking at how the SuM theory explains the sorts of findings that were problematic for the object-indexing model. The key point, to begin with, is that the SuM theory can explain most of these data. Take the multimodal addition study with five-month-olds (Kobayashi et al. 2004). We saw that the mental models explanation of its key finding supposes that infants construct an abstract model that takes visual and auditory input, putting infants in a position to compare a model of the objects that are behind the screen for one-to-one correspondence with the model they form when the screen drops down. But the SuM theory also has an explanation of the disparity in looking time-in fact, a perfectly straightforward explanation. By hypothesis, SuM isn't a visual system. It can take auditory input too. When the first object is seen to be placed behind the screen, this initiates a spread of activation through SuM that triggers its "one" node (i.e., the node that functions to correspond with the presence of one item). But given the familiarization trials that help infants to recognize that these types of objects make a beep when they hit the ground, the subsequent beeps lead to further input to SuM and ultimately to the "two" or "three" node being triggered, depending on whether infants find themselves seeing/hearing 1+1 or 1+1+1. Of course, when the screen drops down, infants are in a position to see how many objects are actually there, and this would provide new input to SuM for the seen numerical quantity. If this quantity is identical to the remembered quantity, that isn't 15 surprising. But when the two differ-which would happen in the 1+1+1=2 condition-it is surprising, and this would cause infants to look longer. Next, consider Cordes and Brannon's (2009) study in which seven-month-olds discriminated between two and three squares. The main finding was that infants dishabituated to the novel number even though it had the same contour as the stimuli they had habituated to. The mental models approach explains this by claiming that infants compare a remembered model from the habituation trials to a model of the squares in each test trial and end up noticing when the two don't correspond one-to-one. But here too the SuM theory has a perfectly straightforward explanation of the looking-time pattern, or why the infants dishabituate to the novel number. Throughout the habituation trials, SuM is active and registers the presence of the numerical quantity two or three. Then when the novel number of squares is seen in the test trials, SuM registers a different numerical quantity, and it is the numerical difference that causes them to dishabituate. Similar explanations can be given for the other studies, including the one where infants recognize that there are remaining toys in the box after some number of them have been removed. Recall that Carey says of this experiment that "the match must have been subserved by a computation of 1-1 correspondence" (italics added). She is certainly right that infants could be approaching this situation by constructing a model of the toys in the box and then comparing this model for one-to-one correspondence with a model of the toys that were removed. But again, there is a straightforward way for infants to determine that further objects remain in the box on the assumption that they can represent particular numerical quantities via SuM. As each toy is placed in the box, this provides input to SuM and ultimately leads to a representation of the numerical quantity of the concealed toys, say, the numerical quantity three. Later, the child can check whether the numerical value in memory is reproduced when SuM is directed to the objects as they are removed from the box, with each removed object being taken as input to SuM. If the remembered value isn't reproduced (e.g., if only two are removed, which wouldn't provide the needed input for the "three" node to be triggered), then this would indicate that the box hasn't been emptied, and infants would be motivated to continue to search the box. The pattern we are seeing here is that the SuM theory is able to account for much the same data as the mental models theory. For most of the cases where infants or animals respond to 16 changes or differences in numerical quantity and where their response is confined to small numbers of items, they might be evaluating the stimuli for numerical equivalence using only assessments of one-to-one correspondence. But alternatively, they might be representing the specific numerical properties of the stimuli and noting changes or differences among these properties. There is one exception to this general rule, however. The SuM theory can't explain the cases where infants or animals respond to nonnumerical quantitative differences among the stimuli (e.g., the amount of cracker placed into a box). To the extent that nonnumerical quantitative assessments show the set-size signature of working memory, something like the parallel individuation approach will be needed to explain why performance is capped in the small-number range even when infants or animals aren't responding to numerical quantity. Still, this doesn't mean that when they do respond to numerical quantity that this can only be a matter of their representing matches and mismatches for numerical equivalence. They might represent nonnumerical quantity in certain contexts via an operation that sums the continuous properties that are bound to object representations, and numerical quantity via an operation that takes the activation of these object representations as its input and filters this information through SuM. In short, both approaches that go beyond object-indexing can accommodate much the same data. One postulates a domain-general system that supports assessments of numerical equivalence; the other postulates a domain-specific system for representing particular small numerical quantities. Are there any further considerations that might help to tease them apart? One that may prove useful focuses on the source of infants' performance limitation-why success in these different tasks is restricted to small numbers of items. For the domain-specific proposal in which infants represent particular small numerical quantities, the performance limitation is, by hypothesis, one of SuM's design features. SuM is built to represent just a few numerical quantities. In contrast, the domain-general mental models proposal traces the performance limitation back to the capacity limit of working memory. The reason infants can only construct or work with models that have a small number of elements is that working memory imposes this constraint. Recall that Carey reports that working memory matures in the first year of life. One factor we can look at, then, is the developmental trajectory of working memory and whether this lines up with infants' performance on numerical tasks. If children are successful at discriminating between small numbers of items in a way that exceeds the immature 17 working memory system's capacity, this would cast doubt on the idea that their success turns on comparing working memory models for one-to-one correspondence. This is an area where we need to proceed cautiously. Not a lot is known about the development of working memory in infancy, and there are questions about whether different researchers who study its development are studying the same thing-for example, there is a controversy about whether and how to distinguish working memory from short-term memory (Reznick 2014). Nonetheless, there is evidence of a correspondence across a variety of tasks in which infants' working memory goes through a developmental expansion in the first year of life in which, for older infants, it can accommodate three or four items, but at six months, it is limited to just one (Oakes and Luck 2014).2 For example, in one study, infants were tested on whether they could remember the location of an occluded object by encoding its shape (e.g., whether they would recognize that two objects had been switched given that the shape that had been placed on the left subsequently appeared on the right, and vice versa). Nine-month-olds were able to do this for two objects, but it was found that six-month-olds were only able to do this for one object (Káldy and Leslie 2005). Suppose we take at face value this pattern of findings and the provisional estimate that infants' working memory is severely limited half way through the first year of life. This would cast doubt on the hypothesis that such young infants are able to perform complex one-to-one comparisons between mental models with three elements. Now this isn't a problem for the mental models account of the study in which 12.5-month-olds succeeded in determining that a toy remained in the box after a certain number had been removed. These infants presumably have a working memory system that is mature enough to accommodate three or four items. But a number of the studies mentioned above had far younger subjects. The study in which infants dishabituated to changes in number as well as contour for two versus three static squares used infant subjects who were just seven months old. And the study in which infants successfully combined visual and auditory information for objects behind a screen (looking longer at the 1+1+1=2 event than the 1+1=2 event) were a mere five months old. The point is that that there 2 In summarizing this research, Oakes and Luck remark that "multiple studies using very different paradigms suggest that young infants (e.g., six months) can retain only a single item in STM... Moreover, because the information is used to compare images before and after occlusion, find hidden objects, and so on, these results may reveal the nature of a WM [working memory] system" (2014, 171). 18 are grounds for supposing that infants at this young age should have difficulty comparing and applying models that require this many elements. On the other hand, the SuM theory has no difficulty in accounting for why these younger infants respond as they do. As each new object is registered to occur behind the screen, this provides further input to SuM, whose network adjusts which output node is active. The only thing infants have to remember when the occluder is removed is the numerical quantity that SuM has registered for the objects behind the screen. Then all they have to do is compare this one value to the current numerical quantity that SuM registers for the objects they can see. If the two values differ, this would be unexpected-hence the longer looking time. To be clear, my claim isn't that we currently have decisive evidence against the mental models explanation. It's that this is a critical juncture where the SuM theory and the mental models theory make different predictions. The mental models theory ascribes the restriction to small numbers of items to the capacity limit on working memory. So if we can independently determine working memory's capacity limit at different ages, we might be able to show that infants have numerical abilities that exceed the cap predicted by the mental models approach. At present, there are some indications that infants do have numerical abilities of this kind, and this in turn is a reason to favor the SuM theory. Of course, there were the objections to the SuM theory mentioned earlier (in section 2). One of these we have already dealt with, namely, the concern that SuM is a purely speculative theory and that there is no evidence that such a system exists. We have seen that there is actually much evidence for the theory. The problem is just that the evidence that supports the SuM theory also generally supports the mental models theory, and consequently we need to think hard about the types of findings that might favor one over the other. The other objection was based on the observation that learning the meaning of words for small numbers takes a long time and that children invariably learn them in order. If SuM provides children with innate and perhaps unordered representations for the numerical quantities one, two, and three, why the difficulty and why don't children sometimes learn the meanings of these words in some other order? In contrast, the mental models approach explains the facts about language learning on the assumption that children have to construct a special stock of models that are regularly used for performing assessments of numerical equivalence and that 19 come to be associated with these number words. On this view, what happens when children learn the meaning of the word "two", say, is that they figure out that it should be associated with a given model that is to be regularly used for performing one-to-one comparisons and that the word "two" applies to just those groups of items to which this special (two-membered) model stands in one-to-one correspondence. Given that these long-term memory models have to be constructed as children are confronted by the difficulty of having to interpret the meanings of number words, it isn't surprising that this takes time. Also, since the model for "three" is more complex than the one for "two", and the one for "two" is more complex than the one for "one", it stands to reason that they will be learned in order, starting with the simplest model. Do these facts about language learning discredit the SuM theory? Not at all. Even if there are innate representations for a few small numerical quantities, it doesn't follow that learning the meanings of the number words for small numbers is a trivial matter. There is still a very challenging mapping problem in which children have to determine that number words (and certain morphological features in language) pick out numerical quantities to begin with. And once they recognize that their interpretation should focus on numerical quantity, there is a further question about which numerical quantity is the right one for a given term. This is a daunting problem even if children don't have to construct new long-term memory models. What's more, given that the linguistic data to which children have access vary enormously for these different terms-with "one" being far more frequent than "two", and "two far more frequent than "three"-any theory that recognizes the difficulty of the mapping problem that children face ought to predict that children are going to learn them in order. To summarize, although it is widely thought that there is no evidence for innate representations of the numerical quantities one, two, and three, I have argued that we just have to look in the right place. In fact, there is a great deal of evidence that fits with this theory, albeit evidence that can be explained by the mental models approach as well. What's more, the SuM theory may be in a better position to explain some of this data, since children's successful performance on some tasks occurs at an age when there is a question about whether their working memory system would be mature enough to handle the needed complex models. But suppose that we put this last point to the side. Suppose that younger infants' working memory is capable of dealing with these models and that the SuM theory and the mental models theory are 20 on a par regarding the data. Many theorists with empiricist leanings would conclude that we should reject the SuM theory in this situation on the grounds that, all things being equal, purely domain-general accounts are simpler and hence better developmental theories. I reject this principle. I don't see any reason to suppose that there are general methodological grounds for preferring domain-general theories over domain-specific theories in accounting for early developing cognitive capacities. But I won't argue for this claim here. Instead, what I propose to do in the next section is to argue that such methodological considerations are beside the point because, in the end, the mental models approach has to accept a significant amount of innate domain-specific structure too. 6. Where Does One-to-One Correspondence Come From? According to the mental models theory, the small number system is fundamentally a domaingeneral system that supports assessments of one-to-one correspondence. Let's assume for the sake of argument that younger infants are able to compare the needed mental models for one-toone correspondence and that this explains their success on the sorts of tasks reviewed above. Still, there is a question about the innate structure of the component systems that underlie this ability; it shouldn't be assumed that the mental models approach invariably vindicates a domaingeneral basis for the representation of small numbers of items. One way to see that a fully domain-general account is problematic is to ask why children so readily compare mental models for one-to-one correspondence and how they mange to reliably perform one-to-one comparisons. Take the why question first. The point is that it is one thing for a certain form of representation to be able to support assessments of one-to-one correspondence and quite another for an agent to recognize the value of carrying out the assessment and to spontaneously perform these comparisons. If the system that underlies these operations is supposed to be a generalpurpose system-one that isn't geared towards numerical representation in particular-where would children even get the idea that they can determine whether two groups of items have the same number by settling whether there is exactly one item in the first group for every item in the second? It may be obvious to numerate adults that this is a good technique for deciding whether two groups are numerically equivalent, but it isn't a self-evident procedure, one that would 21 necessarily occur to any agent who happens to have a general-purpose capacity for constructing mental models. In his discussion of why his mental models approach is a "nonnumerical" theory, Simon argues that each of the fundamental competencies that it requires isn't specific to the domain of number and that there is independent evidence that infants have the competence. For example, he mentions that infants have mechanisms for remembering what they have seen and for generalizing without particular regard to an object's perceptual details. But throughout his discussion, he never asks about the origins of the process that checks for one-to-one correspondence, as if it should go without saying that once the other capacities are in place, his work is done. But it isn't done because there is still the matter of what would drive infants to compare a model in working memory to what they currently see for whether they match in this way. In developmental psychology, it has often been thought that a general understanding of one-to-one correspondence must be learned and that it takes years to develop through observations and activities where objects are paired with one another (candies paired with containers, forks paired with napkins, etc.). Mix et al. trace a developmental trajectory in which recognition of numerical equivalence begins when children are around 2.5 years old and expands in the preschool years as children first become able to match items that have somewhat different features, followed by heterogeneous items in a single modality, followed by crossmodal matches between such disparate items as dots and sounds (2002, 39). But if five-month-olds are supposed to already have a system in place that compares abstract models for one-to-one correspondence, these types of experiences can't be essential to the capacity to establish numerical equivalence. In fact, it's hard to see what alternative there is to a system that incorporates innate operations for determining numerical equivalence. This would be a system that isn't limited to creating models or to using these models to perform nonnumerical quantitative comparisons, but a system that is designed, in part, for making judgments about numerical equivalence. The how question leads to the same conclusion. Assuming that younger infants do manage to use one-to-one correspondence to make judgments of numerical equivalence, how are they able to reliably map each and every item in one model to just one in another? This isn't an easy procedure to execute. Notice that it requires a form of bookkeeping when moving back and forth between the two models, so that, among other things, no item is fed into the process multiple 22 times and the process stops just when it should. A similar issue comes up as children learn to count, which is a comparatively demanding process. To achieve an accurate count, children need a way of keeping track of which counting terms have been used and which items have already been tagged-something young children find to be difficult and that is learned with the aid of adult training and much cultural support. If infants as young as five months old can reliably perform one-to-one comparisons without comparable aid and support, we have reason to believe that the system that underlies this capacity includes innate operations for just this purpose. What we are looking at is no longer a general-purpose representational system, or even a system that is designed for making quantitative comparisons. It is a system that is designed for making numerical comparisons.3 The animal data only reinforce this way of thinking about the small number system. Recall that honeybees can be trained to discriminate between instances of two and three and that their performance is limited to the small number range.4 A very natural explanation of how they do this is that they detect particular small numerical quantities via SuM-for example, they learn to choose the exit with three figures if they see three other figures when they first enter the apparatus. Still, another possibility is that they succeed by determining which of the choice stimuli matches the remembered sample when they are compared for one-to-one correspondence, that is, by choosing the numerically equivalent stimulus rather than the one that also has three elements. However, if this is how they succeed on the task, it is tremendously unlikely that individual bees have learned to determine whether two stimuli are numerically equivalent by drawing on a general-purpose capacity for working with mental models. The only plausible way of developing this account is to hold that the system that implements these processes is an innate system for making judgements of numerical equivalence.5 3 A reviewer has questioned whether the how question argues for a domain-specific system, noting that a similar difficulty arises when infants compare small collections for nonnumerical quantity. For example, when comparing two groups of crackers, infants couldn't reliably choose the one with more surface area if they didn't have a way of keeping track of whether an item's surface area has already been incorporated into the overall sum. But notice that, with nonnumerical quantity comparisons, infants don't have to map items from one group to the other. They can compute each group's total surface area independently of the other and then simply compare the two values. This considerably eases the demands on bookkeeping and suggests that a different type of process underlies nonnumerical comparisons. 4 For related work on the representation of small numerical quantity in newborn chickens, see Rugani et al. (2008, 2010). 5 Of course, it is possible that bees and humans employ different types of cognitive mechanisms in their dealings with small numbers of items. As a reviewer has noted, bees might "have a domain-specific mechanism, but more 23 Recall that Carey characterizes the parallel individuation system as a domain-general system by emphasizing that it serves multiple functions in which mental models support inferences about spatial, causal, and intentional relations, as well as assessments about nonnumerical quantity and numerical equivalence. At the same time, the architecture she is proposing is flexible enough that the systems that drive any of these inferences can themselves be domaingeneral or domain-specific. What I am suggesting is that if one-to-one correspondence accounts for the sorts of findings that might otherwise be explained by SuM, the early developing facility with one-to-one correspondence argues for an innate numerical comparator that interacts with the domain-general capacity for forming mental models. If I am right, then the main choice isn't between one theory that postulates innate domain-specific structure and another that postulates only domain-general structure. It is a choice between two theories that postulate different types of innate domain-specific structure-one that is committed to an innate system for representing particular numerical quantities (SuM) and one that is committed to an innate system for performing assessments of numerical equivalence (an innate comparator). To be sure, these are different approaches to the fundamental structure of the small number system, but either way, the representation of small numerical quantity would be grounded in an innate domain-specific system. There is no domain-general alternative. 7. Conclusion I have argued that more consideration should be given to the proposal of an innate system for representing a few precise small numerical quantities-the SuM theory. I began by showing that we need a richer form of representation than a system for visually tracking small numbers of objects. I then went on to show that the SuM theory does well when compared to the alternative proposal that the small number system starts out as a general-purpose capacity for working with mental models. Not only can the SuM theory explain the majority of the data that the mental models theory has been claimed to explain, but it also has a potential advantage over the mental sophisticated creatures like us use a domain-general mechanism". While this is a possibility, there is a remarkable similarity across a broad range of species (including humans) regarding systems for representing core facets of space, time, and number (Dehaene and Brannon 2011). This suggests that the representation of small number is also likely to be similar in humans and other animals. In any case, my reference to the bee data and how it is best interpreted is not meant to settle the matter in favor of SuM. It's just one part of an overall inference to the best explanation regarding the nature of the human capacity for representing and responding to small numbers of items. 24 models approach when the capacity limit on infants' working memory is fully taken into account. Moreover, the mental models theory itself requires innate domain-specific structure that its proponents have failed to recognize or acknowledge, namely, an innate capacity for performing assessment of one-to-one correspondence. 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Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality Epistemology of Experimental Gravity Scientific Rationality Nicolae Sfetcu 02.11.2019 Sfetcu, Nicolae, "Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality", SetThings (November 2, 2019), MultiMedia Publishing (ed.), ISBN: 978-606-033-201-5, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35350.70724, URL = https://www.setthings.com/en/e-books/epistemology-ofexperimental-gravity-scientific-rationality/ Email: [email protected] This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/bynd/4.0/. A translation of Sfetcu, Nicolae, "Epistemologia gravitației experimentale – Raționalitatea științifică", SetThings (1 august 2019), MultiMedia Publishing (ed.), ISBN: 978-606-033-234-3, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15421.61925, URL = https://www.setthings.com/ro/e-books/epistemologiagravitatiei-experimentale-rationalitatea-stiintifica/ Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality Cuprins CUPRINS .................................................................................................................................. 2 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 4 GRAVITY ................................................................................................................................. 5 GRAVITATIONAL TESTS ........................................................................................................... 6 METHODOLOGY OF LAKATOS SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY .................................................... 10 THE NATURAL EXTENSION OF THE LAKATOS METHODOLOGY ............................................... 14 BIFURCATED PROGRAMS ................................................................................................................ 15 UNIFYING PROGRAMS ..................................................................................................................... 16 1. NEWTONIAN GRAVITY ................................................................................................. 19 1.1 HEURISTICS OF NEWTONIAN GRAVITY ............................................................................. 27 1.2 PROLIFERATION OF POST-NEWTONIAN THEORIES ............................................................ 33 1.3 TESTS OF POST-NEWTONIAN THEORIES ............................................................................ 41 1.3.1 NEWTON'S PROPOSED TESTS .................................................................................................. 42 1.3.2 TESTS OF POST-NEWTONIAN THEORIES ................................................................................. 45 1.4 NEWTONIAN GRAVITY ANOMALIES ................................................................................... 46 1.5 SATURATION POINT IN NEWTONIAN GRAVITY .................................................................. 47 2. GENERAL RELATIVITY ................................................................................................ 50 2.1 HEURISTICS OF THE GENERAL RELATIVITY ...................................................................... 62 2.2 PROLIFERATION OF POST-EINSTEINIAN GRAVITATIONAL THEORIES ................................ 67 2.3 POST-NEWTONIAN PARAMETERIZED FORMALISM (PPN) ................................................. 71 2.4 TESTS OF GENERAL RELATIVITY AND POST-EINSTEINIAN THEORIES ................................ 74 2.4.1 TESTS PROPOSED BY EINSTEIN .............................................................................................. 81 2.4.2 TESTS OF POST-EINSTEINIAN THEORIES ................................................................................ 83 2.4.3 CLASSIC TESTS ....................................................................................................................... 87 2.4.4 MODERN TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 90 2.4.5 STRONG FIELD GRAVITATIONAL TESTS ................................................................................. 99 Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 3 2.4.6 COSMOLOGICAL TESTS ........................................................................................................ 106 2.5 ANOMALIES OF GENERAL RELATIVITY ........................................................................... 119 2.6 THE SATURATION POINT OF GENERAL RELATIVITY ........................................................ 120 3. QUANTUM GRAVITY ................................................................................................... 128 3.1 HEURISTICS OF QUANTUM GRAVITY ............................................................................... 141 3.2 THE TESTS OF QUANTUM GRAVITY ................................................................................. 144 3.3 CANONICAL QUANTUM GRAVITY .................................................................................... 149 3.3.1 TESTS PROPOSED FOR THE CQG .......................................................................................... 150 3.3.2. LOOP QUANTUM GRAVITY .................................................................................................. 152 3.4 STRING THEORY .............................................................................................................. 157 3.4.1 HEURISTICS OF STRING THEORY .......................................................................................... 166 3.4.2. ANOMALIES OF STRING THEORY ......................................................................................... 170 3.5 OTHER THEORIES OF QUANTUM GRAVITY ...................................................................... 172 3.6 UNIFICATION (THE FINAL THEORY) ............................................................................... 174 6. COSMOLOGY ................................................................................................................ 178 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 181 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 189 Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 4 Introduction In this paper I approach the evolution of gravitational tests from an epistemological perspective framed in the concept of rational reconstruction of Imre Lakatos, based on his methodology of research programmes. Unlike other works on the same subject, the evaluated period is very extensive, starting with Newton's natural philosophy and up to the quantum gravity theories of today. In order to explain in a more rational way the complex evolution of the gravity concept of the last century, I propose a natural extension of the methodology of the research programmes of Lakatos that I then use during the paper. I believe that this approach offers a new perspective on how evolved over time the concept of gravity and the methods of testing each theory of gravity, through observations and experiments. I argue, based on the methodology of the research programmes and the studies of scientists and philosophers, that the current theories of quantum gravity are degenerative, due to the lack of experimental evidence over a long period of time and of self-immunization against the possibility of falsification. Moreover, a methodological current is being developed that assigns a secondary, unimportant role to verification through observations and/or experiments. For this reason, it will not be possible to have a complete theory of quantum gravity in its current form, which to include to the limit the general relativity, since physical theories have always been adjusted, during their evolution, based on observational or experimental tests, and verified by the predictions made. Also, contrary to a widespread opinion and current active programs regarding the unification of all the fundamental forces of physics in a single final theory, based on string theory, I argue that this unification is generally unlikely, and it is not possible anyway for a unification to be developed based on current theories of quantum gravity, including string theory. In addition, I support the views of some scientists and philosophers that currently too much resources are being consumed on the idea of developing quantum gravity theories, and in particular string theory, to include general relativity and to unify gravity with other forces, as long as science does not impose such research programs. In Introduction, after a very brief history of the concept of gravity from antiquity to the 17th century, I present various approaches in time of the methodologies of gravitational tests, and the concept of Lakatos' scientific rationality through research programmes. I present my proposal to extend the Lakatos methodology with two new terms, bifurcated programs and unifying programs, with their specific characteristics. In Newtonian Gravity, after an analysis of the Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 5 methodology used by Newton, I talk about the negative heuristics (hard core) and the positive heuristics (development strategy) used in the elaboration of the law of universal gravity. There follows a period of proliferation of post-Newtonian theories of gravity, the tests proposed by Newton and those for the other theories, and then I highlight the anomalies accumulated by the theory and the saturation point, where the need is felt to develop another theory with greater heuristic power and to digest the anomalies of Newton's theory. The General Relativity section is approached in the same way, starting from an epistemological and methodological approach, the negative and positive heuristics of this research program, the proliferation of post-Einsteinian theories, and the description of the parameterized post-Newtonian formalism used to analyze, evaluate and compare the models of gravity based on the gravity tests specific to these theories. The final part of the section is dedicated to the anomalies that appear in general relativity and to highlight the saturation point that requires a new approach to gravity. In Quantum Gravity the same epistemological and methodological issues are addressed, with emphasis on canonical quantum gravity (including loop quantum gravity) and string theory, highlighting the methodological problems of these theories and the tests that are proposed for their experimental verification. I conclude the section with the evaluation of the attempts to obtain the unification of all the forces in a final theory. A shorter section on Cosmology follows, in which I analyze the research program of cosmology from the perspective of gravity theories. In the Conclusions I present, condensed, my opinions and arguments developed throughout the work. Gravity Gravity has a universal character, but its strength rapidly decreases with distance, being the weakest of the four fundamental forces of physics1. In the 4th century BC, the Greek philosopher Aristotle considered as the cause of the fall of heavy bodies their tendency to move to their natural place2. In Book VII of De Architectura, the Romanian engineer and architect Vitruvius argues that 1 The four "fundamental" forces are the electromagnetic force, the "weak" nuclear force responsible for radioactive decay, "strong" nuclear force linking the constituent elements of the nuclei, and gravitational force. 2 Edward Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional and Intellectual Contexts (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 60–61. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 6 gravity does not depend on the "weight" of a substance, but rather on its "nature"3. Indian astronomer and mathematician Brahmagupta argued that the Earth is spherical and attracts objects4. In the seventeenth century, Galileo discovered that, contrary to Aristotle's teachings, all objects were accelerating equally when they fell5. After Newton's count of gravity as a force, general relativity considers gravity to be a consequence of the curvature of spacetime due to mass distribution. According to the current main theory, gravity appeared with the birth of the Universe, during the Planck era (10-43 seconds after the Big Bang). Currently, there are attempts to develop a quantum theory that unifies gravity with the other three fundamental forces in nature. Quantum mechanics with quantum field theory6 and general relativity are the fundamental theories in which gravity is approached. Gravitational tests Allan Franklin and Slobodan Perovic, in Experiment in Physics7, state that theories in science in general, and in physics in particular, are confirmed (temporarily) by experiments that verify the assertions and predictions of theories, thus laying the groundwork for scientific knowledge. Francis Bacon was the first to support the concept of a crucial experiment, which can decide the validity of a hypothesis or theory. Later, Newton argued that scientific theories are directly induced by experimental results and observations, excluding untested hypotheses. Hobbes stated, on the contrary, that human reason preceded experimental techniques, criticizing Boyle's 3 Vitruvius Pollio, De architectura (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1997), 215. 4 Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Bīrūnī, "Alberuni's India," text, 1910, 272, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/digital/collections/cul/texts/ldpd_5949073_001/index.html. 5 Stillman Drake, Galileo at Work: His Scientific Biography (Courier Corporation, 2003). 6 Quantum field theory is the common framework for light and electron theory in the form of fields (quantum electrodynamics), weak nuclear forces theory, and quarks and gluons theory. The standard model of particle physics combines these approaches and describes the internal structure of atoms through quantum fields. 7 Allan Franklin and Slobodan Perovic, "Experiment in Physics," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2016 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/physics-experiment/. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 7 optimism about the role of the experimental method8. In the 20th century, logical positivism separates observational deductions from theoretical ones. Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend criticized this view, saying that all experiments are based on a theoretical framework and therefore cannot independently confirm a theory9. Ian Hacking agreed with this idea, but says the comments remain reliable through independent confirmations. In the case of a single viable experimental system, Allan Franklin and Slobodan Perovic propose specific strategies for validating the observation, which, together with Hacking's strategy, constitute an epistemology of the experiment: 1. Experimental verification and calibration, with the help of known phenomena. 2. Reproduction of previously known artifacts. 3. Elimination of plausible sources of error and alternative explanations of the result ("Sherlock Holmes strategy"). 4. Using the results to argue their validity. 5. Using a well-corroborated independent theory of phenomena to explain the results. 6. Using an apparatus based on a well-corroborated theory. 7. Use of statistical arguments. 10 But applying these strategies does not guarantee the correctness of the results. Because of this, physicists use several strategies, depending on the experiment. Peter Galison, in How Experiments End (1987), states that experiments end in a subjective way, when experts believe they have reached a valid result11. Most experiments are based on the traditions in the field and the personal experience of the researcher (including his theoretical assumptions), both in designing the experiment and in accepting a theory that "allows" the conduct of experiments. The theoretical assumptions of the experimenters are accepted. Harry Collins has developed an argument called "experimenters' regress12," according to which there are no formal criteria that you can apply to decide whether an experimental device 8 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton University Press, 1989). 9 Ian Hacking, "Do We See Through a Microscope?," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62, no. 4 (1981): 63: 305– 322. 10 Franklin and Perovic, "Experiment in Physics." 11 Peter Galison, "How Experiments End," Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 2 (1990): 235. 12 Harry M. Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, Reprint edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 79–111. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 8 works properly or not. What actually matters is negotiation within the scientific community, which depends on factors such as the career, social and cognitive interests of scientists and perceived usefulness for future work, but which is not decided by what we may call epistemological criteria or rationalized judgment13. Pickering also argues that the reasons for accepting the results are their subsequent usefulness in scientific practice, and their agreement with existing community commitments14. He states that an experimental system rarely produces valid experimental results unless it is adjusted accordingly, and that the theory of apparatus, as well as the theory of phenomena, determines the production of a valid experimental result15. Later, he concludes that "the outcomes depend on how the world is"16: "In this way, then, how the material world is leaks into and infects our representations of it in a nontrivial and consequential fashion. My analysis thus displays an intimate and responsive engagement between scientific knowledge and the material world that is integral to scientific practice." 17 Hacking claims that, despite appearances, constructivists, such as Collins, Pickering or Latour, do not believe that facts do not exist or that there is no reality. He cites Latour and Woolgar that the result is a consequence of scientific work rather than its cause18 19, in a relative consensus with the scientific community. Franklin and Perovic state that the accumulation of a large amount of data in an experiment may require a selection, by the technique of reduction used by physicists, of the data that will be used. This may be an important epistemological concern regarding the selection of data considered 13 Franklin and Perovic, "Experiment in Physics." 14 Andrew Pickering, "The Hunting of the Quark," Isis 72, no. 2 (1981): 216–36. 15 Pickering, "The Hunting of the Quark." 16 Andrew Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science, 1 edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 182. 17 Pickering, 183. 18 Bruno Latour, Steve Woolgar, and Jonas Salk, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, 2nd Edition, 2nd edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1986), 180. 19 Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What?, Revised edition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), 80–81. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 9 useful, minimizing the probability of unexplored results20. In such cases, physicists apply a robustness analysis in testing hypotheses, checking the equipment used, and establishing working algorithms. In the case of the solutions of Einstein's equations of general relativity and of the modeling of quantum gravity theories, due to the complexity of these approaches, simulations of computer experiments are attempted. Currently, there is an ongoing dispute to what extent these simulations are experiments, theories or some kind of hybrid methods of doing science. 21 Between 1965 and 1990 many experiments were developed for testing gravitational theories, including22 • High precision measurements of the effects of electromagnetic radiation in the gravitational field, confirming the GR for the weak gravitational field. • Detection of the non-linear gravitational interaction of the masses at a pulsar in the gravitational field of a neutron star. • Indirect confirmation of gravitational radiation by observing two nearby neutron stars, confirming GR. • Attempts, so far failed, to ascertain the violation of the principle of equivalence or the existence of a fifth force. During this period most experiments confirmed the general relativity with the help of the newly developed technologies. A technological basis for gravitational wave astronomy has been created. Cryogenic barogenic antennas and laser interferometric antennas were built, associated with the theoretical analysis of the experiments with the test masses, resulting in the sensitivity of the experiments depending on the thermal insulation, if the device continuously records the coordinates the antenna sensitivity is limited, and the sensitivity can be increased if there are used 20 Allan Franklin, Shifting Standards: Experiments in Particle Physics in the Twentieth Century, 1 edition (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 224–25. 21 Eric Winsberg, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 136. 22 Vladimir B. Braginsky, "Experimental Gravitation (What Is Possible and What Is Interesting to Measure)," Classical and Quantum Gravity 11, no. 6A (June 1994): A1–A7, https://doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/11/6A/001. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 10 quantum procedures23. The antennas can help in observing the gravitational background radiation and testing the general relativity in the ultra-nonlinear case. Regarding the sensitivity of gravitational measuring devices, Vladimir B Braginsky states that the current level of knowledge allows us to hope that the sensitivity of the antennas can increase, and no limit of sensitivity has been set in the gravitational experiments, it depends on the knowledge of the scientists. 24 Currently, experimental gravity is an emerging field, characterized by continuous efforts to test the predictions of gravity theories. The classical limit or the limit of correspondence is the ability of a physical theory to approximate the classical version when it is taken into account by the special values of its parameters25. The principle of correspondence formulated by Niels Bohr in 192026 states that the behavior of systems described by quantum mechanics reproduces classical physics within the limits of large quantum numbers27. This principle has two basic requirements: the reproduction of the Poisson brackets, and the specification of a complete set of classical observables whose operators, when acting through appropriate semiclassical states, reproduce the same classical variables with small quantum corrections28. Methodology of Lakatos Scientific rationality 23 Braginsky. 24 Braginsky. 25 David Bohm, Quantum Theory, Revised ed. edition (New York: Dover Publications, 1989). 26 N. Bohr, "Über die Serienspektra der Elemente," Zeitschrift für Physik 2, no. 5 (October 1, 1920): 423–478, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01329978. 27 Paul A. Tipler and Ralph Llewellyn, Modern Physics, Sixth edition (New York: W. H. Freeman, 2012), 160– 61. 28 Abhay Ashtekar, Luca Bombelli, and Alejandro Corichi, "Semiclassical States for Constrained Systems," Physical Review D, 2005, https://www.academia.edu/587754/Semiclassical_states_for_constrained_systems. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 11 Both general relativity and quantum mechanics are paradigms in Kuhn's sense29. Both coexist simultaneously. But in Kuhn's scheme there is no such situation in which two simultaneous paradigms coexist peacefully. Kuhn's paradigm is defined primarily from a sociological point of view30. In this sense, the "family" of relativists coexist peacefully with the "family" of quantum physics theorists for almost a hundred years, without much interaction between them. In universities, both paradigms are accepted. Both paradigms also have a common feature: the claim for completitude and universality Quantum theoreticians consider that the role of the observer and the corresponding statistical interpretation are properly described only in the framework of quantum theory. At the same time, the supporters of the theory of general relativity consider that gravitational interaction is universal and must be represented by curved, geometric space-time, which in turn influences gravity. The two above paradigms are essentially incompatible from the point of view of the observational system31. Despite the incompatibility, the two paradigms are traditionally applied in different fields, namely macrophysics and microphysics. Both paradigms do not present decisive anomalies and are extremely efficient and respected. Also, there is no competition between the two paradigms. It turns out that this contemporary situation in physics is not compatible with Kuhn's scheme for the structure of scientific revolutions. Lakatos proposed a methodology for investigating the evolution of science through research programs, a combination of Popper's falsifiability, Kuhn's scientific revolutions and Feyerabend's methodological tolerance32. Lakatos' concept takes into account a series of theories included in a research program, in which each new theory results by the addition of auxiliary clauses (or semantic reinterpretations) of existing theories to explain some anomalies. Such a new theory is theoretically progressive if it has an excess of empirical content over existing theories (if it predicts new facts), 29 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 30 Kuhn, 10. 31 Jürgen Audretsch, "Quantum Gravity and the Structure of Scientific Revolutions," Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 12, no. 2 (September 1, 1981): 322–39, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801202. 32 Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University Press, 1980). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 12 and it is empirically progressive if some of these predictions are confirmed (it produces new facts). A new theory is progressive both theoretically and empirically, and otherwise degenerate. It is considered "scientific" if it is at least theoretically progressive. A theory in the series is "falsified" when it is replaced by a theory with more corroborated content. There is no time limit for the final evaluation of a program; so, this program obbeys to neither Popper's "refutation" nor Kuhn's "crises". A new research program (a new scientific concept, for example) benefits from a certain methodological tolerance. "Crucial" experiments can be considered decisive "after a long retrospective" only. As Lakatos states, "the discovery of an inconsistency or of an anomaly must immediately stop the development of a programme: it may be rational to put the incon sistency into some temporary, ad hoc quarantine, and carry on with the positive heuristic of the programme." Thus, Kepler's ellipses were admitted as crucial evidence for Newton and against Descartes one hundred years after Newton's Principle33. And the abnormal behavior of Mercury's perihelion has been known for decades as an anomaly in Newton's program, but only the development of Einstein's theory has transformed it into a "refutation" of Newton's research program. For Lakatos, the history of science is a history of competing research programs ("paradigms"), but does not necessarily include Kuhnian periods of normal science, allowing the simultaneous coexistence of competing theories even if the new theory has, for a period of time that may take tens for years, a lower heuristic power. Heuristics is a central concept of Lakatos philosophy. It tells us which research paths to avoid (negative heuristics) and which paths to follow (positive heuristics), giving a definition of the "conceptual framework" (and, consequently, language). The negative heuristic forbids us to point modus tollens to the "hard core" of the program. With the help of positive heuristics, you can articulate or even invent "auxiliary hypotheses" that form a protective belt around this nucleus, which must withstand tests and be adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the nucleus. While theoretical progress (as described by Lakatos) may be immediate, empirical progress may not be verified for long time, and a long series of "refutations" may occur in a research program 33 Isaac Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, I Ed.," The British Library, 1687, https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/newtons-principia-mathematica. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 13 before the auxiliary hypotheses in growth, with appropriate content, or revising false "facts," to turn the program into a success story. The positive heuristic ignores the real examples, the "available" data, based on the "models" predetermined by the researchers withn the research program, which can be modified and even replaced in the further development of the program. In this evolution, the "refutations" are irrelevant, being predictable and overcome by the research strategy. According to Lakatos, "This methodology offers a new rational reconstruction of science. It is best presented by contrasting it with falsificationism and conventionalism." 34 The history of science is, in Lakatos's opinion, the history of research programs rather than theories, which is a partial justification for the idea that the history of science is the history of conceptual frameworks or scientific language. . "A program advances theoretically if the new theory resolves the anomaly and is independently verifiable by making new predictions, and it advances empirically if at least one of these new predictions is confirmed. A program can progress, both theoretically and empirically, even if every theory produced within it is rejected. A program degenerates if its successive theories are not theoretically progressive (because they do not predict new facts) or are not empirically progressive (because new predictions are rejected)." 35 The models within the research programs are sets of idealized conditions but increasingly closer to the reality, and possibly observational theories, used during the program to help its development. The refutation of these models is foreseen within the development strategy (positive heuristics), being irrelevant and "digested" by the next model. Thus, the difficulties of a program are rather mathematical than empirical. The refutations of the models are rather checkings (corroborations) of the approximation of the model to the reality, and of its heuristic power. According to the methodology, the first models are so idealized that it may not correspond to reality at all. According to Barry Gholson and Peter Barker, Lakatos' methodology suggests that research programs evolve from an initial state that resembles to instrumentalism, to a mature state that resembles to realism. In particular, in Newton's research program, Lakatos states that the first 34 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 110. 35 Nicolae Sfetcu, "Reconstructia Rationala a Stiintei Prin Programe de Cercetare" (2019), http://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24667.21288. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 14 theory in a program was be so idealized that it represents nothing (the distinguishing sign of instrumentalism) 36. Replacing the theory with new successive theories as the program progresses, he changes the initial model into an increasingly plausible candidate for reality. An important part of the heuristic program consists of recommendations for the incorporation of new features, absent in the initial theory, but which are necessary for real world representations. Thus, the instrumentalist and realistic features of the Lakatos research program are incompatible with the mutually exclusive categories presented by the logical empiricists. 37 Lakatos describes a research program as follows: "It consists of a developing series of theories. Moreover, this developing series has a structure. It has a tenacious hard core, like the three laws of motion and the law of gravitation in Newton's research programme, and it has a heuristic, which includes a set of problem-solving techniques... Finally, a research programme has a vast belt of auxiliary hypotheses based on which we establish initial conditions... I call this belt a protective belt because it protects the hard core from refutations: anomalies are not taken as refutations of the hard core but of some hypothesis in the protective belt. Partly under empirical pressure (but partly planned according to its heuristic) the protective belt is constantly modified, increased, complicated, while the hard core remains intact." 38 The natural extension of the Lakatos methodology Research programs allow the development of more complex theories. Barry Gholson and Peter Barker believe that the terms can be applied to both individual theories and programs. If it is applied to the theories of a research program, I consider that they in turn become research programs, which we can call research subprograms. Unlike Kuhn's scientific revolutions, Lakatos assumed that the simultaneous existence of several research programs is the norm. Science is currently facing such an unusual situation: two incompatible theories, but both accepted by the scientific community describe the same reality in 36 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 50–51. 37 Barry Gholson and Peter Barker, "Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan: Applications in the History of Physics and Psychology," American Psychologist 40, no. 7 (1985): 755–69, https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.40.7.755. 38 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 179. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 15 two different ways. Quantum mechanics governs phenomena at small dimensions of elementary particle physics, at speeds much lower than the speed of light and high energies, and general relativity deals with the macro universe, at speeds close to the speed of light and small energies. Thus, a problem of underdetermination in physics appeared. The quantum gravity attempts to complete the scientific revolution in physics started in the 19th century, for the unification of all fundamental forces, by merging the two frameworks of quantum physics and general relativity. From the efforts of physicists in this attempt resulted a rich variety of approaches, techniques and theories, of which the most known are string theory and loop quantum gravity. But the evolution in this direction is very slow and littered with many uncertainties and disputes. The problem of underdetermination implies that more than one theory is compatible with empirical data. Underdetermination may be relative to the currently available data (transient, or scientific underdetermination), in which case theories may differ in unverified predictions, or underdetermination between theories or theoretical formulations regarding all possible data (a "permanent underdetermination"), when all their predictions are identical. A permanent underdetermination disappears (it does not have a real significance) in the case of the instrumentalist approach if the theories are individualized only in terms of their empirical content. But if we assume that the formulations of alternative theories describe different scenarios, the underdetermination must be considered real. Quine states that two logically incompatible theories can be both compatible with the data but, if there is a mapping between the theoretical formulations, they do not in fact describe different theories, they are different variants of the same theory ("reconstruction of predicates"). Matsubara states that the formulations can represent two true alternative theories despite the structural similarity, as there are relevant semantic differences that are lost in mapping of the logically or mathematically formalized theory. Research programs may at one time compete with single theories, single theories between them, or research programs between them. We can speak of a "research unit" as a singular theory or a research program. Bifurcated programs Barry Gholson and Peter Barker state that Lakatos' basic methodology is not an effective way to represent the underlying metaphysics identified by Kuhnians and Popperians, due to the Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 16 simultaneous existence of several Lakatos-type theories that exemplify the same set of fundamental commitments. According to them, the research program consists of a series of successive theories that form chains, but never groups or families of linked theories that can compete. It is a wrong statement, in my opinion. Lakatos has never denied such sequences. Moreover, such a group theory, called by these "clusters", can naturally develop within Lakatos' methodology. Later, Laudan developed this idea of a series of theoretical chains included in a single historical entity determined by the dominance of a certain set of metaphysical commitments. In some cases, contradictory theories can be developed based on the same basic commitments. Lakatos' methodology does not exclude these situations; even more, they can result in a very natural way, if we consider that such theories start from the same hard core (same negative heuristic) but using a different development strategy (positive heuristic). I call these theories "bifurcations", respectively bifurcated theories or even bifurcated programs within a long-term approach. Lakatos himself notes that a research program can be bifurcated at a given moment: "But one should not forget that two specific theories, while being mathematically (and observationally) equivalent, may still be embedded into different rival research programmes, and the power of the positive heuristic of these programmes may well be different. This point has been overlooked by proposers of such equivalence proofs (a good example is the equivalence proof between Schrodinger's and Heisenberg's approach to quantum physics)." Unifying programs Immediately after 1900, Planck's quantification questioned all classical physics. Until then, physics had developed through the application, extension, modification or reinterpretation of established physical theories, in a one-dimensional chain. But physics especially Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell-Lorentzian electrodynamics were no longer valid according to Planck's results. A new theory was needed, but that could no longer be obtained from the extension or modification of the existing physical theories, because they seemed to be fundamentally wrong. Thus, Einstein was forced to invent a new fundamental theory, trying to unify the current theories. This is how special relativity appeared, out of necessity. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 17 Subsequently, the unification of all forces, through a quantum approach of the general relativity, became the main concern of quantum gravity. There are precedents in this regard: from classical electromagnetic theory and classical mechanics, two new independent unifying theories have emerged, special relativity and quantum mechanics; from special relativity and quantum mechanics the quantum field theory resulted; and at present it is hoped to arrive at a new unifying theory, from general relativity (a generalization of special relativity) and quantum field theory. These unified theories combine the theories from which they formed into a new common framework. Within the Lakatos methodology, about these unifying theories it can be stated that they belong to a new research program with negative and positive heuristics different from those of the unified research programs, but the corresponding theory is reduced to the unified theories under certain conditions. I call such a program a "unifying program" ("unifier"), resulted within the concept of unification. To be accepted, a unifying program must have a greater heuristic (theoretical or experimental) power than its unified programs. Thus, the string theory attempts to unify the general theory of Einstein's relativity with quantum mechanics, in a way in which the explicit connection with both quantum theory and the reduced energy description of space-time in general relativity is maintained. At low energies, it naturally gives rise to general relativity, gauge theories, scalar fields and chiral fermions. String theory incorporates several ideas that do not yet have experimental evidence, but which would allow the theory to be considered a unifying candidate for physics beyond the standard model. Matsubara appreciates Lakatos' methodology in Hacking's interpretation, but he also notes the lack of a fusion of different research programs in Lakatos's methodology, giving as examples of unified theories Schrodinger's wave mechanics and Heisenberg's matrix mechanics. He also considers the possibility of a fusion of ideas from string theory and some of its competitors, such as loop quantum gravity. Due to the complexity and the wide variety of phenomena at the cosmological level, scientists build models based on individualized research programs, depending on the specific phenomenon (specific to black holes, for example), taking as the hard core of these programs the principles of general relativity or quantum mechanics. Subsequently, these research programs are trying to unify within some research programs such as black holes, or even larger ones, for Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 18 gravitational or space-time singularities. For each phenomenon there are several alternative research programs, finally gaining recognition only those that have a higher heuristic power, but often there are smaller groups of researchers who do not give up even the alternatives with a lower heuristic power. The unifying research programs can be developed simultaneously with the programs that will be unified (and in this case we can speak of the unified programs as "research subprograms"), or later, choosing from several programs the ones that best fit with the unifying program. This is a widely used way in recent years. When a concept evolves over a long time through independent research programs, without a unifying program to include them, we are not talking about a methodology of a certain research program, but a rational reconstruction of the science to which these independent programs compet. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 19 1. Newtonian gravity In certain research programs, such as the mechanistic theory of the universe according to which the universe is a huge clock (and a system of vortices) with the push as the sole cause of movement, the particular Cartesian metaphysics functioned as a powerful heuristic principle: it discouraged scientific theories, such as the "essentialist" version of Newton's action at a distance, which were incompatible with it (negative heuristics). And it encouraged the auxiliary hypotheses that could have saved it from apparent contradictions, such as the Keplerian ellipses (positive heuristics). The first edition of Newton's Principia contains only two additional comments on the methodology: the notification that the purpose of the paper is to explain "how to determine the true motions from their causes, effects, and apparent differences, and, conversely, how to determine from motions, whether true or apparent, their causes and effects"39; and, in the Scholium at the end of Book 1, Section 11, Newton asserts that his distinctive approach makes possible a safer argumentation in natural philosophy. In the second edition (1713) Newton introduces separate sections for the phenomena and rules involved in determining the universal gravity40, and at the end of the General Scholastic of the third edition, 1726, includes the most famous methodological statement: "I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena41 the reason for these properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made general by induction. The impenetrability, mobility, and the impetus of bodies, and the laws of motion and the law of gravity have been found by this method. And it is enough that gravity really exists and 39 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, I Ed.," para. XIV. 40 Isaac Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, II Ed., 1713, https://www.e-rara.ch/zut/338618. 41 In contemporary philosophy "deduction from phenomena" is known as "eliminatory induction" and "demonstrative induction". Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 20 acts according to the laws that we have set forth and is sufficient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies and of our sea." 42 adding later, "unless as conjectures or questions proposed to be examined by experiments." 43 Newton warns in the Principia that he uses mathematical theory in a new way, with the forces treated abstractly, independently of the mechanism, only mathematically. Clarke and Berkeley in the 18th century assert that these passages express strict causal agnosticism. Newton writes that, using terms such as "attraction," he does not intend to define a "species or mode of action or a physical cause or reason." 44 Referring to Newton's claim to "deduce" the law of universal gravity from the phenomena of orbital motion, Lakatos claimed that this statement is at least misleading and, at worst, a subterfuge. Only a hypothetical-deductive construct of its demonstration of universal gravity makes sense. According to Andrew Janiak, the anti-metaphysical reading of the mathematical treatment of Newton's force is a reasonable one. Anti-metaphysical interpretation can be supported by the famous methodological statement of the Principia, "hypotheses non fingo", "I feign no hypotheses." 45 As the mathematical treatment of force can be interpreted as expressing strict causal agnosticism, focusing exclusively on empirical descriptions of the movements in the solar system, "Newton's methodology can be interpreted as expressing a more general metaphysical agnosticism." 46 42 Isaac Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed.," Science 177, no. 4046 (1726): 943, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.177.4046.340. 43 Isaac Newton, An Account of the Book Entitled Commercium Epistolicum Collinii & Aliorum, de Analysi Promota, 1715, 312. 44 Andrew Janiak, Newton as Philosopher (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 16. 45 Lakatos states that the best rational reconstruction of Newton's famous phrase "hypotheses non fingo" is likely; "I reject the degenerating problemshifts that are designed to retain some theories that are syntactically metaphysical," cf. Imre Lakatos, "Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69, no. 1 (1968): 180. 46 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 17. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 21 For Newton, science, "experimental philosophy," involves explanatory sentences that can be "deduced from phenomena." What cannot be deduced in this way is merely a hypothesis. But Newton does not circumvent hypotheses, he only does not include them into science, considering them purely speculative. Their place is reserved in Opticks Queries47, and in explicit annotations in the Principia. The hypotheses are developed by Newton when he does not have independent empirical support for those assertions. In the General Scholium, he states: ""For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy" 48 From Newton's point of view, gravity is not mechanistic; but he also admits that he does not know the "reason" for the properties of gravity expressed in the law of universal gravity, namely that he does not have a physical explanation of this force, refusing to make assumptions on this subject. Unlike Leibnitz, he explicitly states that a certain causality in nature is non-mechanical, thus challenging the prevailing mechanistic philosophy at that time. In this regard, Stein and DiSalle assert that Newton was a radical empiricist in metaphysical debates: he not only rejects the mechanistic philosophy of Descartes, Leibniz, and Huygens, but transforms the metaphysical questions considered by them as purely a priori into empirical issues, whose answers depend on the development of physics. 49 Newton is willing to hold metaphysical positions, such as in the structure of space and time or causality, but he rejects Cartesian a priori approaches, putting physics ahead of metaphysics, which makes him, according to Stein and DiSalle, not an antimetaphysician, but an empirical metaphysician, with a principial empirical attitude towards metaphysical questions. In order to understand movement in a manner consistent with its laws, Newton postulates absolute space50, thus allowing it to conceive the movement as a change in absolute space. This 47 Isaac Newton, Opticks : Or, A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections and Colours of Light (London : Printed for William Innys at the West-End of St. Paul's, 1730), http://archive.org/details/opticksortreatis1730newt. 48 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed.," 943. 49 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher. 50 In Scholium, Newton explicitly states that absolute space is not perceptible (Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, I Ed.," 414.) being aware that true motion is difficult to detect if it is absolute motion. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 22 idea allows Newton to save the perceptible effects of acceleration of bodies as real movements in absolute space51. Newton's natural philosophy can only be understood if we consider his conception of God: "Newton invoked God in the action at a distance for a specific reason, to support gravity in the universe, warning against a vision of the universe as a mere machine. He thus tried to develop a concept about God that would provide a stable, organized and predictable model of the natural world, a God who projects on rational and universal principles, accessible to all people ... he appeals to God to explain the mechanisms he cannot explain otherwise, including the action at a distance." 52 Newton's theory of gravity was fundamentally rejected by his contemporaries for violating the norms of mechanistic philosophy. According to Andrew Janiak, Newton was forced to defend his mathematical treatment of force and movement on a fundamental metaphysical basis53. After the revolution in physics in the 17th century, from the neo-Aristotelian ("scholastic") philosophy to Cartesianism, Newton caused a new paradigm shift by replacing the mechanistic philosophy with the natural philosophy. This second schism occurred in the absence of a conceptual continuity. Although without a metaphysical system of his own, Newton defended himself by articulating a compelling relationship between mathematical and metaphysical physics in disputes about space and time, matter, laws of motion, the nature of forces, and the relationship of God with the world. Principia has triggered a broad discussion among Newton's contemporaries about the methodology to be adopted when studying the natural world. As Andrew Janiak states, for Newton force was the main concept that explained the movement and its causes in nature. He conceived forces as ephemeral actions, like quantities, through the connection between mass and acceleration, providing a means of measuring forces. In Book III of Principia, Newton identifies the centripetal force that maintains planetary orbits with the force of gravity, which causes the free fall of objects on earth. Hence the conclusion, in Book 51 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed.," 423. 52 Nicolae Sfetcu, Isaac Newton despre acțiunea la distanță în gravitație Cu sau fără Dumnezeu? (MultiMedia Publishing, 2018), http://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.24577.97122. 53 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 23 III, that all bodies are attracted to each other in proportion to their amount of matter (universal gravity). He acknowledges, however, that he does not know the cause of gravity: "I have not as yet been able to discover the reason for these properties of gravity from phenomena, and I do not feign hypotheses." 54 By the seventh sentence of Book III of Principles, Newton came to the following conclusion: "Gravity acts on all bodies universally and is proportional to the quantity of matter in each." 55 The methodology of Principia of discovering the forces present in nature was controversial, including for the action at a distance. In the second edition of 1713, he added other methodological observations, called by him "regulae philosophandi", or the rules of philosophy. The first two rules refer to causal reasoning, and the third rule, much debated by contemporaries, referred to an induction problem: we have perceptions and experiments for knowledge, but on what basis can we generalize? Newton gives a partial answer in proposition seven of the Third Book of Principle, in Rule 3: "Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted [i.e., increased and diminished] and that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally." 56 Newton links this third rule to his laws of motion: "That all bodies are movable and persevere in motion or in rest by means of certain forces (which we call forces of inertia) we infer from finding these properties in the bodies that we have seen. The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia [This is a potentially confusing way to refer to the specific mass, which we would call the inertial mass of a body. See the third definition in the Principia57.] of the whole arise from the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and force of inertia of each of the 54 Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957), 229. 55 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed.," 810. 56 Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, II Ed. 57 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed.," 404–5. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 24 parts; and thus we conclude that every one of the least parts of all bodies is extended, hard, impenetrable, movable, and endowed with a force of inertia. And this is the foundation of all natural philosophy." 58 Leibniz asserted that Newton's three-dimensional Euclidean space allows distinct states, but indistinguishable if the absolute positions of all material bodies are changed, while retaining their relative positions59. The same laws of motion are valid in all inertial frames, so it would be impossible, by applying Newton's laws, to determine what the inertial framework is. Leibniz concludes that we should use the principle of parsimony to reject such "metaphysical" entities. But Newtonian mechanics does not satisfy the principle of relativity for absolute acceleration and absolute rotation, only for inertial frames. In accelerated or rotated systems, Newtonian laws are no longer valid. It would result that absolute acceleration and rotation have physical significance, resulting in a dilemma, as discussed by Michael Friedman. Basically, the combined theory of Newtonian space and time and Maxwell's electrodynamics prove to be false60. Einstein resolved this paradox in 1905, keeping Maxwell's laws intact but changing the transformations that link inertial frames. Newton introduced the term "experimental philosophy" in 1712, in a passage at the General Scholium of Principia where he set out his methodology against hypotheses. His purpose was to defend his theory of gravity against critics, especially Leibniz's: "Experimental Philosophy reduces Phaenomena to general Rules & looks upon the Rules to be general when they hold generally in Phaenomena.... Hypothetical Philosophy consists in imaginary explications of things & imaginary arguments for or against such explications, or against the arguments of Experimental Philosophers founded upon Induction. The first sort of Philosophy is followed by me, the latter too much by Cartes, Leibnitz & some others." 61 58 Newton, 95–96. 59 Michael Friedman, Foundations of Space-Time Theories: Relativistic Physics and Philosophy of Science (Princeton University Press, 1983). 60 Friedman. 61 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, I Ed." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 25 As Alan E. Shapiro states, the term rather refers to empirical science. It was also added to the second edition of the Principia in 1713, where he stated that he demonstrated the existence of gravity even though he could not find its cause, listing the different properties of gravity. Newton also exposes his methodology in Query 31 of Opticks, where he is concerned with force and natural philosophy. Newton's experimental philosophy is considered to have two essential elements: the exclusion of hypotheses from natural philosophy; and the requirement that sentences in experimental philosophy be "duced from the phenomena and are made general by induction." Newton thus rejects the hypothesis without experimental support. Those with experimental support, but insufficient to help demonstrate scientific principles, are allowed but distinct from established principles, like the queries in Optics. This type of hypothesis can suggest new experiments and help explain the properties and principles already discovered. In the second English edition of Principia, 1717, Newton detailed the term "experimental philosophy" and introduced the induction method: "This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the Induction is more general. And if no Exception occur from Phaenomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur." 62 Thus, the existence of gravity "has been proved mathematical demonstrations grounded upon experiments phaenomena of nature: & Mr Leibnitz himself cannot deny they have been proved." Confirmation is, according to Newton, first by mathematical demonstration and secondly by experiment. He was convinced that a deductive mathematical approach leads to certainty and 62 Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, II Ed., 404. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 26 the experiment may provide some foundations needed for a science, but until the 18th century he did not assign to the experiment the leading place in his methodology. According to Laudan63, Newton considered that one of the central purposes of natural philosophy is to show the Creator's hand in the details of his creation, because "to discourse of [God] from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy." 64 The theories, according to Newton, can be certain or very probable. Between two rival theories, Newton would probably have chosen what would have promoted his cognitive goals, as in the case of mechanistic philosophy. But it must to take into account that some of Newton's cognitive purposes differ from those of today. Therefore, according to Laudan we can evaluate their rationality by determining whether their actions have promoted some goals, and their actions can be determined as rational only with reference to the corresponding weighted product of their cognitive utilities. According to Robert Disalle, Newton offers inductive arguments for a metaphysical conclusion, while Einstein uses epistemological analyzes to decompose metaphysical notions. But Newton's arguments have the same basic form and purpose as Einstein's. Newton's thought experiments on the bucket of water are, in essence, arguments for a way to connect physical processes with the structures of space and time. 65 Until at least the second half of the century, Locke and Newton's systems were perceived as being based on very similar principles and methods, composed of natural and moral philosophy. Locke and Newton share a similar conception of the scientific method, based on rational and regular experiments and observations and the use of generalization and deduction. Thus G. A. Rogers writes: "What Locke found in the Principia was the exemplification of a method to which he himself already subscribed. He already believed that a combination of observation, generalization or induction, and deduction was the only route to knowledge of nature and that the Principia exhibited just that method in its most fruitful 63 L. Laudan, Progress and Its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth (University of California Press, 1977). 64 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed." 65 Robert Disalle, "Spacetime Theory as Physical Geometry," Erkenntnis 42, no. 3 (1995): 317–337. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 27 manner... It confirmed for him all his own methodological conclusions... The Principia was for Locke the vindication of a general methodological approach to which he had subscribed for perhaps twenty years." 66 Hume also explicitly associates his work with the Newton's method, although there is a clear distinction between Hume's inductivism and Locke's conception of the methodology of natural science. 67 1.1 Heuristics of Newtonian gravity The classic example of a successful research program is Newton's gravitational theory, probably the most successful Lakatosian research program. Initially, Newton's gravitational theory faced a lot of "anomalies" ("counterexamples") and contradicted the observational theories that supported these anomalies. But supporters of the Newtonian gravity research program have turned every anomaly into corroborating cases. Moreover, they themselves pointed to counterexamples which they then explained through Newtonian theory68. According to Lakatos, "In Newton's programme the negative heuristic bids us to divert the modus tollens from Newton's three laws of dynamics and his law of gravitation. This 'core' is 'irref utable' by the methodological decision of its proponents: anomalies must lead to changes only in the 'protective' belt of auxiliary, 'observational ' hypotheses and initial conditions." 69 Newton established the positive heuristic of his research program through a strategy of successive approaches70. Newton's first three laws of motion regulated inductive reasoning, along with Newton's view of a fundamental taxonomy based on physical forces (interactions). It started 66 G. A. J. Rogers, "Locke's Essay and Newton's Principia," Journal of the History of Ideas 39, no. 2 (1978): 217–32, 229. 67 Graciela de Pierris, "Hume and Locke on Scientific Methodology: The Newtonian Legacy," Hume Studies 32, no. 2 (2006): 277–329. 68 Pierre-Simon Marquis De Laplace, Exposition du systéme du monde, 2nd ed. (Cambridge; 2009: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 69 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 48. 70 Lakatos, "Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 28 from an idealized solar system, with a punctual Sun and a single planet circling around the Sun. Then he considered that the orbit of the planet is an ellipse, deriving the proportionality between the gravitational force and the inverse of the square of the distance between the planet and the Sun. The inductive generalization of Newton considered an elementary motion with a static force included in the deduced law of gravity, and the idea that planetary movements can be generalized. These were his working hypotheses on the basis of which he proceeded to his inductive generalizations. They offer immediate protection of the hard core of the Newtonian research program (negative heuristics), by requiring that the evidence developed from the data be of high quality71. The deduction of the law of gravity fulfilled this requirement to a greater extent than its demonstrative reasoning, but the "deduction" was primarily based on the motion of only five planets in a short astronomical period. Newton acknowledges the risk of introducing such taxonomic working hypotheses into inductive generalization, in the most famous methodological passage in Opticks, in discussing the "analysis and synthesis" methods in the next paragraph of the final query, which was added in 1706. He has considered that the success obtained from unrestricted generalizations is the best protection against the risk introduced by the inevitable taxonomic hypotheses that enter into induction. 72 This model contradicted the law of action and reaction that Newton included in the hard core, so he developed a more complex model, in which the sun and the planet revolved around their center of common weight. It did not generate any anomaly, but it was difficult to deduce from it the real laws of motion for several bodies. Thus, Newton developed a new theory, for several planets, with interactions between each planet and the Sun but neglecting the interactions between planets. After the intermediate verification of this theory, Newton developed a more complex theory, considering that the Sun and the planets are not punctual, but spheres with dimensions other than zero, since in theory he had to take into account the density of bodies, and could not accept 71 I. Bernard Cohen and George E. Smith, The Cambridge Companion to Newton (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 72 Cohen and Smith. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 29 that a point body has infinite density. He also took into account the rotational motion of the bodies around their own axes. In the following model it took into account the non-spherical shape of the Earth and the variation of the gravity of the surface with the latitude, the orbit of the Moon, the tides, the precession of the equinoxes and the trajectories of comets. Through this positive heuristic he tried to protect himself against the risks that appear in the inductive leap, immediately pushing the theory to analyze all relevant phenomena, and using it as a research tool for the problems encountered73. At the same time, the deductions in the case of the Earth allowed him to generalize from the celestial gravity to the universal gravity, as well as the precession of the equinoxes indirectly, taking into account the forces (interactions) between the planets, calculating the resulting perturbations. The tide and the precession of the equinoxes allowed the generalization from simple centripetal forces to an interactive gravity, as did the study of the orbits of Jupiter and Saturn. And the study of comets has allowed the extension of the law of gravity to bodies possible from a very different matter. He published the results of his research program only when he considered that he had obtained as much as possible from observations and mathematics. The process of comparison with phenomena and arguments for the universality of gravity extends throughout Book 3. Newton's inductive generalization for universal gravity introduced an important falsifiable conjectural element, which was subsequently verified, providing the most convincing evidence in his favor. The basic idea was that any discrepancy between Newtonian theory and observation would prove to be physically significant and would tell us something more about the physical world. By this, the taxonomic working hypotheses that underlie Newton's inductive step toward universal gravity remain intact, as theory advances. Based on additional questionable assumptions, and suggestions regarding the movements of Jupiter and Saturn, Newton initiated his own sequence of successive approximations according to the Principia. Even after the third edition of the Principia appeared, almost forty years later, each of these Principia subjects was still being studied. Newton's argument for universal gravity was only completed a century after the publication of the first edition of the Principia. 73 Cohen and Smith. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 30 Newton foresaw the further developments of his models from the first fully idealized model. He understood that the intermediate models would contain anomalies, but he had to go through them in order to develop the mathematical apparatus by confronting the models and modifying the theory along the way so as to eliminate the anomalies. Newton asserted that Principia illustrated a new approach to empirical inquiry. But, besides the remark about the derivation of forces from the phenomena of movement and then of the movements of these forces in the Preface to the first edition, and the remark about comparing a generic mathematical theory of centripetal forces with phenomena to find out the conditions of action of the force, from the end Book 1, Section 11, the only notable remark about the methodology is the famous passage from the general Scholium added in the second edition as a final statement74. The unprecedented success of Newton's theory of gravity has stimulated interest in the methodology of Principia for use in other fields. Two aspects of the methodology are obvious to George Smith75: Newton has opposed his method to the "hidden" assumptions, and the requirement that questions be considered open as long as empirical considerations have not yet given them answers (a requirement in perfect agreement with tolerance methodology proposed by Lakatos in the research programs). The purpose of the method was to limit the theoretical claims to "inductive generalizations". Each successive model in Newton's program predicts a new fact, it is an increase of the empirical content: it constitutes a consistent progressive theoretical change. And each prediction is finally verified, though previously it could have been instantly "refuted". The central idea of the Newtonian inductive method is that universal laws inductively derive from the "manifest qualities" or "phenomena" observed, and only the observed phenomena can lead us to the revision of these laws. Newton explicitly opposes purely hypothetical explanations of mechanistic philosophy. Leibniz and Huygens accepted Newton's demonstration 74 George Smith, "Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2008 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2008), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/newton-principia/. 75 Smith. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 31 that the orbits of the satellites of the large astronomical bodies in the solar system obey the inversesquare law, but they rejected Newton's law of universal gravity because they were related to mechanistic philosophy. The rules III and IV of Newton were added to the second (1713) and third (1726) editions of the Principia in response to the objections of the mechanistic philosophers: Rule III: "Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted [i.e. qualities that cannot be increased and diminished] and that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally." 76 Rule IV: "In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions." 77 These rules state that the inductive universalization method must be applied without interference of hypotheses. Newton explicitly states that the mechanistic philosophy assumptions obstruct his method. He illustrates here the use of his method by first describing the inductive inference of universal law that all bodies are extended. Bernard Cohen thus describes Newton's positive heuristics, in Chapter 5 of The Cambridge Companion to Newton as the "Newtonian style" stages78: (1) the "one-body" problem, (2) the "twobody" problems, (3) the problems of three or more interacting bodies. Thus, Newton must approach the complexity of a real orbital motion in a succession of successive approximations, each approximation being an idealized movement, and with systematic deviations, providing evidence for the next stage of the sequence. In his idealized models, Newton imposed two restrictions on successive approximations79. In each case in which he deduces some characteristics from the celestial gravitational forces, he argued that the consequence of the "if-then" deduction still maintains closeness as long as the antecedent has closeness. And the mathematical results established in Book 1 allow him to identify 76 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed.," 795. 77 Newton, 796. 78 Cohen and Smith, The Cambridge Companion to Newton. 79 Domenico Meli, "The Relativization of Centrifugal Force," Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 81 (1990): 33. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 32 the specific conditions under which the phenomenon from which the deduction is made would have not only proximity, but also accuracy. It follows that Newton's "deductions" from phenomena involve trying to address the complexity of real-world movements in a sequence of increasingly complex progressive idealizations, with systematic deviations from idealizations, each model serving as the basis for the next more complex model. Systematic deviations are called "secondary phenomena" when they are not observable per se, but theoretically deduced80. This respects Newton's first rule for natural philosophy that no more causes than both true and enough causes should be admitted explaining a phenomenon. Newton's law of gravity provides an explanation of Kepler's rules and idealized orbital movements for each previously idealized model, so it has greater heuristic power than any previous model. By this law one can explain why these idealizations are valid at least in the proximity. From the perspective of Lakatos, in the 17th century three scientific systems were in competition: the research program of Aristotle, that of Descartes, and Newton's program appeared as a rival of Descartes's program. Both Descartes and Newton's programs were progressive compared to Aristotle's and could explain the movements of comets and tides. The Cartesians could explain why the moon always kept the same face to the ground and why all the planets rotate in the same direction, while the Newtonians could explain how the planets influence one another81. Explanatory differences resulted from different hard cores. The core of the Cartesian program specified contact action and explicitly forbade the concept of action at a distance. Newton's program also includes elements of the older Cartesian program, such as contact action. This is an example of a fruitful exchange between programs. But the empirical evidence ultimately led to the failure of the Cartesian program. Lorentz's program reached a dominant position at the beginning of the 20th century, then being overtaken by Einstein's, both theoretically and empirically, almost immediately after its 80 Cohen and Smith, The Cambridge Companion to Newton. 81 E. J. Aiton, Vortex Theory of Planetary Motions, First Edition edition (London; New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., 1972). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 33 initiation in 190582. Although Lorentz's program was also progressive, relativity's program overcame, being consistently more progressive and assimilating the Lorentz transformations. 83 In the success of Einstein's program, several research programs were involved: the Newtonian program, caused by a program supported by Lorentz84 that made electromagnetism accepted as more fundamental than mechanics; a second rival program supported by Ostwald and Mach through which an attempt was made to develop a purely phenomenological physics, with energy as a basic concept85; Einstein's program which involved the theories of relativity; and the program of quantum physics initiated by Bohr and developed by the theories of Heisenberg, Schrodinger and Dirac. In the first two decades of the 20th century, quantum physics overcame the phenomenological program and replaced Newtonian physics, but the mathematics and ontology of the new program were incompatible with the mathematics and ontology of Einstein's program. However, these programs coexist today. The rivalry between these programs stagnated in the 1940s and 1950s, reviving with the advent of radio astronomy, which allowed new empirical progress. Lakatos' methodology offers a powerful conceptual framework, which, as in Kuhn's case, derives from the analysis of historical episodes in physics. But unlike Kuhn, Lakatos presented a methodology that avoids the problems of incommensurability86 and irrationalism and demonstrates that empirical evidence is the ultimate arbiter of competing research programs. 87 1.2 Proliferation of post-Newtonian theories 82 Elie Zahar, "Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's? (II)," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24, no. 3 (1973): 211–75. 83 Gholson and Barker, "Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan." 84 Zahar, "Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's?" 85 Niles Holt, "Wilhelm Ostwald's 'The Bridge,'" British Journal for the History of Science 10, no. 2 (1977): 146–150. 86 Two theories are incommensurable if they are embedded in a strongly contrasting conceptual framework, whose languages do not overlap enough to allow scientists to directly compare theories or to cite empirical evidence favoring one theory over the other. 87 Gholson and Barker, "Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 34 Theoreticians have formulated a set of fundamental criteria that any theory of gravity should satisfy, two purely theoretical and two that are based on experimental evidence88. Thus, a theory must be: • complete (capable of analyzing from the "first principles" the result of any experiment of interest). • self-consistent (its prediction for the outcome of each experiment must be unique) • relativistic (at the limit when gravity is neglected compared to other physical interactions, non-gravitational laws of physics must be reduced to special relativity laws) • with the correct Newtonian limit (within the limits of weak gravitational fields and slow motions, they must reproduce Newton's laws) The main theories of gravity from 1686-1900, until the development by Lorentz of his own theory and then was elaborated the theories of relativity by Einstein, are • Newton's Law of Universal Gravity (1686): Newton's theory is considered to be exactly within the limits of low gravity fields and low velocities, and all other theories of gravity must reproduce Newton's theory within the appropriate limits. • Mechanistic explanations (1650-1900): Bifurcated theories having as hard core the mechanistic theory; they failed because most led to an unacceptably high value of aether dragging, which is unconfirmed, violates the law on energy conservation and is incompatible with modern thermodynamics89. o René Descartes (1644) and Christiaan Huygens (1690) used vortexes to explain the mechanistic gravity90. Newton opposed the theory arguing with the lack of deviations of the orbits due to the fluid-dynamic resistance, the sometimes-different direction of the natural satellites from the direction of the vortex, and of Huygens's circular explanations. • Electrostatic models (1870-1900): They tried to combine Newton's laws with those of electrodynamics (Weber, Carl Friedrich Gauss, Bernhard Riemann, James Clerk Maxwell), trying to explain the perihelion precession of Mercury. There were partial successes, in 1890 Lévy and in 1898 Paul Gerber, but the models were rejected because were based on assumptions that later proved to be wrong91. 88 Clifford M. Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition, Revised edition (Cambridge England ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 89 Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages, 60–61. 90 Christiaan Huygens, Discours de La Cause de La Pesanteur, 1885, 443–88. 91 J. Zenneck, "Gravitation," in Encyklopädie der Mathematischen Wissenschaften mit Einschluss ihrer Anwendungen: Fünfter Band in Drei Teilen Physik, ed. A. Sommerfeld (Wiesbaden: Vieweg+Teubner Verlag, 1903), 25–67, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-16016-8_2. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 35 o Robert Hooke (1671) and James Challis (1869) assumed that each body emits waves whose effect is the attraction between bodies. Maxwell argued that this theory requires constant production of waves, which must be accompanied by infinite energy consumption. Challis himself acknowledged that he did not reach a precise result due to the complexity of the processes92. o Including Isaac Newton (1675), and later Bernhard Riemann (1853) proposed a theory that aetheric flows move all bodies to one another93. As with Le Sage's theory, the theory violates the law of energy conservation. There are also problems related to the interaction of bodies with aether. o Nicolas Fatio de Duillier (1690) and Georges-Louis Le Sage (1748) proposed a corpuscular model, using some sort of screening or shading mechanism a bifurcation of Newton's law that respects the law of inverse squares. It was reinvented, among others, by Lord Kelvin (1872) and Hendrik Lorentz (1900), and criticized by James Clerk Maxwell (1875) and Henri Poincaré (1908) in particular for thermodynamic anomalies. Le Sage's theory was studied by Radzievskii and Kagalnikova (1960), Shneiderov (1961), Buonomano and Engels (1976), Adamut (1982), Jaakkola (1996), Tom Van Flandern (1999) and Edwards (2007). A variety of Le Sage models and related topics are discussed in Edwards, et al. 94 o Newton proposed a second theory based on aether (1717) developed later by Leonhard Euler (1760), in which the aether loses its density near mass, leading to a net force directed toward bodies95. James Clerk Maxwell pointed out that in this "hydrostatic" model "the state of stress... which we must suppose to exist in the invisible medium, is 3000 times greater than that which the strongest steel could support." o Later, a similar model was created by Hendrik Lorentz, who used electromagnetic radiation instead of corpuscles. o Lord Kelvin (1871) and Carl Anton Bjerknes (1871) considered that each body pulsates, which could be an explanation of gravity and electrical charges. This hypothesis was also studied by George Gabriel Stokes and Woldemar Voigt. But the theory forces the assumption that all pulsations in the universe are in phase, 92 James Challis, Notes on the Principles of Pure and Applied Calculation: And Applications of Mathematical Principles to Theories of the Physical Forces. (University of Michigan Library, 1869). 93 B. Riemann, Neue Mathematische Prinzipien Der Naturphilosophie (Leipzig: Dedekind, R.; Weber, W., 1876). 94 Matthew R. Edwards, ed., Pushing Gravity: New Perspectives on Le Sage's Theory of Gravitation, y First edition edition (Montreal: Apeiron, 2002). 95 Leonhard Euler, Briefe an eine deutsche Prinzessin, aus dem Französischen übersetzt (Junius, 1773), https://books.google.ro/books?id=FaMAAAAAMAAJ. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 36 which seems highly unlikely. And the aether should be incompressible. Maxwell argued that this process must be accompanied by new production and permanent destruction of aether. Clifford M. Will explains, in Theory and experiment in gravitational physics, the motivations of some of these theories, including the elaboration of general relativity and quantum theory96, which include bifurcations of Newton's initial theory, or do not meet the current criteria of a gravitational theory, with the observation that it is possible that, in the case of the modification of the present forms, some of these theories may subsequently meet these criteria: • Newtonian theory of gravity: it is not relativistic • Milne's kinematic relativity97: it was initially designed to solve certain cosmological problems. It is incomplete it does not predict gravitational redshift. • The various vector theories of Kustaanheimo98 99 contain a vector gravitational field in flat space-time. They are incomplete they cannot be coupled with the other laws of nongravitational physics (Maxwell's equations), unless we impose a flat space-time. They are inconsistent they give different results in the propagation of light for the corpuscular and undulatory aspects of light. • Poincare's theory (generalized by Whitrow and Morduch): the theory of action at a distance in flat space-time. It is incomplete or inconsistent in the same way as Kustaanheimo's theories100. • Whitrow-Morduch vector theory (1965): contains a vector gravitational field in flat spacetime. It is incomplete or inconsistent in the same way as Kustaanheimo's theories101. • Birkhoff's Theory (1943): contains a tensor gravitational field used to construct a metric. It violates the Newtonian limit by the specific conditions imposed102. 96 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition. 97 E. A. Milne, Kinematic Relativity (Facsimile Publisher, 2015), 566–78. 98 Paul Edwin Kustaanheimo and V. S. Nuotio, Relativistic Theories of Gravitation (Helsingin Yliopisto. Department of Applied Mathematics, 1967). 99 G. J. Whitrow and G. E. Morduch, "Relativistic Theories of Gravitation : A Comparative Analysis with Particular Reference to Astronomical Tests," Vistas in Astronomy 6 (1965): 1–67, https://doi.org/10.1016/00836656(65)90002-4. 100 Whitrow and Morduch, "Relativistic Theories of Gravitation." 101 Whitrow and Morduch. 102 George D. Birkhoff, "Matter, Electricity and Gravitation in Flat Space-Time," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 29, no. 8 (August 1, 1943): 231–39, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.29.8.231. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 37 • Yilmaz's Theory (1971, 1973): contains a tensor gravitational field used to construct a metric. It is mathematically inconsistent the functional dependence of the metrics on the tensor field is not well defined103. Other alternative historical theories developed over time have been refuted by experimental checks or replaced by better corroborated theories: • In 1690, Pierre Varignon assumed that all bodies are exposed to thrusts of aether particles from all directions, with a limitation to a certain distance from the Earth's surface, under which bodies would experience greater attraction to Earth104. • In 1748, Mikhail Lomonosov assumed that the effect of aether is proportional to the complete surface of the elemental components of which matter is composed105. • In 1821, John Herapath tried to apply the co-developed model of kinetic gas theory to gravity. He assumed that the aether is heated by bodies and density decreases occur that push the bodies in that direction106. Taylor showed that the low density due to thermal expansion is compensated by the increased velocity of the heated particles; therefore, no attractions appear. • Ritz gravity theory107, Weber-Gauss electrodynamics applied to gravity. Classical promotion of perihelions108. • Nordström's theory of gravity (1912, 1913), an early competitor of general relativity. • Kaluza Klein's Theory (1921) 109 • Whitehead's theory of gravity (1922), another early competitor to general relativity. 103 Hüseyin Yilmaz, "New Approach to Relativity and Gravitation," Annals of Physics 81, no. 1 (November 1, 1973): 81, https://doi.org/10.1016/0003-4916(73)90485-5. 104 Pierre (1654-1722) Auteur du texte Varignon, Nouvelles Conjectures Sur La Pesanteur , Par M. Varignon,..., 1690, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k74179x. 105 Mikhail Vasil'evich Lomonosov, Mikhail Vasil'evich Lomonosov on the Corpuscular Theory, First edition. edition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970), 224–233. 106 J Herapath, "On the Causes, Laws and Phenomena of Heat, Gases, Gravitation I, II, III, in Annals of Philosophy, or Magazine of Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, Natural History, Agriculture and the Arts 1 Pp. 273–293," Atticus Rare Books, 1821, 273–93, https://www.atticusrarebooks.com/pages/books/761/john-herapath/on-the-causeslaws-and-phenomena-of-heat-gases-gravitation-i-ii-iii-in-annals-of-philosophy-or. 107 Walther Ritz, "Recherches critiques sur l'électrodynamique générale," Annales de chimie et de physique, 1908, 267– 71. 108 Ritz, 267–271. 109 Theodor Kaluza, "Zum Unitätsproblem in Der Physik | BibSonomy," 1921, 966–972, https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/19218e3a965ffaefa3af2d4c14bb5ae52/zhaozhh02. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 38 Lorentz aether theory was developed from Hendrik Lorentz's "electron theory", between 1892 and 1895 considering it as a completely immobile aether110. It introduced an ad-hoc hypothesis to cancel the failure of negative first order aether deviation experiments in v/c by introducing an auxiliary variable called "local time". The negative result of the Michelson-Morley experiment resulted in the introduction of another ad-hoc hypothesis, length contraction, in 1892. But neither did the subsequent experiments confirm the theory, which became a degenerate theory according to Lakatos. Lorentz tried to revitalize it in 1899 and 1904 by introducing the Lorentz transformation. But neither the new theoretical models solved the problem of aether. Henri Poincaré corrected the errors in 1905 and incorporated the non-electromagnetic effects into the theory, calling it "New mechanics" and using for the first time the expression "the principle of relativity." 111 He also criticized Lorentz for introducing too many helpful assumptions into his theory. Later, Minkowski (1908) and Arnold Sommerfeld (1910) also tried to develop a Lorentz invariant gravity law112. Poincaré's theory resisted a period due to his greater heuristic power, but he was defeated by the special relativity of Albert Einstein, who also took over some of the ideas of this theory. Lorentz acknowledged in 1914 that his theory was incompatible with the principle of relativity and rejected it113. At present some physicists consider the Lorentz theory developed later by Poincaré as a special, "Lorentzian" or "neo-Lorenzian" interpretation of special 110 Hendrik A. Lorentz, "Considerations on Gravitation," in The Genesis of General Relativity, ed. Michel Janssen et al., Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007), 559–574, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4000-9_13. 111 Henri Poincaré, "Les Relations Entre La Physique Expérimentale et La Physique Mathématique, in Revue Générale Des Sciences Pures et Appliquées," issue, Gallica, 1900, 1163–1175, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k17075r. 112 Scott Walter, "Breaking in the 4-Vectors: The Four-Dimensional Movement in Gravitation, 1905–1910," in The Genesis of General Relativity, ed. Michel Janssen et al., Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007), 193–252, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4000-9_18. 113 Eduard Prugovecki, "Historical and Epistemological Perspectives on Developments in Relativity and Quantum Theory," ResearchGate, 1992, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300434048_Historical_and_Epistemological_Perspectives_on_Development s_in_Relativity_and_Quantum_Theory. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 39 relativity114. Since both use Lorentz transformations and the same mathematical formalism, it is not possible to distinguish between the two theories by experiment. The difference between them is that Lorentz assumes the existence of an undetectable aether. Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND) is a theory that proposes to modify Newton's law of universal gravity with the intention of taking into account the observed properties of galaxies. MOND is trying to eliminate the controversial theory of dark matter. It was developed in 1982 and published in 1983 by Israeli physicist Mordehai Milgrom115. Milgrom introduced the hypothesis that the gravitational force experienced by a star in the outer regions of a galaxy is proportional to the square of centripetal acceleration (as opposed to simple proportionality, from Newton's second law) or, alternatively, that the gravitational force in these cases vary inversely proportional to radius (as opposed to the inverse square of radius in Newton's law of gravity). In the MOND, the modification of Newton's laws takes place only for the movement of galaxies, at extremely small accelerations. MOND successfully predicted galactic phenomena unexplained by the theory of dark matter116, but fails to confirm the properties of galaxy clusters, nor to develop a cosmological model that competes with the current ΛCDM model117. Accurate measurement of the speed of gravitational waves in comparison to the speed of light in 2017 did not exclude MOND theories. A large variety of astrophysical phenomena are corroborated by the MOND, 118 119 such as: 114 Quentin Smith, Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity, ed. William Lane Craig, 1 edition (London: Routledge, 2007). 115 M. Milgrom, "A Modification of the Newtonian Dynamics as a Possible Alternative to the Hidden Mass Hypothesis," The Astrophysical Journal 270 (July 1983): 371–389, https://doi.org/10.1086/161130. 116 Stacy S. McGaugh, "A Tale of Two Paradigms: The Mutual Incommensurability of ΛCDM and MOND," Canadian Journal of Physics 93, no. 2 (April 21, 2014): 250–259, https://doi.org/10.1139/cjp-2014-0203. 117 Pavel Kroupa, The Vast Polar Structures around the Milky Way and Andromeda, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPVGDXNSBZM. 118 Benoit Famaey and Stacy McGaugh, "Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND): Observational Phenomenology and Relativistic Extensions," Living Reviews in Relativity 15, no. 1 (December 2012): 10, https://doi.org/10.12942/lrr-2012-10. 119 Mordehai Milgrom, "MOND Laws of Galactic Dynamics," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 437, no. 3 (January 21, 2014): 2531–41, https://doi.org/10.1093/mnras/stt2066. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 40 • Concrete relationship between the total baryonic mass of the galaxy and the asymptotic rotation speed according to the MOND prediction. • MOND predicts a much better correlation between characteristics in the distribution of the nonbarionic mass and the rotation curve than the dark matter hypothesis, observed in several spiral galaxies. • MOND predicts a specific relationship between the acceleration of stars at any distance from the center of a galaxy and the amount of dark matter in this radius that would be deduced in a Newtonian analysis, an observationally verified prediction. • Confirms the stability of disk galaxies for galaxy regions within the deep MOND regime. • For particularly massive galaxies, MOND predicts that the rotation curve should decrease by 1/r, according to Kepler's law, confirmed by observations of elliptical galaxies with large masses. From the initial MOND theory, several competing theories have been branched off that are based on the same hard core (negative heuristics) but with different development strategies (positive heuristics): • AQUAL was developed in 1984 by Milgrom and Jacob Bekenstein, generating MOND behavior by modifying the gravitational term in the classical Lagrangian120. • QUMOND introduces a distinction between the MOND acceleration field and the Newtonian acceleration field121. • TeVeS starts from the behavior of the MOND but considers a relativistic framework. TeVeS has been successful in gravitational lens observations and structure formation but fails to explain other cosmological aspects122. There are other alternative relativistic generalizations of the MOND, such as BIMOND and the generalized Einstein-Aeter theories123. The external field effect implies a fundamental break of MOND by the principle of strong equivalence (but not necessarily by the principle of weak equivalence), this being recognized as a crucial element of the MOND paradigm. 120 J. Bekenstein and M. Milgrom, "Does the Missing Mass Problem Signal the Breakdown of Newtonian Gravity?," The Astrophysical Journal 286 (November 1984): 7–14, https://doi.org/10.1086/162570. 121 Mordehai Milgrom, "Quasi-Linear Formulation of MOND," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 403, no. 2 (February 4, 2010): 886–95, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2966.2009.16184.x. 122 Jacob D. Bekenstein, "Relativistic Gravitation Theory for the MOND Paradigm," Physical Review D 71, no. 6 (March 14, 2005): 069901, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.71.069901. 123 Famaey and McGaugh, "Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND)." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 41 Supporters of MOND theory have proposed several observational and experimental tests to help establish the best-corrected theory124 between MOND models and dark matter, such as: the existence of abnormal accelerations on Earth that could be detected in a precision experiment125; testing in the solar system using the LISA Pathfinder mission by observing the tides predicted by the MOND and a Sun-Earth saddle point of Newtonian gravitational potential126; measuring the MOND corrections to the precession of the perihelion of the planets in the Solar System127; an astrophysical test to investigate the behavior of isolated galaxies, and non-Newtonian behavior in binary star systems; testing using the redshift dependence of radial acceleration128. The "Fifth Force" is a theory that changes Newton's law of universal gravity. The initial experiments gave contradictory results: one claimed the existence of the fifth force, while the other contradicted this theory. After numerous repetitions of the experiment, the discord was resolved, and the consensus was reached that the Fifth Force does not exist129. 1.3 Tests of post-Newtonian theories 124 John F. Wallin, David S. Dixon, and Gary L. Page, "Testing Gravity in the Outer Solar System: Results from Trans-Neptunian Objects," The Astrophysical Journal 666, no. 2 (September 10, 2007): 1296–1302, https://doi.org/10.1086/520528. 125 V. A. De Lorenci, M. Faundez-Abans, and J. P. Pereira, "Testing the Newton Second Law in the Regime of Small Accelerations," Astronomy & Astrophysics 503, no. 1 (August 2009): L1–4, https://doi.org/10.1051/00046361/200811520. 126 Christian Trenkel et al., "Testing MOND/TEVES with LISA Pathfinder," ArXiv:1001.1303 [Astro-Ph], January 8, 2010, http://arxiv.org/abs/1001.1303. 127 Luc Blanchet and Jerome Novak, "Testing MOND in the Solar System," ArXiv:1105.5815 [Astro-Ph, Physics:GrQc], May 29, 2011, http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.5815. 128 Sabine Hossenfelder and Tobias Mistele, "The Redshift-Dependence of Radial Acceleration: Modified Gravity versus Particle Dark Matter," International Journal of Modern Physics D 27, no. 14 (October 2018): 1847010, https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218271818470107. 129 Michele Cicoli, Francisco G. Pedro, and Gianmassimo Tasinato, "Natural Quintessence in String Theory," Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics 2012, no. 07 (July 23, 2012): 044–044, https://doi.org/10.1088/14757516/2012/07/044. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 42 1.3.1 Newton's proposed tests In the first edition of Principia, Newton considered that the experiments with the pendulum would allow him to decipher the different types of resistance force and their variation with speed. It recognizes the failure of these experiments, in the second and third editions, then appealing to the vertical fall of objects with the forces of resistance due to the inertia of the environment. His intention was to approach the other types using the differences between observations and this law130. But this approach was also wrong, since there is no distinct species of resistance force, but only a result of the interaction with the inertial and viscous environment. This interaction being very complex, Newton could not deduce a law for the force of resistance, it only determined empirically relations for bodies of different forms. 131 Newton argues in the law of gravity the strict proportionality of the "quantity of matter" with weight, but the pendulum experiments only indicate that the inertial mass is proportional to the weight. 132 The mass of an object is an intrinsic feature of it, while the weight is an extrinsic feature, depending on the gravitational fields generated by other objects. The experiments with the pendulum are described in detail in Book III, Proposition 6, where Newton states: "All bodies gravitate toward each of the planets, and at any given distance from the center of any one planet the weight of any body whatever toward that planet is proportional to the quantity of matter which the body contains," 133 and then describes his experiments. 134 Newton states, in contradiction with the Cartesian view, that each of the universal and essential properties of matter i.e. extension, mobility, hardness, impenetrability and mass is known "only through the senses". But from his assertion that the properties of matter are known "only through experiments," it follows that Newton does not accept a naive-empirical view, but rather a sophisticated double conception of the epistemology of matter, 135 denying the Cartesian view that we can determine the universal properties of matter only a priori or only by reason, and arguing that conceptually guided experiments in physical theory are necessary to determine the properties of matter: "It [mass] can always be known from a body's weight, for – by making very accurate 130 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed.," 749. 131 L. D. Landau and E. M. Lifshitz, Fluid Mechanics: Volume 6, 2 edition (Amsterdam u.a: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1987), 31–36, 168–79. 132 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed.," 701, 806–9. 133 Newton, 806. 134 Newton, 806–7. 135 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 43 experiments with pendulums – I have found it to be proportional to the weight." 136 Newton's concept of matter involved a fundamental rejection of mechanistic philosophy. The experiments with the pendulum are also described in Proposition 24 of Book 2, in corollaries five and seven. In the experiments with the pendulum, comparing the number of oscillations of the bob of the solid pendulum and the empty pendulum, Newtom tried to determine how an ether that acts not only on the surface of a body but also on its interior parts, affects these pendulums. This is how Newton came to believe that there is no ether and he favored the idea in the Preface of Principia of the universality of gravity. 137 To discuss the effects that distinguish absolute motion from relative motion, Newton uses the "water bucket" thinking experiment, described in a paragraph on the effects that distinguish absolute motion from relative motion. Newton states here that "the true and absolute circular motion of the water, which is here directly contrary to the relative, becomes known, and may be measured by this endeavor." 138 Hang a bucket of water with a rope and twist the bucket in one direction; then let the rope recover. The bucket is rotating now, and the water surface will initially be flat, but in relation to the bucket it rotates. By rubbing with the rotating bucket, the water gradually starts to rotate, eventually balancing the speed of the bucket, so that the movement towards the bucket gradually reaches zero. But, as the relative rotation of the water relative to the bucket decreases, "endeavor to recede from the axis of motion" increases accordingly. Newton observes that acceleration (for example, rotation) is empirically detectable by the presence of inertial effects, even in the absence of a change in object relations. Also, Newton argues, contrary to Descartes, that we cannot understand the true movement of water in the bucket as a change in the relationship between water and the surrounding body (in this case, the bucket). The relationship between the water and the bucket remains the same, even though the water has a real movement, as indicated by the presence of inertial effects. So, the true movement of a body cannot be understood in terms of changes in its relations with other objects. Absolute space allows us to capture what is the true movement, according to Newton. 139 For Newton, it seems that centrifugal force is the criterion and measure of absolute rotation. He defines absolute rotation as producing such an effect, criticizing Descartes' definition of "motion in the philosophical sense" as a movement of a body in relation to neighboring bodies. The experiment shows that the dynamic effect is independent of the relative motion between the water 136 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, III Ed.," 404. 137 Newton, 382–83. 138 Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, II Ed., 21. 139 Janiak, Newton as Philosopher. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 44 and the bucket. 140 Newton finally demonstrates that, because it depends on identifiable physical forces, its definition can be applied consistently even in the absence of observable reference bodies, because if two bodies connected by a cord are alone in an otherwise empty universe, the tension on cable still offers a criterion and a measure of the amount of true circular motion. 141 Another Newtonian thought experiment involved two bodies connected by a cord, 142 which rotate around their center of common weight, in the absence of other bodies that can influence their movements. "The endeavor of the balls to recede from the axis of motion could be known from the tension of the cord, and thus the quantity of circular motion could be computed." Respectively, the absolute rotation of a body is not only independent of its rotation with respect to the contiguous bodies but is independent of any relative rotation. According to Ernst Mach, two hundred years after Newton, if Newton neglected neighboring bodies, he referred all movements to "fixed stars." But if we can deduce from Newton's laws how bodies will behave in the absence of fixed stars, we cannot deduce whether, in these circumstances, they will remain valid anyway. For Einstein, under Mach's influence, Newton's argument illustrates the "epistemological defect" inherent in Newtonian physics. 143 In Propositions 26-29, Book 3, of Principia, 1687, 144 Newton developed a special treatment of the influence of the Sun's gravitational force on the motion of the Moon around the Earth. Tycho Brahe had discovered a bi-monthly variation in lunar velocity after an expected lunar eclipse disappeared. Remarkably, Newton did not consider the actual motion of the Moon, which is known to be approximated by Horrocks' model of an ellipse precession with the Earth in one focus. He considered an idealized model in which the Moon rotates in a circular orbit around the Earth in the absence of solar disturbance. He calculated the orbit change due to this disturbance and obtained results that were in accordance with Brahe's observation. This was one of the great triumphs of Newton's gravitational theory, further developed by Euler145, and G. Hill146. 140 Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, II Ed., 21. 141 Newton, 22. 142 Cohen and Smith, The Cambridge Companion to Newton, 44. 143 Cohen and Smith, The Cambridge Companion to Newton. 144 Newton, "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, I Ed." 145 Leonhard Euler, Sol et Luna I: Opera Mechanica Et Astronomica Vol 23, ed. Otto Fleckenstein, 1956 edition (Basileae: Birkhäuser, 1956), 286–289. 146 G. W. Hill, "The Collected Mathematical Works of G. W. Hill," Nature 75, no. 1936 (December 1906): 284– 335, https://doi.org/10.1038/075123a0. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 45 Newton's theory was most successful when it was used to predict Neptune's existence based on Uranus movements, which could not be explained by the actions of other planets. The calculations of John Couch Adams and Urbain Le Verrier predicted the general position of the planet, and the calculations of Le Verrier led Johann Gottfried Galle to the discovery of Neptune. 147 Newton's theory of gravity is better than Descartes's theory because Descartes's theory has been refuted (proved to be false) in explaining the motion of the planets. Newton's theory was in turn refuted by Mercury's abnormal perihelion. Even if the Keplerian ellipses rejected Cartesian vortex theory, only Newton's theory forced us to reject it; and even though Mercury's perihelion rejected Newtonian gravity, only Einstein's theory made us reject it. A refusal merely indicates the urgent need to revise the current theory, but it is not a sufficient reason to eliminate the theory. 1.3.2 Tests of post-Newtonian theories Usually, the "laboratory" of gravitational tests was the celestial bodies, the astrophysical systems. But such tests are disturbed by non-gravitational effects. The most used such "laboratory" was the solar system. Recently, scientists have focused on observing binary pulsars for the verification of gravitational theories, by observing the variations of the orbital period, thus providing indirect evidence for the emission of gravitational radiation. But the experimenter cannot "arrange the lab" according to his needs, nor trigger certain events when he needs them. But the current technological development is beginning to allow pure laboratory experiments. Thus, resonant detectors (harmonic oscillators) with very low dissipation levels were reached. In these laboratory tests, one type of experiments is the one for checking the post-Newtonian gravitational effects. For this purpose, a body of laboratory dimensions is moved (by rotation or vibration) to produce in its vicinity a "post-Newtonian gravitational field" (Newtonian-type gravitational fields produced by kinetic energy or pressure). The movement of the mass is modulated so that the desired post-Newtonian signal resonantly drives the oscillations of the detector and the experimenter monitors the changes resulting in the movement of the detector. 148 Through these experiments, only certain types of post-Newtonian effects can be examined. Some post-Newtonian effects (such as nonlinear gravitational effects) are completely negligible. But it is possible to check the gravitational influences of speed and pressure. In these post-Newtonian 147 John Couch Adams, "On the Perturbations of Uranus (1841-1846). | StJohns," 1846, 265, https://www.joh.cam.ac.uk/w16-manuscripts-john-couch-adams-perturbations-uranus-1841-1846. 148 Carlton Morris Caves, "Theoretical Investigations of Experimental Gravitation" (phd, California Institute of Technology, 1979), http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechTHESIS:03152016-161054898. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 46 experiments, the elimination of "Newtonian noise", the Newtonian gravitational field effects of the laboratory source that are much larger than the largest post-Newtonian effects, is attempted. 1.4 Newtonian gravity anomalies Newton's law of gravity is precise enough for practical purposes. The deviations are small when the dimensional quantities φ/c2 << 1 and (v/c)2 << 1, where φ is the gravitational potential, v is the speed of the studied objects and c is the speed of light149. Otherwise, general relativity must be used to describe the system. Newton's law of gravity is the gravitational limit of general relativity under the conditions specified above. Regarding Newton's law, there are still current theoretical concerns: there is still no consensus regarding the mediation of gravitational interaction (whether there is action at a distance). Also, Newton's theory involves an instantaneous propagation of gravitational interaction, otherwise an instability of planetary orbits would appear. Newton's theory could not explain the exact precession of the orbit of the planets, especially for Mercury, which was detected long after Newton died. 150 The difference of 43 arcseconds per century appears from the observations of the other planets and from the precession observed with advanced telescopes in the 19th century. The angular deflection of light rays due to gravity, calculated using Newton's theory, is half the deflection observed by astronomers. General relativity predicts values much closer to observational ones. In spiral galaxies, the orbit of the stars around their centers seems to not exactly respect Newton's law of universal gravity. Astrophysicists have introduced some ad-hoc hypotheses to agree this phenomenon with Newton's laws, assuming the existence of large amounts of dark matter. Newton himself was disturbed by the concept of "action at a distance" that his equations involved. In 1692, in his third letter to Bentley, he wrote: "That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent 149 Charles W. Misner, Kip S. Thorne, and John Archibald Wheeler, Gravitation (W. H. Freeman, 1973), 1049. 150 Max Born, Einstein's Theory of Relativity, Revised edition edition (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1962), 348. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 47 acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the consideration of my readers." 151 152 Newton failed to issue a phenomenological theory, to be confirmed experimentally, on how gravity acts, although he suggested two mechanical hypotheses in 1675 and 1717. In the General Scholium in the second edition of the Principia of 1713, he said: "I have not yet been able to discover the cause of these properties of gravity from phenomena and I feign no hypotheses...." 153 1.5 Saturation point in Newtonian gravity At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the contradictions between Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell's electrodynamics (between the Galilean invariance and the idea of the constant speed of light) became evident. An initially proposed solution was the ether concept. Einstein rejected this solution, interpreting Newton's and Maxwell's theories as so fundamental, each with its rival model, that the only solution was the development of a new unifying theory, with another hard core and a specific positive heuristic: special relativity. Nicholas Maxwell154 discusses six discrepancies in Newtonian mechanics highlighted by Einstein155 (which might be called anomalies in the Lakatos program), namely: 1. the arbitrariness of inertial reference frames and the concept of absolute space; 2. two distinct fundamental laws, (a) the law of motion (F = ma) and (b) the expression of gravitational force (F = Gm1m2/d2); 3. the arbitrariness of (b) being given (a), there being an infinite number of possibilities as good for (b); 4. the possibility that the law of force is determined by the structure of space and the failure to exploit this possibility; 5. the ad-hoc character of the equality of the inertial mass with the gravitational one; and 6. the unnatural nature of energy being divided into two forms, kinetic and potential. 151 I. Bernard Cohen, "Isaac Newton's Papers & Letters on Natural Philosophy and Related Documents," Philosophy of Science 27, no. 2 (1960): 209–211. 152 Sfetcu, Isaac Newton despre acțiunea la distanță în gravitație Cu sau fără Dumnezeu? 153 Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, II Ed. 154 Nicholas Maxwell, "The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science," Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33, no. 2 (December 1, 2002): 381–408, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022480009733. 155 Albert Einstein, "Autobiographische Skizze," in Helle Zeit - Dunkle Zeit: In memoriam Albert Einstein, ed. Carl Seelig (Wiesbaden: Vieweg+Teubner Verlag, 1956), 27–31, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84225-1_2. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 48 Einstein explains why attempts to solve anomalies by ad-hoc hypotheses fail, and concludes: "Accordingly, the revolution begun by the introduction of the field was by no means finished. Then it happened that, around the turn of the century ... a second fundamental crisis set in," the crisis generated by the beginnings of quantum theory, the first being particle/field dualism in classical physics. 156 In addition, Lorentz's classical program was progressive until 1905 the year that Einstein published his theory of special relativity. Nugayev claims that the research program supported by Einstein was much broader, including relativity, quantum theory and statistical mechanics, for the unification of mechanics and electrodynamics. 157 Most of the explanations for Einstein's victory over Lorentz's research refer to the MichelsonMorley experiment. 158 Elie Zahar159, based on Lakatos' methodology160, states that Lorentz's etheric theories and Einstein's special and general theories of relativity have been developed in different competing programs. According to Zahar, Lorentz's program was replaced by Einstein's relativity program only in 1915 by explaining the precession of Mercury's perihelion. But with the development of the GR, Einstein's program predicted observations that could not be derived from Lorentz's. 161 Nugayev, arguing against Zahar's extension of Lakatos' methodology, intends to explain the success of Einstein's research program on Lorentz's by a different extension of Lakatos's methodology, including different ones proposed by me. Thus, for two different theories trying to explain the same experimental data, the process of jointly applying the two theories to solve a problem will be called a "theories' cross", while these will be called "cross-theories". The set of statements that describes the relationships between crossings will be called "crossbred theory"162. Nugayev also addresses the idea of a theory that I have called "unifying" when the theories go 156 Einstein, 27–31. 157 R. M. Nugayev, "The History of Quantum Mechanics as a Decisive Argument Favoring Einstein Over Lorentz," Philosophy of Science 52, no. 1 (1985): 44–63. 158 Gerald Holton, "Einstein, Michelson, and the 'Crucial' Experiment," Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 60 (1969): 132–97. 159 Zahar, "Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's?" 160 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. 161 Nugayev, "The History of Quantum Mechanics as a Decisive Argument Favoring Einstein Over Lorentz." 162 Nugayev. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 49 through "cross-contradictions". Nugayev calls the new theory "global". According to him, there would be two logical ways of elaborating the global theory: "reductionist" and "synthetic". Nugayev states that Lakatos' hard nuclei are obtained by convention. I do not agree with him here. The hard core is established by the initiator of the research program which also establishes the strategy of program development according to the negative heuristic. The hard core is what it wants to remain unwavering, being absolutely convinced that it is right. When they would change the hard core, they would practically abandon that research program and start another program. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 50 2. General relativity Early philosophical interpretations of the general theory of relativity are very diverse, each trying to identify Einstein as a follower of that philosophy. Mach's supporters highlighted Einstein's attempt to implement a "relativization of inertia" in general relativity (GR), and his operationalist approach to simultaneity. Kantians and neo-Kantians have shown the importance of synthetic "intellectual forms" in GR, especially the principle of general covariance. Logical empiricists have emphasized the methodology of theory, the conventions to express the empirical content. 163 Bertrand Russell noted that "There has been a tendency, not uncommon in the case of a new scientific theory, for every philosopher to interpret the work of Einstein in accordance with his own metaphysical system, and to suggest that the outcome is a great accession of strength to the views which the philosopher in question previously held. This cannot be true in all cases; and it may be hoped that it is true in none. It would be disappointing if so fundamental a change as Einstein has introduced involved no philosophical novelty." 164 Most of Einstein's early work reveals that he is a supporter of Ludwig Boltzmann, rather than Ernst Mach, in the debate on atomism165. However, in 1912, Einstein's name was displayed among those who joined Mach in a call to form a "Society for Positivist Philosophy." At the end of his life, Einstein wrote about the "profound influence" exerted on him by Mach's School of Mechanics, and about the very high influence from youth of "Mach's epistemological position." 166 The occasional epistemological and methodological statements seem to indicate agreement with the essential parts of Mach's positivist doctrine167. Mach's idea that the mass and inertial motion of the body results from the influence of all other surrounding masses was probably the strongest motivation for developing a relativistic theory of gravity. 168 163 Thomas A. Ryckman, "Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2018 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/genrel-early/. 164 Bertrand Russell, Relativity: Philosophical Consequences, in Encyclopaedia Britannica: Thirteenth Edition Volume 31 (ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA PRESS, 1926), 331. 165 Thomas Ryckman, Einstein, 1 edition (London ; New York: Routledge, 2011), chap. 3. 166 Einstein, "Autobiographische Skizze," 21. 167 Albert Einstein, Über die spezielle und die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie, 23. Aufl. 2001. Nachdruck (Berlin: Springer, 2002). 168 Ryckman, "Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 51 A passage from Einstein's first full exposition showed that his general covariance requirement for the equations of the gravitational field (meaning that they remain unchanged under arbitrary, but continuously adequate change of spacetime coordinates), "takes away from space and time the last remnant of physical objectivity". Josef Petzoldt, a Machian philosopher, noted that Einstein is best characterized as a relativist positivist169. Contemporary philosophy has shown that Einstein's remarks were merely elliptical references to an "hole argument," according to which if a theory is in general covariant, the empty points of the spacetime manifestation cannot have an inherent primitive identity, and therefore no independent reality170. Thus, for a general covariant theory, no physical reality accumulates in the "empty space" in the absence of the physical fields, ideas that it is not a support for positivist phenomenalism. The relativization of all inertial effects ("Mach's principle"), together with the principle of general relativity interpreted by Einstein as the principle of general covariance, and with the principle of equivalence, were considered by Einstein the three pillar principles on which his theory was based. The retrospective portraits of Einstein's methodology in the genesis of general relativity focus on the idea of a strategy that takes into account mathematical aesthetics171. The positivists and the operationalists have argued with Einstein's analysis of simultaneity as a fundamental methodological element of the theory of relativity. The Kantian philosophers did not pay much attention to the theory of relativity. Cassirer sees the general theory of relativity as a confirmation of the fundamental principles of transcendental idealism172. Natorp173 appreciated the principle of relativity as being consistent with Kantianism by distinguishing between ideal, purely mathematical transcendental concepts of space and time and their relative physical measurements. From this relativization, says Natorp, it follows that " events are ordered, not in relation to an absolute time, but only as lawfully determined phenomena in mutual temporal relation to one another, a version of Leibnizian relationism." 174 Also, the 169 Joseph Petzoldt, Giora Hon, and Ernst Mach, Der Verhältnis der Machschen Gedankenwelt zur Relativitätstheorie, an appendix to Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung: Historisch-kritisch dargestellt (Xenomoi Verlag, 1921), 516. 170 John D. Norton, "General Covariance and the Foundations of General Relativity: Eight Decades of Dispute," Reports of Progress in Physics 56 (1993): 791–858. 171 Thomas Ryckman, "A Believing Rationalist," The Cambridge Companion to Einstein, May 2014, 377–420, https://doi.org/10.1017/CCO9781139024525.014. 172 Ernst Cassirer, W. C. Swabey, and M. C. Swabey, Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity (Courier Corporation, 2003), 172–73. 173 Paul Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften (Sändig Reprint, H. R. Wohlwend, 1910), 399– 404. 174 Ryckman, "Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 52 constancy of the speed of light, considered an empirical presupposition, "reminded that absolute determinations of these measures, unattainable in empirical natural science, would require a correspondingly absolute bound." 175 Natorp considered the invariant requirement of the laws of nature regarding Lorentz transformations as "perhaps the most important result of Minkowski's investigation." 176 A number of neo-Kantian positions, including Marburg's and Bollert's177, have argued that relativity theory has clarified the Kantian position in transcendental aesthetics by showing that not space and time, but spatiality (determinism in the positional order) and temporality (in the order of succession). ) are a priori conditions of physical knowledge. This revision of the conditions of objectivity is essential for critical idealism. The most influential neo-Kantian interpretation of general relativity was Ernst Cassirer's Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie178, in which the theory is considered to be a crucial test for Erkenntniskritik (the epistemology of the physical sciences of Marburg's transcendental idealism). Recognizing the requirement of general covariance, Cassirer stated that the general theory of relativity, with the coordinates of space and time, represents only "labels of events ("coincidences"), independent variables of the mathematical (field) functions characterizing physical state magnitudes." 179 The general covariance would be the most recent refinement of the methodological principle of the "unit of determination" which determines the physical knowledge by moving from concepts of substance to functional and relational concepts. Cassirer concluded that the general theory of relativity presents "the most determinate application and carrying through within empirical science of the standpoint of critical idealism." 180 E. Sellien181 stated that Kant's views on space and time refer only to intuitive space, and thus were impervious to the space and time measurable of Einstein's empirical theory. The logical empiricism of the philosophy of science has emerged largely as a result of Einstein's two theories of relativity, favoring conventionalism à la Poincaré over neo-Kantianism and Machian positivism. The philosophy of logical empiricism of science itself is considered to have 175 Ryckman. 176 Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, 403. 177 Karl Bollert, Einstein's Relativitätstheorie und ihre Stellung im System der Gesamterfahrung (T. Steinkopf, 1921). 178 Ernst Cassirer, Zur Einstein'schen relativitätstheorie: Erkenntnistheoretische betrachtungen (B. Cassirer, 1921), 1–125. 179 Ryckman, "Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity." 180 Cassirer, Swabey, and Swabey, Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity, 412. 181 Ewald Sellien, Die erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung der Relativitätstheorie (Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, 1919). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 53 been formed from the lessons learned from the theory of relativity. Some of the most characteristic doctrines of this philosophy (interpreting a priori elements in physical theories as conventions, dealing with the necessary role of conventions in developing theoretical concepts from observation, insisting on observational language in defining theoretical terms) were used by Einstein in modeling those two theories of relativity. 182 Reichenbach developed the thesis of "the relativity of geometry", that an arbitrary geometry for spacetime can be developed if the laws of physics are modified accordingly by the introduction of "universal forces". But Reichenbach's first work on relativity183 was written from a neo-Kantian perspective. According to Friedman184 and Ryckman185, Reichenbach modified the Kantian conception of synthetic a priori principles, rejecting the meaning of "valid for all time", while retaining the "constitutive of the object (of knowledge)", resulting in a specific "relativized a priori" theory. Thus, a transformation appears in the method of epistemological research of science whereby the method of analyzing science is proposed as "the only way that affords us an understanding of the contribution of our reason to knowledge." 186 The methodology of rationalization implies the clear distinction between the subjective role of the principles and the contribution of the objective reality. Relativity theory is a shining example of this method because it showed that the spacetime metric describes an "objective property" of the world, once the subjective freedom of coordinate transformation (the coordinating principle of general covariance) is recognized. 187 188 Einstein, in a January 1921 lecture entitled "Geometry and Experience", argued that the question of the nature of spacetime geometry is an empirical problem only with respect to certain stipulations. Reichenbach's conventional conception reached maturity in 1922. Reichenbach argued that problems regarding the empirical determination of the spacetime metric must take into account the fact that both geometry and physics support the observational test, this being the case in the Einstein's general relativity(Reichenbach's method has been called the "logical analysis of science.") Thus, the empirical determination of the spacetime metric by measurement requires the choice of "metric indicators" by establishing a coordinating definition. Einstein, together with 182 Ryckman, "Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity." 183 Hans Reichenbach, Relativitätstheorie Und Erkenntnis Apriori (J. Springer, 1920). 184 Michael Friedman, "Geometry, Convention, and the Relativized A Priori: Reichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap," Reconsidering Logical Positivism, July 1999, 21–34, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173193.006. 185 Thomas Ryckman, The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 1915-1925, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 186 Reichenbach, Relativitätstheorie Und Erkenntnis Apriori, 74. 187 Reichenbach, 90. 188 Ryckman, "Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 54 Schlick and Reichenbach, developed a new form of empiricism, suitable for arguing general relativity against neo-Kantian criticism. 189 190 Einstein implemented a relational or relativistic conception of the movement, in accordance with Leibniz's relationalist attitude to space and time and in contrast to Newton's absolutist attitude. By this, constraints are placed on the ontology of the spacetime theories, limiting the field in which the quantifiers of the theories are located to the set of physical events, that is, in the set of spacetime points that are actually occupied by objects or material processes191. Reichenbachian relations, on the other hand, impose constraints on the ideology of spacetime theories, limiting the vocabulary to a certain set of preferred predicates, such as predicates defined in terms of "causal" relations. Conventionalism, like relationalism, is skeptical of the structures postulated by spacetime theories. It raises the problem of geometric (metric) properties and relations defined in this field. Friedman asserts that conventionalism is closely linked to ideological relationalism. Basic conventionalism argues that certain incompatible description systems at first glance, such as Euclidean and nonEuclidean geometries, are in fact "equivalent descriptions" of the same facts, both of which may be true in relation to the various "coordinative definitions" chosen arbitrarily. This represents an epistemological problem in choosing between competing theories, resulting in a problem of theoretical underdetermination. Thus, Friedman asserts that relativity theory seems to be based on a conception of "equivalent descriptions" derived directly from the conventionalist strategy192. The development of relativity theory is based on a methodology from the perspective of the theoretical unification process. A decade after the emergence of the general theory of relativity, there was talk of a reduction of physics to geometry193, leading to distinct philosophical problems, of methodology but also of epistemology and metaphysics, along with technical issues. This implicit reduction of physics to 189 Moritz Schlick, "Kritizistische Oder Empiristische Deutung Der Neuen Physik?," Société Française de Philosophie, Bulletin 26, no. n/a (1921): 96. 190 Hans Reichenbach, Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, 1 Plate (De Gruyter, 1928). 191 Friedman, Foundations of Space-Time Theories. 192 Friedman. 193 Oliver Lodge, "The Geometrisation of Physics, and Its Supposed Basis on the Michelson-Morley Experiment," News, Nature, 1921, 795–802, https://doi.org/10.1038/106795a0. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 55 geometry was obtained crucial in the epistemological framework of what Hilbert called the "axiomatic method." 194 After completing general relativity, Einstein attempted to develop a theory that unified gravity and electromagnetism, by generalizing Riemannian geometry or adding additional dimensions, but excluding the reduction of physics to geometry195. Until 1925 he invented the first geometric "unified field theories"196. None of these efforts were successful. In his research program for geometric unification, Einstein's research methodology underwent a dramatic change197, relying more and more on "mathematical aesthetics, of "logical simplicity", and the inevitability of certain mathematical structures under various constraints, adopted essentially for philosophical reasons." 198 The mathematician Hermann Weyl, in 1918, attempted to reconstruct Einstein's theory on the basis of epistemology of "pure infinitesimal geometry." 199 In December 1921, the Berlin Academy published Theodore Kaluza's new proposal on the unification of gravity and electromagnetism based on a five-dimensional Riemannian geometry. All attempts to geometry the physics in the unified program accepted the ability of mathematics to understand the fundamental structure of the outer world. Thus, the program of the geometrically unified field seems thus to be framed in a form of scientific realism called "structural realism", with a Platonic hue. A form of "structural realism" assumes that no matter the intrinsic character or 194 K. A. Brading and T. A. Ryckman, "Hilbert's 'Foundations of Physics': Gravitation and Electromagnetism within the Axiomatic Method," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 102–153, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2007.08.002. 195 Marco Giovanelli, "The Forgotten Tradition: How the Logical Empiricists Missed the Philosophical Significance of the Work of Riemann, Christoffel and Ricci," Erkenntnis 78, no. 6 (December 1, 2013): 1219–1257, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9407-2. 196 Tilman Sauer, "Einstein's Unified Field Theory Program," The Cambridge Companion to Einstein, May 2014, 281–305, https://doi.org/10.1017/CCO9781139024525.011. 197 Ryckman, Einstein, chaps. 9, 10. 198 Ryckman, "Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity." 199 Hermann Weyl, Axel Hildebrand, and Dieter Schmalstieg, Raum. Zeit. Materie: Vorlesungen über allgemeine Relativitätstheorie, 7. (Berlin Heidelberg New York London Paris Tokyo: Springer, 1988), 115–16. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 56 nature of the physical world, only its structure can be known. This version was supported by Russell, who included the general theory of relativity in this framework. 200 In its contemporary form, structural realism has both an epistemic and an "ontic" form, in which the structural features of the physical world are ontologically fundamental201. Thomas A. Ryckman asserts that geometric unification theories fit this kind of realism. For Weyl and Eddington, "geometrical unification was an attempt to cast the harmony of the Einstein theory of gravitation in a new epistemological and so, explanatory, light, by displaying the field laws of gravitation and electromagnetism within the common frame of a geometrically represented observer-independent reality." 202 Regarding the geometry of physics, there has been a permanent controversy over the conventions in science203, and whether the choice of geometry is empirical, conventional or a priori. Duhem204 states that hypotheses cannot be tested in isolation, but only as part of the theory as a whole (theoretical holism and underdetermination of choice of theory by empirical evidence). In a 1918 address to Max Planck, Einstein stated about underdetermination: "The supreme task of the physicist is ... the search for the most general elementary laws from which the image of the world must be obtained by pure deduction. No logical path leads to these elementary laws; it is only intuition that is based on an empathetic understanding of experience. In this state of methodological uncertainty, it can be believed that many, in themselves, equivalent systems of theoretical principles are possible; and this opinion is, in principle, certainly correct. But the development of physics has shown that, out of all the theoretical imaginable constructions, only one, at any given moment, proved superior unconditionally to all the others. None of those who have delved into this subject will deny that, in practice, the world of perceptions unequivocally determines the theoretical system, even if no logical path leads from perceptions to the basic principles of theory." 205 Einstein considered that the physical real implies exclusively what can be constructed on the basis of the spacetime coincidences, the spacetime points being considered as intersections of the world 200 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter, First Paperback Edition edition (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 2007), 395. 201 Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem, Jules Vuillemin, and Louis de Broglie, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. Philip P. Wiener, 9932nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 202 Ryckman, "Early Philosophical Interpretations of General Relativity." 203 Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., Albert Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist: The Library of Living Philosophers Volume VII, 3rd edition (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1998). 204 Duhem, Vuillemin, and Broglie, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. 205 Albert (Author) Einstein, "Motive des Forschens.," 1918, 31, http://alberteinstein.info/vufind1/Record/EAR000079148. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 57 lines (the "point-coincidence argument")206. Coincidences thus have a privileged ontic role because they are invariable and therefore uniquely determined207. The force in the GR is also "geometrized"208. The spacetime metric in GR is reducible to the behavior of material entities (clocks, light beams, geodesics, etc.) 209. It turns out that the measurement depends on the measuring instruments chosen as standards, and the metric relationships involve the chosen standards. Paul Feyerabend, considers Einstein as a methodological "opportunist or cynic", respectively a methodological anarchist210. Arthur Fine states that Einstein adopts a vision close to the natural ontological attitude211. van Frassen considered Einstein a constructive empiricist212. Nicholas Maxwell asserts that aim-oriented empiricism, as a new method of discovery, is Einstein's mature vision of science213 to overcome a severe scientific crisis: the disappearance of classical physics as a result of Planck's quantum theory of 1900. Aim-oriented empiricism claims that science makes permanent assumptions about the nature of the universe, independent of empirical considerations. Popper214, as well as Kuhn215 and Lakatos216, defend versions of standard empiricism in Einstein's case. Vincent Lam and Michael Esfeld support the concept of ontic structural realism (OSR), in which "spacetime is a physical structure in the sense of a network of physical relations among physical 206 Don A. Howard, "Einstein's Philosophy of Science," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/einstein-philscience/. 207 Nicolae Sfetcu, Singularitățile ca limite ontologice ale relativității generale (MultiMedia Publishing, 2018), http://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.17470.18242. 208 Adolf Grünbaum, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time: Second, Enlarged Edition (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012). 209 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1975). 210 Michael Esfeld and Vincent Lam, "Moderate Structural Realism About Space-Time," Synthese 160, no. 1 (2008): 18, 56–57, 213n. 211 Arthur Fine, The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 9. 212 Fine, 108. 213 Nicholas Maxwell, Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment (London: UCL Press, 2017). 214 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 2nd edition (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002). 215 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 216 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 58 relata (objects) that do not possess an intrinsic identity independently of the relations in which they stand," 217 which can take into account the fundamental GR characteristics of diffeomorphism invariance218 and background independence219. The localization within the OSR is dynamic and background independent, being invariant diffeomorphic, thus well coding the GR characteristic of background independence. According to Don A. Howard, "Einstein's own philosophy of science is an original synthesis of elements drawn from sources as diverse as neo-Kantianism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism, its distinctive feature being its novel blending of realism with a holist, underdeterminationist form of conventionalism." 220 There are a few central ideas to Einstein's philosophy: • Underdetermination of the theoretical option through evidence. • Simplicity and choice of theory. • Univocity in the theoretical representation of nature. • Realism and separability. • Distinction between the theories of the principles and the constructive theories. For Einstein, simplicity is the main criterion in the theoretical choice when the experiments and observations do not give sufficiently clear indications221. Univocity in the theoretical representation of nature should not be confused with a denial of the underdetermination thesis. The principle of univocality played a central role in Einstein's formulation of general relativity, including in the elaboration of the "hole argument" which some physicists mistakenly considered. 222 Many philosophers and scientists consider that Einstein's most important contribution to the philosophy of science was the distinction he made between principle theories and constructive theories. According to Einstein, a constructive theory offers a constructive model for phenomena of interest. A principle theory consists of a set of well-substantiated individual empirical generalizations. Einstein states that the final understanding requires a constructive theory, but 217 Vincent Lam and Michael Esfeld, "The Structural Metaphysics of Quantum Theory and General Relativity," Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43, no. 2 (2012): 243–258. 218 The diffeomorphism is a smooth and bijective mapping between differentiated manifolds whose inversion is also smooth. 219 Esfeld and Lam, "Moderate Structural Realism About Space-Time." 220 Howard, "Einstein's Philosophy of Science." 221 John Norton, How Einstein Found His Field Equations: 1912-1915, 1984, 21, 23. 222 P. M. Harman and Peter Michael Harman, The Natural Philosophy of James Clerk Maxwell (Cambridge University Press, 2001). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 59 progress in theory can be "impeded by premature attempts at developing constructive theories in the absence of sufficient constraints by means of which to narrow the range of possible of constructive." The role of principle theories is to provide constraints, and progress is made on the basis of such principles. Einstein states that this was his methodology in discovering the theory of relativity as the main theory, the other two principles being the principle of relativity and the principle of light. It is worth noting the similarity between the idea of the "principle theories" as Einstein's constraints, and the "hard core" of Lakatos (negative heuristics) that would have been the sum of Einstein's "principle theories". The distinction between principle theories and constructive theories has played an explicit role in Einstein's thinking. Harman noted that early versions of this distinction have been used since the 19th century, by James Clerk Maxwell. 223 Einstein's equations are difficult to solve exactly, but there are currently several exact solutions, such as the Schwarzschild solution, the Reissner-Nordström solution and the Kerr metric, each corresponding to a certain type of black hole in an otherwise empty universe224, and the FriedmannLemaître-Robertson-Walker and de Sitter universes, each describing an expanding cosmos225. Other exact solutions include the Gödel universe (with the possibility of spacetime travel), the Taub-NUT solution (a homogeneous but anisotropic universe) and the anti-de Sitter space (with the Maldacena conjecture) 226. Due to the difficulty of these equations, solutions are currently being sought by numerical integration on a computer or by examining small perturbations of exact solutions. From the approximate solutions found by the disturbance theories is also part of the postNewtonian extension, developed by Einstein, with a distribution of matter that moves slowly compared to the speed of light. A particularization of this extension is the parameterized postNewtonian formalism, which allows quantitative comparisons between the predictions of general relativity and alternative theories. By imposing the general covariance, all the spacetime checks assume a determination of the spacetime coincidences227. Schlick states that the passage from Einstein's 1916 paper dealing with 223 Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, The Mathematical Theory of Black Holes (Clarendon Press, 1998). 224 Jayant Vishnu Narlikar, Introduction to Cosmology (Jones and Bartlett, 1983). 225 Albert Einstein, The Principle of Relativity (S.l.: BN Publishing, 2008), 78. 226 Stephen W. Hawking et al., The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time, New Ed edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 227 A. Einstein, "The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity," in The Principle of Relativity. Dover Books on Physics. June 1, 1952. 240 Pages. 0486600815, p. 109-164, 1952, 117, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1952prel.book..109E. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 60 this aspect represents the birth of the modern observation/theory distinction, and the beginning of empirical and truthful interpretations of later positivism228. Einstein hoped that general relativity would extend the relativity of motion from the Galilean equivalence to the equivalence of all states of motion, including rotation, based on the assumption that general covariance or equivalence of coordinate descriptions guarantees the desired equivalence. But by itself, general covariance is not such an argument, unable to solve the original problem of Einstein's relationship between movement. This problem is, in essence, one of geometric structure229. According to Disalle, Einstein made an epistemological confusion by accepting the idea that relative movements can be known independently of any spatial theory, in order to allow relative movements to have an epistemologically privileged position. Disalle concludes that classical relationalism, considered to be an epistemological critique of spacetime theory, is itself a spatial theory. Riemann (1867) and Helmholtz (1870) stated that all geometric measurements depend on the physical assumptions underlying the measurement method, because empirical geometry must postulate not only a geometrical structure, but also a representation of an idealized physical process230. For Riemann, the connection between geometry and physics will have to be based on physical objects and more complicated processes. Such a connection implies a physical principle, an idea taken up by Einstein for the curvature of spacetime. 231 Poincare stated that any measurement can agree with any geometry, if we eliminate the discrepancies by the hypothesis of a distorting force that affects the measuring instruments232. Reichenbach and Schlick systematized this concept by the notion of "coordinative definition", directing empiricism toward conventionalism, with a geometry with definitions that correlate 228 Moritz Schlick, Space and Time in Contemporary Physics: An Introduction to the Theory of Relativity and Gravitation (Mineola, N.Y: Dover Publications, 2005). 229 Disalle, "Spacetime Theory as Physical Geometry." 230 Bernhard Riemann and Hermann Weyl, Über die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1919), 133–52, https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783662423165. 231 Albert Einstein, Geometrie und Erfahrung: Erweiterte Fassung des Festvortrages Gehalten an der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin am 27. Januar 1921 (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1921), 123–30, https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783642499036. 232 Henri Poincare, The Foundations of Science; Science and Hypothesis, the Value of Science, Science and Method (Place of publication not identified: TheClassics.us, 2013), 81–84. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 61 fundamental concepts with an empirical given object233 234. Thus, Reichenbach stated that: "the philosophical significance of the theory of relativity consists in the fact that it has demonstrated the necessity for metrical coordinative definitions in several places where empirical relations had previously been assumed." 235 An example of this is simultaneity. Newtonian physics considered the simultaneity of events as an empirical fact, while Einstein imposed simultaneity as a physical principle. Since the speed of light was considered invariant, it turned out that simultaneity is relative. Disalle states that Einstein's definition of simultaneity is circular, since it already implies a principle of time measurement. Einstein denied, saying that the definition does not imply anything about light, the invariance of the speed of light being not a hypothesis, but "a stipulation that I can make according to my own free discretion, in order to achieve a definition of simultaneity." 236 Disalle concludes that the problem of the nature of spacetime is not whether a theoretical entity provides a causal explanation for appearances, but whether physical measurement processes are in accordance with geometrical laws. In conclusion, Reichenbach denies the role of geometry in explaining the root cause of spatial relations. 237 But Einstein links spacetime not only with a certain procedure, but with a system of natural laws, the laws of electrodynamics, which he considers to be fundamental invariants. Thus the coordinative definition of the states of motion is a more subtle process than Reichenbach has proposed, implying not choosing a resting frame but establishing the laws of motion. In practice, the laws of motion have thus become, through coordinative definitions, postulates of the spacetime geometry. 238 According to Lakatos, Einstein's theory is no better than Newton's because of the refutation of Newton's theory: there are also "anomalies" of Einstein's theory. But this represents a breakthrough compared to Newton's theory, because he explained everything that successfully explained Newton's theory, and also explained the anomalies of that theory. In addition, he successfully predicted events about which Newton's theory said nothing. 233 Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, 1st edition (New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1957). 234 Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre: Abteilung I / Band 1, ed. Hans Jürgen Wendel and Fynn Ole Engler, Abteilung I: Veröffentlichte Schriften (Wien: Springer-Verlag, 2009), https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783211327685. 235 Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and Time, 15. 236 Einstein, Über die spezielle und die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie, 15. 237 Disalle, "Spacetime Theory as Physical Geometry." 238 Disalle. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 62 2.1 Heuristics of the general relativity The essential principle of coordination in GR is the principle of equivalence, including a negative heuristic. The argument "is not that all reference frames are equivalent, but that the classical coordination of uniform motion in a straight line with the paths of force-free particles cannot be carried out unambiguously or consistently." 239 The principle of equivalence states that the decomposition of the gravitational motion into a uniform motion and gravitational acceleration cannot be unique, since free fall is not distinguishable locally from uniform motion. However, such a decomposition implies a violation of the general covariance, because it represents an arbitrary choice of a coordinate system240. For any coordinate system, if we identify its lines with the geodesic lines, we can construct the gravitational field so that the difference between these geodesics and the actual motions can be differentiated. 241 Einstein's special theory of relativity (SR) is built on two fundamental postulates. the postulate of light (the speed of light, in the "rest frame", is independent of the speed of the source), and the principle of relativity. The latter was explicitly adopted by Einstein as a means of restricting the form of laws, whatever their detailed structure. Thus, we have the difference between a "constructive" theory and a "principle" theory. The general theory of relativity was developed using as a nucleus a principle of symmetry: the principle of general covariance242. Initially, Einstein saw the principle of general covariance as an extension of the principle of relativity in classical mechanics, and in SR. For Einstein, the principle of general covariance was a crucial postulate in the development of GR. The freedom of the GR diffeomorphism (the invariance of the form of the laws under transformations of the coordinates depending on the arbitrary functions of space and time) is a "local" spacetime symmetry, as opposed to the "global" spacetime symmetries of the SR (which depend instead on the constant parameters ). 239 Disalle. 240 Einstein, "The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity," 114. 241 Einstein, 142–43. 242 Katherine Brading, Elena Castellani, and Nicholas Teh, "Symmetry and Symmetry Breaking," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/symmetry-breaking/. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 63 In recent years, there have been numerous debates in physics and philosophy regarding certain types of symmetries that act in the space of theories. Such symmetries are interpreted as achieving an "equivalence" between two theories that are said to be related to a "dual symmetry" (in the case of a "symmetry" in the strict sense of an automorphism, these are called "selfdualities"). Katherine Brading243 exemplifies with the dualities between quantum field theories (such as generalized magnetic/electrical duality), between string theories (such as T and S dualities) and between physical descriptions that are, such as a quantum field theory and a string theory, as in the case of gauge/gravity dualities244. Other examples are the position-momentum duality, the wave-particle duality, or the Kramers-Wannier duality of the two-dimensional Ising model in statistical physics. Dualities are transformations between theories, while symmetry is a mapping between solutions of the same theory. A symmetry can be exact (unconditional validity), approximate (valid under certain conditions) or broken (depending on the object considered and its context). The symmetries functioned normatively, like constraints, in Einstein's general covariance in establishing the equations of general relativity. Elie Zahar said that Einstein's development of relativity was due to his vague metaphysical beliefs, corresponding to some of his own "heuristic prescriptions" that became a specific and powerful tool. Zahar states that Kuhn's scientific revolution does not apply to Einstein's case. According to him, two "heuristic devices" led to the discovery of the theory of relativity: the internal requirement of coherence, and the claim that, "since God is no deceiver, there can be no accidents in Nature." Natural symmetries are fundamental at the ontological level, and the heuristic rule takes precedence over a theory that does not explain symmetries as deeper manifestations. 245 According to Newton, gravity is not a primary quality like inertia or impenetrability. Therefore, inertia and gravity are independent properties. But Newton states that the inertial mass is equal to the gravitational mass, without explaining the reason for this identity (there is a symmetry that contradicts the independence of the two properties). In Michelson's experience, by applying the ether as a universal medium, it is undetectable, which is a paradox. Einstein became 243 Katherine Brading and Harvey R. Brown, "Symmetries and Noether's Theorems," in Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections, ed. Katherine A. Brading and Elena Castellani (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 89–109. 244 Brading, Castellani, and Teh, "Symmetry and Symmetry Breaking." 245 Zahar, "Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's?" Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 64 aware of this paradox. Einstein eliminates the asymmetry between gravity and inertia by proposing that all gravitational fields be inertial. He also had other objections to classical physics: Lorentz's electromagnetic theory faced a dualism between discrete charged particles governed by Newton's laws and a continuous field that respected Maxwell's equations; relativity applies to Lorentz mechanics, but not to electrodynamics; the idea of absolute space (there is a privileged inertial framework), although its elimination does not influence classical mechanics. Einstein appreciated, on the principle of relativity, its universality and its unifying role for mechanics and electrodynamics, this being the first principle used to develop its general theory of relativity. The second principle is that of light but, epistemologically, Einstein's second starting point in developing the general theory of relativity was not the principle of light, but the idea that Maxwell's equations are covariant and express a law of nature. The principle of light results from this idea, as does the principle of relativity, according to Zahar. 246 Basically, Einstein had the choice of developing general relativity based on Maxwell's equations or Newton's laws. But in the dualism between particles and fields, all attempts at mechanical explanation of field behavior failed. According to Zahar, no "crucial" experiment could have been conceived between Lorentz theory and Einstein's in 1905. But Minkowski and Planck abandon the classical program for special relativity, contrary to Kuhn's methodology. Moreover, Einstein was at that time a quasi-stranger, while Lorentz was a recognized authority. And Lorentz's theory was very clear from that of Einstein, which involved a major overhaul of the notions of space and time. Also, there were no anomalies that Einstein's theory would have solved better than Lorentz. In addition, Lorentz himself was finally convinced of the new perspective247. Whittaker248 regards Lorentz and Poincaré as the true authors of special relativity, Einstein's credit being that of developing general relativity. Thus, Lorentz's etheric program was not defeated by the program of relativity but was practically developed in it. Zahar contradicts it, based on the fact that the two programs have very different heuristics. 249 246 Zahar. 247 Zahar. 248 Edmund Taylor Whittaker, A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity (Harper, 1960). 249 Zahar, "Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's?" Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 65 In the case of the Copernican revolution, the Platonic program for modeling the phenomenon through circular and spherical movements was initially successful, with each planet on a real physical crystalline sphere in axial rotation. It was later discovered that the distance between the earth and the planets varies, so that additional assumptions were made through eccentricities, epicycles and screens, to explain the new observations. When one tried to determine the motion of the celestial bodies towards the earth due to the uneven movements, there appeared differences between phenomena and mathematical methods that allowed only circular motions with the earth in the center of the universe. Copernicus, although he considered the Sun fixed, did not resolve this difference, still using epicycles. Kepler was the one who abolished the epicycles and found the laws of the elliptical motion of the planets with the Sun in a focus. Lorentz used the Galilean transformations, eliminating the epicycles but giving the etheric frame a privileged status. Just as Copernicus was aware of the idealization of his planetary model, Lorentz later understood that the effective coordinates, not the Galilean ones, are the quantities measured in the moving frame. Einstein gave up the Galilean transformations and identified the actual coordinates measured as the only real ones. Einstein's heuristics are based on a general requirement of Lorentz covariance for all physical laws, requiring the renunciation of Galilean transformations. Zahar claims that Lorentz and Einstein used different heuristics in their research programs250. The etheric program was practically replaced by a program with greater heuristic power, which is why Planck abandoned Lorentz's theory in favor of Einstein just before Einstein's program became progressively empirical. The two theories are similar in terms of the "hard core" (negative heuristics) and can be considered as bifurcated programs. The difference between the positive heuristics was what led to the choice of scientists of Einstein's program at the beginning of the last century. Lorentz's positive heuristic consisted in providing the ether with properties that would explain many physical phenomena, including the electromagnetic field and Newtonian mechanics. This approach allowed a rapid development of Lorentz's program, but by the end of the 19th century heuristics had reached a saturation point. A number of degenerate programmes have emerged as mechanical models to resolve ether anomalies. To explain certain electromagnetic 250 Zahar. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 66 phenomena, Lorentz introduced the postulate of the ether at rest, but subsequent calculations contradicted this hypothesis. The differences between Lorentz and Einstein's views were metaphysical: Lorentz believed that the universe respects intelligible laws (there is a propagating environment, an absolute "now", etc.), while for Einstein the universe is governed by coherent mathematical principles. (covariant laws, etc.) Zahar states that all major scientific revolutions were accompanied by an increase in mathematical coherence accompanied by a (temporary) loss of intelligibility (Newtonian astronomy is more coherent than Ptolemaic, but remote action was not accepted before Newton, then accepted at the end of the 18th century and again rejected after Maxwell). In Lorentz's research programme, the behavior of the electromagnetic field had come to dictate the properties of the ether, even improbable (for example, resting ether and acting by zero net forces). Basically, Lorentz's heuristic strategy has reversed: instead to deduce a theory from the ether considered fundamental, he reaches the ether based on the field. Einstein's heuristics were based on the requirement that all physical laws be Lorentz-covariant (to take the same form regardless of the frame of reference), and classical law to emerge from the new law as a limit case. In order to obtain a relativistic theory of gravity, Einstein maintained the principle of equivalence, decided to treat all coordinate systems equally and to impose a condition of general covariance on all laws. The empirical success of general relativity through the correct prediction of the behavior of Mercury's perihelion has proved crucial for the further development of the programme. Since 1905, the program of relativity has proved to be heuristically superior compared to the classical one. But special relativity has failed to outperform the Lorentz program. Bucherer's experiment251 confirmed both hypotheses, and Kaufmann's experiment252 denied both. Before the emergence of general relativity, the scientific community spoke of Lorentz-Einstein's theory, considering them as equivalent from an observer's point of view. General relativity has succeeded empirically replacing the Lorentz program by successfully explaining the "abnormal precession" 251 A. H. Bucherer, "Die Experimentelle Bestätigung Des Relativitätsprinzips," Annalen Der Physik 333 (1909): 513–36, https://doi.org/10.1002/andp.19093330305. 252 W. Kaufmann, "Über Die Konstitution Des Elektrons," Annalen Der Physik 324 (1906): 949, https://doi.org/10.1002/andp.19063240303. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 67 of Mercury's perihelion. This prediction was an empirical progress. In addition, general relativity has been found to be more falsifiable. Nicholas Maxwell proposes also a method for the unification of two "mutually contradictory principles." 253 The method proposed by him for establishing the unified theory is as follows: from the two theories, the common elements that do not contradict are chosen, the contradictory elements are removed, and on this basis the new theory is developed. He does not sufficiently exemplify, in my opinion, what would be those common elements in the case of classical mechanics and classical electrodynamics, considered by all scientists as two contradictory theories from which the special theory of relativity was born. Also, Nicholas Maxwell imposes the existence of a "crucial assumption", whose falsifiability allows the acceptance of the theory as a result of a method of discovery based on empirical purpose. In today's physics, there are countless examples of unifying theories (such as the M theory proposing the union of all fundamental forces, including gravity) that have not set out to become falsifiable by "crucial assumptions". General relativity is the result of Einstein's unification of Newton's theory of universal gravity (with the instantaneous action at a distance of the gravity) and the special theory of relativity (with the limitation of any speed to the constant value of the speed of light, c). These two principles contradict each other. So, according to Maxwell, it should be removed from the future unifying theory. 2.2 Proliferation of post-Einsteinian gravitational theories Right after the elaboration and success of general relativity (GR), alternative theories for gravity began to appear, which can fall into four broad categories: 254 • Bifurcated theories (with the Lakatosian255 hard core identical or very similar to that of general relativity) or directly related to general relativity but not bifurcated, such as Cartan, Brans-Dicke and Rosen bimetric theories. • Unifying theories that try to unify quantum mechanics with general relativity (theories of quantum gravity), such as loop quantum gravity. 253 Maxwell, Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment. 254 Timothy Clifton et al., "Modified Gravity and Cosmology," Physics Reports 513, no. 1–3 (March 2012): 1–189, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physrep.2012.01.001. 255 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 68 • Unifying theories that try to unify gravity with other forces, such as Kaluza-Klein. • Unifying theories that try to unify several theories simultaneously, such as the M theory. In developing these theories, many different strategies (positive heuristics) have been tried, by adding new hypotheses to GR, using a spacetime for which the universe is static, hypotheses that eliminate gravitational singularities, etc. In this competition, so far has won the Einstein's GR theory, proving by far a greater heuristic power than his rivals. Some of these theories have been abandoned, others are still being developed by various communities of researchers, trying to eliminate the anomalies found in GR, or to expand GR by bifurcation or as unifying theories. After 1980, when the scientific community agreed that GR is confirmed, generally, only theories that include GR as a particular case have survived. Particular attention began to be paid to theories of quantum gravity, in particular string theory. Most of the newer non-quantum gravity theories try to solve various cosmological anomalies, such as cosmic inflation, dark matter, dark energy, and so on. The proliferation of GR anomalies lately, including in the Pioneer case, has led to a revival of alternatives to this theory. Most of the theories in the first category listed above include a Lagrangian density, an "action" (which guarantees the existence of conservation laws, and whose gravitational component is deduced from the Lagrangian density by integration) 256, and a metric. Metric theories can be classified into (from the simplest to the most complex): • Theories using scalar fields (including conformally flat theories and stratified theories with conformally flat space slices) • Quasilinear theories (including linear fixed gauge) • Tensor theories • Scalar-tensor theories • Vector-tensor theories • Bimetric theories • Other metric theories More important non-metric theories include • Belinfante-Swihart • Einstein-Cartan theory • Kustaanheimo • Teleparallelism 256 Franz Mandl and Graham Shaw, Lagrangian Field Theory, in Quantum Field Theory (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 25–38. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 69 • Gravity based on gauge theory Some of these theories are based on Mach's principle (the frame of reference comes from the distribution of matter in the universe257, considered to be an intermediary between Newton (absolute space and time) and Einstein (there is no absolute frame of reference). Experimental evidence shows that the Mach's principle is wrong, but the related theories were not entirely excluded. In order to verify and classify all these theories, specific tests have been developed, based on selfconsistency (among the non-metric theories includes the elimination of theories that allow tachyons, ghost poles and higher order poles, and those that have problems with the behavior at infinite), and on completeness (to allow the analysis of the result of each experiment of interest). For example, any theory that cannot predict from the first principles the motion of the planets or the behavior of atomic clocks is considered incomplete. Three tests are considered "classics" for the ability of gravity theories to manage relativistic effects: • gravitational redshift • gravitational lenses (around the Sun) • abnormal advance of the perihelion of the planets. To these tests was added, in 1964, the fourth test, called the Shapiro delay. Each theory should confirm these tests. The Einstein equivalence principle (EEP), which is also tested for relativistic theories of gravity, has three components: • uniqueness of the free fall (weak equivalence principle): the inertial mass is equal to the gravitational mass; • Lorentz invariance: in the absence of gravitational effects, the speed of light is constant; • local position invariance: the result of any local non-gravitational experiment is independent of where and when it is performed. Schiff's conjecture states that any complete, self-consistent theory of gravity that checks the principle of weak equivalence necessarily also checks the principle of Einstein's equivalence (if the theory has a complete conservation of energy). 257 Alfred North Whitehead, The Principle Of Relativity With Applications To Physical Science (Whitefish, Mont.: Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2008). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 70 Metric theories satisfy the EEP. Only some non-metric theories satisfy the EEP. The main general non-quantum post-relativity theories are Brans-Dicke theory, Fifth force, and Geometrodynamics. Brans-Dicke theory is a scalar-tensor theory, in which gravitational interaction is mediated by a scalar field, and by the tensor field of general relativity258. The theory is considered to be in general agreement with the observations. The source of the gravitational field is, as in RG, the stress-energy tensor or the matter tensor. In Brans-Dicke theory, in addition to metrics (a rank two tensor field), there is a scalar field that changes the actual gravitational constant depending on the location (this is a key feature of the theory, being part of the Lakatosian hard core). The Brans-Dick theory, compared to GR, admits several solutions. It predicts the deflection of light and the precession of the perihelion of the planets, and general relativity can be derived from the Brans-Dicke theory as a particular case, but Faraoni argues that this is not valid in all situations allowed by the theory259, and some physicists claim that it does not meet the powerful principle of equivalence. The fifth force is a theory that involves, in addition to gravitational, electromagnetic, strong nuclear and weak nuclear forces, a fifth force to explain various anomalous observations that do not match existing theories. One hypothesis of this theory is that dark matter could be related to an unknown fundamental force. Others speculate that a form of dark energy called quintessence might be a fifth force260. Such a new, weak, fundamental force is difficult to test. In the late 1980s, some researchers261 reported that they discovered this force while re-analyzing Loránd Eötvös results from the turn of the century, but other experiments failed to replicate this result. One of the tests that can be undertaken to prove the theory is supposed to be based on the strong principle of equivalence (the fifth force would manifest through an effect on the orbits of the solar system, called the Nordtvedt effect) with Lunar Laser Ranging and very long baseline interferometry. Other tests may consider additional dimensions; the mantle of the earth as a giant particle detector, 258 C. Brans and R. H. Dicke, "Mach's Principle and a Relativistic Theory of Gravitation," Physical Review 124, no. 3 (November 1, 1961): 925–935, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.124.925. 259 Valerio Faraoni, "Illusions of General Relativity in Brans-Dicke Gravity," Physical Review D 59, no. 8 (March 22, 1999): 084021, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.59.084021. 260 Cicoli, Pedro, and Tasinato, "Natural Quintessence in String Theory," 44. 261 E. Fischbach et al., "Reanalysis of the Eotvos Experiment," Physical Review Letters 56 (January 1, 1986): 3–6, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.56.3. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 71 focusing on geoelectrons262; pulsation rate of cepheid variable stars in 25 galaxies263; and so on. Various additional hypotheses have been proposed in recent years to strengthen the theory, but no results have been conclusive so far. Geometrodynamics is an attempt to describe spacetime and associated phenomena in terms of geometry. This is a unifying theory, trying to unify the fundamental forces and reformulate the general relativity. It's a theory initiated by Einstein but still active. In a way, the term geometrodynamics is synonymous with general relativity, in which case it is more precisely referred to as Einstein's geometrodynamics to denote the initial formulation of the value of general relativity. John Wheeler promoted this theory in the 1960s, trying to reduce physics to geometry in a fundamental way, with a dynamic geometry with a variable curve over time. Basically, Wheeler tried to integrate three concepts: mass without mass, charge without charge, field without field. 264 2.3 Post-Newtonian parameterized formalism (PPN) In the field of experimental gravity, one of the important applications is formalism. For the evaluation of gravity models, several sets of tests have been proposed. Post-Newtonian formalism considers approximations of Einstein's gravity equations by the lowest order deviations from Newton's law for weak fields. Higher terms can be added to increase accuracy. At the limit, postNewtonian expansion is reduced to Newton's law of gravity. The post-Newtonian parametric formalism (PPN) details the parameters that differentiate the theories of gravity, in the weak gravitational field and speeds much lower than the speed of light. PPN can be applied to all gravity metric theories in which all bodies satisfy the Einstein equivalence principle (EEP). The speed of light remains constant in the PPN formalism and it is assumed that the metric tensor is always symmetrical. PPN is used to compare and classify alternative metrics of gravity. With the help of this formalism, many theories previously considered viable have been eliminated. 262 Jacob Aron, "Earth's Mantle Helps Hunt for Fifth Force of Nature," New Scientist, 2013, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23202-earths-mantle-helps-hunt-for-fifth-force-of-nature/. 263 Bhuvnesh Jain, Vinu Vikram, and Jeremy Sakstein, "Astrophysical Tests of Modified Gravity: Constraints from Distance Indicators in the Nearby Universe," The Astrophysical Journal 779, no. 1 (November 25, 2013): 39, https://doi.org/10.1088/0004-637X/779/1/39. 264 John A. Wheeler, "On the Nature of Quantum Geometrodynamics," Annals of Physics 2, no. 6 (December 1, 1957): 604–14, https://doi.org/10.1016/0003-4916(57)90050-7. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 72 In beta-delta notation, the behavior of the weak gravitational field in general relativity is completely characterized by ten post-Newtonian parameters. In the notation of Will's265, Misner et al. 266, they have the following values: • γ: gij space curvature produced by unit rest mass • β: nonlinearity in superposition law for gravity g00 • β1: gravity produced by unit kinetic energy ρ0v2/2 • β2: gravity produced by unit gravitational potential energy ρ0/U • β3: gravity produced by unit internal energy ρ0Π • β4: gravity produced by unit pressure p • ζ: difference between radial and transverse kinetic energy on gravity • η: difference between radial and transverse stresses on gravity • Δ1: dragging of inertial frames g0j produced by unit momentum ρ0v • Δ2: difference between radial and transverse momentum on dragging of inertial frames Here, gμν is the symmetrical 4x4 metric tensor with indices μ and ν taking values between 0 and 3. An index 0 will indicate the time direction and the indices i and j with values from 1 to 3 will indicate the spatial directions. In general relativity, the values of these parameters are chosen so that within the limits of velocity and small mass they coincide with Newton's law of gravity, to ensure the conservation of energy, mass, momentum and angular momentum; and to ensure the independence of the equations from the frame of reference. For general relativity, γ = β = β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = Δ1 = Δ2 = 1 and ζ = η = 0. In the most recent alpha-zeta notation of Will & Nordtvedt267 and Will268, a different set of ten PPN parameters is used: • γ = γ • β = β 265 C. M. Will, "Theoretical Frameworks For Testing Relativistic Gravity. Ii. Parametrized Post-Newtonian Hydrodynamics, And The Nordtvedt Effect.," Astrophys. J. 163: 611-28(1 Feb 1971)., January 1, 1971, 163, 611–28, https://doi.org/10.1086/150804. 266 Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler, Gravitation. 267 Kenneth Nordtvedt Jr. and Clifford M. Will, "Conservation Laws and Preferred Frames in Relativistic Gravity. II. Experimental Evidence to Rule Out Preferred-Frame Theories of Gravity," The Astrophysical Journal 177 (November 1, 1972): 177, 757, https://doi.org/10.1086/151755. 268 Clifford M. Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment," Living Reviews in Relativity 17, no. 1 (December 2014): 4, https://doi.org/10.12942/lrr-2014-4. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 73 • α1 = 7Δ1 + Δ2 4γ 4 • α2 = Δ2 + ζ 1 • α3 = 4β1 2γ 2 ζ • ζ1 = ζ • ζ2 = 2β + 2β2 3γ 1 • ζ3 = β3 1 • ζ4 = β4 γ • ξ is calculated from 3η = 12β 3γ 9 + 10ξ 3α1 + 2α2 2ζ1 ζ2 Parameters γ and β are used to describe "classical" GR tests and are the most important, the only non-zero parameters in GR and scalar-tensor gravity. Parameter ξ is non-zero in any theory of gravity that predicts the effects of preferred location; α1, α2, α3 measures whether or not the theory predicts effects of the preferred post-Newtonian framework; α3, ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4 measure whether or not the theory predicts violation of global conservation laws for total momentum. In this notation, general relativity has the parameters PPN γ = β = 1 and α1 = α2 = α3 = ζ1 = ζ2 = ζ3 = ζ4 = ξ = 0 There is a mathematical relationship between the metric, the metric potential, and the PPN parameters for this notation, with ten metric potentials (one for each PPN parameter) to ensure a unique solution. The methodology of applying the PPN formalism to the alternative theories of gravity is a nine-step process269. The limits of PPN parameters270 are determined from experimental tests. The only gravitational field entering the equations of motion is the metric g. Other fields will only contribute to the generation of spacetime curvature associated with the metric. Matter can create these fields, and they together with matter can generate metrics, but they cannot act directly on matter. Matter responds only to the metric271. It turns out that the metric and the equations of motion for matter are primary entities for calculating observable effects, and the only distinction between two metric theories is the particular way in which matter and possibly other gravitational fields generate the metric. 269 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition. 270 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." 271 Will. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 74 At the post-Newtonian limit (slow motion, weak field), comparing a theory with gravitational experiments and theories between them is accurate enough for most tests, especially those involving the solar system. The differences appear in the numerical values of the coefficients in front of the metric potential (parameters in the PPN formalism). Carlton Morris Caves concluded that laboratory experiments for investigating nonlinear characteristics of the gravitational field, as well as laboratory measurements of gravity produced by internal energy, are difficult and inconclusive272. The most accessible laboratory experiments from the point of view of post-Newtonian effects are the effects of preferred frame and preferred orientation (they can be modulated by rotating the entire laboratory apparatus relative to the inertial space) and the magnetic gravity effects (the effects associated with components of metric g: dragging inertial frames through rotating bodies, Lens-Thirring gyroscopic precession, gravitational accelerations produced by spin-spin interactions of rotating bodies, and gravitational accelerations due to spin-orbit coupling). Magnetic effects are much more sensitive to the direction of rotation or to the movement of a source or laboratory detector than other laboratory experiments. As a source, a rapidly rotating, symmetrical axial body can be used, and its angular velocity can be slowly modulated. 273 2.4 Tests of general relativity and post-Einsteinian theories Clifford M. Will describes, in Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, 274 the emergence of a new era for general relativity, testing and checking at very high levels of accuracy. In 1959, scientists at Lincoln Laboratories in Massachusetts bombarded the planet Venus with radio waves from Earth, hoping to detect the echo of reflected waves. They did not detect any echoes. On further analysis, they detected an echo on September 14, this being the first radar echo recorded on a planet. In 1960, astronomers Thomas Matthews and Allan Sandage and colleagues at Mount Palomar used a telescope to record the star field around the 3C48 radio source on a photo plate. They were expecting to find a group of galaxies, but at the exact location of the radio source an object was 272 Caves, "Theoretical Investigations of Experimental Gravitation." 273 Caves. 274 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 75 observed as a star but with an unusual spectrum and variable brightness with the frequency of 15 minutes275. This was the first observed quasar. 276 The Pound-Rebka experiment (1960) verified the principle of equivalence and gravity redshift and demonstrated the utility of quantum technology (atomic clocks, laser measurements, superconducting gravimeters, gravitational wave detectors) in high precision gravitational experiments. 277 Radiations recorded from Venus made the solar system a laboratory for testing relativistic gravity278. The interplanetary space program developed in the early 1960s, and the discovery in 1964 of the relativistic effect of delay279, offered new and accurate tests of general relativity. Until 1974, the solar system was the only way for high accuracy tests of general relativity. In developing general relativity, Einstein was led by theoretical criteria of elegance and simplicity. His theory initially encountered "three classic tests": perihelion precession of Mercury's orbit, deflection of light by the Sun, and gravitational redshift of light. At the end of the 1950s it was suggested that the gravitational redshift of light is not, however, a real test of general relativity. It is a pure consequence of the principle of equivalence and does not test the field equations of gravitational theory. Schiff suggested that the Eotvos experiment is more accurate than the gravitational redshift of light, which it replaced as importance, the Eotvos experiment verifying to what extent the bodies of different composition have the same acceleration. 280 Subsequently, other tests for general relativity were proposed, such as the Lense-Thirring effect, the orbital disturbance due to the rotation of a body, and the Sitter effect, a secular movement of 275 Thomas A. Matthews and Allan R. Sandage, "Optical Identification of 3C 48, 3C 196, and 3C 286 with Stellar Objects.," The Astrophysical Journal 138 (July 1, 1963): 30–56, https://doi.org/10.1086/147615. 276 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition. 277 R. V. Pound and G. A. Rebka, "Apparent Weight of Photons," Physical Review Letters 4, no. 7 (April 1, 1960): 337–41, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.4.337. 278 W. B. Smith, "Radar Observations of Venus, 1961 and 1959," The Astronomical Journal 68 (February 1, 1963): 15–21, https://doi.org/10.1086/108904. 279 Irwin I. Shapiro, "Fourth Test of General Relativity," Physical Review Letters 13, no. 26 (December 28, 1964): 789–91, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.13.789. 280 L. I. Schiff, "On Experimental Tests of the General Theory of Relativity," American Journal of Physics 28, no. 4 (April 1, 1960): 340–43, https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1935800. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 76 the perigee and the node of the orbit of the moon, 281 282 but the perspectives for detecting them were still weak. 283 Another test area for observing general relativity was cosmology, foretelling the primordial explosion called the "Big Bang" and the subsequent expansion of the Unive, but by the end of the 1950s cosmological observations could not distinguish between different theories of gravity. 284 Meanwhile, a "proliferation" of competing alternative gravity theories of general relativity has appeared. By 1960 there were at least 25 such alternative theories. 285 According to Will, by 1960 general relativity was empirically supported by a moderate accuracy test (change of perihelion, about 1%), a low accuracy test (light distortion, about 50%), an inconclusive test (gravitational redshift) and cosmological observations that could not distinguish between different theories. This was what Lakatos called the "stationary period". Due to its limited experimental confirmations, general relativity was even removed from basic physics. 286 The period from 1960 to 1980 was the period of maturity of general relativity: new high-precision test methods were developed that included new tests, such as gyroscopic precession, light delay and the "Nordtvedt effect" in the moon motion, including astrophysical observations and artificial satellites. Due to the proliferation of alternative theories, the best theoretical framework was needed to compare the checks of the different experiments, to classify the theories and to compare their predictions with the results of the experiments in a systematic way. Year Experimental or observational results Theoretical results 1960 Hughes-Drever mass anisotropy Penrose's work on spinors 281 Josef Lense and Hans Thirring, "Über Den Einfluss Der Eigenrotation Der Zentralkörper Auf Die Bewegung Der Planeten Und Monde Nach Der Einsteinschen Gravitationstheorie," Physikalische Zeitschrift 19 (1918): 156–63, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1918PhyZ...19..156L. 282 W. de Sitter, "On Einstein's Theory of Gravitation and Its Astronomical Consequences. Second Paper," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 77 (December 1, 1916): 77, 155–84, https://doi.org/10.1093/mnras/77.2.155. 283 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition. 284 Whitrow and Morduch, "Relativistic Theories of Gravitation," chap. 14. 285 C. DeWitt, Experimental Relativity, in Relativity Groups and Topology. Lectures Delivered at Les Houches During the 1963 Session of the Summer School of Theoretical Physics, Second Printing edition (Gordon & Breach, 1965), 165–313. 286 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 77 Pound-Rebka experiment of gravitational redshift Gyroscopic precision (Schiff) Brans-Dicke theory 1962 Discovery of non-solar X-ray sources Bondi formula for mass loss Discovery of the quasar redshift Discovery of the Kerr metric 1964 Eotvos Experiment, Princeton Delay in time of light (Shapiro) Pound-Snider experiment of gravitational redshift Discovery of the 3K microwave background Singularity theorems in general relativity 1966 Detection of solar flattening Pulsar discovery Production of elements in the Big Bang 1968 Planetary radar measurements for time delay Launch of Mariners 6 and 7 Acquisition of lunar laser echo First radio deflection measurements Nordtvedt effect and early PPN framework 1970 CygXl: a black hole candidate Mariners 6 and 7 time-delay measurements Preferred frame effects Refined PPN framework Increasing the domain of black holes in general relativity 1972 Eotvos Experiment, Moscow 1974 Discovery of binary pulsars Quantum evaporation of black holes Dipolar gravitational radiation in alternative theories 1976 Experiments of gravitational ewsahift with rockets Moon test of the Nordtvedt effect Time delay results obtained with Mariner 9 and Viking 1978 Measurements of decreasing orbital period of binary pulsar SS 433 1980 Discovery of gravitational lenses Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 78 Table 2.2 A chronology of the tests for verifying the theory of general relativity between 1960-80. Source: Clifford M. Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics287 Robert Dicke performed several high-precision nullity experiments to confirm gravity theories. 288 Dicke concludes that gravitational experiments can be divided into two classes: 1. one that tests the basis of gravity theory (eg, the principle of equivalence): the Eotvos experiment, the Hughes-Drever experiment, the gravitational redshift experiment, etc.), verifying that gravity is a curved spacetime phenomenon (described by a "metric theory" of gravity). General relativity and Brans-Dick's theory are examples of metric theories of gravity. 2. a second class that tests the metric theories of gravity: the parameterized post-Newtonian formalism, or PPN, initiated by Kenneth Nordtvedt, Jr., 289 and expanded and improved by Will. 290 PPN takes into account low velocities and weak fields (post-Newtonian limit) of metric theories, based on a set of 10 real parameters. PPN was used to analyze the gravitational experiments of the solar system, to discover and analyze new tests of gravity theory, such as the Nordtvedt effect, the preferred frame effects and the preferred location effects, and to analyze and classify alternative metric theories of gravity becoming the standard theoretical tool for these experiments, searches and studies. By the mid-1970s, many alternative theories of gravity were upheld by experiments at the solar system level, but not at the cosmological level. In 1974, Joseph Taylor and Russell Hulse discovered the binary pulsar, 291 whose extremely stable pulses were monitored radiotelescopically, allowing accurate measurement of astrophysical parameters. In 1978 the rate of change of the orbital period of the system was measured, which was confirmed by general relativity but not by most alternative theories. 287 Will. 288 DeWitt, Experimental Relativity, in Relativity Groups and Topology. Lectures Delivered at Les Houches During the 1963 Session of the Summer School of Theoretical Physics, 165–313. 289 Kenneth Nordtvedt, "Equivalence Principle for Massive Bodies. II. Theory," Physical Review 169, no. 5 (May 25, 1968): 1017–25, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.169.1017. 290 Will, "Theoretical Frameworks For Testing Relativistic Gravity. Ii. Parametrized Post-Newtonian Hydrodynamics, And The Nordtvedt Effect.," 163, 611–28. 291 R. A. Hulse and J. H. Taylor, "Discovery of a Pulsar in a Binary System," The Astrophysical Journal Letters 195 (January 1, 1975): L51-53, https://doi.org/10.1086/181708. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 79 In the Michelson-Morley experiment, Michelson started from an experiment to test Fresnel and Stokes's contradictory theories about the influence of ether. 292 293 Stokes initially believed that the two theories are observationally equivalent, both theories explaining the aberration of light. Michelson argued that his 1881 experiment was a crucial experiment that demonstrated Stokes' theory. Lorentz pointed out that Michelson "misinterpreted" the facts, and Michelson's calculations were wrong. Michelson, along with Morley, decided to repeat the experiment "at intervals of three months and thus avoid all uncertainty," 294 their conclusion rejecting Fresnel's explanation. Lorentz also questioned the new experiment: "the significance of the Michelson-Morley experiment lies rather in the fact that it can teach us something about the changes in the dimensions." In 1897 Michelson made a new experiment, concluding that the result of the experiment was an "improbable" one and decided that in 1887 he was wrong: Stokes' theory had to be rejected, and Fresnel's had to be accepted. Fitzgerald, independent of Lorentz, produced a testable version that was rejected by Trouton, Rayleigh and Brace's experiments as it was theoretically progressive, but not empirical, Fitzgerald's theory being considered ad-hoc (that there is no independent (positive) evidence for it). 295 Einstein, ignoring these experiments, but stimulated by Mach's criticisms of Newtonian mechanics, arrived at a new progressive search program,296 which "predicted" and explained the result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, but also predicted a huge range of undiscovered facts previously, that have obtained dramatic corroborations. Thus, only twenty-five years later, the MichelsonMorley experiment came to be seen as a crucial experiment, considered to be "the largest negative experiment in the history of science," 297 298 demonstrating Lakatos's methodological tolerance. In this context, a typical signal of the degeneration of a program is the proliferation of contradictory "facts". Using a false theory as an interpretive theory, one can obtain without committing an 292 A Fresnel, "Lettre a Francois Arago Sur L'Influence Du Mouvement Terrestre Dans Quelques Phenomenes Optiques, in Annales de Chimie et de Physique 98 Years Available Gallica," 1818, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb343780820/date.r=Annales+de+chimie+et+de+physique.langEN. 293 George Gabriel Stokes, On Fresnel's Theory of the Aberration of Light (London, 1846), 76–81. 294 Lorentz, "Considerations on Gravitation." 295 Joseph Larmor, On the Ascertained Absence of Effects of Motion through the Aether, in Relation to the Constitution of Matter, and on the FitzGerald-Lorentz Hypothesis, 1904, 624. 296 Karl Raimund Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Psychology Press, 2002). 297 J. D. Bernal, Science in History J. D. Bernal, 3rd edition (M.I.T Press, 1965). 298 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 80 "experimental error" contradictory factual proposals, inconsistent experimental results. 299 Michelson himself was frustrated by the inconsistency of "facts" resulting from his measurements. Carlton Morris Caves proposes six possible laboratory experiments for non-Newtonian gravity: three use a torsion balance as a detector, and three use a high-sensitivity dielectric crystal. 300 Caves' idea is to demonstrate that technology will soon make possible a new class of experiments, exclusively laboratory tests. Caves' conclusion is that none of these experiments would be easy to do, because of the limitations of current technology. But most are feasible in the near future. The strong effects of gravity are observed astrophysically (white dwarfs, neutron stars, black holes), in which case there are used, as experimental tests, the stability of the white dwarfs, the spin-down rate of the pulsars, the orbits of the binary pulsars, the existence of a black hole horizon, and so on. Recently, a series of cosmological tests have been developed for theories of dark matter, using for constraints the rotation of the galaxy, the Tully-Fisher relation, the speed of rotation of dwarf galaxies, and gravitational lenses. For the theories related to cosmic inflation, the most rigorous test is by measuring the size of the waves in the spectrum of cosmic microwave background radiation. 301 For dark energy theories, the results of supernova brightness and age of the universe can be used as tests. There are large differences in predictions between general relativity and classical physics, such as gravitational time dilation, gravitational lensing, gravitational redshift of light, and so on. And there are many relativistic theories of gravity, bifurcated or independent, but Einstein's general theory of relativity has upheld all predictions and is the simplest of such theories. 299 Lakatos. 300 Caves, "Theoretical Investigations of Experimental Gravitation." 301 The potential function, which is crucial for determining the dynamics of inflation, is simply postulated, and not derived from an underlying physical theory. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 81 2.4.1 Tests proposed by Einstein Einstein states, in Relativity Theory Special Relativity and General Relativity, 302 that theories evolve through observation-based decalations, in the form of empirical laws, from which general laws are obtained. Intuition and deductive thinking play an important role in this process. After the initial stage, the investigator develops a thinking system guided by empirical data, logically constructed from fundamental assumptions (axioms). The "truth" of a theory results from its correlation with a large number of unique observations. For the same empirical data there may be several theories that differ. Einstein speaks, in Relativity Theory Special Relativity and General Relativity, of the confirmed prediction of general relativity for the motion of Mercury's perihelion, with a precision far greater than that predicted by Newton's law of universal gravity. 303 Another confirmed prediction discussed by Einstein is the deflection of light by a gravitational field, which admits an experimental test by photographic recording of stars during a total solar eclipse, thus: stars in the vicinity of the Sun are photographed during a solar eclipse. The second photo of the same stars is taken when the sun is in a different position on the sky, a few months earlier or later. By comparing the positions of the stars, there should appear radially outward. The British Royal Society and the Royal Astronomical Society performed these tests on two expeditions, on Sobral (Brazil) and Principe Island (West Africa), confirming the prediction. The redshift of the spectral lines was also predicted by the general relativity and discussed by Einstein in the same book, but when this book was written it had not yet been confirmed. Experiments were carried out on cyanogen bands, but the results were not conclusive during that period. Einstein proposed a verification of the average displacement of the lines towards the less refractory edge of the spectrum, through statistical investigations of the fixed stars. In the second edition of the book Relativity Theory Special Relativity and General Relativity, 304 Einstein states that in developing his theory for the "cosmological problem" he relied on two hypotheses: 1. There is an average density of matter throughout the space, which is everywhere the same and different from zero. 302 Albert Einstein, Teoria relativității: Relativitatea specială și relativitatea generală (Nicolae Sfetcu, 2017), https://books.google.ro/books?id=aMtNDwAAQBAJ. 303 Einstein. 304 Einstein. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 82 2. The size ("radius") of the space is independent of time. The hypotheses proved to be in line with the general theory of relativity after the introduction of a hypothetical term in the field equations ("the cosmological term of the field equations"). Subsequently, Einstein came to the conclusion that one can keep the hypothesis (1) without appealing to that term, if one can renounce the hypothesis (2), respectively the initial equations of the field admit a solution in which the "radius of the world" depends on time ( space expansion), thus allowing space expansion. Hubble, through an investigation of extra-galactic nebulae, confirmed that the emitted spectral lines showed a redshift proportional to the distance between the nebulae. For Einstein, the epistemological approach of thought experiments was of particular importance. These experiments, by the way they were developed, offered a new understanding of the discussed phenomena. At sixteen, Einstein imagined what would happen if a light beam is followed with the speed of light. 305 The experiment is more difficult than it seems at first sight. Einstein was, at that time, searching for a "universal principle" that could lead to true knowledge. The experiment starts with the hypothetical situation of tracking a light wave at speed c. In this case of equal magnitude of speeds, the "surfer" will observe a "frozen" light wave, with light radiation as a static spatially oscillating electromagnetic field, and the properties of the wave would disappear. But this time-independent field does not exist, because it is not in line with Maxwell's theory. His conclusion would be that an observer can never reach the speed of light, the hypothesis being false by modus tollens in classical logic. Einstein said that this experiment contains a paradox in that the two assumptions included (the constancy of the speed of light and the independence of the laws (so also the constancy of the speed of light) of the choice of the inertial system (the principle of special relativity) are "mutually incompatible (despite the fact that both, taken separately, are based on experience)". In September 1905, Einstein attempted to extend the principle of relativity to accelerated reference systems by introducing a new and powerful physical principle in 1907, the "principle of equivalence" (the laws of physics take the same form in a uniform system of accelerating coordinates as in a system which is at rest relative to a homogeneous gravitational field), with a very high heuristic value. 306 He argued this principle through the "elevator thought experiment", 305 Einstein, "Autobiographische Skizze," 9–17. 306 Abraham Pais, Subtle Is the Lord: The Science and the Life of Albert Einstein (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 179–80. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 83 sometimes considered Einstein's most important thought experiment. Einstein assumes an accelerated frame of reference with a constant acceleration in the x-direction, and a second frame at rest in a homogeneous gravitational field that gives all objects an acceleration in the same xdirection. Observationally, there is no distinction between the two frames. All bodies are accelerated in the same gravitational field. Thus, the principle of equivalence allows a homogeneous gravitational field to be replaced by a uniformly accelerated reference system. This hypothesis of the exact physical equivalence of the two frameworks has two important theoretical consequences: we cannot speak of an absolute acceleration of the reference system, and the equal fall of all bodies in a gravitational field. 2.4.2 Tests of post-Einsteinian theories With the help of PPN formalism, gravity theories are confronted with the results of experiments in the solar system. The γ parameter in this formalism highlights the light deflection and the light delay. By calculations according to PPN, light deflection is obtained with respect to local straight lines, compared to rigid rods; due to the curvature of space around the Sun, determined by the parameter γ, the straight local lines are bent relative to the asymptotic straight lines away from the Sun. The development of very-long-baseline radio interferometry (VLBI) has improved the measurement of light deformation, allowing transcontinental and intercontinental VLBI observations of quasars and radio galaxies to monitor the rotation of the Earth307. Hipparcos optical astrometry satellite has led to improved performance. 308 The light delay tests are based on a radar signal sent over the solar system along the Sun to a planet or satellite, and upon returning to Earth it suffers an additional non-Newtonian delay. Irwin Shapiro discovered this effect in 1964. Targets used include planets like Mercury or Venus, as passive radar signals (passive radar), and artificial satellites, such as Mariner 6 and 7, Voyager 2, Viking Mars, and the spacecraft. Cassini to Saturn, used as active transmitters of radar signals (active radar) 309. Kopeikin suggested, in 2001, to measure the delay of light coming from a quasar when passing through the planet Jupiter310, thus measuring the speed of gravitational interaction. In 2002, precise 307 S. S. Shapiro et al., "Measurement of the Solar Gravitational Deflection of Radio Waves Using Geodetic VeryLong-Baseline Interferometry Data, 1979--1999," Physical Review Letters 92, no. 12 (March 26, 2004): 121101, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.121101. 308 François Mignard and F. Arenou, "Determination of the Ppn Parameter with the Hipparcos Data," 1997. 309 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." 310 Sergei M. Kopeikin, "Testing the Relativistic Effect of the Propagation of Gravity by Very Long Baseline Interferometry," The Astrophysical Journal 556, no. 1 (2001): L1–5, Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 84 measurements of the Shapiro delay311 were made. But several authors have pointed out that this effect does not depend on the speed of gravity propagation, but only on the speed of light. 312 Explaining the anomalies of Mercury's orbit has long been an unresolved issue half a century since Le Verrier's announcement in 1859. Several ad-hoc hypotheses have been tested to explain this inconsistency with the theory, including the existence of a new planet Vulcan near the Sun, a planetoid ring, a quadrupolar solar moment, and a deviation from the inverse square in the law of gravity, but all these assumptions failed. General relativity has naturally solved this problem. Another class of experiments in the solar system for gravity verifies the strong equivalence principle (SEP). The SEP violation can be tested by violating the principle of low equivalence for gravitational bodies leading to disturbances in Earth-Moon orbit, preferred location and the preferred frame effects in locally measured gravitational constancy that could produce observable geophysical effects, and possible variations in gravity constant at cosmological level. 313 Nordtvedt314 also stated that many metric theories about gravity predict that massive bodies violate the weak equivalence principle (falling with different accelerations, depending on their gravitational energy). Dicke315 notes that this effect (the "Nordtvedt effect") occurs in theories with a spatially variable gravitational constant, such as scalar-tensor gravity. The Nordtvedt effect is not noticed in the results of the laboratory experiments, for objects of laboratory dimensions. The data https://www.academia.edu/18481905/TESTING_THE_RELATIVISTIC_EFFECT_OF_THE_PROPAGATION_O F_GRAVITY_BY_VERY_LONG_BASELINE_INTERFEROMETRY. 311 E. B. Fomalont and S. M. Kopeikin, "The Measurement of the Light Deflection from Jupiter: Experimental Results," The Astrophysical Journal 598, no. 1 (November 20, 2003): 704–11, https://doi.org/10.1086/378785. 312 Fintan D. Ryan, "Gravitational Waves from the Inspiral of a Compact Object into a Massive, Axisymmetric Body with Arbitrary Multipole Moments," Physical Review D 52, no. 10 (November 15, 1995): 5707–5718, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.52.5707. 313 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." 314 Kenneth Nordtvedt, "Equivalence Principle for Massive Bodies. I. Phenomenology," ResearchGate, 1968, 1014–16, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/243706608_Equivalence_Principle_for_Massive_Bodies_I_Phenomenology. 315 P. G. Roll, R. Krotkov, and R. H. Dicke, "The Equivalence of Inertial and Passive Gravitational Mass," Annals of Physics 26 (February 1, 1964): 26, 442–517, https://doi.org/10.1016/0003-4916(64)90259-3. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 85 analyzes did not find evidence, within the experimental uncertainty, for the Nordtvedt effect316. In the general relativity (GR), the Nordtvedt effect disappears317. Some theories violate strong equivalence principle by predicting that the results of local gravitational experiments may depend on the speed of the laboratory in relation to the average resting frame of the universe (the effects of the preferred frame, corresponding to PPN parameters α1, α2 and α3) or to the location of the laboratory in relation to a gravitational body nearby (preferred location effects, some being governed by the PPN parameter ξ) 318. The effects consist of variations and anisotropies in the locally measured value of the gravitational constant leading to the occurrence of abnormal values of the Earth and variations of the rate of rotation of the Earth, abnormal contributions to the orbital dynamics of the planets and the Moon, self-accelerations of the pulsars, and anomalous torques on the Sun which would determine the random orientation of its axis of rotation towards the ecliptic. 319 Most theories that violate the strong equivalence principle predict a variation of the Newtonian gravitational constant measured locally, as a function of time. Other tests to verify gravitational theories are based on gravitomagnetism (moving or rotating matter produces an additional gravitational field analogous to the magnetic field of a moving charge or magnetic dipole). The relativistic effects that can be measured involve the Earth-Moon system and the binary pulsar systems. 320 Gyroscope experiments attempt to detect this frame dragging or Lense-Thirring precession effect. Another way to test the frame dragging is to measure the precession of the orbital planes of the 316 James G. Williams, Slava G. Turyshev, and Dale H. Boggs, "Progress in Lunar Laser Ranging Tests of Relativistic Gravity," Physical Review Letters 93, no. 26 (December 29, 2004): 261101, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.93.261101. 317 Kenneth Nordtvedt, "The Relativistic Orbit Observables in Lunar Laser Ranging," ResearchGate, 1995, 51– 62, 114, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/223758280_The_Relativistic_Orbit_Observables_in_Lunar_Laser_Ranging. 318 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." 319 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition. 320 K. Nordtvedt, "Gravitomagnetic Interaction and Laser Ranging to Earth Satellites," Physical Review Letters 61, no. 23 (December 5, 1988): 61, 2647–2649, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.61.2647. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 86 bodies that rotate on a rotating body, measuring the relative precession321. The Earth-Moon system can be considered a "gyroscope", with the axis perpendicular to the orbital plane. A non-zero value for any of the PPN parameters ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4 and α3 would result in a violation of conservation of momentum or Newton's third law conservation in gravitational systems. A test for Newton's third law for gravitational systems was conducted in 1968 by Kreuzer, in which the gravitational attraction of fluorine and bromine was compared with accuracy. A planetary test was reported by Bartlett and van Buren322. Another consequence of the violation of conservation of momentum is a self-acceleration of the mass center of a stellar binary system. The PPN formalism is no longer valid for strong gravitational fields (neutron stars, black holes), but in some cases post-Newtonian approximations can be made. Systems in strong gravitational fields are affected by the emission of gravitational radiation. For example, relativistic orbital motion (fusion or collapse of binary systems of neutron stars or black holes in the final phase) can be detected by a network of observers with gravitational interference waves with a laser interferometer, but the analysis is done using different techniques. Only two parameters can be used in observing the generation of gravitational waves: the mass momentum and the angular momentum. Both quantities can be measured, in principle, by examining the external gravitational field of the bodies without any reference to their internal structure. Damour323 calls this an "effacement" of the internal structure of the body. Another way to verify the agreement with GR is by comparing the observed phase of the orbit with the theoretical phase of the model as a function of time. The observation of gravitational waves can provide the means to test GR forecasts for polarization and wave velocity, for damping of gravitational radiation and for gravity of strong field, using gravity wave detectors with interferometer or resonant band. Broadband laser interferometers are particularly sensitive to the evolution of gravitational wave phases, which carry information about the evolution of the orbital phase. 321 John C Ries et al., "Prospects for an Improved Lense-Thirring Test with SLR and the GRACE Gravity Mission," n.d., 7. 322 D. F. Bartlett and Dave Van Buren, "Equivalence of Active and Passive Gravitational Mass Using the Moon," Physical Review Letters 57, no. 1 (July 7, 1986): 21–24, 57, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.57.21. 323 T. Damour, "The Problem of Motion in Newtonian and Einsteinian Gravity.," in Three Hundred Years of Gravitation, 1987, 128–98, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1987thyg.book..128D. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 87 Another possibility involves gravitational waves from a small mass orbiting and inspiralling into a spinning black hole. 324 One of the problems considered by physicists in testing GR in the strong field is the possibility of contamination with an uncertain or complex physics. For example, a few seconds after the Big Bang, physics is relatively clear, but some theories of gravity fail to produce cosmologies that meet even the minimum requirements for big-bang nucleosynthesis or the properties of the cosmic microwave background325. But, within modest uncertainties, one can evaluate the quantitative difference between predictions and other theories under strong field conditions by comparing with observations. 326 2.4.3 Classic tests Albert Einstein proposed327 three tests of general relativity, later named the classic tests of general relativity, in 1916: 1. the precession of the perihelion of Mercury's orbit 2. Sun light deflection 3. the gravitational redshift of the light. For gravitational testing, the indirect effects of gravity are always used, usually particles that are influenced by gravity. In the presence of gravity, the particles move along curved geodesic lines. The sources of gravity that cause the curvature of spacetime are material bodies, depending on their mass. But in relativity the mass relates to the energy through the formula E = mc2, and the energy with the momentum, according to the special relativity. Einstein's equations give the relation between the spatial geometry and the properties of matter, using Riemannian geometry, the geometrical properties being described by a function called metric. In general relativity, the Riemann curvature metric and tensor take values defined at each point in spacetime. The content of matter defines a size called the energy-momentum tensor T. These quantities are related to each other by Einstein's equations, in which the Riemann curvature 324 Ryan, "Gravitational Waves from the Inspiral of a Compact Object into a Massive, Axisymmetric Body with Arbitrary Multipole Moments," 52, 5707–5718. 325 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition, chap. 13.2. 326 Clifford M. Will, Was Einstein Right?: Putting General Relativity To The Test, 2 edition (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1993). 327 Einstein, "The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity," 769–822. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 88 tensor and the metric define another geometric magnitude G, called the Einstein tensor, which describes some aspects of how spacetime is curved. Einstein's equation thus states that G = (8πG/c4)T, where G measures curvature and T measures the amount of matter. G is the gravitational constant of Newtonian gravity, and c is the speed of light in special relativity. Each of the quantities G and T are determined by several functions of the spacetime coordinates, thus resulting in more equations, in fact. Each solution of these equations describes a certain geometry of spacetime. 2.4.3.1 Precision of Mercury's perihelion Urbain Le Verrier discovered, in 1859, that the orbital precession of the planet Mercury does not correspond to the theory: the ellipse of its orbit rotated (precessing) slightly faster, the difference being about 38 (subsequently corrected to 43) arcseconds of rotation per century328. Several adhoc hypotheses have been proposed, such as interplanetary dust, the Sun's unobserved oblation, a month undetected of Mercury, or a new planet called Vulcan. As no hypothesis has been confirmed, it was assumed that Newton's law of gravity is incorrect, trying to change the law, but new theories conflicted with other laws. In general relativity, this precession is explained by gravity mediated by the curvature of spacetime, in agreement with the observation. 2.4.3.2 Light deflection The prediction of the light deflection was initially confirmed by observing the light of the stars (quasars) deviated while passing through the Sun329. In the PPN formalism, the light deflection is highlighted by the parameter γ, which encodes the influence of gravity on the geometry of spacetime. 330 The deflection of light by a massive object has been predicted since 1784 by Henry Cavendish, and Johann Georg von Soldner in 1801, based on calculations from Newtonian gravity. This prediction was confirmed by Einstein in 1911, correcting the value of curvature in 1915 based on general 328 U. Le Verrier, Lettre de M. Le Verrier à M. Faye sur la théorie de Mercure et sur le mouvement du périhélie de cette planète, in Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l'Académie des sciences (Paris : Gauthier-Villars, 1859), 379–383, http://archive.org/details/comptesrendusheb49acad. 329 Daniel Kennefick and Jürgen Renn, Astronomers Test General Relativity: Light-Bending and the Solar Redshift, in Albert Einstein Chief Engineer of the Universe: 100 Authors for Einstein Essays, 2005, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2005alei.book.....R. 330 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 89 relativity331. The first observation of light deflection was made by Arthur Eddington during the total sun eclipse of May 29, 1919, simultaneously in Sobral, Brazil and São Tomé and Príncipe on the west coast of Africa332. The light deflection in the general relativistic case is observed only for a stationary observer who sees the path of light in relation to a gravitational body. Einstein understood, using EEP, that mass or even energy in Eisntein's formula would follow geodesic paths in spacetime, in relation to an observer at rest with the gravitational body. This result highlights the essence of EEP, showing that gravity and acceleration cannot be differentiated from one another, in a small region. Shapiro et al. 333 reported the sun's curvature of radio waves emitted by extragalactic radio sources, between 1979 and 1999. 2.4.3.3 Gravitational redshift The gravitational redshift appears when the electromagnetic radiation from a source in a gravitational field is observed from a region with a higher gravitational potential. It is a direct result of the gravitational time dilation. In a test to confirm this effect, the reception of light must be located at a higher gravitational potential. If the observer has a gravitational potential lower than the source, he will notice a gravitational shift towards blue. Einstein predicted the effect from the equivalence principle in 1907, stating that it can be measured in the spectral lines of a white dwarf star that has a very large gravitational field. The first accurate measurement of a white dwarf was made by Popper in 1954. 334 Global Positioning System (GPS) must take into account the gravitational redshift in synchronization335. Physicians analyzed GPS data to confirm other tests336. Other precision tests 331 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." 332 Matthew Stanley, "'An Expedition to Heal the Wounds of War' The 1919 Eclipse and Eddington as Quaker Adventurer," Isis 94, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 57–89, https://doi.org/10.1086/376099. 333 Shapiro et al., "Measurement of the Solar Gravitational Deflection of Radio Waves Using Geodetic VeryLong-Baseline Interferometry Data, 1979--1999." 334 N. S. Hetherington, "Sirius B and the Gravitational Redshift: An Historical Review," ResearchGate, 1980, 246–52, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/234478409_Sirius_B_and_the_gravitational_redshift_An_historical_review. 335 GPS is continuously tested by comparing atomic clocks on the ground and on orbiting satellites, for correlation with relativistic effects, cf. Neil Ashby, "Relativity in the Global Positioning System," Living Reviews in Relativity 6, no. 1 (January 28, 2003): 1, https://doi.org/10.12942/lrr-2003-1. 336 Ashby. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 90 are the Gravity Probe A satellite, launched in 1976, and the Hafele-Keating experiment that used atomic clocks in navigation aircraft. 337 2.4.4 Modern tests Dicke and Schiff established a framework for testing general relativity, 338 including through null experiments and using the physics of space exploration, electronics and condensed matter, such as the Pound-Rebka experiment and laser interferometry. The gravitational lens tests and the temporal delay of light are highlighted by parameter γ of the PPN formalism, equal to 1 for general relativity and with different values in other theories. The BepiColombo mission aims to test the general theory of relativity by measuring the gamma and beta parameters of the PPN formalism. 339 2.4.4.1 Shapiro Delay The gravitational delay (Shapiro delay), according to which the light signals require more time to pass through a gravitational field than in the absence of that field, has been successfully tested. 340 In the PPN formalism, the gravitational delay is highlighted by the parameter γ, which encodes the influence of gravity on the geometry of space. 341 Irwin I. Shapiro proposed this test becoming "classic", predicting a relativistic delay in the return of radar signals reflected on other planets. The use of the planets Mercury and Venus as targets before and after they were eclipsed by the Sun confirmed the theory of general relativity. 342 Later the Cassini probe was used for a similar experiment. 343 The measurement of the PPN gamma parameter is affected by the gravitomagnetic effect caused by the orbital motion of the Sun around 337 S Schiller, "Gravitational Physics with Optical Clocks in Space," 2015, 31. 338 Schiff, "On Experimental Tests of the General Theory of Relativity," 340–343. 339 Brans and Dicke, "Mach's Principle and a Relativistic Theory of Gravitation," 925–935. 340 Shapiro, "Fourth Test of General Relativity," 789–791. 341 Irwin I. Shapiro et al., "Fourth Test of General Relativity: New Radar Result," Physical Review Letters 26, no. 18 (May 3, 1971): 1132–1135, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.26.1132. 342 Shapiro et al., 1132–1135. 343 Sergei M. Kopeikin and Edward B. Fomalont, "Gravimagnetism, Causality, and Aberration of Gravity in the Gravitational Light-Ray Deflection Experiments," General Relativity and Gravitation 39, no. 10 (October 1, 2007): 1583–1624, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10714-007-0483-6. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 91 the barycentre of the solar system. The very long basic interferometry allowed the corrections of this effect in the field of movement of Jupiter344 and Saturn. 345 2.4.4.2 Gravitational dilation of time Gravity influences the passage of time. Processes close to a massive body are slower. 346 The gravitational redshift was measured in the laboratory347 and using astronomical observations. 348 The gravitational dilation of the time in the gravitational field of the Earth was measured using atomic clocks, 349 being verified as a side effect of the functioning of the Global Positioning System (GPS). 350 Tests in stronger gravitational fields need binary pulsars. 351 All the results are in accordance with general relativity, but also with other theories where the principle of equivalence is valid. 352 The gravitational dilation of time coexists with the existence of an accelerated frame of reference, except for the center of a concentric distribution of matter in which there is no accelerated frame of reference, although it is assumed that here time is dilated. 353 All physical phenomena undergo in this case the same time dilation, in accordance with the principle of equivalence. The time dilation can be measured for photons that are emitted on Earth, curved near the Sun, reflected on Venus, and returned to Earth along a similar path. It is observed that the speed of light in the vicinity of the Sun is lower than c. The phenomenon was measured experimentally using atomic clocks on the plane, where time dilations occur also due to the differences of height less than 1 meter and 344 Kopeikin and Fomalont, 1583–1624. 345 Ed Fomalont et al., "Recent VLBA/VERA/IVS Tests of General Relativity," Proceedings of the International Astronomical Union 5, no. S261 (April 2009): 291–295, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743921309990536. 346 Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler, Gravitation. 347 Pound and Rebka, "Apparent Weight of Photons," 186. 348 M. A. Barstow et al., "Hubble Space Telescope Spectroscopy of the Balmer Lines in Sirius B," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 362, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 1134–1142, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2966.2005.09359.x. 349 Hans C. Ohanian and Remo Ruffini, Gravitation and Spacetime (Norton, 1994). 350 Ashby, "Relativity in the Global Positioning System." 351 Michael Kramer, "Millisecond Pulsarsas Tools of Fundamental Physics," in Astrophysics, Clocks and Fundamental Constants, ed. Savely G. Karshenboim and Ekkehard Peik, Lecture Notes in Physics (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004), 33–54, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40991-5_3. 352 Ohanian and Ruffini, Gravitation and Spacetime. 353 Einstein derived these effects using the principle of equivalence as early as 1907, cf. Albert Einstein, "Über Das Relativitätsprinzip Und Die Aus Demselben Gezogene Folgerungen, in Volume 2: The Swiss Years: Writings, 19001909 Page 432 (468 of 692)," 1907, https://einsteinpapers.press.princeton.edu/vol2-doc/468. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 92 were tested experimentally in the laboratory. 354 Other test modes are through the Pound-Rebka experiment, observations of the white dwarf Sirius B spectra, and experiments with time signals sent to and from Mars soil with the Viking 1. 2.4.4.3 Frame dragging and geodetic effect In general relativity, the apsides of the orbits (the point on the orbit of the body closest to the center of mass of the system) will have a precession, forming an orbit different from an ellipse, the shape of the rose. Einstein predicted this move. Relativistic precessions have been observed for all planets that allow accurate measurements of precession (Mercury, Venus and Earth), 355 and in binary pulsar systems where it is larger by five orders of magnitude. A binary system that emits gravitational waves loses energy. Thus, the distance between the two orbital bodies decreases, as does their orbital period. At the level of the solar system, the effect is difficult to observe. It is observable for a near binary pulsar, from which very precise frequency radio pulses are received, allowing measurements of the orbital period. Neutron stars emit large amounts of energy in the form of gravitational radiation. The first observation of this effect is due to Hulse and Taylor, using a binary pulsar PSR1913+16 discovered in 1974. This was the first, indirect, detection of gravitational waves. 356 The relativity of the direction has several relativistic effects, 357 such as the geodetic precession: the direction of the axis of a gyroscope in free fall in curved space will change compared to the direction of light received from distant stars. 358 For the Moon-Earth system, this effect was measured using the laser reflected on the Moon, 359 and more recently with the help of the test masses on board the Gravity Probe B. 360 Near a rotary table, there are gravitometric or frame dragging effects. In the case of rotating black holes, any object that enters the ergosphere rotates. The effect can be tested by its influence on the 354 Pound and Rebka, "Apparent Weight of Photons," 186. 355 Ohanian and Ruffini, Gravitation and Spacetime, 406–7. 356 Hulse and Taylor, "Discovery of a Pulsar in a Binary System," L51–L55. 357 Roger Penrose, The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe, Reprint edition (New York: Vintage, 2007). 358 Ohanian and Ruffini, Gravitation and Spacetime, sec. 7.8. 359 Kenneth Nordtvedt, "Lunar Laser Ranging a Comprehensive Probe of Post-Newtonian Gravity," ArXiv:GrQc/0301024, January 7, 2003, http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0301024. 360 C. W. F. Everitt et al., "Gravity Probe B: Final Results of a Space Experiment to Test General Relativity," Physical Review Letters 106, no. 22 (May 31, 2011): 221101, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.106.221101. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 93 orientation of free fall gyros. 361 Tests were performed using the LAGEOS satellites, 362 with the Mars Global Surveyor probe around Mars, 363 confirming the relativistic prediction. The first frame dragging effect was derived in 1918 by Josef Lense and Hans Thirring and is known as the Lense-Thirring effect. They predicted that the rotation of a massive body would distort the spacetime metric, causing the orbit of a nearby test particle to precede. In order to detect it, it is necessary to examine a very massive body or to construct a very sensitive instrument. The linear dragging of the frames appears by applying the RG principle to the linear momentum. It is very difficult to verify. 364 Increasing of the static mass is another effect, an increase in the inertia of a body when other masses are placed nearby. Einstein states that it derives from the same equation of general relativity. It is a small effect, difficult to confirm experimentally. Several costly proposals were made, including in 1976 by Van Patten and Everitt, 365 for a special space mission to measure the Lense-Thirring precession of a pair of spacecrafts to be placed in Earth's polar orbits with non-dragging devices. In 1986 Ciufolini proposed the launch of a passive geodesic satellite in an orbit identical to that of the LAGEOS satellite. The tests were started using the LAGEOS and LAGEOS II satellites in 1996. 366 The accuracy of the tests is controversial. Neither did the Gravity Probe B experiment achieve the desired accuracy. 367 In the case of stars orbiting near a supermassive black hole, the frame dragging should cause the orbital plane of the star to precess around the axis of rotation of the black hole, an effect that could 361 Ohanian and Ruffini, Gravitation and Spacetime, sec. 4.7. 362 Lorenzo Iorio, "An Assessment of the Systematic Uncertainty in Present and Future Tests of the LenseThirring Effect with Satellite Laser Ranging," Space Science Reviews 148, no. 1–4 (December 2009): 363–381, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11214-008-9478-1. 363 Lorenzo Iorio, "On the Lense-Thirring Test with the Mars Global Surveyor in the Gravitational Field of Mars," Open Physics 8, no. 3 (January 1, 2010): 509–513, https://doi.org/10.2478/s11534-009-0117-6. 364 Albert Einstein, "The Meaning of Relativity," Princeton University Press, 1921, https://press.princeton.edu/titles/484.html. 365 R. A. Van Patten and C. W. F. Everitt, "Possible Experiment with Two Counter-Orbiting Drag-Free Satellites to Obtain a New Test of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity and Improved Measurements in Geodesy," Physical Review Letters 36, no. 12 (March 22, 1976): 629–632, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.36.629. 366 Iorio, "An Assessment of the Systematic Uncertainty in Present and Future Tests of the Lense-Thirring Effect with Satellite Laser Ranging," 363–381. 367 Everitt et al., "Gravity Probe B." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 94 be detected in the following years by astrometric monitoring of the stars in the center of the Milky Way galaxy. 368 Relativistic jets can provide evidence for frame dragging. 369 The gravitomagnetic model developed by Reva Kay Williams predicts the high energy particles emitted by quasars and active galactic nuclei, the extraction of X and γ rays and ee+ relativistic pairs, jets collimated around the polar axis, and asymmetric jets formation. 2.4.4.4 Testing of the principle of equivalence At the beginning of the 17th century Galileo developed a principle similar to that of equivalence when he showed experimentally that the acceleration of a body due to gravity is independent of its mass quantity. Kepler emphasized the principle of equivalence through a thought experiment, what would happen if the Moon were stopped in orbit and dropped to Earth. The principle of equivalence has historically played an important role in the law of gravity. Newton considered it from the opening paragraph of the Principia. Einstein also relied on this principle in general relativity. Newton's principle of equivalence states that the "mass" of a body is proportional to its "weight" (the weak equivalence principle, WEP). An alternative definition of WEP is that the trajectory of a body in the absence of forces is independent of its internal structure and composition. A simple WEP test is the comparison of the acceleration of two bodies of different composition in an external gravitational field. Other high-precision experiments include from Newton, Bessel and Potter's pendulum experiments to the classical torsion measurements of Eotvos, 370 Dicke, 371 and Braginsky. 372 There are several projects to improve the values measured with the help of satellites. The Einstein Equivalence Principle (EEP) is stronger and more comprehensive, stating that the WEP is valid, and the results of local non-gravitational experiments are independent of the speeds of the appropriate reference frames and the place and time they are performed. The independence 368 Ohanian and Ruffini, Gravitation and Spacetime, sec. 7.8. 369 For a distant observer, jets sometimes seem to move faster than light, but this is an optical illusion that does not violate the principles of relativity. 370 Roland V. Eötvös, Desiderius Pekár, and Eugen Fekete, "Beiträge Zum Gesetze Der Proportionalität von Trägheit Und Gravität," Annalen Der Physik 373 (1922): 11–66, 68, https://doi.org/10.1002/andp.19223730903. 371 R. H. Dicke, Gravitation and the Universe., 1969, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1969grun.book.....D. 372 V. B. Braginsky and V. I. Panov, "Verification of the equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass," Soviet Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics 34 (1972): 34, 463–466, https://istina.msu.ru/publications/article/4687588/. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 95 of the frame of reference is called local Lorentz invariance, and independence of its internal structure and composition is called local position invariance. The special relativity benefited from a series of experiments that subsequently contributed to the acceptance of the GR: • Michelson-Morley experiment and subsequent equivalent experiments, 373 • Ives-Stillwell, Rossi-Hall, other tests of time dilation, 374 • independence of the speed of light from the source speed, using X-ray binary stellar sources, and high energy pions, 375 • isotropy of light speed. 376 In recent years, scientists have begun to look for apparent violations of the Lorentz invariance resulting from certain quantum gravity models. A simple modality, embodied in the c2 formalism, assumes that the electromagnetic interactions suffer a slight violation of the Lorentz invariance by changing the velocity of the electromagnetic radiation c relative to the limiting speed of the testing particle of particles, 377 trying to select a prefered universal resting frame, possible of cosmic background radiation. 378 Through the Michelson-Morley experiments the speed of light is verified; the Brillet-Hall experiment379 used a Fabry-Perot laser interferometer; in other experiments, the frequencies of the oscillators of the electromagnetic cavity in different orientations were compared with each other or with the atomic clocks, depending on the orientation of the laboratory. 380 373 A. Brillet and J. L. Hall, "Improved Laser Test of the Isotropy of Space," Physical Review Letters 42 (February 1, 1979): 42, 549–552, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.42.549. 374 F. J. M. Farley et al., "The Anomalous Magnetic Moment of the Negative Muon," Il Nuovo Cimento A (19651970) 45, no. 1 (September 1, 1966): 45, 281–286, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02738104. 375 T. Alväger et al., "Test of the Second Postulate of Special Relativity in the GeV Region," Physics Letters 12, no. 3 (October 1, 1964): 12, 260–262, https://doi.org/10.1016/0031-9163(64)91095-9. 376 null Krisher et al., "Test of the Isotropy of the One-Way Speed of Light Using Hydrogen-Maser Frequency Standards," Physical Review. D, Particles and Fields 42, no. 2 (July 15, 1990): 42, 731–734. 377 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." 378 C. H. Lineweaver et al., "The Dipole Observed in the COBE DMR 4 Year Data," The Astrophysical Journal 470 (October 1, 1996): 470, 38–42, https://doi.org/10.1086/177846. 379 Brillet and Hall, "Improved Laser Test of the Isotropy of Space," 42, 549–552. 380 Paul L. Stanwix et al., "Test of Lorentz Invariance in Electrodynamics Using Rotating Cryogenic Sapphire Microwave Oscillators," Physical Review Letters 95, no. 4 (July 21, 2005): 040404, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.95.040404. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 96 The principle of local position invariance can be tested by the gravitational redshift experiments. The first such experiments were the Pound-Rebka-Snider series from 1960 to 1965, which measured the frequency change of the gamma radiation photons. The most accurate standard redshift test was the Vessot-Levine rocket experiment in June 1976. 381 A "null" redshift experiment conducted in 1978 tested whether the relative rate of two different clocks depends on position. The most recent experiments have used laser cooling and trapping techniques to obtain extreme clock stability and compared the hyperfine transition Rubidium-87, 382 the ionic quadrupole transition Mercury-199, 383 the atomic transition with Hydrogen 1S2S, 384 or an optical transition in Ytterbium-171, 385 against hyperfine ground-state transition in Cesium-133. 386 The Einstein equivalence principle is part of the hard core of Einstein's research program, since the existence of EEP implies gravity as a phenomenon in "curved spacetime". It turns out that the only theories of gravity that can fully incorporate EEP are those that satisfy the postulates of "metric theories of gravity", respectively: 387 1. Spacetime has a symmetrical value. 2. The trajectories of free-falling bodies are geodesic of this metric. 3. In the free-falling local reference frames, the non-gravitational laws of physics are those written in the language of special relativity. In 1960, Schiff developed the hypothesis that any complete, self-consistent theory of gravity that embodies strong equivalence principle (SEP) necessarily embodies EEP (the validity of SEP itself guarantees the validity of local Lorentz and position invariance). In this case, it follows, based on the energy conservation hypothesis, that Eotvos experiments are direct empirical bases for EEP. The first successful attempt to prove Schiff's conjecture more formally was made by Lightman and 381 R. F. C. Vessot et al., "Test of Relativistic Gravitation with a Space-Borne Hydrogen Maser," Physical Review Letters 45, no. 26 (December 29, 1980): 45, 2081–2084, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.45.2081. 382 H. Marion et al., "A Search for Variations of Fundamental Constants Using Atomic Fountain Clocks," Physical Review Letters 90, no. 15 (April 18, 2003): 90, 150801–1–4, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.150801. 383 S. Bize et al., "Testing the Stability of Fundamental Constants with the 199Hg+ Single-Ion Optical Clock," Physical Review Letters 90, no. 15 (April 18, 2003): 90, 150802–1–4, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.150802. 384 M. Fischer et al., "New Limits to the Drift of Fundamental Constants from Laboratory Measurements," Physical Review Letters 92, no. 23 (June 10, 2004): 92, 230802–1–4, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.230802. 385 E. Peik et al., "New Limit on the Present Temporal Variation of the Fine Structure Constant," Physical Review Letters 93, no. 17 (October 18, 2004): 93, 170801–1–4, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.93.170801. 386 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." 387 Will. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 97 Lee, 388 using a framework called "THεμ formalism" which includes all metric theories of gravity and many non-metric theories, which uses the rate of falling of a "tested" body consisting of interacting charged particles. Empirical evidence supporting the Einstein principle of equivalence states that the only theories of gravity that hope to be viable are metric theories, or possibly theories that are metric outside of very weak or short-lived non-metric couplings (as in string theory). 389 There may be other gravitational fields besides metric ones, such as scalar or vector fields, which mediate how matter and non-gravitational fields generate gravitational fields and produce the metric; but once the metric is determined, it only acts backwards in the manner prescribed by the EEP. Thus, all metric theories of gravity can be divided into two fundamental classes: "purely dynamic" and "previously geometric." 390 In a "purely dynamic metric theory" the gravitational fields have the structure and evolution determined by the partially coupled differential field equations. A "previously geometric" theory contains "absolute elements", fields or equations whose structure and evolution are given a priori and are independent of the structure and evolution of the other fields of theory. General relativity is a purely dynamic theory. The strong equivalence principle states that: WEP is valid for all bodies, and the result of any local testing experiment is independent of the speed of the apparatus and the place and time of the experiment. Compared to WEP, SEP includes gravitational sources (planets, stars) and experiments involving gravitational forces (Cavendish experiments, gravimetric measurements). Note that WEP includes EEP as a special case where local gravitational forces are ignored. If the WEP is strictly valid, there must be only one gravitational field in the universe, the metric g, but there is no rigorous evidence of this statement so far. The Einstein equivalence principle can be tested, in addition to WEP tests, by looking for the variation of dimensionless constants and mass ratios. The strong equivalence principle implies that gravity is geometric by nature and does not contain additional associated fields. Thus, SEP says that a measurement of a flat space surface is absolutely 388 A. P. Lightman and D. L. Lee, "Restricted Proof That the Weak Equivalence Principle Implies the Einstein Equivalence Principle," Physical Review. D, Particles Fields 8, no. 2 (1973): 8, 364–376, http://inis.iaea.org/Search/search.aspx?orig_q=RN:5098997. 389 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." 390 Will. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 98 equivalent to any other flat space surface in any other part of the universe. Einstein's theory of general relativity is the only theory of gravity that satisfies the strong equivalence principle. The SEP can be tested by searching for a variation of Newton's gravitational constant G, or a variation of the mass of the fundamental particles. These would result from deviations from the law of gravitational force from general relativity, especially deviations from inverse-quadratic proportionality, which can be explained by the existence of the fifth force. Other sought effects are the Nordtvedt effect, a "polarization" of the orbits of the solar system due to the gravitational acceleration of self-generation at a rate different from the normal matter, sought by the Lunar Laser Ranging experiment. Other tests include studying the deflection of radiation from radio sources far from the sun measured with very long basic interferometry or measuring the change in frequency of signals to and from the Cassini spacecraft. Quantum gravity theories, such as string theory and loop quantum gravity, predict violations of the weak equivalence principle. Currently, the tests of the weak equivalence principle have a degree of sensitivity so that the non-detection of an infringement is as profound as the discovery of an infringement. Discovering the violation of the principle of equivalence would provide an important guide to unification. 391 A formalism of non-gravitational laws of physics in the presence of gravity that incorporates the possibility of nonmetric (nonuniversal) and metric coupling is the TH formalism elaborated by Lightman and Lee. 392 It allows quantitative forecasting for experiment results. 2.4.4.5 Solar system tests The dynamic environment of spacetime around Earth allows testing of gravitational theories, with geodetic satellites as test masses. An example is the LAGEOS satellites, launched for geodetic and geodynamic purposes, and for fundamental physical studies. LAGEOS satellites are used as a target for laser pulses sent from ground stations to calculate the instantaneous distance ("Satellite Laser Ranging" (SLR) technique). The determination of the orbit of the satellites requires models for the dynamics of the satellites, for the measurement procedures and for the transformations of the reference frames. 393 The models take into account geopotential, lunar and planetary disturbances, 391 James Overduin et al., "The Science Case for STEP," Advances in Space Research 43, no. 10 (May 15, 2009): 1532–1537, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asr.2009.02.012. 392 Lightman and Lee, "Restricted Proof That the Weak Equivalence Principle Implies the Einstein Equivalence Principle," 8, 364–76. 393 Friedrich W. Hehl et al., "General Relativity with Spin and Torsion: Foundations and Prospects," Reviews of Modern Physics 48, no. 3 (July 1, 1976): 393– 416, https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.48.393. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 99 pressure of solar radiation and Earth's albedo, Rubin-cam and Yarkovsky-Schach effects, SLR station coordinates, ocean loading, earth orientation parameters and measurement procedure. 394 The models also include general relativistic corrections in the post-Newtonian parametric formalism (PPN). 395 The tests performed confirm the general relativity predictions (Schwarzschild precession, Lense-Thirring effect) and exclude an alternative theory (NLRI/Yukawa potential). 2.4.5 Strong field gravitational tests When the density of the body becomes large enough, general relativity predicts the formation of a black hole. The neutron stars of about 1.4 solar masses and the black holes are the final stage for the evolution of the massive stars. 396 Usually a black hole in a galaxy has played an important role in its formation and related cosmic structures. Such bodies provide an efficient mechanism for the emission of electromagnetic radiation397 and the formation of microquasars. 398 Accretion can lead to relativistic jets. General relativity allows the modeling of these phenomena, 399 confirmed by observations. Black holes are the areas where gravitational waves are searched, sometimes formed by combining binary stars with black holes, detected on Earth; the pre-fusion phase ("chirp") can be used as a "standard illumination" to deduce the distance to the fusion events, serving as a proof of cosmic 394 Emil T. Akhmedov et al., "Experimental Tests of Quantum Gravity and Exotic Quantum Field Theory Effects," ResearchGate, 2014, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274948108_Experimental_Tests_of_Quantum_Gravity_and_Exotic_Quantu m_Field_Theory_Effects. 395 Nordtvedt and Will, "Conservation Laws and Preferred Frames in Relativistic Gravity. II. Experimental Evidence to Rule Out Preferred-Frame Theories of Gravity," 775–792. 396 Cole Miller, "Stellar Structure and Evolution (Lecture Notes for Astronomy 606)," 2002, http://www.astro.umd.edu/~miller/teaching/astr606/. 397 R. D. Blandford, "Astrophysical Black Holes.," in Three Hundred Years of Gravitation, 1987, 277–329, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1987thyg.book..277B. 398 Annalisa Celotti, John C. Miller, and Dennis W. Sciama, "Astrophysical Evidence for the Existence of Black Holes," Classical and Quantum Gravity 16, no. 12A (December 1, 1999): A3–A21, https://doi.org/10.1088/02649381/16/12A/301. 399 José A. Font, "Numerical Hydrodynamics in General Relativity," Living Reviews in Relativity 6, no. 1 (August 19, 2003): 2, https://doi.org/10.12942/lrr-2003-4. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 100 expansion over long distances. 400 When a black hole joins another supermassive black hole, it can provide direct information about the geometry of the supermassive black hole. 401 In February 2016 and later in June 2016, June 2017 and August 2017, Advanced LIGO announced that it had directly detected gravitational waves from a black hole stellar fusion. 402 Gravitational waves can be detected directly, and many aspects of the Universe can be found in their study. The astronomy of gravitational waves is concerned with the testing of general relativity and of alternative theories, verifying the predicted shape of the waves and their conformity with solutions of the field equations of the theories. 403 Other tests for strong gravity allow the gravitational redshift of the light from the star S2 orbiting the supermassive black hole Sagittarius A* in the center of the Milky Way, with the help of the Very Large Telescope using GRAVITY, NACO and SIFONI. 404 The strong equivalence principle of general relativity for bodies with strong self-gravity was tested using a triple star system called PSR J0337+1715, consisting of a neutron star with a white dwarf star located approximately 4,200 light-years from Earth. which orbit along with another distant white dwarf star. The observations, with high accuracy, compare the way in which the gravitational pull of the outer white dwarf affects the pulsar which has a strong autogravity and the inner white dwarf. The results confirmed the general theory of relativity. 405 2.4.5.1 Gravitational lenses When a massive astronomical body lies between the observer and a distant body with an appropriate mass and distance, several distorted images of the distant body can be seen, forming 400 Neal Dalal et al., "Short GRB and Binary Black Hole Standard Sirens as a Probe of Dark Energy," Physical Review D 74, no. 6 (September 18, 2006): 063006, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.74.063006. 401 Leor Barack and Curt Cutler, "LISA Capture Sources: Approximate Waveforms, Signal-to-Noise Ratios, and Parameter Estimation Accuracy," Physical Review D 69, no. 8 (April 30, 2004): 082005, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.69.082005. 402 Charles Q. Choi, "Gravitational Waves Detected from Neutron-Star Crashes: The Discovery Explained," Space.com, 2017, https://www.space.com/38471-gravitational-waves-neutron-star-crashes-discovery-explained.html. 403 B. P. Abbott et al., "Tests of General Relativity with GW150914," Physical Review Letters 116, no. 22 (May 31, 2016): 221101, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.116.221101. 404 R. Abuter et al., "Detection of the Gravitational Redshift in the Orbit of the Star S2 near the Galactic Centre Massive Black Hole," Astronomy & Astrophysics 615 (July 1, 2018): L15, https://doi.org/10.1051/0004-6361/201833718. 405 Anne M. Archibald et al., "Universality of Free Fall from the Orbital Motion of a Pulsar in a Stellar Triple System," Nature 559, no. 7712 (July 2018): 73–76, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0265-1. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 101 the effect known as gravitational lenses, 406 two or more images are the shape of a light ring. known as the Einstein ring or partial rings (arches). 407 The first such observation was in 1979. 408 The effect can be measured according to the brightness of the distant body. Gravitational lenses allow the presence and distribution of dark matter to be detected, being a kind of "natural telescope" for observing distant galaxies and obtaining an independent estimate of the Hubble constant. Their statistical assessments provide information about the structural evolution of galaxies. 409 The observation of gravitational lenses is expected to complement observations in the electromagnetic spectrum, 410 to provide information on black holes, neutron stars and white dwarfs, and on processes in supernovae and the very early universe, and to check the alternative theories including string theory in quantum gravitation. 411 Gravitational lenses also form at the level of the solar system, with the Sun interposed between the observer and the light source, but the convergence point of such lenses would be approximately 542 AU from the Sun. However, this distance exceeds the capabilities of the probe equipment and goes far beyond the solar system. Sources for gravitational lenses are radio sources far away, especially some quasars. For detection are used long-distance radio telescopes combined with very long basic interferometry technique. For accuracy, we consider the systematic effects on the Earth level, where the telescopes are located. The observations confirmed the value of the deformation predicted by the general relativity. 412 406 Joachim Wambsganss, "Gravitational Lensing in Astronomy," Living Reviews in Relativity 1, no. 1 (November 2, 1998): 12, https://doi.org/10.12942/lrr-1998-12. 407 Bernard Schutz, "Gravity from the Ground Up by Bernard Schutz," Cambridge Core, December 2003, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807800. 408 D. Walsh, R. F. Carswell, and R. J. Weymann, "0957 + 561 A, B: Twin Quasistellar Objects or Gravitational Lens?," Nature 279, no. 5712 (May 1979): 381–384, https://doi.org/10.1038/279381a0. 409 Ramesh Narayan and Matthias Bartelmann, "Lectures on Gravitational Lensing," ArXiv:Astro-Ph/9606001, June 3, 1996, sec. 3.7, http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/9606001. 410 Kip S. Thorne, "Gravitational Waves," ArXiv:Gr-Qc/9506086, June 30, 1995, 160, http://arxiv.org/abs/grqc/9506086. 411 Curt Cutler and Kip S. Thorne, "An Overview of Gravitational-Wave Sources," ArXiv:Gr-Qc/0204090, April 30, 2002, 4090, http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0204090. 412 E. Fomalont et al., "Progress in Measurements of the Gravitational Bending of Radio Waves Using the VLBA," The Astrophysical Journal 699, no. 2 (July 10, 2009): 1395–1402, https://doi.org/10.1088/0004-637X/699/2/1395. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 102 With the help of the astronomical satellite Hipparcos of the European Space Agency it was found that the whole sky is slightly distorted due to the gravitational deviation of the light caused by the Sun (except the direction opposite to the Sun). This requires some minor corrections for virtually all stars. 2.4.5.2 Gravitational waves Gravitational waves were predicted in 1916 by Albert Einstein. 413 They are disturbances in the curved spacetime geometry, generated by the accelerated masses and propagating with the speed of light. They were confirmed on February 11, 2016 by the Advanced LIGO team. 414 For the weak fields a linear approximation can be made for these waves. Data analysis methods are based on the Fourier decomposition of these waves. 415 Exact solutions can be obtained without approximation, but for gravitational waves produced by the fusion of two black holes, numerical methods are the only way to build suitable models. 416 Gravitational waves were initially suggested by Henri Poincaré in 1905, and then predicted in 1916 by Albert Einstein based on the general theory of relativity. The laws of classical mechanics do not guarantee their existence, this being one of the classical limitations. Binary neutron star systems are a powerful source of gravitational waves during fusion. Gravitational waves were detected by the LIGO and VIRGO observatories. They allow the observation of the fusion of black holes and the study of the distant universe, opaque to electromagnetic radiation. Einstein and Rosen published the first correct version of gravitational waves in 1937. 417 Gravitational waves are created by accelerating mass in space, but if the acceleration is spherically 413 Albert Einstein, "Näherungsweise Integration Der Feldgleichungen Der Gravitation," Sitzungsberichte Der Königlich Preussischen Akademie Der Wissenschaften (Berlin), Seite 688-696., 1916, 1: 688–696, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1916SPAW.......688E. 414 B. P. Abbott, The LIGO Scientific Collaboration, and the Virgo Collaboration, "Observation of Gravitational Waves from a Binary Black Hole Merger," Physical Review Letters 116, no. 6 (February 11, 2016): 116(6): 061102, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.116.061102. 415 Piotr Jaranowski and Andrzej Królak, "Gravitational-Wave Data Analysis. Formalism and Sample Applications: The Gaussian Case," Living Reviews in Relativity 8, no. 1 (March 21, 2005): 8 (1): 3, https://doi.org/10.12942/lrr-2005-3. 416 Edward Seidel, "Numerical Relativity: Towards Simulations of 3D Black Hole Coalescence," ArXiv:GrQc/9806088, June 23, 1998, 6088, http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9806088. 417 A. Einstein and N. Rosen, "On Gravitational Waves," Journal of The Franklin Institute 223 (January 1, 1937): 43– 54, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0016-0032(37)90583-0. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 103 symmetrical, no gravitational waves are radiated. Binary systems always radiate gravitational waves, because their acceleration is asymmetrical. The first indirect detection of gravitational waves was in 1974 by Hulse and Taylor, from a binary pulsar PSR 1913+16, using delayed radio wave detection. 418 They found that the gravitational time dilation was in line with the GR prediction and contradicted most alternative theories. 419 The first direct detection of gravitational waves occurred in 2015, with two Advanced LIGO detectors, from source GW150914, a binary black hole. 420 These observations confirmed the spacetime curvature as described by GR. Joseph Weber designed and built the first gravitational wave detectors, in 1969 reporting that he detected the first gravitational waves, then reporting signals regularly from the Galactic Center. But the frequency of detection raised doubts about the validity of his observations. 421 Some scientists disagree with the fact that experimental results are accepted on the basis of epistemological arguments. Based on gravitational wave detection experiments, Harry Collins developed an argument he calls the "experimenters' regress":422 a correct result is obtained with a good experimental apparatus, respectively one that gives correct results. Collins argues that there are no formal criteria for checking the device, not even by calibrating a device by using a "surrogate" signal. 423 The problem is finally solved by negotiation within the scientific community, depending on factors such as the career, social and cognitive interests of the scientists, and the perceived usefulness for future work, but without using epistemological criteria or rational judgment. Thus, Collins asserts that there is serious doubt about experimental evidence and their use in evaluating scientific hypotheses and theories. The example given by Collins is early experiments to detect gravitational radiation or gravitational waves. 424 418 Hulse and Taylor, "Discovery of a Pulsar in a Binary System," L51–L53. 419 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment," 17. 420 Abbott, The LIGO Scientific Collaboration, and the Virgo Collaboration, "Observation of Gravitational Waves from a Binary Black Hole Merger," 116(061102). 421 Jorge L. Cervantes-Cota, Salvador Galindo-Uribarri, and George F. Smoot, "A Brief History of Gravitational Waves," Universe 2, no. 3 (September 2016): 2 (3): 22, https://doi.org/10.3390/universe2030022. 422 Collins, Changing Order, 4:79-111. 423 Franklin and Perovic, "Experiment in Physics." 424 Allan Franklin, "Calibration," in Can That Be Right? Essays on Experiment, Evidence, and Science, ed. Allan Franklin, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1999), 5: 31–80, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5334-8_9. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 104 The physical community was forced to compare Weber's assumptions with reports of six other experiments that did not detect gravitational waves. Collins argues that the decision between these contradictory experimental results could not be made on epistemological or methodological grounds the six negative experiments could not legitimately be considered as replications, and thus were considered less important. In his experiments Weber used a new type of device to detect a hitherto unobserved phenomenon, which could not be subjected to standard calibration techniques. 425 The results of other scientists who contradicted Weber's were more numerous, and have been carefully verified, and have been confirmed by other groups of researchers. They investigated whether their analysis procedure, a linear algorithm, could explain the failure in observing Weber's results. They changed the procedure to the one used by Weber, a nonlinear algorithm, to analyze their own data, but again found no trace of gravitational waves. They recalibrated their experimental devices by introducing known acoustic energy impulses and thus detecting a signal. 426 There were other doubts about Weber's analysis procedures. An admitted programming error generated false coincidences between the two detectors that could be interpreted during the experiments as real. The results of the critics were much more credible from the point of view of the procedures that had to be followed: they verified the results by independent confirmation that included the sharing of data and analysis programs, eliminated a plausible source of error, and they calibrated the devices by injecting known energy pulses and observing the output. Allan Franklin and Slobodan Perovic believe that the scientific community made a motivated judgment by initially rejecting Weber's results by accepting those of his critics. Although no strict formal rules were applied, the procedure was reasonable. 427 Another way of detecting gravitational waves is through the interaction of the waves with the walls of a microwave cavity, with a formalism developed by Caves, for measuring inertial frame dragging428 and detecting high frequency gravitational waves. 429 425 Franklin and Perovic, "Experiment in Physics." 426 Franklin and Perovic. 427 Franklin and Perovic. 428 C. M. Will, "The Theoretical Tools of Experimental Gravitation," 1974, 1, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1974exgr.conf....1W. 429 Caves, "Theoretical Investigations of Experimental Gravitation." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 105 2.4.5.3 Synchronization binary pulsars Pulsars are rotating neutron stars that emit radio waves in pulses as they rotate, thus functioning as watches that allow a very precise measurement of their orbital movements. Their observations showed that their precessions that cannot be explained by classical mechanics can be explained by general relativity. 430 Measurements on binary pulsars can test the combined relativistic effects, including the Shapiro delay. 431 And, since the gravitational field near the pulsars is strong, the weak equivalence principle can also be tested due to the invariant position of the objects with strong self-gravity properties. 432 2.4.5.4 Extreme environments Extreme gravity environments are close to very massive compact bodies, where the curvature of spacetime is very pronounced and the general relativistic effects are profound. These are usually neutron stars and black holes (especially supermassive ones), the active galactic nucleus and quasars. Deviations from the GR are most likely to occur here, under strong gravity regime. Such a test, for 16 years, was performed by Gillessen et al., 433 for Sagitarius A* [Sgr A*], a light radio source in the center of the Milky Way where there is a supermassive black hole. The observations made by Hambaryan et al. 434 were in full agreement with the GR, an essential confirmation for this theory. 430 Joel M. Weisberg, David J. Nice, and Joseph H. Taylor, "Timing Measurements of the Relativistic Binary Pulsar PSR B1913+16," The Astrophysical Journal 722, no. 2 (October 20, 2010): 722 (2): 1030–1034, https://doi.org/10.1088/0004-637X/722/2/1030. 431 Lijing Shao and Norbert Wex, "Tests of Gravitational Symmetries with Radio Pulsars," Science China Physics, Mechanics & Astronomy 59, no. 9 (September 2016): 59(699501), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11433-016-0087-6. 432 Will, Theory and Experiment in Gravitational Physics, Revised Edition. 433 S. Gillessen et al., "Monitoring Stellar Orbits around the Massive Black Hole in the Galactic Center," The Astrophysical Journal 692, no. 2 (February 20, 2009): 692(2), pp.1075–1109, https://doi.org/10.1088/0004637X/692/2/1075. 434 V. Hambaryan et al., "On the Compactness of the Isolated Neutron Star RX J0720.4-3125," Astronomy & Astrophysics 601 (May 2017): A108, https://doi.org/10.1051/0004-6361/201630368. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 106 2.4.6 Cosmological tests The current cosmological models are built based on general relativity. The solutions of the specific equations, Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker, 435 allow to model the evolution of the universe starting from the Big Bang.436 Some of the parameters of the universe have been established by observations. Based on these, and other observational data, the models can be tested. 437 Predictions include the initial abundance of chemical elements formed in a period of nucleosynthesis during the Big Bang period, the subsequent structure of the universe, 438 cosmic background radiation, 439 and so on. Observations on the expansion velocity of the universe allow estimation of the total amount of matter, some of which theories predict that 90% is dark matter, with mass but without electromagnetic interactions, and cannot be directly observed. The gravitational redshift of the supernovae and the measurements of the cosmic background radiation show a dependence of the universe evolution on a cosmological constant with an acceleration of the cosmic expansion or, alternatively, a form of energy called "dark energy".440 From the measurements of the cosmic background radiation, 441 in 1980 the initial existence of an inflationary phase was deduced, followed by a strongly accelerated expansion phase after about 10-33 seconds, thus explaining the almost perfect homogeneity of the cosmic background radiation. 435 Sean M. Carroll, "The Cosmological Constant," Living Reviews in Relativity 4, no. 1 (February 7, 2001): 4 (1): 1, https://doi.org/10.12942/lrr-2001-1. 436 At large scales of about one hundred million light-years and more, the universe really looks isotropic and homogeneous, so simplified models are justified. 437 Sarah L. Bridle et al., "Precision Cosmology? Not Just Yet . . .," Science 299, no. 5612 (March 7, 2003): 299 (5612): 1532–1533, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1082158. 438 Volker Springel et al., "Simulations of the Formation, Evolution and Clustering of Galaxies and Quasars," Nature 435, no. 7042 (June 2005): 435 (7042): 629–636, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature03597. 439 Uros Seljak and Matias Zaldarriaga, "Signature of Gravity Waves in the Polarization of the Microwave Background," Physical Review Letters 78, no. 11 (March 17, 1997): 78 (11): 2054–2057, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.78.2054. 440 Thomas Buchert, "Dark Energy from Structure: A Status Report," General Relativity and Gravitation 40, no. 2 (February 1, 2008): 40 (2–3): 467–527, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10714-007-0554-8. 441 D. N. Spergel et al., "Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) Three Year Results: Implications for Cosmology," The Astrophysical Journal Supplement Series 170, no. 2 (June 2007): 170 (2): 377–408, https://doi.org/10.1086/513700. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 107 The phenomena in the area of the black holes question our fundamental concepts about space, time, determinism, irreversibility, information and causality. Normally, we can consider the current state of the Universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. Each state of the Universe is determined by a set of initial conditions and the laws of physics. Theorems apply only to mathematical objects, not to reality. The existence of solutions to some equations of physical laws does not imply physical existence, this being independent of our conceptions. The solutions of dynamic equations cannot predict all future events. General relativity implies the existence of all events represented by a manifold, so it is an ontological deterministic theory. But the impossibility of determining the horizons of black holes shows that general relativity is an example of a theory that can be determinist ontologically, but nonetheless epistemologically undetermined. 442 2.4.6.1 The expanding universe The Big Bang theory is the main cosmological model443 for the early history of the universe and its subsequent evolution. It provides an explanation for a wide range of phenomena, including the abundance of light elements, the cosmic microwave background, the structure of the universe, and Hubble's law. 444 The physicists did not agree that the universe started from a singularity or our present knowledge is insufficient to deduce the initial state. Measures of the expansion rate of the universe show that the universe was born 13.8 billion years ago. After the initial expansion, the universe cooled down into subatomic particles and then atoms. The coagulation of these primordial elements by gravity has led to the formation of stars and current galaxies. From several alternative theories, the scientific community has preferred the Big Bang theory due to its much greater heuristic power, coupled with a wide range of empirical evidence, such as the redshift analyzed by Edwin Hubble in 1929, and the discovery of cosmic background radiation in 1964. 445 The evolution of the universe is deduced starting from the present situation, towards an initial state of huge density and temperature. Particle accelerators can replicate conditions after the first moments of the universe, confirming and refining the details of the Big Bang model. The Big Bang theory explains many observed 442 Gustavo E. Romero, "Philosophical Issues of Black Holes," ArXiv:1409.3318 [Astro-Ph, Physics:Gr-Qc, Physics:Physics], September 10, 2014, http://arxiv.org/abs/1409.3318. 443 Dennis Overbye, "Cosmos Controversy: The Universe Is Expanding, but How Fast?," The New York Times, February 20, 2017, sec. Science, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/science/hubble-constant-universe-expandingspeed.html. 444 E. L Wright, "What Is the Evidence for the Big Bang?, In Frequently Asked Questions in Cosmology," 2009, http://www.astro.ucla.edu/~wright/cosmology_faq.html#BBevidence. 445 R. B. Partridge, 3K: The Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation (Cambridge University Press, 2007), xvii. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 108 phenomena. The Big Bang model is based on general relativity theory and simplifying assumptions, such as homogeneity and isotropy of space. The model equations were formulated by Alexander Friedmann, and similar solutions were found by Willem de Sitter. The parameterization of the Big Bang model as a standard model, called the Lambda-CDM model, allows current investigations of theoretical cosmology. The theoretical deductions from the observed phenomena lead us to an initial singularity (at time t = 0), with infinite density and temperature. 446 General relativity is not able to describe this regime, nor any other physical laws, nor can these laws be extrapolated beyond the end of the Planck period (10-37 seconds from the beginning of the expansion). Expansion measurements by observing supernovae and measuring temperature fluctuations in the cosmic microwave environment show that the "age of the universe" is 13.799 ± 0.021 billion years, 447 this result favoring the ΛCDM cosmological model. Measurements from Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) show conformity with the Lambda-CDM model where dark matter is assumed to be cold448 and account for about 23% of the matter / energy of the universe, while baryon matter represents about 4.6%. An "extended model" includes dark hot neutrino matter. Evidence from supernova observation and cosmic background radiation shows a universe dominated by a form of energy known as dark energy, that permeates all space, accounting for 73% of the total energy density in today's universe. Its composition and mechanism are unknown. 449 The core of the Big Bang research program includes two major hypotheses: the universality of physical laws and the cosmological principle (according to which the universe is largely homogeneous and isotropic). Currently is testing these hypotheses from the outside of the Big Bang research program. The first hypothesis was tested taking into account the largest possible deviation 446 Tai L. Chow, Gravity, Black Holes, and the Very Early Universe: An Introduction to General Relativity and Cosmology (Springer Science & Business Media, 2007), 211. 447 P. a. R. Ade et al., "Planck 2015 Results XIII. Cosmological Parameters," Astronomy & Astrophysics 594 (October 1, 2016): 594: A13, https://doi.org/10.1051/0004-6361/201525830. 448 D. N. Spergel et al., "First-YearWilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe(WMAP) Observations: Determination of Cosmological Parameters," The Astrophysical Journal Supplement Series 148, no. 1 (September 2003): 148 (1): 175–194, https://doi.org/10.1086/377226. 449 P. J. E. Peebles and Bharat Ratra, "The Cosmological Constant and Dark Energy," Reviews of Modern Physics 75, no. 2 (April 22, 2003): 75 (2): 559–606, https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.75.559. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 109 of the constant fine structure for the age of the universe of the order of 10-5. 450 The cosmological principle was confirmed at a level of 10-5 by the observations of the background cosmic radiation. 451 The oldest and most direct observational evidence of the Big Bang is the expansion of the universe according to Hubble's law (deduced from the redshift of galaxies), the discovery and measurement of cosmic background radiation, and the relative quantities of light elements produced by Big Bang nucleosynthesis. Recent observations on galaxy formation and the evolution and distribution of cosmic structures on a large scale also confirm this theory. 452 The current Big Bang models introduce various ad-hoc hypotheses for exotic physical phenomena that have not been observed in experiments or incorporated into the standard particle physics model. Of these, the dark matter hypothesis is currently being investigated at the laboratory level. 453 For the dark energy, no direct or indirect detection method has yet been found. 454 Hubble's law and space expansion are verified by observations of redshifts of galaxies and quasars. The expansion of the universe was predicted from general relativity by Alexander Friedmann in 1922455 and Georges Lemaître in 1927,456 confirming the Big Bang theory developed by Friedmann, Lemaître, Robertson and Walker. 450 A. V. Ivanchik, A. Y. Potekhin, and D. A. Varshalovich, "The Fine-Structure Constant: A New Observational Limit on Its Cosmological Variation and Some Theoretical Consequences," ArXiv:Astro-Ph/9810166, October 10, 1998, 343: 459, http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/9810166. 451 Jeremy Goodman, "Geocentrism Reexamined," Physical Review D 52, no. 4 (August 15, 1995): 52 (4): 1821– 1827, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.52.1821. 452 Michael D. Gladders et al., "Cosmological Constraints from the Red-Sequence Cluster Survey," The Astrophysical Journal 655, no. 1 (January 2007): 655 (1): 128–134, https://doi.org/10.1086/509909. 453 Bernard Sadoulet, "The Direct Detection of Dark Matter," ResearchGate, 1998, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260854303_The_Direct_Detection_of_Dark_Matter. 454 Partridge, 3K, xvii. 455 A. Friedman, "On the Curvature of Space," General Relativity and Gravitation 31, no. 12 (December 1, 1999): 10 (1): 377–386, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026751225741. 456 Abbé G. Lemaître, "A Homogeneous Universe of Constant Mass and Increasing Radius Accounting for the Radial Velocity of Extra-Galactic Nebulae," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 91, no. 5 (March 13, 1931): 47A: 41, https://doi.org/10.1093/mnras/91.5.483. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 110 Radiation of the cosmic microwave background was discovered in 1964 by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson, as an omnidirectional signal in the microwave band. This confirmed the Big Bang theory of Alpher, Herman and Gamow in 1950. In 1989, NASA launched the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE) satellite which, in 1990, by high-precision spectrum measurements, showed that the cosmic microwave background (CMB) frequency spectrum is an almost perfect black body; then in 1992, others found tiny fluctuations (anisotropies) at cosmic microwave background temperature throughout the sky. In the years 20002001, several experiments, such as BOOMERanG, concluded that the shape of the universe is almost a spatial plane, by measuring the typical angular dimension of anisotropies. 457 In 2003, the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) results rejected some specific models of cosmic inflation but were in line with inflation theory in general. 458 The relative abundances of the elements depend on the ratio between photons and baryons. The measurements are in agreement with those predicted from a single value of the baryon-photon ratio, fully confirming the deuterium, approximately 4He, and a larger difference for 7Li. But the general identity with the abundances predicted by Big Bang nucleosynthesis confirms this model. 459 The evolution and distribution of galaxies and quasars are in agreement with the Big Bang. Observations and theory suggest that the first quasars and galaxies formed about one billion years after the Big Bang, after which galaxy clusters and superclusters formed. Differences between relatively recently formed galaxies and those formed shortly after the Big Bang confirm this model and disprove the stationary model. 460 The primordial gas clouds were confirmed in 2011, by analyzing absorption lines in the spectra of distant quasars. They do not contain heavier elements, just hydrogen and deuterium. 461 457 A. Melchiorri et al., "A Measurement of Omega from the North American Test Flight of BOOMERANG," The Astrophysical Journal 536, no. 2 (June 20, 2000): 536(2): L63–L66, https://doi.org/10.1086/312744. 458 Spergel et al., "Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) Three Year Results," 170 (2): 377–408. 459 Barbara Ryden, Introduction to Cosmology, 2003, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2003itc..book.....R. 460 Edmund Bertschinger, "Cosmological Perturbation Theory and Structure Formation," ArXiv:AstroPh/0101009, December 31, 2000, http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0101009. 461 Michele Fumagalli, John M. O'Meara, and J. Xavier Prochaska, "Detection of Pristine Gas Two Billion Years After the Big Bang," Science 334, no. 6060 (December 2, 2011): 334 (6060): 1245–9, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1213581. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 111 The age of the universe estimated from the Hubble expansion and CMB is in agreement with the measurements of the stellar evolution in the globular groups and the radiometric dating of the individual stars. The prediction that the CMB temperature was higher in the past was experimentally proved by the observations of the very low temperature absorption lines in the gas clouds due to the redshift. 462 2.4.6.2 Cosmological observations Stephen Hawking introduced the concept of Hawking radiation according to which black holes have entropy. This concept states that black holes can radiate energy, conserving entropy and solving the problems of incompatibility with the second law of thermodynamics. The loss of energy suggests that black holes "evaporate" over time. A black hole acts as an ideal black body because it does not reflect light. The theory of the quantum field in curved spacetime predicts that the horizons of the event emit Hawking radiation with the same spectrum as a black body, 463 with a temperature inversely proportional to its mass, the order of billions of kelvins, making them essentially impossible to observe. The presence of a black hole can be deduced indirectly through its interaction with other materials and electromagnetic radiation. Matter falling on a black hole can form an external accretion disk, one of the brightest objects in the universe. If there are other stars orbiting a black hole, their orbits may be used to determine the mass and location of the black hole, after excluding alternatives such as neutron stars. In this way, it was established that the radio source Sagittarius A*, from the center of the Milky Way galaxy, contains a supermassive black hole of approximately 4.3 million solar masses. On February 11, 2016, LIGO announced the first observation of gravitational waves that are supposed to have been generated by a black hole fusion, 464 and in December 2018, another detection of an event from gravitational waves was announced, resulted from joining a black hole with a neutron star. 465 On April 10, 2019, the first image of a black hole was captured with the 462 A. Avgoustidis et al., "Constraints on the CMB Temperature-Redshift Dependence from SZ and Distance Measurements," Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics 2012, no. 02 (February 2012): 2012 (2): 013, https://doi.org/10.1088/1475-7516/2012/02/013. 463 P. C. W. Davies, "Thermodynamics of Black Holes," Reports on Progress in Physics 41, no. 8 (August 1978): 41 (8): 1313–1355, https://doi.org/10.1088/0034-4885/41/8/004. 464 Abbott, The LIGO Scientific Collaboration, and the Virgo Collaboration, "Observation of Gravitational Waves from a Binary Black Hole Merger," 116 (6): 061102. 465 LIGO Scientific Collaboration, "Detection of Gravitational Waves," 2019, https://www.ligo.org/detections.php. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 112 help of the Event Horizon Telescope observations in 2017 of the supermassive black holes in the galactic center of Messier 87. 466 The "no-hair" theorem states that a stable black hole has only three independent physical properties: mass, charge and angular momentum. 467 Any two black holes that have the same values for these properties cannot be distinguished according to classical (non-quantum) mechanics. These properties are visible from outside a black hole and can be measured. The horizon of events is similar to a dissipative system that is almost analogous to that of an elastic conductive membrane with electric friction and resistance the membrane paradigm. 468 There is no way to avoid losing information about the initial conditions, including quantum parameters.469 This behavior was called the paradox of black hole information loss. 470 The existence of the black holes is deduced by indirect observations, based on the gravitational interactions with its vicinity. 471 Observing the orbits of the stars around Sagittarius A* in the center of the Milky Way, provided strong evidence of the existence of a supermassive black hole. 472 In addition, there is some 466 K. L. Bouman et al., "Computational Imaging for VLBI Image Reconstruction," in 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2016, 913–922, https://doi.org/10.1109/CVPR.2016.105. 467 Markus Heusler, Piotr T. Chruściel, and João Lopes Costa, "Stationary Black Holes: Uniqueness and Beyond," Living Reviews in Relativity 15, no. 1 (December 2012): 15 (7): 7, https://doi.org/10.12942/lrr-2012-7. 468 Kip S. Thorne, Richard H. Price, and Douglas A. MacDonald, Black Holes: The Membrane Paradigm, 1986, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1986bhmp.book.....T. 469 The components of a quantum field inside and outside the black hole will generally be separated, but the micro-causality implies that the inseparably degrees of freedom from the black hole cannot recombine coherently with those from the outer universe. Thus, when the black hole has completely evaporated, these separations will disappear, and the entropy of the universe will increase. 470 Warren G. Anderson, "Black Hole Information Loss," 1996, http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Relativity/BlackHoles/info_loss.html. 471 NASA, "Black Holes | Science Mission Directorate," 2019, https://science.nasa.gov/astrophysics/focusareas/black-holes. 472 Gillessen et al., "Monitoring Stellar Orbits around the Massive Black Hole in the Galactic Center," 692 (2): 1075–1109. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 113 observational evidence that this cosmic body could have an event horizon, a clear feature of black holes. 473 By preserving the angular momentum, the gas in the gravitational well of a black hole forms a disklike structure around the object (accretion disk), 474 emitting electromagnetic radiation (mainly Xrays) that can be detected by telescopes. In some cases, the accretion discs may be accompanied by relativistic jets emitted along the poles, by which there is removed much of the energy. Many of the energetic phenomena of the universe are the accumulation of matter by the black holes, especially the active galactic nuclei and the quasars, considered to be the discs of accumulation of supermassive black holes. In November 2011, the first direct observation of an accretion disk for a quasar around a supermassive black hole was reported. 475 Binary X-ray systems emit a large part of their radiation when one of the stars picks up mass from another star, thus being able to study the existence of a black hole. 476 For this purpose, Cygnus X1, discovered by Charles Thomas Bolton, Louise Webster and Paul Murdin in 1972, was studied, the results not being certain as the accompanying star is much heavier than the candidate black hole. Subsequently, other better candidates were found. The lack of the accretion disk of such a system is due to an accumulation mass flow dominated by advection which, if confirmed by observation, is a strong evidence for the presence of an event horizon. 477 X-ray emissions from the accretion discs sometimes behave as quasi-periodic oscillations, with frequency dependent on the mass of the compact object. This phenomenon can be used to determine the mass of the black holes. Astronomers have observed certain galaxies, called "active", with unusual characteristics, such as unusual emission of spectral lines and very strong radio emissions. 478 They can be explained by the presence of supermassive black holes. The observational correlation between the mass of this 473 Avery E. Broderick, Abraham Loeb, and Ramesh Narayan, "The Event Horizon of Sagittarius A*," The Astrophysical Journal 701, no. 2 (August 20, 2009): 701(2): 1357–1366, https://doi.org/10.1088/0004-637X/701/2/1357. 474 J. A. Marck, "Shortcut Method of Solution of Geodesic Equations for Schwarzschild Black Hole," Classical and Quantum Gravity 13, no. 3 (March 1, 1996): 13 (3): 393–402, https://doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/13/3/007. 475 José A. Muñoz et al., "A Study of Gravitational Lens Chromaticity with the Hubble Space Telescope," The Astrophysical Journal 742, no. 2 (December 1, 2011): 742 (2): 67, https://doi.org/10.1088/0004-637X/742/2/67. 476 Celotti, Miller, and Sciama, "Astrophysical Evidence for the Existence of Black Holes," 16 (12A): A3–A21. 477 Ramesh Narayan and Jeffrey E. McClintock, "Advection-Dominated Accretion and the Black Hole Event Horizon," New Astronomy Reviews, Jean-Pierre Lasota, X-ray Binaries, Accretion Disks and Compact Stars, 51, no. 10 (May 1, 2008): 51 (10–12): 733–751, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newar.2008.03.002. 478 Julian Henry Krolik, Active Galactic Nuclei: From the Central Black Hole to the Galactic Environment (Princeton University Press, 1999). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 114 black hole and the dispersion velocity of the host galaxy, known as the M-sigma relationship, suggests a link between the formation of the black hole and the galaxy itself. 479 Scientists hope that in the future they will be able to test black holes by observing the effects caused by a strong gravitational field in their vicinity, such as the gravitational lens. There are already observations about weak gravitational lenses, in which the light rays are deflected with only a few seconds, but never directly for a black hole. There are several candidates for this purpose, orbiting around Sagittarius A*.480 There are several ad-hoc conjectures that have been introduced to better explain the observations of identical astronomical black hole candidates, but with different operating mechanisms: gravastar, black star (semi-classical gravity), 481 dark energy star, etc. 482 Cosmology, as the study of the physical universe, began as a branch of theoretical physics through the static model of Einstein's 1917 universe, later developed by Lemaître. 483 Since 1960, cosmology has been considered a branch of philosophy. The standard model of cosmology is based on extrapolations of existing theories, especially general relativity. It is based on a set of FriedmanLemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) solutions with uniform and three-dimensional symmetrical geometry with three possible curves: positive (spherical space), zero (Euclidean space), and negative (hyperbolic space). The basic characteristics of the models that are based on the FLRW solutions, which can be considered as the hard core for the related cosmological research program, are: the models are dynamic (universe constantly changing), the rate of expansion of the universe varies according to the different types of dominant material, and FLRW models have a uniqueness in a finite time in the past (Big Bang). 479 Laura Ferrarese and David Merritt, "A Fundamental Relation Between Supermassive Black Holes and Their Host Galaxies," The Astrophysical Journal 539, no. 1 (August 10, 2000): 539 (1): 9–12, https://doi.org/10.1086/312838. 480 Valerio Bozza, "Gravitational Lensing by Black Holes," General Relativity and Gravitation 42, no. 9 (September 1, 2010): 42 (9): 2269–2300, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10714-010-0988-2. 481 Charles Q. Choi, "Black Hole Pretenders Could Really Be Bizarre Quantum Stars," Scientific American, 2018, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/black-hole-pretenders-could-really-be-bizarre-quantum-stars/. 482 Philip Ball, "Black Holes 'Do Not Exist,'" Nature, March 31, 2005, news050328-8, https://doi.org/10.1038/news050328-8. 483 Lemaître, "A Homogeneous Universe of Constant Mass and Increasing Radius Accounting for the Radial Velocity of Extra-Galactic Nebulae." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 115 In the case of FKRW models, there are two types of observational tests for their verification: the geometry of the background space and its evolution is studied using the matter and radiation in the universe, or the mode of formation of the model structure that describes the evolution of small disturbances is studied. The observational study of the geometry of the universe shows that it is isotropic at sufficiently large scales, according to the data resulting from the cosmic radiation of the microwave background (CMB) and from discrete sources (galaxies, etc.). The study of the model's structure formation uses a small number of parameters for observations from different periods, using temperature anisotropies in CMB and the power spectrum of matter by observing galaxies as independent constraints of these parameters, and of the background parameters. 484 The standard cosmological model includes several periods in the evolution of the universe treated separately in experimental and observational verifications: 485 • Quantum gravity: the beginning period, when quantum effects were essential in describing phenomena • Inflation: a period of exponential expansion of the universe, during which pre-existing substances and radiation are rapidly diluted, and then the universe is repopulated with matter and energy by degrading the field in other areas at the end of inflation ("reheating"). • Big Bang nucleosynthesis: the period in which the constituents of the universe include neutrons, protons, electrons, photons and neutrinos, closely coupled in the local thermal equilibrium, and light elements appear. • Decoupling: electrons become bound in stable atoms and photons decouple with matter; as the univers expand, the photons cool adiabically but retain a spectrum of the black body background cosmic radiation that contains much information about the state of the universe at decoupling. 486 • Dark period: after decoupling, the baryon matter formed from neutral hydrogen and helium coagulates into stars; Dark Age ends with the emergence of light from the stars. • Structure formation: the first generation of stars is aggregated into galaxies, and galaxies into clusters; The massive stars end up in supernova explosions and spread in space heavy elements created inside them, forming the second generation of stars surrounded by planets. 484 Christopher Smeenk and George Ellis, "Philosophy of Cosmology," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/cosmology/. 485 Smeenk and Ellis. 486 P. a. R. Ade et al., "Planck 2015 Results XX. Constraints on Inflation," Astronomy & Astrophysics 594 (October 1, 2016): 594: A20, https://doi.org/10.1051/0004-6361/201525898. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 116 • Dark energy domination: dark energy (or a non-zero cosmological constant) gets to dominate the expansion of the universe, leading to accelerated expansion; the expansion will continue indefinitely if the dark energy is in fact a cosmological constant.487 The standard cosmological model includes several free parameters, such as the abundance density of different types of matter, which can be measured in several ways with distinct theoretical hypotheses and sources of error. At present, there are large differences between the different measurement methods, and the significance and implications of these differences are still unclear. The standard model of nucleosynthesis is confirmed by several independent evidence to eliminate isolated theoretical errors or sources of systematic errors. Although it is the most complete, the standard cosmological model encounters three problems that imply the need for a new physics: 488 there is no complete description of the nature or dynamics of dark matter, 489 dark energy490 and the inflationary field; 491 the formation of galaxies, 492 and the possible refutation of the model if objects in the universe with an age greater than the determined one of the universe would be discovered, by approx. 13.7 billion years. 493 There is a view that current cosmological evidence is not sufficient to determine which scientific theory to choose, and each theory according to a certain number of data offers quite different descriptions of the world. Duhem494 characterized the difficulty of choosing physical theories, and Quine495 pleaded for sub-determination. The difficulty lies in the characterization of the empirical 487 An alternative explanation, according to string theory, is that the universe has multiple dimensions and gravity is losing gravitons moving from one dimension to another. 488 Smeenk and Ellis, "Philosophy of Cosmology." 489 Gianfranco Bertone, Dan Hooper, and Joseph Silk, "Particle Dark Matter: Evidence, Candidates and Constraints," Physics Reports 405, no. 5 (January 1, 2005): 405(5–6): 279–390, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physrep.2004.08.031. 490 Peebles and Ratra, "The Cosmological Constant and Dark Energy," 75(2): 559–606. 491 David H. Lyth and Antonio Riotto, "Particle Physics Models of Inflation and the Cosmological Density Perturbation," Physics Reports 314, no. 1 (June 1, 1999): 314(1–2): 1–146, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0370-1573(98)00128-8. 492 Joseph Silk, "Formation of Galaxies," The Philosophy of Cosmology, April 2017, 161–178, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316535783.009. 493 G. F. R. Ellis and J. E. Baldwin, "On the Expected Anisotropy of Radio Source Counts," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 206, no. 2 (January 1, 1984): 206(2): 377–381, https://doi.org/10.1093/mnras/206.2.377. 494 Duhem, Vuillemin, and Broglie, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. 495 W. V. Quine, "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation," The Journal of Philosophy, January 1, 1970, 67(6): 178–183, https://doi.org/10.2307/2023887. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 117 content of the theories. Van Fraassen (1980) defines a theory as "empirically appropriate" if what is said about observable phenomena is true. In cosmology the basic characteristics of the standard model impose two fundamental limits: the finiteness of the speed of light, and the fact that the theories that can be tested by their implications for cosmology imply too much energy to be tested on Earth. (Ellis (2007)) The observational cosmology research program496 497 shows to what extent an ideal set of observations can determine the spacetime geometry based on a minimum of cosmological hypotheses. The ideal data set involves astrophysical objects that can be used as standards for determining the properties and evolution of some sources. In practice, observers do not have access to the ideal data set, so they face challenges in understanding the nature of the sources and their evolution. According to Christopher Smeenk and George Ellis, the problem in cosmology is the discrimination between models of a given theory, rather than a choice between competing theories. They give as an example the global symmetry assumed in the derivation of FLRW models. All the existing evidence is equally compatible with the models where this symmetry is not valid. One possibility would be that it be considered a priori, or as a precondition for cosmological theorizing. 498 Recently the justification of the FLRW models has been tried by using another weaker general principle, in conjunction with theorems related to homogeneity and isotropy. The Ehlers-GerenSachs theorem499 shows that if all geodesic observers in a model where expansion is accepted determine the free-propagating background radiation is exactly isotropic, then the FLRW model is confirmed. If the causal past is "typical", the observations along our universe line will constrain what other observers can see (the Copernican principle). This principle can be tested indirectly, by verifying isotropy through the Sunyaev-Zel'dovich effect. Other tests are direct with a sufficiently good set of standards, and an indirect test based on the elapsed time of cosmological redirection. This way of working offers an empirical argument that the observed universe is well approximated 496 J. Kristian and R. K. Sachs, "Observations in Cosmology," The Astrophysical Journal 143 (February 1, 1966): 143: 379-399, https://doi.org/10.1086/148522. 497 G. F. R. Ellis et al., "Ideal Observational Cosmology," Physics Reports 124, no. 5 (July 1, 1985): 124(5–6): 315– 417, https://doi.org/10.1016/0370-1573(85)90030-4. 498 Claus Beisbart, "Can We Justifiably Assume the Cosmological Principle in Order to Break Model Underdetermination in Cosmology?," Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40, no. 2 (December 1, 2009): 40(2): 175–205, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9098-9. 499 J. Ehlers, P. Geren, and R. K. Sachs, "Isotropic Solutions of the Einstein‐Liouville Equations," Journal of Mathematical Physics 9, no. 9 (September 1, 1968): 9(9): 1344–1349, https://doi.org/10.1063/1.1664720. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 118 by a FLRW model, thus transforming the initial philosophical hypothesis into an observationally tested basis. 500 Soviet physicist Yakov Zeldovici called the early universe the "poor man's accelerator", because by observing the early universe phenomena from high energy physics can be studied. For quantum gravity, cosmology offers the only practical way to evaluate competing ideas. Currently, there are debates about the legitimacy of different research programs in cosmology. One answer is to resort to hypothetical-deductivist (HD) models: a hypothesis becomes more reliable as one of its consequences is verified, and vice versa. But the HD model has several contested aspects (it is often called "naive HD", similar to Popper's naive falsifiability). The naive view does not allow the distinction between the sub-determined rival theories that make the same predictions. 501 Scientists distinguish between theories that simply "fit in with the data," as opposed to those that accurately capture laws and evaluate some successful predictions as more revealing than others. A more sophisticated methodology can explicitly recognize the criteria that scientists use to evaluate scientific theories, 502 which include explanatory power, and coherence with other theories, in addition to compatibility with evidence. These factors should be clear and discriminatory. Alternatively, some of the desirable characteristics may be considered as part of what constitutes an empirical success. 2.4.6.3 Monitoring of weak gravitational lenses With the help of the Hubble Space Telescope and the Very Large Telescope, general relativity tests were performed on a galactic scale. The ESO 325-G004 galaxy acts as a strong gravitational lens, distorting light from a farther galaxy and creating an Einstein ring around its center. Comparing ESO 325-G004 mass, by measurements of the motion of the stars inside this galaxy, with the curvature of the space around it, gravity behaved according to general relativity. 503 500 Smeenk and Ellis, "Philosophy of Cosmology." 501 Vincenzo Crupi, "Confirmation," May 30, 2013, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/confirmation/. 502 George F R Ellis, "Issues in the Philosophy of Cosmology," in Philosophy of Physics, ed. Jeremy Butterfield and John Earman, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2007), 1183–1286, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-044451560-5/50014-2. 503 Thomas E. Collett et al., "A Precise Extragalactic Test of General Relativity," Science 360, no. 6395 (June 22, 2018): 360 (6395): 1342–1346, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aao2469. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 119 Weak gravitational lens studies are in its infancy. The weak lenses produce distortions in the apparent image of the size, shape and fluxes of the astrophysical object used as a cosmic lens. The study of weak gravitational lenses is a good method for GR testing, and a strong proof of the existence of dark energy and dark matter. 504 Reyes and others measured "gravitational slip" as the difference between two different gravitational potentials that define matter disturbances. In the GR this value is zero or very small, but in other theories it is different from zero and leads to substantial differences in the power of gravitational lenses. 505 More recently, Blake et al., 506 performed similar GR tests on cosmological distances, using spectroscopic data and imaging. They found that the results validate the GR. 2.5 Anomalies of general relativity Over time, the general theory of relativity has accumulated several anomalies and discrepancies, indicating the need for a better theory about gravity or other approaches: • Stars in galaxies have a distribution of increasing speeds from the center to the periphery, with a greater variation than predicted. The same is true of galaxies in galaxy clusters. The hypothesis of dark matter, which would interact by gravity but not electromagnetically, could explain the discrepancy. There are also various changes in Newtonian dynamics that can explain this anomaly, such as the MOND theory. • Spacecrafts experienced greater acceleration than predicted during gravitational maneuvers. • The metric expansion of space seems to be accelerating. Dark energy was introduced as a hypothesis to explain this. A recent explanation is that space geometry is not homogeneous due to galaxy clusters, but this hypothesis is challenged. 507 504 Yong-Seon Song and Olivier Doré, "A Step towards Testing General Relativity Using Weak Gravitational Lensing and Redshift Surveys," Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics 2009, no. 03 (March 23, 2009): 025, https://doi.org/10.1088/1475-7516/2009/03/025. 505 Reinabelle Reyes et al., "Confirmation of General Relativity on Large Scales from Weak Lensing and Galaxy Velocities," Nature 464, no. 7286 (March 2010): 464(7286: 256–258, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature08857. 506 Chris Blake et al., "RCSLenS: Testing Gravitational Physics through the Cross-Correlation of Weak Lensing and Large-Scale Structure," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 456, no. 3 (March 1, 2016): 456(3): 2806–2828, https://doi.org/10.1093/mnras/stv2875. 507 Anil Ananthaswamy, "Swiss-Cheese Model of the Cosmos Is Full of Holes," New Scientist, 2008, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20026783-800-swiss-cheese-model-of-the-cosmos-is-full-of-holes/. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 120 • Recent measurements show that planetary orbits grow faster than predicted by the loss of the Sun's mass by radiative energy. • Photons from cosmic radiation should gain energy and then lose it on the way, but in reality, they gain twice as much energy as predicted by theory. One hypothesis would be that gravity decreases faster than the inverse square at certain distances. • Extra massive hydrogen clouds: Lyman-alpha spectral lines suggest that hydrogen clouds are more crowded at certain scales than expected and, like dark flux, may indicate that gravity is slower than inverse squares at certain distances. 508 The ad-hoc hypotheses introduced in general relativity to explain gravitational singularities based on energy conditions are not very efficient. More detailed assumptions on the content of the subject are needed. 509 Many scientists and philosophers have come to the conclusion that singularities must be associated with reaching the limits of the physical validity of general relativity, and a new theory of quantum gravity needs to be developed. A singularity that can causally influence certain parts of the space is called naked singularity. Penrose proposed the elimination of naked singularities using the cosmic censorship hypothesis. 510 Demonstrating the cosmic censorship hypothesis is one of the central mathematical problems of general relativity. According to some scientists, general relativity contains the germs of its own destruction, since the theory is incapable of predicting physics on the Planck scale, and problems such as nonrenormalizability and singularities are "known unknown." 511 2.6 The saturation point of general relativity According to the methodology of Lakatos research programs, general relativity can be divided into several periods: the initial period, the stagnation period, the maturity period, and the saturation point. The initial period ("Genesis", 1887-1919) includes the two great experiments of relativistic physics, the Michelson-Morley experiment and the Eotvos experiment, and the two confirmations, the deformation of light and the perihelion advance of Mercury. There followed a period of 508 Marcus Chown, "Gravity May Venture Where Matter Fears to Tread," New Scientist, accessed May 3, 2019, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20126990-400-gravity-may-venture-where-matter-fears-to-tread/. 509 Alan D. Rendall, "The Nature of Spacetime Singularities," ArXiv:Gr-Qc/0503112, November 2005, 76–92, https://doi.org/10.1142/9789812700988_0003. 510 R. Penrose, "Singularities and Time-Asymmetry.," 1979, 581–638, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1979grec.conf..581P. 511 David Tong, String Theory (University of Cambridge, 2009), http://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/user/tong/string/string.pdf. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 121 stagnation ("Hibernation", 1920-1960) during which the theory took it before technological and experimental possibilities, the theory being even removed from the textbooks of physics and astronomy. The maturity of the theory begins in 1960, when the astronomical discoveries and new experiments drew attention to the GR. This period (1960 1980) was named by Will as a "Golden Era",512 in which observable predictions of GR were systematized, compared to other alternative theories, and new experiments were proposed for testing. The first experiment of this period was developed to confirm the change in gravitational frequency of light (1960) and ended with the confirmation of the GR prediction of the energy loss of gravitational waves (1979) by observing the Hulse-Taylor binary pulsar. From 1980 the saturation zone of the GR began, called by Will as "Quest for Strong Gravity". Some of the new predictions of the theory are now insignificant and difficult to verify, in some cases requiring still undeveloped technologies. The theory began to be attacked by new experimental theories or techniques, such as using laser-cooled ion atoms and traps to perform ultra-precise tests, proposing a "fifth" force, or additional dimensions to test the inverse square law of gravity. Increased attention has begun to be paid to the effects of strong gravitational fields, near the horizon of the event of a non-rotating black hole, in neutron stars or, for the extended universe, associated gravitational fields on the Planck scale. In Einstein's equations of classical general relativity, there remains a fundamental asymmetry between gravitational and non-gravitational fields: on the left, a geometrical object (gμν, the Einstein tensor), representing the curvature of spacetime, is identical with the phenomenological but non -geometrical representation of tensor of the matter on the right side. (1) Gμν = kTμν, where Gμν ≡ Rμν - (1/2)gμνR Thus, in his lecture for the Nobel Prize in July 1923, Einstein stated: "The mind striving after unification of the theory cannot be satisfied that two fields should exist which, by their nature, are quite independent. A mathematically unified field theory is sought in which the gravitational field and the electromagnetic field are interpreted as only different components or manifestations of the same uniform field, ... The gravitational theory, considered in 512 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 122 terms of mathematical formalism, i.e., Riemannian geometry, should be generalized so that it includes the laws of the electromagnetic field." 513 There is theoretical evidence that disregards Einstein equivalence principle (EEP) in certain cases, through quantum gravitational effects, effects derived from string theory, or through other undetected interactions so far. In string theory there are such fields that violate EEP, but the theory is not yet mature enough to materialize such a refutation. Clifford M. Will states that observing effects that appear to violate the EEP is, to some extent, semantic. The fields involved in string theory can be long distances and can mimic gravitational fields, but no way has been found to do so. 514 The idea of using EEP tests in this way appeared in the 1980s, in search of a "fifth" force515 as a force of about a percentage of gravity but with a range of several hundred meters, implying a deviation from the inverse-square law of Newtonian gravity. The idea came about when using gravity profile measurements from deep mines in Australia and from new ideas in particle physics, suggesting the possible presence of very small gravity particles. Numerous experiments have sought evidence of this force by measuring acceleration differences by composition, but the results have not been conclusive, the consensus being that there is no credible experimental evidence for a fifth force. 516 The possibility that the inverse square law would be violated at very short intervals in laboratory tests517 provided that some of the extra spatial dimensions in string theory could extend beyond macroscopic scales. On a small scale, gravity deviates from the known law. Many methods of high precision and low noise have been developed, adapted for laboratory tests. No deviations from the inverse square law were found. 518 Gravitational singularities are considered to be a spacetime limit. General relativity allows for the existence of singularities, but it cannot say anything about what is happening inside them, and scientists have not yet agreed on a definition of them, also considering that without a geometry in accordance with the laws of physics cannot exist a spacetime location. In conclusion, they say, one 513 Albert Einstein, Fundamental Ideas and Problems of the Theory of Relativity: Lecture Delivered to the Nordic Assembly of Naturalists at Göteborg on July 11, 1923 (Nobel Museum, 2009), 489. 514 Will, "The Confrontation between General Relativity and Experiment." 515 Fischbach et al., "Reanalysis of the Eotvos Experiment," 56, 3–6. 516 C. M. Will, "Twilight Time for the Fifth Force?," 1990, 80, 472–479, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/9011192203/twilight-time-fifth-force. 517 Lisa Randall and Raman Sundrum, "An Alternative to Compactification," Physical Review Letters 83, no. 23 (December 6, 1999): 83, 4690–4693, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.83.4690. 518 Joshua C. Long et al., "Upper Limits to Submillimetre-Range Forces from Extra Space-Time Dimensions," Nature 421, no. 6926 (February 2003): 421, 922–925, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature01432. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 123 cannot speak of singularities, but rather of singular spacetimes, although in principle these terms are equivalent. 519 Clarke520 and Earman, 521 as well as Geroch, Can-bin and Wald522 and Curiel, 523 argue that a precise, rigorous and univocal definition of singularity is needed for a better approach to them and for a more accurate modeling of spacetime aspects. 524 It is common assertion that general relativity, considering spacetime as singular, predicts its own inability to limit the singularities of black holes and the Big Bang, negating their reality. It is hoped that a more fundamental theory, possibly quantum gravity, will solve this problem. 525 The black holes appear, according to general relativity, when the cosmic body collapsed under the so-called Schwarzschild ray, proportional to the body mass. The "event horizon" of a black hole is the point where there is no turning back, within which the gravitational attraction is greater than any attempt to exit this area, including for light.526 (1) For a standard black hole (uncharged, nonrotating), the horizon of the event is within the Schwarzschild radius. From the point of view of a person outside the event horizon, the time near a black hole is delayed due to the strong gravity, until the time intervals reach infinitely large within the horizons of events. From the perspective of the person entering the horizon of events, nothing unusual happens. Time is running the same way and he does not realize that he has entered the horizon of events. Relativistic black holes are purely gravitational entities. They are solutions to the "vacuum" of Einstein's field equations. In the context of general relativity, Erik Curiel states that gravity is given up and a curved geometry of spacetime is postulated that produces all the effects of gravity, the 519 Erik Curiel, "Singularities and Black Holes," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2019 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/spacetime-singularities/. 520 C. J. S. Clarke, "The Analysis of Space-Time Singularities by C. J. S. Clarke," Cambridge Core, May 1994, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511608155. 521 John Earman, "Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks: Singularities and Acausalities in Relativistic Spacetimes," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49, no. 2 (1998): 338–347. 522 Robert Geroch, Liang Can‐bin, and Robert M. Wald, "Singular Boundaries of Space–Times," Journal of Mathematical Physics 23, no. 3 (March 1, 1982): 23(3): 432–435, https://doi.org/10.1063/1.525365. 523 Erik Curiel, "The Analysis of Singular Spacetimes," Philosophy of Science 66, no. 3 (1999): 66(S1): S119–S145. 524 Nicolae Sfetcu, Singularitățile ca limite ontologice ale relativității generale (MultiMedia Publishing, 2018), http://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.17470.18242. 525 Abhay Ashtekar and Martin Bojowald, "Quantum Geometry and the Schwarzschild Singularity," Classical and Quantum Gravity 23, no. 2 (January 21, 2006): 23(2): 391–411, https://doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/23/2/008. 526 A more accurate description distinguishes other types of horizon, such as apparent horizons, cf. HawkingHawking et al., The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time, 312–20. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 124 black hole being no more a "thing" in space, but a feature of spacetime itself. 527 The matter of the collapsing star disappears in the singularity of the black hole, leaving only the geometrical properties of the black hole (mass, charge and angular momentum), according to theorems called "no-hair", regardless of the previous physical properties of objects that collapse into a black hole. A "naked" singularity does not have a horizon of events. This implies a fundamental break in the structure of spacetime. 528 529 A version of a naked singularity is the "white hole", a black hole reversed in time, from which matter and objects from nothing could appear. Since the equations of the field of general relativity do not select a preferred direction of time, and the formation of a black hole is allowed, then white holes will be allowed by these laws. 530 Roger Penrose asserts that naked singularities will never be formed, introducing an ad-hoc hypothesis called the "cosmic censorship hypothesis": a singularity will always be in a black hole that is surrounded by the horizon of events. The former was abandoned in time. Several alternative hypotheses have been proposed to eliminate the possibility of naked singularities that violate the principle of causality, 531 532 but none is considered satisfactory to date. Black holes provide an essential testing ground for the conceptual problems underlying quantum gravity and general relativity, regarding the violation of energy conservation and micro-causality, and the paradox of information loss. Quantum gravity seems to be the best candidate for modeling these phenomena. In 1971, Hawking introduced the conjecture that the total surface of event horizons in any group of black holes does not decrease, even if they unite (the second law of black hole mechanics, by similarity to entropy in thermodynamics). 533 To prevent the black holes from having zero entropy, Bekenstein proposed that a black hole would have an entropy proportional to the area of its horizon. 534 Hawking discovered that quantum field theory predicts that a black hole behaves like a black body radiating at a constant temperature, thus violating the second law of black hole mechanics 527 Curiel, "Singularities and Black Holes." 528 Sfetcu, Singularitățile ca limite ontologice ale relativității generale. 529 Earman, "Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks," 65–66. 530 Curiel, "Singularities and Black Holes." 531 Pankaj S. Joshi, "Cosmic Censorship: A Current Perspective," ArXiv:Gr-Qc/0206087, June 28, 2002, 17(15): 1067–1079, http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0206087. 532 Earman, "Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks," chap. 3. 533 S. W. Hawking, "Gravitational Radiation from Colliding Black Holes," Physical Review Letters 26, no. 21 (May 24, 1971): 26 (21): 1344–1346, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.26.1344. 534 Robert M. Wald, "The Thermodynamics of Black Holes," Living Reviews in Relativity 4, no. 1 (July 9, 2001): 4 (1): 6, https://doi.org/10.12942/lrr-2001-6. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 125 due to energy loss and hence shrinkage. But radiation removes also entropy, and so the amount of entropy of matter is increasing. This allows the formulation of the first law of black hole mechanics similar to the first law of thermodynamics, with the mass acting as energy, the gravity of the surface as temperature, and the area as entropy. 535 In this interpretation of the black hole, general relativity is unsatisfactory, and a better theory of quantum gravity is needed. 536 A black hole only holds information about the total mass, charge and angular momentum. The theory of stable black holes states that this loss is not a problem, because the information can be considered as being present in the black hole, inaccessible from the outside but represented on the horizon of the event in accordance with the holographic principle. But in the theory that black holes slowly evaporate through Hawking radiation, information about the matter that formed the black hole is irretrievably lost. In quantum mechanics, the loss of information corresponds to the violation of unity, related to the conservation of probability, resulting in the violation of energy conservation. 537 The latest studies show that information and unity are nevertheless preserved in a quantum treatment of the problem. 538 In the case of a body falling into a black hole, the theory of the quantum field in curved space involves quantities of Hawking radiation, including only a finite amount of information encoded in Hawking radiation. But the inseparability of the particle at the exit of all the Hawking radiation that the black hole has previously emitted creates a paradox called "the monogamy of inseparability." 539 To solve the paradox, one of the three theories tested over time should be discarded: the principle of Einstein's equivalence, unitarity, or the existing theory of the quantum field. The renunciation of the principle of equivalence implies a "firewall" that destroys the particles that enter in the horizon of the event. 540 The 2016 LIGO data shows possible echo signals 535 Wald, 4 (1): 6. 536 S. Carlip, "Black Hole Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics," in Physics of Black Holes: A Guided Tour, ed. Eleftherios Papantonopoulos, Lecture Notes in Physics (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009), 769: 89– 123, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88460-6_3. 537 Steven B. Giddings, "The Black Hole Information Paradox," ArXiv:Hep-Th/9508151, August 28, 1995, http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9508151. 538 Samir D. Mathur, "The Information Paradox: Conflicts and Resolutions," Pramana 79, no. 5 (November 1, 2012): 1059–73, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12043-012-0417-z. 539 Zeeya Merali, "Astrophysics: Fire in the Hole!," Nature News 496, no. 7443 (April 4, 2013): 20–23, https://doi.org/10.1038/496020a. 540 Jennifer Ouellette, "Black Hole Firewalls Confound Theoretical Physicists," Scientific American, 2012, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/black-hole-firewalls-confound-theoretical-physicists/. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 126 due to a fuzzy horizon of events, possible in fuzzball theories, but impossible in general classical relativity. 541 The need for consistency between quantum theory and general relativity, 542 and the existence of singularities, require the emergence of a complete theory of quantum gravity. 543 So far, such a complete and consistent theory has failed to develop, although there are several candidates. 544 The generalization of quantum field theory from the elementary particle physics to include gravity has failed. 545 At low energies the theory is acceptable, but at very high energies, the results are very divergent and lead to models without predictive power. 546 An attempt to eliminate these limitations is string theory, a quantum theory. The theory promises a unification of gravity with the other forces, supplementing the three spatial dimensions with another six. 547 A newer version of the theory, the superstring theory, is trying to unify general relativity and supersymmetry, under the name of supergravity, 548 and a hypothetical unifying model with eleven dimensions known as M-theory. 549 Another approach uses the canonical quantization of quantum theory in which, starting from general relativity, one reaches the Wheeler-deWitt equation, an analogue of the Schrödinger 541 Zeeya Merali, "LIGO Black Hole Echoes Hint at General-Relativity Breakdown," Nature News, 2016, 540, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature.2016.21135. 542 S. Carlip, "Quantum Gravity: A Progress Report," Reports on Progress in Physics 64, no. 8 (August 1, 2001): sec. 2, https://doi.org/10.1088/0034-4885/64/8/301. 543 Schutz, "Gravity from the Ground Up by Bernard Schutz," 407. 544 Herbert W. Hamber, Quantum Gravitation: The Feynman Path Integral Approach (Berlin Heidelberg: SpringerVerlag, 2009), https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783540852926. 545 G. 't Hooft and M. Veltman, "One-Loop Divergencies in the Theory of Gravitation," Annales de L'Institut Henri Poincare Section (A) Physique Theorique 20 (1974): 20 (1): 69, http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1974AIHPA..20...69T. 546 Steven Weinberg, The Quantum Theory of Fields, Volume 2: Modern Applications, 1 edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 547 M. B. Green, J. H. Schwarz, and E. Witten, "Superstring Theory. Vol. 1: Introduction," ZAMM Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics / Zeitschrift Für Angewandte Mathematik Und Mechanik 68, no. 6 (1988): 258–258, https://doi.org/10.1002/zamm.19880680630. 548 Steven Weinberg, The Quantum Theory of Fields, Volume 3: Supersymmetry, 1st Edition edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 549 P. K. Townsend, "Four Lectures on M-Theory," ArXiv:Hep-Th/9612121, December 11, 1996, 13: 385, http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9612121. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 127 equation, but which has been wrongly defined. 550 By introducing Ashtekar ad-hoc (variable) hypotheses, it was developed the theory of loop quantum gravity. 551 There are numerous other attempts to arrive at a viable theory of quantum gravity, based on the Feynman approach and the Regge calculation, dynamic triangulations, causality sets, twistor models552 or the models based on integrals of paths of the quantum cosmology. 553 All candidate theories still have major formal and conceptual problems that are difficult to overcome so far, including the impossibility of verifying predictions through experimental tests. 554 550 Karel Kuchař, "Canonical Quantization of Gravity," Relativity, Astrophysics and Cosmology, 1973, 237–288, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2639-0_5. 551 Abhay Ashtekar and Jerzy Lewandowski, "Background Independent Quantum Gravity: A Status Report," Classical and Quantum Gravity 21, no. 15 (August 7, 2004): 21 (15): R53–R152, https://doi.org/10.1088/02649381/21/15/R01. 552 Penrose, The Road to Reality. 553 S. W. Hawking and W. Israel, Quantum Cosmology, in Three Hundred Years of Gravitation (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 631–651. 554 John H. Schwarz, "String Theory: Progress and Problems," Progress of Theoretical Physics Supplement 170 (May 1, 2007): 170: 214–226, https://doi.org/10.1143/PTPS.170.214. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 128 3. Quantum gravity Recent decades indicate "a blurring of distinction between physical science and mathematical abstraction ... [reflecting] a growing tendency to accept, and in some cases ignore, serious testability problems." 555 Oldershaw lists dozens of major non-testing issues in the preinstrumentalist era. From a methodological point of view, both Newton and Einstein, and later Dirac, unreservedly supported the principle of mathematical simplicity in discovering the new physical laws of nature. They were joined by Poincaré and Weyl. "For Dirac the principle of mathematical beauty was partly a method-ological moral and partly a postulate about nature's qualities. It was clearly inspired by the theory of relativity, the general theory in particular, and also by the development of quantum mechanics... mathematical-aesthetic considerations should (sometimes) have priority over experimental facts and in this way act as criteria of truth." 556 Eduard Prugovecki states that quantum gravity has required the consideration of fundamental epistemological questions, which can be identified in philosophy with the mind-body problem and the problem of free will. 557 These questions influenced the epistemology of quantum mechanics in the form of von Neumann's "psycho-physical parallelism"558 and the subsequent analysis of the thesis by Wigner559 that "the collapse of the wave packet" occurs in the mind of the "observer". Quantum gravity in cosmology involves the problem of the experimenter's freedom to change local physical conditions, a passive "observer". In any theory that describes a single universe, questions arise about the nature of causality in the traditional philosophical sense. 560 555 Robert L. Oldershaw, "The New Physics-Physical or Mathematical Science?," American Journal of Physics 56, no. 12 (December 1, 1988): 1076, https://doi.org/10.1119/1.15749. 556 Helge Kragh, Dirac: A Scientific Biography, 1 edition (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 277, 284. 557 Hermann Weyl and Frank Wilczek, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, Revised ed. edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2009). 558 John Von Neumann, Mathematische grundlagen der quantenmechanik, (Berlin: J. Springer, 1932). 559 E. P. Wigner et al., "The Scientist Speculates: An Anthology of Partly-Baked Ideas," American Journal of Physics 32, no. 4 (April 1, 1964): 168–81, https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1970298. 560 Mario Bunge, "The Revival of Causality," in La Philosophie Contemporaine / Contemporary Philosophy: Chroniques Nouvelles / A New Survey, ed. Guttorm Fløistad, International Institute of Philosophy / Institut International de Philosophie (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1982), 133–55, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9940-0_6. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 129 A quantum theory of gravity may be useful in unifying general relativity with the principles of quantum mechanics, but difficulties arise in this attempt. 561 The resulting theory is not renormalizable,562 and cannot make significant physical predictions. Later developments led to string theory and loop quantum gravity. 563 The structure of general relativity would result from the quantum mechanics of the interaction of theoretical particles without mass of spin-2, called gravitons, 564 although there is no concrete evidence of them. The dilaton appeared in Kaluza-Klein theory, a five-dimensional theory that combines gravity and electromagnetism, and later in string theory. The equation of the field that governs the dilaton, derived from the differential geometry, could be subject to quantization. 565 Because this theory can combine gravitational, electromagnetic and quantum effects, their coupling could lead to a means of justifying the theory through cosmology and experiments. However, gravity is perturbatively nonrenormalizable. 566 The theory must be characterized by a choice of finitely many parameters which, in principle, can be established by experiment. But, in quantifying gravity, in the theory of perturbation, there are infinitely many independent parameters needed to define the theory. It is possible that, in a correct quantum gravity theory, the infinite unknown parameters are reduced to a finite number which can then be measured. One of the possibilities is to have new, undiscovered principles of symmetry that constrain the parameters and reduce them to a finite set, a path followed by string theory. 561 A. Zee, Quantum Field Theory in a Nutshell, 2nd Edition, 2 edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2010), 172, 434–435. 562 Renormalization is an "absorption" of infinities by redefining a finite number of physical parameters. The physical parameters (mass, charge, etc.) have perfectly finite values when observed in real experiments. In the case of gravity, the perturbative theory is not renormalizable. In order to renormalize the theory, we should introduce infinitely many "absorption parameters", each having to be determined by experiment. 563 Penrose, The Road to Reality, 1017. 564 S. Deser, "Self-Interaction and Gauge Invariance," General Relativity and Gravitation 1, no. 1 (March 1, 1970): 1: 9–18, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00759198. 565 T. Ohta and R. B. Mann, "Canonical Reduction of Two-Dimensional Gravity for Particle Dynamics," Classical and Quantum Gravity 13, no. 9 (September 1, 1996): 13 (9): 2585–2602, https://doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/13/9/022. 566 Richard P Feynman et al., Feynman Lectures on Gravitation (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1995), xxxvi–xxxviii; 211–12. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 130 There are several theories that address quantum gravity, but none are complete and consistent. The models must overcome major formal and conceptual problems, including the formulation of predictions that can be verified by experimental tests. 567 String theory involves objects similar to strings propagating in a fixed spacetime background, and interactions between closed strings give rise to spacetime in a dynamic way. This promises to be a unified description of all particles and interactions. 568 One way in string theory will always correspond to a graviton, but to this theory unusual features appear, such as six additional dimensions of space. In an evolution of this program, the superstring theory, it is trying to unify the string theory, general relativity and supersymmetry, known as supergravity in an elevendimensional hypothetical model known as M-theory. 569 Quantum gravitational effects are extremely weak, and therefore difficult to test. In recent years physicists have concentrated on studying the possibilities of experimental tests, 570 the most targeted being the violations of Lorentz invariance, the quantum gravitational effects in the cosmic microwave background, and the decoherence induced by the spacetime fluctuations. Quantum gravity theories are affected by a lot of technical and conceptual problems. Tian Cao argues that quantum gravity offers a unique opportunity for philosophers, allowing them "a good chance to make some positive contributions, rather than just analysing philosophically what physicists have already established." 571 Carlo Rovelli (the architect of loop quantum gravity) urges philosophers not to limit themselves to "commenting and polishing the present fragmentary physical theories, but would take the risk of trying to look ahead." 572 Conceptual difficulties arise mainly from the nature of gravitational interaction, in particular the equivalence of gravitational and inertial masses, which allows the representation of gravity as a 567 Abhay Ashtekar, "Loop Quantum Gravity: Four Recent Advances and a Dozen Frequently Asked Questions," in The Eleventh Marcel Grossmann Meeting (World Scientific Publishing Company, 2008), 126, https://doi.org/10.1142/9789812834300_0008. 568 L. E. Ibanez, "The Second String (Phenomenology) Revolution," Classical and Quantum Gravity 17, no. 5 (March 7, 2000): 17 (5): 1117–1128, https://doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/17/5/321. 569 Townsend, "Four Lectures on M-Theory," 13: 385. 570 Sabine Hossenfelder, "Experimental Search for Quantum Gravity," ArXiv:1010.3420 [Gr-Qc, Physics:Hep-Ph, Physics:Hep-Th], October 17, 2010, chap. 5, http://arxiv.org/abs/1010.3420. 571 Tian Yu Cao, "Prerequisites for a Consistent Framework of Quantum Gravity," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32, no. 2 (2001): 138. 572 Carlo Rovelli, "Halfway Through the Woods: Contemporary Research on Space and Time," in The Cosmos of Science, ed. John Earman and John Norton (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 182. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 131 property of space itself, rather than as a field propagated in spacetime. When quantizing gravity some of the properties of spacetime are subjected to quantum fluctuations. But quantum theory implies a well-defined classical background for these fluctuations. 573 Yoichiro Nambu574 has researched the "postmodern physics" of quantum gravity, of its spacing from experiments. There are certain methods of evaluating the theory, and constraints. Their investigation is a current research problem. 575 Audretsch576 argues that quantum gravity research runs counter to Kuhn's paradigms, in quantum gravity co-existing several paradigms, both wellconfirmed and universal. Given that both general relativity and quantum theory claim to be universal theories, any conceptual or formal tension between them would indicate that the universality of one or both theories is wrong. Peter Galison577 argues that mathematical constraints take the place, in quantum gravity, of empirical constraints. Most physicists focus their attention on string theory, but loop quantum gravity (LQG) is an active program, as are other programs. It is extremely difficult to make concrete predictions in these theories. String theory is affected by the lack of testable experimental predictions due to the extremely large number of distinct states, and the absence of guiding principles for highlighting the physically significant ones. 578 The LQG seems to be less affected by the lack of predictions, the discreteness of the area and volume operators represent concrete forecasts of the theory, with potentially verifiable consequences, making the theory more susceptible to falsification and therefore more scientific than string theory. 579 But it is not clear how these quantities can actually be observed. 573 Steven Weinstein, "Absolute Quantum Mechanics," Preprint, 2000, 52: 67–73, http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/836/. 574 Y. Nambu, "Directions of Particle Physics," Progress of Theoretical Physics Supplement 85 (1985): 104–110, https://doi.org/10.1143/PTPS.85.104. 575 Dean Rickles, "A Philosopher Looks at String Dualities," Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 42 (2011): 42: 54–67, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2010.12.005. 576 Audretsch, "Quantum Gravity and the Structure of Scientific Revolutions," 12(2): 322–339. 577 Peter Galison, Laws of Nature: Essays on the Philosophic, Scientific, and Historical Dimensions (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 369–408. 578 Steven Weinstein and Dean Rickles, "Quantum Gravity," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2018 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/quantum-gravity/. 579 Lee Smolin, The Trouble With Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next, Reprint edition (Boston u.a: Mariner Books, 2007). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 132 Steven Weinstein and Dean Rickles state that it is difficult to develop an observational test of a theory if we do not know where to look or what to look at, 580 due to the fact that most quantum gravity theories seem to consider only very large energy scales, of the order 1019 GeV, needing a particle accelerator of galactic size to approach the necessary energies. The most notable "test" of theories of quantum gravity imposed by the community to date involves a phenomenon that has never been observed, the so-called Hawking radiation from black holes. The string theory and the loop quantum gravity both passed the test, using different degrees of microscopic freedom. Erik Curiel581 argued how this test is used as evidence in the same way that empirical evidence is used to justify a common theory. Although the result of Bekenstein-Hawking does not have the empirical factual status, it is a powerful deduction from a framework that is quite mature, namely the quantum field theory on a curved spacetime background, which may function as a constraint on possible theories. In quantum gravity, it is particularly important to have some constraints agreed to guide the construction, and a complete theory of quantum gravity should reproduce the predictions of the semi-classical theory of gravity as one of its possible limits. 582 Curiel questions the classification of quantum gravity approaches according to scientific merit, such as elegance and coherence, which he does not consider to be scientific. He states that the explanatory potential of theories must be taken into account. So far, none of the main research programs has shown that it properly reproduces the world at low energies. There are indications that both theories will overcome this challenge. 583 584 Bryce DeWitt stated that the gravitational field should be quantized to be consistent with quantum mechanics, 585 based on two premises: logical arguments, and the analogy between the electromagnetic and gravitational fields. But Planck's length is so small that aspects of reality that 580 Brading, Castellani, and Teh, "Symmetry and Symmetry Breaking." 581 Erik Curiel, "Against the Excesses of Quantum Gravity: A Plea for Modesty," Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001, no. 3 (2001): 68(3): S424–S441. 582 Weinstein and Rickles, "Quantum Gravity." 583 Thomas Thiemann, "The Phoenix Project: Master Constraint Programme for Loop Quantum Gravity," Classical and Quantum Gravity 23, no. 7 (April 7, 2006): 23(7): 2211, https://doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/23/7/002. 584 Mariana Graña, "The Low Energy Limit of String Theory and Its Compactifications with Background Fluxes," Letters in Mathematical Physics 78, no. 3 (December 1, 2006): 78(3): 279–305, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11005-006-0125-z. 585 Bryce S. DeWitt, "Definition of Commutators via the Uncertainty Principle," Journal of Mathematical Physics 3 (July 1, 1962): 619–24, https://doi.org/10.1063/1.1724265. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 133 define a theory of quantum gravity, such as "emergence", "phenomenon" or "empirical", cannot be considered under this dimension. The first approach to interpreting quantum theory was "instrumentalist". Jeremy Butterfield and Christopher Isham state that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory is not only as a minimal statistical interpretation of quantum formalism in terms of frequency of measurement results, but as insisting on a classical domain which, if it includes space and classical time, involves the fact that, speaking of "quantum gravity", we are wrong in trying to apply quantum theory to something that belongs to the classical background of this theory. A quantum theory of gravity should be avoided, but we can try the development of a "quantum theory of space and time." 586 The "literalist" vision implies the interpretation of quantum theory "as close as possible" to quantum formalism. This involves two versions, one by Everett and one based on quantum logic. Everett's literalism has been discussed in relation to quantum gravity (especially quantum cosmology). Its purpose is to solve the "measurement problem": when the wave function collapse occurs in relation to macroscopic objects (such as instruments). The theories of the extra values aim to interpret the quantum theory, especially in the measurement problem, without resorting to the collapse of the state vector, by postulating extra values for a certain "preferred quantity", together with a rule for the evolution of these values. But, contrary to Everett's theory, "extra values" do not imply other real physical worlds; they are just trying to be more accurate about the preferred quantity and dynamics of its values. Such theories are deBroglieBohm's interpretation of the "pilot wave" of quantum theory, and the various types of modal interpretation. 587 Basically, "extra values" preserve the ordinary unit dynamics (Schrodinger equation) of quantum theory but add equations that describe the temporal evolution of its extra values. The pilot wave interpretation was applied only to the quantum gravity research program based on quantum geometrodynamics. 588 According to Jeremy Butterfield and Christopher Isham, the new dynamic is more radical than "extra values". It replaces the usual dynamics for solving the measurement problem by dynamically suppressing overlays. In recent years, the new dynamics, especially as a result of Ghirardi, Rimini 586 Jeremy Butterfield and Chris Isham, "Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity," in Physics Meets Philosophy at the Panck Scale (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 587 Jeffrey Bub, Interpreting the Quantum World, 1st edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 588 Butterfield and Isham, "Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 134 and Weber589 and Pearle's "spontaneous localization" theories, 590 have developed considerably. Penrose was particularly active in supporting this idea. Motivations for a theory of quantum gravity, from the perspective of elementary particle physics and quantum field theory: 1. Matter is made of elementary particles described in terms of quantum and interacting gravitationally. 2. The relativistic quantum field theory could only make sense by including gravity. 3. Quantum gravity will help unify the three fundamental non-gravitational forces. Motivations for a theory of quantum gravity, from the perspective of general relativity: 1. The hope of eliminating singularities by introducing quantum effects. 2. The quantum explanation of the final nature of the black holes that lose mass through Hawking radiation. 3. Quantum gravity can help explain the very early universe, deducing from here the 4dimensionality of spacetime, and the origin of the inflationary evolution. 4. It is hoped that a theory of quantum gravity will provide a quantum cosmology. J. Butterfield lists four types of approaches in search of a theory of gravity: 591 1. Quantized general relativity: it starts with the general relativity to which a certain type of quantification algorithm is applied. Two types of techniques are used for this purpose: a 4-dimensional spacetime approach to quantum field theory, and a canonical 3dimensional approach to physical space. It was the first type of approach. 2. General relativity as a limit to the low energy of a quantification of a different classical theory: quantification algorithm is applied to a certain classical theory, recovered as a classical limit of the new quantum theory. This type of approach is exemplified by the main current research program: the superstring theory. There have been also several attempts to construct quantum theories of topology, and of causal structures. 3. General relativity as a limit to the low energy of a quantum theory which is not a quantification of a classical theory: it is considered to construct a quantum theory from scratch without a reference to a classical theory, without a certain classical limit. 4. Starting from scratch with a radical new theory. it is developed a theory that differs from both general relativity and quantum theory. 589 G. C. Ghirardi, A. Rimini, and T. Weber, "Unified Dynamics for Microscopic and Macroscopic Systems," Physical Review D 34, no. 2 (July 15, 1986): D34:470–491, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.34.470. 590 null Pearle, "Combining Stochastic Dynamical State-Vector Reduction with Spontaneous Localization," Physical Review. A, General Physics 39, no. 5 (March 1, 1989): A39:2277–2289. 591 Butterfield and Isham, "Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 135 The fundamental principles of general relativity and quantum theory are so incompatible that any reconciliation will require a rethinking of the categories of space, time and matter. Currently, the dominant program is that of the superstrings, of the second type. The canonical quantum gravity in the Ashtekar approach is of the first type. The construction of a quantum gravity theory is associated with two assumptions: classical notions of space and time are only approximately valid concepts, resulting from the "real" quantum nature of space and time, 592 and quantum gravity will provide classical physics on a deeper level. 593 594 The measurement problem implies that quantum theory cannot, in itself, explain any classical phenomenon such as measurement results defined with well-defined spacetime and energy properties. 595 The need for general relativity for quantum gravity is somewhat analogous to the need for classical mechanics for quantum mechanics, the role of general relativity in the first case being to specify the scope of quantum theory. But quantum gravity can circumvent the need for a classical theory by choosing a different interpretation of quantum mechanics. A first attempt to develop a theory of quantum gravity was the coupling of GR and quantum field theory (QFT), forming the so-called semi-classical theories. 596 In these theories matter fields are fundamental quantum theoretical structures, and gravity, that is, spacetime, is fundamentally classical (non-quantum). Basically, such a theory rewrites Einstein's equation. Currently, "quantum gravity" is a more substantial reconciliation of gravity quantization, 597 building a quantum theory whose classical limit is in agreement with classical theory. Quantization does not necessarily imply the discretion of all observables, as in the case of position and momentum operators. Therefore, quantification of GR does not imply the discreteness of space. 592 J. Butterfield and C. J. Isham, "On the Emergence of Time in Quantum Gravity," ArXiv:Gr-Qc/9901024, January 8, 1999, 111–68, http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9901024. 593 Steven Weinberg, Dreams Of A Final Theory: The Search for The Fundamental Laws of Nature (Random House, 2010). 594 Max Tegmark and John Archibald Wheeler, "100 Years of the Quantum," ArXiv:Quant-Ph/0101077, January 17, 2001, 68–75, http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0101077. 595 Henrik Zinkernagel, "The Philosophy Behind Quantum Gravity," Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 21, no. 3 (2010): 295–312. 596 S. Carlip, "Is Quantum Gravity Necessary?," Classical and Quantum Gravity 25, no. 15 (August 7, 2008): 154010, https://doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/25/15/154010. 597 Christian Wuthrich, "To Quantize or Not to Quantize: Fact and Folklore in Quantum Gravity," Published Article or Volume, Philosophy of Science, 2005, 777–788, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/508946. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 136 According to Kiefer, 598 quantum gravity (QG) theories can be grouped into primary and secondary theories. The former use standard quantization procedures (canonical or covariant) as in the case of quantum electrodynamics. The second includes QG as a limit of a fundamental quantum theoretical framework, e.g. string theory. It should be noted that this classification is based on how the approaches are conducted. From a systemic point of view, however, these approaches can be correlated. 599 It is hoped that the quantum gravity will resolve the incompleteness of the current physics related to the QG problem, having as motivated cosmological considerations, the evolution of black holes, theoretical problems in QFT and unification. 600 601 But there is no empirical need to build the theory. Both theories (quantum theory and general relativity) are in perfect agreement with all available data. The typical energy scale (or length) in which quantum gravitational effects become relevant is about 16 orders of magnitude larger than the current one. 602 So, pragmatically we cannot really hope for direct experimental data. 603 In quantum gravity, the Planck length dimension is so small that it suggests that those aspects of reality that require a quantum gravity theory to describe them should not be referred to as, for example, "aspect", "phenomenon" or "empirical". Kantians assert that "emergence" is not only what is practically accessible, but whatever is located in space is part of the empirical reality. But J. Butterfield considers it unacceptable that these scales of length, energy, etc., being so small, really exist "in principle." 604 He states that these elements or their localized aspects are not empirical, although we might still call them "physical" and "real". If this is accepted, the various Kantian claims that space and time may have certain characteristics for example, continuity as a matter of a priori to the claims of those quantum gravity programs that deny space and time have to be reconciled. "The apparent contradiction would be an artefact of an ambiguity in 'space and 598 C. Kiefer, "Quantum Gravity: General Introduction and Recent Developments," Annalen Der Physik 518 (January 1, 2006): 15(12), 129148, https://doi.org/10.1002/andp.200510175. 599 Steven Weinberg, "What Is Quantum Field Theory, and What Did We Think It Is?," ArXiv:Hep-Th/9702027, February 3, 1997, 241–251, http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9702027. 600 Wuthrich, "To Quantize or Not to Quantize," 777–788. 601 Kiefer, "Quantum Gravity," 15(12), 129148. 602 Nima Arkani-Hamed, "The Future of Fundamental Physics," 2012, 141(3), 53–66. 603 Kian Salimkhani, "Quantum Gravity: A Dogma of Unification?," in Philosophy of Science. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol 9., ed. Alexander Christian et al. (Cham: Springer, 2018), 23–41. 604 Butterfield and Isham, "Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 137 time': the quantum gravity programmes would not be about space and time in the Kantian sense." 605 The Copenhagen interpretation can be understood not only as a minimal statistical interpretation of the quantum formalism for the frequency of the measurement results, but also as emphasizing a classical domain in the quantum system, with a firm separation from it and a quantum description of the first interpretation. If the classical domain includes the classical space and time, with regard to "quantum gravity" we would be wrong in applying quantum theory to something that is related to the classical background of that theory. To build a "quantum theory of space and time", a radical change of interpretation, possibly also of mathematical formalism and of quantum theory itself, is needed. 606 An instrumentalist view specific to quantum theory should either deny that the quantum state describes individual systems, at least between measurements (similarly, be cautious in quantum description of these systems), or postulate a "non-quantum" domain whose description can be taken literally (not instrumentalist as in the first condition), with the respective domain being postulated as "classical domain" understood as macroscopic and / or the field of "measurements" and / or described by classical physics. 607 But recent applications of quantum theory make these conditions difficult to meet. It follows that we should seek an interpretation in which no fundamental role is assigned to "measurement", understood as an operation outside the domain of formalism. If the instrumentalist interpretation of quantum theory is "as close as possible" to quantum formalism ("literalism"), one may reject the use of ideas such as measurement, "classical domain" or "external observer" to which a quantum-theoretical description is denied, rather a search for an interpretation of formalism is sought. The question now arises whether theoretical statements can address any topic beyond observational data. Scientific anti-realists deny this possibility, as opposed to scientific realists. The scientific realist gives the electron and quark the same ontological status as the chairs and tables. The antirealist considers the concepts of invisible objects as mere technical tools to describe and predict visible phenomena, useful but without a value of truth. The instrumentalist also denies the possibility of true statements about invisible theoretical objects. Bas van Fraassen considers a less radical way to reject scientific realism. His constructive empiricism believes that statements about theoretical objects may in principle have a truth value, but it is impossible to gather sufficient evidence for the truth of any particular statement. Richard Dawid states that by avoiding the 605 Butterfield and Isham. 606 Butterfield and Isham. 607 Butterfield and Isham. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 138 ontological quality of the instrumentalist claim, constructive empiricism remains at an epistemological level. 608 Due to the multitude of empirical data, scientists must build theoretical structures to help manipulate and analyze such data. There may be several sets of such theoretical structures that compete with each other and replace one another over time. Even the essential elements of scientific theories are not uniquely determined by empirical data (the principle of underdetermining scientific theories by experimental data). So there are no scientific statements that need to be considered indisputable (pessimistic meta-induction). Scientific theories seem too underdetermined to fit into a realistic scheme, but they are not sufficiently underdetermined to allow empiricism, this dilemma being difficult to avoid. 609 A generalization of the underdetermination hypothesis espoused in particular by Quine, argues that no hypothetical ideal theoretical description, consistently covering all possible experimental data, would be unique. He admits the existence of theories that have identical phenomenological consequences but are still "logically incompatible" because of their incompatible sets of ontological objects. Quine is thus forced to distinguish between different theories by purely conceptual means, and on an ontological basis. Richard Dawid believes that instrumentalism is most plausible in the context of underdeveloped theory, because the ascension of the theory can open "new frontiers of the visible whose identification with frontiers of existence appears less plausible than in the classical cases", and because "once the balance between theoretical effort and observational consequence has become too tilted, it gets quite problematic to hold that the theoretical physicist's sound motivations for his activity exclusively lie in the visible regime." 610 His conclusion is that physicists working in string theory are not interested in experiments for predicting visible phenomena. Their theory is not yet capable of such a thing. But observation is a prerequisite for attributing the meaning of concepts and string theory. A motivation for possible future visible consequences does not seem convincing. Steven Weinstein considers QG as a "a physical theory describing the gravitational interactions of matter and energy in which matter and energy are also described by quantum theory." 611 Many theories of quantum gravity are quantizations of gravity but, as Callender and Huggett point out, 608 Richard Dawid, "Scientific Realism in the Age of String Theory," Physics and Philosophy, 2007. 609 Dawid. 610 Dawid. 611 Weinstein and Rickles, "Quantum Gravity." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 139 this is an empirical choice, rather than a logical one. 612 Finally, a quantification of gravity by GR suggests more, especially those in the canonical quantum gravity field (CQG), that a certain quantization method is required for space. One of the earlier attempts to reconcile quantum with gravity appeared in the 1960s and is known as semi-classical theory. Although semi-classical theory was quickly understood to be flawed, it was seen as an excellent heuristic device for feeding the problem of quantum gravity. This theory, along with other dilemmas, such as the quantification debate, has led to the need for more robust theories about quantum gravity. Unlike other modern theories in physics, where consensus has been reached in theory, quantum gravity has a number of alternative research programs that develop a basic hypothesis through the auxiliary hypotheses. Three of the most popular quantum gravity research programs in its short history include semi-classical theory, string theory, and canonical quantum gravity. But so far, none have experimental support. Some experiments were performed, but all were negative. The experiments were developed in such a way that the theory predicts only what might happen according to a certain specific scenario, which is not the only one possible, so they are not potentially refutable. Given the lack of empirical progress, a pluralistic strategy for theoretical development is recommended in all quantum gravity approaches. In string theory there are different theoretical formulations, or physically equivalent dualities, which is relevant to the problem of subdetermining theories by data. It is argued that a more empirical perspective on the semantics of theories should be adopted, in order to understand what the theories of space and time tell us. In string theory, unlike other approaches, there is a true unification of different forces, not just a quantum description of gravity, but some scientists criticize this theory as using too many resources at the expense of other approaches to quantum gravity. Thinking experiments may be important for heuristic purposes, but in the case of quantum gravity, conclusions based on thought experiments are not very reliable. The lack of empirical results has led some scientists and philosophers to assert that these theories are not truly scientific. 612 Craig Callender and Nick Huggett, Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale: Contemporary Theories in Quantum Gravity (Cambridge University Press, 2001). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 140 Simonluca Pinna and Simone Pinna propose a "conceptual test" to evaluate whether the mathematical content of quantum gravity theory refers to a possible verifiable empirical model. 613 The best empirical observations are the astrophysical ones for the strong gravity, so there are two options: (1) the development of new appropriate experimental frameworks, 614 and (2) the possibility of replacing the standard scientific verification criteria with the least empirically regulated ones. 615 There are two opinions of scientists: those who consider that spacetime is not a fundamental physical structure, 616 and those who consider it fundamental in any physical field617 that presuppose the epistemological conservative approach expressed by (1). Those who support the disappearance of spacetime seem to follow the perspective, (2). Some methodologists claim that the thesis of the disappearance of spacetime at high energies requires a change of the criteria of scientific verification, in order to adapt the empirical coherence to these theses in quantum gravity. This would involve changes in the concepts of "observer" and its connection with observations and measurements. Geometrodynamics618 was the first attempt to quantify gravity starting from the canonical (Hamiltonian) formulation of the general theory of relativity interpreted as a backgroundindependent theory. 619 Subsequently, the followers of loop quantum gravity, a canonical approach, assert that relativistic spacetime disappears to the limit of high energy. This could imply the absence of a spacetime framework. 620 There are suspicions about the disappearance of spacetime 613 S. Pinna and Simone Pinna, "A Conceptual Test for Cognitively Coherent Quantum Gravity Models," 2017, https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies5030051. 614 Sabine Hossenfelder and Lee Smolin, "Phenomenological Quantum Gravity," ArXiv:0911.2761 [Gr-Qc, Physics:Physics], November 14, 2009, 66, 99–102, http://arxiv.org/abs/0911.2761. 615 Richard Dawid, String Theory and the Scientific Method, 1 edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 616 Carlo Rovelli, "Quantum Gravity," Cambridge Core, November 2004, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755804. 617 Amit Hagar and Meir Hemmo, "The Primacy of Geometry," ResearchGate, 2013, 44, 357–364, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259158226_The_primacy_of_geometry. 618 Karel Kuchar, "Canonical Quantum Gravity," ArXiv:Gr-Qc/9304012, April 8, 1993, 119–150, http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9304012. 619 C. Kiefer, "Time in Quantum Gravity," in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, ed. Craig Callender (Oxford University Press, 2011), 663–678. 620 Carlo Rovelli, "The Disappearance of Space and Time," in The Disappearance of Space and Time, ed. Dennis Dieks (Elsevier, 2007), 25–36. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 141 and other approaches, 621 including string theory that is generally interpreted as background dependent. Hagar and Hemmo declare the need for a certain type of spacetime even at QG level; physics consists not only of dynamic theories, but also of experiments and measurements by which models must be tested. So, there must be something observable with geometric features or that can be translated into geometric terms. 622 They assert that the interpretation of QG theories as spaceless theories would be in contradiction with the epistemic basis of experimental physics, respectively with the primacy of geometric observations and measurements. Supporters of the disappearance of spacetime follow a leibnizian approach, according to Earman, even Pythagorean, of reality, according to which the sense of physical reality can be derived directly from mathematical theory using a priori more "reasonable" criteria. 623 The operationalist perspective defines the physical reality with respect to its measurability, respectively any concept is "nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations." 624 Detection of measurable quantities in quantum gravity is the main goal of the experimenters, as measurability is an essential feature for identifying physically relevant quantities. It has not yet been possible to include gravity in the theoretical framework of the quantum field of the standard model, because gravitational interactions do not meet the principles of renormalizability. 3.1 Heuristics of quantum gravity As for the attempt to create a gravitational quantum theory, there are several research programs, some of which became obsolete over time due to the higher heuristic power of other programs. J. Butterfield thus distinguishes three major research programs: 625 The program of particles establishes as the basic entity the graviton, the quanta of the gravitational field. The graviton spreads in a Minkowski spacetime and is associated with the specific 621 Nick Huggett, Tiziana Vistarini, and Christian Wuthrich, "Time in Quantum Gravity," ArXiv:1207.1635 [GrQc, Physics:Physics], July 3, 2012, 242–261, http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.1635. 622 Hagar and Hemmo, "The Primacy of Geometry," 44, 357–364. 623 John Earman, "Thoroughly Modern Mctaggart: Or, What Mctaggart Would Have Said If He Had Read the General Theory of Relativity," Philosophers' Imprint 2 (2002): 2, 1–28. 624 Richard Feldman, "Naturalized Epistemology," July 5, 2001, 5, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/epistemology-naturalized/. 625 Butterfield and Isham, "Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 142 representation of the zero-mass Poincare group and the spin 0 or 2. But this program presents many conceptual dysfunctionalities. The program of superstructures, an approach motivated by the success of the transition from the old non-renormalizable theory of weak interactions to the new renormalizable unification of the weak and electromagnetic forces found by Salam, Glashow and Weinberg. The idea was to add fields of matter from general relativity to eliminate the UV problem. Thus appeared the theory of supergravity which, after some minor successes, came to the conclusion that it does not solve the divergences, but its line of thinking is currently continued by the superstring theory, which is the dominant research program in quantum gravity. The program has not yet matured. From the point of view of the response offered to the conceptual aspects, the program of superstrings is similar in many respects with the program of particles. The program of canonical quantum gravity began with the Wheeler-DeWitt theory. Later came the program of Ashtekar that uses the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, 626 with the help of a set of canonical variables that produce a simplification of the structure of the central constraint functions, and is still a very active program, with impressive developments in recent years. All three programs are similar in that the main way they go beyond the common treatment of spacetime is by quantifying an amount that is a standard type of variable in classical physics. There are three major problems in the conception of a theory of quantum gravity: both quantum theory and general relativity present significant conceptual problems in themselves, the disparate fundamental bases of the two theories generate major new problems when trying to combine them, and the contrast between the lack of a satisfactory theory of quantum gravity and successful ingredient theories raise questions about the nature and function of the philosophical discussion of quantum gravity. According to Laudan, the preferred theory is the one that maximizes the empirical successes, while reducing the conceptual problems, and the research preferred tradition is the one that supports the most successful theories. According to Péter Szegedi, the history of quantum mechanics interpretations fit very well with Lakatos' methodology of rival scientific research programmes, compared to Kuhn's methodology 626 Bryce S. DeWitt, "Quantum Theory of Gravity. I. The Canonical Theory," Physical Review 160, no. 5 (August 25, 1967): 160 (5): 1113–1148, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.160.1113. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 143 which does not allow the simultaneous existence of different rival paradigms. 627 628 It turns out that the development of quantum mechanics itself is a development, an evolution of progressive problems, if it is progressive both theoretically and empirically. Interpretations of quantum mechanics can be arranged as a series of theories, resulting in theoretical progressivity, but empirical progressivity is difficult to evaluate. Thus, according to the criteria, the interpretive programs can be scientific, but they are degenerative, respectively they are characterized by stagnation. The evaluation may change in the future, being a long-term program: "Moreover, it occasionally happens that when a research pro gramme gets into a degenerating phase, a little revolution or a creative shift in its positive heuristic may push it forward again." 629 There is a possibility that a degenerate program may be revived, or even considered successful if it provides useful results for other programs. 630 Péter Szegedi distinguishes, in the case of various quantum interpretations, a hard core and a heuristic adapting to the problems that have arisen. 631 Thus, in Louis de Broglie's program, the synthesis of wave-particle images is the hard core, while the real forms of realization in order of appearance (positive heuristic) are the following: the principle of double solution, the theory of pilot waves, the hypothesis of non-linearity and the hidden thermodynamics. In the case of David Bohm, the hard core is the theory of hidden variables and the quantum potential, to which at one point he added the hypothesis of stochasticity. Vigier used the same hard core, but with an additional assumption of the hidden degrees of freedom hypothesis. There are other programs in the interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the Fényes-Nelson-de Peňa research program, stochasticity is not an additional hypothesis, but a hard core, where the positive heuristic forced the initial use of diffusion processes, then the Brownian motion and, finally, stochastic electrodynamics. The positive heuristics of these programs are different, but generally they use the relativistic approach, the principle of determinism or causality and the principle of the unity of nature. In orthodox interpretation, according to Cushing, the hard core consists of the canonical commutation relations and Hamiltonian equations of motion, and the positive heuristic applies to the classical forms of Hamiltonians for specific systems, the principle of correspondence and the 627 Péter Szegedi, "Lakatos On Crucial Experiments And The History Of Interpretations Of Quantum Mechanics," in Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man, ed. G. Kampis, L. : Kvasz, and M. Stöltzner (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 1–101. 628 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 33–34. 629 Lakatos, 51. 630 H. Zandvoort, Paul Weingartner, and Methology and Philosophy of Science International Congress of Logic, Intrinsic Success and Extrinsic Success of Research Programs, in 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Salzburg, July 11th-16th, 1983 Vol. 4, Vol. 4, (Salzburg: Huttegger, 1983), 289–92. 631 Szegedi, "Lakatos On Crucial Experiments And The History Of Interpretations Of Quantum Mechanics." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 144 principle of observables; as an auxiliary hypothesis, the operator-observer report was used. Lakatos says about this program: "In the new, post-1925 quantum theory the 'anarchist' position became dominant and modern quantum physics, in its 'Copenhagen interpretation', became one of the main standard bearers of philosophical obscurantism. In the new theory Bohr's notorious 'complementarity principle' enthroned [weak] inconsistency as a basic ultimate feature of nature, and merged subjectivist positivism and antilogical dialectic and even ordinary language philosophy into one unholy alliance. After 1925 Bohr and his associates introduced a new and unprecedented lowering of critical standards for scientific theories. This led to a defeat of reason within modern physics and to an anarchist cult of incomprehensible chaos." 632 Lakatos' crucial experiments in quantum mechanics begin with a Gedanken experiment, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment. 633 Commentators distinguish (at least) five hypotheses here: the principle of realism, the validity of quantum mechanical formalism, the hypothesis of completeness, the principle of separability, and the validity of classical logic. According to the EPR argument, one of the five assumptions is false. The next step was taken by Bohm, who reformulated the Gedanken experiment with spins, 634 but without seeming yet another crucial experiment as it was not stated that different theories offer different measurement results. The work of John Bell has given hope that experimental testing of interpretations is possible, 635 emphasizing that there must be differences between quantum mechanical and hidden predictions. He assumed that in a real experiment we could measure probabilities. Bell's inequality was even closer to the real conditions of an easy-to-manage experiment. 3.2 The tests of quantum gravity The primordial test of any quantum theory of gravity is the reproduction of the successes of general relativity. This involves reconstructing the local geometry from the non-local observables. In 632 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 59–60. 633 A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?," Physical Review 47, no. 10 (May 15, 1935): 770–80, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.47.777. 634 Bohm, Quantum Theory. 635 J. S. Bell, "On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen Paradox," Physics Physique Fizika 1, no. 3 (November 1, 1964): 447, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysicsPhysiqueFizika.1.195. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 145 addition, quantum gravity should probabilistically predict the large-scale topology of the Universe, which may soon be measurable, 636 and phenomena at the Planck scale. 637 There is already a prediction that relates to quantum gravity: the existence and spectrum of Hawking radiation of the black hole, a "semi-classical" prediction resulting from quantum field theory on a fixed curved background, and subsequently confirmed theoretically. 638 It is assumed that a theory of gravity that will not reproduce this prediction is wrong. For the Planck energy scale several tests have been proposed based on two ideas: that we can detect very small deviations of the exact symmetries, and that we can integrate over long distances or times to observe very small collective effects. These proposals remain extremely speculative, but they are plausible. 639 Some of these ideas can be found in Giovanni Amelino-Camelia, Are we at the dawn of quantum-gravity phenomenology: 640 • Violations of the principle of equivalence. 641 Accuracy tests of the equivalence principle could be developed by atomic and neutron interferometry. • Violations of CPT (charge, parity, and time) invariance, 642 for example by forming virtual black holes. The current experimental limits approach the observation level of these effects. 643 Violations of other global symmetries, such as CP, can also occur, with consequences that can be observed on the Planck scale. 644 636 Neil Cornish, David Spergel, and Glenn Starkman, "Circles in the Sky: Finding Topology with the Microwave Background Radiation," Classical and Quantum Gravity 15, no. 9 (September 1, 1998): 15, 2657, https://doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/15/9/013. 637 Richard Easther et al., "Inflation as a Probe of Short Distance Physics," Physical Review D 64, no. 10 (October 16, 2001): 103502, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.64.103502. 638 Fay Dowker et al., "Pair Creation of Dilaton Black Holes," Physical Review D 49, no. 6 (March 15, 1994): 2909, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.49.2909. 639 Carlip, "Quantum Gravity." 640 Giovanni Amelino-Camelia, "Are We at the Dawn of Quantum-Gravity Phenomenology?," ArXiv:GrQc/9910089, October 25, 1999, http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9910089. 641 G. Z. Adunas, E. Rodriguez-Milla, and D. V. Ahluwalia, "Probing Quantum Aspects of Gravity," Physics Letters B 485, no. 1–3 (July 2000): 215, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0370-2693(00)00697-3. 642 Alan Kostelecky and Rob Potting, "Expectation Values, Lorentz Invariance, and CPT in the Open Bosonic String," Physics Letters B 381, no. 1–3 (July 1996): 89, https://doi.org/10.1016/0370-2693(96)00589-8. 643 R. Adler et al., "Test of CPT Symmetry and Quantum Mechanics with Experimental Data from CPLEAR," Physics Letters B 364, no. 4 (December 1995): 239, https://doi.org/10.1016/0370-2693(95)01416-0. 644 Renata Kallosh et al., "Gravity and Global Symmetries," Physical Review D 52, no. 2 (July 15, 1995): 912, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.52.912. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 146 • Distortions of dispersion relationships for light and neutrinos over long distances, resulting in a frequency-dependent light speed. 645 It can be observed by observing the gamma rays, the current experimental limits are close to the observation level. If the effect depends on polarization, gravity-induced birefringence tests may be within observation limits. 646 • Interferometers for detecting gravitational waves could observe quantum fluctuations testable in space geometry, 647 an idea still controversial. • Quantum gravity near Planck mass affects renormalization group fluxes and low energy coupling constants in large unified theories, 648 but this effect is rather a disadvantage making other possible tests more difficult. • Use of powerful lasers for (indirect) observation of Unruh radiation, the counterpart of Hawking radiation for an acceleration particle. 649 This may be at least a test of theoretical quantum field predictions from quantum gravity. • An indirect test from analogues of condensed matter with black holes, which should emit phonons through "Hawking radiation" from sonic horizons. 650 Tests may be possible in the future in Bose-Einstein condensates, 651 superfluid helium 3652 and "slow light" in dielectrics. 653 These experiments will not differentiate between specific models of quantum gravity, as current models cannot yet make sufficiently clear predictions, but phenomena can be tested on the Planck 645 Jorge Alfaro, Hugo A. Morales-Tecotl, and Luis F. Urrutia, "Quantum Gravity Corrections to Neutrino Propagation," Physical Review Letters 84, no. 11 (March 13, 2000): 2318, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.84.2318. 646 Reinaldo J. Gleiser and Carlos N. Kozameh, "Astrophysical Limits on Quantum Gravity Motivated Birefringence," Physical Review D 64, no. 8 (September 2001): 083007, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.64.083007. 647 Y. Jack Ng and H. van Dam, "Measuring the Foaminess of Space-Time with Gravity-Wave Interferometers," Foundations of Physics 30, no. 5 (2000): 795, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1003745212871. 648 L. J. Hall and U. Sarid, "Gravitational Smearing of Minimal Supersymmetric Unification Predictions," Physical Review Letters 70, no. 18 (May 3, 1993): 2673, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.70.2673. 649 Pisin Chen and Toshi Tajima, "Testing Unruh Radiation with Ultraintense Lasers," Physical Review Letters 83, no. 2 (July 12, 1999): 256, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.83.256. 650 Matt Visser, "Acoustic Black Holes," ArXiv:Gr-Qc/9901047, January 15, 1999, http://arxiv.org/abs/grqc/9901047. 651 L. J. Garay et al., "Sonic Analog of Gravitational Black Holes in Bose-Einstein Condensates," Physical Review Letters 85, no. 22 (November 27, 2000): 4643, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.85.4643. 652 G. E. Volovik, "Field Theory in Superfluid 3He: What Are the Lessons for Particle Physics, Gravity and HighTemperature Superconductivity?," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96, no. 11 (May 25, 1999): 6042, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.11.6042. 653 U. Leonhardt and P. Piwnicki, "Relativistic Effects of Light in Moving Media with Extremely Low Group Velocity," Physical Review Letters 84, no. 5 (January 31, 2000): 822, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.84.822. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 147 scale affected by quantum gravity. Lately, physicists have focused on the idea of experimental tests for a certain class of quantum gravity models, "gravity on the TeV scale" or "world of branes",654 which postulate additional "large" dimensions, of one millimeter. The problem of how the measurement affects the ontological state of the observed system is called the measurement problem. Measurement in quantum mechanics is viewed in different ways in various interpretations. In classical mechanics, a simple point system is fully described by the particle's position and momentum. In quantum mechanics, a system is described by its quantum state, by the probabilities of possible positions and momentums. The predicted values of the measurements are described by a probability distribution or an "average" (or "expectation") of the measurement operator based on the quantum state of the prepared system. The measurement process is often considered random and indeterministic in some interpretations, while in other interpretations indeterminism is fundamental and irreducible. There are several possible ways to mathematically describe the measurement process (both the probability distribution and the collapsed wave function). The most convenient description depends on the spectrum (ie the set of eigenvalues) of the observable. The most obvious feature in quantum gravity is the lack of data (there are no phenomena that can be identified unequivocally as a result of an interaction between general relativity and quantum theory). This is because the quantum gravity scale (Planck length) is extremely small, as is Planck energy and Planck time. It turns out that the only physical regime in which the effects of quantum gravity could be studied directly is in the immediate post-Big Bang era, in addition to the problems related to the interaction of spin-2 gravitons with a conserved energy-momentum tensor. It follows that different quantum gravity theories could be empirically verified only at very high energies. For physics, this means that it is very difficult to build a fully satisfactory theory. From a philosophical point of view, the difficulty is due to the conceptual problems of space, time and matter, but also due to the theoretical construction, since there is no agreement on the types of data that a quantum theory of gravity would obtain. In this situation, J. Butterfield states that the theoretical construction becomes much more strongly influenced by theoretical considerations, based on the different first-hand opinions on how the theory should look, based in part on the philosophical bias of the researcher and on the mathematical techniques considered. successful. Thus, a research program tends to construct abstract theoretical schemes compatible with a preconceived conceptual framework and internally coherent in a mathematical sense, resulting in a "sub-determination of data theory". Moreover, the program tends to produce schemes based on a 654 Lisa Randall and Raman Sundrum, "A Large Mass Hierarchy from a Small Extra Dimension," Physical Review Letters 83, no. 17 (October 25, 1999): 3370, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.83.3370. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 148 wide range of philosophical motivations, which could be presumed to be unconscious projections of the individual researcher's psychic, and could be rejected as such. It is important to determine if quantum gravity effects are measurable below the Planck limits, possibly resulting from a non-perturbative effect. But the very existence of such effects, and the phenomena they predict, are themselves probably strongly dependent on theory. It follows that the subject of quantum gravity presents to the philosopher a wide and varied range of approaches, provided that in quantum gravity there are not sufficiently well defined theories, not even well established. From the dimensional analyzes it would appear that quantum gravity requires experimentally high energies, of the Planck energy level. This would require a particle accelerator larger than our galaxy, so direct quantum gravity tests seem impossible according to these calculations. It turns out that high precision laboratory tests in the weak field will be the only possibility to make quantum gravity a testable / falsifiable physical theory. This would be possible in macroscopic systems that still adhere to the laws of quantum theory those described by macroscopic wave functions. These would allow, for example, the measurement of quantum gravitational excitation energies. 655 Johan Hansson and Stephane Francois suggest the possibility of testing quantum gravity theories using macroscopic quantum systems; superfluid helium, Bose-Einstein gas condensates and "macroscopic" molecules still subject to quantum mechanics, and neutron stars. The effects of quantum gravity, defined here as observable gravitational interactions between quantum objects, should be observed using existing technology, allowing for low energy falsifiability in the weak field regime. 656 Roberto Balbinot and Alessandro Fabbri, in Amplifying the Hawking Signal in BECs, 657 propose simple models of Bose-Einstein condensates to study the analogue effects of pair creation, namely, the Hawking effect of acoustic black holes and the Casimir dynamic effect. The idea is to reproduce in a context of condensed matter some quantum effects predicted by quantum field theory in curved space, including the thermal emission of black holes predicted by Hawking in 1974. 658 The authors 655 Johan Hansson, "Aspects of Nonrelativistic Quantum Gravity," ArXiv:0910.4289 [Astro-Ph, Physics:Gr-Qc, Physics:Hep-Ph, Physics:Quant-Ph], October 22, 2009, 707 (2009), http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.4289. 656 Johan Hansson and Stephane Francois, "Testing Quantum Gravity," International Journal of Modern Physics D 26, no. 12 (October 2017): 1743003, https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218271817430039. 657 Roberto Balbinot and Alessandro Fabbri, "Amplifying the Hawking Signal in BECs," Advances in High Energy Physics 2014 (2014): 1–8, https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/713574. 658 S. W. Hawking, "Particle Creation by Black Holes," Communications in Mathematical Physics 43, no. 3 (August 1, 1975): 199–220, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02345020. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 149 of this experiment conclude that they have obtained some results that could be useful in future experimental research. THe formalism is based on the Lagrangian form which regulates the dynamics of the point particles with mass and charge and the electromagnetic field in a static, spherically symmetrical gravitational field described by the phenomenological gravitational potentials T, H, e. This theory was used to interpret the results of the experimental tests of the strong equivalence principle. 659 The xg formalism introduced by W.-T. Ni660 initially offered us a framework for the analysis of electrodynamic physics in a gravitational background field, then expanded to cover other sectors of the standard model. The Kostelecky formalism, developed by Colladay and Kostelecky, is used to deal with the possibility of spontaneous breakdown of Lorentz symmetry in the context of string theory. 661 A formalism based on the forms of the equations of motion has the advantage of directly addressing some natural requirements. 3.3 Canonical quantum gravity In the interpretation of canonical quantum gravity (CQG), gravity appears as a geometric pseudoforce, is reduced to spacetime geometry and becomes a simple effect of spacetime curvature. 662 (Maudlin663). Lehmkuhl664 argues that canonical formalism does not confirm this interpretation. General relativity (GR) associates gravity with spacetime, but the type of association is not fixed. 665 Instead of the geometric interpretation, one can use the field interpretation (the spacetime geometry is reduced to a gravitational field, respectively the metric, considered as "just another 659 J. E. Horvath et al., "Einstein Equivalence Principle and Theories of Gravitation: A Gravitationally Modified Standard Model," Physical Review D 38, no. 6 (September 15, 1988): 1754, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.38.1754. 660 W.-T. Ni, "Equivalence Principles and Electromagnetism," Physical Review Letters 38 (February 1, 1977): 301, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.38.301. 661 Don Colladay and Alan Kostelecky, "Lorentz-Violating Extension of the Standard Model," Physical Review D 58, no. 11 (October 26, 1998): 6760, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.58.116002. 662 Salimkhani, "Quantum Gravity." 663 Tim Maudlin, "On the Unification of Physics," Journal of Philosophy 93, no. 3 (1996): 129–144. 664 D. Lehmkuhl, D. Dieks, and M. Redei, "Is Spacetime a Gravitational Field?, In The Ontology of Spacetime II, Volume 4 1st Edition," 2008, 83–110, https://www.elsevier.com/books/the-ontology-of-spacetime-ii/dieks/978-0444-53275-6. 665 Lehmkuhl, Dieks, and Redei, 84. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 150 field") or the egalitarian interpretation (a conceptual identification of gravity and spacetime in GR666). These alternative interpretations reduce the conceptual differences between GR and other field theories. Instrumentalism allows the ignoring of quantum gravity, since it conceives scientific theories only as predictive tools. Canonical quantum gravity follows a nonperturbative quantum theory of the gravitational field. It is based on consistency between quantum mechanics and gravity, without trying to unify all fields. The main idea is to apply standard quantification procedures to the general theory of relativity. For this, it is necessary for general relativity to be expressed in canonical (Hamiltonian) form and then quantified as usual. This was (partially) successfully done by Dirac667 and (differently) by Arnowitt, Deser and Misner. 668 3.3.1 Tests proposed for the CQG Carlip states, with reference to quantum gravity: "The ultimate measure of any theory is its agreement with Nature; if we do not have any such tests, how will we know whether we're right?" 669 Usually, a new theory is constructed using the available experimental data, which attempts to match the phenomenological models, then verifying through predictions. Often, the conceptual and formal consistency is bypassed in an attempt to match the reality. At quantum gravity everything happens very differently: it is almost entirely based on conceptual and formal consistency, along with the constraints imposed, and seems impossible to approach through experimental research. Dean Rickles states that the basic test of any scientific theory is an experimental test, without which the theory becomes entangled in pure mathematics or, even worse, in metaphysics. 670 Giovanni Amelino-Camelia initiated a new research program called "quantum gravitational phenomenology", in which he tries to transform quantum gravity research into a true experimental discipline. The scale at which quantum gravitational effects occur is determined by the different physical constants of fundamental physics: h, c and G, which characterize quantum, relativistic and gravitational phenomena. By combining these constants, we obtain the Planck constants at which the effects of quantum gravity must manifest. 666 Lehmkuhl, Dieks, and Redei, 84. 667 Paul A. M. Dirac, Lectures on Quantum Mechanics (Mineola, NY: Snowball Publishing, 2012). 668 R. Arnowitt, S. Deser, and C. W. Misner, "The Dynamics of General Relativity," General Relativity and Gravitation 40, no. 9 (September 2008): 1997–2027, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10714-008-0661-1. 669 Carlip, "Quantum Gravity," 64: 885. 670 Dean Rickles, "Quantum Gravity: A Primer for Philosophers.," Preprint, October 2008, http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/5387/. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 151 These are many orders of magnitude beyond current experimental capabilities. But the scale argument applies to individual quantum gravitational events. The idea is to combine such events to amplify the effects that can be detected with current or near future equipment. Quantum gravity can also be studied by observing the opposite end of the scale spectrum, astronomical systems, by observing cosmic radiation, gamma ray generating explosions, Kaon explosions, particles, light and cosmic background radiation, through quantum gravitational effects that might manifest in these systems. In these systems, the Planck scale effects are naturally amplified. Name Formula Value (SI) Lungimea Planck length lP = √ħG/c3 1,616229(38)×10−35 m Planck mass mP = √ħc/G 2,176470(51)×10−8 kg Planck time tP = lP/c = ħ/mPc2 = √ħG/c5 5,39116(13)×10−44 s Planck charge qP = √4πε0ħc = e/√α 1,875 545 956(41) × 10−18 C Planck temperature TP = mPc2/kB = √ħc5/GkB2 1,416808(33)×1032 K • Name >>> Formula >>> Value (SI) • Planck length >>> lP = √ħG/c3 >>> 1.616229 (38) × 10−35 m • Planck mass >>> mP = √ħc/G >>> 2.176470 (51) × 10−8 kg • Planck time >>> tP = lP/c = ħ/mPc2 = √ħG/c5 >>> 5.39116 (13) × 10−44 s • Planck charge >>> qP = √4πε0ħc = e/√α >>> 1.875 545 956 (41) × 10−18 C • Planck temperature >>> TP = mPc2/kB = √ħc5/GkB2 >>> 1.416808 (33) × 1032 K Tabelul 3.1 Constantele Planck But such effects can also be studied in experimental devices on Earth, also using "natural experiments", such as particles moving over large distances at enormous speeds. 671 Bryce DeWitt argued that quantum gravitational effects will not be measurable on individual elementary particles, since the gravitational field itself does not make sense at these scales. The static field of such a particle would not exceed the quantum fluctuations. 672 671 Rickles. 672 B. S. DeWitt and Louis Witten, The Quantization of Geometry, in Gravitation an Introduction to Current Research, First Edition edition (John Wiley & Sons, 1962), 372. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 152 For the use of the universe as an experimental device, the idea is that light changes its properties over long distances in the case of discrete spacetime, which produces birefringent effects. 673 The theoretical basis is that a wave propagating in a discrete spacetime will violate Lorentz invariance, which can be a "test" for quantum gravity models. But spacetime discrepancy is not a sufficient condition for Lorentz non-invariance: a counterexample is the causal sets which are discrete structures and do not appear to violate it. 3.3.2. Loop quantum gravity Loop quantum gravity (LQG) attempts to unify gravity with the other three fundamental forces starting with relativity and adding quantum traits. It is based directly on Einstein's geometric formula. In LQG, space and time are quantified just like energy and momentum in quantum mechanics. Space and time are granular and discrete, with a minimal size. The space is considered to be an extremely fine fabric or network of finite loops, called spin networks or spin foam, with a size limited to less than the order of a Planck length, about 10-35 meters. Its consequences apply best to cosmology, in the study of the early universe and Big Bang physics. Its main, unverified prediction involves an evolution of the universe beyond the Big Bang (Big Bounce). Any theory of quantum gravity must reproduce Einstein's theory of general relativity as a classical limit. Quantum gravity must be able to return to classical theory when ħ → 0. To do this, quantum anomalies must be avoided, in order to have no restrictions on Hilbert physical space without a correspondent in classical theory. It turns out that quantum theory has less degrees of freedom than classical theory. Lewandowski, Okolow, Sahlmann and Thiemann674 on the one hand, and Christian Fleischhack675 on the other, have developed theorems that establish the uniqueness of the loop representation as defined by Ashtekar. These theorems exclude the existence of other theories in the LQG research program and so, if LQG does not have the correct semiclastic limit, this would mean the end of the LQG representation as a whole. 673 Rodolfo Gambini and Jorge Pullin, "Quantum Gravity Experimental Physics?," General Relativity and Gravitation 31, no. 11 (November 1, 1999): 1999, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026701930767. 674 Jerzy Lewandowski et al., "Uniqueness of Diffeomorphism Invariant States on Holonomy–Flux Algebras," Communications in Mathematical Physics 267, no. 3 (November 1, 2006): 267 (3): 703–733, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00220006-0100-7. 675 Christian Fleischhack, "Irreducibility of the Weyl Algebra in Loop Quantum Gravity," Physical Review Letters 97, no. 6 (August 11, 2006): 97 (6): 061302, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.97.061302. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 153 The canonical quantum gravity program treats the spacetime metric as a field and quantizes it directly, with space divided into three-dimensional layers. The program involves rewriting the general relativity in "canonical" or "Hamiltonian" form, 676 through a set of configuration variables that can be encoded in a phase space. The evolution in time of these variables is then determined, the possible physical movements in the phase space, a family of curves, are quantized, and the dynamic evolution is generated with the help of the Hamiltonian operator. 677 Thus, some constraints of the canonical variables imposed after quantification appear. In loop quantum gravity, Ashtekar used a different set of variables with a more complex metric, 678 solving the constraints more easily. By the changes introduced in the program, all standard geometrical features of general relativity can be recovered. 679 The advantage of this version is a greater (mathematical) control over the theory (and its quantification). The LQG program requires that a theory of spacetime be independent of the background, as opposed to the string theory where spacetime is treated as a fixed background. LQG uses the Hamiltonian or canonical formulation of GR. The advantage of a canonical formulation of a theory is the ease and standardization of quantification. The loops in the LQG give us a description of the space. At the intersection of the loops there appear nodes that represent basic units of the space, which is thus discretized; two nodes connected by a link represent two space units side by side. The surface is determined by the intersections with the loops. Thus, one can imagine a graph (spin network)680 made from certain quantum numbers attached to it. The numbers determine the surfaces and volumes of space. 681 The problem of time in LQG is to incorporate time into this image. The LQG considers GR as a starting point, at which it applies a quantification procedure to arrive at a viable quantum theory of gravity. In the quantification procedure, called canonical quantization, it is necessary to reformulate the GR as a Hamiltonian system, thus allowing a time evolution of all the degrees of freedom of the system. The respective Hamiltonian formulas divide 676 Kuchař, "Canonical Quantization of Gravity." 677 Weinstein and Rickles, "Quantum Gravity." 678 Carlo Rovelli, "Notes for a Brief History of Quantum Gravity," ArXiv:Gr-Qc/0006061, June 16, 2000, http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0006061. 679 Lee Smolin, "The Case for Background Independence," ArXiv:Hep-Th/0507235, July 25, 2005, 196–239, http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0507235. 680 The spin network is a graph whose nodes represent "slices" of space and whose links represent surfaces that separate these pieces, representing a quantum state of the gravitational field or space. 681 Keizo Matsubara, Stringed Along Or Caught in a Loop?: Philosophical Reflections on Modern Quantum Gravity Research (Filosofiska Institutionen, Uppsala universitet, 2012). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 154 the spacetime in a foliation of three-dimensional space hypersurfaces, through a formalism called ADM after its authors (Richard Arnowitt, Stanley Deser and Charles Misner). ADM formalism assumes metrics induced on spatial surfaces as "position" variables and a linear combination of the outer curvature components of these hypersurfaces encoding their incorporation into 4-dimensional space-time as canonically conjugated "momentum" variables with metrics. 682 The resulting Hamiltonian equations are not equivalent to the Einstein field equations. To make them equivalent, restrictions must be introduced, resulting in certain conditions for the initial data. The first family of constraints encodes the freedom of choosing the foliation (Hamiltonian constraint), and the second set of constraints concerns the freedom to choose the coordinates in the 3-dimensional space (vector constraints), resulting in a total of four constraint equations. In the LQG there is a family of additional constraints related to internal symmetries. So far, only two of the three families of constraints have been resolved. The canonical quantization procedure is carried out according to Paul Dirac, 683 transforming the canonical variables into quantum operators that act on a space of quantum state. The use of ADM formalism was hit by insurmountable technical complications, so in the 1980s Abhay Ashtekar introduced new variables that simplified the equations of constraints, with the disadvantage of losing the direct geometric significance of ADM variables. In this case the spacetime geometry is captured by a "triad field" which encodes the local inertial frames defined on spatial hypersurfaces, rather than the metrics. The transition from ADM to the Ashtekar variables represents a reinterpretation of the Einstein field equations. The generalized theory of reinterpreted relativity is then subjected to the canonical procedure as above. 684 In many approaches to quantum gravity, including string theory and LQG, space is no longer a fundamental entity, but merely an "emergent" phenomenon that results from basic physics. 685 Christian Wüthrich states that it is not clear whether we can formulate a physical theory in a coherent way in the absence of space and time. 686 682 Christian Wuthrich, "In Search of Lost Spacetime: Philosophical Issues Arising in Quantum Gravity" (2011). 683 Dirac, Lectures on Quantum Mechanics. 684 Wuthrich, "In Search of Lost Spacetime." 685 Wuthrich. 686 Wuthrich, "To Quantize or Not to Quantize," 72 : 777-788. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 155 A newer approach is the use of so-called "spin foam" models, 687 which use path integration to generate spacetime. The evolution in time of spin networks is assumed to represent spacetime in terms of spin foam. LQG is a vast active research program, developed in several directions with the same hard core. 688 Two directions of development are more important: the more traditional canonical LQG, and the covariant LQG, called the spin foam theory. The loop quantum gravity resulted from an attempt to formulate a quantum theory independent of the background. This takes into account the general relativity approach that spacetime is a dynamic field and, therefore, a quantum object. The second hypothesis of the theory is that the quantum discreteness that determines the behavior similar to the particles of other field theories also affects the structure of space. The result is a granular structure of space at Planck length. The quantum state of spacetime is described by means of a mathematical structure called a spin network. Spin networks do not represent quantum states of a field in space, but quantum states of spacetime. The theory was obtained by reformulating the general relativity with the help of the Ashtekar variables. 689 Currently, there are several positive heuristics based on which the dynamics of the theory develop. The black hole thermodynamics tries to reconcile the laws of thermodynamics with the black hole event horizons. A recent success of the theory is the calculation of the entropy of all non-singular black holes directly from the theory and independent of other parameters. This is the only known derivation of this formula from a fundamental theory, in the case of generic black holes that are not singular. The theory also allowed the calculation of quantum gravity corrections at entropy and radiation of black holes. In 2014, Carlo Rovelli and Francesca Vidotto suggested, based on LQG, that there is a Planck star inside a black hole, thus trying to resolve the protection of the black hole and the paradox of the black hole information. Loop quantum cosmology (LCC) predicted a Big Bounce before the Big Bang. LCC was developed using methods that mimic those of LQG, which predicts a "quantum bridge" between contracting and expansive cosmological branches. Through the LCC, the singularities of Big Bang, Big 687 John W. Barrett and Louis Crane, "Relativistic Spin Networks and Quantum Gravity," Journal of Mathematical Physics 39, no. 6 (June 1998): 32:3296–3302, https://doi.org/10.1063/1.532254. 688 Dirac, Lectures on Quantum Mechanics. 689 Abhay Ashtekar, "New Variables for Classical and Quantum Gravity," Physical Review Letters 57, no. 18 (November 3, 1986): 57 (18): 2244–2247, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.57.2244. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 156 Bounce, and a natural mechanism for inflation were predicted. But the results obtained are subject to restriction due to the artificial suppression of the degrees of freedom. The avoidance of singularities in the LCC is done through mechanisms available only in these restrictive models; the avoidance of singularities in the complete theory can only be achieved by a more subtle feature of the LQG. The GR reproduction as a low-energy limit in LQG has not been confirmed yet, and the scattering amplitudes have not yet been calculated. The most pressing problems of the LQG are our lack of understanding of the dynamics (the inability to solve the Hamiltonian constraint equation), and the failure to explain how the classic smooth space appears (how GR succeeds in this case). Another LQG problem is a general problem of quantum mechanics: time. Carlo Rovelli and Julian Barbour tried to formulate quantum mechanics in a way that does not require external time, replacing time by relating events directly with one another. 690 The effects of quantum gravity are difficult to measure because the Planck length is much too small, but we try to measure the effects from astrophysical observations and gravitational wave detectors. It has not yet been shown that the LQG description of spacetime on the Planck scale has the correct continuous limit described by the general relativity with possible quantum corrections. Other unresolved issues include dynamics of theory, constraints, coupling with matter fields, renormalization of graviton. 691 There is still no experimental observation for which LQG made a different prediction from the Standard Model or general relativity. Due to the lack of a semiclassic boundary, LQG did not reproduce the predictions made by general relativity. The LQG has difficulties in trying to allow the theory of general relativity at the semiclassical limit, among which • There is no operator that responds to infinitesimal diffeomorphisms, it must be approximated by finite diffeomorphisms and thus the structure of the Poisson brackets of 690 Carlo Rovelli, "Relational Quantum Mechanics," International Journal of Theoretical Physics 35, no. 8 (August 1996): 35 : 1637-1678, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02302261. 691 Hermann Nicolai, Kasper Peeters, and Marija Zamaklar, "Loop Quantum Gravity: An Outside View," Classical and Quantum Gravity 22, no. 19 (October 7, 2005): 22(19): R193–R247, https://doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/22/19/R01. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 157 classical theory is not exactly reproduced. The problem can be circumvented by introducing constraints. 692 • The difficulty of reconciling the discrete combinatorial nature of quantum states with the continuous nature of classical theory of the fields. • Difficulties arising from the structure of the Poisson brackets that involve spatial diffeomorphism and Hamiltonian constraints. 693 • The developed semiclassic mechanisms are only suitable for operators who do not change the graph. • The problem of formulating observables for general relativity due to its nonlinear nature and the invariance of spacetime diffeomorphism. 694 LQG is a possible solution of quantum gravity, just like string theory but with differences. In contrast to the string theory which postulates additional dimensions and unobserved additional particles and symmetries, LQG is based only on quantum theory and general relativity, and its scope is limited to understanding the quantum aspects of gravitational interaction. In addition, the consequences of LQG are radical, fundamentally altering the nature of space and time. 3.4 String theory In quantum field theory, the main obstacle is the occurrence of the untreatable infinities in the interactions of the particles due to the possibility of arbitrary distances between the point particles. Strings, as extended objects, provide a better framework, which allows finite calculations. 695 String theory is part of a research program in which point particles in particle physics are replaced by onedimensional objects called strings. It describes how these strings propagate through space and interact with one another. At larger scales, a string looks like an ordinary particle, with mass, charge and other properties determined by the vibrational state of the string. One of the vibrational states of the strings corresponds to graviton, the hypothetical particle in quantum mechanics for gravitational force. 696 String theory is usually manifested at very high energies, such as in black hole physics, early universe cosmology, nuclear physics, and condensed matter physics. String 692 Thomas Thiemann, Modern Canonical Quantum General Relativity, 1 edition (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 693 Thiemann. 694 B. Dittrich, "Partial and Complete Observables for Hamiltonian Constrained Systems," General Relativity and Gravitation 39, no. 11 (November 1, 2007): 39 (11): 1891–1927, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10714-007-0495-2. 695 Dawid, "Scientific Realism in the Age of String Theory." 696 Katrin Becker, Melanie Becker, and John H. Schwarz, String Theory and M-Theory: A Modern Introduction (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2–3. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 158 theory tries to unify gravity and particle physics, and its later versions try to modify all the fundamental forces in physics. 697 The purpose of string theory was to replace elementary particles with one-dimensional strings in order to unify quantum physics and gravity. The string theory research program is based on a 1930 assumption that general relativity resembles the theory of a field of spin-two without mass in the Minkowskian flat space. 698 The quantification of such a theory has been shown not to be perturbative renormalizable, implying infinities that cannot be eliminated. This early theory was abandoned until the mid-1970s, when it was developed as a one-dimensional string theory. It should be noted that the string theory was initially developed, in the late 1960s and early 1970s in particle physics the bosonic string theory, which only dealt with bosons. After a temporary success as a hadron theory, quantum chromodynamics has been recognized as the correct hadron theory. In 1974 Tamiaki Yoneya discovered that the theory provides a massive particle of spin 2, considered to be a graviton. John Schwarz and Joel Scherk reintroduced Kaluza-Klein's theory for additional dimensions, recovered the abandoned bootstrap program, and thus began the string theory research program in quantum gravity. A typical example of reinvigorating a research program in the sense of Lakatos (bootstrap program) and changing the direction of research of another program (string theory) whose heuristics, by adding an additional theory (Kaluza-Klein), has proved to be a lot more useful in a different direction than originally envisaged. Later it was developed in the superstring theory, based on the supersymmetry between bosons and fermions, 699 and then appeared other versions of the theory. In the mid-1990s, scientists focused on developing a unifying research program, an eleven-dimensional theory called the M theory. The strings do not have quantum numbers, but they differ in their topological form (open or closed, modes of compacting) and their dynamics (modes of oscillation). They can be perceived on a macroscopic scale as point particles with certain quantum numbers. The change of the oscillation mode corresponds to a transformation to another particle. The strings at the fundamental level do not have coupling constants. The interaction between them corresponds to their dynamics. 700 697 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, 3, 15–16. 698 A. Capelli, "The Birth of String Theory Edited by Andrea Cappelli," Cambridge Core, April 2012, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977725. 699 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, String Theory and M-Theory, 4. 700 Vincent Lam, "Quantum Structure and Spacetime.," Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics, January 1, 2016, 81–99, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004310827_005. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 159 For each version of string theory there is only one type of string, such as a small loop or string segment, which can vibrate in different ways. In the string theory research program, the characteristic string length scale is of the order of Planck length (10-35 meters), over which the effects of quantum gravity are considered significant. 701 At ordinary dimensions, such objects cannot be distinguished from zero-dimensional point particles. There are several variants of the superstring theory: type I, type IIA, type IIB and two types of heterotic strings, SO (32) and E8×E8. String theories require additional dimensions of spacetime for mathematical consistency. In bosonic string theory, spacetime is 26-dimensional, while in superstring theory it is 10dimensional, and in M-theory it is 11-dimensional. These additional dimensions will not be observed in experiments, 702 due to their compaction by which they "close" on themselves forming circles. At the limit, when these extra dimensions tend to zero, they reach the usual spacetime. In order for the theories to properly describe the world, the compacted dimensions must be in the form of the Calabi-Yau manifolds. 703 Another way to reduce the number of dimensions is by using the membrane cosmology scenario ("brane-world"), considering the observable universe as a three-dimensional subspace of a multidimensional space. In these models, gravity appears from the closed strungs in a space with several dimensions, thus explaining the lower power of gravity compared to the other fundamental forces. 704 In string theory, a brane (the abbreviation for "membrane") generalizes the notion of a point particle to dimensions other than zero. Branes are physical bodies that obey the rules of quantum mechanics. 705 A particularity of the theories in this research program are the "dualities", mathematical transformations that identify the physical theories within this program between them, drawing the conclusion that all these theories are subsumed into one, the M-theory. 706 Two theories are dual if they are exactly equivalent in terms of observational consequences, although they are constructed differently and may involve different objects and topological scenarios. 707 The different theories within the string theory research program are linked by several relationships, one being the specific 701 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, String Theory and M-Theory, 6. 702 Barton Zwiebach, A First Course in String Theory, 2 edition (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 703 Shing-Tung Yau, The Shape of Inner Space, Reprint edition (Basic Books, 2012), chap. 6. 704 Randall and Sundrum, "An Alternative to Compactification," 83 (23): 4690–4693. 705 Gregory Moore, "What Is... a Brane?," Notices of the American Mathematical Society 52, no. 2 (November 28, 2005): 214, https://www.researchwithrutgers.com/en/publications/what-is-a-brane. 706 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, String Theory and M-Theory, 9–12. 707 Dawid, "Scientific Realism in the Age of String Theory." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 160 correspondence relation called duality S. 708 Another relationship, called duality T, considers strings that propagate around an additional circular dimension. In 1997, the anti-de Sitter/conformal field theory correspondence (AdS/CFT) was discovered, 709 which links the string theory with a quantum field theory. 710 In a more general framework, AdS/CFT correspondence is a duality that correlates string theory with other physical theories better understood theoretically, with implications in the study of black holes and quantum gravity, but also in nuclear physics711 and condensed matter. 712 The dualities in string theory have been linked by philosophers with issues specific to philosophy, such as underdetermination, conventionalism and emergency/reduction. Thus, spacetime has come to be considered by some physicists as an emergent entity, which depends, for example, on the coupling power that governs physical interactions. According to the ADS/CFT duality, a 10dimensional string theory is observationally equivalent to a 4-dimensional gauge theory the "gauge/gravity" duality. It follows from these dualities that the theories, being equivalent, are not fundamental, and therefore neither spacetime described is fundamental, but an emergent phenomenon. 713 In this program, gauge theory and gravitational theory are classic limits of a more comprehensive, unifying quantum theory. Philosophers question whether two dual theories are physically distinct or only notational variants of the same theory. 714 715 In 1995, Edward Witten suggested that the five families of theories in the string theory research program are special limiting cases of an 11-dimensional theory called M-theory. 716 In 1997, Tom Banks, Willy Fischler, Stephen Shenker and Leonard Susskind proposed a matrix model for the 708 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, String Theory and M-Theory. 709 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, 14–15. 710 Zwiebach, A First Course in String Theory, 376. 711 Igor R. Klebanov and Juan M. Maldacena, "Solving Quantum Field Theories via Curved Spacetimes," Physics Today 62, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 62 (1): 28–33, https://doi.org/10.1063/1.3074260. 712 Subir Sachdev, "Strange and Stringy," Scientific American 308 (December 1, 2012): 308 (44): 44–51, https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0113-44. 713 Tiziana Vistarini, "Emergent Spacetime in String Theory," 2013, 103. 714 Joseph Polchinski, "Dualities of Fields and Strings," ArXiv:1412.5704 [Hep-Th], December 17, 2014, http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.5704. 715 Rickles, "A Philosopher Looks at String Dualities," 42: 54–67. 716 Michael J. Duff, "The Theory Formerly Known as Strings," Scientific American 278 (February 1, 1998): 278 (2): 64–9, https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0298-64. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 161 11-dimensional M theory, where the reduced energy limit of this model is eleven-dimensional supergravity. 717 Feynman regards quantum gravity as "just another quantum field theory" such as quantum electrodynamics. The different types of existing particles are different excitations of the same string. Since one of the modes of string oscillation is a spin-2 massless state that identifies with graviton, string theory necessarily includes quantum gravity. String theory modifies the point gravity of particles at short distances by exchange of massive states of strings. 718 In string theory, the spacetime dimension is not an intrinsic property of the theory itself, but a property of the particular solution. While string theory cannot currently provide falsifiable predictions, it has, however, inspired new and imaginative proposals for solving outstanding problems in particle physics and cosmology. Early string theory, when dealing with hadron physics, can explain why fermions come in three hierarchical generations, and mixing rates between generations of quarks. 719 In the second period when it approached quantum gravity, the theory addressed the paradox of information about the black hole, 720 counting the correct entropy of the black holes and the processes of changing the topology. 721 The discovery of AdS/CFT correspondence led to a formulation of string theory based on quantum field theory, better understood, and provided a general framework for solving black hole paradoxes, 722 such as in Hawkins radiation of black holes (information paradox). 723 Through his research program, he led to many theoretical discoveries in mathematics and gauge theory. 717 T. Banks et al., "M Theory as a Matrix Model: A Conjecture," Physical Review D 55, no. 8 (April 15, 1997): 55 (8): 5112–5128, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.55.5112. 718 Feynman et al., Feynman Lectures on Gravitation. 719 Jonathan J. Heckman and Cumrun Vafa, "Flavor Hierarchy From F-Theory," Nuclear Physics B 837, no. 1–2 (September 2010): 837 (1): 137–151, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nuclphysb.2010.05.009. 720 Andrew Strominger and Cumrun Vafa, "Microscopic Origin of the Bekenstein-Hawking Entropy," Physics Letters B 379, no. 1 (June 27, 1996): 379 (1–4): 99–104, https://doi.org/10.1016/0370-2693(96)00345-0. 721 A. Adams et al., "Things Fall Apart: Topology Change from Winding Tachyons," Journal of High Energy Physics 2005, no. 10 (October 11, 2005): (10): 033, https://doi.org/10.1088/1126-6708/2005/10/033. 722 Sebastian de Haro et al., "Forty Years of String Theory Reflecting on the Foundations," Foundations of Physics 43, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-012-9691-3. 723 Leonard Susskind, The Black Hole War: My Battle with Stephen Hawking to Make the World Safe for Quantum Mechanics, Reprint edition (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 162 String theory is considered to be a useful tool in investigating the theoretical properties of the thermodynamics of black holes, 724 respectively their entropy. 725 The theoretical basis for these investigations has taken into account the case of idealized black holes, with the smallest possible mass compatible with a given task. 726 This result can be generalized to any theory of gravity, 727 being able to extend to non-extreme astrophysical black holes. 728 In the Big Bang theory, part of the predominant cosmological model for the universe, the initial rapid expansion of the universe, is caused by a hypothetical particle called inflaton. The exact properties of this particle are not known. They should be derived from a more fundamental theory, such as string theory. 729 The development of this subprogram within the string theory research program is under development. 730 In brane theory, brane D was identified with black hole supergravitation solutions. Leonard Susskind identified the holographic principle of Gerardus' t Hooft with common states of thermal black holes. Recently, some experiments in other fields, such as condensed matter physics, have used theoretical results of string theory. 731 And the quantum inseparability in superconductors is largely based on the ideas of duality and additional spatial dimensions developed in string theory. With the help of the duality between 4-dimensional gauge theories and 5-dimensional gravity, string theorists have predicted the experimental value of plasma entropy, a result not obtained by any other theoretical model, but these are not absolute experimental validations. 732 733 724 de Haro et al., "Forty Years of String Theory Reflecting on the Foundations," 2. 725 Yau, The Shape of Inner Space, 189. 726 Yau, 192–93. 727 Andrew Strominger, "Black Hole Entropy from Near-Horizon Microstates," Journal of High Energy Physics 1998, no. 02 (February 15, 1998): (2): 009, https://doi.org/10.1088/1126-6708/1998/02/009. 728 Alejandra Castro, Alexander Maloney, and Andrew Strominger, "Hidden Conformal Symmetry of the Kerr Black Hole," Physical Review D 82, no. 2 (July 13, 2010): (2): 024008, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevD.82.024008. 729 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, String Theory and M-Theory, 533. 730 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, 539–43. 731 Sachdev, "Strange and Stringy," 44–51. 732 Dawid, String Theory and the Scientific Method. 733 Paul Verhagen, "Understanding the Theory of Everything: Evaluating Criticism Aimed at String Theory" (Amsterdam University College, 2015), Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 163 It is hoped that the additional dimensions can be observed with the Hadron Collider (LHC) from CERN, Geneva, but a possible denial would not mean refuting the theory. For many researchers, gauge theory is considered the only way to renormalize relationships, and string theory is the only option to eliminate the infinities of a unifying program of quantum physics and gravity. The string theory was initially experimentally corroborated as a theory of particle physics, but in the current development it is considered to be far from being falsifiable. The continuation of the program is based on the confidence that theory is the best candidate for a total unifying program. Its credibility is enhanced by the interconnections created during its development, as in the case of supersymmetry and cosmology of black holes. String theory still does not have a satisfactory definition in all circumstances. The theory uses perturbative techniques, 734 but has not yet clarified the aspects of determining the properties of the universe, 735 so it has attracted criticism from scientists, questioning the value of research in this direction. 736 Critics of string theory draw attention to the large number of possible solutions described by the string theory. According to Woit, "The possible existence of, say, 10500 consistent different vacuum states for superstring theory probably destroys the hope of using the theory to predict anything. If one picks among this large set just those states whose properties agree with present experimental observations, it is likely there still will be such a large number of these that one can get just about whatever value one wants for the results of any new observation." 737 The supporters of the theory argue that this can be an advantage, allowing a natural anthropic explanation of the observed values of the physical constants. 738 http://www.uva.nl/binaries/content/documents/personalpages/h/a/s.deharo/en/tab-three/tabthree/cpitem%5B8%5D/asset. 734 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, String Theory and M-Theory, 8. 735 Becker, Becker, and Schwarz, 13–14. 736 Zee, Quantum Field Theory in a Nutshell, 2nd Edition. 737 Peter Woit, Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory and the Search for Unity in Physical Law, Reprint edition (Basic Books, 2007), 242. 738 Woit, 242. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 164 Another criticism focuses on the dependence of the background theory, as opposed to general relativity. Lee Smolin argues that this is the main weakness of string theory as a theory of quantum gravity. 739 The solutions of the theory are not unique, and there is no perturbative mechanism to select a particular solution or to choose the true vacuum. Thus, the perturbative formulation of string theory loses its predictive power. Also, there is no perturbative mechanism to select solutions that support low energy spectra that are not supersymmetrical. 740 Paul Verhagen asks how we should evaluate string theory; can a theory that has considerable difficulties with experimental verification to be classified as a science? to answer this question we must analyze the origins of the different concepts used in theory, evaluate the need for a large unified theory, and focus on evaluating its scientific situation. Some argue that string theory has failed, while others point to its theoretical progress. There is a "meta-paradigmatic rift" between experimentalists and theorists in this regard. 741 Chalmers believes that a theory must be falsifiable in Popper's sense742 in order to be scientific: "If a statement is unfalsifiable, then the world can have any properties whatsoever, and can behave in any way whatsoever, without conflicting with the statement." 743 In this sense, string theory is considered as non-falsifiable. 744 The current technology is not precise enough to develop experiments to verify string theory. But the theory is "potentially" falsifiable; makes some predictions, such as the existence of additional dimensions, but they cannot be verified, at least for now. And not yet all the mathematical consequences of the axioms have been elaborated to detect possible conflicts with the observed reality. But efforts are being made in this direction, both for the experimental and the theoretical part. String physicists are accused of ignoring empirical testability and that are replacing this criterion with mathematical arguments. Some of the questions of physicists and philosophers are: 1. Does a theory need to be testable, or are mental experiments sufficient? 2. Does a theory need to make verifiable predictions, or is indirect testability sufficient? 3. A theory without predictions, with only probability distributions, is considered testable? 739 Smolin, The Trouble With Physics, 184. 740 Feynman et al., Feynman Lectures on Gravitation. 741 Verhagen, "Understanding the Theory of Everything: Evaluating Criticism Aimed at String Theory." 742 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. 743 Alan F. Chalmers, What Is This Thing Called Science?, 3 edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999), 63. 744 H. Georgi and Paul Davies, Grand Unified Theories, in The New Physics (Cambridge University Press, 1992). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 165 4. Should the tests be necessarily empirical, or can mathematical consistency checks be considered tests? 5. If contradictory or unacceptable results are obtained from the mental tests by reduction to the absurd, what is the value of these tests? 6. When can testability be requested? Is the possibility of future testing valid? 7. How important is testability in relation to other epistemic desires? Is a theory easy to test but with a low explanatory value preferred over a non-testable theory but with a higher explanatory power? But if the testable theory is too complicated and the non-testable one is simple and elegant? 8. Are predictions of new phenomena more important than preor retrodictions of already known phenomena? 745 Reiner Hedrich suggests746 that the current failure of string theory could be due to the wrong mathematical device chosen, using the mathematics of the continuum. It is possible that when the theory finds its fundamental principle, it may lead to a more appropriate mathematical basis. An independent background formulation and holographic principle could help heuristic in finding this principle. But it is possible that the principle will never be found, possibly due to the wrong basic assumptions. Currently, string theory is the dominant research program in the theoretical physics of high energy, 747 considered by some scientists as no viable alternative. 748 Peter Woit regards this status of theory as unhealthy and detrimental to the future of fundamental physics, its popularity largely due to the financial structure of the academic environment and the fierce competition of limited resources. 749 Roger Penrose expresses similar views, saying: "The often frantic competitiveness that this ease of communication engenders leads to bandwagon effects, where researchers fear to be left behind if they do not join in." 750 Logical positivists considered that the scientific method means the deduction of nature models from observations. String theory was initially developed based on an observed fact, the Regge slopes, which at present is no longer considered to be explained by this theory. And the theory has so far not been confirmed by any empirical experiment or observation. But it continued to develop, 745 Helge Kragh, "Fundamental Theories and Epistemic Shifts: Can History of Science Serve as a Guide?," ArXiv:1702.05648 [Physics], February 18, 2017, http://arxiv.org/abs/1702.05648. 746 Reiner Hedrich, "The Internal and External Problems of String Theory: A Philosophical View," Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38, no. 2 (2006): 261–278. 747 Penrose, The Road to Reality, 1017. 748 Woit, Not Even Wrong, chap. 16. 749 Woit, 239. 750 Penrose, The Road to Reality, 1018. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 166 supported by the belief of many physicists that it is much better than quantum field theory for quantum gravity, and in the hope that it will help unify gravity with other fundamental forces. Most supporters seem to be completely indifferent to experiments and observations, being rather concerned with the "elegance" of mathematical formulation of the theory. 751 For this reason, a reconciliation between string theory and logical positivists seems impossible. 752 Richard Dawid argues that string theory is based on observations, but its problem would be the huge "theoretical distance" between observable phenomena and scientific concepts. Some researchers argue that the principle of empirical underdetermination of scientific theories does not admit that this "theoretical distance" can be made to allow reliable claims about nature. To this end, Dawid believes that the principle of underdetermination must be replaced by arguments that support string theory. The problem of this theory is, according to Dawid, arbitrariness in choosing its fundamental principles. The theory has a certain set of physical postulates, but there is a continuous erosion of these postulates that follows a uniquely determined linear path. Thus, Dawid asserts that the disagreement between string theorists and phenomenological physicists on string status disappears due to a dramatic change in the characteristics of scientific theory: the old concept of underdetermination of scientific theories in modern particle physics gradually loses ground against the theory of uniqueness. String theory would induce a new understanding of what may be called a scientific statement about nature: the claim of theoretical uniqueness is sufficient for the adoption of a new scientific theory. 753 In 1995, from the unification of string theories was born the most demanding, unifier gravity research program, the 11-dimensional M-theory, 754 in order to unify gravity with all other fundamental forces in physics. 3.4.1 Heuristics of string theory The logical positivists would have considered string theory as a speculative metaphysics. The instrumentalist aspect of logical positivism does not correspond with the opinions of string theorists. 751 F. David Peat, Superstrings and the Search for the Theory of Everything, 1 edition (Place of publication not identified: McGraw-Hill Education, 1989), 276. 752 Verhagen, "Understanding the Theory of Everything: Evaluating Criticism Aimed at String Theory." 753 Dawid, "Scientific Realism in the Age of String Theory." 754 Duff, "The Theory Formerly Known as Strings," 278 (2): 64–9. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 167 From the point of view of Popper's falsifiability, 755 we clearly distinguish between the context of discovery and the context of justification. In the context of discovery, there are no methodological rules, but there are strict rules for testing hypotheses, avoiding ad hoc hypotheses as much as possible, which must be independently verifiable anyway. The string theory has not yet been tested and has already entered an ad-hoc hypothesis phase. But it has not been refuted so far, and the theory allows testing through experiments, even though there is not yet the technology needed to develop these experiments. An unexpected situation for Popper? Kuhn adopted an externalist perspective in the philosophy of science. Scientific motivations do not always succeed in explaining paradigm shifts, as other external causes, including social ones, can enter this equation. 756 Kuhn's theory is rather a retrospective account of the history of science, never intended to provide a normative force methodology. 757 Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions by changing "paradigms" can also be applied to string theory as a new paradigm in high energy physics. But a paradigm shift involves renouncing the old paradigm, going through a period of "crisis" in which anomalies occur, and observations that contradict the old paradigm. 758 The anomalies are discrepancies between theory and experiment. But in string theory there are no experiments, and problems of a theoretical nature have been known from the beginning. Thus, the new paradigm does not look any better than the old one. Since string theory has not been able to explain phenomena to date, it may seem that this confirms Feyerabend's view that there is no "method" of science. And yet, string theory is still the most active research program for quantum gravity. But, compared to other non-falsifiable theories, this has something extra, especially: mathematical language, with a clear logic of deductions. Up to a point it can reproduce classical gauge theories and general relativity. And there is hope that in the not too distant future experiments can be developed to test the theory. String theory is called by Keizo Matsubara a "research program" and this is in the sense of Lakatos. 759 Hacking took over Lakatos theory, 760 but not as a methodological norm, rather as a method of 755 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 756 Thomas S. Kuhn and Jim Conant, The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview (University of Chicago Press, 2000), 286–87. 757 Matsubara, Stringed Along Or Caught in a Loop? 758 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 202. 759 Keizo Matsubara, "Realism, Underdetermination and String Theory Dualities," Synthese 190, no. 3 (2013): 471– 489. 760 Ian Hacking, "Representing and Intervening by Ian Hacking," Cambridge Core, October 1983, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814563. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 168 rational reconstruction of the periods of the history of science. Keizo Matsubara supports Lakatos methodology, highlighting its main features in string theory: 761 Hard core: 1. The fundamental objects are not punctual particles, but extended objects, strings or branes. 2. Acceptance of the basic assumptions of quantum mechanics as given. 3. The necessity of the supersymmetry of the theory. Protective belt: • Different variants of string theory are different theoretical formulations, not different theories. • Compact dimensions are too small to be observed with current technology. • Explaining the values of the constants of nature, assuming a landscape of universes. Positive heuristics: 1. Explaining the diversity of the particles as mere manifestations of a fundamental type of objects. 2. Deriving the constants of nature 3. Unification of the standard model with gravity. Negative heuristics: 1. No modus tollens argument is allowed to be directed against the hard core. Compared to other programs, string theory seems to be more progressive in a more general sense. And the distinction between progressive/degenerative program cannot be made because empirical tests are lacking. But the failed attempts of the theorists over a large period to determine the constants of nature starting from the principles of the theory can be considered as a degenerative phase in the sense of Lakatos in which the empirical findings determine the theoretical development, although in this case the empirical results were known in advance, and had not predicted. Matsubara's conclusion is that string theory is a degenerative program, so it should be rejected if there would be such a progressive rival program. 762 Unfortunately, at present the other research programs are at least as inconclusive. 761 Matsubara, Stringed Along Or Caught in a Loop? 762 Matsubara. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 169 "I hold Lakatos theory, MSRP, to be the most reasonable analysis of scientific development; it fits quite a number of episodes from history of science and I think it strikes the right balance between a descriptive and a normative account of science. It is also, to some extent, useful for discussing string theory and its competitors, mainly loop quantum gravity. However one cannot really say that one programme is progressive and one degenerative, because the distinction and comparison is made in terms of theoretical and empirical development, and no empirical development has occurred. On the other hand, without using Lakatos criteria and instead merely relying on our somewhat vague notion of development, one is tempted to say that string theory has been theoretically progressive, but not empirically progressive. One could say that adherents to string theory believe that theoretical progressiveness is sufficient for continuing work on the theory, whereas critics think it's not."763 Cartwright and Frigg reached similar conclusions by analyzing string theory from the perspective of Lakatos methodology, evaluating the degree of progressivity of the theory according to: the range of empirical applications, the predictions of success, the reproduction of new technologies, the answer to problems, the coherence, the elegance, the explanatory power, the truth. Their conclusion was that string theory was progressive as explanatory and unifying power, but this is insufficient to state the progressiveness of the theory as a whole. But the authors do not recommend rejecting the theory, appealing to the methodological tolerance proposed by Lakatos. 764 Reiner Hedrich states that currently "string theory" is not a theory at all, but a labyrinth structure of mathematical procedures and intuitions. His only motivations over loop quantum gravity are the mutual incompatibility of the standard model of quantum field theory and general relativity, and the metaphysics of the physics unification program. 765 Delaying a philosophical decision on string theory after the consolidation of the research program could lead to more appropriate conditions for an evaluation. The great asset of the theory is the hope that it will succeed in unifying the two seemingly incompatible theories, quantum and general relativity, and implicitly all the fundamental forces, in a great unified theory. In addition, the theory conformed to an approach considered fundamental in the scientific methodology by Einstein, Duhem, and others: simplification. String theory unified 763 Matsubara, 43. 764 N. Cartwright and Roman Frigg, "String Theory Under Scrutiny" (2008), 14–15. 765 Hedrich, "The Internal and External Problems of String Theory." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 170 the standard model and general relativity, in this sense being a "better" model even though it still does not make predictions. 766 Greene also appreciates his "elegance".767 3.4.2. Anomalies of string theory Some of the predictions made by string theorists, such as microscopic black holes and low-energy super-symmetrical particles, were falsified by observation. 768 But these problems do not refute the theory, because they are indirect observations, rather than direct results of the theory. In the case of string theory, the experimental aspects are beyond our technological capacity. 769 But the fact that all predictions of the theory have so far been falsified is a problem. In addition, the landscape problem is another problem that makes the theory not falsifiable. To solve this problem, it was proposed to use the anthropic principle, according to which we can choose from different permutations those universes that create conditions suitable for the appearance of life, 770 but this principle is controversial. 771 Another problem concerns dark matter/energy, which are not predicted by string theory. As the string theory changed its scope (and in this context also all the requirements of a research program, including strategy) from hadron physics to quantum gravity, internal problems began to emerge that, by trying to eliminate them with ad-hoc hypotheses, led to other internal problems, resulting in a growing self-referentiality and a simultaneous removal of phenomenology. Her empiricism dropped steadily, remaining a labyrinth mathematical structure of unclear physical relevance. 766 Hakon Enger, "String Theory and the Scientific Method," 2003, http://home.simula.no/~henger/publ/mnvit-essay.pdf. 767 Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory, 2nd ed. edition (New York London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), 137. 768 Matthias Blau and Stefan Theisen, "String Theory as a Theory of Quantum Gravity: A Status Report," General Relativity and Gravitation 41, no. 4 (April 1, 2009): 743–55, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10714-008-0752-z. 769 Richard P Feynman, "The Feynman Lectures on Physics," 2013, http://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/. 770 Verhagen, "Understanding the Theory of Everything: Evaluating Criticism Aimed at String Theory." 771 Lee Smolin, "A Perspective on the Landscape Problem," Foundations of Physics 43, no. 1 (January 2013): 21–45, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-012-9652-x. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 171 In addition, the theoretical developments have led to a self-immunization of the theory against empirical refutations, including in the case of supersymmetry. 772 String theory does not make predictions for supersymmetric particle masses; thus, if future experiments in accelerators do not discover these particles, it can be argued that they have masses beyond the range of the experimental device. 773 It has thus become that the inability to make quantitative forecasts is used as a strategic advantage for auto-immunization, a unique aspect in physics. 774 Dawid believes that a confirmation of a scientific theory is based on three main factors: 1. the existence of alternative solutions to a particular problem (string theorists claim that their theory is the only viable option for unification); 2. the degree of connection with the already confirmed theories (string theorists consider their program as a natural continuation of the particle physics research program); 3. number of unexpected intuitions/predictions. Confidence in theory would depend on conformity with these factors, even in the absence of empirical confirmation. Basically, Dawid suggests a switch from empirical falsifiability to a Bayesian model that defines probability not "how often something happens" but "what degree of confidence we should have in our knowledge." Some physicists propose to evaluate alternative theories to string theory. The main difference would be that the string theory aims to solve the problem of quantum gravity in the context of unification. Unfortunately, many of the problems of string theory remain in the alternative theories. The main rival, loop quantum gravity, has not yet been developed sufficiently to make falsifiable statements. Smolin claims the alternatives have been consistently neglected. 775 The problem with alternatives is that at present there is not sufficiently developed and consolidated theory to take the place of string theory. 776 Looking for "everyone's theory" there seems to be no other way than to continue working on string theory (the argument "There are no alternatives.") 777 772 Richard Dawid, "On the Conflicting Assessments of the Current Status of String Theory," Preprint, April 2008, 984–96, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4009/. 773 Greene, The Elegant Universe. 774 Hedrich, "The Internal and External Problems of String Theory." 775 Smolin, The Trouble With Physics. 776 Joanes Lizarraga et al., "Fitting BICEP2 with Defects, Primordial Gravitational Waves and Dust," Journal of Physics: Conference Series 600 (April 28, 2015): 600 (2015): 012025, https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/600/1/012025. 777 Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann, and Jan Sprenger, "The No Alternatives Argument," Preprint, February 24, 2013, 66.1 (2014): 213-234, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9588/. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 172 A scientific realist would only consider a well-tested mature theory that predicted new facts. String theory does not meet these requirements. The dualities of string theory reinforce this belief. The underdetermination of theories by data is a problem that concerns scientific realism. Realists will differentiate by simplicity, lack of ad-hoc, explanatory power, etc., between theories. Alternatively, it can be argued that underdetermination involves only two ways of describing the same theory. Undetermination should force the scientific realist to abandon either semantic or epistemic realism. 778 Traditional logical positivists are kind of anti-realists, considering that the significant cognitive part of a theory is limited to its empirical content. So, string theory would not be accepted in the current situation. If string theory were to have empirical success in the future, the dualities would only be considered as semantic equivalents, because only the empirical content would be considered relevant. 3.5 Other theories of quantum gravity Bimetric gravity is a class of modified theories of gravity in which two metric tensors are used instead of one, 779 the second metric being used at high energies. If the two metrics interact, two types of gravitons appear, one massive and one massless. The set of theories tries to explain the massive gravity. 780 Such theories are those of Nathan Rosen (1909-1995) 781 or Mordehai Milgrom's Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND). The evolutions of massive gravity have encouraged the emergence of new consistent theories of bimetric gravity, 782 but none have reflected physical observations better than general relativity theory. 783 Some of these theories (MOND, for example) are alternatives to dark energy. Other biometric theories do not take into account massive gravitons and do not change Newton's law, describing the universe as a variety of 778 Matsubara, "Realism, Underdetermination and String Theory Dualities." 779 N. Rosen, "General Relativity and Flat Space. I," Physical Review 57, no. 2 (January 15, 1940): 57 (2): 147–150, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.57.147. 780 S. F. Hassan and Rachel A. Rosen, "Bimetric Gravity from Ghost-Free Massive Gravity," Journal of High Energy Physics 2012, no. 2 (February 24, 2012): 1202 (2): 126, https://doi.org/10.1007/JHEP02(2012)126. 781 Rosen, "General Relativity and Flat Space. I," 57 (2): 147–150. 782 Lisa Zyga, "Gravitational Waves May Oscillate, Just like Neutrinos," 2017, https://phys.org/news/2017-09gravitational-oscillate-neutrinos.html. 783 Clifford Will, The Renaissance of General Relativity, in The New Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 18. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 173 two coupled Riemannian metrics, where matter interacts by gravity. Some of them stipulate the variable speed of light at high energy density. 784 Rosen's bigravity (1940) 785 proposes that at every point of spacetime there is a Euclidean metric tensor in addition to the Riemannian metric tensor. Thus, at each point of spacetime there are two values. The first metric tensor describes the geometry of spacetime, and therefore the gravitational field. The second metric tensor refers to spacetime flat and describes the inertial forces. Rosen's bigravity satisfies the principle of covariance and equivalence. Rosen's bigravity and GR differ in the case of the propagation of electromagnetic waves, of the external field of a high-density star, and in the behavior of intense gravitational waves that propagate through a strong static gravitational field. The predictions of gravitational radiation from Rosen's theory were refuted by the observations of the Hulse-Taylor binary pulsar. 786 Massive bigravity appeared in 2010, developed by Claudia de Rham, Gregory Gabadadze and Andrew Tolley (dRGT). 787 A non-dynamic "reference metric" appears in dRGT theory. The reference metric value must be specified manually. A further extension was introduced by Fawad Hassan and Rachel Rosen. 788 Bohmian quantum gravity incorporates the real configuration in theory as the basic variable and stipulates that it evolves in a natural way suggested by symmetry and Schrodinger's equation. 789 The theory solves the problem of time (the same role as in GR), and partly the problem of diffeomorphism. It has no problems with the role of observers and observables because they play no role in this theory. The time-dependent wave function, which satisfies the Schrodinger equation, is not necessary here. 784 J. P. Petit and G. D'Agostini, "Cosmological Bimetric Model with Interacting Positive and Negative Masses and Two Different Speeds of Light, in Agreement with the Observed Acceleration of the Universe," Modern Physics Letters A 29, no. 34 (October 27, 2014): 29 (34): 1450182, https://doi.org/10.1142/S021773231450182X. 785 Rosen, "General Relativity and Flat Space. I," 57 (2): 147–150. 786 Will, The Renaissance of General Relativity, in The New Physics, 18. 787 Claudia de Rham, Gregory Gabadadze, and Andrew J. Tolley, "Resummation of Massive Gravity," Physical Review Letters 106, no. 23 (June 10, 2011): 106 (23): 231101, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.106.231101. 788 Hassan and Rosen, "Bimetric Gravity from Ghost-Free Massive Gravity," 1202 (2): 126. 789 Sheldon Goldstein and Stefan Teufel, "Quantum Spacetime without Observers: Ontological Clarity and the Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Gravity," ArXiv:Quant-Ph/9902018, February 5, 1999, http://arxiv.org/abs/quantph/9902018. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 174 Bohmian quantum gravity implies a simple transition from quantum mechanics, incorporating the actual configuration into theory as the basic variable and stipulating that it evolves in a natural manner suggested by Schrodinger's symmetry and equation. 3.6 Unification (The Final Theory) The fields of application of general relativity (GR) and quantum field theory (QFT) are different, so most situations require the use of only one of the two theories. 790 The overlaps occur in regions of extremely small size and high mass, such as the black hole or the early universe (immediately after the Big Bang). This conflict is supposed to be solved only by unifying gravity with the other three interactions, to integrate GR and QFT into one theory. The string theory states that at the beginning of the universe (up to 10-43 seconds after the Big Bang), the four fundamental forces were a single fundamental force. According to physicism in philosophy, a physical final theory will coincide with a final philosophical theory. Several unifying theories have been proposed. Great unification implies the existence of an electronuclear force. The last step in unification would require a theory that includes both quantum mechanics and gravity through general relativity ("the final theory"). After 1990, some physicists consider that the 11-dimensional M-theory, often identified with one of the five perturbative superstring theories, or sometimes with the 11-dimensional maximal-supersymmetric supergravity, is the final theory. The idea of M theory791 took over from the ideas of the Kaluza-Klein theory, in which it was found that the use of a 5-dimensional spacetime for general relativity (with a small one) is seen, from the 4-dimensional perspective, like the usual general relativity along with Maxwell's electrodynamics. An important property of string theory is its supersymmetry (version of superstring theory) which, along with the additional dimensions, are the two main proposals for solving the problem. The additional dimensions would allow gravity to spread to the other dimensions, the other forces remaining limited in a 4-dimensional spacetime. Attempts to use loop quantum gravity (LQG) in a final theory (FT) have failed, but supporters of this program are continuing their research. 792 There are attempts to develop a final theory through other theories, such as the causal fermions systems theory, which contains the two current physical theories (general relativity and quantum field theory) as limiting cases. Another theory is that of causal sets. Another proposal is Garrett 790 Carlip, "Quantum Gravity," 64 (8): 885–942. 791 Weinberg, Dreams Of A Final Theory. 792 Sundance Bilson-Thompson et al., "Particle Identifications from Symmetries of Braided Ribbon Network Invariants," ArXiv:0804.0037 [Hep-Th], April 1, 2008, http://arxiv.org/abs/0804.0037. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 175 Lisi's E8, 793 which proposes unification within the Lie group. Christoph Schiller's Strand model attempts to reflect the gauge symmetry of the standard particle physics model, and another version involves ER = EPR, a conjecture in physics stating that entangled particles are connected by a wormhole (or Einstein–Rosen bridge). 794 Jürgen Schmidhuber is for FT, stating that Gödel's incompleteness theorems795 are irrelevant to computational physics. 796 Most physicists claim that Gödel's theorem does not imply the impossibility of a FT. 797 Some physicists, including Einstein, believe that theoretical models should not be confused with the true nature of reality, and argue that approximations will never reach a complete description of reality. 798 A philosophical debate is about whether a final theory can be called the fundamental law of the universe. 799 The reductionist FT supporters claim that theory is the fundamental law. Another view is that emerging laws (such as the second law of thermodynamics and the theory of natural selection) should be considered as fundamental, and therefore independent. The name "final theory" is contradicted by the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics predictions, sensitivity to initial conditions, limitations due to event horizons, and other deterministic difficulties. Frank Close contradicts the idea of FT claiming that the layers of nature are like layers of onion, and the number of these layers could be infinite, 800 implying an infinite 793 A. Garrett Lisi, "An Exceptionally Simple Theory of Everything," ArXiv:0711.0770 [Gr-Qc, Physics:Hep-Th], November 6, 2007, http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.0770. 794 Ron Cowen, "The Quantum Source of Space-Time," Nature News 527, no. 7578 (November 19, 2015): 527 (7578): 290–293, https://doi.org/10.1038/527290a. 795 Gödel's incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish limitations inherent in all axiomatic systems, except for the most trivial ones, capable of arithmetic. The first theorem states that any effectively generated theory, capable of expressing elementary arithmetic, cannot be both consistent and complete. 796 Jürgen Schmidhuber, "A Computer Scientist's View of Life, the Universe, and Everything. Lecture Notes in Computer Science," 1997, 201–208, http://people.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/. 797 Jürgen Schmidhuber, "Hierarchies of Generalized Kolmogorov Complexities and Nonenumerable Universal Measures Computable in the Limit," International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science 13, no. 04 (August 1, 2002): 13 (4): 587–612, https://doi.org/10.1142/S0129054102001291. 798 Pais, Subtle Is the Lord, chap. 17. 799 Weinberg, Dreams Of A Final Theory. 800 Frank Close, The New Cosmic Onion: Quarks and the Nature of the Universe, Revised edition (New York: CRC Press, 2006). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 176 series of physical theories. Weinberg801 states that since it is impossible to accurately calculate even a real projectile in the Earth's atmosphere, we cannot speak of a FT. Unification does not necessarily mean reduction. Quantum field theory and general relativity are unified theories themselves. General relativity is a gravitational generalization of the special theory of relativity that unified electromagnetism with classical non-gravitational mechanics, and quantum field theory is a combination of special relativity and quantum mechanics. The standard model is often presented as an example of successful unification. In trying to unify gravity with other forces, loop quantum gravity is a "minimalist" version (it is just an attempt to quantify general relativity). String theory tries to be the "theory of everything", in which a single type of interaction determines any other aspects of reality. Between quantum theory and general relativity there are problems of conceptual compatibility in the development of quantum gravity: the background independence of general relativity due to the lack of a preferred frame of reference, is opposed to the geometry of quantum theory which implies a background dependence related to the existence of a preferred frame of reference. 802 The metric in general relativity determines the geometry of spacetime and acts as a potential. Because it is a dynamic variable, it turns out that geometry itself is dynamic. Quantum theory requires a fixed geometry, resulting in a very different treatment of spacetime compared to GR. A theory of quantum gravity can give up substance dependence, or quantum theory can be modified. According to Reiner Hedrich, string theory is a mathematical construct without any empirical control, which seems to transcend more and more the context of physics, by increasing selfimmunization, eventually becoming a metaphysical form of a mathematical inspiration nature. 803 The return to a metaphysical nature must be seen as a retrograde step. String theory can be understood as a return to the ancient ideal of a deepening of nature exclusively through our (mathematical) intellect, without observations or experimental devices. Jeremy Butterfield and Christopher Isham point out that the immense self-reference that is found in all theories of quantum gravity is a consequence of the absence of empirical data, of the metaphysical significance of hypotheses and bias, and of the mathematical apparatus and theoretical model on which those theories are conceived. 804 The mathematical basis of string theory (an extended version of the quantum field theory apparatus) has not changed significantly during its evolution. There have also been attempts to unify gravity 801 Weinberg, Dreams Of A Final Theory. 802 Weinstein, "Absolute Quantum Mechanics," 52: 67-73. 803 Hedrich, "The Internal and External Problems of String Theory." 804 Butterfield and Isham, "Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity," 33–89. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 177 with other forces on mathematical bases, such as Einstein, Schrodinger, Misner and Wheeler's theories of geometrically unifying gravity and electromagnetism, but they have also failed. 805 All researchers, regardless of whether they are followers or critics of the Final Theory, are trying to find an answer to the question why this unification has not succeeded so far. After all, there is no consensus even on defining what unification actually is, and to what extent it can epistemically reflect this eventual ontic unity. Our epistemic boundaries could make such an exploration impossible. Basically, the philosophers of science are skeptical of the philosophical motivations of this unification, and of its scientific success. 806 805 Robert Weingard, "A Philosopher Looks at String Theory," PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1988): 95–106. 806 Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (Cambridge University Press, 1999). Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 178 4. Cosmology At the cosmological level, the standard cosmological model contains Einstein's theory of gravity as part of the "hard core". Dark matter, dark energy, and inflation were added to the theory in response to observations. None of these ancillary hypotheses have yet been confirmed. The standard cosmological model does not have predictions of success, it is constantly adjusted following observations. The reproduction of the spectrum of temperature fluctuations in the cosmic microwave environment is considered a success of the model, but it was obtained by the forced modification of the model parameters, with inconsistencies with the values determined in other, more direct ways. David Merritt807 draws attention to an alternative research program, which was initiated in the early 1980s and made new predictions; the program of Mordehai Milgrom (MOND), initiated in 1983, whose specific principle states that the laws of gravity and motion differ from those of Newton or Einstein in the very low acceleration regime (at the level of galaxies). The program has a long list of other predictions, avoiding the assumptions of dark matter and dark energy. In cosmology, metaphysics involves a wide range of questions beyond empirical evidence, sometimes using speculative inference. Epistemological analysis in cosmology helps model evaluation. The philosophical study provides a general framework for interpreting inferences that go beyond science. 808 In cosmology there are some ontological principles that help to classify the models according to characteristics, to conceive the cosmic reality in a more transparent description and allow us to solve mathematical equations as central constructions of any model. These principles are: 809 1. Homogeneity of space (uniform distribution of matter) 2. Homogeneity of time (structure independent of global cosmic time) 3. Isotropy of space (independence of structure from the direction of observation) 4. Homothety of space (independence of structure from scalar transformations) Thus, the standard model (Hot Big Bang) includes the models (a, c), the stationary model includes (a, b, c), the hierarchical model includes (c, d). 807 David Merritt, "Gravity: The Popper Problem," IAI TV Changing how the world thinks, October 2, 2017, https://iai.tv/articles/gravity-the-popper-problem-auid-899. 808 Petar V. Grujic, "Some Epistemic Questions of Cosmology," ArXiv:0709.3191 [Physics], September 20, 2007, http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.3191. 809 Grujic. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 179 In order to epistemically evaluate cosmological models, we assume that the physical laws are valid and the same everywhere in the cosmos, in space and time. Isotropy of space is the only property of the cosmos that is easy to verify. Because the inference on physical properties and phenomena is always indirect and related to theoretical models, empirical evidence is based on the validity of these theoretical constructs. 810 In estimating the cosmic distances we take into account the color change of the spectral lines from these objects and we rely on the interpretation of this change, attributed to the Doppler effect (kinematic), gravitational phenomena (dynamic), space expansion (geometric), etc., depending on the ours model of the universe. Within the "epistemic space", the ontologically defined principles (a, b, c) are postulated, but the fourth (d) is no longer valid at sufficiently small scales, including probably the gravitational one. Part of the observable cosmos, cosmography, can be viewed as a structure built on particular elemental components. Cosmographic models begin with the galaxy as an elemental unit. Cosmology treats galaxies as physical points, endowed with collective (coherent) and own (chaotic) movements. In cosmology, the theoretical predictions or descriptions must be in accordance with the empirical evidence, it turns out that the models will be adapted to the new empirical situations, or new external elements may be introduced into the model, provided they do not contradict the initial structure. 811 The test stone for a cosmological model is how it treats the problem of the Beginning, including the initial conditions and the eschatological problem. The Abderian approach is immune to these problems. In general, a good theory includes a formal mathematical model and the procedure of coupling with physical reality. Hawking proposed a solution that aims to formulate a model that is self-sufficient. Thus, the research program for the standard cosmological model is a unifying program in the sense of the methodology of Lakatos' research programs, including several unified programs (such as the one for the Big Bang, stellar and galaxy evolution, gravitational singularities, etc.). These unified programs are at the same time research sub-programs of the unifying program because, even if they are created and developed without being required by the unifying program, they must take into account its requirements in order to be validated and included in it. General relativity has emerged as an extremely successful model for gravity and cosmology, which has so far passed many unequivocal observational and experimental tests. However, there are 810 Grujic. 811 P. Duhem, "La Théorie Physique, Son Objet Et Sa Structure," Revue Philosophique de La France Et de l'Etranger 61 (1906): 324–327. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 180 strong indications that the theory is incomplete. 812 The question of quantum gravity and the question of the reality of spacetime singularities remain open. Observational data taken as evidence of dark energy and dark matter could indicate the need for new physics. Even as it is, general relativity is rich in possibilities for further exploration. Mathematical relativists seek to understand the nature of the singularities and fundamental properties of Einstein's equations, 813 while numerical relativists run increasingly powerful computer simulations (such as those describing black holes merging). A century after its introduction, general relativity remains a very active research area. 812 John Maddox, What Remains to Be Discovered: Mapping the Secrets of the Universe, the Origins of Life, and the Future of the Human Race, 1st Touchstone Ed edition (New York: Free Press, 1999), 52–59, 98–122. 813 H. Friedrich, "Is General Relativity 'Essentially Understood'?," Annalen Der Physik 15, no. 1–2 (2006): 15 (1– 2): 84–108, https://doi.org/10.1002/andp.200510173. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 181 Conclusions Through this paper I have developed the rational reconstruction of gravity based on the Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes, from Newton to the present, highlighting the main methodologies used in the evolution of this concept, and the current trends of development. The natural extension I proposed for the Lakatos methodology can successfully explain the new evolutions of physics in the case of quantum gravity. When scientists formulate and develop new theories, they do not have an immediate understanding of the formalism of the theory. The description is approximate, and the reference to their terms may be vague. 814 Images developed by a theory have an important heuristic value, which may suggest possible extensions of the theory or inspire new hypotheses. A philosophical critical analysis of the history of the concept of gravity can help to better understand the evolution of science, how to approach this concept over time, and current trends and possibilities. In Lakatos' opinion, there are multiple ways to reconstruct history, it all depends on what is considered to be rational. He proposes that the evaluation of these theories be made according to how well they manage to reconstruct the history of science while retaining the rationality of the "great science": "All methodologies function as historiographical (or meta-historical) theories (or research programmes) and can be criticized by criticizing the rational historical reconstructions to which they lead." Thus, research programmes are normative criteria for scientific rationality. 815 The standard empiricism, which is part of the methodology of Lakatos research programmes, states that in science all theories must be evaluated impartially in terms of evidence, simplicity, unity or explanatory power. Some versions of standard empiricism give simplicity and explanatory power a more important role than other versions. Planck remarked at one point that: "Experiments are the only means of knowledge at our disposal. The rest is poetry, imagination," 816 and Poincare817 said that "Experiment is the sole source of truth. It alone can teach us something new; it alone can give us certainty." 814 Matsubara, "Realism, Underdetermination and String Theory Dualities." 815 Sfetcu, "Reconstructia Rationala a Stiintei Prin Programe de Cercetare." 816 Peter W. Atkins and Ronald S. Friedman, Molecular Quantum Mechanics, 5 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), xiv. 817 Henri Poincare, Science and Hypothesis (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 140. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 182 Lakatos, according to Larry Laudan, states that the methodologist cannot tell scientists what theories to reject or accept, renouncing the prescriptive force of the methodology. 818 But, says Laudan, one must not give up the methodological enterprise. The doctrine adopted by Lakatos is that of rationality, according to which most scientists have rationally made theoretical choices: "If we put forward a theory to resolve a contradiction between a previous theory and a counterexample in such a way that the new theory, instead of offering a content-increasing (scientific) explanation, only offers a content-decreasing (linguistic) reinterpretation, the contradiction is resolved in a merely semantical, unscientific way. A given fact is explained scientifically only if a new fact is also explained with it." 819 Keizo Matsubara concludes that "If it is possible to find dualities between seemingly very different formulations within one research programme one should acknowledge that it might not be suitable to only study one research programme. The hostility that from time to time has appeared between proponents of different research programmes in quantum gravity might be a serious mistake. If something like a duality would be found between the research programmes, then they could actually merge. A general methodological suggestion can be given to the effect that only if a research programme is empirically progressive, would it be rational to completely 'stick with the programme'. When a theoretical research programme does not produce empirical results then a broader perspective ought to be adopted." 820 Unprecedented proliferation of the gravity theories requires an appropriate methodological approach, allowing logical relationships between these theories to explain the motivation of their emergence, their developmental modalities, and to evaluate future development trends. In this regard, I believe that Lakatos' methodology has sufficient flexibility and logic to address all these issues. The extension I proposed through bifurcated and unifying programs allows the explanation at methodological level and through the scientific rationality of this proliferation of postEinsteinian theories and quantum gravity. Einstein can best be understood from the perspective of his views on geometry and physics: "axiomatic geometry" must be supplemented with statements about the behavior of objects, which is a natural science which Einstein calls "practical geometry"; thus, the length measurements represent a practical geometry: 818 Larry Laudan, "Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism," American Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 1 (1987): 19–31. 819 Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 34. 820 Matsubara, "Realism, Underdetermination and String Theory Dualities." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 183 "I attach special importance to these views of geometry, because without it I should have been unable to formulate the theory of relativity. Without it the following reflection would have been impossible; in a system of reference rotating relatively to an inertial system, the laws of disposition of rigid bodies do not correspond to the rules of Euclidean geometry on account of the Lorentz contraction; thus if we admit non-inertial systems on an equal footing, we must abandon Euclidean geometry. Without the above interpretation the decisive step in the transition to generally covariant equations would certainly not have been taken." 821 For Einstein, ether and absolute space and time were useless or inadequate. Unlike Einstein, who attributed properties or states to space, physicists in the 18th and 19th centuries could not conceive of such a thing, so they invented the ether to take over these attributes. Einstein revolutionized the concepts of space, time and matter, through a relational approach to physics. All physical laws are based on a certain spacetime geometry. In this sense, there are three fundamental types of geometric structures: topology, connection and metric. Topology addresses the proximity of points or events, boundaries, continuity, connection and related concepts. The connection is a prescription of the parallel transport of the vectors (and tensors) along the curves, and therefore the comparison of the vector fields at different points to form (covariant) derivatives and differential equations. The metric attributes inner products to the vectors, length to curves, and in the relativistic theories determines the structure of the light cones and the causal relations. 822 In Einstein's theory, the connection and the metric and the structures determined by them, such as the curvature represent the gravitational field, resulting in it being part of the dynamic structure of spacetime geometry. According to Clifford, the variation of spacetime curvature determines the motion of matter, and so the theory of general relativity explains gravity in terms of geometrical curvature of spacetime. 823 824 Luciano Boi states that from the philosophical and scientific point of view, the most important finding of Einstein is that the way the gravitational field behaves depends on the nature of the geometry that characterizes spacetime. Keizo Matsubara states that the existence of dualities in the context of string theory can only be interpreted correctly if certain semantic aspects are clarified. 825 The arguments about string duality 821 Einstein, Geometrie und Erfahrung, 235. 822 Luciano Boi, "Theories of Space-Time in Modern Physics," Synthese 139, no. 3 (2004): 429–489. 823 Wheeler, "On the Nature of Quantum Geometrodynamics." 824 Luciano Boi, Le problème mathématique de l'espace : Une quête de l'intelligible, 1995 ed. (Berlin ; New York: Springer, 1995). 825 Matsubara, "Realism, Underdetermination and String Theory Dualities." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 184 seem to be compatible with a certain form of structural realism. String theorists do not believe that dual descriptions give rise to real alternatives. They are based on pragmatism. Thus, in some situations one description is better than another. But this is valid from a computational point of view. Physicists do not understand dualities as holding a vision in which everything in a theoretical formulation is considered literally true, not even an attempt. Although most physicists understand dualities similar to ontic or metaphysical structural realism, alternative opinions are also possible. In the case of the dualities of the string theory, they deny the semantic realism, but in other situations the string theorists have opted for a realistic understanding, as in the case of the "landscape" of the string theory, in which the idea of a parallel and real universe appears. Thus, string theorists must balance between realism and anti-realism in their attitude to their theoretical constructs, often accepting an intermediate realism, a version of structural realism, more specifically ontic or metaphysical structural realism. 826 With this idea, Dawid827 also agrees that dualities can undermine a vision that takes them seriously. Erik Curiel828 compared the current preference for quantum gravity with that for the hypotheticaldeductive methodological model of the 17th century, when instead of being critically analyzed it was chosen only to express enthusiasm for its future possibilities. He believes that such an attitude harms science. It is hoped that in the not too distant future, the energies generated by CERN' Large Hadron Collider will be sufficient to test aspects of quantum gravity, such as additional dimensions, supersymmetry, microscopic black hole behavior, etc. If supersymmetry is verified, this could be a "crucial test" for refuting or preserving string theory, but not for confirming it. Sean Lorenz comes to a simple conclusion about quantum gravity: "we simply do not know yet." 829 He thinks that quantifying the general theory is wrong. One reason would be spacetime, which in string theory defies ontological simplicity in favor of mathematical consistency. A theory of quantum gravity obtained from the theory of the quantum field of the standard model, combined with the general theory of relativity, is difficult to realize, especially for the explanation of some aspects that involve strong gravity (early universe, gravitational singularities). Curiel states 826 Matsubara. 827 Dawid, "Scientific Realism in the Age of String Theory." 828 Curiel, "Against the Excesses of Quantum Gravity." 829 Sean Lorenz, "A Cautious Ontology of Spacetime in Quantum Gravity," ResearchGate, 2015, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268296604_A_CAUTIOUS_ONTOLOGY_OF_SPACETIME_IN_QUAN TUM_GRAVITY. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 185 that as long as there are no empirical results to disprove a theory, it remains viable, 830 but a theory that does not confirm long-term empirically loses credibility. Another problem concerns the so-called landscape problem, a widely debated point of view in string theory: many of the fundamental constants of nature are the result of ways in which the Calabi-Yau varieties can be folded, 831 with more than 10500 different permutations with different values. 832 833 Thus, experiments that seem to contradict the predictions of string theory can be rejected as a wrong permutation. A proposed but controversial solution is to reduce the number of universes only to the habitable ones, in this way the fundamental constants of the universe being the result of the anthropic principle, rather than those deduced from the theory. 834 The large number of permutations causes testing of all versions to be unrealistic. Thus, the string theory selfimmunized against the refutations of such experiments and came to be regarded as pseudoscience by some researchers. Rosenfeld was the first to attempt to build a theory of quantum gravity (in 1930), but later gave up because of the lack of experimental evidence on the quantum effects of gravity. 835 Rosenfeld denied its necessity and argued that the analogy between the gravitational field and the electromagnetic field is not convincing, stating that "the ultimate necessity of quantizing the electromagnetic field (or any other field) can only be founded on experience." 836 Rosenfeld seems to have been agreed with Bohr's view on the unity of physics, according to which quantum gravity cannot be a final theory that results from classical physics (and classical phenomena). Skeptics believe that general relativity and quantum field theory, while not incompatible in a logical sense, are fundamentally incompatible as "immeasurable theories",837 because "according to GTR [general relativity], gravity simply is not a force." 838 Some suspect that only the internal strategies of physics (for example, inductive generalization, expanding the scope of a set theory, or exploiting the explanatory capabilities of a set theory) are not sufficient to support such 830 Curiel, "Against the Excesses of Quantum Gravity." 831 Disalle, "Spacetime Theory as Physical Geometry." 832 Leonard Susskind, "Lecture Collection | Topics in String Theory (Winter 2011)," YouTube, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL3E633552E58EB230. 833 Adams et al., "Things Fall Apart," 347. 834 Smolin, The Trouble With Physics. 835 L. Rosenfeld, "On Quantization of Fields," Nuclear Physics 40 (February 1, 1963): 442–44, https://doi.org/10.1016/0029-5582(63)90279-7. 836 Rosenfeld, 443. 837 Wuthrich, "To Quantize or Not to Quantize," 778. 838 Maudlin, "On the Unification of Physics," 129–144. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 186 programs. But physicists use external arguments, for example a "dogma of unification",839 840 841 using metaphysical principles (for example, "unity of nature"), meta-theoretical principles (for example, "economics of thought") or epistemological principles (for example, unification for its own sake, elimination of theoretical dualism), respectively philosophical reasons. 842 843 844 Some researchers argue that Gödel's incompleteness theorem implies that it is not possible to construct a final theory, an idea also advocated by Stanley Jaki845 and Freeman Dyson: "Gödel's theorem implies that pure mathematics is inexhaustible. No matter how many problems we solve, there will always be other problems that cannot be solved within the existing rules. [...] Because of Gödel's theorem, physics is inexhaustible too. The laws of physics are a finite set of rules, and include the rules for doing mathematics, so that Gödel's theorem applies to them." 846 Stephen Hawking, although he initially believed in the final theory, after analyzing Gödel's theorem, thought: "Some people will be very disappointed if there is not an ultimate theory that can be formulated as a finite number of principles. I used to belong to that camp, but I have changed my mind." 847 There are also scientists who ask how the relationship between general relativity and quantum theory could be conceived if the gravitational field is not quantified. 848 The "question of the question" is whether such a model would be (experimentally and observationally) relevant. Rosenfeld849 argued that in such a case it is better to stick to semi-classical gravity, which combines a classical description of the gravitational field with a quantum treatment of all other fields of force 839 Wuthrich, "To Quantize or Not to Quantize," 777–788. 840 Maudlin, "On the Unification of Physics," 129–144. 841 James Mattingly, "Is Quantum Gravity Necessary?," in The Universe of General Relativity, ed. A. J. Kox and Jean Eisenstaedt, Einstein Studies (Birkhäuser Boston, 2005), 327–38. 842 Salimkhani, "Quantum Gravity." 843 Wuthrich, "To Quantize or Not to Quantize," 777–788. 844 Mattingly, "Is Quantum Gravity Necessary?," 327– 338. 845 Stanley L. Jaki, The Relevance of Physics, First Edition edition (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1966), 127– 130. 846 Freeman Dyson, "The World on a String," May 13, 2004, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2004/05/13/the-world-on-a-string/. 847 Stephen Hawking, "Gödel and the End of Physics," 2003, https://www.caltech.edu/campus-lifeevents/master-calendar/stephen-hawking-goumldel-and-the-end-of-physics. 848 Butterfield and Isham, "Spacetime and the Philosophical Challenge of Quantum Gravity," 57. 849 Rosenfeld, "On Quantization of Fields," 442–44. Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 187 and matter. In this case, quantum gravity would no longer be needed. Callender and Huggett comment on this: "Another philosophical position, ... might claim that general relativity describes certain aspects of the world, quantum mechanics other distinct aspects, and that would be that. According to this view, physics (and indeed, science) need not offer a single universal theory encompassing all physical phenomena. We shall not debate the correctness of this view here but we would like to point out that if physics aspires to provide a complete account of the world, as it traditionally has, then there must be a quantum theory of gravity [in the general sense of a connection between general relativity and quantum theory]. The simple reason is that general relativity and quantum mechanics cannot both be correct even in their domains of applicability." 850 They claim that the two theories "... cannot both be universal in scope, for the latter strictly predicts that all matter is quantum, and the former only describes the gravitational effects of classical matter." With all the impressive empirical successes of the quantum theory, it does not predict that all matter is quantified, which results only in adopting an ontological interpretation of quantum theory. In Bohr's opinion, this idea can withstand the extent to which objects are neither quantum nor classical (even if in particular cases a predisposition appears). A special problem in favor of decoupling the two theories is the problem of the cosmological constant: while the quantum field theory predicts a high astronomical value (indicating an extreme curvature of spacetime), an observer will find that spacetime is flat, or almost flat. . The problem of cosmological constant is considered by Weinberg851 to be a "real crisis" for fundamental physics. He suggests that our understanding of the link between general relativity and quantum field theory is (so far) premature to rely on high-energy regime extrapolations. 852 Richard Dawid argues that string theory is a new type of scientific theory that goes beyond the current sphere of experiment-based science. He suggests that physics undergoes meta-paradigmatic changes in which modern theories take it well ahead of experimental capabilities, and a new scientific method is needed to establish the validity of theories. 850 Callender and Huggett, Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale, 4. 851 Steven Weinberg, "The Cosmological Constant Problem," Reviews of Modern Physics 61, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.61.1. 852 Zinkernagel, "The Philosophy Behind Quantum Gravity." Nicolae Sfetcu: Epistemology of experimental gravity Scientific rationality 188 But it is possible that physics at the Planck scale may be successfully described by a theory that has no connection with the current string theory or any other existing approach to quantum gravity): 853 "[...] nature is much more crazy at the Planck scale than even string theorists could have imagined"854 "[...] it is unlikely that a final theory of quantum gravity if indeed there is one will look much like any of the current candidate theories, be they string theory, canonical gravity, or other approaches." 855 The revolution in gravity physics remains incomplete. It is a problem that, if solved, will fundamentally change the way we think about the world. 853 Dawid, "On the Conflicting Assessments of the Current Status of String Theory," 984–96. 854 G. 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Description, Construction, and Representation. From Russell and Carnap to Stone Thomas Mormann Abstract . The first aim of this paper is to elucidate Russell's construction of spatial points, which is to be considered as a paradigmatic case of the "logical constructions" that played a central role in his epistemology and theory of science. Comparing it with parallel endeavours carried out by Carnap and Stone it is argued that Russell's construction is best understood as a structural representation. It is shown that Russell's and Carnap's representational constructions may be considered as incomplete and sketchy harbingers of Stone's representation theorems. The representational program inaugurated by Stone's theorems was one of the success stories of 20th century's mathematics. This suggests that representational constructions à la Stone could also be important for epistemology and philosophy of science. More specifically it is argued that the issues proposed by Russellian definite descriptions, logical constructions, and structural representations still have a place on the agenda of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. Finally, the representational interpretation of Russell's logical constructivism is used to shed some new light on the recently vigorously discussed topic of his structural realism. 1. Introduction 2. Stone's Representation of Boolean Algebras 3. Carnap's Representational Construction of Qualities 4. Russell's Representational Construction of Points 5. Representations, Ramsey Sentences and Structural Realism 6. Concluding Remarks References 1. Introduction . According to Russell "[t]he subject of denoting is of very great importance, not only in logic and mathematics, but also in the theory of knowledge" (On Denoting, 41). As one of the great achievements of Russell's essay one may consider the fact that he showed how "definite descriptions" help clarify the meaning of otherwise obscure denoting phrases such as "the present king of France", or "the centre of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the 21st century". Definite descriptions are a special kind of logical constructions. In this paper I'd like to concentrate on a type of logical construction that was especially important for Russell's epistemology and philosophy of science, namely the constructions of what may be called in non-Russellian terms theoretical entities such as spatial points, temporal instants, or particles. More precisely, in this paper I'll deal with Russell's construction of space points as sketched in Our Knowledge of the External World (Russell 1914) and carried out more fully in Analysis of Matter (1927).1 For Russell, the role of logical constructions in all areas of philosophy and science was guided by two principles, the "fundamental epistemological principle" and the "supreme maxim of scientific philosophizing". According to the first the following holds: "In every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e. not only in those whose truth or falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think about), all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance." (On Denoting, 56). Not all we know we know by acquaintance. Particularly in science, a large part of our knowledge is indirect knowledge, or, as Russell put it, knowledge by description. The principal means to reach things for which we cannot obtain direct knowledge of, i.e., knowledge by acquaintance, are denoting phrases which, through logical analysis, can be reconstructed as a special kind of logical constructions, to wit, as definite descriptions. Although science has often been hailed to be the domain of knowledge par exellence, most scientific knowledge is (indirect) knowledge by description, whose role Russell described as follows: "The chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. In spite of the fact that we can only know truths which are wholly composed of terms which we have experienced in acquaintance, we can yet have knowledge by description of things which we have never experienced. In view of the very narrow range of our immediate experience, this result is vital, and until it is understood, much of our knowledge must remain mysterious therefore doubtful." (Problems of Philosophy , 32). Similarly as for denoting phrases the meaning of apparently irreducibly theoretical terms in physics such as "point", "instant", or "electron" are claimed to be logically reconstructible in terms of components we 1 For a detailed discussion of Russell's construction of temporal points, i.e., instants, see Anderson (1989). 2 are acquainted with. This was expressed by the second principle of his epistemology, the "supreme maxim of scientific philosophizing", first stated explicitly in The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics: "Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities." (Russell 1914, 149). The "supreme maxim" served as a kind of Occam's razor that cut the class of inferred entities to a minimum ensuring thereby that our claims for indirect knowledge by description were more than mere metaphysical speculations. Russell's theory of scientific knowledge may be characterized in general terms as aiming to secure the move from perception to the objects of physical theory. As such, this aim was hardly original. Many a philosopher in those days subscribed to it in one way or other. For instance, the logical empiricists were struggling for decades to elucidate the intricate relation between the observational and the theoretical, but already the Neokantian philosopher of science Cassirer had claimed that the essential problem of philosophy of science was to understand how to move from "percepts" to "concepts" (cf. Cassirer 1910). The originality of Russell's theory of knowledge resided in the emphasis he laid upon the role of logic and mathematics for this endeavour. Following Grayling one may distinguish two ways of how Russell thought this aim could be achieved: "[Either this move must] be inferential, in which it takes us from the incorrigible data of sense to something else, or it is analytic, that is, it consists in a process of constructing physical entities out of percepts." (Grayling 2003, 468). In this paper I'll concentrate on the analytic approach as Grayling calls it, which dealt with the construction of physical entities out of entities we are acquainted with. Recently, Demopoulos made the interesting proposal to conceive Russell's method of logical construction in terms of representation (Demopoulos 2003, 412f). For spacetime theories this requires that every abstract model of such a theory have an isomorphic representation constructed in terms of compresent (more precisely, copunctual) events. Thus reformulated, "the program of logical construction is a now familar part of the nature and methodology of representation theorems, a part which Russell understood very well." (ibidem). I do not fully share Demopoulos's positive assessment with respect to Russell's understanding of the representational paradigm. As I'll argue in this paper, Russell's representational construction of space-time points was mathematically flawed and sometimes conceptually obscure. Hence, it is well worth the effort to attempt a clarification of the concept of structural representation Russell and other philosophers such as Carnap were after in the first decades of the last century. I contend that the concept of structural representation and its conceptual ramifications were not too well understood in the early 20th century, not even in mathematics, to say nothing about philosophy. More specifically, I contend that the first profound theorem on matters representational ever proved in mathematics was Stone's Topological Representation Theorem of Boolean Algebras in his epoch-making papers The Theory of Representation of Boolean Algebras (Stone 1936) and Applications of the Theory 3 of Boolean Rings to General Topology (Stone 1937).2 The point I want to make is that Russell's construction of spatial points as well as Carnap's construction of qualities out of elementary experiences are best understood as sketchy and incomplete forerunners of what was carried out sucessfully by Stone a few years later.3 To put it bluntly, from that time onwards Stone's work had set the benchmark of what was to be understood by structural representation. Russell's construction of points out of "events" and Carnap's constitution of quasiproperties out of "elementary experiences" aimed at something similar, but achieved it only partially. While Stone's representational program was extremely sucessful in mathematics (cf. Johnstone (1982), Mac Lane (1970), the fledgling representational current in philosophy fared less well. Today, the program of logical or mathematical constructions as inaugurated by Russell in Our Knowledge of the External World and and pushed further by Carnap's The Logical Structure of the World is generally thought to be a proven failure. Maybe this dismissal was a bit too hasty, due to a too superficial assessment of the conceptual possibilities of the representational approach. Since Stone representational reconstruction has become a complex and intricate concept that can hardly be dismissed in the chivalresque manner many philosophers seem to believe, or so I want to argue. The outline of this paper is as follows. To set the stage we succinctly present Stone's trail-blazing construction of a set-theoretical representation of Boolean algebras in section 2. Stone's representational account provides a precise conceptual framework in which the achievements and deficiencies of the representational enterprises of Carnap and Russell can be discussed in detail. That is to say, I propose to assess the fragmentary and sometimes obscure representational endevours of Russell and Carnap from the perspective of Stone's mathematically and conceptually mature account. In section 3 it is shown that Carnap's early construction of (quasi)qualities of 1923 can be interpreted as a fragment of Stone's representation of 1936. The topic of section 4 is Russell's sketch of the logical construction of points out of a system of "events" as carried out in Analysis of Matter. It can be shown that Russell's construction bears a striking similarity with that Stone carried out a decade later, in particular with his topological representation of 1937. Moreover, some of the shortcomings that plagued Russell's account can be attributed directly to his too close observance to the principle that logical constructions have to be based 2 Of course, this contention has to be taken with a grain of salt: beside Stone there were other mathematicians who can claim to have made substantial contributions to matters representational, e.g. Birkhoff. In this paper, I am not interested in historical accuracy in the first line. Rather I propose to consider Stone as a paradigmatic example. 3 As far as I know, no philosopher ever took notice of Stone's work during his lifetime. The closest link between Stone on the one hand, and logic and analytic philosophy on the other, seems to have been Tarski who knew Stone's work on Boolean algebras well. Indeed, Tarski's investigations on relational algebras (Tarski 1941) may be understood as a far-reaching generalization of Stone's work. Tarski mentioned the representation problem for relational algebras with direct reference to Stone's representation (ibidem, 546). One might expect a closer relation between the work of Stone and Whitehead, but I have not been able to find evidence for this. Without doubt, Whitehead had a profound influence on Russell in matters of logical constructions. For reasons of space, I cannot deal with it in this paper. 4 upon entities we know by acquaintance. In contrast to Russell's, Carnap's approach was less hampered by philosophical prejudices, but rather by its excessive generality which rendered it impossible to fully exploit the representational resources available. In section 5 the representational perspective on logical constructions is used to shed new light on some of the epistemological and metaphysical questions concerning Russell's constructional program, in particular on the recently vigorously debated problem of how to assess Newman's anti-structuralist argument against the feasibility of Russell's structural realism. We close with some general remarks on the feasibility of a representational approach in section 6. 2. Stone's Representation of Boolean Algebras,4 In this section I'd like to present as succinctly as possible one of the most important theorems of 20th century's mathematics, to wit, Stone's representation theorem of Boolean algebras.5 According to it every abstract Boolean algebra can be represented as subalgebra of a set-theoretical Boolean algebra such that the Boolean operations of meet, join and complement are represented by the set-theoretical operations of intersection, union, and set-theoretical complement. The reason for outlining a modernized version6 of Stone's representational account is to show what Russell and Carnap could have achieved if the modern conceptual apparatus had been available to them. Stone's representational account offers a perspective to better understand what Russell and Carnap were after in their representational constructions. To put it in a nutshell, in matters representational Carnap and Russell were Stone's precursors without knowing it. There are essentially two (equivalent) ways of defining Boolean algebras: either as special posets (B, ≤) or as a relational structures of type (B, ∧,∨), ∧ and ∨ being the binary operations of meet and join satisfying some familiar axioms.7 Both characterizations are related by the equivalence a ≤ b ⇔ a = a ∧ b. 4 For this section I am very much indebted to Hannah Mormann. She helped me to get acquainted with Stone's The Theory of Representation of Boolean Algebras (1936) and Applications of the Theory of Boolean Rings to General Topology (1937). 5 For some compelling arguments for this assessment, see Johnstone (1982). 6 As is well known, the representation theory of Boolean algebras can be carried out either in terms of ideals or filters. Both accounts are strictly equivalent, since for Boolean algebras a maximal filter is just the set-theoretical complement of a maximal ideal. In his papers Stone used throughout the language of ideals. In particular he proved the crucial result that a Boolean algebra has enough prime ideals to ensure the existence of a faithful set-theoretical representation. In his (2003) Demopoulos asserts that Stone proved what today is often called the Ultrafilter Theorem for Boolean algebras (ibidem, Footnote 26). Strictly speaking, this is not the case: Stone proved the corresponding theorem for maximal ideals (cf. Stone 1936, Theorem 64, 105). Demopoulos rightly asserts that Russell's theorem on the existence of points as maximal classes of compresent events has a striking similarity with the Ultrafilter theorem. Since Russell's "points" and Carnap's "similarity circles" closely resemble maximal filters, it is expedient to present Stone's account in the garb of filters and not in its original version based on ideals. A slick presentation of Stone's results in terms of filters can be found in Koppelberg (1985), a more leisurely pace in terms of ideals is offered to the reader in Davey and Priestley (1990). Today, the topological applications of Stone's theorem, which established deep but quite unexpected relations between algebra and topology are considered as the most spectacular ones (cf. Stone 1937). Surprisingly, Russell's construction of points snugly fits in this topological version of Stone's theorem. 7 For precise definitions one may consult any textbook, e.g. Davey and Priestley (1990), Halmos (1963), or Koppelberg (1989). 5 A Boolean algebra defined in one of these ways may be called an abstract8 Boolean algebra because its order relation and its operations are defined abstractly in purely relational terms. Concrete Boolean algebras arise in the following way: If X is any set denote the set of all subsets of X by PX. The set PX becomes a Boolean algebra (PX, ≤) by defining the set-theoretical inclusion ⊆ as the order relation ≤. A Boolean algebra B isomorphic to a subalgebra of the powerset PX of some set X is called a concrete or set-theoretical Boolean algebra. All finite Boolean algebras are concrete Boolean algebras. More precisely, if B is a Boolean algebra with 2n elements it is isomorphic to the power set P({1, 2, ..., n}) of the set {1, 2, ..., n}. Hence, it is natural to ask if every Boolean algebra is isomorphic to a subalgebra of a Boolean algebra of type PX. Stone's representation theorem for Boolean algebras answers this question positively. More precisely it constructs for any abstract Boolean algebra B a set X and a structurepreserving representation B---r--->PX such that B is isomorphic to the subalgebra r(B) of PX. Before we discuss the proof of Stone's theorem in some detail it should be noted that the representation theorem is a non-elementary theorem in the sense that for its proof the axiom of choice (AC) or some similar principle such as Zorn's Lemma has to be used. The first step for the proof of the theorem is the introduction of the concept of a filter: (2.1) Definition . Let (B, ≤) be a Boolean algebra. A subset F ⊆ B is a filter if and only if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) Ø ≠ F. (2) F is upward closed, i.e., x ∈ F and x ≤ y imply y ∈ F. (3) F satisfies the finite intersection property, i.e., x, y ∈ F entails x ∧ y ∈ F. A maximal filter (ultrafilter) is a filter that is not properly contained in any other filter. Every b ∈ B defines a filter called the principal filter F(b) defined by F(b) := {x; b ≤ x ∈ B}. In general, F(b) is not a maximal filter. Without further assumptions it is not at all clear that a given Boolean algebra has any maximal filter. To ensure the existence of maximal filters one has to rely on the axiom of choice or a similar principle (cf. Davey and Priestley 1990, chapter 9). With the help of such a principle it is possible to prove the following proposition that is crucial for the construction of Stone's representation: (2.2) Proposition . Any filter of a Boolean algebra B is contained in a maximal filter. 8 This terminology can be traced back to Stone. 6 Now we are able to describe the basic ingredient of Stone's representation theorem, to wit, the set of points some of whose distinguished subsets will serve as set theoretical representatives of the elements of B. By definition (2.1) a maximal filter of B is an element of the power set PB of B. Hence one may define a set-theoretical representation B-------r----->PPB by defining (2.3) r(b) := {F; b ∈F, F is a maximal filter of B}. The map (2.3) is often called the Stone map. According to (2.2) r(b)≠ Ø for all b ∈ B: by definition b ∈ F(b) ⊆ F, F some maximal fillter. Before we go on, the following remark may be in order. At first look, this representation, based on the elusive concept of maximal filter, looks to be a rather unwieldy construction. It is therefore remarkable that Carnap and Russell, apparently independent of each other and almost ten years before Stone, used exactly the same construction. Informally, an element b of B is represented by the set of all maximal filters that contain it. This representation is order-preserving in the sense that if b ≤ c then F(b) ⊆ F(c) by (2.1)(ii). Orderpreservation alone, however, is no guarantee that the representation r in (2.3) is interesting. As long as we do not know that B has enough maximal filters, it may happen that r is pretty trivial. Fortunately, proposition (2.2) can be strengthened to ensure that there are sufficiently many maximal filters in the sense that for two distinct elements of there is a maximal filter F that contains one of them but not the other. It should be noted that already Russell was aware that is was necessary to prove the existence of certain maximal classes of compresent events that could serve as logical constructions of "points" (cf. AMA, 299/300). Indeed, he proved his existence theorem with the aid of Zermelo's well-ordering theorem (which is well-known to be equivalent with the axiom of transcendental induction used by Stone). On the other hand, Carnap took the existence of maximal similarity classes (his analogues of maximal filters) for granted. Having established the fact that there are enough maximal filters one proves that the representation r is a monomorphism in the sense that r(b) = r(c) entails b = c. Next we have to show that r not only preserves the order relation ≤, but also the Boolean operators ∧, ∨, and *. This is done by exploiting the fact that for Boolean algebras maximal filters are prime (cf. Davey and Priestley 1990, Theorem 9.8, 186). Thereby we eventually can prove (2.4) Theorem (Stone's Representation Theorem (Set-theoretical Version) . Let B be a Boolean algebra. Denote the set of maximal filters of B by MAX(B) and the Stone map as defined in (2.3) by r. Then B has a faithful set-theoretical representation B-----r----->P(MAX(B)) with the following properties: (1) r is an order-preserving 1-1 map,i.e., a ≤ b if and only if r(a) ⊆ r(b). 7 (2) r is a Boolean homomorphism in that the Boolean operations ∧, ∨, and * of B are represented by the corresponding set-theoretical operations. Actually these assertions only form a part of Stone's results in his (1936). Moreover, in his (1937) he showed that the representing sets r(b), b ∈ B, could be characterized topologically. More precisely, he pointed out that the r(b) figured as the open and closed ("clopen") sets of a certain topology. In other words, the representation r was not only a set-theoretical representation but actually a topological representation. This result has no counter-part in Carnap's representational construction of qualities, but, as we shall see, traces of a topological interpretation of event structures may be found in Russell's representational construction of points. 3. Carnap's Representational Construction of Qualities . Russell's influence on early Carnap, and particularly on the Aufbau is a matter of dispute. While Quine did not hesitate to interpret the Aufbau as an attempt to execute the epistemological program Russell had layed out in Our Knowledge of the External World a more careful reading of the Aufbau shows that it is positively misleading to "Russell" Carnap's Aufbau in the straight-forward way advertised by Quine and other empiricists (cf. Richardson 1990). More recently, Pincock argued that Quine as well as the revisionist exegetes such as Richardson misconstrued the complex relation between the Aufbau and Russell's reconstructivist program (cf. Pincock 2002). In this paper I don't want to take side in this issue. Rather, I'd like to concentrate on an early (unpublished) manuscript of Carnap's (Carnap 1923) that may be considered as precursor of the Aufbau and that does square quite well with Russell's program. It may be considered as a direct application of his "supreme maxim of scientific philosophizing". This assessment is not intended to contend anything concerning the more complex problem of how to characaterize the intricate relation between Carnap's and Russell's philosophical stances in general. After these disclaimers let us begin with the real thing, to wit, a representational interpretation of Carnap's earliest attempt of a logical construction of qualities (cf. Mormann 1994). This endeavour was set out in his unpublished manuscript Die Quasizerlegung Ein Verfahren zur Ordnung nichthomogener Mengen mit den Mitteln der Beziehungslehre (Quasi-Division A Method for Ordering Non-Homogeneous Sets by Means of the Theory of Relations) (Carnap 1923). The task of the method proposed by Carnap is best explained by invoking the "principle of abstraction" as explained in Our Knowledge of the External World: "When a group of objects have that kind of similarity which we are inclined to attribute to possession of a common quality, the principle in question (i.e. the principle of abstraction, T. M.) shows that membership of the group will serve all the purposes of the supposed common quality, and that therefore, ... the group or class of similar objects 8 may be used to replace the common quality, which need not be assumed to exist." (OKEW, p. 51). In line with Russell's program Carnap described the aim of Quasizerlegung in more detail as follows: "Suppose there is given a set of elements, and for each element the specification to which it is similar. We aim at a description of the set which only uses this information but ascribes to these elements quasicomponents or quasiqualities in such a way that it is possible to deal with each element separately using only the quasiqualities, without referene to other elements." (Carnap 1923) More formally the task of Quasizerlegung can be described as follows: Given a similarity structure (S, ~), i.e., a set of objects endowed with a reflexive and symmetric relation ~. The relation ~ is to be interpreted as a similarity relation: a ~ b this is to be interpreted as the fact that a and b are similar. Then the task is to construe qualities q such that any two elements a and b of S that are similar to each other share a common quality q; if, however, a and b are not similar, they do not share a quality q. In line with the supreme maxim of scientifique philosophizing these qualities should not simply be inferred, rather they have to be constructed. This meant they had to be characterized extensionally, i.e., as sets of elements that have this quality. Denoting the power set of S by PS the correspondence between elements of S and their qualities may be conceived as a function S----r--->PPS by which every element a ∈ S is represented by the set r(a) := {q; q quality of r}. Up to now we have only said that a quality q is to be characterized extensionally as a subset of S. This is quite vague. Not any subset of S will be acknowledged as a quality. Rather, a quality q is to be characterized as a subset q ⊆ S that is compatible (in a sense to be specified in a moment) with the similarity relation ~ defined on S. Carnap proposed to take as qualities so called similarity circles: (3.1) Definition . Let (S, ~) be a similarity structure. A subset q ⊆ S is a similarity circle of (S, ~) iff it is a maximal set of similar elements, i.e., iff it satisfies the two conditions: (1) All elements of q are similar. (2) No element outside q is similar to every element of q. Carnap took the existence of similarity circles for granted. This is justified only for finite similarity structures. To prove the existence of similarity circles for similarity structures with infinitely many elements, one has to rely on the axiom of choice, or, equivalently and conceptually simpler, on Zorn's Lemma. The proof is elementary and we need go into it here. Rather, under the assumption that the existence of similarity circles has been ensured in one way or other, the main result of Quasizerlegung can be stated as follows: 9 (3.2) Theorem . Let (S, ~) be a similarity structure, and a, b ∈ S. Define the map S ----r----> PPS by r(a) := {q| q is a similarity circle and a ∈ q}. Then a and b are similar if and only r(a) ∩ r(b) ≠ Ø. Moreover, if a is similar to all elements to which b is similar, then r(a) ⊆ r(b). The first thing to note is that this theorem is to be read as a representation theorem. It asserts that every abstract similarity structure (S, ~), as Stone might have said, has a faithful set-theoretical representation S----r----->PPS in the sense that the abstract similarity relation a ~ b is represented by the concrete settheoretical relation of non-empty intersection r(a) ∩ r(b) ≠ Ø of elements as defined in PPS. Already this observation suggests that Carnap's project bears a certain similarity with that of Stone. Indeed, it can be shown that Carnap's theorem (3.2) is a fragment of Stone's representation theorem (2.4). In order to understand why this is the case the following remarks may be in order: First observe that Boolean algebras (B, ≤) may be considered as a special class of Carnapian similarity structures: Every Boolean algebra (B, ≤) gives rise to a similarity structure (B, ~) by defining a ~ b := a ∧ b ≠ 0 or a = b = 0.9 Then the Boolean partial order ≤ can be reconstructed from the similarity relation ~ by defining a ≤ b := {x; x ~ a} ⊆ {x; x ~ b}. Hence, Boolean algebras may be conceived as special similarity structures. Moreover, the relation between maximal filters (defined on Boolean algebras (B, ≤) and similarity circles (defined for similarity structures (B, ~)) can be explicated as follows: (3.3) Proposition . Let (B, ≤) be a Boolean algebra and (B, ~) be the corresponding similarity structure. Then a maximal filter F of (B, ≤) is a similarity circle of (B, ~) which satisfies the finite intersection property, i.e., that a, b ∈ F entails a ∧ b ∈ F. (3.4) Corollary . Conceiving a Boolean algebra (B, ≤) as a similarity structure (B, ~) Stone's representation B---r--->PMAX(B) is a special case of Carnap's representation B-----> PPB mapping the elements b of B to the sets r(b) of maximal similarity circles containing them and satisfying the finite intersection property. Thus, conceiving Boolean algebras as special similarity structures reveals that Carnap and Stone were engaged in essentially the same project, to wit, the construction of set-theoretical representations of similarity structures. Their projects differed in that Stone's was much more specific: he was interested in a special class of similarity structures, to wit, Boolean algebras.10 Moreover his representations were more 9 As we shall see in the next section, this similarity relation corresponds exactly to Russell's relation of "overlapping". 10 As a direct effect of this concentration on "Boolean similarity structures" one may consider the introduction of the finite intersection requirement as an explicit condition on "admissible" similarity circles. 10 sophisticated since he went on to show that they were not just a set-theoretical representations but topological ones that described the represented elements in topological terms (cf. Stone 1937). To rule out any misunderstandings: Corollary (3.4) does not contend that Carnap was Stone's forerunner in giving a full-fledged proof of the latter's representation theorem for Boolean algebras. Carnap never considered Boolean algebras as a special case of similarity structures and he never undertook the slightest efforts to couch his representation in topological terms. Moreover, Stone was well aware of the fact that he was engaged in "building a general abstract theory [of representation] and must accordingly be occupied to a considerable extent with the elaboration of technical devices" (Stone 1937, 376). In contrast, Carnap in his representational entreprises employed only a rather modest formal apparatus. Nevertheless it seems justified to ascribe to him the achievement of having proved a fragment of Stone's representation theorem. By hindsight, one may say that the main drawback of Carnap's quasi-analytical constructional system put forward in Quasizerlegung was its excessive generality. He should considered more specific kinds of similarity structures for which more specific results could have been obtained. 4. Russell's Representational Construction of Points . It is not easy to fairly treat Russell's "construction of points" as set out in chapter xviii of The Analysis of Matter. His mathematical contentions are often vague and sometimes strictly interpreted outright mistaken. On the other hand, his programmatic statements concerning the tasks his logical constructions were to achieve are lucidly formulated and sometimes far ahead of his times. In order to come to grips mathematically with Russell sketch of a representational constitution of space points in terms of events I propose to cast his approach in terms of Stone's representational theory. This needs some preparation. Russell's starting point for the representational constitution is a class of "events" characterized vaguely as a class of well-formed spacetime regions. In the terminology of the Aufbau "events" correspond to Carnap's "Elementarerlebnisse". They may be considered as the "Grundelemente" of Russell's system. On the set E of events there is defined the relation of overlapping ("compresence"). This relation enjoys the relational properties that are to be expected intuitively from such a relation, i.e. compresence is a reflexive and symmetric relation. Hence, ignoring its implicit geometrical connotations, Russell's system E of events, endowed with the relation of overlapping, is just a similarity structure (E, ~) in Carnap's sense. Recalling that also Boolean algebras can be conceived as special similarity structures one may say that Stone, Carnap, and Russell grounded their representational constructions on the very same formal base. Not only this, Russell started his constructional endevour by proposing to define a "point" as a maximal group of compresent events in the same way as Carnap had defined a quality as a maximal similarity circle: 11 (4.1) Definition . A point is a group G of events having the following properties: (1) Any two members of the G are compresent. (2) No event outside G is compresent with every member of G. According to Russell, this definition works for the 1-dimensional case in the sense that for a group of compresent 1-dimensional events (conceived as intervals of the real line) "there will be some place ... which is occupied by all of them." (AMA, 294). The following example shows that this is not the case: (4.2) Example . Let R be the real line endowed with the standard topology, and assume the class E of events to be the class of open intervals of R. Denote by G to the class of open intervals {x; -a < x < +b} and {x; 0 < x < +c), a, b, c positive real numbers. Then any finite intersection of members of G has a nonempty intersection, but there is no point ("place") occupied by all of them, since there is no y with 0 < y contained in the intersection of all {x; -a < x < +b}. Russell used a 2-dimensional example to show that (4.1) does not suffice to ensure a non-empty intersection when we pass beyond 1-dimensional manifolds (cf. (AMA, 295). Hence, in order to ensure non-empty intersection for the 4-dimensional space-time manifold he proposed to replace definition (4.1) by the following apparently stronger requirement: (4.3) Definition . A point is (or is represented by) a group G of events having the following properties: (1) Any five members of G are compresent. (2) No event outside G is compresent with any four members of G. As far as I can see he gave no compelling reason why "five" should work better than "two". Somehow he seemed to have believed that the number n necessary to ensure that a group of compresent events , conceived as regions of a manifold M of dimension k, had a point in common, was k +1. Since he was interested in the logical construction of 4-dimensional spacetime he came to adopt n = 4 + 1 = 5, since for the 1-dimensional manifold R the number n = 1 +1 = 2 allegedly worked. In any case, the example (4.2) for the 1-dimensional case satisfies (4.3) and even the stronger requirement (4.4) Any n members of the group are compresent, n any finite number. By the light of Stone's proof of the set-theoretical representation of Boolean algebras (4.4) is not yet the "correct" constraint. Rather, what is suggested by Stone's proof is that systems of set if they are to serve 12 as points for a set-theoretical representation of Boolean algebras, should be maximal filters, i.e., they should satisfy the finite intersection property (2.1)(3) ensuring that a, b ∈ F entails a ∧ b ∈ F. Evidently, (2.1)(3) implies (4.4) but not vice versa. The finite intersection property (2.1)(3) has become the unanimously accepted one in mathematics. For philosophical reasons, however, Russell could not swallow this condition. According to him, all events involved in the logical construction of points had to be of a certain minimal size, since otherwise they could not be known by acquaintance. If the overlapping of any two events was again an event, then any finite intersection of events counts as an event whereby an event might eventually lose the quality of being known by acquaintance. At least, this was Russell's argument against Whitehead's sketch of constructing points by his method of "enclosure-series" (cf. AMA, 291). Russell's argument is problematic for several reasons, in particular since it seems to smuggle in the concept of size of events as a new primitive. In any case, Russell left the relational structure of the domain of events utterly underdetermined and never defined what relational properties the basic relation of overlapping was assumed to have on which his construction of points was based. This distinguished his constructional sketch from that of Carnap and Stone who both defined their constructional bases quite carefully. On the other hand, his construction went beyond that of Carnap's insofar as his attempted construction of points anticipated in a certain sense the topological version of Stone's representation theorem (cf. Stone 1937). While in his (1936) Stone had constructed only a set-theoretical representation of Boolean algebras, in (1937) he went on and proved that this set-theoretical construction had a natural topological interpretation. In some more detail, this may be explained as follows. Given the set-theoretical representation B----r---->PMAX(B) as defined in (2.4) in the line of Stone11 it could be shown that MAX(B) of maximal filters was not just a set but carried a natural topological structure so that the images r(b) of the elements of the Boolean algebra B could be neatly characterized in topological terms. More precisely, the sets r(b) were not just contrived subsets of MAX(B) but turned out to be a so called "clopen", i.e., closed and open sets with respect to the topological structure defined on MAX(B), later to be called the Stone topology. Thus, Stone's construction had shown that every Boolean algebra not only had a set-theoretical but actually a topological representation. On the one hand, Stone spaces are topologically well-behaved being compact Hausdorff spaces, on the other hand, they have some rather bizarre topological features, e.g. they were totally disconnected. Their discovery profoundly changed the mathematicians's ideas of what was to be understood by topology. By hindsight one may even say that Stone's topological representation of Boolean algebras paved the way for a new conceptualization of topology, later to be called "pointless topology" (cf. Johnstone 1982). In the traditional perspective point set topology, a topological space X was conceptualized as a set endowed 11 Recall that Stone actually used ideals. 13 with some extra "topological" structure. This structure gave rise to certain lattices such as the Heyting lattice of open subsets or the Boolean lattice of regular open subsets of X. Stone's representation suggested a quite different conceptualization. Starting with a Boolean algebra B, one could construct a topological space X(B) that fitted B in the sense that B was isomorphic to the Boolean algebra of regular open subsets of X(B). Thereby the "essence" of a topological space was shown to lay in the algebraic structure B points turned out to be derivated entities. This opened up a completely novel perspective on topology. The surprising fact is that in (AMA) we find Russell engaged in formulating just this program of a "pointless topology" or "pointless geometry" that came into being only several decades later.12 Contrasting it with the more familiar point-set topology ("analysis situs") he explicitly stated the ambitious agenda of such an invisaged discipline as follows: "In analysis situs, both points and neighborhoods are given. We, on the other hand, wish to define our points in terms of "events", where "events" will have a one-one correspondence with certain neighborhoods. We want our "events" to correspond with neighborhoods which are above a certain minimum and below a certain maximum when, at a later stage, the empirical metric is introduced. We have to assign to our events such properties as will enable us to define the points of a topological space as classes of events. But we have to remember that we do not want to construct merely a topological space: what we want to construct is the four-dimensional space-time of the general theory of relativity." (AMA, 298). The following remarks on his program may be in order. Russell's constraint that we are allowed to use only neighborhoods of limited size is due to his "principal epistemological principle" according to which we can only use components we are acquainted with. Too large or too small regions are rejected as entities we cannot be acquainted with. Implicitly, this distinction introduces a further undefined primitive term, namely, the size of a region. As has been shown by Roeper (1997), at least the exclusion of "too large" regions can be formulated in a precise way. As far as I know, nobody has ever followed Russell in excluding too small regions as well. In the following reconstructional sketch his size complication will be ignored. Also Russell's introduction of an empirical metric is too sketchy to deserve detailed reconsideration. The most charitable way of interpreting Russell's proposal is to ignore his flawed "construction by quintets" reading his attempted construction of points instead in terms of Stone's topological representation of Boolean algebras (cf. Stone (1937)). In order to keep things as simple as possible, let us consider the specific example of the 2-dimensional Euclidean plane E. Assume E to be endowed with 12 Russell credits Whitehead for the basic ideas of this approach. Indeed, Whitehead's sketch of constructing points in his Process and Reality may be considered as a forerunner of "pointless topology". As it seems, however, his work was not very influential in mathematical quarters. 14 its standard topological structure. Recall that the topological structure of E gives rise in a canonical way to the complete Boolean algebra O*E of regular open regions. These regions are to be considered as Russelian events ignoring Russell's size restrictions. Two regions are defined to overlap if and only if there is a non-empty region contained in both. Then Boolean structure of O*E can be defined in terms of the overlapping relation by imposing appropriate axioms on it (cf. Lewis 1991, Chapter 3.4) In terms of Carnapian similarity structures, this amounts to define a similarity structure (O*E, ~) as the basic level of Russell's construction system. Following Stone's construction, the set O*E of events is assumed a complete Boolean algebra. The task, then, is to define "points" for O*E in the sense that events are represented as sets of points in such a way that the overlapping relation for events corresponds to the set-theoretial intersection of the point sets. In line with Stone, Russell, reinterpreted in the light of Stone, may be said to represent an event e ∈ O*E by the set of maximal filters F of O*E containing it: (4.5) e ≡ {F; e ∈ F, F is a maximal filter on O*E}. This corresponds to Carnap's quasi-analytical representation of an element a of the similarity structure (O*E, ~) by the set of similarity circles containing it: (4.6) a ≡ {F; a ∈ F, F is a similarity circle on O*E}. Russell claimed to have reconstructed thereby the points of the Euclidean plane E as maximal filters of O*E and the topological structure of E in the usual sense of point set topology. For several reasons, this claim is untenable. One can object that in Russell constructed at most a point set, namely, the set of maximal filters of O*E. He did not prove how this set is to be endowed with a topology. He simply assumed that this set should carry the "same topology" as E. Unfortunately this is mistaken. Looking at Stone's proof it is evident that the topological structure of the point set constructed by Stone's method is not that of the Euclidean plane E. Rather, the topological space constructed from O*E is not E but the Stone space SE of E that is quite different from E. For instance, SE is compact and totally disconnected, while E is not compact and connected (cf. Stone 1937, Theorem 1, 378). In short, what Russell could have achieved by his method, was the construction of the Stone space S(E) but not that of E itself.13 Nevertheless, Russell was not too far off the mark: By more refined methods that cannot be discussed here it is indeed possible to reconstruct E from O*E (endowed with a more sophisticated overlapping relation) more or less in the sense Russell adumbrated. Hence one may say that in the light of Stone's achievements and the advent of modern "pointless" topology in the seventies and eighties of the last 13 E and SE are not unrelated to each other: SE may be conceived as a kind of algebraic version of the space E. It is sometimes called "the absolute of E". 15 century Russell's program eventually has become feasible, although his own sketchy execution of it was less than perfect. 5. Representations, Ramsey-Sentences, and Structural Realism . As stated already in the introduction, for Russell there were two paths to move from the level of perceptions to the level of the objects of physics, either the inferential path or the representational one, as we may call it now. In general, the inferential option has attracted more attention than the representational one. In particular it has been pointed out that Russell's account may be seen in line with subsequent developments inaugurated by Ramsey, and later pursued further Carnap, Lewis, and others (cf. Carnap 1956, Lewis 1970). One may consider as one of the main achievements of Russell's theory of definite descriptions that it avoids reference to anything not known by acquaintance. If one provisionally equates knowledge by acquaintance with empirical knowledge Russell's and Ramsey's reconstructional aims become close neighbors. Both rely on the assumption that what really matters is the empirical content of a theory, and not its theoretical garb. Although scientists typically use theoretical terms and predicates in presenting a theory, these need not be treated as names. One can consider the theoretical terms and predicates as variables bound by existential quantifiers. Thereby one obtains the Ramsey sentence of a theory T as a sentence of the form (5.1) R(T):= ∃x1 ... ∃xn T(x1, ..., xn, o1, ...., om) Here T(t1, ..., tn, o1, ...., om) is a complex conjunction stating T's axioms in which empirical terms o1, ...., om and theoretical terms t1, ..., tn are entangled in some way or other. Thereby, the Ramsey sentence can be interpreted as a kind of global and simultaneous definite description of all theoretical terms as sketched by Russell already in On Denoting. The Ramsey sentence R(T) of a theory T provides a neat and elegant description of the theory's layer structure. Nevertheless it did not help much to solve the many controversies concerning the problem of how the relation between the theoretical and the empirical is to be conceptualized. This is evidenced by the recent debates on the issue of "structural realism" in which the discussion on the correct interpretation of the theory's Ramsey-sentence occupies a prominent place. Discussion about epistemological and ontological consequences of the Ramsey sentence of an empirical theory suffer from an extreme degree of abstractness. Usually not much more is told about the Ramsey sentence of a theory than that it is a quantified sentence of the form given above. Often, the "indissoluble entanglement" of the observational and the theoretical terms is alluded to (e.g. Zahar 2004, 10), but a detailed presentation of it is usually missing. This would be OK, if no serious difference concerning the interpretation of R(T) threatened. But it 16 does. Quite incompatible interpretations of the Ramsey-sentence have put forward. In some sense they rehearse the classical debate Newman and Russell had on the (non)triviality of structural realism some seventy years ago. Russell had put forward the radical claim that all we can validly infer from perceptions is the mathematical structure of the world (cf. (AMA, 254) which had for him the consequence that "[t]he only legitimate attitude about the physical world seems to be one of complete agnosticism as regards all but its mathematical properties." (ibidem, 270/271). To this extravagant claim that only the structure of the world can be known, Newman had rightly objected that ignoring some mild constraints of cardinality just any structure can be imposed on the world (cf. Newman 1928, 144). Hence, Russell's radical structuralist claim that only structure can be known, boils down to an extremely implausible agnosticism concerning the nature and scope of scientific knowledge about the world. Russell readily admitted that Newman had made a point: "It was quite clear to me, as I read your article, that I had not really intended to say what in fact I did say, that nothing is known about the physical world except its structure. I had always assumed spacio-temporal continuity with the world of percepts, that is to say, I had assumed that there might be co-punctuality between percepts and non-percepts, ... . And co-punctuality I regarded as a relation which might exist among percepts and is itself perceptible." (Russell 1928 (1991), 413) This argument is dismissed by Demopoulos and Friedman as not compatible with Russell's theory of knowledge by acquaintance, since one cannot assume acquaintance with "a cross category notion such as spatiotemporal contiguity or causality" (cf. Demopoulos and Friedman 1985, 192) as Russell did in his answer to Newman. It may be that Demopoulos and Friedman are right. To assess their verdict would require to delve deeper into the subtleties of Russell's theory of acquaintance. It should be noted, however, that Russell offers a second, more elementary argument to ensure a more plausible interpretation of his structuralism. Demopoulos and Friedman ignore this argument. Put forward in the last sentence quoted above it contends that copunctuality is a perceptible relation among concepts. This claim is compatible with his theory of acquaintance according to which we can be acquainted with relations. Cashed out in terms of structural representation it asserts we can assume to be acquainted with the similarity structure (E, ~) consisting of events cum compresence (or, more precisely, co-punctuality). In the light of this quite natural representational interpretation of Russell's claim it is then a non-trivial task to construct a point-set or a topological representation of (E,~) as explained in the previous section. Summarizing one may say that Russell's structural realism, correctly interpreted, still seems a viable option, pace Newman's criticism. 17 This conclusion is not unanimously accepted by those who consider the Ramsey sentence as a useful tool for describing a theory's structure. Demopoulos and Friedman maintain that Newman's argument can be couched in terms of the theory's Ramsey-sentence rendering it essentially trivial: "...[I]f our theory is consistent and if all its purely observational consequences are true, then the truth of the Ramsey-sentence follows as a theorem of set-theory or second order logic, provided our initial domain has the right cardinality if it does not, then the consistency condition of our theory again implies the existence of a domain that does." (Demopoulos and Friedman1985, 635) Zahar vigorously disagrees (cf. Zahar 2004). According to him Newman's criticism, as well as that of Demopoulos and Friedman miss the point of Russell's structural realism (properly understood as a partial structuralism) since it ignored the crucial distinction between the observational predicates and the theoretical ones: "No serious version of structuralist realism can get going without some distinction between the theoretical and the empirical. If all predicates of a scientific theory are taken to be interpreted only within the context of the claims made by the theory, it, that is, none is taken to be firmly anchored in experience independently of our attempted descriptions of the universe, then the constraints imposed by the Ramsey sentence would be hopelessly weak." (Zahar 2004, 10). I think Zahar is right, and I take the divergent interpretations of the Ramsey-sentence as evidence that the Ramsey-sentence is rather a description of the problem than its solution. In this respect, the representational reconstruction of Russell's theory has an advantage. It clearly brings out that the existence of a structure-preserving representation is not a matter of cardinality, but depends on the structural kind of empirical system represented. To explain why, it is expedient to go back once again to Stone's representation and consider one of its important later ramifications as exhibited in Tarski's work on relational algebras (Tarski 1941). Relational algebras may be conceived as enriched Boolean algebras in the sense that they are Boolean algebras endowed with some further structure. With direct reference to Stone's representation, Tarski posed the problem to find out if relational algebras had a representation in the sense of Stone. He himself was not able to solve this problem, and only much later it could be shown that relational algebras in general do not have set-theoretical representations. The proof of this important theorem has, of course, nothing to do with trivial cardinality considerations. This may be taken as evidence that the traditional Ramsey account does not do full justice to representational constructions. Hence it may be expedient to modify it in such a way that the importance of structurepreserving representations becomes more visible. A not too far-fetched way would be this: Denote the empirical base system by E ("events") and the theoretically completed system by T(E) ("events cum points"). The task is to find a structure-preserving representation E---r--->T(E). To have specific examples 18 at hand, consider Stone's representation B---r--->PMAX(B) or Russell's E----r---->PPE. Asserting that this task can be achieved is to claim that such an r exists. For Stone's representation theorem this claim can be expressed in terms of the following "representational Ramsey-sentence": (5.2) ∃r[(x)(y) (x,y ∈ E ⇒ (x = y ⇔ r(x) = r(y) & x ≤ y ⇔ r(x) ≤ r(y) & ....] The bounded variable of this "Ramsey-sentence" is running over all all representations r and it is immune against trivializations à la Newman, since it amounts to the claim that there is a structure-preserving representation r, and this claim is, as has been explained above, definitively non-trivial. The representational constructions, carried out explicitly by Stone and propagated by Russell as the core of his theory of physics exhibit a feature that distinguishes them from "arbitrary" constructions: "[S]tarting from hypotheses concerning undefined objects, ... we have reason to believe that there are objects fulfilling these hypotheses, although, initially, we are unable to point out any such objects with certainty. Usually, in such cases, although many different sets are abstractly available as fulfilling the hypotheses, there is one such set which is much more important than the others ... . The substitution of such a set for the undefined objects is "interpretation". This process is essential in discovering the philosophical import of physics." (AMA, 4 5) For instance, the importance of Stone's representational construction of points as maximal filters is not exhausted by the fact that it yields for each Boolean algebra B an isomorphic point-set algebra r(B). Rather, beyond the fact that it offered an isomorphic set-theoretical model of B, it opened the path to conceptual reinterpretations of the represented and the representing domains that had been literally unthinkable without it. This is amply confirmed by the tremendous impact of Stone's representation that virtually reshaped the theories of Boolean algebras and topology. In order that this is possible even on a modest scale there has to exist a certain intensional affinity between the representing and the represented level that goes beyond a mere isomorphism. Carnap was after something similar when he characterized the range of the variables of the Ramsey sentence as follows: "The entities to which the variables in the Ramsey-sentence refer are characterized not purely logically, but in a descriptive way; and this is the essential point. These entities are identical with mathematical entities only in the customary extensional way of speaking. ... In an intensional language there is an important difference between the intension 9 and the intension n(p) (number of planets). The former is Ldeterminate, the latter is not. Thus, if by "logical" or "mathematical" we mean "Ldeterminate" then the entities to which the variables in the Ramsey-sentence refer are not logical." (Carnap 1958, RC 102-07-05, quoted after Psillos 1999, p. 55) The sketchy remarks of this section on the relations between the Ramsey-sentence, the representational constructions à la Stone, and structural realism certainly do not exhaust these topics, but at it should 19 have been made clear that the case of Russell's "structuralism" is more intricate than one might have thought. 6. Concluding Remarks . The philosophical prospects of Russell's structuralist program of representational (re)constructions use to be assessed as rather bleak. For instance, Deomopoulos asserts that even the sucessful execution of this program in terms of representation theory "lends no support to the central epistemological contention of structuralism: from the fact that the representation is purely structure-preserving, it by no means follows that the knowledge expressed by the original theory in this case, the theory of space-time is purely structural." (Demopoulos 2003, 413). He is certainly right in contending that the thesis of radical structuralism according to which knowledge is purely structural cannot be maintained. But this is not the issue as has been admitted already by Russell himself in his answer to Newman. It is quite another thing, however, to maintain that the concept of structural representation in general is philosophically unimportant. A closer look at the theories of representations developed in the sciences reveals that representation is a "difficult" concept that up to now as been only partially understood by epistemologists and philosophers of science. As I wanted to show in this paper, the issue of definite descriptions, logical constructions, and structural representations may still have a place on the agenda of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. These disciplines could learn a lot by looking more closely to mathematics and the other sciences for their conceptual resources and technical tools (cf. Richardson 2003, 165). More specifically, the concept of structural representation, which unfolded in the evolution of 20th century's logic and mathematics in a spectacular manner, has been digested only partially by philosophy up to now. Perhaps the best example is the emergence of category theory14, for which one of the decisive factors was Stone's representation theorem15 (cf. Johnstone 1982, Mac Lane 1970). Studying in a Russellian spirit the concept of representational constructions may help overcome this less than optimal state of affairs. References: 14 For an account of category theory especially adapted for the needs of philosophers and with special emphasis on its relevance to Russell's philosophy, see Marquis (1993). It is not too far-fetched to characterize category theory as the theory of structure-preserving representations (morphisms). Although it came into being more than sixty years ago, philosophers have been rather reluctant to welcome it as relevant for matters philosophical, in stark contrast to the enthusiastic reception the "new logic" received one hundred years ago by Russell and other scientifically minded philosophers. 15 The topological version of Stone's representation provided one of the earliest non-trivial examples of a functor, which is a fundamental concept of category theory. Almost explicitly, this is already contained in Stone's Theorem 4, 387 (1937) which asserts that the "algebraic theory of Boolean algebras and the topological theory of Boolean spaces are mathematically equivalent." (More precisely, Stone's functor is a duality.) 20 Anderson, C.A., 1989, Russell on Order in Time, in C.W. Savage, and A.C. Anderson (eds.), Rereading Russell. Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume XII, 249 263. Carnap, R. 1923, Die Quasizerlegung. Ein Verfahren zur Ordnung nichthomogener Mengen mit den Mitteln der Beziehungslehre, Unpublished Manuskript RC-081-04-01, University of Pittsburgh. Carnap, R., 1928 (1998), Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Hamburg, Meiner. Carnap, R., 1958 (1975), Observation Language and Theoretical Language, in J. Hintikka (ed.), Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist, Dordrecht, Reidel. Carnap, R., 1966, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, New York, Basic Books. Cassirer, E., 1910 (1953), Substance and Function, New York, Dover Publications. Coffa, J. A., 1991, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. To the Vienna Station, ed. by L. Wessels, Chicago, Chicago University Press. Davey, B.A., Priestley, H., 1990, Introduction to Lattices and Order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Demopoulos, W., 1999, On the Theory of Meaning in "On Denoting", Nous 33, 439 458. Demopoulos, W., 2003, Russell's Structuralism and the Absolute Description of the World, in N. Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Russell, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 392 419. Demopoulos, W., 2003, On the Rational Reconstruction of Our Theoretical Knowledge, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54, 371 403. Grayling, A.C., 2003, Russell, Experience, and the Roots of Science, in N. Griffin (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 449 474. Halmos, P.R., 1963, Lectures on Boolean Algebras, Princeton and New York, Van Nostrand. Hylton, P., 1992, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, Cambridge, Clarendon Press. Irvine, A.D. and Wedeking, G.A., 1993, Russell and Analytic Philosophy, Toronto, University of Toronto Press. Johnstone, P.T., 1982, Stone Spaces, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Koppelberg, S., 1989, General Theory of Boolean Algebras, in Handbook of Boolean Algebras volume 1, edited by J.D. Monk with the cooperation of R. Bonnet, North-Holland, Amsterdam and New York. Lewis, D., 1970, How to Define Theoretical Terms, Journal of Philosophy 62, 427 -446. Lewis, D., 1991, Parts of Classes, Oxford, Blackwell. Linsky, B., 2003, The Metaphysics of Logical Atomism, in N. Griffin (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 371 392. 21 Mac Lane, S., 1970, The Influence of M.H. Stone on the Origins of Category Theory, in Functional Analysis and Related Fields, Berlin and New York, Springer, 228 335. Marquis, J.-P., 1993, Russell's Logicism and Categorical Logicisms, Russell and Analytic Philosophy, A. Irvine & G. Wedeking (eds.), Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 293-424. Mormann, T., 1994, A Representational Reconstruction of Carnap's Quasianalysis, PSA 1994, Volume 1, 96 104. Pincock, C. 2002, Russell's Influence on Carnap's Aufbau, Synthese 131, 1 37. Psillos, St., 1999, Scientific Realism. How Science Tracks the Truth, London, Routledge. Psillos, St., 2000, "Rudolf Carnap's "Theoretical Concepts in Science"", Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 31, 151 172. Ramsey, F.P., 1990, Theories (1929), in Philosophical Papers, edited by D.H. Mellor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 112 136. Richardson, A.W., 1990, How not to Russell Carnap's Aufbau, in PSA 1990, volume 1, 3 -14. Richardson, A.W., 2003, The Geometry of Knowledge: Carnap, Becker, and Lewis, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 34, 165 182. Roeper, P., 1997, Region-Based Topology, Journal of Philosophical Logic 26, 251 309. Russell, B., 1905, On Denoting, in B. Russell, Logic and Knowledge, Essays 1901 1950, edited by R.C. March, London and New York, Routledge, 4156. Russell, B., 1912(1967), The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Russell, B., 1914, The Relation of Sense-data to Physics, in B. Russell, 1918, Mysticism and Logic, London and New York, Routledge. Russell, B. 1914, Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy, London and New York, Routledge. Russell, B., 1918 (1972), The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Edited and with an Introduction by D. Pears, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court. Russell, B., 1924, Logical Atomism, in B.Russell, Logic and Knowledge, Essays 1901 1950, edited by R.C. Marsh, London and New York, Routledge, 321 343. Russell, B., 1927, The Analysis of Matter, London, Routledge. Russell, B., 1991(1967-1969), Autobiography, London and New York, Routledge. Stone, M.H., 1936, The Theory of Representations for Boolean Algebras, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 40, 37 111. Stone, M.H., 1937, Applications of the Theory of Boolean Rings to General Topology, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 41, 375 481. 22 Tarski, A., 1941, On the Calculus of Relations, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 6, 73 89, also in Collected Papers Vol. 2, 571 587. Zahar, E., 2004, Ramseyfication and Structural Realism, Theoria 19, 5 30.

2 HIPPOCRATES' COMPLAINT The fascinating Journey of the Renaissance Medicine __________________________ GUIDO del GIUDICE __________________________ he teachings of the Renaissance era are still a live issue and they are taken into account in our culture nowadays, because the Renaissance is not only a historic period but it represents a condition of the soul, which returns to illuminate whenever the human action is overwhelmed by periods of torpor and obscurantism. The Renaissance tradition has continued to exercise its influence in art and philosophy in different ways and at different times, whereas nowadays it reduces itself to pure historical curiosity in the medical-scientific field. Its inexhaustible source of creativity and the awareness of the human capabilities have been sacrificed in the name of impetuous progress and they have no longer been considered unable to offer any valid contribution. The reference to the forefathers of the ars medica (Hippocrates, Avicenna, Galen) remains although formally, whereas the memory of the medical renaissance has lost itself in the centuries, because everything refers to the pre-Galilean era is something to be ashamed of. The desire to get rid of ancient subjects, such as magic, ______________________________________________________________________________ Previous page: Hippocrates, engraving by Peter Paul Rubens (1638). Below, from left: Hippocrates and Galen, painting in the crypt of Cathedral Anagni (first half of the twelfth century); Hippocrates painted by a Byzantine artist of the fourteenth century. T 3 Frontispiece, Opus Chirurgicum by Paracelsus (printed in 1565, Frankfurt). astrology and alchemy, has alienated the philosophy of nature, which once allowed to doctor to realize that everything is related to everything, and that science alone cannot provide any explanation to every question, without any regard of a monistic vision both of man and of universe. Contrary to the ancients, who had to be talented in order to achieve the general truth, the modern doctors, gradually, have focused on some particular facts. This change in perspective has led to a transformation of themselves: in order to pursue science and technology achievements, they have chosen to sacrifice the combination of medicine and philosophy, that always characterized their liberal education. The famous sentence of Hippocrates, that says the doctor who becomes philosopher is like God ("ιατρός υιλόσουος ισόθεος"), then resumed by Galen ("Nullus medicus nisi philosophus"'), has became a veritable Renaissance dogma. "If they aren‟t astronomers they are missing a wing, if they aren‟t philosophers they are missing the other" said Theophrast Bombast von Hohenheim called Paracelsus, a leading 4 To the right, from top: a famous portrait of Paracelsus (engraving of 1660); Astronomia Magna by Paracelsus, (Frankfurt: Martin Lechler fur Hieronymous Feyerabend, 1571). scholar who represented the intellectual pride and studied the nature with a sensitivity at time mystical, two characteristics of the Renaissance spirit. Giordano Bruno admired the intuition of Paracelsus of an existing bond between the man and environment, between microcosm and macrocosm, between outside and inside, and for his idea of the Philosophy as a guide of the medicine, since it allows to know the nature, so that he was named by Bruno "doctor Miracles". "And what else is this nature if not philosophy, what else is philosophy if not the invisible nature? Only those who are philosophers are worthy of being engaged in the Ars Medica". The experimental approach continuously has separated the ancient thought from the newest one, the middle age from the modern age, even though it has influenced the medical renaissance since then. In the past the experimental method was regarded by both Cardano and Paracelsus and was the foundation of the "Academy of Secrets " by Giovan Battista Della Porta, whose statute still claims its real purpose to test the prescriptions and potions, in order to demonstrate their effectiveness. There wasn‟t any critical attitude towards the experimental method, only its means and applications to achieve it were criticized. If nowadays some attempts to treat a headache either with bloodletting or with invocations are ridicolous, in most case our current beliefs about medicine are going to appear more ridiculous in the next five centuries. Our life has been preserved longer, whereas our planet earth has been destroyed; many diseases have been defeated whereas the pollution has been spreading everywhere, and other diseases 5 From left: Girolamo Cardano at the age of 49; Frontispiece, Contradicentium Medicorum Liber by Girolamo Cardano (Venice, Geronimo Scotto, 1545); Giovan Battista Della Porta at the age of 64 (picture of the seventeenth century). have occurred whose terrible effects will affect the rising generation one day. If you consider the cycle of vicissitude in which individual survival is irrelevant, who the real fool? It would be better if we were tolerant of these precursors of the modern science, in any case they managed with science and alchemy. They weren‟t able to put the numerous applications of the experimental method into practice, because the reality was not revealing to them. It was difficult to achieve good results, as a consequence they turned to the medieval magic tradition. The magic was regarded by those wise men as the only mean at disposal to exploit the enormous potential of nature that was perceived by them as an active force in the Universe. Paracelsus considered the magic " praeceptor et paedagogus " a guide to help you discover all the existing secrets in the nature: "Everyone who doesn‟t appeal to nature often calls it witchcraft, but it is the veritable art to which appeal". Girolamo Cardano, while he was accepting beliefs and superstitions of all kinds, he deeply conceived some innovative ideas. He was ahead of his time with his surprising insights which were then confirmed some centuries later by the current science research. In the ten books entitled "Contradicentium medicorum " that are an admirable example of the differential diagnostic study, he dealt with different opinions and diagnosis of doctors about the diseases. He described the various forms of mental illness in detail, and he was one of the first doctors who treated the fever typhoid and syphilis. In addition, he guessed the first allergies. His studies of physiognomy (which came earlier those by Della Porta), include his observations and comments that were resumed by Cesare Lombroso, who founded the crime science. He who scolds, or even derides the extravagant remedies or the rituals written in those „medical prescriptions" by both Cardano and Paracelsus should read the cures given by the luminaries to the patients of that time: it‟s a wonder if someone could survive! Although these men made reference to the past experiences, they relied on their own observations, rather than on the authority of the ancients. Their treatments that improved the bonds between the doctor and his patients 6 were branded by the Inquisition as demonic magic and hammered by the malleus maleficarum. The dramatic act of Paracelsus who burned the summa of medical knowledge on one of the pyres , in Basel, in the 1527 on the day St. John, was a attack to the arrogant colleagues who were passive followers of GalenAristotelian theories, which led back all the diseases and their cures into rigid schemes. In Labyrinthus medicorum errantium, after philosophy, astronomy and alchemy, he designates, as the fourth subject the virtue, the feeling of compassion that gets the real-being of the sick, without any regard to the privileges of the caste and their profits. From this point of view, the medical Renaissance has something to teach to the Modern Age, where the doctor task is to treat the patient and to control health care costs. After the developments of the experimental method, everyone needs to take care of patient‟s health, and has to consider the balance which maintains the human body and environment, one of the aspect more sacrificed for the total trust in the technological progress over the centuries. The ethical dilemma raised by genetics, the epistemological doubts deriving from the quantum physics observation have highlighted the necessity to combine the scientific knowledge with the philosophical inquiry . The medical doctor has the hard task to link up these two important human skills and mix the ancient knowledge with the newest one. Therefore he who wants to get the new scientific discoveries should regard the ancient medical science carefully, because there is no new science that cannot become old, and no old science that has not been new. O modern Asclepio, you have to look back at your ancestors who lived in the Renaissance! If you want to continue your journey, you have to look back at history: "They are amputated roots which germinate, ancient things which return yet again, occult truths which are discovered; it is a new light which after the long night riseth over the horizon in the hemisphere of our knowledge and little by little approacheth the meridian of our intelligence" (Giordano Bruno). Translated by Michela Placido Zodiac Figure, Fasiculo de medicina, written in vulgar latin by Johannes de Ketham (1494).

volume 16, no. 3 january 2016 What Is Sexual Orientation? Robin A. Dembroff Princeton University © 2016 Robin A. Dembroff This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/016003/> 1. Introduction Ordinary discourse is filled with discussions about "sexual orientation". Everyone seems to have opinions about it - whether it should be a legally protected class, whether it is apt for moral judgment, and whether Lady Gaga is right that, whatever our sexual orientations, we were "born this way".1 This discourse suggests a common understanding of what "sexual orientation" is. But even a cursory search turns up vastly differing, conflicting, and sometimes ethically troubling characterizations of sexual orientation. Consider the following, taken from (respectively) a professional scientific association, an LGBTQ advocacy organization, a neuroscientist, and a philosopher: 1. Sexual orientation refers to an enduring pattern of emotional, romantic, and/or sexual attractions to men, women, or both sexes.2 2. 'Sexual orientation' is the preferred term used when referring to an individual's physical and/or emotional attraction to the same and/or opposite gender.3 3. Sexual orientation ... is the trait that predisposes us to experience sexual attraction to people of the same sex as ourselves (homosexual, gay, or lesbian), to persons of the other sex (heterosexual or straight), or to both sexes (bisexual).4 4. A person's sexual orientation is based on his or her sexual desires and fantasies and the sexual behaviors he or she is disposed to engage in under ideal conditions.5 1. Lady Gaga (2011). "Born This Way". Born This Way. Abbey Road Studios. 2. The American Psychological Association (2008). 3. Human Rights Campaign (2014). 4. LeVay (2011), 1. 5. Stein (1999), 45. ImprintPhilosophers' robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 2 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) The conceptual jumble surrounding sexual orientation suggests that the topic is overripe for analytical philosophical exploration.9 While the delay in such exploration may be due to metaphysicians' historical focus on discovering and articulating metaphysically necessary truths about reality, recent feminist critiques have brought topics related to contingent social realities into the subfield's focus. Philosophers such as Charlotte Witt and Sally Haslanger have begun, for example, rich and growing literatures on metaphysical questions concerning gender and race. But sexual orientation has yet to receive due in-depth metaphysical exploration. This paper lays the groundwork for one such in-depth exploration and, in so doing, encourages further analytic philosophical discussion of sexual orientation. Its target is twofold: (i) the everyday concept of sexual orientation, and (ii) the corresponding concepts associated with the taxonomy of sexual orientation (e. g., gay, straight). These concepts are highly interwoven, since the concept of sexual orientation constrains the taxonomy. (For example, a concept of sexual orientation that centrally concerns a relation between a subject's own sex [or gender] and the sex [or gender] of the persons they are attracted to will imply a taxonomy containing correspondingly relational concepts.) My project sets out to engineer a revised concept of sexual orientation that implies a new taxonomical schema of sexual orientation. Both the revised concept and the new taxonomical schema are intended to elucidate and improve our everyday concepts in light of particular theoretical and socio-political purposes. And, importantly, this project is limited in scope: the proposed concept and taxonomy of sexual orientation are not meant to apply across all cultural contexts. Instead, my project constructs a concept that is both responsive to and critical people, I encourage you with all good will to incorporate a gender-neutral singular pronoun of your own choosing into ordinary English discourse. 9. While sexual orientation has received little attention in the analytical tradition, the continental tradition has a rich history of thinking about sexual orientation - see Foucault (1980) and Halperin (1990) and (2002), among others. To name just a few of the worries that might be raised for these characterizations: (1)–(3) assume binary categories of sex or gender (i. e., male/female or men/women)6; (2) and (3) disagree on whether sexual orientation concerns gender-attraction (attraction to individuals with certain genders) or sex-attraction (attraction to individuals with certain sexes); and (4) appeals to the opaque notion of "ideal conditions" for acting on one's sexual desires (more on this later). Characterizations like these - assuming they are attempts to elucidate a shared, pre-existing concept of sexual orientation - reveal that we have an extremely poor grasp of this concept. And even if the characterizations are stipulative, we have good reason to resist adopting many of them. Inadequate understandings of sexual orientation can reinforce heteronormative assumptions (i. e., assumptions that heterosexuality should be privileged within society) by maintaining a majority/minority divide between heterosexuality and other sexual orientations that historically has been normatively loaded and policed. They also can reinforce cisnormative assumptions (i. e., assumptions that all persons are cisgender - that is, that all persons' genders are the ones assigned to them at birth on the basis of their anatomy) by failing to provide recognition or clarity within the sexual-orientation taxonomy for persons who are not cisgender or who are attracted to persons who are not cisgender.7, 8 6. I here understand sex as a classification solely on the basis of human bodies' physical characteristics and gender as a classification (at least in part) on the basis of social situatedness. For more on this distinction, see section 3. Also, I acknowledge that gender-identity (the gender one self-attributes) and gender-expression (the external characteristics and behaviors that are socially interpreted as communicating that one belongs to a certain gender category) can come apart. In this paper, talk of gender-attraction is most easily understood as attraction to certain gender expressions, but I leave open that persons' gender identities can also play a role in gender-attraction. 7. Often this cisnormative assumption is paired with the views that gender is biologically determined by one's anatomy, and that gender is essentially a biological rather than social category. 8. Throughout this paper, I will use 'their' as a gender-neutral singular pronoun. Some people may take grammatical issue with this. If you are one of those robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 3 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) (if any) our ordinary concept of x tracks. The last project, and the one that best categorizes the methodology of this paper, is what I will call the "engineering project": it asks about the purposes of our concept of x, and (if necessary) improves or replaces the existing concept to better realize the purposes we want this concept to fulfill.11, 12 This project takes seriously that, as Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett put it, "our conceptual repertoire determines not only what we can think and say but also, as a result, what we can do and who we can be".13 Given this important feature of our conceptual repertoire, we can think of the engineering project as one that sets out to elucidate and possibly revise or replace our everyday concepts in light of the impact we would like them to have. Importantly, the engineering project is not required to replace or even to revise an existing concept - what is important is that the final concept serves the proposed purposes. In some cases, these purposes may be best served by preserving (e. g.) the ordinary usage, connotation, or extension of the everyday concept in question. To quote Haslanger: [I]f we allow that everyday vocabularies serve both cognitive and practical purposes, purposes that might also be served by our theorizing, then a theory offering an improved understanding of our (legitimate) purposes and/ or improved conceptual resources for the tasks at hand might reasonably represent itself as providing a (possibly revisionary) account of the everyday concepts. ... The responsibility is ours to define [these concepts] for our 11. Haslanger (2000), 32–33. Haslanger calls this the "analytic project". In order to distinguish it from "conceptual analysis", though, which is more akin to the "conceptual project", I will refer to it throughout as the "engineering project". 12. Though I do not want to take a strong stance on the nature of concepts, I am loosely understanding concepts here as ways of representing the world. I mean this, though, in a deflationary sense that remains neutral on the issue of whether concepts can carry non-descriptive, expressive content. 13. Burgess & Plunkett (2013), 1091. of our everyday thinking in contemporary Western society about sexual orientation. On my proposed account of sexual orientation, which I call "Bidimensional Dispositionalism", sexual orientation is based upon a person's sexual behavioral dispositions under the ordinary manifesting conditions for these dispositions (i. e., the conditions corresponding to applications of the term 'sexual orientation' and related terms), and having a particular sexual orientation is based upon what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons one is (or is not) disposed to sexually engage with under these conditions. Importantly, these particular categories of sexual orientation do not reference one's own sex or gender.10 In what follows, I assume non-eliminativism about sex and gender. I use the terms 'male' and 'female' to refer to sex categories, though I do not assume that these terms exhaust or refer to discrete sex categories. Similarly, I use the terms 'man' and 'woman' to refer to gender categories, though I do not assume that these terms exhaust or refer to discrete gender categories. 2. Methodology and Framework This section clarifies my project's methodology and framework. I first discuss the project's methodology, and then turn to the purposes guiding my analysis of the concept of sexual orientation. Finally, I distinguish between the central target of my analysis - the everyday concept of sexual orientation - and three distinct but closely related concepts. Methodology: The Engineering Project In her work on gender, Haslanger points out the importance of distinguishing between three projects that ask a question of the form, What is x? One project is conceptual: it asks only about the content of our ordinary concept of x. Another is naturalistic: it asks which natural kind 10. Acknowledging that some people wholly lack dispositions to sexually engage with other persons on the basis of sexor gender-attractions will include asexuality with regard to sex and gender among the class of sexual orientations. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 4 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) replace our former concept. This tension is fine; I'm not sure anything important hangs on whether my project is described as providing a revised or replacement concept of sexual orientation. Either description can point to what does matter - that as an engineering project, my project consists of two parts: (I) Elucidating purposes ideally served by our concept of sexual orientation, and (II) Re-engineering our concept of sexual orientation (and the corresponding taxonomy of sexual orientation) in light of the purposes described in (I).15 Having now described the methodology of my project, I will turn to describing purposes that (I argue) are ideally served by our concept of sexual orientation and clarifying my central target concept. I will then spend the remainder of the paper reconstructing this concept and its corresponding taxonomic schema in a way that fulfills these purposes. Framework I: Purposes I propose that the following purposes are ideally served by our concept of sexual orientation: (i) Clarifies the criteria for ascribing sexual orientation, as well as how these criteria translate into a taxonomic schema of sexual orientation; (ii) Is consistent with relevant social-scientific research - in particular, research concerning sex and gender; 15. These parts could be conceptually divided into two projects, one of which looks for suitable concepts in light of assigned purposes, and the other of which engineers revised (or new) concepts that meet these purposes (should suitable ones not be found elsewhere). For simplicity, I am including both projects under the heading of the 'engineering project'. purposes. In doing so we will want to be responsive to some aspects of ordinary usage (and to aspects of both the connotation and extension of the terms).14 In this way, engineering projects may range in the descriptiveness and prescriptiveness of their conceptual construction. Given the purposes that projects assign to their target concepts, they might prescribe no revision to an everyday concept, or prescribe revisions that (among other things) preserve features of the everyday concept. These latter projects are descriptive insofar as they elucidate and maintain certain features of the everyday concept, but prescriptive insofar as they propose revisions to the everyday concept in light of certain purposes. Haslanger acknowledges that, because of this flexibility, an engineering project will confront issues regarding how conceptually conservative it intends to be - i. e., whether it intends to retain, revise, or eliminate the everyday concept. My project is somewhat conservative in one sense but not another. While - for reasons I will soon explain - it attempts to preserve the general extension of our everyday concept of sexual orientation, it does not attempt to preserve many of the connotations associated with the term 'sexual orientation' or the concepts associated with our current taxonomy of sexual orientation. Given this, my project will clarify and minimally revise our everyday concept of sexual orientation, but also eliminate and replace the everyday concepts associated with the taxonomy of sexual orientation. Some might take my proposed concept of sexual orientation to constitute a new, distinct concept replacing the former concept, rather than revising it. I can see both sides of this issue. Insofar as my account attempts to be responsive to our ordinary usage of the concept of sexual orientation while revising the concept's content, it may be thought merely revisionary. But insofar as this revised content implies a new taxonomy of sexual orientation and significantly changes the connotations of the term 'sexual orientation', it may be thought to entirely 14. Haslanger (2000), 33. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 5 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) sex and gender - especially with regard to sexual orientation - regularly create difficulties for queer, gender-nonconforming, and intersex persons, as well as their partners. How should gender-nonconforming, transgender, or intersex persons (or their partners) describe their sexual orientations? How can or should non-discrimination laws address these sexual orientations? The current categories of sexual orientation offer little to no flexibility or clarity for these individuals. For these reasons, the current categories reinforce cisnormativity as well as heteronormativity. That is, because the current categories place queer orientations in a vast minority and have no place at all for many transgender or intersex individuals (or persons attracted to these individuals), they perpetuate prejudices that sexual orientations and gender identities that do not meet standard binaries of homosexual/heterosexual and cisgender man/cisgender woman are somehow deviant, dysfunctional, or even nonexistent.18 Ideally, our concept of sexual orientation would get rid of or at least diminish these harms by achieving purposes (iii)–(iv) above, and do so (at least in part) by employing the tools articulated in purposes (i)–(ii). In addition to guiding my project, purposes (iii)–(iv) also impose certain constraints. In particular, they constrain the project to construct a concept of sexual orientation that is feasible for public uptake. Only such a concept can move us toward achieving these social and political purposes. So, rather than rebuilding the concept of sexual orientation from scratch, I restrict myself to engineering a concept that clarifies and improves upon the pre-existing structure of our everyday concept and - on the basis of this clarification and improvement - rebuilds and expands the sexual-orientation taxonomy. To put this slightly differently: I am not out to develop a theoretically ideal or purely stipulative concept and then argue that the term 'sexual orientation' should be attached to my concept rather than the 18. Consider, for example, the well-recognized phenomenon known as "bisexual erasure" (a tendency to explain away or simply deny evidence that persons are attracted to both men and women, or, on alternative accounts, females and males). (See, e. g., Greenesmith [2010].) See also Stein's (1999) critiques of the binary operationalization of sexual orientation in scientific studies. (iii) Reduces or eliminates the presumption that cisheterosexuality16 is the normatively standard sexual orientation and all queer sexual orientations are normatively deviant;17 and (iv) Is conducive for establishing legal and social protections for persons who have queer sexual orientations. These purposes are not merely stipulative; someone could disagree with me concerning whether these purposes should guide our concept of sexual orientation. I take each of them, though, to be rooted in everyday political and social realities. My reasons for adopting (i)–(ii) are both theoretical and practical. As I've shown, sexual orientation is understood in a variety of conflicting ways - there is disagreement about how to articulate the criteria for ascribing sexual orientation (e. g., in terms of genderor sex-attraction), as well as corresponding disagreement about the taxonomy of sexual orientation. There also are regular confusions between sex and gender, which suggests that these understandings are not informed by recent research concerning the distinction between sex and gender. This alone immediately reveals a need for an elucidation of the concept and taxonomy of sexual orientation, and possibly a revision ensuring their consistency with relevant research on sex and gender. More practically, clarifying the criteria for ascribing sexual orientation (and how they translate into a taxonomic schema of sexual orientation) is a key ingredient in developing a concept that serves the social and political purposes stated in (iii)–(iv). Confusions between 16. As will become clear in the subsequent section, because I understand sexual orientation as concerning both sex and gender, I reject the idea that heterosexuality picks out a specific sexual orientation. I believe that talk about "heterosexuality" in ordinary discourse is usually talking about "cisheterosexuality" - that is, the attraction of a cisgender woman to a cisgender man or vice versa. 17. I use the term 'queer' here to mean something like "not cisheterosexual". For reasons that hopefully become clear, I intentionally avoid terms such as 'same-sex', 'homosexual', etc. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 6 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) orientation that they fail to recognize. Given this, I will not address sexual identity in what follows. The second is romantic or emotional attraction. Some characterizations of sexual orientation - for example, that of the American Psychological Association - understand sexual orientation in terms of "emotional, romantic, and/or sexual attractions".21 I grant that romantic and emotional attractions are often reliable evidence of sexual orientation, and can be themselves the target of discrimination. But it seems that our concept of sexual orientation is distinct from the concepts of romantic and emotional attraction in that it primarily concerns sexual behavior. This is why, for example, I think we correctly call "asexual" persons who are disposed to never engage in sexual behaviors, even though they may experience a range of romantic and emotional attractions. The fact that asexuality is considered (even by asexual persons) to be a single category within the taxonomy of sexual orientation, despite asexuals reporting a wide range of romantic and emotional attractions, suggests that these latter attractions are captured by concepts other than concepts of sexual orientation.22 (There is even a distinct taxonomy for these romantic and emotional attractions, e. g., 'biromantic', 'panromantic'.) Conversely, we can imagine that someone - or even every person - who has sexual attractions that lead us to ascribe a sexual orientation to them could completely lack romantic or emotional attractions. In short, it is not difficult to think of examples in which persons with seemingly the same sexual orientation have vastly differing romantic or emotional attractions, as well as examples in which sexual orientation is unaccompanied by romantic or emotional attractions. Given cases like these, I assume in what follows that, while romantic and emotional attractions might fall under a concept of sexuality broadly construed, the concepts associated with these attractions are distinct from the concept of sexual orientation. For this reason, my 21. American Psychological Association (2008). 22. See Emens (2014). everyday concept. Instead, I am constraining my conceptual engineering so that it is responsive to our ordinary usage by generally preserving the extension of our everyday concept of sexual orientation.19 I will say more about this soon, but in particular, this means that I limit my concept to one that primarily concerns sex-attraction and gender-attraction. I have no qualms if someone wants to describe this restricted project as building a ladder that we climb in order to eventually kick away and move on to a different concept of sexual orientation. It is a ladder that I think we must climb. And - I would suggest - this pragmatic approach to a conceptual project is well suited for any project that hopes to balance theoretical aims with a political and social agenda.20 Framework II: Target Concept Given my project's constrained scope, it is important to get a sense of the everyday concept's extension. To this end, I will now argue that we should distinguish the everyday concept of sexual orientation from three other, closely related concepts. The first is sexual identity, which I understand to refer to an individual's self-identification with regard to sexual orientation. Because sexual identity concerns sexual orientation in this way, the concept of sexual identity is sensitive to the concept of sexual orientation. But we also acknowledge that someone can be self-deceived or in denial about their sexual orientation (or even lack the concepts necessary for self-identification), while still being truly said to have the sexual 19. I say "generally" because it is unclear to me whether our everyday concept of sexual orientation extends to certain non-cisheteronormative pairings and simply fails to place them within its taxonomy, or whether it fails to extend to these pairings. My project secures this extension. It is also worth noting that this constraint is not an unusual move in metaphysics - e. g., Haslanger (2000) and Sider (2011) also constrain their conceptual engineering to a particular phenomenon in light of certain proposed purposes. It is also a move that is explicitly discussed in recent literature on conceptual ethics, such as Plunkett (2015) and Burgess & Plunkett (2013). 20. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this point. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 7 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) Admittedly, the cultural distinction we make between sexual orientation and sexual druthers seems somewhat arbitrary. It is not clear why attraction to certain sexes or genders is considered relevant to one's sexual orientation, but not attraction to a certain hair color, race, or economic status. But sex and gender are, for better or worse, particularly salient social categories with respect to sexual orientation. As a result, we find ourselves in the position of classifying persons' sexual orientations on the basis of their sexand gender-attractions, and not on the basis of other sexual attractions. And this makes persons with particular sexand gender-attractions more vulnerable to discrimination than persons with attractions to persons with a certain hair color or economic status. Again, I am not generally preserving the everyday concept's extension for its own sake, but in order to fulfill certain purposes. And the purposes that I've proposed are, I think, best served by maintaining the distinction between sexual druthers and sexual orientation (understood in terms of attraction to persons with certain sexes or genders). No one is interested in creating nondiscrimination laws to protect people attracted to blondes or baritones. We are, though, interested in creating legal and social protections for queer, transgender, gendernonconforming, and intersex persons. And, as mentioned before, I am here assuming that an account of sexual orientation should be aimed at better realizing these political and social purposes. So, given the pragmatic interests guiding the boundaries of "sexual orientation", I think that I can best fulfill purposes (iii)–(iv) by retaining these boundaries and separating sexual orientation from sexual druthers. For this reason, I will hold fixed that sexual orientation primarily concerns sexand gender-attractions, and not other sexual attractions. That said, one might worry that even once we take on board the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual druthers, it remains vague because many of the traits that are objects of druthers also (at least in part) construct gender. In other words, the worry goes, if sexual orientation concerns attraction to persons of a certain gender, and gender is a social construction that concerns (e. g.) performativity project is not directly concerned with emotional or romantic attraction. That is, my analysis is not concerned with emotional or romantic attractions that have no effect upon one's dispositions toward sexual behavior, and only indirectly concerned with those that have an effect. Should, for example, someone's romantic attractions significantly influence these dispositions, their romantic attractions will be part of what forms their sexual orientation under my account insofar as they have this influence. Any concern with attraction in what follows will focus upon sexual (and I mean sexual!) attraction regardless of whether other forms of attraction accompany it. To this end, talk of attraction in what follows generally can be understood as shorthand for dispositions to engage in sexual behaviors.23 The third concept to distinguish from sexual orientation is what I call sexual druthers, which refers to specific preferences of sexual partners within potential partners according to one's sexual orientation. This is often referred to as someone's "type".24 Height, hair color, body structure, and voice quality are all examples of traits about which people may have sexual druthers. In order to generally preserve the extension of our everyday concept of sexual orientation, I do not include sexual druthers in my account of sexual orientation, and instead focus upon preferences of sexual partners with regard to sex and gender categories. 23. Michael Rea raises the interesting question of what this distinction (between emotional/romantic attraction and sexual orientation) implies for someone who lacks dispositions to engage in sexual behaviors (perhaps, e. g., due to chronic deficiency of sex hormones), but who has higher-order desire for sexual intimacy. Does having only this higher-order desire preclude such a person from having a sexual orientation? I would answer "No" - not so long as we consider asexuality a sexual orientation. Asexuality is generally understood as the lack of sexual attraction, or lack of first-order desire to have sexual contact with someone else. (See, e. g., The Asexual Visibility & Education Network (2012).) Asexuals can and often do experience romantic or emotional attractions, though. And they might have higher-order desire to experience first-order sexual desire or sexual intimacy. A person in the situation that Rea describes seems, for these reasons, to be best categorized as asexual. 24. Of course, a single person may have multiple "types". robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 8 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) experience no sexor gender-attractions? These questions press on our ordinary concept, and its embedded assumption that there is a clear line between sexual druthers and sexual orientation. Happily, I take no such position. Borderline cases like these make it clear that our social categories have fuzzy edges and do not cut at deep joints. But we would be mistaken to expect that they would. For my purposes, what is important is that - though the separating line can be fuzzy - the majority of cases show that there clearly is a distinction between sexual orientation and sexual druthers. I leave it to future papers to further discuss borderline cases, and whether these cases ought to affect the extension of our concept of sexual orientation; the following will aim toward a general account of sexual orientation that preserves the central bases of sexual orientation as it is ordinarily understood - namely, sexand gender-attraction. For this reason, I will assume that - just as sexual orientation concerns romantic and emotional attractions only insofar as they affect sexual attraction - sexual orientation concerns sexual druthers only insofar as features that are the object of druthers go into constructions of gender (or insofar as primary or secondary sex characteristics that are objects of sexual druthers affect sexual behavioral dispositions). 3. Bidimensional Dispositionalism In what follows, I propose a concept of sexual orientation that is designed to satisfy purposes (i)–(iv). However, I first address two issues that constrain and shape my concept of sexual orientation: the distinctions between sex and gender and between behaviorism and dispositionalism. I then state my proposal and discuss its implications, as well as additional philosophical questions pointing to further expansion on my proposal.28 28. Specifically, I will address the application of discrete vs. continuous categories of sex or gender and essentialism vs. constructionism to accounts of sexual orientation. (behaviors, dress, etc.) or social status, then the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual druthers is vague. I agree with this point, but still insist that there are cases where sexual orientation and sexual druthers come apart - that is, cases where someone is attracted to a particular feature that lacks gendered connotations.25 In fact, it may be that some persons lack any genderor sex-attractions, and are solely sexually attracted to persons with non-gendered features such as wealth or red hair. That is, there may be persons whose sexual attractions are based only on what I've termed sexual druthers.26 This, of course, puts pressure on the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual druthers - why don't we think that being (e. g.) solely attracted to redheads is a sexual orientation?27 And if it is not, what sexual orientation do such persons have, since they are not asexual (i. e., having no sexual attractions to anyone), but 25. Whether or not certain druthers have gendered connotations should be assessed from a subjective perspective. It could be, for example, that someone has a druther (or, if you prefer, fetish) for a particular shoe color because for that person this shoe color is associated with aspects of sexual engagement that express their sexual orientation. While such druthers might appear to others to have no gendered connotations, they have these connotations for the persons who have them. For this reason, I think that an account of sexual orientation should concern such gender-laden druthers, albeit indirectly, as expressions of persons' underlying sexual orientations. 26. Thanks to David Black for bringing this possibility to my attention. 27. A more common example of a similar phenomenon is pedophilia, or exclusive attraction to pre-pubescent children regardless of their sex or gender. Is pedophilia a sexual orientation? Those inclined to think that it is not a sexual orientation might think that it is instead a sexual disorder, which (unlike sexual orientation) is something that should be subject to psychiatric and medical treatment. Those inclined to think that it is a sexual orientation, though, can maintain that sexual orientation concerns sexand gender-attractions. On a plausible view of sex-categories, these categories are based on continuous and fluid groupings of primary and secondary sex characteristics. Because these characteristics undergo significant change during puberty, it is arguable that humans shift sex-categories during puberty. These possibilities are surely not exhaustive, and I acknowledge that this is a difficult (as well as a morally and emotionally loaded) case. Undeniably, there are a host of similar difficult cases that beg for further discussion. Length limitations and the freshness of this topic to philosophical debate constrain me from providing more than an extremely general discussion of sexual orientation in this paper. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 9 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) think that understanding sex as an anatomical category entails understanding it as purely "natural" or culture-independent. Our sex categories seem to (in some way) track anatomical features associated with reproductive functions, but these very anatomical categories of reproductive roles could be (at least partially) the result of cultural practice. As I see it, one can maintain that both sex and gender categories are (at least partially) culturally constructed while distinguishing between them on the grounds that they are constructed upon different physical and social features and aimed at fulfilling different purposes. Given this, I see little to be gained by adopting the unification view. Of course much more can be said, but for the sake of brevity I will now turn to the cisnormative view. A pathway to challenging this view was famously laid by Simone de Beauvoir, who marked sex as a biological category and gender as a category concerning the social position (e. g., exploitation and oppression) experienced by those exemplifying femininity.31 While the details of de Beauvoir's ideas have been challenged in contemporary discussions, her sex/gender distinction is the standard view in psychology, sociology, and queer and women's studies, as well as in feminist philosophy.32 Given this, it would be fairly uncontroversial for me to simply assume this distinction moving forward in my account of sexual orientation. It is worth saying explicitly, though, that not only is the distinction theoretically useful, dividing what seem to be distinct phenomena, but it is also politically and socially advantageous. For one, it provides a helpful framework through which to understand the gender identity 31. Sveinsdóttir (2011), 48. As de Beauvoir famously said, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman." I will adopt Haslanger's view that 'sex' refers to a classification on the basis of anatomy (e. g., primary sex characteristics), though this is compatible with these classifications having vague boundaries, or boundaries heavily influenced by socio-political interests. I am also sympathetic with Haslanger's view that gender is not merely a social construct, but is defined in terms of social relations (Haslanger [2012], 39). 32. For an overview of recent philosophical approaches to sex and gender, as well as the interaction between philosophical approaches and other (e. g., psychological, political) approaches to sex and gender, see Mikkola (2012) and Haslanger (2012). Preliminary Issues Sex and Gender As mentioned, previous characterizations of sexual orientation typically and without argument equate and assume binary categories of sex and gender. They often also analyze sexual orientation in terms of either sex-attraction to the exclusion of gender-attraction, or vice versa. These assumptions lead to understandings of sexual orientation according to which sexual orientation is unidimensional - tracking either sexor gender-attraction, but never both independently of each other - and limited to a small number of discrete sub-categories. The position that there is no distinction between sex and gender might be understood in two ways: as the claim that sex (taken as anatomical) wholly determines gender, or that gender (taken as socio-political or psychological) wholly determines sex. The former - call it the "cisnormative view" - is much more prevalent than the latter - call it the "unification view" - which has a small presence within feminist theory and other academic literature.29 In this paper, I am primarily concerned with rejecting the cisnormative view. While I find the unification view provocative, I also think it incorrect. Much of the motivation for the view, it seems, comes from the conviction that we should not posit sex/gender along a nature/culture binary, because this binary has historically provided justification for women's oppression, or because - as Linda Alcoff rightly identifies - "in an important sense, everything is natural".30 But (as Alcoff also points out) it is confused to 29. See, e. g., Butler (1990), Wittig (1992), or Halpern (2002). Butler and Wittig (both feminist theorists) argue that sex classifications follow laborand politically-driven gender classifications. Wittig, for example, writes, "No biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society: it is civilization as a whole that produces this creature." (For dissenting discussion of these views, see Alcoff [2005].) In contrast, Halpern (a psychologist) emphasizes sex differences in cognitive capacities, meaning that one who understands gender as a primarily psychological feature might argue based on Halpern's research that sex differences follow gender identity. 30. Alcoff (2005). robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 10 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) For example, someone may be attracted only to transgender men who have not had genital or top surgery, or only to cisgender men and women. And given that we recognize that conferral of sexual orientation tracks both genderand sex-attraction, we also should recognize that it tracks various combinations of these attractions. For this reason, I place a further constraint on my account of sexual orientation: (b) The account must permit individuals' sexual orientations to be based on both gender-attraction and sex-attraction. Someone perfectly happy with (a) may still resist (b), and argue that sex-attraction (or gender-attraction) should be taken as a mere sexual druther, allowing sexual orientation to remain unidimensional. Consider, for example, someone who is attracted to women and not men, but is only attracted to cisgender women. Why think that this latter attraction is anything more than a sexual druther? That is, why should we think that someone attracted only to cisgender women has a different sexual orientation than someone attracted to both transgender and cisgender women? This line of argument might suggest that, while we preserve the extension of our ordinary sexual-orientation concept, we should make the relevant criterion for ascribing sexual orientation only gender-attraction (or only sexattraction), and also categorize sexual orientations along only one of these dimensions. There are a number of considerations against thinking of sexattractions (or gender-attractions) as mere sexual druthers. The two most weighty (and related) considerations are: (i) the frequency with which people experience sexual attraction not only to individuals with particular gendered features, but also to individuals with particular primary and secondary sex characteristics, and (ii) the need to recognize the community of persons who are exclusively (or strongly) attracted to transgender individuals, or who are themselves transgender and seeking persons with these attractions. or anatomical transition of (e. g.) gender-nonconforming, androgynous, and transgender individuals. That is, because it separates sex as an anatomical category from gender as a category of social situatedness, it creates the possibility for understanding how the two can be combined in a variety of ways. It also creates an avenue for addressing the ways in which gender categories can be altered to combat patriarchal social structures. If, for example, gender is defined in terms of social situatedness such that (as Haslanger argues) to be a woman is (in part) to be in a position of systematic social oppression, then acknowledging this clarifies the changes that should and can be made to our gender categories if we are to establish gender equality.33 For all of (but certainly not only) these reasons, I hold that the following constraint on an account of sexual orientation will move us closer to achieving what were earlier established as the purposes ideally served by a concept of sexual orientation: (a) The account must be compatible with the distinction between sex and gender. If the cisnormative assumption and unification view of sex and gender are dismissed - and I think they should be - then the unidimensional view of sexual orientation also should be. The distinction between sex and gender allows for various combinations of sex and gender across individuals, making it clear that an account of sexual orientation should be sensitive to the fact that individuals may be sexually attracted to persons with various sex/gender combinations.34 33. See, e. g., Haslanger (2000). 34. I take it to be a fairly uncontroversial assumption that we can (though an individual need not) experience sexual attraction to purely anatomical features as well as gendered features. (I acknowledge that the boundary between these features is slippery.) Given this, we can already begin to see how sexual orientation is significantly dependent upon both biological traits and particular social contexts. For example, if we hold that one's sexual orientation concerns (at least in part) gender-attraction, and that gender is merely a social construct, this sexual orientation will be dependent on placement in a context that has gender-constructs. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 11 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) important for ensuring legal and social protections for persons with these attractions, insofar as we can reasonably expect that (e. g.) many partners of transgender persons will encounter discrimination that they would not if partnered with cisgender persons. Without concepts that capture these attractions as part of individuals' sexual orientations, it becomes difficult if not impossible to guarantee the protections that such individuals deserve. For all of these reasons, I maintain (ii), and disagree with the position that either sexor gender-attraction should be classified as mere sexual druthers. Of course, adopting (a) and (b) does not resolve the issue of whether sex or gender (and therefore sexual orientation) should be understood in terms of discrete or continuous categories. I revisit this issue in discussing my account's implications. But it is worth noting here that this neutrality is, I think, appropriate for a general account of sexual orientation. Understanding sexual orientation categories as discrete or continuous should piggyback on, and not decide, whether we understand sex and gender categories as discrete or continuous. And the debate over this issue has not reached a clear consensus. For similar reasons, my project does not take a precise stance on which features are the basis of sex and gender categories. As seen from my discussion so far, I do assume that sex and gender are real (i. e., non-eliminativism), that sex and gender are distinct, and that sex categories are related to anatomical features while gender categories are related to relational and social features. (Of course, there may be overlap in the features that provide the basis for sex and gender ascriptions - what's important is that they are not identical.) More specific theories of sex and gender can be filled into the forthcoming schematic understanding of sexual orientation (and its taxonomy). I purposively build this flexibility into my account in order to construct a concept of sexual orientation (and of its taxonomy) that can be structurally preserved even when the number or understanding of recognized sex and gender categories undergoes shift.37 37. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this feature of my project. The first consideration is fairly straightforward: it is simply the observation that, in addition to attraction to particular genders, persons can also be exclusively interested in partners with particular sex characteristics. It is not unusual, for example, for persons to become uninterested in pursuing a relationship with someone upon discovering that they are transgender or intersex. At first, one might be tempted to chalk up all scenarios like this to transphobia or other prejudices, and not these persons' sexual orientations. However, there also are numerous cases within the growing "trans-oriented" community of persons who experience strong or exclusive sexual attraction to transgender persons.35 These persons report feeling misplaced among the current categories of sexual orientation, identifying neither as straight nor as gay. Some, for example, consider themselves a "different kind of gay" - indicating that the current taxonomy of sexual orientation simply fails to capture their sexual orientation, since they experience strong or exclusive attraction specifically to persons who are not cisgender. This failure is also reflected within academic literature, where a variety of terms have been suggested for these individuals (e. g., 'MSTW' ['men sexually interested in transwomen'], 'gynemimetophilia'/'andromimetophilia').36 While - unsurprisingly - none of these terms have caught on, the community of trans-oriented persons (and the research concerning this community) suggests that individuals can have exclusive sexual preference for transgender persons that is not caused by social prejudice. Similarly, one would expect, individuals can have unprejudiced exclusive preference for cisgender persons. Recognition of these possibilities is not only important for trans-oriented persons; it is also important for transgender persons who may experience rejection by both "straight" and "gay" potential partners, and who are seeking someone who is (though perhaps are not exclusively) trans-oriented. It is also 35. See www.transoriented.com or the most recent work of British journalist and transgender rights activist Paris Lees on the question, 'Is trans-oriented an emerging sexual orientation?' 36. See, e. g., Weinberg & Williams (2010); Money & Lamacz (1984). robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 12 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) psychological states, except perhaps states that can be in turn reduced to behavior. We can understand this view - behaviorism - as the following claim: A person's sexual orientation is determined solely by their observable sexual behavior.38 In other words, under a behaviorist account, an individual's sexual orientation is decided simply by looking at their sexual behaviors, and seeing what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons they sexual engage with. For example, if they only sexually engage with cisgender men, their sexual orientation is ascribed accordingly. An immediate difficulty for behaviorism is determining what behaviors and span of time are relevant to someone's sexual orientation. Even setting this aside, though, three more egregious problems remain.39 First, behaviorism doesn't allow that individuals can behaviorally repress their sexual orientations. Consider, for example, the case of Episcopal Bishop Gene Robinson, a cisgender man who, after privately identifying himself as gay during seminary, was married and faithful to a cisgender woman for fifteen years.40 Cases like these are extremely common within the LGBTQ community - under extreme social pressure to conform to cisheteronormativity, many individuals enter so-called "straight" relationships and so behaviorally (if not also psychologically) repress their sexual desires. Additionally, homeless LGBTQ persons are often forced into prostitution, thereby sexually engaging with individuals of sexes and genders that these persons do not necessarily find sexually desirable.41 38. Alternatively, Edward Stein describes this as the view that "a person's sexual orientation is indexed to his or her sexual behavior" (Stein [1999], 42). 39. For further discussion of the merits and demerits of behaviorism, see Stein (1999). 40. Robinson (2012). 41. Ray (2006). Conditions (a) and (b) are also intended to be neutral with regard to whether we can in the future adopt further dimensions of sexual orientation, and subsequently expand our concept of sexual orientation. As discussed previously, my current project is limited to these two dimensions because it aims to construct a readily accessible but politically and socially beneficial concept of sexual orientation. Behaviorism and Dispositionalism The previous subsection argued that we should take sexual orientation to involve both sexand gender-attraction. But it is not clear how to assess these attractions in order to determine someone's sexual orientation. The task of clarifying the criteria for ascribing sexual orientation and how these criteria translate into a taxonomic schema of sexual orientation, then, is not complete. The following part of my project continues this task. It is primarily descriptive in nature, though it will also contain a prescriptive element. It is centrally aimed at further elucidating criteria for ascribing sexual orientation as well as articulating (in light of social and political motivations) criteria for placing individuals within a taxonomy of sexual orientation. The following discussion will compare two main approaches to this task: behaviorism and ideal dispositionalism. Both of these approaches, I will argue, fail to provide an acceptable analysis of sexual orientation because both insist on overly rigid conditions for ascribing sexual orientation - behaviorism insists on rigid actual conditions, and ideal dispositionalism insists on rigid ideal conditions. I conclude by demonstrating how a different form of dispositionalism - call it ordinary dispositionalism - captures an intuitive balance between actual and ideal conditions for ascribing sexual orientation. Behaviorism One way of understanding sexual orientation is as nothing over and above (i. e., as reducible to) one's observable behaviors - that is, as something solely concerning behavior and not at all concerning robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 13 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) in terms of individuals' dispositions to engage in sexual behaviors with a certain class of persons (rather than their actual sexual behaviors), and that concern psychological states only insofar as they influence individuals' behavioral dispositions. After assuming this shift to talk of dispositions, though, significant and difficult questions remain. A standard account of dispositions tells us that: Something x has the disposition to exhibit manifestation m in response to being situated in stimulating circumstance c iff, if x were to be situated in c, it would exhibit m.43 That is, for example, a match is disposed to light (i. e., is flammable) in response to being in a certain circumstance if and only if, were the match in that circumstance, it would light. Applying this to sexual orientation, we can let x range across the domain of human persons, and let m be engagement in sexual behavior (broadly construed) with persons of a certain sex and gender. But determining what c should be is a much more complicated task. And without specifying c, dispositionalism gives us: A person's sexual orientation is determined solely by what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons S is disposed to sexually engage under certain stimulating circumstances. This claim is enough to get us to the position that there is some particular scrutability basis of sexual orientation - namely, relevant sexual behavioral dispositions. Without specifying the conditions under which these relevant dispositions manifest, though, we have not made much headway beyond behaviorism. To assign actual conditions to c would make the view indistinguishable from behaviorism - if the manifesting conditions are actual conditions, then the relevant 43. Choi (2008), 796. For simplicity, I have removed the variable ranging across times. But, by behaviorist lights, it is correct to categorize these individuals' sexual orientations according to their coerced behaviors, rather than according to their (freely or forcibly) behaviorally repressed desires. It seems obvious to me that this is a bad result. Because sexual behavior can be - and, for LGBTQ persons, frequently is - coerced by societal pressures, we must understand sexual orientation as something "deeper" than observable behavior. Even if influenced by social pressures, sexual orientation cannot be explicitly forced upon someone by these pressures.42 To deny this is to do an injustice to a large number of LGBTQ persons, especially in countries where queer sexual behavior can result in prison or even death. Two other, related problems for behaviorism regard its implications for voluntary celibates and persons who are not sexually active, as well as sexually active persons in situations lacking a variety of potential sexual partners (e. g., prisons). Behaviorism wrongly dictates that persons in the first situation either lack sexual orientations or ought to be classified as asexual, and that the sexual orientations of persons in the second situation should be determined with no regard to the extremity of their circumstances. These too are bad results, and ones that blatantly conflict with the general extension of our everyday concept of sexual orientation. Ideal Dispositionalism A plausible account of sexual orientation should account for situationally specific sexual behaviors. Behaviorism fails to do this. And yet behaviorism admittedly captures something important about sexual orientation: our concept of sexual orientation tracks (with qualifications) sexual behavior, and not selfor other-identification, emotions, or purely psychological states. But insisting that it concerns only actual behavior is, as we have seen, riddled with problems. For this reason, I propose that analyses of sexual orientation should move toward dispositional accounts - that is, accounts that define sexual orientation 42. See, for example, the near-universal recognition of the total failure of socalled "reparative therapy". robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 14 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) While I think that this type of proposal rightly pushes against behaviorism's rigid focus on actual conditions, I also think that the extreme shift to "ideal" conditions would create two different problems. First, this view legitimizes a worrisome cross-cultural projection of our concept of sexual orientation. The ideal conditions for (e. g.) ancient Greeks to realize their sexual desires might vastly differ from the ideal conditions for (e. g.) a contemporary European or North American.46 If, for example, political power dynamics were significantly built into their sexual desires, then the ideal conditions for ancient Greeks acting on sexual desires might be unlike the conditions we think of as ideal for acting on our sexual desires - perhaps they would include a specific political scenario. Likewise for any culture in which sexual desires largely concern (e. g.) social status, wealth, or particular survival skills, not to mention ones where the recognized sexes or genders differ from those built into our concept of sexual desire.47 And yet the "ideal conditions" view suggests that our concept of sexual orientation can be aptly applied within all of these widely ranging "ideal conditions". In other words, the view implies that we can ascribe sexual orientation (as we understand it) to all human beings across cultures by holding fixed their sexual desires and projecting them into corresponding "ideal conditions", regardless of how foreign these conditions are to the conditions that correspond to contemporary concepts of sexual desire. But given how tightly our concept of sexual desire is entwined in our concept of sexual orientation, I am doubtful that sexual orientation can be cross-culturally applied to this extent. For this reason, this approach would seem to 46. For example, Miriam Reumann's (2005) American Sexual Character develops a compelling case for the existence of uniquely American sexual desires and patterns, shaped by uniquely American politics, social life, gender roles, and culture, as well as racial and economic divides. The main takeaway for the purpose of this paper is that it would be naïve - and, in fact, simply incorrect - to assume that sexual desire has a universal and cross-culturally consistent character. 47. Interestingly, Stein addresses this possibility later in his book amidst a discussion of essentialism and constructionism. dispositions should be those dispositions manifested in actual conditions - that is, actual behaviors. And this is precisely what we want to avoid. To capture the general extension of our everyday concept, we will need a different theory of what circumstances manifest these dispositions - one less narrow than "actual conditions", and more informative than, say, "all the physical facts". In Edward Stein's The Mismeasure of Desire, he proposes that the dispositions relevant to determining sexual orientation manifest "under ideal conditions".44 He goes on to say, "Conditions are ideal if there are no forces to prevent or discourage a person from acting on his or her [sexual] desires, that is, when there is sexual freedom and a variety of appealing sexual partners available."45 According to Stein, then, we can understand sexual orientation in terms of the sexual behaviors someone would engage in if nothing - nothing at all - were stopping them. While it is not clear that Stein is attempting to capture the general extension of our ordinary concept of sexual orientation, his proposal suggests that one way to fill out the dispositional schema above is as follows: A person's sexual orientation is determined solely by what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons S is disposed to sexually engage under ideal conditions. In other words, Stein suggests that sexual orientation is determined by how someone would sexually behave if we held fixed their sexual desires and ensured that nothing is stopping them from acting on those desires. We can then consider whether Stein's suggestion can be used to capture the extension of our ordinary concept of sexual orientation by specifying that the relevant features of these sexual behaviors are the sex[es] and gender[s] of the persons that they involve. 44. Stein (1999), 45. My emphasis. 45. Stein (1999), 45. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 15 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) Ordinary Dispositionalism The problems facing behaviorism and ideal dispositionalism may be avoided by appealing to conditions somewhere between "actual" and "ideal" conditions. One possibility - which I here tentatively adopt - incorporates an adaptation of Sungho Choi's notion of "ordinary" manifestation conditions for a given disposition. Choi argues that it is possible to articulate manifesting conditions for dispositions that will not be subject to the standard counterexamples to analyses of dispositions (e. g., "masked" or "finkish" dispositions),50 but which also will not be vacuous (e. g., "if it were struck, then, unless the match didn't light, it would light").51 He proposes that this challenge is met by examining the purpose behind our concept of a given disposition, which in turn reveals what manifesting conditions are conceptually connected to that disposition. To put this slightly differently: Choi suggests that whatever conditions those having the concept consider "ordinary" manifesting conditions for that disposition are the relevant manifesting conditions for that disposition. In a slight divergence from Choi, I suggest instead that the relevant manifesting conditions for the dispositions determining sexual orientation are not the conditions that those who possess the concept consider "ordinary", but the conditions under which people in fact apply the term 'sexual orientation' (and relevantly associated terms).52 Or, more 50. A "finkish" disposition is one whose stimulus conditions also remove the disposition - for example, a glass's disposition to break is finkish if, every time it is struck, God hardens the glass so that it is no longer disposed to break. A "masked" disposition is one that is simply prevented from manifesting under the stimulus conditions - for example, a glass's disposition to break is masked if it is bubble-wrapped when it is struck. See Choi & Fara (2014). 51. Choi (2008). 52. I remain neutral on the question of whether this sort of account should be applied widely across all types of dispositions. Perhaps some of the manifesting conditions for some dispositions can be given a purely physics-based explanation, for example. Here, I only commit to an account for determining the ordinary manifesting conditions for the dispositions relevant for determining sexual orientation. (Thanks to Michael Rauschenbach for raising this issue.) get the extension of our concept wrong, extending it beyond its appropriate reach.48 Second, there are some empirical reasons to think that sexual desires cannot be "held fixed" independently of someone's actual social context, and that these desires would not remain constant when projected into ideal circumstances. In particular, when surrounded by a vast variety of sexual partners and lacking any inhibitions, there is evidence suggesting one's sexual desires - and so, one's sexual behaviors - will undergo significant alteration from what they were under ordinary circumstances. In particular, social psychologists have discovered that sexual desires frequently increase or decrease (depending on other characteristics of the individual) in situations with high sexual opportunity. The corresponding principles, known as the "satisfaction principle" (high opportunity decreases desire) and the "adaptation principle" (high opportunity increases desire) are perfect examples of why we should doubt that individuals' sexual desires would remain constant when they are placed in a situation with complete sexual freedom and availability.49 But if these desires undergo significant shift, then we should expect that an "ideal conditions" account of sexual orientation will frequently dictate ascriptions of sexual orientation that conflict with our everyday understanding of sexual orientation. To put this in slightly stronger terms: there is some reason to think that it would significantly change the subject from what we were originally talking about when we were talking about sexual orientation. 48. One might respond on Stein's behalf that our concept of sexual orientation (and other cultures' related concepts) should be understood as socially-historically constrained, such that it may not be cross-culturally applied. While this is not clear from Stein's text, and I would still have concerns about the view (see the following argument), I do think that this would improve the account. In my own proposal - and as we will soon see - I attempt to develop a way of ensuring this social-historical sensitivity by looking to ordinary language use as a guide to the relevant manifesting conditions. 49. See, for example, Gebauer, Baumeister, Sedikides, & Neberich (2014). robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 16 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) Central to this proposal is the idea that finding the ordinary manifesting conditions for a disposition means looking to the (often pragmatic) goals determining application of the term referring to that disposition. In the case of sexual orientation, then, the manifesting conditions for the behavioral dispositions relevant to determining sexual orientation must be understood within the framework of the purposes behind the everyday operative concept of sexual orientation - finding potential partners, establishing laws (be they protective or discriminatory), predicting behavior, enabling scientific research of sexual attraction, and so on.56 These purposes determine the "ordinary" conditions under which the term is applied - that is, they are the conditions corresponding to the operative concept. Importantly, using these conditions as the relevant manifesting conditions for a particular disposition does not mean forfeiting any revision to the everyday operative concept. It simply means that these conditions are built into the revised concept, guaranteeing that the everyday concept's extension is generally preserved. These conditions only provide constraints on the eligible criteria for ascribing sexual orientation - they do not determine these criteria, much less determine the taxonomy resulting from them. More needs to be said about what these ordinary conditions are - that is, what are the conditions corresponding to the everyday operative concept of sexual orientation? Or, in other words, what conditions lie behind our ascriptions of sexual orientation? 56. While these purposes at bottom will result in the same behaviors as the purposes behind the manifest concept of sexual orientation, they importantly differ in the interpretation of those behaviors. Whereas those applying the term 'sexual orientation' may take themselves to be (e. g.) identifying moral failing or categorizing psychological defects, this is simply using fictions as a mask for what Haslanger calls the "explicitly social content of the operative concept". So too, those applying the term may take the manifesting conditions relevant to sexual orientation to be anything from "having certain genetics" to "being cursed by God", but these cannot be the conditions we are concerned with. We are instead concerned with the conditions that actually determine application of the term 'sexual orientation', regardless of what someone thinks they are doing when applying it. simply, the relevant manifesting conditions just are the conditions under which ascriptions of sexual orientation typically take place. Here I follow Haslanger, who makes a useful distinction between "operative" and "manifest" concepts: The operative concept of "cool", for example, is "the concept that actually determines how we apply the term to cases, i. e., (roughly) being such as to conform to the standards of the in-group".53 In contrast, the manifest concept of cool is "the concept that users of the term typically take themselves to be applying, i. e., being intrinsically or objectively cool".54 By defining "ordinary" manifesting conditions in terms of the concept those applying the term take themselves to have, Choi restricts our search for these conditions to the conditions attached to manifest concepts. But these conditions may be nonexistent (i. e., "intrinsic coolness") or severely mistaken. Better, I think, is to identify the "ordinary" conditions as those corresponding to the everyday operative concept - that is, the conditions corresponding to applications of the relevant terms. Consider, for example, a match's disposition of flammability. Using this adaption of Choi, we look at the operative concept of "flammability" and find that the purpose of it is to determine whether a match will light when it is struck in normal temperatures, when dry, etc. These conditions, that is, determine how we apply the term 'flammable' to a match. Because of this, they are the relevant manifesting conditions c in the statement 'A match is disposed to light in response to being situated in stimulating circumstance c iff, if the match were to be situated in c, it would light.'55 53. Haslanger (1995), 102. 54. Haslanger (1995), 102. 55. One might worry that this account is circular - that it relies on the "ordinary manifesting conditions" that identify a disposition by appealing to the concept of that very disposition. Choi (2008) argues that this objection fails. As he points out, because the ordinary conditions for a disposition are understood as "extrinsic conditions that are ordinary to those who possess the dispositional concept", those persons need no knowledge of a conceptual account of the disposition in question. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 17 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) corresponding to exclusive attraction to women.57 This sort of case illustrates that we expect an explanatory relation to hold between one's sexual orientation and the sex or gender of the persons they are attracted to. (II) The operative concept assumes attraction to certain persons while having a reasonable diversity of potential sexual partners. This generalization is far from Stein's suggestion that sexual orientation is based on attractions with no restriction on sexual partners. But it captures why we do not consider behaviors in outlying circumstances where potential partners are extremely limited or homogenous (e. g., prisons, boarding schools, deserted islands) as reliable indicators of one's sexual orientation. (III) The operative concept assumes that one is willing and able to sexually engage with other persons. We refuse to ascribe sexual orientations to someone on the basis of their actual sexual behaviors if (e. g.) they are voluntarily celibate, subject to sexual contact without consent, or possess a prohibitive medical condition. These scenarios indicate that it is also important to the operative concept of sexual orientation that the behaviors relevant to ascribing sexual orientation are ones that are engaged in willingly and with the physical and psychological ability to engage or not engage in the behavior.58 It might also explain why we judge 57. Or because Elijah thinks they are women. This would leave room for cases in which, e. g., someone attracted to cisgender men is attracted to someone they take to be a cisgender man, but who is anatomically female. 58. Of course, some (and perhaps all) asexual persons will never be in a situation in which they are willing to engage in sexual behavior. In that case, we can determine that, because it is impossible for them to meet condition III, they do not have any sexual behavioral dispositions that would be manifested under the ordinary conditions - that is, they are asexual. This distinguishes asexuals from (e. g.) voluntary celibates. My primary goal in moving away from actual or ideal conditions, and toward the conditions corresponding to the everyday operative concept of sexual orientation, is to escape the rigidity of both behaviorism and ideal dispositionalism. I want to avoid a view that ascribes sexual orientation on the basis of only observable behaviors, or only behaviors within unattainable, potentially culturally distant ideal conditions. This is not to say that the operative concept is without substance. But I will not pretend to articulate necessary and sufficient conditions corresponding to the operative concept of sexual orientation - nor do I maintain that such conditions exist. The conditions corresponding to our ascriptions of sexual orientation admit, no doubt, of borderline and vague cases. My primary concern is to capture the core elements of these conditions in order to generally preserve the extension of our everyday concept of sexual orientation. And I do think that a number of things can be said to elucidate the conditions under which we typically confer sexual orientation. In particular, I propose the following as conditions constraining our ascriptions of sexual orientation - that is, as conditions corresponding to the operative concept - reminding the reader to think of these as generalities that admit of exception and vagueness, rather than as strict rules of use. (I) The operative concept assumes attraction to persons of a certain sex or gender (at least partially) because they are that sex and/or gender. For example: Say that Elijah has strong sexual druthers for persons with long hair, but has no preference between men or women as sexual partners. Elijah lives in a town where the only people with long hair happen to be women. As a result, it is true to say that Elijah is attracted only to women. But because he is not attracted to them because they are women, we would not say that Elijah has the sexual orientation robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 18 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) Bidimensional Dispositionalism [BD]: A person S's sexual orientation is grounded60 in S's dispositions to engage in sexual behaviors under the ordinary condition[s] for these dispositions,61 and which sexual orientation S has is grounded in what sex[es] and gender[s] of persons S is disposed to sexually engage under these conditions.62, 63 In other words, I propose that - whatever the categories we place within 'sexual orientation' - their ascription should be based on the sex[es] and gender[s] of the persons someone is disposed to 60. I use the term 'grounded' here in the loose sense of 'dependent on' or 'explained by'. One may also be able to understand it in terms of 'built on', which (roughly) means 'less fundamental than' or 'accounted for in terms of'. (See Bennett [forthcoming].) 61. I remain neutral on the debate over whether properties can have dispositional essences or if all dispositions reduce to categorical properties. For my purposes here, I don't have a dog in that fight. 62. As Shamik Dasgupta pointed out, someone might be concerned that BD, as stated, does not ensure that the dispositions relevant to sexual orientation are particularly "deep" or "self-disclosing". Sexual orientation, one might think, deserves protection because it is deep and, in this way, outside (or mostly outside) a person's control. While I acknowledge this worry, I disagree with the idea that sexual orientation must be particularly "deep" to merit special protections. Whether or not sexual orientation has these features is orthogonal to its merit for protection. Even if every person shifted sexual orientation every week (and even if we could do so by choice), I would insist that sexual orientation deserves protections. However, one might worry that, even apart from questions of protections, sexual orientation is a "deep" and unchangeable (or nearly unchangeable) feature of who someone is. I want to remain neutral on this question, and so the formulation of BD allows but does not require someone's sexual orientation to undergo frequent shifts. 63. By 'sex[es] and gender[s] of persons...' I do not mean to imply that there must be any particular persons of this sex and gender, or particular persons with whom S is disposed to sexually engage. That is, S could be disposed to engage with persons who are cisgender women even if there were no cisgender women, or even if there were no particular cisgender women with whom S is disposed to engage. abnormal sexual behavior that occurs under the influence of alcohol or narcotics (and therefore is nonconsensual) to be an unreliable indicator of sexual orientation. Again, (I)–(III) are generalizations of the conditions that I think are built into the operative concept of sexual orientation, and they therefore will admit of occasional exceptions or borderline cases. They remain, though, useful guidelines explaining why we consider extreme circumstances poor guides to determining sexual orientation, and how we can reliably ascribe sexual orientation to persons without appealing to "ideal" conditions. Someone may here object that, in appealing to the conditions underlying our operative concept of sexual orientation in order to construct a revised concept of sexual orientation, I appear to be doing mere conceptual analysis. To this, I would again emphasize that my project is necessarily in part descriptive because it aims to generally preserve the extension of our everyday operative concept of sexual orientation. But it is prescriptive insofar as I am out to precisify and revise this concept in order for it to more efficiently and ethically serve the purposes assigned to it. Noticeable revisions concern decisively including both sexand gender-attraction as criteria for ascribing sexual orientation and - as we will now see - distancing the concept from concerning the relation between a subject's own sex or gender and the sex or gender of the persons they are attracted to. These revisionary aims are importantly distinct from projects that intend to radically revise the conditions determining concept deployment.59 Bidimensional Dispositionalism Putting together the previous discussions of gender/sex and behaviorism/dispositionalism, we arrive at my positive proposal: 59. See Haslanger (1995), 114. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 19 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) orientation should "reduce or eliminate the presumption that cisheterosexuality is the normatively standard sexual orientation and all queer sexual orientations are normatively deviant", and be "conducive for establishing legal and social protections for non-cisheterosexual persons". The categorization shift proposed by BD moves us closer to accomplishing both of these tasks. First, BD promotes the aims of purpose (iii) because BD eliminates the distinction between cisheterosexuality and queer sexual orientations and provides a taxonomic schema capable of recognizing persons outside the gender or sex binary. On the former point, on BD, there are no such sexual orientations as (e. g.) "homosexual" or "heterosexual". And there is no distinction in the sexual orientations of (e. g.) a cisgender man and a transgender woman who both are exclusively attracted to women. The statistical divide between cisheterosexuality and queer sexual orientations simply disappears, because these categories disappear, and their members are reorganized into new categories. While this will not of itself eliminate discriminatory attitudes, it does change the concept of sexual orientation such that it does not simply fall out of the concept that cisheterosexuality is statistically standard and all else is deviant. It also removes the connotation that "sexual orientation" is what distinguishes (e. g.) the so-called "straight" and "queer" communities. I believe that this is a socially and politically beneficial result, encouraging dismantling the divide between these communities. On the latter point, BD does not build in either discrete or binary gender or sex categories, and so has the flexibility to adopt a variety of sex and gender taxonomies. With this flexibility, it is capable of providing taxonomic recognition for persons outside of the sex or gender binaries (e. g., genderqueer or intersex persons), as well as their sexual partners. Second, BD achieves (or at least moves toward achieving) purpose (iv) by providing the conceptual tools for lawmakers to secure protections for sexual orientation under pre-existing protections against genderand sex-discrimination. That is, because sexual orientation makes no reference to one's own sex and gender on BD, any discrimination sexually engage with under ordinary conditions for ascribing sexual orientation.64 This analysis recasts sexual orientation as pertaining to bidimensional attraction - that is, as pertaining to both sexand gender-attraction. But, importantly, BD does not require that, in order to be ascribed a sexual orientation, someone must have a certain sex-attraction or gender-attraction. One could be neutral as to one or both, or be attracted to neither (i. e., be asexual with regard to sex and gender). All of this would be revealed by their dispositions to engage (which could be dispositions to never engage) in sexual behavior with certain persons (at least partially) on the basis of their sex and gender.65 By emphasizing only these dispositions, BD understands sexual orientation solely in terms of the sex[es] and gender[s] of the persons one is disposed to sexually engage, without reference to the sex or gender of the person so disposed. Under this framework, for example, a cisgender man and transgender woman disposed to sexually engage only with cisgender women have the same sexual orientation, and so too for a cisgender man and gender-nonconforming female disposed to engage only with men. In emphasizing this shift in our categories of sexual orientation, BD rejects the idea that sexual orientation can be classified in terms of a relation between persons of the "same" or "opposite" sex or gender. This taxonomical shift is important to the fulfillment of purposes (iii)–(iv). Recall that these purposes stated that an analysis of sexual 64. While I will not address this issue here, we arguably should also acknowledge that these dispositions themselves come in a range of strengths, which would add another dimension to sexual orientation. (Thanks to Justin Christy for this suggestion.) 65. I expect that we are often attracted to certain persons because they have characteristics that are associated with particular genders, and not because of the totality of their gender expression. For my purposes, this sort of connection is sufficient to allow for the explanatory connection between gender and attraction, though it leaves many open questions regarding what (if anything) is essential to particular gender expressions, and more generally, how we should think about the constitution of gender expressions. I leave these questions to persons working in the metaphysics of gender. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 20 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) One worry about BD is that it does not give us enough epistemic access to our own sexual orientations. How will we know our sexual orientation if it would require being placed under circumstances that we are not actually in? How could, say, a lifelong celibate priest know that they would take certain actions if they were under these "ordinary circumstances"? It might seem as though any compelling account of sexual orientation will make it possible for someone to know their own sexual orientation, and BD does not do this.67 This objection, though, makes a substantive assumption: that the correct metaphysical analysis of sexual orientation must bend to a demand for epistemological transparency (or something close to transparency). And I see no reason to think this. In fact, we have good reason to deny it, given the many examples of repression and selfdeception of sexual orientation under (e. g.) social, religious, or familial expectations.68 And this does not mean that we have no idea what our sexual orientations are - in general, people seem to have a "good enough" idea of their sexual attractions and how they do or would act under certain circumstances that they also have a "good enough" idea of their sexual orientation to seek out specific (or no) sexual partners. Insofar, too, as we think that persons have some manner of epistemic privilege in self-assessments of desire, attraction, and so on - features that inform and direct their behavioral dispositions - we can maintain that persons also have some manner of epistemic privilege in self-ascriptions of sexual orientation. Another worry for BD concerns the relation between sexual dispositions and sexual desires. Why, someone might ask, should we go to the trouble of analyzing sexual orientation in terms of dispositions and all their metaphysical baggage, when we can much more simply analyze it in terms of sexual desire, understood as an occurrent mental state? 67. Thanks to Peter Finocchiaro for raising this objection. 68. Indeed, the testimony of many queer persons suggests that discovery of one's own sexual orientation can be a long and difficult process. against someone in response to their sexual orientation can be re-described as discrimination on the basis of their gender or sex. This conceptual shift is, in fact, ripe for public uptake. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts recently articulated a similar shift in thought during oral argument in Henry v. Hodges, a case concerning the legalization of same-sex marriage. Justice Roberts re-described the same-sex marriage question in terms of sex discrimination, and (perhaps rhetorically) asked why the issue could not be decided on the basis of pre-existing protections against sex discrimination: I'm not sure it's necessary to get into sexual orientation to resolve this case.... I mean, if Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom can't. And the difference is based on their different sex. Why isn't that a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?66 As Justice Roberts here notes, cases of sexual orientation discrimination can be easily re-described in terms of gender or sex discrimination by holding fixed that multiple individuals share the same sexor gender-attractions, and yet some are discriminated against simply because they have a particular sex or gender in addition to those attractions. BD goes a step further by saying that the sexand gender-attractions - again, understanding these attractions in terms of behavioral dispositions under ordinary conditions - are all that matter for sexual orientation. My own sex and gender, for example, do not matter for my sexual orientation. And so, if I am discriminated against for having the attractions constituting sexual orientation X and a man who has sexual orientation X is not discriminated against, I can recast this discrimination as gender discrimination and appeal to pre-existing laws prohibiting this discrimination as the basis for my legal protection. 66. Liptak (2015). This argument in favor of legalizing same-sex marriage on the basis of pre-existing laws against sex-discrimination also was the central argument of an amicus curiae brief filed by a number of legal scholars in Henry v. Hodges, Supreme Court Case No. 14–556. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 21 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) desire (and the corresponding behavioral dispositions) would not be able to accommodate this case. If instead one prefers, for example, a pleasure-based theory of desire, then the formulation will be too narrow to capture the concept of sexual orientation. Not everyone receives pleasure from sexual behavior. Still other theories of desire (e. g., attention-based or holistic) are too broad to capture the concept.69 And so on, I would argue, for the other main candidate theories of desire. Of course, one could simply appeal to a "common understanding" of desire, but I am skeptical that there is any such thing. Third, one might worry that desires are too context-sensitive to capture the general (though perhaps not necessary) stability of sexual orientation. Earlier, I argued that we should not use Stein's "ideal conditions" as the relevant manifesting conditions for sexual behavioral dispositions, because we have good reason to think that someone's desires would be significantly altered in a scenario with wholly unrestricted access to a huge variety of sexual partners. Whatever these desires (and the corresponding behaviors) are, I argued, they are not reliable indicators of someone's actual sexual orientation. But, similarly, I think there are cases where someone's actual desires are not reliable indicators of their sexual orientation. For example, it is reasonable to expect that someone in a context lacking a reasonable variety of potential partners, such as a prison, may undergo shifts in sexual desire. And yet we would, I think, still deny that these shifted desires are reliable indicators of their sexual orientation, or that these shifts in desire constitute a shift in their sexual orientation. Perhaps, to avoid this result, one could insist that the desires relevant to sexual orientation are those that one would have in the ordinary conditions that I've described. But, in that case, we've only moved from behavioral to psychological dispositions; we haven't gotten rid of dispositions, or pinpointed particular mental states determining sexual orientation. 69. For an overview of these (and other) theories of desire, see Schroeder (2014). The first and most important response is, I think, to emphasize that in order to achieve the pragmatic goals discussed earlier, it is important to avoid an account that wholly psychologizes sexual orientation. While I leave open that the behavioral dispositions for which persons need political and social protections have categorical psychological bases, these bases will not be the focus of a socio-politically oriented account of sexual orientation. For these purposes, someone with the psychological features of a "heterosexual" but queer behavioral dispositions can and should be protected from anti-queer prejudice. In other words, given the pragmatic goals of my account, the questions of whether or which psychological states ground the behavioral dispositions at issue are interesting questions for neuroscientists, but not ones that should guide a politically motivated account of sexual orientation. Second, given the current main contending theories of desire, an account in terms of desire either amounts to a problematically restricted dispositional view or else creates new (and worse) problems. Suppose, for example, that one is partial to an action-based theory of desire, articulated in terms of dispositions. In this case, sexual desires just are the categorical basis of the kinds of behavioral dispositions that I have been talking about. At first, it might seem like this view would be co-extensive with my own, but preferable because it is articulated in familiar terms (desire) rather than in the technical language of dispositions. This thought would be mistaken. A sexual-desire view of sexual orientation would not be co-extensive with my own, because ordinary dispositionalism allows sexual behavioral dispositions to have a range of categorical psychological bases (or no categorical basis), and certainly does not restrict the relevant dispositions to ones grounded in the mental states that we would categorize as "sexual desire". For example, if someone is attracted to women on the basis of, say, a constant curiosity about what it is like to have sex with women, but not because of desire-like attitudes typically considered sexual attraction, my account does not rule out that this person can be classified as sexually women-oriented. A view of sexual orientation restricted to sexual robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 22 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) Discrete/Continuous Categories BD requires that we acknowledge that sexual orientation is bidimensional, pertaining to both sexand gender-attraction. Within this bidimensionality, though, we can and should ask whether our categories of sexual orientations will be discrete or continuous. The most common current categories of sexual orientation are uniformly discrete. In ordinary discourse, we typically hear two, or at best three, discrete categories: "heterosexual", "bisexual", and "homosexual". Expanding our concept of sexual orientation to include both sex and gender will increase the number of sexual orientation categories. But it will not of itself revise these categories such that they are no longer discrete, since it will not of itself revise our categories of sex and gender to no longer be discrete (much less binary). Suppose someone accepts, for example, a sex binary (male and female) and a gender binary (men/women). In that case, under BD, they would have four categories for attraction qua sex and four for attraction qua gender, arriving at sixteen discrete categories of sexual orientation. Consider the following example of how one might retain discrete categories of sexual orientation under BD, where 'attraction' can be taken as a useful shorthand signaling dispositions to engage in sexual behavior: Illustration 1: Discrete Categories Sex-Attraction (Assumes two sexes - male/female) Gender-Attraction (Assumes two genders - men/women) A: Not attracted to either sex qua sex 1: Not attracted to either gender qua gender B: Attracted to males 2: Attracted to men C: Attracted to females 3: Attracted to women D: Attracted to males and females 4: Attracted to men and women My respondent might be fine with accounting for sexual orientation in terms of dispositions to desire rather than dispositions to behavior, strange as it may seem. But framing sexual orientation in this way would not avoid yet another problem for any desire-based account: dispositions to desire would underdetermine sexual orientation because desire underdetermines sexual orientation. Consider someone who is behaviorally disposed to sexually engage with certain persons, but does not possess the emotional or cognitive features of sexual desire. (Again, we could imagine that they are motivated to sexually engage with persons on the basis of curiosity, free of desire.) That is, they don't (e. g.) feel sexual yearnings, spend time thinking about sexual behavior or receive particular pleasure from sexual behavior. Does this person have a sexual orientation? It seems to me that they do, suggesting that desires are not necessary for sexual orientation. But are they sufficient? Consider too the unlikely but imaginable case of someone who feels desire for, say, cisgender men, but is disposed only to sexually engage with women. In this case, and particularly for the socio-politically motivations discussed above, I would argue that this person's sexual orientation is one of orientation toward women and not cisgender men. But I admit that intuitions about our concept's extension may get fuzzy with regard to both of these hypotheticals - I can only report my own. I suspect that one's response may come down to whether one tends to think about sexual orientation as something predominately action-oriented or predominately internal. But more importantly (given that this is an engineering project), I support the former view as better equipped to achieve the social and political purposes behind the concept of sexual orientation, and as not clearly in conflict with the general extension of our everyday concept. Even with this advantage, BD is only the beginning of a full analytic account of sexual orientation. It remains neutral on a number of important and closely related philosophical questions. I turn now to these questions, which will highlight where further research can expand philosophical discussion of sexual orientation. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 23 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) Sex-Attraction (Assumes two sexes - male/female) 1: Not attracted to either sex qua sex 2: Attracted to males 3: Attracted to females 4: Attracted to males and females Under this view, a category within sexual orientation might be "MA-1", heuristically referring to someone who - under ordinary conditions - is disposed to engage in sexual behaviors with persons who present as (roughly) androgynous or masculine, regardless of their sex. BD remains neutral on the issue of discrete vs. continuous categories of sexual orientation. But the questions surrounding the issue require much closer attention, and my hope is that further research on sex and gender will allow an expansion of BD that specifies sexual orientation as continuous. It would thereby become more equipped to recognize sexual diversity and fulfill the need for an account of sexual orientation that eliminates the idea that cisheterosexuality is the "standard" sexual orientation and all else is "deviant". Essentialism/Constructionism As stated, BD is also neutral on the question of essentialism vs. constructionism about sexual orientation. Roughly, essentialism is the view that sexual orientation is something necessary or unifying about humans as a kind or as particular humans (thereby applying cross-culturally), whereas constructionism is the view that sexual orientation is socially constructed (thereby culturally specific), and may not (depending on the type of construction) in any sense "carve at the joints" of reality.71 71. See Haslanger (1995) for a wonderful look at how different levels and kinds of social constructions correspond to what we admit into our ontology. Under a view such as this, a category within sexual orientation might be "C2", which refers to someone who - under ordinary conditions - is disposed to engage in sexual behaviors only with transgender men who have not had genital surgery. One could also easily add 'intersex' to the left-hand column, 'genderqueer' to the right-hand column, and so on. The element I mean to emphasize in such a view is the insistence upon discrete categories for sex and gender, which leads to discrete categories of sexual orientation. If instead (as I prefer) one understands gender (and perhaps sex) to refer to a continuous spectrum, then sexual orientation will also refer to a continuous spectrum. Of course, within ordinary discourse, we typically have heuristic markers along continuous spectrums for pragmatic purposes (e. g., 'tall' or 'hot').70 But it is generally understood that these markers are merely heuristic, and do not refer to neatly closed categories. This could easily be applied within discourse about sexual orientations. The following illustrate a view under which sex categories are discrete but gender categories are continuous, resulting in continuous categories of sexual orientation: Illustration 2: Continuous Categories Gender-Attraction [Attraction may be represented at one, no, or multiple locations on the diagram]: 70. In other words, I prefer an account that rejects epistemicism about gender categories, just as most of us, I think, would reject epistemicism about 'tall' or 'hot'. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 24 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) framework related to sexual orientation are socially constructed, but they refer to real properties (or traits, if you prefer) of individuals that are in part socially formed and in part biologically determined.75 Moderate constructionism's main benefit is allowing the possibility of cross-cultural behaviors and biological traits loosely translating onto a contemporary framework - namely, the framework of the "ordinary conditions for ascribing sexual orientation" - while maintaining that the contemporary understanding of sexual orientation should not be applied to cultures lacking the concept of sexual orientation within that culture. But I also worry that moderate constructionism gives too prominent of a place to biology, and underestimates the degree to which sexual orientation is socially constructed. In any case, I currently have only tentative opinions about these issues, and so I have chosen to here state BD as neutral on issues of essentialism and constructionism.76 4. Conclusion and Implications Although I've gone to lengths to clarify what issues I do not take a firm position on, I do not mean to leave the impression that BD is an uncontroversial thesis. To clarify this, I will briefly state its central implications. First, to adopt BD is to reject our current taxonomy of sexual orientation. The assumptions that sexual orientation is always onedimensional - concerning either sex-attraction or gender-attraction, 75. I predict that whether you consider this a realist or fictionalist account of sexual orientation will largely depend on whether you are a realist or fictionalist about certain social kinds. Within the distinction of ideaand objectconstruction, this view would incorporate elements of each. While sexual orientation classifications would be considered idea-constructions, the way that we are socially and politically impacted by these classifications (whether our self-identity aligns with our sexual orientation or not) incorporates a large dose of object-construction into our understanding of persons as sexually oriented beings. (For more on this issue, see Haslanger & Sveinsdóttir [2011].) I am partial to the idea that there is a balance between these constructions and biological influence in determining sexual orientation. 76. For an interesting perspective on the need for recognizing individuals' agency in determining their sexual orientations, see Behrensen (2013). One common form of essentialism is biological essentialism - often heard in the sentiment "Born This Way" - which claims that sexual orientation is a biologically determined feature of a person.72 While BD is compatible with this view, to hold both, one must hold to biological determination of gender-attraction. That is, if sexual orientation is to be genetically determined and pertain to gender-attraction, biological essentialism faces the difficult challenge of explaining how gender could be (at least partially) socially constructed, and yet genderattraction be biologically determined.73 For this reason, it seems that BD - though compatible with biological essentialism - is unlikely to be paired with it. I do not have space here to discuss alternative forms of essentialism about sexual orientation, other than to say that I think it will be difficult to find a form of essentialism that agrees with contemporary theories of gender, which almost always incorporate some degree of constructionism.74 For this reason, I tentatively lean toward a moderately constructionist view according to which our social context (which may be self-selected to some extent) directs the manifestation of and categories for the manifestation of biological tendencies toward certain sexual attractions. On this view, the concepts and interpretive 72. See, for example, LeVay's (2011) analysis of sexual orientation as "the trait that predisposes us to experience sexual attraction to people of the same sex as ourselves (homosexual, gay, or lesbian), to persons of the other sex (heterosexual or straight), or to both sexes (bisexual)" (emphasis added). By identifying sexual orientation with the (according to him, biological) trait that predisposes us to have certain attractions, LeVay adopts a biological essentialism about sexual orientation. 73. Of course, one could also insist (against the prevalent view) that gender is biologically determined. 74. One interesting line of inquiry would be whether Charlotte Witt's "uniessentialist" account of gender, which combines both individual essentialism and social construction, could be applied to sexual orientation. On this view, certain properties of someone, such as their gender, can be essential to that person as a social individual, which Witt views as one of the three parts in the trinitarian ontology of "selves" (i. e., human organism, person, social individual). If one is willing to adopt Witt's ontology of "selves", perhaps a case could be made for sexual orientation as an essential property of a social individual. robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 25 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) implications of our answers - remain unexplored. BD only begins to map this promising philosophical landscape.77 References Alcoff, L. M. (2005). "The Metaphysics of Gender and Sexual Difference". In Barbara S. Andrew, Jean Keller & Lisa H. Schwartzman (eds.), Feminist Interventions in Ethics and Politics: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. American Psychological Association (2008). Answers to Your Questions: For a Better Understanding of Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality. Washington, DC. URL = www.apa.org/topics/sorientation.pdf. The Asexual Visibility & Education Network (2012). General FAQ. URL = http://www.asexuality.org. Behrensen, M. (2013). "Born That Way? The Metaphysics of Queer Liberation". APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Issues 12 (2):2–7. Bennett, K. (Forthcoming). Making Things Up. Oxford University Press. Burgess, A. & Plunkett, D. (2013). "Conceptual Ethics I". Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1091–1101. Butler, J. (1990). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge. 77. Many thanks to David Black, Justin Christy, Shamik Dasgupta, Esa Diaz-Leon, Peter Finocchiaro, Vera Flocke, Katharine Jenkins, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Rachel McKinnon, David Plunkett, Michael Rauschenbach, Michael Rea, Cat SaintCroix, Father Raphael Mary Salzillo, Sami Sumpter, Elizabeth Victor, Ted Warfield, and audiences at Princeton University, Notre Dame, UC Irvine's Perspectives on Gender Conference, the New York Society for Women in Philosophy, the 2015 Central APA, and the Berkeley Social Ontology Group for helpful feedback and conversation during the development of this paper. Special thanks as well to two anonymous referees at Philosophers' Imprint for insightful comments, and to the Princeton University Center for Human Values' Political Philosophy Graduate Student Research and Travel Fund. As is the case with most philosophy papers, to call this paper "single-authored" does not do justice to the vast amounts of time and energy that others have generously donated to help me develop these ideas. but never a combination of the two - and that sexual orientation concerns the sex or gender of both potential partners are deeply embedded within the concepts associated with these categories. For this reason, the current concepts of "homosexual" and "heterosexual" do not pick out sexual orientations under BD. These terms inherently refer to a relation between the sexes (or genders) of sexual partners, whereas BD focuses exclusively on the sex and gender of the persons one is attracted to. Second, BD implies - but does not necessitate - that we should reject biological essentialism about sexual orientation. This again comes on the heels of BD's incorporation of both sexand genderattraction in its analysis of sexual orientation. Third, and also for this reason, BD implies that the categories of sexual orientation ought to be continuous, rather than discrete. Contemporary research suggests that the categories of gender (and perhaps sex) are continuous, and so any dispositions related to gender (including the ones at issue in BD) must be sensitive to this continuous scale. This has political and social implications, as it raises questions about how to understand sexual orientation as a protected class or legal decisions concerning sexual orientation, and it puts pressure on the idea that cisheterosexuality (or any sexual orientation) is normative or non-deviant. Fourth, because BD appeals to the "ordinary conditions" for ascribing sexual orientation, it requires that we hesitate in ascribing any category of sexual orientation to an individual on the basis of their behavior without first carefully considering their social context. This hesitation is particularly required when considering persons under (e. g.) religious, situational, or familial pressures to partner with someone of a certain sex or gender, as well as any cross-cultural applications of our categories of sexual orientation. Finally, I also hope to have shown that the issues surrounding sexual orientation need further philosophical analysis. A vast number of questions about essentialism, dispositions, choice, reduction, and social kinds and properties - not to mention the political and ethical robin a. dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers' imprint – 26 – vol. 16, no. 3 (januray 2016) LeVay, S. (2011). 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23 Philosophical Studies An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition ISSN 0031-8116 Volume 173 Number 3 Philos Stud (2016) 173:711-731 DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0515-0 Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness Vuko Andrić & Attila Tanyi 1 23 Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com". Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness Vuko Andrić1 • Attila Tanyi2 Published online: 8 July 2015  Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015 Abstract In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs 'multidimensional consequentialism'. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In defending his particular version of multidimensional consequentialism, Peterson advocates the thesis-he calls it DEGREE-that if two or more moral aspects clash, the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes against the orthodoxy according to which-Peterson calls this RESOLUTION-each act is always either entirely right or entirely wrong. The argument against RESOLUTION appeals to the existence of so-called deontic leaps: the idea is that endorsing RESOLUTION would not give each relevant moral aspect its due in the final analysis. Our paper argues that, contrary to Peterson, (1) all moral aspects remain visible in what can properly be called the final analysis of a moral theory that involves RESOLUTION, (2) moral aspects do not have to remain visible in judgements of all-things-considered rightness or wrongness, respectively, (3) introduction of what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the overall picture in favour of DEGREE. We conclude that multi-dimensional consequentialists should accept RESOLUTION rather than DEGREE. Keywords Moral dimensions  Moral reasons  Moral rightness  Consequentialism  Martin Peterson & Attila Tanyi [email protected] Vuko Andrić [email protected] 1 Lehrstuhl für Philosophie/Wirtschaftsethik, Universität Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany 2 Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, 7 Abercromby Square, Liverpool L69 7WY, UK 123 Philos Stud (2016) 173:711–731 DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0515-0 Author's personal copy 1 Multi-dimensional consequentialism Consequentialism, at the most general level, is the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. This general approach can be applied at different levels to different normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most prominent example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts. This version of consequentialism holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind, as judged from an impersonal perspective. Setting now aside the often subtle differences between versions of the doctrine, consequentialists traditionally also hold that rightness is a binary property: an act is either fully right or fully wrong; there is no intermediate stage. In this, they unite with other mainstream moral theories such as Kantian deontology and virtue ethics. In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson probes this unshaken assumption of our moral thinking. He does so by putting forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs 'multi-dimensional consequentialism' (MDC).1 To work out his theory, Peterson rethinks the structure of consequentialism in particular and of the deontic in general, questioning many well-established views and putting forward radical alternatives. He develops a version of MDC that he claims to be superior to other consequentialist theories in significant respects, to wit, to be intuitively more appealing and to avoid many of the influential objections to consequentialism (such as the separateness-of-persons objection by Rawls (1971) and the demandingness objection by Williams (1973)). These supposed advantages and radical departures from established thinking no doubt make interest in MDC warranted, singling out Peterson's theory as an important target of discussion for anyone with an interest in moral theorizing. In this paper, we argue against the most salient and most revisionary claim of Peterson's version of MDC, while we remain silent on some less important assumptions. The best place to start our investigation is Peterson's account of MDC. He defines consequentialism as the view that ''the deontic status of an act depends only on consequences'' (1). He dubs this principle C*. The principle is crucially vague though: we need to name the moral aspects-Peterson calls them C* aspects-that can affect the moral rightness or wrongness-the deontic status-of an act. Once these aspects are on the table-Peterson will later name well-being, equality and risk, in particular-we can distinguish MDC from its one-dimensional counterpart. The idea is that the latter holds ''that an act's deontic status can be characterised by a one-place function of some C*-aspect'', whereas the former denies this: on MDC the deontic status of an act ''can only be characterised by a function of several C*-aspects.'' (3f.)2 1 From now on, unless otherwise stated, all page references in brackets will be to this book. 2 The clause 'can be characterized' in the definition of one-dimensional consequentialism is important because it makes the set of one-dimensional theories less restricted. For all it requires is that we find a moral aspect that makes it possible to characterize an act's deontic status as a function of that one aspect; this does not rule out that another characterization exists that employs several moral aspects. 712 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy Peterson's next move is to hold that the moral aspects that determine deontic status must be irreducible. This is in fact the defining thesis of MDC and follows from the account given above. Peterson labels the thesis C1. One-dimensional consequentialists, among them all utilitarians, egalitarians, and prioritarians (the three major versions of this brand of consequentialism, according to Peterson), must reject C1; multi-dimensional consequentialists must endorse it.3 However, Peterson goes on to claim that ''in order to formulate a normatively plausible multidimensional theory, which fits well with our considered intuitions, two further nondefinitional claims need to be added. Both these claims raise substantial moral issues and are logically independent of C1'' (8). The first additional claim is C2: ''The binary relation 'at least as good consequences as' is not a complete ordering'' (8). The idea behind this thesis is that different moral aspects are either incomparable or on a par-''that it is impossible to establish a precise exchange rate between all relevant aspects''4 (9). How widespread this phenomenon is, i.e., whether all or most or only some moral aspects come under the scope of C2, is, however, left unclear by Peterson. The last defining thesis of Peterson's version of MDC is given by C3: ''Moral rightness and wrongness are non-binary entities, meaning that moral rightness and wrongness vary in degrees'' (9). Peterson's idea is simple: not all acts are either entirely right or wrong; some acts fall between these extremes, being in part right and in part wrong. His intuitive example is a case where you can bring about either a world in which Alice gets 100 units of well-being and Bob gets 50, or a world in which Alice and Bob get 60 units each (2). The following table illustrates the situation: The first option, Peterson says, is right with respect to well-being as it brings about more well-being than the second. The other option is right with respect to equality. All things considered, no option is entirely right or wrong since none of the aspects trumps the other. To use the language of MDC, here we have two conflicting and arguably incomparable moral aspects, well-being and equality, giving rise to a deontic analysis that conforms to C3. 2 The argument from deontic leaps Peterson is well aware that even from a consequentialist point of view MDC is a deeply controversial theory. Each of its main building blocks (C1–C3) are hotly contested, but the most radical among them, as again Peterson admits (23), is C3: 3 There is a complication, though, that deserves mention. ''A dimension'', Peterson explains, ''can be conceived of as the conceptual space in which an aspect can be altered.'' (4) This means, as Peterson subsequently admits, that a consequentialist theory that identifies several moral aspects as affecting the deontic status of an act need not be multi-dimensional because all these aspects might belong to the same dimension. However, for reasons of convenience and because his particular version identifies moral aspects that belong to different dimensions, Peterson keeps the label 'multi-dimensional' throughout the book and we will follow him on this. 4 Peterson defines incomparability as the claim that ''for some consequences, no pair-wise evaluative comparisons can be made''. As for the other notion, his definition is that ''two elements are on a par if and only if they are comparable, although it is false that one is at least as good as the other'' (9). Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 713 123 Author's personal copy the idea that rightness and wrongness come in degrees. In a sense, he has a simple argument to support C3: that it, just like the rest of MDC in his view, tallies ''better with our considered moral intuitions than traditional, one-dimensional versions of consequentialism'' (14). The example given at the end of the previous section is designed to illustrate this point. Yet, recall our introductory remarks, this is not obviously convincing when contrasted with our general thinking about morality. In any case, this can hardly be enough to support an entire theory and in fact Peterson puts forward a master argument in support of C3: the argument from deontic leaps. To get a clear grasp of Peterson's argument, let us first introduce the competing positions with regard to the truth or falsity of C3. The question to answer is the following: If two or more irreducible moral aspects clash (because they are incomparable or on a par), is the act under consideration right to some non-extreme degree? That is, assuming that we accept C1 and C2, do we also have to endorse C3? Peterson discusses three possible answers5: In the RESOLUTION view, some available acts are right and all other acts are wrong, because there always exists a single, underlying, all-things-considered right-making feature that holds to the highest degree. In the DILEMMA view, clashes between incompatible aspects entail that all available acts are wrong in the binary sense, because there exists two or more all-things-considered rightmaking features that hold to the highest degree. My hypothesis is, however, that by rejecting the standard view we make room for a third position, according to which all-things-considered deontic verdicts are, in many cases, only partial (i.e., hold to a limited degree). This position, DEGREE, will be the main focus of this chapter. It can be conceived of as an explication of claim C3 stated in Chapter 1. (26) In this paper we will not discuss DILEMMA, but will focus on the debate between RESOLUTION and DEGREE. However, Peterson's definition of RESOLUTION is problematic and this needs to be fixed before we can move on. The definition uses the clause ''a single, underlying, all-things-considered rightmaking feature that holds to the highest degree'', but this surely cannot be correct. If this was so, RESOLUTION would be committed to comparability and thus deny C2. In fact, from Peterson's own discussion it is clear that RESOLUTION is primarily the view that conflicts of different moral aspects can always be resolved into a binary all-things-considered moral verdict. For this to happen, there is no need to postulate the existence of a ''single, underlying, all-things-considered rightmaking feature''. All that is needed is to establish the relevant moral aspects for each available alternative act in the given situation, check how acts score with respect to the different aspects and then use the scores across acts to arrive at a binary verdict. In fact, Peterson not only points out that C3 does not follow from C2 by logical implication, he also considers two approaches that endorse C2 while rejecting C3. Here is the one he claims to be better: ''An act is morally right if and 5 As Peterson points out, these are pair-wise incompatible positions, but are not jointly exhaustive. Just like him, however, we will rest content with these three positions in what follows. 714 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy only if there is no alternative act that is better vis-à-vis the majority of aspects, and all acts that are not right are wrong'' (12). Although Peterson rejects this idea (as well as the other), this is not our concern now. Our point is only that this, or some other similar approach, must be the way to go for advocates of RESOLUTION if they want to also endorse C2 (as Peterson assumes) while denying C3. To sum up, by ''RESOLUTION'', we henceforth mean the position that each act is entirely right or entirely wrong and that, in each choice situation, there is at least one entirely right act. Once the competing positions are in place, we can turn to the argument itself. Recall Well-Being versus Equality, illustrated in Table 1, in which you have to decide about Alice's and Bob's well-being. A one-dimensional consequentialist who seeks to maximize well-being is committed to the claim that maximally benefitting Alice is the right choice and distributing well-being equally is the wrong choice; if he/she is an egalitarian, then the conclusion is the reverse. According to the multi-dimensional consequentialist, the first option is right to some degree as it maximizes well-being but wrong to some degree as it produces more inequality. The other option produces more equality but less well-being and is therefore also right to some degree and wrong to some degree. In order to explicate and support the multi-dimensional consequentialist's verdict, Peterson introduces the argument from deontic leaps (25): The most important reason for taking the non-binary account of rightness and wrongness seriously is an idea suggested by Nicolas Espinoza: unless we concede that rightness and wrongness are non-binary properties, the multidimensional consequentialist will sometimes face deontic leaps. A deontic leap occurs if the deontic status assigned to an act does not reflect all relevant moral aspects that obtain in the situation – the 'leap' arises as the moral theory incorrectly ignores some moral aspect in its assignment of a deontic status to an act. Consider again the case in which you face a choice between either preserving a particular distribution of wellbeing or increasing the wellbeing only for the best-off individual. No matter how you try to merge these two conflicting aspects into a binary moral verdict, one of the two aspects – equality or increased wellbeing for the individual – will not receive its due. A deontic leap is bound to occur as you assign some binary deontic status to the available act that does not reflect the two moral aspects that obtain in the situation.6 Table 1 Well-being versus equality Option 1 Option 2 Alice 100 60 Bob 50 60 6 Espinoza and Peterson (2012) also discuss deontic leaps in the medical ethics context, but we take it that what appears in the book is the definitive statement of the argument from deontic leaps. Peterson (2013: 24) actually introduces a case structurally similar to Well-Being versus Equality when putting forward the argument from deontic leaps (this is the case he refers to in the quoted passage). However, for ease of read and because nothing gets lost as a result of this move, we continue focusing on Well-Being versus Equality. Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 715 123 Author's personal copy To make his case more convincing, Peterson brings in an analogy with football. In football, he says, if one team beats another team by 3 to 1, ''then the goal scored by the defeated team made no difference to the final outcome. The team that scores three goals won the match. The single goal scored by the defeated team was completely outweighed and neutralised by the three goals scored by the winning team'' (28, our emphasis). But this, Peterson maintains, is not so in ethics where ''there is actually a fundamental difference between winning by 3 to 1, and by 4 to 1. In ethics (but not in football) all goals scored by each team have to be fully recognised in the final verdict, so to speak'' (28). The argument from deontic leaps can be summarized in two claims: (1) All moral aspects have to be reflected (''given their due'') in the final analysis (Peterson's term), but (2) on RESOLUTION this is not possible because according to this doctrine about the deontic one moral aspect is allowed to outweigh, annihilate, neutralise or overshadow (these are the terms Peterson uses at different places to characterize the phenomenon) another moral aspect. As we saw, this does not have to imply a direct comparison of moral aspects (this would violate C2); it is enough if we can use the different moral aspects across alternative acts to arrive at a binary moral verdict. Nonetheless, Peterson will object that the result is that the situation in which two or more moral aspects conflict is ultimately resolved by selecting the option that satisfies only some of the conflicting aspects. As a consequence, the agent will have committed an unwarranted leap in her assignment of deontic status to the chosen option. Having started with the assessment 'A is right, with respect to those and those aspects', the agent ends up with 'A is right'. This is unwarranted since, clearly, A is in fact not fully justified, as some of the aspects that apply in the situation in fact entail that it would have been right to do B rather than A. (30) On DEGREE, we get a different sort of picture. All moral aspects will be reflected in the final analysis because they will all be taken to contribute to the final calculation of the degree of the rightness (and wrongness) of the given act. Take the three moral aspects Peterson discusses in the book: well-being, equality, and risk. In Peterson's analysis each aspect, in different ways, will receive its own analysis that results in a non-binary deontic verdict as to the degree of rightness (wrongness) of a given act with respect to the particular moral aspect. Once this is done, an aggregation mechanism is used to arrive at an all-things-considered non-binary moral verdict as to the degree of rightness (wrongness) of a particular act concerning all relevant moral aspects. The emerging view can be illustrated with Fig. 1: What we label as Level I includes the identification of all the considerations, typically called right-making features, that are channeled into verdicts as to the deontic status of the act with respect to these considerations-well-being, equality, and risk, respectively. The verdicts, pro tanto moral judgments, then appear on Level II in a non-binary form (Degreeaspect). 7 Finally, the mentioned aggregation mechanism is 7 We prefer the term 'pro tanto' to 'prima facie' because the latter suggests that the consideration in question is only apparent (as many have pointed about W. D. Ross's use of the term, see e.g. Searle 1980 and Kagan 1989: 17n). Although in his discussion of Ross (27–29) he follows Ross in using the term 716 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy used to factor the different level II judgments into one final, all-things-considered judgment on Level III, once again in a non-binary form (DEGREE). As Peterson admits (106), this last step requires a novel kind of aggregation method, the technical details of which are discussed in an appendix of the book. There are many questions to ask about DEGREE that we are not going to discuss in detail. Thus, the exact nature of the aggregation mechanism is important and arguably unresolved, partly because it is unclear how aggregation is possible at all in light of C2. In this paper, however, we will critique other aspects of C3 and the argument from deontic leaps. We will argue that, contrary to Peterson: (1) All moral aspects remain visible in what can properly be called the final analysis (Peterson does not define this term) of a moral theory that involves RESOLUTION; (2) Moral aspects do not have to remain visible in judgements of all-thingsconsidered rightness or wrongness, respectively; (3) The introduction of what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the overall picture in favour of DEGREE. Each point will be taken up in a separate section and the paper will end with a short summary and some concluding remarks concerning the final fate of MDC. 3 The final analysis As a starting point, notice that proponents of RESOLUTION can, and should, accept the following pro tanto judgements with respect to Well-Being versus Equality (Table 1): Level I Identification of rightmaking features Level II Pro tanto moral judgments Level III All-things-considered moral judgment DEGREE Degreewellbeing Binarywellbeing Degreeequality Binaryequality Degreerisk Binaryrisk Fig. 1 DEGREE and the structure of deontic judgements Footnote 7 continued prima facie, we take it that Peterson has no preferred label for these qualified moral judgments and feel at liberty to make a choice ourselves. We also assume that 'pro tanto' does not entail comparability. Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 717 123 Author's personal copy • Option 1 is right as far as well-being is concerned and wrong as far as equality is concerned. • Option 2 is wrong as far as well-being is concerned and right as far as equality is concerned. This is clearly not the point where Peterson's analysis differs from RESOLUTION.8 The disagreement occurs when, as a next step, we ask about the account RESOLUTION gives of all-things-considered judgments. What all-things-considered judgement are proponents of RESOLUTION committed to in Well-being versus Equality? This depends on the balance of moral aspects across acts, and thus on pro tanto rightness or wrongness, respectively. We submit that proponents of RESOLUTION accept these claims: • If one of the options is, on balance, more important than the other, then the former option is all-things-considered right and the other all-things-considered wrong. • If neither option is, on balance, more important than the other, then both options are all-things-considered right. At this point, however, an obvious reply suggests itself, which can, it seems, sink RESOLUTION and which is based on the second building block of MDC-claim C2. For, it seems that Peterson could just object that, given C2, no option is ever more important than its alternative; hence no balancing (or weighing) of moral aspects can take place, so RESOLUTION cannot even get off the ground and C3 must be true. This objection, however, would puzzle us for three reasons. First of all, according to the second claim we advise RESOLUTIONists to accept, all options are right if neither option is more important than its alternatives because the options are incomparable or on a par. Thus, RESOLUTION would have clear implications (and in this sense ''get off the ground'') even if C2 implied that no option is ever more important than its alternative. Although Peterson does not clarify how often moral aspects are incomparable or on a par, in each such case the proponent of RESOLUTION can have recourse to the second claim we advised him/her to accept and maintain the rejection of C3. Second, if C2 is intended by Peterson to defeat RESOLUTION and rule out binary all-things-considered judgements in the first place, why does he offer the argument from deontic leaps at all? In fact, Peterson clearly says, as we saw, that RESOLUTION, DEGREE, and DILEMMA are the three positions he considers possible to take on the assumption that C1 and C2 are accepted (23). If these claims are false, then the entire chapter in which Peterson argues for C3 using the notion of deontic leaps is redundant and hence all the burden to support C3 falls on his arguments for C2, which focuses only on a small part of the existing literature (126–128, 162–164).9 8 Although Peterson explicitly endorses this claim (2), there is some ground for hesitation for he also claims, as we saw in the previous section, that Level II judgments (which we take to be pro tanto moral judgments) are also non-binary. 9 In particular, the so-called 'small improvement argument' by Chang (2002) that was designed to support the idea that there is a third sui generis value-relation, namely, 'on a par'. For an overview of the debate, see Hsieh (2008). 718 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy Finally, there is no reason to think that C2 rules out binary all-things-considered judgements. One can endorse C2 as well as the whole of the above analysis since, as Peterson himself points out (12) and we explained in detail in the previous section, C2 does not imply C3: it is possible to arrive at binary deontic judgments on the basis of how alternative acts score with respect to the same bundle of moral aspects. After this detour, let us return to the main line of our discussion. Once the two views of RESOLUTION are on the table (its account of pro tanto and all-things-considered moral judgments), an objection to the argument from deontic leaps suggests itself. It has two parts, the first is negative, the second is positive. Our negative claim is that Peterson seems to assume, but does not give a reason for thinking, that by ''the final analysis'' of a moral theory we should just understand the all-things-considered judgements it implies. Our positive claim is that the final analysis offered by a moral theory is instead best understood as the conjunction of-at least-the all-thingsconsidered judgements and the pro tanto judgements concerning the deontic status of an act (we will elaborate on this point below). If this is so, there is an important sense in which all moral aspects remain visible in the final analysis, even if one endorses RESOLUTION. To illustrate, take again Well-being versus Equality. Proponents of RESOLUTION might hold the following final analysis with respect to the case: • Option 1 is right as far as well-being is concerned and wrong as far as equality is concerned. • Option 2 is wrong as far as well-being is concerned and right as far as equality is concerned. • And: Either option is all-things-considered right. As we pointed out, the last claim-either option is all-things-considered right-holds even if the consequences of Options 1 and 2 are incomparable or on a par.10 There is a further complication, though. One might wonder how we link the claim that both options are all-things-considered right to a plausible account of decision making. For in his chapter about multi-dimensional decision making, Peterson argues that a decisionmaking procedure analogue to our criterion of rightness (that is: a decision-making procedure according to which, if two objects are incomparable or on a par, the agent is permitted to choose either of them), leads to certain losses because it sanctions nonrandomised choices when facing consequences that are not fully comparable (129–138). Cannot an agent who accepts our final analysis be turned into a kind of money pump because he/she is committed to the decision-making procedure criticized by Peterson? We have a twofold response. Firstly, even if an agent who accepts our final analysis could be turned into a money pump, this wouldn't by itself speak against our proposal. The money-pump argument arguably has its merits in discussions about rational decision making. Here, however, we are talking about moral rightness, not about rationality. This is a crucial difference that Peterson himself often emphasizes. Why should money-pump arguments be relevant when it comes 10 In fact, as we mentioned above, Peterson himself concedes that an advocate of RESOLUTION could even endorse a more committed analysis, namely: either Option 1 or Option 2 is all-things-considered right and the other is all-things-considered wrong. These verdicts, however, would commit RESOLUTIONists to the rejection of the second claim we suggested to them above. Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 719 123 Author's personal copy to assessing moral theories (as opposed to theories about rationality)? It is widely accepted that moral rightness and rationality can come apart: what morality requires might not be the rational thing to do, and vice versa. Applying criteria that are used for the assessment of theories of rationality to moral theories therefore seems to be problematic and in need of justification. Secondly, the final analysis we suggest does not commit agents to decision-making procedures of the kind criticized by Peterson. It is, rather, compatible with Peterson's preferred decision-making procedure.11 Thus, if Peterson is right that multidimensional consequentialists should adopt his preferred decision-making procedure and this procedure prevents you from being exploited as a money pump, then agents who accept our final analysis should adopt Peterson's preferred decision-making procedure and, as a consequence, cannot be turned into money pumps. Hence, we suggest that the final analysis of a moral theory contains, at least, the pro tanto as well as the all-things-considered judgements; contrary to Peterson's suggestion that the final analysis is exhausted by all-things-considered judgments. We have seen that our final analysis does not turn you into a money pump. However, why should one accept our rather than Peterson's proposal? Aren't only the all-things-considered judgements of moral theories important at the end of the day, so that Peterson's understanding of ''final analysis'' is more adequate? We agree that ''the final analysis'' should refer to a moral theory's most important judgements. However, we would like to point out that which moral judgements are important depends on what we are looking for: (1) If we are looking for action-guidance (if we ask, ''How ought we to decide?'', that is), only all-things-considered judgements are important. (2) If we want to deliberate about what we ought to do all things considered or if we already know the all-things-considered judgements and are looking for an explanation of them, then only the pro tanto judgements are important. (3) If we are asking for an exhaustive description of what is going on in a situation, from a moral point of view, then both all-things-considered and pro tanto judgements are important. It seems most appropriate to call the exhaustive description (3) a moral theory's final analysis. For it contains both the action-guiding all-things-considered judgements (1) and the explanatory pro tanto judgements (2) and will thus inform us about whatever judgements implied by the moral theory are relevant to us.12 11 According to the decision-making procedure Peterson proposes for MDC, it is rational to choose each option with a probability that is directly proportional to its moral force (119). An option's moral force is the sum total of all the products of degree and strength corresponding to each aspect (118). Obviously, then, since the data you feed into Peterson's decision-making procedure do not stem from the all-thingsconsidered but from the pro-tanto level, and since DEGREE and RESOLUTION do not contradict each other on the pro-tanto level, you do not need to accept DEGREE in order to apply Peterson's decisionmaking procedure; you can apply it on our favoured version of RESOLUTION, too. 12 It can be argued that an exhaustive description also has to mention other moral facts: evaluative facts, the explanatory relations between pro tanto and all-things-considered judgements, etc. But this isn't a problem for us to admit, as we only want to show that the final analysis, contrary to Peterson, does not only include all-things-considered but at least also pro tanto judgments. 720 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy We conclude that Peterson is wrong in claiming that on RESOLUTION certain moral aspects will be lost in the final analysis of moral theories. Proponents of RESOLUTION can have their cake and eat it, too: they can adopt both binary allthings-considered judgements and nonetheless keep all moral aspects visible in their final analysis. The bottom line is that our claim (1) is true. 4 All-things-considered judgments However, accepting the claim that the final analysis of a moral theory is best understood as an exhaustive account that includes both all-things-considered and pro tanto moral judgments does not put an end to critical questioning. For, Peterson could ask: ''What about the deontic leaps within the all-things-considered judgements: Isn't it worrisome if, say, an option's being wrong in one respect doesn't figure in the judgement that the option is all-things-considered right?'' Whether or not we are right about what the final analysis of a moral theory looks like, Peterson can point out, this is the real issue that the argument from deontic leaps is designed to call attention to. We disagree. First of all, there is no general requirement that each deontic property of an act has to reflect all the other deontic properties of the act. Therefore, it looks sensible to hold that an act's all-things-considered rightness does not have to reflect the act's wrongness as far as a certain aspect is concerned, just like an act's rightness with respect to equality does not have to reflect the act's wrongness with respect to well-being and vice versa. Similarly, an act's being the prudent thing to do does not have to reflect its being immoral. In short, the question is why we should single out the property of an act's being all-things-considered right as somehow special and different from all other moral (as well as non-moral) properties of acts. Appeal to deontic leaps cannot be the answer because this just is the claim that such a special status should be granted. Our question is: why? One could answer that the relationship between all-things-considered and pro tanto rightness is special because the former kind of rightness is uncontroversially based, in some way or other, on the latter, whereas rightness with respect to equality and rightness with respect to well-being are independent from each other, just like an act's being the prudent thing to do is not based on its being immoral. This answer is unconvincing, however, for it is not true in general that if property P is based on property Q, then P has to reflect Q; and there is no reason for thinking that deontic properties are special in this regard. To illustrate with Peterson's own example, assume that a football team's winning a match is based on its beating the other team by 3:1. As the team's winning the match is a binary property, it does not reflect the team's beating the other team by 3:1. Another possible answer to our question takes us back to incomparability. At an early point in the book, Peterson says that what he takes to be the best argument for accepting C3, given that one accepts the ''multi-dimensional picture'' he describes, is ''that this principle accurately reflects the insight that the ordering of consequences is incomplete. If consequences determine deontic properties, and there are 'gaps' in the ordering of consequences, then these gaps should presumably occur all the way up to Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 721 123 Author's personal copy the ultimate deontic level.'' (12) Peterson's idea here seems to be that to argue for C3, one needs both incomparability (C2) and the notion of deontic leaps: it is the former that creates the 'gaps' that, as the latter claims, need to be reflected in the final deontic verdict. This combination of claims would answer our previous question (in section II) why Peterson needs the argument from deontic leaps if he already has C2 in place. And it would also answer our question above by pointing to incomparability as the missing link in granting special status to all-things-considered moral rightness. We have a three-fold response. First of all, although C2 implies that there are evaluative gaps in the assessment of consequences and consequentialist moral theories can map these evaluative gaps onto their deontic assessments of actions, we have still not been shown that consequentialist theories should map them. In particular, an argument is required to make the move from the evaluative (gaps) to the deontic (degrees). And again, the deontic leap argument cannot be this argument because it states simply that such a move must take place without itself being an argument for it. It is true that Peterson's discusses and argues for incomparability (although the arguments, as we noted, are relatively meagre, focusing on only a small part of the debate), but only for incomparability as such and not for moving from the evaluative to the deontic. Hence from his arguments it does not follow that any such move must be made. Second, a question about the legitimacy of focusing solely on all-thingsconsidered moral verdicts still looms large: If, on RESOLUTION, the gaps mentioned by Peterson are represented in the form of pro tanto judgments in the final analysis, why is this not enough? Why must these gaps also be reflected in the all-things-considered judgments? Finally, there is the question whether Peterson is right in his claim that the only way to represent the relevant gaps in all-things-considered judgments is by endorsing DEGREE. It seems to us that Peterson's point turns on whether he is right that RESOLUTION is committed to a picture on which moral aspects get, to use his terms, outweighed, annihilated, neutralised or overshadowed by other moral aspects. These terms characterize importantly different phenomena. In particular, outweighing and overshadowing contrast with annihilating and neutralising: When aspects conflict, the former phenomenon leave the aspect in place as something that stays around, although outweighed; whereas the latter tells us that the given aspect is not relevant, that it should not be considered at all (cf. Scanlon 1998 and Tanyi 2013). That is, the first type of phenomenon does not imply that a moral aspect is non-existent (irrelevant) just because it lost out in a conflict with another moral aspect(s). A moral aspect is thus reflected in two ways on RESOLUTION (since we can reasonably assume that this approach requires no more than the first phenomenon): It appears in the process that leads to an all-things-considered judgment, namely, weighing, and it does not disappear as irrelevant even if it looses out, but stays around waiting for its call. Add to this the fact that, as we showed, RESOLUTION does not require any direct weighing of moral aspects and certainly no annihilation or neutralisation of aspects, and it becomes questionable if Peterson is right that the gaps created by incomparability are not reflected at all on RESOLUTION. Is anything more theoretically demanding needed in order to reflect the presence of moral aspects? 722 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy If there is no good answer to our question, how about offering a simpler argument in favour of non-binary all-things-considered judgments? Here is one. Since we have accepted that pro tanto judgments are non-binary and all-things-considered judgments are reached at via some method of aggregation from pro tanto judgments, it appears reasonable to hold that all-things-considered judgments are also non-binary. There are two problems with this proposal. One is that, although we haven't questioned this (since there was no need to) at the point when we introduced the idea, it is far from clear why pro tanto judgments would be non-binary. What would make these judgements non-binary, given that they are arrived at on the basis of binary judgments about the right-making features of acts? Deontic leaps certainly wouldn't, since here we have no conflicting moral aspects that would have to be reflected in the pro tanto judgment. Nor could the present proposal be reapplied since judgments about right-making features are binary. More importantly, Peterson wants to say that all-things-considered judgments are non-binary also in those cases when pro tanto judgments from which they are generated are themselves binary- Well-being versus Equality is an example at hand. The crucial point is not that the present proposal would therefore make the scope of DEGREE significantly restricted (although this too is a problem), but that it would contradict the very spirit of Peterson's thinking about why C3 is true (as encapsulated in the argument from deontic leaps): that non-binary judgments are needed to reflect the conflict of moral aspects as they appear in Level II pro tanto judgments. What has been said so far is negative; here is a positive point against the idea that all-things-considered judgments must be non-binary. Since the purpose of allthings-considered judgements suggests that at least one option is entirely all-thingsconsidered right in each choice situation, an option's being wrong in one respect should not figure in all-things-considered rightness in cases when different moral aspects clash. To substantiate: One purpose of (deontic) all things-considered judgments is the provision of action-guidance. However, all-things-considered judgements are not action-guiding in a satisfactory way if they do not single out at least one action as the thing to do. (Imagine the following conversation: ''What should I do?''-''Well, there is nothing it would be entirely right for you to do. To some extent...''-''What?!'')13 Another purpose of all-things-considered wrongness judgments is assigning blameworthiness. Arguably, the performance of wrong acts without excuses makes people blameworthy. However, if there were choice situations with no entirely right acts, then agents would become blameworthy irrespectively of what they did, for every act in such situations would be somewhat wrong and in some such situations there would be no excuses. The possibility of unavoidable blameworthiness, we submit, is not plausible.14 Two objections have to be considered at this point. To our first claim concerning action-guidingness, Peterson could reply that on his theory the thing to do is the 13 Note that the action-guiding function also explains why RESOLUTION is preferable to DILEMMA. 14 Intuitively, it would be unfair if you became blameworthy whatever you did. Morality would seem to be incoherent. Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 723 123 Author's personal copy action that is most right in the given circumstances. However, first, is this really in line with how we ordinarily see the connections between rightness and obligation? Doesn't morality demand only what is entirely right? How do demands relate to degrees? Second, if the thing to do on MDC is the act that is most right in the given situation, it is far from clear that Peterson can indeed disarm the demandingness objection: the charge that given the world as it is, consequentialism requires us to do things that we, intuitively, find excessively demanding-say, to donate a large part of our income to famine relief (Peterson's example). Peterson claims that MDC has the resources to defuse the objection because it can hold that donating is both right and wrong at the same time (47–48).15 However, if the thing to do is the act with the highest deontic score ('most right'), it is well possible that, given the world as it is, consequentialism will still come out as excessively demanding.16 In other words, it is not enough if Peterson can show that excessive donation on MDC is not entirely right; he must also show that the ranking of alternative acts is such that excessive donation does not come out on top. Turn now to the second objection that targets our second point concerning assigning blameworthiness. Peterson could in response point out that if there is no entirely right act in the given situation, then precisely this is an excuse. However, this also sounds strange. It would mean that in a given situation where there is no entirely right act, every act that is also to some degree wrong is nonetheless excused just because it is not entirely right. This is surely a too easy way to avoid blameworthiness! We thus conclude that, contrary to what Peterson claims, not every moral aspect has to figure in all-things-considered moral judgments in the way DEGREE requires. Even if this qualifies as a deontic leap, it is not a problematic one. Hence our claim (2) is true. 5 Verdictive reasons So far, our treatment of the argument from deontic leaps did not take into account the distinction between evidential and verdictive reasons. Peterson thinks that the distinction is important in that it lends significant support to his thesis about deontic 15 The idea, as Peterson later explains (70), is that those who donate excessively damage their own as well as their loved ones' well-being. Since, according to Peterson, persons' well-being count separately ('persons' is a separate moral aspect that Peterson uses to answer the separateness of persons charge), this influences the calculation of all-things-considered rightness by making excessive donations less right and more wrong. 16 Peterson could try to get around this problem by holding that the thing to do is not what is most right to do in the given situation but what is sufficiently right to do. Besides that this raises the question of where we draw the line (what is sufficiently right?), we also end up with the mirror of the debate about satisficing consequentialism. Another possible way-out for Peterson would be to adopt agent-relative theories of value-or maybe a person-relative dimension of value. Again, this would leave us with the mirror version of an on-going debate. In general, arguments based on satisficing, agent-relative value, etc., would be disappointing in the present context, for the hope was for MDC to escape the demandingness objection in virtue of multi-dimensionality. 724 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy degrees (C3) because it shows how certain moral considerations (evidential reasons) can be disregarded in our final deontic verdicts, whereas others (verdictive reasons) must always remain visible in our deontic analysis. If this was so, the argument from deontic leaps would clearly follow since to say that certain moral considerations must remain visible in the deontic analysis just is to state the argument from deontic leaps. In ending our paper we must therefore bring the distinction and Peterson's use of it under close scrutiny. This requires that we understand what the distinction is about, how it allegedly gives us the argument from deontic leaps, and what its problems are. The distinction between the two kinds of reasons comes from Foot (1978: 182). Peterson quotes Foot in introducing the distinction (29): ''That a promise is being broken, or a man killed or injured, is an evidential consideration; that something immoral is being done is a verdictive consideration.'' He then reformulates the argument from deontic leaps using the distinction (29): Now the deontic leap occurs in the transition from evidential to verdictive considerations. Even though, initially, the agent correctly acknowledges all relevant considerations while deliberating, some of which are verdictive and some of which were merely evidential, the agent's all-things-considered conclusion will only respect some of these verdictive considerations. From a moral point of view, this seems too heavy-handed. If you promise something and then break the promise, it seems that the verdictive consideration that you actually made a promise should – if we take traditional non-consequentialist intuitions about promises seriously – remain visible in the final analysis. The first thing to observe is that in the quote Peterson falsely interprets the distinction; hence, as it stands, the distinction cannot give us the argument from deontic leaps. 'That you actually made a promise' is not a verdictive reason, but an evidential one: it is therefore not a consideration that, by Peterson's own lights, should be visible in the final analysis. A verdictive reason, as the quote from Foot makes clear, would be a consideration such as 'that your breaking the promise was immoral'. However, this understanding of a verdictive reason would again not give Peterson the argument from deontic leaps since this is clearly an all-things-considered claim, one that should be what reflects verdictive reasons and not be reflected itself-as a verdictive reason would have to for the argument from deontic leaps to go through. This is already clear in Foot's original treatment since she talks about breaking a promise being 'immoral' without any qualifiers, whereas it is certain that the kind of verdictive reason Peterson needs is one that corresponds to qualified-we called them: pro tanto-moral verdicts, where the qualification comes from the relevant moral aspect. Stratton-Lake (1997: 753) whom Peterson also quotes in support of the distinction makes this clear (this comes from the same passage that Peterson also quotes at 29)17: 17 There is an underlying strand in Peterson's discussion of verdictive reasons in which Stratton-Lake's article also appears that we do not discuss in this paper and to which the quote Peterson uses refers. It concerns W. D. Ross's distinction between prima facie duties and duties proper. Although it is an interesting question how Ross's theory relates to Peterson's and whether Peterson's treatment of Ross is correct, dealing with these questions would bring unnecessary complications into this paper. Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 725 123 Author's personal copy A verdictive moral consideration is the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning about the deontological status of some act. It is an overall verdict about whether some act is morally right, wrong or permissible. Evidential considerations, on the other hand, are those which support, but do not constitute overall moral verdicts. To sum up, neither underlying right-making features such as 'that you actually made a promise', nor overall moral verdicts such as 'that breaking a promise is immoral' can be the verdictive reasons that would give Peterson the argument from deontic leaps. The only interpretation of verdictive reasons that can support the argument is one that claims that verdictive reasons correspond to pro tanto moral claims, i.e., claims that are qualified according to a particular moral aspect. At certain points Peterson is clear about this. Thus, he says (18, same point repeated at 30): I argue that clashes between different moral aspects give rise to clashes between conflicting verdictive reasons...Each aspect gives the agent a verdictive reason to act in a certain way and the key question is, thus, whether such conflicting verdictive reasons can always be resolved into a single all-things-considered reason, such that all alternative acts are either entirely right or entirely wrong, or whether there are cases in which acts come out as neither entirely right nor entirely wrong. That is, recall our schematic representation of DEGREE, evidential reasons are the right-making features that figure in Level I judgments; verdictive reasons of the kind Peterson needs are considerations that figure in Level II (pro tanto) judgments; while verdictive reasons of the kind Foot and Stratton-Lake have in mind are those that figure in Level III (all-things-considered) judgments. The conflict of evidential reasons, under a given moral dimension, decides what verdict an act deserves with respect to the given dimension; then the conflict of verdictive reasons, following the argument from deontic leaps, decides about the overall deontic status of an act, i.e., about its degree of rightness/wrongness; finally, this overall deontic verdict gives rise to an overall verdictive reason-whether we are morally required, prohibited, permitted etc. to carry out the act in question-that can conflict with non-moral reasons, should the situation arise. The result is the following modified schematic representation of DEGREE, again using the three moral aspects-well-being, equality, and risk-that Peterson discusses in the book (Fig. 2): An advantage of this new presentation of DEGREE is that, piecing it together with the schema we provided in Sect. 2 (Fig. 1: DEGREE and the structure of the deontic), we can learn more about the overall structure of MDC. In particular, the aggregation of Level II judgments (verdictive reasons) into Level III judgment becomes somewhat clearer. Peterson gives the following clue: (30): The fact that an act scores low with respect to a moral aspect is a verdictive reason for not performing that act. If the act on the other hand scores high, then that is a verdictive reason for performing it. Sometimes two or more aspects give rise to a single verdictive reason for performing or not performing an act, but sometimes each aspect produces separate verdictive reasons. 726 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy That is, assuming that we have established the relevant deontic scores on Level II, i.e., the degrees of rightness (wrongness) the act has with respect to the different moral aspects, we can determine, in the way Peterson says in the quote, the presence or absence of verdictive reasons generated by these aspects. And once we have these reasons in place, we can follow Peterson's further instructions as to how the conflicting verdictive reasons give us the final deontic status of an act (33).18 There can be no doubt that the appeal to verdictive reasons, in the way specified above, adds a further layer to Peterson's already complex theory. And it is indeed a further layer, as nothing in what Peterson says about moral aspects, incomparability and irreducibility requires or implies the need for verdictive reasons (hence our decision to give this topic a separate treatment), especially considering that not everyone is keen on introducing reasons into moral theory. Be that as it may, the real question for us is whether the introduction of verdictive reasons helps Peterson to support the argument from deontic leaps. We don't think so. To begin with, our points in the previous two sections retain their force. If we are right that the final analysis of a moral theory involves also the pro tanto judgments (Sect. 3), then of course it also involves the verdictive reasons these judgments are grounded in. Next, the introduction of verdictive reasons will make no difference to our point that, given the two main purposes of all-thingsconsidered moral judgments, degrees of rightness and wrongness are not admissible on that overall level of judgment (Sect. 4). Finally, there is the critical question we raised and have attempted to answer concerning the special status of all-thingsconsidered moral verdicts and the properties they reflect (Sect. 4): why do they have Level I Evidential judgements Level II Pro tanto moral judgments Level III All-things-considered moral judgment VERDICTIVE REASON Verdictive reasonwellbeing Evidential reasonswellbeing Verdictive reasonequality Evidential reasonsequality Verdictive reasonrisk Evidential reasonsrisk Fig. 2 DEGREE and the structure of moral reasons 18 Peterson discusses four basic cases: when an act is entirely right (there is a verdictive reason in favour of and no verdictive reason against the act), when it is neutral (there is no verdictive reason either for or against the act), entirely wrong (there is verdictive reason against the act, and no verdictive reason for it), and to some non-extreme degree right (there is a verdictive reason both in favour and against the act). Of course, several gaps still need to be filled in. In particular, the exact calculation of degrees still requires a technically well worked out aggregation mechanism. Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 727 123 Author's personal copy to reflect deontic properties of acts when no other, moral or non-moral, properties of acts have to do the same? This question now reappears with renewed force: what is so special about verdictive reasons that would require them to be reflected, in the way Peterson proposes, in final all-things-considered moral judgments? In fact, the force of this question is not simply renewed but stronger. For it is not obvious that verdictive reasons exist. Recall that both Foot and Stratton-Lake think in terms of two kinds of reasons: evidential reasons that are provided by what the given theory takes to be the right-making features of acts and verdictive reasons that are, however, understood as final, all-things-considered moral considerations-that is, not the sort of considerations that Peterson needs in order to get his argument off the ground. At this point, though, Peterson could have an answer that is analogous to the one we gave on his behalf in the previous section: a combined appeal to incomparability and deontic leaps. There are different moral aspects, he could say, and they are incomparable, creating 'gaps' in the ordering of consequences. Verdictive reasons are provided by these aspects (this is something, recall the quote above, he does in fact say) and the need to reflect the gaps in the ordering is what gives us the argument from deontic leaps. We have taken issue with this sort of answer in the previous section and what we say there also applies here (as far as we can tell).19 But now there is a further challenge. The challenge is simple: are there reasons which are not evidential? Jonathan Dancy (2004: 16) clearly answers 'no': The point that verdictive judgments do not contribute to the situations on which they pass judgment is only one application of the more general truth that thin concepts cannot be used to add to the store of reasons. That an action is good, or right, is no reason to do it. It is the features that make the action good or right that are the reasons for doing it, and to say that it is good or right is merely to express judgment about the way in which other considerations go to determine how we should act. Now, of course, we do not have to accept what Dancy says just because he says it. One opinion, however well-known it is, cannot decide the debate. However, the point is that there is a debate: Dancy, for instance, spends an entire chapter on arguing for his thesis. This, in the minimum, means that, whether or not Dancy's thesis appears sensible to one (and to us it does so appear), the only way to support the argument from deontic leaps that in its present interpretation crucially requires the existence of verdictive reasons, is by taking issue with Dancy's (and others') 19 Of the three responses we give there, the last might be less applicable insofar as Peterson repeatedly denies that the weight of verdictive reasons would be what determines the degree to which an act is right; it is instead the content of these reasons that does so (37–39). This claim is then supported by examples that should trigger intuitions in favour of Peterson's thesis (37, 93, 117). We are not so sure that the examples indeed work in Peterson's favour but, in absence of space, we let this go. What instead we would like to point out is that, as we noted in our original response, it is not clear that RESOLUTION would have to be committed to any direct weighing of verdictive reasons (since it accepts C2 that rules out any such weighing). 728 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy thesis. However, Peterson does no such thing and this leaves his argument from deontic leaps without proper foundations.20 Therefore, we conclude that our claim (3) stands: the introduction of verdictive reasons does not, as it stands, tilt the balance in favour of DEGREE. 6 Concluding remarks We have argued for three points in this paper: (1) all moral aspects remain visible in what can properly be called the final analysis of a moral theory that involves RESOLUTION, (2) moral aspects do not have to remain visible in judgements of all-things-considered rightness or wrongness, respectively, (3) the introduction of what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the overall picture in favour of DEGREE. Since we have moreover seen, in Sect. 4, that the purposes of allthings-considered judgements-the provision of action-guidance and the attribution (or expression) of blameworthiness-suggest that at least one option is entirely allthings-considered right in each choice situation, we have reason to conclude that multi-dimensional consequentialists should accept RESOLUTION rather than DEGREE. Despite our criticisms, we find Peterson's theory a fascinating new take on an old view. In fact, even if we have managed to establish our three points, we have not questioned two of the three building blocks of MDC: we have accepted that there are irreducible moral aspects and that at least some of these aspects are incomparable or on a par. Given that the first claim of irreducibility is the one that, according to Peterson, makes consequentialist theory qualify as multidimensional, this means that we have not refuted MDC per se. All we did was to question the particular version of MDC that Peterson advocates. This doesn't mean, though, that we find the theory obviously true. In particular, we have the nagging worry that anything can be built into MDC: if there is an alleged problem with consequentialism, be that concerning equality, rights, duties, virtues, or risk, Peterson can simply point out that this is a separate moral dimension, or a separate aspect of a dimension, and the challenge these ideas pose to consequentialism is over. Still, one cannot but wonder: is this really so easy? Take Peterson's discussion of the legitimacy of what is normally called, following Scheffler (1994), agent-centred prerogatives. Peterson simply says that this is a legitimate device, because 'persons' is a separate moral dimension in his theory (69–70). Yet, one wonders if he can really get this result so cheap: over the past decades several philosophers have struggled to find a rationale for such prerogatives within consequentialism (cf. Kagan 1989) and now Peterson brings them in with one simple move. Could this be so easy? 20 In fact, the situation is more peculiar since Peterson cites Dancy in support of the distinction between evidential and verdictive reasons (29, fn. 10) and hence in support of the argument from deontic leaps. This, as the quote in the text shows, is clearly a mistake. Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 729 123 Author's personal copy To be fair, at one point Peterson does give us his criterion for including a moral aspect in MDC (which is pretty much what our worry boils down to).21 He says that it should directly influence an act's deontic status in the sense that ''the deontic status of an act varies if we hold constant everything but the putative aspect in question'' (15). But this definition appears to be question-begging, since the dispute among moral theories is exactly what influences this deontic status. As a result, this criterion cannot come from within moral theories, since then every one of them will be self-justifying and hence uninteresting.22 It must come from outside these theories, but what would that outside source be? We suppose that it would have to be intuition. But surely, one thing we know about common-sense is that it is unclear and often inconsistent about questions of this sort. In any case, is Peterson suggesting that intuitions singling out widely different features of our moral life can be pulled into one moral theory just by one master stroke? Before we embrace MDC, even if without C3, we would like to hear a convincing answer to this question.23 Acknowledgments We would like to thank the participants of the workshop ''The Dimensions of Consequentialism'', which took place at Konstanz University in November 2013. Special thanks go to Martin Peterson, who provided detailed comments on the entire paper. We are also very grateful for the comments received from Sebastian Köhler, David Sobel, an anonymous reviewer for the journal as well as audiences in Liverpool and Bern (special thanks to Julian Fink for organizing the workshop in Bern). This research was supported by a grant from the German Research Foundation (Grant Number TA 820/1-1). References Chang, R. (2002). The possibility of parity. Ethics, 112, 659–688. Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without principles. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Daniels, N. (1996). Justice and justification: Reflective equilibrium in theory and practice. New Work: Cambridge University Press. Espinoza, N., & Peterson, M. (2012). How to depolarise the debate over human embryonic cell research (and other ethical debates too!). Journal of Medical Ethics, 38, 496–500. Foot, P. (1978). Are moral considerations overriding? Virtues and vices, and other essays in moral philosophy (pp. 181–188). Oxford: Blackwell. Hsieh, N. (2008). Incommensurable values. In N. Z. Edward (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/value-incommensurable/. Kagan, S. (1989). The limits of morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 21 This is not the same problem as the alleged vacuity of the consequentializing project that Peterson spends a separate chapter on justifying (Chapter 8). The vacuity objection says that if consequentialism builds everything into itself, it will no longer be making any practical recommendations (since everything will be fine with it). What we are saying now is that even if there is no problem with the project of consequentializing, there is still the question how this accommodation is to be carried out on MDC without encountering the charge that its moves are ad hoc. 22 There is a clear (and intended) parallel here with Murphy's (2000) criticism of Scheffler's (1994) attempt to build prerogatives into consequentialism. 23 An appeal to reflective equilibrium could offer the right way forward but this is also a long and complicated way that cannot be got for free. To compare: the most famous example of reflective equilibrium is that of Rawls, but, in addition to considered judgments ('intuitions'), he brings in several levels of background theories and other aspects of our moral thought (see Daniels 1996 for an excellent account of the Rawlsian method). Not even traces of this idea could, however, be found in Peterson's book. 730 V. Andrić, A. Tanyi 123 Author's personal copy Murphy, L. D. (2000). Moral demands in non-ideal theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peterson, M. (2013). The dimensions of consequentialism: Ethics, equality and risk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. Scheffler, S. (1994). The rejection of consequentialism, Revised Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Searle, J. (1980). Prima-facie obligations. In Z. van Straaten (Ed.), Philosophical subjects: Essays presented to P.F. Strawson (pp. 238–259). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Stratton-Lake, P. (1997). Can Hooker's rule-consequentialist principle justify Ross's prima facie duties? Mind, 106, 751–758. Tanyi, A. (2013). Silencing desires? Philosophia, 41(3), 887–903. Williams, B. (1973). A critique of utilitarianism. In J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams (Eds.), Utilitarianism: For and against (pp. 77–151). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Multi-dimensional consequentialism and degrees of rightness 731 123 Author's personal copy

TEORIE VĚDY / THEORY OF SCIENCE / XXXIX / 2017 / 1 TEORIE KULTURNÍ MEZERY: SOCIÁLNÍ VĚDA A JEJÍ PUBLIKUM V DÍLE THORSTEINA VEBLENA A WILLIAMA F. OGBURNA Abstrakt: Článek se zaměřuje na teorie kulturní mezery, jež ve svém díle rozpracovali Th orstein Veblen a William F. Ogburn. Sleduje přitom zejména dva motivy: jak se v přístupech těchto autorů tematizuje vztah sociální vědy a jejího publika a jak je argument mezery využit k prosazování specifi ckého pojetí „účelu" sociální vědy. Je zde předvedeno, jak se ve dvou různých stylech psaní a ve dvou různých argumentačních strategiích v podstatě identická teorie proměňuje a současně zužitkovává k prosazení distinktivního (kritického a instrumentálního) pojetí sociální vědy. Veblenův klíčový motiv „sebe- -konfrontace" společnosti je srovnán s Ogburnovým motivem „využitelnosti" vědění ve vztahu k úvahám o literárních technologiích vědy. Klíčová slova: kulturní mezera; sociální věda; publikum; literární technologie; William F. Ogburn; Th orstein Veblen Th e Th eory of Cultural Lag: Social Science and Its Audience in the Works of Th orstein Veblen and William F. Ogburn Abstract: Th e article analyses the theories of cultural lag elaborated by Th orstein Veblen and William F. Ogburn. In particular, it pursues two motives: how the relation between social science and its audience had been implied in their respective approaches, and how the "lag" argument had been employed in their view of the "purpose" of social science. It is demonstrated here that the essentially identical theory had been transformed in their "argumentative strategies" and "styles of writing" to fi t their distinctive (critical and instrumental) concepts of social science. Veblen's key motif of "selfconfrontation" of society is contrasted with Ogburn's motif of "applicability" of knowledge with regard to refl ections on literary technologies of science. Keywords: cultural lag; social science; audience; literary technology; William F. Ogburn; Th orstein Veblen JAN BALON Kabinet pro studium vědy, techniky a společnosti Filosofi cký ústav AV ČR, v. v. i. Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1 email / balon@fl u.cas.cz ////// tematická studie / thematic article /////////////////////// 58 Úvod Pojem „kulturní mezera" sdílí osud mnoha kdysi proslulých sociálněvědních pojmů, které byly v intelektuálních debatách přetěžovány do té míry, že se jejich původní poměrně srozumitelně vymezený obsah každou následnou formulací dále a dále znejasňoval, až jsou nakonec prakticky k nepoužití. Původní příslib identifi kace v podstatě jednoduchého procesu, jenž se opíral o myšlenku, podle níž se dva prvky společenského vývoje, totiž technologie a kultura, pohybují v podstatě stejným směrem, avšak jeden prvek (kultura) za druhým (technologie) prokazatelně (a nevyhnutelně) zaostává, vystřídalo rozčarování z omezeného analytického potenciálu tohoto pojmu. Empiricky vypozorované soulady i rozpory, pozitivní i negativní důsledky vývoje společnosti, měly být na základě raných představ převoditelné do obecného výkladového rámce, do jehož středu byl pojem kulturní mezery postaven. Očekávaný scénář se ovšem nenaplnil, především, jak se zdá, z důvodu empirické „nenaplnitelnosti" pojmu. Z pojmu, jenž se z jazyka vědy postupně začal vytrácet, se stala fráze, přičemž lze říci, že nakonec zcela převážil morálně-kritický způsob jeho využívání, jenž, zhruba řečeno, na jedné straně poukazoval na nežádoucí anachronismy ve vývoji společnosti, na straně druhé zase byl živnou půdou pro nářky nad ztrátou lidské přirozenosti v důsledku překotného technologického vývoje. Následující text se zaměří na dvě zřejmě nejvýraznější sociálněvědní pojetí „kulturní mezery", které ve svých textech rozpracovali Th orstein Veblen a William F. Ogburn. Tito autoři se v prvních dekádách dvacátého století tezi o „kulturní mezeře",1 – jež se ve vědeckém prostředí začala objevovat již kolem poloviny devatenáctého století –, pokusili rozvinout do podoby obecné „teorie" kulturního vývoje se zřetelnými prediktivními a explanačními nároky. Jak se pokusím předvést, jejich konstrukce „kulturní mezery" takřka příkladně vyjevují rozdíly jednak mezi dvěma klíčovými „technologiemi" sociálněvědního argumentu (kritika společnosti, instrumentální faktografi e), jednak mezi různými pojetími vztahu sociální vědy a jejího publika. Souhrnně vyjádřeno, hlavním cílem textu je sledovat, jak byl půdorys teorie „kulturní mezery" – ohraničený souměřitelnými analytickými kategoriemi – využit prostřednictvím různých argumentačních důrazů k rozvinutí distinktivních pojetí sociální vědy a jejího „účelu". 1 I když by zřejmě bylo vhodnější překládat v kontextu Veblenovy a Ogburnovy teorie termín „cultural lag" jako „kulturní zaostávání", respektive „opožďování", přidržuji se zde ustáleného českého překladu. Jan Balon 59 Tento text zcela jistě nemá za cíl – jak by mohlo jeho zařazení mezi texty tohoto monotematického bloku naznačovat – reprodukovat Shapinův a Schaff erův celkový přístup z jejich knihy Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life,2 v níž na příkladu dvou autorů s konkurenčními pojetími (experimentální) vědy, Th omase Hobbese a Roberta Boyla, rozpracovávají specifi cký výklad vědecké změny. Cílem je zde spíše využití Shapinova a Schaff erova motivu dramatizace, prezentace a expozice vědeckých zjištění, který je obsažen v jejich vymezení takzvané „literární technologie", jíž v nejširším slova smyslu rozumějí určitý způsob komunikace ve vědě. „Literární technologie", celkově vzato, slouží k zajištění, zprostředkování a upevnění vztahu mezi vědcem a jeho publikem. V Shapinově a Schaff erově výkladu je tento vztah konceptualizován jako „svědectví". Díky takzvané „technologii virtuálního svědectví" nemusí být „svědectví (prováděným experimentům) přímé ani spojené s usnadňováním replikování experimentu. Jak Shapin a Schaff er uvádějí: „Technologie virtuálního svědectví zajišťuje to, že se ve čtenářově mysli reprodukuje takový obraz experimentální scény, až eliminuje nutnost jak přímého svědectví, tak i replikace."3 Jakkoli jsou motivy dramatizace, expozice a prezentace vědeckých zjištění v případě Shapinova a Schaff erova výkladu vztaženy ke specifi ckému historickému kontextu a konkrétním způsobům prosazování určitých „literárních technologií", nepochybně jsou otevřené obecnějším otázkám: Jak se utváří vědecký fakt? Jak se profi luje komunikace ve vědě? Jak se formují a legitimizují vědecké přístupy? Jak se buduje vědecká argumentace?4 Smyslem konfrontace dvou pojetí „kulturní změny", a současně také dvou pojetí sociální vědy, jež se odrážejí v díle Th orsteina Veblena a Williama F. Ogburna, tedy není nabídnout srovnání dvou konkurenčních koncepcí à la Shapin a Schaff er, tentokrát v prostředí sociální vědy, nýbrž pokusit se využít motivy expozice, prezentace a dramatizace z jejich pojetí „literární technologie" pro položení otázky, zda lze identifi kovat určitou technologii sociálněvědního argumentu ve Veblenově a Ogburnově teorii kulturní mezery, již využili k prosazování rozdílných pojetí „účelu" sociální vědy. V obecnějším smyslu se tento text zaměřuje zejména na otázku vztahu sociální vědy a jejího publika. Své rozlišení mezi vztahem k publiku z hle2 Steven Shapin a Simon Schaff er, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). 3 Shapin a Schaff er, Leviathan, 60. 4 Jednotlivé Shapinovy a Schaff erovy „technologie" představuje v širším kontextu např. Tomáš Dvořák, „Materiální kultura vědy," in Současné přístupy v historické epistemologii, ed. Tomáš Dvořák a kol. (Praha: Filosofi a, 2013): 209–10. Teorie kulturní mezery 60 diska sebe-konfrontace (Veblen) a z hlediska využitelnosti (Ogburn) přitom opírám o parafrázi Shapinova a Schaff erova pojetí svědectví: (sociálněvědní) publikum se účastní konstituce (sociálněvědního) faktu. Publikum přitom na vytváření faktu participuje tím, že se nechává přesvědčit a svým přesvědčením fakt konstituuje. Jak se pokusím ukázat, teorie kulturní mezery se v pojetích Th orsteina Veblena a Williama F. Ogburna rozchází nikoli v rovině teoretické adekvátnosti nebo empirické korespondence, nýbrž ve styku s různými publiky. Teorie kulturní mezery: Veblenův argument Přestože v dnes kanonizované podobě představil teorii „kulturní mezery" William F. Ogburn v roce 1922 ve své knize Social Change With Respect to Culture and Original Nature,5 současnější akademická literatura6 odkazuje častěji k implicitní formulaci tohoto pojmu a jeho teoretickému rozvedení, jež lze najít v textech Th orsteina Veblena. I když neexistuje akademický konsensus o přesném významu „pojmu" kulturní mezery, převládá poměrně značná shoda na samotném pojetí „teorie" kulturní mezery. Toto pojetí shrnul i zpětně vymezil Ogburn, jenž prohlásil: „Jelikož je to určité pojetí vztahu, myslím si, že je lepší to nazývat teorií. Je to tudíž něco více než jen pouhý nový jazykový termín."7 Teorie „kulturní mezery", jak ji rozumí sociálněvědní literatura, je především vztahem dvou oblastí, mezi nimiž je možné systematicky rozlišovat. Jsou to distinkce (např. materiální/nemateriální, průmysl/podnikání, pokrok/inercie), které teorii umožňují konstruovat. Teorie takto do sebe promítá minulé distinkce, pokud jsou v souladu s její logikou pojímání určitého vztahu. V takovémto smyslu se také stal teoretikem kulturní mezery Th orstein Veblen, přestože on sám nikdy tento termín nepoužil.8 Samotná teorie stojí na Veblenových distinkcích, jež odrážejí jeho způsob literární expozice identifi kované „mezery" vznikající 5 William F. Ogburn, Social Change With Respect to Culture and Original Nature (New York: Viking Press, 1922). 6 Viz např. Richard L. Brinkman a June E. Brinkman, „Cultural Lag: In the Tradition of Veblenian Economics," Journal of Economic Issuess 40, č. 4 (2006): 1009–28; Rick Tilman, Th orstein Veblen and the Enrichement of Evolutionary Naturalism (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007); Stephen Edgell, Veblen in Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2015). 7 Otis Dudley Duncan, William F. Ogburn: On Culture and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964): 89. 8 Téma „kulturní mezery" se opakovaně objevuje zejména ve Veblenových knihách Teorie zahálčivé třídy, Th e Th eory of Business Enterprise, Higher Learning in America, Th e Instinct of Workmanship nebo Nature of Peace. Jan Balon 61 v důsledku odlišné logiky a odlišného tempa vývoje institucí a technologií. Jeden příklad literární expozice „mezery" představuje úryvek z Veblenova nejkomentovanějšího díla, Teorie zahálčivé třídy: Je tedy třeba říci, i když snad jde o banální truismus, že instituce dneška – dnes přijímaný způsob života – nejsou zcela přiměřené dnešní situaci. Dnešní navyklé způsoby uvažování mají přitom tendenci přetrvávat neomezeně dlouho, pokud si okolnosti nevynutí změnu. Tyto instituce, které nám byly takto předány, tyto navyklé způsoby uvažování, hlediska, postoje sklony atd. jsou tedy samy konzervujícími faktory – faktory společenské setrvačnosti, psychologické setrvačnosti, konzervativismu [...]. Vývoj společnosti je ve skutečnosti procesem mentální adaptace jedinců pod tlakem okolností, které již nadále nepřipouštějí myšlenkové návyky vytvořené v minulosti pod vlivem odlišných podmínek a v souladu s nimi.9 „Mezera" je takto exponována jako konfl ikt nároků přítomnosti a konzervativních, respektive, jak je Veblen sám nazýval, atavististických sil, jež odrážejí minulá institucionální uspořádání a jim uzpůsobené myšlenkové návyky. Veblenův teoretický argument „mezery" má zřetelnou temporální strukturu, přičemž dynamika vývoje je určována „změnou situace", která vždy vyžaduje „novou adaptaci". Jak to Veblen formuluje na jiném místě, vztah přítomnosti a budoucnosti je určen procesem selektivní adaptace, který není a nikdy nebude s to reagovat na měnící se situaci: Dnešní situace utváří zítřejší instituce prostřednictvím selektivního, nátlakového procesu tak, že působí na lidský navyklý pohled na věci a buď mění, nebo upevňuje hledisko či stanovisko předané z minulosti. Instituce – tj. navyklé způsoby myšlení –, které usměrňují život lidí, pocházejí v každém případě z minulosti, nehledě na to, jde-li o minulost nedávnou či vzdálenou. Jsou to produkty dřívějšího vývoje, přizpůsobené dřívějším podmínkám, a proto nikdy neodpovídají požadavkům přítomnosti. Proces selektivní adaptace nemůže z povahy věci nikdy dohonit neustále se měnící situaci, v níž se společnost nachází, neboť prostředí, situace, naléhavé potřeby života, které si vynucují přizpůsobení a provádějí selekci, se mění každým dnem. Každá nová situace společnosti začíná zastarávat v okamžiku, kdy vznikla. Každý krok ve vývoji navozuje změnu situace: tato změna vyžaduje novou adaptaci, stává se východiskem pro další krok v přizpůsobení a tak dál do nekonečna.10 9 Th orstein Veblen, Teorie zahálčivé třídy (Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 1999): 149. 10 Ibid., 148–49. Teorie kulturní mezery 62 Výchozí předpoklad „mezery" v celkové teorii změny, již Veblen rozpracoval ve svých hlavních textech, je, jak uvádí Rick Tilman, „pozoruhodný svým využitím pro lokalizování a identifi kování jak zastarávajících tak i na budoucnost orientovaných struktur a pro predikování pravděpodobnosti či nepravděpodobnosti opětovného vyskytování určitých druhů problémů a jevů."11 Distinkce, které Veblen využívá v kontextu svého výkladu vývoje společnosti, jsou konstruovány na základě hlavní veblenovské dichotomie technologie a ceremonialismu, jež se sice prolíná celým jeho dílem, avšak, jak si povšimnul William P. Glade ve svém klasickém textu o veblenovském příspěvku k teorii kulturní mezery, „je neuvěřitelné, jak často ji dokonce i seriózní čtenáři Veblena přehlížejí nebo přímo opomíjejí."12 Tato dichotomie od sebe analyticky odděluje oblast „technologie", do níž přísluší zejména „mírumilovné počínání, industriální aktivity, nezúčastněné a věcně- -faktické hledisko, industriální kapitál nebo stav industriálních dovedností, proces strojové výroby a řemeslné dovednosti," od oblasti takzvaného „ceremonialismu," do níž jsou zahrnuty především „predátorské nebo agresivní počínání, pekuniární aktivity, animistické hledisko, podnikatelský kapitál, investování pro zisk a vykořisťování."13 Základní rozdíl mezi takto vymezenými oblastmi spočívá ve skutečnosti, že technologie je kumulativní a samotný technologický proces je spjat s postupem „vpřed", kdežto ceremonialismus se opírá o minulost (status, hierarchie, nátlak, moc) a na změnu reaguje na základě „tlaku okolností". Jak uvádí Allan G. Gruchy, podle Veblenovy teorie kultury je technologická změna „nejdůležitějším jednotlivým faktorem, jenž mění instituce, a tudíž i lidské chování."14 V samotném vztahu technologie a ceremonialismu je přitom zjevné, že ceremonialismus progresivní využívání technologie různými způsoby omezuje, zatímco technologické změny „vedou k úpadku zastaralých myšlenkových návyků [...]. Technologie má ,leptavé účinky' [...]. Ti, kteří jsou ve spojení s takovouto proměňující se technologií, nahrazují zastaralé myšlenkové návyky novými mentálními návyky, pro něž je oporou věcně-faktický způsob poznání vnějšího světa."15 Je to především přístupnost změně technologické povahy, jež odděluje od sebe tu oblast, která se progresivně vyvíjí, od oblasti, která je 11 Tilman, Th orstein Veblen and the Enrichement, 77. 12 William P. Glade, „Th e Th eory of Cultural Lag and the Veblenian Contribution," Th e American Journal of Economics and Sociology 11, č. 4 (1952): 433. 13 Ibid., 433. 14 Allan G. Grunchy, Modern Economic Th ought – Th e American Contribution (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1947): 78. 15 Ibid., 125. Jan Balon 63 vůči změně rezistentní: „Skutečnost, že některé části nemateriální kultury mají ne-kumulativní povahu spočívá v jejich ceremoniální povaze, zatímco jiné části nemateriální kultury jsou, přinejmenším částečně, technologické povahy."16 Veblenův argument „kulturní mezery" je podložen zřetelným autorským záměrem, jímž je formulace teorie vývoje společnosti. Analytický rámec Veblenovi umožňuje jednak systematicky nahlížet vztahy mezi jednotlivými oblastmi (vývoje) společnosti, jednak promítat do vyznačených trajektorií vývoje konkrétní jevy, jež je možné na základě provedených distinkcí vysvětlovat (v daném případě vývoj průmyslu, vědy, technologie, výroby, vzdělávání, podnikání, vlastnických a mocenských vztahů, povahy mírového uspořádání apod.). Argument o neschopnosti institucí držet krok s vývojem technologie je spojen především s motivem progresivního vývoje vědy. Ve svém eseji o postavení vědy v moderní civilizaci Veblen tvrdí, že je to věda, jež vyvrací starý řád věcí a současně nastavuje řád nový, věda představuje klíčový krok, „jenž sám o sobě konstituuje změnu situace, která vyžaduje novou adaptaci". „Mezera" se reprodukuje v situaci, kdy vědecký přístup, jejž Veblen vymezuje jako „nezúčastněné, nevzrušené nahlédnutí do materiálních faktů, jimiž se lidstvo musí zabývat"17 zajišťuje výhodu jedněch před druhými. Věda je hybatelem změny, civilizace, v níž dominuje vědecký přístup, se musí „prosadit proti jakémukoli kulturnímu schématu, jež tento prvek postrádá."18 Dynamika technologického procesu přitom vědu staví do protikladu k vývoji politiky, kultury a společnosti. Dichotomie technologie/instituce se v termínech Veblenovy teorie projevuje jako rozdíl dvou pohybů: „dopředu" a „zpět". Institucionální oblast zahrnovala hodnoty „zakořeněné v minulosti. Byla statická v tom smyslu, že konzervovala zděděná přesvědčení, třídní rozdíly a statusová uspořádání."19 Pro Veblena to byla věda (a technologie), která „přinesla změny ve fyzickém světě, které zpětně narušily stávající institucionální uspořádání. Aktivity byly vnímány jako instrumentální, pokud rozšiřovaly potenciál lidského života, a jako ceremoniální, pokud tento potenciál omezovaly z hlediska míry, v jaké byl poměřován technovědeckým étosem."20 V nejširším slova smyslu tedy Veblen 16 Glade, „Th e Th eory of Cultural Lag," 436. 17 Th orstein Veblen, „Th e Place of Science in Modern Civilization," American Journal of Sociology 11, č. 5 (1906): 585. 18 Ibid., 586. 19 Tilman, Th orstein Veblen and the Enrichement, 77. 20 Ibid., 77–78. Teorie kulturní mezery 64 „drama" vývoje společnosti inscenuje především jako střet věcně-faktického vědění a myšlenkových návyků. Veblen a jeho publikum Přestože, jak uvádí Rick Tilman ve svém rozsáhlém pojednání o Veblenově příspěvku sociální vědě, dnes neexistuje žádný konsensus ohledně hodnoty či dokonce významu Veblenova díla,21 existuje poměrně silná shoda na tom, že Veblen ve svém díle rozvinul osobitý „styl psaní", jenž nastavuje specifi cký vztah mezi sociálním vědcem a jeho publikem, respektive sociálním vědcem a jeho čtenářem. Jak to vyjadřuje Clare Virginia Eby, „Veblenovu distinktivní metodu kritické analýzy je nezbytné chápat jako určitý styl. Podobně jako jiné distinktivní styly – ať již je to Hemingwayova próza, Sullivanovy mrakodrapy nebo Cézannovy krajiny – je i Veblenův styl nezaměnitelný."22 Při budování vztahu se svým publikem se Veblen opírá o osobitou literární expozici svých (vědeckých) zjištění, v níž systematicky využívá strategii „vědeckého" argumentu. Tato strategie, která Veblenovi zajišťuje explanační perspektivu mimo kontext jednotlivých pozorování a umožňuje mu přitom vypovídat o takřka nekonečném množství sociálních, kulturních či ekonomických jevů, je současně strategií konstrukce vědeckého argumentu i strategií konstrukce intelektuální autority. Onou výchozí i konečnou explanační perspektivou je perspektiva „kulturní mezery", která je jednak základem systematické teorie, jednak přiznanou formou kulturní (a sociální) kritiky.23 I když se Veblen opakovaně pokoušel založit (nebo alespoň načrtnout) sociální vědu jako (objektivní) evoluční vědu,24 prvek dramatizace chápal jako inherentní povaze vědy a pozici vědce jako nezúčastněného pozorovatele popíral. Nevyhnutelný prvek dramatizace pro něj rovněž potvrzoval jeho formativní zájem o kritiku institucí, respektive kritiku konvencí. Jak to shrnuje Dorothy Ross, když porovnává Veblenovu argumentační strategii 21 Ibid., 3. 22 Clare Virginia Eby, Dreiser and Veblen, Saboteurs of the Status Quo (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998): 16. 23 Jak to poněkud ironicky formuluje Clare Virginia Eby, pro Veblena jako „darwinovského sociálního vědce, jehož jedinou jistotou je to, že se věci změní, je motto ,whatever is, is wrong' analytickým konceptem vyjadřujícím nevyhnutelnost kulturní mezery." Clare Virginia Eby, „Th orstein Veblen and the Rhetoric of Authority," American Quarterly 46, č. 2 (1994): 139. 24 Viz např. Th orstein Veblen, „Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 12, č. 4 (1898): 373–97. Kritický rozbor Veblenovy evoluční perspektivy lze nalézt např. v Malcolm Rutherdorf, „Veblen's Evolutionary Programme: A Promise Unfulfi lled," Cambridge Journal of Economics 22, č. 4 (1998): 463–77. Jan Balon 65 v době vzestupu sociální vědy a pokusů o „nalézání objektivity",25 „Veblen usiloval o to, aby věda poskytovala kritické nahlédnutí do průběhu evoluce, nikoli o to, aby se stala nástrojem pro to, jak ji kontrolovat."26 Jak to Veblen vyjádřil na příkladu „kauzální spojitosti", jednoho z nejvýraznějších vědeckých konceptů své doby: V pozdější moderní době se formulace kauzální spojitosti stávají stále více neosobními, objektivnějšími a fakticky věcnějšími; přisuzování aktivity pozorovaným objektům ovšem nikdy neustává, přičemž i v těch nejnovějších a nejvyspělejších formulacích vědeckého výzkumu není dramatický tón zcela ztracen. [...] Aktivita je stále přisuzována jevům, jimiž se věda zabývá; a aktivita pochopitelně není faktem pozorování, nýbrž je jevům přisuzována pozorovatelem.27 To je pochopitelně popíráno těmi, kteří trvají na čistě matematickém vyjádření vědeckých teorií, avšak toto popření lze udržovat pouze na úkor soudržnosti. Ty významné autority, jež promlouvají ve prospěch bezbarvého matematického vyjádření, se neustále a nevyhnutelně uchylují k (svou podstatou metafyzickému) předem utvořenému pojetí kauzality, a to ihned jakmile začnou se skutečnou prací vědeckého zkoumání.28 V kritickém přístupu se dramatický tón pochopitelně projevuje výrazněji než v „bezbarvém matematickém vyjádření", jelikož každý výklad evoluce byl spojen s více či méně skrývaným morálním hodnocením. Sociální věda nevyhnutelně zahrnuje práci s termíny, které nesou morální konotace (predátorský, vykořisťování, okázalá spotřeba) a odkazují ke sdíleným významům, vycvičený sociální vědec je však v zájmu objektivity schopen, jak byl Veblen přesvědčen, „tyto kategorie nahlížet v neosobním světle."29 Podobně Veblen exponoval i argument „kulturní mezery" jako teoretické perspektivy využitelné pro reprezentace a konstrukce sociálního života, jež byla obzvláště efektivní z hlediska působení na různé druhy (především čtenářských) publik. Dramatizace „mezery" byla neoddělitelně spojena s morálními konotacemi jevů, jimž Veblen „přisuzoval aktivitu". Techniky 25 Robert C. Bannister, Sociology and Scientism: Th e American Quest for Objectivity, 1880–1940. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987). 26 Dorothy Ross, Th e Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 213. 27 Veblen, „Th e Place of Science," 596. V poznámce pod čarou Veblen tuto tezi ještě upřesňuje: „Epistemologicky vyjádřeno, aktivita je přisuzována jevům za účelem jejich uspořádání do dramaticky soudržného systému." 28 Ibid. 29 Ross, Th e Origins of American Social Science, 214. Teorie kulturní mezery 66 zajišťování přesvědčivosti, jak se zdá, Veblen opíral především o „literární technologii" kombinující objektivizující pohled a rétorické nástroje kulturní kritiky (společnosti). 30 Veblenův argument „kulturní mezery" nezformoval pouze určitý osobitý „styl psaní", nýbrž také vymezil specifi cký oborový (ekonomický) přístup, když jeho dílo je dnes konsenzuálně považováno za „bod počátku institucionální ekonomie".31 Zrod tohoto přístupu i jeho veblenovské ohraničení lze rovněž přisuzovat uplatnění osobité argumentační strategie, jíž Veblen konstruoval autoritu pro své (vědecké) výroky. Jak to formuluje Rick Tilman: Veblenův intelektuální ikonoklasmus není nikde patrnější než v jeho užívání slov. Jeho rétorická technika usiluje o přesvědčení čtenáře, aby rozpoznal, že [...] sociální konfl ikt nebyl jen střetem o kontrolu půdy, plodin nebo výrobního zařízení, nýbrž také střetem o kontrolu znaků coby jednotek významu. To, vůči čemu se Veblen vymezoval, byl jazyk minulosti, jenž byl skutečně silně vtělen a zakořeněn v žargonu neoklasické ekonomie. Tyto předem utvořené verbální úsudky představovaly překážky, jež znemožňovaly objektivnější analýzu ekonomických jevů. Konvenční ekonomický slovník byl produktem dřívějšího způsobu myšlení a ekonomům bránil uskutečňovat přesnější pozorování ekonomické aktivity. Stručně vyjádřeno, tyto úsudky byly vyjádřeními kulturní mezery. Neoklasická ekonomie byla systémem znaků, jenž vycházel ze zastaralých předpokladů a povětšinou sloužil potřebám osobních zájmů. Veblen problém ekonomů představoval jako zápas o překonávání navyklých způsobů myšlení s cílem artikulovat kategorie, jež neoklasicistický slovník dokázal pouze vyřazovat. Kulturní mezera tudíž dokládala jeho odmítnutí obecně přijímané ekonomické moudrosti.32 30 David Riesman sice nabídnul při hodnocení Veblenova díla psychologické vysvětlení, když se pokusil charakterizovat „obsesivní Veblenovu péči o kvalitu psaní jako techniky člověka, jenž se obává, že nebude slyšen – avšak také, že bude slyšen, a tudíž bude zavázán", takové mínění ovšem jen stěží může vysvětlit intenzitu odezvy publika či přetrvávající motivy Veblenovy argumentační strategie v sociálněvědních stylech psaní. David Riesman, Th orstein Veblen: A Critical Interpretation (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953): 38. 31 Charles Camic, „Reputation and Predecessor Selection: Parsons and the Institutionalists," American Sociological Review 57, č. 4 (1992): 428. Viz též Yuval Yonay, Th e Struggle Over the Soul of Economics: Institutionalist and Neoclassical Economists in America Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 32 Tilman, Th orstein Veblen and the Enrichement, 58. Jan Balon 67 Obdobně jako Veblen nalézá „mezeru" mezi vývojem technologie a institucí, nalézá ji i v jazyce a oborových slovnících. Argument terminologické „mezery" mezi „jazykem minulosti", jenž slouží potřebám osobních zájmů, a „jazykem přítomnosti", jenž slouží objektivnější analýze ekonomických jevů, umožňuje Veblenovi zaujímat hledisko zprostředkovatele, jehož autorita se odvozuje od skutečnosti, že on sám ovládá oba jazyky. Prezentace zjištění plynoucích z Veblenových pozorování se opírá o autoritativní hlas „nezúčastněného, nevzrušeného nahlédnutí do materiálních faktů, jimiž se lidstvo musí zabývat", které nakonec publikum konfrontuje s ideologickými předpoklady tohoto autoritativního hlasu. Kupříkladu Teresa Toulouse to vyjadřuje takto: Veblen nerozebírá pouze znaky své kultury, nýbrž také používá znaky k tomu, aby o těchto znacích vypovídal. Zcela zřetelně disponuje velice dobře vymezenou představou o publiku, jež si přeje přesvědčit. Přesto však, aby utvrdil své publikum v přesvědčení o validitě svých tvrzení o jejich světě, Veblen je nucen své kritické záměry maskovat ve formách výpovědí, jež se ucházely o přízeň publika prostřednictvím ostentativně objektivního podání. Pouze pod zástěrkou systematické analýzy, pečlivě strukturované tak, aby vyhovovala jeho vlastnímu chápání očekávání tohoto publika, mohl postupně vyložit ideologické motivy [...].33 Velice zřetelná představa o publiku, jež chce Veblen oslovit, zjevně předurčuje strategii jeho argumentace. Jak naznačují mnozí komentátoři Veblenova díla,34 klíčem k interpretaci jeho textů je rétorická analýza. Veblen intelektuální oporu pro svá zjištění hledá především v objektivizujícím pohledu, který zakládá jeho „styl psaní" a je neoddělitelně spojen s jeho specifi ckým autorským záměrem. Jeho texty lze považovat za jedno z nejsoustavnějších vyjádření pojetí teorie v sociální vědě jako „performativní aktivity v jazyce, jehož operativními metodami jsou způsoby psaní, jejichž prostřednictvím jsou dávány dohromady specifi kovatelné čtenářské odezvy."35 33 Teresa Toulouse, „Veblen and His Reader: Rhetoric and Intention in ,Th e Th eory of the Leisure Class'," Th e Centennial Review 29, č. 2 (1985): 249. 34 Viz např. Gary A. Fine, „Th e Social Contruction of Style: Th orstein Veblen's Th e Th eory of the Leisure Class as Contested Text," Th e Sociological Quarterly 35, č. 3 (1994): 457–72; Rick Tilman a Robert Griffi n, „Th e Aesthetics of Th orstein Veblen Revised," Cultural Dynamics 10, č. 3, (1998): 325–40. Ze starších textů viz Th eodor Adorno, „Veblen's Attack on Culture," Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9, č. 3 (1941): 389–413. 35 Bryan S. Green, Literary Methods and Sociological Th eory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988): vii. Teorie kulturní mezery 68 Veblenova literární expozice „kulturní mezery" vystavuje jeho čtenáře nejen nároku překročení „navyklých způsobů myšlení", nýbrž i uskutečnění „přechodu od víry v teorie odvozované z pevných vzorců k teoriím, jež analyzovaly kulturní odlišnosti."36 Zřejmě nejúčinněji a nejdůsledněji tuto strategii Veblen uplatnil v Teorii zahálčivé třídy, v níž je „jazyk pokroku a evoluce" využit k rozvinutí vědeckého argumentu o regresivním vývoji společnosti: „Na konci Teorie, kdy se text o spotřebě sám spotřebovává odmítnutím samotného stylu, v němž je napsán, čtenáři stojí osamoceni, rozpolceni mezi pocity víry a nevíry."37 Vysvětlení Veblenova výkladového zvratu lze přitom zřejmě nejadekvátněji nahlížet z hlediska jeho vztahu k publiku a jeho předpokládaným očekáváním. Veblenův odklon od rétorické strategie objektivizující analýzy (autoritativního hlasu vědy) k rétorickým nástrojům kulturní kritiky (společnosti) je rovněž pochopitelný z hlediska jeho odmítnutí profesionalizované koncepce sociální vědy, jež se, jak to vyjádřil v Th e Higher Learning in America, dostala do područí „kapitánů erudice", kteří jsou zkorumpováni podnikatelskými magnáty a výzkumné univerzity řídí jako „podnikatelskou fi rmu, jež obchoduje s věděním, přičemž je pod ovládající rukou kapitána erudice, jehož posláním je vytěžit z disponibilních prostředků co možná největší výstup."38 Veblenova „technologie" utváření sociálněvědního argumentu je spjata s vědomým směšováním objektivizujícího přístupu a rétorických nástrojů zajišťování přesvědčivosti. Adresátem Veblenových zjištění přitom nebyla profesionalizovaná oborová komunita, nýbrž v širším smyslu veřejnost, v užším smyslu ti, o nichž on sám vypovídal. Argument „mezery" je ve Veblenově podání efektivní zejména tehdy, když je jeho cílem sebe-konfrontace společnosti, tedy mezera mezi morálními očekáváními aktérů a jejich vyjádřeními v termínech institucionálních skutečností. Teorie kulturní mezery: Ogburnův argument Jak již bylo řečeno, autorem první explicitní formulace teorie „kulturní mezery" byl William F. Ogburn, jehož dílo je rovněž primární referencí pro jakékoli učebnicové, encyklopedické a jiné sumarizující výklady samotného pojmu „kulturní mezery". Podobnost mezi Ogburnovou a Veblenovou 36 Toulouse, „Veblen and His Reader," 267. 37 Ibid., 247. 38 Th orstein Veblen, Th e Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1918): 85. Jan Balon 69 formulací je přitom natolik zarážející, že Ogburn sám byl opakovaně obviňován z toho, že Veblenovi jeho teorii zcizil. Tato nařčení Ogburn odmítnul a prohlásil, že on sám Veblena v tomto bodě „nikdy nečetl."39 Přiznal se však k tomu, že jej k formulaci této teorie inspiroval Marx, jehož dílo bylo „základnou, z níž byla teorie kulturní mezery rozvinuta, avšak zcela jistě platí, že ani materialistická intepretace dějin, ani ekonomický determinismus není totéž co kulturní mezera."40 Jelikož teorie kulturní mezery byla dlouhodobým a systematickým Ogburnovým zájmem, je množství defi ničních i interpretačních úprav, jimiž „svůj" koncept během několika desetiletí prakticky nepřerušované práce opatřil, značné a v prostoru tohoto textu je nelze ani vyjmenovat, natož koherentně rozvést. Následující část se zaměřuje především na způsob expozice argumentu „mezery", který Ogburn vyjádřil ve své knize Social Change With Respect to Culture and Original Nature z roku 1922. Ogburn zde poprvé ohlašuje svůj celoživotní projekt, který v jednom z pozdějších retrospektivních textů pojmenoval jako snahu „sledovat procesy jednoho faktoru, a to technologie."41 V jeho raném vyjádření se tento zájem překládal do otázek typu: „proč se objevují sociální změny, proč jsou určité podmínky zjevně resistentní vůči změně, jak kultura roste, jak se civilizace stala tím, čím je."42 Zcela určující při rozvíjení vlastního pojetí sociálněvědního argumentu byl pro Ogburna „praktický" zájem, přičemž hlavním měřítkem nebyla „teoretická adekvátnost" navrhovaného výkladového schématu, nýbrž jeho „praktická využitelnost." Jak to shrnuje Otis Dudley Duncan: „Pro Ogburna nebylo nejdůležitější věcí konceptuální schéma, nýbrž objevy, k nimž jeho využití mohlo vést."43 Základem Ogburnova argumentu „kulturní mezery" je předpoklad akcelerace různých částí kultury. Ve zřejmě nejsoustavnějším vyjádření rané Ogburnovy formulace44 je „kulturní mezera" vyložena následovně: 39 Duncan, William F. Ogburn, 87. 40 Ibid. 41 William F. Ogburn, „Th e Process of Adjustment to New Inventions," in Technology and International Relations, ed. William F. Ogburn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949): 19. 42 Ogburn, Social Change, v. 43 Duncan, William F. Ogburn, xv. 44 Z pozdější doby byla nejvlivnější Ogburnova formulace „kulturní mezery" z proslulé zprávy Recent Social Trends in the United States z roku 1933. „V adaptivní kultuře se často objevuje opoždění nebo mezera [...]. To znamená, že je zde nedostatečná harmonie, často v podobě závažného nepřizpůsobení, vždy provázeného selháním vytěžit to nejlepší z možného vývoje. Problémy sociální změny tudíž vyžadují zaprvé, aby se člověk sám přizpůsobil novému prostředí, jež zahrnuje ohromnou oblast materiální kultury, a za druhé, aby se člověk sám Teorie kulturní mezery 70 Různé části moderní kultury se nemění stejnou rychlostí, některé části se mění mnohem rychleji než části jiné; a jelikož mezi částmi existuje vzájemná souvislost a vzájemná závislost, rychlá změna v jedné části naší kultury vyžaduje uzpůsobení prostřednictvím jiných změn v různých vzájemně souvisejících částech kultury [...]. Tam, kde se jedna část kultury mění jako první, prostřednictvím nějakého objevu nebo vynálezu, a vyvolává změny v některé části kultury, jež na ní závisí, tam se často změny vyvolané v závislých částech kultury opožďují [...]. Rozsah této mezery se bude lišit podle povahy kulturního materiálu, může však přetrvávat po značně dlouhou dobu, přičemž během této doby lze říci, že došlo k nepřizpůsobení určitého prvku.45 Hlavním rozlišujícím nástrojem Ogburnova argumentu je distinkce mezi materiální a nemateriální kulturou, jež do značné míry koresponduje s Veblenovým rozlišením technologie/ceremonialismus, poněkud se však liší v tom, jak jednoznačně je do centra samotného argumentu postavena jistota „růstu". Přestože se Veblen také opíral o „jistotu" kumulace v oblasti technologií, jeho hlavním zájmem byla teorie socioekonomické změny, tedy především výklad (a, jak bylo naznačeno dříve, kritika) vývoje institucí. Zjednodušeně řečeno, „jistota" růstu jedné oblasti (technologické) mu dávala „jistotu" stagnace oblasti druhé (institucionální), jež měla v jeho argumentu jak analytickou, tak i rétorickou přednost. Pro Ogburna byla ovšem „první věcí, již lze (o růstu materiální kultury) vypozorovat, ta skutečnost, že materiální kultura kumuluje."46 Přednost měla jistota „růstu", z níž Ogburn dále odvozoval jistotu „akcelerace" a nakonec ji dovedl až k jistotě „exponenciálního růstu".47 Na rozdíl od předešlých výkladů vývoje sociálních institucí na základě „nevyhnutelných stádií", které „nejenže nebyly potvrzeny, nýbrž byly přímo vyvráceny,"48 umožňuje teorie kulturní mezery kvantitativně zkoumat to, jak materiální kultura „roste". Jelikož „pokusy najít zákony dědičnosti, variance a výběru v evoluci sociálních institucí přinesly zanedbatelné množství nepostradatelných nebo byť i jen významných výsledpřizpůsobil proměnlivému tempu změny v materiální a sociální kultuře." William F. Ogburn a S. Colum Gilfi llan, „Th e Infl uence of Invention and Discovery," in Recent Social Trends in the United States: Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933): 125. 45 Ogburn, Social Change, 200–201. 46 Ibid., 73. 47 Benoît Godin, „Innovation Without the Word: William F. Ogburn's Contribution to the Study of Technological Innovation," Minerva 48, č. 3 (2010): 284. 48 Ogburn, Social Change, 57. Jan Balon 71 ků,"49 je nezbytné závislost mezi přetrváváním starých a přibýváním nových kulturních forem nahlížet z perspektivy „kumulace" objevů a vynálezů učiněných v oblasti materiální kultury, jejichž počet nepopiratelně narůstá. Materiální část kulturní základny očividně roste rychleji než nemateriální část. Nemateriální kultura (např. pravidla, náboženství, rodina, politika)50 je v konstrukci Ogburnova argumentu nepochybnou příčinou „mezery". Klíčovým hlediskem je přitom „frekvence výskytu změny v materiální kultuře v důsledku kumulativní povahy vynálezů a technik. Některé části nemateriální kultury (náboženství) žádnou takovouto kumulativní povahu nemají, zatímco jiné části (umění, literatura, vládnutí) jsou sice kumulativní, avšak v menší míře než materiální kultura."51 „Frekvence výskytu" se stává hlavním měřítkem, když platí, že čím větší je počet vynálezů, tím větší je počet vytvořených nových vynálezů: „Když byla materiální kultura malá, vynálezů bylo jen pár, kdežto teď, když je materiální kultura rozsáhlá, vynálezů je mnoho."52 Z tohoto hlediska byly „mezery" pouze „problémem moderní doby. Ve velmi rané době nedocházelo k dostatečnému počtu a výskytu změn na to, aby vůbec mohl vzniknout nějaký zásadní problém takovéto povahy."53 Ogburn svůj argument „kulturní mezery" zakládá v jistotách „růstu a kumulace". Ačkoli je jeho teorie „kulturní mezery" do značné míry formulována veblenovskými termíny a jeho rozlišení materiální a nemateriální kultury je na první pohled stěží rozeznatelné od Veblenovy dichotomie technologie/ceremonialismus, Ogburn sám materiální a nemateriální kulturu nepojímá ve vzájemném vztahu, nýbrž jejich rozlišení využívá k identifi kaci prvku, jenž mu umožňuje rozvinutí specifi cké „literární technologie". Svou teorii „kulturní mezery" směřuje k praktickému cíli využitelnosti. Jistoty „růstu a kumulace" vymezují oblasti, jež jsou přístupné kombinování nástrojů kvantitativní analýzy (zejména jde o oblast technologických trendů a sociální statistiky). „Technologie" Ogburnova argumentu dílem odráží a dílem dále profi luje rétorickou strategii instrumentální faktografi e, 49 Ibid. 50 Do nemateriální kultury Ogburn zahrnuje také „staré zvyky, užitečnost a snadnost stávajících kulturních forem, osobní zájmy, tradici, zvyky, konzervativismus a obtíže s difuzí poznatků." Ogburn, Social Change, 145–96. 51 Glade, „Th e Th eory of Cultural Lag," 431. 52 Ogburn, Social Change, 105. Viz též výrok: „Vynález dokládá změnu. Je-li málo vynálezů, je i málo změn." William F. Ogburn a Meyer F. Nimkoff , Sociology (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1940): 815. 53 Ogburn, Social Change, 265. Teorie kulturní mezery 72 jež svou (vědeckou) autoritu odvozuje z hlediska využitelnosti. V nejširším slova smyslu je rovněž odrazem intepretace vývoje společnosti z hlediska eliminace sociálních překážek technologickému pokroku. Pro Ogburna klíčový pojem „nepřizpůsobení prvku" (maladjustation) má sice zřetelný normativní náboj, jejž Veblen systematicky využíval ve své kulturní kritice vývoje společnosti, ani zde však Ogburn neopouští svůj cíl využitelnosti, jenž je nakonec také kvantifi kovatelným ukazatelem „změny". Jak to formuluje v jednom ze svých pozdějších textů, „sociální změna a sociální vynález jsou řešením problému nepřizpůsobení mezi technologií a kulturou: materiální vynález vybízí k sociálnímu vynálezu. Sociálním vynálezem je jakýkoli vynález, jenž není mechanický a není objevem přírodní vědy."54 Sociální vynálezy, mezi nimiž Ogburn jmenuje mimo jiné IQ testy, patentové zákony, sociální pojištění, cestovní pasy apod., dokládají potenciál nemateriální kultury „kumulovat" a přizpůsobovat se novým praktikám umožněným novými technologiemi. Otevírají také prostor pro „vědecké" (tedy kvantifi kovatelné) způsoby reprezentace sociálního života, jež jsou založeny v jistotách „růstu a kumulace". Ogburn svůj leitmotiv „růstu" ovšem nevyužil pouze pro rozvinutí specifi ckého argumentu „kulturní mezery", nýbrž jej také, jak se pokusím doložit v následující části, postavil do středu svého argumentu ve prospěch profesionální vědy. Ogburn a jeho publikum Na rozdíl od Veblena, jehož „styl psaní" byl vědomě konstruovaný s ohledem na publikum nedifi erencované na vědecké/nevědecké, pro Ogburna existovaly v zásadě pouze dva typy relevantních publik: komunita vědců a komunita „využivatelů" produktů sociální vědy (zhruba řečeno vláda, průmysl, fi rmy, poradenství). Na rozdíl od Veblena, jenž nikdy nezískal nezpochybňované postavení v rámci profesionální hierarchie americké sociální vědy, se Ogburn, také díky svému setrvalému organizačnímu úsilí, prakticky po celý svůj akademický život těšil značné prestiži.55 Rovněž se během svého angažmá v Social Science Research Council56 výrazně zasloužil 54 Ogburn a Nimkoff , Sociology, 859–60. 55 Barbara Laslett, „Biography as Historical Sociology: Th e Case of William Fielding Ogburn," Th eory and Society 20, č. 4 (1991): 511–38. 56 Tehdy nejvýznamnější instituci pro podporu sociálněvědního výzkumu. Viz např. Martin Bulmer, „Support for Sociology in the 1920s: Th e Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Beginnings of Modern, Large-Scale, Sociological Research in the University," American Sociologist 17, č. 4 (1982): 185–92. Jan Balon 73 o rozvinutí specifi cké koncepce sociální vědy, takzvané „rockefellerovské realistické agendy",57 jež upřednostňovala empirický (a prakticky využitelný) interdisciplinární výzkum a usilovala o rozvinutí metod využitelných napříč jednotlivými sociálními vědami. Oproti Veblenovi, který měl jen slova pohrdání pro „kapitány erudice" a sociální vědce jako zaprodance mecenášů opakovaně zesměšňoval, Ogburn své badatelské zájmy důsledně podřizoval praktickým cílům. Ve vztahu k akademickému publiku svou ideu vědecké sociální vědy ve zřejmě nejčistší podobě vyjádřil v roce 1929 v prezidentském proslovu ke členům American Sociological Society, v němž představil svou vizi budoucí sociálněvědní praxe očištěné od nežádoucích starých zvyků: Jedním z těchto nových návyků bude psaní zcela bezbarvých článků spolu s opuštěním současného zvyku pokoušet se přenášet výsledky vědy do literatury, který v tomto smyslu zavedli Huxley a William James, a který považujeme za špatný odkaz pro učedníky vědy. Nebude tudíž již nezbytné zakončovat články naléhavými apely ani jiskrnými závěry. Bude rovněž možné začínat články bez odkazů k Platónovi, Aristotelovi nebo k jiným tolik velebeným Řekům. Jasnost a přesnost budou jedinými ctnostmi expozice. Vyjádření emocí bude špatnou formou. Publikem pro takovéto články bude spolek vědců; a nebude podniknut žádný pokus o to, aby tyto články byly čitelné i pro prodavačky a středoškolskou mládež. Články budou vždy doprovozeny podpůrnými daty. Text bude tudíž kratší a tabulky a záznamy delší. Bude dražší je vysázet. Bude se číst pouze určitá část článku; zbytek bude poskytovat jen odkazovou informaci [...]. A tak vznikne nový typ sociálněvědního časopisu, který stále dnes, snad až na jednu výjimkou, k dispozici není, jenž bude plně zasvěcen publikování vědeckých výsledku pro vědecké publikum.58 Ogburnova „literární technologie" se ve vztahu k jeho publiku opírá o extrapolaci argumentu „kulturní mezery" na oblast sociálněvědní praxe. Jistota „růstu" materiální kultury se uskutečňuje v jistotě, že věda také „kumuluje". Stávající institucionální uspořádání sociální vědy je nezbytné nahlížet z hlediska přetrvávajícího „nepřizpůsobení". „Mezera" je zde exponována jako opožďování se vůči změně iniciované „vynálezem" modelu kvantifi kace. 57 Donald Fisher, Fundamental Development of the Social Sciences: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the United States Social Science Research Council (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993). 58 William F. Ogburn. „Th e Folkways of a Scientifi c Sociology," Publications of the American Sociological Society 24 (1930): 2–3. Teorie kulturní mezery 74 Směřování sociální vědy tedy závisí na tom, jaké vědění sociální vědci nechají „kumulovat". Jiná cesta než „publikovat vědecké výsledky pro vědecké publikum" pro sociální vědu neexistuje.59 Třebaže v jiném smyslu, než tomu bylo u Veblena, měl i Ogburn velice zřetelnou představu o svém publiku. Způsob konstrukce autority, který využívá pro svou expozici vědeckých zjištění (a také očekávání), se plně opírá o praktický zájem. Před své publikum předstupuje jako vědec jistý si využitelností svých poznatků. Tuto sebejistotu odvozuje z faktu „kumulace" ve vědě, která činí jeho roli zastupitelnou. Kdyby to, co tvrdí, netvrdil on, tvrdil by to zcela jistě někdo jiný. Jak toto přesvědčení výstižně vyjádřil v jednom ze svých textů: „Objev kalkulu nebyl závislý na Newtonovi: neboť i kdyby Newton zemřel, byl by objeven Leibnizem. A my si myslíme, že i kdyby Leibniz nebo Newton nikdy nežili, byl by přesto objeven nějakým jiným matematikem."60 Jak bylo naznačeno, Veblenova „technologie" utváření sociálněvědního argumentu je do značné míry spjata s jeho konceptualizací vztahu vědce a jeho publika z hlediska sebe-konfrontace. Ogburnova „technologie" utváření sociálněvědního argumentu je spjata s pojetím tohoto vztahu z hlediska využitelnosti na straně příjemce. Vymezení „publika" je zcela jistě užší, neboť ogburnovská zjištění jsou využitelná pro toho, pro koho využitelná být mají, tedy jednak pro (další) vědce, jednak pro uživatele. Konečné posouzení využitelnosti přitom spočívá v tom, že příjemce „dosvědčí", že to, co sociální věda produkuje, pro něj využitelné bylo. 59 Ogburnův proslov byl sice tehdy odsouzen jako projev extrémního scientismu, retrospektivně vzato jej však lze považovat za jeden z prvních kroků ke kodifi kaci standardní publikační praxe americké sociální vědy. Zřejmě nejvýraznější podobu této praxi vtiskli Samuel Stouff er, přímý Ogburnův žák, a Felix P. Lazarsfeld v jejich pojetí výzkumné práce. Jak uvádějí Jonathan H. Turner a Stephen P. Turner, typickou studií zpracovanou podle vzoru lazarsfeldovsko-stouff erovského konceptu výzkumného projektu, jenž zakládal paradigma „survey" výzkumu, byla „disertace nebo časopisecký článek, jenž měl následující podobu: shrnutí ,teorie' vztahující se k problému (obvykle ne více než několik poznámek o zájmu některého dřívějšího myslitele zabývajícího se více či méně souvisejícím problémem a občas ne více než odkaz k předchozímu výzkumu na dané téma); formulace ,hypotézy' a rozbor testovaného vzorku, ,design' výzkumu a metody měření nebo operacionalizace ,pojmů'; prezentace zjištění obvykle uvedených v tabulkách a doplněných o rozbor statistické metody, jenž dokládá tvrzení o významnosti zjištění; a závěr naznačující některé implikace výsledků, jež se mohou stát předmětem budoucího výzkumu." Jonathan H. Turner a Stephen P. Turner, Th e Impossible Science: An Institutional Analysis of American Sociology (Newbury Park: Sage 1990): 115. O úspěšnosti a životaschopnosti tohoto výzkumného modelu svědčí i skutečnost, že takto stále vypadá „standardní" sociálněvědní výzkum. Více viz Jan Balon, Sociologie v USA: Historické kontextualizace (Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství 2011): 77–79. 60 William F. Ogburn, „Th e Great Man versus Social Forces," Social Forces 5, č. 2 (1926): 227. Jan Balon 75 Ogburn, který se ve své pozdější profesní dráze věnoval tomu, co se i díky jeho významnému přičinění oborově institucionalizovalo jako „technology assessment", „innovation studies" nebo „impact studies", svůj argument „mezery" rozvíjel důsledně ve prospěch profesionalizované sociální vědy. „Profesionalizace" je v jeho pojetí jedinou zárukou překonávání „nepřizpůsobení" sociální vědy na změny vyvolávané objevy či vynálezy v přírodní vědě. Pro „akceleraci" sociální vědy je rozhodující to, jaké vědění bude kumulovat. To, co se nekumuluje tak, aby to bylo možné „kvantifi kovat", do sociální vědy nepatří.61 V takovémto smyslu lze Ogburnovu teorii „kulturní mezery" považovat za prototypický příklad technologie sociálněvědního argumentu, jež své publikum hledá mezi účastníky procesu produkce vědění a autoritu pro své výroky si zajišťuje v rovině praktické využitelnosti. Závěr Veblenovu a Ogburnovu teorii „kulturní mezery" lze zřejmě nejadekvátněji nahlížet jako reakci na nejrozšířenější historickou ideu jejich doby, totiž na myšlenku – jak ji formulovala Dorothy Ross –, podle níž se „americká společnost opožďovala ve své odpovědi na stále rychlejší ekonomickou změnu."62 Argument „mezery" byl přitom v jejich případě využit způsobem, který se, jak jsem se pokusil ukázat, dotýkal nejen samotné otázky povahy kulturní změny, nýbrž i samotné technologie utváření sociálněvědního argumentu. Jejich „expozice" dobového motivu – proč se společnost opožďuje, respektive proč není s to reagovat na změny – slouží k rozvedení komplexních explanačních perspektiv, jež přes mnohé terminologické rozdíly sdílejí souměřitelný argumentační základ. Co je ovšem poměrně dramaticky odděluje, je jednak jejich pojetí „účelu" sociální vědy, jednak jejich pojetí vztahu sociální vědy a jejího publika. Tyto rozdíly se nejzřetelněji vyjevují v otázkách disciplinace vědeckého přístupu a prezentace vědeckých zjištění. Jinak řečeno, přestože Veblen a Ogburn exponovali argument „mezery" v podobném slovníku, ve svých prezentacích „mezery" volili značně odlišné techniky vytváření autority a zajišťování přesvědčivosti pro svá „vědecká" zjištění. 61 Své přesvědčení o nezbytnosti kvantifi kace si Ogburn odnesl ze svého raného působení na kolumbijské univerzitě. Viz Charles Camic a Yu Xie, „Th e Statistical Turn in American Social Science: Columbia University, 1890 to 1915," American Sociological Review 59, č. 5 (1994): 773–805. Viz též Mark C. Smith, Social Science in the Crucible: Th e American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1994): 73–74. 62 Ross, Th e Origins of American Social Science, 444. Teorie kulturní mezery: 76 Veblen přes své velké ambice založit sociální vědu jako „evoluční" vědu i přes svůj důraz na neosobní, věcně-faktické hledisko, pojímal „účel" sociální vědy z hlediska „idle curiosity",63 jež usiluje o odstranění největší překážky progresivního vývoje, totiž konvencí odrážejících stávající uspořádání. Sociální vědec, disciplinovaný nároky profesionalismu, se nevyhnutelně takovýmto institucionalizovaným konvencím přizpůsobuje a čím více je jimi sociální věda, která se nikdy nemůže zbavit dramatické formy, zasažena, tím více se vzdaluje své hlavní přednosti, totiž tomu, že „nemá pragmatický cíl".64 Obdobně je založen i způsob, jakým pojímá vztah sociální vědy a jejího publika. Sociální věda oslovuje své publikum prostřednictvím nároku sebe-konfrontace (např. průmyslníka, vědce, podnikatele, všeobecně čtenáře, respektive společnosti). V tomto se sociální věda může opírat toliko o intelektuální autoritu „vycvičeného" vědeckého hlasu, jenž má schopnost delegitimizovat navyklé způsoby myšlení i rozvracet stávající uspořádání. Kdykoli je její „účel" institucionalizován, stává se sám konvencí, proti níž se má obracet. „Věda nemá žádné postranní záměry,"65 jak to Veblen explicitně formuloval ve své zásadní výpovědi o „účelu" vědeckého bádání. Ogburn oproti tomu prosazoval mnohem přímočařejší pohled na možnosti disciplinace sociálněvědního přístupu a na způsoby prezentace sociálněvědních zjištění, když prohlašoval, že v budoucnosti „bude každý statistikem, totiž takřka každý" a obývat bude laboratoř.66 Svůj všeobecný argument „mezery" vztáhnul na situaci sociální vědy a demonstroval, že i ona je opožděná, že i ona „je v mezeře". Jedinou možnou cestou je pro něj přizpůsobení se modelu „kvantifi kace", který je nejvíce v souladu s evidentním faktem „kumulace" ve vědě. „Účelem" sociální vědy je tudíž kumulovat vědění. Sociální věda oslovuje své publikum prostřednictvím nároku využitelnosti kumulovaného vědění. To může být využitelné jen pro disciplinované publikum, tedy pro spoluvědce, respektive pro ty, kteří vědí, co chtějí, tedy pro využivatele produktů sociální vědy. Sociální věda se takto opírá o institucionální autoritu. Pouze jako instituce opírající se o autoritu „využitelné" vědy může jednak zaštiťovat a koordinovat aktivity sociálních vědců, jednak dodávat své produkty zadavatelům. Jak již bylo řečeno, cílem tohoto textu není hledat v oblasti sociálních věd analogie se Shapinovým a Schaff erovým výkladem dvou (historických) 63 Veblen, „Th e Place of Science," 599. 64 Ibid., 607. 65 Ibid. 66 Ogburn, „Th e Folkways of a Scientifi c Sociology," 5. Jan Balon 77 konkurenčních pojetí vědy. Nebylo by to možné ani z toho důvodu, že Veblen a Ogburn nevedli spor o funkci vědeckého textu ani o „účel" sociální vědy. Obdobně jako tomu bylo u Shapina a Schaff era, cílem tohoto textu není rozhodovat o úspěšnosti jednoho nebo druhého způsobu legitimizace (sociální) vědy. Vzhledem k tomu, že současná sociální věda po všech možných „obratech" (k jazyku, rétorice, textu, refl exivitě apod.) bere skutečnost, že je „literárně" založená a využívá různé rétorické strategie k zajišťování přesvědčivosti pro svá zjištění, vcelku za samozřejmost,67 je potenciál Shapinova a Schaff erova konceptu literární technologie coby nástroje samotného vytváření vědeckého faktu poněkud omezenější než v případě Hobbesova a Boylova sporu o pojetí vědy. Zde rozvinutý výklad Veblenovy a Ogburnovy teorie „kulturní mezery" sleduje především to, jak se v podstatě identická teorie zformulovaná v době hledání „objektivity" a rigorózního vědeckého přístupu, v době formování sociálněvědních profesí a všudypřítomných debat o metodě, proměňuje ve dvou různých argumentačních strategiích a současně zužitkovává k prosazení specifi ckého (kritického a instrumentálního) pojetí sociální vědy.68 Veblenův argument „mezery" vyústil ve zpochybnění sociálněvědních postupů, které usilují o využitelnost. Ogburnův argument „mezery" směřuje k „akceleraci" sociální vědy směrem k využitelným produktům. V čem se ovšem odlišují ještě více, je jejich pojetí sociální vědy a jejího publika. Veblenovy cíle jsou zcela nepřehlédnutelně politické a morální.69 Publikem je nediferencovaná veřejnost. Ogburnovým publikem jsou spoluvědci a spoluuživatelé. V současnějších termínech vyjádřeno se otázka „veřejné relevance" vědy a její „praktické využitelnosti" překládá v podmínkách převládajícího 67 Obdobně to platí, jak to ukazuje ve svém příspěvku Radim Hladík, i pro oblast humanitních věd. Radim Hladík, „Zdrojový kód jako literární technologie? Vytváření faktů v digitálním výzkumu," Teorie vědy / Th eory of Science 39, č. 1 (2017): 43. 68 I když není smyslem tohoto textu překládat Veblenův a Ogburnův příspěvek do Shapinova a Schaff erova výkladu, je evidentní, že před pomyslným tribunálem Royal Society by Veblen nejspíše působil jako nedisciplinovaný radikální individualista, jenž sám sebe vidí jako „nejzazšího soudce vědění," který rozbíjí konvencionální základnu skutečného vědění, zatímco Ogburn by byl vnímán jako někdo, kdo usiluje o rozvinutí „disciplinované kolektivní sociální struktury experimentální formy života." (Shapin s Schaff er, Leviathan, 85). Ogburn byl také vytrvale, podobně jako experimentátoři, „ve střehu proti ,dogmatikům' a ,tyranům' ve fi losofi i, jež oni považovali za právě tak nehorázné jako ,obchodníky s tajemstvím', kteří své nároky na vědění vytvářeli v privátním a nedisciplinovaném prostoru." Ibid. 69 Podobně jako tomu bylo u Hobbese, jehož hlavním cílem, jak to ve svém příspěvku ukazuje Jan Maršálek, nakonec vždy byla „politická intervence". Jan Maršálek, „Hobbesova literární technologie závaznosti rozumu," Teorie vědy / Th eory of Science 39, č. 1 (2017): 14. Teorie kulturní mezery 78 režimu vědění do „mezery" mezi tradičními, historicky zformovanými hodnotami (konvencemi) vědy a na budoucnost orientovanými strukturami upřednostňujícími vykazatelný přínos. Podle všeho i díky Veblenovu a Ogburnovu příspěvku je dnes zřejmější, že změna je jednak důsledkem „tlaku okolností", jednak důsledkem snahy vytěžit z tlaku okolností „to nejlepší". Zásadní přitom je, jak je „tlak okolností" prezentován v různých (vědeckých, politických, kulturních apod.) oblastech aktivit a jaké prostředky se k dosahování „toho nejlepšího" prosazují ve skutečnostech technologických a institucionálních zájmů. Jak zde bylo naznačeno, do vztahu sociální vědy a jejího publika zcela zásadně promlouvá „mezera" v obou podobách, v jaké ji Veblen a Ogburn exponovali, dramatizovali a prezentovali ve svých teoriích. Bibliografi e: Adorno, Th eodor. „Veblen's Attack on Culture." Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9, č. 3 (1941): 389–413. Balon, Jan. Sociologie v USA: Historické kontextualizace. Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 2011. Brinkman, Richard L. a June E. Brinkman. „Cultural Lag: In the Tradition of Veblenian Economics." Journal of Economic Issuess 40, č. 4 (2006): 1009–28. 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Teorie kulturní mezery 80 Ogburn, William F. „Th e Process of Adjustment to New Inventions." In Technology and International Relations, ed. William F. Ogburn, 16–27. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. Ogburn, William F. „Th e Great Man versus Social Forces." Social Forces 5, č. 2 (1926): 225–31. Riesman, David. Th orstein Veblen: A Critical Interpretation. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953. Ross, Dorothy. Th e Origins of American Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Rutherdorf, Malcolm. „Veblen's Evolutionary Programme: A Promise Unfulfi lled." Cambridge Journal of Economics 22, č. 4 (1998): 463–77. Shapin, Steven a Simon Schaff er. Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. Smith, Mark C. Social Science in the Crucible: Th e American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose. Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1994. 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A RT IG O S / A RT IC LE S 43 O CONCEITO DE DOXA (OPINIÃO) EM ARISTÓTELES THE CONCEPT OF DOXA (OPINION) IN ARISTOTLE Christiani Margareth de Menezes e Silva* Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Londrina, PR, Brasil Resumo: A noção de doxa (opinião) será geralmente entendida por pensadores gregos como Platão como contrária ao conhecimento epistêmico, verdadeiro, devido ao fato de expressar ou particularidades ligadas às percepções, que podem ser errôneas, ou a passionalidade dos sujeitos. Aristóteles, através da análise de um tipo de opinião, endoxa, que coincide com o verossímil na maioria das vezes, estabelecerá as espécies de opiniões que sevirão de base para argumentos dialéticos e retóricos. Palavras-chave: Doxa. Endoxa. Retórica. Dialética. Argumentação. Abstract: The notion of doxa (opinion) will be understood by Greek thinkers like Plato as opposed to epistemic knowledge, true, due to the fact to be understood as an expression of particularities linked to perceptions, which may be erroneous, as well as express passionateness subjects. Aristotle, through the analysis of a type of opinion, endoxa, which coincide with the verisimilar most of the time, is who will establish the kinds of opinions that will be the base for dialectical and rhetorical arguments. Keywords: Doxa. Endoxa. Rhetoric. Dialectic. Argumentation. * Doutora da Universidade Estadual de Londrina – UEL, Londrina, PR, Brasil; [email protected] Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.2236-4242.v29i2p43-67 44 Breve desenvolvimento da argumentação Para a maioria dos gregos, os embates entre opiniões (doxai) eram comuns nas argumentações das assembleias e tribunais, sendo parte de duelos discursivos e argumentativos típicos da cultura da época. É na cidade de Atenas que vemos o gosto pelos debates públicos aos poucos desenvolver artes da argumentação como a dialética e a retórica, o que talvez seja em parte devido a certa liberdade de expressão presente na polis ateniense.1 De acordo com Platão na obra Parmênides, Zenão de Eléia teria inventado a dialética – a arte de discutir perguntando e dando razões daquilo que se diz –, ao desenvolver argumentos em defesa das teses de seu mestre, Parmênides. Vemos na obra homônima de Platão Zenão apresentar argumentos que têm função semelhantes as das provas (tekmerion) dos debates jurídicos, ou seja, demonstrando uma verdade segura e irrefutável, enquanto a argumentação oposta expressa o contraditório e, consequentemente, é refutada e considerada errrônea. Tal técnica da argumentação inventada por Zenão servirá para atacar qualquer tipo de tese, inclusive as de seu mestre Parmênides,2 como vemos o sofista Górgias fazer em seu Sobre o não-ser. O argumento central de Górgias nesse texto é demonstrar que o ser parmenídico é contraditório, e para isso ele diz que o ser não pode ser pensado nem dito, porque a palavra (logos) não exprime o ser, e nem pode conhece-lo, mas é ela própria que cria a realidade, tomando o lugar do ser. Isso aparece ainda em outro texto de Górgias, Elogio de Helena, no qual o logos não comunica conhecimento, mas sentimento, sendo compreendido por Platão e Aristóteles como contrário ao logos da dialética, e identificado com o logos da 1 Para uma apresentação da relação entre a liberdade de expressão e a democracia ateniense antiga, ver BERTI, Enrico. "A antiga dialética grega como expressão da liberdade de pensamento e de expressão". In Novos estudos aristotélicos I: Epistemologia, lógica e dialética. Trad. Élcio de Gusmão V. Filho. São Paulo: Loyola, 2010a. p. 392-409. 2 Para os argumentos contra o movimento e os paradoxos desenvolvidos por Zenão, ver MCKIRAHAN Jr. In. LONG, 2008, p. 191-218; BERTI, 2010b, p. 194-197; KIRK; RAVEN; SCHOFIELD, 2010, p. 275-292, entre outros. Sobre Zenão como inventor da dialética ver "Zenão de Eléia: inventor da dialética?" (BERTI, 2010a, p. 411-431). Sobre as questões relacionadas à noção de "ser" no pensamento grego, ver os artigos presentes em KAHN, Charles H. Sobre o verbo grego ser e o conceito de ser. Tradução de AAVV. Rio de Janeiro: PUC-Rio, 1997. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 45 retórica sofística, que visa persuadir movendo os afetos. Vemos Platão apresentar um exemplo dessa força da linguagem quando faz Górgias na obra homônima dizer que mesmo não sendo ele médico, consegue convencer os pacientes a adotarem o tratamento recomendado por seu irmão, este sim médico (Górgias 456 b)! Assim, o logos é o grande dominador (dynastes) ao qual a maioria não resiste (Elogio de Helena, 19), não comunicando a verdade, mas a criando e persuadindo passionalmente seus ouvintes.3 Outra característica criticada por Platão na retórica dos sofistas é o fato deles preferirem "discursos longos", sem participação de interlocutores, como seria o caso dos discursos dialéticos, estes sim discursos "breves" e com a constante presença de interlocutores. Porém, no diálogo Protágoras, o personagem título, um sofista, é descrito por Platão como alguém que prefere o discurso breve, fato raro entre os oradores; então Protágoras aceita perguntar e dar razão do que diz – algo característico também da dialética –, enquanto a retórica, como Platão a caracteriza, ao utilizar discursos longos, faz esquecer as razões, sem apresentar passo a passo o que afirma. Apesar disso, Protágoras é considerado por Platão um professor de retórica ou sofista hábil tanto no discurso breve como no longo (Protágoras, 335 b-c); parece que Protágoras pretendia em suas argumentações apresentar a credibilidade de pontos de vistas opostos, o que tornaria impossível decidir qual ponto de vista seria falso e qual seria verdadeiro, concluindo dessa maneira, que ambos fossem verdadeiros; assim, ambas as opiniões (doxai) se equivaleriam (Teeteto, 166 dss.). Isto é consequência da famosa doutrina do homo mensura – "o homem como medida de todas as coisas" –, ou da equipolência das teses, interpretada por Platão e Aristóteles como uma doutrina relativista, porque torna a contradição e a refutação impossíveis ao não permitir a dedução da contradição em teses contrapostas (Cf. Eutidemo, 286 b-c). 3 Devemos lembrar que o termo sophistes (sofista) não apresenta na época uma conotação pejorativa, significando "sábio", e que essa é dada pela interpretação de alguns autores, dentre os quais Platão, seguida por Aristóteles. Para uma apreciação inicial dessa questão, remeto o leitor a WOODRUFF, Paul. "Retórica e relativismo: Protágoras e Górgias" e CAIZZI, Fernanda D. "Protágoras e Antifonte: Debates sofísticos acerca da justiça" (LONG, 2008, p. 365-388; e p. 389-411). MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 46 Contemporâneo dos sofistas e de alguns dos primeiros filósofos, Sócrates fará uso das práticas discursivas típicas da dialética em suas inquirições nas ruas de Atenas, mas apesar de utilizar algo que os sofistas desenvolveram, ele imprime à dialética outra configuração, na qual a opinião não terá o mesmo peso que tem para Protágoras, por exemplo. De acordo com Platão, Xenofonte e Aristóteles,4 Sócrates praticava um método de discussão via perguntas e respostas para refutar seu interlocutor, conhecido como elenchus (refutação). Com Sócrates a dialética se distingue da retórica, especialmente em relação à forma de considerar as opiniões, pois a dialética propõe um método de análise crítica das mesmas, enquanto a retórica, como a protagoriana, as considera verdadeiras, cabendo ao orador tornar uma delas persuasiva. Mesmo distinta na forma de considerar a opinião, a dialética mantém-se no terreno das opiniões para Sócrates, embora relacionada com a ciência, mas com esta não se identificando, como percebemos nos primeiros diálogos inconclusos de Platão, conhecidos como "diálogos socráticos" ou aporéticos. Sinteticamente, o método socrático do elenchus consiste em ser: [...] um procedimento dialético no qual, ao contrário de uma demonstração científica aristotélica, onde partimos de premissas apodíticas e chegamos a uma conclusão necessária, partimos de uma proposição aceita pelo interlocutor com o intuito de testá-la em conjunto com outras crenças do mesmo interlocutor de modo a verificar a consistência do conjunto (DINUCCI, 2008, p. 5). O elenchus socrático é, portanto, um método de verificação da consistência das opiniões, demonstrando que essas não constituem conhecimento verdadeiro, embora Sócrates não nos indique nesses diálogos aporéticos em que consiste a ciência, apenas que opinião não é ciência ou conhecimento epistêmico. 4 Os testemunhos, e a descrição do método praticado por Sócrates, encontramos em Xenofonte Memoráveis (ver bibliografia), em várias obras de Platão e sua teorização é feita nas Refutações Sofísticas e nos Tópicos de Aristóteles. Os diálogos entendidos como ligados ao Sócrates histórico, ou diálogos socráticos, escritos por Platão, são os seguintes: Apologia de Sócrates, Cármides, Críton, Eutífron, Eutidemo, Górgias, Hípias Menor, Íon, Lísis, Laques, Protágoras, o Livro I da República e a primeira parte do Mênon. Destes diálogos, apenas a Apologia é, em grande parte, um monólogo de Sócrates defendendo-se no tribunal de Atenas, os demais são diálogos entre Sócrates e interlocutores. Conforme grande parte dos especialistas, é muito provável que a dialética característica desses diálogos fosse praticada pelo Sócrates histórico. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 47 Será Platão, seu discípulo, que indicará a saída das aporias presentes nos primeiros diálogos e fará a distinção entre opinião e ciência, identificando esta última com a dialética. Platão: Oposição opinião-ciência No diálogo Mênon, da fase intermediária de seu pensamento, a dialética é relacionada à ciência, embora Platão ainda não identifique as duas, o que ele faz em uma obra sua da maturidade, República.5 Nesta obra, especialmente na descrição dos estados do conhecimento no final do Livro VI, passagem conhecida como "Símile da Linha" ou "Linha Dividida", Platão, na voz de Sócrates, descreve os dois planos do real e atribui a eles graus de conhecimento, identificando a dialética com a ciência, assim como o lugar da opinião no processo de conhecimento. A questão do conhecimento aqui passa pelo famoso dualismo da realidade platônico, isto é, a distinção entre dois planos do real, a saber: o sensível e o inteligível, sendo este último causa (aitia) do primeiro. A Linha (509 d-511 e), como exposta por Sócrates, é dividida primeiramente em duas partes desiguais correspondentes aos dois planos da realidade, sendo subdividida em cada um desses segmentos em segmentos intermediários. Sua divisão dá-se conforme uma determinada relação e, segundo Pierre Aubenque, os dois segmentos intermediários são iguais.6 Assim, na divisão feita por Sócrates em 509d, sabemos que inicialmente a 5 No Teeteto, Platão fala da "opinião verdadeira", que é uma possibilidade, mas, por não termos como saber se a possuímos em todos os casos, toda opinião deve ser recusada como expressando algo verdadeiro, já que não há garantias de que opinião e verdade coincidam sempre, já que quando coincidem é acidentalmente. 6 A consideração da divisão da linha em partes iguais, foi abandonada pela maioria dos comentadores desde John Burnet, como nos esclarece Pierre Aubenque em seu artigo: "De l'egalité dês segments intermédiaires dans la ligne de la Republique", In Sophies Maietores, Homnage a Jean Pépin, 1992, 31-44. Aubenque ainda esclarece que tal desigualdade apresenta como argumento de fundo o fato de serem as regiões do sensível e do inteligível, ali representadas, regiões desiguais, permanecendo em aberto a qual das duas caberia o segmento mais longo. E outro argumento apresentado por Aubenque é de ordem matemática, pois se a intenção aqui é construir uma proporção, uma analogia, então não há porque esta ser reduzida a uma igualdade aritmética, já que a analogia seria de tipo 1/1 = 1/1 e resultaria em 1 =1, o que, segundo Aubenque faria peder a função própria da analogia, a saber: "pensar a igualdade de relações entre termos desiguais" (AUBENQUE, op. cit., p. 38-39). MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 48 linha é dividida desigualmente em dois segmentos, um correspondente ao sensível e outro à realidade inteligível. Logo a seguir, Sócrates faz corresponder ao plano do sensível e ao plano do inteligível, níveis de conhecimento, ou seja, à divisão entre o mundo dos sentidos e o mundo inteligível cabe uma subdivisão associada aos quatro estados (pathemata) da alma quanto ao que se conhece em cada seguimento de ambas as realidades, sensível e inteligível. Dessa forma, em relação ao sensível, tem-se apenas o conhecimento das opiniões, ou seja, as doxai, formadas inicialmente com o que primeiro temos do sensível, isto é, a percepção das sombras e dos reflexos das coisas sensíveis, correspondentes à eikasia, das quais fazemos no máximo conjecturas (República, 509d-510a). As coisas sensíveis, que provocam sombras e reflexos, aparecem após a eikasia (conjectura) são os artefatos humanos e os seres vivos (animais e plantas) que correspondem à pistis, ou seja, a crença que colocamos naquilo que vem da sensação (aisthesis) (República, 510a). Na eikasia, por percebermos apenas sombras e reflexos das coisas sensíveis, temos um conhecimento mais obscuro do que na pistis, pois nela percebemos as próprias coisas sensíveis (IGLÉSIAS, 1998, p. 48). Essa distinção, portanto, entre ver um graveto na água, por exemplo, e vê-lo fora dela implica um maior grau de clareza, pois uma coisa é ver o objeto e outra bem diferente é ver o seu reflexo ou sua sombra (ibid., p. 49). Portanto, no plano do sensível, o máximo de conhecimento que atingimos se baseia nas opiniões (doxai) acerca daquilo que os sentidos captam via eikasia e pistis, sem alcançarmos um conhecimento seguro e verdadeiro, pois o sensível é considerado por Platão uma cópia imperfeita, mutável, instável do verdadeiro encontrado apenas no plano inteligível. Na descrição do segmento inteligível, Sócrates também apresenta divisões, assim como no sensível, embora a distinção que neste é clara em relação ao que corresponde à pistis e ao que corresponde à eikasia, resultando em um conhecimento opinativo (doxa), não é assim tão clara no texto platônico em relação ao inteligível, porque pelo texto não há como sabermos se entre os objetos matemáticos (presentes na primeira parte do segmento inteligível) e as Ideias/Formas (idea/eidos) propriamente ditas existe uma diferença ontológica. Deixando esta questão de lado, por ela ser complexa e extrapolar nosso objetivo aqui, devemos observar que no primeiro segmento do inteligível, a análise feita estabelece MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 49 hipóteses e, a partir dessas análises procuramos chegar a uma conclusão hipotética. Já no segundo segmento do inteligível, também utilizamos hipóteses, mas não procuramos mais conclusões provisórias, hipotéticas, pois objetiva-se chegar ao princípio (ousia) ou princípios sem se apoiar no uso de imagens, apenas nas Ideias ou Formas (República, 510b). Na dianoia, o primeiro grau de conhecimento dessa etapa, os resultados obtidos ainda não levam ao inteligível, embora este seja visado. As hipóteses aqui obtidas chegam a um princípio, que é considerado hipotético e não absoluto e depois dessas serem cuidadosamente examinadas chega-se ao princípio não hipotético (id.). No procedimento dialético como entendido por Platão, o que se procura é o princípio e passamos gradualmente de hipótese em hipótese até se chegar ao não hipotético. Chegando a esse ponto a razão passa então "de Idéia em Idéia para chegar a uma Idéia." (IGLÉSIAS, 1998, p. 50; República, 511 b) Mas como isso se dá – chegar ao não hipotético –, Platão esclarece apenas em outra obra sua, Fédon. Não nos alongaremos mais nessa questão, já que nos interessa aqui a postura que Platão tem diante das opiniões, sua desvalorização e distinção da ciência, e a identificação desta com a dialética, pois: Para Platão, o 'refutar segundo a opinião' praticado por Protágoras não se caracteriza mais com a dialética, visto que esta última deve 'refutar segundo a realidade': logo, não há outra dialética senão a filosofia, uma filosofia entendida como ciência. (BERTI, 2010b, p. 404) Portanto, a doxa, mesmo quando verdadeira (Teeteto) não é o terreno do conhecimento epistêmico e objetivo para Platão. Mesmo reconhecendo que o tipo de argumentação sofística, ou algumas figuras dessa como o elenchus, deva ser levada a sério, é só observarmos as várias obras de Platão nas quais a retórica está em pauta, ele só reconhecerá valor à retórica quando a aproximar de seu método epistêmico, a dialética como ocorre no Fedro, e mesmo nesse caso, a opinião é refutada por ligar-se ao terreno do passageiro e revelar posições singulares que pouco, ou quase nada, contribuem para o âmbito do conhecimento objetivo, necessário e universal. Veremos a seguir que para Aristóteles a opinião, ou certo tipo dela, será base para as argumentações da retórica, assim como da dialética, mas no estagirita MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 50 esta última não será mais sinônimo de episteme e filosofia como em Platão, e a retórica será uma arte (techne) da linguagem, como a dialética. Um tipo especial de opinião: os endoxa Como aludimos antes, em Aristóteles a opinião terá papel central nas esferas da dialética e da retórica, além de servir também às ciências particulares e às filosóficas. Diferentemente de seu mestre Platão, Aristóteles atribui outro papel à dialética em seu pensamento e não a identifica com a ciência (episteme), embora a dialética esteja a ela associada por possibilitar a análise dos princípios, algo que a ciência não faz. É interessante lembrar que Aristóteles contrapõe as opiniões dos filósofos no início de sua Metafísica, quando analisa as teses de seus predecessores, indo de Tales a Platão, à luz de sua teoria das quatro formas7. As teses dos filósofos, contudo, não são para Aristóteles os tipos de opiniões expressas nas discussões dialéticas e retóricas, pois essas esferas são constituídas para ele por uma classe especial de opiniões conhecidas como endoxa, adjetivo grego que expressa não uma opinião qualquer, mas aquela ou aquelas opiniões que têm "fama", "reputação", "glória" (BERTI, 2002, p. 25), isto é, as opiniões dos mais sábios ou eminentes, ou opiniões comuns à maioria. Nos Tópicos, tratado aristotélico sobre a dialética, Aristóteles procura os topoi (lugares) ou esquemas de raciocínio úteis para a argumentação: Nosso tratado se propõe encontrar um método [methodos] de investigação graças ao qual possamos raciocinar, partindo de opiniões geralmente aceitas [endoxa], sobre qualquer problema que nos seja proposto, e sejamos também capazes, quando replicamos a um argumento, de evitar dizer alguma coisa que nos cause embaraço.8 7 Como observado por J. Mansfield, em um texto sobre o princípio da filosofia grega, na passagem em que trata da recepção de Aristóteles dessa herança: MANSFIELD, Jaap "Fontes". In LONG, A. A. (Org.) Primórdios da Filosofia. Tradução de Paulo Ferreira. Aparecida, SP: Idéias & Letras, 2008. p. 74. (Companions & Companions) 8 Tópicos I 1, 100 a18-22. Tradução de Leonel Vallandro e Gerd Bornheim da versão inglesa de W. D. Ross. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1973. (Os Pensadores IV) Uso esta tradução nas citações dessa obra, geralmente com modificações, mas não na presente passagem citada. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 51 A dialética constrói suas premissas e proposições baseando-se nas "opiniões geralmente aceitas" (endoxa), que são opiniões, como dissemos, de tipo especial, porque elas dizem respeito a um corpo de crenças expressas, e é no interior destas que elas se elegem e se justificam: "São, por outro lado, opiniões 'geralmente aceitas' [endoxa] aquelas que todo mundo admite, ou a maioria das pessoas, ou os sábios [sophoi] – em outras palavras: todos, ou a maioria, ou os mais notáveis e eminentes [endoxoi]."9 Assim, a dialética aristotélica desenvolve a argumentação no plano das opiniões comuns à maioria, e é neste plano que se encontra sua veracidade (Tópicos I 14, 105 b30-31). Dessa forma, o plausível (endoxon), objeto da opinião comum, é identificado por Aristóteles com o provável (eikos), que, sem ser necessário, contém verdade, pois ele é assim reconhecido pela maioria (hoi pleitoi), ou, pelo menos, pelos mais sábios (hoi sophoteroi; Tópicos I 10, 104 a8). Além disso, a dialética para Aristóteles seleciona e justifica os endoxa e não é uma arte da controvérsia entre opiniões, onde encontramos para ele a erística; ela é um cálculo de probabilidades,10 que estabelece quais opiniões são endoxa e quais são seu contrário, as adoxon, opiniões compartilhadas por poucos, ou pelos menos sábios (Tópicos I 10, 100 b23-101 14). Pois nem toda opinião que parece geralmente aceita o é na realidade. Com efeito, em nenhuma das opiniões que chamamos geralmente aceitas, a ilusão é claramente visível [epi polaion echei pantelos ten phantasian], como acontece com os princípios dos silogismos erísticos, nos quais a natureza da falácia é de uma evidência imediata, e em geral até mesmo para as pessoas de pouco entendimento. (Tópicos I 1, 100 b26-101 a1) 9 Tópicos 1, 100 b21-23. Tradução de Leonel Vallandro e Gerd Bornheim com modificações. Preferi traduzir sophoi por "sábios" por concordar com os comentadores que apontam o fato de que estes não coincidem com os filósofos, já que as opiniões destes podem não ser compartilhadas pela maioria, não se caracterizando, portanto, como endoxa. Estes sophoi são geralmente os especialistas em uma determinada área, por exemplo, no caso de geômetras, quanto à geometria, e dos médicos, quanto à medicina. 10 Cf. VIANO, G. apud. RACIONERO, Quintín. "Introduccíon" In ARISTÓTELES, Retórica. Introdução, Tradução e Notas de. Madrid: Gredos, 1994. p. 35. O eikos (provável ou plausível) era o esquema argumentativo comumente ensinado pelos sofistas, sendo identificado por Platão com aquilo que esses rétores ofereciam no lugar da verdade. Cf. WOODUFF, P. "Retórica e relativismo: Protágoras e Górgias" In LONG, A. A. (org.) Primórdios da Filosofia. Trad. Paulo Ferreira. Aparecida, SP: Idéias & Letras, 2008. (Companions & Companions) p. 372. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 52 Para Aristóteles os endoxa expressam um fundo real de sabedoria em linguagem já construída e reconhecida pela maioria, ou pelos especialistas. Eles são, assim, as próprias premissas ou proposições dialéticas, como ele diz expressamente ao definir essas proposições nos Tópicos: [...] uma proposição dialética consiste em perguntar alguma coisa que é admitida por todos os homens, pela maioria deles ou pelos sábios [sophoi], isto é, ou por todos, ou pela maioria, ou pelos mais eminentes, contanto que não seja contrária à opinião geral; pois um homem assentirá provavelmente ao ponto de vista dos sábios se este não contrariar as opiniões da maioria das pessoas. (Tópicos 10, 104 a 9-12) Quando nos encontramos diante de uma pergunta que apresenta duas possibilidades contraditórias de respostas estamos diante de um tipo de problema dialético (problema dialekikon) para Aristóteles: "Os problemas [dialéticos] também incluem questões em relação às quais os raciocínios se chocam (consiste então a dificuldade em se tal ou tal coisa é ou não é assim, havendo argumentos convincentes a favor de ambos os pontos de vista)" (Tópicos I 11, 104 b11-15). Se na discussão desse tipo de problema alguém der uma resposta que contradiga a opinião comum (endoxa), a resposta dada é paradoxal (paradoxos), como acontece com as opiniões dos filósofos, e por isso tais opiniões não coincidem com os endoxa. É só lembrarmos que as opiniões dos filósofos não eram na época compartilhadas pela maioria, eram mesmo motivo de controvérsia (BERTI, 2010a, p. 370-371). Já as opiniões dos peritos ou especialistas (teknites) podem ser endoxa, e as proposições formadas a partir delas se harmonizam para Aristóteles com as artes (technai): [...] todas as proposições que se harmonizam com as artes [kata technas] são proposições dialéticas; pois os homens estão predispostos a dar seu assentimento aos pontos de vista daqueles que estudaram essas coisas: por exemplo, numa questão de medicina concordarão com o médico, numa questão de geometria, com o geômetra; e da mesma forma nos outros casos. (Tópicos 10, 104 a33-37) MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 53 Opiniões como as dos geômetras e médicos, especialistas em suas áreas, são endoxa, assim como opiniões compartilhadas pela maioria. Como esclarece Berti, as premissas dialéticas, por serem endoxa, se dispõem em ordem decrescente de autoridade, "se a propósito de um problema houver uma opinião aceita por todos, esta será o endoxon, se não houver uma opinião aceita por todos, mas apenas pela maioria, o endoxon será esta, e assim por diante."11 Uma premissa endoxa pode ser verdadeira ou falsa, entretanto, ela deve ser compartilhada por uma maioria, ou pelo menos por especialistas. Além disso, as premissas dialéticas são endoxa porque devem ser compartilhadas pelo interlocutor, ou pela plateia que assiste ao debate, como era comum na antiguidade grega. Se, como dissemos antes, a característica das premissas dialéticas é expressar opiniões de tipo endoxa, a confutação de uma solução e a validação de sua oposta depende do valor de verdade das premissas. Se estas são verdadeiras, não há o que opor, mas se são premissas que podem não ser verdadeiras, sua confutação tem um valor relativo para o interlocutor. Por isso a importância de estabelecer o valor de verdade, ou valor epistemológico dos endoxa: segundo Enrico Berti é ao distinguir endoxa autênticos de endoxa aparentes, que Aristóteles esclarece o valor de verdade ou valor epistemológico destes nos Tópicos. Os endoxa autênticos são premissas dos silogismos dialéticos e os aparentes são, por outro lado, premissas dos silogismos erísticos ou sofísticos, sendo, portanto, superficiais, enquanto os endoxa autênticos são verdadeiros na maioria dos casos. Opinião, dialética e retórica Apesar de tais explicações no seu trabalho sobre dialética, é em sua Retórica que o valor de verdade ou valor epistemológico dos endoxa é esclarecido por Aristóteles mais que nos Tópicos (cf. BERTI, 2010a, p. 374). A primeira parte da Retórica, Livro I capítulos 1 e 2, apresenta muita semelhança com os Tópicos, especialmente o Livro I 1-2 deste. Esta proximidade entre retórica e dialética parece se dever 11 BERTI, 2010a, p. 370. Berti parafraseia J. Brunschwig em Dialetique et philosophie. Berti inclusive lembra que o neologismo "endoxa" foi cunhado por Brunschwig, para ser contraposto a "paradoxal". MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 54 à fundamentação da retórica como uma verdadeira techne da linguagem.12 Além disso, a retórica é também considerada como "o desdobramento" ou "a outra face" (antistrophos) da dialética (BERTI, 2010a, p. 406). A retórica é a outra face [antistrophos] da dialética; pois ambas se ocupam de questões mais ou menos ligadas ao conhecimento comum e que não pertencem a nenhuma ciência em particular. De fato, todas as pessoas de alguma maneira participam de uma ou de outra, pois todas elas tentam em certa medida questionar e sustentar um argumento, defender-se ou acusar.13 A dialética e a retórica são disciplinas paralelas que lidam com as opiniões, são técnicas ou artes (technai) da linguagem em Aristóteles que se complementam, mas não se identificam, e a função de ambas é selecionar e justificar enunciados prováveis para assim constituir raciocínios verossímeis. Elas são methodoi, 12 Cf. MOST, 1994, passim; BERTI, 2010a, 373-387. O artigo de Most é pioneiro na análise do valor epistemológico dos endoxa na Retórica. Techne, arte, técnica ou perícia, é uma noção próxima à episteme (ciência) entre os antigos, sendo geralmente sua sinônima em Platão e em algumas passagens da obra de Aristóteles. Apesar disso, Aristóteles estabelece mais claramente a diferença entre essas noções: a techne é um tipo de saber teorético, e por isso epistêmico, que pode ser aplicado, como também ensinado, já que é característica do especialista, assim como do cientista, saber o porquê e a causa, o que os capacita a ensinar para Aristóteles. No processo de conhecimento descrito no início da Metafísica, que vai da sensação (aisthesis) à episteme, apenas esta e a techne são conhecimentos universais, enquanto aisthesis, mneme (memória) e empeiria (experiência) o são dos particulares. O teknites, especialista, perito, técnico, artista, são médicos, arquitetos, sapateiros, navegadores, poetas, entre outros (Ver PUENTE, Fernando Rey. A téchne em Aristóteles. Hypnos, ano 3, n. 4, p. 129-135). Para o esclarecimento dessas questões em Aristóteles, ver as distinções feitas na Ética a Nicômaco VI. É curioso notar que os textos que tratam de technai em Aristóteles – Tópicos, Retórica e Poética – dizem respeito a artes que se dão por meio da linguagem. 13 Retórica I 1, 1354 a1-7. Tradução M. Alexandre Jr., P. F. Alberto e A. N. Pena, modificada. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional/Casa da Moeda, 1998. O termo antítrofe vem do teatro e significa uma cumplicidade formal comum à retórica e à dialética: e rhetorike estin antistrophos te dialektike (Retórica 1354 a1-2). Antistrophos é traduzido geralmente por "correlativo": "Na lírica coral, a estrutura métrica de uma strophe repete-se na antistrophe, representando a primeira o movimento numa direcção, e a segunda o movimento contrário. Ambos, porém, em coordenação oposta e complementar, como artes que têm semelhanças gerais e diferenças específicas." Cf. ALEXANDRE JÚNIOR, M.; ALBERTO, P. F.; PENA, A. N., 1998, nota 2, p. 89. Literalmente significa "convertível", correspondente, paralela, análoga. Cf. BERTI, 2002, p. 171. A retórica é também considerada "imagem" (homoima), "semelhante" (homoia) à dialética. Cf. Retórica 1359 b11 e 1354 a31, respectivamente. Ela também é paraphyes (ramo); ver nota abaixo. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 55 instrumentos que determinam os requisitos que as argumentações prováveis devem cumprir, apresentam o mesmo objeto e o mesmo tipo de saber, mas o âmbito de aplicação de ambas não se restringe a alguma matéria ou fim determinado (Retórica I 1, 1355 b8-10). Cabe à dialética examinar (exetazein) e sustentar um argumento (hypechein logon), e cabe à retórica acusar (kategorein) e defender (apologeisthai) (Retórica 1354 a5-6). Como já consideramos, a retórica e a dialética são antístrofes ou saberes simétricos e complementares, e não redutíveis um ao outro (Retórica 1354 a1-3; Refutações Sofísticas 34, 183 b1-8), já que além de antistrophe, a retórica é paraphyes, isto é, um ramo ou ramificação autônoma da dialética (e da política): "a retórica é como que um ramo [paraphyes] da dialética e daquele saber prático sobre os caracteres a que é justo chamar política" (Retórica I 1, 1354 a1-10).14 Assim, a dialética deve saber provar a probabilidade de uma opinião, refutando as opiniões opostas objetivando vencer uma discussão; enquanto a retórica deve saber defender a opinião mais provável, determinando, mediante persuasão, a necessidade da aceitação de tal opinião pelo público, que julga calado, o discurso proferido pelo orador. O paralelismo entre retórica e dialética se deve ainda ao fato de ambas possuirem a mesma estrutura: a forma e a argumentação via silogismo, o que as torna ainda análogas da ciência apodítica ou demonstrativa (episteme).15 Em suma, ambas são artes ou técnicas (technai) que constroem seus argumentos 14 O termo paraphyes, comum na biologia aristotélica, parece indicar a independência do ramo cortado da planta, ou o membro de um animal, em relação ao todo do organismo. Utilizado aqui de maneira metafórica, indicaria que, mesmo independente, a retórica é parte da filosofia prática de Aristóteles, a saber: da dialética, da ética e da política Cf. RACIONERO, 1994, nota 38, p. 178-179. 15 Encontramos a definição de ciência (episteme), nos Segundos Analíticos: "Julgamos conhecer cientificamente (epistasthai) cada coisa, de modo absoluto e não, à maneira sofística, por acidente, quando julgamos conhecer a causa pela qual a coisa é, que ela é a sua causa e que não pode essa coisa ser de outra maneira" (I 2, 71 b9-12) Tradução de PEREIRA, 2000, p. 35. A causa (aitia) no sentido antigo e aristotélico significa o porquê ou qualquer tipo de explicação: se é para explicar um objeto, pergunta-se do que ele é feito (causa material), porque é feito de certo modo e não de outro (causa formal), quem o fez (causa eficiente) e para que serve (causa final). Se o que se quer explicar é um evento pergunta-se por que aconteceu, o que o provocou, por que se apresentou daquele modo e não de outro, que consequências ele pode ter, a que fins pode estar voltado. Em sentido moderno, causa coincide apenas com a causa de tipo eficiente aristotélica (Cf. BERTI, 2010b, p. 10). MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 56 partindo de opiniões de tipo endoxa e mantém a estrutura típica dos argumentos para Aristóteles, a silogística. O caráter técnico da retórica é saber utilizar, da melhor maneira, as pisteis, ou seja, os meios de persuasão, os modos de causar crença, as provas (1354 a13, 1355 a4). Como arte (techne) da linguagem que é a retórica lida com a construção argumentativa do discurso a ser falado junto a um auditório, seja nas assembleias ou nos tribunais, e por isso Aristóteles distingue os meios de persuasão, as argumentações ou provas (pisteis) em duas categorias: numa estão as provas não-técnicas (atechnoi), que são as leis, as testemunhas, os depoimentos extraídos sob tortura, os contratos e os juramentos, ou seja, provas preexistentes ao discurso do orador; noutra estão as técnicas ou artísitcas (entechnoi), provas (pisteis) pelo logos elaborado pelo orador, pelo ethos deste e pelo pathos do auditório. Já o caráter técnico da dialética consiste em saber utilizar bem as argumentações (syllogismoi) (Tópicos 100 a21). Enquanto a dialética analisa os enunciados prováveis a partir da função designativa da linguagem, concluindo com isto a verossimilhança de tais enunciados, a retórica os investiga a partir das competências comunicativas da linguagem, concluindo sobre sua capacidade de persuasão (RACIONERO, Retórica de Aristóteles, 1994, p. 36). É, pois, evidente que a retórica não pertence a nenhum gênero particular e definido, antes se assemelha à dialética. É também evidente que ela é útil e que sua função não é persuadir mas discernir os meios de persuasão mais pertinentes a cada caso, tal como acontece em todas as outras artes; de fato, não é função da medicina dar saúde ao doente, mas avançar o mais possível na direção da cura, pois também se pode cuidar bem dos que já não estão em condições de recuperar a saúde. (Retórica I 1355b) A arte retórica não possui um único objeto ao qual se dedica, antes pode ser aplicada a várias questões e sua finalidade é encontrar os meios de persusão mais eficazes nos gêneros de discurso – deliberativo, epidítico e judiciário. A persuasão, contudo, não objetiva apenas o sucesso, como vemos em Protágoras, porque para Aristóteles ela também se relaciona com a verdade: "[...] a retórica é útil porque a verdade e a justiça são por natureza mais fortes que os seus contrários." (Retórica MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 57 I 1, 1355 a21-22). A capacidade persuasiva da retórica para o filósofo, inclusive, é maior quanto mais próximo se está do verdadeiro: [...] quem melhor puder teorizar sobre as premissas – do que e como se produz um silogismo – também será o mais hábil em entimemas, [...] pois é próprio de uma mesma faculdade discernir o verdadeiro e o verossímil, já que os homens têm inclinação natural para a verdade e a maior parte das vezes alcançam-na. E, por isso, ser capaz de discernir [stochastikos echein] sobre o plausível [pros ta endoxa] é ser igualmente capaz de discernir sobre a verdade. (Retórica I 1, 1355 a10-18) Estar próximo do verdadeiro indica o verossímil que, para Aristóteles, não é o que tem aparência de verdadeiro e, por isso conclui-se falso, mas, é aquilo que se aproxima do verdadeiro; devemos lembrar que o termo grego eikos, muitas vezes, traduzido como "provável" ou "verossímil", literalmente significa "semelhante", o que indica sua proximidade com o verdadeiro. A retórica é um método (hodos; Retórica I 1, 1354 a8) que seleciona e justifica enunciados verossimilhantes (e por isso mesmo eles são persuasivos), pois a pistis é uma "espécie de demonstração" (apodeixis tis), cuja principal forma é o entimema, um silogismo de probabilidade, fundamentado nos endoxa:16 "Persuadimos, enfim, pelo discurso [via argumentos que têm como premissa os endoxa], quando mostramos a verdade ou o que parece verdade, a partir do que é persuasivo em cada caso particular." (Retórica I 2, 1356 a19-20) Podemos ainda concluir que aquele que conhece bem a dialética também conhece bem os entimemas retóricos para o filósofo (1355 a3-14), e nisso consiste, como diz Berti, a analogia estrutural que existe entre dialética e retórica em Aristóteles. Este comentador observa ainda que o próprio Aristóteles percebe uma analogia entre a capacidade de apreender a verdade – da ciência ou filosofia –, e a capacidade de apreensão daquilo que se "assemelha à verdade", próprio da retórica, assim como há uma analogia entre a disposição para o verdadeiro (próprio da filosofia) e a disposição para as premissas "gerais" ou comuns (endoxa), das quais partem as argumentações dialéticas (Tópicos 100 b21 ss). Disso se conclui que a 16 De acordo com Q. Racionero, a raiz do vocábulo entimema, formada por en thymoi, indica a validade subjetiva das premissas. Aristóteles Retórica, p. 46. Thymos indica o "ânimo", "ímpeto", envolvendo o estado de alma. Cf. Retórica I 1. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 58 analogia estrutural da retórica com a dialética torna a retórica análoga também da ciência (episteme), embora isto ocorra indiretamente, já que tal analogia se faz pelo operar da dialética assemelhar-se ao da episteme:17 "Não porque os fatos de que se ocupam tenham igual valor [retórica e ciência], mas porque os verdadeiros e melhores são pela sua natureza sempre mais aptos para os silogismos e mais persuasivos." (Retórica I 1, 1355 a36-38) De maneira parecida com o tratamento que a dialética faz entre silogismo autêntico e silogismo aparente, a retórica trata do entimema autêntico e do entimema aparente: "que corresponde justamente à demonstração do verdadeiro aparente" (Retórica I 2, 1356 b16-18). O que caracteriza o entimema, ou as premissas da argumentação retórica de maneira semelhante ao silogismo dialético, é o verdadeiro "na maioria dos casos" [hos epi to poly], e nisso consiste o valor epistemológico dos endoxa para Aristóteles: [...] atendendo a que nenhuma arte se ocupa do particular – por exemplo, a medicina, que não especifica o que é remédio para Sócrates ou Cálias, mas, para pessoas da sua condição (pois isso é que é próprio de uma arte, já que o individual é indeterminado e não objeto de ciência) –, tampouco a retórica teorizará sobre o provável para o indivíduo – por exemplo, para Sócrates ou Hípias –, mas sobre o que parece verdade para pessoas de certa condição, como também faz a dialética. (Retórica I 2, 1356 b30-34) As premissas das argumentações retóricas – entimemas – são argumentações persuasivas por fundamentarem-se nos endoxa, e seu valor epistemológico está no fato dos endoxa coincidirem com o que é semelhante ao verdadeiro na maioria dos casos, ou seja, o verossimilhante (to eikos). É, portanto, dessa forma que Aristóteles estabelece o valor epistemológico ou valor de verdade das opiniões de tipo endoxa. Já o verossímil (eikos) – provável, plausível –, aparece esclarecido na obra aristotélica sobre outra arte da linguagem, a Poética: 17 Cf. observa BERTI, 2002, p. 172-173. Lembremos que filosofia e episteme (ciência) são sinônimas em Aristóteles. Berti ainda recorda uma analogia posterior entre retórica e ciência: ambas são, como toda potência racional, potência de contrários, como, por exemplo, a arte da medicina, que tanto pode curar como envenenar o paciente. Id. Ibid. p. 175. Cf. também Metafísica IX 2. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 59 [...] a poesia é mais filosófica e tem um caráter mais elevado do que a história. É que a poesia expressa o universal, a histórica o particular. O universal é aquilo que certa pessoa dirá ou fará, de acordo com a verossimilhança ou a necessidade, e é isso que a poesia procura representar, atribuindo, depois, nomes às personagens. O particular é, por exemplo, o que faz Alcibíades ou que lhe aconteceu. (Poética 1451 b5-11) Ser mais filosófica que a história não significa aqui que a poesia trate de verdades ou que não haja verdade nos fatos históricos. Estes são verdadeiros sim – recordando que o termo grego historia significa "investigação" –, mas tratam de fatos particulares, não necessariamente relacionados entre si, enquanto a poesia apresenta narrativas sobre assuntos que poderiam acontecer na maioria das vezes e, quando encadeados, tornam a poesia mais "científica" ou filosófica do que a história de acordo com Aristóteles. Na Poética, a unidade da ação na poesia deve formar um todo (holon) de maneira que, se suprimida ou deslocada qualquer uma de suas partes, essa supressão ou esse deslocamento provoque a desorganização desse todo. Cada parte que compõe a totalidade do enredo (mythos) deve formar um corpo tão coeso e interligado a ponto de totalidade e unidade serem inseparáveis, uma implicando a outra. E isso não ocorre com os fatos narrados pela história, ou se ocorre é algo raro. São estes critérios, de unidade e de totalidade, que indicam o universal (kathalou) da poesia em detrimento do particular da história, e a aproximação da poesia com a filosofia. Segundo Aristóteles, a narrativa histórica diz respeito ao já acontecido, enquanto que a narrativa poética se inscreve no campo do possível e do verossímil. Apesar do poeta e do historiador utilizarem-se do mesmo meio de expressão – a escrita em verso ou em prosa –, o conteúdo a que se referem demonstra suas diferenças: o historiador narra o sucedido e o poeta narra o que poderia ser dentro da ordem do verossímil e do necessário. Por encadear e ordenar os fatos e as ações no mythos, a poesia é considerada mais próxima da filosofia do que a história, e seu conteúdo ordenado revela sua universalidade (Cf. Poética 9, 1451 a36-1451 b10). Como lida com o plausível do "como se" composto pelo poeta, a poesia se distancia da filosofia, que lida com o que é verdadeiro (Cf. Metafísica II 6, 1003 a15). MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 60 Segundo Paul Ricoeur, para Aristóteles um período único de tempo, em que várias ações ocorrem, não constitui uma ação una, portanto, "o laço interno da intriga é mais lógico que cronológico" e, como observa Ricoeur, essa lógica não é a mesma da theoria, pois ela se refere a uma inteligibilidade própria do campo da praxis, significando ser ela vizinha da phronesis, ou seja, da inteligência da ação já que a poesia é um fazer sobre o fazer dos homens em ação, dos agentes. Mas esse fazer também não é de ordem ética, pois não é efetivo, é sim um fazer mimético (RICOEUR, 1994, p. 67-68). De acordo com Stephen Halliwell, o discurso mimético em Aristóteles está fora do dilema verdadeiro-falso, enquanto o discurso teórico, científico, deve ser considerado sob o aspecto do verdadeiro ou do falso (HALLIWELL, 2002, p. 155; HALLIWELL, 1998, p. 132-133). Mas esta afirmação não se sustenta plenamente pelo aspecto mimético da linguagem poética, já que isso não é exclusivo dela, pois as palavras, ou a própria linguagem, são consideradas miméticas por Aristóteles: "Assim, pois, os que a princípio iniciaram este movimento [do estilo e da recitação] foram, como é natural, os poetas, posto que as palavras são imitações [onomata mimemata estin]".18 A proximidade da poesia e da filosofia estaria, então, na ordenação de um todo, e o fato da poesia ser do campo do "como se" sublinha a diferença desta em face da filosofia.19 Quanto às argumentações retóricas, o provável ou verossímil (que é uma premissa plausível ou endoxon) é uma classe do contingente, ou seja, é um contingente que ocorre "na maioria das vezes", o que garante a proximidade ou semelhança com a verdade: Com efeito, probabilidade é o que geralmente acontece [to os epi to poly ginomenon], mas não absolutamente, como alguns definem; antes versa sobre coisas que 18 Retórica III, 1404 a20-23. Tradução nossa a partir do texto grego da Loeb cotejada por sua tradução e pelas traduções de YEBRA e de SOUSA. 19 Ainda na Poética, ao comparar a narrativa da epopeia com a história, Aristóteles considera que esta além de sempre dizer respeito ao particular, é também narrativa casual, portanto, sem necessidade, probabilidade ou verossimilhança, já que se liga ao factual: "Também é manifesto que a estrutura da poesia épica não pode ser igual à das narrativas históricas, as quais têm de expor não uma ação única, mas um tempo único, com todos os eventos que sucederam nesses períodos a uma ou a várias personagens, eventos cada um dos quais está para os outros em relação meramente casual." Poética 23, 1459 a21-24. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 61 podem ser de outra maneira, e relaciona-se no que concerne ao provável como o universal se relaciona com o particular. (Retórica I 2, 1357 a31-b1) Os entimemas retóricos apresentam outra premissa, os "signos" (semeia), e deles a conclusão pode ser necessária, enquanto que as premissas prováveis (eikota), apesar de constituírem a maioria das premissas dos entimemas, caracterizam-se por levarem a uma conclusão geral, não necessária. Apesar de alguns signos levarem a conclusões necessárias, e nesse caso, os signos são "provas" (tekmeria) de caráter irrefutável (alyta), há signos que não constituem provas e, portanto, são signos não necessários, refutáveis (lyta), como alguns casos de indução (Retórica I 2, 1357 b1-17), mesmo quando sua conclusão seja verdadeira (1357 a22-b25). Este último tipo de sinal "não guarda nenhuma relação com os endoxa", como esclarece Berti (2010a, p. 378). Tanto os entimemas retóricos quanto os silogismos dialéticos dizem respeito aos lugares (topoi), aos esquemas de argumentação comuns (koinoi). Ambas, retórica e dialética, são capacidades argumentativas calcadas em opiniões que apresentam a veracidade de premissas aceitas pela maioria ou pelos peritos, que são verdade na maioria das vezes. Em suma, a retórica é uma forma de racionalidade estruturada sobre argumentações dialéticas, e por causa desta estrutura apresenta caráter técnico, visto dizer respeito ao verossímil (Cf. BERTI, 2002, p. 185). Isso fica ainda mais evidente na distinção feita por Aristóteles dos entimemas: Há duas espécies de entimemas: os demonstrativos [deiktika] de algo que é ou não é, e os refutativos [elenktika]; a diferença é igual à que existe na dialética entre refutação e silogismo. O entimema demonstrativo é aquele em que a conclusão se obtém a partir de premissas com as quais se está de acordo; o refutativo conduz a conclusões que o adversário não aceita. (Retórica II 22, 1396 b22-27) Outra aplicação interessante da dialética para Aristóteles vai além de seu campo e do campo retórico, chegando às ciências, ao permitir o desenvolvimento de aporias opostas que possibilita ao pesquisador de uma dada ciência a dedução das consequências na verificação de qual solução conduz à contradição – e por isso deve ser evitada –, e qual solução não cai em contradição e pode ser aceita. Dessa forma, a dialética permite ao cientista chegar ao verdadeiro e ao falso, já MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 62 que a contradição é para Aristóteles sinal de falsidade. Tal aplicação da dialética está presente para Aristóteles nas chamadas "ciências verdadeiras" ou "ciências filosóficas", como a geometria, o modelo de ciência apodítica dos Segundos Analíticos, e nas ciências cujos fatos ocorrem casualmente, como a física e a ciência política ou ética.20 A metodologia dialética calcada nos endoxa consegue, assim, verificar ou indagar os princípios das ciências verdadeiras ou filosóficas, algo que elas próprias não podem fazer, pois é preciso indagar sobre suas proposições partindo dos endoxa de cada uma delas, tornando a dialética aristotélica uma verdadeira "via para os princípios" (BERTI, 2010b, p. 224-234). E, no caso das ciências anteriormente aludidas, nas quais não é possível a demonstração propriamente dita, a dialética ajuda no mesmo tipo de distinção entre verdadeiro e falso: Depois do que precede, devemos dizer para quantos e quais fins é útil este tratado. Esses fins são três: o adestramento do intelecto, as disputas casuais e as ciências filosóficas. Que ele é útil como forma de exercício ou adestramento, é evidente à primeira vista. A posse de um plano de investigação nos capacitará para argumentar mais facilmente sobre o tema proposto. Para as conversações e disputas casuais, é útil porque, depois de havermos considerado as opiniões defendidas pela maioria das pessoas, nós as enfrentaremos não nos apoiando em convicções alheias, mas nas delas próprias, e abalando as bases de qualquer argumento que nos pareça mal formulado. Para o estudo das ciências filosóficas é útil porque a capacidade de suscitar dificuldades significativas sobre ambas as 20 "Tais coisas, isto é, as que são por natureza, ou sempre ou no mais das vezes vêm a ser de tal maneira, mas, entre as coisas que são por acaso ou pelo espontâneo, nenhuma vem a ser assim." (Física II 8, 198 b35-37 Tradução de Lucas Angioni. Campinas: IFCH/UNICAMP, 1999); "e ao falar de coisas que são verdadeiras apenas em sua maior parte [hos epi to poly] e com base em premissas da mesma espécie, só poderemos tirar conclusões da mesma natureza." (Ética a Nicômaco I 3, 1094 b21-22 Tradução de Leonel Vallandro e Gerd Bornheim da versão inglesa de W. D. Ross. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1973) Permanece um problema, como Berti considera ao final de seu artigo sobre o valor epistemológico dos endoxa, "saber se também a metafísica pode usar os endoxa como premissas para suas argumentações." (BERTI, 2010a, p. 384-387) Em outro lugar, Berti considera a discussão acerca das quinze aporias no Livro III da Metafísica um procedimento tipicamente dialético (2002, p. 81 ss.), interpretação partilhada por diversos comentadores. Para isso ver ainda PEREIRA, 2001, p. 355ss. Também em Metafísica IV, onde se discute os princípios de não contradição e do terceiro excluído, a análise é dialética. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 63 faces de um assunto nos permitirá detectar mais facilmente a verdade e o erro nos diversos pontos e questões que surgirem. Tem ainda utilidade em relação às bases últimas dos princípios, usados nas diversas ciências, pois é completamente impossível discuti-los a partir dos princípios peculiares à ciência particular que temos diante de nós, visto que os princípios são anteriores a tudo o mais; é à luz das opiniões geralmente aceitas [endoxa] sobre as questões particulares que eles devem ser discutidos, e essa tarefa compete propriamente, ou mais apropriadamente, à dialética, pois esta é um processo de crítica onde se encontra o caminho que conduz aos princípios de todas as investigações. (Tópicos I 2) Enfim, a dialética para Aristóteles permite desenvolver as aporias opostas de uma dada ciência, o que possibilita distinguir o verdadeiro e o falso onde há duas possibilidades de respostas de difícil solução – a aporia –, o que possibilita ao cientista desenvolvê-las para verificar o contraditório e o verdadeiro. Assim chegase a certo grau de certeza em ciências nas quais não é possível exatamente uma demonstração, e outra aplicação da dialética para as ciências é a análise de seus princípios, já que é algo que as ciências verdadeiras não podem fazer. Finalizando o que vimos até aqui, dialética e retórica, assim como a própria ciência, não são distintas para Aristóteles pela estrutura, pois nas três temos o silogismo – científico, dialético e entimema –, estrutura que permite deduzir ou fazer inferência das premissas até chegarmos à conclusão, lembrando ainda que o verbo syllogeisthai significa "argumentar", ou seja, todas são artes da argumentação em que as opiniões de tipo endoxa desempenham importante papel na verificação do verdadeiro ou do verossímil, seu semelhante. Assim, os "em-doxa" (endoxa) constituem opiniões refinadas usadas nas argumentações das diversas formas de racionalidade teorizadas por Aristóteles, formas estas até hoje praticadas e nem todas redutíveis ao raciocínio lógico matemático, tão em voga (cf. BERTI, 2002, p. 187; p. XVI). MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 64 Referências Obras Completas e traduções ARISTÓTELES. Aristotle in Twenty-three Volumes. Cambridge-Mass./London: Harvard University Press. (The Loeb Classical Library) ______. The Works of Aristotle: Selected Fragments. Translated by Sir David Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952. ______. Ética a Nicômaco. Tópicos. Dos Argumentos Sofísticos. Metafísica (Livros I e II). Poética. Tradução AAVV. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1973. (Os Pensadores IV) ______. Retórica. Tradução e notas de M. Alexandre Jr., P. F. Alberto e A. N. Pena. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional/Casa da Moeda, 1998. ______. Retórica. Introdução, tradução e notas de Quintín Racionero. Madrid: Gredos, 1994. ______. Ética a Nicómaco. Ética Eudemia. Tradução de e Notas Emílio Lledó Íñigo. Madrid: Gredos, 1974. ______. Ética a Nicômaco. Tradução de António de Castro Caeiro. São Paulo: Atlas, 2009. ______. Poética. Tradução e Notas de Ana Maria Valente. Lisboa: Calouste Gulbenkian, 2004. ______. Poética. Tradução trilíngue de Valentín García Yebra. Madrid: Gredos, 1974. ______. Poética. Tradução, Prefácio, Introdução, Comentário e Apêndices de Eudoro de Sousa. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional/Casa da Moeda, 1986. ______. Política. Tradução e Notas A. C. Amaral e C. C. Gomes. Lisboa: Vega, 1998. ______. Física. Livros I-II. Tradução de Lucas Angioni. Campinas: IFCH/UNICAMP, 1999. ______. Metafísica. Tradução trilíngue de Valentín García Yebra. Madrid: Gredos, 1990. ______. Metafísica. Prefácio de Sir David Ross. Tradução de Leonel Vallandro da versão inglesa de D. W. Ross. Porto Alegre: Globo, 1969. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 65 ______. Tratados de Lógica (Organon): Categorias. Tópicos. Sobre las refutaciones sofísticas. Tradução de Miguel Candel Sanmartín. Madrid: Gredos, 1988. ______. Tratados de Lógica (Organon): Sobre la interpretación. Analíticos Primeiros. Analíticos Segundos. Tradução de Miguel Candel Sanmartín. Madrid: Gredos, 1994. GÓRGIAS. Sobre o não-ente. Elogio de Helena. Tradução de Maria Cecília de Miranda Nogueira Coelho. Cadernos de Tradução, São Paulo, n. 4, p. 5-14, 1999. DIÔGENES LAÊRTIOS. Vidas e doutrinas dos filósofos ilustres. Tradução Mário da Gama Kury. 2.ed. Brasília: UnB, 2008. PLATÃO. Eutidemo. Tradução de Maura Iglésias. Rio de Janeiro: PUC-Rio/Loyola, 2011. PLATÃO. Górgias. Tradução de Daniel R. N. Lopes. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2011. Comentadores AUBENQUE, Pierre. "De l'egalité dês segments intermédiaires dans la ligne de la Republique", In Sophies Maietores, Homnage a Jean Pépin, 1992, 31-44. BAILLY A. Dictionnaire Grec-Français. Paris: Hachette, 2010. BERTI, Enrico. O valor epistemológico dos endoxa segundo Aristóteles. In Novos estudos aristotélicos I: Epistemologia, lógica e dialética. Tradução de Élcio de Gusmão V. Filho. São Paulo: Loyola, 2010a. p. 370-387. ______. "A antiga dialética grega como expressão da liberdade de pensamento e de expressão". In Novos estudos aristotélicos I: Epistemologia, lógica e dialética. Tradução de Élcio de Gusmão V. Filho. São Paulo: Loyola, 2010a. p. 392-409. ______. "Zenão de Eléia: inventor da dialética?". In Novos estudos aristotélicos I: Epistemologia, lógica e dialética. Tradução de Élcio de Gusmão V. Filho. São Paulo: Loyola, 2010a. p. 411-431. ______. No princípio era a maravilha. As grandes questões da filosofia antiga. Tradução de Fernando Soares Moreira. São Paulo: Loyola, 2010b. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 66 ______. Aristóteles no século XX. Tradução de Dion Davi Macedo. São Paulo, Loyola, 1997. ______. As razões de Aristóteles. Tradução de Dion Davi Macedo. 2. ed. São Paulo: Loyola, 2002. (Leituras Filosóficas) CHERNISS, H. F. A Economia Filosófica da Teoria das Idéias. Tradução de Irley Franco. O que nos faz pensar. Rio de Janeiro: PUC, n. 2, 1990. p. CONFORD, F. M. La Teoria Platónica del Conhecimento. Buenos Aires: Piados, 1968. DINUCCI, Aldo Lopes. O elenchus como o principal instrumento da pedagogia socrática. Saberes, Natal-RN, v. 1, n. 1, dez. 2008. p. 5-16. DÜRING, Ingemar. Aristóteles. Tradução de Barnabé Navarro. 2. ed. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1990. GOLDSCHMIDT, V. Os diálogos de Platão: estrutura e método dialético. Tradução de Dion Davi de Macedo. São Paulo: Loyola, 2002. HALLIWEL, Stephen. "Mimesis". In Aristotle's Poetics. With a new introdution. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998. p. 109-137. ______. "Inside and Outside the Work of Art: Aristotelian Mimesis Reevaluated". The Aesthetics of mimesis. Ancient texts & modern problems. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. p. 151-176. IGLÉSIAS, Maura. Platão: a descoberta da alma. Boletim do CPA, Campinas, n. 5/6, jan./dez. 1998. KIRK, G. S.; RAVEN, J. E.; SCHOFIELD. Os filósofos pré-socráticos. História crítica com selecção de textos. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Louro Fonseca. Lisboa: Calouste Gulbenkian, 2010. MANSFIELD, Jaap "Fontes". In LONG, A. A. (Org.) Primórdios da Filosofia. Tradução de Paulo Ferreira. Aparecida, SP: Idéias& Letras, 2008. p. 74. (Companions & Companions) MOST, Glen. "The uses of the Endoxa. Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Rhetoric." In FURLEY, D.; NEHAMAS, A. (orgs.) Aristotle's Rhetoric. Philosophycal Essays. Princeton: Princenton University Press, 1994. p. 167-190. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez. 2016 67 PEREIRA, Oswaldo Porchat. Ciência e dialética em Aristóteles. São Paulo: UNESP, 2001. PUENTE, Fernando Rey. A téchne em Aristóteles. Hypnos, ano 3, n. 4, p. 129-135 RICOEUR, Paul. "Entre retórica e poética: Aristóteles". In A metáfora viva. Tradução de Dion Davi Macedo. São Paulo: Loyola, 2000. (Leituras Filosóficas) ______. "O tecer da intriga: uma leitura da Poética de Aristóteles". In Tempo e narrativa. Tomo I. Tradução de Constança Marcondes César. Campinas: Papirus, 1994. ROBINSON, R. Plato's earlier dialectic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966. Recebido: 30/08/2016. Aprovado: 18/09/2016. MENEZES E SILVA, C. M. O conceito de doxa (opinião) em Aristóteles Linha D'Água (Online), São Paulo, v. 29, n. 2, p. 43-67, dez.

www.argument-journal.eu ARGUMENT Vol. 3 (1/2013) pp. 133–149 The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing and Understanding the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA ABSTRACT The base texts of most of the philosophical systems of ancient India are in the form of a collection of aphorisms (sūtra-s). The aphorisms are so brief and tersely worded that their significance can seldom be understood without the help of a commentary or commentaries. Sometimes, the literal meaning of an aphorism needs to be qualified or modified by an explanation found in the commentary. If a reader relies exclusively on the literal meaning of the aphorisms in the base text without having recourse to any commentary or disregards all commentaries, he or she may miss the point. Contrariwise, if a reader relies exclusively on a commentary and disregards the literal meaning of an aphorism, he or she will commit another kind of blunder. Ideally, equal attention should be paid to the base text as well as the commentary or commentaries. Even then, all problems are not automatically solved, for it is an uphill task to decide when to go by the literal meaning of the aphorisms and when to follow the commentary. In their polemics against the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Jayantabhaṭṭa (c. ninth century C.E.) and Hemacandra (eleventh century C.E.) erred because they did not follow the golden rule stated above and consequently misunderstood and misrepresented their opponents' contentions. KEYWORDS base text, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Indian philosophy, commentary, inference, perception Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA, Pavlov Institute, India. E-mail: [email protected] * Acknowlegements: Amitava Bhattacharyya, Arindam Saha, Krishna Del Toso, Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya and Sunish Deb. The usual disclaimers apply. 134 Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA I The base texts of most of the philosophical systems of ancient India are in the form of a collection of aphorisms (sūtra-s). The aphorisms are as a rule very brief and terse, even to the point of being incomprehensible. The task of the guru was to make his pupils understand what was in the mind of the author/ redactor of the sūtra-s. The base text was meant to be committed to memory, not to be consulted as and when necessary. Hence, the shorter the better. Since the extreme brevity was meant for facilitating learning by heart, there is a maxim: "Grammarians rejoice over the saving of (even) the length of half a short vowel as much as over the birth of a son", ardhamātrā lāghavena putrotsavaṃ manyante vaiyākaraṇāḥ (NĀGEŚABHAṬṬA 1960–1962: 122). The Kalpasūtras, ancillary works of Vedic ritual literature, and more importantly the ancient grammatical work, the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini (sixth/fifth century B.C.E.) were the models of composing such brief aphorisms. The custom was followed by the founding fathers and/or redactors of the philosophical systems. Brevity may be the soul of wit, but it entails a fundamental problem: for the sake of terseness the aphorisms were sometimes composed in the form of incomplete sentences without verbs. Sometimes just a word was considered sufficient to form an aphorism. The task of the guru was to fill in the gaps by supplying the missing words (technically known as adhyāhāra, supplying). Not all gurus agreed on the right adhyāhāra. There is a Cārvāka aphorism (I.4): tebhyaścaitanyam, 'Consciousness out of these' (BHATTACHARYA 2009: 79, 87). From a preceding aphorism (I.2) it is to be understood that the word tebhyaḥ, 'out of these', refers to the four elements, namely, earth, water, fire and air. Nevertheless, does consciousness arise (anew) or is it merely manifested (as if it was pre-existing)? Two anonymous commentators offered two such adhyāhāras, utpadyate and abhivyajyate. Later writers merely repeat the alternatives or opt for either one or the other (KAMALAŚĪLA II: 633–634).1 Similarly, one guru would suggest one explanation; another guru, something else. Such a difference of opinion inevitably led to confusion. The student was expected to accept either or both as equally probable.2 In any case, book learning, that is, learning from written commentaries, was not considered to be a proper substitute for learning from the mouth of a guru (gurumukhī vidyā). As Rangaswami Aiyangar says: Reliance on a book for elucidation was therefore held as likely not only to mislead but to convey wrong impressions of [the] authentic doctrine. This is why we find in smṛti literature, even in ages in which documents and writings came to be the mainstay of judicial decisions, denunciations of dependence on books, side by side with praise of gifts of purāṇas 1 For further details, see BHATTACHARYA 2009: 121 n. 49. 2 For such an instance, when commentators retain both explanations as two equally valid alternatives, see BHATTACHARYA 2009: 159–160. 135The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing... as among the donations of most sanctity. Devaṇṇa Bhaṭṭa (thirteen century) quotes the authority of Nārada for including dependence on books along with women, gambling, addiction to the stage, idleness and sleep among the impediments to the acquisition of knowledge. Mādhava also quotes Nārada to show that "what is learnt from books, and not from the teacher, will not shine in the assembly of the learned". The familiar denunciation of the sale (vikraya) of knowledge is aimed as much at teaching under contract for a fee as at the sale of the books which will supersede the teacher. The result of the prejudice was twofold: first, improvement of the memory to make its retentiveness greater; and secondly, to make citation in books aim at the utmost accuracy to escape the familiar charge (AIYANGAR 1941: 10). Yet commentaries and sub-commentaries began to appear to meet the need of the students who could not find any guru to guide them through the maze of the base text. Even though a poor substitute, the commentary literature ultimately turned out to be the most viable means of understanding of the philosophical systems. Surendranath Dasgupta, however, notes: [T]he Sanskrit style (sic) of the most of the commentaries is so condensed and different from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid of an expert preceptor (DASGUPTA 1975, I: 67). Thus, in spite of the written commentary, oral exposition by a guru cannot be dispensed with. We are back to square one. Commentaries and sub-commentaries, however, served one important purpose. As early as 1805, Henry Thomas Colebrooke noted: It is a received and well grounded opinion of the learned in India, that no book is altogether safe from changes and interpolations until it have been (sic) commented: but when once a gloss has been published, no fabrication could afterwards succeed; because the perpetual commentary notices every passage, and, in general, explains every word. [...] The genuineness of the commentaries, again, is secured by a crowd of commentators, whose works expound every passage in the original gloss; and whose annotations are again interpreted by others (COLEBOOKE 1977: 98–99). Nevertheless, there is no denying the fact that different systems of Indian philosophy developed and grew out of the expositions, commentaries and subcommentaries composed by the adherents of the systems. When such secondary works are written by the professed adherents of the respective systems, they become a part of the tradition. Yet such works would have to digress to at least some areas that might very well have been totally alien to the sūtrakāra/s, the originator/s or the original systematiser/s. Moreover, it is well known that commentaries or sub-commentaries are sometimes written to defend a system of philosophy that has been attacked by some exponents of another antagonistic system. Uddyotakara's (sixth century 136 Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA C.E.) Vārttika to the Nyāyasūtra is a case in point. The Vārttika was basically a work of defence against the objections to Gautama raised by the Buddhist philosophers, especially Diṅnāga and Vasubandhu, and also Nāgārjuna. Such an apologia is bound to introduce new matters and invent novel interpretations of the original sūtra-s.3 Another sort of problem crops up when the expositor or commentator does not belong to the system he is elucidating, yet for reasons best known to him he composes a commentary on the base text. When a versatile scholar like Vācaspatimiśra, the sarvatantrasvantra (independent) expositor, writes commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā or the Vedāntasūtra or other base texts, he does not represent the tradition of any of the systems; he relies wholly on his personal understanding and perhaps what he had learnt from his gurus. How much reliance is to be placed on his exposition? We know of at least two commentators on the Cārvākasūtra, Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, whose works are permeated with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology. Their names are known from other sources as belonging to the Nyāya tradition.4 There is no way to ascertain whether they were Cārvākas themselves or merely assumed the role of being so. Would it be wise to accept their interpretations as reflecting the mainstream view of the Cārvākas? All the same commentaries are useful aids to the understanding of all sorts of texts, not merely philosophical ones. Damodar Dharmananda Kosambi is not alone in grumbling that no good Sanskrit text can be interpreted without a commentary (KOSAMBI 1975: 284). A variety of commentaries, from the brief ṭippanī to the elaborate bhāṣya, with many varieties of glosses and interpretations, such as anutantra, avacūrṇī, cūrṇī, pañcikā (pañjikā), vyākhyāna, vārttika, vṛtti, etc., lying in between, have made their presence felt in the corpus of Indian philosophical literature.5 The same base text generates a number of commentaries and even sub-commentaries. As it is to be expected, the commentators do not agree among them3 The situation is similar to what happened in the grammatical tradition. Kshitish Chandra Chatterji put it succinctly: "It would appear that it took several centuries for Pāṇini's grammar to establish itself and that even at the time of Patañjali [second century B.C.E.] grammarians belonging to other schools tried their level best to point out errors of omission and commission in the grammar of Pāṇini. Patañjali had to meet the objections put forward by these captious critics and for this purpose he had often to turn and twist the rules of Pāṇini. This is why in some cases we remain in doubt as to the true views of Patañjali, his words conveying the impression t h a t t h e y a r e m e r e l y i n t e n d e d t o s i l e n c e h i s a n t a g o n i s t." (CHATTERJI 1972: vii). Emphasis R.B. 4 For a detailed analysis, see BHATTACHARYA 2010a; BHATTACHARYA 2010b; BHATTACHARYA 2010c. 5 For a general discussion on Sanskrit commentaries with special reference to philosophical works see the two essays by Jonardon Ganeri (2008) and Karin Preisezdanz (2008) respectively. See also BHATTACHARYA 2010a and BHATTACHARYA 2010b. 137The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing... selves; sometimes they erect new hurdles by introducing matters not found in the sūtras themselves. Vātsyāyana, for example, in the introductory sentence of his comments on Nyāyasūtra, 4.2.18 mentions a mysterious person whom he calls ānupalambhika. Neither he nor any sub-commentator such as Uddyotakara or Udayana bothered to explain exactly who or what kind of a person is meant by this strange appellation. Widely divergent identifications have been made, but it is still a far cry from unanimity or even near-unanimity.6 The Nyāya and the Vedānta systems have the largest number of commentarial apparatus. It is rather odd that, in spite of the existence of so much explanatory materials for these systems, or perhaps because of it, some cruxes in the base texts cannot still be resolved. Plurality of interpretations confuses rather than convinces the learner about the true intention of the sῡtrakāra, composer of the aphorisms. Too many cooks spoil the broth, sometimes irredeemably. For example: what is meant by ākasmikatva (accident) in the Nyāyasūtra (NS) 4.1.22–24? Does it signify the absence of the material cause (upādānakāraṇa) or of the instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa) or of both? Vātsyāyana, the first known commentator of the NS (but writing many centuries after the redaction of the base text) explains the opponent's thesis as "effects have material causes only, but no efficient cause". However, later commentators, such as Varddhamāna Upādhyāya and others take the sūtra to mean that "an effect has no invariable or fixed (niyata) cause," thereby eliminating both material and instrumental causes. In the interpretation of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, ākasmikatva = yadṛcchā (chance). According to Varddhamāna and Varadarāja, however, ākasmikatva = avyutpanna (non-derivable).7 A new learner is free therefore to choose either of the two interpretations, but the earlier one is more probable. The problem arises because some sūtra-s are too brief to indubitably suggest one or the other interpretation; without the help of the commentator/s, one cannot form any opinion from the words of the text itself. Moreover, the irreconcilable differences in the two interpretations offered by earlier and later commentators makes the task more difficult. There are also other factors, such as partisan approach (due to affiliation to particular schools), factional quarrels, etc., which vitiate some commentaries. We need not go into all the details here. It is wise to follow the sage advice: don't rely exclusively on the commentator. One should initially try to make out the intention of the sūtrakāra from the words of the aphorisms themselves, but when the words are of dubious significance or open to more than one interpretation, help from the commentators has to be sought. Even then, it is not obligatory to accept the view of the commentator who is as much fallible as we are. Uncritical acceptance of whatever a commentary says is inadvisable; at the same time, however, total rejection of the commentaries is 6 For further details, see BHATTACHARYA 2007: 13–18. 7 TARKAVAGISA's elucidation of NS 4.1.22. [In:] GANGOPADHYAYA 1973: 27– –31. 138 Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA equally impracticable. In any case, a student at first should try whenever possible to make the most of the literal meaning of the aphorisms and then turn to the commentaries and other aids (such as secondary works, expositions, etc.). Even this golden rule of following the middle course - paying due attention to both the base text and the commentary (or commentaries) but not accepting any of them uncritically - does not solve all problems. A commentator, one would naturally expect, should be faithful to the author; he must not say anything that the author did not mean or could not have meant. Such a fond expectation is often belied by the commentaries. A commentator is seldom satisfied with merely providing glosses. He adds to or modifies or qualifies the statements of the author. All this is recognized to be the duty of the commentator. He is expected to clarify what is rather opaque in the text, supply whatever the author of the sūtra-s had forgotten to provide and even what he failed to notice!8 The problem is that every commentator on a philosophical text is himself a philosopher of a sort who is sometimes tempted to rewrite the contents of the base work by elaborating certain points that are not mentioned or even hinted at in the extremely concise sūtra-s. There should be a permanent caveat for the students of Indian philosophy: B e w a r e o f t h e c o m m e n t a t o r! Never cease to ask yourself: is he being faithful to the intention of the author or using the base text as a peg on which to hang his own speculations? Blind acceptance of the commentator's interpretation, whoever and however exalted he may be, is not to be recommended under any circumstances.9 At the same time, some aphorisms are so obscure that one is at a loss without a commentary. There is no denying that some explanations are indeed illuminating. The crux of the matter is: when to abide by the literal meaning of an aphorism and when to follow the interpretation given in a commentary. Everything depends on a judicious choice on the part of the student of Indian philosophy. 8 Cf. HARADATTA 1965 (Padamañjarī 9): yad vismṛtam adṛṣtaṃ vā sῡtrakāreṇa tat sphuṭam | vyākhyākāro vravītyevaṃ tenādṛṣṭaṃ ca bhāṣyakṛt. 9 DASGUPTA (1975, II: 462, n. 1) provides an excellent example from Śaṅkara's commentary on Gītā 14.3: "mama yonir mahad brahma tasmin garbhaṃ dadhāmy aham... Śaṅkara surreptitiously introduces the word māyā between mama and yoni and changes the whole meaning." To take another example: Vātsyāyana in his comments on NS 1.1.1 writes: "[...] The inference (anumāna) which is not contradicted by perception (pratyakṣa) and scripture (āgama) is called anvīkṣā, that is, knowing over again (anu, literally 'after') of that which is already known (īkṣita) by perception a n d s c r i p t u r e [ ...] the inference which is contradicted by either perception or s cr ip ture is pseudo-nyāya." Trans. M.K. GANGOPADHYAYA 1982: 4 (emphasis R.B.). The repeated addition of s cr ip ture is totally unwarranted, for NS 1.1.5 states that inference is to be preceded by perception – tat (sc. pratyakṣa) pūrvakam, and nothing else. The preceding sūtra defines perception without mentioning scripture at all. 139The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing... II I apologize to learned readers for this disproportionately long proem. They certainly know all this from their own experience. Like them I too had to pay a price - a very heavy one at that - for placing absolute trust on the words of the base texts on some occasions as well as for relying blindly on the commentaries on others. Nevertheless, before getting into the problematic of this paper, I found such an exordium necessary for putting the enquiry into a question: Ho w m a n y i n s t r u m e n t s o f c o g n i t i o n (pramāṇa) d i d t h e m a t e r ia l i s t s i n In d i a a d m i t? When we set ourselves to study the rise and development of materialism in India, we are confronted with an overriding problem, that of the paucity of materials. This is unlike studying some idealist systems such as Vedānta, where the opposite is the case. As to materialism, all we have, besides a few scattered verses of doubtful origin and unknown authorship, are very few fragments, quotations and paraphrases of certain aphorisms and short extracts from commentaries, which are all found in works seeking to refute materialism.10 It is common knowledge that there was no continuous chain linking the materialists in India from the days of Ajita Kesakambala (sixth/fifth centuries B.C.E.) down to the advent of the Cārvākas (c. eighth century C.E.). From whatever little evidence we possess it is, however, evident that there were more than one materialist school long before the appearance of the Cārvākas. In certain earlier and later works, a more general term, nāstika (as in Pāṇini, 4.4.60: asti nāsti diṣṭaṃ matiḥ, from which the words āstika, nāstika and daiṣṭika are derived)11 or nāhiyavādī or natthiyavādī (negativist), is employed to suggest some pre-Cārvāka materialists.12 However, we have no evidence that they had a common base text and each materialist thinker had enough adherents to form his own school. It is probable that one or some of them might have spoken of five elements as well (as in Mahābhārata, 12.267.4 and the Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra (SKS), 1.1.1.1–20). Guṇaratna in fact refers to "another kind of Cārvākas," cārvākaikadeśīyāḥ, who spoke of five elements instead of four (300), but apparently he employs the name Cārvāka as a kind of 'brand name' for all materialists, past and present. In or around the sixth century C.E. we come across a group of philosophers called the Lo(au)kāyatikas. This group is not at all like its namesake, which was 10 For a collection of such fragments see BHATTACHARYA 2009: 78–86 (text), 86–92 (translation). 11 By nāstika, at first only the denier of the after-world was meant (as explained by the commentators of PĀṆINI, 4.4.60. See BHATTACHARYA 2009: 227–228. See also ĀRYAŚŪRA 23.57. 12 As in HARIBHADRA, Samarāicca Kahā 164, SAṄGHADĀSAGAṆIVĀCAKA 169, 275. 140 Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA known at least as early as the fifth century B.C.E. in Buddhist literature. The members of the older group used to indulge in disputation for disputation's sake and because of this irksome habit incurred the disapproval of the Buddha.13 The new Laukāyatikas of the Common Era are known to have been rabidly opposed to religion (in Bāṇabhaṭṭa, Kādambarī: 513: lokāyatikavidyayevādharmaruceḥ). By the eighth century C.E. however the word cārvāka appears as synonymous with the new Lokāyata school.14 Another name, Bārhaspatya (related to Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of the gods), came to be associated with the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. The story was derived from some Purāṇic tales, particularly those found in the Viṣṇupurāṇa (VP 3.18) and copied out in the Padmapurāṇa, Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa, chapter 13. So all the four names, Bārhaspatya, Cārvāka, Lokāyata and Nāstika came to signify the same materialist school. In his lexicon Abhidhānacintāmaṇi, Hemacandra provides three synonyms for Bārhaspatya: Nāstika, Cārvāka and Laukāyatika (3.525–27). There seems to have been another school of materialists in southern India. Its existence is recorded in the Tamil epics Manimekalai and Neelakesi. They called their system bhūtavāda.15 The presence of several groups of pre-Cārvāka materialists is also testified to by an old Jain canonical work, the Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra (SKS) (1.1.1.1–20). Many of them (if not all) were bhῡtapañcakavādin, holding that the number of elements was five, not four (as the Cārvākas did).16 Bhūtavāda and the Lokāyata doctrine had much in common but, as a Bhūtavādin in the the Manimekalai, 27: 273–274 says, there were some differences too. For example, the Bhūtavādins believed in two kinds of matter, lifeless and living, where life originates from living matter, the body from the lifeless. The Lokāyatas did not think so (VANAMAMALAI 1973: 38). A problem arises when some writers adhering to the pro-Vedic systems (āstika-s) set out to criticize the Cārvākas but make no distinction between the pre-Cārvākas and the Cārvākas. So much so that they either rely on a particular commentary at the expense of the base text or disregard the existing commentaries of the Cārvākasūtra altogether. Sometimes they resort exclusively to the base 13 For references see CHATTOPADHYAYA 1975: 143–148. 14 See HARIBHADRA, Ṣaḍdarṣanasamuccaya, chapter 6. The chapter is devoted to the exposition of Lokāyata –lokāyatā vadanty evam, etc., (80a), but in 85d we read: cārvākāḥ pratipedire. See also KAMALAŚĪLA who, in his commentary on a chapter in ŚᾹNTARAKṢITA's Tattvasaṅgraha entitled Lokāyataparīkṣā, uses the names Cārvāka and Lokāyata interchangeably as if they were synonymous. See TSP, II: 639, 649, 657, 663, 665, also II: 520, 939 and 945. 15 See VANAMAMALAI 1973: 26, 36–38. Also ILANKO ADIGĀL and SATTANAR 1989: 153–154 (27.264–276); ILANKO ADIGĀL and SATTANAR 1996: 170. 16 ŚĪLĀṄKA in his comments on Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra 1.1.1.20 calls them pañcabhūtavādyādyāḥ, and more elaborately pañcabhūtāstitvādivādino lokāḥ (19). Earlier he has explained ekeṣāṃ (1.1.1.7) as bhūtavādinām but identifies them as followers of the Bārhaspatya doctrine. 141The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing... text; on other occasions, they follow a commentary but err in making the wrong choice. Some of them mistake a particular commentator's personal view to be the mainstream view, disregarding the words of the aphorisms; other stick to the words of the aphorisms, ignoring the commentaries. I shall give two examples to show how the opponents of materialism misrepresented the Cārvāka view concerning the instrument of cognition by shifting their ground rather injudiciously from the aphorism to a commentary or vice versa. III Jayantabhaṭṭa, a luminary of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school (ninth century C.E.) was a domicile in Kashmir although he was a Gauḍa brāhamaṇa by origin. His exegetical work Nyāyamañjarī (NM) contains stringent attacks against the Cārvākas. Speaking of the instruments of cognition, Jayanta at one place says: "the Cārvākas say that there is only one kind of pramāṇa, which is perception (pratyakṣa)."17 Jayanta assures his readers that he would establish the validity of inference (anumāna), which the Cārvākas allegedly do not admit as a pramāṇa. Apparently, Jayanta is here going by the Cārvāka aphorism: "Perception indeed is the (only) instrument of cognition" (BHATTACHARYA 2009: 80, 87).18 So far so good. Had this been the only example of going by the literal meaning of an aphorism, we could have dispensed with Jayanta. After all, he takes the words of the aphorism as they appear in the base text and stands firmly on its basis. However, he soon changes his track; instead of the sūtra work, he takes his stand on a commentary, presumably the Tattvavṛtti written by his fellow Kashmirian, Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa. Jayanta does not name him anywhere in his work but refers to him in various indirect and ironical ways and refers to Udbhaṭa's view three times in successive pages.19 After referring to the alleged one-pramāṇa position of the Cārvākas (quoted above), Jayanta writes: "The Cārvākas, the well-learned ones (suśikṣita), say that it is really impossible to specifically state the number of pramāṇa-s."20 In another instance Jayanta complains that the Cārvāka, the cunning one (dhūrta), does not explain the principle (tattva) but merely expatiates on "the impossibility 17 NM, I: 43. Translation in: C/L, 154. 18 For variant readings of the same (III.1), see BHATTACHARYA 2009: 60, n. 23. 19 CAKRADHARA, author of the Granthibhaṅga, a commentary on the NM, identifies the person/s referred to in such ways (suśikṣita and dhūrta) as UDBHAṬA and others (I: 52, 100). CAKRADHARA is corroborated by VĀDIDEVASŪRI who quotes at length from UDBHAṬA's commentary on several occasions and provides the title of the work (Tattvavṛtti) as well (265). Tantravṛtti (270) in all probability is a misprint. See BHATTACHARYA 2009: comm. 11, 13. 81–82, 89. 20 NM I: 52. Trans. in: C/L, 154. 142 Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA of making a specific rule regarding the number and definition of pramāṇa and prameya (the object of cognition)."21 It is no longer the number of pramāṇa-s but those of prameya-s as well. On yet another occasion Jayanta derides the Cārvākas by saying: "The nāstika-s, not having enough intelligence to determine the power of the pramāṇa-s have been clamouring in vain that in the case of pramāṇa-s, there is no specific rule as to the number."22 The same kind of contempt is manifest again on the same page: "By declaring before the assembly of the learned that tattva is nothing but the impossibility of determining (the true nature of pramāṇa and prameya), they (sc. the Cārvākas) have only revealed their dullheadedness."23 It is to be noted that Jayanta does not ridicule Udbhaṭa alone, or even those who allegedly adhere to his views, for holding this agnostic position regarding the number of pramāṇa-s and prameya-s. In the first two instances he does so, but in the last two he condemns the Cārvākas as a whole, not a section of them or a particular individual. The charge is not true, for it goes against the statement made earlier by Jayanta himself that the Cārvākas admit one pramāṇa only, as the sūtra says. Even though we have to work on the basis of very few Cārvāka fragments, we at least know that Udbhaṭa in some respects differed from the ancient (cirantana) Cārvākas (NM II: 257) and that Cakradhara himself tells us, as does Vādidevasūri that Udbhaṭa sought to explain some sūtra-s in quite unconventional and novel ways.24 Therefore, Udbhaṭa's view concerning the number of pramaṇa and prameya should not be taken as the opinion generally held by all nāstika-s or Cārvākas, past and present. Moreover, Udbhaṭa's view flatly contradicts the sūtra, which specifies that the principle is earth, air, fire and water and nothing else (iti) (I.2) (BHATTACHARYA 2009: 78, 86). Udbhaṭa himself was aware of his departure from the old way of interpretation. He tried to reinterpret the word iti in the text in a tortuous way by saying that here iti does not denote the end but instead is illustrative.25 Jayanta, then, is inconsistent in representing the opponent's view (pūrvapakṣa). He knew full well that the Cārvākas interpreted the sūtra in a very different way than the wording suggests. At least three commentators, Purandara, 21 NM I: 100. Trans. in: C/L, 155. 22 NM I: 101. Trans. in: C/L, 156. 23 Ibidem. 24 CAKRADHARA I: 100. Cf. VĀDIDEVASŪRI (SVR 764): "This respectable veteran twice-born is revealing to us a novel way of answering criticism." (comm. 15 in: BHATTACHARYA 2009: 82, 89). 25 Cf. VĀDIDEVASŪRI (SVR 1087), and BHATTACHARYA 2009: comm. 16.82, 89–90. Cakradhara too points out in relation to other sūtra-s that Udbhaṭa's explanations go against the conventionally proposed ones. Also BHATTACHARYA 2009: comm. 8, 81, 88; NM I: 100, 257–258. 143The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing... Aviddhakarṇa and Udbhaṭa, took pains to point out that although they did not consider inference to be an independent instrument of cognition, they did not reject inference as such. Only such inferences as are drawn from scriptures or unverifiable sources are rejected by them; inferences established in everyday life and verifiable by sense perception are admitted by them (BHATTACHAYA 2009: 81–82, 88–90, commentaries 3, 12, 18). Jayanta in fact paraphrased the view of those whom he calls "the better educated ones" (suśikṣitatarāḥ)26 as follows: Indeed who will deny the validity of inference when one infers fire from smoke and so on; ordinary people ascertain the probandum by such inferences though they may not be pestered by the logicians. However, inferences that seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being and the other-world and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real nature of things. Simple-minded people cannot derive the knowledge of probandum by such inferences so long as their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians (NM I: 184; BHATTACHARYA 2009: 86, 92, verses 18–20). By refusing to abide by the commentator's interpretation of the sūtra concerning the partial validity of inference but by generalizing the same commentator's purely personal opinion about the impossibility of determining the number of pramāṇa and prameya to be the original Cārvāka view, Jayanta merely betrays his personal antipathy for Udbhaṭa in particular and the Cārvākas in general. He would at one point go by the literal meaning of a sūtra in the base text but at another point accept the commentator's view rather than what the sūtra says. No doubt the commentator (Udbhaṭa in this case) provided an opportunity to an opponent of his system by resorting to a far-fetched interpretation; Jayanta makes full use of it. Instead of bringing the charge of sūtrabhaṅga, going against the aphorism (which Udbhaṭa definitely does while interpreting iti in the Cārvāka fragment I.2), he refers to the view as if it represents the true position of the Cārvākas. On another occasion, he refers to the sūtra itself just because it suits him. On yet other occasions he conveniently forgets the sūtra and picks up Udbhaṭa alone. If he believed that a particular commentator's view properly reflected the intention of the sūtrakāra, why did he suppress the same commentator's interpretation of a vital sūtra (III.1, discussed above) and stick to the letters of it instead? 26 Unfortunately, Cakradhara does not identify these persons as he did in case of the welleducated Cārvākas and the cunning Cārvāka (see n23 above). The use of plural may be ironically honorific. On the basis of the extract quoted by VĀDIDEVASŪRI (SVR comm. 12. 81–82, 88.265–266) we may safely conclude that this person cannot but be Udbhaṭa. 144 Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA IV Hemacandra, the Jain savant (twelfth century C.E.) also criticizes the nāstika, or heterodox view in his Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā (AYVD) solely on the ground that it does not admit inference as a valid instrument of cognition (verse 20). Malliṣeṇa (thirteenth century), in his Syādvādamañjarī (SVM), a commentary on the AYVD, identifies this nāstika with the Cārvāka. Rightly so, for the two words are synonymous (see above). Malliṣeṇa then explains the point as follows: the Cārvākas accept only perception as the sole instrument of cognition; hence they do not accept anything else, not even inference, as a means of valid knowledge.27 We have already seen that this is a common charge brought against the Cārvākas by many of their opponents, both Vedists (Brahminical, such as Jayanta) and non-Vedists (the Jain, Hemacandra in this instance. See also KAMALAŚĪLA, II: 520, but see also II: 528, quoted below). In fact, the point that the Cārvākas accepted nothing but perception as pramāṇa is so widely – almost universally – believed by so many authorities, both ancient and modern, that it may appear to be an exercise in futility to question the veracity of this oft-repeated objection. Yet the fact is that long before Hemacandra wrote this, Purandara, a Cārvāka philosopher (fl. eighth century C.E.) whose name is connected with both the base text of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata system of philosophy as well as with a short commentary (vṛtti) on it,28 had clearly stated: "The Cārvākas, too, admit of such an inference as is well-known in the world, but that which is called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them]."29 Purandara was not alone in asserting this view. Aviddhakarṇa (not later than the eighth century), another commentator on the Cārvākasūtra, also declared: It is true that inference is admitted by us as a source of knowledge, because it is found to be so in general practice; (but what we only point out is that) the definition of an inferential mark is illogical (BHATTACHARYA 2009: comm. 3.81, 88). And last but not least, Udbhaṭa, the last known commentator on the Cārvākasūtra, who in other respects was rather atypical in his interpretation of certain Cārvāka aphorisms (see above), states the Cārvāka position vis-à-vis inference more elaborately: Failure of concomitance is not seen even in the case o f p r o b a n s e s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e w o r l d; so also it is not noticed in the case of the p r o b a n s e s e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e s c r i p t u r e; so, on the basis of the quality characterized by 'non-percep27 For a detailed study of SVM, chapter 20, see BHATTACHARYA 2009: 167–168. 28 See BHATTACHARYA 2009: 67. 29 As quoted by KAMALAŚĪLA in TSP II: 528 (on TS, Ch. 18, verse 1481, comm. 18 [in:] BHATTACHARYA 2009: 82, 90). 145The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing... tion of failure of concomitance' being common to them, the probanses established in the scriptures are admitted as being gamaka. It is because of this that inference is secondary. N o w t h e k n o w l e d g e o f n o n f a i l u r e o f c o n c o m i t a n c e i n r e s p e c t o f w o r l d l y p r o b a n s e s i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e p r o b a n d u m. B u t t h a t i s n o t t h e r e i n t h e c o n c e p t o f p r o b a n s e s e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e s c r i p t u r e s. S o i t i s n o t p r o p e r t h a t n o n p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s s h o u l d b e k n o w n w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e s e. Hence it is said that the ascertainment of things is difficult to attain by dint of inference (BHATTACHARYA 2009: comm. 12.81–82, 88). The position of the Cārvākas is perfectly clear. They do not admit inference as an independent instrument of cognition on a par with perception, but at the same time they do admit the limited validity of inference insofar as it is confined to the material world, which is perceivable and verifiable by sense experience. It is in this sense that Udbhaṭa in response to some opponent makes a distinction between "incapable reasons" and "capable reasons" (BHATTACHARYA 2009: comm. 14.82, 89). Jayanta certainly knew all this. Hence, he makes "better educated ones" declare this in clear terms (as quoted above). Given the incredible mobility of mss from Kashmir to Kerala and the custom of getting such mss speedily copied in various local scripts from Śāradā to Nāgarī to Malayalam, it is inconceivable that Hemacandra (respectfully called the "omniscient one of the Kali era," kalikālasarvajña by the Jains) did not know any of them. Ratnaprabhā (fourteenth century), another Jain scholar, echoes the view of the three Cārvākasūtra commentators mentioned above: The Cārvākas, however, contend that they admit inferences which are of practical utility, such as the inference of fire from smoke, and deny only those which deal with such supernatural matters as the heaven, the unseen power (apūrva) which generates in a next birth fruits of acts done in a present life, etc. etc. (VADIDEVASURI 1967: 540). Guṇaratna (fifteenth century), yet another Jain commentator, also repeats all this30 as do both anonymous author of the Avacūrṇi to the ṢDSam (1969: 508) and another digest-writer of a small, anonymous and undated work called the Sarvamatasaṃgraha (BHATTACHARYA 2009: 58). Hemacandra and Malliṣeṇa do not shift their position from the base text to the commentary (as Jayanta does) in their criticism of the Cārvākas. They err in completely ignoring the commentaries and thereby, like many others before and after them, misrepresent the Cārvāka view of inference. In fact, as has been shown time and again by other scholars before, partial acceptance of inference distinguished the Cārvākas (among other things) from the earlier materialists, some of whom might 30 TRD, on ṢDSam verse 83, 306.13–15; C/L, 273. 146 Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA have held one-pramaṇa position as alleged by their opponents.31 Very much like Jayanta, he too conveniently avoids mentioning the view of the "better educated Cārvākas" in this regard. * One last word. Why did Jayanta and Hemacandra, two stalwarts in the field of Indian philosophy, make such injudicious choices between the base text and the commentary? It will be insulting them to say that they did not know or understand the actual position of the Cārvākas in regard to inference. Yet to say that these savants deliberately distorted their opponent's view will be equally ungenerous. Then why? The only explanation I may venture to offer is that their desire to trounce their opponent blurred their vision and made them recourse to the shortest and easiest way. By damning the Cārvākas as 'wretched' (varāka) and undeserving of any serious discussion (NM I: 299),32 both chose to portray them as simpletons, which they were not. Jigīṣā (desire to conquer) is the greatest enemy of objectivity, as a learned friend of mine is fond of saying. BIBLIOGRAPHY AIYANGAR, Kumbakonam Viraraghava Rangaswami (1941): Bṛhaspatismṛti (reconstructed). Baroda: Oriental Institute. ĀRYAŚŪRA, Jātakamālā (1959): Paraś urā ma Lakshmanạ VAIDYA (ed.). Darbhanga: Mithila Institute. AYVD – Hemacandra. Anya-yoga-vyavacheda-dātṛṃṣikā with Malliṣeṇa. Ā nandaś aṅkara Bā pubhā ī DHRUVA (ed.) (1933): Syādvādamañjarī. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. See also THOMAS 1968. BĀṆABHAṬṬA (1956): Harṣcarita. Pandurang Vaman KANE (ed.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 31 Whether all pre-Cārvāka materialists too held such a one-pramāṇa position is open to further enquiry. A passage in the MBH mentions three pramāṇa-s, namely, perception confirmed in the world (lokataḥ sidddhaṃ pratyakṣam), doctrines having the Veda to support them, and the practice of eminent persons, śiṣṭa-s (13.147.9). Dandekar has noticed that inference is absent in the list but suggests that presumably inference is understood to have been included in perception (critical edition, Anuśāsanaparvan, notes, 1119). This would suggest that inference was required to be confined to this world only and not to be derived from the Veda, etc. to prove the existence of supernatural objects. Cf. Nyāyasūtra 1.5: tad (sc. pratyakṣam) pūrvakam. See also MBH 12.211.26–27 where reasoned-out truth (kṛtānta) is called nothing but perception. See BHATTACHARYA 2010a: 426. 32 Cf. HEMACANDRA 1926 (Yogaśāstra 2.38, f. 96b). Śilāṅka (19) also uses this insulting word to denigrate nāstika-s who speak of five elements (on SKS 1.1.1.21). 147The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing... BĀṆABHAṬṬA (1950): Kādambarī. Haridas Siddhantavagisa BHATTACHARYYA (ed.). Kalikata: Śaka. BHATTACHARYA, Ramakrishna (2007): Will the True Ānupalambika Please Stand up? Anvīkṣā 28, 13–18. BHATTACHARYA, Ramakrishna (2009): Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Firenze: Società Editrice Fiorentina (also published in 2011, London: Anthem Press). BHATTACHARYA, Ramakrishna (2010a): Commentators on the Cārvākasūtra: A Critical Survey. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38, 4, 419–430. BHATTACHARYA, Ramakrishna (2010b): What the Cārvākas Originally Meant: More on the Commentators of the Cārvākasūtra. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38, 6, 529–542. BHATTACHARYA, Ramakrishna (2010c): Lokāyata Materialism: Classification of Source Material. [In:] Subuddhi Charan GOSWAMI (ed.): Lokāyata Philosophy: A Fresh Appraisal. Kolkata: The Asiatic Society, 37–42. C/L – CHATTOPADHYAYA, Debiprasad, GANGOPADHYAYA, Mrinal Kanti (1990): Cārvāka/Lokāyata. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. CAKRADHARA (1982–1984), Granthibhaṅga, with Jayantabhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī: Gaurinatha SASTRI (ed.). Varanasi: Sampūrṇānanda Sam skṛta Viśvavidyālaya (three vols). CHATTERJI, Kshitish Chandra (1972): Patañjali's Mahābhāshya. Paśpaśāhnika. Calcutta: A. Mukherjee & Co. CHATTOPADHYAYA, Kshetresh Chandra (1975): The Lokāyata System of Thought in Ancient India. Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute 31, 137–155. COLEBROOKE, Henry Thomas (1977): On the Vedas or Sacred Writings of the Hindus. [In:] COLEBROOKE, H.T., Essays on History Literature and Religion of Ancient India. Vol. 1 (reprint of Miscellaneous Essays). New Delhi: Cosmo Publications (first published 1805). DASGUPTA, Surendranath (1975): A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (first published 1922). GANERI, Jonardon (2008): Sanskrit Philosophical Commentary. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 25, 1, 107–127 (also available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/ mealac/pollock/sks/papers/Ganeri(commentary).pdf – accessed: 28.12.2012). GANGOPADHYAYA, Mrinal Kanti (1973): Nyāya Philosophy, Part IV. Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present (abridged translation of the elucidation by Phanibhushana TARKAVAGISA). HARADATTA Śarmā (1965), Padamañjarī. [In:] Kāśikā, Dwarikadas SASTRI, Kalika Prasad SUKLA (eds). Part I. Varanasi: Prachya Bharati Prakashan. HARIBHADRA (1969), Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (with Guṇaratna's and Somatilakasūri's commentaries and an anonymous Avacūrṇi). Mahendrakumar JAIN (ed.). Varanasi: Bhā ratī ya Jñ ā napī tḥa. HARIBHADRA (1926), Samarāicca Kahā. Hermann JACOBI (ed.). Calcutta: The Asiatic Society. HEMACANDRA (1914–1919): Abhidhānacintāmaṇi. Hargovindand DAS, Jayanta VIJAYAJI, MUNIRAJ (eds). Bhavnagar: N.L. Vakil. HEMACANDRA (1926): Yogaśāstram. Bhavanagara: Srijainadharma Pracharasabha. ILANKO ĀDIGĀL and SATTANAR (1989): Manimekalai. Trans. Prema NANDAKUMAR. Thanjavur: Tamil University. 148 Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA ILANKO ĀDIGĀL and SATTANAR (1996): Silappattikaram/Manimekalai. Retold by Laksmi HOLMSTÖRM. Hyderabad: Orient Longman. KAMALAŚĪLA. See TS. KAUṬILYA (1965–1972): The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra. R.P. KANGLE (ed.). Bombay: University of Bombay (three vols). KOSAMBI, Damodar Dharmananda (1975): An Introduction to the Study of Indian History. Bombay: Popular Prakashan (first edition 1956). MAHĀRĀJA, Ācārya Sarvanandājī (ed.) (1978): Ācāraṅgasūtram and Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtram with Niryukti of Ācārya Bhadravāhu Svāmī and the commentary of Śīlāṅkācārya. Re-ed. with appendix by Muni JAMBUVIJAYAJI. Delhi: MLBD Indological Trust. MALLIṢEṆA (2005): Syadvadamañ jari with Anya-yoga-vyavacheda-dvātṛṃṣikā of Hemacandra. Ā nandaś ankara Bā pubhā ī DHRUVA, Push Raj JAIN (eds). Delhi: Akshaya Prakashan (reimp.). See also THOMAS 1968. MBH – The Mahābhārata (1933–1966): Vishnu S. SUKTANKAR et al. (eds). Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. NĀGEŚABHAṬṬA (1960–1962): Paribhāṣenduśekhara. Ed. and trans. Franz KIELHORN, Kashinath Vasudev ABHYANKAR and Vā sudevaś ā strī ABHYAṄKARA (second editon). Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (two vols). NM – JAYANTABHAṬṬA (1982–1984): Nyāyamañjarī. Gaurinatha SASTRI (ed.). Varanasi: Sampūrṇānanda Saṃskṛta Viśvavidyālaya (three vols). NS – Nyāyasūtra – GANGOPADHYAYA, Mrinal Kanti (1982): Nyāya (translation of the Nyāyasūtra and Vātsyāyana's commentary). Calcutta: Indian Studies. – Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, etc. (1996–1997): Anantalal THAKUR (ed.). New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Padmapurāṇa. Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa (1903–1904): Pancanana TARKARATNA (ed.). Kalikata: Manasukharā ya Mora. PĀṆINI (1989): Aṣṭādhyāyī. Sumitra Mangesh KATRE (ed. and trans.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. PREISENDANZ, Karin (2008): Text, Commentary, Annotation: Some Reflections on the Philosophical Genre. Journal of Indian Philosophy 36, 599–618. SAṄGHADĀSAGAṆIVĀCAKA (1989): Vasudevahiṃḍi. Part I. CATURVIJAYA and PUṆYAVIJAYA (eds). Gandhinagar: Gujarata Sahitya Akademi. SDS – SĀYAṆA-MĀDHAVA (1981): Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha. Kanhaiyala JOSHI (ed.). Ahmedabad-Delhi: Parimal Publication. ṢḌSam – HARIBHADRA (1916): Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (with Guṇaratna's commentary, Tarkarahasyadīpikā). Luigi SUALI (ed.). Calcutta: The Asiatic Society. SKS – Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra: Prathama śrutaskandha. Series „Jinā gama granthamā lā ", Bewar: Sri Agama Prakashan Samit, 1982. SVR – Syādvādaratnākara (1988): VĀDIDEVASŪRI (ed. Motilal Ladhaji Osval) TARKAVAGISA, Phanibhusana (1981–1989): Nyāya Darśana Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya (in Bangla). Calcutta: West Bengal State Book Board (five vols; reprint). See also GANGOPADHYAYA 1973. The Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa. Ayodhyākāṇḍa (1962): Paraś urā ma Lakshmaṇa VAIDYA (crit. ed.). Baroda: Oriental Institute. 149The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing... THOMAS, Frederick William (1968): The Flower-spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine. Trans. of Hemacandra AYVD and Malliṣeṇa SVM). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. TRD – GUṆARATNA (1916): Tarkarahasyadīpikā with HARIBHADRA's Ṣaḍdarṣanasamuccaya. Luigi SUALI (ed.). Calcutta: The Asiatic Society. TS – ŚĀNTARAKṢITA (1981): Tattvasaṃgraha (with Pañjikā by Kamalaśīla). Dvarikdas SASTRI (ed.). Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati (first edition 1968). TSP – See TS. VANAMAMALAI, N. (1973): Materialist Thought in Early Tamil Literature. Social Scientist 2, 4, 25–41. VĀDIDEVASŪRI (1967): Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṃkāra. Hari Satya BHATTACHARYA (trans.). Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal. VP – Viṣṇupurāṇa (1965–1966): Pañcānana TARKARATNA (ed.). Kalikata: Aryyasastra (reprint).

Page 1 Solution of Einstein's Causality Problem: The AHK Theorem By Peter M. Kaiser Using terms and categories as „causality" or „chance" in scientific debates means to leave the field of physics or other natural sciences. These terms/categories are in fact philosophical terms. Even if they occur in both areas, the most general science of human thinking and in many single sciences, the meaning is sometimes completely different. This results often in superb misunderstanding, even because people are not aware when they are on the other level and have in mind completely different definitions of terms. Recently one could read in the scientific part of the most serious German newspaper „Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" of "physics and the individual sciences". This is actually a completely wrong definition. Since when is physics the Universal Science and all other sciences individual sciences? This is obviously a special type of reductionism and hypertrophy of physics at the same time. Actually, as an example, Michael Esfeld, Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Lausanne, understands that physics – not presumptuously – explains even „the world".1 What are the resulting misunderstandings and how are they expressing? The start of all those misunderstandings was that the ostensibly intimate term causality which was further used in its „old" meaning although the upcoming quantum physics in the beginning of 20th century was enforcing new thinking and definitions of old terms. Although required by Heisenberg and Einstein nobody was prepared to undergo such efforts to define significant terms in a new way, implementing chance into a new concept of causality. The „old" meaning of causality was derived from the paradigm of mechanical determinism; according to the worldview of almost all natural scientists the connotation of "causal" stood for an exactly defined cause and an exactly foreseeable effect. Chance showing unpredictable effects was excluded. The epigone of this conception of deterministic ideology is the eminent French mathematician and astronomer of the 18th/19th century Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827). The corresponding citation of Laplace on „Weltgeist", later called Laplace's Demon, is as follows: „We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes."2 1 That means, also human society, because this is part of the world (Michael Esfeld and Christian Sachse, Kausale Strukturen. Einheit und Vielfalt in der Natur und den Naturwissenschaften, Berlin 2010, S. 2; see also M. Esfeld, Naturphilosophie als Metaphysik der Natur, Berlin 2008). 2 Pierre-Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, translated into English from the original French 6th ed. by Truscott,F.W. and Emory,F.L., Dover Publications, New York 1951, Introduction, p.4 Page 2 Laplace's wording is subjunctive or irrealis, i.e., he by himself believed never that such knowledge of the universe could be possible. For mankind the universe is forever locked, it remains „forever infinitively remote". In the 1920s the development of quantum mechanics enforced all natural scientists to think about the role of objective chance, because certain effects in the sphere of atoms and elementary particles could not be described without the idea of chance or randomness. In front of the prevailing mechanical Weltbild the idea of objective chance was unbearable, even for most of the philosophers. Beyond that, interpretation of chance without any other cause violated ostensibly the term causality because this idea was – completely unnecessarily – associated with deterministic prognosis and exact calculability. Instead of new and consistent definition of the term causality a new demon was summoned, videlicet Maxwell's demon. The corresponding statement of one of the most important physicist and philosopher of the 19th century, James Clerk Maxwell (18311879) was interpreted extremely imprecise to conserve the obsolete idea of a „law of causality" in contrast to the – correct – „Principle of Causality". Differentiation into „strong" and „weak" causality was introduced to that end (nobody knows who was the first). To explain other, random effects, e.g. in the field of chaos research, the violation of causality was additionally introduced.3 The example of the fractal geometry of the Mandelbrot sets was one of the most aesthetic forms resulting from chaotic effects.4 However, the so-called „classical" physics exhibits not only mechanical-deterministic movements and processes; series of random events can be identified not allowing exact prediction.5 The following definitions were introduced: „Strong Causality" should mean: similar causes produce similar effects; „Weak Causality" should occur in processes when identical causes result in identical effects every time. Apart from that that Maxwell is over-interpreted, those definitions lack the logic of speech or predication. Maxwell wrote solely: „It is a metaphysical doctrine that from the same antecedents follow the same consequents. No one can gainsay this. But it is not of much use in a world like this, in which the same antecedents never again concur, and nothing ever happens twice .... The physical axiom which has a somewhat similar aspect is 'That from like antecedents follow like consequents.' But here we have passed ... from absolute accuracy to a more or less rough approximation. There are certain classes of phenomena, as I have said, in which a small error in the data only introduces a small error in the result. Such are, among others, the larger phenomena of the Solar System, and those in which the more elementary laws in Dynamics contribute the greater part of the result. The course of events in these cases is stable. There are other classes of phenomena which are more complicated, and in which cases of instability may occur, the number of such cases increasing, in an exceedingly rapid manner, as the number of variables increases."6 3 One of the first authors, as far as I could detect, were the chaos researchers Uli Deker and Harry Thomas, Die Chaos-Theorie. Unberechenbares Spiel der Natur, Bild der Wissenschaft Heft 1, 96-75 (1983). These have read this into Maxwell. Other physicists attribute this strange idea to Max Born. However, Born has never made such a statement. Later the scheme, finally presented as a graphic, circulated in the scientific community. It can be read in University lectures, countless papers, textbooks written by philosophizing natural scientists, power point presentations, always and almost using identical wording. Apparently nobody registered that the logic of those terms is completely inconsistent. 4 Benoît B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature, New York 1990 5 For example Pohl's Pendulum, magnetic pendulum, coupled pendulum etc. showing completely incalculable trajectories. 6 J.C. Maxwell, Matter and motion, London 1920; cited from Brian R. Hunt and James A. Yorke, Maxwell on Chaos, Non-linear Science today, Springer, Vol. 3 No. 1, 1993, pp. 1-4. Page 3 Maxwell imagined clearly that the same causes resulting in same effects could never be realized and that this idea can be referred into metaphysics. So, he anticipated brilliantly the theory of irreversibility of all real processes. Even more important is the consequence that there is obviously no „weak causality" (same cause – same effect). If this is not existent it could not be violated. Nevertheless violations of both types of causality were introduced to explain the particular effects in quantum world; nobody intended to define the term causality in a new and finally correct way. What was going wrong? If causality is a principle and not a law it cannot be violated, because otherwise it would never be a principle, i.e. highest and basic precept. Causality should be treated like an axiom; it could never be demonstrated by any natural science.7 Now „objective chance" must be explained in the light of a consistent theory of causality. It is well-known that Einstein struggled with its existence and wanted to hold determinism, whereas quantum physicists came hard to declare random events as causal processes. Unfortunately they didn't read Hegel and therefore no idea of a dialectical contradiction. Tentatively many natural scientists introduced therefore somewhat like „probabilistic" causality, an illogical term presenting 'contradictio in adjectu'. Heisenberg, for example, often spoke of causality, but he meant predictions, i.e., he was still captured in the „old" definition.8 However, he was so clever to avoid terms like „statistical" or „probabilistic" causality. How can we solve this dilemma? At first we have to define causal reactions (in contrast to correlations) and when under what circumstances random effects occur. Causal reactions must be connected substantively and timely and start and completion must be sufficiently known. In case of a reaction chain with numerous single reactions it is only possible to determine causality between defined single reactions. Causality between start and end of such a chain cannot be determined because a lot of random events or reactions could be in between and cannot be influenced by antecedent causes. This is the main argument against the co-called butterfly-effect: the butterfly can only influence and control its direct environment causally and in most of the cases nothing further happens. Only if the effect is escalating further consequences can occur, showing a certain probability. This probability has absolutely nothing to do with the start situation. Every particular reaction within the chain, from one link to the next, is nevertheless causally conditioned (Fig. 1). Exactly the same holds true for chance, for random events. Those events can only occur at an exactly defined, real point of the (imagined) reaction chain. Random event is, however, not „acausal". There is no „acausality" in real world, known for us, otherwise the principle of causality would again be violated. The result of a random reaction is unforeseeable, but not arbitrarily. It should be prohibited to speak about 'absolute chance'. There is no 'absolute chance' in the sense of capriciousness. I assume that Einstein's unwillingness to acknowledge objective randomness could be traced back to this misunderstanding of the role of „objective chance". 7 Also a law knows no exceptions; otherwise it would be no law. Only rules could show exceptions. As first approximation one may define: laws are rules without exceptions. 8 Werner Heisenberg, Der Teil und das Ganze – Gespräche im Umkreis der Atomphysik, München 1981, especially section „10. Quantenmechanik und Kantsche Philosophie", pp. 141. Page 4 Cause Effect Cause Effect Cause Effect (ad infinitum) t Cause Effect Cause Effect Cause (ad infinitum) t=0 (arbitrarily set start) Fig. 1 Cause-effect chain (t = time). As already noted by Hegel an effect is always a cause at the same time with respect to the next reaction in the chain. Start of the chain is arbitrarily selected (t = 0). Time axis is simplified as mathematical line; in reality it should be three-dimensional in the sense of dendritic time logic. However, this could not be presented in two-dimensional plain. Physicists differentiate between the terms „reaction" and „event": „A process the result of which is only dependent by chance is called Random Experiment and possible results of a random experiment is called Events."9 Effects of deterministic experiments where we know the results sufficiently (i.e., showing only small or smallest errors playing no significant role in human practice) will be called consequently Reactions. Now we can solve the secret of objective chance maintain the principle of causality. Only then terms and categories are logically and philosophically consistent. There is no more indissoluble contradiction between physics and philosophy. We take the favorite example of all physicists with which they appreciate to putatively demonstrate the powerlessness of the principle of causality again and again: radioactive decay. Einstein was immoderately confused that the electron breaking out of a metal foil under high vacuum and UV radiation (photoelectric effect; Hallwachs effect10) should determine time and direction by itself (exactly randomly). But this was an anthropomorphic misunderstanding, Nobel price doesn't help. Today most of the physicists are perturbed by the effect radioactivity of certain elements that nobody knows which atom is the first to decompose and – again – in which direction the impulse is channeling the decomposed parts. But, this is not the right question to derive the law of radioactive decay, because: 1. It is an irreversible process; 2. In every renewed trial another atom is tunneling and decomposing at first, and 3. The point of time for the first decomposing event is always different. Because of those reasons nobody must know the atomic details; atoms of one class are undistinguishable, even elementary particles. Experiments cannot be repeated exactly. The real cause (and therefore correct explanation) for radioactive decay is the instability of that defined atom. This is the reason why it decays. The law of decay is, however, 9 Habbo Hait Heinze, Die Permanente im thermodynamischen Viel-Bosonen-Pfadintegral sowie die Bestimmung von Phasenübergängen aus experimentellen Streuspektren atomarer Cluster, Diplomarbeit an der Carl von Ossietzky-Universität Oldenburg, Oldenburg 1998, p. 85 (translation by author). Results of a random experiment which was defined with the aid of abstract set, i.e. the Set of Elementary Events within a factual Sample Room or Event Room is the basis of Monte-Carlo calculation procedures. This could not be explained here in detail. Monte–Carlo calculations are used in general to simulate abstract mathematical random experiments numerically. Monte-Carlo procedures play also an important role in quantum chemical calculations of molecular electron structures using ab-initio procedures supposedly dispensing with empirical parameters (see, for example, Enrico Clementi, Ab initio computations in atoms and molecules, IBM Journal of Research and Development 44, 228-245 [2000]). 10 Wilhelm Hallwachs, an ancestor of my step-father, was the assistant of Heinrich Hertz and continued his experimental work on the photoelectric effect (Hallwachs, W. [1907] "Über die lichtelektrische Ermüdung", Annalen der Physik 328 (8): 459–516). Page 5 deduced from reactions of a huge collective of decaying atoms. This can only be measured: decay of first-order kinetics showing the geometrical form of an e-function with negative exponent. Half-life and all other parameters of the reaction can be calculated. No other parameters must be known quantitatively for any practical application to construct atomic bombs, nuclear plants or atomic submarine. We learn: by chance means precisely there is a lack of knowledge with respect to some particular processes regarding elements of an entire collective showing a total and probabilistic process; however, such particular processes, trajectories of elements, cannot be foreseen and therefore they are completely unnecessary to know exactly because they are irreproducible. They are inappropriate to determine parameters of laws. Nothing happens 'acausal', without any reason. We propose to use preferably the term "explanation" in those cases as James Woodward and others discuss it.11 The philosophical solution of the problem – what is the cause for chance – is as follows: there is no antecedent event on the axis of time, chance is occurring directly, instantaneously. That means, in that case cause and effect are synchronizing at t=0. The principle of causality is retained; in other words chance is its own cause (Fig. 2). Cause t Effect (t=0) Fig. 2 Chance as cause and effect identically. There is no other cause for chance before t=0 on the time axis. Possible „products" of the random event are conventionalized. As already Aristotle12 and approximately 2000 years later Hegel13 had preformulated this idea, I call that approach Aristotle-Hegel-Kaiser Theorem, or shortly AHK Theorem.14 11 James Woodward, Making Things Happen. A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press: Oxford 2003; J. Woodward, "Scientific Explanation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/scientific-explanation/; Juda Pearl, Causality. Models, Reasoning, and Inference, Cambridge University Press: New York 2000; Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Harry Silverstein (Eds.) Causation and Explanation, MIT Press, Massachusetts 2007. 12 Aristoteles, Physics. Lecture on Nature. Greek-German, ed. by Hans Günther Zekl, Vol.: Book I–IV. Meiner: Hamburg 1986, Book II, Capitel 4 and 5. See also the excellent interpretation by Helene Weiss, Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 1967. 13 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Erster Teil. Die objektive Logik. Erster Band. Die Lehre vom Sein (1832). According to the text of GW, Bd. 21 newly edited by Hans-Jürgen Gawoll with an introduction of Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke. PhB 385. 2nd improved Edition, Meiner: Hamburg 2008 (in German). The entire text can also be found in Gutenberg-Project in the Internet. 14 I owe the suggestion to introduce this term Hans Fogedby, retired Prof. of Statistical Physics at the University of Ǻrhus, Denmark.

www.ijpub.org © 2018 IJCRT | Volume 6, Issue 1 March 2018 | ISSN: 2320-2882 IJPUB1801292 International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts (IJCRT) www.ijpub.org 1832 Reason, Authority and Consciousness: An Analytical Approach to Religious Pluralism Mudasir Ahmad Tantray Department of post graduate studies and research in philosophy, Rdvv Jabalpur Abstract: Present world is the victim of conflicts on the basis of misunderstanding of religious dogmas of different religions, irrationality, ignorance and intolerance. People are moving away from knowledge, truth and reason. Indeed people accept false beliefs, hallucinations and myths. The role of religious plurality in philosophy is not to integrate and harmonize religions, especially religions cannot, and rather it is the business of religious pluralism to learn, think and acquire knowledge about the variety of religious beliefs, statements and injunctions. This paper determines the function of intelligence/intellect to understand religious pluralism. How and where we make mistake in the plurality of religions. In this paper there is no issue to describe the conflict between faith and reason however reason is only to think and clear the ambiguities which we are using either to integrate one religion with another or to refute the religious dogmas of other religions. That is why authority places a significant part which teaches humans how to use their reason to bring peace, tranquility and acceptance in the plurality of religions. Mostly the scholar who practicing their religions and without having the authority and knowledge of other religions they are vehemently criticizing other religions. This paper shows that what is authority and where to use it. Who are authoritative persons? If authority in one religion is transferred to another what would happen. What would happen if authority is misrepresented? This paper further illuminates the concept of rational outlook to modify and learn from different religious; furthermore we can discuss the nature of consciousness or awareness in exploring religious pluralism. Is it necessary for a person who believes in one religion to learn another religion in order to resolve the controversies and evils in different religions conditional to authority? The more we mixing up religions into each other, the more religious conflicts arise. Therefore this paper tries to furnish people's mind with consciousness about religions realities and state of affair, inculcate world with rational outlook to ponder, analyze, understand and evaluate as well tolerate and accept the truth and authenticity in the domain of religions. This study analyzes and stress on the exertion of relative vision in accordance and intimation with reason, authority and moral consciousness to resolve the conflicts, diversities and issues in the field of religious pluralism. Keywords: rationality, religious pluralism, consciousness, authority, beliefs Introduction Today the world is governed with religious diversity and religious belief systems. Man is regarded as the centre of the globe with religious realm and issues on one side and rationality, and apprehension on the other side. However we are abided with authority, beliefs and superstitions from the view of social connections with religious dogmatism. Next to this we are exploring and proving these beliefs and religious statements within the criteria which fit to reason and experience. Humans are in dilemma, where to go which belief system and tradition is authentic and valid to follow. Scholar from different religions and sects often attack the belief and faith of their opponents as well they hurt the religious sentiments of others whose beliefs and religion differs from them. Everyone treats his religion and religious convictions certain and correct and refute others religious theories. We can live in harmony and global brotherhood only if we could make our rational vision vast, authority authentic and clear, consciousness relational and simple. Society is indulged in their own religions and have concern with others. Furthermore these society compare their beliefs and doctrine with others in order to assume that they could conceive their beliefs reliable and authentic when they could get universality of their beliefs in other religions. In religious pluralism, the people have different and definite thoughts and connections towards the multidimensional belief systems and religious deeds. On the basis of freedom of will, people of one faith and religion can study and investigate the faith and religion of others. This is what we can say interfaith dialogue or religious dialogue. Although there are some ill effects of interfaith conversation because authority of the religion differ and also their consciousness towards other beliefs as well as religions. Religion pluralism has two planes; one is pessimistic and other is optimistic. Pessimistic plane is attacking and criticizes co-existing religions in the world. while optimistic plan considers religions as a divine law as well as educate the people of the world with morality, universal codes of conduct, religious harmony with their own sects and with other belief systems of the society, peace, and respect for religions via beliefs. The world is extremely affected with the issues of religious plurality. The issue which are palpable in the world related to pluralism of religious are as: religious discrimination, sectarian conflicts in religions, inferiority and superiority of belief systems, rational diffusions on faith, religious authority issue, religious inequality, mythological conflicts, interfaith or interruption from opposite religions and sects, role of competent authority, argumentations and ignorant claims about resolution of religious questions, modesty issue, traditionalistic, religious verbalism, documentation, religious testimony and hedonistic along with utilitarian issues of religious beliefs and faiths. These issues can be analyzed and resolved with wisdom, religious consciousness, philosophical examinations along with religious epistemology and religious axiology. Humans can live in harmony and peace only if we could understand the tenets and principles of religious ideology. www.ijpub.org © 2018 IJCRT | Volume 6, Issue 1 March 2018 | ISSN: 2320-2882 IJPUB1801292 International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts (IJCRT) www.ijpub.org 1833 As far as the plurality of religion is concerned, there are three approaches to describe religious pluralism; rational approach/intellectual approach, authoritative approach or traditional approach and third is perspective from consciousness or religious understanding. Reason Reason or rationality exercised an important part in the world harmony, universalization and rationalization of human ideas and deeds. The deficiencies in the society as well as in different religions and religious sects are created and evolved due to the diverse attitudes of the people towards belief systems. From the religious aspect, most of the people have misconception about reason that it is the element of cognitive faculty which is employed to verify the concepts of religious dogmas in accordance with the rationality or judgments. When we judge re4ligious concepts or beliefs on the basis of reason or rationality we commit various errors i.e. the error of apprehension of religious terminology, as the field of religion is different from the field of rational inquiry. Religions differ from community to community, sect to sect and from people to people. Some religions provide full authority to reason where other religion restrict its claim and make it subservient to revelation. In religious pluralism, religions differ on the basis of faith, belief systems, rituals and act of worship. The department of religion differs from the department of intellect on the criteria of principles and language. Neither religious concepts can be resolved on the basis of rationality nor can reason supersede religious inquiry. In addition there are many limitations to reason. Reason can provide legitimate source of knowledge only when judgments are a-priori or innate and cannot be put in practice, observation and experimentation. Reason resolves the conflicts in the plurality of religious beliefs. The major and sectarian religions in the world could be understood only if we rationalize ourselves. It supposes to me that the objective of the reason is to perceive and interpret the dogmas and facets of the diverse religions. Reason can be explained in two ways to analyze the religious plurality; one Authority Religious authority in religious pluralism whether personal or impersonal determines the criteria for beliefs, rituals, convictions, and ideologies. In the world matter religions, sectarian religious and tribal religion there is some kind of valid authority and this authority is divine or sometimes it could be in the form of competent person. In Hinduism the authority is Vedas and person of the Vedas, in Islam authority is Quran and Sunnah and competent persons of Islam, in Christianity, authority is bible and persons of the bible. In other religious and religious sects authority differs. We are living in a global knot with various kinds of people who have accepted different religious and belief system. The policies, objectives, attitudes, way to look at different religious and their faith considers their value and understanding their belief system so that we can treat every religion equal and should respect religious belief systems as well as religious places. Actually the corruption and deficiencies regarding in humans and not in authority , it is the responsibility of the human beings to understanding and respect religious all thought their responsibility towards their particular faith is to accept his own religious and obey his authority. Personal authorities of religious are violating the principles and attitudes of religions. The chaos in the society or in the world is only due to the personal authority because they are misguiding the people and followers. Impersonal authority (scripture, religion text, jurisprudence) can never be wrong. No scripture or religion text is against interfaith dialogue and intellectual debates can solve many problems in the diversity of religious fields. But the authoritative person could be a competent person having worthy knowledge about world religious or opposite religious or belief system which is Augmenting. Consciousness In addition to reason and authority, consciousness is the significant element which facilitates people in understanding and reflecting the religious issues related to religious pluralism. It is only conscious attitudes which develops toleration, cooperation and acceptance in case of ideas of beliefs among humans. the reason and authority can be known through consciousness. It can make ourselves aware about the integration and togetherness in religion pluralism satre said that every consciousness is consciousness of itself. We are conscious of our attitudes and attitudes towards others religious consciousness make us aware about the conflicts when people are making faith with rationality. The integrity literature and cooperation in the world could be achieved only when we are conscious beings even when we are not using consciousness or of having conscious efforts towards religious belief system religious intolerance could arise , religious crises and arguments arise. It seems to me that consciousness does not correspond one religious belief into another but it can understand the diversity of religions, its merits and demerits when we could explore correctly or incorrectly consciousness provide the legitimate grounds to judge the different religious beliefs and religious ideologies. The way of living a good life in a society in connection to multiple belief systems ought to be judged on the principles of religious consciousness religious understanding /consciousness is examined in two grades. one is inner consciousness :conscious to judge inner policies , attitudes & methods to look at religious plurality and second is external consciousness : conscious to judge external mode of policies , attitudes and methods to look at religious plurality whether the formal is rule or axiom based principles to perceive set of beliefs within a community or religion and the former is experience based principles to perceive and acquire at different ideologies as well as set of beliefs within diverse type religious. Conclusion Reason, authority and consciousness are assumed as the fundamental tools to develop integrity, humanity, rationality, interfaith relationship, world brotherhood, religious tolerance, respect, humility, acceptance, world welfare, good will, freedom of expression, democracy, togetherness, understanding, religious reflection, self realization, unity and Ecumenism. All the major www.ijpub.org © 2018 IJCRT | Volume 6, Issue 1 March 2018 | ISSN: 2320-2882 IJPUB1801292 International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts (IJCRT) www.ijpub.org 1834 religions of the world like Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Jainism, could provide authentic grounds to understand religious pluralism in context to reason, authority and consciousness. The challenges and issues of religious pluralism ought to be rectified and resolved on the principles and products of reason, authority and consciousness. Every religion has Every religion has Every religion has Every religion has Every religion has Every religion has Every religion has Every religion has its own goals to achieve but those goals can be reflect and judged either on the modes of belief system or through act of worship. In this piece of writing I have shown the importance of rational outlook, authority and consciousness in order to maintain peace and kindness towards world religions. If we philosophize our activities and thoughts, rationalize our ways, methods, and attitudes and understand the choices, desires, world welfare, development and responsibility for ourselves as well as for others, then we could definitely realize the benevolent consequences of religious plurality and its ill effects could vanish and modified. References [1] Giordan, G. (2014), Introduction: pluralism as legitimization of diversity, In Ed., G. Giordan & E. Pace, Religious Pluralism Framing Religious Diversity in the Contemporary World, Springer: Switzerland. [2] Appiah, K. A. (2008), Causes of quarrel: what's is special about religious disputes?, In Ed., T. Banchoff, Religious Pluralism Globalization and World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [3] Hick, J. (1985), Problems of Religious Pluralism, Palgrave: Macmillan. [4] Rose, K. (2013). Pluralism the Future of Religion, New York: Bloomsbury. [5] Griffiths, P. J. (2001). Problems of Religious Diversity, Oxford: Blackwell. [6] Meister, C. (2009). Introducing Philosophy of Religion, New York: Routledge. [7] Edwards, R. B. (1979). Reason and Religion: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers. [8] Davies, B. (1993). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, New York: Oxford University Press. [9] Yandel, K. E. (1999). Philosophy of Religion A Contemporary Introduction: London & New york: Routledge. [10] Collingwood, R. G. (1916). Philosophy and Religion, London: Macmillan and Co.

PALEY, WILLIAM – Teologo anglicano n. a Peterborough nel luglio 1743 (è documentata la data del battesimo, 30 agosto 1743), m. a Lincoln il 25 maggio 1805. Studiò a Cambridge dove fu fellow e poi tutor al Christ College per 9 anni; in seguitò ricoprì diversi incarichi ecclesiastici. The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy ([1785] New York 1978), precedette di poco l'opera più nota di Jeremy Bentham. La dottrina di Paley fu una prosecuzione della via aperta da Richard Cumberland, guidata dalla preoccupazione di stabilire un criterio della virtù senza ricorrere a uno speciale senso morale. Il postulato del consequenzialismo teologico è che Dio ha scelto di emanare certe leggi in modo non arbitrario ma razionale, laddove si intendeva per razionale un calcolo della quantità di bene portata dall'applicazione di queste leggi: «le azioni possono essere valutate secondo la loro tendenza a promuovere felicità. Tutto ciò che è vantaggioso è giusto. È solo la convenienza [expediency] di qualsiasi norma morale ciò che ne determina il carattere di obbligo» (p. 62). Ma è Dio che opera il calcolo, e l'obbligazione trae origine dalla sua volontà e capacità di esercitare sanzioni garantendo la felicità eterna a chi è virtuoso. Il bene a sua volta si risolve nella «felicità», cioè in «ogni condizione in cui l'ammontare o l'aggregato di piacere eccede quello di dolore; e il grado di felicità dipende dalla quantità di questo eccesso. E la sua più grande quantità, ordinariamente raggiungibile nella vita umana, è ciò che intendiamo per felicità» (p. 18). Da queste premesse Paley fece discendere una contestazione della legittimità della proprietà privata affermando: se si vedesse in uno stormo di piccioni il «novantanove per cento di loro accumulare tutto ciò che hanno preso, tenendo per sé solo gli scarti e tenendo ciò che hanno accumulato per uno che è il più debole e forse il peggiore piccione dello stormo [...] non vedresti nulla più di ciò che viene praticato e stabilito quotidianamente fra gli uomini» (p. 90). Tuttavia, la proprietà privata, benché «paradossale e innaturale» è giustificata dai vantaggi che porta. Non va sottovalutato il carattere di rottura dell'affermazione; gli amici di Paley predissero – a ragione – che la pubblicazione di questo passo gli sarebbe costata la nomina a vescovo. Un argomento parallelo veniva svolto a proposito della «origine del governo civile», dichiarato anch'esso illegittimo in linea di principio; ma anche qui la mancanza di legittimità del governo vale come argomento contro ogni innovazione nella «costituzione» britannica, perché ogni innovazione ne avrebbe diminuito la stabilità, legata alla sola forza della consuetudine, portando più svantaggi che vantaggi (v. ivi, libro II, cap. 6). Un ampio capitolo è dedicato all'economia politica, riprendendo nozioni diffuse nel mondo inglese prima di Adam Smith (si noti che le lezioni di P. rielaborate nel volume erano state tenute a Cambridge prima del 1776) ma tenendo conto probabilmente di alcune idee di La ricchezza delle nazioni. Un tema cui Paley dedicò notevole attenzione è la popolazione, sulla quale riprese le dottrine pre-malthusiane che legano crescita della popolazione e sviluppo e le collegò con il suo consequenzialismo che portava a fare della crescita della popolazione un bene in sé, non soltanto in vista della potenza dello Stato: dato che il fine della «politica razionale» è la produzione della «massima quantità di felicità» ma dato che non esiste la felicità delle comunità, la quantità di felicità può essere accresciuta soltanto accrescendo il numero di coloro hanno percezioni o la piacevolezza delle percezioni stesse. Dopo la pubblicazione del Saggio di Malthus Paley ammise le sue buone ragioni e ritrattò la propria dottrina. La trattazione di Paley del problema della popolazione comunque comprende una complessa teoria del rapporto fra popolazione, consumo, crescita economica, occupazione dove trova posto una funzione per il consumo di lusso come fattore che, se spinto fino a e non oltre un punto ottimale ha più effetti benefici che dannosi sulla crescita. Partendo da queste idee Thomas R. Malthus sviluppò la sua teoria sulla funzione dei ceti medi improduttivi e non a caso John Maynard Keynes che in Paley scoprì un proprio precursore, lo dichiarò il primo degli economisti di Cambridge. Le altre opere principali furono opere di «teologia fondamentale»: Horae Paulinae (1790) è dedicata alla verità del cristianesimo, trattando la questione dell'attendibilità del Nuovo Testamento come documento storico. A View of the Evidences of Christianity (2 voll., London 1794), altra opera di apologetica, risponde alla critica alla possibilità del miracolo di Hume rovesciando il suo argomento dell'improbabilità: se si parte dall'ammissione della possibilità che Dio abbia destinato le creature a uno stato futuro di felicità e che voglia rendere noto questo destino alle sue creature, allora la possibilità del miracolo deve essere garantita e la verità del cristianesimo dipende dall'autenticità dei suoi miracoli. Partendo dal carattere improbabile del cristianesimo se ne fa una ragione a favore della sua verità in quanto lo si usa per escludere la possibilità della falsificazione deliberata da parte dei primi testimoni, testimoni che l'argomento di Hume dichiarava inattendibili in quanto la loro testimonianza andava contro l'esperienza comune; il requisito di Hume viene dichiarato troppo forte, in quanto un miracolo deve essere per definizione un'eccezione all'esperienza universale. Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributs of the Deity (1802) riprende, senza alcun riconoscimento (come d'altronde Paley fece costantemente nelle sue altre opere con altri autori), idee di Jacob Nieuwenhuis (teologo olandese seguace di Karl Krause), in cui ha un posto centrale lo Argument from Design. Gli organismi viventi sarebbero la prova per eccellenza, più che i fenomeni astronomici e quelli chimici, dell'esistenza di un autore della natura così come l'esistenza di un orologio è prova dell'esistenza di un orologiaio. Il punto decisivo dell'argomentazione è la legittimità di considerare parti della natura come meccanismi, legittimità che era stata contestata da Hume nei Dialoghi, pubblicati 1779, che Paley non sembra conoscere dato che – diversamente che sui miracoli – non risponde a Hume. Il problema della teodicea viene risolto sulla base della considerazione che certe parti della creazione sono state create in modo tale da funzionare beneficamente, e inoltre dal fatto che la divinità ha aggiunto alle sensazioni degli esseri che rientrano nel calcolo morale (fra i quali gli animali) il piacere, in una misura che va oltre il necessario, anche quando lo stesso scopo avrebbe potuto essere ottenuto attraverso il dolore. Paley fu per decenni il portavoce della via media di Cambridge, una posizione latitudinaria in religione e whig in politica, sostenitrice dei diritti innati dell'individuo (va ricordato il suo impegno per l'abolizione della tratta degli schiavi). Alcune opere furono tradotte in tedesco (i Principles da Christian Garve), francese, spagnolo, italiano e i Principles furono l'opera canonica di etica e politica in Inghilterra fino al 1845, quando apparvero gli Elements di William Whewell che presentavano un'etica intuizionista alternativa a quella consequenzialista di Paley EDIZ.: The Works, 7 voll, a cura di E. Paley, London 18252; Natural Theology, Farnborough 1970; tr. it. Teologia naturale, Roma 1808; A View of the Evidence of Christianity, Farnborough 1977; The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, New York 1978; tr. it. Principi di filosofia morale e politica, London 1817. BIBL.: D.L. LE MAHIEU, The Mind of William Paley, a Philosopher of his Age, Lincoln (Neb) 1976; J. SCHNEEWIND, Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, Oxford 1977; A.M.C. WATERMAN, Why William Paley was 'the first of the Cambridge economists', in «Cambridge Journal of Economics», 1996 (20), pp. 673-686; ID., A Cambridge via media in late Georgian Anglicanism, in «Journal of Ecclesiastical History», 42 (1991), pp. 419436. S. Cremaschi

History of Science Society and University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Isis. http://www.jstor.org Review Author(s): Gary Hatfield Review by: Gary Hatfield Source: Isis, Vol. 84, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), p. 811 Published by: on behalf of University of Chicago Press History of Science Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/235159 Accessed: 24-11-2015 14:32 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Tue, 24 Nov 2015 14:32:08 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 84: 4 (1993) Menachem Fisch; Simon Schaffer (Editors ). William Whewell: A Composite Portrait . xiv + 403 pp., bibl., index. Oxford: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1991. $98. William Whewell (1794-1866) is a nineteenth -century figure of great significance whose multivolume works have long sat silently on library shelves, attracting only a smattering of interest over many decades. With the two-hundredth anniversary of his birth fast approaching, his work and his place in the nineteenth-century scientific and philosophical economy are receiving due attention. (A similar outcropping occurred near the centenary of his death.) The present volume views its quarry from varied perspectives and under differing lights, yielding a new and deeper appreciation of Whewell as philosophically minded historian , historically minded philosopher, terminologically minded scientist, confident natural theologian, conservative political apologist, axiom-seeking moral philosopher, and committed reformer of scientific pedagogy . Old stereotypes fall away as new, or newly nuanced, characterizations emerge. Largely gone is the old and easy talk of "Kantian influence" on Whewell's basic philosophical notion, the "fundamental ideas." Whewell did draw on Kant in certain ways, but he was no Kantian: his fundamental ideas are less precisely defined than anything in Kant's transcendental taxonomy and are conceived as being historically embedded and developmental in a way that Kant's categories and forms of intuition are not. Menachem Fisch's second essay provides a detailed discussion of Whewell's theory of "antithetical knowledge," revealing along the way the many un-Kantian aspects of Whewell 's thought, even if in his first essay he somewhat misleadingly attributes a form of "transcendental reasoning" to Whewell (pp. 62-64). Gerd Buchdahl's masterful comparison of Whewell's and J. S. Mill's deductivist and inductivist philosophies of science is a major contribution to the history of the philosophy of science; in the course of it, Buchdahl closely details similarities and dissimilarities between Whewell and Kant. Several authors sound a new theme in Whewell studies : Whewell's opposition to the utilitarian calculus of pleasures as a major motivating force in his rejection of traditional empiricist and inductivist epistemology and in his practice of natural theology (Harvey Becher, Geoffrey Cantor, Perry Williams, John Hedley Brooke, Richard Yeo, Simon Schaffer, David B. Wilson). Williams's essay is especially effective at showing how Whewell came to adapt and employ his early philosophical commitment to nonempiricist "fundamental ideas" in a political and moral program that took God and tradition as its objects of reverence. Williams plausibly contends that the History of the Inductive Sciences and the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences were fruits of this program. The essays of Michael Ruse, Williams, Brooke, Wilson, and M. J. S. Hodge reveal the pervasive presence of Whewell's theism in his philosophical and scientific projects. The authors of this volume wrote with a firm conviction that Whewell deserves more attention than he has received. If their volume receives its due from historians of science and historians of philosophy, as well as from philosophers of science and historians of the philosophy of science, Whewell studies will be much advanced. GARY HATFIELD Robert J. Richards. The Meaning of Evolution : The Morphological Construction and Ideological Reconstruction of Darwin's Theory . (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations .) xvi + 205 pp., frontis., illus., bibl., index. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1992. $19.95, ?15.95. Lest there were any doubts: the history of scientific ideas is alive and living rambunctiously in Chicago. In his peppery prose, Robert Richards treats us to a tour through the meanings of evolution from early modem times through Darwin's version. This is no mere exercise in word tracing: as its subtitle suggests, this small, profusely illustrated book has a larger agenda. An existing tradition holds that there have been two distinct meanings of evolution, one denoting a preformationist theory of embryological development, and a separate, later one denoting descent with modification. The burden of Richards's argument is that these two meanings were not separate at all, but were united through the concept of embryological recapitulation. The stakes here are not as low as may appear , at least within the Darwin industry. The "separatist" argument maintains that Darwin 811 This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Tue, 24 Nov 2015 14:32:08 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 3 Issue 3, March – 2019, Pages: 81-86 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 81 The Impact of Crude Oil Price Fluctuation on Tertiary Education Survival in Nigeria Olatunbosun Odunsayan Federal University of Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria Abstract: This paper examined the impact of crude oil price fluctuation on tertiary education survival in Nigeria from 2011-2018. Ex-post facto research design was used. Data were extracted from Education Trust Fund (ETF), Federal Ministry of Education (FME), and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The data were analyzed using multiple regression analysis with the aid of Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20.0 software package. The findings of this study revealed that Crude oil price fluctuation is a critical determinant of tertiary education survival in Nigeria. There is a significant relationship between crude oil price fluctuation and budget allocation to tertiary education in Nigeria. This paper recommend that a policy that permits tertiary education survival through education tax fund allocation from profits of registered petroleum companies proceed should be extended and apply to established Alumni Tax Fund. The Alumni Tax Fund will generate pool of fund from graduate of Nigeria Universities, Colleges of Education and Polytechnic Education. Keywords: Crude oil, crude oil price, price fluctuation, tertiary education survival, Budget Allocation 1. INTRODUCTION Crude oil is a naturally occurring substance which is found in widely differing amounts in various countries throughout the world. Oil is not used directly for any important purpose, rather it is refined and split into different products which are either used directly for final consumption or are in turn further processed. Different crude oils yield different proportions of these refined products, and since the value is related to the end uses, those crude oils yielding higher proportions of valuable by-products (petroleum motor spirit, diesel fuels, jet fuels, petroleum gas etc.) will tend to sell at a premium relative to other crude oils. Nigeria depends a lot on oil price. Oil is the mainstay of the economy. Change in price is definitely bound to affect us. Oil price can change any time. Anything can affect it. It is all about international politics. Oil price fluctuation is not a new thing in global crude oil market. Price fluctuation is making planning very difficult for countries that depend solely on crude oil as their main source of foreign earning and fund generation. The implication of this sole dependence on revenues from oil meant that the country was exposed to the vagaries of international oil market. That clearly explains the recent crash in the price of crude oil resulted in short fall in revenue inflows to the government. The effect was the inability of the government at various levels in Nigeria to fund their budgets leading to reduction on budget allocation to education, abandonment of capital projects, nonpayment of contractors and salaries of government workers. The spiral effect on the economy was the weakened capacity of consumers which affected the economy negatively. This is coupled by the general hike in the prices of goods and services due to high cost of manufacturing and imports due to the fall in the value of the naira (Nigeria's currency against other currencies). Budget planning in Nigeria is determined and control by crude oil price fluctuation. Therefore, dwindling crude oil price globally is bound to affect all aspect of Nigeria Economy. Nigeria economy is sustained and survives by global crude oil price. Nigeria education sector is not exempted from damning consequence of crude oil price fluctuation. Crude oil price is a key determinant in budgetary allocation to Nigeria education sector. In Nigeria, funds allocated to education sector by Federal Government are usually distributed to the various tiers of education, such as the primary, secondary, and tertiary. Tertiary education relates to all forms of post-secondary education such as the Universities, Polytechnics, Colleges of Education, Monotechnics and Professional schools (Abdu 2003). In the quest for development, developing countries have acknowledged that investment in and adequate funding of higher education are viable conditions that facilitate change since the value of education hinges on teaching, learning, research and the production of qualified personnel which are needed for national development (UNESCO, 2002). It is a fact that out of the three levels of education, the tertiary level is favoured in terms of allocation of funds in Nigeria (Saint, Hartnett & Strassner, 2003). It is even worthy International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 3 Issue 3, March – 2019, Pages: 81-86 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 82 of note that the Education Tax Fund (generated by Federal Government from 2% tax imposed on profits of companies in Nigeria) favours higher education, being shared at the ratio: higher education (50%); primary education (40%); and secondary education (10%) (Nwagwu, 2015). Statement of the Problems Oil prices have witnessed profound fluctuations and this strongly determines the allocation of fund to education sector and poses great challenges for budget planning in Nigeria. Crude oil price falling have negative impact on Nigeria education sector. The effect of crude oil price fluctuation is evident in the decrease in budget allocation to tertiary education during period of crude oil price changes. This decrease in budget allocation to tertiary education may have a significant relationship with tertiary education survival in Nigeria. The findings of many researchers have established significant effects of inadequate funding on the standard and sustainability of tertiary education in Nigeria. However, few research work has been carried out on the influence of crude oil price fluctuation on the survival of tertiary education in Nigeria. Therefore, this study is aimed at investigating the impact of crude oil price fluctuation on survival of tertiary education in Nigeria. Objectives of the Study This study is aimed at examining the impact of crude oil price fluctuation on survival of tertiary education in Nigeria. Other objectives are as follows;  Find out whether crude oil price fluctuation is a critical determinant of survival of tertiary education in Nigeria.  Discover whether there is a significant relationship between crude oil price fluctuation and budget allocation to tertiary education in Nigeria.  Recommend on how to sustain tertiary education in Nigeria without depending on crude oil revenue. Research Questions The following research question were sought so as to provide solutions to the problems of the study. i. Is there a significant relationship between crude oil price fluctuation and budget allocation to tertiary education in Nigeria? ii. Does crude oil price fluctuation determine the survival of tertiary education in Nigeria? iii. How can tertiary education be sustained and survived in Nigeria without depending on crude oil revenue? 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE Crude oil is a major source of foreign exchange earnings and the dominant source of revenue for the Nigerian government. According to Oguchuckwu (2016) Oil price fluctuation have had a damning multiple effect on crude oil price and economic activity. The Nigerian economy has been completely reliant on oil and the basis upon which government budgeting, revenue distribution and capital allocations are determined. Fluctuation is an upward and downward movement of oil prices globally. Fluctuation in price of crude is a common phenomenon in the global oil market as the world economy has witnessed a number of changes in the price of crude oil at different times. This assertion thus translates that these oil prices are exogenous because it's determined by external influences that negatively impact the Naira and Nigeria cannot moderate the causes of these oil price slides. Statistic revealed that 80% of Nigeria's energy revenues flow to the government; 16% cover operational costs, and the remaining 4% go to investors (Atukeren 2003). The recent crash in crude oil prices has resulted in a massive financial decline in oil producing countries (Ogochukwu 2016). Some researchers projected the likely impact of oil prices on different aspects of economy of oil producing countries (Olomola 2006; Habib & Kalamova 2007; Aliyu & Usman 2009; Ricken 2009). For instance, Olomola (2006), conducted a study to investigate the likely effect of oil prices on the total economic activity in Nigeria. The author discovered that changes in oil prices affected the foreign exchange rate in Nigeria. The author also documented that oil prices did not have any effect on the rate of inflation and general output in the country. The effect of oil prices on the exchange rate in Saudi Arabia, Norway and Russia was investigated by Habib & Kalamova (2007). The authors reported that there was a positive relationship between exchange rate and oil price in Russia. However, oil price did not have a significant impact on the exchange rate in Saudi Arabia and Norway. According to Ricken (2009), the influence of oil prices on foreign exchange rate is as a result of the unavailability of solid institutions and the country's complete dependence on the exportation of oil. The negative effects of fluctuating oil prices can be International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 3 Issue 3, March – 2019, Pages: 81-86 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 83 reduced by the diversification of the Nigerian economy (Aliyu & Usman, 2009). The current decrease in oil price has significantly affected the Nigerian economy (Olomola, 2006; Ogochukwu, 2016). Crashing crude oil prices have resulted in inflation, massive laying off of employees in private companies, increased cost of living, nonpayment of salaries by Nigerian state governments, increased foreign exchange rate, reduced amount of funds flowing into the foreign reserve and depletion of the account of excess crude oil (Adeoye & Atanda 2005). The previous fluctuations in crude oil prices ($95.16 per barrel in January 2008, $146.15 per barrel in July 2008, and $76.15 dollars per barrel in October 2008) eventually took a major dive in the year 2016 to less than $28 per barrel (Sanusi 2010). The current decrease in oil price is an eye-opener for the Nigerian economy to consider the need for diversification (Ogochukwu 2016). The country must explore other avenues to make its economy viable rather than depending solely on oil commodity. This will forestall the effect of present or future crude oil crisis on the Nigerian economy. Hence, there is a need for Nigeria to shift to other sectors that were previously neglected when it experienced a boom in oil prices. Currently there has been an increased cry for diversification in Nigeria; this is due to the negative effects of oil prices on the country's economy. Diversification is considered to be the nostrum for neutralization of the harsh effects of dwindling oil prices and stabilization of Nigeria's financial economy. The Nigerian economy has also begun to explore other non-oil sectors. For instance, one of the recent priorities of the financial economy of Nigeria is Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SME)'s (Ogochukwu 2016). He opined that Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SME)'s increases output and per capita income, creates job opportunities, play crucial roles in the process of economic growth and industrialization, and improve sectoral and/or regional economic balance via the promotion of resource use and industrial dispersal. Thus, the Central Bank of Nigeria directed Nigerian banks to diversify as well as increase their lending portfolio to non-oil sectors of the economy. 3. METHODOLOGY Research Design Ex-post facto method was adopted in this study because the independent variable has already occurred and the researcher starts with observation of the dependent variable. The study involves collection of existing data to access the contributions of crude oil price fluctuation on tertiary education survival in Nigeria. The independent variable is the crude oil price fluctuation and the dependent is the Education Tax Fund Allocation for tertiary education survival. Method of Data Analysis Data collected for the study was extracted from Education Trust fund (ETF), Federal Ministry of Education (FME) and National Bureau of Statistics. The data were analyzed using multiple regression analysis with aid of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20.0 software package. Model Specification To establish the effect of crude oil price on tertiary education survival and this model was developed: SurvivalTE = β0 + β1UNITFt + β2COGEDUt + β3PLYTECHt +Ɛ1....................................1 Where SurvivalTE represents tertiary education survival UNITFt represents University ETF Fund Allocation COGEDUt represents College of Education ETF Fund Allocation PLYTECHt represents Polytechnic Education ETF Fund Allocation and Ɛ1 represents stochastic variable (error term) 4. RESULTS 1. Research Question 1: Does crude oil price fluctuation determine the survival of tertiary education in Nigeria? Table 4.1 Trend of Crude Oil Price Fluctuation and ETF Fund to Tertiary Education in Nigeria Years Average Crude Oil Price ETF Fund Allocation 2011 $102.58 N26,852,940,000 2012 $101.09 N125,800,000,000 2013 $98.12 N147,900,000,000 2014 $89.63 N215,400,000,000 2015 $46.34 N50, 923,000,000 2016 $38.17 N213, 418,124,493 2017 $48.73 N69,180,000,000 2018 $50.59 N133,800,000,000 Source: The Author Compilation (2018 edition) International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 3 Issue 3, March – 2019, Pages: 81-86 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 84 Table 4.1 above shows the trend of fluctuation in crude oil price and fund allocation to tertiary education through Education Tax Fund (ETF). It indicates that when the average price was 102.58 dollar in 2011, ETF allocated least fund to tertiary education. In 2014, when crude oil price declined to 89.63 dollar, tertiary education had highest fund. It is clear to infer that during economic recession in the country in 2016, the average price fluctuated to 38.17 dollar which was insignificant to the Education Tax Fund allocation to tertiary education. Table 4.2: Multiple Regression Between Independent Variable (Crude Oil Price Fluctuation) and Dependent Variable (Tertiary Education Survival) a. Predictors: (Constant), Crude Oil Price b. Dependent Variable: Tertiary Education Survival The Multiple regression analysis outcome on crude oil price fluctuation and tertiary education survival are presented in Table 4.2 above with the significant predictor (R = 0.78). This indicates that crude oil price fluctuation contributes to tertiary education survival in the country. Crude oil price fluctuation predicts a significant effect size of 61 percent variability towards tertiary education survival. The findings are consistent with Ugwuanyi (2014) whose study revealed that Education Tax Fund has helped in enhancing the educational development Tertiary Institutions and Oraka & Okenwa (2017) that ETF has impacted positively in Nigerian Educational Development with particular focus on Tertiary institutions. 2. Research Questions 2: Is there a significant relationship between crude oil price fluctuation and budget allocation to tertiary education in Nigeria? Table 4.3 Relationship Between Crude Oil Price Fluctuation And Budget Allocation to Education In Nigeria Years Average Crude Oil Price Budget Education Allocation % of Budget 2011 $102.58 N4.972 TRN N306.3 BN 6.16 2012 $101.09 N4.877 TRN N400.15 BN 8.20 2013 $98.12 N4.987 TRN N426.53 BN 8.55 2014 $89.63 N4.962 TRN N493.00 BN 9.94 2015 $46.34 N5.068 TRN N392.20 BN 7.74 2016 $38.17 N6.061 TRN N369.60 BN 6.10 2017 $48.73 N7.444 TRN N550.00 BN 7.38 2018 $50.59 N8.612 TRN N605.80 BN 7.03 Source: Author Compilation (2018) Table 4.3 above shows that 2014 has the highest record of budget allocation to Education by the Federal Government of Nigeria from 2011-2018. The highest percentage of education budget allocation compares to total budget allocation was recorded in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Hence, we could infer that crude oil price fluctuation is a predictor of budget allocation to tertiary education in Nigeria. This finding agree with Ugwuanyi (2014) study of the activities of Education Tax Fund (ETF) upon Nigerian tertiary institutions with the target of revealing how Education Tax Fund has helped in enhancing the educational development of Nigerian Tertiary Institutions. There is indicative that ETF has the potential of alleviating the chronic under-funding of the educational sector. International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 3 Issue 3, March – 2019, Pages: 81-86 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 85 Table 4.4: Multiple Regression Between Independent Variable (Crude Oil Price Fluctuation) and Dependent Variable (Budget Allocation to education) a. Predictor: (Constant), Crude Oil Price Fluctuation b. Dependent Variable: FG Budget c. Dependent Variable: Education Allocation The Multiple correlations that tested for crude oil price fluctuation and budget allocation to tertiary education in Nigeria are presented in Table 4.4 with the significant predictor (R = 0.86). This indicates that crude oil price fluctuation contributes to tertiary education survival in this study. Crude oil price fluctuation states a significant effect size of 75 percent variability towards budget allocation to tertiary education in Nigeria. 5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION This study examined the impact of crude oil price fluctuation on tertiary education survival in Nigeria and certain truth were revealed in the course of this study. The findings of this study revealed that Crude oil price fluctuation is a critical determinant of tertiary education survival in Nigeria and that there is a significant relationship between crude oil price fluctuation and budget allocation to tertiary education in Nigeria. This paper has given rise to the following recommendations. i. The policy that permits tertiary education survival through education tax fund allocation from profits of registered petroleum companies proceed should be extended and apply to established Alumni Tax Fund. The Alumni Tax Fund will generate pool of fund from graduate of Nigeria Universities, Colleges of Education and Polytechnic Education. ii. The Federal Government of Nigeria should strive to meet the UNESCO minimum standard of 26% of national budget and promote private sector investment on education in Nigeria. iii. The intervention agency should be encouraged towards prompt tax collection and budget allocations and cooperation from Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS) for an efficient service that can induce more wonderful outcome from ETF efforts. REFERENCES 1. Adeoye B. W. and Atanda, A. A (2005) Exchange volatility in Nigeria; consistency, persistency and severity analysis. CBN Journal of Applied Statistics, Vol. 2 No 2 2. Aliyu, S. and Usman, R (2009) Impact of oil price shock and exchange rate volatility on economic growth in Nigeria. An empirical investigation 3. Atukeren, E (2003) Oil price and the Swiss economy. Journal series working paper vol 77 4. Habib, M. M and Kalamova, M. M (2007) The real exchange rate of oil exporting countriesEuropean Central Bank, http://www.ecb.eunpa.eu 5. Oguchukwu, O. N (2016) The oil price fall and the impact on the Nigeria economy: A call for diversification, journal of law, policy and globalization vol 48 6. Olomola, P (2006) Oil price shocks and aggregate economic activity in Nigeria. African Economic and Bussiness Review, 4; 40-45 International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 3 Issue 3, March – 2019, Pages: 81-86 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 86 7. Oraka, A. O and Okenwa, O. (2017) Effect of value added tax on the Nigeria economy; Academic Article http:www.researchgate.net 8. Ricken, T (2009) A multiphase finite element simulation of Biological conversion process in Landfills, https:/www.transfermarket.com 9. Saint, W. Hartness, T and Stranssner, E (2003) Higher education in Nigeria: A status Report Published in Higher Education Policy. 10. Sanusi, L. S (2010) Growth prospect for the Nigeria economy. Central bank of Nigeria. Convocation Lecture Delivered at the Igbinedon University Convocation Ceremony, Okada, Edo State. http:/www.cbn.gov.ng 11. UNESCO, (2002) Annula Report 2002: UNESCO Institute for Education, http:/unesco.org>annual-report-2002une

Kuznetsov V.I. Scientific concepts and their changes Since 1970-ties, the topic of changes of scientific knowledge has become disputable and fashionable in the philosophy and methodology of science. Any work devoted to this topic may be interpreted as the realization of a certain combination of four major strategies. The first two strategies are associated with a dichotomy of informal and formal methods used. An example of the informal studies is T.Kunh's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963). Examples of the formal studies are J.Sneed's The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics (1971) and The Structure of Scientific Theories edited by F.Suppe (1974). It might be well to point out that Sneed and his followers have mainly operated with set-theoretical and category-theoretical methods, while Suppe and his co-authors have favored logical and linguistic methods and tools. The second two strategies are associated, correspondingly, with a holistic and compositional analysis of scientific knowledge systems. In the former case, the subject of studies is the holistic features and patters of a knowledge system and its history. An example is virtually any book on the history of a particular science. In the latter case, the subject is some component(s) of a knowledge system. M.Jammer's The Concept of Mass (1961) is a typical embodiment of this strategy. From this standpoint, the triplet study of concept changes is some combination of set-theoretical methods and modeling such particular components of a scientific knowledge system as its concepts. The triplet approach models a scientific concept as three collections of sets associated with three fundamental informative components of a concept [1; 2; 3]. These components are the concept base (the information about objects falling under a concept and about their properties and relations as they are supposed to be), the concept representing part (the information about tools of representing and describing the concept base in a knowledge system) and concept linkage (the information about links between the kinds of information mentioned above). The concept base is modeled as set of objects subsumed under a concept, sets of various attributes of these objects, sets of various relations between members of the first set, the set of measurable values of quantitative attributes, etc. The concept representing part is modeled as sets of various linguistic structures (including mathematical ones) used for representation of the information about the concept base: letters (symbols), expressions (formulas), texts (mathematical structures). The concept linkage is modeled as sets of various operations and procedures (naming, observation, measurement, computing, interpretation, etc.) of constituting correspondences between the concept base and concept representing part. In the triplet framework it is possible to propose the ramified classification of concepts, the set-theoretical description of varieties of complex structures of any scientific concept and numerous relations between concepts etc. If we are not conceptual Platonists and recognize flux and growth of any concept we possess, then there is good reason to believe that the triplet modeling is applicable to study of some aspects of concept changes. Indeed, according to the triplet model, a certain change of a concept may be studied as 1) adding/removing a new/old set in the three major collections mentioned above; 2) a quantitative and/or qualitative changes of the appropriate sets; 3) introducing/restructuring relations between sets (and between their elements) in these collections; 4) a quantitative and/or qualitative change of the appropriate relation. The problem is to describe precisely these changes. The triplet modeling will lead to explicating many well-known concept changes (explication, quantification, formalization, mathematization, extension, restriction, etc.) and introducing many before unknown types of changes of concepts. Examples are various kinds of concept alteration, variation, rearrangement, transmutation, permutation, etc. All these concept changes and their patterns have nontrivial interpretation on the real history of the fundamental scientific concepts, especially those from theory of number and elementary particle physics. It seems to me, that the problem of concept changes is very attractive and promising for ambitious young researchers. Those who are interested in, please, call 553-19-29. 1. Кузнецов В. Понятие и его структуры. Методологический анализ. К.: Институт философии НАН Украины, 1997. 2. Kuznetsov V. The Triplet Modeling of Concept Connections // Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science. Selected Contributed Papers from the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Ed. by A. Rojszczak, J. Cachro and G. Kurczewski, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003, 317-330. 3. Kuznetsov V. Representing Relations between Physical Concepts // Communication and Cognition, 2004, 37: 105-135.

The Acrobatics of the Figure: Piranesi and Magnificence Lars Spuybroek In the history of aesthetics, Giambattista Piranesi's case is an extraordinary one, and the fact that he inspired and influenced such a vast number of authors, artists and architects clearly signals that he was both a unique and elusive figure. Aside from the obvious reasons for his continuing relevance, such as the nature of his interests and the extreme, uncompromising way he handled such content, we need to acknowledge Piranesi's invention of what we would today call "speculative drawing"; that is, architectural drawing not as a study, a design or a preparation for a materialized object but as a practice in itself. Piranesi himself stated that this practice was explicitly not that of the architect, who spent-and often wasted-most of his days trying to find clients, adapt plans, gather political support, and negotiate more variations.1 Dissociated from building, the drawing's realm suddenly expands enormously. Certainly, it still relates to architecture and the notion of a future project, but also to scenography, as we can see in the case of the Carceri; and to fantasies, as in the Grotteschi; to artist's perspectives, as in the Vedute di Roma; to illustration, as in the Antichità Romane; even to archaeological observation, as in Della Magnificenza; and, of course, to the merging of several of these disciplines, as we can see in the plans for the Campo Marzio. By keeping as close to the architectural drawing as possible, Piranesi could deploy a project's power to speculate on the future while at the same time speculating on the past as much as novelists and painters are allowed to do. Speculative drawing enabled him to introduce mood, thought, fantasy and fear into architecture in a way that mere architectural practice would never have allowed him to do. Of course, the invention of such a medium can only be sustained if it makes full use of its new powers. So many architects have struggled with the question how to do this. We could think of the late-Victorian architect William Burges, whose romantic drawings for a new, wholly Gothicist Law Courts building in London enchanted the public but never had the slightest chance of being built.2 Or we could think of John Soane, one of architecture's absolute greats, and Joseph Gandy's watercolor renderings of his projects: looking at them, we can never fully rid our minds of the idea that these warm, golden pictures are actually more beautiful than the projects themselves. And this is true for a very specific reason: not because Gandy's drawings were of higher quality or Burges' project 1 Piranesi writes in his dedication for the Prima Parte: "There is no hope that an Architect of our times can successfully execute anything similar [to the Roman buildings of the past], be it the fault of Architecture itself... [or] of those who should act as patrons of this most noble art... no other option is left to me, or to any other modern Architect, than to explain his own ideas through drawings and in this way... to take it away... from the abuse of those who possess wealth, and who make us believe that they themselves are able to control the operations of Architecture." Quoted from Teresa Stoppani, "Material and Critical: Piranesi's Erasures," in Ivana Wingham (ed.), Mobility of the Line (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2013), 234–246. 2 The 1866–7 competition to design the new Law Courts buildings in London stands out for its organizers having invited only Gothic Revivalists, such as G.E. Street (the final winner), Gilbert Scott (the architect of St. Pancras station), Alfred Waterhouse and William Burges, one of the most radical Gothicists of his day. was unpractical but because Soane, Burges and Piranesi aimed to revive and glorify a past. And though they project that past into a future, they do not mean it to arrive in the present just yet. All three, and especially Piranesi, made a very specific claim on the notion of glory, or, as he called it, magnificence. Piranesi understood that architecture by its nature has an intimate relationship with magnificence; he understood its formal, "ascending" and "cumulative" qualities; moreover, he understood that ascent to a sunlit state of glory cannot be disconnected from descent, from the groundless and endless that we so often associate with the sublime. Now, mentioning the two aesthetic categories of the sublime and the magnificent opens up a millennia-long history of aesthetics too convoluted to properly disentangle in this context. However, a few pointers can be given that afford us at least a sense of their relationship. First, it is not true that the sublime is merely associated with the groundless and the endless; its original meaning lies with the notion of the "high" as we recognize it from Longinus' Peri Hypsous,3 generally translated as On the Sublime but literally meaning "on the high" or "on the elevated," which is close to the German term Erhabene. The reasons why the sublime is sometimes associated with the high and sometimes with the deep are complicated, but in general it is safe to say that when it is associated with the high, it is derived from Plato's heavenly Forms, which are located, outside of time, in the transcendent world of the mind. And since Plato's Beyond is fundamentally defined as an Above, we could argue that transcendence is of a singularly spatial nature. Wherever it is, it is there. In contrast, when the sublime is associated with the deep, it relates specifically to time: the genesis of things is now not instantiated by earthly shapes "participating" in heavenly Forms4; rather, they "emerge" from a unified past. The deep sublime, therefore, coincides with the Romantic notion of Bildung and formation as opposed to mere form.5 Formation is generally considered a purely immanent category; in fact, a force more than a form. We should not view this opposition as one of extremes within a philosophical debate but simply acknowledge that the sublime contains both spatial and temporal aspects, which necessarily coexist. For instance, Kant's appreciation of the infinite as essential to the sublime involves the endless in time as well as the infinite in space. Kant calls the sublime essentially formless and without measure6; 3 Longinus, On the Sublime, transl. W. Rhys Roberts (Cambridge University Press, 1935). 4 According to Plato, all particular forms relate to ideal universal Forms through what he calls "participation" (methexis), which has connotations with gift exchange and sharing as well as metaphysical issues concerning the whole and the parts. The gift cycle would allow the Forms to be conceived as eternal yet not as static, the latter being the standard interpretation. The sun (Plato's central metaphor) is not fixed but circulates in the sky, and Plato often refers to it as doing so. 5 The German notion of Bildung is related to that of the Bildungstrieb, the "formative drive." The latter concept stems from the biological debate in the mid-eighteenth century between preformationists and epigeneticists. Epigenesis theorized an initially undifferentiated state of the embryo, which developed through stages of progressive differentiation. This coincides with Schelling's notion of the Ungrund, which he had earlier spelled as Urgrund. In the beginning, all was One, in a state that was "unthinged" (Unbedingt) but not at rest, filled with a chaos of opposing forces. The notion of Ungrund quickly developed into that of the unconscious; the term was used long before Freud appropriated it. Therefore, to understand the depth of the "unground," we should conceive it as a depth in time, a geological and archaeological depth. It is very close to the Abgrund that we encounter so often in Caspar-David Friedrich's paintings. 6 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, §24. this is why it tends to confiscate the mind, and why the aesthetic of the sublime was the favorite of abstractionists such as Mark Rothko and Barnett Newman, who in 1948 wrote the influential article "The Sublime is Now."7 Before we proceed any further, we should state clearly that the magnificent is not of the same order. Sublimity and magnificence are close, even akin, but there is a major difference: magnificence is always a quality of form- yet, I hasten to add, of a very special type of form. In a similar vein, the earlier Kant of the 1764 Observations on the Feeling of the Sublime and the Beautiful positioned magnificence-or, in German, das Prächtige-close to the sublime, though it also contained aspects of the beautiful. For Kant, the sublime was an extreme category, followed on a spectrum by the Schreckhaft-Erhabene (the terrifying), then the Edle (the noble), then the Prächtige (mostly translated as the splendid but coinciding exactly with the magnificent), then the Schöne, and finally, in diametrical opposition to the sublime, the Hübsch, or the pretty.8 At this point, we should not be distracted by the question of how correct his organization of the aesthetic categories is; rather, we should take note of the fact that Kant sees the magnificent as a mitigated and measured version of the sublime, because it mixes aspects of the noble and the beautiful. One of his examples is St. Peter's, which he describes as a combination of a "large and simple frame" with "beautiful mosaic and gold."9 And indeed, magnificence combines two essential aspects of architecture: the abstract, geometric structure and the ornate, shining surface-an argument that brings us very close to an understanding of Piranesi. But let us first go back to the notion of magnificence, before we start discussing its programmatic function in his works. The term "magnificence," which etymologically combines magnus ("great") and facere ("to make") to signify "the doing of great deeds," is consistent with the Aristotelian term megaloprepeia from the Nicomachean Ethics, defined as the "disposition to expend substantial private wealth on projects that both benefit the city and... bring credit on the individual."10 In short, greatness lies in the relative size of the gift and the subsequent esteem it brings to its donor. The fact that magnificence is derived from gift-giving is crucial, since it implies that the term was originally reserved for acts and deeds before it was applied to objects.11 In the history of aesthetics the conflation of activity and object is not uncommon, as in the case of beauty, a term that can be applied to a face, a phrase, a walk in the park, a way of walking, anything. And the same applies to ugliness, ridiculousness, vulgarity, cuteness, and all other categories. In fact, in aesthetics no 7 Barnett Newman, "The Sublime is Now," in: Barnett Newman: Selected Writings and Interviews (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1948] 1990), 170. Cited, of course, by Jean-François Lyotard in "The Sublime and the Avant-Garde." 8 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Sublime and the Beautiful, tr. J. Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1764] 1991), 45–55, 87. 9 Ibid., 49. 10 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.1122a-b. 11 Lars Spuybroek, "Charis and Radiance," in: Giving and Taking: Antidotes to a Culture of Greed, eds. J. Brouwer and S. van Tuinen (Rotterdam: V2_Publishing, 2014), 119–50. This essay develops the idea that beauty as an aesthetic concept evolved from gift exchange, which in ancient Greek culture centered around the notion of charis, usually translated as "grace," though it also means favor, gratitude, pleasure, and beauty. The gift cycle embodied by the Three Graces (giving, receiving and returning) exists in all cultures in one way or another. fundamental distinction is made between things and actions or between objects and events. In this spectrum, magnificence takes its own place and emphasizes the verticality that we encountered with the sublime, in contrast to categories such as the pretty and the vulgar, which emphasize the horizontal, shallow and flat. Therefore, alongside the great, we quickly recognize as synonymous with the magnificent the splendid, the glorious, the illustrious, the superb, the grandiose. That does not mean all powerful and elevated positions are wholly magnificent, but it is no accident that many kings' and emperors' names-including Alexander and Peter-have been suffixed with "the Great," and that Lorenzo de Medici was called "Il Magnifico." On the other hand, it goes without saying that, though kings and emperors get magnificence for free, this by no means signifies that they can claim it: one has to perform great deeds to earn such praise. Similarly, objects such as books, buildings, or symphonies, can qualify as magnificent, relatively independent of their size. A movie can be great, a poem magnificent. Greatness has nothing to do with bigness. What counts is that great things combine various aspects of radiance (glory, splendor, luster), wealth (affluence, abundance, gift) and power (nobility, excellence, structure), without any external structure to hold them in an elevated position. Things that are magnificent are so by themselves, and in that sense they are neither big nor small. It is the pure reversibility of object and action that makes a thing scaleless, not a connection to anything larger, such as a network, Umwelt or Welt.12 In the realm of the aesthetic, an act can present itself as an object, and an object as an activity. Things act (and eventually act on us), and acts are things. In aesthetics, we often refer to this idea using the notion of the motif or the figure, and each has an elaborate history. A figure can be a form but also a gesture or a set of gestures or movements. We describe the motifs on a frieze as "meandering" while realizing perfectly well that nothing is actually moving. 13 This reversibility of path and trace, of channel and movement, lies at the heart of how things exist aesthetically. And in the case of magnificence, it means that we need a specific type of figure that allows a scaleless thing to qualify as great. What makes a thing, which is not big as an object, great? When we return to the work of Piranesi with this thought in mind, we quickly discover just such a special type of figure in his etchings and drawings: what I would call the cumulative figure. It is a heaping, cascading, stepping, aggrandizing figure with which he organizes his candelabri, his grotteschi and his vedute, from the smallest object to the largest, and from perspective to frontal views. We encounter cascading proliferations of arches, bridges and colonnades; stacks of wholly disparate objects;14 views leading to other views and again to still others, generally leading the eye upward. The 12 Bruno Latour, who calls things "actants," views entities as activities because they are part of networks, a concept he derived from Heidegger's notion of a Welt: things "open up" towards a world. Heidegger again derived it from a contemporary biologist, Jakob von Uexküll, who viewed all living beings existing in their own Umwelt, what he called a Seifenblase, a soap bubble. All three have a functional concept of this worldnetwork, where thing and world define each other reciprocally. Here I borrow the twin concept of the thingact, but disconnect it from any hypothetical world as the determining factor of such action. 13 Susanne Langer, Feeling and Form (New York: Charles Scribner, 1953), 64. Lars Spuybroek, The Sympathy of Things (Rotterdam: V2_NAI Publishing, 2011), 178-183. 14 Horace Walpole described Piranesi's designs as piles: "He piles palaces on bridges, and temples on palaces, and scales Heaven with mountains of edifices" (from: The Works of Horatio Walpole, Vol. 3, London, 1798, p. 399). cumulative figure is not as smooth as the serpentinata figures of Giambologna and Hogarth15 but rather stepped, rough and incremental; nonetheless, it is a figure, that is, a conflation of object and movement. It is a figure of richness and abundance that adds to what has already been added and then adds again, not so much by layering but precisely by accumulating and spilling over. For Piranesi, every thing is a cornucopia. When we look at his vases in the Vasi, his chimneypieces in the Diverse Maniere, his man-sized candlesticks (especially those), the high altar in S. Maria del Priorato, the stairs that seem to go on forever in the Carceri, the terraces of the Campo Marzio, the decorations in the Parere su l'Architettura, the frontispieces of the Antichità Romane, we see the same thing again and again: figures exceeding themselves iteratively, leaping from themselves while remaining with themselves, generally engaged in the most prodigious antics and exhibiting the most elaborate acrobatics. Everything aims for the highest point, be it a facade, a view, a candlestick, a city, anything-but it does so without leaving itself. Striving is not a matter of ecstasy, which we typically associate with the sublime. Things definitely take a turn in Piranesi's universe, but as they do so, they define themselves-at least aesthetically. In his world, and maybe ours, things are like athletes or acrobats: while striving for the best, they show themselves. Or, to put it more paradoxically: in their acrobatics, things stand on their own, simply because the object has turned into a figure. When we look at the wondrous architecture of the Campo Marzio, we don't see fragments, or Tafuri's bricolage,16 or a "critique" of classical order, or any other type of deconstruction; no, we see figures standing on their own, organized entirely within themselves. We should not take this lightly: the order that creates things is not shared with other things, which are in turn created by their own order. Things are not nested according to some ontological set theory in which parts form wholes and wholes in turn are parts of bigger wholes, et cetera; no, there are only wholes. It is like a universe of snowflakes: each flake is perfectly organized, but that organization is not shared spatially between them. Nevertheless, we haven't entered a world where all contact consists of chance encounters and blind dates; things do connect precisely and intimately, but on their own terms. In the realm of architecture, this would mean that urbanism's claims over the object would be declared null and void. There is in fact no space external to the figure, no outer, universal order holding these things together: they only come together to add more glory, more verticality. Again, let us not mistake such a world for one where things blindly elbow their way upward; there is great generosity (in Aristotle's sense) and no lack of communality (though there is definitely a lack of solidarity). And each flake constitutes a palace, or a mausoleum, a garden, a circus, or a bathhouse, all of them appearing in large numbers. The Campo Marzio is a world devoid of work and workspaces. Huizinga's notion of play offers us a powerful conceptual tool for comprehending its program, turning our notion of the plan of the Campo Marzio into a ludic plan-unsurprisingly, since it concerns the field of Mars. Things are added to 15 William Hogarth, The Analysis of Beauty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 51 and 73. The figura serpentinata started as a late Renaissance concept of graciousness and smooth movement but was soon used by Mannerists such as Giambologna for more contorted postures (cf. Rape of the Sabine Women, 1566). Hogarth's use of the figure, which he termed the "line of beauty," is closer to its Mannerist application, though his definition seems to suggest the Renaissance variant. 16 Manfredo Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976), 15–6. another in pure competition, in agon,17 but not in space-there is no mediation, no overall mediator. These are figures without ground. And here we arrive at a crucial point. Piranesi was perfectly aware that a magnificent city is not just a city full of palaces and memorials: as the palatial objects competitively aggregate, the ground underneath opens up further and further, into what he so aptly designates the Hanging City, the Città Pensile. Of course, we recognize this concept of suspension from the Carceri and Della Magnificenza, where it often takes the form of underground structures such as massive sewers and foundations: the nonhuman spaces of technology. Needless to say, today every thriller and suspense movie uses ducts and sewers to house the monsters threatening the lives of the terrified humans. More importantly, in the light of our comparative analysis of the sublime and the magnificent, we should comprehend that this polarity of the vertical axis plays a role in both categories. In the sublime, the vertical axis extends between the high and the deep; in Piranesi's world, we cannot have the glory of the magnificent without the suspense of the groundless, of the porous, unstable earth.18 Pointing upward, toward the sun and its golden rays, we call one pole magnificent; pointing downward into the dark and unknown, we call the other tragic. The tragic is not simply the opposite of the magnificent; it is the temporal, event side of that axis, while the magnificent stresses the spatial side of it, the side of objects.19 It is the space of the fall, and very well illustrated by the Carceri, which is conceptually the mirror image of the Campo Marzio. While the latter is essentially a plan, an ichnographia, the Carceri is without plan. Ulya Vogt-Göknil's excellent analysis from the 1950s clearly shows the impossibility of reconstructing a plan from the perspectives of the Carceri series.20 The perspectives are ambiguous, consisting of views constructed from multiple plans that overlap and contradict one another. The infinitude of the proliferating 21 17 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Boston: Beacon Press, [1938] 1955). Huizinga stresses the need for isolated and enclosed spaces for play, which can be a tennis court, a football field, a chess board, a poker table, the stage of a theatre, or the arena of a circus. The suspension of universal rules is essential to any successful form of play, race or game. Later, Roger Caillois restructured Huizinga's ideas and distinguished four forms of play: mimesis (imitation), agon (competition), ilynx (vertigo) and alea (chance). See: Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, [1958] 2001). 18 Sarah Maclaren, La magnificenza e il suo doppio (Milano: Mimesis Edizioni, 2005). Maclaren follows a route to appreciating Piranesi similar to the one I take here. Using a somewhat idiosyncratic formulation, she positions Piranesi's works between two forms of magnificence, one "politically correct" and the other "black," the latter functioning as the Doppelgänger of what we generally view as magnificent. I'd say that the magnificenza nera is nowadays the more politically correct notion, and maybe we should start to reconsider the other more seriously-even so, Maclaren's book, partially based on the work of Mario Perniola, is a valuable one. 19 For further clarification, see: Lars Spuybroek, "The Ages of Beauty," in: Vital Beauty: Reclaiming Aesthetics in the Tangle of Technology and Nature (Rotterdam: V2_Publishing, 2012). In this essay, I analyze Charles Hartshorne's aesthetic diagram, in which he splits the sublime downward into the tragic and upward into the magnificent, with the two aligning vertically. I think Hartshorne's diagram, which is based on Whitehead's later ideas, offers the only proper framework for understanding relations between aesthetic categories, and it is surprising how much of Piranesi's work fits within the diagram's systematics. 20 Ulya Vogt-Göknil, Giovanni Battista Piranesi "Carceri" (Zurich: Origo Verlag, 1958), 30–6. 21 Ibid., 46: "Obwohl diese Bauten stellenweise eine sehr solide Tektonik vortäuschen, ist ihr eigentliches Formengesetz die Wucherung... Aus Brücken sehen wir tatsächlich Türme wachsen, aus denen wieder neue structures of the Carceri creates a universe where "the center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere,"22 of course, but most of all, the drawings of the Carceri depict a setting for an event, a tragic event-or, if you will, a tragic play. With the magnificent, it is always the object that has our focus; with the tragic, we ourselves are the focus. They are of the same order, but whereas the magnificent object is located in space, the tragic event happens in time. Therefore, while the architecture is fleeing from us, we come to a stop. While the architecture seeks the endless, we come to our end. The tragedy of the Carceri is that its infinity matches our finality. Things not only stand on their own but collapse in on themselves too. We should understand the groundlessness and the ever-ascending figures of the magnificent as comprising one vertical axis, or better, one vertical horizon.23 The space of the tragic fall is the same space as that of the acrobatic jump. Each acrobatic figure in Piranesi's universe stands on its own because it spins around its own vertical axis. Coming to a conclusion of this brief exercise, I think we could say that Piranesi's project is one of a radical pluralism; his world is completely granular.24 Things meet, negotiate, bounce and break, certainly, but without such behavior being directed by external orders. All order is internal, and all radiance external. This might seem surprising if we look at it from the perspective of the Roman Empire, which never hesitated to force an iron grid over any foreign landscape whatsoever. But it does not if we take the archaeologist's viewpoint. Piranesi's archaeology has often been ridiculed as fantasy, but his quest was never one aimed at excavating or uncovering a hidden truth; on the contrary, it was a project of bringing things into the sunlight, and in the process, accepting that things remain on that vertical trajectory and consequently become disjointed. Indeed, instead of seeing the Campo Marzio as a city of palaces, we should call it a favela or a slum of palaces, where affluence and abundance lies in each distinct whole, not between them. The Campo Marzio shows that palaces, mausoleums, and circuses, in all their glory, cannot be added up without friction, nor without opening to the void below, but that their frictional addition adds up to more magnificence. Brücken hervorgehen... Die Wucherung, zum architektonischen Gliederungsprinzip erhoben, lässt die einzelnen Bauelemente sowie ihre Funktion stets als miteinander vertauschbar erscheinen." 22 Jorge-Luis Borges, "The Fearful Sphere of Pascal," in: Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings (New York: Penguin Books, 1962), 225. 23 Lars Spuybroek, The Architecture of Continuity (Rotterdam: V2_Publishing, 2008), 37 and 97. 24 Famous pluralists-to mention just two-include William James, who called his philosophy "mosaic" and wrote A Pluralistic Universe, and Paul Feyerabend, author of Conquest of Abundance, a title that interests us for obvious reasons.

Nr. 20 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 5. Oktober 2018 3 Lutz Hachmeister Wie künstlich ist die künstliche Intelligenz? 5 Vincent C. Müller In 30 Schritten zum Mond? Zukünftiger Fortschritt in der KI 16 Rüdiger Suchsland Von „Golem" zu „Her": Künstliche Intelligenz und Robotik in der Filmgeschichte 26 Raju Pookottil How Species Direct Their Evolution 34 Elisabeth André Lässt sich Empathie simulieren? Ansätze zur Erkennung und Generierung empathischer Reaktionen anhand von Computermodellen 58 Autorenbiografien 59 Bibliografie S o n d e r h e f t M E D I E N E V O L U T I O N Müller, Vincent C. (2018), 'In 30 Schritten zum Mond? Zukünftiger Fortschritt in der KI', Medienkorrespondenz, 20 (05.10.2018), 5-15. http://www.sophia.de http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4144-4957 2 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M AZ U M B E I S P I E LS O N D E R H E F T IM P R E S S U M Medienevolution VI Zum sechsten Mal hat das Institut für Medienund Kommunikationspolitik (IfM) 2017 die Cologne Futures (CF) zu Fragen der Medien und Technikevolution veranstaltet. Dabei ging es im Oktober des vo rigen Jahres um das Thema Menschen, Roboter und Künstliche Intelligenz – eine nahtlose Evolution? Die MK doku mentiert in diesem Sonder heft die auf dieser Tagung gehaltenen Referate von Vincent C. Müller, Rüdiger Suchsland und Raju Pookottil. Zudem enthält dieses Heft den Nachdruck des Aufsatzes „Lässt sich Empathie simulieren?" von Elisabeth André, der als Basis diente für ihr mündliches Referat bei den CF 17. Ergänzt sind die Texte um eine Einleitung von IfM-Direktor Lutz Hachmeister, dem Organisator der Medienevolutionstagung. Die „Cologne Futures 2017" wurden vom IfM organisiert in Koopera tion mit der Deutschen Telekom, der Stadt Köln, dem Westdeutschen Rundfunk (WDR) und der Kölner Kunsthoch schule für Medien (KHM). Die Veranstaltung und diese Dokumenta tion schliessen an die ersten fünf Colloquien zur Medienevolution an (vgl. die Dokumentationen in FK 20/13, FK 34/14, MK 26/15, MK 20/16 und MK 20/17). Die sechsten „Cologne Futures" fanden am 6. Oktober 2017 in der Aula der Kunsthoch schule für Medien statt. Die Veranstalter danken besonders Reza Moussavian und Henrik Schmitz (Deutsche Telekom), Roland Berger (Stadt Köln), Frank Döhmann (KHM) und Matthias Kremin (WDR) für deren Unterstützung. Die „Cologne Futures" (bis 2015: „Cologne Conference Futures") werden im Rahmen des Filmfesti vals Cologne veranstaltet. Das siebte CF-Colloquium zur Medienevolution fand am 2. Oktober 2018 statt, das Thema lautete diesmal: Gedanken lesen? „Brain Reading" und soziale Kontrolle als technologische und politische Felder. Dabei gab es Vorträge von Gert Scobel, Stephan Schleim, Michael Pauen, Wolfgang Hagen und Melissa Little field. Veranstaltungsort war wieder die Kölner Kunsthoch schule für Medien. 5.10.18/MK Nr. 20 • 5. Oktober 2018 • 66. Jahrgang Medienkorrespondenz • hervorgegangen aus der Funkkorrespondenz (FK), 1953-2014 Anschrift von Verlag und Redaktion: Medienkorrespondenz dreipunktdrei mediengesellschaft mbH Heinrich-Brüning-Str. 9, 53113 Bonn Telefon: 0228/26000-0 E-Mail: [email protected] Amtsgericht Bonn HRB 18 302 Redaktion: Dieter Anschlag (Chefredakteur), Volker Nünning Geschäftsführer: Ludwig Ring-Eifel Abonnement: Leserservice Medienkorrespondenz Heinrich-Brüning-Str. 9, 53113 Bonn Telefon: 0228/26000-251 E-Mail: [email protected] Bezugsbedingungen: Einzelbezieher 32,55 Euro (monatlich, zzgl. Porto) Schüler/Studierende 14,30 Euro (monatlich, zzgl. Porto) Kündigung: 3 Monate vor Abo-Ablauf Konto: dreipunktdrei mediengesellschaft mbH, Pax-Bank e.G. IBAN: DE50370601930027955010; BIC: GENODED1 PAX 5 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A • Der folgende Text ist das Transkript von Vincent C. Müllers Vortrag, gehalten am 6. Oktober bei den „Cologne Futures 2017". Mit diesem Vortrag werde ich die Diskussion fortführen, die bereits in der Ein-führung zu dieser Veranstaltung angeklungen ist. Wohin geht die Reise ungefähr? Da passiert etwas Spannendes, das ist klar. Wie geht es weiter und kann man das vorhersehen? Ich werde mich auf einen Punkt konzentrieren, nämlich dass es im Wesentlichen der zusätzlichen Rechnergeschwindigkeit geschuldet ist, dass die KI, die Künstliche Intelligenz, sich jetzt anders darstellt als noch vor einigen Jahren. Sie haben vorhin in der Einführung gehört, dass auch im Jahr 2000 die Leute sehr optimistisch waren. Ich glaube übrigens nicht, dass Rodney Brooks damals schon so optimistisch war, das würde mich wundern (Brooks 1990, 1991). Es ist jedenfalls klar, dass sich da irgend was tut. Noch vor zehn Jahren war es so, dass die Künstliche Intelligenz einen ziemlich schlechten Ruf hatte. Viele Leute, die an KI geforscht haben, haben das gar nicht so genannt, die nannten das dann Datenanalyse, Sprachverstehen, kognitive Systeme oder ähnlich, um das ein bisschen zu kaschieren. Und jetzt hat sich daran etwas geändert und alle machen KI. Ich glaube, dass das exponentielle Wachstum ein wesentlicher Faktor ist. Ich komme noch dazu, was das ist. Und ich werde mich damit befassen, was für Annahmen hinter der Auffassung stecken, dass vielleicht die gegenwärtige Entwicklung fortgeschrieben werden kann in Richtung einer KI, die wirklich ein hohes Niveau erreichen und ungefähr das menschliche Intelligenzniveau schaffen kann. I. Also, eine Analyse – was passiert gegenwärtig? – und ein paar Annahmen, die dahinterstecken. Dazu beginne ich mit einem kleinen Bild: Hier sieht man einen amerikanischen Physik-Professor, der mit Dominos spielt. Ich werde gleich erklären, warum das wichtig ist. Mit diesem Minidomino – vielleicht fünf Millimeter hoch –, mit dem er da angefangen hat, kann er das Empire State Building über den Haufen werfen. Die Energie wird dadurch aufgewendet, dass er diese Dinger hinstellt; natürlich passieren hier keine Wunder. Was daran interessant ist, finde ich, ist, dass es überhaupt funktioniert und dass es uns wundert. Also, wenn man diesen Menschen am Anfang sieht und diesen kleinen Dominostein, denkt man: „Da passiert gar nichts." Wir sind nicht ohne weiteres in der Lage, uns solche exponentiellen Geschehnisse klarzumachen, auch wenn der Professor gleich am Anfang gesagt hat: „Jeder Dominostein kann einen Dominostein umwerfen, der anderthalbmal so gross ist." Trotzdem scheint uns diese Vorstellung Schwierigkeiten zu bereiten. Vincent C. Müller In 30 Schritten zum Mond? Zukünftiger Fortschritt in der KI 6 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A Das exponentielle Wachstum ist also überraschend. Das erklärt auch meinen Titel „In 30 Schritten zum Mond?". Auch das ist wahrscheinlich keine gute Technik für die Raumfahrt, aber was ich damit meine, ist Folgendes: Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie machen einen normalen Schritt und der nächste Schritt ist doppelt so gross wie der vorherige Schritt und so weiter; sie machen eine Schrittfolge, bei der jeder Schritt doppelt so gross ist wie der vorherige Schritt. Wenn Sie 30 Schritte machen, nur 30 Schritte, dann sind sie bereits am Mond. Wenn Sie wollen, können Sie das nachrechnen. Ich habe nachgerechnet. Es stimmt tatsächlich. Ich habe das irgendwo gelesen und dachte, man soll den Sachen nicht trauen. Es stimmt aber wirklich. Ungefähr 385.000 Kilometer – je nachdem, wo der Mond sich gerade befindet – kann man also in 30 Schritten schaffen. Das heisst also, mit 29 Schritten hat man die Hälfte der Strecke hinter sich. Der erste Schritt ist nur ein ganz normaler Schritt. Der dreissigste Schritt ist aber die Hälfte der Entfernung von hier zum Mond. Es ist ein Riesenschritt und der nächste Schritt ist doppelt so weit in den Weltraum hinaus. Das sind Wachstumsvorgänge, die uns nicht ohne weiteres zugänglich sind. Auch wenn jeder, der ein bisschen Mathematik versteht, das gut verstehen kann. Die Frage ist: Wie weit kommt man damit? Es gibt Leute, die glauben in der KI, dass das die Methode ist, mit der man zum Mond kommt. Es gibt auch schon seit langem Kritiker, die sagen, so gehe es nicht. Zu solchen Kritikern zählen zum Beispiel der Logiker Yehoshua Bar-Hillel und Hubert L. Dreyfus. Sie nennen das den Fehlschluss des ersten Schrittes – first step fallacy (Dreyfus 2012). Diese Kritiker sagen, das ist nun ein Zitat von Dreyfus: Wenn man glaubt, dass man damit zur KI kommt, ist das so, als wenn der erste Affe, der auf einen Baum geklettert ist, sagen würde, er hätte einen Fortschritt auf dem Weg zum Mond gemacht. Man hat zwar einen Fortschritt gemacht, aber man kommt so nicht zum Mond. Man kann nicht einfach so weitermachen, wie man bisher weitergemacht hat. Die Frage ist also ganz oft: Sind die Schritte, die wir bis jetzt gemacht haben, sind das solche Schritte, mit denen man einfach weitermachen kann und dann zum Mond kommt, oder muss man etwas völlig Anderes machen? Man kann auf den Baum klettern und das ist eigent lich keine schlechte Methode, aber eben nur bis zu einem gewissen Punkt. Das ist also die Frage. Mir scheint, das ist eine gute alte philosophische Frage, nämlich die Frage, die Sokrates immer schon seinen Mitbürgern gestellt und sich damit unbeliebt gemacht hat, nämlich: Was sind die Annahmen? Unter welcher Annahme stimmt das, was sie da behaupten, dass es dahin gehen würde? Das Schicksal von Sokrates ist ja bekannt, oder? Was ist mit ihm passiert? Sie haben ihn umgebracht. Das ist eine riskante Technik, wenn man sich gegen etwas stellt. Dreyfus, der vor kurzem eines natürlichen Todes gestorben ist, hat sich damit bei den KI-Leuten vor langer Zeit sehr unbeliebt gemacht und gesagt (Dreyfus 1972): „Das wird nichts." II. Nick Bostrom und ich haben herauszufinden versucht, was die gegen wärtige Auffassung ist (Müller/Bostrom 2016). Wie wird es weitergehen? Wir haben uns, um den üblichen Vorurteilen aus dem Weg zu gehen, den Begriff High Level Machine Intelligence (HLMI) ausgedacht. Das ist also absichtlich einfach etwas Neues. Das haben wir definiert: High Level Machine Intelligence bedeutet, dass eine Maschine mehr oder weniger alle menschlichen Arbeitstätigkeiten ausüben kann. Vielleicht sind da ein paar Tätigkeiten, die eine Maschine, weil sie eine Maschine ist, nicht ausführen kann, aber im Prinzip ist es so operationell definiert. 7 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A Und dann haben wir eine einige hundert Experten verschiedener Professionen gefragt, wann sie glauben, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass dieses Ereignis eintritt, 10 Prozent ist, wann sie bei 50 Prozent liegt und wann bei 90 Prozent. Wir haben also nicht gefragt: „Wann tritt das ein?" Sondern: „Wann glauben Sie, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit diesen Punkt erreicht?" (Siehe die Grafik in Müller/ Bostrom 2016: 562). Wie man sieht, ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit hier unten erst einmal, dass das im nächsten Jahr bei 90 Prozent ist, fast null. Denn niemand glaubt das. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass es bei 90 Prozent ist – die rechte der drei Kurven –, geht relativ langsam voraus und erreicht in den nächsten 200 Jahren ungefähr 1. Die 10-Prozent-Wahrscheinlichkeit und insbesondere die 50-Prozent-Wahrscheinlichkeit gehen in den ersten Jahren relativ zügig voran und kommen 1 schon in 100 Jahren recht nahe. Das kann man vielleicht ein bisschen besser sehen, wenn man sich die Zahlen anschaut. Wir haben auf einer KI-Konferenz zur Philosophie der Künstlichen Intelligenz (www.pt-ai.org) verschiedene Leute befragt, auch die 100 meistzitierten Forscher. Der Median dieser Vorhersage ist ungefähr das Jahr 2040. Der Schnitt ist irgend wo zwischen 2014 und 2050 für den 50-Prozent-Punkt. Das heisst also, diese Leute von der AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) – das ist eine Vereinigung, die der Ansicht ist, dass die Künstliche Intelligenz bereits weit fortgeschritten ist –, diese Leute, die wir gefragt haben, glauben, dass das der Punkt ist, an dem die Wahrscheinlichkeit über 50 Prozent steigt. Wie Sie schon gehört haben, ist solchen Vorhersagen aber nicht zu sehr zu trauen. Im Gegensatz zu dem, was Sie gehört haben, ist unsere Erfahrung die, dass solche Vorhersagen meistens so ungefähr 25 bis 30 Jahre in der Zukunft liegen. Das ist so der Sweet Spot für solche Sachen. Was in zehn Jahren passieren wird, weiss man schon relativ gut. Das sind gegenwärtig Technologien, die ungefähr 15 Jahre weiter vorausschreibbar sind. Dann fängt es ungefähr an, dass man sagen könnte: Wenn alles gelöst wäre, dann wird es anders gehen. Also in 25 bis 30 Jahren ist es relativ sicher, dass wir diesen Punkt erreichen. Also, man weiss eigentlich wirklich nicht, was da passieren wird. Es wird so vorausgesehen. Deshalb gibt es ziemlich viele Parallelen – wenn man andere Vorhersagen anschaut. 8 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A III. Was passiert mit diesen Daten und warum ist Geschwindigkeit so wichtig? Ein relativ leichtes Beispiel sind Spiele – etwa „Tic Tac Toe" („Drei gewinnt"). Man versucht, drei Kreuze oder drei Kreise in eine Reihe zu bringen. Das haben Sie wahrscheinlich in der Schule unter der Bank gespielt. Warum spielen Sie das jetzt nicht mehr? Ich glaube nicht, dass irgendjemand von ihnen noch „Tic Tac Toe" spielt. Man stellt relativ bald fest, dass – wenn nicht ein Spieler grobe Fehler macht – keiner gewinnt. „Tic Tac Toe" ist relativ leicht vorhersehbar und deswegen lösbar. Die möglichen Positionen bei „Tic Tac Toe" sind 39. Das sind nicht alle. Einige in der ganzen Menge sind illegal. „Tic Tac Toe" hat ungefähr 5500 mögliche Spielsituationen – mit einem gewöhnlichen Computer total leicht zu berechnen. Also ist dieses Spiel formell gelöst. Man kann von jeder Position aus wissen, was der beste Zug ist, und wenn da keiner einen groben Fehler macht, gewinnt, wie gesagt, auch keiner. Bei Schach sieht die Sache schon etwas anders aus. Man hat ein grösseres Feld und auch mehr Figuren, die kompliziertere Züge machen und eben nicht nur einen Zug pro Figur. Es wird geschätzt, dass die möglichen Züge im Schach ungefähr 1047 sind (Shannon 1950). Das ist eine gewaltige Zahl. Und auch wenn Computer, wie Sie sicherlich wissen, inzwischen deutlich besser Schach spielen als Menschen, ist Schach nicht in dem Sinne gelöst. Das heisst, man kann nicht einfach weiterrechnen, welches der beste Zug ist, und den ganzen Rest des Spiels durchrechnen. Das ist nicht möglich, weil man dafür sehr viel mehr Rechenschritte bräuchte, als man selbst in Hunderten oder Tausenden von Jahren machen könnte. Also braucht man andere Techniken, die es ermöglichen, diesen Entscheidungsbaum zu verkleinern. Und diese Techniken sind inzwischen ganz gut entwickelt. Man kann auch die Anfangszüge vorher berechnen. Jeder von Ihnen wird das kennen, wenn Sie mal mit einem guten Schachspieler gespielt haben. Die spielen am Anfang eigentlich, ohne darüber überhaupt nachzudenken. Dann fangen diese professionellen Spieler irgendwann an, wahrscheinlich an einem Punkt, an dem sie etwas Unkonventionelles gemacht haben. Der Profi denkt, das muss ein Fehler sein. Jetzt werde ich ihn besiegen. Das kann man in eine Datenbank packen. Bei Go ist es ähnlich. Das Spielfeld ist grösser, die Zahl der Positionen ist noch einmal massiv grösser. Schach ist bekanntlich 1996 auf Weltmeisterniveau angekommen. Bei Go ist das im Jahr 2016 der Fall gewesen – mit Machine Learning. Poker ist inzwischen auch mehr oder weniger auf diesem Niveau. Videospiele sind ein interessanter Bereich. Auch da wird versucht, Spieler zu kreieren, die besser sind als menschliche Spieler. Die Frage ist: Geht es jetzt einfach so weiter? Ein wichtiger Punkt dabei ist, dass beispielsweise Schach ein digitales Spiel ist. Ein Bauer kann nur auf A2 oder auf A3 stehen. Er kann nicht irgendwo in der Mitte ungefähr stehen. Ausserdem spielt nichts eine Rolle, was ausserhalb dieses Acht-mal-Acht-Feldes ist. Der Rand des Spielfelds ist das Ende der Welt. Und das gilt für die Spiele, die wir im gewöhnlichen Leben spielen, überhaupt nicht. Schach ist also massiv einfacher als alles, was sie in ihrem gewöhnlichen Leben tun. Also, wie wird es weitergehen? Es gibt da verschiedene Auffassungen. Toby Walsh, der sagt es, wie ich finde, ein bisschen einfach: „Ein schnell denkender Hund ist und bleibt ein Hund." Ich bin mir da nicht so sicher. Wenn ich mir vorstelle, ich hätte einen Hund, der massiv schneller denken würde als ich, dann würde ich mich ein bisschen 9 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A unsicher fühlen, ob ich den noch unter Kontrolle hätte. Wenn Sie sich vorstellen, Sie könnten massiv schneller denken als die anderen, wenn sich die anderen sozusagen in Slowmotion verhalten, dann wären sie den anderen in der Regel deutlich voraus. Hier ist noch einmal eine Illustration zu der Rechenkapazität. Das ist eine Variante von „Moore's Law" – und zwar „Moore's Law" im Verhältnis zum Preis. Wie viel Rechenkapazität kriegt man für einen Dollar? Die Beschleunigung hier pro Dollar seit dem Jahr 2000 liegt ungefähr beim Faktor 1000. Rechner sind jetzt also ungefähr um einen Faktor 1000 schneller, als sie es vor 17 Jahren waren. Stellen Sie sich das mal mit irgendwas anderem vor, beispielsweise mit der Geschwindigkeit von Autos. Das ist ein unglaublicher Fortschritt, der in keiner anderen Technologie erreicht wird, und das geht ungefähr alle 18 Monate so weiter. Das heisst also, Ende des Jahres 2018 sind wir schon zweitausendmal schneller, als wir es im Jahr 2000 waren. Es ist dasselbe wie beim Mond. Die Entwicklung wird sich weiter beschleunigen. Wie weit das gehen wird? Genau weiss das natürlich niemand. Wir wissen, dass es nicht ständig weitergehen kann. Es muss irgendwann aufhören, langsamer werden. Mein Kollege Anders Sandberg hat sich ein bisschen damit beschäftigt. Er glaubt, dass von heute aus gesehen die Beschleunigung noch ungefähr um einen Faktor von 100.000 zunehmen wird (Garfinkel 2017). Damit zusammenhängend gibt es einen anderen Faktor, mit dem ich mich in letzter Zeit öfter beschäftige, das ist nämlich der Datenzuwachs. Es ist nicht nur so, dass man die Daten schneller berechnen kann, sondern auch so, dass man massiv mehr Daten zur Verfügung hat und verschiedene Arten von Daten, die man gemeinsam verarbeiten kann. Das erleichtert einem die Lösung von enorm vielen Prozessen gewaltig. Das ist bereits eine Entwicklung, die gegenwärtig im Gange ist. Eine Fussnote noch dazu. Alles, worüber ich hier jetzt spreche, ist nicht Singularität. Mit Singularität bezeichnet man die Idee, dass man eine Superintelligenz hat, die von selbst schneller wird. Hier ist ein ganz schönes Zitat von Irving Good 10 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A (Good 1965): „...an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines. [...] It is curious that this point is made so seldom outside of science fiction." Das ist nicht unbedingt eine neue Idee. Und das war im Grunde genommen Science-Fiction, als er das gesagt hat. Die Idee ist: Wenn wir schlau genug sind, eine KI zu schaffen, dann – per Definition – müsste auch eine KI schlau genug sein, eine KI zu schaffen, die ein bisschen schlauer ist als wir. Und die nächste KI kann eine neue schaffen und so weiter. Das ist nicht der Punkt meiner heutigen Diskussion. Ich beschäftige mich damit nur bis zu dem Punkt, wo die KI erreicht wird, nicht damit, was danach passiert. Ich werde jetzt anfangen, mich mit den Annahmen zu beschäftigen. IV. Hier ist eine Abbildung aus einem Buch von Ray Kurzweil (Kurzweil 2005). Die Punkte stehen für die Rechengeschwindigkeiten der schnellsten Rechner, die er zum damaligen Zeitpunkt finden konnte. Es ist eine logarithmische Tafel, das heisst also, auf der Vertikalen sind Zehnerpotenzen. Hier hat er die Geschwindigkeit aufgetragen, in der er glaubt, dass ein Insektengehirn, ein Mausgehirn, ein menschliches Gehirn und alle menschlichen Gehirne rechnen würden. Dann kann er ganz einfach sagen: 'Daraus ergibt sich eine Kurve. Die ist hier und dann ist diese gestrichelte Kurve, die geht weiter. Irgendwann schneidet sie diese Linien und man weiss also ungefähr, wann das eine schneller wird als das andere.' Es ist eine ziemlich komische Annahme, wie viele Leute dann auch gesagt haben. Woher weiss man zum Beispiel, dass zwei Menschen doppelt so schlau sind wie einer. Meistens ist das Umgekehrte der Fall. Und woher weiss man, dass reine Rechengeschwindigkeit und Intelligenz dasselbe wären. Also, das ist, glaube ich, diskreditiert. Der Punkt scheint mir, dass diese Annahmen Kurzweils sicherlich problematisch sind, aber das exponentielle Wachstum ist ein entscheidender Faktor. Die meisten Leute schütten das Kind mit dem Bade aus. Sie sagen: 'Kurzweil hat das missverstanden, also ist diese ganze Vorhersage Blödsinn.' Das glaube ich nicht. Die Vorhersage ist deswegen nicht Blödsinn, weil das exponentielle Wachstum, das er auf dieser Kurve verzeichnet, tatsächlich stattfindet und dies tatsächlich enorme Auswirkungen hat. Die Frage ist: Welche Auswirkungen hat das? 11 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A Eine Annahme, die hier gemacht wird, ist, dass Intelligenz in einem mathematischen Sinne 'geordnet' ist. Das heisst: Wenn A intelligenter ist als B und B intelligenter ist als C, dann ist A intelligenter als C. Das stimmt zum Beispiel im Fussball nicht. Wenn also eine Fussballmannschaft A die Fussballmannschaft B besiegt, und B besiegt C, dann heisst das nicht, dass A auch C besiegen würde. Und bei Intelligenz bin ich mir auch nicht so sicher, ob das wirklich eine gute Idee ist, sie so zu sehen. Vielleicht ist das halb geordnet. Gibt es da vielleicht mehr als eine Dimension? Beim Begriff Intelligenz scheint mir da noch einiges Potenzial vorhanden zu sein. Vielleicht sollte man ihn überhaupt nicht verwenden. Es gibt durchaus Leute, die denken, dass es ein Irrtum war, ihn zu verwenden. Man sollte nicht von Intelligenz sprechen und etwas anderes machen. Es gibt den schönen Fluch der Künstlichen Intelligenz. Der Fluch ist, dass Intelligenz als das definiert ist, was Maschinen nicht können. Also die Kl läuft der Intelligenz immer hinterher. Sobald die Maschinen irgendwas können, sagen die Leute: Das war ja keine Intelligenz. Lange Zeit wurde gesagt, Schachspielen sei ein Zeichen eines intelligenten Menschen. Sobald die Computer das konnten, haben alle Leute gesagt: 'Ja, Schach! Das ist nichts Besonderes.' Und dann geht es bei allen Sachen so weiter. Demnächst wird es wahrscheinlich heissen: Autofahren? Nichts Besonderes. Meine eigene Auffassung zu dieser Frage ist, dass Intelligenz vielleicht zwei Dimensionen hat. Nämlich eine Dimension des Erfolges in der Horizontalen und Flexibilität in der vertikalen Variante (Gomila/Müller 2012; Müller 2012). Und die klassischen künstlichen Systeme sind sehr, sehr gut in einigen bestimmten Sachen, aber sehr, sehr unflexibel. Sie können nichts anderes. Ein Schachcomputer kann nur Schachspielen, der kann sonst gar nichts. Und in der Regel ist ein natürliches System in der Lage, dies und jenes zu machen. Es ist also besser in der vertikalen Ebene, aber hier ist noch jede Menge Freiraum vorhanden für schlaue Systeme, die beides ganz gut können. Zweite Annahme bei dieser Idee, dass die Geschwindigkeit entscheidend ist, ist, dass man eigentlich Kognitionswissenschaft nicht braucht, also das man eigentlich nicht wissen muss, wie natürliche Systeme diese Probleme eigentlich lösen. Das ist wiederum eine Annahme, die in der klassischen KI gemacht wurde. Künstliche Intelligenz geht folgendermassen vonstatten: Man macht Kognitionswissenschaft und man findet heraus, wie intelligente Wesen – insbesondere Menschen – das machen. Wenn man das herausgefunden hat, kann man dieses Modell in eine andere Hardware übertragen und dann dort laufen lassen. Gleichzeitig kann man auf diese Weise prüfen, ob die Theorie in der Kognitionswissenschaft stimmt oder nicht. Inzwischen ist das weitgehend voneinander gelöst. Die meisten KI-Leute beschäftigen sich relativ wenig mit Kognitionswissenschaft (Müller 2016). Ich finde das in verschiedener Hinsicht riskant. Ein Risiko sieht man, wenn man einen Spitzenfussballer – nehmen wir Marco Reus – mit einem Spitzenschachspieler – wie etwa Gary Kasparow – vergleicht. Welcher von den beiden ist intelligenter? Welcher von ihnen löst eine schwierigere Aufgabe? Traditionell würde man sicher den Schachspieler nennen. Kasparow ist vielleicht einer der erfolgreichen Schachspieler aller Zeiten. Und leider hauptsächlich deswegen bekannt, weil er gegen eine Maschine verloren hat. Das verfolgt ihn noch immer. Ich habe ihn getroffen. Und es scheint eine Sache zu sein, die ihn tatsächlich umtreibt. Kasparow, so hat man geglaubt, löst eine sehr viel schwierigere Aufgabe. Es hat sich aber herausgestellt, dass das, was Marco Reus macht, in Wirklichkeit viel schwieriger ist als das, was Kasparow macht. Wir stellen uns Fussballspieler nicht als besonders intelligent vor, doch das ist vielleicht ein Irr12 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A tum. Was die in real time machen, mit der körperlichen Komplexität, durch die Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Leuten, ist viel, viel komplexer als Schachspielen. Und davon sind wir in der KI weit entfernt. Ich weiss nicht, ob sie schon mal RoboCup-Fussball gesehen haben? Das ist jedenfalls zum Totlachen und von normalem Fussball meilenweit entfernt. Wobei man natürlich sehr vorsichtig sein muss, denn zum Totlachen war manches andere vor einigen Jahren auch noch, was jetzt überhaupt nicht mehr zum Totlachen ist. Wie kommt man da weiter? Kommt man mit Speed in dieser Richtung weiter? V. Eine weitere Annahme, die entscheidend ist, über die ich jetzt aber nicht besonders reden will, weil sie theoretisch kompliziert ist, lautet: Kognition ist Berechnung. Früher ging man in der klassischen KI davon aus, dass eigentlich das, was ich mache, um kognitive Fähigkeiten zu haben, also zum Beispiel das Glas zu finden und da einen Saft eingiessen zu können oder herauszufinden, dass alle Leute mich komisch angucken, dass irgendetwas nicht stimmt mit meinem Vortrag, dass das alles Berechnungsprozesse sind und dementsprechend Berechnungsprozesse in meinem Hirn in Berechnungsprozesse in einem Computer übertragen werden können oder zumindest – das ist der zweite Punkt – dass Berechnungsprozesse dafür hinreichend wären, selbst wenn das im natürlichen System nicht der Fall ist. Das scheint mir falsch zu sein. Berechnung an sich ist wahrscheinlich noch nicht ausreichend. Man braucht vermutlich Interaktion mit der physischen Welt. Und wie das funktionieren kann, ist ziemlich kompliziert. Eine andere Annahme ist, dass die gegenwärtigen Techniken ausreichend sind. Das hört man ziemlich oft. Also jedes Mal, wenn wir eine Technik haben, gehen wir gleich davon aus, dass diese Technik wunderbar ist und weitergehend alle unsere Probleme löst. Das war in der klassischen KI schon so. Dann gab es eine relativ kurze Zeit lang Rodney Brooks' neue KI: Wir machen das alles ganz anders – ohne Repräsentation. Grosser Enthusiasmus! Jetzt werden alle Probleme gelöst. Das ging dann bis zu einem Staubsaugerroboter – der diese einfachen Aufgaben löst, aber ganz viele andere Sachen eben nicht. Im Moment ist maschinelles Lernen en vogue, womit ganz viele Probleme wunderbar gelöst werden können, auch weil die Rechner schneller sind. Sicherlich auch eine hochproblematische Technik, weil das Grundprinzip lautet: Lernen ist, wenn der Output stimmt. Man weiss aber nie so richtig, warum der Output eigent lich stimmt. Insbesondere wenn man das Gerät hat selbst lernen lassen. Und deswegen weiss man auch nicht so richtig, was der Output das nächste Mal sein wird, wenn die Situation ein klein wenig anders ist. Es kann ganz gut sein, dass wir auch da auf die Nase fallen werden. Wenn wir sagen, Speed reicht aus, dann ist das aber eine Annahme, bei der wir davon ausgehen, dass die gegenwärtigen Techniken funktionieren werden. Es gibt aber auch eine ganze Menge Leute, die glauben, wir bräuchten etwas ganz Neues. Ganz grosse Schwierigkeiten gibt es bei der Integration. Wie bringen wir diese ganzen Sachen zusammen, die wir haben? Also zum Beispiel Sensory Integration – ganz viele verschiedene Sensoren. Wie macht man das? Wie bringt man das zusammen mit Memory-Aktionen? Das ist alles sehr problematisch. Und wie kann man diese ganzen Techniken so kombinieren, dass sie skalierbar sind, wenn man grössere Systeme damit macht, dass sie auch wirklich funktionieren? Das ist nicht bei allen Systemen so. Man kann Flugzeuge bauen, die zehn Meter lange Tragflächen haben, aber nicht einen Kilometer lange. Es geht irgendwann nicht mehr. Es ist nicht bei jeder Technik so, dass man sie ohne weiteres in eine grössere Form bringen kann. 13 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A Ein schöner Reality-Check in dieser Frage scheint mir autonomes Fahren zu sein. Da gibt es verschiedene Level, von denen üblicherweise gesprochenen wird. Level 5 ist autonomes Fahren in dem Sinne, dass ein Fahrer vollständig ersetzt werden kann. Man braucht keinen Fahrer mehr. Und dazu hören Sie ganz verschiedene Sachen. Hier habe ich ein schönes Zitat vom Entwicklungsleiter einer deutschen Autofirma, die mich vor einigen Monaten eingeladen hatte: „Level 5, daran arbeiten wir nicht." Das war sein Kommentar dazu. Er glaubt, die Leute, die sagen, dass sie Level 5 machen werden, wie zum Beispiel Elon Musk, also Tesla, die werden auf die Nase fallen. Im Grunde genommen war seine Theorie: 'Wir warten, dass sie ordentlich auf die Nase fallen. Je mehr Leute sich in ihren TeslaAutos umbringen, desto mehr Leute werden dann unsere Autos kaufen.' Das war so ungefähr die Marketingstrategie – riskant, aber es ist immerhin eine Strategie. Ingenieurswissenschaftler bauen normalerweise Systeme, wo sie wirklich mehr oder weniger garantieren können, dass das System so funktioniert, wie es behauptet wird. Wird es mit den gegenwärtigen Techniken funktionieren? Oder nicht? Meine gegenwärtige Annahme ist: Vielleicht ja, aber so richtig genau weiss man es noch nicht. Last but not least: Technological Readiness Level (TRL). Das ist eine Skala von der NASA. Das ist eine kleine Erinnerung, dass, wenn man eine Technologie erzeugt, es immer noch ein ganz schön weiter Weg ist. Beispielsweise von dem Bereich drei oder vier – wo man sagt, das ist eine Technologie, die im Prinzip funktioniert. Wir haben da mal was im Labor. Das geht schon ganz gut. Bis zu acht oder neun – man hat ein vollständiges System, das in der Umwelt wirklich funktioniert. Es gibt Techniken, die kommen nie auf die höheren Level. Kernfusion zum Beispiel hat solche Probleme. Im Prinzip geht das, das wissen wir. Aus verschiedenen Gründen aber, die vielleicht auch mit Geld und anderen Sachen zusammenhängen, haben sie es bisher nicht geschafft, wirklich Systeme zu machen, die auch tatsächlich Strom produzieren und nicht nur Strom verbrauchen. VI. Also zusammenfassend, die Annahmen, die ich hier sehe, sind im Wesentlichen die folgenden fünf: 1) Die Intelligenz ist eindimensional und messbar. Das scheint mir etwas pro- blematisch zu sein. 2) Kognitionswissenschaft wird nicht benötigt, um diese Erfolge zu erzielen. Das scheint mir noch problematischer zu sein. Es kann sein, würde mich aber wundern. 3) Berechnung ist hinreichend. Mir scheint, das ist klarerweise nicht der Fall. Man muss sich also leider in die dreckigen Gebiete der Robotik und der Sen- sorik begeben. 14 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A 4) Die gegenwärtigen Techniken sind ausreichend (skalierbar) und, um das Einstein-Zitat abzuwandeln: Wir brauchen Transpiration, keine Inspiration. Wir können im Prinzip weiterarbeiten, wo wir gegenwärtig sind. Wenn ich sage, Speed und Data machen diese Arbeit, meine ich natürlich nicht damit, dass die Leute in der Forschung sitzen und warten, dass Intel die neuen Pro- zessoren herausbringt. Das erfordert eine ganze Menge Arbeit, um das zu tun. Und schliesslich und endlich: 5) Technological Readiness Level, erscheinen sie als machbar? Auch das weiss man im Moment nicht. Mir scheint, da gibt es einiges zu tun. Ist das die richtige Analyse? Sind das die richtigen Annahmen? Da gibt es vielleicht eine ganze Menge anderer Probleme ethischer Natur oder andere. Das sind Dinge, die mich beschäftigen. Ich bin jetzt gerade dabei, ein Handbuch herauszugeben: „Philosophy of AI", bei der Oxford University Press. Ich organisiere demnächst zur Thematik eine Konferenz in Leeds (vgl.: www.pt-ai.org/2017/). Was ich hier und heute versucht habe, war, einen Überblick zu geben. Und was passiert in Deutschland? Ich weiss es auch nicht. Es ist ziemlich still in Deutschland in dieser Frage. Εs gibt eine Menge sehr guter Forschung in der KI – nicht, dass wir das jetzt durcheinanderbringen – und es gibt auch Forschung der Kognitionswissenschaft. Doch auch diese Sachen, die da mal einen Schritt zurückgehen und sich fragen: Wohin geht das? Was sind das für Annahmen? Ist es überhaupt gesellschaftlich erwünscht, was wir da machen? Ist es problematisch? Dazu tut sich, scheint mir, relativ wenig. Ich habe da ein oder zwei Leute gesehen, die da etwas machen. In Düsseldorf gibt es jemanden, in Berlin. Aber insgesamt ist es relativ still. 5.10.18/MK Zusammenfassung • Die Entwicklungen in der Künstlichen Intelligenz (KI) sind spannend. Aber wohin geht die Reise? Ich stelle eine Analyse vor, der zufolge exponentielles Wachstum von Rechengeschwindigkeit und Daten die entscheidenden Faktoren im bisherigen Fortschritt waren. Im Folgenden erläutere ich, unter welchen Annahmen dieses Wachstum auch weiterhin Fortschritt ermöglichen wird: 1) Intelligenz ist eindimensional und messbar, 2) Kognitionswissenschaft wird für KI nicht benötigt, 3) Berechnung (computation) ist hinreichend für Kognition, 4) Gegenwärtige Techniken und Architektur sind ausreichend skalierbar, 5) Technological Readiness Levels (TRL) erweisen sich als machbar. Diese Annahmen werden sich als dubios erweisen. Literatur Brooks, Rodney A. (1990): Elephants don't play chess, in: „Robotics and Autonomous Systems", Nr. 6, S. 3-15 Brooks, Rodney A. (1991): Intelligence without representation, in: „Artificial Intelligence", Nr. 47, S. 139-159 Dreyfus, Hubert L. (2012): A history of first step fallacies, in: „Minds and Machines", Nr. 22 (2/Special issue „Philosophy of AI", ed. Vincent C. Müller), S. 87-99 Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1972): What computers still can't do: A critique of artificial reason (2 edn., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press) 15 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A Garfinkel Ben/Brundage, Miles/Filan, Daniel/ Flynn, Carrick/Luketina, Jelena/ Page, Michael/Sandberg, Anders/Snyder-Beattie, Andrew/Tegmark, Max (2017): On the Impossibility of Supersized Machines, in: „arXiv preprint arXiv":1703.10987, (2017/3/31) Gomila, Antoni/Müller, Vincent C. (2012): Challenges for artificial cognitive systems, in: „Journal of Cognitive Science", Nr. 13 (4), S. 453-469 Good, Irvin J. (1965): Speculations concerning the first ultraintelligent machine, in: Alt, Franz L/Ruminoff, Morris (eds.): „Advances in Computers" (6; New York/ London: Academic Press), S. 31-88 Kurzweil, Ray (2005): The singularity is near: When humans transcend bio logy (London: Viking) Müller, Vincent C. (2012): Autonomous cognitive systems in real-world environments: Less control, more flexibility and better interaction, in: „Cognitive Computation", Nr. 4 (3), S. 212-215 Müller, Vincent C. (2016): New developments in the philosophy of AI, in: Vincent C. Müller (ed.): Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence (Synthese Library; Berlin: Springer), S. 1-6 Müller, Vincent C./Bostrom, Nick (2016): Future progress in Artificial Intelligence: A survey of expert opinion, in: Müller, Vincent C. (ed.): Fundamental issues of Artificial Intelligence (Synthese Library; Berlin: Springer), S. 553-570 Shannon, Claude E. (1950): Programming a computer for playing chess, in: „Philosophical Magazine", Nr. 41 (314), S. 265-275 Herbert von Halem Verlag • edition medienpraxis 10 2013, 340 S., 6 Abb., Broschur, 190 x 120 mm EUR(D) 24,00 / EUR(A) 24,55 / sFr. 40,50 / ISBN 978-3-86962-081-7 „Viel trockener und sperriger kann ein Buchtitel nicht mehr ausfallen. [...] Was aber die beiden Herausgeber Lutz Hachmeister und Dieter Anschlag hier bieten, ist FünfSterne-Analyse vom Feinsten. [...] Und da praktisch alles, was in Deutschland relevant ist, bald auch in Österreich von Bedeutung ist, sollte dieses Werk vor allem bei Politikern und Medienmachern auf dem Nachtkästchen liegen." „Statement", Medienmagazin des Österreichischen Journalisten-Clubs (Ausgabe Juli/August 2015) Herausgegeben von Lutz Hachmeister und Dieter Anschlag Rundfunkpolitik und Netzpolitik Strukturwandel der Medienpolitik in Deutschland A N Z E I G E 58 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A Autorenbiografien Vincent C. Müller Vincent C. Müller ist Professor für Philosophie am Anatolia College/ATC und Academic Fellow an der University of Leeds. Er forscht zur Zukunft von Computertechnologien. Er ist Präsident der European Society for Cognitive Systems und Vorsitzender von euRobotics für den Bereich „ethical, legal and socio-economic issues". Müller hat in Marburg, Hamburg London und Oxford Philosophie, Kognitionswissenschaften, Linguistik und Geschichte studiert. Rüdiger Suchsland Rüdiger Suchsland, Jg. 1968, ist Filmkritiker, Autor und Regisseur. Er schreibt unter anderem für die „Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", die „Frankfurter Rundschau", die „Berliner Zeitung", die „Jüdische Allgemeine", den „Filmdienst" und das Online-Magazin „Telepolis". Von 1998 bis 2004 arbeitete er für das Filmfest München, das Filmfestival Mannheim-Heidelberg und für das Festival des deutschen Films. Im Jahr 2014 erschien sein Film „Von Caligari zu Hitler" über das Kino der Weimarer Republik. Er ist zudem Autor und Regisseur des Dokumentarfilms „Hitlers Hollywood. Das deutsche Kino im Zeitalter der Propaganda 1933-1945" (Kinokoproduktion Arte/ZDF). Raju Pookottil Raju Pookottil ist Autor und Geschäftsmann. Er hält einen MBA in Engineering, lebt und arbeitet in London. Sein Buch „BEEM: Biological Emergence Based Evolutionary Mechanism How Species Direct Their Own Evolution" (2013) nähert sich auf provozierende Weise den biologischen Evolutionsprozessen. In dem Buch zieht Raju Pookottil die Dominanz von Darwins Prinzip der natürlichen Selektion in Zweifel und argumentiert, dass Spezies durchaus ihre evolutionäre Entwicklung selbständig steuern und optimieren können, etwa indem sie gezielt Modifikationen der DNA dort vornehmen, wo es für ihren Fortbestand nötig ist. Elisabeth André Prof. Elisabeth André ist Informatikerin und lehrt an der Universität Augsburg. Sie leitet dort den Lehrstuhl Human Centered Multimedia und arbeitet auf den Gebieten Intelligent User Interfaces, Virtual Agents und Social Computing. Elisabeth André erhielt im Sommer 2007 ein Alcatel-Lucent Fellowship für ihre Arbeiten im Bereich der Kommunikationsforschung. Im Jahr 2010 wurde sie zum Mitglied der Leopoldina, der Academy of Europe und von AcademiaNet. 2013 erhielt sie für ihre Arbeiten im Bereich der Künstlichen Intelligenz die Ernennung zum ECCAI Fellow (European Coordinating Committee for Artificial Intelligence). 59 M E D I E N K O R R E S P O N D E N Z 2 0 / 2 0 1 8 T H E M A Bibliografie: Bücher und Aufsätze zum Themenbereich Medienund Technikevolution Arthur, W. 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Humanities and Technology Review Fall 2019, Volume 38, issue 2 Pages 1-28 ISSN 1076-7908 ¤2019 Albert Antosca. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivatives license which permits non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction of this article in any medium, provided the author and original source are cited and the article is not modified without permission of the author. Technological Re-Enchantment: Transhumanism, Techno-Religion, and Post-Secular Transcendence Albert R. Antosca Dartmouth College Abstract: This article provides a framework for understanding the dynamics between the disenchanting effects of a uniquely modern existential meaning crisis and a countervailing reenchantment facilitated by the techno-cultural movement of transhumanism. This movement constructs a post-secular techno-theology grounded in a transhumanist ontology that corresponds to a shift away from anthropocentric meaning systems. To shed light on this dynamic, I take a phenomenological approach to the human-technology relationship, highlighting the role of technology in ontology formation and religious imagination. I refer to examples of transhumanist religious movements to illustrate a new posthumanist ontological grounding of meaning corresponding to a contemporary meaning-crisis that scholars are calling neuroexistentialism.' I then use the language of Charles Taylor and his work on secularization to frame these ontological developments. Ultimately, this article argues that Antosca 2 transhumanist religious expression represents a zeitgeist of post-secular re-enchantment. Introduction Scientists and philosophers alike are beginning to recognize a uniquely modern meaning-crisis driven by the contemporary techno-scientific milieu. The term "neuroexistentialism" has been coined to describe a new wave of existentialism characterized by the disenchanting effects of science and technology that pose a fatal challenge to fundamental conceptions of humanist-based groundings of meaning, forcing a reassessment of what it means to be human and producing a correlated meaning-vacuum as these fundamental conceptions of ontological grounding begin to shift. This article explores a countervailing meaningproducing phenomenon of technological re-enchantment emerging from transhumanism, a growing cultural movement that seeks to transcend humanity through the radical use of technology. Despite the disenchanting effects of modern science and secularization, this techno-cultural movement of transhumanism1 has given rise to new techno-religions, stimulating religious imagination based on a new technotheology grounded in a shifted locus of meaning beyond the human subject. To support this understanding, I explore the case of emerging techno-theology arising from the techno-cultural movement of transhumanism. Transhumanism, with its 1 Transhumanism is the idea that the concept of the human is open-ended and should be transcended through the use of radical technological interventions. Transhumanism shifts the locus of ultimate value from the human itself to a broader focus on consciousness, data, or information patterns, thereby seeing the human being as merely a limited manifestation of consciousness that should be technologically upgraded. Technological Re-Enchantment 3 accelerationist ethos,2 is posing a challenge to a traditionally humanist model of meaning-making, facilitating new transhumanist forms of religious expression.3 Some of these forms of religious expression include the Church of Perpetual Life, the Turing Church, Terasem, the Christian Transhumanist Association, and the Mormon Transhumanist Association. With the phenomenology of perception as my point of departure, I describe the function of technology as a mediator to constructing models of reality, thereby providing a point of connection between meaning-making structures and technology. Ultimately, I argue that this ontological shift from human-centric meaning structures to the transhuman ontology has developed into a form of techno-theology, facilitating new modes of religious expression and post-humanistic meaningmaking. To begin talking about how technology is affecting the underlying ontological meaning-making paradigms of techno-culture, and thereby facilitating new forms of religious expression, I will briefly lay out a phenomenological perspective on the human-technology relationship. 2 I use the term "accelerationist" to signify a belief in the historically inevitable process by which technology advances at a rapid, accelerating, and predictable pace. Such accelerationism and corresponding beliefs drive much of the enthusiasm for transhumanism and give strength to certain predictions of radical technological progress. 3 Historian Yuval Noah Harari, although never using the term "transhumanism," does outline a dichotomy of dataist vs. humanist ideologies in his book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. I argue that this dataist mindset can be clearly observed in the growing transhumanist movement. See: Harari, Y. N. (2017) Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. New York: HarperCollins, p. 371. Antosca 4 Phenomenology of Technological Mediation According to Heidegger, entities like ourselves experience the world first and foremost as a world of meanings, rather than objects. This view challenges the objective Cartesian concept of an observer apprehending an array of objects in a context-independent world present-athand, instead positing a phenomenologically-oriented ontology of Beings interacting with their environment in a ready-at-hand, context-dependent situation, always already equipped with value-predicates. In Heideggerian terms, Dasein is understood to be, "[ ] in primary epistemic contact not with context-independent present-at-hand primitives [ ] to which context-dependent meaning would need to be added via value-predicates, but rather with equipment, the kind of entity whose mode of Being is readiness-to-hand and which therefore comes already laden with context-dependent significance. (italics mine)"1 Heidegger outlines this distinction in the following way: What we first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to hear' a pure noise.' The fact that motor-cycles and wagons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-theworld, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside sensations' nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide a springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a world.' Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood.2 Technological Re-Enchantment 5 The world presents itself to us as ready-to-hand, in terms of potential uses, not initially as objects. We see the meaning of things in terms of their uses, and then infer intentional objects from this initial perception of significance. This structure of perception is an essential element in the framework of our mode of existing in the world and produces a world with a particular set of technologically mediated questions, goals, motivations, and values. For example, a person in Latin Christendom is going to have a fundamentally different set of questions and challenges in life than the modern Western person, because their world is constructed of fundamentally different networks of goals and values, mediated by the technological conditions of their reality.4 The technology of your world changes your world, and by extension changes your concerns to include the ultimate locus of meaning if the technological conditions are sufficiently transformative to challenge the underlying meaning-making structures. Therefore, the world is mediated, interpreted, and ultimately constructed through technology. This technological lens frames our perceptions, attitudes, and theories of our situation, structuring reality in a particular way. Technology mediates our world insofar as it immersively sets the scope of perceptual significance in which we orient our moment-tomoment actions.5 The set of problems that make up our perception of the world is technological. 4 The example of Latin Christendom is also famously used as an arbitrary point of historical contrast by the philosopher Charles Taylor when considering changes to secularity in the West. I am adopting this same point of contrast. See: Taylor, C. (2007) A Secular Age Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p. 13. 5 In his book Homo Deus, Harari makes an argument concerning the power of technology to set the bounds of our understanding the challenges and opportunities available in a Antosca 6 Technology and the Problem of Meaning Apart from the material impact of technology, we cannot separate the technological from our understanding of the world, since the world always already presents itself from within an ontology of technological framing. In this way, the problems and questions a Western individual self might have in, for example, Medieval Europe, were different from those of today because of the different technological realities bounding the limits of how reality is understood. Technology gives rise to the kinds of problems and potentiality with which the society is presently confronted in any given historical moment. The other elements of the society, such as its particular political structure, normative values, economic system, etc., are built upon the foundation of these technologically mediated concerns. This role of technology implies a link between technology and meaning. The relationship between technology and meaning can be seen in the shifted grounding of meaning from the divine to the human that precipitated liberal humanism and its various corresponding political and economic systems of organization. Commenting on the nature of this transition, historian Yuval Noah Harari writes, "the central religious revolution of modernity was not losing faith in God rather, it was gaining faith in humanity."3 For example we can see this transition in the work of John Locke, manifested in the Declaration of Independence of the United States, which is decidedly humanist in its foundational beliefs given society, although without emphasizing a phenomenological approach. Likewise, much work has been done by Don Ihde in the area of post-phenomenology, producing a more nuanced and granular examination of the human-technology relationship. See: Ihde, D. (1990) Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth. Indianapolis, IA: Indiana University Press. Technological Re-Enchantment 7 in the human as a free, individual self, worthy of inalienable rights. Although these rights originate from a divine creator who established natural law, the Deism fashionable at that time required only a small shift to eventually bracket off the divine agent, leaving only the superordinate natural law' itself. With this newfound confidence and faith in humanity, the West committed to a new paradigm of locating ultimate meaning in humanist values. This was not a painless transition, as Nietzsche foretold with his proclamation of the death of God.' The experiments in different varieties of humanism, such as the communist and Nazi varieties, each held the same fundamentally secular belief in the primacy of the human as a source of meaning, although these systems disagreed drastically as to the scope and implications of such a commitment. However, the 19th century was one of religious diversity and fervor, at a time when certain secular and religious paradigms of meaning were competing to fill a meaning-vacuum formed by a rapidly changing world. The technological conditions of reality were changing, and there were several options from which to choose when deciding how best to adapt. Considering this process, Harari asks, Why did Marx and Lenin succeed where Hong and Mahdi failed Not because socialist humanism was philosophically more sophisticated than Islam and Christian theology, but rather because Marx and Lenin devoted more attention to understanding the technological and economic realities of their time [ ]4 These reactions to the meaning vacuum fit with what philosopher Charles Taylor terms "the malaise of modernity" whereby our modern "spiritually unstable" milieu is characterized by a need for meaning.5 Antosca 8 This makes sense in a context where technology is understood as playing a major role in the creation of meaning systems. Harari writes, "[ ] technology often defines the scope and limits of our religious visions. [ ] New technologies kill old gods and give birth to new gods."6 In this way, Marx's apt understanding of and adapting to the new technological realities of his time are what drove the powerful rise of Marxism. Old paradigms of meaning must continuously adapt to avoid becoming obsolete. As Marx wrote, "[ ] mankind always takes up only such problems as it can solve since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation."7 In this way, we can start to see a path by which technology can give rise to yet another shift in meaning-making, facilitating new forms of religious expression such as the new religions emerging from the transhumanist movement. Science, Technology, and Religion This is not to say that traditional world religions' are not adaptable. Indeed, the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) is now compelling mainstream religious organizations to confront accelerating technological change. One example is the Southern Baptist Convention who recently issued an official declaration of principles concerning AI to address the growing relevance and social impact of accelerating technology.8 However, there are other voices in this discussion about the different possible ways contemporary religion can adapt to a technologically changing world. For example, Miroslav Volf writes about contemporary religion and globalization, including the corresponding issue of accelerating technological advance.9 In his book Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World, Volf points out that: Technological Re-Enchantment 9 Unless we seriously misunderstand both globalization and world religions, the achievements of well-run globalization and the offering of world religions aren t in competition with one another. More precisely: market-driven globalization in alliance with science and technology and globalization shaped by world religions aren t exclusive alternatives and need not clash religions have their own contribution to make without diminishing the importance of science and technology.10 In response to thinkers such as Volf, who object to the way in which technology and religion are pitted against each other in a competition for hearts and minds, a distinction must be made as to why technological adaptation is occurring. The assumption that science is functioning merely as descriptive or that technology's function is merely providing material goods ignores the deeper ontological essence of technology and its potential effect on meaning making. Volf rightly points out that, " to put the contest between religion on the one side and science and technology on the other in these terms presumes that religions, like science and technology, primarily aim at explaining and manipulating the world."11 This is a compelling position since it rejects the notion that religion is merely oriented at explaining the world, but the technology religion dialogue does not necessarily have to assume such a position. My point is not to reduce the function or role of religion to the level of scientific explanation, but to show how science and technology can shape meaning-making paradigms, going beyond the mere explanatory function typically granted them. Volf's point is correct, but only if we disregard science and technology's power to affect meaningmaking paradigms and to facilitate the transcendent. Volf writes: From the perspective of world religions, their central challenge isn t to gain a competitive advantage over Antosca 10 science and technology or at least maintain their share of the same "market." World religions don t stand or fall on their ability to deliver more and better worldly gods to more people than do science and technology in the context of globalization goods like health and longevity, the necessities and conveniences of life, or explanations of how the world and things in it function. World religions stand or fall on their ability to connect to the transcendent realm and thereby make it possible for them to truly flourish, to find genuine fulfillment in both their successes and failures, and to lead lives worthy of human beings...12 This objection is valid, but only by assuming a narrow conception of the role of science and technology in affecting meaning-making. Nevertheless, Volf's point of view is necessary to present a valid counter-perspective that helps to draw the limits of such claims on science and technology's impact on religion. For now, the liberal humanist paradigm of meaning is holding strong in modern Western society, but the prevalence of this paradigm does not necessarily correlate to the continued stability or longevity of the paradigm. History is rife with examples of paradigm shifts emanating from relatively small groups that represented indicators of how religion was changing. New transhumanist religions may be providing such an indication since they are founded on a shift toward fundamentally different paradigms of meaning. Shifting Paradigms: From Humanism to Transhumanism Prior to the ontological changes described in this article, the label given to the modern grounding of meaningmaking has been liberalism,' or the more general term humanism.'6 This signifies a modern Western sense of 6 Both Harari and Taylor point to what I believe is the same Technological Re-Enchantment 11 placing the individual human self at the center of our system of values. Charles Taylor adds to this the modern emphasis on following our individual hearts and desires. Taylor notes how the modern Western ethic of authenticity emerging after the Second World War placed special emphasis on a kind of humanism that gave precedent to the desires and feelings of the individual. Mantras such as follow your heart' and do what feels right' became widely popular, and when seeking answers to deep personal questions, your friends, family, or therapist will no longer advise that you seek the counsel of your priest to interpret the appropriate action, but rather ask how you feel, what would make you happy, and understand the solution in terms of how it best expresses the desire of your true self.13 This modern ethic is built on an understanding of the human as an innately free and individual self, possessing both free will and innate value. The liberal intersubjective ideology, complete with its commitments to universal human rights and the resulting legal and political systems on which are predicated these ontological presuppositions are themselves upheld by prior essential presuppositions about reality.7 For modern humanist locus of meaning when they speak of "humanism" or "liberal humanism." 7 The term intersubjective' has been used in many ways by philosophers and social scientists. I use the term intersubjective here in the same way as Harari to refer to a level of reality distinct from subjective and objective realities whereby an entity or concept emerges as a function of many individuals holding a common belief. Examples of intersubjective entities or concepts include corporations, imagined national communities, the value of paper money, etc. whereby the entity does not exist objectively, but rather exists as an intersubjective supposition. See: Harari, Homo Deus, p.146. Antosca 12 example, the structural integrity of this edifice requires the concepts of free will and a model of the self as individual. Only then are we able to derive an innate value of the individual and locate our sources of meaning in a conception of human agency based on the presupposition of free will.14 Transhumanist Technology and Neuroe istentialism The current grounding of humanist individualism and corresponding religious ultimate concerns are being challenged by certain scientific discoveries and technological advances. I label this set of scientific discoveries and technological advances as "transhumanist technology."8 Since our liberal humanist worldview is based on a conception of the self with axiomatic presuppositions such as free will and individualism, we must look to transhumanist technologies that pose a potential threat to these particular elements of the contemporary humanist ethic. We can see that, if an empirically valid observation of the world contradicts some element of our presuppositions, that this will call into question the validity of that presupposition, thereby posing a fatal challenge to the conclusions which the presuppositions support. We can see that, given the implicit acceptance of the concept of free will, for example, that we do not simply believe in free will, but also hold some sort of basis on which to believe it at some level the belief had to be perceived as being real, grounded in our understanding of reality, not arbitrary. It then follows that, insofar as our understanding of material reality changes, so too could our beliefs since our reliance on the concept of free will represents an elementary presupposition of the humanist liberal order. Additionally, 8 "Transhumanist technologies" is a term I use to refer to advanced technologies with transhumanist implications, i.e., that hold the potential to shift the mainstream cultural attitude towards that of transhumanism. Technological Re-Enchantment 13 since such a belief is not arbitrary and must be seen as true, in a sense as corresponding to our reality, any challenge to the empirical truth-value of this claim could undermine its ultimate validity and ontological status, resulting in the abovedescribed disruption to the paradigm. Harari states that, "For liberalism to make sense, I must have one and only one true self, for if I had more than one authentic voice, how would I know which voice to heed in the polling station, in the supermarket and the marriage market [ ] If I look really deep within myself, the seeming unity that I take for granted dissolves into a cacophony of conflicting voices, none of which is my true self.' Humans aren't individuals. They are dividuals.'"15 This reinforces the notion that our modern paradigm of liberal humanist meaning is grounded in large part on the idea of the individual self. Transhumanist technology is posing a challenge to this element of humanist grounding. Our modern paradigm of liberal humanist meaning is not merely grounded in a conception of the individual self, but also depends on that self as possessing a free will.16 In 2015, I asked the philosopher and linguist Noam Chomsky a question concerning the nature of the mind and its computability. Essentially, my question asked whether he believed the mind to be computable, in principle. Chomsky answered by stating: The mind is organized matter. It's organized in a particular way, which we don't understand, but we don't understand much about bee communication. We don't know of any physical reason to believe that the particular components of that organized matter are critical for its operation. It appears to be something about the way it's organized that's as far as we know. Antosca 14 So therefore, it could be emulated, presumably, in some other substances.9 However, he went on to say, "[ ] the major question what is the puppeteer doing that is one that we don't even know how to address." 9 The puppeteer' to whom Chomsky refers is the mysterious pre-conscious driver of our thoughts and actions, uncovered by recent discoveries in neuroscience.17,18 His analogy to a puppeteer is apt what he is alluding to is the fact that recent neuroscience has confirmed that intentional human action in the body is initiated in the brain prior to conscious awareness of the action. This means that when we make decisions we are actually acting on mobilizing forces prior to our consciousness of having made our decision to act, implying some kind of disconnect between the thing that we suppose is making our decisions namely, our individual, free, willful self' and the thing actually making the decision, which seems to be much more diffuse and complex. This leads to a new understanding of how free-will functions, presenting an incompatible element of consciousness that our present humanist model of self cannot incorporate. These revelations serve as key drivers of this new wave of shifting meaning structures. The puppeteer' study to which Chomsky referred concluded that, " the outcome of a decision can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects the 9 This question was posed to Prof. Chomsky through a live online correspondence facilitated by Twitter and broadcast live on the Internet as part of a public speaking engagement. My question was posed to Chomsky by the moderator. See: Chomsky, N. (2015) Chomsky and Krauss: An Origins Project Dialogue (official) - (Part 2/2) [Video File]. Retrieved from: https: www.youtube.com watch v tbxp8ViBTu8 Technological Re-Enchantment 15 operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters awareness."19 Essentially, this new understanding shows that our actions are based on operations in the brain, the neuronal correlates to which we are able to empirically observe. The new reality emerging from this science tells us that free will is more complicated than our conception of an individual human agent making their own decisions. You, in an essential sense, are not making choices despite the intuitive phenomenology of perception and identity. There are many discrete examples of transhumanist technology presenting similar challenges to traditional understandings of the self and a corresponding grounding of meaning, from brain-machine interfaces to technologically enabled neuroscientific insights into the nature of perception and behavior. These innovations collectively are now giving rise to what some scholars are now calling "neuroexistentialism." This can be understood in the following context: There are three kinds of existentialism that respond to three different kinds of grounding projects grounding in God's nature, in a shared vision of collective good, or in science. The first-wave existentialism of Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche expressed anxiety about the idea that meaning and morals are made secure because of God's omniscience and good will. The second-wave existentialism of Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir was a post-Holocaust response to the idea that some uplifting secular vision of the common good might serve as a foundation. Today, there is a third-wave existentialism, neuroexistentialism, which expresses the anxiety that, even as science yields the truth about human nature, it also disenchants.20 Antosca 16 My argument is that transhumanist technologies are now providing an adaptive means of re-enchantment as a response to the challenge of third-wave neuroexistentialism by dissolving the "boundary of the mind" that Taylor describes as the defining feature of what he calls the "buffered," disenchanted self.21 Techno-theology: Dissolving the Porous Buffered Boundary The question then becomes: what does the humantechnology relationship reveal in a world of rapidly accelerating transhumanist technologies To understand what it means to be religious in an age of advanced technology, I frame the concepts of religion and the secular through the lens of Charles Taylor and his model of the porous' and buffered' selves since these shifts in meaning making seem to tightly correspond to the shifts in meaning making he describes as having occurred in the prior God-centric to human-centric shift. The human-centric to transhuman shift can be seen as the next step in Taylor's model. Taylor's phenomenological approach starts with a presupposition that humans do not possess an innate, universal, unchanging nature, and that from epoch to epoch, the nature of how humans relate to the world can change. In comparing the two epochs of the years 1500 and 2000, Taylor sees two distinct versions of a conception of self and its relation to the world. In the older version of the past, he describes a way-of-being he calls the "porous self" this term refers to the porous nature of the boundary between the self and the world. This is a conception in which the self, living in a pre-scientific world, is available to enchantment in a world full of mysterious spiritual forces. He contrasts this porous self' with the modern way of being, called the "buffered self," which is a result of our disenchantment and newfound confidence in our ability to Technological Re-Enchantment 17 find order in the world.22 The buffered self is "buffered" or "shielded," in the sense that, in the modern "social imaginary,"10 the self is no longer available to the magic of the enchanted world we are no longer porous we live in our own internal psychological and scientifically grounded reality. Here, Taylor links the concepts of porousness and enchantment. Taylor summarizes the key concepts of the porous and buffered selves in the following way: Almost everyone can agree that one of the big differences between us and our ancestors of five hundred years ago is that they lived in an "enchanted" world, and we do not at the very least, we live in a much less "enchanted" world. We might think of this as our having "lost" a number of beliefs and the practices which they made possible. But more, the enchanted world was one in which these forces could cross a porous boundary and shape our lives, psychic and physical. One of the big differences between us and them is that we live with a much firmer sense of the boundary between self and other. We are "buffered" selves. We have changed.23 Taylor's conception of the buffered self serves as a sophisticated model of secularization and serves as a way of understanding the implications of the emerging technotheology represented by transhumanist religions. In a world 10 Taylor's concept of social imaginary can be defined as: "Different from an intellectual system or framework, "broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode," surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, it carried images, stories, legends, etc." See: Smith, J. K. A. (2014) How Not to Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. See also: Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 171-172. Antosca 18 saturated by transhumanist technology, a new-wave neuroexistential meaning crisis, and corresponding countervailing materialist techno-theologies, it is meaningless to call the self "buffered." One must ask, from what is it buffered There is no longer this kind of subject object dualism. There is no opposing realm from which the self is buffered. No longer is the subject buffered from the enchanted world because in the transhumanist world all is contained, in principle, within the same material space-time system, which itself is available to materially realized yet mysterious and functionally miraculous forces.11 In a transhumanist world full of mysterious, albeit ultimately material forces, the barrier between the realm of phenomenal experience and the magical world is flattened the transhumanist world is completely available to the miraculous, and this is taken for granted. The entire world is contained within a common plane of reality available to the miraculous, albeit a materially-realized, functionally miraculous. This represents a cultural re-enchantment linked to technology. For transhumanist religions, a techno-theology of re-enchantment moves the locus of meaning through a transmutation of the human to the transhuman. In his book, A Secular Age, Charles Taylor lays out a critique of Weberean secularization theory by rejecting the traditionally conceived notion of secularization as an 11 My use of "miraculous" here is in a functional sense I am claiming a miracle in this sense need not be supernatural, by definition, but be mysterious to the person or group experiencing the miracle. A miracle with a supernatural cause and a miracle with a perceived or expected material cause are functionally and phenomenologically equivalent as long as the element of mystery exists they are experienced in the same way and serve the same function. Technological Re-Enchantment 19 axiomatic result of a decline in religion something Taylor describes as a mere subtraction story.' Instead, Taylor sees our disenchanted secular world as a result of a complex process of buffering ourselves to the enchanted world, to which our Western ancestors of 500 years ago were porously open. The porous openness of the past resulted in theirs being an enchanted world. However, given the challenge of modern technological conditions, I claim that our uniquely advanced transhumanist technology is bringing back this state of enchantment by eliminating the boundary between the magical and the "real world" in which we act, thereby revealing the role modern technology plays in forming new paradigms of meaning and religious expression. The old world in which people of Latin Christendom acted was enchanted precisely because it was co-located with the world of the mysterious and miraculous there was no boundary. The same now holds for transhumanists and their worldview as transhumanist techno-theology dissolves the secular boundary between the magical realm and the material world they are once again coterminous in a re-enchanted world of unlimited technological potentiality. Transhumanist technology serves to transfer the locus of meaning from the human to quantifiable data, thus combining the world of perceived technological wonder with the phenomenologically experienced self. This self is no longer indivisible, but malleable and deconstructed. The world is, once again, porous. Transhumanist Hyper-connectivity: Collapsing Boundaries The transhumanist future expects a world of hyperconnectivity. Some transhumanists, such as Singularitarians12, 12 Singularitarians are a subset of transhumanists who hold a belief in a coming event known as the Technological Antosca 20 hope to connect their minds with machines, in line with the possibilities of the deconstructed, quantified, dataist conception of self. This would, in principle, collapse the boundary between an external world and the mind a boundary that Charles Taylor defines as a necessary condition for the modern buffered self. Philosopher Slavoj i ek agrees that the removal of this buffer would amount to a categorical shift in the human condition, noting, "[ ] are we aware that, if this becomes a reality this direct link between our brain and digital space [ ] then in a way we will no longer be human because to be human means to have this minimal sense of separation between me in my mind and reality out there. Who knows what happens when this distance falls."24 This minimal separation represents the metaphorical "buffer" of Taylor's "buffered self" the metaphysical vanguard defending against our return to the enchanted world. In a transhumanist ontology, Being will not be thought of in terms of the human but rather the transhuman of nebulous identity and patterns of data. In such a world, who or where is the puppeteer This question highlights my connection to Taylor since his concept of the buffered self relies on the presence of a boundary separating our mental world and the external world. I am claiming that the transhumanist view implies the elimination Singularity. This event has an eschatological dimension as it represents a transformative world-changing moment when technology accelerates at an explosive exponential rate, creating near-infinite levels of superintelligence and creating new possibilities that cannot currently be conceived of using current human minds. The Technological Singularity is therefore tantamount to an end-times event found in millenarian religious beliefs and includes a functionallymiraculous transition to a state of permanent well-being through mysterious, unknowable technological processes. Technological Re-Enchantment 21 of this distinction it implies a world where we are directly linked to the deconstructed plane of data on which the miraculous technologies mysteriously function. Similarly, in Taylor's concept of the enchanted world of the porous self, people were likewise directly available to the mysterious and magical. Taylor writes, in the enchanted world, the line between personal agency and impersonal force was not at all clearly drawn. We see this again in relics. The cures effected by them, or the curse laid on people who stole them or otherwise mishandled them. Were seen both as emanating from them, as loci of power, and also as coming from the good will, or anger, of the saint they belonged to. Indeed, we can say that in this world, there is a whole gamut of forces, ranging from (to take the evil side for a moment) super-agents like Satan himself, forever plotting to encompass our domination, down to minor demons, like the spirits of the wood, which are almost indistinguishable from the loci they inhabit, and ending in magic potions which bring sickness or death. This illustrates that [ ] in the enchanted world, in contrast to our universe of buffered selves and "minds," shows a perplexing absence of certain boundaries which seem to us essential.25 Functionally, the enchanted world was one in which objects were tacitly understood to be imbued with potential mysterious power. What, essentially, is the difference between this and magical technology As Singularity University13 cofounder David Rose wrote, "Humans today are no less prone 13 Singularity University is a transhumanist educational institute co-founded by transhumanist Singularitarian thinker (and current Director of Engineering at Google, Inc.) Ray Kurzweil. Antosca 22 to believe in potions and elixirs, magic stones fountains, and youth-giving spirits than the past."26 As was the case in the enchanted world, objects have power. This reflects Taylor's conception of the porous, which he understood as representing the enchanted world of Medieval Europe. This world is returning by transhumanist technology removing the Taylorian buffer, opening space for re-enchantment through techno-theology. It is this notion of boundary that defines the modern buffered self. Taylor notes that, "The materialist fantasy, that we could for all we know be brains in a vat, being manipulated by some mad scientist, depends for its sense on this view that the material sufficient condition for thoughts of all kinds is within the cranium." In other words, our buffered self depends on a conception of self predicated on a mind-centric world, as opposed to the enchanted world. Taylor writes: the crucial difference between the mind-centered view and the enchanted world emerges when we look at meanings in this sense14 that things only have the meaning they do in that they awaken a certain response in us, and this has to do with our nature as creatures who are thus capable of such responses, which means 14 Taylor's sense of "meanings" here is in the context of a discussion of thoughts. Taylor writes: "What I am gesturing at with the expression "thoughts, etc." I mean, of course, the perceptions we have, as well as the beliefs of propositions which we hold or entertain about the world and ourselves. But I also mean our responses, the significance, importance, meaning, we find in things. I want to use for these the generic term meaning,' even though there is in principle a danger of confusion with linguistic meaning. Here I am using it in the sense in which we talk about "the meaning of life," or of a relationship as having great "meaning" for us." See Taylor, Secular Age, p. 31. Technological Re-Enchantment 23 creatures with feelings, with desires, aversions, i.e., beings endowed with minds, in the broadest sense.27 Transhumanism represents a move away from the humanist ethic of the buffered, anthropocentric identity that gave rise to the "malaises of modernity" of which Taylor writes. Humans are now moving back to a pre-buffered state of enchantment by moving past the human, past the anthropocentric, having transitioned from a pre-humanistic structure, through a humanistic one, to the functionally enchanted post-humanistic structure of meaning. When you remove the world-mind substance boundary, you strip away the security of being a buffered self and are once again available to an enchanted reality. As Taylor explains, "Living in a disenchanted world, the buffered self is no longer open, vulnerable to a world of spirits and forces which cross the boundary of the mind, indeed negate the very idea of there being a secure boundary."28 What has in modernity provided such a buffer is now becoming experienced as obsolete, returning to a porous, enchanted default mode. Conclusion The mediating function of technology, in which our world is constructed through a technological lens, characterizes the human-technology relationship. In a world of rapidly accelerating and increasingly immersive technologies, our meaning-making paradigms have the potential to deconstruct into a more transhumanist orientation. We see this early shift in the rise of transhumanist religions and third-wave neuroexistentialism. Some of these transhumanist religions include the Church of Perpetual Life, the Turing Church, the Terasem Faith, the Christian Transhumanist Association, and the Mormon Transhumanist Association, among others. Likewise, Singularitarianism poses a novel example of millennialism in the new light of techno-theology. Antosca 24 Faced with accelerating transhumanist technology, the "buffer" of Taylor's secularization model could be removed as a slide back into a "re-enchanted" state of living in an immersive world of technologically enabled enchantment occurs. This slide back to an enchanted world begins when we start to lose what Zizek describes as our "minimal sense of separation between me in my mind and reality out there," and what Taylor describes as, "certain boundaries which are both familiar and crucial "29 Transhumanist religions represent an early sign of this merger. The rise of transhumanist religions is a product of what Harari calls an intersubjective ideology of "dataism," born from technological accelerationism and novel interpretations of key scientific discoveries, framed within the rich historical legacy of techno-millennial expectations in the West.15 The new transhumanist techno-theology is the result of a confluence of factors that include the material technological conditions able to generate key interpretations of reality that serve to challenge traditional paradigms of the self. In the midst of a wave of disenchanting neuroexistentialism, transhumanist techno-theology represents the deeply human quest for meaning adapted to the modern technological age. By relocating the modern ontological grounding, transhumanism is contributing to a post-secular zeitgeist of technologically mediated re-enchantment. or s Cited 15 Historian David Noble presents a compelling theory of the link between millennial religious impulses in the West and technological development in his book, The Religion of Technology. See: Noble, D. (1997). The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention. New York: Penguin Books. Technological Re-Enchantment 25 Chomsky, N. (2015). Chomsky and Krauss: An Origins Project Dialogue (official) - (Part 2/2) [Video File]. Retrieved from: https: www.youtube.com watch v tbxp8ViBTu8 Caruso, G. D. and Flanagan, O. (2018). Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. (Edited by Gregg D. Caruso and Owen Flanagan). New York: Oxford University Press. Harari, Y. N. (2017). Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. New York: HarperCollins. Heidegger, M. (2008). Being and Time. (John Macquareie and Edward Robinson trans.). New York: Harper and Row. Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth. Indianapolis, IA: Indiana University Press. Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action, Behavioral and Brain Sciences v. 8, 529-66. Marx, K. (1904). A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (N. I. Stone Trans.). Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co. Noble, D. (1997). The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention. New York: Penguin Books. Rose, D. (2015). Enchanted Objects: Innovation, Design, and the Future of Technology. New York: Simon and Schuster. Smith, J. K. A. (2014). How Not to Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. Soon, C. S. et al (2008). Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, Nature Neuroscience v. 11 (5), 543-5. Antosca 26 Taylor, C. (2008). Buffered and Porous Selves. Retrieved from: https: tif.ssrc.org 2008 09 02 buffered-andporous-selves Taylor, C. (2007). A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention (2019). Artificial Intelligence: An Evangelical Statement of Principles. Retrieved from: https: erlc.com resource-library statements artificialintelligence-an-evangelical-statement-of-principles Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wheeler, M. (2017). Martin Heidegger The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL https: plato.stanford.edu archives fall2017 entries he idegger Wolf, M. (2015). Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World. New Haven: Yale University Press. Zizek, S. (2017). Who will control this digital space merged with our brain? – Slavoj Zizek on Elon Musk's AI venture. Retrieved from: https: www.youtube.com watch v kZJSmUExU6M 1 Wheeler, M, Martin Heidegger , The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL https: plato.stanford.edu archives fall2017 entries heidegg er 2 Heidegger, M. (2008). Being and Time. (John Macquareie and Edward Robinson trans.). New York: Harper and Row., p 207. 3 Harari, Y. N. (2017). Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. New York: HarperCollins, p. 223. Technological Re-Enchantment 27 4 Harari, Homo Deus, p. 273. 5 Taylor, C. (2007). A Secular Age Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p. 302. 6 Harari, Homo Deus, p. 270. 7 Marx, K. (1904). A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (N. I. Stone Trans.). Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., pp. 12-13. 8 The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention (2019). Artificial Intelligence: An Evangelical Statement of Principles. Retrieved from: https: erlc.com resource-library statements artificialintelligence-an-evangelical-statement-of-principles. 9 Wolf, M. (2015). Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World. New Haven: Yale University Press. 10 Volf, Flourishing, p. 80. 11 Volf, Flourishing, p. 80. 12 Volf, Flourishing, pp.81-82. 13 Harari, Homo Deus, p. 236. 14 Harari, Homo Deus, p. 332-350. 15 Harari, Homo Deus, p. 293. 16 Harari, Homo Deus, pp. 306-308. 17 Soon, C. S. et al (2008). Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, Nature Neuroscience v. 11 (5), 543-5. See also: Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action, Behavioral and Brain Sciences v. 8, 529-66. Harari, Homo Deus pp. 286, 421. 18 Harari, Homo Deus, p. 286. 19 Soon et al, "Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions," 543-545. 20 Caruso, G. D. and Flanagan, O. (2018). Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. (Edited by Gregg D. Caruso and Owen Flanagan). New York: Oxford University Press, p. ix. Antosca 28 21 Taylor, Secular Age, p. 31. 22 Taylor, Secular Age, p. 27. 23 Taylor, C. (2008) Buffered and Porous Selves. Retrieved from: https: tif.ssrc.org 2008 09 02 buffered-and-porousselves . 24 Zizek, S. (2017). Who will control this digital space merged with our brain? – Slavoj Zizek on Elon Musk's AI venture. Retrieved from: https: www.youtube.com watch v kZJSmUExU6M. 25 Taylor, Secular Age, pp. 33-34. 26 Rose, D. (2015). Enchanted Objects: Innovation, Design, and the Future of Technology. New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 116. 27 Taylor, Secular Age, p. 31. 28 Taylor, Secular Age, p. 300. 29 Taylor, Secular Age, p. 35.

www.argument-journal.eu ARGUMENT Vol. 3 (2/2013) pp. 273–283 Byt i nicość w myśli Mistrza Eckharta. Początki niemieckiej filozofii woli Piotr AUGUSTYNIAK* Kraków ABSTRACT The article is devoted to Meister Eckhart's interpretation of ontological structures of reality in which the concepts of being, nothingness, existence, and Godhead play an important role. The article discusses: 1. the interpretation of being and nothingness in the prologue to the Latin Opus tripartitum; 2. the interpretation of existence and Godhead in German works; 3. the placement of these deliberations in the context of Eckhart's conception of abegescheidenheit. The article's main thesis is that in his ontological reflection, Meister Eckhart comes close to thinking about the essence of reality as Will, which is a clear anticipation of an important current in German philosophy. KEYWORDS being, nothingness, existence, Godhead, will, Meister Eckhart, German philosophy Problem, który stawiam w tytule tego artykułu, uważam za samo sedno myśli Mistrza Eckharta i to nie tylko w jej wymiarze ontologicznym, ale również teologicznym i antropologiczno-teoriopoznawczym. Oznacza to, że ontologia, czyli próba opisu rzeczywistości na poziomie orzekania o jej istnieniu (o sposobach jej bycia), jest w jego myśleniu centralna. Teza ta jest śmiała, ponieważ wynika z niej, że kwestia natury i działania Boga oraz natury i działania (również poznania) człowieka znajduje swój pełny wyraz i swoje pełne znaczenie tylko jako dopowiedzenie i komentarz do kwestii bytu i nicości. Podporządkowanie zagadnienia natury Boga i człowieka „kwestii bycia" ma jednak daleko idące konsekwencje również dla tej ostatniej: otóż, prosta totalność, leżąca u pod- * Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny. E-mail: [email protected] 274 Piotr AUGUSTYNIAK staw wszelkiego indywidualnego istnienia, nazywana przez Eckharta zarówno „bytem", jak i „nicością", nie może być określona li tylko negatywnie, na drodze apofatycznego orzekania, jako niewyrażalne, spoczywające w mroku, pierwotne, homogeniczne niezróżnicowanie. Gdy bowiem Eckhart ujmuje ową totalność kategoriami, wywodzącymi się z języka opisującego bosko-ludzkie odniesienia i zależności, przybiera ona charakter relacyjnego dynamizu vel twórczego procesu, który przez niemieckich kontynuatorów myśli Eckharta został nazwany Wolą oraz Życiem. ESSE ET NIHIL Mistrz Eckhart nieprzypadkowo jest nazywany ojcem filozofii niemieckiej1. Zasadność takiego twierdzenia wynika między innymi z tego, że Eckhart jako autor Kazań i Traktatów jest bodaj pierwszym filozofem języka niemieckiego. Jako taki stanął on przed zasadniczą kwestią wypracowania w tym języku odpowiedniej filozoficznej terminologii. Eckhart tworzy ją, szukając staroniemieckich odpowiedników dla pojęć swojej akademickiej, średniowiecznej łaciny2. Przyjrzyjmy się więc najpierw temu, jakich terminów na określenie bytu i nicości używa w swoich łacińskich dziełach i jaką ontologię w oparciu o nie konstruuje. Odwołam się w tym celu do najbardziej reprezentatywnego, jeśli chodzi o tę kwestię, spośród jego akademickich traktatów. Jest nim Prolog do Dzieła Tez, stanowiący pierwszą część słynnego Opus tripartitum. W Prologu Eckhart formułuje podstawowe rozróżnienie: z jednej strony różnicy jest esse, które zostaje zrównane z ens, z drugiej zaś nihil. Czytamy tam: „pierwszy traktat dotyczy istnienia i bytu oraz jego przeciwieństwa, którym jest nic" (ECKHART 2006: 3)3. Wszelako ens oraz esse nie są po prostu tożsame ze sobą. Ens jest bowiem terminem oznaczającym esse, które jest zatem jego desygnatem. „[...]«byt» oznacza samo istnienie" - pisze Eckhart (2006: 3). W sensie ścisłym mamy więc opozycję pomiędzy esse i nihil, czyli pomiędzy istnieniem oraz nicością. Wszelako opozycja ta nie ma charakteru różnicy pomiędzy dwoma rozdzielnymi, odrębnymi od siebie porządkami. Nihil nie jest czymś, co stoi na zewnątrz esse, ponieważ - Eckhart argumentuje tu po parmenidejsku - stojąc na zewnątrz istnienia, samo, jako będące (wszak byłoby czymś, co z zewnątrz przeciwstawia się istnieniu), byłoby istnieniem. Nie 1 Jest to powszechnie przyjmowana teza. Por. PIÓRCZYŃSKI 1997: 5. 2 Nie znaczy to jednak, że tworzy ją od podstaw. De facto wpisuje się już w pewną kaznodziejską tradycję języka niemieckiego. Kazania w tym języku głosili wszak jego poprzednicy, jak choćby Dietrich z Freiburga. 3 Modyfikuję (i tu, i w kolejnych przywołaniach) swój własny przekład, tłumacząc esse jako „istnienie", nie zaś jako „bycie", jak uczyniłem pierwotnie. Powodem jest to, że odpowiednikiem esse w Kazaniach jest staroniemieckie wesen, które oznacza zarazem „istotę" i „istnienie", o czym będzie mowa w dalszej części artykułu. 275Byt i nicość w myśli Mistrza Eckharta. Początki niemieckiej filozofii woli byłoby więc nihil. Oznacza to zarazem, że esse jest totalnością, że jest wszystkim i nic mu się nie przeciwstawia, nic go nie o-granicza (tj. stojąc na zewnątrz, nie wyznacza jego granicy). Eckhart wyraża tę myśl z właściwą sobie, dosadną precyzją: „istnienie jest Bogiem" (ECKHART 2006: 3). Czy można w związku z tym mówić jeszcze o nihil? Czy różnica nihil - esse jest do utrzymania, skoro nihil samo musiałoby być „zawarte" w esse? Być jego wewnętrznym stanem vel predyspozycją? Esse est deus - od tych słów zaczyna się nie tylko omawiany przeze mnie traktat, ale całe myślenie Eckharta. Nie chodzi tu o to, że Bóg jest swym własnym istnieniem, czyli takim wyjątkowym bytem, który istnieje na mocy włas nej istoty (a więc w sposób bezwzględnie konieczny). Ten sposób myślenia, z którym Eckhart spotkał się, tak jak my wszyscy, u Tomasza z Akwinu, jest mu zupełnie obcy. Można rzec śmiało, że nawet bluźnierczy. Teza Eckharta, z pozoru identyczna z Tomaszową, bo zrównująca Boga z esse, nie powiada, że Bóg jest analogicznym do każdego z nas bytem (ens). Eckhart zrywa bowiem z zaproponowanym przez Tomasza rozumieniem esse jako pewnego substratu każdego bytu (co prowadzi Akwinatę do zwielokrotnienia esse - każdy byt vel każda istniejąca rzecz ma swoje własne esse, wszelako tylko Bogu przynależy ono na mocy samej jego istoty, w związku z czym jest on z esse tożsamy). Eckhart proponuje w to miejsce przyjęcie jednej powszechnej totalności esse, która wszystko obejmuje, a więc i jest wszystkim4. Tak ujęte istnienie jest omni-potencją, jest zarazem możnością, czyli podłożem wszystkiego, jak i aktualnością wszystkiego (bowiem nic z tego, co jest, poza istnienie nie wykracza). Ze względu na tę swą przemożność i wszech-moc esse jest boskie, jest totalnością, którą należy nazwać Bogiem. Wynika stąd szokująca dla chrześcijańskiego ucha teza teologiczna, którą Eckhart znów wypowiada z nader dosadną precyzją i jednoznacznością - wszystko zawiera się w Bogu (ECKHART 1964: 160–161), wszystko uczestniczy (istnieje jako „moment") w jego wewnętrznym życiu. Przypomnijmy, wszak poza istnieniem, czyli poza Bogiem, nie ma nic. Nic z zewnątrz go nie ogranicza. Czy nie oznacza to jednak, że wszystko, co zamieszkuje świat, jest de facto czymś pozornym, przypominającym nieistotny akcydens w spinozjańskiej Bożej substancji? Innymi słowy, czy zanegowanie jakiejkolwiek pozytywnej zewnętrzności wobec boskiego istnienia, czyli sprowadzenie opozycji esse - nihil do tezy, że jest tylko esse (tylko Bóg), pozwala na „obronę" istotnej różnorodności świata? Eckhart nie jest monistą uznającym jedną tylko, niezróżnicowaną, niezmienną, nieskończoną substancję. Jego sposób myślenia sprowadza się do tego, żeby uzgodnić ze sobą jedyność esse, którą trzeba przyjąć z już zawsze daną nam wielorakością rzeczy. Pytanie Eckharta rozpoczyna się więc nie od słowa „czy" 4 Na temat różnicy pomiędzy rozumieniem esse u Tomasza i u Eckharta por. mój artykuł: AUGUSTYNIAK 2006. 276 Piotr AUGUSTYNIAK (czy istnieje świat wielości, czy zmysły nas nie mylą etc.)5, ale od słowa „jak" - jaka jest natura jedyności esse, skoro dany jest nam wieloraki w swych przejawach świat, oraz jaka jest natura niewątpliwej (bo danej nam) wielości i różnorodności rzeczy zamieszkujących świat, skoro wszystkie one uczestniczą w jednym esse i są jednym esse. Innymi słowy, idąc tropem Eckhartiańskiego rozumienia esse, „nie odbieramy rzeczom istnienia, ani nie niszczymy istnienia rzeczy, ale ugruntowujemy" (ECKHART 2006: 8). Myśl Eckharta zmierza więc do tego, aby owo esse, określone jako „byt" (ens) i wykluczające jakąkolwiek ontologiczną wobec siebie zewnętrzność, pomyśleć jako pleromę. Poprzez „pleromę" rozumiem taką jedność, która polega na wewnętrznym zwielokrotnieniu; jedność dynamiczną, a więc tożsamą ze sobą („jednolitą") tylko jako ruch wyłaniania z siebie wielości i jej łączenia. Wielość bowiem wyłania się w owym jedynym (tożsamym z jedynością esse) dynamizmie. Powraca tu kwestia różnicy esse - nihil. Otóż jest nią samo esse jako ów dymizm. Jest ono samo dzianiem się różnicy pomiędzy „istnieniem prostym i samym w sobie, bez żadnych dodatków" (ECKHART 2006: 4) (jako wirtualnym podłożem ruchu) a jego zaprzeczeniem, którym jest istnienie zwielokrotnione, które rozpatrywane samo w sobie (znów czysto wirtualnie) jest właśnie nihil, jest to „istnienie «tego» lub «tamtego»" (ECKHART 2006: 4). Różnica esse - nihil przyjmuje w ten oto sposób kształt rozróżnienia na ens oraz ens hoc et hoc. Z jednej strony jest prosta totalność esse, a z drugiej jest „to" lub „tamto", czyli każda konkretna rzecz, którą można wskazać („rzeczy są bytem «tym», jak kamień, lew, człowiek itp." - ECKHART 2006: 5). O każdej ze stron różnicy orzeka się inaczej. O esse można wydawać sądy ogólne, powiadając, że byt jest dobrem, pięknem etc. Tymczasem o „tym lub tamtym" można powiedzieć, że jest to „coś dobrego", „coś pięknego" albo „coś bytującego" (czyli ens hoc właśnie). Mówiąc na przykład, że „kamień jest dobry", nie mówimy, że jest dobrem, ale że ten kamień (ta rzecz, czyli „to") jest dobrym kamieniem etc. (ECKHART 2006: 3–4). Obie strony różnicy są wszelako momentami jednej, dynamicznej wewnętrzności. Hoc et hoc oraz esse mają się bowiem tak do siebie, iż wszystko jest „z" esse, czyli bezpośrednio od niego pochodzi (ECKHART 2006: 6), a to, co jest (zaistniało) w ten sposób (każde hoc et hoc), nic do esse nie dodaje. Ilustracją tych twierdzeń jest przeformułowanie chrześcijańskiej koncepcji stworzenia ex nihilo, które - zdaniem Eckharta - nie dokonuje się na zewnątrz Boga, ale w Bogu, jest więc pewnego rodzaju zwielokrotnieniem vel zróżnicowaniem, dokonującym się w obrębie esse (ECKHART 1964: 159–165). Cała ta argumentacja, jak widać, ma na celu destrukcję rozróżnienia na Boga i stworzenie, rozróżnienia rozumianego jako wyodrębnienie dwu rozłącznych sfer 5 Podobnie nonsensowne jest dla niego „dowodzenie" istnienia boga: Bóg to istnienie - jak można więc chcieć go dowodzić. Istnienie świata jest świadectwem tego, że on jest - jest jego istnieniem (por. ECKHART 1964: 158–159). 277Byt i nicość w myśli Mistrza Eckharta. Początki niemieckiej filozofii woli rzeczywistości. Myślenie takie prowadziłoby bowiem do wniosku, że stworzenie (sfera tego, co zróżnicowane) jest czymś pozornym, jest bowiem poza istnieniem. Nie oznacza to jednak, że Eckhart odrzuca zupełnie różnicę Bóg - stworzenie i że zastępuje ją homogenicznym niezróżnicowaniem. Eckhart zmierza jedynie do jej modyfikacji, która wpisuje stworzenie w jedyne boskie życie. Bóg jest samym istnieniem w sensie stwórczej, różnicującej (się) mocy, stworzenie jest zaś istnieniem zróżnicowanym, czyli wynikiem tego procesu. I tylko rozpatrywane w jego odrębności (tak jakby było czymś odrębnym od Boga–esse) jest ono nihil - czymś pozornym. Wszelako ujęte we właściwej perspektywie, tj. w horyzoncie boskiej, omnipotentnej dynamiki esse, jest czymś istotnie rzeczywistym. WESEN Ten sposób myślenia jest również obecny w Kazaniach i przyjmuje w nich swą ostateczną formę, zrównującą esse z Boskością (gotheit). Boskość to bezgrunt (abgrunt) (ECKHART 1971: 68), czyli esse w jego totalności i bezwarunkowości. Jako taka Boskość jest bezgruntową podstawą zarówno Boga, jak i stworzenia, jest bowiem istnieniem w-nim-samym (jego pełnią), czyli - jak powiada Friedrich W. J. von Schelling - jest indyferencją (SCHELLING 2007: 41). Bóg jest w niej ugruntowywany jako podstawa stworzeń, a więc jest esse „w funkcji" potencji (możności), stworzenie zaś jest tym, co na tej podstawie „ustawione", jest więc esse zaktualizowanym i w swych aktualizacjach zwielokrotnionym. Eckhart, mówiąc w Kazaniach o Boskości–bezgruncie, wyraża w nowy sposób swą „łacińską" tezę esse est deus, czyli nie można mówić o żadnej ontologicznie pozytywnej zewnętrzności względem esse vel deus. Wyrażając ją w ten sposób, projektuje takie ujęcie owej boskiej immanencji esse (totalności, w której wszystko się zawiera), aby jeszcze mocniej potwierdzić i utwierdzić w jej obrębie wielorakość i różnorodność świata, które są nam dane i które nigdy nie miały dla Eckharta statusu czegoś pozornego, pozbawionego „wartości", „realności" etc. To właśnie w Kazaniach ukazuje się więc w całej pełni strategia Eckhartiańskiego myślenia, o której mówiłem powyżej. Zacznijmy jednak od początku. Staroniemieckim słowem, które Eckhart adaptuje dla swych rozważań ontologicznych, jest termin wesen. Podstawowym znaczeniem tego słowa jest „istota", wszelako nie w sensie essentia, czyli istoty danej rzeczy, ale w sensie rzeczy właśnie, czyli istoty bytującej w obrębie świata. Wesen to zatem coś istniejącego i w tym sensie to również istnienie. I znów nie w sensie właściwości pewnej rzeczy, ale w sensie istnienia (wielu istnień), które spotykamy w świecie. Można powiedzieć więc, że wesen jest odpowiednikiem ens hoc et hoc. I tak rzeczywiście jest. W Kazaniach hoc et hoc ma ścisły odpowiednik, mianowicie diez und daz. Każda rzecz spotykana vel dana nam w świecie, czyli - mówiąc teologicznie - każde stworzenie, jest „tym" lub „tamtym", co Eckhart 278 Piotr AUGUSTYNIAK wyraża najczęściej negatywnie, mówiąc, że „Bóg nie jest «tym» ani «tamtym»" (ECKHART 1958: 146). Zastosowanie do rzeczy terminu wesen bardzo dynamizuje i - jeśli tak można powiedzieć - „de-ontyzuje" obraz rzeczywistości. Świat nie jest bowiem zbiorem wielu odrębnych bytów, z których każdy posiada swój akt istnienia (swoje wesen). Świat to wiele istot, spośród których każda jest wesen, czyli wpisuje się w jedno istnienie (wesen), które w każdym „tym lub tamtym" vel w każdej istocie (w każdym ukonkretnionym wesen) wyraża się, „aktualizuje" vel „ukonkretnia". Taki sens ma teza Eckharta, powiadająca, że „wszystkie stworzenia są jednym wesen" (ECKHART 1958: 130). Wesen zaś samo w sobie jest tożsame z Boskością, która jest wesen âne wesen (ECKHART 1976: 231), czyli czystym „istnieniem bez istot", istnieniem, które dopiero może się zaktualizować jako istnienie „to" lub „tamto" vel „tego" lub „tamtego". Stąd też każde „to" lub „tamto", czyli każde coś (iht), potraktowane jako coś odrębnego od boskiego wesen, czyli rozpatrywane osobno, jako coś-wsobie, jest nicością: „każde stworzenie jest czystym nic [niht]" (ECKHART 1958: 69). I tylko rozpatrywane w obrębie jednego wesen, czyli w obrębie Boskości, jest czymś (iht) - mianowicie „to jest czymś, co jest całkowicie w Bogu" ( ECKHART 1971: 615). Jako taka okazuje się Boskość (wesen) omni-potencją, jest dynamiką jednej, aktualizującej się możności. Boskość to: (a) czysta możność, która (b) staje się (jest) możnością czegoś, czyli Bogiem. Innymi słowy, Boskość to (a) bez-grunt, który (b) staje się (jest) gruntem istot. Stąd Eckhart określa Boskość czy to jako gałązkę, na której wszystko się zieleni i rozkwita (wszystko, co jest, jest jej zielenieniem się i rozkwitaniem), czy to jako ekstatyczne, wytryskujące źródło, czy to jako pędzącą przez świat (czy przez ludzką duszę), przypominającą młodego źrebaka twórczą siłę. Bardzo istotne jest przy tym to, że ta twórcza potencja nie tworzy nic poza sobą, że nie jest czymś, co inicjuje coś na zewnątrz siebie. Dlatego jest właśnie bez-gruntem, czyli wspomnianą już indyferencją, która nie tylko jest nie-zróżnicowaniem, ale też potencjalnym zawieraniem w sobie (in-) wszystkich różnic. Eckhart i tę prawdę wyraża na wiele sposobów, powiadając, że to, co wyłania się z Boga, pozostaje mimo to wewnątrz (ECKHART 1971: 94), pojawia się bowiem „wewnątrz" Boskości (wesen), stanowi jej własną aktualizację etc. Dlatego powiada on, że „wesen [...] wytapia się wewnątrz" (ECKHART 1958: 301), pozostając nie tylko podstawą ale i „obręczą" wszystkiego (ECKHART 1958: 225). A zatem tylko metafizyczna struktura naszego języka, domagająca się zawsze podmiotu i orzeczenia, zmusza nas do mówienia o czymś, z czego stworzenie wypływa etc. De facto bowiem Boskość nie jest czymś, co wytryskuje i wytapia się, bo wtedy to, co wytrysnęłoby i wytopiło się, byłoby na zewnątrz niej jako podmiotu. Immanencja wszystkiego w wesen, którą orzeka Eckhart, to wesen vel Boskość jako samo wytryskiwanie, samo wytapianie się i wypływanie. To więc indyferencja, która sama jest różnicowaniem się - dynamicznym, bez-grunto279Byt i nicość w myśli Mistrza Eckharta. Początki niemieckiej filozofii woli wym żywiołem, który jest niewyczerpanym ugruntowywaniem (wyłanianiem się) świata. Eckhartiańska Boskość więc to coś na kształt przelewającego się w sobie oceanu, o którym pięknie pisał Fryderyk Nietzsche: A wiecież wy, czym jest dla mnie „świat"? Mam go wam pokazać w swym zwierciadle? Ten świat - monstrum siły, bez początku, bez końca, stała, spiżowa wielkość siły, która nie rośnie, nie maleje, która się nie zużywa, lecz tylko przemienia, jako całość niezmiennie wielka, gospodarstwo bez wydatków i strat, ale też bez przerostu, bez przychodu, opasane „nicością" jako swą granicą, nic, co by się rozpływało, nic roztrwonionego, nic nieskończenie rozciągłego, lecz określona siła [...], jako gra sił i fal sił zarazem jedno i „wiele", tu się spiętrzające, tam zarazem malejące, morze w sobie wzburzonych i wzbierających sił ( NIETZSCHE 2004: 357–358). Przywołuję Nietzschego nieprzypadkowo, gdyż jest on ważnym świadkiem tego, że obrona jednostkowości i indywidualności przed przemocą całości, co było jedną z zasadniczych jego pasji, nie musi wykluczać się z orzekaniem o relatywizującej metafizyczną odrębność indywidualnych rzeczy ponad-jedności (ponadmetafizycznej „całości"). Tak samo jest u Eckharta. Ta ponad-jedność bowiem to nie jedna tożsama ze sobą metafizyczna substancja, ale potencja–dynamizm, która jest ekstatyczną aktualnością wszystkiego. Eckhart powiada w tym kontekście, że jest ona rodzeniem. W ten sposób to, co dane w naszym doświadczeniu świata, nie zostaje sprowadzone do pozoru, do akcydensu jednej statycznej substancji (Boga), ale zostaje zanurzone w ekstatycznym dynamizmie życia–potencji, intensyfikując się nieskończenie w swej realności jako skondensowana w danym kształcie cała Boskość. Właśnie dlatego powiada Eckhart, że w Boskości wszystko jest równe - mucha, człowiek oraz kamień - i jest samą Boskością (ECKHART 1958: 199). W zrozumieniu tego paradoksu pomocna może być ponownie teologiczna wyobraźnia. Podobnie jak Syn, będąc obrazem Ojca, nie jest bytem pozornym, ale właśnie dzięki temu, że jest jego obrazem, jest - jeśli tak można powiedzieć - pełnokrwistą realnością, przybierającą wciąż na sile w swej wyrazistości, autentyczności etc.; tak też jest ze wszystkim, co wraz z Synem wytryskuje z ciemnej otchłani (z bezgruntu) Ojcowskiego niezróżnicowania (jego indyferencji). Zaiste, powiada Eckhart, wszystko wypływa z Boga jako jeden Syn i jest w tym wypływie jednym Synem (ECKHART 1971: 535). Wszystko w ten sposób zostaje „domknięte" w jednym wesen, w jednej indyferencji, która nie jest przeciwieństwem dyferencji (różnicy, różnorodności), ale jest zarazem jej potencjalnością i jej aktualnością - jej dzianiem się. 280 Piotr AUGUSTYNIAK GELASSENHEIT Eckhart opisuje w Kazaniach nie tylko samą tę ontologiczną strukturę, która sprzeciwia się naszej zdroworozsądkowej intuicji, ale również, a chyba nawet przede wszystkim, drogę, jaką trzeba przejść, aby się w tej pełni odnaleźć. Istotne jest tu, że jest to droga powrotu, a więc przywrócenia stanu pierwotnego. Nie wybicia się ku czemuś jeszcze nam niedostępnemu, ale skupienia się w czymś dla nas samych źródłowym, przedarcia się ku sobie prawdziwemu (to być „sobie przywróconym we właściwy sposób" - ECKHART 1958: 244). Jest to więc wydobywanie się z jakiejś formy upadku, pozoru, zatracenia. Zauważmy, że w świetle powyższych ustaleń nie można tego wydobywania się traktować jako drogi wspinania się ponad wtórność i pozorność świata wielu istnień, a więc jako drogi wyzwolenia się z więzienia „tego" i „tamtego". W drodze tej nie chodzi więc o zaprzeczenie wielości, różnorodności, indywidualności tego, co dane nam w świecie jako iluzji - co oznaczałoby przekroczenie w ogóle naszego doświadczenia jako iluzorycznego - i zapadnięcie się w nicość braku wszelkiego zróżnicowania. Tu chodzi o wydobycie się z pewnego rodzaju samonarzucającej się, złudnej interpretacji owej różnorodności jako ugruntowanej na rzekomej, metafizycznej odrębności tego, co wyróżnione. Interpretacji naiwnie teologicznej, sprowadzającej wszystko, co jest, do czegoś zewnętrznego wobec Boga. Powtórzmy, punktem dojścia nie jest więc nicość braku różnicy, ale omni-potentna indyferencja, która jest sama-w-sobie różnicowaniem się, zwielokrotnianiem, płodzeniem etc. i która w ten właśnie sposób jest w najwyższym stopniu sobą, potwierdzając się w-sobie i, jak powiada Eckhart, doznając w tym najwyższej radości. Dlatego człowiek, który tę drogę przejdzie, znajduje się w stanie Gelassenheit. Pozostawiwszy ów błędny światoobraz, ekstatycznie utożsamia się z owym dynamizmem, który pozwala (lassen) być wszystkiemu, co jest; pozwala mu istnieć jako ekstaza jednego, zwielokrotniającego się istnienia. Taki, trwający w stanie gelâzen, człowiek uczestniczy w s-twórczej swobodzie tworzenia. (Paradoksalnie: może on Bogu rozkazywać (ECKHART 1958: 246), Bóg musi w niego spłynąć (ECKHART 1971: 415) etc.). Droga do tego stanu gelâzen, jako właściwego sposobu bycia, jest wszelako daleka. Jest nią wytrwała praca, której sens streszcza się w pojęciu abegescheidenheit - odosobnienia vel oddzielenia się. Jest to wytrwałe zrywanie ze wszystkim, czego kresem ma być stan, jak by się wydawało, zupełnego zapadnięcia się i wygaszenia. Nirwana nieposiadania niczego, zaniku wiedzy i chcenia (ECKHART 1971: 488). Praktyka abegescheidenheit to jednak w opisie Eckharta przede wszystkim rozwód, powrót do stanu wolnego, co opisuje on przymiotnikiem ledic. Chodzi tu więc nie o zanegowanie indywidualnego istnienia rzeczy jako pozoru, ale o swego rodzaju odwiązanie się od niego, czyli o przekroczenie 281Byt i nicość w myśli Mistrza Eckharta. Początki niemieckiej filozofii woli przywiązania do rzeczy, które skutkuje metafizycznym, zdroworozsądkowym światoobrazem. Chodzi tu o odwiązanie się od takiego obrazu rzeczy, który jest pochodną naszego zatroskania o samych siebie, jako odrębnych, zagrożonych unicestwieniem, które to zatroskanie proponuję nazwać w o l ą t r w a n i a. To odwiązywanie się zmusza nas do ciągłego szukania swego, ciągłej pracy na rzecz utrzymania siebie, polegającego na przyswajaniu (zawłaszczaniu) otaczających nas rzeczy, a więc na ciągłym pożądaniu (dlatego człowiek, który jest gelâzen, musi najpierw nic nie mieć i nie chcieć). Przy czym podstawowym sposobem owego przyswojenia i żądzy jest zdroworozsądkowa „wiedza", czyli ujęcie rzeczy jako współmiernych nam, tym samym (tak jak siebie odruchowo odczuwamy) skończonych, odrębnych, a więc możliwych do pochłonięcia (spacyfikowania). Dlatego właśnie bycie gelâzen domaga się, aby nic nie wiedzieć. Ta niewiedza nie oznacza wszelako wygaszenia, ale nowy rodzaj ontologicznej wiedzy, o której była mowa powyżej6. W związku z tym praktykowanie abegescheidenheit jest również dialektycznym transem przeprojektowującego się myślenia. Na jego drodze to, co do tej pory było uznawane jako iht (coś), ponieważ było związane z przekonaniem o ontologicznej odrębności, musi być określone jako niht. Bowiem ujęte jako odrębne od boskiego wesen jest czystym pozorem. Jednocześnie jednak również owo boskie wesen, jako prawda o innej ontologicznej perspektywie, jest zaprzeczeniem tego wyjściowego obrazu odrębnego iht, i jako takie słusznie może być nazwane niht - niczym. Jest to wszelako „ponadistniejąca nicość" (ECKHART 1976: 441), a więc pełnia istnienia, otwierająca się w momencie zanegowania odruchowego, metafizycznego światoobrazu; nicość, w której jest miejsce na dynamicznie wyłaniającą się wielość świata etc. NIEMIECKA FILOZOFIA WOLI Zamiast podsumowania, chciałbym zakończyć zarysowaniem otwierającej się w myśli Eckharta dziejowej perspektywy7. Otóż, sposób jego rozumienia esse/wesen jako Boskości oraz droga ku temu rozumieniu, polegająca na zaprzeczeniu swojej egzystencji jako woli trwania, jest otwarciem bardzo żywotnej i niezwykle intrygującej, zasadniczej perspektywy niemieckiej filozofii woli. Owo zaprzeczenie człowieka jako woli trwania jest otwarciem się na istnienie jako bezgruntową potencję; na Boskość jako Wolę vel Życie. Jest to więc ścisła antycypacja i właściwe źródło myśli Schellinga (PIÓRCZYŃSKI 1999: 13–16). Nie jest to przy tym tylko strukturalne podobieństwo obu tych perspektyw. Schelling inspirował się przecież pismami mistyków niemieckich. Wśród tych 6 Na ten temat piszę szerzej w mojej książce (AUGUSTYNIAK 2009). 7 Rozwijam ją szczegółowo gdzie indziej (AUGUSTYNIAK 2013). 282 Piotr AUGUSTYNIAK pism warto wyróżnić anonimowy traktat pt. Theologia Deutsch8, w którym wesen po raz pierwszy zostało nazwane „wolą" („DER FRANCKFORTER" 1982: 143–148). Teologia niemiecka powstała zaś na bazie idei obecnych w poprzedzającym bezpośrednio jej powstanie dziele Eckharta. Boskość jako Wola vel Życie jest zaprzeczeniem zwykłej woli człowieka, to jest: boska Wola vel boskie Życie jest zaprzeczeniem pragnienia przetrwania, czyli woli trwania. Boskość to więc koniec końców taka wykładnia Życia–Woli, która jest zaprzeczeniem wykładni życia jako woli (zachowania) życia, którą proponował Arthur Schopenhauer, notabene wytrwały czytelnik i sympatyk Theologia Deutsch. W to miejsce pojawia się ekstaza, roztrwanianie się, twórczy trans Życia–Potencji vel w o l a t w o r z e n i a. A skoro tak, to Eckhart zapoczątkowuje tradycję, której zwieńczeniem jest Nietzscheańska koncepcja Życia jako Woli Mocy i człowieka, który poprzez Wolę Mocy włącza się (powraca) w ekstatyczny nurt Życia będącego ciągłym ruchem ponad siebie. Życia, które właśnie jako takie trwa nieporuszone w swych granicach, czyli jest sobą. Mówiąc lapidarnie, Eckhart i Nietzsche to spotykające się ze sobą początek i koniec filozofii niemieckiej, a więc właściwa miara i wykładnia Schellinga na przekór Schopenhaue rowi. BIBLIOGRAFIA AUGUSTYNIAK, Piotr (2006): Myślenie bycia czy teoria istnienia? „Esse" Mistrza Eckharta i Tomasza z Akwinu. Logos i Ethos 20, 12–26. AUGUSTYNIAK, Piotr (2009): Inna Boskość. Mistrz Eckhart, Zaratustra i przezwyciężenie metafizyki. Kraków: Instytut Myśli Józefa Tischnera. AUGUSTYNIAK, Piotr (2013): Istnienie jest Bogiem, ja jest grzechem. Theologia Deutsch i początki niemieckiej filozofii. Warszawa: Fundacja Augusta Hrabiego Cieszkowskiego. „DER FRANCKFORTER" (1982): „Theologia Deutsch". Kritische Textausgabe. Wolfgang von Hinten (red.). München: Artemis Verlag. ECKHART, Meister (1958): Die deutschen Werke. Predigten. Josef Quint (red.). T. 1. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. ECKHART, Meister (1964): Prologus generalis in opus tripartitum. [W:] Meister ECKHART: Die lateinischen Werke. T. I: Prologi, Expositio Libri Genesis, Liber Parabolorum Genesis. Konrad Weiss (red.). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 148–165. ECKHART, Meister (1971): Die deutschen Werke. Predigten. Josef Quint (red.). T. 2. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. ECKHART, Meister (1976): Die deutschen Werke. Predigten. Josef Quint (red.). T. 3. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 8 Za podstawę analiz tego traktatu należy przyjąć wydanie krytyczne („DER FRANCKFORTER" 1982). Pomijam, czy Schelling znał ten traktat bezpośrednio, czy oddziaływał on na niego za pośrednictwem późniejszej mistyki. 283Byt i nicość w myśli Mistrza Eckharta. Początki niemieckiej filozofii woli ECKHART, Mistrz (2006): Prolog do Dzieła Tez. Przeł. Piotr Augustyniak. Logos i Ethos 20, 3–11. PIÓRCZYŃSKI, Józef (1997): Mistrz Eckhart. Mistyka jako filozofia. Wrocław: Fundacja na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej. PIÓRCZYŃSKI, Józef (1999): Wolność człowieka i Bóg. Studium filozofii F.W.J. Schellinga. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. NIETZSCHE, Fryderyk (2004): Pisma pozostałe. Przeł. Bogdan Baran, Kraków: Inter Esse. SCHELLING, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von (2007): Światowieki. Ułamek z roku 1815. Przeł. Wawrzyniec Rymkiewicz. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk. WELTE, Bernhard (1979): Meister Eckhart. Gedanken zu seinen Gedanken. Freiburg–Basel– –Wien: Herder.

Three Dogmas of 'If' Rani Lill Anjum Introduction In this paper I want to argue that a truth functional account of conditional statements 'if A then B' not only is inadequate, but that it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by 'if'. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements 'A' and 'B' and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. But this is not a flaw only of truth functionality and the material conditional. All approaches that try to treat conditionals as mere functions of their antecedents and consequents will end up in some sort of logical atomism where causal matters simply are reduced to the joint occurrence of A and B. What we need is a non-extensional approach to conditionals that can account for hypotheticality, potentiality, and dependency, none of which can be understood by looking to the antecedent or consequent per se. The importance of being earnest about 'if' Why bother about the logic of 'if'? Well, first of all because so much is at stake if we fail to grasp the logic of conditionals. Without an adequate understanding of 'if', we cannot account for some of the most basic matters in life, namely potentiality, hypotheticality and dependency. Unless we know what it means that something might happen, or that something would prevent or trigger something else to happen, or that something happens because of something else; how would we even be able to hope, fear, expect or regret anything? A language without conditionals cannot be the language of a world where we make predictions, choices, calculations or even explanations. A language without conditionals would be the language of a world that is nothing but a collection of unrelated particulars (events, facts, properties, or whatever). But this is not the world as we know it. Our world is all about causal relations between such particulars, whether the particulars themselves are taken to be actual, potential or purely hypothetical. In our world we need 'ifs', and we need them badly. If successful, a logic of conditionals can help us understand matters like causation, dispositions and laws. If failed, it can dissolve the very conception of conditionality. Three dogmas of conditionals What is the logic of 'if'? Although this is a matter of controversy, there is a tendency to let certain anticipations motivate and limit the scope of the debate. Instead of discussing particular positions, I want to argue against three dogmas that I find to be more of less basic in any proposed logical analyses of conditionals: 1. The dogma of truth functionality: The material conditional is an adequate representation of conditionals with respect to truth conditions, though we may need some further conditions of assertability, probability or modality. 2. The dogma of counterfactuals: The material conditional is an adequate representation of indicative conditionals, though counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals must be given a different account. 3. The dogma of functionality: A conditional's truth, probability, assertability or modality is calculable from the truth, probability, assertability or modality of its antecedent and consequent. Rani Lill Anjum: 'Three Dogmas of 'If', Enhet i Mangfold, A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds), Oslo: Unipub 2008: 5-16 2 These principles all point in the direction of an extensional logic. In the following I will try to make clear why an adequate logic of conditionals cannot be based in any of these dogmas, and that each of them will inhibit an account of the conditionality expressed by 'if'. 1. The dogma of truth functionality If conditionals have truth functional truth conditions, there seems to be no alternative to the material conditional 'A  B'. The material conditional is defined as true whenever we have one of the following combinations of truth-values for the antecedent and the consequent: (TT), (FT) or (FF). This means that a conditional would be truth functionally defined as false only when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false (TF); otherwise true: A B A  B T T F F T F T F T F T T That the truth conditions of a conditional cannot be truth functional should be clear from the fact that the truth-values of 'A' and 'B' as such cannot determine the truth-value of 'if A then B': (TT) A conditional can be true when the antecedent and the consequent are both true, as in 'If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal', or it can be false under these circumstances, as in 'If Socrates is mortal, then he is a man'. (TF) A conditional is false whenever the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, as in 'If Socrates is a man, then he is a cat'. (FT) A conditional can be true when the antecedent is false and the consequent is true, as in 'If Socrates is a cat, then he is mortal', or it can be false under these circumstances, as in 'If Socrates is a stone, then he is mortal'. (FF) A conditional can be true when the antecedent and the consequent are both false, as in 'If Socrates is a stone, then he is inanimate', or it can be false under these circumstances, as in 'If Socrates is inanimate, then he is a stone'. 1 Accordingly, the truth conditions of 'if A then B' do not seem to coincide with the truth conditions of 'A  B' in other cases than when 'A' is true and 'B' is false. So why would anyone think that the material conditional represents an adequate account of a conditional's truth conditions? Well, the thing is that there are some strong indications of a logical equivalence, or at least compatibility, between '' and 'if', namely the fact that they both allow contraposition, modus ponens and modus tollens: 1. Contraposition If A then B  If not-B then not-A 1 The point made here is taken from Garland, a medieval logician. Cf. Ivan Boh (1993) Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages, London, Routledge, pp. 4-5. Rani Lill Anjum: 'Three Dogmas of 'If', Enhet i Mangfold, A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds), Oslo: Unipub 2008: 5-16 3 2. Modus ponens If A then B A  B 3. Modus tollens If A then B not-B  not-A This means that for both '' and 'if' there seems to be a sufficient/necessary relation between the antecedent and consequent, with the antecedent being a sufficient condition for the consequent, and the consequent being a necessary condition for the antecedent. But not all conditionals have these logical properties. Consider for instance expressions like 'If you are hungry, there's food in the kitchen', 'If he made a mistake, it wasn't a big mistake' and 'If you want my opinion, you should divorce him'. None of these allow contraposition. For instance, if there is no food in the kitchen, this is not sufficient for you not being hungry. Conditionals that do not allow contraposition should be taken as a separate class. We can call these conditionals rhetorical. In these conditionals, 'if' does not express a sufficient/necessary relation between antecedent and consequent, but is used either to doubt the antecedent or assert the consequent in various ways. Conversely, whenever a conditional expression allows both modus ponens and modus tollens, it also allows contraposition. In those cases 'if' expresses a sufficient/necessary relation between the antecedent and the consequent. This characterizes the set of what are called ordinary conditionals. The ordinary conditionals are of two kinds, (i) The ones expressing causal relations ('If I drop this pen, it will fall', 'If the interest rises, the property market slows down') and (ii) the ones expressing categorical facts of classification ('If Socrates is a man, he is mortal', 'If n is an even number, it is divisible on 2'). We thus have a case where ordinary and material conditionals have some basic logical properties in common, allowing modus ponens, modus tollens and contraposition. This is usually taken as an indication of the exactness of the material conditional as an interpretation of 'if'. But this is to jump to conclusions. Consider for instance the fact that the following inferences are equally valid for the material conditional, though not for ordinary conditionals: A B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A B  A  B From this we would not be tempted to conclude that the material conditional gives us the logical properties of 'if'. The reason why the material conditional seems to grasp the logical properties of ordinary conditionals is that the material conditional is parasitic on ordinary conditionals: It gets its meaning and plausibility entirely from the use of 'if'. We keep forgetting that the material conditional is nothing but a function, allowing the pairs of truthvalues (TT), (FT), (FF) for any ordered pair of arbitrary chosen statements (AB). So unless we read ordinary conditional properties into the material conditional, we would not be able to make any sense out of saying things like: 'If the antecedent is true, then the consequent must be true as well' or 'If the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be Rani Lill Anjum: 'Three Dogmas of 'If', Enhet i Mangfold, A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds), Oslo: Unipub 2008: 5-16 4 true'. And how would we then be able to explain the validity of modus ponens and modus tollens in a meaningful way? In fact, the only reason why the material conditional seems to be intuitively well defined via modus ponens and modus tollens is that the conditional is already assumed in the premises. And then of course we would never interpret 'if' as material, meaning only (TT), (FT), (FF). All this indicates that modus ponens, modus tollens and contraposition are not first of all properties of the material conditional. Instead, these are actually properties of ordinary conditionals that, if completely handed over to material conditional treatment, would be reduced to meaning absolutely nothing but a certain combination of truth-values. 2. The dogma of counterfactuals The case of counterfactuals is generally considered as representing the main problem for a truth functional account of conditionals, namely that if the antecedent 'A' is false, the conditional 'If A then B' is defined as true (and so is 'If A then not-B'). And this is of course a problem if we want a logic that preserves the truth conditions of 'if'. But the problem with counterfactuals actually points to the general problem of truth functionality, and not particularly to a problem related to the nature of conditionals with false antecedents. Note that the following inferences are valid according to the truth functional definition of conditionals, though none of they hold if '' is replaced by 'if': 1. (A & B)  ((A  B) & (B  A)) 2. (A & B)  ((A  B) & (B  A)) 3. B  ((A  B) & (A  B)) 4. A  ((A  B) & (A  B) Then why should the case of (4) be taken as exceptional and more in need of a solution than (1), (2) or (3)? Getting a true conditional from a true consequent or from any pair of true (or false) statements seem equally problematic as getting a true conditional from a false antecedent. In fact, what all this points to is that the truth functional approach to conditionals is an inadequate and reductive one that in the end leads to a triviality of conditional relations. 2 By treating all conditionals containing a false antecedent (typically referred to as counterfactuals or subjunctives) as being special cases with different logical properties from the remaining class of conditionals (typically called factual or indicative conditionals), one expects to be able to preserve the truth functional interpretation of at least indicative conditionals. The problem is that truth functionality fails in accounting for the truth conditions of conditionals in general, and not only for counterfactuals. To introduce an alternative approach to conditionals with false antecedents is therefore a dead-end that obscures the nature of conditionals rather than clarifying it. A conditional is neither factual nor counterfactual in the traditional sense, according to the truth or falsity of the antecedent. If I am wondering if it's true that I will get sick if I drink a whole bottle of whisky, then it is completely irrelevant to ask myself whether or not I am actually going to drink it. The conditions under which the conditional is true will not change just because I decide not to drink the whisky. To treat counterfactuals as special cases hence misses the 2 See also the triviality proofs of Robert Brandom (1981): 'Semantic Paradox of Material Implication', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22, April, pp. 129-132, and David Lewis (1976): 'Probability of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities' (I & II), reprinted in F. Jackson (ed.): Conditionals, 1991, pp. 76-101 & 102-110. Rani Lill Anjum: 'Three Dogmas of 'If', Enhet i Mangfold, A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds), Oslo: Unipub 2008: 5-16 5 point that the truth or falsity of 'A' and 'B' as such is not sufficient for asserting a conditional relation between them. Now Adams' detection of the difference in truth conditions for 'If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, then someone else did it' and 'If Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, then someone else would have' seems to have motivated the general expectation of a logically relevant distinction between indicatives and counterfactuals. Since we would accept the first conditional but not necessarily the second, they do seem to call for a different treatment. But again, this is not because of some problem of counterfactuals. Rather, it is related to the distinction between indicatives and subjunctives. Note that the factual/counterfactual distinction is about the truth or falsity (or for other logical systems, possibility, probability, or assertability) of the antecedent, while the indicative/subjunctive distinction concerns the grammatical mood of the conditional expression. Whether or not the antecedent is false, that is, whether or not we are dealing with a counterfactual, is not revealed by surface syntax or grammar. 3 Instead of saying that all conditionals of the subjunctive mood are counterfactual, therefore, maybe one could say that the subjunctive mood indicates a higher degree of hypotheticality than the indicative mood. A property usually associated with subjunctivity, namely hypotheticality, seems to be an essential part of all ordinary conditionals (that is, those conditionals that are used to express a sufficient/necessary relation between antecedent and consequent). As long as the background conditions remain unchanged, ordinary conditionals can appear with various degrees of hypotheticality without a change in truth conditions. This means that a conditional's truthvalue is not affected simply by changing mood from the indicative to the subjunctive. For instance, the same conditional relation is expressed in 'If I drink a bottle of whisky, I'll get sick', 'If I were to drink a bottle of whisky, I would get sick' and 'If I had drunk a bottle of whisky, I would have gotten sick'. They should therefore not be treated as logically different. Let's go back to Adams' pair of conditionals. The divergence in truth conditions between the two conditionals is not due to a logically relevant distinction between factuals and counterfactuals, nor between indicatives and subjunctives, but to a change of background conditions. In the first conditional, it is assumed that Kennedy was killed. Then of course he must have been killed by Oswald or someone else. In the second conditional we are asked to disregard this fact and imagine what would have followed if Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy. Another change of background conditions is that while the first conditional does not express anything about whether it actually was Oswald who killed Kennedy, the second seems to have such an implication. Now many of the alternative proposals for a logic of 'if' seem to be motivated by problems related to counterfactuals. So even though the material conditional is not regarded as a perfect, adequate, or as an exhaustive interpretation of 'if', it might still express the truth conditions of indicative conditionals. Counterfactuals will on this view need a separate account. If the material conditional is thought to account for the truth conditions of indicative conditionals, then, we would need some further conditions of assertability, probability or modality to account for counterfactuals. I have tried to show that, if the move from the indicative to the subjunctive mood does not represent a change in truth conditions for the conditional, a separate logical treatment of counterfactuals is not even called for. 3 See for instance Bernard Comrie (1986): 'Conditionals: A typology', in Ferguson C.A., A. Meulen, J.S. Reilly, E. Traugott (eds.): On Conditionals, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 77-99, and David K. Johnston (1996): 'The Paradox of Indicative Conditionals', Philosophical Studies 83, 1996, pp. 93-112. Rani Lill Anjum: 'Three Dogmas of 'If', Enhet i Mangfold, A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds), Oslo: Unipub 2008: 5-16 6 3. The dogma of functionality Regardless of whether the distinction between indicatives and subjunctives (or factuals and counterfactuals) is taken as logically significant, there seems to be general agreement that the truth, probability, assertability or modality of 'If A then B' is in some way calculable from the truth, probability, assertability or modality of 'A' and 'B'. But this will in general take us no further than the material conditional. For instance, the attempt to improve the material conditional by bringing in modality seems to amount to nothing more than replacing truth with necessity. One would still get a problem with counterfactuals, saying that 'not-A' being necessary would imply 'If A then B' being necessary. One would also get that a necessary 'B' implies a necessary conditional 'If A then B'. Another option is to replace truth with probability, saying that the probability of 'B given A' is equal to the probability of 'A & B' divided on the probability of 'A'. This is Adams' thesis for conditional probability: 4 AT Pr(If A then B) = Pr(B/A) = Pr(AB)/Pr(A) Although AT avoids a problem associated with counterfactuals, namely that a conditional gets a high probability on no other grounds than the antecedent having low probability, it still inherits some problems faced by the material conditional: i) If the probability of 'A' is zero, the probability of 'B given A' will also be zero, and: ii) If the probability of 'B' is 1, the probability of 'B given A' will also be 1. But in addition to i) and ii), that at least must be admitted to be closely related to problems with the material conditional, AT faces a third and distinct problem: iii) If 'A' and 'B' are probabilistically independent, we will get that Pr(B/A) = Pr(B). What i), ii) and iii) point to is that Adams' thesis is a purely compositional interpretation of conditionals, treating them as products of the probabilities of 'A', 'B' and 'A & B'. There are lots of other theories of conditionals as well, but no one that treats conditionals as primitive. Actually, there seems to be a general reluctance against recognizing the actual cause of the problems related to truth functionality: To treat conditionals as mere functions of their antecedent and consequent will necessarily involve dissolution of the conditional relation between the antecedent and consequent; the hypotheticality, potentiality and dependency that 'if' is supposed to express. And why even consider 'A', 'B' or 'A & B' when the conditional 'If A then B' is in question? When someone says 'If you fall down from that cliff, you'll die', the question about whether or not I will fall is completely irrelevant for the conditional. Our interest is in the causal relation, and in what enables us to establish, predict, and explain such a relation. So if a logical system allows us to infer a conditional relation 'If A then B' from the truth, probability, assertability, possibility or necessity of 'A' and 'B', we seem to have fallen victim of the logical mistake pointed out by Hume. According to Hume, the joint occurrence (or even constant conjunction) of two events A and B is not per se sufficient for inferring a relation between them: We can observe that A and B occur, and we can observe that A occurs before B. We can even observe some contact between A and B. But none of these observations are in themselves ample grounds for inferring that A is a cause of B, or that there is any connection between them whatsoever. Allowing 'if A then B', 'if B then A', 'if not-A 4 Ernest W. Adams (1975): The Logic of Conditionals: An application of probability to deductive logic, Dordrecht, Reidel. Rani Lill Anjum: 'Three Dogmas of 'If', Enhet i Mangfold, A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds), Oslo: Unipub 2008: 5-16 7 then not-B' and 'if not-B then not-A' to follow from any pair of true statements 'A' and 'B', the material conditional seems to permit inferences that even Hume wouldn't think of warning us against. So how can a conditional relation 'If A then B' be inferred from the joint occurrence of two particulars A and B? Or even worse, how can it be inferred from the joint occurrence of two truth-values (TT)? Isn't it commonly accepted that it is a logical mistake to verify a hypothesis, but not to falsify it, based on single observations? When a logical system allows us to verify all hypotheses that are not falsified, we are left with an epistemological mismatch between when we are justified in affirming a conditional and when we are justified in affirming a scientific hypotheses. One way to explain away this seemingly inconsistency between logic and philosophy of science would be to say that logical truth does not, and is not meant to have, epistemological or metaphysical bearing. Logic is just a consistent system that spells out analytic truths. It isn't concerned with how the world actually is, or with how we get knowledge about the world. And such an answer certainly takes the edge off my criticism. But it also makes logic irrelevant for a philosophical analysis of 'if'. And maybe that is all to the best. A system that can deal only with factuality and counterfactuality, indicating the occurrence or nonoccurrence of some particulars A and B, will necessarily prevent us from ever getting down to the very nature of causal matters. Seeking a way to calculate the truth, probability or modality of a conditional from the truth, probability or modality of the antecedent or consequent, all the main logics of conditionals turn out to be extensional and reductionist. Hence they are unsuitable for dealing with hypothetical matters such as potentiality, dispositions, predictions and causation. In short, they cannot deal with ifs. So although a logical system originally was intended as a scientific tool, free from metaphysical presuppositions, the three dogmas of 'if' seem to give rise to a very specific metaphysics, namely one in which the world is a collection of unrelated particulars. Thus truth functional or any extensional logic actually presupposes a philosophical position very similar to logical atomism. Ten lessons about 'if' So what is the alternative for a logic of 'if'? Are there any positive results in all this criticism? Can we even have a logic of conditionals, or should we give up on the whole project? These are the questions I usually get. And of course it is much easier to tear down than it is to build up. But in all my criticism, there are also some positive lessons to be learned, I think. In an attempt to sum up this paper, I offer ten: 1. A conditional is not a truth function, but a form of statement in our language, used to assert a certain relation in the world. A truth function (of two variables) is nothing but an assignment of a truth-value to each combination of truth-values for any ordered pair (AB). 2. A conditional is not factual or counterfactual, but hypothetical. 3. A conditional does not change truth conditions from the indicative to the subjunctive mood, unless there is a change in background conditions. Rani Lill Anjum: 'Three Dogmas of 'If', Enhet i Mangfold, A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds), Oslo: Unipub 2008: 5-16 8 4. A conditional does not only have one fixed set of logical properties; it is an expression that can be used in various ways for various rhetorical purposes. There is thus not one single logic of conditionals, but several. 5. A conditional that allows contraposition will always allow both modus ponens and modus tollens, hence it will be an ordinary conditional where the antecedent is taken as a sufficient condition for the consequent and the consequent is taken as a necessary condition for the antecedent. 6. A conditional that does not allow contraposition will only allow either modus ponens or modus tollens, hence it will be a rhetorical conditional, generally used to doubt the antecedent or assert the consequent in various ways. 7. A conditional cannot be accounted for by a purely extensional logic, but we must always first look at the content of the conditional expression and interpret what kind of logical relation is asserted. 8. A conditional cannot be inferred from the truth, probability, assertability, possibility or necessity of its antecedent or consequent, but must be justified and explained in the same way that we justify and explain our scientific or other hypotheses: outside the immediate context of the antecedent and consequent of the conditional itself. (The causal relation between me dropping a pen and it falling cannot be found by testing and affirming the dropping and falling by some constant conjunction. What we must do is to look to external and underlying causes, like gravitation, mass, friction, and what have you.) 9. A conditional is not a function of its antecedent and consequent, but must be taken as conceptually basic, irreducible and primitive. 10. That a system of logic is consistent doesn't mean that it can tell us anything about how we reason or ought to reason. Expecting an extensional logic to teach us something about conditionals is like expecting sudoku to teach us something about mathematics.

ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 602 Discussions on Pagan Theology in the Academia and in the Pagan Community Stanislav Panin Lecturer, D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology of Russia, Moscow, Russia Email: [email protected] Doi:10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n3s1p602 Abstract A concept of Pagan Theology has been producing a number of discussions throughout the last decade and particularly in the last few years both inside and outside Pagan community. In this paper, the author analyzes three aspects of the phenomenon of Pagan Theology and discussions emerged around it. The first aspect is the genesis of the idea of Pagan Theology. It includes an examination of academic and religious roots of this research programme. The second aspect is a view on Pagan Theology from the perspective of the academia. While for some scholars Pagan Theology appears to be a legitimate field of study and/or research programme in Pagan Studies, others describe it is an attempt of Pagan intervention in the academia. Finally, the third aspect is a discussion on Pagan Theology emerged among Pagans, whose reflections of this topic are very ambiguous too. In spite of this fact, the author concludes that the idea of Pagan Theology was a necessary stage of development, both in the conceptualization of contemporary Paganism itself and in Pagan Studies at the same time. Keywords: Pagan Theology, Pagan Studies, Paganism Introduction 1. A concept of Pagan Theology that denotes studies aimed to find and describe the main features of Paganism as a whole is a highly controversial research programme in Pagan Studies, which took its shape in the beginning of the millennium. Debates around this concept are, from my point of view, very important for scholars of new religions and esotericism, because these debates can show us different ways to understand Religious and Esoteric Studies per se as well as show us a number of issues in these fields. They also help us to understand deeper the plurality of opinions existing among Pagans themselves in understanding of what Paganism is and what should be the future of its relations with the academia and with Western rationality in general. Literature Review 2. A concept of "Pagan Theology" is usually associated with Michael York's book Pagan Theology: Paganism as a World Religion (York, 2003). In the book, the author tries to describe some aspects of Weltanschauung and behavior that, as he believes, defines the common ground for all Pagan movements. C. Kraemer used and developed the idea in her book Seeking the Mystery: An Introduction to Pagan Theologies (Kraemer, 2012). Its title with plural form "Theologies" instead of "Theology" shows the accent on plurality and undogmatic essence of Pagan traditions. In contrast with York's book, Seeking the Mystery is a book addressed not to researchers, but rather to insiders participating in courses dedicated to Pagan Theology. The book definitely indicates a transformation of York's research programme into a specific discipline that is in many senses beyond the domain of Religious Studies. On the other hand, the book includes extremely valuable emic materials for further studies of Paganism and an interesting attempt of summarization of Pagan beliefs that can be useful for scholars in their studies of Paganism. The concept of Pagan Theology was in a scope of a number of discussions throughout the last decade and particularly in the last few years both inside and outside the Pagan community. In 2012 and 2013 a related discussion of Pagan Studies emerged with a critical publication of M. Davidsen in Method and Theory in the Study of Religion (Davidsen, 2012) followed by answers published in Pomegranate by E. D. White (2012) and M. York (2013). The discussion had a wide resonance and moved from the pages of academic publications into the Internet. Particularly, M. Harrington, whose works were criticized in Davidsen's article, answered him on her page at academia.edu. The topic was also in a scope of discussions on several academic conferences, for example, during a Conference on Current Pagan Studies 2013 in Claremont (Pitzl-Waters, 2013). ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 603 Analysis 3. In this paper, I will try to focus on three important aspects in discussions related to Pagan Theology which are the roots of Pagan Theology and the reactions of the academia and of Pagans on this phenomenon. 3.1 The roots of the Pagan Theology I believe that the birth of the Pagan Theology is reflecting the development of Pagan community itself, or the development of contemporary Paganism as a religion. All religions in their development go through similar states. Almost every religion emerges as a small, esoteric community with a charismatic leader (or leaders), who has a direct mystical experience, and a group of his or her followers. In very ancient times, such a function could belong to a shaman or to the chieftain of a tribe. However, it was the same for Buddhism or for Christianity as well as it is for contemporary Wicca created by a group leading by G. Gardner and, for some measure, by D. Valiente. If a doctrine then becomes popular, it gets more and more followers, and so an esoteric group gives a birth to a new religion. A religion with quite a number of followers and almost no institutional pressure can be undogmatic one, because there is nobody to control what people believe in and how they behave. In such a situation, a wide diversity of currents emerges, like in the early Christianity, for example. It is a good, fertile time; however, it leads to a crisis of identity when people simply cannot understand what does it means to be a follower of this religion. An explanation needed, be it common rituals, common myth or common beliefs. On the other hand, some people involved in this religion, those of the intellectual type, tries to rationalize it. This gives a birth to theology that can be theology of different types: philosophical theology of the Ancient Greek authors is prominently different from Christian or Muslim theology, but both of them are attempts of rationalization of religious beliefs. A level of dogmatism can differs from religion to religion, from country to country, from age to age. For example, Ancient Greeks who were rather liberal about religious beliefs still thought that every member of their community should believe in gods and participate in religious rituals, whereas how exactly did he or she believe in gods was his or her own duty. Nevertheless, when Socrates was condemned to death accusations against him included an invention of new gods, while Anaxagoras leaved Athens because of accusation in atheism for his philosophical ideas. Thus, we can say that, although the Greeks were generally rather liberal about religion, there were some questions where you could not ignore common beliefs, and so there was a type of Ancient Greek "credo". In any case, every religion that reached an advanced stage of development gives birth for a type of theology which can be more dogmatic or less dogmatic in accordance with the frame of mind of the time and of the territory where it appeared. Paganism is not an exclusion, so one can ask if its amorphous form that we see today really an essential feature of Pagan Weltanschauung or just an attribute of its current state of development. Besides internal reasons described above, there was an important external, social reason for the emergence of Pagan Theology. We know that theologies of "traditional" religions, first of all, Christian Theology is a part European and American education system for centuries as well as Philosophy of Religion with its attempts to create a rational foundation for religion (for example, in the works of British philosopher R. Swinburne). This creates an important precedent: if one kind of theology, say Christian Theology, regarded as academic discipline why should not others be regarded the same way? Therefore, we can say with no doubts that the very fact of the existence of Christian Theology itself has given birth to the idea of Pagan Theology. Another social reason supports it: a need in "religious specialists", like priests, who will perform different religious ceremonies and pastoral services and will have a verified qualification to perform it. Nobody wants to be fooled and misguided by a person who know nothing about his or her religion but pretend to be a priest. Therefore, we usually want to be sure that the person we talk to has qualification needed, and proper education is a good indicator of it. Because of these reasons, a Pagan Theology is not only a research programme in Religious/Pagan Studies but it also tends to institutionalize itself as an independent discipline. For now, I have described Pagan Theology as a phenomenon which belongs mostly to the Pagan community, but Pagan Theology has emerged not only from it, but also from the academia. Pagan Theology has emerged in Britain and in the USA and it is by no means a matter of chance. Academic roots of Pagan Theology belong to the Anglo-American tradition of scholarship in Religious and Esoteric Studies, where an influence of "religionism" of Eranos transmitted through M. Eliade and phenomenology of religion brought in the USA by J. Wach has very prominent significance. The former aimed at "exploring historical sources in search of what is eternal and universal" (Hanegraaff, 2012). The latter tried to "perceive religion on its own terms, or essence", "use a comparative approach to reveal what is essential in religion", "maintaining a proper understanding or empathy of religion to prevent a reduction of religion to another plane of formed a group known as the Chicago school of Religious Studies influenced American scholarship in the field of explanation" (Phenomenology of Religion, 2006). Eliade and Wach together with philosopher and theologian P. Tillich ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 604 Religious and Esoteric Studies very prominently. The main idea of these scholars was to describe the universal elements that are essential for every religion, the idea that obviously influenced the Pagan Theology looking for such common elements in different pagan traditions. Therefore, it can be regarded as a particular incarnation of this research programme. On the other hand, the History of Ideas was another force that prominently influenced Anglo-American scholarship in the field. The creation of the History of Ideas is usually associated with A. O. Lovejoy, but the concept of the History of Ideas has also the prominent resemblance with ideas of German philosopher E. Cassirer who worked in the USA in 1941 – 1945. In the study of esotericism, L. Thorndike adopted this approach and then famous British scholar F. Yates, who was influenced by Thorndike's works (Yates, 1964). Thorndike wrote about magic: "Some may think it strange that I associate magic so closely with the history of thought <...> The exact meaning of the word, "magic," was a matter of much uncertainty even in classical and medieval times, as we shall see. There can be no doubt, however, that it was then applied not merely to an operative art, but also to a mass of ideas or doctrine, and that it represented a way of looking at the world" (Thorndike, 1923). If we replace here the word "magic" with the word "Paganism", we can easily understand that the approach used by York derives from this tradition. William James' ideas in Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion were one more important component of Anglo-American tradition in Religious and Esoteric Studies. His works brought an accent on religious experience and critical attitude towards to classical empiricism and evidentialism in the field. Therefore, we can see how the concept reflects American and British realities, including those related to specifics of Anglo-American scholarship in Religious and Esoteric Studies. On the other hand, Pagan Theology does not belong only to these countries. Both Pagans and scholars from other countries demonstrate an interest in this concept. At least, after publication of my first paper dedicated to this topic, I have received its appreciation from different countries marking the topic as interesting and important. We can also see very similar tendencies related to conceptualization of Pagan Theology in other countries, for example, in Russia, where this term is usually associated with Russian Pagan current named "Rodnoverie" ( ). If you try to search "Pagan Theology" in Russian on the Internet, you will find a number of entries written by Russian Pagans. The term itself came into Russian Paganism not from the Western sources, but rather from the works of famous Soviet scholar B. A. Rybakov who used it to describe the religious ideas of ancient Slavs, particularly when we writes about Zbruch Idol (Rybakov, 1980) and about Pagan priests (Rybakov, 1987). Rybakov is a very popular author among Russian Pagans and his influence was as prominent as those of M. Murray on G. Gardner. That is why we cannot be surprised when we find out that the concept of Pagan Theology can find a fertile ground in Russia. While Rybakov wrote mostly about ancient Russian Paganism and used this term to describe rather a type of ancient Weltanschauung than a particular research programme or discipline, contemporary Pagans in Russia use the term to describe Pagan beliefs in general and rationalization of these beliefs. On Russian Pagan site "Bujan", for instance, there is an article entitled Questions and Answers about Paganism, where we can read a statement that "Paganism is a world religion" (Questions and Answers, 2012). I believe that the authors of the article have not ever read the York's book, at least they do not mention it in their articles, but their statement is the same as in the title of the book. That shows us the process of creation of Pagan Theology is not only an American or British phenomenon, but also a phenomenon that belongs to contemporary Paganism in general. 3.2 Academic and Pagan reception The second problem we are moving to now is a view on Pagan Theology from the perspective of the academia. While for some scholars Pagan Theology appears to be a legitimate concept, for others it is an attempt of some Pagans to act in the academia according to their personal interests instead of achieving academic goals and that such a behavior is dangerous for the academia. Almost any criticism of Pagan Theology including those of Davidsen is resting on two beliefs: first, that those who criticize knows exactly what is it to be "academic" (or even "scientific") in the study of religion, and second, that his or her Weltanschauung produces perfectly adequate and neutral image of the object studied. As far as in European Religious Studies scientism, empiricism and historicism were three forces which won the battle of research programmes, the most of the authors assume that this perspective and this methodology is the best, the perfect, clean and untouched by any distortion brought only by insider's perspective. It is regarded as given and obvious fact that "an objective study of religion" should be based on "critical-naturalist program" as Davidsen put it or "empiricism" in terms of W. Hanegraaff. So, every critical review or article on the topic is based on the same arguments: any research is compared with the "ideal type" of empirical/naturalistic/scientific research. If it does not fit in this standard, such research is usually stigmatized as "religionism" or "latent esotericism" and a reviewer can proudly say that he or she has done his or her job. On the other hand, those who try to protect Pagan Studies from unjust criticism usually share these believes too. Their answers are ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 605 targeted to show that Pagan Studies complies with these standards of scientism, empiricism and historicism and do not analyze methodological assumptions at the heart of the criticism. Instead, they are playing in an empiricist's game on the empiricist's field with empiricist's rules and concentrating around particular mistakes in critical articles. However, why should one really be bothered if some research is not created in accordance with the ideal type chosen by a group of scholars? As far as Davidsen begins his essay with a statement that religionism was criticized as "ideology" "resting on theological or esoteric suppositions" (Davidsen, 2012), one can say the same about "naturalism" or "scientism" that was widely and soundly criticized as a form of dogmatism in number of publications from those of P. Feyerabend to recent anthology Scientism: the New Orthodoxy (Williams, Robinson, 2015). Speaking about Religious or Esoteric Studies it is much more important, at least for me, if a research can bring new perspectives and deeper understanding of the subject or not. I do not interested if it fits in some artificial standards, artificial "ideal types" of academic activity. I believe that in the academia many approaches to the same problem can and should coexist at the same time. These approaches can fight with each other, can criticize each other, but only together they will bring us new perspectives and more holistic view on the subject. The concurrence of different research programmes for me is a very important indicator of healthy situation in the academia. The problem begins when one programme wins and achieve almost unlimited power through institutional control. Winners can impose their approach to other scholars and try to monopolize the field which is an example of monopolism and a kind of totalitarian regime not in economics or politics but in the academia. One can ask is it appropriate not only from the point of view of the academia, but also from the point of view of democratic principles grounding the Western society in general. Thus, I do not believe that academic studies is a line of "paradigms" where better one comes after worse repeatedly and where only one point of view can exist. For me it is rather a field of battle between different research programmes in the sense of Imre Lakatos, programmes with different perspectives and different theoretical foundations. If we look from this perspective, we should agree that empiricist perspective is rather new research programme that is not the only option in Religious Studies either historically or geographically. If we look at the Pagan Theology from this point of view, we can agree that Pagan Theology is an interesting research programme targeted to find, describe and systematize beliefs that a common for Pagans from different ages and countries. Whether this programme will succeed or not, I do not know, but we obviously can give it a chance and see what will happen. Even if it fails, we will get some new ideas, information and inspiration that maybe helps us to improve our understanding of Paganism. However, not only academic but also insider's reflections on this topic are very ambiguous. While some Pagans welcome this concept as a new view on Paganism and an important step in the development of the Pagan community, others are very critical about it, describing it as dogmatic, overgeneralizing and ecumenist approach that is not suitable for Paganism. This discussion reflects the difference in the understanding of Paganism itself that exists among Pagans. Some Pagans are inspired with the idea of bringing some rational elements and critical thinking into their Pagan activities. These Pagans are often academically trained people who think that their historical, psychological or philosophical knowledge can help them to be better Pagans. On the other hand, there is another type of Pagans. These Pagans stress the role of feelings, of direct experience and intuition in Pagan activities. This type of Pagans describes a systematization of teaching as a limitation of their creativity. Even the most liberal Pagans need to describe what Paganism is and therefore they need to choose some important aspects of Paganism and concentrate on them. Therefore, they do exactly the same thing as M. York and just do not call it Pagan Theology. For example, some authors can write about Pagan philosophy when they describe common aspects of Pagan mentality (Sythove, 2010), and it looks fairly similar to Yorks's idea of Pagan Theology. Such projects can be more or less inclusive and imply more or less generalized image of Paganism. York, for instance, uses a very broad definition of Paganism and describes it as a religion where "the two-way relationship that any person or community has with the physical world, with other humans or conscious beings, and/or with the supernatural, or magical dimensions of reality are to be conceived as a sacred, holy, or holistic relationship" (York, 2003). York contrasts Paganism with "Gnosticism" that is another "ideal type" of Theology in York's book. An opposition here is related to an attitude towards to the natural reality: while "Gnostic" religions describes it as an illusion, Paganism is concentrated on the importance of both natural and supernatural realms as well as their interactions. Although this idea is rather interesting and can provoke discussions about an influence of Pagan ideas on different types of Weltanschauung, including Christianity and Atheism, such a broad definition was criticized both by a number of Pagans and by a number of scholars as an overgeneralization. However, it does not mean that its critics believe that we entirely cannot analyze and describe the common aspects of Pagan behavior, and discussions here are generally about the terms that are in use. For many Pagans, the word "Theology" has strong connotations with Christianity and religious dogmatism. Nevertheless, if there were no common beliefs shared by all Pagans, we could not talk about "Paganism" at ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 606 all. Any definition requires a set of attributes. When it comes to a Weltanschauung, these attributes usually related to common beliefs and/or common behavior. A selection of these attributes, their description and systematization is what M. York calls Pagan Theology. Therefore, if we believe that "Paganism" really exists and that this term is not a useless overgeneralization, we should agree that Pagan Theology in terms of York is a possible project. Otherwise, we should, first of all, abandon the term itself as well as the idea of Pagan Studies. Conclusion 4. Keeping all that was said above in mind, I believe that the emergence of Pagan Theology is not a matter of chance, but a necessary stage of development, both in the conceptualization of contemporary Paganism itself and in Pagan Studies at the same time. An emergence of Pagan Theology reflects tendencies that one have been observing in these groups for years and that is why we cannot describe it as artificial phenomenon. It looks like Pagan Theology as a specific research programme has emerged in Great Britain and in the USA, and not without reasons. However, nowadays this concept achieves more popularity in other countries too, and I believe that it is reflecting the contemporary situation in the development of Paganism. From the point of view of the academia, Pagan Theology can be described in three ways: as a research programme in Religious or Pagan Studies, as an independent field like Christian Theology and as a profession that can be a subject of professional training in educational institutions. References Davidsen M. A. (2012). What is Wrong with Pagan Studies? Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 24: 183-199. Hanegraaff W. J. (2012) Western Esotericism: The Next Generation. Mystic and Esoteric Movements in Theory and Practice. History and Discourse: Historical and Philosophical Aspects of the Study of Esotericism and Mysticism. St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Academy for Humanities. Pp. 113-129. Kraemer C. H. (2012). Seeking the Mystery: An Introduction to Pagan Theologies. Englewood: Patheos Press. Pitzl-Waters J. (2013) Pagans Studied: The 2013 Conference on Current Pagan Studies. [Online] Availble: http://wildhunt.org/tag/paganstudies-conference (February 22, 2015). Phenomenology of Religion (2006). Britannica Encyclopedia of World Religions. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. P. 916. Questions and Answers (2012). Questions and Answers about Paganism (in Russian). [Online] Availble: http://bujan.ru/molva/st2.html (February 22, 2015). Rybakov B. A. (1980). Paganism of Ancient Slavs (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Rybakov B. A. (1987). Paganism of Ancient Rus' (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Sythove M. (2010). Beyond the Broomstick. Whyte Track. Thorndike L. (1923). A History of Magic and Experimental Science. Vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press. White E. D. (2012). In Defense of Pagan Studies: a Response to Davidsen's Critique. Pomegranate: The International Journal of Pagan Studies, 14(1): 5-21. Williams R. N., Robinson D. N., eds. (2015) Scientism: the New Orthodoxy. London: Bloomsbury. Yates F. A. (1964). Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. York M. (2013). An Intersubjective Critique of A Critique of Pagan Scholarship. Pomegranate: The International Journal of Pagan Studies, 15(1-2): 136-150. York M. (2003). Pagan Theology: Paganism as a World Religion. New York: New York University Press.

Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. CONTENT RECARVING AS SUBJECT MATTER RESTRICTION _________ VINCENZO CICCARELLI https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8996-9170 University of Campinas Department of Philosophy Rua Cora Coralina, 100, Cidade Universitária Campinas, SP, 13083-869 Brazil [email protected] Article info CDD: 193 Received: 14.05.2018; Revised: 12.12.2018; Accepted: 02.01.2019 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2019.V42N1.VC Keywords Abstraction principles Content recurving Subject matter Abstract: In this article I offer an explicating interpretation of the procedure of content recarving as described by Frege in §64 of the Foundations of Arithmetic. I argue that the procedure of content recarving may be interpreted as an operation that while restricting the subject matter of a sentence, performs a generalization on what the sentence says about its subject matter. The characterization of the recarving operation is given in the setting of Yablo's theory of subject matter and it is based on the relation of determination between properties. The main advantage of the proposal is its generality, for it is applicable not just to the case of abstraction principles. Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 2 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. 1. INTRODUCTION In section 64 of the Foundations of Arithmetic (Frege, 1950), Frege writes: The judgment 'line a is parallel to line b' [...] may be taken as an identity. If we do this, we obtain the concept of direction and say: 'the direction of line a is identical with the direction of line b'. Thus we replace the symbol ǁ by the more generic symbol =, through removing what is specific in the content of the former and dividing it between a and b. We carve up the content in a way different from the original way and this yields us a new concept. This passage is of no secondary importance: it may be read as the justification for the fact that a statement asserting that a certain equivalence relation holds may be taken as an identity. A family of definitions may be seen as logically grounded in the procedure described in the quoted passage; using a terminology that probably Frege would not have endorsed, they have been labeled abstraction principles. One of the most interesting cases of abstraction principle is the implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number, also known as Hume's Principle; it states that the sentence 'there is a one-to-one correspondence between all instances of the concept F and those of the concept G' may be taken as the identity 'the cardinal number of the concept F is identical to the cardinal number of the concept G'. To highlight the similarity between the case of cardinal numbers and that of directions, note that the open sentence 'there is a one-toone correspondence between all instances of the concept X and those of the concept Y ' defines a higher-order Vincenzo Ciccarelli 3 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. equivalence relation that, for sake of brevity, we will call equinumerousity. It has to be admitted: the passage in §64 is partially obscure. It is unclear what should be taken as the content of the symbol '∥ '; moreover, it is even less clear how to intend the operation of removing what is specific in the content of this symbol and dividing it between a and b. The first step toward a satisfactory interpretation of the quoted passage is to make explicit the aspects of Frege's procedure that are immediately understandable. Frege is implying that there may be different ways of carving up the same content, i.e. that the same content may be "organized" in different ways. Moreover, Frege is implying a special relation between (all?) carvings of the same content: the relation that holds whenever one carving is obtained by performing a certain re-conceptualization of another. The operation of removing part of the content of the relation of parallelism and distributing it between its relata may be seen as an example of the operation that converts a carving into another. I call this kind of operation content recarving. It is worth emphasizing that content recarving has been defined as a class of operations, i.e. the class including all operations that convert a carving into another; thus I am open to the possibility of there being procedures of recarving a content different from that described by Frege. Note that Frege is by no means implying that all carvings of the same content must be one the recarving of the other1. According to these remarks, a satisfactory analysis of Frege's procedure must make sense of the notion of 1 The view that two sentences may be different carvings of the same content while not being one the recarving of the other is defended Yablo (2014) while considered as "incomprehensible" by Potter and Smiley (2001). Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 4 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. content, of the idea that the same content may be carved up in different ways, and provide a general account of the operation of content recarving. This paper aims at proposing such an analysis; my proposal consists in defining the content of a sentence φ as the proposition expressed by φ, the carving of a content as the specification of the exact subject matter of a certain sentence, and the operation of content recarving as subject matter restriction, where this restriction must be defined according to specific criteria. Roughly speaking, the fundamental idea is that given a sentence φ and its subject matter m, the operation of content recarving consists in restricting the attention to the aspect of m which is the most relevant to 'what φ says about m'. The semantic setting is the semantics of possible worlds, while the theoretical context is the account of the notion of subject matter given by Lewis (1988) and improved by Yablo (2014). The main theoretical advantages of the proposal are: 1) a general theory of content recarving that does not apply just to abstraction principles; 2) an explication of Frege's idea that, by going far beyond the level of interpretation, allows for the evaluation of the philosophical consequences of the proposal in a context wider than that of Frege's logicist project. In section 2 I will give a brief exposition of the theory of subject matter as proposed by Lewis and improved by Yablo; in section 3 I will give a rigorous definition of 'carving up a content'; in section 4 I attempt a first definition of 'content recarving' and I will present the main philosophical difficulty associated with this definition; in Vincenzo Ciccarelli 5 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. section 5 I will improve the definition of section 4 and in section 6 I will give some conclusive remarks. 2. LEWIS AND YABLO ON SUBJECT MATTER The most immediate account of the subject matter of a given sentence is given by Ryle (1933): a sentence S is about m iff S mentions m. However, this account suffers from several limitations: for instance, the sentence 'Brazil has the largest tropical forest' is about Brazil, but also about South America, even though South America is not explicitly mentioned. An improvement of Ryle's proposal is Goodman's account (Goodman, 1961): a sentence S is about m iff either m is mentioned by S or by one of S's consequences. If Ryle's account is too narrow, Goodman's improvement seems to be too wide: the sentence 'Brazil has the largest tropical forest or the Congress of Vienna started in 1814' is about the Congress of Vienna and is a consequence of 'Brazil has the largest tropical forest': thus 'Brazil has the largest tropical forest' is about the Congress of Vienna, which is evidently false. In (Lewis, 1988) a purely semantic account of subject matter is given: a subject matter is presented as some kind of "part" of a possible world. Two worlds w1 and w2 having a certain part p in common are indistinguishable whenever p is concerned, i.e. a sentence that is entirely about p cannot have different truth-values in w1 and w2 2. This remark leads 2 For sake of simplicity I speak of parts in common between possible worlds. This does not imply that the theory of subject matter presupposes world overlapping; the reader who thinks of world overlapping as untenable may replace 'w1 and w2 have a part in common' with 'there is a part of w1 that is an intrinsic duplicate of a part of w2'. Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 6 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. Lewis to make a further step: two worlds that are indistinguishable with respect to a certain part p, stand in a certain equivalence relation associated with p; call this relation ≣p ; the introduction of this relation allows for the definition of a criterion for saying whether a certain sentence S is entirely about a certain world part p or not: S is about p iff for every two worlds w1, w2, if w1 ≣p w2, then the truth-value of S in w1 is identical to the truth-value of S in w2. This account of subject matter seems to be promising; however, as Yablo noted, it works only with parts-based subject matters. For instance, it is easy to see that the sentence 'The congress of Vienna started in 1814' as a sentence about 1814, and it also is easy to see that 1814 is a temporal part of a possible world. Similarly, the sentence 'Brazil has the largest tropical forest' is about Brazil, and there are no particular difficulties in considering Brazil as part of a possible world. Yet matters stand in a more complicate way with other examples: the sentence 'There are n stars' is supposedly about the number of stars in the universe and to say that the number of stars is a part of a possible world seems to be understandable only at the cost of substantially altering the meaning of the word 'part'. As Yablo remarks, "Astronomers have not discovered a "starcounter" part of the universe, such that worlds agree in how many stars they contain if and only if the one's counter is an intrinsic duplicate of the other's "3. In other words, the number of stars is not a parts-based subject matter. Yablo's solution to the difficulty is to generalize the notion of parts-based subject matter by introducing the notion of partitions-based subject matter. What does it mean to say that a subject-matter is partitions-based? Consider the case of the number of stars; surely we have no 3 (Yablo, 2014), p. 25 Vincenzo Ciccarelli 7 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. guarantees that there is a part of possible worlds that we may point at and say that it is the number of stars. However, it is still possible to define an equivalence relation between worlds agreeing on how many stars there are. Let ≣nos be this relation; we may apply Lewis' criterion and say: a sentence S is wholly about the number of stars iff for any two worlds w1, w2, if w1 ≣nos w2, then the truth-value of S in w1 is identical to the truth-value of S in w2. Given that the number of stars seems to be a subject matter, what kind of entity is it qua subject matter? It cannot be a physical part of a world. At this point the shift from the notion of part to that of partition is crucial, for it allows for the needed generalization: the equivalence relation ≣nos divides the logical space into cells, i.e. it partitions the logical space, where each cell is composed of all possible worlds agreeing on how many stars there are. Thus we may identify the subject matter number of stars with the partitioning of the logical space defined by the equivalence relation ≣nos. Clearly, if this generalization works well enough from a logical point view, it introduces an important distinction at the ontological level: when the theory was concerned only with parts-based subject matters we had no problem in identifying a certain subject matter with a certain entity existing in some possible worlds; nonetheless, when we introduce the notion of partitionsbased subject matters, an ontological distinction is needed, for now the subject matter 1814, i.e. the partition of the logical space including all worlds agreeing on what happened in 1814, no more coincides with the temporal part 1814. The theoretical move of generalizing the notion of part by introducing that of partition has the significant advantage of providing for all cases: whenever a way of partitioning the logical space is given according to a partial indistinguishability between worlds, a subject matter also is Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 8 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. given. And given a subject matter m, Lewis' criterion for saying whether a certain sentence S is wholly about m is immediately applicable: if worlds belonging to the same mcell assign to S the same truth-value, then S is about m, otherwise it is not. In other words, S is about m iff the set of possible worlds in which S is true (false) is partitioned by m. The theory of partitions-based subject matters has another significant advantage: it allows for the definition of interesting relations between subject matters. For instance, it allows for the definition of the relation of inclusion of one subject matter into another, or, in different terms, it allows to say when a subject matter is smaller than another. Consider the case of 1814 as a subject matter: worlds agreeing on what happened in 1814 belong to the same cell. Intuitively, the subject matter XIX century includes the subject matter 1814, for the amount of information about the events occurred in the XIX century includes the information about the events that occurred on 1814; this intuition is confirmed by the theory. Indeed, worlds agreeing on what happened in the XIX century must agree on what happened on 1814 but the contrary does not hold. As a consequence, each 1814-partition must include a XIX century-partition as proper subset; generalizing this result we may say that the wider the subject matter, the finer the partitioning of the logical space. This conclusion is easily explainable: the wider the subject matter, the bigger the amount of information it conveys; the bigger the amount of conveyed information, the harder the agreement between two possible worlds ; the harder the agreement between possible worlds, the finer the partitioning of the logical space. The relation of 'larger than' or 'smaller than' applied to subject matters allows us to determine two extreme cases. Consider a sentence S; I will refer by the expression 'SVincenzo Ciccarelli 9 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. partitioning' to the way the sentence S partitions the logical space, i.e. the set of all possible worlds in which S is true and the set of possible worlds in which S is false. An extreme case is represented by the coarser subpartitioning of the S-partitioning, i.e. the S-partitioning itself (an improper subpartitioning). Call minS this subject matter: worlds agree on minS iff they agree on the truth-value of S. In other words, the subject matter minS is nothing but 'the truth-value of S' or 'whether S is true or not'. Clearly S is about 'whether S is true or not', yet at the same time it seems to say something more. This because minS is the smallest subject matter on which S is about. Another extreme case is the one in which as subpartitioning of the S-partitioning we consider the one that divides the logical space into singleton cells. In this case no two worlds belong to the same cell, i.e. the subject matter is such that it is impossible for two worlds to agree on it. We may characterize this subject matter as 'how the world is': it is the largest subject matter. Clearly, S is about 'how the world is'; yet at the same time it seems to say something less. The notion underlying these considerations is that of exact subject matter: S is exactly about m iff S is wholly concerned with m and it doesn't care about anything else. We may say that the sentence S is exactly about a certain subject matter that lies in between the largest one and smallest one. For simplicity of exposition, I say that a sentence φ is genuinely about m iff m strictly lies between the largest and the smallest subject matter. The exact subject matter of a sentence φ is one of the genuine subject matters on which φ is about. Yablo introduces the notion of ways of being true (false) to define the grade of fineness of the subpartitioning associated with the exact subject matter of a certain sentence. "Sentential subject matter should be at most as Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 10 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. fine-grained as ways of being true"4 – he writes. To clarify the notion of ways of being true, it may help to refer to one of Yablo's examples; consider the sentence: The U.S. president in 2001 is a senator's son. (φ) In the actual world wa the U.S. president in 2001 was Dubya, son of former senator George H.W. Bush; suppose that in a possible world w∗ different from wa, the U.S. president in 2001 was Al Gore, son of the former senator Albert Gore Sr. Both wa and w∗ make the sentence φ true, however there is a substantial difference between the ways in which φ obtains in the two worlds: there is a change in personnel, i.e. the U.S. president and his father are different persons. Let s be the subject matter of φ; Yablo writes: This is enough, it seems, to change the state of things where s is concerned. A transworld reporter on the φ beat could not plausibly claim that there was nothing to report – that it doesn't matter, from a subject matter of φ perspective, who plays the two key roles. A change in personnel is more newsworthy than a change in the price of cotton. It is pretty clear why. The personnel change is a change in the individuals witnessing φ's truth; a change in the witnesses affects how φ is true; and changes in how a sentence is true cannot be changes in an aspect of reality that φ is not even about. 4 (Yablo, 2014), p.41 Vincenzo Ciccarelli 11 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. My understanding of the passage is that ways of being true (false) of a sentence φ are univocally determined by the collection of the verifiers of φ, where by the word 'verifier of φ' I mean 'what witnesses the truth of φ'; a sentence cannot be true (false) in the same way in two different worlds in which is verified (falsified) by different entities. According to this preliminary consideration, we may identify the ways of being true or false of a sentence S with the part of the world that is determinant for the assignment of the truth-value to S. Or, in different words, the part of a possible world that witnesses the truth-value of the sentence. For instance, the truth-value of 'Socrates is wise' is determined by the part of world corresponding to the individual Socrates; the truth-value of 'There are no zombies' is determined by the extension of the property 'x is a zombie' in a certain world: if this extension is empty than it corresponds to a way of being true, otherwise any possible non-empty extension of 'x is a zombie' corresponds to a way of being false. In the following, I will use the general term witness to denote indistinctly ways of being true or ways of being false of a certain sentence. Alternatively, I may use the expression verifier (falsifier) to denote the witness associated with a way of being true (false). Yablo's proposal may be summed up by means of the following criterion: Exact aboutness The sentence φ is exactly about m iff • Worlds agreeing on the m-conditions also agree on the truth-value of φ, or, in other words, the subject matter m subpartitions the φ-partitioning. (Truthvalue supervenience) Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 12 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. • There is at least one m-cell that is a proper subset of an φ-cell (Non-minimality) • There is at least one m-cell that is not a singleton (Non-maximality) • Each m-condition corresponds to a way of being true (false) of φ (where each way of being true corresponds to the list of verifiers (falsifiers) of φ in some possible worlds) In the next section all these notions will be used to define the carving of a content and the recarving operation. 3. CARVING UP A CONTENT Frege's account of the notion of content (Begriffinhalt) is not as clear as his account of other semantic notions, e.g. the germane notion of sense. This fact is easily explained if we take into account that he did not develop his mature theories on the ground of the notion of content; from 1884 on, this notion was progressively abandoned. Frege himself seems to suggest that the notion was somehow confusedly presented: When I wrote my Foundations of Arithmetic, I had not yet made the distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung); and so, under the expression 'the content of a possible judgement', I was combining what I now designate by the distinctive words 'thought' (Gedanke) and 'truth-value' (Wahrheitswert). (Frege et al., 1951) Vincenzo Ciccarelli 13 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. The combination of notions mentioned in the passage has lead several scholars to suppose that the notion of content was something in between sense and reference5; in particular, Hale (1997) proposes that the notion of content should be identified with what he calls weak sense; roughly speaking, weak sense is defined as some strong notion of truth-conditions which should stand for the state of affairs that a certain sentence describes. Though introducing an interesting perspective on the matter, this is not the position I take in this paper: I propose that two sentences are identical in content iff they have the same truth-value in all possible worlds. If the proposition expressed by a sentence is taken to be the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true, a consequence of my proposal is the identification of contents with propositions. The view that any two logically equivalent sentences have the same content seems at odd with some aspects, consequences, and interpretations of Frege's view:  Suppose that all necessary truths have the same content; yet if all theorems of arithmetic share the same content with all theorems of logic, how truths arithmetic may be informative without presenting any addition of content to truths of logic?6  There seems to be a certain relation of relevance between the two sides of an abstraction principle; however, there are many cases of logically equivalent sentences that do not present any relevance at all. 5 (Hale, 1997), (Dummett, 1991) 6 A similar remark is made by M. Kremer in his essay included in (Ricketts and Potter, 2010), p.220–293. Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 14 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. Thus identity of content should be a relation stronger than logical equivalence7. The first line of thought is based on the assumption that informativeness is characterized in terms of a difference in content, in particular, in terms of a certain surplus of content. I don't have an argument to reject this view; my only remark is that informativeness is an epistemic notion while content is not. Thus informativeness may be characterized in terms of the way a certain content is accessed and not in terms of content itself: for instance, a certain logical equivalence α ≡ β may be informative in virtue of the fact that the same content is presented in different ways and not in virtue of a difference in content between α and β. The second point is raising a more fundamental objection to the identification of the content of a sentence with the proposition it expresses. My reply is that as far as the main purpose of the analysis is not merely exegetic, the difficulty is mainly terminological. Once the interpretation of Frege's notion of content is not a priority, what matters is the characterization of the relation of relevance holding between the two sides of an abstraction principle; according to my proposal, this is a relation that holds between some special carvings of a certain content: call this family of carvings related carvings; according to what may be called the fine grained content approach, the relation of relevance holds between two sentences in virtue of the fact that they are carvings of the same content. Suppose now that there is a valid argument to the effect that Frege's notion of content should not be identified with that of proposition: once the relation of relevance has been satisfactorily characterized, one may decide to simply call 'proposition' what I call 'content' and to say that two sentences are 7 I attribute this position to Hale (1997). Vincenzo Ciccarelli 15 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. identical in content whenever I say that they are related carvings8. On the other hand, the identification of content with proposition allows me to discuss the issue within a better understood theoretical setting; this may result in an interpretation of the notion of carving and recarving easily understandable also outside of the context of Frege's project. I will now introduce the needed definitions to formulate my proposal. Let W be the class of all possible worlds; I will assume that W is associated with a certain interpretation of a certain language. I define the bilateral proposition expressed by a sentence φ – denoted by |φ| – in the following way: |φ| = ⟨ |φ|T , |φ|F⟩ (1) where |φ|T (|φ|F ) stands for the set of possible worlds in which φ is true (false). I take the content of φ to be the bilateral proposition expressed by φ. Thus, the content of a sentence is something very close to its truth-value, or, in different words, is a minimal notion of truth-conditions of a sentence, i.e. what is commonly known as the intension of the sentence9. In a preliminary way, I may say that the content of a sentence φ conveys no more information than the truth-table of φ. 8 When the operation of recarving will be defined, instead of using the expression 'related carvings' I will say that two sentences are one the recarving of the other. 9 Hale (1997) also identifies content and truth-conditions, yet he seems to have in mind a more refined notion of truth-conditions; for this reason I use the adjective 'minimal' to characterize the notion of truth-table-like truth-conditions. Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 16 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. Even if the content of a sentence has been characterized in purely extensional terms, there are different ways of understanding the given definition. For instance, for the purpose of the following exposition, the content of a sentence S may be conceived as the characteristic function associated with S, i.e. the function that returns the value 'True' when applied to a world according to which S is true, the value 'False' otherwise. When the content is thus understood, I will also speak of the content as a condition on possible worlds, where the word 'condition' has to be intended in its extensional sense, i.e. as a characteristic function. Given a sentence S, the condition associated with the content of S may be determined by the expression 'the world w is such that the sentence S is true'. Albeit the given definition of content may result very simple, it becomes problematic when the task of defining the carvings of a content is considered. Indeed, there is no immediate sense we may give to the expression 'carving up an ordered pair of sets of possible worlds in different ways'. Even if we assume that to carve up a set is to divide it into proper subsets, sets give us no hint in how they should be divided. More specifically, we may allow decompositions of each set A, B composing the content ⟨ A , B ⟩ into proper subsets as carvings; however there are three main difficulties related to this approach: 1) Given a content ⟨ A , B ⟩ it must be clarified what is the condition that determines a certain decomposition; 2) it is not clear what such decomposition should mean 3) it is even less clear what a decomposition of sets into proper subsets has to do with the description of Frege's procedure. My claim is that these difficulties may be overcome by applying LewisYablo theory of subject matter to the notion of content carving as preliminary understood. It has been said that a certain content may be associated with a certain condition on possible worlds. Consider now Vincenzo Ciccarelli 17 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. the sentence φ being 'Madison Ave is parallel to the 5th Avenue' and let c be its content; for each possible world w, c tells us whether w makes φ true or not; consider now the way c seems to be carved up by φ: for each possible world w, it is said whether two constituents of w, i.e. Madison Ave and the 5th Avenue, are brought together in such a way that φ is true or not. This simple consideration shows that a carving of a content may be seen as the conversion of a condition on worlds into a new condition applied to worldconstituents (or, to be general, to some specific aspects of a world) . In other words, while the content c tells us whether a world w meets a certain requirement R or not, a carving of c tells us how a world w meets R. According to the given definition, the content of a sentence φ distinguishes between worlds that make φ true and worlds that make φ false. The way φ carves up this content traces a finer distinction: among worlds that makes φ true (false) it distinguishes worlds that make φ true (false) in different ways. In other words, a content partitions the logical space into the region of truth and that of falsity, while a carving of a content partitions the logical space into ways of being true and ways of being false. This takes us to the notion of exact subject matter: a sentence φ carves up its content c according to what φ is exactly about. More precisely, φ partitions the region of truth (falsity) of c into sub-cells univocally associated with φ's ways of being true (false). I have previously mentioned that to carve up the content of a sentence S is to convert the condition on possible worlds determined by S into a condition on worldconstituents, where the word 'condition' in the first occurrence has to be intended in an extensional sense, i.e as the characteristic function of the sentence (or, in Carnap's terminology, intension). How the word 'condition' should be understood when applied to world constituents? We may define also this new condition as an extensional truth Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 18 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. function. Let S be a sentence and m the exact subject matter of S. As Yablo himself suggests, we may conceive the subject matter m as a function that given a possible world w returns the witness of S in w. For instance, given that the sentence 'Socrates is wise' is exactly about Socrates, the function m associates to every possible world w the extension of the proper name 'Socrates' in the world w. Hence we may define the condition introduced in the informal definition of content carving as a function – say it FS – defined over all witnesses and having the set of truth-values as codomain. More precisely, given a witness A, FS (A) is the value 'True' if all worlds agreeing that the value of m is A makes the sentence S true, otherwise FS (A) is the value 'False'. According to the previous remarks, we may consider a carving of a certain content c of a sentence φ as the specification of the exact subject matter of φ, or, as a subpartitioning of c according to the ways of being true and the ways of being false of the sentence φ. This definition may be easily formalized: Content Carving (CC) Let ≡φT (≡φF ) be the relation that holds between two possible worlds whenever φ is true (false) in the same way in them; let χ (φ) denote 'the way φ carves up its content'; according to the given considerations: χ (φ)= ⟨ |φ|T/ ≡φT , |φ|F/ ≡φF ⟩ (2) where |φ|T/ ≡φT stands for the quotient set of |φ|T with respect to the equivalence relation ≡φ T . Given that all logically equivalent sentences have the same content, yet they may have different exact subject matters, there may be different carvings of the same Vincenzo Ciccarelli 19 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. content. One may ask if there is a purely extensional criterion that given the content c of a certain sentence, allows us to determine all possible carvings of c; we may attempt the following definition: Criterion for content carving (CCC) Let ⟨ A , B ⟩ be a content; the pair ⟨ K , H ⟩ is a carving of ⟨ A , B ⟩ , in symbols: Γ( ⟨ A , B ⟩ , ⟨ K , H ⟩ ) iff the following conditions obtain: (i) ∪ K = A & ∪ H = B (ii) ∀ x ∈ K (x ⊂ A & x ≠ ∅ ) (iii) ∀ x ∈ H (x ⊂ B & x ≠ ∅ ) (iv) ∃ x ∈ (K ∪ H) ∃ u, v ∈ x (u ≠ v) (v) ∀ u, v ∈ (K ∪ H) (u ≠ v ⇒ u ∩ v = ∅ ) . . . Conditions (i)-(v) ensure that the set K (H) is a decomposition of A (B) into cells such that all K-cells (Hcells) are non-empty proper pairwise disjointed subsets of A (B) and at least one element of K or H is not a singleton. According to the notions introduced in the previous section, conditions (i)-(v) ensure that the partitioning represented by ⟨ K , H ⟩ is associated with a genuine subject matter of the bilateral proposition ⟨ A , B ⟩ . To see (CCC) as defining a carving is to assume that every genuine subject matter of a certain bilateral proposition is the exact subject matter of some sentence. This seems to be too strong: it implies that every combinatorially possible partitioning of a content satisfying conditions (i)-(v) defines a class of ways of being true (false), i.e. defines a class of Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 20 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. possible verifiers (falsifiers). Under the assumption that a verifier v is an entity which exists in all worlds in which the sentence that it verifies is true in the way associated with v, (CCC) implies a form of ontological inflationism. For we may introduce new entities with extreme liberty: it suffices only to partition a certain content in the suitable way defined by (i)-(v). This consequence is highly undesirable; for now I say that not all combinatorially possible "re-partitionings" that satisfy condition (i)-(v) are to be considered as carvings of the given content. In section 5 I will attempt to characterize this restriction. As previously suggested, from definition (2) it follows that two sentences are different ways of carving up the same content iff they are logically equivalent and they have different exact subject matters. Take the case of lines and directions: the sentence 'In the city X, the street of the bakery is parallel to the street of the library '10 is exactly about the street of the bakery and the street of the library in the city X11, whereas the sentence 'In the city X, the direction of the street of the bakery is identical to the direction of the street of the library' is about different 10 Assume that in the city X there is only one bakery and only one library. 11 Firstly, note that worlds agreeing on which streets the street of the bakery and the street of the library are, must agree on whether they are parallel or not. Moreover, recall Yablo's remark on the sentence 'The U.S. president in 2001 is a senator's son': a change in the entities with which a certain subject matter is concerned must imply a change in the way the sentence is true. Thus, a transworld change in the streets for which 'the street of the bakery' and 'the street of the library' stand that maintains them parallel, is a change of the way the sentence asserting their parallelism is true. Vincenzo Ciccarelli 21 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. things, i.e. directions (supposing for simplicity that the existence of directions is uncontroversial). To see the difference, note that two possible worlds may agree on the common direction of the street of the bakery and the street of the library (for instance they may agree that the two streets form a certain angle θ with the north-south axis) while disagreeing in which street the bakery or the library is (the two streets may be different from a world to another while maintaining the same direction). Moreover, it is impossible that there are two worlds assigning the same direction to the streets and different truth-value to the sentence asserting the identity of these directions, thus directions are a genuine subject matter of the considered sentence. Moreover, it seems to be absurd to allow the sentence to be true (false) in the same way when the directions of the considered streets has changed from one world to another; thus the sentence is exactly about the direction of the street of the bakery and the direction of the street of the library. I hope to have successfully showed how to overcome two of the three difficulties related to the notion of carving when applied to a set theoretic definition of content. The first difficulty was related to the determination of the conditions that decompose a set into proper subsets, the second to the requirement of a meaningful interpretation of such a decomposition. According to my proposal, given a sentence φ , the true (false) region of the logical space is partitioned according to φ's ways of being true (false); thus ways of being true (false) represent the condition for decomposing the true (false) region into proper subsets. It has been shown that this decomposition is associated with a philosophically significant notion, i.e. the notion of exact subject matter. There is still a third difficulty, i.e. the relation between the proposed decomposition and Frege's Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 22 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. procedure; it will be solved in the next section, when the operation of content recarving will be defined. Given the identification of the content of a sentence with its minimal truthconditions, an interesting question would be whether the carving of a certain content may be identified with a certain notion of refined truth-conditions. The answer is positive: it suffices to see that the operation of carving up a content consists in the transformation of a condition on worlds into a new condition on the specific aspect of worlds which is determinant for the truth-value. Thus by carving up the content of a sentence φ we pass from a "brute expression of the truth-conditions" to a more refined version, in which we specify some constituents/aspects of a possible world that brought together in a suitable way make φ true. One may object that my proposal on content carving does not take into account another aspect of the preliminary understanding of the notion: the logical form. Indeed, one may understand the fact that two sentences are different ways of carving up the same content as the fact that they are logically equivalent sentences having different logical forms. An immediate reply to the objection would be that the language in which the sentences are expressed must be regimented in such a way that a difference in subject matter is a necessary and sufficient condition for a difference in logical form. Yet this is impossible; consider the sentence φ and the sentence φ ∧ (φ ∨ ¬φ) and assume that φ is exactly about m: both φ and φ ∧ (φ ∨ ¬φ) are exactly about m while having different logical forms. Thus to assume that a logical form picks out a unique carving of a certain content is in contrast with the definitions given in this section. I don't have a definitive argument to the effect that a syntactic criterion for carving distinction in terms of logical form is less satisfactory than a semantic one in terms of subject matter. To my mind, when the notion of content Vincenzo Ciccarelli 23 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. carving is concerned, the notion of logical form is interesting insofar as it provides information about the way truth-conditions are satisfied. On this aspect, the sentence φ ∧ (φ ∨ ¬φ) does nothing more than φ, for the conjunct φ ∨ ¬φ does not even contribute to the determination of the truth-value of φ. In conclusion, I remark that given a certain carving, i.e. given a certain refined expression of the truth-conditions of a sentence, there are logical forms that naturally correspond to this expression (as in the example of parallelism and identity of directions) and logical forms that expresses the same refined truth-conditions in a very roundabout way (as in the example of the previous paragraph). According to my proposal, the latter cases collapse into the former ones, for less natural cases of logical form fail to specify a different exact subject matter12. As a consequence, my notion of content carving is insensitive to artificial syntactic constructions that are not determinant for the assignment of truth-value. In this sense, my account is less dependent on language than the view according to which each logical form is univocally associated with a carving. 4. CONTENT RECARVING In this section the part of Frege's procedure labeled 'content recarving' will be analyzed and defined. We will start by highlighting some similarities between the operation of carving up a content and that of recarving a content already carved up in a certain way. 12 A different and equally interesting approach to the matter is Yablo distinction between invited and uninvited recarvings, (Yablo, 2008). Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 24 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. Consider Frege's example: it has been said that the sentence 'a ∥ b' carves up its content according to what it is exactly about, i.e. lines a and b; more specifically, the carving associated with 'a ∥ b' is the transformation of a condition on worlds into a new condition – determined by the relation of parallelism – on relevant constituents of worlds, i.e. the lines for which the expressions 'a' and 'b' respectively stand. In this way, we refine the given truth-conditions by focusing on a specific aspect of a world and not on a world in its entirety. We may conceive content recarving as a similar operation: we transform a condition on some constituents of a world into a new condition on some more relevant aspect of these constituents. For instance, we transform the condition of parallelism between lines into a new condition, i.e. identity, applied to an aspect of lines, i.e. directions, that is the most relevant when parallelism is concerned. These considerations may be taken to go toward the fundamental idea of my proposal: the operation of content recarving is an operation of restriction of a certain subject matter. The similarity between carving and recarving may illuminate further aspects of Frege's procedure: the restriction of our attention on a relevant aspect of lines may be seen as the result of applying the specific part of the content of the relation of parallelism to its relata; the new conditions obtained over directions may be seen as the result of removing the specific part of the content of the original condition. These two aspects are in some sense complementary: when we restrict our attention on a specific aspect of lines we automatically make the condition applied to lines more general, i.e. we transform it into an identity. This fact may be spelled out as follows: an equivalence relation R may be seen as a partial identity: in fact, every equivalence relation defines a class of invariant properties, i.e. all properties that two object that are R-related have in Vincenzo Ciccarelli 25 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. common. As a consequence, two objects are R-related iff they have all the R-invariant properties in common. This may be seen as a restricted version of Leibniz's law: whenever two objects shares all properties that are in a certain class ∆, they are partial identical (or identical with respect to ∆). According to this reading of an equivalence relation, what is specific of the content of R is the class of invariant properties it defines; and all invariant properties characterize the aspect of the relata that is relevant to the equivalence relation. Thus to remove what is specific in the content R is to convert a partial identity into a total identity, and to apply what is specific of R to a and b is to pick out the aspect of a and b associated their R-invariant properties. In the case of lines, we may say that the concept of direction is determined by the class of all orientational properties defined by the relation of parallelism; in the case of concepts, the concept of cardinal number is determined by the class of quantitative properties associated with the relation of equinumerousity. One may object that the previous explanation does not help to understand the operation of content recarving insofar as it lacks generality, for it is relevant just to the case of abstraction principles. Though the objection is correct, it is possible to extrapolate a pattern of explanation that apply to all cases. To this end, consider the following example of content recarving: let φ be the sentence 'The U.S. president in 2017 is blond (blonde)'; it is exactly about the U.S. president in 2017. We may recarve this content by restricting the subject matter the U.S. president in 2017 and obtain the hair color of the U.S. president in 2017 ; if we do this, we obtain the sentence ψ: 'The hair color of the U.S. president in 2017 is in the rang Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 26 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. of yellow'13. It is easy to see that the new sentence is exactly about the hair color of the U.S. president; it can also be shown that the hair color of the U.S. president in 2017 is a subject matter strictly included in the U.S. president in 2017, for all worlds wholly agreeing on who's the U.S. president in 2017 must agree on his/her hair color, yet not all worlds agreeing on the hair color of the U.S. president in 2017 also agree on who's the president. As a result of such a subject matter restriction, the condition 'x is blond (blonde)' has now been generalized so that the condition 'x is in the range of yellow' obtains; to be blond (blonde) is a property that concerns the color of a specific part of a person, while to be in the range of yellow applies to all object having a defined color. There is a general way to present this fact. Given a sentence φ, we may always distinguish between the subject matter of φ and what φ says about its subject matter. Let ψ be a sentence that recarves the content of φ by restricting the subject matter m of φ in such a way that a new smaller subject matter n obtains. Consider now an n-cell A associated with a certain witness a of ψ. Given that n is strictly included in m, there is always an n-cell that may be seen as obtained by merging some (at least two) m-cells. Suppose that the n-cell A is the result of merging the mcells B1, B2, and B3 to which the witnesses of φ b1, b2, and b3 are associated. The fact that what ψ says about n is more general than what φ says about m may be explained thus: we may describe a certain circumstance in which ψ is true by saying that a is compatible with what ψ says about n; this very circumstance corresponds to three different circumstances in which φ is true, viz. the circumstances in which either b1 or b2 or b3 is compatible with what φ says 13 Assuming that it is a necessary truth that whenever someone is blonde her hair color is in the range of yellow. Vincenzo Ciccarelli 27 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. about m. Therefore what ψ says about n is more general because with a single condition of compatibility it captures a multiplicity of circumstances in which what φ says about m is the case. Or, in different terms, for an object a to be compatible with what ψ says about n less is required from a possible world than what is required for b1 (b2 or b3) to be compatible with what φ says about m. Thus content recarving may be conceived as a content preserving operation that by making more specific one aspect of the content (i.e. the subject matter of the given sentence) has to make more general the other (i.e. what the given sentence says about its subject matter). These two aspects of the same operation may be associated with the two steps of Frege's procedure: the determination of a more specific subject matter may be associated with the division of the specific content of the relation of parallelism between the two lines; the operation of removing the specific content of the relation of parallelism may be associated with the generalization of the condition applied to the original subject matter. Having clarified the general idea of content recarving, it is possible to formulate a rigorous definition: Content recarving (CR) Let φ and ψ be sentences; let χ(φ) and χ(ψ) be the respective carvings; we say that χ(ψ) is obtained by recarving χ(φ), in symbols Θ(χ(ψ), χ(φ)) iff (i) |φ| = |ψ| Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 28 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. (ii) ∀x ∈ (|φ|T/≡Tφ ∪ |φ|F/≡Fφ) ∀ y ∈ (|ψ|T/≡Tφ ∪ |ψ|F/≡Fφ), (x ⊆ y ∨ x ∩ y = ∅ ) (iii) ∃ x ∈ (|φ|T/≡Tφ ∪ |φ|F/≡Fφ) ∃ y ∈ (|ψ|T/≡Tφ ∪ |ψ|F/≡Fφ), (x ⊂ y) Some remarks on the given definition. Firstly, the formula Θ(ξ, ζ) has the metavariables ξ and ζ ranging over carvings, yet it may also be read as a relation between sentences, by defining Θ∗ (ψ, φ) ⇔ Θ(χ(ψ), χ(φ)) for this reason we may simply say that ψ is a recarving of φ whenever the way ψ carves up its content is obtained by recarving the way φ carves up its content. The definition (CR) says that ψ is a recarving of φ whenever φ and ψ are logically equivalent and the exact subject matter of ψ is strictly included in the exact subject matter of φ. By simple set theoretic considerations it is possible to conclude that Θ is a partial strict order, i.e. it is an anti-reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation. It is interesting to see that Θ is not connected, i.e. there are carvings of the same content such that none is the recarving of the other. This is explained by the fact that there may be logically equivalent sentences whose subject matters are not in a relation of inclusion, for instance in the case that the intersection between a cell of one subject matter is non-empty and different from a cell of the other subject matter. This result is in line with one aspect of our preliminary understanding of the notion of content recarving: for ψ to be a recarving of φ, a certain relation of relevance between φ and ψ is expected: my proposal rigorously defines such a relation of relevance as strict inclusion of subject matter. Vincenzo Ciccarelli 29 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. From a set theoretic point of view, (CR) provides an interesting characterization of the relation of recarving conceived as an operation. Let m be the exact subject matter of a certain sentence, and n the subject matter resulting from the recarving. Clearly, n is strictly included in m; by definition of subject matter inclusion, every m-cell is a subset of every n-cell with at least one m-cell being proper subset of one n-cell. As a consequence, the restriction of subject matter associated with content recarving may be seen as performed by merging some m-cells to obtain the ncells. Content recarving has been defined as a relation between carved contents; the previous remark suggests that it may also be conceived as an operation performed on a carving, provided that the new restricted subject matter is given in advance. Let φ be a sentence and m a subject matter; denote by [φ] the subject matter of φ; the operation of recarving according to the subject matter m, in symbols Θm is defined as follows: Θm(χ(φ)) = ⟨ K , H ⟩ iff (i) m < [φ] (ii) Γ(|φ|, ⟨ K , H ⟩) (iii) K =|φ|T/≡m & H =|φ|F/≡m where the expression 'm < [φ]' stands for 'the subject matter m is strictly included in the subject matter of φ', the relation Γ is the one defined in (CCC), and '≡m' stands for the equivalence relation associated with the subject matter m (i.e. the relation that holds between two worlds whenever they are indistinguishable with respect to m). Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 30 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. Given a subject matter m, the result of the operation Θm may not be the carving of a defined sentence but just a hypothetical carving. This because nothing ensures that the cells in K (H) correspond to ways of being true (false) of a certain sentence; in other words, we have no guarantee that what is indistinguishable between worlds belonging to the same cell in K (H) is an existing witness of some sentence ψ. This leads to fundamental semantic and metaphysical issues related to the notion of content recarving: the discussion on these aspects of the notion will be the focus of the next section. 5. RECARVING AT THE JOINTS The account of the operation of content recarving given so far left unanswered some fundamental questions on the matter: when the result of a recarving obtained by a mere merging of partitions effectively corresponds to a new subject matter of a new sentence? What is the ontological import of such an operation? These questions point at the problem of distinguishing between merely hypothetical carvings, i.e. carvings obtained by a mere set theoretic procedure, and effective carvings, i.e. carvings that besides being the result of a certain merging also present some kind of connection with the metaphysical structure of reality. To trace this distinction two problems must be solved: 1) the problem of the determination of the new restricted subject matter associated with a recarving operation; 2) the problem of establishing the ontological import of the new ways of being true (false) of the new sentence exactly about the restricted subject matter. For instance, in the case of Frege's example, the solution of the first problem Vincenzo Ciccarelli 31 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. would be the answer to the question "why directions?" and the solution of the second problem would be the answer to the question "Given that we may restrict the subject matter line a, line b to direction of a, direction of b , on what grounds we may say that directions exist? ". In the following part of this section I will propose a sketch of a solution to the first problem (determination of the new subject matter); regarding the second issue, I will limit myself to specify in which terms the problem may be formulated without disputing the details. Given a sentence φ, φ carves up its content according to its exact subject matter; for instance, the subject matter U.S. president in 2017 divides the logical space into cells each of which is associated with a certain individual. There is a huge variety of possible ways of merging these cells in order to obtain a coarser partitioning of the logical space; however, many of them are merely arbitrary insofar as they are just the result of set theoretic operations. If we want a guiding criterion that tells us which cell should be merged with which, then we need a certain pattern of resemblances between the ways the sentence whose content is to be recarved is true (false); and it is reasonable to assume that such a pattern of resemblances is given by a battery of necessary truths related to the subject matter at issue. For instance, given the subject matter U.S. president in 2017, consider the cell associated with the actual Donald Trump (i.e. the set of worlds in which the actual Donald Trump is the U.S. president in 2017) and that associated with the actual Hilary Clinton. If we want to merge the Trump-cell with the Clinton-cell, we should do this on the ground of a certain resemblance between Clinton and Trump that instantiates a certain general pattern of resemblances between U.S. presidents in 2017; given that the required relation of resemblance has to do with entities of different possible Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 32 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. worlds, it depends on a certain class of necessary truths about U.S. presidents in 2017 (for instance the set of truths analytic of the concept of U.S. president or of the concept of person). However, not any sort of resemblance may serve our purpose: the specific resemblance between Clinton and Trump must be relevant to what the original sentence (i.e. the sentence to be recarved) says about the subject matter U.S. president in 2017 ; for example, if the sentence is 'The U.S. president in 2017 is blond/blonde', then the Clintoncell and the Trump-cell may be merged iff there is a relation between Clinton and Trump that instantiates a pattern of resemblances with respect to blondness. The goal of determining the new subject matter resulting from the recarving may be achieved in two steps: firstly, a criterion for saying when a certain partitioning of the logical space corresponds to an effective subject matter, i.e. a partitioning of the logical space such that all worlds belonging to the same cell must have something in common, in the sense of being indistinguishable under a certain respect; secondly, once the aforementioned pattern of resemblances has been defined, it must be shown that the new subject matter determined by the pattern of resemblances is a subject matter satisfying the criterion of effectiveness of the previous point. As it turns out, both the criterion of effectiveness and the definition of the pattern of resemblances are based on the same notion: the relation between a determinable property and its determinate properties. The relation determinable-determinates may be briefly described as a particular kind of specification relation: 'red' (i.e. the determinate) is a specifier of 'colored' (i.e. the determinable), 'having 2 kg of mass' is a specifier of 'having mass', 'having a length of two meters' is a specifier of 'having a length' etc. Intuitively, each cell in which a subject Vincenzo Ciccarelli 33 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. matter divides the logical space seems to be a specifier of the same sort: consider the subject matter 'The US president in 2017'; it partitions the set of worlds according to which there is a US president in 2017. Thus we may see this set as the extension of the determinable property 'w is a world according to which there is a US president in 2017'. Correspondingly, each cell is the extension of a certain determinate: for instance, the cell including all worlds according to which the US president in 2017 is the actual Donald Trump may be seen as the extension of the property 'w is a world according to which the actual Donald Trump is the US president in 2017'. The fundamental idea is to take the relation determinate-determinable as a characteristic feature of effective subject matters, i.e. of subject matters that are not just the result of a mere set theoretic operation of partitioning. Yet to do this, we need a criterion for saying when a class of properties may be considered the determinates of a certain determinable. According to the relevant literature, the fundamental features that characterize the relation determinatedeterminables are the following: i. (Exclusiveness) If Q and M are determinates of P , then no object having P may have both Q and M ((Johnson, 2014), (Prior, 1949)) ii. (Non-conjunctive) If Q is a determinate of P , then Q is a non-conjunctive specifier of P and it is logically related to any non-conjunctive specifier of P , where two properties are logically related whenever either one entails the other or one entails the negation of the other (Körner and Searle, 1959) iii. (Modal constraint ) If Q is a determinate of P , then necessarily to have Q entails to have P and possibly Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 34 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. am object may have P without having Q. (Yablo, 1992) iv. (Levels) There possibly are many levels of specification of P , each level corresponding to a different class of determinates of P ; every determinate of P of a certain level is a determinable with respect to a certain class of determinates of P of the next level.((Johnson, 2014), (Prior, 1949)) To understand how these four conditions apply, consider the most common example of the relation of determination, i.e. the one holding between a particular color property and the property of being colored. (Exclusiveness) is satisfied, for no object may have two different colors at the same time. To understand (Nonconjunctive) we need to spell out the notion of 'non-conjunctive specifier'; for instance, the property of being human is a specifier of the property of being animal, for not all animals are humans. However, human is a conjunctive specifier, for there is a property not necessarily co-extensional with human, i.e. rational, such that the conjunction of this property with the property of being an animal is co-extensional with the property of being a human. It is easy to see that 'x is red' cannot be defined as the conjunction of 'x is colored' and some other property not co-extensional with 'x is red'. In other words, the relation between a determinable and a correspondent determinate does not reduce to the relation between genus and specie. Moreover, given any other non-conjunctive specifier of 'x is colored', for instance 'x is yellow', 'x is red' implies that 'x is not yellow'. (Modal constraint ) is easy to understand: necessarily, if something is red, then it must be colored, yet something might be colored without being red. (Levels) is one of the most interesting feature: 'x is red' is a determinate of 'x is colored' while it is a determinable with respect to the determinate 'x is scarlet'. Vincenzo Ciccarelli 35 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. What the relation of determination has to do with the notion of subject matter? I will not propose a general argument to the effect that the existence of a relation of determination between properties of possible worlds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the effectiveness of a subject matter; nonetheless, I will try to convince the reader that this is the case by referring to some examples. Consider the subject matter 'The US president in 2017'. It is an effective subject matter, for worlds agreeing on the US president in 2017 do have something in common: they are partially indistinguishable, i.e. indistinguishable with respect to the US president in 2017. We will show that for every X such that X is a possible US president in 2017 , the cell associated with X is a determinate of the determinable property 'w is a world according to which there is a US president in 2017'. Firstly, note that no world may admit both the actual Donald Trump and the actual Hilary Clinton as US presidents, which proves that (Exclusiveness) holds14. Regarding (Non-conjunctive), it is hard to imagine how the property 'w is a world according to which the actual Donald Trump is the US president in 2017' may be defined by putting the property 'w is a world according to which there is a US president in 2017' in conjunction with another property not co-extensional with the former. Indeed, it 14 One may disagree by supposing that there is a possible world in which the United States in 2017 have adopted a sort of duumvirate, thus admitting two presidents. Yablo himself ((Yablo, 2014), p.36) recognizes the possibility of subject matters that are not defined by an equivalence relation due to the lack of transitivity, as in this case. For sake of simplicity, I will not consider this sort of subject matters in the present discussion; it is as if the operation of recarving may be applied only to subject matter that are in good order, i.e. that partitions the logical space into disjointed cells. Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 36 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. seems that such property may be defined by the conjunction of all properties of the sort 'w is a world according to which the US president in 2017 is F ' with F intrinsic property of the actual Donald Trump; yet this conjunctive property is co-extensional to 'w is a world according to which the actual Donald Trump is the US president in 2017'. (Modal constraint ) is straightforward: necessarily, if w is such that the actual Donald Trump is the US president in 2017, then w must be a world according to which there is a US president in 2017; moreover, from the fact that w is a world according to which there is a US president in 2017, it does not always follow that, according to w, the US president in 2017 is the actual Donald Trump. (Levels) also is satisfied, and it is the most interesting feature for – as we will see – is what makes the recarving operation possible. Let m be an effective subject matter and n a subject matter strictly included in m; it is easy to show that each m-cell is a determinable having as determinates all ncell that it strictly contains. Let m be the subject matter 'The hair of the US president in 2017' and n the subject matter 'The US president in 2017'; by a reasoning similar to the one previously given, it is possible to show that the property 'w is a world according to which the object a is the hair of the US president in 2017' is a determinable having of the property 'w is a world according to which the object a is the hair of the actual Donald Trump'. The relation determinate-determinable may be reasonably taken also as a sufficient condition. To see this point it suffices to note that the way a set of determinates partitions the domain under consideration defines a relation of partial indistinguishability with respect to the determinable15. Indeed, all red things are indistinguishable with respect to their color, as well as a red thing and a 15 A similar remark is made in (Armstrong, 1996), pp.51–55. Vincenzo Ciccarelli 37 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. yellow thing are distinguishable – inter alia – under the same respect. As suggested by Lewis (1988), what I have called an effective subject matter has the characteristic feature of being defined by an equivalence relation that is a relation of partial indistinguishability under a fixed respect. Therefore the following criterion may be reasonably assumed: Criterion for effectiveness of a subject matter (CESM): Let m be a subject matter and W be the set on which m is defined. The subject matter m is effective iff every m-cell is the extension of a determinate of a determinable having W as extension. Note that the fact that a subject matter m is effective does not imply that to each m-cell A corresponds an object existing in all worlds belonging to A that is a witness for every sentence exactly about m; it simply says that all worlds in A are indistinguishable with respect to m, not that they must have a part in common. The criterion (CESM) is used to determine when a certain partitioning of the logical space is an effective subject matter. Nonetheless, what we require to perform a recarving operation is something more: given a sentence and its exact subject matter, we want a procedure that determines a new effective subject matter strictly included in the initial one; or at least, we want a procedure that determines a certain range of effective smaller subject matters. As previously mentioned, we may do this according to a certain pattern of resemblances between the witnesses of the given sentence, a pattern that must display a certain sort of relevance with what the sentence says about its exact Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 38 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. subject matter. In the following we will see how to define this pattern. Let S be the sentence 'The US president in 2017 is blond' and let m be its exact subject matter 'The US president in 2017'. As briefly mentioned in section 3, we may represent the intension CS of S as obtained by a functional composition between the subject matter function m and the truth-function FS representing the condition in the way S carves up its content, i.e for all w ∈ W, CS (w) = FS (m(w)) where FS may be seen as the function that, for every object x, FS(x) is the value 'True' iff x is blond, and m is the function that associates to every possible world w the witness of S in w. Again, we may use the relation of determination between properties to define the pattern of resemblances and to grant that the new restricted subject matter is an effective one. Let US be the set of all witnesses of S; under the assumption that there is a determinable property P shared by all witnesses in US, we may say that two witnesses stand in the required resemblance relation iff they have the same determinate of P . Moreover, we must require that the resemblance relation is relevant to what S says about m; thus we add the following condition: for every two witnesses of S u and v, and for every determinate X of P , if u and v both have X, then FS(u) = FS(u), namely, if two witnesses stand in the relation of resemblance defined by the determination of P , then either both witness the truth of S or both its falsity (either both are ways of being true of S, or both are ways of being false). With reference to the considered example, the determinable property may be 'x is not bald' and each determinate may be 'x has hair so-and-so' (for sake of simplicity we suppose that there are no possible bald US presidents in 2017); it follows that two possible US presidents in 2017 stand in the suitable relation of Vincenzo Ciccarelli 39 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. resemblance iff they are indistinguishable with respect to their hairs; and if two possible US presidents in 2017 are indistinguishable with respect to their hairs, then it is impossible that one is blond while the other is not. We may define the following criterion based in a pattern of resemblance as previously defined: Good recarvings (GR) Let S be a sentence exactly about m, and let US be the set of witnesses of S. Let Σ be an operation of subject matter restriction, such that Σ(m)= n with n strictly included in m. We say that Σ is a good candidate for content recarving iff there is an intrinsic determinable property P shared by all witnesses in US whose class of intrinsic determinates ∆(US) satisfies the following: i. For every two possible worlds w1, w2 and for every X in ∆(US), both m(w1) and m(w2) have X iff w1 and w2 belong to the same n-cell, ii. For every two possible worlds w1, w2 and for every X in ∆(US), if m(w1) and m(w2) have X, then the truth-value of S in w1 is identical to the truth-value of S in w2 . The criterion (GR) may be seen as suggesting how to define the new restricted subject matter by merging the cells of the initial subject matter once that a range of determinate properties of a certain determinable is given. Indeed, according to condition (i), whenever two witnesses of S have the same determinate, we must merge their corresponding m-cells. Condition (ii) ensures the relevance of the pattern of resemblances: two witnesses that have the same determinate must be either both ways of being true of S or both ways of being false of S. Note the difference Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 40 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. between (CESM) and (GR): while the former is framed in terms of the relation of determination between properties of possible worlds, the latter is framed in terms of the relation of determination between properties of witnesses. How (GR) is supposed to grant that the resulting subject matter n is an effective one? The answer is almost immediate: to say that two witnesses of S have the same determinate is just to say that they are indistinguishable under a fixed respect; as a consequence, all worlds in which these witnesses exist are also indistinguishable under the same fixed respect. In other words, the relation of determination between intrinsic properties of the witnesses of a given sentence is transmitted between corresponding properties of possible worlds, and – by (CESM) – the new subject matter is effective. To use the relation of determination between properties to define a good candidate operation for content recarving appears to be an illuminating improvement on the definition of the previous section: content recarving is not just a subject matter restriction, yet a restriction that has been characterized as a relevant specification; of all subject matters strictly included in the initial one, the operation of content recarving should pick out only those that represent a further determination of what the given sentence says about its subject matter. For this reason, we cannot perform a recarving of the sentence 'The US president in 2017 is blond' by restricting the subject matter to 'The left hand of the US president in 2017': for there are possible US presidents in 2017 that are indistinguishable with respect to their left hands while being distinguishable with respect to their blondness; what the sentence says about the US president in 2017 has nothing to do with the his/her left hand. Nor we may perform the recarving by an arbitrary subpartitioning of the initial subject matter, for what grants Vincenzo Ciccarelli 41 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. that worlds belonging to the same new cell really are indistinguishable under a certain respect? What such an improved account of content recarving has to say regarding abstraction principles? Consider the case of Hume's Principle: 'The number of stars = the number of planets' is expected to be the recarving of 'There are as many stars as planets'. The latter sentence is exactly about the concept of star, the concept of planet . Each cell in which this subject matter partitions the logical space, corresponds to worlds agreeing on all instances of the concept of star and that of planet. Consider the property 'The concept X is n-instantiated': for every finite cardinal n, it is well known that such a property may be defined without mentioning cardinal numbers, but relying only on a suitable use of quantifiers of the form ∃ nx Xx. This second-order property may be seen as an intrinsic determinate of the second-order determinable 'X is instantiated'. The list of all second-order properties ¬∃ xXx , ∃ 1xXx, ∃ 2xXx, ... , ∃ nxXx, ..., may be considered as the class of determinates defining our pattern of resemblances according to the criterion (GR). Call this class C#; we will define the relation of C#-similarity, i.e. our relation of resemblance between two pairs of extension of respectively the concept of star and the concept of planet: for any two possible worlds w1, w2, the pair of extensions of the concept of star and the concept of planet at w1 is C#-similar to the pair of extensions of the concept of star and the concept of planet at w2 iff the extensions of the concept of star at w1 and w2 have the same determinate in C# and the same happens with the pair of extensions of the concept of planet. The relation of C#-similarity may be used to define a new equivalence relation ≡# on possible worlds: for any two worlds w1, w2 ∈ W, w1 ≡# w2 iff the pair composed by the extension of the concept of star in w1 and extension of the concept of planet in w1 is C#similar to the pair Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 42 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. composed by the extension of the concept of star in w2 and the extension of the concept of planet in w2. The relation ≡# defines the new subject matter strictly included in the concept of star, the concept of planet . It should appear clear what this new subject matter is: ⟨ #( the concept of star), #(the concept of planet) ⟩ where the symbol # has been used to abbreviate the expression 'the cardinal number of '. This result shows that it is possible – by an application of the recarving operation according to a certain pattern of resemblances – to restrict the subject matter of a sentence saying that two concepts are equinumerous so that a new subject matter , the cardinal numbers of the two concepts at issue, is determined. Moreover, by (GR), the new subject matter is an effective one, for it is defined according to a relation of determination between higher-order properties. What is still missing is a way of deciding whether there is a sentence exactly about the restricted subject matter or not. In other words, what is needed is a criterion for saying that the new cells in which the logical space has been partitioned may be associated with ways of being true (false) of a certain sentence, i.e. with existing entities. This takes us to the second problem related to the definition of a non-arbitrary recarving operation. The discussion that follows, though being focused on Hume's Principle, is applicable to all cases of abstraction principles. The given definition of content recarving and the described procedure of the determination of the restricted subject matter according to a pattern of resemblance, allow us to classify the possible scenarios in three cases: 1. Even if the subject matter cardinal number may be determined according to the described procedure, there is no sentence exactly about it, i.e. the cells determined by the subject matter cardinal number Vincenzo Ciccarelli 43 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. cannot be associated with ways of being true (false) of a certain sentence, simply because the objects that should play the role of witnesses of such a sentence (i.e. the cardinal numbers) do not exist in all possible worlds. Verdict: cardinal number is an effective subject matter, it is not an exact subject matter of a certain sentence, and there are numberless worlds. 2. Cardinal number is a subject matter and the sentence 'The number of stars = the number of planets' is exactly about cardinal numbers. Yet a difference in the way this sentence is true (false) may be explained without appealing to cardinal numbers as objects existing in every possible worlds. Verdict: cardinal number is an effective subject matter, it corresponds to the exact subject matter of a certain class of sentences, yet there are numberless worlds. 3. Cardinal number is a subject matter and the sentence 'The number of stars = the number of planets' is exactly about cardinal numbers. The way this sentence is true or false is characterized in terms of the objects corresponding to the cardinal number of stars and that of planets; in other words, cardinal numbers as objects are the witnesses of the sentence 'The number of stars = the number of planets'. Verdict: cardinal number is an effective subject matter, it corresponds to the exact subject matter of a certain class of sentences, and there are cardinal numbers in every possible world. All cases agree on the fact that cardinal number is an effective subject matter: sentences may be about cardinal numbers in a genuine sense. For instance, the sentence 'There are as many stars as planets' is about both the Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 44 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. number of stars and the number of planets, for this latter subject matter is effective and included into the exact subject matter of the sentence. Clearly, 'There are as many stars as planets' is not exactly about cardinal numbers: for cardinal numbers are not crucial for the determination of the ways in which the sentence may be true or false. Case 1 is the only case of rejection of the fact that 'The number of stars = the number of planets' is the result of recarving the content of 'There are as many stars as planets': for the former sentence cannot be exactly about the restricted subject matter determined by the described procedure. Case 2 and 3 present an agreement on the fact that the sentence of number identity is a recarving of the sentence of equinumerousity between two concepts. Case 3 accepts the recarving in the most straightforward way: a sentence exactly about cardinal numbers is made true or false by the objects corresponding to the cardinal numbers at issue. Case 2 is more complicated, yet far more interesting: it contemplates the possibility of formulating sentences exactly about cardinal numbers which do not require the necessary existence of them as objects. How this could be possible? How the notion of exact subject matter may be characterized without the relation between ways of being true/false and existing verifiers/falsifiers? A preliminary answer could be that the ways in which the sentence 'The number of stars = the number of planets' is true may be characterized pragmatically; for instance, we may agree on a conventional procedure-type of cardinal number assignment, e.g. counting, and we may establish the validity of such procedures even in possible worlds in which there are no beings able to count. Another possible answer uses the notion of the best world when a certain subject matter is concerned. The sentence 'The number of stars = the number of planets' is true (false) in a certain possible world w precisely in the way in which it is true (false) in all worlds Vincenzo Ciccarelli 45 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. belonging to the same cardinal number-partition that are most adequate to the subject matter cardinal number: and these worlds are all worlds in which cardinal numbers exist16. There is much more to say about the ontological import of the operation of content recarving; yet disputing the details of this issue will take us too faraway. What matters for the present discussion is the fact that the recarving operation may be characterized as a restriction of subject matter where the restriction is intended as a specification relevant to what the sentence to be recarved says about its exact subject matter. 6. CONCLUSION I have proposed that the operation of carving up a content expressed by a sentence φ may be conceived as the partitioning of the bilateral proposition expressed by φ according to the exact subject matter of φ; moreover, I have proposed that the recarving of a content already carved up by a sentence φ may be seen as an operation that restricts the given subject matter in accordance with what φ says about its subject matter. Such a notion of restriction in accordance with what φ says about its subject matter has been characterized in terms of the relation of determination between properties; the resulting account proposes content recarving as an operation of subject matter restriction, where restriction is intended as a relevant specification. As I hope, this proposal clarifies the apparently mysterious procedure described in §64 of the Foundations of Arithmetic: the application of the specific content of the symbol 'ǁ' to a and b is interpreted as the restriction of the 16 Both the pragmatic answer and the best world answer are suggested by Yablo (2014), p.36 Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 46 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. subject matter (i.e. line a, line b) to the aspect most relevant to what 'a ǁ b' says about it: directions. As a result of this restriction of subject matter, the new condition applied to the new subject matter has to be more general, and in this respect I also hope to have clarified what is the result of "removing what is specific in the content of ". The proposal has the advantage of explaining the operation of content recarving using a philosophically significant notion – that of subject matter – with reference to a robust theoretical characterization of this notion (Lewis-Yablo theory of subject matter). The fact that the proposal presents several limitations insofar as it is neither a proper interpretation of Frege's view nor a characterization within Frege's conceptual universe, has the advantage of resulting more general in its applications: indeed, the described recarving operation is not limited to the case of abstraction principles. There are two main possible future works stemming from the given characterization. The first one is the analysis of other abstraction principles: the outcome of such an analysis is that some abstraction principles may not be considered as obtained by content recarving, for they may not perform an effective subject matter restriction. The second one concerns the relation between mathematical language and subject matter: arithmetical statements, when conceived as obtained by a recarving operation, may be seen as sentences that while succeeding in being about mathematical notions, are not committed to the existence of mathematical objects. This reasearch was funded by the FAPESP grant n. 2014/27057-5 Vincenzo Ciccarelli 47 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. REFERENCES ARMSTRONG, D. M. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press, 1996. DUMMETT, M. Frege, Philosophy of Mathematics. Duckwell, 1991. FREGE, G. Foundations of Arithmetic. Routledge, 1950. FREGE, G., GEACH, P. T., and BLACK, M. On Concept and Object. Mind, 60(238):168–180, 1951. GOODMAN, N. About. Mind, 70:1, 1961. HALE, B. Grundlagen § 64. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 97(3):243– 261, 1997. JOHNSON, W. E. Logic, Part 1. Cambridge University Press, 2014. KÖRNER, S. and SEARLE, J. On Determinables and Resemblance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 33(1):125–158, 1959. LEWIS, D. Statements Partly About Observation Philosophical Papers, 17(1):1–31, 1988. POTTER, M. and SMILEY, T. Abstraction by Recarving. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101(3):327–338, 2001. PRIOR, A. N. Determinables, Determinates and Determinants (ii). Mind, 58(230):178–194, 1949. RICKETTS, T. and POTTER, M. The Cambridge Companion to Frege. Cambridge University Press, 2010. RYLE, G. 'About'. Analysis, 1(1):10–12, 1933. Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction 48 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. YABLO, S. Mental Causation. Philosophical Review, 101(2):245–280, 1992. _____ Carving the Content at its Joints. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38. pp.145-177, 2008. _____ Aboutness. Princeton University Press, 2014.

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.268 Vol. 12, No. 3 * December 2017 © 2017 Author 304 CAN WE INTEND THE PAST? Oded Na'aman n the burgeoning literature on the rationality of regret, Jay Wallace's The View from Here has played an important role. It is a book full of provocative and gripping ideas. One such idea concerns the way in which our love and attachment may, and often do, implicate us in the wrongs and evils of the past. In particular, Wallace argues that our love and attachment involve something like a willingness to bring about the necessary conditions for the existence of their objects, even when those conditions involve wrongs and evils that we should not be willing to bring about. Therefore, the persons and things that are most important to us implicate us in their morally dubious genealogy. Wallace calls the backward unfurling of intention due to one's present attachments the affirmation dynamic. Some have found the affirmation dynamic plausible and offered further defense of it.1 Others have found plausible a qualified version of the affirmation dynamic.2 I argue that the affirmation dynamic is impossible, at least as Wallace construes it. In particular, I argue that the idea that we may have intention-like attitudes about the past is fundamentally confused. It betrays a misguided conception of retrospection as involving a choice between courses of history. As an alternative to this timeless conception of retrospection, I briefly propose that retrospection is diachronic: it begins after the moment of choice or action has passed and unfolds over time and in accordance with its own standards of appropriateness. Contrary to Wallace's view, affirming and regretting the past involve no longer viewing it as a matter of choice. I We may regret the past in various ways. However, according to Wallace, all-in regret involves an on-balance preference that the object of regret did not occur.3 Wallace's counterpart to all-in regret is on-balance affirmation. On-balance affir1 Kolodny, "Dynamics of Affirmation." 2 Nagel, "An Invitation to Hand-Wringing"; Munoz-Dardé, "Puzzles of Regret." 3 Wallace, The View from Here, 55. I Can We Intend the Past? 305 mation involves an on-balance preference that the object of affirmation did occur. In regretting or affirming (I henceforth drop the qualifications "all-in" and "on-balance") we settle the question: "Would we, knowing what we now know about how things have since played out, bring it about that things were otherwise in the respect that we are focusing on, if it were in our power to do so?"4 The attitudes of regret and affirmation are therefore like conditional intentions. They involve a commitment to doing something in certain conditions. These attitudes are only like conditional intention because the conditions they invoke will never obtain and therefore these attitudes will never lead to action.5 Affirmation of one object, according to Wallace, has a way of spreading to others. The people we love and the projects to which we are attached give us powerful reasons to affirm them.6 The affirmation that is called for with regard to objects of love and attachment is especially demanding, for it involves being "glad on balance that those objects are part of the history of the world, taking into account the totality of things that they involved."7 Crucially, Wallace claims that this unconditional affirmation entails a commitment to affirming "the historical conditions that were necessary for the existence of the thing that one affirms."8 Such affirmation is incompatible with regret, and therefore our unconditional affirmation of the objects of our attachment precludes regretting any of the necessary conditions (whether causal or constitutive) for their existence. This is the affirmation dynamic. II The affirmation dynamic leads to serious trouble. The causal lineage that made one's objects of attachment possible is bound to involve some deeply regrettable events somewhere along the way. I, for one, can confidently say that neither my existence nor the existence of most of the people I love would have been possible if it were not for the occurrence of the Holocaust. Similar concerns arise with regard to many of the projects and activities we cherish. For instance, Wallace remarks that the readers of his book are likely to be attached to academic philosophy, itself a "bourgeois pursuit" made possible by serious past (and present) injustice. Once we consider the intricate courses of history that made the objects of our attachments possible, none of us remain unscathed by their sordid past. 4 Wallace, The View from Here, 62 5 Wallace, The View from Here, 55–57. 6 Wallace, The View from Here, 75. 7 Wallace, The View from Here, 75. 8 Wallace, The View from Here, 75. 306 Na'aman We are committed to willing those evils and wrongs without which the objects of our attachments would not have existed. Thomas Nagel accepts the affirmation dynamic but in light of its disturbing upshots claims it should be contained: "our affirmation of anything . . . is bounded by a statute of limitations on its reach into the past. We can take much about the world that we have not created, good and bad, as simply given, and limit our affirmations and regrets to what is downstream from that."9 Niko Kolodny defends Wallace's unbounded affirmation dynamic by arguing against Nagel's proposed cutoff point.10 Why does the affirmation of an object of attachment commit us to affirming all the necessary conditions for its existence? Kolodny argues this is due to the principle of instrumental rationality, according to which if one intends an end one is committed to intending the necessary means to it. Let me briefly rehearse Kolodny's argument. As Wallace argues, and both Kolodny and Nagel accept, by affirming an object of our attachment we intend to bring it about if we could. If a past wrong was necessary for the existence of the object of our attachment, then if we could bring it about this wrong would be a necessary means for the existence of the object of our attachment. Given that we intend to bring about the object of our attachment, the principle of instrumental rationality commits us to intending to bring about the necessary means to it, including the past wrong. It does not matter where on the axis of time the past wrong lies; what matters for our commitment to affirming it is only that it was necessary for our end, that is, for the existence of the object of our attachment. Thus, instrumental rationality leads us from affirming the object of our attachment to affirming all of its necessary conditions.11 III Kolodny's argument is valid, but it relies on a premise that both Nagel and Kolodny accept without question: that regret and affirmation are intention-like attitudes. If this premise is false, and regret and affirmation should not be construed as intention-like attitudes, then it is also false that by failing to affirm the necessary conditions for the existence of one's object of affirmation one fails to intend the necessary means for one's end. The affirmation dynamic would be blocked right from the start. The principle of instrumental rationality does not plausibly apply to wishes, for example, because they do not relate to action as intentions do. 9 Nagel, "An Invitation to Hand-Wringing," 25–26. 10 Kolodny, "Dynamics of Affirmation." 11 Kolodny, "Dynamics of Affirmation," 772. Can We Intend the Past? 307 One crucial element of intention, conditional or not, is that from the agent's point of view it might lead to action. In other words, one cannot intend what one takes to be impossible.12 If I went to sleep early last night then I cannot go to sleep early last night again; if I did not go to sleep early last night then I can never do so. But if I believe that it is impossible for me to go to sleep early last night, then it is impossible for me to intend to go to sleep early last night, even though it is perfectly possible for me to regret not doing so or to be glad I did.13 Regret and affirmation cannot be like intending a past occurrence since they are possible when the latter is not. Wallace, however, does not suggest that in regretting or affirming a past occurrence we actually intend to change or repeat that very same occurrence. Rather, he argues that in regretting or affirming a past occurrence we intend to change or repeat it if we could. Wallace may therefore grant that if one believes [φ-ing in c] is impossible then it is impossible that one intends [to φ in c]. And yet Wallace may still insist that when one believes [φ-ing in c] is impossible, one may consistently believe that [φ-ing if c] is possible and therefore intend [to φ if c]. The reasoning might be the following: if c is impossible, then it will never be the case that c obtains and I do not φ, so my success at [φ-ing if c] is guaranteed. The impossibility of the antecedent guarantees the satisfaction of the intended conditional. This maneuver, however, is too successful. Since [φ-ing if c] is trivially satisfied due to the impossibility of c, there is nothing I need to do in order to [φ if c]. In particular, I do not ever need to intend to φ. My conditional intentions are empty when I take them to be trivially realized. Consider my intention to run in the street naked if 2 + 2 = 5. Since I believe the antecedent impossible, I may intend never to run in the street naked and still coherently intend to do so if 2 + 2 = 5. Whether because I cannot intend what I take to be impossible or because I believe the condition of my intention is impossible, I do not intend anything at all. As I said, it is crucial for intention that from the agent's point of view it might lead to action.14 By contrast, it is precisely the impossibility of action that makes room for regret. It is distinctive of regret that it is directed toward settled facts. Even if we can act to mitigate the negative consequences of a regrettable choice or compen12 Davidson, "Intending," 100–1. For the purposes of this discussion, I use "believe impossible" and "take to be impossible" interchangeably. 13 Note that I might falsely believe it possible for me to go to sleep early last night, in which case it would be possible for me to intend to do so. We cannot do what is impossible, but we can intend it as long as we believe it possible. 14 Hills ("Hindsight," 11–12) makes a similar point. 308 Na'aman sate those harmed by it, our regret is intelligible only on the assumption that we take the choice itself to be irreversible. We can wish we did not make it, or wish we could go back and choose differently, but we can intend neither. To say that affirmation and regret are different from conditional intentions only in that their conditions are taken by the agent to be impossible is to say that affirmation and regret are nothing like conditional intentions. IV I said earlier that many of the people I love would not have existed were it not for the occurrence of the Holocaust. Clearly, it would be insane of me to intend the occurrence of the Holocaust for the sake of the individuals whose existence was made possible by it. But why would it be insane? Wallace and Kolodny are impressed by the fact that I cannot justify causing so much evil and suffering for the sake of my few friends and family members. But to stop here would be to overlook a further aspect of my would-be insanity, namely, that by intending to bring about the Holocaust for the sake of the existence of my loved ones I would be treating the occurrence of the Holocaust as unsettled. That is, by intending to bring about the Holocaust I would commit myself to the possibility of actually bringing about the Holocaust. I would thereby fail to appreciate the fact that the Holocaust is an event that lies in the past and whose occurrence I can do absolutely nothing about. A willingness to bring about an event like the Holocaust is morally insane; a willingness to bring about the Holocaust is plain insane. The idea that we can have intentions about the past can seem plausible if we conceive of retrospection as a choice between courses of history. Such a choice would aspire to take into account the totality of occurrences in each possible chain of events to determine which course of history should be chosen on balance.15 On this timeless conception of retrospection, as we might call it, our regret and affirmation reflect where we happen to be in history, but they are justified by a more fundamental choice that is not itself expressive of any course of history. Our location in time should not impact our evaluation of each course of history taken as a whole. Intending a past occurrence does not seem insane since the intention is expressive of one's endorsement of an entire course of history considered from an atemporal point of view. In light of this model of retrospection, our commitment to people with whom we happen to coexist at the expense of those who existed before us seems difficult to justify.16 15 Again, Hills makes a similar point ("Hindsight," 19). 16 Setiya ("The Ethics of Existence") claims that we should prefer the existence of those who coexist with us over their nonexistence. However, his claim seems difficult to square with Can We Intend the Past? 309 Wallace is not alone in implicitly assuming such a timeless conception of retrospection. Kieran Setiya recently discussed retrospection as a preference between "world-histories."17 And John Rawls relies on this model of retrospection for his view of rational regret. According to Rawls, regret about one's choices is rational when the choices were not part of one's rational life plan, understood as the plan "that would be decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection in which the agent reviews, in the light of all the relevant facts, what it would be like to carry out these plans and thereby ascertained the course of action that would best realize his more fundamental desires."18 According to Rawls, in making a particular choice a rational person endorses a life plan of which the choice is a component; correspondingly, in regretting a particular choice a rational person disowns a life plan of which the choice is a component. In short, for Rawls, every rational choice is a choice of a whole life plan, which spans backward and forward in time. Therefore, in intending a specific choice a rational agent intends its rational future as well as its rational past. V A focus on the choiceand action-guiding roles of practical reason might have led philosophers to endorse a timeless conception of retrospection: a conception of retrospection as a choice of history. But retrospection should not be construed as a futile attempt to undo or redo history as viewed from a point of view outside of it. Rather, retrospection occurs when the past is already settled and the space for intention is closed; it occurs in time and over time and may involve various complicated emotions and thoughts. For example, a diachronic model of retrospection differs from a timeless model of retrospection in making room for non-comparative preferences or wishes. In a choice situation, preferences are naturally interpreted as comparative: a preference against one option tells in favor of the alternative, and vice versa. Accordingly, if we model retrospection on a choice between courses of history, then a preference against one course of history tells in favor of another. That this model is mistaken is demonstrated by the fact that we often have rational non-comparative preferences about the past. When I order the burger but his timeless conception of retrospection, in which our attitudes toward the past are determined by our overall evaluations of possible courses of history. Setiya's claim about preferences regarding coexisters may therefore seem like an ad hoc exception made to accommodate intuitions that tell against his timeless conception of retrospection. 17 Setiya, "The Ethics of Existence," 294, and "Retrospection," 10. 18 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 415–16. 310 Na'aman later wish I had the schnitzel instead, I have a comparative counterfactual wish, but if the burger gave me food poisoning I might simply wish I did not have it without having any replacement in mind, in which case I have a non-comparative counterfactual wish. Preferring or wishing that things were otherwise does not rationally commit us to preferring the most likely alternative, or any specific alternative at all for that matter. Upon reading the memoirs of Jean Améry, Primo Levi, or Robert Antelme, I am horrified by the events of the Holocaust and wish with all my heart that they did not occur. But I do not thereby commit myself to preferring any specific alternative history, and I certainly do not commit myself to preferring a history in which my loved ones did not exist. Appropriate retrospection might preclude a consistent view of our preferred course of history. This is an important lesson from Wallace's affirmation dynamic: there is probably no causally possible course of history that would satisfy all our most fervent retrospective preferences-no one course of history that we favor over all others given the totality of things it includes. But this is as it should be given that history is not, for us, a matter of choice.19 Stanford University [email protected] References Davidson, Donald. "Intending." In Essays on Actions and Events, 83–102. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Hills, David. "Hindsight." Unpublished manuscript. Kolodny, Niko. "Dynamics of Affirmation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92, no. 3 (May 2016): 771–77. Munoz-Dardé, Véronique. "Puzzles of Regret." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92, no. 3. (May 2016): 778–84. Nagel, Thomas. "An Invitation to Hand-Wringing." London Review of Books 36, no. 7 (April 3, 2014): 25–26. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. Setiya, Kieran. "The Ethics of Existence." Philosophical Perspectives 28, no. 1 (December 2014): 291–301. ---. "Retrospection." Philosophers' Imprint 16, no. 15 (August 2016): 1–15. 19 I wish to thank Johann Frick and Jorah Dannenberg for their valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper. Can We Intend the Past? 311 Wallace, R. Jay. The View from Here: On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

EL LENGUAJE DEL DERECHO: UNA CUESTIÓN DE TIEMPO Marina Gorali1 "Leer lo que nunca ha sido escrito. Tal lectura es la más antigua... la lectura de las vísceras, de las estrellas o de las danzas." W. Benjamin Resumen: Para Meschonnic el ritmo es el problema de la teoría del lenguaje. También el pensamiento de qué sea un sujeto, de qué sea un poema, de qué sea la ética y de qué sea la política. Y de su íntima vinculación. Por ello el problema concierne a la filosofía. En ese marco, el presente trabajo pretende aportar dos lecturas para repensar el derecho y el lenguaje jurídico: una lectura crítica del signo desde y con una crítica del ritmo, situada por Benveniste y retomada por Meschonnic; pero también por las epistemologías del sur. Y una lectura del concepto de Tiempo-ahora (Jetztzeit) de Walter Benjamin, que interroga el tiempo homogéneo y vacío propio del paradigma del progreso moderno; proponiendo una praxis ya no del proyecto por venir, sino de la interrupción como modo de acción. Palabras clave: Crítica del signo – ritmo – tiempo praxis derecho I. Introducción H. Meschonnic (1982) escribía que el pensamiento del lenguaje depende más de su impensado que de lo que es capaz de pensar. En esa medida y desmesura, afectan las cosas del lenguaje a la filosofía. Inscribiéndose en la línea trazada por Benveniste, el autor invita entonces a una crítica del signo desde y con una crítica del ritmo. El ritmo como organización del movimiento de la palabra. Un trabajo de restitución de una escucha incomprendida. Para 1 Doctora en Derecho por la Universidad de Buenos Aires/ Profesora de Filosofía del Derecho de la Universidad de Buenos Aires /Profesora de Sociología Jurídica de la Universidad Nacional de Avellaneda/ Investigadora Proyecto Ubacyt "Leer el derecho" dirigido por el Dr. Carlos M. Cárcova. [email protected] / [email protected] Meschonnic el ritmo es el problema de la teoría del lenguaje. También el pensamiento de qué sea un sujeto, de qué sea un poema, de qué sea la ética y de qué sea la política. Y de su íntima vinculación. Por ello el problema concierne a la filosofía. La propuesta avanza entonces hacia una lectura del ritmo que implica, a su vez, una lectura de los silencios, los tonos, acentos y desaciertos. Ya no una simple hermenéutica del sentido sino una búsqueda de lo desconocido del lenguaje. Lo que está ante (fuera) y más allá del signo; y simultáneamente en él: su extimidad. Una crítica del derecho implica una escucha de las lenguas que lo organizan, como práctica y discurso. Una lectura de lo que allí calla, susurra, grita, apura, acompaña o detiene. En definitiva, una lectura del ritmo, que no es otra cosa que la pregunta por la temporalidad. Una crítica del derecho se torna así una crítica del tiempo, de sus representaciones y luchas. Como sugería Brecht, una praxis de la interrupción que desarticula el naturalismo teatral bajo el cual l@s espectadores quedan absortos. En ese marco, el presente trabajo pretende aportar dos lecturas para repensar el derecho y el lenguaje que lo organiza: 1. Una lectura crítica del signo desde y con una crítica del ritmo, situada por Benveniste y retomada por Meschonnic; pero también por las epistemologías del sur. 2. Una lectura del concepto de Tiempo-ahora (Jetztzeit) de Walter Benjamin, que interroga el tiempo homogéneo y vacío propio del paradigma del progreso moderno; proponiendo una praxis ya no del proyecto por venir, sino de la interrupción como modo de acción. II. Crítica del signo, crítica del ritmo: más allá del principio de no contradicción. Siendo el lenguaje, como señala Meschonnic, aquello en lo que y por lo que se piensa y vive una vida humana, en el sentido en que "el lenguaje sirve para vivir" (Meschonnic, 2007:13) se pretende aquí inscribir algunos lineamientos para una crítica del signo desde una crítica del ritmo. Esta dimensión de lo impensado es respecto a la paradigmática del signo una contra-coherencia que hay que reconocer y poner al descubierto. Una contra-coherencia ya no en el sentido del absurdo de Camus sino de lo que podría situarse como más allá del principio de no contradicción. La paradoja de Schröedinger podría constituir un buen comienzo. Ese impensado es la cadena íntegra del continuo del lenguaje, que consiste necesariamente en el continuo ritmo-sintaxis-prosodia, en la cadena de las significaciones ocultadas por el dualismo del significante y significado. Ese encadenamiento transforma necesariamente todo el pensamiento del lenguaje y del interpretar. Atender al ritmo, al movimiento de la palabra, a su discontinuidad y también a su silencio, a su mudez. Reconocer allí una parábola de la escucha. El asunto no puede dejar de constituirse más que como un combate: el para del ritmo interrumpiendo el reino del signo como centralidad, el fonocentrismo. Hacer eco de esta disputa muestra el tiempo de la transformación misma, una crítica de la temporalidad homogénea, teleológica y lineal. III. Jetztzeit (tiempo-ahora) como modo de acción. Como bien señala Michel Löwy (2002) en su introducción a los comentarios sobre la tesis de filosofía del historia, en Benjamin no hay sistema filosófico, más bien toda su reflexión adopta la forma del ensayo o el fragmento. En consecuencia, toda tentativa de sistematización de este pensamiento resulta problemática e incierta. Pensamiento inclasificable, la obra de Benjamin nos habla de un crítico radical de la filosofía del progreso, de un revolucionario antievolucionista. Esta heterodoxia benjaminiana será también legataria y a la vez participe de lo que Foster denomina la generación antipositivista de fines del siglo XIX y principios del XX. Generación que constituirá una clara rebelión contra la hegemonía del discurso positivista y los resabios de la tradición ilustrada, cuyo primer gran responsable, será Nietzsche. La crisis civilizatoria que, inscripta en el propio despliegue de la modernidad, se volverá el tema obsesivo de la generación postnietzscheana, a la que pertenecerán Buber, Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem, Landauer, Kafka, Bloch y Lukács. Es posible identificar una triple inscripción filiatoria en gran parte de las reflexiones fragmentarias de Benjamin; romanticismo2, materialismo histórico y mesianismo. Producción que no implica una mera combinación de fuentes o síntesis ecléctica sino de la invención a partir de ellas de una renovada mirada sobre el marxismo, la estética, la temporalidad, el derecho y la justicia. La relación de Benjamin con el materialismo histórico ha estado signada por su cercana relación con B. Brecht. El trabajo de Benjamin cuestiona al marxismo mecanicista de corte positivista insistente en interpretar a la historia como una máquina de evolución automática. Cuestión que trae asimismo una crítica al paradigma del progreso y la temporalidad homogénea y vacía que lo acompaña. En ese marco, propone un concepto totalmente disruptivo que desarticula toda la filosofía de la historia, que es el de Jetztzeit (tiempo – ahora). Ligado al concepto de interrupción del teatro de Brecht que desarma el naturalismo teatral bajo el cual los/las espectadores quedan absortos. Bhabha explica que en Brecht, la interrupción es el método dramático que posibilita precisamente la ruptura del encantamiento al que el naturalismo teatral y la normalización someten al público. Es en esta función de interrupción que la acción exhibe su capacidad propiamente transformadora. El tiempo actual, la Jetztzeit o el tiempo-ahora debe ser pensado en el sentido secular y colectivo de acción revolucionaria: el presente como momento de constante posibilidad revolucionaria. Benjamin resignifica así el concepto de redención que, como bien señala Lowy, requiere ser leído en el sentido profano de la emancipación de los oprimidos. La humanidad misma es el mesías, la cual debe esforzarse por ejercer ese poder. Circunstancia que implica no un proyecto a realizarse, la emancipación siempre adelante, sino de la interrupción como modo de acción. 2 El romanticismo implicando no sólo una escuela estética sino una profunda visión del mundo articulada sobre la base de una crítica a la civilización moderna capitalista y a la racionalidad instrumental que ésta trae aparejada; una crítica a la mecanización de la vida, a la reificación de las relaciones sociales y al desencantamiento del mundo; y una mirada nostálgica hacia el pasado que no significa necesariamente reacción, aunque también la supone. En el romanticismo revolucionario, por ejemplo, el objetivo no es un retorno al pasado sino un desvío por éste hacia un porvenir otro. Será la alegoría de la tesis IX, la que expresará en su doble dimensión crítica y profética las miserias catastróficas de ideal moderno de progreso. La tesis habla de un cuadro de Klee que se llama Angelus Novus, en él, escribe Benjamin, vemos a un ángel que parece estar alejándose de algo mientras lo mira con fijeza. Tiene los ojos desorbitados, la boca abierta y las alas desplegadas. Ese es el aspecto que debe mostrar necesariamente el ángel de la historia. Su rostro está vuelto hacia el pasado. Donde se nos presenta una cadena de acontecimientos, él no ve sino una sola y única catástrofe, que no deja de amontonar ruinas sobre ruinas y las arroja a sus pies. Querría demorarse, despertar a los muertos y reparar lo destruido. Pero desde el Paraíso sopla una tempestad que se ha aferrado a sus alas, tan fuerte que ya no puede cerrarlas. La tempestad lo empuja irresistiblemente hacia el futuro, al cual da la espalda, mientras que frente a él las ruinas se acumulan hasta el cielo. Esa tempestad es lo que llamamos progreso. Se trata de un texto de una gran profundidad que traduce entre otras cosas la crítica romántica al ideal ilustrado del progreso, donde el ángel de la historia testimonia boquiabierto y desorbitado la montaña de ruinas que arroja a sus pies. Quisiera reparar lo destruido más no puede, desde el Paraíso sopla una tempestad llamada progreso que lo empuja irresistiblemente hacia el futuro. Esta tempestad del progreso se constituirá entonces para Benjamin como la contracara inevitable de la catástrofe. En un texto de 1938 "Parque Central. Fragmentos sobre Baudelaire" señala: "Es preciso fundar el concepto de progreso sobre la idea de catástrofe". Tema que forjará en gran parte el trabajo de Adorno y Horkheimer sobre la "Dialéctica de la Ilustración". La Ilustración o el Iluminismo es posibilitadora de la emancipación pero también de la barbarie. La fabricación de cadáveres constituye un claro ejemplo de ello. La crítica benjaminiana a la idea de progreso no se limita entonces a su automatismo o linealidad; sino que ahonda en una cuestión aún más profunda, la del tiempo. "La idea de un progreso de la especie humana a lo largo de la historia escribe Benjamin en la tesis XIII es inseparable de la idea de su marcha a través de un tiempo homogéneo y vacío". Y agrega: "La crítica centrada en la idea de una marcha semejante es el fundamento necesario de la que acomete contra la idea de progreso en general". A este tiempo homogéneo y vacío, puramente mecánico y cuantitativo representado por el automatismo del reloj le opondrá un tiempo cualitativo, un tiempo actual, aquello que Benjamin denomina Jetztzeit. "La historia es una construcción cuyo marco no es el tiempo homogéneo y vacío sino un ámbito de tiempo actual". IV. Crítica jurídica, tiempo e interrupción. Del mismo modo que Derrida sostenía que el poema está en el corazón de la filosofía, el tiempo está en el corazón del derecho. Un tiempo-lenguaje, un tiempo-ritmo que reinscribe la interpretación de la letra jurídica y su ambición de significar. El concepto de Jetztzeit exhibe allí su capacidad propiamente transformadora. Una crítica del derecho se torna así una crítica del tiempo, de sus representaciones y disputas. Como sugería Brecht, una praxis de la interrupción. No todo forma conjunto. Es el escándalo de la muerte, escribe Levinas leyendo a Rosenzweig, lo que desintegra la síntesis universal. El tiempo-ahora puede tal vez constituir el tono de un nuevo comienzo, el inicio de una nueva juridicidad. Emprender el desciframiento del valor de esta insistencia exige el pulso de una lucha: la escucha atenta de lo que allí no se deja decir. Referencias bibliográficas Arendt, H. (2005) De la historia a la acción, Buenos Aires: Paidós. Barretta, C. (2013) Ritmando danzas. Análisis rítmico de la danza. Buenos Aires: Autores de Argentina. Bhabba, H. (2013) Nuevas minorías, nuevos derechos. Notas sobre cosmopolitismos vernáculos, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI. Benjamin, W. (2009) Obras, Madrid: Abada Editores. Benjamin, W. (2007). Concepto de filosofía de la historia. La Plata: Terramar. Benveniste, E. (1966) "La noción de ritmo en su expresión lingüística" en Problemas de lingüística general. Cárcova C. M. (2020) Semiosis y derecho. En prensa Derrida, J. (2000) El derecho a la filosofía desde el punto de vista cosmopolítico. ÉNDOXA N° 12, Madrid, pp. 381-395. Foster, R y Tatián, D. (2005) Mesianismo, nihilismo y redención. Buenos Aires: Altamira Goodrich, P. (2005) Nietzsche and Legal Theory: Half – Written laws. Edited by Peter Goodrich and Mariana Valdeverde, London: Routledge. Gorali, M. (2014) "Derecho, comunidad política e interpretación". En Cárcova, C. Los derechos fundamentales en la Constitución: interpretación y lenguaje. Revista Jurisprudencia Argentina, Número especial, Buenos Aires: Abeledo Perrot. Meschonnic H. (1982) Critique du rythme. Anthropologie historique du langage, Lagrasse: Verdier. Meschonnic, H. (2004) Un golpe bíblico a la filosofía. Buenos Aires: Lilmod. Miller, J. A. (2010) Extimidad. Buenos Aires: Paidos. Levinas, E. (2019) La hora de las naciones. Salamanca: Sigueme. Lowy, M. (2002) Walter Benjamin. Aviso de incendio. Buenos Aires: FCE. Voloshinov, V. (1929) El marxismo y la filosofía del lenguaje. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Godot, 2009.

The Beauty in Art and the Notion of Proportion "The good, of course, is always beautiful, and the beautiful never lacks proportion." Plato In the western world, contemplation on art began with the philosophers of ancient Greece. Plato discussed portion as the source of beauty, and imitation as the primary mode of art. Plato's influence on western culture generally is a very strong one, and this includes a strong influence on the arts, and on theories of art. In the case of the arts and aesthetic theory that influence is mostly indirect, and is best understood if one knows a little bit about his philosophy. "Artists should... fix their eyes on perfect truth as a perpetual standard of reference, to be contemplated with the minutest care, before they proceed to deal with earthly canons about things beautiful." -Plato Plato's perspective and vision in art consisted that Art is imitation. This is a feature of both of Plato's theories. Indeed he was the first to establish this philosophy of art in western history, he established this philosophy that affected many artists later in the Renaissance. In Plato's view, the art imitates reality, so was the idea was very strong in the Renaissance, when Vasari, in his Lives of the Painters, said that "painting is just the imitation of all the living things of nature with their colors and designs just as they are in nature." It may still be the most commonly held theory. Most people still think that a picture must be a picture of something, and that an artist is someone who can make a picture that "looks just like the real thing". It wasn't until late in the nineteenth century that the idea of art as imitation began to fade from western aesthetics, to be replaced by theories about art as expression, art 1 as communication, art as pure form, art as whatever elicits an "aesthetic" response, and a number of other theories. So if art is imitation, what does it imitate? Here is where Plato's two theories come in. In the Republic, Plato says that art imitates the objects and events of ordinary life. In other words, a work of art is a copy of a copy of a Form. It is even more of an illusion than is ordinary experience. On this theory, works of art are at best entertainment and at worst a dangerous delusion. The view of the artist as inspired revealer of ideal essences fits well with the spirit of Plato's Symposium, a dialogue full of speeches in praise of Love, in which Socrates gives a compelling picture of the ascent from sexual love, to the aesthetic appreciation of beautiful bodies, to the love of beautiful souls, and finally to the contemplation of the ideal Form of Beauty itself. The same spirit fills much classic Greek art. Late classical sculpture presents gods and heroes as ideal bodies, built in perfect proportions, and filled with a cool repose, as if they inhabited a perfect and changeless divine world. The classical ideal of the artist as capturing an essence has continued to exert great power, from the Renaissance rediscovery of the Greek canons of proportion to the twentieth century sculptures of Constantin Brancusi, the paintings of Piet Mondrian, and the color theories of Vasily Kandinsky and the Blue Rider (der Blaue Reiter) group. Aristotle identified different kinds of imitation, and Xenocrates wrote technical dissertations on painting and sculpture that examined the ideal synthesis of proportion and imitation in terms of the lives of classical Geek artists. 2 1. Aesthetic harmony in Aristotle This juxtaposition does not seem that arbitrary if we take into account the fact that Aristotle's doctrine on music harmony is included in his Politics. The harmony in art could be used as an example of what the citizens of a society should aim at and what kind of form and content could social and political actions have, in order to assure social harmony. Umberto Eco (1993: 149) in his research on the archaeology of aesthetic theories, refers to the eighth book of Politics, where Aristotle classifies melodies into three categories, ethical melodies, melodies of action, and passionate or inspiring melodies, the first ones being useful for pedagogical purposes and the others for theatrical spectacle. The educational dimension of art in Politics, as it is explored regarding the music harmonies, is not entirely distinct from pleasure: the melody represents the composer's state of mind and transmits aesthetic values through the mediation of senses to the spectator and thus modifies the state of mind of the later. However, music does not only contribute to the education of human beings, but also provides enjoyment and satisfies the spirit (1340a 38 ff.). Aristotle describes in Poetics how both goals of art, education and satisfaction can be accomplished. It is not only the content (myth) of the tragedy that is important but also the configuration of external elements, such as extensio n and language (1451a 21-29). The symmetry of the parts of a play presupposes an exterior (lexical items) as well as interior (plot) coherence. These norms ensure the organic balance, the harmony and the aesthetic 3 quality of the tragedy. Eco is right when he remarks that there is a quantitative conception of aesthetics in Aristotle: the right proportion among the parts of the tragedy (episodes and chorals) is a sine qua non rule for the construction of a well-structured and homogeneous play. The beauty in ancient Greek philosophical tradition, not only the Aristotelian one, is strongly assoc iated with proportion (Eco, 1993: 90). This principle of symmetry is generalizable; forasmuch as it is used as a normative rule in figurative arts. Nonetheless, the proportion for Ancient Greeks does not only describe a mathematical relation, but also represents a metaphysical principle. Thus, beauty is the measurement of the elements of the external form (in the case of tragedy, the meter, the symmetry of the parts, the number of syllables, the number of verses) as well as the aesthetic harmony which the play transmits as total to the spectators (in the same case, the content must be neither superior nor inferior to the chosen form; otherwise the form would give the impression of grotesque or inadequate). Eco in his research on ancient aesthetics (1993: 109) cites the comment of Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle's On the Soul (426a), where the Greek philosopher seems to identify the voice and the sense of hearing. The conclusion is that both philosophers agree on the fact that harmony is a certain proportion. We will proceed now to explore the application of this principle to the concept of social harmony.

Reason to be Cheerful Tom Cochrane Forthcoming in Review of Philosophy and Psychology Abstract This paper identifies a tension between the commitment to forming rationally justified emotions and the happy life. To illustrate this tension I begin with a critical evaluation of the positive psychology technique known as 'gratitude training'. I argue that gratitude training is at odds with the kind of critical monitoring that several philosophers have claimed is regulative of emotional rationality. More generally, critical monitoring undermines exuberance, an attitude that plays a central role in contemporary models of the happy life. Thus, prominent notions of what it takes to maintain emotion rationality and what it takes to maintain happiness are in tension. To resolve this tension, I argue that some people have good reason to depreciate critical monitoring-even while maintaining the requirement of emotion rationality that we be sensitive to facts about how our concerns are faring. Keywords: emotion, rationality, happiness, well-being, exuberance, absorption 1. Introduction It is commonly said that intelligence and happiness are in conflict. Famously, Mill explores the issue in Utilitarianism (1863) and argues that intelligent people have greater opportunities for satisfaction. Recent psychological studies have also addressed the issue, with rather mixed results.1 My focus in this paper is somewhat narrower. I want to determine whether there is a conflict between the happy life and emotional rationality. This is a question that has very rarely been subject to philosophical analysis.2 Yet it is here that intelligence and well-being may most 1 For instance, Nikolaev & McGee (2016) find that individuals with a greater verbal intelligence than their peers report higher levels of happiness. Similarly, Kanazawa (2014) finds that greater intelligence correlates with greater stability in happiness levels, itself correlated with a greater mean average. Yet Penney, Miedema & Masmanian (2015) find that verbal intelligence is a predictor of worry and depression while Zettergen & Bergman (2014) find that though individuals with high IQ adjust better in adolescence (mostly because of school achievement) they report moderately worse life satisfaction in adulthood. I suspect that these mixed results could be mitigated if the concepts of both well-being and intelligence were straightened out, but I will not pursue this issue here. 2 The only other study I am aware of is Kahane 2011, which I discuss below. 2 directly come into contact, given the plausible assumption that intelligent people like to maximise rationally justified mental states.3 On the basis of both empirical evidence and philosophical considerations, I argue that there is indeed a tension between emotional rationality and well-being. That is, dispositions constitutive of well-being and emotional rationality, while not mutually exclusive, tend to pull in opposing directions. The reason for this is that pursuing and maintaining emotional rationality places certain cognitive demands upon us that tend to undermine an exuberant approach to life, and there is good reason to think that exuberance is a major component of the happy life. Given the cliché that well-being and intelligence are at odds, the diagnosis of a tension between well-being and emotional rationality is unlikely to be mind-blowing, though it is worth clarifying where the conflict lies. What should hopefully be more surprising is how I then overcome the conflict. In the last section of this paper, I argue that once we properly understand the concern-relative nature of emotional rationality, there will be some people for whom it is maximally emotionally rational to be exuberant. This is the case even when we focus not on prudential or strategic rationality, but on the kind of epistemic rationality where we are sensitive to facts about how our concerns are faring. 2. Gratitude Training I want to begin my argument by critically examining a psychological intervention known as 'gratitude training'. This technique raises certain worries that serve as a useful illustration of issue I am getting at. Following this discussion, I will generalise my worries to identify the wider tension between well-being and emotional rationality. Gratitude training is one of the flagship techniques of the contemporary positive psychology movement (Bono et al., 2004; Seligman et al. 2005). The technique requires that each evening before you go to sleep, you simply write down a list of things for which you are grateful. There are different recommendations about how many items you are supposed to list, and the amount of contemplation required when making your list, but one of the key advantages of the technique is that it is fairly liberal and easy to maintain (Geraghty et al. 2010a; Seligman 2005). It is also clear that the positive psychologists work with a broad notion of what counts as meriting gratitude. We are not limited to cases where you receive a favour from another person. 3 I will use the terms 'happy life' and 'well-being' interchangeably in this paper. Note the distinction between this long-term state and episodic states of happiness. 3 Acceptable items include all kinds of things that make a positive difference: sunny days, health, job security and so on. Moreover, the individual is not typically encouraged to dwell on the contingency of these benefits. Accordingly, in a review by Wood et al. (2010), the authors define the kind of gratitude encouraged as "a life orientation towards noticing and appreciating the positive in life." The results of this simple technique are apparently dramatic. Researchers observe significantly improved reports of well-being, less depression and worrying, (Geraghty et al., 2010b; Seligman et al 2005; Watkins et al 2003) as well as improvements in hours of sleep and refreshment upon waking (Emmons & McCullough 2003). One of the studies in Emmons & McCullough (2003) even finds improved functioning in people with neurodegenerative diseases. Most notably, the effects of gratitude training are reported to be robust, with benefits to well-being persisting in one study even after six months (Seligman et al. 2005). Moreover, the more intensely one engages in gratitude training, the more powerful the effect (Emmons & McCullough 2003). How is gratitude training supposed to work? Naturally, there is some difficulty in establishing the causal processes involved, but there are several plausible hypotheses. The first and most obvious explanation is that gratitude training disposes the individual to pay more attention to the positive things that happen to them (cf. Rashid 2013: 987; Watkins et al. 2003; 449). For instance, the individual tends to make a mental note of positive matters in order to write about them later on. This leads to the more consistent stimulation of positive emotions. A second, related, hypothesis is that gratitude training prompts the individual to interpret situations and the behaviour of others as meriting some positive emotion (cf. Wood et al. 2008). Thus while the affective significance of a situation may be mixed, the individual is encouraged to see matters in a positive light. A third suggestion is that a grateful attitude can encourage a selfreinforcing behavioural strategy. If you are made more aware of the supportiveness of your social networks, you may be more likely to make use of these resources when you need them (Wood et al 2010: 901). Thus grateful people may deal with their problems better. Moreover, by expressing gratitude, individuals may build the good will of other people towards them (McCullough et al. 2001: 261; Emmons & McCullough 2003: 386; Rashid 2013: 986). On top of the above proposals, it is known that emotions generate mood-congruence biases. That is, it is easier to remember and attend to matters that reflect one's occurrent emotional state than ones that don't (Yiend 2009 provides a helpful meta-review of the various evidence). When suffering anxiety for instance, individuals are quicker to respond to stimuli that confirm feelings of vulnerability, and have a tendency to ignore or respond slower to disconfirming 4 evidence (de Jong & Vroling 2013). In the same way, the stimulation of positive emotions will encourage the individual to discern or to recall scenarios that stimulate further positive emotions. In this way, gratitude training should be self-reinforcing. Thus we have three or four different ways to account for the effectiveness of gratitude training. But all of these hypotheses have something in common. Note that even when appealing to behavioural strategies, the effectiveness of gratitude training on each hypothesis relies on a greater tendency to see the world as providing opportunities for positive emotions. This is where worries about rationality can get a foothold. Gratitude training functions by inculcating a cognitive bias towards noticing the positive in life. That is, you are manipulating the way you direct your attention such that the positive things stand out more. Attention is a limited resource. As a consequence, making the positive things stand out more entails making other matters recede into the background. Thus, gratitude training may encourage an individual to neglect matters that genuinely warrant anxious concern, indignation, or the recognition of loss. A positivity bias may have further worrying consequences. There is evidence that positive emotions can make individuals prone to attribute success to their own efforts when this is not the case. This is known as the self-serving bias (see e.g. Jundt & Hinsz 2002; Ifcher & Zarghamee 2014). Negative moral consequences may also accrue. One study by Tan & Forgas (2010) observed that in games where participants were in charge of allocating scarce resources, participants made to feel 'happy', either as a consequence of doing well on a test, or watching a comedy, tended to act more selfishly. Finally, note that the acceptable items when engaging in gratitude training can include one's own abilities (Wood et al: 891).4 In this case, gratitude training could also generate what is known as the licensing effect. This is where establishing one's credentials as a good or moral person can lead to a relaxing of efforts to be good or moral later on. For example, in a study by Sachdeva et al. (2009) individuals encouraged to think about their positive traits donated one fifth as much to charity as those encouraged to think about their negative traits. As with most findings in empirical psychology, the significance of these worrying effects may well be revised or refined in light of further evidence. Even if the effects are firmly established, they may turn out to be mild or transitory. We also don't know to what extent gratitude training might exacerbate such effects, or whether there are ways to refine gratitude training so that 4 Note that feeling in control of one's own well-being is believed to be conducive to well-being (e.g. Sanjuán et al. 2008). 5 these effects are avoided. For instance, the kinds of items that are acceptable to list could be restricted to favours from other people. Yet, to the extent that positive psychologists promote this intervention, these potential side effects ought to be investigated. Gratitude training is not risk-free. These concerns are rarely addressed in the gratitude training literature (perhaps positive psychologists are caught up in their own positivity bias). We do however find one brief, though quite plausible response in a book by the psychologist Tal Ben-Shahar: Our culture tends to highlight the negative and underplay the positive, leading to a distorted view of reality. The underlying cause of this biased perspective is to some extent the news media, which by and large plays the role of a magnifying glass (selectively focusing on the negative) rather than a looking glass (accurately representing reality). While there is certainly a value to the media's negative focus-playing the role of a watchdog-there are unhealthy side effects in the form of a distorted worldview. To counter this bias toward the empty part of the glass, we need to be hypervigilant about identifying the part of the glass that is full. (BenShahar 2012: 40) So Ben-Shahar claims that there is an existing balance of positive to negative issues that, due to the distorting influence of the news media, our everyday emotional lives fail to reflect. Thus it is justified to inculcate an attention bias towards sources of happiness, because it counteracts a pre-existing attention bias towards sources of worry and frustration. Moreover, no one is suggesting that the things one is grateful for may not genuinely merit gratitude. Thus gratitude training is rather like wearing corrective lenses in order to fix short-sightedness. In so far as a person may be suffering from clear and pronounced biases towards sources of worry and frustration, Ben-Shahar's response is sensible. However I continue to worry about the rationality of gratitude training for the average newspaper-reading member of the public. Suppose that the news media is a biasing influence. Which is the more rational response: to ignore that news, or to critically evaluate how well it reflects the actual state of the world? What if the state of the world is actually getting worse? Someone paying less attention would not be able to track this as well as someone who is simply more sceptical about the news. So my worry is this: the gratitude training regime encourages the individual in a broad way to pay less attention to sources of worry and frustration. But to systematically manipulate attention in this way risks desensitising the individual towards changes in their circumstances 6 that warrant negative emotions. In particular, there is no provision in gratitude training for correcting an overly optimistic attitude. Thus the individual may end up happier, but may also over-shoot the most appropriate ratio of positive to negative emotions. But now suppose the individual compensates by taking the time every evening to consider the negative things in life, in addition to the positive things in life. In all likelihood, the observed benefits of gratitude training would be reduced, if not fully undermined. Indeed, the control conditions in the gratitude training experiments confirm this (e.g. Wood et al. 2010: 898). The probable causal mechanisms underlying the effectiveness of gratitude training entail that the whole point is to reduce the attention one pays towards worries and frustrations. The more powerful the effect is to be, the more it must suffuse one's everyday life with an attention bias towards the positive. 3. Emotion Rationality So far, I have developed the worry that while gratitude training may contribute to the happy life, it may make you less rational because you are blinkered, or 'pollyannaish' towards circumstances that warrant negative emotions. However, this worry is nebulous until we get a clearer sense of what it is to be either rational or irrational with respect to one's emotional life. In particular, emotions may not be the sorts of things that are amenable to high standards of critical rationality, so systematic interventions like gratitude training may be our best alternative.5 To sharpen this debate, it's worth briefly considering what philosophers have had to say about emotion rationality. Once we've done that, we will more easily see where it is coming into conflict with gratitude training. My aim here is modest. Drawing on existing views, I present the requirement that emotionally rational people engage in significant critical monitoring. This condition is sufficient to count against gratitude training. Moreover, it will allow me to build the case that there's a conflict between emotion rationality and well-being more generally, not just with a particular psychological intervention. 5 This is close to the line that Guy Kahane (2011) takes. Kahane's main argument is that emotional reasons can conflict with hedonic reasons, for instance that emotional reasons tell us that we should feel grief, while hedonic reasons counsel avoiding such emotions. However, he offers cautious support for mood enhancing drugs, given findings regarding emotional set-points (that individuals tend to maintain fairly consistent emotion profiles over the long-term, no matter what triumphs or catastrophes occur). That is, emotional setpoints indicate that our emotions are highly influenced by a-rational factors anyway. I don't have space here to criticize set point theory (Bishop 2015: 170-180 has a very good discussion). I merely note that I am much more optimistic than Kahane that emotions can be held up to rational standards, specifically by means of critical monitoring. 7 There is disagreement about what emotions are exactly. Some philosophers and psychologists think that emotions are a kind of evaluation or judgement (e.g. Scherer 2005; Solomon 2007) where others treat emotions as something like perceptions, (e.g. Prinz 2004; Tappolet 2016) and a third group treats emotions more like behavioural tendencies (e.g. Frijda 1986; Deonna & Teroni 2012). On only the first of these views can emotions be treated as instances of rational cognition in themselves. However, all three views agree that emotions are geared towards tracking factual states of affairs, and specifically the values in play. Thus it is appropriate to feel fear only when the situation really is dangerous, or to feel envy only when one really is being outshined. A key idea here is that each type of emotion is specified by a formal object, e.g. 'dangerousness' or 'enviableness', which is an abstract property borne by the situation towards which the emotion is fittingly directed (e.g. de Sousa 1987; D'Arms & Jacobsen 2000; Prinz 2004). Determining the formal object partly depends on how the world is-a tiny yapping Chihuahua is nowhere near as dangerous as a rabid St Bernard. Partly it depends on us and what we care about-the chess grandmaster's ability is not enviable if I regard chess as a totally trivial and meaningless activity. For the purposes of this paper, I am not concerned with whether our values have any objective merit. I am interested in what makes a person emotionally rational when we take their concerns or values as a given. If a man cares deeply about avoiding the cracks in the pavement and his capacity to achieve this really is threatened, then it is rational for that man to feel fear. From this perspective there's still a couple of different ways to be irrational. If the man compulsively fears that passing cars will unbalance him, despite his explicit belief that they will not, then by his own standards his emotion is irrational. A second sort of irrational emotion is where the subject experiences fear on the basis of misconstruing the facts; he fears that the passing car will upset his balance but actually, the car has little effect or is even a positive influence. Note that such misconstruals need not result from faulty inference. We can get things wrong in emotional episodes by fixating on certain trivial details to the exclusion of more relevant factors. The important point in either sort of case is that even taking our values as given, our emotions can be wrong or false.6 My question now is: what does it take to be emotionally rational beings, such that our emotions are unlikely to mislead us? For instance, it is widely recognized that emotions are often triggered in a fast, automatic manner. Indeed, this is a feature not a bug. 6 Cf. De Sousa (1987; 2011) on the 'axiological rationality' of emotions. 8 If we are in a dangerous situation, it's a bad idea to stand around contemplating the pros and cons of running away. It's perfectly appropriate to panic now and leave reflective justifications for later. But it is the very fact that emotions can be triggered so automatically that means that, when a response isn't urgently demanded, we need to pay attention to their justifications. The problem is typically one of selective attention. An emotion like anger can be triggered merely by observing the expression on someone's face, taking the expression as an offence. However, the agent may not be aware of the various contextual factors behind that expression. If they were, they may recognize that anger is not warranted. In fact, some entirely different emotion, such as sympathy, might be warranted instead. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, once emotions are stimulated, they have a reciprocal effect on the way we interpret ongoing situations. Here, emotions are implicated in all kinds of cognitive biases. When we respond more to authority than rational arguments, when we stereotype, over-personalise, ignore evidence that disconfirms our beliefs and so on, it is very often the case that there is an emotion lurking in the background. As Peter Goldie (2004) memorably put it, emotions "skew the epistemic landscape"; the presentation of facts becomes oriented around whatever serves our current feeling. Indeed, Goldie has argued that not only do emotions occasionally skew our awareness of the world, they are also responsible for systematic rational failures. He points to male aggression, xenophobia and sexual jealousy as emotion types that systematically distort our thinking. Goldie argues that emotions are all the more dangerous because they undermine our capacity to notice rational failures. Below the level of our conscious awareness "the pale non-emotional evidence is already discounted and the vivid emotional evidence is already given too much weight" (2008: 160).7 So while philosophers of emotion have wanted to celebrate emotions as the very stuff of the good life, we are also frequently reminded that it's important to keep an eye on them. That is, a commitment to emotion rationality seems to recommend a significant degree of monitoring of one's emotions. We need to monitor both how our emotions are stimulated, and whether we have neglected relevant information. For instance, Catherine Elgin claims that while emotions play a positive epistemic role in attuning us to salient information, we can improve the yield of our emotional sensitivity by critical-monitoring: "attending to our responses and our responses to our responses, assessing appropriateness, learning to discern subtleties that 7 Compare Adam Smith (1767, part III, chapter 4, page 220). 9 align with circumstances, and so forth" (2008: 47). Daniel Dohrn (2008) (drawing on Descartes) similarly recommends an ideal of "critical reflective awareness" of one's emotional states. These philosophers' recommendations are in line with everyday practice. Suppose that your partner explodes with rage in response to a mildly critical remark. It is common to demand that he or she justifies this emotional response. Moreover, you will distinguish excuses from genuine justifying reasons. Complaining that he or she hasn't slept well is not a good reason for anger. Instead, the ensuing argument is more like to focus on the rudeness of the triggering remark. You will argue about whether in fact it was rude, or if it was, whether it was deserved. All of this practice assumes the capacity for critical monitoring, and the expectation that emotionally rational people practice it. Many people only reflect on the justification for their emotions when challenged. But the ideally rational person goes further. Michael Brady (2013) in particular articulates a standard of optimal emotional rationality. His most general claim is that emotions "raise rather than silence the justificatory demand". That is, in the properly rational agent, emotions should spur the search for justifying reasons, to understand more fully the basis for feeling. Thus: The [rationally] virtuous person, in other words, grasps the need for reflection on the accuracy of her emotional appraisals in circumstances where she doesn't possess an understanding of why things are thus-and-so. As such, the virtuous person will feel the need to reflect on the accuracy of her responses and on the adequacy of her underlying concerns, as a result of her awareness that she presently lacks access to the reasons why the relevant object or event has (or does not have) the relevant evaluative feature, and hence lacks understanding on this matter. This is why the virtuous person will not rest content with her initial emotional appraisals in circumstances where she lacks understanding, but will instead subject them to critical scrutiny. (Brady, 2013: 179) Note the strength of Brady's claim. We may experience hundreds of emotions a day, many of which are likely to be subtle. Yet Brady argues that all emotions should be accompanied by a full understanding of the factors driving them. Optimal emotion rationality is when one is in the best possible condition not to be misled by one's emotional states, and this is what critical scrutiny achieves. Of course, this is an ideal that we can only approach.8 Still, it is fair to add 8 Note that Brady does not apply this ideal to ordinary beliefs gained through perceptual experience. One of Brady's main claims in the book is that perceptual experience is a default justifier of belief while emotions are not. This drives his criticism of the perceptual theory of emotions. 10 that the more noticeable or irruptive one's emotional response, the more the rationally virtuous person can be expected to reflect on its accuracy. Given these sorts of views, we can now see why philosophical accounts of emotion rationality clearly speak against gratitude training. Critical monitoring requires that we be open to evidence that both confirms and disconfirms one's current emotional state, or better yet, actively seek such evidence. It is when one's emotions can survive such critical scrutiny that we can be confident of their rational justification. Yet gratitude training encourages a strategy whereby we repeatedly focus on the positive emotional interpretations of the situation. Could Ben-Shahar's perspective on emotional rationality accommodate these points? BenShahar claims that because there is an existing bias towards negative matters, we need an opposing disposition to consider what is positive. This means that if one engages in gratitude training, one may develop the tendency to confirm positive emotions and disconfirm negative emotions. Yet this can only take us half way towards the rational ideal. Gratitude training discourages the search for defeaters of positive emotions and confirmers of negative emotions. As mentioned in the previous section, gratitude training includes no provision for achieving critical balance. For instance, nothing in gratitude training tells you to only write down the positive thing once you've thoroughly checked that it really is positive and outweighs one's negative reasons. Perhaps this would be an appropriate modifier of the practice, but as I noted in section 2, such a modification may well undermine its effectiveness. So far, it seems clear that emotional rationality requires that we commit to, and frequently succeed at critically monitoring our emotional states. But this is easier said than done. The crucial problem is that being in the grip of an emotional state can undermine one's capacity to criticise that emotion. To overcome this, it looks like we must cultivate the tendency to 'detach' ourselves from our emotional reactions to some degree (cf. Lambie 2007). That is, critical monitoring does not demand complete inhibition of the emotional state. But it does demand the capacity to interrupt thoughts and impulsive responses that serve the emotional bias. One must take a little time to observe or reflect upon one's emotional state. Only then can one evaluate the appropriateness of one's emotion, or whether one has neglected relevant considerations. This is how detachment allows us to break the cycle of the emotional confirmation bias. For example, if I'm having an argument with my partner, a tendency to detach enough to notice that I'm feeling more and more irritated is a vital first step to questioning whether my emotions are blinding me to my partner's point of view, or whether my attitude is really serving the goal of sustaining a healthy relationship. 11 It is also important to note that if one is to achieve optimal emotional rationality, the tendency to detach or engage in open-minded contemplation of one's emotions must be 'always on'. Partly this is because emotions tend to strike without warning, so we must always be ready. But mostly it's because tendencies aren't the sorts of things we can switch on and off at will; they are the sorts of things that are gradually internalised. Thus to the extent that one is emotionally rational, one will have a standing disposition to become reflectively conscious of one's emotions. However, given that emotions can often be very subtle, the ideal can allow that the more intense or irruptive the emotion, the more one should be apt to become reflectively conscious of it. If the reader is concerned that, even as an ideal, this requirement is far too strong, then be assured that I share their worries. The requirement cannot simply be dismissed however. We must seek principled justifications for its moderation. 4. The Tension So far, I have fleshed out a certain ideal of emotional rationality. Rationally virtuous people should cultivate a tendency to detach to a degree from their emotional states, allowing them to seek confirming or defeating considerations. This already contradicts the recommendations of gratitude training. But it is at this point that a more general conflict between emotional rationality and well-being arises. The problem is that it seems to be a common feature of the happy life that one is disposed not to critically monitor one's emotional state. A prominent contemporary model of well-being is offered by Daniel Haybron in his (2008) book The Pursuit of Unhappiness. Here Haybron identifies three major strands of happiness: i) emotions of endorsement (e.g. pride, joy, gratitude); ii) an attitude of strong engagement or exuberance and; iii) a state of feeling attuned, or at home in one's surroundings. Haybron's model also bears striking (unacknowledged) parallels with the model proposed by psychologist Martin Seligman (2002) who similarly divides up well-being into the three areas of: i) positive emotions; ii) high engagement, and; iii) the pursuit of meaning. It is the second factor in both models-exuberance or high engagement-that potentially counts against the reflective rational disposition. Exuberance is a tendency towards highly motivated engagement in activities, displaying vitality and absorption as opposed to listlessness or withdrawal. Both Haybron and Seligman link exuberance to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's well-known concept of flow (1990), where the demands of an activity match well one's cognitive capacities, fully absorbing one's attention. Since flow is partly defined as a lack of self-consciousness, this clearly speaks against self-reflection. But even when we 12 consider engagement in a broader sense, there is a definite tension with detached reflection. To be highly engaged is to be task-focused and not self-focused. At the same time, it is a feature of strong commitment to a task that one is disposed to feel intense emotions serving that commitment. Thus, the highly engaged person is liable to feel intense excitement, frustration or anxiety depending on how well the task is going, and to maintain task-focus while undergoing such emotions, rather than becoming self-reflective. For example; when my son plays tennis he undergoes a wide variety of emotional states such as pride, shame, anger, joy, disappointment, and worry. To me, his dispassionate opponent, it is clear that a large number of his emotions are poorly justified. This is not just because it's merely a game. I can fully grant the value that playing and winning at tennis has for him. What may make his emotion irrational is, say, that he may not really have been responsible for winning or losing a point, or that the point has no significant bearing on the score line (he still reliably thrashes me). Yet we can say that having all these emotions is part and parcel of my son being passionately engaged and absorbed in the game. Moreover, to be so absorbed is part of the good life. He plays tennis precisely because it is so absorbing. Thus, high engagement is compatible with the elicitation of negative emotions. However, in its contribution to a happy life, Haybron prioritizes engagement over the mere preponderance of positive emotions like cheerfulness, or indeed pleasure.9 Haybron argues that the energetic pursuit of one's goals is a better indicator of a happy life because it is fundamentally life affirming. 10 Besides, engagement tends towards achievement, and thereby emotions of endorsement, rather than the other way round. In contrast, a life that on average contains more cheerful emotions than gloomy ones is compatible with daily crises of confidence and listlessness that would suggest that, at root, the individual is not particularly happy at all. To Haybron's considerations we can also add points made by psychologist Tayyab Rashid. Rashid observes that unlike simple pleasures, engagement endures. We are less prone to habituation or satiation when engaged with activities like rock climbing, cookery, or artistic 9 Here is another significant point of contrast between my argument and Kahane 2011. Kahane focuses on the way that emotional reasons can conflict with pleasure, whereas I am focused on the broader notion of the happy life. There are nevertheless a number of points where our arguments converge. 10 See also Fred Feldman, who though he does not explicitly define engagement as a key component of the happy life, devotes several pages to discussing the case of a philosopher thoroughly absorbed in his work, who never reflectively questions his level of well-being, and might even deny it if asked. Feldman says, "surely the philosopher is in fact quite happy at the moment described-he is wholeheartedly engaged in an activity he loves. Those who think that happiness is The Good would want to say that the imaginary philosopher is enjoying very high-perhaps maximally high-welfare at this moment" (Feldman 2010: 83). 13 creation (Rashid 2013: 982). Rashid also emphasises the ways in which engagement combats negative emotional states like boredom and depression: "Anhedonia, apathy, boredom, multitasking, and restlessness-hallmarks of many psychological disorders-are largely manifestations of disrupted attention" (cf. Killingsworth & Glibert 2010). Rashid's point here aligns with a general inverse correlation that has been observed between happiness and self-conscious monitoring. For instance, Lyubomirsky and Leeper (1999) find that dispositionally happy people tend to be less introspective, while Ingram (1990) reviews various evidence indicating that chronically unhappy people show high levels of self-focused attention, confirmed in a meta-review by Mor and Winquist (2002).11 Add to this the (fairly unsurprising) finding of Schooler et al. (2003) which found that instructing participants to monitor their enjoyment levels correlated with less self-reported enjoyment. The central role that exuberance or engagement plays in the happy life is something I hope we all recognize. A life without significant periods of such exuberance may, on the whole, be content. But it is exuberance-where we are caught up in the flow of an event, a conversation, or an ongoing project-that characterises many of the happiest times in our lives. My argument can now be summarised. Exuberance generally counts against critically reflecting upon whether one's emotional state is justified, because exuberance is characterised by increased task-focus. Reduced self-focus is a consequence of increased task-focus, because attention is a limited resource. Since reflection upon one's emotional state is a sub-type of self-focus, we can expect less critical monitoring during periods of exuberance. Yet emotional engagement itself does not count against task-focus. Indeed, intense emotional engagement is a way of being task focused. Thus we can predict that during periods of exuberance the individual has a tendency to experience emotions and not to critically reflect upon them. Thus my argument is that exuberance tends against critical monitoring of one's emotions while emotional rationality tends towards this. That is, these are dispositions that pull in opposing directions when it comes to critical monitoring. Since we have reason to regard exuberance as a major component of the happy life, we have reason to believe that there is a tension between a happy life and emotional rationality. This is a more general version of our earlier 11 Self-focused attention is defined as "an awareness of self-referent, internally generated information that stands in contrast to an awareness of externally generated information derived through sensory receptors" (Ingram, 1990: 156). It is accordingly a very general sort of cognitive disposition. 14 problem with gratitude training: Critical monitoring is at odds with achieving and sustaining a happy life. Note that the tension does not require that we are never critically reflective when feeling happy. We can allow that many episodes of happiness are robust enough to withstand critical scrutiny. But it is intuitively plausible that self-conscious reflection upon one's state of mind tends to weaken one's passionate engagement with activities. So the strength of the tension is not only that, while critically reflecting, one may come to notice factors that undermine positive emotions. The tension is also that critical reflection, by itself, involves a more detached attitude that counts against passionate exuberance. It is also compatible with the tension I have identified that exuberance can land you in messes that critical monitoring would avoid. For example, suppose a whirlwind holiday romance leaves you in a disastrous marriage that you could have avoided had you realised that your joy in a certain person's company had less to do with their qualities and more to do with being on holiday. In such instances, critical monitoring would lead to a happier life. Similarly, to subject certain negative emotions to critical scrutiny may well expose them as unduly biased and thereby help one to feel happier. Yet the existence of such examples does not overturn the fact that exuberance tends towards a happy life, while critical monitoring tends against exuberance. Potentially, individuals can fluctuate between critical monitoring and exuberance, depending on the context. However, both reflective monitoring and exuberance are dispositional. We are liable to develop general tendencies either one way or the other. Indeed, I believe the tension I have articulated sits on a fault line dividing basic approaches to living. One could either maximise a tranquil life of sober reflection, or else embrace the passionate, carefree lifestyle; become either a devotee of Apollo or a devotee of Dionysus. The contrasting Dionysian and Apollonian strategies align quite neatly with the well-known introvert-extrovert divide in personality theory, where the extrovert is characterised as out-going and fun-loving while the introvert tends to be more quiet and self-contained (Shiner & Caspi 2003: 4; McCrae & Costa 2003: 49).12 These personality styles are largely a product of different approaches to emotion regulation (Ashton & Lee 2007; Cochrane 2018: 162-168) 12 The emotionally rational strategy also aligns quite well with the ancient Epicurean ideal of ataraxia or tranquillity. 15 5. Concern-Relative Rationality For the sake of clarity, I have set up the tension between emotion rationality and the happy life as starkly as possible. Drawing on prominent and plausible models of emotional rationality and happiness I have set up a conflict which calls out for some kind of resolution. Of course it can't be right that we must constantly critically reflect on our emotions-it sounds far too demanding. And of course exuberance must be able to withstand periods of critical scrutiny. The point is that, as things stand, it seems we can only compromise between the two ideals. That is, we achieve a balance by reducing our commitment to either or both ideals. This response thus fundamentally accepts that happiness and rationality are in tension. However, maybe we are not forced to accept the tension I have identified. In particular, there may be good principled reasons for moderating the ideal of emotional rationality. Here is one line of attack: So far, I've outlined an ideal of emotion rationality that demands the disposition towards self-conscious reflection upon one's emotional states. But if such a disposition truly undermines the pursuit of the happy life, can it really be emotionally rational? Plausibly, the existence of the emotional capacity is premised on the fact that emotions serve our concerns; they get us to protect or promote the things we care about. Presumably the happy life is one in which, broadly speaking, our concerns are optimally served. Thus, any attitude that undermines the happy life could not be emotionally justified. We should accordingly reject the earlier model of emotion rationality. An argument along these lines has recently been proposed by Miriam McCormick (2016). McCormick argues that the rationality of hope partially relies upon its practical importance. She suggests that as the practical importance of feeling hope increases (e.g. to help one endure difficult circumstances), the evidential demands upon the emotion (i.e. how likely it is that the hoped-for event will occur) decrease. According to McCormick, "a hope is deemed "rational" if, overall, it allows for an augmentation rather than a diminishment of agency" (2016: S134). Perhaps then, a parallel argument can be made regarding the rationality of exuberance. The general attitude of exuberance allows the individual to pursue wholeheartedly her commitments, increasing the probability that these commitments will be well served. This practical value compensates for any increased likelihood that some of her emotional states fail to track the truth. However, the Apollonian will respond that the Dionysian is confusing prudential or strategic rationality with the epistemic rationality relevant to grasping the facts that bear on one's 16 concerns. The Apollonian may readily admit that the exuberance of the Dionysian is prudentially rational if it helps her to get the things that she wants. But epistemic rationality is when one acts in a way that is most likely to gain one access to truth and understanding. The Dionysian should be under no illusions that in pursuing passionate exuberance they are promoting their grasp of what's true or false. So long as we insist that the strategy of exuberance or high engagement has a greater tendency not to notice false emotions, there seems no way to avoid the tension. Yet there is now a second line of response available to the Dionysian, somewhat more subtle than the first. We have admitted that the rationality of emotions is limited in scope. That is, it is only rational to have an emotion if one first of all has a relevant background concern. For instance, it is irrational to weep over a broken vase that one hates; that would be out of line with one's values. The Dionysian can now ask this: suppose I have a greater concern for living a happy, engaged life than I do for a life in which rational emotions are maximised. Now suppose that I manage to become highly engaged, but in the process come to have quite a few irrational emotions. In this situation, the overall ratio of engagement to irrational emotions in my life satisfies my priorities. So would it be true that something bad has happened to me, all things considered? That is, would emotions of disappointment or frustration be fitting or appropriate in this situation? No, they would not. My life is in proceeding in accordance with my priorities. I should feel contented in this situation. On this line of response then, the Dionysian may be experiencing a certain number of emotional states that poorly grasp the facts (i.e. emotional states resulting from his or her exuberant attitude). Yet it would be irrational for the Dionysian to worry about it. At the same time, the Dionysian can admit that the Apollonian is within her rights to cultivate a more reflective disposition. For various prudential or moral reasons, the Apollonian may be highly averse to irrational emotional states. She prefers a balance between engagement and irrational emotions that minimizes irrationality even at the cost of engagement. Thus, it is rational for the Apollonian to worry about the occurrence of irrational emotional states, but not the Dionysian. Thus, the Dionysian should not worry about her engagement-induced irrational emotions. To worry about this would itself be an irrational emotion. Moreover, we can plausibly give greater weight to rational emotions about how one's whole life is going than rational emotions about more narrow issues. 17 Still, it remains the case that the Dionysian will undergo numerically more irrational emotions than the Apollonian. Despite the greater weighting of emotions about one's whole life, the Apollonian can still accuse the Dionysian of lacking in epistemic virtue. To be epistemically virtuous would be to maximize the number of rational mental states. In response to this, I have a final thought in defence of the Dionysian. This relies on a potentially controversial way of conceiving the self-evaluative process, but one that I will justify. The thought is that the Apollonian's disposition to become emotionally detached is itself an emotional disposition. In other words, when the Apollonian interrupts the flow of her emotion and engages in critical self-monitoring, this is a meta-emotional response (cf. Jäger & Bänninger-Huber 2015). Alternatively, while the detachment process is not itself an emotion, it is caused by an emotion. Either way, we should therefore also count these episodes when we are adding up the number of rational or irrational emotions that we have. Then, once we do this, we find that the Dionysian actually has fewer irrational emotions than they would have, were they to adopt the critical disposition. Why should we think that the engagement of critical monitoring is an emotional episode or caused by an emotional episode? The basic reason is that it fits the standard pattern of an emotional response. Note first that the Apollonian has a concern to avoid irrational emotions. Second, her cognitive monitoring strategy is driven by that concern. It is because the incidence of an emotion, particularly an intense emotion, threatens the Apollonian's concern to avoid irrational emotions, that monitoring is initiated. The overall structure here of concern-sensitivity, plus discernment of a potential impact on that concern, which then triggers a regulative response, fits the standard structure of an emotional episode, even across different ways of modelling emotions. It may be objected that the motivated response here is a cognitive act rather than the kind of behavioural responses we usually see in emotions. However, it is very common for emotions to trigger cognitive responses. For instance, when feeling nostalgia we may rehearse old memories. When feeling anger we may nurture fantasies of revenge. When feeling anxiety we may plan ways to improve our security. Indeed, in civilised human beings, these sorts of cognitive responses dominate impulsive behavioural responses. A second objection may be that the cognitive interruption of an emotion may not have a bodily response profile, where several philosophers regard bodily responses as a necessary characteristic of emotion (e.g. Deonna & Teroni 2012; Prinz 2004). However, it seems to me that the interruption of a developing bodily response that accompanies an episode of 18 detachment has a very characteristic bodily profile; precisely that of interrupting a response. It is rather like freezing in response to a threat. Now if one's detachment strategy led one to fully inhibit the original emotion and become entirely calm, then at this point I would agree that one is not undergoing an emotion. But that's one particular consequence of detachment. It should not be identified with the process of detachment itself, which may well involve some significant bodily struggle. Indeed, most emotions seem to aim at the restoration of a calm state of equilibrium. That hardly counts against their having a characteristic bodily profile. Suppose we accept that the engagement of critical monitoring is either an emotional response or caused by an emotional response. How can this come to the aid of the Dionysian? We have already admitted that, since the Dionysian does not care as deeply for ensuring the rationality of her emotions, it would be irrational for the Dionysian to feel bad about having an irrational emotion. We now add the following consideration: For the Dionysian to interrupt her emotions with critical-monitoring would be, on each occasion, to have an irrational emotion. This means that the Dionysian, by not triggering the monitoring response, is avoiding irrational emotions. Since it is presumably the case that not every single (intense) emotion that the Dionysian has is unjustified, the Dionysian ends up with fewer irrational emotions than she would have (given her concerns), were she to be disposed towards detachment. So given a certain understanding of what happens when the detachment strategy is enacted, the Dionysian can even claim that, relative to her, she is maximising rational emotions. To clarify then, the argument I have presented in this section gives us a principled reason to moderate the call for critical detachment. Even if philosophers have offered good reasons for critical detachment, we intuitively grasp that constant critical scrutiny is too demanding. I believe the best way to justify this intuition is to allow that for some people who care a great deal about rationality, constant critical detachment may be a worthy ideal. But for a lot of other people it would amount to a kind of irrational anxiety. That is, the checking process itself, when taken too far, can poorly align with facts about what threatens my concerns; it is epistemically irrational. 6. Conclusion Overall, while emotion theorists have claimed that the rationally optimal strategy is to critically monitor one's emotional states, the situation is actually not so clear-cut. What counts as the epistemically rational strategy depends upon the concerns of the individual. The Apollonian prizes respectable emotions above exuberance. Given this concern, the Apollonian maximises 19 rational emotions by means of detachment. Things are different for Dionysian. She prioritises exuberance, so it would be irrational for her to adopt the detachment strategy. Thus, we should not assume that the optimal strategy for emotion rationality is critical detachment. And thus, so long as one is clear about the risks and rewards of the different strategies available, one can be rationally exuberant. Interestingly then, we can envisage a kind of two-level emotional rationality, somewhat akin to two-level theories of utilitarianism (e.g. Hare 1981). There is the first order rationality of a given emotional state. Alongside this, there is the second order rationality of one's meta-emotional regulations. Presumably, as with two-level utilitarianism, the individual can periodically reflect on which strategy brings about a state of affairs that is most in line with her concerns. Such a process can recommend both limits to critical monitoring and, it is worth noting, also constitutes a justifiable limitation to exuberance. On this note, let us return to our earlier worries about gratitude training. It seems to me perfectly feasible that, having considered the various moral or prudential implications, one can end up prioritising a happy life over the avoidance of a positivity bias. 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EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY COPYRIGHT © 2009 ASSOCIAZIONE PRAGMA ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 237 Nate Jackson* Moral Particularism and the Role of Imaginary Cases: A Pragmatist Approach Abstract. I argue that John Dewey's analysis of imagination enables an account of learning from imaginary cases consistent with Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism. Moreover, this account provides a more robust account of learning from cases than Dancy's own. Particularism is the position that there are no, or at most few, true moral principles, and that competent reasoning and judgment do not require them. On a particularist framework, one cannot infer from an imaginary case that because a feature has a particular moral importance there, that it must have that import in an actual case. Instead, for Dancy, cases can yield "reminders," and a person with a lot of experience (real or imagined) brings a "checklist" of features that can matter to a situation. Using the Nathan-David exchange from 2 Samuel and Martha Nussbaum's "Steerforth's Arm" from Love's Knowledge, I show that this account does not explain all instances of learning from cases. Drawing on recent work on cases, I argue that cases can be educative by serving an exploratory function, probing what one takes to be known and provoking change in the background one uses in evaluating a situation. I then argue that Dewey's work on imagination in his comments on sympathy and in A Common Faith and Art as Experience enables such a role for cases on a particularist framework. Mark Johnson's recent work on metaphor further illuminates how Dewey's account of art can be exploratory. I contend that this account affords an exploratory role for cases consistent with Dancy's particularism. Moral particularism is the view that there are no, or at most few, true universal moral principles and that competent reasoning and judgment do not require them. Instead of conformity to a principle, particularists affirm that actions are justified by a situation's salient features, and deny that a feature must have the same moral import in every situation in which it appears. But, since the reason-giving force of a feature in one situation is not a guarantor of its status elsewhere, particularism seems unable to account for moral learning from cases. In ethics, an imaginary case is a proxy for an actual situation, a description of a hypothetical state of affairs, and consideration of what would be morally required in the case is generally intended to provide actionguidance in a real situation.1 However, the features of a past or imaginary case are not precisely those of the real situation before us. It is possible that a feature might be salient in one case but not in another, and, on a particularist framework, appealing to cases seems likely to lead us astray. Jonathan Dancy, particularism's primary advocate, acknowledges that particularism must accommodate a role for inferring from cases in moral reasoning. Dancy argues that cases, imagined and experienced, yield reminders; they provide a "checklist" of features that might have moral import. Here, I provide reason to think that this role for cases is unsatisfactory by looking at the impact that reviewing cases has in facilitating new moral appreciations. In response, I argue that John Dewey's work on the imagination along with contemporary elucidations of moral imagination in the * Capital University [[email protected]]. 1. Walsh (2011: 469) offers a similar definition. See also his introduction in Walsh (2013: 5143). Gendler 2000 also offers extensive treatment of the role of imaginary cases in philosophical inquiry generally, not solely in moral argument. ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 238 pragmatist tradition allow for a more robust account of the ability to learn from cases consistent with particularism. Thus, while there are key distinctions between Dewey's ethics and contemporary particularism, Dewey's work on imagination affords an alternative particularist explanation of learning from imaginary cases.2 Particularism, Holism and Narrative Rationality Particularism's fundamental position concerning moral reasons sets the parameters for its approach to cases. Foundational to the dispute between generalism, or principlebound accounts of morality, and particularism is a dispute concerning the behavior of moral reasons. Here, a reason is a consideration that favors, or makes a case for, an action. For particularists like Dancy, ordinary features of situations (that someone lied, that one borrowed property, etc...) serve as reasons. Underlying particularism is holism, the thesis that, "a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another" (Dancy 2004: 73). In Moral Reasons (1993), Dancy argues that, The leading thought behind particularism is the thought that the behavior of a reason (or of a consideration that serves as a reason) in a new case cannot be predicted from its behavior elsewhere. The way in which the consideration functions here either will or at least may be affected by other considerations here present, [...] and identifies this view as a "holistic view of the behavior of reasons" (Ibid.: 60). He contrasts this position with atomism, the thesis that "a feature that is a reason in one case must remain a reason, and retain the same polarity, in any other" (Dancy 2004: 70). If moral principles are in sufficient supply to ground moral reasoning, we should expect to find many atomistic (invariant) reasons, since principles specify features as having invariant moral importance. If most of the features that count for or against an action behave holistically, depending on other features in a situation in order to stand as a reason, we should not expect many moral principles. Dancy offers several illustrative arguments for holism. First, particularists can envision a large number of cases in which the same feature can serve as a reason for an action, a case against an action, or have no bearing on whether an act is right or wrong. In effect, particularism denies the soundness of "switching arguments," arguments that isolate a feature and infer that because that feature is sometimes morally significant, it must matter in the same way in any case in which it appears. For example, we might maintain that an action's causing pain counts against it morally and envision a case in which causing pain is a morally significant feature (torturing innocents, for example). But Dancy invites us to consider his extracting a sea urchin's 2. Various commentators highlight central aspects of the distinctions between particularism and pragmatism. Some, like Todd Lekan and Gregory Pappas, offer arguments for the strength of Dewey's ethics over Dancy's particularism. In particular, these authors draw on Dewey's work to disclose a role for principles in moral deliberation. Others, like David Bakhurst, consider the possibility of a fruitful intersection between the views. See for instance: Bakhurst (2007: 122-41); Fesmire (2015: 143); Jackson (2016: 215-24); Lekan (2003: 96-102); and Pappas (2008: 51-5). nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 239 pin from his daughter's heel. A painless method of doing so, if available, would have been preferable, but no such method was available. Here, pain does not count against the action's moral propriety (Dancy 1993: 65). Similarly, Dancy asks us to imagine borrowing a book. Normally, that we borrowed something is reason to return it. But, if we learn the book is stolen, that we borrowed it no longer serves as a moral reason (Ibid.: 60). The same feature can thus be a reason or not, depending upon background features of the specific case. Particularists are confident that the supply of these cases is large enough that, for any given feature, there are cases in which it matters and cases in which it does not.3 This supply illustrates the context-dependence of moral reasons. Another argument for holism is that other sorts of reasons are evidently holistic, and there is no need to posit a gulf between moral reasons and other sorts of reasons. For example, in the realm of practical reasons, "that there will be nobody much else around is sometimes a good reason for going there, and sometimes a very good reason for staying away." (Dancy 2004: 74). Or, take an epistemic example. Normally, being appeared to redly is a reason to accept that something is red. But, if I am aware that I am an inverted spectrum case, then something appearing red is a good reason to believe that it is blue. These cases, and cases like them, are motivation to abandon atomism in the practical and epistemic domains. Other examples of reason-behavior in non-moral spheres are similarly intuitive, and motivate Dancy's question, "[C]ould it be the case that moral reasons are quite different from all the others in this respect, being the only atomistic ones?" (Ibid.: 76). A particularist account of learning from cases must cohere with holism. Importantly, such an account must also comport with Dancy's commitments regarding the structure of moral justification. Given his commitment to holism, Dancy re-envisions moral competence. He argues in rejecting the generalist (principled) account of moral reasons, that, "Moral justification is therefore not subsumptive in nature, but narrative" (Dancy 1993: 113). Generalists distinguish between reason-giving practices, descriptions of a situation and what it calls for, and the structure of moral justification. According to Dancy's characterization of generalism, moral justification has to take the form of subsumption, where a principle or rule provides reason for action. But when we describe a situation, we do not offer a principle under which the action is subsumed. We try, rather, to get another to see a situation as we do, to notice what we notice. Practices of justification, therefore, are distinct from practices of description on a generalist picture. Particularists reject this distinction between moral description and moral justification. Rather, "to justify one's choice is to give the reasons one sees for making it, and to give those reasons is just to lay out how one sees the situation, starting in 3. Albertzart helpfully argues that a certain criticism of thought-experiments in "contrast arguments" is at the heart of Dancy's particularism. He writes, "There is widespread reliance on the possibility of making progress by extracting what we take to be morally relevant in one particular situation and transplanting it into a new hypothetical situation, and vice versa. The assumption is that if something is morally relevant in one case it must remain relevant, and relevant in a similar way, in any other. This atomism is rarely openly admitted, and, if asked, most moral philosophers would probably deny it. However, many arguments nevertheless implicitly rely on atomism and – suitable rephrased – Dancy's theory helps to expose this assumption" (Albertzart 2014: 52). nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 240 the right place and going on to display the various salient features in the right way" (Ibid.: 113). The structure of justification mirrors the structure of description, and the distinction between justification and description collapses. As a consequence of this collapse, Dancy maintains that the structure of moral justification is narrative, not subsumptive. Descriptions, if we are proceeding aright, "track" the salient features of a situation. What we describe, if we perceive accurately, are the various salient features of the situation. But, more than just having a list of all of the relevant features, "a full view of circumstances will not only see each feature for what it is but will also see how they are related to one another. Such a view will grasp the shape of the circumstances" (Ibid.: 112). This metaphor of "shape" is central to Dancy's account of justification and rationality. A good description follows the shape of the situation, which provides moral reasons for action. Finally, since moral rationality is a matter of tracking a situation's shape and perceiving its proper description, Dancy maintains that, "Rationality [...] is more like the ability to listen to and appreciate a story" (Ibid.: 144). Morally competent individuals are able to have a narrative construal of a situation and perceive what action that narrative supports.4 Narrative construals that in fact justify an action display the strengths the form allows, namely coherence (Ibid.: 114). Holism about reasons and narrative rationality undermine reliance on principles and complicate an account of learning from cases. The interplay of features identified by holism is complex and speaks against the possibility of principles insofar as we cannot be assured that a feature will serve as a reason from case to case. The same feature can display different roles in different situations' narrative shapes. That a feature plays a particular role in one situation's story is no guarantee that it must have that role in other narratives. This potential for interference from other features presents a problem regarding the possibility of learning from cases, since a feature revealed as important in a past or imaginary case may not have that importance in a future situation. A particularist account of learning from cases must cohere with the commitment to narrative justification and with holism. Revealing Reasons: Particularism's Reception Regarding Cases Particularism motivates a deep suspicion of considering cases, insofar as it exhorts moral sensitivity to the narrative organization of a present case's features. Dancy writes, The primary focus of particularism is the particular case, not surprisingly. This means that one's main duty, in moral judgement, is to look really closely at the individual case before one. Our first question is not "Which other cases does this one best resemble?," but rather "What is the nature of the case before us?." (Dancy 1993: 63) 4. Bakhurst (2007: 138-9) notes that "particularists frequently invoke aesthetic phenomena [like narrative] to illuminate their position," but "[...] it remains unclear how seriously we are to take this parallel." He suggests that Dewey's work on the imagination might be of aid here, but does not develop this suggestion, instead focusing attention on supposed inadequacies in Steven Fesmire's argument for artistry as a paradigmatic metaphor for morality. nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 241 Recent work on the role of analogical reasoning and cases in ethics puts Dancy's particularism in service of liming the kinds of cases that can legitimately test moral intuitions.5 Jakob Elster, for instance, cites particularism to suggest that "outlandish cases," cases that are conceivable but impossible in our world, can only have a limited role in moral argument, since the imagined case will not share the same profile of morally relevant features as those actually confronting us (Elster 2011: 252-3). In response, Joseph Spino maintains that such impossibility is only a concern if it signals a morally relevant difference from the actual case (Spino 2012: 30). Though defending a limited role for cases, Spino cites Dancy in arguing that the fact that the imaginary case is easier to assess than a real case potentially indicates a significant moral difference between the scenarios. Particularist considerations about the malleability of moral reasons across situations motivate caution "[...] when results from imaginary cases are put forth as evidence for drastic changes in our lives" (Ibid.: 31). These appropriations of Dancy aid in providing a taxonomy of imaginary cases in terms of similarity to the actual case and reveal limits of inferring from cases, but they do not afford avenues by which particularists could accommodate a role for abbreviated narratives. Others call Dancy's particularism into question on the grounds that it cannot accommodate a role for reasoning from cases. Marcello Guarini, for instance, argues that, "our ability to engage in analogical argumentation and evaluate it depends on the ability to make multidimensional similarity assessments, and such assessments are usefully understood in terms of contributory standards [principles]" (Guarini 2010: 395). That is, analogical reasoning demands the recognition of similarities between cases, and a compelling account of these similarities relies on sharing features that contribute to an act's overall rightness or wrongness. Benedict Smith similarly warns against accepting any "bald" particularism, in light of the potential for comparative analysis to facilitate moral understanding (Smith 2002: 247). Analogical reasoning between cases fosters a kind of sensitivity to morally relevant features. Considering relevant similarities and differences between circumstances calls our attention to those features explaining why a given comparison is weak or strong, which bolsters moral knowledge. Smith exhorts, we need to supplement particularism so as to make it flexible enough to accommodate the procedures of analogical reasoning, and the ability to compare and learn from different moral cases, imaginary or otherwise. (Ibid.: 247) In these treatments of particularism, the necessity of comparison for moral reasoning seems to be in tension with particularism's call for attentiveness to the present situation. 5. Some of this work actually considers the limitations of inferring from imaginary cases in ethics on a generalist framework, and offers only a cursory treatment or mention of moral particularism. Walsh, for example, defends a limited role for cases, requiring a "contingency clause" that "respects the fundamental contingency of applied ethical problems" (Walsh 2011: 468). In the course of his argument he acknowledges that Dancy's particularism demands more than a suspicion of cases, writing, "For a particularist, like Jonathan Dancy (1993), moral judgments are particular to the cases in question and we cannot generalise from other cases" (Ibid.: 479). nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 242 In these works, either the legitimacy of considering cases calls particularism into question, or particularist commitments severely limit the kinds of cases to which we can appeal. And, neither of these sets of arguments present an account of educative functions of the imagination beyond the potential for revealing some morally relevant feature or principle. Dancy supplies a nuanced rejoinder that particularism can accommodate a role for cases consistent with holism. However, even this treatment is too conscripted, and I look to Dewey's work to bolster a particularist approach to learning from cases, an approach responsible to the centrality of imagination in experience. Dancy on a Particularist Function for Cases In articulating a particularist approach to cases, Dancy considers the following appeal: There is at present a controversy about whether Britain ought to return the Elgin Marbles to Greece. An argument might run as follows. Suppose that an orphan's estate is under the control of a not particularly conscientious trustee, who for reasons of his own allows a collector to remove part of that estate for a (not really sufficient) payment which the trustee then absorbs for his own purposes. The orphan eventually comes into his estate and attempts to recover his property. Whatever be the legal situation, must we not admit that the collector has some moral obligation to return the property? [...] So the collector ought to return the property. And similarly Britain ought to return the Elgin Marbles. (Dancy 1985: 143) Admitting that this is reasonable instance of moral deliberation, Dancy maintains that particularism needs to make sense of such arguments. If it cannot, that inability would constitute a serious deficiency. Clearly, having a body of relevant experiences matters to particular judgments; Dancy affirms, Of course, a comparison with other cases may help us to decide how things are here, just as a long experience of car engines may help us to diagnose the fault this time. But this decision or diagnosis is still essentially particular. It would be surprising if a long experience in garages were no help to a mechanic; it would be surprising if a long and varied moral experience did not serve to sharpen one's sensitivity for the future. (Dancy 1993: 63) In lieu of actual moral experience, imagined cases supplement these lessons. The problem is that prior and imagined cases often share very few of the features of the actual case requiring a decision. If what justifies a course of action is the particular shape of the situation produced by the interplay of its various features, what can we take away from that case to inform our future reasoning, considering the contextdependence of moral reasons? Particularism requires an account of how moral experience can inform decision-making consistent with holism. Generalists, on the other hand, seem to have an easy answer. They reject reasonsholism, and thus can say that a case highlights a principle. There's some feature (or a collection thereof) that always counts for or against the rightness of an action, and nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 243 imaginary case bring this feature to the foreground. Thus, cases reveal principles that connect a feature with moral rightness or wrongness. Of course, this conception relies on rejecting holism. Granting that moral reasons behave holistically, this interpretation of the role of cases closes. Dancy asks what role generalism could afford imaginary cases, given holism. Generalists' failure here is twofold. First, if cases are supposed to be action-guiding, one must ask if the imaginary case is a reliable guide to the actual case. But an imaginary case is an abbreviated narrative with unspecified background features. The incompleteness of the imagined case means that we cannot be sure that whatever features do the justificatory work in it will function the same way in the actual case. They might be frustrated in the actual case by features un-specified in the imagination. Thus, one cannot infer that because a feature matters in an imaginary case it must matter in the same way in an actual situation. Second, even if we learned from the imaginary case that a collection of properties has moral relevance, we can be assured that it has relevance in the actual case only if we already know that the actual case has that same collection and no more morally relevant features. But, if we already knew that, then we would know the "moral make-up" of the actual case, defeating the purpose of turning to imagined cases (Dancy 1985: 149). While Dancy suggests that generalists lack a satisfying reply, he recognizes the impetus for particularists to respond to these worries as well. That is, one cannot say "so much the worse for imaginary cases." He writes, Our duty as philosophers of ethics is to make sense of the discoverable patterns of moral reasoning; if we cannot do this it is a fault on our side, a fault in the philosophy rather than in the reasoning. (Ibid.: 149-50) But, the commitment to holism means that a feature identified as important in one case might not be salient, or it might be salient in a different way, in a second case. Various background features might prevent that feature from serving the same function case to case. In an abbreviated narrative, features serve a particular role in organization. Even if the same features are in the real case, the real case has other features that may affect the moral import of shared features. In response, Dancy suggests that cases can reveal that a particular property or feature can matter morally. Here, Dancy presents particularism in conciliatory mood, acknowledging that cases produce principles, but principles understood differently from a generalist view: The suggestion I want to make is that a moral principle amounts to a reminder of the sort of importance that a property can have in suitable circumstances. (Dancy 1985: 150) The case reveals a collection of features that exhibit moral importance. One learns of a particular feature that it can serve a particular function in the larger narrative that justifies actions, not that it must serve that role. This view, he thinks, accounts for our use of imaginary cases, nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 244 we can hope that an imaginary case is an abbreviated sketch of a case where a property can be seen to be important [...] This is especially so in the case of some parables of the New Testament, or the morals attached to Aesop's fables. (Ibid.: 151) Since, in an imaginary case, a particular feature is morally important, we can infer that it can be morally important elsewhere. And, since principles amount to reminders that a feature can be important, Dancy maintains that this understanding of imaginary cases makes sense of the thought that we glean principles from consideration of particular cases. Dancy offers the image of a store of principles as a kind of "checklist" of oftimportant features (Ibid.: 150). The morally experienced person, who has a variety of cases and principles understood as reminders at hand, is at an advantage when coming to a decision in a particular case. He wants to be sure that he does not miss the importance or relevance of any relevant property. A panoply of moral principles, understood in the way suggested, can function as a sort of checklist for this purpose. (Ibid.: 150) Someone who has considered a variety of cases or has a store of experience is in a better position to know the sorts of things that might matter and how they might matter. Having in mind a checklist of features and the moral import they often display can aid moral reasoning, directing one's attention to those often-important features. In what follows, I question the adequacy of this checklist image and argue that Dewey's work on the imagination affords a more robust particularist understanding of the role of cases in moral learning. "You are the man" and Loving Steerforth: Imagination Reconsidered Brief reflection on instances of learning from cases reveals the inadequacy of Dancy's checklist image. Considering cases can change our appreciation of a situation's appropriate description without reminding one that a feature can matter in a particular way. Here I consider two cases that call into question Dancy's approach. The first case is a familiar classical example. In 2 Samuel, the prophet Nathan confronts King David over his lechery. David had committed adultery with Bathsheba, Uriah's wife, and then sent Uriah to the front lines of an ongoing war, assured of Uriah's death. At this point, Nathan confronts David: The Lord sent Nathan to David. He came to him, and said to him, "There were two men in a certain city, one rich and the other poor. The rich man had a very many flocks and herds; but the poor man had nothing but one little ewe lamb he had bought. He brought it up, and it grew up with him and his children; it used to eat of his meager fare, and drink from his cup, and lie in his bosom, and it was like a daughter to him. Now there came a traveler to the rich man, and he was loath to take one of his own flock or herd to prepare for the wayfarer who had come to him, but he took the poor man's lamb, and prepared that for the guest who had come to him." (2 Samuel 12:1-6) nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 245 Famously, David becomes angry and demands that the rich man be punished. Nathan responds, "You are the man!" and David subsequently feels contrition. Using the language of narrative rationality, David comes to appreciate the narrative shape of his situation only by acquaintance with the shape of another situation. One test for the adequacy of Dancy's approach to cases is to ask, what feature(s) did the imaginary case highlight? In this case, of what was David reminded? Many of the shared features are those that David had to appreciate already in order to undermine Bathsheba and Uriah's relationship. For instance, the difference in power and the vulnerability of Uriah were evident in David's initial appreciation of the situation; otherwise he would not have been able to perform the act. The features furnished by the case are already present in David's appreciation. Since the case spurs new moral appreciation of the action without revealing missing features in the actual situation, Dancy's approach to cases is inadequate. The inadequacy is more striking in other cases, especially those that less resemble parables. For instance, Martha Nussbaum visits her own interaction with Charles Dickens' David Copperfield, particularly the James Steerforth character. Troubled by her daughter's attraction to Steerforth, she re-considers the novel. At first, she recalls Steerforth as morally bankrupt: "as I remembered it, it was Dickens' intention to make the reader judge Steerforth from the moral point of view" (Nussbaum 1990: 335). However, in the process of re-reading the novel she feels the "power" of Steerforth's presence, and, like the character David Copperfield, she comes to feel love for Steerforth. Nussbaum says of the experience of reading, Steerforth's gesture stirs us, as it hauntingly does, not because we see beyond it into something else, but because it is made, for us, a sensuous reality, because, by the spell of erotic and incantatory language we are brought, ourselves, into the charmed world of love. (Ibid.: 350) The reassessment of Steerforth, from a character unworthy of admiration to an object of love, stems from sustained engagement in the literary world constructed by Dickens. The narrative he offers invites readers to adopt a particular point of view – Nussbaum calls this love's point of view – which Nussbaum argues contrasts with the moral point of view. By arguing that we are brought to a new point of view, Nussbaum denies that she missed any particular salient feature on her first reading. Instead, through the experience of re-reading, she comes to appreciate a description of Steerforth through Copperfield's excited eyes. Given Nussbaum's description of coming to adopt a new point of view, there are two competing appraisals of Steerforth, two competing "shapes" of the situation. Literature often invites one to organize experience in accordance with a perspective shaped by the author, and Nussbaum, especially in more recent work, echoes Dewey's contention that this imaginative engagement with artworks and literature enables new appreciations.6 While one may, like Nussbaum in the case 6. In a more recent work Nussbaum draws on Dewey and Rabindranath Tagore to argue that literature helps develop the imaginative capacity to "see the world from the viewpoint of other people" (Nussbaum 2010: 44, 102-11). Her comments echo Dewey's contention that, "They [arts and literature] nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 246 of David Copperfield, be able to list properties that make Steerforth objectionable, the novel as a whole presents a very different organization of the relevant features. The checklist image is not adequate to the task of explaining Nussbaum's reassessment of Steerforth. This account exemplifies learning from a case, as does the 2 Samuel example, and starkly suggests that cases do not merely furnish reminders. After drawing on contemporary work on imaginary cases to identify a particularist myopia regarding their potential functions, I turn to Dewey's work on the imagination to articulate an alternative role for imaginary cases consistent with Dancy's particularism. Particularist Myopia and the Educative Functions of Cases Recent work on thought experiments and imaginary cases enables a functional distinction in their educative roles. Though perhaps not precisely mirrored in Dewey's corpus, this distinction calls attention to a need for particularism to accommodate an "exploratory" function of cases, distinct from calling attention to features' potential moral importance. Dewey's work on imagination yields a response that comports with holism. Working on the relationship between thought experiments and moral theory in a Wittgensteinian tradition, Cora Diamond delineates two approaches to imaginary cases. The first approach treats cases as "well-posed problems," the second as "exploration problems." In a well-posed problem, the description given requires, on pain of irrationality, a determinate conclusion without questioning either the parameters of the case or the background an individual brings to the case. In treating a problem as well-posed, we seek to determine what "canons of reasonableness" dictate as the appropriate practical outcome (Diamond 2002: 236). Exploration problems, however, may be set up in such a way that assumptions underlying the initial understanding of the problem need to be questioned if the problem is to be resolved. The function of the discussion of such a problem may be precisely to probe what we take to be known. (Ibid.: 241) Such problems are supposed to reveal that the assumptions or background conceptions brought to a situation need to be changed, and to facilitate development of that background. Exploration problems resemble cases like that of Nussbaum's re-reading of Dickens. Her imaginative involvement in the world of David Copperfield undermines her previous view that Steerforth is not an admirable character, changing her initial assessment. In familiar language, the case is not used to show the possible relevance of a feature. Instead, the case can serve to undermine an accepted appreciation and to facilitate a new appraisal in virtue of reassessing background assumptions.7 reveal a depth and range of meaning in experiences which otherwise might be mediocre and trivial. They supply, that is, organs of vision" (MW 9: 247). 7. To illustrate, Diamond considers the ring of Gyges tale from Plato's Republic as both a well-posed nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 247 Others working on thought-experiments and cases have highlighted similar functional distinctions. For instance, in offering a helpful taxonomy of fictive narrative philosophy, Michael Boylan distinguishes between open-ended and closed cases: Cases are fictive presentations that are structured so that the reader is enjoined to come up with his own response at the end. Some cases are open-ended so that the author is really interested in stimulating autonomous thinking within broad boundaries that limit the reader's evaluation. Others are closed; structured for right answers. (Boylan 2013: 73; emphasis added) Per Boylan, closed cases offer a "conscripted vision of the world," demanding a listener respond from a particular framework rather than question the background assumptions one brings to a case (Ibid.: 74). In Dancy's treatment of cases, the imaginary situation supports a distinct course of action in virtue of a certain collection of features, but holism undermines the inference that the real situation supports the same action. However, open-ended cases promise an avenue around this pitfall. The results of "autonomous thinking" engendered by considering a case can facilitate new appraisals or mold the frameworks we use to evaluate cases. Imaginary cases thus admit multiple educative functions. Well-posed or closed problems assess what the commitments of particular framework dictate given a situation's features, while other cases spur revision of the background conceptions used to understand the situation. In the kind of moral reasoning under consideration, Dancy's treatment of arguing from cases resembles the treatment of cases as closed or well-posed problems. On Dancy's analysis, the facts of the actual case are settled; our perplexity is a symptom of not being able to comprehend the appropriate description of various relevant features. To address this perplexity, one employs an imaginary or past case that resembles a present one, but with an easier-to-grasp practical conclusion. As in a closed case, canons of reasonableness drive one to a particular, definite conclusion in terms of appropriate responses. Generalists infer that since that response is appropriate in the imaginary case, it should be appropriate in the real one. But this treatment conflicts with holism. Thus, the use of such cases must be restricted for particularists, as one sees in limiting the role of cases to yield "reminders." In essence, Dancy treats cases as collections of features bearing a narrative shape more or less similar to an actual case. The operative features and their particular relationships comprise this shape. Thus, Dancy thinks cases reveal a feature's potential function in a larger description. Think of a case as a "mine" for potentially relevant features; individuals with more experience have more knowledge of such features. The lesson of one situation is that its features can play the role they do, and and an exploration problem. Conceived as an exploration problem, the ring of Gyges functions as a sounding board for one's conception of the moral life itself, and various arguments in the Republic following book II undermine the sophist's response. The case cannot be appreciated without undermining pre-conceived notions of justice: "our canons of reasonableness are supposed to be taken by us to determine a unique solution. But the assumptions with which we understand the situation need to be changed" (Diamond 2002: 236). nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 248 that information might be helpful in a real case. This treatment of cases views them as "closed"; we are to look for what the morally competent individual would see, and infer from her vision of the situation that some overlooked features matter. But this approach does not account for the phenomenon of learning from imaginary cases, as evidenced by the cases of 2 Samuel and Nussbaum's reconsideration of Steerforth. To bolster the approach to cases, I suggest that particularism requires an account of their exploratory function. Dewey's comments on the imagination, especially in the context of his comments on sympathy and his analysis of imagination in Art as Experience and A Common Faith, expand a particularist account of learning from cases. Dewey on Imagination Contemporary interpreters of Dewey's ethics appreciate the centrality of imagination in his work. In his discussion of Dewey on moral imagination, Thomas Alexander argues that the imagination "constitutes an extension of the environment to which we respond. By reading the possibilities of the present, the present situation is itself transformed and enlarged," which facilitates the discovery of new ideals enabling resolution of situations with conflicting values (Alexander 2013: 197). Steven Fesmire characterizes a Deweyan account of moral competence in terms of "moral artistry," "[highlighting] the role of an expansive imagination that enables sensitivity to social bearing and consequences, intervenes widely and deeply in experience, and brings diverse elements together in a unified experience" (Fesmire 2003: 110). Fesmire emphasizes that, for Dewey, "art is paradigmatic of all experience," and that the imagination enables us to perceive relationships between a situation's features and possibilities (Fesmire 2015: 204, 135). The primacy of aesthetic qualities of experience and deliberation in Dewey's work motivate looking to his analysis of the imagination in art to illuminate its function in moral contexts. Dewey's work on moral imagination, per Fesmire, exemplifies two intertwining and simultaneously operative aspects: an account of moral imagination as "creatively tapping into a situation's possibilities," and "empathetic projection" as "the animating mold of moral judgment" (Ibid.: 65, 132-3). The first theme includes Dewey's treatment of dramatic rehearsal, a stage of deliberation wherein one imagines taking possible courses of action and what would follow upon those actions.8 On Dewey's account, deliberation occurs when habits of action are frustrated. When this happens, "We give way, in our mind, to some impulse; we try, in our mind, some plan. Following its career through various steps, we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of the consequences that would follow" (LW 7: 275). We carry out various courses of action through representation in imagination and see what experiences they produce. Particularists might understand this rehearsal as a method, an epistemic tool, for appreciating the salience of an action's relationship to future events and experiences.9 8. See the following for more extended treatments on deliberation and dramatic rehearsal: Caspary (2006: 367-93); Fesmire 2003, especially Chapter 5; and Pappas 2008, especially 98-108. 9. One lesson particularists might glean by focusing on dramatic rehearsal as a temporally complex imaginative "trial" of a course of action is that the function of moral imagination is necessary to nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 249 However, cases like those in 2 Samuel and in Nussbaum's work do not appear to produce new appraisals by the imaginative rehearsal of one's own possible actions. For Dewey, imagination facilitates our appreciation of salient features beyond rehearsing possible lines of action. There is a danger that focusing on dramatic rehearsal as an imaginative temporal extension of a course of action unhinged from sympathy will ignore the mystery that Dancy highlights. Still, particularists can look to Dewey's work on the imagination to articulate a role for exploratory or open-ended cases. Recall that Fesmire identified two themes in Dewey's work on the imagination, "creatively tapping into a situation's possibilities," and "empathic projection." Interaction with art and imaginary cases requires this latter operation of imagination to be educative. The theme of "empathetic projection" derives from Dewey's discussion of sympathy. Regarding empathetic projection, the empathetic individual is one who has the ability to "take on" another point of view, and to construe a situation from another's perspective. Dewey writes, "sympathy carries thought beyond the self [...] [it renders] vivid the interests of others" (Ibid.: 270). To be sympathetic is, "to put ourselves in the place of others, to see things from the standpoint of their purposes and values" (Ibid.: 270; emphasis added). This ability facilitates new descriptions as a different perspective provides different concerns, limitations, and aims.10 By taking on another point of view, we construe a situation differently, possibly unsettling our initial descriptions. This role of empathic projection suggests that the same collection of features is open to different narrative structures, and that these different shapes are accessible and can be subject to evaluation. Moreover, Dewey sees this operation of the imagination in ordinary communication insofar as it has an aesthetic dimension: Dewey writes, To be a recipient of communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience. One shares in what another has felt and in so far, meagerly or amply, has his own attitude modified [...] one has to assimilate, imaginatively, something of another's experience in order to tell him intelligently of one's own experience. All communication is like art. (MW 9: 8-9; emphasis added) Empathetic projection is thus ingrained in Dewey's account of communication itself. Since communication is like art and is educative in virtue of this similarity, one should look to Dewey's account of art to articulate an account of moral learning from appreciate the salience of a situation's relationship to past and future situations. One shortcoming of particularism, then, for which the pragmatist tradition offers resources, would be in understanding the practical necessity of the imagination for revealing moral features of situations that involve continuity with past and future situations. This analysis potentially alleviates worries that particularism renders the moral life too episodic. Davis (2004: 74-5) develops this point in Rules and Vision: Particularism in Contemporary Ethics, illustrating how Socrates' final moments in the Crito require Socrates to connect his present action to his past actions. And, plausibly, the temporal complexity of dramatic rehearsal can help Dancy's particularism regarding this charge, as it might reveal disunity between past and future experiences. 10. In addition to offering this account of a habit of sympathy, Dewey maintains that sympathy is necessary for moral judgment, claiming, "Sympathy is the animating mold of moral judgment [...] because it furnishes the most efficacious intellectual standpoint" (LW 7: 270). nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 250 imagined experience. For Dewey, aesthetic imagination has a central role in genuine experience, including moral deliberation. As commentator Duane Cady writes, "For Dewey, the opposite of the aesthetic is the arbitrary and a routine submission to conventional practices and procedures" (Cady 2005: 51). Dewey sees the operation of imagination as a pre-requisite for understanding a situation at all; he contends in Democracy and Education that the imaginative is, "a warm and intimate taking in of the full scope of a situation," and develops his account of imagination in other works, especially A Common Faith and Art as Experience (MW 9: 244). Dewey's analysis in these works illustrates the workings of imagination in experience more broadly, and offer outlines of imagination in experience applicable to moral reasoning.11 In Art as Experience, Dewey maintains, "imagination is the chief instrument of the good," consisting in a "presentation of ideals" (LW 10: 350). In A Common Faith and Art as Experience, Dewey articulates an educative function for poetry, literature and art. The "moral function" of such imaginative productions is captured by the unification of concrete facts and ideals. In A Common Faith, Dewey (LW 9: 49) writes, The aims and ideals that move us are generated through imagination. But they are not made of imaginary stuff. They are made of the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience [...] The new vision does not arise out of nothing, but emerges through seeing, in terms of possibilities, that is, of imagination, old things in new relations. This understanding of the imagination as re-organizing actual experienced features of situations affords an exploratory role for cases and a more robust understanding of their role in moral learning than Dancy's checklist image allows. Dewey recognizes the educative phenomenon of learning from imaginative productions, writing that aesthetic experiences of works of a variety of kinds of art, not merely imagined cases, can yield a, "sense of disclosure and of heightened intelligibility of the world" (LW 10: 295). In his account of this sense of disclosure, Dewey writes, "in both production and enjoyed perception of works of art, knowledge is transformed" (Ibid.: 294). He denies that this transformation is exhausted by a disclosure of new properties, writing, Tangled scenes of life are made more intelligible in esthetic experience: not, however, as reflection and science render things more intelligible by reduction to conceptual form, but by presenting their meanings as the matter of a clarified, coherent, and intensified or 'impassioned' experience. (Ibid.: 295) These references to the work of the imagination here do not involve projecting into situations features that they lack. Nor does imagination reduce "tangled scenes" to "conceptual form," or what Dancy might consider a non-narrative list of relevant features. Thus, the function of imagination for Dewey is not limited to representing possible courses of action, nor exhausted by reducing a complex situation to its constitutive elements. 11. Dewey affirms that "all conscious experience has of necessity some degree of imaginative quality" (LW 10: 276). nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 251 In an imaginary case, as in empathetic projection, we imaginatively participate in organizing experienced materials in accord with a perspective. We participate in an activity in which the elements are organized and contribute to an experience of fulfillment. By interacting with a work of art, an individual appreciates the organization of experience afforded by that work. As discussed below, this participatory quality of art enables a broader understanding of cases than Dancy allows. Art as Challenge: Interaction with Art and Exploration In Art as Experience, Dewey echoes his suggestive comments in A Common Faith, writing, "possibilities are embodied in works of art that are not elsewhere actualized; this embodiment is the best evidence that can be found of the true nature of the imagination" (LW 10: 279). Dewey continues to define imagination in terms of the interaction of two "modes of vision," one inner and one outer, such that, "an imaginative experience is what happens when varied materials of sense quality, emotion, and meaning come together in a union to mark a new birth in the world" (Ibid.: 272). Regarding the two kinds of vision, outer vision is the report of the sense modalities, a list of perceived facts, while inner vision "seems wraith-like," and is formed by "ideals" (Ibid.: 273). Imaginative interaction of the two modes of vision culminates in a narrative-structured experience. Dewey analyzes imagination as the interaction of these modes of vision where the ideal and the material available to express it interact. Outer vision includes the materials presented by a situation, its features. Inner vision includes the appreciation of ideals as mentioned in A Common Faith. In that work, imagination is the vehicle by which ideals form out of experienced material, yielding a vision of possibilities to direct action. The same experienced features can exemplify different narratives, depending upon the organization provided by these ideals. Inner vision provides organization to a collection of features provided by outer vision. Key to the educative function of art, for Dewey, is that imaginative productions form a challenge to those who interact with them. We see new narrative and organizational structures when interacting with artwork, and this interaction illuminates a particularist understanding of learning from cases. In the work of art, meanings imaginatively summoned, assembled, and integrated are embodied in the material existence that here and now interacts with the self [...] [The artwork is] a challenge to the performance of a like act of evocation and organization, through imagination on the part of one who experiences it. (Ibid.: 278; emphasis added) These comments on the educative function of artworks clarify the role Dewey sees for cases like 2 Samuel or Nussbaum's experience (1990). In an artwork, as in a case, various features are unified by an organization, in Dancy's terms, a narrative "shape." Observers interact with this organized unity, not just a list of individual elements. This interaction consists in an activity of organizing experienced elements, as one does in empathetic projection, or, Dewey thinks, in ordinary communication. This action then nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 252 effects new organizations of other situations. Dewey elaborates, While the perception of the union of the possible with the actual in a work of art is a great good, the good does not terminate with the immediate and particular occasion in which it is had. The union that is presented in perception persists in the remaking of impulsion and thought. (LW 10: 351; emphasis added) By interacting with an artwork, observers participate in an act of organizing individual elements, and in doing so re-create that organization with different elements from their own experience. This "remaking of impulsion and thought" is an exploratory function. Reverting to Dancy's vocabulary is useful, since the notions of "ideal" and "inner vision" might invite confusion. In a work of art, a collection of features is given organization or shape by an author or artist. By interacting with this shape, Dewey thinks, one is "challenged" to produce a like act of organization out of materials (features) in a concrete situation. Instead of revealing features, the case-as-artwork becomes provocation to mold the actual set of features in accordance with a case's organization. In addition to cases showing that a particular feature can matter, they also demonstrate the coherence of a narrative form that organizes those features. Consider the 2 Samuel example again. Dewey might explain David's learning as follows: when Nathan presents the tale, he presents an abbreviated narrative that David encounters as an actual situation with a particular narrative organization. David is the king, and interacts with the tale as one who must exercise some authority in the case. The practical organization of the case yields a conclusion that the rich man was unjust. The subsequent "you are the man" elicits a "like act of organization." The narrative presented with the elements of the rich man and the poor man "fits" David's case. The act of organization provoked by Nathan's story yields a description of the case with the strengths of narrative. On this analysis, an artwork's function can be exploratory; it challenges an initial construal of a situation by exploring what we take to be known. The case does not yield new features nor does it demonstrate that other features can function differently. It does not demonstrate what canons of reasonableness dictate given a collection of features. Instead, it alters "inner vision" or those background conceptions individuals bring to a situation that give it shape. Cases-as-artworks mold "inner vision" through imaginative participation, and individuals bring the background formed by interaction to other situations; they are challenged to a like act of organization. Dewey's account of the educative function of the imagination in art allows an expansion of the role of cases and the conclusions they warrant. Developments of Dewey: Mark Johnson, Metaphor and Moral Argument The treatment of artwork as educative suggests that, taken as artworks, imaginary cases provoke new organizations of familiar materials. Mark Johnson's work drawing on Dewey's analysis and recent developments in cognitive science clarifies how a case nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 253 can serve this end. An ethics responsible to human nature, Johnson argues, embraces a central role for imagination and supports "conscientiousness" as a moral ideal, a quality resisting principle-bound ethics and exhibiting "the mental and emotional flexibility to imagine new solutions and new ways of going forward that resolve pressing moral problems" (Johnson 2014: 216). Johnson draws on recent research in cognitive sciences to critique rule-bound accounts of morality, suggesting instead: "moral deliberation is an activity of transformative thinking that reconfigures the situation by ordering the materials of that situation into a new gestalt" (Ibid.: 118). In an earlier work, Johnson develops an account of the necessity of "imaginative framing devices" like metaphor for moral understanding, and maintains that imagination provides narrative elements that structure experience (Johnson 1994: 170). Johnson's work on metaphor illustrates how interaction with artwork and cases is potentially educative and exploratory, and enables an articulation of the use of imaginary cases consistent with Dancy's particularism. Research in cognitive sciences shows "how abstract thinking traffics mostly in metaphor, and how our reasoning is grounded in our bodily (sensory-motor) experience" (Johnson 2014: 196). Johnson argues, in accord with Dewey, that synthesizing or making sense of experience is an imaginative activity and "that narrative structure provides the most comprehensive synthetic unity that we can achieve" (Johnson 1994: 170). Moreover, Johnson echoes Dancy's claim that justification and description coincide when he argues, The way we frame a given situation will determine what we ought to do about it, and our semantic frames typically involve metaphorical concepts. Consequently, our reasoning about these situations will typically be based on metaphors. (Ibid.: 52) Here, metaphor refers to structures, relations and vocabulary from one domain mapping onto another. In a central example, Johnson examines an individual's moral understanding of marriage under different metaphors. While details of the case are unimportant, what is important is that marriage can be described using different narrative structures; it can be understood as a journey, a commodity exchange, an organic unity, etc. Each device is projected from a different domain onto the description of marriage. What an individual discovers is that these metaphorical frames allow better and worse descriptions of marriage and its difficulties; Johnson writes of someone exploring these different descriptions that, He is trying out each possible explanation to see how it "feels," how it makes sense of his experience. And as he performs this test he is glimpsing possible structurings of his marriage. (Johnson 1994: 61) In Dancy's terms, the metaphor employed reveals different shapes for the same situation. Different domains afford different narrative structures that can be applied to a target domain, in this case, marriage. nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 254 Importantly, the narrative elements of one domain can enable synthesis and description of the features of a situation within another domain without denying holism of reasons. Instead, the patterns and vocabulary of one domain give shape to the features of another by, the mapping that constitutes the metaphor [...] the mapping consists of the entities, events, states, structures, causes and relations that are projected from the source domain [...] to the target domain. (Ibid.: 55) These structures do not necessarily suggest that because some feature matters in one domain or situation that the same feature must or might matter in another. Another example will help illustrate this pragmatist alternative to a particularist understanding of cases. Imagine a family in which a grandfather suffers from cancer. After much struggle, multiple courses of treatment, and periods of remission and sickness, the grandfather decides to quit chemotherapy treatment knowing this decision will hasten death. For the most part, his family understands his decision and prepares themselves accordingly. The twelve-year-old grandson, however, finds this decision confusing. His grandfather's "fight" with the disease he regards as brave, and the decision to stop treatment he sees as giving up. Given the grandchild's experiences of his grandfather's previous struggles with cancer, he sees cancer as an enemy, the physicians, nurses, and family members as combatants, and the elimination of cancer as the objective. The combat metaphor enabled a narrative construal of the situation by providing certain characters (the hero, the enemy, etc.), but also suggests that the grandfather's choice is cowardly, "giving in" to the enemy, accepting defeat, and so on. Suppose the child's parents have a stock of literary and actual examples of people who have bravely faced death. Death is not an "enemy" in their stories; rather, it is an especially unsettling moment because it marks an uncertainty in a journey. By making use of some examples (e.g., Hamlet's soliloquy, Socrates' final moments), they give new narrative organization to the grandfather's case. In particular, they provide a story engaging the grandchild. Through this exploration and imaginative participation in the parents' stories, the child participates in a different method of organizing the situation. The narratives offered by the parents employ a different metaphor, imbuing the situation with a different shape. Crucially, the child is not to infer that because the journey metaphor affords a particular moral appraisal in an imaginary case that it must do so here. Through further inquiry, the grandchild can test the competing construals afforded by different metaphors and see which is stronger. Dewey (LW 10: 273) writes, The peculiar quality of the imaginative is best understood when placed in opposition to the narrowing effect of habituation [...] The imaginative endures because, while at first strange with respect to us, it is enduringly familiar with respect to the nature of things. In this case, the child is used to understanding actions in combat terms. The imaginary cases provide ways to unify the same elements of the situation differently. This new nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 255 organization yields a different appraisal of the grandfather's action, one which might afford a stronger, enduringly familiar, narrative. In consulting different metaphors, we see not that some feature or other matters, but that some experienced metaphorical frameworks, aims, characters and vocabularies can structure and facilitate descriptions. An imaginary or past case might reveal that a feature is important, or it might reveal that a given vocabulary or metaphor can yield a coherent description. In the 2 Samuel case, David learns that his own activity can be understood using the vocabulary of theft and the characters of the rich man and the poor man. The imaginary case provided narrative elements that imbue the situation with a new shape, undermining the initial appraisal. An application of metaphor can yield a coherent narrative, changing the background conceptions that we initially used to organize a situation. Art, Moral Reasoning, and Consistency with Particularism Recall that Dancy's focus pertains to the role cases can have as instances of moral reasoning. Dancy identifies the appeal to cases as a form moral argument, and the challenge is to make sense of that form of inference from a particularist point of view. I have argued that Dewey's work on imagination allows an understanding of cases as revealing different narrative "shapes" that might apply to a concrete situation. Here, I briefly explicate how cases understood as artworks inform moral reasoning in a manner consistent with Dancy's particularism. Dewey's analysis coheres with the commitment to narrative justification, does not rely on "importing" features into concrete situations, and does not deny holism, the fundamental position underlying particularism. In rejecting principle-bound accounts of justification, Dancy affirmed that justification has a narrative structure. The narratives are comprised of a situation's salient features. The appeal to cases as revealing narrative elements to be used in a concrete situation comports with Dancy's account of justification. The success of a description can be read as an endorsement of the helpfulness of its narrative elements in organizing a situation's features. And, as an argument for a certain narrative structure, the "conclusion" of a case need not be limited to the claim that some feature may contribute to the overall case for or against an action. Instead, cases can show that different vocabularies and metaphorical structures, elements of "inner vision," give rise to different descriptions or shapes of a situation. In his own example of the orphan and malevolent trustee, Dancy does not tell the reader what feature turned out to be important; no analysis shows how that case drove an understanding of what Britain ought to do with the Elgin Marbles. The case did, however, reveal that in a metaphor of familial and legal relationships, the actions of the trustee were unjustified and vicious. That narrative displayed a unity, had the strengths afforded the form, and employed the vocabulary of family and legal relationships. The structures and characters employed in the imaginary case afford a narrative description of the actual case. That one could describe the situation without the analogy shows merely that other narrative descriptions of the case are available. nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 256 My suggestion is that Dewey's analysis of the imagination allows particularists to see the imagination as the "experimental ground" for narrative structures and devices that may or may not turn out to "fit" a situation at hand. There is no need here to deny the narrative structure of justification. Instead of revealing that a certain property or collection of properties can be salient, exploration contributes to our abilities to offer different descriptions of concrete situations. Examining cases can probe and develop background conceptions and dominant metaphors brought to a situation by an observer. Since the function of the imagination is to explore structures that afford new narrative descriptions of situations, the analysis here comports with Dancy's claim that justification is narrative in structure. Crucially, consistency with particularism demands that appeal to the imaginary case does not "import" features to the real case that are not there. Some might think that Dewey's view of the imagination is incompatible with particularism on this point. He sometimes writes as if the imagination imbues a situation with properties that are not "in" the concrete situation: the reality of ideal ends as ideals is vouched for by their undeniable power in action. An ideal is not an illusion because imagination is the organ through which it is apprehended. For all possibilities reach us through the imagination. In a definite sense, the only meaning that can be assigned the term "imagination" is that things unrealized in fact come home to us and have the power to stir us. (LW 9: 43) However, the "things unrealized in fact" need not be additional features of a situation; the imagination need not operate by imputing saliences to situations that they do not have. Recall, Dancy argues that situations exhibit a practical shape, a narrative structure. The imagination as the unification of ideal and real can be understood as the unification of different narrative structures with a particular set of features. Since the imagination can disclose different "shapes" for the same set of features, it can operate by revealing different narratives about the same situation. These different shapes can be subject to evaluation. Cases as arguments show that a different metaphorical structure can be fruitful. Consider the Nathan-David exchange again. Perhaps David's position of power inured him to construing his own action as theft; instead he might have seen the situation as the just or normal actions of a monarch. Nathan's abbreviated story offers a competing narrative shape for the situation. Through participation in that act of organization, David returns to his own situation provoked to re-organize its actual features. Similarly, Nussbaum's initial encounter with Steerforth left her disliking the character, worrying about her daughter's love for Steerforth since there must be nothing admirable about him. By imaginatively participating in the story, Nussbaum comes to appreciate a different shape. There are no new, previously unnoticed features in her second reading of the novel, but through the "incantatory language" of the novel, she re-organizes its elements. By participating in the novel's organization, she meets the challenge to a like act of organization, undermines her initial appraisal, and comes to a new appreciation of the situation without introducing or omitting elements. nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 257 Finally, since holism, the position that features need not have the same moral import in every situation, is the leading thought behind particularism, the analysis offered here must cohere with this commitment. Dewey's approach to imaginary cases does not require any feature or collection of features to have invariant moral import. As moral argument, the case does not show that because a collection of features in one instance justifies an action, that the same collection will matter elsewhere. Instead, since a particular narrative organization works in one case, one knows that those characters, vocabulary and general metaphoric structure can function to make sense of a collection of features. Because those narrative elements work in the imagined situation, they might yield an understanding of a second case. While it may be unintended, Dewey's account of artwork as "eliciting a like act of organization" can make sense of the use of cases in moral learning and reasoning on a particularist framework. Thus, Dancy's particularism, using Dewey's analysis, can provide a robust account of learning from cases, and is not limited to considering cases solely as sources of "reminders."12 References Albertzart M., (2014), Moral Principles, New York, Bloomsbury Academic. Alexander T. M., (2013), "John Dewey and the Moral Imagination: Beyond Putnam and Rorty toward a Postmodern Ethics," The Human Eros: Eco-ontology and the Aesthetics of Existence, New York, Fordham University Press. Bakhurst D., (2007), "Pragmatism and Ethical Particularism," New Pragmatists, edited by Cheryl Misak, New York, Oxford University Press. Boylan M., (2013), "What Fictive Narrative Philosophy Can Tell Us: Stories, Cases, and Thought Experiments," Revista del Instituto de Filosofia, Universidad de Valparaiso, 1, 2, 61-81. Cady D., (2005), Moral Vision: How Everyday Life Shapes Moral Thinking, New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Caspary W., (2006), "Dewey and Sartre on Ethical Choice: Dramatic Rehearsal Versus Radical Choice," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 42, 3, 367-93. Dancy J., (1985), "The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66, 1&2, 141-53. 12. 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The Middle Works of John Dewey, 18891924, volume 9, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University Press. - (2008), Ethics. The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, volume 7, edited by Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University Press. Diamond C., (2002), "What If X Isn't the Number of Sheep? Wittgenstein and Thought-Experiments in Ethics," Philosophical Papers, 31, 3, 227-50. Elster J., (2011), "How Outlandish Can Imaginary Cases Be?," Journal of Applied Philosophy, 28, 3, 241-58. Fesmire S., (2003), John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press. - (2015), John Dewey, New York, Routledge. Gendler T., (2000), Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases, New York, Garland Publishing. Guarini M., (2010), "Particularism, Analogy, and Moral Cognition," Minds & Machines 20, 385-422. Jackson N., (2016), "John Dewey and the Possibility of Particularist Moral Education," Southwest Philosophy Review, 32, 1, 215-24. nAte JAckSon MorAl PArticulAriSM And the role of iMAGinAry cASeS ISSN: 2036-4091 2016, VIII, 1 259 Johnson M., (1994), Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. - (2014), Morality for Humans: Ethical Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Lekan T., (2003), Making Morality: Pragmatist Reconstruction in Ethical Theory, Nashville, TN, Vanderbilt University Press. Nussbaum M., (1990), "Steerforth's Arm: Love and the Moral Point of View," Love's Knowledge, New York, Oxford University Press. - (2010), Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Pappas G., (2008), John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as Experience, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press,. 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Author's accepted, pre-publication version – may contain typographical errors Allen-Collinson, J. (2017). Chapter 1: Sporting embodiments: Sports studies and the (continuing) promise of phenomenology, in M Giardina and M Donnelly (eds), Physical Culture, Ethnography and the Body: Theory, Method and Praxis. Abingdon: Routledge Originally published as: Allen-Collinson, J. (2009). Sporting embodiment: sports studies and the (continuing) promise of phenomenology. Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercise, 1 (3): 279-296 Sporting embodiments: sports studies and the (continuing) promise of phenomenology Jacquelyn Allen-Collinson email: [email protected] Prof J Allen-Collinson, School of Sport & Exercise Science, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, UK 2 Sporting embodiment: sports studies and the (continuing) promise of phenomenology Abstract Whilst in recent years sports studies have addressed the calls 'to bring the body back in' to theorisations of sport and physical activity, the 'promise of phenomenology' remains largely under-realised with regard to sporting embodiment. Relatively few accounts are grounded in the 'flesh' of the lived sporting body, and phenomenology offers a powerful framework for such analysis. A wide-ranging, multi-stranded, and interpretatively contested perspective, phenomenology in general has been taken up and utilised in very different ways within different disciplinary fields. The purpose of this article is to consider some selected phenomenological threads, key qualities of the phenomenological method, and the potential for existentialist phenomenology in particular to contribute fresh perspectives to the sociological study of embodiment in sport and exercise. It offers one way to convey the 'essences', corporeal immediacy and textured sensuosity of the lived sporting body. The use of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is also critically addressed. Key words: phenomenology; existentialist phenomenology; interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA); sporting embodiment; the lived-body; Merleau-Ponty Acknowledgement The author wishes to thank the editor and three reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. 3 Introduction Whilst in recent years sports studies have undoubtedly taken to heart vociferous calls 'to bring the body back in' to theorisations of sport and physical activity, the 'promise of phenomenology' (Kerry and Armour, 2000) remains largely under-realised with regard to sporting embodiment. There are relatively few accounts truly grounded in the 'flesh' of the lived sporting body, and phenomenology offers a powerful framework for such description and analysis. Phenomenology, derived from the Greek 'phainomenon', is the study of phenomena, things as they present themselves to, and are perceived in our consciousness.1 Kvale (1996: 53) describes it as an approach: 'interested in elucidating both that which appears and the manner in which it appears. It studies the subjects' perspectives of their world; their essential meanings'. The concern with subjectivity, first-person accounts, experience and meaning has, however, sometimes resulted in phenomenology's being erroneously conflated with qualitative research in general, despite its specific philosophical roots and ethos. Described as arguably the major philosophical movement of the twentieth century (Embree and Mohanty, 1997: 1), modern phenomenology emerged from the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and now spans a wide-ranging, multi-stranded, and interpretatively contested set of perspectives falling under its general rubric. Even one of the key exponents of existentialist philosophy, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, noted (2001: vii) that the question of what phenomenology actually is, had by no means been answered. Part of the problem lies perhaps in the different ontological and epistemological positions underlying the distinctive strands of phenomenology. Whilst originating in philosophy, forms of phenomenology have been taken up and utilised in a myriad of ways by different disciplines and subjects. In general, though, phenomenology seeks highly detailed, in-depth descriptions of subjective human experiences in specific contexts, and aspires to reveal their 'essences' (described below); 1 In contrast 'noumena' are deemed to be the actual objects that produce the phenomena, although the possibility of their 'independent' existence is debated within phenomenology. 4 the essential, but always situated, structures of experience as they appear to consciousness. This article gives a brief introduction to phenomenology, and aims to: 1) provide a brief overview of key phenomenological strands; 2) identify central characteristics or qualities of the phenomenological method; 3) consider some of the ways in which phenomenology has been operationalised, including within sports and exercise studies, and in the application of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis; 4) examine the potential of existentialist phenomenology in particular to offer rich analyses of sporting embodiment that evocatively portray the multi-textured experiences of the lived sporting body. The focus on phenomenology, and the 'lived body' (Leib), the body as linking self and world in an ongoing dynamic inter-relationship, the body of everyday experience, is not, it should be stressed, to advocate some form of idealist, or 'every wo/man', universalist analysis. It is, rather, to suggest some ways in which phenomenologicallyinspired insights might be brought to bear on the study of situated sporting experiences. Criticisms of phenomenology as failing to acknowledge sufficiently the power of socialstructural constraints upon individuals, interactions and relationships2, have been addressed by many forms of more 'social' phenomenological analysis that recognise the structurally-influenced, historically-specific, and socially situated nature of human experience, the intersectionality of identities, and indeed the centrality of relationships within 'human (inter)existence' (Adams, 2007: 24). Although departing from its original 'pure' Husserlian form, more sociologised forms of phenomenology incorporate and develop insights from other theoretical frameworks such as feminism (e.g. Young, 1980, 1998; Bartky, 1990; Butler, 1997), queer studies (e.g. Grosz, 1994; Ahmed, 2007), critical sociology (Hughson and Inglis, 2002) and the phenomenology of 'race' (Alcoff, 1999), to name a few. For, in addition to overcoming Cartesian mind-body dualism and advancing detailed, grounded descriptions of phenomena (two of Husserl's original purposes), phenomenology also provides a stance on embodiment that incorporates 2 See Throop and Murphy (2002) for an analysis of Bourdieu's critique of phenomenology, for example 5 conceptions of bodies and action as sociallyand historically-located, socially-related and interacting from particular structural standpoints. Our bodies are thus acknowledged to be gendered, classed, sexually-'oriented', aged, 'raced', with differing degrees of dis/ability and corporeal variation or in Shildrick's (2001) specific term 'monstrosity', and not always singular or individuated (Tyler, 2001). Phenomenology: key movements Philosophical phenomenology is complex, mutable, multi-stranded, nuanced and contested, and this article can provide only a brief, schematic overview; a flavour of the perspective rather than any detailed analysis. Some of the richness, complexity and tensions are inevitably lost in a resumé such as this. Modern phenomenology as a philosophical stance was originally developed by Edmund Husserl (1931) in an attempt to remedy the inadequacies of 'scientific', 'objective' approaches to studying the nature of human beings and existence. Husserl wanted to acknowledge and address the subjectivity of human experience, which for him constituted the basis of all knowledge. Embree and Mohanty (1997) posit four specific tendencies within the phenomenology movement: realist, constitutive, existentialist and hermeneutic. A brief description of the latter three strands, as particularly apposite to sports studies, is provided below, before focussing specifically on the relevance of existentialist phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty's work for the investigation of sporting embodiment. It should be noted, however, that the strands portrayed here in reality are overlapping and intertwined, and the work of some theorists transcends categories. Labelling can be descriptively useful but also restrictive, and phenomenology is a rich, complex, contested and protean perspective; truly a tangled web in Ehrich's (1999) evocative imagery. 1) Constitutive/transcendental phenomenology are terms applied to Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, which underwent substantial rethinking as his work developed. As Embree and Mohanty (1977) indicate, constitutive phenomenology relates broadly to the notion that we are simultaneously in and part of the world into which we are born, that we are aware of, have an 'idea' of, act on the world and 'constitute' 6 ourselves and that world. Husserl's phenomenology has also been termed 'transcendental', in that it seeks to transcend our tacit presuppositions and taken-forgranted assumptions about phenomena, including 'scientific' assumptions, interpretations and abstractions, in order to describe the very 'essences' of phenomena as they present themselves in everyday life. Husserl's phenomenology is epistemological with an idealistic goal, to develop a method to yield absolute essential knowledge or universal laws of facts (Jennings, 1986: 1235, quoted in Ehrich, 1999: 25). He considered phenomenology a rigorous human science that could provide not only detailed descriptions of phenomena but also the ways in which human knowledge is developed, and shared understandings are generated. One of his central ideas was that consciousness is always intentional, directed at something (see Intentionality below). Whilst acknowledging the role of interpretation, transcendental phenomenology is primarily descriptive, utilising the techniques of 'epochē' and 'reduction' (defined below) in an attempt to suspend or bracket existing beliefs and presuppositions about a phenomenon prior to its description, in order to arrive at its essential element(s). In Husserl's terms, this is to return 'to the things themselves' (zu den Sachen selbst). Controversially, Husserl believed it was not only possible to bracket one's own beliefs and assumptions, but also to bracket oneself from the 'natural world' via transcendental reduction and thus to attain pure transcendental consciousness. His idealistic notion of 'transcendental subjectivity' was perhaps not surprisingly subject to trenchant critique, leading Husserl to focus in his later work (1976) upon shared social reality via the concept of the Lebenswelt the commonsense lifeworld of everyday experience, intersubjectively constructed. This world is not, however, immediately accessible to analysis because of its tacit, taken-for-grantedness. To access the lifeworld requires, Husserl argued, application of the phenomenological method to identify and bracket the commonsense, everyday assumptions enveloping the essences of experiences. The concept of the lifeworld was further developed by Alfred Schutz (1972), whose work in turn was adapted by Harold Garfinkel (1984) in his ground-breaking approach, ethnomethodology. More recently, Giorgi (1985) has contributed a significant and 7 detailed body of work within the general spirit of descriptive phenomenology, predominantly applied in the areas of psychology and nursing. Examples of studies within sport and physical activity that use transcendental phenomenology include Morley's (2001) study of breath control in yoga, which also contrasts transcendental with existentialist forms of phenomenology, whilst Moe (2004) uses insights derived from both transcendental and more hermeneutic forms of phenomenology to explore processes of skill acquisition in sport. 2) Hermeneutic phenomenology: Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur are key proponents of hermeneutic phenomenology, an approach that seeks to analyse the context, intention and meaning surrounding a text or representation. Whilst transcendental phenomenology focuses upon the descriptive, hermeneutic phenomenology emphasizes the interpretive. Indeed, Heidegger posited that all description is always fundamentally interpretative, strongly rejecting Husserl's idealistic notion of a transcendental phenomenology, and arguing against the possibility of our being (Sein) as open to bracketing or suspension, given its predating of and preeminence over consciousness. Heidegger considered that we are 'thrown into' the world, which we experience directly through a kind of encompassing sight – Umsicht developing a certain know-how or intuitive coping skill. Thus, as Wrathall (2000, quoted in Moe, 2004: 219) notes, we do not encounter the world as a set of meaningless, atomistic elements, indeed for things to be intelligible and meaningful to us, they are 'always already' (in Heidegger's terms) integrated into our world via a background of coping practices. Moe (2004: 219) quotes the example of grasping for a doorknob, and notes that actions such as this do not become meaningful after atomistic information processing, but are always already meaningful to us, seemingly 'natural'. This notion of things being intelligible only because they are already in our world schema has also been challenged. Within hermeneutic phenomenology, Gadamer, one of Heidegger's students, took on and further explored the latter's interest in the centrality of language as the fundamental mode of 'being-in-the-world'. Ricoeur's form of phenomenology similarly 8 focuses upon the ways in which meanings are deposited and mediated through language, narrative, myth, religion and art, with a particular emphasis on the narrativity of self. Within sports and exercise, hermeneutic phenomenology has been employed, for example, to examine methodological issues in researching child athletes' experiences of figure skating (Ryba, 2008). Whilst hermeneutic phenomenology certainly offers great possibilities for application in the study of the sporting body, it is upon another strand of phenomenology that the article primarily focuses on the existentialphenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 3) Existentialist phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty's perception: Existentialist philosophies in general seek understanding of what it means to be human, cohering around fundamental questions such as whether a human nature exists, what it means to be aware of our own mortality. Early proponents of existentialism were Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and in the twentieth century, key existentialist writers such as Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre worked closely with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose work wedded existentialism and phenomenology (Ehrich, 1999: 28). Heidegger too is often described as an existential phenomenologist, given the ontological slant of his writings, although he himself did not recognise the existentialist label. Existentialist phenomenology provides a 'third way' epistemologicallyand ontologically-speaking, commencing not from the assumption of an objective world 'out there', nor from a pure, constituting consciousness, but from a dialogic where world, body and consciousness are all fundamentally intertwined, inter-relating and mutually influencing. One's own body (le corps propre) is the subject of perception, the standpoint from which all things are perceived and experienced; a concept certainly of salience within studies of sporting embodiment. Phenomena are thus not merely abstract things out there in the world, separate from human consciousness and experience, but are part of our incarnate subjectivity. We have existential unity with the chair (flesh) of the world, and can experience phenomena at a deeply corporeal, pre-reflective, pre- (or perhaps ultra)linguistic level. Further, in relation to behaviour, it is 'not directed to the true world or pure being, but to being-for-the animal ... a certain manner of treating the world, of 9 "being-in-the-world"' (Merleau-Ponty, 1963: 125). Our mode of being is thus based on the union of the 'psychic' and the 'physiological'. As illustrative of Heidegger's notion of 'being-in-the-world' (Dasein, 'being there') Merleau-Ponty (1963: 77) gives the example of phantom-limb pain; pain that cannot be purely physiological, nor purely psychological because the person is under no illusion of having an actual physical limb, thus expressing an ambivalent mode of being-in-the-world. In his later work, Merleau-Ponty recast the 'lived body' of his earlier writings as 'chair' (flesh) in order better 'to capture its primordial or elemental character' (Morley, 2001: 75), so that 'being in the world' then became 'flesh-of-the-world', to convey the continuity of world and body. Existentialist phenomenology also highlights the situatedness of human experience, including gendered experience and behaviour (de Beauvoir, 1974; Young, 1980), and also, importantly for the analysis of much sporting experience, interembodiment, in Merleau-Ponty's (1969) terminology, 'intercorporeality'. For it is argued that the experience of embodiment is 'never a private affair, but is always already mediated by our continual interactions with other human and non-human bodies' (Weiss, 1999: 5). Merleau-Ponty's (1969) focus upon the sensory dimensions of embodiment and his concept of reversibility also have high applicability to studies of sporting embodiment (Hockey and Allen-Collinson, 2007). Reversibility refers to the notion that our sense perceptions are reversible: we both touch and are touched, see and are seen, and so on. So Merleau-Ponty (2001: 93) suggests that the experience of touching, for example, cannot be understood without reference to the possibility of situational reversal. These possibilities are held in a state of constant inter-relationship, so our embodied subjectivity inheres in both our touching and our tangibility; the two are inextricably intertwined. In relation to sportspeople, such a relationship is not just with other participants but also with objects such as sports equipment and kit, and the general environment whether air, water, snow, terrain, and so on (Hockey and AllenCollinson, 2007). Phenomenology and Embodiment in Sport and Exercise 10 These then are just some of the strands of phenomenology, and its potential for the study of sporting embodiment becomes clear when we recall that a primary task of phenomenology: 'is not to denude human beings, but to reawaken ourselves to the idea that we are beings who live with and through bodies' (Kim 2001: 69). As Connell (1995: 51) evocatively phrases it: 'There is an irreducible bodily dimension in experience and practice; the sweat cannot be excluded'. Given the centrality of the body within sport, it is surprising that, with some notable exceptions, relatively little use has been made explicitly of phenomenological approaches within sports-related studies generally. This point perhaps requires clarification. Some accounts appear implicitly to use phenomenologically-inspired analysis, without naming it as such, whilst others claim to be phenomenological but make scant, superficial, or no reference to any phenomenological theory or theorists. Given the very different ontological and epistemological claims of the various phenomenological strands, leaving unstated the specific phenomenological frame being adopted inevitably raises a number of questions. For the reader fully to appreciate, and to arrive at an informed judgment about the study, s/he needs to be able to locate the account more precisely within the broad sweep of phenomenology. Despite Whitson's (1976) signalling in the 1970s the potential of the phenomenological method for sports sciences, Kerry and Armour in the 2000s could find few examples of sports-related research that 'fully merit the phenomenological descriptor' (2000: 1). Analogously, as Arnold (1979) and Bain (1995) note, phenomenology has particular relevance to the study of movement, but despite this: 'little of qualitative research in kinesiology and physical education is grounded in this theoretical perspective' (Bain, 1995: 244). There are, however, perceptive, evocative accounts of phenomenological perspectives on movement applied elsewhere, for example in Engel's (2007) hermeneutic 'aesthetic-phenomenological' analysis of everyday movement as the performance of the dynamic repertoires of existence. Whilst all strands of phenomenology potentially offer insights into the sporting experience, Merleau-Ponty's form of existentialist phenomenology, with its focus upon embodiment, is particularly well-suited to the in-depth portrayal of the corporeally- 11 grounded experience of sport and physical activity. Indeed, as Kerry and Armour (2000: 7) point out, although not always acknowledged, much work in the sociology of the body generally is rooted in existential philosophy. Given Merleau-Ponty's interest in human consciousness as embodied consciousness, in perception, intentionality, and the ways in which we experience lived-time/space, his work is particularly apposite, and a small but developing corpus draws upon existential phenomenology in examining sport and physical activities. To give a flavour, the following studies provide some examples (not a comprehensive listing) of the use of a Merleau-Pontian inspired analysis to these areas. In relation to the time-space nexus, for example, Masciotra et al. (2001) provide a detailed phenomenologically-grounded account of spatio-temporal 'distancing' and coordination in Karate. The dialectical relationship between 'player-body-subject' and the lived-space of the playing field has been evocatively portrayed in relation to 'the beautiful game' of soccer, and the 'silky touch' aesthetics of star players (Hughson and Inglis, 2002; Hemphill, 2005). Merleau-Ponty's work has been taken up by various scholars interested in mind-body practices and physical cultures, such as Morley's (2001) interpretation of yoga practice and breath control. McDonald (2007) considers kalarippayattu, a traditional martial art (but also a whole system of spiritual and physical training) of southern India, drawing upon Merleau-Ponty's framework of embodied consciousness and being-in-the-world. Addressing sports and physical activity more generally, Hockey and Allen-Collinson (2007) consider the sensuous dimension of the sporting body and the centrality of sense perceptions in participants' experiences of engagement in sport and exercise, utilising insights from Merleau-Ponty's work on the body as subject of perception. As noted, for Merleau-Ponty (2001) intentionality is a key concern, and perception is inextricably linked to movement, accompanied by intentionality; all elements central to sporting experience. Crossley (2001: 123) succinctly portrays Merleau-Ponty's position whereby the corporeal schema is 'an incorporated bodily know-how and practical sense; a perspectival grasp upon the world from the "point of view" of the body'. This bodily know-how and practical sense are developed by habit. This does not imply mere 12 mechanical repetition, but, as Crossley (2001: 127) highlights, a practical 'principle' which emerges into the social world via the formulation of meaning, intention and appropriate action, to create the 'habit-body'. So, for example, the sporting body develops not only a cognitive understanding of training and performance but also an embedded corporeal, 'fleshy' knowledge and memory, developed, refined and sedimented over time via habitual, everyday training practices. In this vein and in relation to cricket, Sutton (2007: 764) portrays the role of memory, for the ways in which the past is alive in our embodied actions is typical of mundane human activities, such as talking and driving, as well as more specialist skills such as batting. The development of skill and expertise requires that the performer go beyond a cognitive understanding of what to do, to develop a seemingly 'natural', pre-reflective response to situations. This is well encapsulated by Dreyfus' (1996, cited in Moe, 2004: 220) quoting of Larry Bird, a star basketball player, who indicated: '[A lot of the] things I do on the court are just reactions to situations. . . . A lot of times, I've passed the basketball and not realized I've passed it until a moment or so later'. The next section addresses the phenomenological method specifically, including four key qualities of phenomenology, together with a brief examination of some ways of writing and representing phenomenological research. The phenomenological method Although the different strands of phenomenology have their own distinctive principles and perspectives, four themes or qualities, derived from Husserlian phenomenology, provide a touchstone in portraying 'the phenomenologcal method', not merely as a set of methods or techniques, but more akin to a distinctive and encompassing worldview (Weltanschauung), the very phenomenological attitude itself. 1) Description Given the centrality of the inter-relationship between the perceiver's consciousness and perceived objects within phenomenology, description is never conceived merely as 13 the 'abstract' writing or recording of things without reference to the person perceiving and recording them. Description, however, can mean very different things for phenomenologists working in different traditions, depending upon the degree of interpretative work explicitly involved. For hermeneutic phenomenologists for example, there is no description without interpretation, for any description provides: 'not a copy of the world, but a hermeneutics' (Spurling, 1977: 168). Husserlian forms of descriptive phenomenology, however, have as their aim to 'go back to the things themselves' and to describe experience by suspending as far as possible prior knowledge, assumptions, attitudes and interpretations of the phenomenon in order to arrive at its essential core characteristics and meanings. It is of course acknowledged by many phenomenologists that, contra Husserl's early exhortations, suspending all preconceptions and biases is an impossibility, although 'epochē' is nevertheless a useful research principle. 2) Epochē and reduction These elements of Husserlian phenomenology have been subject to intense contestation especially by those working from a more hermeneutical perspective. 'Epochē', from the Greek 'to abstain, stop' or 'to keep a distance from', is used to denote the suspension of taken-for-granted assumptions about a phenomenon, or at least attempts to identify these explicitly and set them aside. It is thus the suspending or 'bracketing' of the 'natural attitude', our taken-for-granted, everyday assumptions and presuppositions about something, in order to be able to arrive at and describe its essential characteristics. A form of reduction advocated by Husserl was the 'eidetic'. Here, once the natural attitude has been suspended via epochē, eidetic reduction is used to make sense of what remains, to reduce the phenomenon to an exemplar of an essence or an 'eidos'. For most contemporary phenomenological researchers, however, complete bracketing of the cultural and social situatedness of descriptions and understandings is acknowledged to be an impossibility; we cannot stand outside our cultural frame of reference (including our language structures), although we can make best efforts reflexively to be aware of our assumptions and standpoints, and to render these explicit. Maso (2001: 138) for example notes that theories and interpretations are there in the observing, right from the outset, and: 'To bracket them, if at all possible, would make 14 perception, and therefore experience, impossible'; furthermore, what is bracketed and what appears to consciousness depends very much upon the person doing the bracketing. Although complete bracketing of assumptions and beliefs is an impossibility, nevertheless in practical research terms Husserl's notion of epochē is useful in encouraging us to adopt a more self-critical and reflective approach in research. In sports studies for instance, it is possible to take the descriptions provided by participants themselves and subject these to analysis by bracketing as much as possible our prior knowledge and assumptions of the phenomenon, for example by making the familiar strange, explicitly questioning and recording our own conceptualisations of the phenomenon, or using researcher triangulation. 3) Essences The purpose of eidetic reduction is to distil a phenomenon, to reduce it down to its core meaning, its 'eidos', devoid of the usual tacit, taken-for-granted assumptions and preconceptions enveloping it. For Husserl, a central aim of phenomenology was the 'discovery of the essences of experience', the essential structures of experience, in order to create a 'systematic and disciplined methodology for the derivation of knowledge' (1931, quoted in Kerry and Armour, 2000:3). But, as Ehrich (1999: 23) notes, for later phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, arriving at such description of the phenomenon is not the culmination, but merely a starting point in understanding the relationships of the experience. The concept of 'essences' has been widely debated, particularly in relation to notions of universality and the 'independence' of such essences from social context. It is clear, for example, that for Merleau-Ponty (1963) with his emphasis on the situatedness of experience, such essential structures are indeed socially constituted, cultureand context-bound rather than universal. Similarly, Giorgi's (1985) work focuses upon 'typical' structures that are always inevitably context-dependent. 4) Intentionality Another key claim of phenomenology, originating in Husserl's work and critically developed by Merleau-Ponty, is that consciousness is always consciousness of 15 something; it is thus intentional, directed or orientated towards something or someone. Intentionality in this context relates not so much to the element of 'intent', but more to 'directedness'. As Willig (2008: 52) neatly phrases it: 'Intentionality allows objects to appear as phenomena', and explains why different people can and do perceive and experience the 'same' environment in radically different ways. Thus, it is argued, a thing must present itself to us as something recognizable and always already in our schema of the world, in order to be perceived and recognised as such. Our being-in-the-world consists in projecting purposes and goals, which structure and influence our situatedness (Young, 1980: 140). Ahmed (2007: 2) for example portrays this in relation to the orientation and intentionality of emotions; our emotions being always 'directed' toward objects, so that when we experience fear, we feel fear of something (however nebulous that might be). As she further notes (2007: 3), orientations shape not only how we inhabit space, but how we apprehend the world of shared inhabitance, to whom or what we direct our energy and attention. Merleau-Ponty (2001) distinguishes between two kinds of intentionality: intentionality of acts, when we consciously and voluntarily take up a position; and operative intentionality, a kind of pre-reflective intentionality, a tacit, 'background-noise' setting to our lives, only brought to light via the phenomenological reduction (see Reuter, 1999 for a detailed explanation). These then are four central qualities or elements within the phenomenological method, which, as Kerry and Armour (2000: 8) note, 'is the phenomenological approach itself'. This 'method' for deriving knowledge is perhaps better described as a phenomenological attitude, an orientation to the world, a way of looking, 'an attitude of attentiveness to the things of immediate experience' (Van den Berg, 1972), rather than any set of prescribed techniques or procedures, although these have been advocated by some. For many phenomenologists, however, any method that can produce detailed, rich, in-depth, textured, descriptions of participants' own subjective, concrete lived experiences of a phenomenon, has the potential to provide the basic data for application of phenomenological analysis or empirical phenomenological reflection (EPR) (Colaizzi, 1973). Indeed phenomenological description and analysis have been applied to data derived from a spectrum of methods ranging from semi-structured interviews (for 16 example, Hiskey et al., 2008) through to autoethnographic data (for example, Hockey and Allen-Collinson, 2007), or at least to the autophenomenographic elements of the latter. Examples of research that fully acknowledges and respects phenomenological ethos and principles are provided by van Manen (1990) (hermeneutic perspective on pedagogy), Todres (2007) (in relation to psychotherapy and spirituality), Moustakas (1994) and Giorgi (1985) (using existential perspectives). Although word limit precludes a fuller discussion of the wide range of ways in which phenomenological research has been and might be designed and conducted, there is a burgeoning literature of 'practitioner-related' phenomenology, particularly within psychology, health psychology and nursing (e.g. Colaizzi, 1978; Moustakas, 1994; Dale, 1996; Willig, 2007). There have been numerous and varied efforts at operationalising phenomenology in a specific empirical approach, which seeks to obtain 'comprehensive descriptions that provide the basis for a reflective structural analysis that portrays the essences of the experience' (Moustakas, 1994: 13). Giorgi's (1985) phenomenological method, for example, uses a Husserlian-inspired approach to address psychological problems, and he provides detailed guidelines for undertaking this form of research (see Willig, 2008: 55), which can also be applied to sporting phenomena. He advocates: 1) the collection of concrete, 'naïve' descriptions of the phenomenon from participants', as co-researchers; 2) the researcher's adoption of the phenomenological attitude; 3) an impressionistic reading of each description to gain a feel of the whole; 4) the in-depth re-reading of the description to identify 'meaning units', which capture specific aspects of the whole; 5) identifying and making explicit the psychological significance of each meaning unit; 6) the production of a general description of the structure(s) of the experience, with the aim of letting 'the phenomena speak for themselves' (Giorgi, 1985: 151). Moving away from the more Husserlian end of the spectrum, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) provides a popular, accessible and relatively 17 straightforward research approach that has been extensively applied within psychology, especially health psychology, and health and medicine-related studies, also finding favour with some sport and exercise psychologists (see for example, Shepherd et al. 2006; Jones and Lavallee, 2009). Despite its undoubted potential with regard to the much-needed focus upon patients'/participants' own subjective experiences, and its burgeoning popularity, there are certain problems with some studies employing the IPA framework when viewed from the more phenomenological, 'open' and participantfocussed end of the phenomenological spectrum. (For other criticisms of IPA, see for example, Parker (2005) from a narrative analytic stance.) This is not to decry, or deny in any way the usefulness of IPA-based studies, some of which are excellent, perceptive and phenomenologically acute, but merely to raise awareness of some of the problems that may occur when studies depart radically from a phenomenological grounding and ethos, or are not explicit about how and why they employ phenomenology specifically, as opposed to other qualitative approaches. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA): caveat The aim of IPA is to explore in detail the sense-making activities of participants in relation to their own subjective experiences.3 This concern with subjectivity, firstperson accounts, experience, meaning and sense-making has sometimes resulted in a confusing conflation with qualitative research in general, however. So, for instance, an oft-cited rationale for employing phenomenology in IPA-bases studies is that it enables the exploration variously of participants' subjectivity, experiences and perceptions. As these are by no means specific to phenomenology but a general goal of much qualitative research in general, the rationale is fundamentally blunted and it is left to the reader to speculate as to why a phenomenological perspective in particular was chosen. A further problem lies with the phenomenological/interpretational balance in some IPA-based research. As Brocki and Wearden (2006) note, IPA is phenomenological in so much as it is concerned with individuals' subjective reports rather than with 3 See Smith (2004) and Smith and Osborn (2003) for good discussions of IPA. 18 'objective' accounts, but also interpretative in its recognition of the researcher's interpretative role in the analysis. It should be said, however, that this phenomenological/interpretational balance can prove difficult to maintain, and a good deal of IPA-based research strays a considerable way from any phenomenological grounding, although some studies do retain strong elements of phenomenological ethos. Nicholls et al., (2005) for example use an IPA approach, underpinned by clearly articulated phenomenological principles, to investigate golfers' coping strategies in relation to performance-related stressors during competitions. At the other end of the spectrum, whilst interesting in their own right, with some IPA-based studies it is difficult to discern in what ways they are actually distinguishable from qualitative research in general. This is especially so where there is scant, if any, reference to phenomenology as theory (let alone phenomenological principles) in anything other than name. Warriner and Lavallee's (2008) excellent study of retirement experiences amongst former elite gymnasts, for example, provides an interesting, thoughtful and insightful analysis but its phenomenological grounding is not evident in the write-up, although the authors state clearly that a phenomenological approach was indeed adopted (2008: 303). Somewhat analogous to the way in which 'grounded theory' is often cited as constituting part of a methodological approach, but then no further reference made to its principles or the detail of its processes, 'phenomenology' is sometimes adopted in talismanic fashion, with no real attempt to engage with phenomenology as epistemology, ontology or indeed methodology in its wider, philosophical sense. Following on from this lack of phenomenological engagement, problems with IPA, at least from a 'stronger' phenomenological perspective, cohere around the actual methods used for data collection and analysis. Semi-structured interviews are described as the primary method for IPA by key proponents (Smith and Osborn, 2003), and forms of thematic content analysis are often used to examine participants' understandings of, perceptions of, and beliefs about a phenomenon (see for example, Chapman and Smith, 2002; Moore et al. 2008). As the purpose of phenomenology is to assemble descriptions of, and above all to be faithful to the direct lived experiences of research participants, using approaches such as semi-structured interviews can engender problems. Here, 19 researcher preconceptions, including the theoretical, can filter through at an earlier stage and to a greater extent than in approaches more conducive to participants' own constructions of experience, such as in unstructured interviews or participant diaries, for example. Some IPA researchers even indicate prior to interview the precise areas participants will be 'required' to expand upon (e.g. Lavallee and Robinson, 2007). In a literature review of IPA-based research in health psychology, Brocki and Wearden (2006: 91) found that IPA interviews were often designed on the basis of extant research findings, theory or models, even including positivistic and quantitative work (e.g. Flowers et al., 2000), highly problematic from a phenomenological angle. Pre-existing research, concepts and models also structure some IPA studies in sport and exercise (e.g. Shepherd et al., 2006; Gillison et al., 2008; Warriner and Lavallee, 2008). Whilst all researchers necessarily hold preconceptions about their topic of enquiry, adherence to tightly preconceived frameworks based heavily on existing theory, models and constructs, sits very uneasily with the openness-to-the-world of, and faithfulness to participant-generated concepts and accounts held to be essential for phenomenological research. Preconceptions and assumptions may also creep in at the data analytic stage, another key element in IPA, if pre-defined category systems are used to structure the thematic analysis. Warriner and Lavallee (2008), for example, in their IPA study of the retirement experiences of retired elite female gymnasts explain that their research 'instrument' was: 'a predetermined interview schedule [which] was developed employing standardized open-ended questions in addition to tailored probes... The schedule was underpinned by an extensive review of the extant literature on retirement from elite sport...' (p. 304). Again, it should be stressed that these studies are often interesting and well-conceived qualitative projects, but it is the use of pre-defined concepts, categories and even extant models that inevitably raises some questions, given phenomenology's commitment to epochē and the bracketing of such presuppositions and prior assumptions. In many IPA studies, too, the production of general statements of the phenomenon/a studied involves the researcher's translation of 'units of meaning' into 20 second-order constructs of the subject or disciplinary language, to produce a general description of the structures of the experience. Researchers vary greatly in the extent to which they undertake such translational work and apply theoretical or 'scientific' constructs to participant-recounted experiences. Mindful of Husserl's original exhortation to bracket such 'scientific' explanations and assumptions, however, the dangers of 'over-interpreting', and indeed overwriting participants' accounts to conform to social scientific or other frameworks, loom large. Much may indeed be lost in translation. And, as Willig (2007: 216) reminds us, 'the researcher's choice of label for the phenomenon of interest is not merely a descriptive act but a constitutive one'; this risks departure and divergence from the participants' own lived experience of the phenomenon. Such abstraction and imposition of labels clearly create potential problems with IPA-based studies that stray too far away from the general principles of phenomenology, particularly in relation to phenomenology's insistence that participants are the experts in the phenomenon/a under investigation. It is therefore most peculiar to find that some IPA-based studies do not even include substantial quotations from their participants, as Brocki and Wearden (2006) discovered in their research review. Moreover, in relation to the degree of interpretative work undertaken by IPA researchers, whilst complete epochē is impossible, and researcher interpretation is unavoidable, nevertheless abandoning entirely Husserl's original exhortation to bracket or at least attempt explicitly to identify the researcher's own characteristics, preconceptions, theories of interest, and interpretations, runs deeply counter to phenomenological attitude and ethos, where a high degree of reflexivity is requisite. As Gruppetta (2004: 4) notes phenomenology in general has sometimes been criticised because the vast majority of phenomenological researchers do not participate themselves in the processes they study, but rely upon second-hand accounts. Although the use of second-hand accounts need not necessarily be construed as a weakness of phenomenology or IPA per se (or indeed of any research approach), it is incumbent upon IPA researchers without substantial 'insider experiential knowledge' of the areas they study to proceed with particular caution in imposing their own meanings and constructs upon the accounts of their 'expert' participants, and to articulate explicitly the degree of 21 interpretation and 'analytic licence' being employed. Given that the phenomenological method seeks above all to understand phenomena from the perspective of those studied (Creswell, 1998: 274), there are clear dangers in a researcher's imposition of meanings, categories, concepts and terminology upon her/his participants' experiences. For, as Garfinkel warned in relation to his 'unique adequacy requirement': ... for the analyst to recognize, or identify, or follow the development of, or describe phenomena of order in local production of coherent detail, the analyst must be vulgarly competent to the local production and reflexively natural accountability of the phenomenon or order he (sic) is "studying". (2002, p. 175) (italics in original) Autoethnographic phenomenology or 'autophenomenography' is one possible means of overcoming some of the problems of using second-hand accounts, but to-date has been rarely utilised (e.g. Hockey and Allen-Collinson, 2007). Gruppetta (2004) argues that if the researcher studies a phenomenon rather than a 'cultural place', then the appropriate term would be autophenomenography, rather than autoethnography, which latter focuses upon an individual's experiences qua member of a cultural/subcultural group. Autophenomenographic accounts could therefore be used either as sole data source – as in phenomenological single-case studies (e.g. Jones and Lavallee, 2009) or in conjunction with other participants' accounts. These could then provide the rich, evocative, textured descriptions of first-person experience, including sporting embodiment, so central to the phenomenological quest to bring to life and to share with others the felt, lived, embodied experience. A final criticism of IPA raised here is the tendency for some researchers to use highly abstract language in their general statements of phenomena and thus to lose the feel, vitality, richness, textures and grounded 'bodyfulness' of the lived experience. Todres (2007: 9) for examples warns that 'One could describe the general themes of an experience in such an abstract way that the qualities are devitalised...', a tendency fundamentally anathema to the phenomenological project. So in light of this, the final 22 section considers briefly potential forms of writing/representing phenomenological accounts. Writing and representation Writing and representation are fundamental concerns within phenomenology. In order to bring to life the essential structures of lived experience for the reader, to engage in 'the breathing of meaning' (Van Manen, 1990: 36), the researcher has to be able to convey accurately, powerfully, evocatively and many would advocate aesthetically and poetically (but always inevitably only partially) the phenomena described, whether via writing or re/presentational forms such as ethnodrama and other performative, audience-interactive forms (see e.g. Hopper et al., 2008; Todres, 2008). Phenomenology seeks to provide highly textured, evocative descriptions that locate the specifics of individual experience within broader, more general structures of human experience. Importantly, these accounts aim to generate a feeling of understanding in the reader (Todres, 2007: 9) thus linking the embodiment of researcher, research participant(s) and reader. As Merleau-Ponty (2001) notes in relation to structures of experience, these are 'lived' rather than 'known', and understanding occurs at a prereflective and corporeal as well as at a cognitive level. 'Full-bodied', corporeallytextured, sensuously-detailed descriptions are of particular salience within accounts of sporting embodiment. In addition to unstructured interview-derived data or personal diaries, a source of detailed, highly personal, grounded and evocative accounts can be found within the personal narratives of sports participants themselves (e.g. Sparkes and Smith, 2007), including phenomenological elements within some autoethnographies, as noted above. Although there is not the scope fully to consider its potential here, it is worth noting that autoethnographic and/or autophenomenographic genres fuse author/researcher/researched, with the purpose of using the researcher's personal lived experience to illuminate the phenomenon under study (Ellis and Bochner, 2000), to invite readers into the text, to relive the experience rather than merely analyse it at least at a certain level. Authors within this developing literature in sports studies (e.g. Sparkes, 2002; Denison and Markula, 2003; Allen-Collinson and Hockey, 2001; 2005) 23 depart from more orthodox, 'author-absent' textual accounts of sporting embodiment, by constructing forms of narrative that seek to portray in a first-person, evocativeanalytic fashion the lived-body sporting experience. Although little of this oeuvre formally applies phenomenological theory or method to the data, the potential for phenomenological analysis is clearly discernible particularly in relation to highly embodied and situated experiences such as McCarville's (2007: 163) vivid description of the nausea-generating, disorientating moments after his completion of the swimming component of an Ironman triathlon, or Hockey and Allen-Collinson's (2007: 125) portrayal of the mixed sensations of the running-body's muscular gradual 're-awakening' after a period of injury. Autophenomenography is thus just one possible means of generating the rich, body-ful, fleshy, grounded and evocative descriptions of the body in sport and exercise, encouraging us to bring the sweat 'back in', rather than to exclude it from our analyses (c.f. Connell, 1995). Concluding (but never final) thoughts Having portrayed some of the key strands of phenomenological thought, and the ways in which existentialist phenomenology in particular might offer fresh descriptive and analytic insights into the study of sporting embodiment, it is clear that there are sound reasons for incorporating phenomenological perspectives into the theoretical and methodological pantheon of approaches to investigating sporting experience. For, despite a growing corpus of research literature on the sporting body, this particular 'subject' has often been addressed at an abstract, theoretical level. We still find relatively few studies actually grounded in the carnal, 'fleshy', lived, richly-textured realities of the moving, sweating, sensuous sporting body, which of course also holds meanings, significances, purposes and interests. This is not to advocate phenomenology as the only or even the best way of pursuing qualitative investigations into sporting embodiment, but to propose it as a complementary theoretical and methodological avenue. Rich phenomenological descriptions and analyses can promote a re/consideration of the essential structures of sporting and physical activity experience (corporeal, emotional and so on) in context, and encourage reflection upon, and empathic understanding of how it actually feels to be a sporting/exercising body. 24 As Todres (2008: 1571) perceptively describes, the 'epistemic body' can implicitly 'hold' multiple meanings and significances in ways much more holistic and interrelated than abstract thought. These meanings, felt in the body, can become the source of thoughts and words that point to greater wholes, so that: 'The greater wholeness can never be fully summarized, but its impact can be somewhat felt and held through the evocative power of words' (2008: 1571). As Willig (2007) notes in relation to her phenomenological research on extreme sports, language is a central issue for phenomenologists, given that it both facilitates and limits the expression of experience. Although phenomenology, as with any theoretical or methodological approach, can never fully capture or summarise the totality of an experience (and is explicit about this partialness), this article has suggested how phenomenologically-inspired perspectives – both theoretical and methodological might bring fresh insights to the portrayal of the lived sporting and exercising body. But perhaps, I should say lived sporting bodies, to re-emphasize our individual, biographically-specific, historicallyand socially-situated experiences of sporting embodiment. For developments in the social-phenomenological field itself, such as the 'queering' of phenomenology (e.g. Ahmed, 2007), provide fertile grounds for its linkage with newer theoretical perspectives within sport studies, together with continued development of its longer-standing connection with feminism (e.g. Young, 1980, 1998). This addresses criticisms of phenomenology as being, in some forms at least, neglectful of social structure and of 'difference'. Phenomenology can provide not only a theoretical and methodological framework for examining human subjectivity and embodiment in general, but also for investigating the specifics of socially-located, socially-related and interacting bodies. With its focus upon the essential (but always context-dependent) meanings of phenomena, it can portray sporting embodiment vividly and evocatively. Phenomenology seeks to remain 'true' to the expert accounts of those who experience it directly, rather than creating abstract theories without due attention to, and analytic grounding in those accounts. As McCall (1983: 57; quoted in De Castro, 2003: 47) reminds us: 'To ignore the phenomena of conscious life just as they are given in experience is to abnegate the ultimate source of all knowledge in favour of physicalistic dogma'. Although, in common with any 25 research approach, there are undoubted limitations to phenomenology, the exhortation to remain true to the experiential accounts of participants themselves and to examine phenomena in context rather than too far abstracted from their 'grounding' corporeal and conscious is nevertheless a sound one. 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www.crossingdialogues.com/journal.htm DIALOGUES Crossing Dialogues Association xx Adjusting our epistemic expectations: Explaining experience with nonreductive psychophysical laws MATTHEW T. SOLEIMAN Magnuson Health Sciences Center, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 Email: [email protected] Phone: (661) 839-8139 DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2015; 8(): xx-xx Since Chalmers (1995) seminal paper on consciousness, many have argued for or against its hard problem subjective experience. Earp (2012) agrees there is a hard problem, but argues against Chalmers' supposed proposition that positing phenomenal properties of experience, or qualia, as brute counts as explaining them. Unfortunately, this is not Chalmers' proposal. Chalmers does indeed propose that qualia should be taken as fundamental, but he does not argue that their nonreducible metaphysical status confers their explanation. Instead, taking them to be brute is necessary to begin to empirically study and understand the psychophysical laws governing the relations between physical mechanisms and their corresponding nonphysical phenomenal properties. Chalmers makes this point clear in the paper Earp cites heavily from: "Where there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws. A nonreductive theory of experience will add new principles to the furniture of the basic laws of nature. These basic principles will ultimately carry the explanatory burden in a theory of consciousness" (Chalmers, 1995, p.210) Earp wants an answer to why something physical can produce something experiential, and states that to explain something is "(at minimum) to give an account of its nature or existence by referring to some other existing thing, reductively or otherwise" (Earp, 2012, p.18). But this is exactly what Chalmers proposes to do. Experience would be explained by referring to laws, or principles, that nonreductively, but systematically link neural activity to experience. As for why something physical can produce experience, Chalmers offers the beginning of an answer with his principle of organizational invariance, stating "any two systems with the same fi ne-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences" (Chalmers, 1995, p.214). It is something about the function neural activity instantiates that causes experience. Does the principle tell us what overarching thing about function is relevant, or why certain functional states like hunger or fear cause their respective experiences? No. But we should not expect Chalmers to provide those answers a priori. These research questions demand empirical answers. Earp makes reference to Chalmers' psychophysical principle of structural coherence – the structure of experience parallels the structure of awareness. But Earp considers this an "easy" explanation, unlike his sought after "hard" explanation for why something physical produces something experiential. This distinction is pointless, as I have argued Chalmers is offering the explanation Earp seeks, but it is nascent. Even if Earp accepts this point, he may still consider the laws Chalmers proposes as not offering "epistemic satisfaction," the feeling of understanding (Campbell, 2009). Epistemic satisfaction is troublesome as the feeling is above all subjective. I could fi nd that psychophysical laws perfectly Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2015; 8(1): xx-xx Soleiman, 2015 REFERENCES Campbell N. (2009) Why we should lower our expectations about the explanatory gap. Theoria, 75:34-51. Chalmers DJ. (1995) Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J Conscious Stud, 2:201-219. Earp BD. (2012) I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. Dial Phil Ment Neuro Sci, 5:1420. Hicks MT, van Elswyk P. (2015) Humean laws and circular explanation. Philos Stud, 172:433-443. Loewer B. (2012) Two accounts of laws and time. Philos Stud, 160:115-137. explain experience and exclaim "Eureka!" As for Earp's appeal to epistemic satisfaction, he does not suggest how a satisfactory explanation would look like. Secondly, should the epistemic satisfaction we expect for reductive explanations of physical phenomena generalize to nonreductive explanations of nonphysical qualia? There is no reason to think so, especially if epistemic satisfaction usually applies to cases of physical reductionism. Indeed, why should we insofar as experience seems to be the set of phenomena most resistant to explanation – hence, the hard problem. Since Chalmers endorses the existence of psychophysical laws, could these laws be explanatory? More generally, do laws have explanatory power? To the extent that Chalmers' proposed psychophysical laws will supervene on physical and phenomenal properties, we could approach their explanatory power from a Humean perspective. Loewer (2012) and Hicks and van Elswyk (2015) have argued that laws scientifi cally "explain their instances by showing their natural unity and similarity" (p.436). If experience is nonphysical and psychophysical laws are offered as an explanation, then is seems that we can indeed explain experience. Hence, we should adjust our expectations for epistemic satisfaction – that is, nonreducible psychophysical laws seem capable of being epistemically satisfactory. xx Acknowledgements I thank Zachary Taich for his invaluable comments and feedback.

www.crossingdialogues.com/journal.htm DIALOGUES Crossing Dialogues Association xx Adjusting our epistemic expectations: Explaining experience with nonreductive psychophysical laws MATTHEW T. SOLEIMAN Magnuson Health Sciences Center, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 Email: [email protected] Phone: (661) 839-8139 DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2015; 8(): xx-xx Since Chalmers (1995) seminal paper on consciousness, many have argued for or against its hard problem subjective experience. Earp (2012) agrees there is a hard problem, but argues against Chalmers' supposed proposition that positing phenomenal properties of experience, or qualia, as brute counts as explaining them. Unfortunately, this is not Chalmers' proposal. Chalmers does indeed propose that qualia should be taken as fundamental, but he does not argue that their nonreducible metaphysical status confers their explanation. Instead, taking them to be brute is necessary to begin to empirically study and understand the psychophysical laws governing the relations between physical mechanisms and their corresponding nonphysical phenomenal properties. Chalmers makes this point clear in the paper Earp cites heavily from: "Where there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws. A nonreductive theory of experience will add new principles to the furniture of the basic laws of nature. These basic principles will ultimately carry the explanatory burden in a theory of consciousness" (Chalmers, 1995, p.210) Earp wants an answer to why something physical can produce something experiential, and states that to explain something is "(at minimum) to give an account of its nature or existence by referring to some other existing thing, reductively or otherwise" (Earp, 2012, p.18). But this is exactly what Chalmers proposes to do. Experience would be explained by referring to laws, or principles, that nonreductively, but systematically link neural activity to experience. As for why something physical can produce experience, Chalmers offers the beginning of an answer with his principle of organizational invariance, stating "any two systems with the same fi ne-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences" (Chalmers, 1995, p.214). It is something about the function neural activity instantiates that causes experience. Does the principle tell us what overarching thing about function is relevant, or why certain functional states like hunger or fear cause their respective experiences? No. But we should not expect Chalmers to provide those answers a priori. These research questions demand empirical answers. Earp makes reference to Chalmers' psychophysical principle of structural coherence – the structure of experience parallels the structure of awareness. But Earp considers this an "easy" explanation, unlike his sought after "hard" explanation for why something physical produces something experiential. This distinction is pointless, as I have argued Chalmers is offering the explanation Earp seeks, but it is nascent. Even if Earp accepts this point, he may still consider the laws Chalmers proposes as not offering "epistemic satisfaction," the feeling of understanding (Campbell, 2009). Epistemic satisfaction is troublesome as the feeling is above all subjective. I could fi nd that psychophysical laws perfectly Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2015; 8(1): xx-xx Soleiman, 2015 REFERENCES Campbell N. (2009) Why we should lower our expectations about the explanatory gap. Theoria, 75:34-51. Chalmers DJ. (1995) Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J Conscious Stud, 2:201-219. Earp BD. (2012) I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. Dial Phil Ment Neuro Sci, 5:1420. Hicks MT, van Elswyk P. (2015) Humean laws and circular explanation. Philos Stud, 172:433-443. Loewer B. (2012) Two accounts of laws and time. Philos Stud, 160:115-137. explain experience and exclaim "Eureka!" As for Earp's appeal to epistemic satisfaction, he does not suggest how a satisfactory explanation would look like. Secondly, should the epistemic satisfaction we expect for reductive explanations of physical phenomena generalize to nonreductive explanations of nonphysical qualia? There is no reason to think so, especially if epistemic satisfaction usually applies to cases of physical reductionism. Indeed, why should we insofar as experience seems to be the set of phenomena most resistant to explanation – hence, the hard problem. Since Chalmers endorses the existence of psychophysical laws, could these laws be explanatory? More generally, do laws have explanatory power? To the extent that Chalmers' proposed psychophysical laws will supervene on physical and phenomenal properties, we could approach their explanatory power from a Humean perspective. Loewer (2012) and Hicks and van Elswyk (2015) have argued that laws scientifi cally "explain their instances by showing their natural unity and similarity" (p.436). If experience is nonphysical and psychophysical laws are offered as an explanation, then is seems that we can indeed explain experience. Hence, we should adjust our expectations for epistemic satisfaction – that is, nonreducible psychophysical laws seem capable of being epistemically satisfactory. xx Acknowledgements I thank Zachary Taich for his invaluable comments and feedback.

UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 brill.com/sp 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Simultaneous Brightness and Apparent Depth from True Colors on Grey: Chevreul Revisited Birgitta Dresp-Langley 1,∗ and Adam Reeves 2 1 Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS UMR 5508), Montpellier, France 2 Psychology Department, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USA Received 18 April 2012; accepted 2 September 2012 Abstract We show that true colors as defined by Chevreul (1839) produce unsuspected simultaneous brightness induction effects on their immediate grey backgrounds when these are placed on a darker (black) general background surrounding two spatially separated configurations. Assimilation and apparent contrast may occur in one and the same stimulus display. We examined the possible link between these effects and the perceived depth of the color patterns which induce them as a function of their luminance contrast. Patterns of square-shaped inducers of a single color (red, green, blue, yellow, or grey) were placed on background fields of a lighter and a darker grey, presented on a darker screen. Inducers were always darker on one side of the display and brighter on the other in a given trial. The intensity of the grey backgrounds varied between trials only. This permitted generating four inducer luminance contrasts, presented in random order, for each color. Background fields were either spatially separated or consisted of a single grey field on the black screen. Experiments were run under three environmental conditions: dark-adaptation, daylight, and rod-saturation after exposure to bright light. In a first task, we measured probabilities of contrast, assimilation, and no effect in a three-alternative forced-choice procedure (background appears brighter on the 'left', on the 'right' or the 'same'). Visual adaptation and inducer contrast had no significant influence on the induction effects produced by colored inducers. Achromatic inducers produced significantly stronger contrast effects after dark-adaptation, and significantly stronger assimilation in daylight conditions. Grouping two backgrounds into a single one was found to significantly decrease probabilities of apparent contrast. Under the same conditions, we measured probabilities of the inducers to be perceived as nearer to the observer (inducers appear nearer on 'left', on 'right' or the 'same'). These, as predicted by Chevreul's law of contrast, were determined by the luminance contrast of the inducers only, with significantly higher probabilities of brighter inducers to be seen as nearer, and a marked asymmetry between effects produced by inducers of opposite sign. Implications of these findings for theories which attempt to link simultaneous induction effects to the relative depth of object surfaces in the visual field are discussed. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 * To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: [email protected] Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 1 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI:10.1163/18784763-00002401 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 2 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Keywords Chevreul's laws, color, simultaneous contrast effects, relative distance, luminance contrast, visual borders 1. Introduction Almost two centuries ago, the French chemist Michel Eugène Chevreul published his observations on the perceptual modifications produced by the mutual proximity of colors (De la loi du contraste simultané des couleurs et de l'assortiment des objets colorés, Chevreul, 1839). He therein defined what later has become known as simultaneous color contrast (e.g. Beck, 1966; De Weert, 1984; De Weert and Spillmann, 1995; Dresp and Fischer, 2001; Gerrits and Vendrik, 1970; Heinemann, 1955; Helson, 1963; Pinna, 2008; Shapley and Reid, 1985) or color context effects (e.g. Long and Purves, 2003; Reeves et al., 2008; Shevell and Kingdom, 2008). Observing how colors placed side by side or surrounding each other change in appearance according to which color is put next to which other, Chevreul suggested how they needed to be displayed in space to produce specific effects on the perception of the human observer. His laws of color and contrast provide valuable intuitions about the effects of color on processes of perceptual organization that have inspired artists, architects, designers and visual scientists ever since. Two such laws describe what Chevreul (1839) invoked in terms of a law of true color and a law of contrast, both relevant to our study here. The law of true color states that for any color to truly appear to the observer as that particular color, the background must be grey, implying that a color on a grey background should be the least likely to produce mutual interactions that alter the appearance of either. From his observations "on the juxtaposition of colored bodies with grey", reported in Chapter VI of his essay, Chevreul concludes: ". . . it may be conceived that grey bodies, judiciously selected with regard to their depth in tone, would, by contiguity to colored bodies, exhibit the color in a more striking manner than either black or white bodies would; . . .colors in juxtaposition with grey being more perceptible than when juxtaposed with white or black" (Chevreul, 1839, translated by Spanton in 1854, Chapter VI). This conclusion summarizes Chevreul's idea that all primary colors would gain 'purity' and 'brilliancy' by the proximity of grey, rather than white or black, which tend to affect a color's brightness and thereby alter the perception of its tone. When placed nearby other so-called inducing colors, the appearance in either brightness or tint of the so-called test color often changes dramatically (e.g. Livitz et al., 2011). Such changes may be reflected by a contrast effect, where the perceived brightness or tone of the test color changes away from that of the inducing color, or by an assimilation effect, where the perceived brightness or tone of the test color changes toward that of the inducing color (Wyszecki, 1986). Interaction of a similar kind occurs between achromatic stimuli of positive and negative contrast polarities, proPrn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 2 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 3 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 ducing either contrast, where a bright surface makes an adjacent one look darker and a dark one makes an adjacent one look brighter, or assimilation, where a bright surface makes an adjacent one look brighter and a dark surface makes an adjacent one look darker (e.g. Beck, 1966; Festinger et al., 1970; Hamada, 1985; Heinemann, 1955; Helson, 1963). Chevreul's law of true color has never been challenged by induction studies, and mutual interactions where colors change the appearance of nearby or surrounding grey fields, or where grey fields change the appearance of nearby or surrounding colors, have up to date not been investigated. For a color to be seen as standing out in depth against the background, or to be seen as figure rather than as ground, the difference in luminance or brightness between the color and its background must be strong, as stated in Chevreul's law of contrast. This intuition that differences in luminance would act as a cue to relative depth in the visual field has been confirmed since by psychophysical studies showing that surfaces with the stronger luminance contrast in the two-dimensional plane tend to be perceived as figure rather than as ground, or as nearer to the human observer than surfaces with the weaker luminance contrast (Bugelski, 1967; Dresp et al., 2002; Guibal and Dresp, 2004; O'Shea et al., 1994; Oyama and Yamamura, 1960; Rohaly and Wilson, 1999; Schwartz and Sperling, 1983). Mutual interactions between colors in terms of assimilation and contrast may be linked to their capacity for generating effects of relative depth or, in other words, to the likelihoods that they will be perceived as belonging to the same or as belonging to different surfaces in the visual field (Long and Purves, 2003), a possibility that was not made explicit by Chevreul at the time. The effect of frames on the appearance of tones and their brightness, or "the difference between the effect of a framed picture and the effect of that same picture when seen through an opening" was considered critical by Chevreul, who observed that the "contiguity of the frame" could alter any of the perceptual effects produced by any of his laws under conditions where no frame is present. His intuition that distinct object borders influence our perception of color and contrast is consistent with studies showing interactions between color appearance and the spatial profile of surface contours, or the geometric configuration of the visual display (Devinck et al., 2006; De Weert and Spillmann, 1995; Dresp and Fischer, 2001; Fach and Sharpe, 1986; Pinna, 2008, 2011; Pinna and Reeves, 2006). Here, we present a new kind of induction phenomenon where true colors in the sense of hevreul, placed on grey background fields presented on a black screen, produce changes in the appearance of their immediate grey backgrounds (Fig. 1). When spatially distributed sets of small squares, all of the same color and darker on one side of the display and brighter on the other, are placed on spatially separated grey fields of homogenous intensity presented on a dark (black) screen, the grey background to the colors may be seen as brighter on one side. The induction can switch from contrast, where the grey field containing the darker inducers appears brighter, to assimilation, where the grey field containing the brighter inducers appears brighter. Such effects are absent when the grey background fields do Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 3 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 4 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Figure 1. The stimulus configurations here consisted of patterns of colored inducers of a single color, with a brighter luminance on one side and a darker luminance on the other, placed on grey backgrounds. Background intensity varied between trials, between a lighter and a darker luminance, and backgrounds were presented as either spatially separate fields (top and lower middle) or as single fields (upper middle and bottom) placed on a uniformly darker screen. (This figure is published in colour in the online version of this paper.) not contain any inducers at all (Fig. 2), or when the background fields consist of a single uniformly grey surface (Fig. 3). Conversely, when the green inducers of a stronger and a weaker luminance are placed on grey background fields of identical luminance which themselves have an even darker background, the colored squares produce simultaneous induction effects in terms of apparent contrast and assimilation, where the grey background on either side of the display may appear brighter Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 4 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 5 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Figure 2. Two grey fields of identical luminance presented on a uniformly dark screen generally appear equal in brightness to the human observer, i.e. the probability of one being seen as brighter than the other is considered zero. Figure 3. When the colored inducers are placed on a single uniformly grey background, the induction effects shown in Fig. 1, top and lower middle, are weakened or abolished, as in Fig. 1, upper middle and bottom. (This figure is published in colour in the online version.) than on the other side (Fig. 1, top). When two grey backgrounds are grouped into a single one on a dark screen, they are then seen as if surrounded by a single dark frame. The simultaneous induction effects are considerably weakened or abolished in such a configuration (Fig. 1, upper middle), which closely approaches the example shown in Fig. 3. Changes in inducer contrast do not seem to affect the induction effects (Fig. 1, lower middle and bottom), but alter the perception of relative depth in a way that is consistent with Chevreul's law of contrast. Brighter squares tend to be seen as standing out in front of the grey backgrounds, while darker ones tend to be seen in the same plane with the background. Grouping the backgrounds into a single one (Fig. 1, upper middle and bottom) does not appear to change this apparent depth effect. To quantify this new phenomenon, we presented several such configurations with colored inducers on grey generating varying inducer luminance contrasts, investigating their probability of producing brightness induction effects in terms of contrast and assimilation. Given that such induction effects often occur together Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 5 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 6 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 with changes in the perceived depth of either the inducing field or the test field, as in the watercolor illusion (e.g. Pinna and Reeves, 2006; von der Heydt and Pierson, 2006), we compared probabilities of simultaneous induction with the probabilities that the patterns which generate them are seen as nearer to the observer. In fact, inducers with a stronger tendency to be perceived as separated in depth from their immediate backgrounds may also have a stronger tendency to produce induction effects in terms of apparent contrast. This assumption relates to a theoretical framework that searches for a universal explanation of color context effects in terms of statistical properties of natural scenes. Similarly toned, with regard to either luminance or color or both, objects would have a tendency to generate assimilation because they would have a higher probability of belonging to the same surface and, therefore, to lie in the same depth plane. Strongly contrasting ones would have a tendency to generate contrast because they would be more likely to belong to different surfaces and, therefore, to lie in different depth planes (e.g. Katz, 1911; Long and Purves, 2003). If such a prediction holds, then a strong positive correlation between the luminance contrast of colored objects, the apparent contrast effects induced by these objects, and their perceived depth is to be expected. The induction effects produced by the complex spatial configurations displayed here are likely to originate from mechanisms of neural processing well beyond the receptor level (e.g. De Weert and Spillmann, 1995; resp and Fischer, 2001; Long and Purves, 2003). The relative contributions of rods and cones determines both the appropriate luminance input (photopic or mesopic) and the input stream to the visual cortex. Also, color and luminance may be affected by rod-cone interactions at the low brightness levels typical of computer monitors (e.g. Cao et al., 2008; Stabell and Stabell, 1975). To assess the contribution of rods relative to that of cones, we tested observers under three different conditions of light-dark adaptation, in both experimental tasks. 2. Materials and Methods Experiments were run on a PC computer equipped with a mouse device and a high resolution color monitor. Selective combinations of RGB increments generating the colors of the stimuli were calibrated with a spectrophotometer (Cambridge Research Instruments). Subjects were seated at a distance of 75 cm from the screen, their heads comfortably resting on a head-and-chin support. 2.1. Subjects Eight observers, most of them students at NU, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and fully functional color vision were run in the simultaneous contrast task. Eight observers, most of them also students at NU, with normal or corrected-tonormal vision and fully functional color vision, were run in the relative distance task. Three of the sixteen subjects were run in both tasks. Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 6 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 7 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 2.2. Stimuli The stimuli (see Fig. 1A, B, C and D for illustration) consisted of pairs (as in Fig. 1, top and lower middle), the spatially separated configurations, or singles, the regrouped configurations (as in Fig. 1, upper middle and bottom). Colored inducers were placed on light grey and dark grey background fields, displayed on the considerably darker (5.45 cd/m2, with the color guns of the screen at R = 0, G = 0 and B = 0) background of the computer screen. Twenty small squares, the so-called inducers, of a given color were placed on the darker (Fig. 1, lower middle and bottom) and lighter grey immediate backgrounds (Fig. 1, top and upper middle) backgrounds. Five different inducer colors were generated (red, green, blue, yellow, and white) in different configurations, with always the same color in a given configuration. The luminance of red inducers was 56.7 cd/m2 for the brighter ones (color guns of the screen at R = 255, G = 0, B = 0) and 27.2 cd/m2 for the darker ones (R = 100, G = 0, B = 0). Green inducers were displayed at 69.8 cd/m2 (R = 0, G = 255, B = 0) and 27.7 cd/m2 (R = 0, G = 100, B = 0), blue inducers at 70.9 cd/m2 (R = 0, G = 0, B = 255) and 44.3 cd/m2 (R = 0, G = 0, B = 125) yellow inducers at 81.6 cd/m2 (R = 255, G = 255, B = 0) and 43.7 cd/m2 (R = 100, G = 100, B = 0), and grey inducers at 148.6 cd/m2 (R = 190, G = 190, B = 190) and 54.3 cd/m2 (R = 100, B = 100, G = 100). The luminance of the light grey background was 72.7 cd/m2 (R = 150, G = 150, B = 150), the luminance of the dark grey background was 23.2 cd/m2 (R = 50, G = 50, B = 50). Inducers were always darker on one side of the display, and brighter on the other in a given trial. The intensity of their grey backgrounds varied between trials only. Combining inducing patterns with two luminance intensities with the light and dark grey backgrounds produced four different inducer contrasts for each color. Table 1 gives these inducer contrasts, expressed in terms of (Linducer − Lbackground)/(Linducer + Lbackground), for a given color with a given luminance on a background of a given intensity. Brighter inducers appeared on the left and on the right of a given configuration in random order, with always a set of darker inducers on the other side. The horizontal distance between two spatially separated squares on the screen was 3.5 cm. The height of each such square was 9.7 cm, the width 10 cm. The height of regrouped grey backgrounds was 9.7 cm, their width 13.2 cm. Each type of configuration was displayed centrally on the screen. The smallest horizontal distance between colored inducers was 0.4 cm, the smallest vertical distance 0.5 cm. All colored inducers had identical height (0.9 cm) and width (1 cm). 2.3. Task Instructions Three response alternatives ('left', 'right' or 'same') were given to subjects in each of the two tasks. In the simultaneous contrast task, they were asked to indicate on which side of a given configuration ('left' or 'right') the grey background appeared brighter to them, or whether both sides appeared equal in brightness ('same'). It was made clear to the subjects that they should judge the relative brightness of the background, not that of the inducers. In the relative distance task, subjects had to Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 7 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 8 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Table 1. The configurations of colored inducers on light and dark grey backgrounds, used as stimuli in the experiments here, generated four inducer contrasts of varying intensity and polarity for each color, expressed here in terms of (Linducer − Lbackground)/(Linducer + Lbackground). These contrasts and their sign (negative or positive) are given here, for each inducer color, inducer luminance (a higher one and a lower one), and background intensity (light grey and dark grey) Red Green Blue Yellow Achromatic The brighter inducer on dark grey background +0.42 +0.50 +0.51 +0.56 +0.72 on light grey background −0.12 −0.02 −0.01 −0.06 +0.34 The darker inducer on dark grey background +0.08 +0.09 +0.31 +0.31 +0.40 on light grey background −0.45 −0.44 −0.24 −0.25 −0.14 decide on which side of a given configuration ('left' or 'right') the colored inducers appeared nearer to them, or whether all seemed equally near or distant ('same'). 2.4. Procedure The experiments were run in a room with no windows, under three separate conditions of visual adaptation. In the first ('daylight'), subjects were run under conditions similar to daylight, generated by diffuse, soft-white, 60 W tungsten light (General Electric). In the second condition ('dark-adapted' observers), subjects were dark-adapted for 25 min and then tested with all room lights off. The only illumination was provided by the screen. In the third condition ('rod-saturated' observers), subjects were pre-exposed to an intense, full-field, white adaptation light from a model PS22 Grass Photonic Stimulator run at 45 Hz, which was progressively intensified to 1 500 000 candelas, where it was held before the subject's open eyes for one minute. Subjects were then dark-adapted for two minutes to permit cones to recover, but leave rods relatively inactive for the next ten to fifteen minutes, knowing that a given set of experimental trials for a given adaptation level lasted for about three to five minutes. In each of these conditions, the grouped and ungrouped configurations with a given background intensity and inducer color were presented in random order for about one second each. Inter-stimulus intervals typically varied from one to three seconds and were placed under the control of the subject to allow for individually experienced after-images to vanish before the next trial was initiated. Subjects were instructed to fixate the center of the screen and to blink between trials to check for residual after-images, which were especially noticeable in the dark adapted condition, in which a few subjects took as long as six seconds between trials to recover (after-images were rarely experienced in the daylight and rod-saturated conditions). In stimulus displays with spatially separated backgrounds, a small, dim fixation mark was displayed in the center of the screen (as shown in Fig. 1, top and upper middle) to remind subjects where to look, Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 8 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 9 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 and between stimulus presentations, subjects were exposed to a uniformly dark (5.45 cd/m2) screen, with the fixation mark still displayed in the center. They were allowed to break fixation and look left or right when comparing two backgrounds. Each individual session consisted of 40 trials per adaptation level, giving a total of 120 trials per subject within a 3 × 4 × 2 × 5 experimental design, with three adaptation levels, four inducer contrasts, two types of spatial configuration, and five colors. 3. Results The data from the two tasks were analyzed as a function of adaptation level, inducer contrast, spatial configuration ('grouped fields' versus 'separate fields'), and inducer color. Probabilities of inducers of a given color to produce effects of apparent contrast, assimilation, and relative depth were computed for each experimental condition and subjected to repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA). Given that the levels of the factor inducer contrast were not identical for different colors (see Table 1), separate ANOVA were performed for each level of the color factor and a 3 × 4 × 2 factorial design, with three levels of the adaptation factor, four levels of inducer contrast, and two levels of spatial configuration. Average results, summed over the adaptation level factor, will be shown here for each inducer color given that no significant effect of visual adaptation, or interaction of this factor with inducer contrast or type of spatial configuration, was found with inducers of any of the four colors studied here. Only the achromatic configurations varied significantly with conditions of visual adaptation, as will be shown here. The probabilities of GREEN inducers to produce effects of apparent contrast, assimilation, or relative depth ('nearness') are shown as a function of the luminance contrast of the inducers (Fig. 4, top left). Green inducers systematically generated higher probabilities of assimilation compared with probabilities of contrast, at all levels of inducer contrast. Effects of the luminance contrast of green inducers on either the probability of assimilation or the probability of apparent contrast are not statistically significant. Conversely, the effect of inducer contrast on the probability of green inducers to be seen as nearer to the observer is highly significant (F(3,23) = 45.12, p < 0.001). Inducers with the strongest positive luminance contrast produced the highest probability to be seen as nearer. The probabilities of 'near' generated by green inducers reveal an asymmetry between negative and positive contrast signs, where green inducers of negative contrast (here C = −0.02 and C = −0.44) failed to produce an effect of relative depth, while roughly equivalent positive contrasts (here C = +0.09 and C = +0.50) produced probabilities of 'near' between 0.75 and 0.90. Grouping the backgrounds into a single field had no significant effect on probabilities of relative depth (Fig. 4, top right), but significantly influenced induction effects, in terms of contrast (F(1,23) = 82.33, p < 0.001). Induction effects are significantly stronger, producing higher probabilities of apparent contrast, in configurations where the background fields are spatially separated Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 9 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 10 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Figure 4. Probabilities of contrast, assimilation, and relative depth ('near'), averaged over the adaptation level factor, are shown as a function of the luminance contrast of the GREEN inducers and the type of background configuration. (Fig. 4, bottom left). The effect of grouping on assimilation tends in the same direction, but was not statistically significant for the green inducers (Fig. 4, bottom right). There is no significant interaction between grouping and the luminance contrast of the green inducers. The probabilities of BLUE inducers to produce effects of apparent contrast, assimilation, or relative depth ('nearness'), as a function of the luminance contrast of the inducers, are shown next (Fig. 5, top left). As observed with the green inducers, blue inducers also systematically generated higher probabilities of assimilation compared with probabilities of contrast, at all levels of inducer contrast. Effects of the luminance contrast of blue inducers on either the probability of assimilation or the probability of apparent contrast are not statistically significant. Interestingly, the Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 10 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 11 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Figure 5. Probabilities of contrast, assimilation, and relative depth ('near'), averaged over the adaptation level factor, are shown as a function of the luminance contrast of the BLUE inducers and the type of background configuration. blue inducers with zero luminance contrast (equiluminant color contrast) produced the strongest induction effects, in terms of summed probabilities of assimilation and apparent contrast (P 'assimilation' + P 'contrast' = 0.78), but the lowest probability of standing out in depth from the background (P 'near' = 0.09). The effect of inducer contrast on the probability of inducers to be seen as nearer to the observer is, again, highly significant (F(3,23) = 77.86, p < 0.001). Inducers with the strongest positive luminance contrast produced the highest probability to be seen as nearer. The probabilities of 'near' generated by blue inducers reveal the same kind of asymmetry between negative and positive contrast signs observed with the green inducers, where blue inducers of negative contrast (here C = −0.24) failed to produce an effect of relative depth, while similar positive contrasts (here C = +31 or C = +0.51) produced probabilities of 'near' between 0.60 and 0.90. GroupPrn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 11 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 12 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Figure 6. Probabilities of contrast, assimilation, and relative depth ('near'), averaged over the adaptation level factor, are shown as a function of the luminance contrast of the RED inducers and the type of background configuration. ing the backgrounds into a single field had no significant effect on probabilities of relative depth (Fig. 5, top right), but significantly influenced induction effects in terms of apparent contrast (F(1,23) = 24.33, p < 0.01). In configurations where the background fields are spatially separated, the probabilities of apparent contrast are significantly higher (Fig. 5, bottom left). As with the green inducers, the effect of grouping on assimilation was not statistically significant for the blue inducers (Fig. 5, bottom right). Again, there was no significant interaction between grouping and the luminance contrast of the inducers. The probabilities of RED inducers to produce effects of apparent contrast, assimilation, or relative depth ('nearness'), as a function of the luminance contrast of the inducers, are shown next (Fig. 6, top left). As observed with green and blue, Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 12 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 13 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 red inducers also systematically generated higher probabilities of assimilation compared with probabilities of contrast, at all levels of inducer contrast. Effects of the luminance contrast of red inducers on either the probability of assimilation or the probability of apparent contrast are not statistically significant. The effect of inducer contrast on the probability of inducers to be seen as nearer to the observer is, again, highly significant (F(3,23) = 58.18, p < 0.001). Inducers with the strongest positive luminance contrast produced the highest probability to be seen as nearer. The probabilities of 'near' generated by red inducers reveal the same kind of asymmetry between negative and positive contrast signs observed with the green and blue inducers, with red inducers of negative contrast (here C = −0.45) producing only a weak effect of relative depth, while similar positive contrasts (here C = +0.42) produced probabilities of 'near' higher than 0.90. Grouping the backgrounds into a single field had no significant effect on probabilities of relative depth (Fig. 6, top right), but significantly influenced induction effects in terms of apparent contrast (F(1,23) = 24.33, p < 0.01). In configurations where the background fields are spatially separated, the probabilities of apparent contrast are significantly higher (Fig. 6, bottom left). Again, the effect of grouping on assimilation was not statistically significant (Fig. 6, bottom right), and there was no significant interaction between grouping and the luminance contrast of the inducers. The response probabilities generated by the YELLOW inducers are shown next (Fig. 7, top left). As observed with the green, blue, and red inducers, yellow inducers also systematically generated higher probabilities of assimilation compared with probabilities of contrast, at all levels of inducer contrast. Effects of the luminance contrast of yellow inducers on either the probability of assimilation or the probability of apparent contrast are not statistically significant. Again, it is shown that inducers with a luminance contrast near physical equiluminance (here C = 0.06) produced the strongest induction effects, in terms of summed probabilities of assimilation and apparent contrast (P 'assimilation' + P 'contrast' = 0.79), but the weakest probability of standing out in depth from the background (P 'near' = 0 here). The effect of inducer contrast on the probability of inducers to be seen as nearer to the observer is, again, highly significant (F(3,23) = 36.29, p < 0.001). Inducers with the strongest positive luminance contrast produced the highest probability to be seen as nearer. The probabilities of 'near' generated by yellow inducers reveal the same kind of asymmetry between negative and positive contrast signs observed with green blue and red inducers. Yellow inducers of negative contrast (here C = −0.25) produced no effect of relative depth here, while a similar positive contrast (here C = +0.31) produced a probability of 'near' higher than 0.80. Grouping the backgrounds into a single field had no significant effect on probabilities of relative depth (Fig. 7, top right), but significantly influenced induction effects in terms of apparent contrast (F(1,23) = 17.02, p < 0.01). In configurations where the background fields are spatially separated, the probabilities of apparent contrast are significantly higher (Fig. 7, bottom left). Again, the effect of grouping on assimilation tends in the same direction, but was not statistically significant (Fig. 7, Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 13 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 14 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Figure 7. Probabilities of contrast, assimilation, and relative depth ('near'), averaged over the adaptation level factor, are shown as a function of the luminance contrast of the YELLOW inducers and the type of background configuration. bottom right). Again, there was no significant interaction between grouping and the luminance contrast of the inducers. The probabilities of ACHROMATIC inducers to produce induction effects were markedly influenced by the visual adaptation conditions, with significant effects of adaptation level on probabilities of apparent contrast (F(2,23) = 5.46, p < 0.05) and on probabilities of assimilation (F(2,23) = 10.50, p < 0.01). Probabilities of achromatic inducers to produce effects of apparent contrast, assimilation, or relative depth ('nearness') are shown as a function of the luminance contrast of the inducers and the adaptation level (Fig. 8). Achromatic inducers produce the highest probabilities of apparent contrast in dark-adapted observers, and the lowest probabilities of apparent contrast in daylight, while the reverse is observed for assimilation, with the highest probabilities of assimilation in daylight and the lowest after dark-adaptation Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 14 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 15 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Figure 8. Probabilities of contrast, assimilation, and relative depth ('near') are shown as a function of the luminance contrast of the ACHROMATIC inducers (top) and the adaptation level (bottom). The dotted lines in the graph on top suggest the theoretical drop to zero of all effects at physical equiluminance of achromatic inducers and backgrounds (see Fig. 1). (Fig. 8, bottom). The luminance contrast of the achromatic inducers had a significant effect on induction, in terms of apparent contrast (F(3,23) = 4.47, p < 0.05) and in terms of assimilation (F(3,23) = 11.09, p < 0.01). For a luminance contrast of negative sign (here C = −0.14), the probability of apparent contrast is higher than the probability of assimilation, while the reverse is found to hold for strong inducer contrasts of positive sign. The effect of inducer contrast on the probPrn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 15 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 16 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 ability of inducers to be seen as nearer to the observer is, again, highly significant (F(3,23) = 32.95, p < 0.001). Inducers with the strongest positive luminance contrasts produced the highest probability to be seen as nearer. Adaptation level had no significant effect on perceived relative depth. No significant interaction between adaptation level and inducer contrast was found for any of the three dependent variables. Grouping the backgrounds into a single field had no significant effect on probabilities of relative depth (Fig. 8, top), but significantly influenced induction effects in terms of apparent contrast (F(1,23) = 17.02, p < 0.01). In configurations where the background fields are spatially separated, the probabilities of apparent contrast are significantly higher (Fig. 8, middle). As with the colored inducers, the effect of grouping on assimilation is not statistically significant in configurations with achromatic inducers (Fig. 8, bottom). Again, there was no significant interaction between grouping and the luminance contrast of the inducers. Interestingly, green and yellow inducers with a low luminance contrast of positive sign (Figs 4 and 7, upper left) produced noticeably stronger depth effects than red inducers with a low luminance contrast of positive sign (Fig. 6, upper left). Otherwise, there are no noticeable differences between the different colors in terms of their probability to produce apparent contrast, assimilation, or relative depth effects, as shown here when the probabilities, averaged over the adaptation level and inducer contrast factors, are plotted as a function of the inducer color and type of background configuration (Fig. 10). 4. Discussion Repetitive patterns of a single color placed on achromatic backgrounds of a lighter and a darker tone induce simultaneous contrast effects where the background's brightness may be altered either towards apparent contrast or towards assimilation. The observation that perception can switch from one to the other in one and the same configuration is consistent with psychophysical data on achromatic configurations of positive and negative contrast polarities (Beck, 1966; Hamada, 1985; Heinemann, 1955; Helson, 1963), sometimes described in terms of a 'brightness paradox' (De Weert and Spillmann, 1995). These effects have been interpreted in terms of non-linear spatial interactions, and their potential neural origins, ensuring the discounting of changes in global illumination to facilitate the perception of complex objects under variable lighting conditions (Gerrits and Vendrik, 1970; Grossberg, 1997; Reid and Shapley, 1988; Shapley and Reid, 1985). Such an interpretation is fully consistent with our observations here, and accounts well for the insensitivity of the simultaneous induction effects to either visual adaptation or luminance contrast of the colored inducing patterns. Roughly equiluminant chromatic inducers often produced the strongest brightness induction on their grey backgrounds, with systematically more assimilation than contrast, as previously found in other geometrically complex displays (Wyszecki, 1986). We conclude that chromatic patterns, regardless of their luminance contrast and under any condition of Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 16 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 17 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Figure 9. Probabilities of contrast, assimilation, and relative depth ('near') are shown as a function of the luminance contrast of the ACHROMATIC inducers (top) and the type of background configuration (bottom). Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 17 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 18 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 Figure 10. Probabilities of contrast, assimilation, and relative depth ('near'), averaged over the adaptation level and the inducer contrast factors, are shown as a function of the color of the inducers and the type of background configuration. Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 18 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 19 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 light-dark adaptation of the eye, alter the appearance of achromatic backgrounds by producing unsuspected 'paradoxical' (e.g. De Weert and Spillmann, 1995) changes in their perceived intensity. These observations shed a new light on Chevreul's law of 'true' color, bearing in mind that it is based on the idea of an absence of mutual interaction between color and grey. Here we show that colored patterns may have an either suppressive or enhancing effect on the perceived brightness of their immediate grey backgrounds when these latter are placed on an even darker general background. At or near physical equiluminance with the grey backgrounds, colors produced effects similar or identical to those of colors with strong luminance contrasts. Significant variations in either assimilation or contrast as a function of the luminance contrast of a given color were not found. We are confident that individual differences in equiluminance, although we did not measure them, had little or no effect on our results as the average psychophysical equiluminance for ten or more subjects, selected from the same population as in this study, approaches physical equiluminance (Dresp and Fischer, 2001; Guibal and Dresp, 2004), and differences at the threshold level are unlikely to be relevant here. Configurations with spatially separated background fields, where the inducers are seen as belonging to two different visual objects separated by a gap in the middle, produced significantly higher probabilities of apparent contrast compared with the regrouped configurations, where inducers and background form a single object. Here, we observe that the grey object surfaces separated by the wide gap in the middle have a significantly higher probability to induce apparent contrast. Devinck et al. (2006) observed a significant increase in assimilation in the watercolor illusion with increasing width of the contour separating the assimilated field from its surround. Such effects are the direct perceptual consequence of what Chevreul called "the contiguity of the frame", which he believed could destroy or alter the perception of any attribute of a scene when observed "without the frame". Visual configurations may thus be seen as pictures, hung side by side when separated by distinct borders, or unified into a single one when the backgrounds are regrouped. Chevreul's concept points towards a structural analysis of visual configurations at higher levels of perceptual and cognitive processing. Object borders and pattern contours have previously been found to influence induction effects, produced by colors or achromatic surfaces, in often unsuspected ways (Devinck et al., 2006; De Weert and Spillmann, 1995; Dresp, 1992; Dresp and Fischer, 2001; Grossberg, 1997; Pinna, 2008; von der Heydt and Pierson, 2000) and no single explanation suffices to account for them all. Given the insensitivity of the brightness induction effects produced by the colors here to adaptation levels and luminance contrast, low-level explanations in terms of critical interactions at the receptor levels can be safely excluded. In marked contrast with the induction effects produced by colors, the effects generated by achromatic inducers, in terms of either contrast or assimilation, were found to vary significantly with the luminance contrast of the inducers and the visual adaptation level, with apparent contrast being the strongest after dark-adaptation, Prn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 19 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF 20 B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 assimilation the strongest under daylight conditions. This may suggest that the simultaneous induction effects produced by the achromatic inducing patterns arise at different levels of visual processing than the induction effects produced by the colored patterns. While these latter are likely to involve complex interactions between chromatic and achromatic visual pathways (e.g. Hong and Blake, 2009), the induction effects produced by grey inducers would involve only the achromatic pathways, or the contrast sensitive on-center-off-center pathways of the brain. Interestingly, with achromatic inducers on grey backgrounds, the probability of contrast was found to be higher than the probability of assimilation when inducer contrasts bear a negative sign, while the reverse holds for inducer contrasts of positive sign. This observation is reminiscent of conclusions from earlier experiments by Magnussen and Glad (1975) on brightness and darkness enhancement during flicker assessed by human observers and their potential neural correlates, assessed on the basis of firing activities in the contrast selective on-center-off-center pathways of cat cortex. Functional asymmetries for contrasts of negative and positive sign consistent with our observations were found, originating in the retina and communicated to visual cortex through 'straight-through' neural pathways. Contrast-sensitive asymmetries in the processing of visual objects of negative and positive sign (see also Dresp and Langley, 2005) have been reported in various earlier studies. Many of these results have remained unexplained (see McCormick et al., 2012, for a deeper analysis). Although the bright inducers with the highest luminance contrasts are the most likely to be seen as nearer, they turn out to be the most unlikely to induce apparent contrast effects. Yet, a strong positive correlation between apparent contrast and relative inducer depth is to be expected if a direct functional link between such induction effects and the relative depth of inducing and test surfaces in the visual field exists, as suggested by Long and Purves (2003) or, a century ago, by Katz (1911). We find, instead, that the perceived relative distance of inducers appears to be independent of the induction effects they produce in terms of either apparent contrast or assimilation. The perception of the relative distance of the colored inducing patterns is determined solely by their luminance contrast under conditions where no cues to depth are made available, as predicted by Chevreul's law of contrast. However, in our experiments here the law only holds for contrasts of a strong positive sign. Colors with luminance contrasts of a strong negative sign did not generate strong probabilities to be perceived as nearer. This may be explained if the three surface planes in the visual field (as here in Fig. 1) compete for perceptual organization into foreground and background. Given that the general background of the screen is always darker than the immediate background fields of the inducers (as here in Fig. 1), inducers with a strong negative sign may generate some probability of belonging to that darker general background, of lying behind their immediate inducing fields, in other words. Post-experimental discussions with the subjects revealed that some of them had, indeed, the feeling that "sometimes the darker inducers seemed to lie behind their background fields". With two surface planes only (as here in Fig. 3), this ambiguity disappears, and competition for perceptual organization prePrn:2012/09/24; 13:14 [research-article] F:sp2401.tex; (Milda) p. 20 UN CO RR EC TE D P RO OF B. Dresp-Langley, A. Reeves / Seeing and Perceiving 0 (2012) 1–23 21 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 43 44 44 dicts that inducers of strong and equivalent negative and positive contrast signs will generate equal likelihoods to be perceived as nearer to the observer than inducers with weaker contrasts. Simultaneous induction effects, however, are unlikely with the two-surface displays, as indicated by our results with the regrouped background fields. These considerations deserve attention in further research. Also, the tendency of red inducers with a low luminance contrast of positive sign to produce weaker depth effects than green and yellow inducers with a low luminance contrast of a positive sign calls for further testing. Additional experiments with a tighter sampling of inducer contrasts in the lower positive range would be needed to help determine whether a particular effect of low contrast green and yellow exists in the perceptual genesis of relative depth of chromatic inducers with weak positive luminance contrast. The effects reported here are insensitive to visual adaptation levels. They definitely do not involve chromatostereopsis (e.g. Dengler and Nitschke, 1993; Simonet and Campbell, 1990), as we chose configurations where the chromatic or wavelength characteristics of the stimuli were always constant in a given display, only the luminance contrast of the inducers varied. Acknowledgements Financial support from CNRS (PICS05971) to B. Dresp-Langley and A. 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Persée http://www.persee.fr Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft and Perez Zagorin (eds.), Philosophy, Science and Religion in England, 1640-1700 (Cambridge-New York-Port Chester : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992) Revue d'histoire des sciences, Année 1994, Volume 47, Numéro 1 p. 149 150 Voir l'article en ligne Avertissement L'éditeur du site « PERSEE » – le Ministère de la jeunesse, de l'éducation nationale et de la recherche, Direction de l'enseignement supérieur, Sous-direction des bibliothèques et de la documentation – détient la propriété intellectuelle et les droits d'exploitation. A ce titre il est titulaire des droits d'auteur et du droit sui generis du producteur de bases de données sur ce site conformément à la loi n°98-536 du 1er juillet 1998 relative aux bases de données. Les oeuvres reproduites sur le site « PERSEE » sont protégées par les dispositions générales du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Droits et devoirs des utilisateurs Pour un usage strictement privé, la simple reproduction du contenu de ce site est libre. Pour un usage scientifique ou pédagogique, à des fins de recherches, d'enseignement ou de communication excluant toute exploitation commerciale, la reproduction et la communication au public du contenu de ce site sont autorisées, sous réserve que celles-ci servent d'illustration, ne soient pas substantielles et ne soient pas expressément limitées (plans ou photographies). La mention Le Ministère de la jeunesse, de l'éducation nationale et de la recherche, Direction de l'enseignement supérieur, Sous-direction des bibliothèques et de la documentation sur chaque reproduction tirée du site est obligatoire ainsi que le nom de la revue etlorsqu'ils sont indiqués le nom de l'auteur et la référence du document reproduit. Toute autre reproduction ou communication au public, intégrale ou substantielle du contenu de ce site, par quelque procédé que ce soit, de l'éditeur original de l'oeuvre, de l'auteur et de ses ayants droit. La reproduction et l'exploitation des photographies et des plans, y compris à des fins commerciales, doivent être autorisés par l'éditeur du site, Le Ministère de la jeunesse, de l'éducation nationale et de la recherche, Direction de l'enseignement supérieur, Sous-direction des bibliothèques et de la documentation (voir http://www.sup.adc.education.fr/bib/ ). La source et les crédits devront toujours être mentionnés.

"Shut The Front Door!": Obviating the Challenge of Large-Scale Extra Dimensions and Psychophysical Bridging RICHARD L. AMOROSO Noetic Advanced Studies Institute, Escalante Desert, UT 84714-5104 USA [email protected], www.noeticadvancedstudies.us Physics has been slowly and reluctantly beginning to address the role and fundamental basis of the 'observer' which has until now also been considered metaphysical and beyond the mandate empirical rigor. It is suggested that the fundamental premise of the currently dominant view of 'Cognitive Theory' - "Mind Equals Brain" is erroneous; and the associated belief that the 'Planck scale, 'the so-called basement level of reality', as an appropriate arena from which to model psycho-physical bridging is also in error. In this paper we delineate a simple, inexpensive experimental design to 'crack the so-called cosmic egg' thereby opening the door to largescale extra dimensions (LSXD) tantamount to the regime of the unified field and thus awareness. The methodology surmounts the quantum uncertainty principle in a manner violating Quantum Electrodynamics, (QED), a cornerstone of modern theoretical physics, by spectrographic analysis of newly theorized Tight-Bound State (TBS) Bohr orbits in 'continuous-state' transition frequencies of atomic hydrogen. If one wonders why QED violation in the spectra of atomic hydrogen relates to solving the mind-body (observer) problem; consider this a 1st wrench in a forthcoming tool box of Unified Field Mechanics, UF that will soon enough in retrospect cause the current tools of Classical and Quantum Mechanics to appear as stone axes. Max Planck is credited as the founder of quantum mechanics with his 1900 quantum hypothesis that energy is radiated and absorbed discretely by the formulation, E = hv. Empirically implementing this next paradigm shift utilizing parameters of the long sought associated 'new physics' of the 3rd regime (classicalquantum-unified) allows access to LSXD of space; thus pragmatically opening the domain of mental action for the 1st time in history. This rendering constitutes a massive paradigm shift to Unified Field Theory creating a challenge for both the writer and the reader! Keywords: Bohr orbit, Psycho-physical bridging, QED, Quantum theory, Spectroscopy, Tight-bound states, Uncertainty principle. 1. Introduction Threshold of a 3rd Regime "Shut The Front Door!", a slang interjection or statement representing a moment of disbelief in US vernacular [1], is an appropriate 'reverse psychological' insult for this paper's experimental challenge to the myopic presumptions of both Cognitive Neuroscience and contemporary physics that has thwarted progress in solving the mind-body problem (nature of the observer) like the most honored Mullah Nasrudin who losing his keys in his backyard looked for them instead at night under the street light in front of his house because it was easier to look there with his neighbors helping. Quantum Electrodynamics (QED) sacrosanct for the past 50 years is now summarily being violated [24]. QED, the relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) of electrodynamics describes the interaction of light and matter; and was the first theory to mesh full agreement between quantum mechanics and special relativity. Feynman, a QED founder called it "the jewel of physics" for its extreme accuracy in predictions such as the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron, and the Lamb shift in energy levels of hydrogen. It is interesting that new TBS energy levels of hydrogen will now lead to QED being violated. Rowlands in terms of current thinking in contemporary physics hints at the dilemma that we sachet past here: Physics at the fundamental level can be effectively reduced to an explanation of the structures and interactions of fermions. Fermions appear to be singularities rather than extended objects, but there is no obvious way of creating such structures within the 3-dimensional space of observation. However, the algebra associated with the Dirac equation appears to suggest that the fermion requires a double, rather than a single, vector space, and this would seem to be confirmed by the double rotation required by spin 1⁄2 objects, and the associated effects of zitterbewegung and Berry phase shift. Further investigation of the second 'space' reveals that it is, in effect, an 'antispace', which contains the same information as real space but in a less accessible form. The two spaces effectively cancel to produce a norm 0 (nilpotent) object which has exactly the mathematical structure required to be a fermionic singularity [5]. Although the mathematics of Rowlands avantgarde nilpotent physics works brilliantly in extending our understanding of the nature of a fermionic singularity (as yet an open question in physics), for Noetic Field Theory (NFT): The quantization of Mind, for which Rowland's model has recently even become a basis for solidifying NFT's foundation [6,7]; elegant "Shut The Front Door!" 511 math is not necessarily tantamount to physics. The nature of the so-called fermionic singularity is profoundly unique in NFT; and even though the protocol introduced here would not work without that noetic nature being physically realistic, its technical description is beyond the scope of this paper [8-10] within which we outline the experiment and only delineate a minimum of associated parameters to help explain its radical theoretical foundations. 2. Physics New and Old Protocol Philosophy A wrinkle in atomic spectra may not initially appear as an appropriate crack in the 'cosmic egg' meaning a door to empirically demonstrating the 1st indicia of the existence of Cartesian Interactive Dualism. To clarify, NFT [7-13] now has sufficiently firm theoretical grounds to declare that the Planck scale is 'not the basement of reality', albeit it is an oasis between the 1st and 3rd regimes of reality a nilpotent boundary of the infinite potentia [5-7] hidden behind it or domain wall forming the virtual reality perceived by the Euclidean/ Minkowski observer. Just as the quantum regime was until recently invisible to the empirical tools of Newtonian or Classical Mechanics, so until now Unified Field Mechanics, UF has remained invisible to the tools of quantum mechanics primarily because of the barrier associated with the uncertainty principle. The uncertainty principle has been empirically demonstrated by the Stern-Gerlach experiment [14] where a continuous non-uniform em-field arbitrarily projected along the z-axis produces 'spacequantization' and by definition the quantum uncertainty principle under the auspices of the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory. The simple solution to surmount uncertainty is to 'do something else' [6,8,15] which will only be given brief conceptual delineation here. The experiment to be presented revolves around an as yet obscure work by Vigier called 'tight bound states' (TBS) in the hydrogen atom [9,17]. Hydrogen is chosen for the experiment because of its atomic simplicity; it is surmised that a more complex atom might have a tendency to mask the anticipated effect making the putative result more difficult to observe. The experiment if successful would demonstrate a violation of QED. The timing for theoretical acceptance is good because QED has recently been violated in Titanium atoms to a discernible degree [3]. Such preliminary experiments in the history of physics often start as tiny cracks in a theory that have to be repeated and extended many times to produce sufficiently salient effects. The TBS experiment introduced below promises to 'Open the Front Door' wide because it leaps beyond the standard model on a faster track by utilizing aspects of UF mechanics; i.e. the several new QED violation experiments are standard 4D quantum mechanical and therefore unable to access the 'hidden' large-scale extra dimensional (LSXD) UF regime. History has incessantly demonstrated that it is human nature to resist new ideas. Thus it would be easier if one could merely describe the mechanical details of the TBS experiment without delving into a description of the theory behind it because it is currently extremely radical and such a perambulation most certainly will initially also appear sufficiently metaphysical (especially since it purports discovery of Cartesian dualism) to current thinking in mainstream physics to mow down the delicate bloom of openminded consideration... The spectra of hydrogen and associated Zeeman and Stark effects have been rigorously investigated over the last 100 years. What we propose requires no repeat or manipulation of that data which is used only as a comparative benchmark with the new TBS experimental data. We propose three new lines in the atomic transition frequency of hydrogen inconsistent with QED standards suggesting the existence of new TBS below the lowest traditional Bohr orbit (heretofore hidden behind the uncertainty principle) caused by a cyclical or holophote-like periodicity of LSXD resonant transitions. Imagine for the sake of simplistic illustration that the 1st Bohr orbit, s (without descriptive units) has a spectral energy volume of 10 and the 2nd Bohr orbit, p a volume of 20 units. Before we get more deeply into the TBS scenario let's further explain the 10-20 energy volume metaphor. Imagine being in a symmetrically organized orchard, auditorium or grave yard where an observer will notice alternating paths extending to infinity or local barriers blocking the view in the near field. Coincidently this appears like the interference fringes of a Moiré pattern. In HAM cosmologies Calabi-Yau-Dodecahedral-AdS5-DS5 12D symmetry the 'mirror image of the mirror image' (conformal scale-invariant copies) of the 3D 'particle in a box' is causally free of the 4D nilpotent Minkowski space resultant. 12D appears to be the minimal dimensionality for this condition to occur. This inherent structure allows us to set up the required rf-pulsed resonance hierarchy. Figure 13e shows the possibility of three spectrographic results spectral energy volumes of 12, 14 or 16 depending on whether the standing-wave structure of the resonance hierarchy cycle is fully parameterized or not. Thus if successful the TBS protocol will be distinct from the usual 10-20 QED spectrum of the hydrogen atom. This result would not only violate QED but also demonstrate the existence of LSXD which for our purposes opens the door to a regime of new physics able to cross the psychoRichard L. Amoroso 512 physical bridge leading to the 1st pragmatic model of 1st person 3rd person entanglement [8,11]. Figure 1. Conceptualized structure of a transaction (present quantum state or TI event) where the present (simplistically) is a standingwave of future-past elements [22]. A point is not a rigid singularity as in the classical sense, but has a complex structure like a miniwormhole where R1 & R2 (like the frets holding the wire of a stringed instrument) represent opposite ends of its vibrational diameter. However a NFT HAM singularity is only cyclically discrete as shown in the text below. Under the auspices of the Copenhagen Interpretation protons are said to be created near the time of the Big Bang and their half-life has been confirmed to this order of temporal magnitude [18,19]. But this condition is independent of what one might say about de Broglie matter-waves applied to the de Broglie-Bohm Causal Stochastic Interpretation of quantum theory [20,21] well known to include a quantum potential or pilot wave that NFT additionally interprets to suggest that fermions embedded in spacetime are cyclically annihilated and recreated as an inherent ontological basis for the generation of observed reality (Figs, 2 and 3); which NFT further postulates in terms of Cramer's Transactional Interpretation (TI) [22], acts like a hyperspherical standing-wave of the future-past (Fig. 1). Figure 2. How observed (virtual) 3D reality (center) arises from the infinite potentia of 12D space (like a CI transaction). The 'standingwave-like' (retarded-advanced future-past) mirror symmetric elements, C4+ / C4- (where C4 signifies an 8D potentia of complex continuous-state space is distinguished from the locally realized visible 3D spacetime) produce the observed Euclidian, E3, Minkowski, M4 space (center) as a closed resultant. Least Cosmological Units (LCU) governing evolution of the 'points' of 3D reality are represented by circles. The Advanced-Retarded future-past cubes in HD space guide the evolution of the central cube (our virtual reality) that emerges from potentia elements of HD UF space. Cramer derived this basis for his interpretation by correspondence to the Wheeler-Feynman radiation law [23]. NFT takes this scenario a significant additional step by elevating both Cramer's TI and wave-particle duality to Principles of Cosmology. One gets from this concatenation an application of the Dirac equation where the annihilation-creation vectors applied to matter embedded in spacetime act as a locus of resultant LCU points able to not only model the arrow of time with large-scale continuous-state extra dimensions (LSXD); but also a description of the exciplex gating mechanism mediating the UF. (See Figs. 2, 3 & 10) Figure 3a. Macroscopic movie theatre model of virtual reality (like a hyperdimensional hologram) and the observer's place in the theatre. Putting all this together (more is left out for brevity here) one gets instead of an inflationary Doppler Big Bang universe, a 'continuous-state' anthropic multiverse [8] where the energy of inflation is internalized locally as a form of gravitational free-fall giving the Euclidean observer his façade of virtual reality (Figs. 2 & 3). If this sounds like a horrendous concatenation violating Occam's razor, be reminded that if one is inclined to accept the need for a 'life principle' even the founders of the current interpretation of quantum theory maintained that it was incapable of describing biological systems; and the ever so popular Big Bang cosmology is Darwinian and naturalistic thus void of an anthropic principle. Therefore to this author's thinking there is little choice other than to follow the path presented here especially since additional degrees of freedom are required to go beyond the mechanistic fallacy of cognitive neuroscience. The Continuous-State property of the LCU spacespacetime raster forms the open-closed structure of its 'singularity'. Leibnitz in an argument with Newton over whether spacetime was relational or absolute called this conundrum an antinomy that space was an open-closed duality of the two. In HAM cosmology [8,11] the Hubble sphere, HR is a self-organized complex system closed and finite in time, but open and infinite in eternity which is a conformal scaleinvariant property symbolic especially of the continuous-state LCU structure modulated by the "Shut The Front Door!" 513 coherence force of the UF. Figure 3b. Microscopic details of transduction of the UF through the complex exciplex spacetime raster LCU gate (Fig. 10) into every point, atom and thus molecule of self-organized living systems (SOLS) the propagation of which also produces a locus of spacetime points associated with the arrow of time because it is part of the structure and content of the observers mind. 3. Devil in the Details Continuous-State, LCUs and the Synchronization Backbone One of the most amazing realizations during development of HAM cosmology was the inherent synchronization backbone associated with the nonlocal Continuous-State cycle. Even the author himself does not yet fully comprehend the structure of an LCU or its gating mechanism so additional profundity looms. The idea of a spacetime synchronization backbone arose with Feynman's suggestion of its requirement in the development of quantum computers (QC) [8,24]. Figure 4. The Continuous-State process can be thought of as the path of a fermion (ball) embedded in a spacetime raster (not as shown but instead embedded in a Riemann hypersphere) that is continuously rotating relativistically such that the fermion remains centralized as if in a form of gravitational free-fall. But researchers in the QC field gave up the idea as intractable not realizing that this was the case only in terms of the 4D Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory. In 12D it is miraculous and like getting half the QC for free! What researchers attempted could best be described as a form of 'bi-locality' not a breaking through uncertainty to the essential nonlocal LSXD criteria for a synchronization backbone. However Feynman's comment was brief leaving that restriction unclear to Copenhagen regime philosophy and tools. The chaotic motion of a bouncing ball on a harmonically forced oscillator like the motion of a ball rolling down an inclined plane and bouncing off pegs in its path is analogous to the continuous-state process of the LCU raster of spacetime in the presence of the UF. The synchronization backbone forms the geometric topology or domain wall of continuous-state Calabi-Yau mirror symmetry. There is a sort of mantra associated with its structural-phenomenology: A 'Continuous-state mirror symmetric spin exchange dimensional reduction compactification process'. Figure 5. Triune structure of a conceptualized solitary LCU that like an isolated quark does not exist in nature. The central parallel lines are a Witten string vertex [32] with properties of a complex Riemann sphere able to continuously rotate from zero to infinity. The field lines represent the 'super quantum potential' of the unified field, UF. This LCU structure is the NFT extension of the Rowland fermionic singularity [5]. As a portion of UF dynamics the topology of the continuous-state process also includes gravitational elements called 'parallel transport' [8,31] which creates what physicists call a 'deficit angle'. What this means is that a fermion following a geodesic path around the edge of a hypercube does not return to the precise fermionic vertex it originated from at the beginning of the cycle but incurs a deficit angle or gap between the original point and new final point. This gap in the Calabi-Yau mirror symmetric spin-exchange process is like a relay race baton passing where the electron for example 'leapfrogs' across the deficit angle gap (and recouples) in the standing wave structure of the Minkowski space resultant maintaining the properties of the uncertainty principle while in the nonlocal Calab-Yau mirror symmetric background the continuous-state dimensional reduction compactRichard L. Amoroso 514 ification process runs smoothly through its 12D to 0D cycle a stereographic property of a Riemann sphere rotation from zero to infinity. Figure 6. Segment of proximal HD Calabi-Yau mirror symmetric 3-folds represented as dual quaternion trefoils undergoing continuous-state rotation periodically coupling into a Euclidean 3-space resultant. This horrendous concatenation occurs as the basis for the arrow of time because our temporal virtual reality surfs as it were of the face of the LSXD eternal realm hidden behind it. (The discrete frames of spacetime film in Fig. 3 producing the continuous virtual image of reality relativistically on the screen) These parameters are essential to the LCU as an exciplex gating mechanism This is how each point (LCU open-closed singularity like a rotating light house beacon) is created in the temporal locus and allows the UF's 'force of coherence' to modulate complex self-organized living systems (SOLS) [11] as the organizing principle itself and likewise mediate the physical basis of qualia [10-12]. We will do our best to clarify this scenario in the text and figures in sections following. We are not yet finished outlining the required battery of new physical parameters; recall that NFT represents a whole paradigm shift. (why it hasn't been easy this past 1,000 years) WE MUST also utilize the parameters of another well established and generally ignored aspect of contemporary physics called Extended Electromagnetic Theory [25-27] in conjunction with a covariant Dirac polarized vacuum (ignored also) [28]; both because physicists erroneously believe they conflict with Gauge Theory which has been eminently successful for decades. Now we are finally be set up with enough parameters to putatively manipulate the spacetime backcloth (Einstein energy dependent spacetime metric) [29,30]. Metaphorically if one throws a stone in water concentric ripples occur. If one throws two stones regions of destructive and constructive interference occur. We will utilize an M-Theoretic Calabi-Yau symmetric version of this model to set up an rf-pulsed spacetime resonance hierarchy to access the 'hidden' regime of the UF [8]. In the next series of several figures (Figs. 5-8) we will attempt to clarify the continuous-state structure of LSXD as it applies to HAM cosmology. Figure 7. Complex Calabi-Yau mirror symmetric 3-form potentia, C4 become an embedded quantum resultant in Minkowski space, M4. This resultant projection entails a continuous quantum state evolution represented as a Bloch 2-Sphere. Representing the lower portion that embeds in local spacetime; there is an additional 5D dodecahedral duality above this projection embedded in the infinite potentia of the UF from which it arises. The noeon mediating the UF does not imply the usual phenomenological exchange of energy as in a standard field interaction such as the photon of the electromagnetic field; but constitutes an ontological exchange (without energy transfer). This is achieved by a process called 'topological switching' and implies instead a 'force of coherence' inherent in the action of the UF. This process also allows the quantum uncertainty principle defined by the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory to be surmounted [8]. Figure 8 illustrates a nilpotent continuous-state regime "Shut The Front Door!" 35 cycling from a 12D dodecahedral de Sitter space [38] through an intermediate Calabi-Yau mirror symmetry to a virtual 'standing-wave' nilpotent 3D Euclidean space resultant. Figure 8. Complete LSXD regime of HAM cosmology illustrating the hierarchy of its geometric topology. Dodecahedral involute properties, as well as the continuous-state exciplex 'hysteresis loop' of noeon injection not shown. It represents a unique M-Theoretic model of 'ContinuousState' UF dynamics as it relates to NFT and its putative exchange quanta of the UF called the noeon. We extend Vigier's original model of TBS in hydrogen [17] to include a unique 12D M-Theoretic perspective [8] with a Calabi-Yau : Dodecahedral involute mirror symmetry [6] in Continuous-State HD space [8,11] elevating Cramer's Transactional model [22] and wave-particle duality to principles of cosmology. The 4-Space nilpotent resultant of the E3/M4 virtual present which is a standing-wave of the Richard L. Amoroso 516 future-past is shown in Figs. 2-9. M4 being 'locked' into place cyclically by the uncertainty principle [8]. The HD or XD are not curled up at the Planck scale because they are invisible; but they are Large-scale XD (LSXD) [8] because of subtractive interferometry as it were of the C4 + M4 C4 standing-wave modes [8] that operates like a movie theatre where discrete frames of film moving through the projector at a few cm/sec appear continuous on the screen. For our virtual reality Exchange quanta of the UF is relativistically 'pumped' through discrete holographic-like LCU tiling the raster of spacetime producing the virtual image of the Minkowski space present. So behind the virtual veil is a continuous-state cycle from 0  as shown in Fig. 3. 4. More LSXD Experimental Theory The Born-Oppenheimer (BO) approximation [33] which is based on the fact that within molecular systems fast-moving electrons can be distinguished from slow-moving nuclei allows the wavefunction of a molecule to be broken into its electronic and nuclear (vibrational, rotational) Total Electronic Nuclear    components for easier calculation. Figure 9. Calabi-Yau future-past mirror symmetry potentia illustrated as tiered surfaces (additional dimensionality suppressed) of constant phase, in this case to represent cyclic components of evenly spaced orthogonal standing reality waves with the E3/M4 cubic resultant localized at the bottom. The resultant locked in 4D by the uncertainty principle. The assumption is made that if nonadiabatic coupling terms are negligibly small then the upper electronic surfaces have no effect on the nuclear wave function of the lower surface. This assumption is not considered dependent on the systems energy. However, the ordinary BO approximation was also employed for cases where these coupling terms are not necessarily small, assuming that the energy can be made as low as required. The justification for applying the approximation in such a case is that for a low enough energy the upper adiabatic surfaces are classically forbidden, implying that the components of the total wave function related to these states are negligibly small. As a result the terms that contain the product of these components with the nonadiabatic coupling terms are also small, and will have a minor effect on the dynamical process. The protocol tests for both the existence of TBS and also for LSXD. HAM Cosmology predicts novel periodic HD cavities in the brane topology of CalabiYau : Dodecahedral AdS5-DS5 mirror symmetry. Simplistically a tunable NMR device acts on a vial of hydrogen over a range of de Broglie wavelengths set for specific Cavity-QED resonances to probe the lowest Bohr orbit for TBS conditions. If our cosmological model is correct there will be novel resonances that cannot correspond to either classical wave mechanics or Copenhagen QED modes. One might suspect C-QED to detect nodes in the Dirac spherical rotation of the electron (cyclical pattern of Klein bottle open-closed modes). Critics might say this is just a 4D Dirac effect of the putative Klein bottle symmetries in the electron's dual spinor rotation. But our LSXD cosmology predicts a much richer CalabiYau mirror symmetry within the higher 9D brane topology so there "should" be a cycle of novel TBS resonances in the Calabi-Yau symmetry. Likewise these resonance nodes would have de Broglie wavelengths different than any higher Bohr orbit excitation in Hydrogen. It may be possible to predict the de Broglie wavelengths in the resonance hierarchy if the topology can be theoretically determined or if a clear C-QED resonance hierarchy appears, the topological structure of higher dimensions may be revealed. Vigier discussed using deuterium; it is an open question if that would make a qualitative difference in success or results in such an experiment. It will be easy enough to test both cases. EXCIPLEX PROPERTIES OF SPACETIME AND MATTER Figure 10. a) Least cosmological unit (LCU) exciplex complex tiling the spacetime backcloth of HAM cosmology. The array of LCUs acts as a gating mechanism for entry of the UF into every point in Minkowski 4-space and all matter [8]. b) Conformal scale-invariant properties related to TBS in the hydrogen atom as it pertains to LSXD and the oscillating form of Planck's constant fluctuating from the continuous-state asymptotic virtual Planck scale to the Larmor radius of the hydrogen atom 9,17]. "Shut The Front Door!" 517 Another way of looking at the experimental design set up is as a special case for manipulating the Lorentz Transformation [34,35] Aspects of a spacetime exciplex model [8] in terms of restrictions imposed by Cramer's Transactional Interpretation [22] on mirror symmetry can be used for the putative detection of virtual tachyon-tardyon interactions in zitterbewegun [5]. We have designed a tachyon measurement experiment [36] by initially considering Bohr's starting point for the development of quantum theory, i.e. the emission of photons by atoms from quantum jumps between stable Bohr orbits. We do this from the point of view of the de Broglie-Bohm causal stochastic interpretation in order to take into consideration new laser experimental results by Kowalski [34,35]. Re-quoting Rowlands from pg. 1: "Fermions appear to be singularities rather than extended objects... requires a double, rather than a single, vector space, and this would seem to be confirmed by the double rotation required by spin 1⁄2 objects," [5]. This represents the crux of the nut to be cracked. As we already stated Rowlands' addition of an antispace is a brilliant extension of how to understand the nature of a fermionic vertex especially as we feel it represents a clear conceptualization of the lock-down of HD potentia components of the local quantum state 'resultant' that produces the uncertainty principle. The absolute nature of the fermionic singularity requires the structure of the LCU. Figure 11. a) Decrease in energy level E2 to E1 resulting in photon emission (squiggly arrow) with quantized energy, hv. b) An increase in energy level from E1 to E2 resulting from absorption of a photon (squiggly arrow) also with energy, hv. This is the simplistic basis for spectrographic analysis of the quanta in a particular atomic orbit. The TBS experiment anticipates 3 new spectral lines in atomic hydrogen under the novel conditions set up by the apparatus. This is conceptually illustrated in the usual 2D illustration of a 3D space immersion of a 4D Klein bottle. Dissecting a Klein bottle into halves along its plane of symmetry results in two mirror image Möbius strips, one that has left-handed halftwist symmetry and the other with a right-handed halftwist symmetry. The Klein bottle unlike the Möbius strip is a closed 2D manifold without boundary; but unlike the Möbius strip which can be embedded in 3D Euclidean space, the Klein bottle can only be embed in a 4D or higher dimensional space. By adding a fourth dimension to the 3D space, the selfintersection can be eliminated. This is the property we wish to extend beyond the Rowlands singularity. Figure 12. Periodic Moiré-like properties of the Continuous-state backcloth allow access to the LSXD regime by utilizing an rf-pulsed resonance hierarchy. Just like Classical Mechanics had no access beyond 3D Euclidean space, so Quantum Mechanics or the Standard Model has no access beyond 4D EinsteinMinkowski-Riemann space. Thus the UF Mechanics of NFT introduces an additional complex 8D space A 12D total comprised of nine spatial and three temporal; but because of the 4D Minkowski resultant being virtual and the involute properties of the topology operationally the HD space is 6D, with three temporal dimensions and three 'energetic' dimensional control factors of the UF acting like a 'super quantum potential' [8,21]. When this 12D structure is put into the HAM Continuous-State cycle with properties like a Moiré pattern added to the periodicity of the LCU gating mechanism; we are finally set up to understand the topological geometry of TBS parameters. Figure 13a. Figure 13b. Historical evolution of atomic concepts. a) 2D representation of 3D reduction cone of standard Bohr orbits. b) Z' Real is same as (a), Z Vacuum is the Rowland's nilpotent doubling, C+ & Ccomplex Calabi-Yau mirror symmetric generators & the 3 dots represent continuous-state control elements. c) Wave function domain of the Hubble Universe, H   with a 1st and 2nd quantization, ,  respectively of the Hubble radius, HR with the Earth observer, E in center. d) Conceptualized area, V =10; see text. (central dot is proton) for the usual representation of the s Bohr orbital in a hydrogen atom. e) Same as (d) but with additional LSXD complex TBS space area represented. In reality the square would be folded up into a 3-torus or HD Klein bottle. The additional three concentric circles beyond the V = 10 volume of the gray circle representing the hydrogen atom s orbital are meant to represent the added TBS periodic LSXD 12-14-16 energy volume cycles of the continuous-state matter-wave annihilation-creation process. Richard L. Amoroso 518 As one knows light emitted from atoms during transitions of electrons from higher to lower energy states takes the form of photon quanta carrying energy and angular momentum. Any causal description of such a process implies that one adds to the restoring force of the harmonic oscillator an additional radiation (decelerating) resistance associated (derived from) with the electromagnetic (force) field of the emitted photon by the action-equal-reaction law. Any new causal condition thus implies that one must add a new force to the Coulomb force acting at random and which we suggest is related to ZPF vacuum resonant coupling and motions of the polarized Dirac aether. In this respect we prefer an extension of the model proposed by Rowlands [5] as mentioned above. We assume that the wave and particle aspects of electrons and photons are built with real extended spacetime structures containing internal oscillations of point-like electromagnetic topological charges, e within an extended form of the causal stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Figure 14. NMR apparatus designed to manipulate TBS in Hydrogen. The Fig. only shows possible details for rf-modulating TBS QED resonance, not the spectrographic recording and analysis components. Kowalski's interpretation [34,35] drawn from recent laser experiments showing that emission and absorption between Bohr atomic states take place within a time interval equal to one period of the emitted-absorbed photon wave, the corresponding transition time is the time needed for the orbiting electron to travel one full orbit around the nucleus. Kowalski describes the additions to the usual theory of atomic structure. In the noetic theory the Kowalski additions, specifically the 'Kowalski time interval' are probably a key element in setting up the HD symmetry conditions of the TBS resonance hierarchy which can be further manipulated in terms of new parameters related to LSHD to test for UF action and new cyclical continuous-state quantum cavity dynamics. 5. Experimental Design Testing for and Manipulating TBS Figure 15a. Figure 15b. a) Top down list of the rf-resonance hierarchy for accessing HD space. b) Basic conceptual mathematical components of the rf-pulsed applied harmonic oscillator resonance hierarchy in descending order: classical, quantum, relativistic, transactional and incursive are all required in order to achieve coherent control of the inherent conformal, scale-invariant properties of the HD Dirac polarized vacuum. Vigier et al. [17] has proposed TBS below the 1st Bohr orbit in the Hydrogen atom. Utilizing tenets of the original hadronic form of string theory such as a variable string tension, TS where the Planck constant,  is replaced with a version of the original Stoney,  where  is an asymptote never reached and instead oscillates from a virtual Planck asymptote to the Larmor radius of the hydrogen atom, i.e. the so-called Planck scale is a mathematical restriction (not physical) imposed by the limitations of the Copenhagen Interpretation and is not a fundamental physical barrier other than for Minkowski space [8]. "Shut The Front Door!" 519 LSXD exist behind it. Key to operation of the experiment is what we have termed a 'couple-punch' (Table 1). Utilizing relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) at the moment of spin-spin coupling an rfpulse is 'kicked' at various phases of a Bessel function coordinate harmonically set to coincide with putative phases in the Continuous-State cycle of TBS [8-10]. This protocol is considered simplest and least expensive of the 12 empirical tests so far derived by the author [10-13]. Some experimental evidence has been found to support this view showing the possibility that the interaction of these extended structures in space involve real physical vacuum couplings by resonance with the subquantum Dirac ether. Because of photon mass the CSI model, any causal description implies that for photons carrying energy and momentum one must add to the restoring force of the harmonic oscillator an additional radiation (decelerating) resistance derived from the EM (force) field of the emitted photon by the action-equal-reaction law. Figure 16. The spheroid is a 2D representation of a HD complex Riemann sphere able to spin-flip HD brane coupling dynamics from zero to infinity and act as a holophote or 'light house' exciplex pumping mechanism to mediate the action of the UF into spacetime. Kowalski has shown that emission and absorption between atomic states take place within a time interval equal to one period of the emitted or absorbed photon wave. The corresponding transition time corresponds to the time required to travel one full orbit around the nucleus. Individual photons are extended spacetime structures containing two opposite point-like charges rotating at a velocity near c, at the opposite sides of a rotating diameter with a mass, m =10-65 g and with an internal oscillation E = m2= hv . Thus a new causal description implies the addition of a new component to the Coulomb force acting randomly and may be related to quantum fluctuations. We believe this new relationship has some significance for our model of vacuum C-QED blackbody absorption/emission equilibrium. 6. Experimental Procedure If for the sake of illustration we arbitrarily assume the s orbital of a hydrogen atom has an energy volume of 10 and the p orbital an energy volume of 20. To discover TBS we will investigate the possibility of heretofore unknown volume possibilities arising from cyclical fluctuations in LSXD Calabi-Yau mirror symmetry dynamics. This is in addition to the Vigier TBS model. As in the perspective of rows of seats in an auditorium, rows of trees in an orchard or rows of headstones in a cemetery, from certain positions the line of sight is either open to infinity or blocked. This is the assumption we make about the continuous-state cyclicality of HD space. Then if the theory has a basis in physical reality and we are able to measure it, we propose that at certain nodes in the cycle we would discover cavity volumes of say 12, 14, and 16. We propose the possibility of three LSXD cavity modes like 'phase locked loops' depending on the cycle position maximal, intermediate and minimal. The mechanical engineering property of perfect rolling motion or perfect rolling contact is another metaphor for illustrating how the continuous-state cycle operates. A logarithmic spiral can be sliced into curved segments; and ellipsoids of various radii can be constructed from the curved segments. If the spheroids are made to touch and roll without slippage during some rotational cycles the points of contact will return to the original position, i.e. forming a pattern of open and closed moments like orchard rows. TABLE I KICK PULL P + K K + P R R R + A R + A A A A + R A + R R + A R + A A = R A + R A + R A = R A = R Table I. Possible TBS experimental Kick-Pull (K-P) coupling mode parameters. R signifies a retarded K or K coupling, A respectively of advanced K coupling. The plus (+) sign signifies sequential order and the equals sign (=) means simultaneous action for a total of 15 experimental KP coupling options. Table 1 shows 15 ways to test Calab-Yau symmetric CQED TBS parameters and LSXD. Richard L. Amoroso 520 7. Nine Empirical Tests of Noetic Field Theory Cosmology A partial list of the 15 current putative empirical tests relating to both demonstrating aspects of noetic cosmology as well as mind-body parameters is listed. If experiments prove viable we anticipate a new class of research platform for studying properties of the spacetime vacuum, the structure of matter with bench top apparatus instead large accelerators and fundamental aspects of living systems. We propose nine derivatives of the experimental protocol to test the HD continuous-state hypotheses: 1. Basic Experiment Fundamental test that the concatenation of principles is theoretically sound. A laser oscillated rf-pulsed Sagnac Effect resonance hierarchy set to interfere with the periodic conformal scale-invariant structure of the inherent 'beat frequency' of spacetime in a covariant Dirac polarized vacuum to detect the new action principle associated with a cyclical entry of the Unified Field, UF into 4-space. 2. Bulk Quantum Computing Utilizing protocol (1) Bulk Universal QC can be achieved by superseding the quantum uncertainty principle. (see [6] for details) Programming and data I/O are performed without decoherence by utilizing the inherent conformal scale-invariant mirror symmetry properties that act like a 'synchronization backbone' [6,8] whereby the local quantum state is causally free (measureable without decoherence) at a specific HD node in the continuous-state conformal symmetry cycle. 3. Protein Conformation Utilizing aspects of protocols (1 & 2) dual Hadamard quantum logic gates are set as a Cavity-QED spacetime cellular automata experiment to facilitate conformational propagation in the prion protein from normal to the pathological form [39,40]. 4. Manipulating a special case of the Lorentz Transformation [9] Aspects of a spacetime exciplex model [8,9] in terms of restrictions imposed by Cramer's Transactional Interpretation on mirror symmetry can be used for the putative detection of virtual tachyon-tardyon interactions in Zitterbewegung [40]. We design our tachyon measurement experiment by initially considering Bohr's starting point for the development of quantum theory, i.e. the emission of photons by atoms from quantum jumps between stable Bohr orbits. We do this from the point of view of the de Broglie-Bohm causal stochastic interpretation in order to take into consideration new laser experimental results described by Kowalski [42]. As one knows light emitted from atoms during transitions of electrons from higher to lower energy states takes the form of photon quanta carrying energy and angular momentum. Any causal description of such a process implies that one adds to the restoring force of the harmonic oscillator an additional radiation (decelerating) resistance associated (derived from) with the electromagnetic (force) field of the emitted photon by the action equal reaction law. Any new causal condition thus implies that one must add a new force to the Coulomb force acting at random and which we suggest is related to ZPF vacuum resonant coupling and motions of the polarized Dirac aether. We assume that the wave and particle aspects of electrons and photons are built with real extended spacetime structures containing internal oscillations of point-like electromagnetic topological charges, e+ within an extended form of the causal stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Kowalski's interpretation drawn from recent laser experiments showing that emission and absorption between Bohr atomic states take place within a time interval equal to one period of the emitted-absorbed photon wave, the corresponding transition time is the time needed for the orbiting electron to travel one full orbit around the nucleus. Kowalski describes the additions to the usual theory of atomic structure. In the noetic theory the Kowalski additions can be further manipulated in terms of new parameters related to large scale HD to test for UF action and new quantum cavity dynamics. 5. Extended Quantum Theory Test of causal properties of de Broglie-Bohm-Vigier quantum theory by utility of the UF holophote effect (protocol 1) as a "super" quantum potential to summate by constructive interference the density of de Broglie matter waves. 6. Coherent Control of Quantum Phase Additional test of de Broglie-Bohm for existence of a nonlocal 'pilotquantum potential' to manipulating the phase 'space quantization' in the double slit experiment by controlling which slit quanta passes through. 7. Manipulating Spacetime Structure - (similar to protocol 6) Test of conformal scale-invariant properties of the putative Dirac conformal polarized vacuum, a possible 'continuous-state' property related to an arrow of time (Similar to basic experiment, but more advanced) 8. Testing for and Manipulating Tight Bound States (TBS) [9] - (similar to protocol 4) Vigier [17] has proposed TBS below the 1st Bohr orbit in the Hydrogen atom. Utilizing tenets of the original hadronic form of string theory such as a variable string tension, TS where the Planck constant,  is replaced with a version of the original Stoney,  where  is an asymptote never reached and instead oscillates from virtual Planck to the Larmor radius of "Shut The Front Door!" 521 the hydrogen atom, i.e. the so-called Planck scale is a restriction imposed by the limitations of the Copenhagen Interpretation and is not a fundamental physical barrier. Large scale XD exist behind it. Key to operation of the experiment is what we have termed a 'couple-punch'. Utilizing relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) at the moment of spinspin coupling an rf-pulse is kicked at various phases of a Bessel function harmonically set to coincide with putative phases in the cycle of TBS. [9]. Considered simplest and least expensive empirical test. 9. Test of the Unique String Vacuum Until now the structure of matter has been explored by building ever bigger supercolliders like the LHC. If the model described here for accessing HD space in terms of a Dirac covariant polarized vacuum proves to be correct utilizing the inherent conformal scaleinvariant mirror symmetry properties of de Broglie matter waves will allow examining the various cross sections in the structure of matter in symmetry interaction during the cyclic continuous-state futurepast annihilation-creation modes of matter in the spacetime metric. Experimental access to vacuum structure or for surmounting the uncertainty principle can be done by two similar methods. One is to utilize an atomic resonance hierarchy and the other an incursive spacetime resonance hierarchy. 8. Conclusions Utilizing a postulates of the recently formulated paradigm shift in cosmology called the Holographic Anthropic Multiverse [8,11] that employs extensions of quantum theory, gravitation and electromagnetism, one is able to design experiments that putatively open the door to the 3rd regime of reality (classical-quantumunified). If the model proves correct it will be the beginning of empirical access to tenets of unified field mechanics opening the door to a battery of new technologies including bulk universal quantum computing [8]. The key aspect is the cyclical nature of the continuous-state hypothesis that provides a simple method for surmounting quantum uncertainty, suggested to be a limiting factor of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory; 'behind' which the door opens to large-scale extra dimensions wherein lies the regime of action of the unified field and the teleology of mind-body interaction. We have proposed a simple inexpensive experiment that suggests three new spectral lines in the hydrogen atom. The protocol operates by utility of a simple rfpulsed resonance hierarchy timed to coincide with specific parameters of the continuous-state process when periodic openings occur into the higher dimensional regime. With a final whimsical sortie through the entelechies of your imagination we mention a theory about the magnetic sense of birds that assumes an as yet undiscovered protein in the retina of the eye is changed due to the Zeeman effect. The door is now open and cannot be shut again. We are curious to see who will be the experimentalist. Will it be you...? References and Notes [1] The slang phrase 'Shut the Front Door' was originally coined by Buckethead on 101.1 WJRR Radio, Orlando, Fl, USA, www.wjrr.com. [2] Chantler, C.T. et al. 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UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS INSTITUTO DE FILOSOFIA E CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS ANA GABRIELA COLANTONI A QUESTÃO DO VALOR EM SARTRE – SOBRE O SENTIDO DO IDEALISMO SARTRIANO Campinas 2016 Agência(s) de fomento e no(s) de processo(s): CAPES, 99999.008811/2014-08 Ficha catalográfica Universidade Estadual de Campinas Biblioteca do Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas Cecília Maria Jorge Nicolau CRB 8/3387 Colantoni, Ana Gabriela, 1980- C67q ColA questão do valor em Sartre : sobre o sentido do idealismo sartriano / Ana Gabriela Colantoni. – Campinas, SP : [s.n.], 2016. ColOrientador: Luiz Benedicto Lacerda Orlandi. ColTese (doutorado) – Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Col1. Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1905-1980. 2. Valores. 3. Idealismo. 4. Fenomenologia. 5. Ética. I. Orlandi, Luiz Benedicto Lacerda,1936-. II. Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. III. Título. Informações para Biblioteca Digital Título em outro idioma: La question de la valeur chez Sartre : sur le sens de l'idéalisme satrien Palavras-chave em inglês: Values Idealism Phenomenology Ethics Área de concentração: Filosofia Titulação: Doutora em Filosofia Banca examinadora: Luiz Benedicto Lacerda Orlandi [Orientador] Franklin Leopoldo e Silva Marcos César Seneda Enéias Júnior Forlin Alcino Eduardo Bonella Data de defesa: 27-04-2016 Programa de Pós-Graduação: Filosofia Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS INSTITUTO DE FILOSOFIA E CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS A comissão Julgadora dos trabalhos de Defesa de Tese de Doutorado, composta pelos Professores Doutores a seguir descritos, em sessão pública realizada em 27/04/2016, considerou a candidata Ana Gabriela Colantoni aprovada. Prof. Dr. Luiz Benedicto Lacerda Orlandi – UNICAMP/SP Orientador Prof. Dr. Franklin Leopoldo e Silva – USP/SP Arguidor Prof. Dr. Marcos César Seneda – UFU/MG Arguidor Prof. Dr. Enéias Júnior Forlin – UNICAMP/SP Arguidor Prof. Dr. Alcino Eduardo Bonella – UFU/MG Arguidor A Ata de Defesa, assinada pelos membros da Comissão Examinadora, consta no processo de vida acadêmica da aluna. Às atitudes inspiradoras, À Dona Vó. AGRADECIMENTOS Agradeço a todos que lerem esse texto, pois é um texto que requer atenção, pela quantidade de detalhes. Alguns deles podem parecer banais, mas a explicação da utilização aparece ao longo do texto, por outro lado, alguns detalhes podem parecer difíceis, não sendo. Sei também que pode ter faltado clareza sobre a intensão da real expressão, por isso agradeço pela paciência. Agradeço à Unicamp, por sua excelência em estrutura e corpo acadêmico. Agradeço ao Prof. Dr. Fausto Castilho (In Memoriam) por ter aberto a vaga no processo seletivo do doutorado e por ter insistido na importância do estudo da língua original do autor. Agradeço especialmente ao Prof. Dr. Luiz Benedicto Lacerda Orlandi, por ter aceitado dar continuidade à orientação e por ter se mostrado sempre acolhedor e empenhado diante das situações inesperadas, além de ter me dado importantes contribuições desde a qualificação, principalmente, por me chamar a atenção sobre o que é mais importante em Sartre: o conceito de responsabilidade. Ao Prof. Dr. Enéias Júnior Forlin, agradeço por suas intervenções na banca, pois suas perguntas me ajudaram a esclarecer o sentido do idealismo discutido. Ao coordenador da Pós-Graduação da Unicamp, o Prof. Dr. Marco Ruffino, que atendeu algumas solicitações até mesmo em período de greve. Às secretárias da PPG Filosofia da Unicamp Maria Rita Gandara Santos e Sônia Beatriz Miranda Cardoso, por terem sido tão prestativas e por terem realizado esforços para além de suas obrigações de trabalho. Ao representante discente Adriano Januário e ao discente Tennessee Williams Monteiro Matos, ao gerente de produção da editora da Unicamp Ricardo Lima, por favores com documentos e coleta de assinaturas. Agradeço à Universidade de Paris X (Nanterre), em especial Ao Prof. Dr. Jean-Michel Salanskis, por ter aceitado me coorientar no exterior, especialmente, por sua flexibilidade de pensamento e generosidade nos elogios. À CAPES, pela bolsa de doutorado sanduíche. Ao Prof. Dr. Franklin Leopoldo e Silva, da USP, por ter aceitado participar da banca e por seus livros, textos e palestras virtuais. Suas referências foram de grande importância para o desenvolvimento desse trabalho. Seus comentários no dia da defesa são expressões de sua capacidade de apreensão do diferente, bem como da profundeza de sua pesquisa. Agradeço à UFG, e principalmente aos professores de filosofia, porque sei que a liberação de minha licença para doutorado gerou sobrecarga para os demais. Agradecimento especial ao Prof. Ms. Silvio Carlos Marinho Ribeiro, por ter sido informalmente um coorientador, graças à amizade. Ele também fez revisão ortográfica. A partir de sua leitura e crítica ao meu trabalho, fiz reformulações importantes, principalmente no que diz respeito aos conceitos de idealismo epistemológico e ontológico e sobre a explicitação dos conceitos em 1.5. Ele me apontou vários lugares que estavam mal escritos, e que eu não conseguia perceber antes de seus comentários. Também a partir de sua leitura, senti a necessidade de criar a lista de palavras. Agradeço-o ainda, por suas aulas sobre Heidegger, por ter lido um de meus artigos, e a partir dele, ter feito comparações esclarecedoras entre Sartre e Heidegger. Agradeço ao Prof. Dr. Fábio Amorim de Matos Júnior, que foi o relator de meu projeto de pesquisa na UFG/Regional Goiás, quando era coordenador do curso de filosofia. Ao Prof. Ms. Paulo Ribeiro de Souza, por ter me ajudado na busca bibliográfica de alguns materiais, por ter lido a introdução do texto de qualificação e por ter discutido alguns aspectos do trabalho no sentido de contraposição. Não poderia deixar de agradecer ao Prof. Thiago Rodrigo de Oliveira Costa e à Profa. Priscilla da Veiga Borges pelas sínteses que realizei na tentativa de explicar como penso durante nossas práticas de corrida na praça de eventos da Cidade de Goiás. Também agradeço à UFU e a todos os professores que foram imprescindíveis para minha formação na graduação e no mestrado. Ao Prof. Dr. Marcos César Seneda, por sua excelência. Não poderia deixar de citar suas aulas de Hume e de Kant, que só agora percebo o quanto influenciaram minhas pesquisas. Além disso, agradeço por ter aceitado participar da banca de qualificação, pois suas críticas precisas enriqueceram meu desenvolvimento. Agradeço também sua aceitação para a participação da banca de defesa final do doutorado e suas análises pontuais. Agradeço ainda pela revisão ortográfica. Ao Prof. Dr. Alcino Eduardo Bonella, a quem respeito e admiro. Ele foi meu orientador de mestrado em Hare, acompanhou algumas de minhas publicações recentes e discute várias questões comigo. Obrigada por ter aceitado participar da banca de doutorado. Ao Prof. Dr. Alexandre Guimarães Tadeu de Soares, professor de destaque como pesquisador, que aceitou participar da banca de qualificação e foi um dos responsáveis por viabilizar o primeiro contato acadêmico tanto com meu primeiro orientador, quanto com meu coorientador no exterior. Agradeço à Profa. Ms. Luciene Torino, que, embora não tenha sido minha professora, meu contato com ela enriqueceu meu conhecimento e compreensão no âmbito filosófico. Sem seu incentivo, eu não teria sequer participado da seleção do doutorado em 2011, visto que na época eu passava por sérios problemas pessoais. Ao Prof. Dr. Simeão Sass, pelos primeiros contatos com o autor foco desse trabalho, e por seus artigos. Ele me deu aulas sobre Sartre tanto na graduação e quanto no mestrado. Também agradeço à Profa. Dra. Ana Said, que demonstrou interesse pelo assunto, ainda que tivesse proposto caminhos alternativos. À Profa. Dra. Georgia Amitrano, que leu meu texto e me incentivou a defender. Agradeço principalmente pelas dicas de apresentação para o dia da defesa. Aos meus professores de francês. Profa. Ms. Irmã Paula (Maria Alma Pedri) participou das traduções iniciais, antes de meu estágio em Paris e, posteriormente, participou da correção de meu artigo em francês. A ela, agradeço o interesse pelo meu trabalho, pois seus questionamentos fizeram com que eu desenvolvesse alguns argumentos de forma mais clara. Profa. Ms. Michelle O'Connell foi minha professora de francês em Uberlândia e foi essencial para o desenvolvimento da linguagem falada antes de minha partida para a França. Sua presença em Nanterre me possibilitou explorar possibilidades que a Universidade de Paris X me ofereceu. Agradeço a ela, que, pela amizade, leu até o item 1.1 e encontrado alguns erros de grafia, assim como minha mãe, que também se aventurou a ler meu texto e a encontrar o mesmo tipo de erro de digitação. À Profa. Ms. Anne Struve-Debeaux, da Universidade de Paris X em Nanterre, foi importante para meu desenvolvimento gramatical na língua francesa. O trabalho do Prof. Ms. Christophe Salgueiro foi importante para a correção dos sentidos em minhas traduções do francês para o português, especialmente no início de meu estágio na França. Agradeço por ter se tornado um grande companheiro, principalmente no âmbito emocional, durante e após meu estágio na França. Obrigada também por ter formulado questões interessantes em minha comunicação "Universel chez Sartre". À professora Ms. Virginie Personnaz, pela correção final do artigo em francês elaborado a partir do estágio na França. À artista plástica Soni-Pin, pois alguns de seus quadros inspiraram-me relações sartrianas que desenvolvi em minha tese. Ao Ms. Thiago Teixeira, que me fez perguntas na ANPOF de 2014. À Prof. Ms. Priscila Antonio e ao Ms. Carlos Orellana, que assistiram minha comunicação "Sartre e a influência metodológica", na França e sugeriram alguns esclarecimentos. Ao prof. Ms. Urbano Cavalcante Filho e à Ms. Samantha Borges que assistiram e se interessaram por minha comunicação "Universel chez Sartre" também apresentada na França. Ao Ms. Caio Padovan, presidente da APEB-FR e à Ms. Lorraine Beatrice Petters diretora do comitê científico da APEB-FR, pela organização dos eventos e participação com perguntas nos mesmos. À Letícia Cunha Rocha, minha amiga de infância em Uberlândia, que compartilha e acompanha meu desenvolvimento pessoal e profissional, e que me presenteou com o resumo em inglês. Às conversas com o Prof. Ms. Álison Cleiton de Araújo, com a Profa. Dra. Gláucia Lelis Alves e com a Profa. Ms. Ana Carolina Gomes de Araujo, que participaram bastante de meu cotidiano e me fizeram refletir sobre vários assuntos de minha tese. Agradeço à Carol também pela leitura da introdução e da conclusão e por pequenas sugestões no âmbito do estilo. À Profa. Iara Helena Magalhães, que leu meu texto e me encorajou a não desmarcar a defesa, brincando que meu texto era cinematográfico dirigido ao jeito de Godard e Eric Rohmer. Ao Prof. Eduardo Marra, que me influenciou a estudar Sartre, com seu entusiasmo referido às aulas do Prof. Simeão. À Ms. Marilda Fayad, que faz o doutorado sobre Sartre na França sobre o livro O idiota da família, por nossos encontros em Paris e Besançon, embora tenhamos perspectivas diferentes. Às pessoas que me testemunharam mudança de vida após o contato com a teoria sartriana: Maria Eunice Luiz da Silva Santos (primeira aluna a se formar em filosofia em Goiás Velho), Leomar Teodoro de Souza, Fernanda Maria da Silva e Sinara Gomes de Sá. Àqueles que assistiram à defesa: Margareth Colantoni (mãe), Luiz Lemes de Aquino (padrasto), Rafael Lemes de Aquino (filho de meu padrasto e grande amigo), Ms. Luiza Helena Hilgert (colega de pesquisa) e Christophe Salgueiro (meu namorado). Aos colegas que se interessaram por meu trabalho, de alguma forma, principalmente por seus questionamentos, especialmente: à Profa. Dra. Lívia Barbosa, ao Prof. Dr. Eduardo Gonçalves Rocha, ao Prof. Ms. Cláudio Gomes, à Profa. Dra. Meire carvalho, ao Prof. Dr. Renato de Paula, ao Prof. Ms. Alex Muniz, ao Ms. Fábio Júlio, ao Prof. Dr. Pedro Jonas, à Profa. Dra. Silvana Beline Tavares, ao Prof. Dr. Alexandre Santos, à Profa. Ms. Patrícia Basílio Estábile, ao Prof. Ms. Henrique Estábile, à Profa. Dra. Daniela Moreira, ao Ahcene Belaid, ao Marcelo da Silva Gonçalves, ao Antônio Marques, à Michele Rodrigues, ao Luciano Lu, ao Marcelo Lopes Rabelo Zuza (mais conhecido como Tio Uepa), ao Rafael Modesto, ao Raphael Guilherme de Carvalho, ao Ms. Daniel Verginelli Galantin. Aos demais amigos, agradeço o desejo de boa sorte. Um agradecimento à minha família, que tenho amor infinito, especialmente à minha mãe, à minha avó e às minhas tias Regina e Clelinha, por ter me dado um passado tão rico, o qual eu pude ressignificar tantas vezes, e que me deu tantas inspirações. Para quem quer se soltar invento o cais Invento mais que a solidão me dá Invento lua nova a clarear Invento o amor e sei a dor de me lançar Eu queria ser feliz Invento o mar Invento em mim o sonhador Para quem quer me seguir eu quero mais Tenho o caminho do que sempre quis E um saveiro pronto pra partir Invento o cais E sei a vez de me lançar" (Milton Nascimento / Ronaldo Bastos) RESUMO A fenomenologia traz consequências irreversíveis para o pensamento sobre as prescrições comportamentais desenvolvidas na história da filosofia. Como não há essência pré-existente, então, prescrições não podem ser descobertas ou deduzidas. Entretanto a relação entre ação e valor é mantida em Sartre, em outro tipo de configuração: para o autor, não existe ação sem valor. Motivos (condições objetivas para se atingir alguma finalidade) ou móbeis (condições subjetivas – vontades, desejos, fome, calor, sentimentos) influenciam e possibilitam, mas não determinam a ação, que não ocorre sem a eleição de alguma ideia pelo indivíduo. Nesse arcabouço, faz-se necessário investigar o fundamento ou a ausência de fundamentos para uma moral. Fundamentar a moral sobre a liberdade seria o mesmo que dizer que não há fundamentos para a moral? Em que sentido a existência de valores se faz necessária? De que forma assumir a responsabilidade da ação impulsiona para a constituição de uma personalidade que o indivíduo não tem, mas que deseja constituir? Como que o olhar do outro que cerceia minhas possibilidades é fundamento da identidade que não tenho, mas que desejo constituir? Em que medida a alternância entre má-fé e autenticidade ocorre, em atitudes que tem como finalidade qualquer projeto? Como as contradições inevitáveis que ocorrem nas relações de amor-desejo podem servir para elucidar as contradições nas práticas para se alcançar algum projeto? Em minha dissertação de mestrado, desenvolvi uma relação entre lógica, ética e linguagem. Agora, pretendo mostrar que o fato da Ética ser apenas um projeto, que pode ou não ser escolhido, não diminui a importância de sua investigação, assim como não é diminuída a importância do projeto da ciência. Pelo fato de que a Ética se constitua somente como um projeto com finalidade inventada, isso garante a possibilidade, e somente a possibilidade, de que ela seja escolhida e defendida. Palavras-chave: Valor; Sartre; Idealismo. ABSTRACT The phenomenology brings irreversible consequences to thinking about the behavioral prescriptions developed in the history of philosophy. As there is no pre-existing essence, prescriptions cannot be discovered or deduced. However, the relationship between action and value is kept in Sartre in another type of setting: for the author, there is no action without value. Motives (objective conditions to achieve some purpose) or mobiles (subjective conditions wills, desires, hunger, heat, feelings), they influence and create possibility but do not determine the action. Only from an idea, an action can occur. Then, it is necessary to investigate the foundation or lack of foundation for a moral. Finding morality on freedom would be the same as saying that there is no basis for morality? In what sense is the existence of values needed? How taking responsibility for the action leads to the formation of a personality that the individual does not have, but wants to have? To what extent the alternation between bad faith and authenticity occurs, in attitudes aiming any project? How the inevitable contradictions that occur in love-desire relationships may serve to clarify the contradictions in the practices for achieving a project? In my dissertation, I developed a relationship between logic, ethics and language. Now I intend to show that the fact of Ethics being only one project, which may or may not be chosen, does not diminish the importance of its research, and the importance of the science project is also not lesser. The fact that Ethics is constituted only as a project with invented purpose ensures the possibility and only a possibility for it to be chosen and defended. Keywords: Value; Sartre; Idealism. RÉSUMÉ La phénoménologie apporte des conséquences irréversibles pour la réflexion sur les prescriptions comportementales développées dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Comme Il n'y a pas d essence-préexistante, alors les prescriptions morales ne peuvent pas être découvertes ou déduites. Cependant, le rapport entre l'action et la valeur est maintenues chez Sartre, dans une autre forme de configuration : pour l'auteur, il n'y a pas d'action sans valeur. Les motifs (les conditions objectives pour atteindre quelque finalité) et les mobiles (les conditions subjectives – les envies, les désirs, la faim, la chaleur, les sentiments) influencent et rendent possibles, mais ils ne déterminent pas l'action qui n'a pas lieu sans le choix de quelque idée par l'individu. De cette structure, il faut rechercher le fondement ou le défaut de fondement pour une morale. Établir la morale sur la liberté ne reviendrait-il pas à dire qu'il n'y a pas de fondement pour la morale ? Dans quel sens l'existence de valeurs devient-elle nécessaire ? Comment, le fait d'assumer la responsabilité de l'action stimule-t-il la constitution d'une responsabilité que le sujet n'a pas, mais qu'il désire édifier ? Comment, le regard de l'autre qui rogne mes possibilités est-il assis de l'identité que je n'ai pas, mais que je désire constituer ? Dans quelle mesure l'alternance entre mauvaise foi et authenticité survient-elle, dans des attitudes qui ont n'importe quel projet comme but ? Comment les contradictions inévitables qui surviennent dans les relations amour-désir peuventelles servir à élucider les contradictions dans les pratiques pour atteindre quelque projet ? La recherche sur ces questions est d'une importance capitale pour me qui a développé dans ma dissertation un rapport entre logique, éthique et langage. Maintenant, je cherche à montrer que le fait que l'Éthique ne soit qu'un projet qui peut être choisi ou pas, n'enlève rien à l'importance de la recherche, ainsi qu'elle n'amoindrit pas l'importance du projet de la science. Par le fait que l'Ethique se constitue seulement comme projet avec un but inventé, cela garantit la possibilité et seulement la possibilité d'être choisie et défendue. Mots-clés : Valeur ; Sartre ; Idéalisme. LISTA DE PALAVRAS Consciência – o nada, ausência de ser, falta, liberdade, intencionalidade, presente. Ela não é "ser", não é ente e ocorre simultaneamente ao fenômeno, ou seja, ontologicamente, depende do objeto para existir. A consciência é o homem enquanto para-si, e diferentemente do homem quando a referência de homem está ligada a Ego. Ego – conjunto de estados de ação vistos, passado. Objeto observável. O fenômeno entre uma consciência (o outro) e esse objeto (o Ego) produz a identidade, que é a essência do Ego. O Ego está fora da consciência e é a parte determinada do homem. Em-si – aquilo que é determinado: os objetos e o passado. Em francês, Sartre não usa essa expressão em maiúsculo e nem separada por traço, mas boa parte dos tradutores e comentadores adotam pelo menos o traço. Suponho que seja por influência da leitura de Heidegger anterior a de Sartre. Compreendo que a fluidez da leitura é melhor com o uso do traço. Adotei a utilização em minúsculo com o traço, com exceção das citações. Essência – propriedades que fazem uma coisa ser ela mesma. Existencialismo – concepção de contraposição ao fato de que a essência precede a existência. A formulação original é de que a existência precede a essência, mas existem nuances que mostraremos ao longo do texto, pois para o existencialismo é mais importante contrapor o idealismo ontológico. Assim, nossa formulação é mais geral que a formulação original, ainda que a formulação original esteja inserida em nossa formulação. Fenômeno – relação entre para-si e em-si, a aparição, a essência, a significação. A palavra "relação" só pode ser entendida didaticamente, pois Sartre, baseia-se em Hegel para destacar que essa palavra pode, apesar de seu sentido de união, presumir um isolamento do sujeito e do objeto1. Por outro lado, permito-me utilizar a palavra "relação" porque ele mesmo a utiliza em outra parte2. Idealismo – concepção que admite que as ideias são a priori à toda existência. Para Sartre, o idealismo se contrapõe ao existencialismo, pois para o idealismo, a ideia (a essência) antecede a existência. Objeto – em-si que existe ontologicamente independentemente da existência da consciência, mas que ganha significado com a consciência, na relação fenomênica. 1 "[...] o problema da expressão 'relação do sujeito e do objeto' é que, mesmo dizendo relação do sujeito e do objeto, "sujeito" e "objeto" assumem sentidos que eles não têm assim juntos, mas tendem a se isolar" (SARTRE, 2015, p. 64). 2 "Não creio que haja possibilidade de criar um objetivo sem que esse objetivo seja precisamente a apreensão em interioridade do conjunto do ser por uma realidade, e essa realidade se faz subjetiva ao criar, ao apreender ou ao descobrir, como queiram, o objetivo; o objetivo sendo simplesmente matéria diante dela, enquanto há relação com ela" (SARTRE, 2015, p. 80). Epistemologicamente, depende da consciência, e a estrutura de seu ser é desvelada na relação fenomênica. Para-si – consciência. Aquilo que não possui "ser" mas que se projeta para um ser que não coincide com ele no presente, somente no futuro. Da mesma maneira que ocorre com o "em-si", em francês, Sartre não usa essa expressão em maiúsculo e nem separada por traço. Adotei a utilização em minúsculo com o traço, visando fluidez, com exceção das citações que coloco em maiúsculo, quando assim ocorre na fonte. Possível – condição concreta existente e objetiva de realização de algo. Para que a chuva caia, é preciso que existam nuvens e uma umidade mínima no ar. Ser – Em-si. Transcendental – além do físico, metafísico, a priori. Transcendente – projeção, escolha mundana. Valor – ser-em-si-para-si, futuro, ideia. É o si do para-si, o ser para o qual o para-si se projeta. Síntese entre a subjetividade e a objetividade. O valor é subjetivo, porque é a escolha do para-si, mas é objeto porque é a finalidade escolhida do para si, com todas as características descritivas do objeto, além disso, possui a concretude do possível. De acordo com a filosofia da linguagem, toda palavra de valor é em relação a um fim. Certo, errado, bom e mal são palavras de valores porque só podem ser julgadas com relação a uma finalidade, o que é análogo em Sartre. Sumário INTRODUÇÃO .................................................................................................................................... 16 1 IDEALISMO ...................................................................................................................................... 21 1.1 A problemática específica da proposta fenomenológica diante das questões gerais da filosofia ............................................................................................................................................. 21 1.2 Identidade e universalização: o sentido de moral a posteriori .......................................... 32 1.3 O surgimento do nada pela interrogação do ser em contraposição ao Ego Transcendental ............................................................................................................................... 46 1.4 Idealismo prático – convergências com Salanskis ............................................................. 57 1.5 Coerência das obras e a prova do otimismo sartriano pela exigência ............................ 61 1.6 Existencial e universal: a vivência imperativa ..................................................................... 75 2 FAZER-IDENTIDADE ..................................................................................................................... 80 2.1 Má-fé e identidade: dependência da subjetividade para classificação e imperativos implícitos .......................................................................................................................................... 81 2.2 A questão temporal e os projetos para constituição da identidade ................................. 85 2.3 Aparecer, ser e o projeto fundamental ................................................................................. 92 2.4 O olhar do Outro e a identidade ............................................................................................ 95 2.5 O corpo e a identidade .......................................................................................................... 100 2.6 Comprometimento com o mundo pelo valor ...................................................................... 106 3 FAZER-UNIVERSALIZAÇÃO...................................................................................................... 112 3.1 Verdade prática ...................................................................................................................... 112 3.2 A concretude do valor ........................................................................................................... 118 3.3 Valor e universalidade ........................................................................................................... 122 3.4 Ideia e realização ................................................................................................................... 129 4 CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS ........................................................................................................ 133 CONCLUSÃO ................................................................................................................................... 143 BIBLIOGRAFIA ................................................................................................................................. 152 ANEXO I: TRADUÇÃO DO TEXTO "Moral e Responsabilidade"[ título original: "Morale et Responsabilité" (SALANSKIS, 2000)] ........................................................................................... 159 ANEXO II: TRADUÇÃO DO TEXTO: "Sartre, Levinas e o Idealismo" [título original: "Sartre, Levinas et l'idéalisme" (SALANSKIS,2004)] ................................................................................ 171 ANEXO III: TRADUÇÃO DO TEXTO "Sartre, Kant e a serialidade" [título original: "Sartre, Kant et la sérialité" (SALANSKIS, 2005)] ...................................................................................... 210 ANEXO IV: TRADUÇÃO DO TEXTO "Sartre, a história e a verdade" [título original: "Sartre, l'histoire et la vérité" (SALANSKIS, 2008)] ................................................................................... 235 16 INTRODUÇÃO Logo no início de O ser e o nada, Sartre criticou o idealismo kantiano que admitia uma realidade numênica, pois: "o dualismo do ser e do aparecer não pode encontrar legitimidade na filosofia" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 15)3. Então, por que existe interpretação de que Sartre resgata o idealismo na fenomenologia? No livro O que é a subjetividade, resultado de uma conferência apresentada por Sartre em 1961, o filósofo recebe questionamentos de três críticos com considerações de que ele fosse idealista: Francesco Valentini (SARTRE, 2015, p. 72), Giuseppe Semerari (SARTRE, 2015, p. 92) e Cesare Luporini (SARTRE, 2015, p. 139). Diante dessas três menções, Sartre responde somente a Luporini, dizendo que o fato de que a subjetividade tenha originariamente uma relação com o objeto, não significa que sua teoria seja idealista. É justamente o contrário, pois é impossível falar sobre uma realidade sem se referir à objetividade: É impossível, praticamente, porque tudo o que conhecemos de maneira rigorosa, é determinado, é objeto. Mas quando o senhor fala desse algo que há sempre além, além das aproximações, é uma realidade que ainda não é objetiva, já que ela só existe para nós como a interrupção objetiva e subjetiva de nossas experiências. [...] Essa realidade existe totalmente fora, fora de nós, como realidade, mas, para nós, ela só tem ainda uma objetividade relativa, objetividade que não está desenvolvida, não é total. Sabemos que tais partículas existem, mas não temos os meios para conhecê-las realmente, teremos daqui a dez ou vinte anos, é um progresso da objetividade saber que elas existem. Mas elas perturbam muitíssimo toda a ciência, é um dos motivos pelos quais ela está em crise, visto que não dispõe dos meios para tratar a coisa. [...] Chamo isso de objetividade em marcha, em movimento, uma objetividade implícita que vai explicitarse, mas não uma verdadeira objetividade. Porém, ao dizer isto, é uma realidade absoluta, existe e, mesmo que não existíssemos, isso sempre existiria. É nesse sentido que o senhor não pode chamar isso de idealismo, já que o idealismo consiste em dizer que o ser, de um ou outro modo, é percebido, e trata-se portanto de um ser. (SARTRE, 2015, p. 140-141)4. 3 « [...] le dualisme de l'être et du paraître ne saurait plus trouver droit de cité en philosophie » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 11). 4 « C'est impossible, pratiquement, en ce sens que tout ce que tout ce que nous connaissons d'une manière rigoureuse est déterminé, est objet. Mais quand vous parlez de ce quelque chose qu'il y a toujours au-delà, audelà des approximations, c'est une réalité qui n'est pas encore objective, puisqu'elle n'existe pour nous que comme l'arrêt objectif et subjectif de nos expériences. [...] Cette réalité existe totalement, dehors, hors de nous, en tant que réalité, mais elle n'a pour nous qu'une objectivité relative encore, cette objectivité n'est pas développée, n'est pas totale. Nous savons que ces particules existent, mais nous n'avons pas le moyens de les connaître réellement, nous les aurons dans dix ans, dans vingt ans, c'est un progrès de l'objectivité que de savoir 17 A partir disso, podemos verificar que Sartre compreende o idealismo e o contesta, na medida em que desenvolve sua teoria no âmbito do existencialismo. Se, de acordo com a teoria sartriana, a existência precede a essência, se o objeto existe independentemente do sujeito, e, se não é a significância que permite a existência do ser, então, ele não pode ser chamado de idealista. Inclusive, o que ele realmente contesta é a corrente que considera que a ideia ou essência seja a priori em relação à existência do ser, pois para Sartre, a ideia só pode existir na relação com o objeto. Entendemos que essa contestação de Sartre conseguiu contrapor o idealismo ontológico5, por afirmar a existência objetiva do mundo independentemente da existência do sujeito e por conceber que o significado das coisas é a aparição desse mundo objetivo à consciência. Também sabemos que sua teoria não está vinculada ao idealismo ético, visto que os valores não existem a priori, mas são constituídos a partir das vivências humanas e das criações de objetos/objetivos pelo homem. Entretanto a contestação de Sartre não foi suficiente para contrapor um tipo de idealismo epistemológico6, conforme mostraremos pela análise dos textos de Salanskis, filósofo contemporâneo7. Com isso, o objetivo desse trabalho é desenvolver uma contraposição a Salanskis a respeito dessa questão e assim reafirmar que Sartre não é idealista. qu'elles existent ; mais elles gênent énormément toute la science ; c'est une des raisons pour lesquelles elle est en crise, pus qu'elle n'a pas les moyens de traiter la chose. [...] J'appelle cela une objectivité en marche, en mouvement, une objectivité implicite qui va s'expliciter, mais non pas une véritable objectivité. Ceci dit, c'est une réalité absolue, cela existe et si nous n'existons pas, cela existerait toujours. C'est en ce sens que vous ne pouvez pas appeler cela de l'idéalisme, puisque l'idéalisme consiste à dire que l'être d'une manière ou d'une autre est perçu et il s'agit donc d'un être» (SARTRE, 2013b,173-174). 5 Segundo a plataforma Stanford (plataforma na internet, enciclopédia filosófica), o idealismo ontológico é um movimento que considera que o idealismo epistemológico oferece a verdade, porque a realidade é uma forma de pensamento e o pensamento participa na realidade. A mente é o fundamento último da realidade. 6 Segundo a plataforma Stanford, o idealismo epistemológico é o movimento que considera que o conteúdo do pensamento humano é determinado pela estrutura do pensamento humano. Embora a existência de algo independente da mente pode ser concebida, toda construção de conhecimento é uma forma de autoconhecimento. O idealismo epistemológico pode manter-se dualista. 7 Salanskis é referenciado principalmente por desenvolver um método filosófico próprio em seu livro "Partages de sens". Somente em 2015, ele foi convidado para ministrar 5 palestras em eventos diferentes em Paris, das quais apenas 2 foram organizadas por seu grupo de pesquisa. Em todos os eventos ele é apresentado com honrarias distintas: Colloque International – Lyotard et le langage, Colloque International de Philosophie – L'adresse et L'argument, Penser avec J.-M. Salanskis, Partages du sens, Judaïsme et altérité (Autour de Catherine Chalier). 18 Por outro lado, essa indagação nos leva a uma hipótese não situada nos textos de Salanskis: Sartre poderia ser considerado um idealista, não no sentido de idealismo desenvolvido da história da filosofia (ontológico, epistemológico, ético), mas no sentido da utilização ordinária do termo8, uma vez que, para ele, a criação de novas ideias pelo homem é necessária para que modificações ocorram, e assim, é assegurada a possibilidade de constituição de uma identidade de maneira predominantemente autêntica, bem como a possibilidade de constituição de um mundo melhor. Essa hipótese não é óbvia, e, inclusive apresenta considerações discutíveis e problemáticas em Sartre, como mostraremos ao longo do texto. Ainda que não exista necessidade ontológica de qualquer valor, como no idealismo ético, existe a necessidade de valor para a consciência, o para-si. Como o para-si é ausência de ser e sua estrutura fundamental se dá por aquilo que ele não é, em primeiro lugar, ele é livre e responsável pelo que ele escolhe para si e para o mundo, em segundo lugar, ele se projeta para aquilo que ele quer ser: o valor. Embora esse valor não tenha a carga moral e fundamental do idealismo (capítulo 1), pois é simplesmente a finalidade que o para-si transcende a ela, o valor é o que possibilita a constituição da identidade do para-si (capítulo 2) e de transformação do mundo (capítulo 3). Nos utilizaremos do conceito de fenômeno para explicar o conceito de identidade humana, apesar do Prof. Dr. Leopoldo e Silva, o pesquisador e comentador de Sartre de maior prestígio no Brasil9, apresentar outra interpretação. O autor compreende uma diferença sobre a "aprioridicidade" da essência de um objeto (a priori, segundo o mesmo) e da essência humana (a posteriori). Com o intuito de apresentar essas interligações (entre essência de qualquer objeto e identidade humana), utilizar-nos-emos dos conceitos de má-fé, de temporalidade (em que há divergências também com a interpretação de Leopoldo e Silva), do olhar do outro e das dimensões corporais a partir do conceito de fenômeno (a aparência, a essência gerada também a posteriori), que é a relação entre a consciência (para-si, o nada, a liberdade) e o objeto (em-si, o concreto, o determinado). Defenderemos que essas 8 Segundo a plataforma Stanford, o idealismo no sentido popular significa pensamento social progressista e otimista. 9 Embora estejamos no Brasil, o que dispensaria as devidas apresentações do professor e pesquisador da USP, gostaria de destacar que, inclusive, em 2009, Franklin Leopoldo e Silva foi convidado para escrever sobre Sartre no livro "Os Filósofos – Clássicos da Filosofia", vol. III, em que foram convidados somente conceituados e reconhecidos especialistas, como é mencionado no prefácio do livro. 19 conexões nos ajudam a compreender o conceito de identidade sartriana, que é a essência humana, constituída a posteriori, externa ao para-si, em uma relação fenomênica de um para-si com um em-si, ou seja, a partir da relação entre uma consciência (o olhar do Outro) e o objeto (o Ego, o conjunto de estados de ações passadas). Entretanto, entendemos que, em Sartre, seria mais fácil conceber a ideia a priori no caso da identidade humana, do que em relação aos objetos, pois, para Sartre, somente uma ideia nova escolhida é capaz de provocar o movimento humano. Ou seja, enquanto que o objeto existe independentemente da ideia de objeto, que é sua própria essência a partir da relação fenomênica, a identidade do homem – sua essência – é constituída a partir de sua ação vista pelo outro e transcendida rumo a uma ideia: o valor. Por outro lado, através da fundamentação em O ser e o nada, poderemos constatar que o surgimento da ideia é algo simultâneo à existência, e é pela existência que se tem acesso à verdade do valor, que é a atitude. A ideia (o valor) não é a priori e nem inacessível, visto que ela é o objeto escolhido, que revela as atitudes daquele que a escolhe, pois o ato de escolher já é ato concreto, o que confirma que Sartre não é um idealista, no sentido mais tradicional da história da filosofia, desde seus primeiros escritos. Todavia, como já havíamos mencionado, essas indagações culminam no sentido prático da filosofia sartriana. Em qual sentido Sartre seria então um idealista? No sentido de que ele construiu ideias, imagens, valores, concepções de um mundo melhor, ou seja, ideais, e de que por isso ele se permitia defendê-los. Embora seus ideais fossem meras escolhas suas, que não poderiam ser deduzidos de nenhuma realidade transcendental, isso não acarretaria na impossibilidade de comunicação aos outros dessas ideias inventadas e escolhidas, e depois disso, também não impossibilitaria a dedução e a prescrição de atitudes. Isso se relacionará com nossa discussão entre a consistência ou não entre a obra O ser o nada e as outras duas: Crítica da razão dialética e O existencialismo é um humanismo. Por considerar que o homem é mais livre do que ele realmente pensa que é, Sartre defende a transformação coletiva partindo da transformação individual. Cada escolha é uma instância vivida capaz de abrir possibilidades de que outros façam o mesmo. Uma história em movimento, em que o todo e o singular relacionam-se concomitantemente, 20 em buscas e alternâncias de objetos, em que a razão analítica não é fundamentação de nada, mas pode ser útil a serviço da razão dialética. É pensando no ser humano que queremos ser, que escolhemos simultaneamente o mundo em que queremos viver. Dessa maneira, o fazer-identidade (capítulo 2) e o fazer-universalização (capítulo 3) são indissociáveis. A responsabilidade não só diz respeito à própria identidade do indivíduo, mas também sobre a identidade do mundo. Isso é opressivo, gera angústia. Uma angústia que não reafirma um caráter pessimista, ao contrário, que impulsiona o leitor a mudanças. E, a possibilidade de transformação é otimista, o que corresponderia ao sentido de idealismo, não no sentido filosófico, mas no sentido ordinário do termo. Desenvolveremos isso para se chegar a uma conclusão, que poderia ser apenas o início de uma tentativa de responder outra questão (com ar de romantismo burguês superficial, mas com conteúdo profundo e revolucionário, como foi assim Sartre): quais são as nossas ideias? O que queremos de nós mesmos e do nosso mundo? 21 1 IDEALISMO Esse capítulo visa mostrar que, se por um lado, Sartre não admite valores ideais pré-estabelecidos, por outro lado ele confia na capacidade do homem de construir seus ideais e de transformar a si e a seu redor a partir da constituição deles. Os ideais não são determinações da natureza, mas são construções culturais. O homem constrói os signos porque ele é significante em sua realidade mesma e ele é significante porque ele é ultrapassamento dialético de tudo o que é simplesmente dado. O que nós nomeamos liberdade é a irredutibilidade da ordem cultural à ordem natural (SARTRE, 1985, p. 115, tradução nossa)10. 1.1 A problemática específica da proposta fenomenológica diante das questões gerais da filosofia Desde os primórdios, a filosofia configura-se pela dialética entre o que por um lado, podemos colocar no âmbito do acesso à verdade pelo ideal: razão, ideia, forma, inteligibilidade; e o que por outro lado, permite-se colocar no âmbito do acesso à verdade pela empiria: sentido, impressão, objeto. E Platão é o autor mais referenciado no primeiro âmbito, em que o acesso à verdade se dá pela ideia, especificadamente pela ideia do bem, uma vez que, para ele, aquele que conhece a verdade, necessariamente age de acordo com o bem. Percebe-se então uma implicação ética de seu idealismo otológico, pois a ideia do bem é a causa da verdade, que ilumina o conhecimento, que permite aos homens conhecer as essências das coisas. Ou seja, a pessoa que age de forma imoral não conhece a verdade, segundo Platão. Fica sabendo que o que transmite a verdade aos objetos cognoscíveis e dá ao sujeito que conhece esse poder, é a ideia do bem. Entende que é ela a causa do saber e da verdade, na medida em que esta é conhecida, mas, sendo ambos assim belos, o saber e a verdade, terás razão em pensar que há algo de mais belo ainda do que eles. E, tal 10« L'homme construit des signes parce qu'il est signifiant dans sa réalité même et il est signifiant parce qu'il est dépassement dialectique de tout ce qui est simplement donné. Ce que nous nommons liberté, c'est l'irréductibilité de l'ordre culturel à l'ordre naturel ». 22 como se pode pensar correctamente (sic.) que neste mundo a luz e a vista são semelhantes ao Sol, mas já não é certo tomá-las pelo Sol, da mesma maneira, no outro, é correcto (sic.) considerar a ciência e a verdade, ambas elas, semelhantes ao bem, mas não está certo tomálas, a uma ou a outra, pelo bem, mas sim formar um conceito ainda mais elevado do que seja o bem. [...] Logo, para os objetos do conhecimento, dirás que não só a possibilidade de serem conhecidos lhes é proporcionada pelo bem, como também é por ele que o Ser e a essência lhes são adicionados, apesar de o bem não ser uma essência, mas estar acima e para além das essências, pela sua dignidade e poder (PLATÃO, 1949, p. 311-312). Citemos também o precursor do segundo âmbito. Aristóteles não admite "Ideias" enquanto a priori, pois a definição (a verdade sobre as coisas) surge simultaneamente à existência: Assim, as causas que propiciam movimento são causas que se dão antes, mas são simultâneas as que são causas como a definição. De fato, há saúde precisamente quando um homem tem saúde, assim como há figura de esfera ênea simultaneamente à esfera ênea. Devemos examinar se, de fato, algo subsiste posteriormente; em alguns casos, nada o impede, por exemplo, se é algo de tal tipo a alma, não toda alma, mas a inteligência, pois, certamente, é impossível que o seja toda alma. Assim, é evidente que, ao menos por essas razões, não é preciso haver Idéias: um ser humano gera um ser humano, um particular gera um qualquer; ocorre de modo similar nas técnicas: a técnica medicinal é a definição da saúde (ARISTÓTELES, 2005, p. 204). Desde as origens da discussão, foi mais importante contrariar que a essência precede a existência, do que afirmar o contrário, que a existência precede a essência. O fato de que a essência seja simultânea à existência é suficiente para a afirmação da acessibilidade da essência pelos sentidos e contestação do idealismo ontológico. O motivo desse destaque ficará claro em 3.2. A questão é iniciada na antiguidade, formulada na escolástica, pelo problema dos universais e perdurada na história da filosofia tanto na modernidade quanto na contemporaneidade. O idealismo epistemológico, de certa forma, cria uma síntese entre esses dois âmbitos filosóficos. Kant é o primeiro na história da filosofia a mostrar que o conhecimento não se dá somente pelo âmbito do sujeito ou somente pelo âmbito do objeto, mas pela relação entre ambos. Anteriormente a Kant, observamos uma divisão entre duas correntes filosóficas, uma corrente que admite ser possível conhecer a 23 essência somente pela razão, pois os sentidos dificultam esse processo e outra corrente que concebe que a verdade da essência só pode ser alcançada partindo dos sentidos. Mas Kant anuncia o conhecimento pela relação entre sujeito e objeto, pelo fenômeno. Entretanto, é preciso destacar que, ainda que Kant coloque o conhecimento no âmbito da relação objeto e sujeito, em Kant existe realidade inacessível ao conhecimento, pois ele conserva "o dualismo dos númenos e dos fenômenos" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 142, tradução nossa)11, em que o númeno é o em-si, e nada pode ser dito sobre ele. Kant considera a verdade como pertencente ao âmbito do ideal, e, portanto, inalcançável. Embora idealismo epistemológico e ontológico sejam diferentes – pois para o epistemológico, a essência (o significado, a ideia) depende do sujeito, mas não somente do sujeito, enquanto que, para o ontológico, a essência depende exclusivamente do sujeito ou da razão – ambos possuem aspectos em comum, ao admitir um tipo de realidade inacessível a partir do sensível: numênica para o primeiro, e substancial para o segundo. A fenomenologia surge como corrente que se apropria do fenômeno kantiano, sendo, entretanto, sua antítese, visto que a fenomenologia propõe nova relação desse fenômeno com a verdade. A proposta da fenomenologia surge com a pretensão de que o fenômeno pudesse atingir a estrutura do ser e de desvelar a realidade. Além disso, essa realidade poderia ser acessível somente pelo fenômeno. Esse trabalho quer mostrar que Sartre cumpre essa proposta da fenomenologia iniciada por Husserl, através de sua associação da fenomenologia ao existencialismo, em que a essência (a ideia das propriedades das coisas) é a posteriori, e que, por isso, ele rompe definitivamente com o idealismo. Sobre essa proposta de que Sartre tenha rompido com o idealismo existe controvérsia. E para desenvolvermos a problemática, utilizaremo-nos dos textos de Salanskis, cuja tradução deles estão em anexo. Salanskis nos apresenta argumentos com o intuito de mostrar justamente o contrário, ou seja, com o propósito de mostrar que Heidegger foi aquele que rompeu com o idealismo na fenomenologia e que Sartre juntamente com Levinas teriam retomado o idealismo. Segundo o crítico, Sartre e Levinas contribuíram por, de certa forma, validarem o pensamento de Heidegger, 11 « Kant peut conserver le dualisme des noumènes et des phénomènes». 24 (acredito que seja especificamente sobre a verdade como totalização verificável se fazendo em uma história da verdade), por reafirmarem a revolução fenomenológica iniciada por Husserl, mas principalmente por terem feito ressurgir componentes do idealismo na fenomenologia (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 365), o que é o cerne do meu questionamento nesse capítulo. Husserl inaugura a fenomenologia considerando que o fenômeno (essa relação entre os dois âmbitos) dá acesso à verdade das coisas como elas realmente são. Entretanto, embora Husserl quisesse que a descrição fosse suficiente para se chegar à verdade, ele mantém o Ego Transcendental. Para Salanskis, Heidegger rompe com o idealismo de fato ao mostrar que a verdade está somente no mundo, e Sartre retoma o idealismo de certo modo. Mas, antes de tratarmos sobre a retomada de Sartre em relação ao idealismo, de acordo com Salanskis, precisamos fazer algumas observações a respeito de suas conceituações. Para Salanskis, existe diferença entre Heidegger e Sartre sobre o acesso à realidade, pois, para Sartre a verdade da essência estaria na relação fenomênica, que depende da consciência, enquanto que, em Heidegger, essa verdade já se encontraria no objeto: Vê-se bem a diferença com o esquema de Heidegger: para esse último, o desvelamento é o fato do ser, a estrutura da manifestação é anônima e primeira em relação ao Dasein. Ao inverso, em Sartre, o em si é por ele mesmo incapaz da verdade, incapaz da luz pressuposta em toda verdade, ele pertence por ele mesmo à "noite sem data". É necessária a distância nadificadora levada pelo para si para que o desvelamento se opere (SALANSKIS, 2008, p. 14, tradução nossa)12. Contudo, existe controvérsia sobre essa distinção da verdade entre Heidegger e Sartre. Isso ocorre porque Salanskis cita o texto que os pesquisadores chamam de "segundo Heidegger", enquanto que no "primeiro Heidegger", que é o Heidegger de Ser e Tempo, e cujo texto influenciou bastante Sartre, essa distinção é mais tênue, porque, para Heidegger "de fato, o desvelamento seria, a princípio, 12 « On voit bien la différence d'avec le schéma de Heidegger : pour ce dernier, le dévoilement est le fait de l'être, la structure de la manifestation est anonyme et première par rapport au Dasein. A l'inverse, chez Sartre, l'en soi est par lui-même incapable de la vérité, incapable de la lumière présupposée dans toute vérité, il appartient par luimême à la « nuit sans date ». Il faut la distance de néantisation apportée par le pour soi pour que le dévoilement s'opère ». 25 independente do Dasein. Porém, se ser, para o Dasein, é compreensão de ser, então o ser dos entes, de alguma forma, depende da abertura do Dasein para o ser" (RIBEIRO, 2014). A partir disso, mostramos que a dependência do Dasein para o sentido, e consequentemente para o desvelamento e a verdade, seria congruente, de certo modo, à dependência do sentido e da verdade, em relação ao para-si sartriano. Se Salanskis considerasse isso, para se manter coerente, ele teria que concordar que Heidegger também não teria rompido com o idealismo. Contudo, queremos mostrar que esses aspectos não são suficientes para afirmar o idealismo desses filósofos. Na verdade, essa discussão, quer responder a seguinte pergunta: as aparências enganam? Sartre, fortemente influenciado pelos escritos de Heidegger, retoma a questão do ser e das essências. Ainda que não utilizem esses termos no mesmo sentido, ambos tentam resolver permanentemente o problema metafísico da dicotomia sobre a verdade a partir do imaterial e do material. Até mesmo para discutir sobre isso, foi preciso justificativas. Assim sendo, Heidegger enuncia os três principais preconceitos tradicionais enfrentados ao adentrar na questão sobre o "ser", de que "O 'ser' é o conceito 'mais universal' [...] [,] 'ser' é um conceito indefinível [...] [e] 'ser' é o conceito que-pode-ser-entendido-por-si-mesmo" (HEIDEGGER, 2012, p. 35-39). Com o intuito de rebater esses preconceitos e justificar a necessidade de pesquisar o "ser", ele cria argumentos que podem ser resumidos da seguinte forma: ainda que o "ser" seja um conceito universal, essa universalidade não garante a clareza do sentido do "ser" porque não é algo genérico e conceitual que pode ser simplificada como tipicamente a universalidade do gênero; não é porque o ser não pode ser definido que seu sentido não pode ser investigado; além disso, Heidegger considera um procedimento duvidoso o fato de dizer que o "ser" não precisa ser explicado. Para ele, isso é mais uma prova de que falta entendimento sobre o "ser". Seguindo a proposta de Heidegger, Sartre também investiga sobre o ser, mas assume postura diferente, mais sobre as denominações do que sobre os resultados finais. Sartre assume que ser é somente o que é determinado (o passado e o mundo, ver 2.2), ao passo que o para-si (consciência) é ausência de ser, e a significação do ser só pode advir pela relação entre o não ser e o ser. Enquanto entendo que o conceito de fenômeno em Sartre elucida o conceito de identidade, para Leopoldo e Silva a existência precede a essência somente no 26 caso da realidade humana (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2009, p. 107), e, mais explicitamente, em outro texto ele afirma que isso não se verifica nos outros entes: "No caso da realidade humana, a existência precede a essência. Essa tese célebre significa que, ao contrário dos outros entes, o homem não tem o seu ser determinado por uma essência pré-existente, seja de modo real, seja logicamente" (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2013b, p. 12). Percebe-se, então, que em Leopoldo e Silva, para que um objeto exista, como por exemplo, uma mesa, é preciso antes ser concebida a ideia da mesma, o que seria sua essência. Contudo, mostraremos que essa ideia de mesa é simultânea às condições concretas da possibilidade da existência da mesa (a madeira, as ferramentas) (3.2). E, como a escolha pela criação advinda do para-si é simultânea a essas condições concretas, não se pode afirmar que a ideia de mesa é a priori em relação a sua existência. Além disso, em Sartre, a própria escolha pela constituição já é atitude concreta, o que garante a simultaneidade da existência e da essência, e que estaria mais relacionada aos projetos humanos e as construções de utensílios (meios) para realização dos projetos (fins) do para-si, como fundamentaremos nos capítulos seguintes. Em Sartre, conforme a citação abaixo, a ontologia é a descrição do fenômeno. A essência das coisas (a descrição do fenômeno) não advém somente do para-si e muito menos do em-si, mas da relação fenomênica entre o não-ser (a quem se aparece, a consciência, o para-si) e o ser (o objeto, o em-si), de tal modo que o primeiro se encarrega ativamente da interpretação do em-si e o segundo, nesse processo de significação, passivamente, da aparição ao para-si: O fenômeno é o que se manifesta a todos de algum modo, pois dele podemos falar e dele temos certa compreensão. Assim, deve haver um fenômeno de ser, uma aparição do ser, descritível como tal. O ser nos será revelado por algum meio de acesso imediato, o tédio, a náusea etc., e a ontologia será a descrição do fenômeno de ser tal como se manifesta, quer dizer, sem intermediário. [...] Em um objeto singular podemos sempre distinguir qualidades como cor, odor, etc. E, a partir delas, sempre se pode determinar uma essência por elas compreendida, como o signo implica a significação. O conjunto "objeto-essência" constitui um todo organizado: a essência não está no objeto, mas é o sentido do objeto, a razão da série de aparições que o revelam (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 19)13. 13 « Le phénomène est ce qui se manifeste et l'être se manifeste à tous en quelque façon, puisque nous pouvons en parler et que nous en avons une certaine compréhension. Ainsi doit-il y avoir un phénomène d'être, une apparition 27 Isso é a base de sua teoria e também o fundamento do argumento de que Sartre não é um idealista no sentido mais utilizado na história da filosofia, pois ele não admite que a ideia (a essência) preceda a existência do ser, nem que os valores estejam em um céu inteligível (SARTRE, 1996, p. 38). A essência não advém da ideia a priori, mas ao contrário, é o fenômeno, a aparição, o sentido, que acessa a realidade do ser. No início do texto Sartre, Levinas e o Idealismo, Salanskis afirma estar trabalhando com o conceito de idealismo no sentido transcendental, que admite uma estrutura a priori, em que a realidade é conhecida a partir do sujeito que se impõe a ela, e que dessa maneira, o valor do objeto é correlativo ao procedimento subjetivo (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 364). Nossa primeira contraposição a Salanskis direciona-se ao fato de que ele relacionou a teoria de Sartre com o idealismo no sentido transcendental, não observando o tratamento diferenciado que Sartre dá às noções de transcendental e de transcendência. Para isso, observemos o livro A transcendência do Ego, onde Sartre explicitamente não admite um Eu a priori, pois utiliza-se de Husserl para contestar Kant, para depois também criticar Husserl: A consciência transcendental de Kant, Husserl a encontra e distingue [a apreende] por meio da epoché. Mas essa consciência não é mais um conjunto de condições lógicas, é um fato absoluto. Tampouco é uma hipóstase do direito, um inconsciente que flutua entre o real e o ideal. É uma consciência real acessível a cada um de nós desde que tenha operado a "redução". Resta o fato de que é ela que constitui nossa consciência empírica, essa consciência "no mundo", essa consciência com um "eu" psíquico e psicofísico. Quanto a nós, preferimos acreditar na existência de uma consciência constituinte. Seguimos Husserl em cada uma das admiráveis descrições em que mostra a consciência transcendental constituindo o mundo ao aprisionar-se na consciência empírica; estamos persuadidos como ele de que nosso eu psíquico e psicofísico é um objeto transcendente que deve cair sob a ação da epoché. Mas nós nos colocamos a seguinte questão: Esse eu psíquico e psicofísico não é suficiente? É preciso d'être, descriptible comme telle. L'être nous sera dévoilé par quelque moyen d'accès immédiat, l'ennui, la nausée, etc., et l'ontologie sera la description du phénomène d'être tel qu'il se manifeste, c'est-à-dire sans intermédiaire. [...] Dans un objet singulier, on peut toujours distinguer des qualités comme la couleur, l'odeur, etc. Et à partir de celles-ci, on peut toujours fixer une essence qu'elles impliquent, comme le signe implique la signification. L'ensemble « objet-essence » fait un tout organisé : l'essence n'est pas dans l'objet, elle est le sens de l'objet, la raison de la série d'apparitions qui le dévoilent » (SARTRE, 1943, P. 14-15). 28 duplica-lo em um Eu Transcendental estrutura da consciência absoluta? (SARTRE, 2013a, p. 18-19)14. Sartre concorda com Husserl que o eu psíquico e psicofísico é um objeto transcendente, pois é constituído pelo conjunto de estados e ações passadas da consciência, mas não aceita a existência de um eu transcendental. Para ele, essa é uma duplicação desnecessária. No capítulo 2, explicitaremos melhor a forma com Sartre desenvolve o conceito de identidade, diferenciadamente do conceito de consciência. Por outro lado, Salanskis desenvolve sua comparação não fixada no fato de que Sartre seguiria o idealismo transcendental ou ontológico, mas o aproximando do idealismo epistemológico. Segundo o autor, para Sartre, a realidade só é acessível a partir da descrição15, pois a descrição é o que permite a compreensão. Descrição essa que é subjetiva e normativa do ser (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 364). Quando Sartre fala do conhecimento em termos kantianos, então ele considera que o acesso real ao ser escapa ao conhecimento e ao mesmo tempo o fundamenta. Em Sartre, a essência, que é o fenômeno, propriamente a aparição, dá acesso à estrutura do ser, assim, fundamenta o ser, o que para Kant seria algo inacessível: 14 « La conscience transcendantale de Kant, Husserl la retrouve et la saisit par l'epoché. Mais cette conscience n'est plus un ensemble de conditions logiques, c'est un fait absolu. Ce n'est pas non plus une hypostase du droit, un inconscient flottant entre le réel et l'idéal. C'est une conscience réelle accessible à chacun de nous dès qu'il a opéré la « réduction ». Reste que c'est bien elle qui constitue notre conscience empirique, cette conscience « dans le monde », cette conscience avec un « moi » psychique et psychophysique. Nous croyons volontiers pour notre part à l'existence d'une conscience constituante. Nous suivons Husserl dans chacune des admirables descriptions où il montre la conscience transcendantale constituant le monde en s'emprisonnant dans la conscience empirique ; nous sommes persuadés comme lui que notre moi psychique et psycho-physique est un objet transcendant qui doit tomber sous le coup de l'epoché. Mais nous nous posons la question suivante : ce moi psychique et psychophysique n'est-il pas suffisant ? Faut-il le doubler d'un Je transcendantal, structure de la conscience absolue ? » (SARTRE, 1966a, 18-19). 15 Salanskis mostra que o idealismo em Sartre está ligado à "revelação" do qualquer. E fazendo uma comparação lógica-matemática, ele mostra a formação da ideia de alguém a partir de um plano com variáveis e instâncias dessas variáveis. Para ele, enquanto qualquer, nós nos projetamos nessa constituição do que somos no plano da existência, em que o artigo definido (que acompanha o substantivo, como por exemplo, em: o comprador, o funcionário, etc.) nos instancia em uma variável e constitui ideia, para aquele que vê, que convive, ou seja, para o sujeito da relação fenomênica. Dessa maneira, os postos assumidos representam indivíduos ausentes, apenas instanciados de uma parte, propriamente não os indivíduos, mas as ideias dos indivíduos (SALANKIS, 2004, 379380). Assim, o autor percebe uma filosofia da linguagem em Sartre, congruente à filosofia da linguagem de Frege, em que os valores só existem a partir do contexto, e a relaciona com a teoria do conhecimento advinda de sua fenomenologia (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 383-384). 29 Reduzimos as coisas à totalidade conexa de suas aparências, e depois constatamos que as aparências reivindicam um ser que já não seja aparência. O percipi nos remeteu a um "percipiens", cujo ser se nos revelou como consciência. Alcançamos assim o fundamento ontológico do conhecimento, o ser primeiro ao qual todas as demais aparições aparecem, o absoluto em relação ao qual todo fenômeno é relativo. Não se trata do sujeito, no sentido kantiano do termo, mas da própria subjetividade, imanência de si a si. Até agora escapamos ao idealismo. Para este, o ser se mede pelo conhecimento, o que submete à lei da dualidade; não há outro ser além do ser conhecido, trata-se ele do próprio pensamento. Este só aparece a si através de seus próprios produtos, ou seja, só o captamos como significação de pensamentos realizados; e o filósofo em busca do pensamento deve interrogar as ciências constituídas para encontrá-lo, a título de condição de sua possibilidade. Nós, ao contrário, captamos um ser que escapa ao conhecimento e o fundamenta, um pensamento que não se dá como representação ou como significação dos pensamentos expressados, mas é captado diretamente enquanto é – e este modo de captação não é fenômeno de conhecimento, mas estrutura do ser (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 29)16. Também em Questão de método, Sartre critica claramente o idealismo enquanto método que parte das verdades já dadas, do que é a priori, e que é utilizado como instrumento manipulador da burguesia: O idealismo é a terra nutridora de todas as produções burguesas; esse idealismo está em movimento posto que ele reflete à sua maneira as contradições profundas da sociedade; cada um de seus conceitos é uma arma contra a ideologia montante – a arma é ofensiva, ou defensiva conforme a conjectura. Ou, melhor ainda, de início ofensiva, ela torna-se defensiva em seguida. [...]. Esse método não nos satisfaz: ele é a priori; ele não tira seus conceitos da experiência – ou pelo menos não da experiência nova que ele busca decifrar –, ele já os formou, ele já está certo de sua verdade, ele lhe atribui o papel de esquemas construtivos: seu único fim é de fazer entrar os acontecimentos, as pessoas ou os atos considerados nos moldes préfabricados (SARTRE, 1985, p. 41, tradução nossa)17. 16 « Nous avions réduit les choses à la totalité liée de leurs apparences, puis nous avons constaté que ces apparences réclamaient un être qui ne fût plus lui-même apparence. Le « percipi » nous a renvoyé à un « percipiens », dont l'être s'est révélé à nous comme conscience. Ainsi aurions-nous atteint le fondement ontologique de la connaissance, l'être premier à qui toutes les autres apparitions apparaissent, l'absolu par rapport à quoi tout phénomène est relatif. Ce n'est point le sujet, au sens kantien du terme, mais c'est la subjectivité même, l'immanence de soi à soi. Dès à présent, nous avons échappé à l'idéalisme : pour celui-ci l'être est mesuré par la connaissance, ce qui le soumet à la loi de dualité ; il n'y a d'être que connu, s'agît-il de la pensée même : la pensée ne s'apparaît qu'à travers ses propres produits, c'est-à-dire que nous ne la saisissons jamais que comme la signification des pensées faites ; et le philosophe en quête de la pensée doit interroger les sciences constituées pour l'en tirer, à titre de condition de leur possibilité. Nous avons saisi, au contraire, un être qui échappe à la connaissance et qui la fonde, une pensée qui ne se donne point comme représentation ou comme signification des pensées exprimées, mas qui est directement saisie en tant qu'elle est – et ce mode de saisissement n'est pas un phénomène de connaissance, mais c'est la structure de l'être » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 23). 30 Através de um exemplo, Sartre mostra os possíveis motivos das divergências filosóficas sobre o que parece ser a priori, mas que na verdade é a posteriori, quando ele trata da criação da riqueza. Aquilo que é a posteriori acaba por impor certas coisas à realidade, como se fosse a priori: O fundamento do enriquecimento sintético, não precisa buscar como Kant em um juízo sintético a priori, mas em uma reunião inerte de significações enquanto elas são forças. Mas na medida em que essas forças são forças de inércia, ou seja, em que elas se comunicam de fora pela matéria para a matéria, elas introduzem a exterioridade sob forma de unidade passiva como ligação material de interioridade. Assim, a práxis materializada (a moeda cunhada, etc.) tem para efeito de unir os homens na medida mesmo onde ele os separa, impondo a cada um e a todos uma realidade significante infinitamente mais rica e mais contraditória que o resultado que eles esperam individualmente (SARTRE, 1985, p. 289, tradução nossa)18. O que se pretende mostrar é que a constituição de ferramentas, por um lado é práxis, pela abertura de possibilidade de se atingir um novo estado de realidade, mas ao mesmo tempo produz inércia, na medida em que cada indivíduo se compromete com essa ferramenta, inclusive quando a ferramenta passa a ser buscada como fim. Por ser práxis, logicamente é contingente. Mas a inércia sugere o pensamento de que a ferramenta sempre existiu, como se existisse uma necessidade ontológica. O dinheiro inventado para facilitação de trocas, passa a ser finalidade de acumulação e possibilita ao homem tornar-se rico. Do mesmo modo, a máquina 17 « L'idéalisme est la terre nourricière de toutes les productions bourgeoises ; cet idéalisme est en mouvement puisqu'il reflète à sa manière les contradictions profondes de la société ; chacun de ses concepts est une arme contre l'idéologie montante – l'arme est offensive, ou défensive suivant la conjoncture. Ou, mieux encore, d'abord offensive, elle devient défensive par la suite. [...]. Cette méthode ne nous satisfait pas : elle est a priori ; elle ne tire pas ses concepts de l'expérience – ou du moins pas de l'expérience neuve qu'elle cherche à déchiffrer –, elle les a déjà formés, elle est déjà certaine de leur vérité, elle leur assignera le rôle de schèmes constitutifs : son unique but est de faire entrer les événements, les personnes ou les actes considérés dans des moules préfabriqués ». 18 « Le fondement de l'enrichissement synthétique, il ne faut pas le chercher comme Kant dans un jugement synthétique a priori, mais dans un rassemblement inerte des significations en tant qu'elles sont des forces. Mais dans la mesure où ces forces sont forces d'inertie, c'est-à-dire où elles se communiquent du dehors par la matière à la matière, elles introduisent l'extériorité sous forme d'unité passive comme lien matériel d'intériorité. Ainsi la praxis matérialisée (la pièce frappée, etc.) a pour effet d'unir les hommes dans la mesure même où elle les sépare, en imposant à chacun et à tous une réalité signifiante infiniment plus riche et plus contradictoire que le résultat qu'ils escomptaient individuellement ». 31 inventada passa a exigir e a qualificar o trabalhador individual, ela dita as tarefas a serem feitas (SARTRE, 1985, p. 297). O interesse, enquanto simples especificação da exigência (SARTRE, 1985, p. 307) ou o objeto passam a ter função de imperativo categórico e cada indivíduo passa a ser mediação entre o objeto e o imperativo dos Outros, em que a tensão sustenta a alteridade serial e retorna a cada um para os condicionar (SARTRE, 1985, p. 301). Em um setor determinado da indústria, cada um determina o interesse do Outro enquanto que ele é um Outro para esse Outro e cada um se determina por seu próprio interesse enquanto que esse interesse é vivido pelo Outro como o interesse de um Outro (SARTRE, 1985, p. 311, tradução nossa)19. Embora mutável, a situação se apresenta com um caráter de inércia. Essa inércia da situação é a responsável pela ideia de riqueza e contradição da realidade. Logo, ela sugere a ideia de que o dinheiro sempre existiu, como se ele fosse a priori, como se a inércia determinasse necessariamente a condição do próprio homem, como se a exterioridade determinasse toda interioridade, o que é um erro. Mesmo que o exemplo do dinheiro propriamente não se relacione com a discussão kantiana, a partir do formato do exemplo, infere-se que a inércia seria a responsável por tudo que se pensa existir a priori. Além de não admitir qualquer ideia a priori em relação à existência, Sartre também não aceita a existência de uma realidade impossível de ser acessada pela experiência fenomênica. Dessa maneira, em Sartre, o conteúdo noemático no sentido kantiano não existe: Porque o ser de um existente é exatamente o que o existente aparenta. Assim chegamos à ideia de fenômeno como pode ser encontrada, por exemplo, na "Fenomenologia" de Husserl ou Heidegger: o fenômeno ou o relativo-absoluto. O fenômeno continua a ser relativo porque o "aparecer" pressupõe em essência alguém a quem aparecer. Mas não tem a dupla relatividade da Erscheinung kantiana. O fenômeno não indica, como se apontasse por trás de seu ombro, um ser verdadeiro que fosse, ele sim, o absoluto. O que o fenômeno é, é absolutamente, pois se revela como é. Pode ser 19 « Dans un secteur déterminé de l'industrie, chacun détermine l'intérêt de l'Autre en tant qu'il est un Autre pour cet Autre et chacun se détermine par son propre intérêt en tant que cet intérêt est vécu par l'Autre comme l'intérêt d'un Autre ». 32 estudado e descrito como tal, porque é absolutamente indicativo de si mesmo (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 16)20. O homem, que possui um modo particular de ser, sendo aquilo que não é, sendo assim, necessidade, negatividade, ultrapassamento, projeto e transcendência, "é o ser pelo qual o tornar-objeto vem ao homem" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 128, tradução nossa)21. É dessa maneira que o homem busca a constituição de sua identidade, aparecendo ao Outro através de suas atitudes, constituindo assim, sua essência. Uma essência que surge com o movimento e não com determinações a priori. Temos ainda muito a discutir sobre como Salanskis entende o idealismo em Sartre, e seus argumentos mais relevantes, mas, antes de prosseguir, consideramos importante exemplificar como seria um projeto a posteriori em contraposição à ideia de homem e de mundo a priori, além exemplificar o valor moral aplicado ao valor em Sartre, e de mostrar o sentido da palavra Ética nesse trabalho. Então, faremos isso no próximo item, sabendo que ele poderia ser também a introdução ao capítulo 2 ou 3, pois os conceitos estão fortemente relacionados. 1.2 Identidade e universalização: o sentido de moral a posteriori Se por um lado discordo de Salanskis sobre o sentido em que Sartre é idealista, por outro lado percebo uma aproximação entre a criação de identidade em Sartre e o que Salanskis chama de Ego Responsabilidade, em seu outro artigo, Moral e responsabilidade. Inclusive, essa aproximação é mais um argumento de que Sartre realmente não é idealista no sentido filosófico do termo, pois sua concepção de identidade é a posteriori. 20 « Car l'être d'un existant, c'est précisément ce qu'il paraît. Ainsi parvenons-nous à l'idée de phénomène, telle qu'on peut la rencontrer, par exemple, dans la « Phénoménologie » de Husserl ou de Heidegger, le phénomène ou le relatif-absolu. Relatif, le phénomène le demeure car le 'paraître' suppose par essence quelqu'un à qui paraître. Mais il n'a pas la double relativité de l'Erscheinung kantienne. Il n'indique pas, par-dessus son épaule, un être véritable qui serait, lui, l'absolu. Ce qu'il est, il l'est absolument, car il se dévoile comme il est. Le phénomène peut être étudié et décrit en tant que tel, car il est absolument indicatif de lui-même » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 12). 21 « l'homme est l'être par qui le devenir-objet vient à l'homme ». 33 Nesse artigo, Salanskis descreve três tipos de morais vigentes de forma generalizada: a moral da correção (que consiste em obedecer às regras simplesmente por serem regras), a moral do respeito (que consiste em respeitar as diferenças e não prescrever o modo como o Outro deve agir), moral do socorro (que consiste em ajudar o Outro sempre que ele precisar). Embora as três sejam irredutíveis umas nas outras, o autor considera que a moral do socorro tem o seu destaque e que as demais perdem seu sentido quando aplicadas em conjunto com ela. Então, ele descreve outro tipo de responsabilidade, que diz respeito às promessas que uma pessoa faz a si mesma, de tal maneira que garanta um tipo de identidade a ela (Ego Responsabilidade) e, assim, ele passa a confrontá-la com os tipos de moralidade que ele descreveu, de tal modo que observa que o Ego Responsabilidade não realiza nenhuma das ambições morais. Então, o autor considera que o Ego responsabilidade deveria ser encorajado como uma máxima de felicidade e não de moralidade. Mas por ironia, o cuidado consigo mesmo (Ego Responsabilidade) para se atingir tal felicidade acaba tendo por consequência um benefício moral: já que a moralidade prescreve um agir de tal modo que o agente deve-se preocupar com o Outro, se eu gero felicidade a mim mesma, eu ajudo o agente moral a atingir seu fim (SALANSKIS, 2000). É nesse contexto que Salanskis compreende Sartre como um dos filósofos que vislumbrou a estrutura da irresponsabilidade subjetiva em contraposição ao Ego Responsabilidade, pois acredita que a constituição da identidade seria algo rechaçado por Sartre. Mas isso não é algo unânime, e inclusive, diz respeito ao aspecto ordinário sobre o qual considero que Sartre pode ser chamado de idealista. É verdade que, em Sartre, a contingência é a verdade da existência humana enquanto experiência metafísica, mas isso não impede o desejo humano da identidade e a constituição do ser para-além de toda existência, pela projeção do futuro que não é, mas que está para ser realizado livremente. "O homem é para ele mesmo e para os outros um ser significante pois não se pode jamais compreender o menor de seus gestos sem ultrapassar o presente puro e o explicar pelo futuro" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 115, tradução nossa)22. Dessa maneira, contesto Salanskis sobre a impossibilidade de constituição de identidade pela irresponsabilidade de acordo com sua interpretação sobre a teoria 22 « L'homme est pour lui-même et pour les autres un être signifiant puisqu'on ne peut jamais comprendre le moindre de ses gestes sans dépasser le présent pur et l'expliquer par l'avenir ». 34 sartriana, porque esse desejo de ultrapassar a ausência de identidade para se constituir é também condição fundamental do modo de ser enquanto faltado, que o homem só consegue ultrapassar com a morte, quando ocorre a realização do desejo de ser, pois passa a ser só passado: "No extremo limite, no instante infinitesimal de minha morte, não serei mais que meu passado. Somente ele me definirá" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 167)23. Além disso, a responsabilidade está explícita em Sartre, pois em qualquer atitude, a responsabilidade é atribuída ao para-si, que decide sobre si mesmo e também sobre os Outros, mesmo na atitude de má-fé, em que há a confusão entre transcendência e facticidade (mentira para si). Salanskis mostra que a teoria ética de Levinas surgiu como um tipo de derivação da teoria de Sartre, principalmente no campo ético, mas também passando pelo fenomenológico. Ele faz a comparação a respeito do valor do Outro, que em Levinas tem o valor de culpabilidade e em Sartre, o valor da vergonha, ainda que em Sartre, a vergonha não tenha valor moral, apenas social24 (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 373). Entretanto, não é porque a vergonha não tenha de fato um valor moral (no sentido do que seja certo ou errado moralmente, de forma absoluta), que ela isenta o para-si de sua responsabilidade. Ao contrário, essa função que Salanskis chama de social ocorre justamente pelo fato de que a vergonha faz o para-si reconhecer que o conjunto dos estados de pensamentos e ações passados (Ego) são seus, embora esse Ego seja externo à consciência. Por isso, também, que a responsabilidade se torna inerente com o sentimento de vergonha. Aliás, assumir a responsabilidade de sua ação ou negá-la diz respeito aos dois tipos de projetos em Sartre: autenticidade e má-fé. A partir disso, quero defender que a teoria de Sartre é o fundamento não só da teoria moral de Levinas, como de qualquer outra teoria moral. 23« A la limite, à l'instant infinitésimal de ma mort, je ne serai plus que mon passé. Lui seul me définira » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 150). 24 Salanskis considera também outras diferenças entre Sartre e Levinas e as mostra sobre o tema da destotalização, por considerar que o todo que desfaz o outro em Sartre é subjetivo e em Levinas é objetivo. Dessa forma, ele destaca o fato de Sartre não atribuir valor moral à vergonha, o que gera problemas paradoxais, e compara os dizeres de Sartre ao famoso problema da acrasia, em que eu me aprovo (de agir de forma má) pelo mesmo ato pelo qual eu me critico (em racionalmente saber que esse ato é mal). Considero que esse aspecto deve ser analisado com maior atenção, porque Sartre desconstrói qualquer valor absoluto, de tal modo que a maldade não existe em si mesma e o que o outro considera como mal, pode não ser mal para mim. E ainda, ao meu ver, Sartre consideraria o problema da acrasia como uma mentira para si mesmo, pois originariamente em Aristóteles, acrasia é fraqueza da alma, e Sartre diria que isso é desculpa para não se assumir a responsabilidade da ação, o que na verdade é máfé. 35 É bem certo que os conceitos de autenticidade e má-fé são os modos de escolhas do para-si, e estão para além de uma discussão sobre bem ou mal moral. Sempre que a causa da atitude é interpretada pelo indivíduo como externa a ele, ocorre a mentira para si mesmo. Se uma pessoa age simplesmente com as justificativas para si mesmo porque é lei, ou porque o Outro quer, ou por causa da religião, então essa pessoa age de má-fé. A discussão sobre o bem e o mal da lei, do Outro, ou da religião encontra-se em outro âmbito diferente da fundamentação fenomenológica sartriana. Da mesma forma que acontece quando uma pessoa age de acordo com um impulso, pelo simples fato de ser impulso. A discussão sobre a bondade ou a maldade do impulso está em outro âmbito. Portanto, em Sartre, a consciência é desvinculada tanto do modo tradicional de entender a razão, como também dos sentidos. A consciência é escolha e essa escolha pode ser autêntica quando é assumida por si mesma, ou pode ser de má-fé, quando se auto relaciona a motivos externos, sejam eles motivos racionais ou impulsos subjetivos. O erro de que fala Sartre trata-se do erro lógico da má-fé, de falta de coerência (SARTRE, 1996, p. 68-69). Observa-se então que a discussão sobre o bem e o mal moral é externa à discussão dos fundamentos sartrianos, mesmo que essa discussão seja consequência lógica desses fundamentos. A discussão sobre o bem e o mal não faz parte da fundamentação sobre a consciência. Como não existe essência divina, nem valores absolutos, não existe fundamentalmente bem ou mal, em Sartre. Mas, como fundamentalmente, a liberdade é negatividade, ou seja, falta e carência de ser, o homem necessariamente se projeta para um ser no futuro. A síntese dessa carência com esse ser no futuro é o valor humano. Como não existem valores préestabelecidos, existe uma necessidade lógica de que o homem faça sua escolha. Logo, ele escolhe existencialmente o que para ele mesmo é bem ou mal. Por isso, não existem fundamentos necessários sobre o bem e o mal, mas a discussão sobre eles e sua eleição enquanto vivência são consequências lógicas e necessárias da falta de fundamento sartriano, ou seja, da fundamentação na consciência (no não ser) e na liberdade (na falta de determinação). O para-si é livre, porque ele é ausência de ser, logo ele se dirige para o ser que ele escolhe. Ele não é ser, não é resposta, é pergunta, é direcionamento. A pergunta é justamente aquilo que lhe falta (em 1.3 apresentaremos a prova sartriana de como o não-ser vem ao mundo). 36 O homem é o ser pelo qual as questões vêem ao mundo; mas o homem é o ser a quem as questões que lhe concernem e que ele não pode resolver vem ao mundo. O homem se define então pela relação a uma ignorância original. Tem uma relação profunda com essa ignorância. É em função dela que ele define o que ele é e o que ele busca (SARTRE, 1989, p. 14, tradução nossa)25. O direcionamento do homem inicia sua definição. Assim, essas escolhas vividas e, por outro lado, observadas, definem a identidade do indivíduo, pois a ação de cada um volta-se para o valor como finalidade, de tal maneira que o indivíduo age constituindo sua biografia, sendo responsável por ela. Justamente pelo fato de que a consciência é ausência de ser e totalmente livre, o que mais importa é o sentido que ela cria ou imita, aquilo que a ela carece, na sua maneira de escolher agir e tentar constituir a si mesma enquanto ser: "Ter-se-ia que constatar, então, que nossa compreensão do outro se faz necessariamente pelos fins" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 118, tradução nossa)26. Então o homem se define por seu projeto. Esse ser material ultrapassa perpetuamente a condição que lhe é dada; ele desvela e determina sua situação a transcendendo para se objetivar, pelo trabalho, a ação ou o gesto. O projeto não deve se confundir com a vontade, que é uma entidade abstrata, embora ele pudesse tornar uma forma voluntária em certas circunstâncias (SARTRE, 1985, p. 113-114, tradução nossa)27. Sartre não quer discípulos que sigam seus projetos escolhidos, mesmo porque, cada época possui questões próprias que são mais imediatas. Quando ele fala de moral, ele fala de moral de seu tempo, a partir das possibilidades situadas: "Eu busco então a moral de hoje... Eu tento elucidar a escolha que um homem pode fazer 25 « L'homme est l'être par qui des questions viennent au monde ; mais l'homme est l'être à qui des questions viennent au monde ; mais l'homme est l'être à qui des questions qui le concernent et qu'il ne peut pas résoudre viennent au monde. L'homme se définit donc par rapport à une ignorance originelle. Il a un rapport profond à cette ignorance. C'est en fonction d'elle qu'il définit ce qu'il est et ce qu'il cherche ». 26 « On aurait dû constater, alors, que notre compréhension de l'autre se fait nécessairement par les fins ». 27 "Donc l'homme se définit par son projet. Cet être matériel dépasse perpétuellement la condition qui lui est faite ; il dévoile et détermine sa situation en la transcendant pour s'objectiver, par le travail, l'action ou le geste. Le projet ne doit pas se confondre avec la volonté, qui est une entité abstraite, bien qu'il puisse revêtir une forme volontaire en certaines circonstances ». 37 de si mesmo e do mundo em 1948"28 ( ELKAÏM-SARTRE, 1989 apud SARTRE , 1989, p. I, tradução nossa). Implicitamente o seu escrito faz um convite para que cada um pense sobre seu projeto, sobre seu próprio fim escolhido. Como exemplo desses fins, trago a esse trabalho uma consideração singular sobre aquilo que mais importa a mim, para assim mostrar como isso pode interferir nos grupos em fusão e na história. Eu, singularmente, tenho interesse nas pesquisas sobre a ética, que, inclusive, foi tema de meu mestrado sob uma ótica contemporânea. Entendo que Sartre pode desmistificar âmbitos desse estudo ao passo que ele também constitui fundamento para o mesmo. A partir de Sartre, podemos dizer que a pesquisa sobre a ética, com seus propósitos claros e bem definidos, é apenas um dos projetos inventados e assumidos pelos sujeitos e que cabe à consciência individual escolher ou não esse projeto como seu, em seu processo de engajamento, na realização de ações intermediárias de acordo com os motivos (condições objetivas, ou seja, as ferramentas)29 existentes ou criados (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 553) (SARTRE, 1943, p. 492), independentemente de quais sejam seus móbeis (condições subjetivas) (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 552) (SARTRE, 1943, p. 491). Os motivos e móbeis não são determinantes, pois ambos podem ser superados, especialmente pelo processo criativo, de invenção e de prática dessa invenção. "[...] o saber prático é invenção de início. Para serem descobertas, utilizadas e verificadas, é necessário que as possibilidades sejam de início inventadas. Nesse sentido todo homem é projeto: criador [...]" (SARTRE, 1972, p. 15, tradução nossa)30. Dizer que a ética é uma invenção não é uma desvalorização da mesma. Em Sartre, a invenção é propriamente humana, é o seu projeto, pois se, por um lado, o homem se constitui através de sua atitude, da alteração de si mesmo e de sua realidade, de outro lado, essa atitude só pode ser concretizada a partir de seu projeto inventado. Assim, defendo que a investigação dos juízos deduzidos do projeto que foi escolhido é a inferência que permite realização de ações coerentes com esse fim, 28 « Je cherche donc la morale d'aujourd'hui... J'essaye d'élucider le choix qu'un homme peut faire de soi-même et du monde en 1948 ». 29Penso que os motivos podem também ser denominados de técnicas, ao modo como Leopoldo e Silva utilizou (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2013, p. 46). 30 « [...] le savoir pratique est invention d'abord. Pour être découvertes, utilisées et vérifiées, il faut que les possibilités soient d'abord inventées. En ce sens, tout homme est projet : créateur[...] ». 38 como forma de lutar para que sua própria ação não se torne outra, como prescreve Sartre contra a alienação primitiva: "[...] o homem não tem que lutar somente contra a Natureza, contra o meio social que o engendra, contra outros homens, mas também contra sua própria ação enquanto ela se torna outra" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 236, tradução nossa)31. Elejo arbitrariamente meu fim, e sou responsável também por eleger as atitudes intermediárias para se atingir esse fim. O fato de ter eleito a Ética32 como fim não garante que minhas atitudes sejam coerentes com ela, e é exatamente por isso que sou também responsável pela pesquisa dedutiva dos juízos (que seriam as ferramentas) em relação a esse fim, para que minha ação não se torne outra diferente daquela a qual escolhi. Percebe-se então, que essa maneira de entender a Ética, embora isso seja uma elaboração propriamente nossa, não é contraditória com a forma com que Sartre constrói o conceito de projeto, de ser-de-fora, sobre aquilo que se organiza objetivamente com o Outro nesse todo indissolúvel. Ela é reconhecimento livre de minha responsabilidade incluindo a responsabilidade do Outro nisso que Sartre chama de nós-sujeito. Esse nós-sujeito, situação de solidariedade com o Outro, sem que o sentido de solidariedade seja de bem ou mal moral, mas tão objetivo quanto o encontro das linhas de metrô (Salanskis, 2004, p. 376-379), que se descobre pela necessidade onde eu sou de assumir também o Outro, a causa da reciprocidade interna da situação. Quando nós imaginamos essa concepção do nós-sujeito, hoje, nos é difícil não pensar nas teses derrido-stieglerianas: o fundamento do nós-sujeito, a cada vez, é uma forma canalizante das possibilidades da transcendência existencial, conceito que, em Sartre, envolve ferramenta e sinal, e que apresenta o caráter essencial de uma marcação espacial, de uma exteriorização originária na qual a transcendência se chama ela mesma sob uma forma "universal" (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 378, tradução nossa)33. 31 « [...] l'homme n'a pas à lutter seulement contre la Nature, contre le milieu social qui l'a engendré, contre d'autres hommes, mais aussi contre sa propre action en tant qu'elle devient autre ». 32 Optamos por utilizar Ética com letra maiúscula todas às vezes que se referir a esse projeto inventado, como uma finalidade, para a qual consideramos poder nos projetar praticamente. A letra maiúscula está sendo utilizada para fazer a distinção em relação às demais pesquisas sobre ética. 33 « Lorsque nous lisons cette conception du nous-sujet, aujourd'hui, il nous est difficile de ne pas penser aux thèses derrido-stiegleriennes : le fondement du nous-sujet, à chaque fois, est une forme canalisant les possibilités de la transcendance existentiale, concept qui, chez Sartre, enveloppe l'outil et le signe, et qui possède le caractère essentiel d'un marquage spatial, d'une extériorisation originaire en laquelle la transcendance s'appelle elle-même sous une forme 'universelle' ». 39 Um universal que não é advindo do transcendental, mas constituído pelas escolhas dos homens quaisquer, não pelo fato de ter que ser assim, mas pelas influências mútuas na multiplicidade das escolhas comuns, na averiguação objetiva das necessidades coletivas. Escolher pegar o metrô para se chegar a algum lugar é tão acaso quanto escolher seguir uma ética, ainda que pela necessidade prática pareça tão universal e absoluto, ao mesmo tempo também pareça tão impessoal. O universal em Sartre não é lógico, mas sim histórico. E da mesma forma que posso projetar uma linha de metrô, também posso projetar uma ética, pois, se minha necessidade convergir para o mesmo fim que o dos Outros, o projeto que é objetivo pode se concretizar objetivamente, não na forma de linhas férreas, mas na forma de leis. Entender que leis não são cristalizadas, que são determinações momentâneas, nos permite pensar em estratégias para transformálas. É por isso que Sartre recusa o argumento dos intelectuais burgueses de que a lei está no domínio natural: Estendendo a ideia de lei natural ao domínio econômico – erro inevitável, mas fundamental –, eles fazem da economia um setor laicizado e exterior ao homem: a inflexibilidade das leis que não se pode mesmo sonhar em modificar obriga a submeter-se a ela [...] (SARTRE, 1976, p. 22, tradução nossa)34. Portanto, sou responsável não só pela constituição dessa pessoa que quero ser, mas também pelo mundo em que quero viver, como afirma Sartre. Por outro lado, entender que esse universal é cultural e não natural, permite-nos perceber que mudanças podem ser necessárias ou possíveis de serem concretizadas. Se caísse uma bomba nas estações de metrô de Paris, as pessoas talvez não iriam mais pegar o metrô, e talvez nem quisessem mais reconstruir o caminho que antes faziam. Também nada nos impede de projetar outra linha que facilitaria o acesso de muitos. Vejamos como seria uma leitura dos principais representantes das correntes éticas de forma geral e resumida, a partir da perspectiva da escolha 34 « En étendant l'idée de loi naturelle au domaine économique – erreur inévitable mais fondamentale –, ils font de l'économie un secteur laïcisé et extérieur à l'homme : l'inflexibilité des lois qu'on ne peut même rêver de modifier oblige à s'y soumettre [...]. 40 existencialista. Aristóteles, representante da ética das virtudes (eudaimonia), escolhe que a virtude é alcançada pela mediania, ou seja, pela ponderação entre excessos e faltas (ARISTÓTELES, 2009, p. 42-43). Por outro lado, para a deontologia de Kant, o objeto escolhido é outro: a ação somente é boa se ela ocorrer de acordo com o dever e por causa dele (KANT, 2009, p. 29). E o dever deve ser deduzido da lei universal. Logo, de acordo com Kant, devemos agir somente se a máxima de nossa ação puder ser universalizada de forma geral, sem analisar as particularidades das circunstâncias. De maneira diferente, o utilitarista Mill cria uma moral relacionando-a com a felicidade, com a pretensão do prazer e da ausência da dor, a partir da análise das consequências (MILL, 2007, p. 22). Esses são três exemplos do que nos autorizamos a denominar de regras inventadas e eleitas como objetos, a partir da leitura da teoria de Sartre. A interpretação sendo feita desse modo permite-nos dizer que inventar e eleger finalidades é um processo dialético puramente filosófico, que garante o caráter aberto da filosofia. É um processo dialético de escolhas de objetos em que o papel da filosofia é discutir, amplificar, contrapor e sintetizar objetivos para criar um projeto de Ética. Podemos também fazer uma tentativa de síntese ao assumir como processo dialético as descrições dos tipos de moral existentes de acordo com Salaskis (correção, respeito e socorro). Como proposta de exercício de pensamento, e de constituição dessa Ética, imaginemos um projeto existencial que relacione esses três tipos, que eleja como finalidade a prática deduzida da investigação sobre a construção de juízos da ética da correção, e, que tenham como fundamento o seguinte: quando não há conflito de interesse direto e significativo, aplica-se a ética do respeito; quando houver conflito de interesse direto e significativo, aplica-se a ética do socorro. Nesse caso, eu uso os três tipos de teorias morais descritas por Salanskis, sem ter que reduzir um tipo de teoria na outra (que é o que o autor afirma ser impossível), mas de qualquer modo, elas permanecem ligadas de forma racional e coerente. A moral do respeito e a moral dos socorros introduzidas no interior da moral da correção, a partir de uma condicional, permite, não a redução, mas a conciliação entre elas, além de formar uma proposta em consonância com a finalidade das pesquisas em ética na história da filosofia. De fato, quando se pesquisa sobre ética, objetiva-se constituir leis que expressem os juízos de acordo com seus objetivos. Logo, se a pesquisa estiver já desenvolvida, não há problemas na aplicação da moral da correção. De uma forma simplista, podemos afirmar que toda lei existe somente para aqueles que não pensam 41 e, em verdade, nem todo mundo quer pensar, e também, nem todo mundo quer pensar sobre as mesmas coisas. Então, que os pesquisadores elaborem as leis, e que aqueles que quiserem somente aplicar, que apliquem, mas não uma lei constituída de forma aleatória, ou a partir de interesses particulares de que quem tem o poder no sistema atual, mas a partir de um objeto consensual escolhido. Posso querer a longevidade, mas posso não querer pensar sobre a longevidade. Logo, escolho ter acesso somente aos resultados das pesquisas sobre a nutrição. Do mesmo modo, muitas são as pessoas que estão dispostas a serem éticas e, por isso, pensam que seguir as leis seria o bastante, acreditando que elas sejam o resultado da pesquisa sobre a ética, o que não é verdade, mas que deveria ser. A escolha por esse projeto permanece sendo pessoal, particular, arbitrária, subjetiva, mas a investigação no interior do projeto (que tem objetivo bem definido) é racional, dedutiva, objetiva e não arbitrária, uma vez que a construção de juízos para se atingir a finalidade buscada, nada mais é do que os "motivos" (condições objetivas) descritos por Sartre. E, se é um projeto que posso escolher, é também um projeto que posso defender, uma vez que sou responsável efetivamente por mim e pelo mundo. Percebo que todas as correntes éticas, cujas mais importantes são essas citadas (eudaimonia, utilitarismo e deontologia), ou até mesmo essa reformulação, a partir da taxonomia de Salanskis, possuem uma finalidade em comum, que é a de pelo menos minimizar a possibilidade de ocorrências de situações em que existam vítimas. O próprio Sartre, que não admite dedução de valores absolutos, ao utilizar a denominação de "verdadeiro" para a condição do intelectual (aquele que é radical, mas que não é nem moralista nem idealista) (SARTRE, 1972, p. 58), de uma forma implícita, prescreve atitudes de engajamento ao lado das vítimas a todos os intelectuais. Pois, o que ele quer dizer é que somente os verdadeiros intelectuais se mantêm do lado dos oprimidos, ainda que o objetivo seja de que os intelectuais deixem de existir, quando não houver mais contradições no mundo. Em outras palavras, a natureza de sua contradição o obriga a engajarse em todos os conflitos de nosso tempo porque eles são todos – conflitos de classe, de nação ou de raças – efeitos particulares de opressão dos desfavorecidos pela classe dominante e que ele se encontra, em cada um, a oprimida consciência de ele estar do lado dos oprimidos. Portanto, é necessário repetir, sua posição não é científica. Ele aplica tateando um método rigoroso aos objetos não conhecidos que ele desmistifica em se desmistificando; ele conduz uma ação prática de desvelamento combatendo as ideologias e 42 desnudando a violência que elas mascaram ou justificam; ele abre para que uma universalidade social seja um dia possível onde todos os homens sejam verdadeiramente livres, iguais e fraternos, seguro de que nesse dia, mas não antes, o intelectual desaparecerá e que os homens poderão adquirir o saber prático na liberdade que ele exige e sem contradições. No momento, ele pesquisa e se engana sem parar, não tendo outro fio condutor a não ser seu rigor dialético e seu radicalismo (SARTRE, 1972, p. 58-59, tradução nossa)35. Embora para Sartre um projeto ético não se vincularia às leis necessariamente, se considerarmos que as leis devem ser elaboradas a partir da fundamentação Ética, poderemos, por analogia ao exemplo do metrô, transportar isso para a situação atual. Dessa forma, nada nos impede de pensarmos no fundamento das leis, que regem, de certa forma, nosso comportamento, com maior respeito às liberdades individuais e de tal maneira que as vítimas fossem minimizadas: um trilho que fosse mais interessante para os milhares de usuários, sem pensar que os já existentes são tudo o que nos resta. Essa objetividade do projeto, essa concretude que menciono, relaciona-se com o que Sartre chama de reciprocidade: Como o conteúdo histórico de meu projeto é condicionado pelo fato de estar já lá entre os homens, reconhecido avanço por eles como um homem de uma certa espécie, de um certo meio, com um lugar já fixado na sociedade pelas significações gravadas na matéria, a reciprocidade é sempre concreta: não se pode tratar nem de uma ligação universal e abstrata – como a "caridade" dos cristãos – nem de uma vontade a priori de tratar a pessoa humana em mim mesmo e no Outro como fim absoluto, nem de uma intuição puramente contemplativa que entregaria a cada um "a Humanidade" como a essência de seu próximo. É a praxis de cada um, enquanto realização do projeto, que determina suas ligações de reciprocidade com cada um. E o caráter do homem não existe como tal: mas esse produtor reconhece nesse cantoneiro um projeto concreto que se manifesta por suas condutas e que outros já reconheceram pela tarefa mesma que eles lhe prescreveram. Assim reconhece o Outro sobre a base de um reconhecimento social do qual testemunham na passividade suas roupas, suas ferramentas, etc. Desse ponto de vista, apenas o uso da fala, o gesto mais simples, a estrutura elementar da percepção (que 35 « En d'autres mots, la nature de sa contradiction l'oblige à s'engager dans tous les conflits de notre temps parce qu'ils sont tous – conflits de classes, de nation ou de races – des effets particuliers de l'oppression des défavorisés par la classe dominante et qu'il se retrouve, en chacun, lui, l'opprimé conscient de l'être, du côté des opprimés. Pourtant, il faut le répéter, sa position n'est pas scientifique. Il applique à tâtons une méthode rigoureuse à des objets inconnus qu'il démystifie en se démystifiant ; il mène une action pratique de dévoilement en combattant les idéologies et en dénudant la violence qu'elles masquent ou justifient ; il oeuvre pour qu'une universalité sociale soit un jour possible où tous les hommes seront vraiment libres, égaux et frères, sûr que ce jour-là, mais pas avant, l'intellectuel disparaîtra et que les hommes pourront acquérir le savoir pratique dans la liberté qu'il exige et sans contradictions. Pour instant, il enquête et se trope sans cesse, n'ayant d'autre fil conducteur que sa rigueur dialectique et son radicalisme ». 43 desvela os comportamentos do Outro indo do futuro ao presente, da totalidade aos momentos particulares) implicam o reconhecimento mútuo (SARTRE, 1985, p. 221-222, tradução nossa)36. Assim, quando falo que a investigação sobre a Ética poderia se concretizar na criação das leis, não digo isso como se fosse uma necessidade metafísica, advinda do princípio mencionado a priori, mas sim como uma práxis possível de ser realizada e compartilhada, em uma relação de reciprocidade, de reconhecimento mútuo. Reciprocidade essa, que pode tornar-se posteriormente reciprocidade inerte, que não necessariamente se opõe à possibilidade de uma futura alienação (SARTRE, 1985, p. 223), mas que pode ser projetada e utilizada, pelo menos a princípio, como ferramenta de transformação, pelo menos rumo a um tipo de totalização dos momentos, sem o desmerecimento da complexidade do processo: Vê-se a complexidade de um processo prático-inerte: finalidade, contra-finalidade descoberta e sofrida por certos grupos na impotência, contra-finalidade denunciada teoricamente, mas jamais praticamente reconhecida, em um período determinado, por outros grupos que tem o poder de modificar a situação (SARTRE, 1985, p. 306, tradução nossa)37. Ou seja, queremos mostrar que, apesar das dificuldades, o combate ao universal abstrato pelo universal prático, pode tornar-se efetivo, se os cuidados forem tomados para não se cometer os mesmos erros que os intelectuais cometeram, outrora apontados por Sartre: 36 «Comme le contenu historique de mon projet est conditionné par le fait d'être déjà là parmi les hommes, reconnu d'avance par eux comme un homme d'une certaine espèce, d'un certain milieu, avec une place déjà fixée dans la société par les significations gravées dans la matière, la réciprocité est toujours concrète : il ne peut s'agir ni d'un lien universel et abstrait – comme la « charité » des chrétiens – ni d'une volonté a priori de traiter la personne humaine en moi-même et dans l'Autre comme fin absolue, ni d'une intuition purement contemplative qui livrerait à chacun « l'Humanité » comme l'essence de son prochain. C'est la praxis de chacun, en tant que réalisation du projet, qui détermine ses liens de réciprocité avec chacun. Et le caractère d'homme n'existe pas comme tel : mais ce cultivateur reconnaît dans ce cantonnier un projet concret qui se manifeste par ses conduites e que d'autres ont déjà reconnu par la tâche même qu'ils lui ont prescrite. Ainsi chacun reconnaît l'Autre sur la base d'une reconnaissance sociale dont témoignent dans la passivité ses vêtements, ses outils, etc. De ce point de vue, le seul usage de la parole, le geste de plus simple, la structure élémentaire de la perception (qui dévoile les comportements de l'Autre en allant de l'avenir au présent, de la totalité aux moments particuliers) impliquent la reconnaissance mutuelle ». 37 « On voit la complexité d'un processus pratico-inerte : finalité, contre-finalité découverte et subie par certains groupes dans l'impuissance, contre-finalité dénoncée théoriquement mais jamais pratiquement reconnue, dans une période déterminée, par d'autres groupes qui ont le pouvoir de modifier la situation ». 44 De toda maneira, a ambiguidade de seu objeto distancia o intelectual da universalidade abstrata. De fato, o erro dos "filósofos" tinha sido de crer que se podia diretamente aplicar o método universal (e analítico) à sociedade onde se vive embora justamente eles viviam nela e ela os condicionava historicamente de modo que os preconceitos de sua ideologia se deslizassem em sua pesquisa positiva e sua vontade mesmo de combate. A razão desse erro é clara: eles eram os intelectuais orgânicos, trabalhavam para a classe mesma que os tinha produzido e sua universalidade não era outra que a falsa universalidade da classe burguesa que se tomava pela classe universal (SARTRE, 1972, p. 47, tradução nossa)38. Assim, Sartre diz que o intelectual deve evitar de fazer universalizações de maneira muito rápida, pois a universalidade não existe, mas está para ser feita perpetuamente (SARTRE, 1972, p. 49). Aliás, leis que fossem simplesmente deduzidas da finalidade em comum das éticas que eu mencionei anteriormente, feririam o método existencialista, que tem a pretensão de permanecer heurístico (SARTRE, 1985, p.104), e que não aceitaria a simples dedução que é própria da Razão analítica. Contudo, acredito que a licença pode ser dada porque a proposta de Razão dialética em Sartre é o movimento da totalização (SARTRE, 1985, p. 163): Entretanto esse sistema racional singular pretende ultrapassar todos os modelos de racionalidade e os integrar: a Razão dialética não é nem razão constituinte nem razão constituída, ela é a Razão se constituindo no mundo e por ele dissolvendo nela todas as Razões constituídas para dela constituir novas que ela ultrapassa e dissolve a seu redor (SARTRE, 1985, p. 140, tradução nossa)39. Além disso, como mostra Sartre, para se chegar a qualquer lei, partimos da indução heurística. O que escolho para mim, posso comunicar aos Outros, pois "o grupo confere poder e eficácia aos indivíduos que ele fez, que os fizeram em torno e 38 « De tout manière l'ambiguïté de son objet éloigne l'intellectuel de l'universalité abstraite. De fait l'erreur des « philosophes » avait été de croire qu'on pouvait directement appliquer la méthode universelle (et analytique) à la société où l'on vit alors que justement ils y vivaient et qu'elle les conditionnait historiquement en sorte que les préjugés de son idéologie se glissaient dans leur recherche positive et leur volonté même de les combattre. La raison de cette erreur est claire : ils étaient des intellectuels organiques, travaillant pour la classe même qui les avait produits et leur universalité n'était autre que la fausse universalité de la classe bourgeoise qui se prenait pour la classe universelle ». 39 « Portant ce système rationnel singulier prétend dépasser tous les modèles de rationalité et les intégrer : la Raison dialectique n'est ni raison constituante ni raison constituée, elle est la Raison se constituant dans le monde et par lui en dissolvant en elle toutes les Raisons constituées pour en constituer de nouvelles qu'elle dépasse et dissout à son tour ». 45 cuja particularidade irredutível é uma maneira de viver a universalidade" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 101, tradução nossa)40. Algo que não tem que ser, mas que pode ser melhor para mim, e, portanto, pode ser melhor para muitos – talvez essa fosse a inversão da alienação – não um universal que me subordine, mas um existencial que inspire Outros, na busca de condições objetivas para um universal ideal: uma totalidade destotalizada pela subjetividade que constitui o projeto totalizante no movimento histórico. O universal que não é deduzido, mas que parte da indução (SARTRE, 1985, p. 150). Uma vida prática vivida de acordo com esse projeto é uma instância que objetiva a possibilidade41 e que incrementa o processo histórico. "O projeto deve necessariamente atravessar o campo das possibilidades instrumentais. Os caracteres particulares dos instrumentos o transformam mais ou menos profundamente; eles condicionam a objetivação" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 89, tradução nossa)42. O homem é mediado pelos acontecimentos, assim como os mesmos são mediados pelos homens (SARTRE, 1985, p.193). Digo isso, ainda que eu entenda que existam as contradições do projetarse para o "ser", na busca da constituição da identidade vista pelo outrem, assim como existem as contradições que Sartre descreve quando fala sobre o amor-desejo. Mas, em Sartre, o "aventureiro", aquele que está em constante mudança, sem se preocupar com a constituição da identidade, sem se preocupar com a responsabilização de suas escolhas, ou aquele que vive no anonimato sem se preocupar com a constituição do sentido, está fadado à constante atitude de má-fé (MÉSZÁROS, 2012, p. 41). Leopoldo e Silva (2015) fala da crítica de Sartre à personagem Anny de A náusea, pois ela se preocupa com a realização do instante, como se cada instante fosse único. 40 "Le groupe confère leur pouvoir et leur efficacité aux individus qu'il a faits, qui l'ont fait en retour et dont la particularité irréductible est une manière de vivre l'universalité ». 41 Abro um parêntese para dar como exemplo a vida do escritor francês Edmond Haraucourt, que construiu sua casa em Bréhat (no formato de um navio virado de cabeça para baixo, o que me instiga a relacionar essa imagem com a alienação invertida) perto do mar e começou a comprar terrenos em volta para garantir a preservação do local. Não se sentindo ainda realizado com isso, ele foi o autor da lei que aprovou a ilha de Bréhat como o primeiro lugar de preservação ambiental da França. Posteriormente, sua casa, que se tornou um museu, ele a doou para a Cité Internationale Universitaire em Paris, com a condição de que ela recebesse estudantes do mundo inteiro e que fosse sem fins lucrativos. Hoje, a cidade, que parece um cenário com suas flores e paisagens naturais, é visitada por cerca de 4.000 turistas por dia, mas não aceita o trânsito de carros. Esse é um exemplo de um projeto pessoal que se tornou nós-sujeito. 42 « Le projet doit nécessairement traverser le champ des possibilités instrumentales. Les caractères particuliers des instruments le transforment plus ou moins profondément ; ils conditionnent l'objectivation ». 46 Essa seria um tipo de busca da eternização, da intensidade do instante. Ainda que essa personagem seja interessante, esse tipo de atitude impede a realização da finalidade de sua vida, pois, se cada homem é uma história, então cada um é responsável pela ordenação de sua própria realidade, e a vivência da intensidade do instante é um obstáculo para um projeto de constituição de significado de vida. Logo, constituição da identidade em Sartre, apesar de objetificar o homem, de transformálo naquilo que ele não é, é o projeto fundamental do para-si e é aquilo de maior significância para cada existência. Ainda que não esteja pronta, a vivência é sempre essa reformulação de tentativa de constituição de essência. O fato de não existir ideias a priori, não impede o homem de querer constituí-las e vivenciá-las. Justamente por Sartre não ser idealista no sentido filosófico, pelo fato de que nada determina o para-si a priori, há valorização das escolhas e das vivências de suas ideias a posteriori. 1.3 O surgimento do nada pela interrogação do ser em contraposição ao Ego Transcendental Retomando a questão do idealismo no sentido filosófico do termo, Salanskis faz a consideração de que a perspectiva sartriana não é tão estranha à perspectiva de Husserl, fora da metodologia. Desenvolve o argumento mostrando que a realidade humana em Sartre, propriamente o para-si, tem como aspectos biológicos e psicológicos dessa realidade o pertencimento ao em-si, que é pura positividade. E como o para-si apresenta-se assim esvaziado de ser, ele afirma ironicamente que isso diminuiria a força do para-si. Entretanto, o ser precisa da negação do para-si para a constituição do significado, e, assim, Salanskis diz que o para-si possui o poderoso "ser do não", capaz de reduzir qualquer objeto à sua insignificância. Vejamos o argumento, em que Salanskis acaba por concluir que Sartre reconstitui a função solipsista do ego, o que seria um ponto importante para sua teoria de que Sartre seria um idealista, graças à responsabilidade epistemológica que ambos possuem em comum: 47 O para si aparece assim como uma infinitamente magra, frágil ponta de ser, todavia sobre ela todo o fardo de negatividade e autoexcluída por seu gesto negativo infinito de todo compreensível qualquer que ele seja. Estando bem entendido que o ser, para valer como tal, para acender ao nível de ser tal ou tal, de ser averiguado, necessita do pincel negativador proveniente do centro insituável que é o para si. Como responsável universal de toda negatividade, o para si coloca igualmente o como tal do ser. Ele é então colocado por Sartre como um suplemento ao ser, banido por princípio de cada um de seus distritos, quase igual ao não-ser por esse motivo, salvo que ele concentra sobre si o ser do não, e salvo que todo o ser, em falta de passar para a operação negativa única e decisiva desse não, permaneceria órfão de seu como tal, e então, em um sentido, absorveria em insignificância. Reconhece-se então, ao fundo, o solipsismo do ego transcendental e sua responsabilidade epistemológica universal, salvo que, em Sartre, essa relação epistemológica é tida em vista como relação no ser de um suplemento negativo a tudo com esse tudo, que trata no ser a negação a seu respeito. Do mesmo modo, pode-se dizer, como historiador da filosofia, que Sartre sobrepõe Hegel em Husserl, reconstituindo a função solipsista do ego, procedendo em Husserl da epoché, como a função negativa originária instituindo a possível dinâmica do ser, o salvando da insignificância parmenidiana (SALANSKIS, 2004, p.388389, tradução nossa)43. Na citação acima, Salanskis apresenta-nos uma leitura original de aproximação sobre o que as linhas de pesquisa destacam como contrário. Por exemplo, Sass apresenta-nos uma interpretação distinta em relação à Transcendência do Ego, ao destacar que Sartre quer constituir uma filosofia que "tenha como inspiração teórica a fenomenologia de Husserl mas que se distancie daquilo que ele chama de recaída idealista do fenomenólogo" (SASS, 1999, p. 264). Vejamos a contraposição de Sartre em relação à Husserl, mostrada por Sass: O erro que Sartre aponta na fenomenologia husserliana, contudo, está na crescente valorização das noções transcendentais da consciência 43 « Le pour soi apparaît ainsi comme une infiniment mince, fragile pointe de l'être, pourtant sur elle tout le fardeau de la négativité et s'excluant par son geste négatif infini de tout saisissable quel qu'il soit. Étant bien entendu que l'être, pour valoir comme tel, pour accéder au rang d'être tel ou tel, d'être avéré, a besoin du pinceau négateur provenant du centre insituable qu'est le pour soi. En tant que responsable universel de toute négativité, le pour soi porte également le comme tel de l'être. Il est donc campé par Sartre comme un supplément à l'être, banni par principe de chacun de ses cantons, quasiment égal au non-être pour ce motif, sauf qu'il concentre sur soi l'être du non, et sauf que tout l'être, à défaut d'en passer par l'opération négative unique et décisive de ce non, demeurerait orphelin de son comme tel, et donc, en un sens, sombrerait dans l'insignifiance. On retrouve donc, au fond, le solipsisme de l'ego transcendantal et sa responsabilité épistémologique universelle, sauf que, chez Sartre, cette relation épistémologique est prise en vue comme relation dans l'être d'un supplément négatif à tout avec ce tout, qui agit dans l'être la négation à son égard. De la sorte, on peut dire, comme historien de la philosophie, que Sartre superpose Hegel et Husserl, en reconstruisant la fonction solipsite de l'ego, procédant chez Husserl de l'épochè, comme la fonction négative originaire instituant la possible dynamique de l'être, le sauvant de l'insignifiance parménidienne ». 48 a ponto de Husserl conceber em Meditações Cartesianas a possibilidade de um ego transcendental. A partir desse momento, Sartre considera que Husserl foi infiel ao seu postulado primordial que é o da intencionalidade. A Transcendência reflete essa ambiguidade. Ela é uma proposta de constituição do ego que toma o pressuposto fenomenológico da intencionalidade, mas que se constitui como uma teoria anti-husserliana, por que (sic.) Sartre formula a idéia de que o ego é transcendente e não transcendental. [...] Sartre estabelece a autonomia da consciência irrefletida, um dos elementos contra o erro do solipsismo que ainda estaria presente na fenomenologia de Husserl (SASS, 1999, p. 264-265). Apesar de Sartre não trazer para sua teoria o Ego transcendental de Husserl, como destaca Sass, ele ainda assim poderia compartilhar a responsabilidade epistemológica com o mesmo, como aponta Salanskis, ou seja, as duas teorias não seriam contraditórias. Dito de outra maneira, a negação do para-si teria duas funções nos dois tipos de interpretações. Em primeiro lugar, a negação fundamental seria o que diferencia Sartre de Husserl sobre a não constituição de um eu a priori (que é o que Sass aponta), e em segundo lugar, a negação fundamental seria aquilo que poderia os aproximar nessa responsabilidade interpretativa do mundo (conforme Salanskis). Na verdade, queremos discutir em que sentido a negação fundamental de Sartre, que garante o que Salanskis chama de "diferença metodológica" entre os dois filósofos é ou não suficiente para distinguí-los no que diz respeito ao idealismo epistemológico. Para desenvolver essa questão, precisamos retomar alguns aspectos fundamentais: o fenômeno e a origem da negação em Sartre. Podemos dizer que, ao modo de Hume comparar-se com Newton, e de Kant com Copérnico, Sartre também mostra que a fenomenologia faz na filosofia o que os físicos já fizeram sobre a forma de concepção de mundo. Se a corrente elétrica é entendida como um somatório de aspectos que aparecem ao humano, assim também são reveladas as verdades filosóficas, pela relação entre quem percebe e o que é percebido, entre a consciência e o objeto, ou seja, entre o Para-si e o Em-si, o nada e o ser (SARTRE, 1943, p.12). O parecer revela o ser (SARTRE, 1943, p. 12), ainda que todos os aspectos desse ser não possam ser apreendidos pelas capacidades daquele que observa. A percepção do outrem como provável faz parte do acesso à verdade fenomenológica, que depende tanto do sujeito que observa, quanto daquilo que é observado, ainda que 49 as capacidades daquele que observa sejam limitadas, ou pelo fato de que "há uma infinidade de maneiras de se afirmar [...e de que...] nossa primeira fórmula não pode ser senão uma aproximação, devido às necessidades da linguagem" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 38)44. Ainda que eu me engane em minha percepção, como, por exemplo, um boneco colocado na cabine da fiscalização das rodovias, ou seja, ainda que eu pudesse pensar que o boneco fosse um centro intencional, o que foi visto não é uma mentira, pois parecer ser um centro intencional é uma verdade, é o surgimento de um ser, pode não ser uma realidade mais profunda, mas ainda assim é uma realidade. Vejamos o exemplo dado por Sartre: O erro, dizem, é a aparência. Isso é falso. Ao contrário a aparência é sempre verdade se a gente se limita a ela. A aparência é o ser. Essa árvore que eu tomo por um homem não é homem em aparência, árvore em realidade. Em aparência (ou seja, como aparição imediata) ele é esse algo mais obscuro surgido na noite. E isto é verdade: é o surgimento de um ser. E é minha antecipação verificável que é falsa enquanto ela visa à realidade mais profunda. Dito de outra maneira, na dupla aparência-realidade (falsa dupla inventada pelas necessidades da causa), a aparência é sempre verdade, o erro se situa ao nível da realidade. A aparência é sempre revelação de ser, a realidade pode ser ou não revelação de ser (SARTRE, 1989, p. 16, tradução nossa)45. A aparência não vela uma verdade sublimada e escondida dos seres, mas revela versões da estrutura de ser do objeto. O problema então, não estaria na dúvida sobre onde encontrar a verdade, posto que ela se encontra no aparecimento, mas sim em seu acesso de maneira plena, visto que infinitos podem ser os fenômenos com o mesmo objeto, bastando que se varie infinitamente os sujeitos. Se observo uma radiografia, mas não tenho a capacidade de interpretá-la para dizer se o fêmur está quebrado, temos um fenômeno diferente de quando ela é vista por um médico, mas não significa que o que foi visto por mim é uma mentira. Também em Heidegger, ainda 44 « [...] il y a une infinité de manières de s'affirmer [... et que...] notre première formule ne peut être qu'une approximation due aux nécessités du langage » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 32). 45 « L'erreur, dit-on, c'est l'apparence. C'est faux. Au contraire l'apparence est toujours vraie si l'on s'en tient à elle. L'apparence, c'est l'être. Cet arbre que je prends pour un homme n'est pas homme en apparence, arbre en réalité. En apparence (c'est-à-dire comme apparition immédiate) il est ce quelque chose de plus sombre surgi dans la nuit. Et cela est vrai : c'est le surgissement d'un être. Et c'est mon anticipation vérifiable qui est fausse en tant qu'elle vise à la réalité plus profonde. Autrement dit, dans le couple apparence-réalité (faux couple inventé pour les besoins de la cause), l'apparence est toujours vraie, l'erreur se situe au niveau de la réalité. L'apparence est toujours révélation d'être, la réalité peut être ou non révélation d'être ». 50 que sob uma concepção distinta, várias serão as interpretações do objeto, visto que o Dasein é histórico e marcado pela temporalidade. Sartre não nega a essência das coisas, apenas nega que ela seja anterior ao mundo, pois que é resultado dessa relação fenomênica. E, para investigar melhor essa relação, Sartre, como quem copia Heidegger, parte da interrogação. Observemos que a interrogação de Heidegger também conduz ao perguntante, ao ente humano: "Esse ente que somos cada vez nós mesmos e que tem, entre outras possibilidades-de-ser, a possibilidade-de-ser do perguntar, nós o apreendemos terminologicamente como Dasein" (HEIDEGGER, 2012, p. 47)46. Sartre explica o processo pelo qual o não-ser surge no mundo. Ele afirma que, quando se "interroga" um objeto, espera-se uma resposta positiva ou negativa. O carro está com problema. É a vela? É o motor? Conforme mencionamos, o não ser (não-vela, não-motor) surge a partir de uma pressuposição de ser anterior, isto é, o não-ser surge logicamente posterior a se pressupor o ser, pois é preciso pressupor que o problema esteja com a vela para depois negar e assim surgir a não-vela. Inicialmente, Sartre se utiliza da interrogação para chegar às suas conclusões. Essa interrogação, das quais apontamos os aspectos em comum com Heidegger, assemelha-se também à dúvida cartesiana, mas percorre caminhos outros47, para chegar a uma conclusão semelhante sobre a existência humana. Se, de um modo, em Descartes, a dúvida leva-nos a uma certeza indubitável – o cogito, que garante a existência do "eu" – de outro modo, a interrogação sartriana nos leva à origem do não-ser, ou seja, à origem do nada, e então, à origem da consciência. Entretanto, Sartre parte do cogito invertido, "toda consciência, mostrou Husserl, é consciência de alguma coisa" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 22), para criticar a forma do cogito de Descartes, em que o pensamento ocorre por causa do "eu". Mas Sartre acaba por afirmar que nem Descartes e nem Husserl estão corretos: Husserl e Descartes, como mostrou Gaston Berger, pedem ao cogito que lhes entregue uma verdade de essência: em um, alcançamos a conexão de duas naturezas simples, no outro, captamos a estrutura eidética das consciências. Mas, se a consciência deve fazer sua 46 "Dieses Seiende, das wir selbst je sind und das unter anderem die Seinsmöglichkeit des Fragens hat, fassen wir terminologisch als Dasein" (HEIDEGGER, 2012, p. 46). 47À maneira fenomenológica, Sartre resgata a conclusão de Husserl "toda consciência é consciência de alguma coisa". Se penso, não é porque eu existo, mas sim porque existe algo, pois, não existe pensamento se não existir o Em-si. O foco está no Em-si e não no "eu". 51 essência ser precedida por sua existência, ambos cometeram um erro. O que se pode pedir ao cogito é somente que nos descubra uma necessidade de fato. É também ao cogito que vamos nos dirigir para determinar a liberdade como liberdade que é a nossa, como pura necessidade de fato, ou seja, como um existente que é contingente, mas que não posso não experimentar (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 542)48. Da interrogação, que tem como possibilidade de resposta a afirmação ou a negação, Sartre mostra-nos como consequência o não-ser e que a consciência é nãoser. Isso garante a "necessidade de fato" para Sartre: a ausência de determinação e a liberdade, que são as consequências do cogito, segundo o autor. Colocamos primeiramente a questão do ser. Depois, voltando a esta questão, concebida como tipo de conduta humana, passamos a interrogá-la. Concluímos então que, se a negação não existisse, nenhuma pergunta poderia ser formulada, sequer, em particular, a do ser. Mas essa negação, vista mais de perto, nos remeteu ao Nada como sua origem e fundamento: para que haja negação no mundo e, por conseguinte, possamos interrogar sobre o Ser, é necessário que o Nada se dê de alguma maneira. [...] Mas esse Nada intramundano não pode ser produzido pelo ser-Em-si: a noção de Ser como plena positividade não contém o Nada como uma de suas estruturas. [...] Resulta, pois, que deve existir um Ser – que não poderia ser o ser-Emsi – com a propriedade de nadificar o Nada, sustentá-lo com seu próprio ser, escorá-lo perpetuamente em sua própria existência, um ser pelo qual o nada venha às coisas (SARTRE, 2011d, 64-65).49 Temos que, da interrogação conclui-se a existência do não-ser. Só podemos interrogar se existe a possibilidade da negação. Isso, por sua vez, visto como conduta humana, passa a ser interrogado. Mas sem a negação não existe 48 Husserl et Descartes, Gaston Berger l'a montré, demandent au cogito de leur livrer une vérité d'essence : chez l'un nous atteindrons à la liaison de deux natures simples, chez l'autre nous saisirons la structure eidétique de la conscience. Mais, si la conscience doit précéder son essence en existence, ils ont commis l'un et l'autre une erreur. Ce qu'on peut demander au cogito, c'est seulement de nous découvrir une nécessité de fait. C'est aussi au cogito que nous nous adresserons pour déterminer la liberté comme liberté qui est nôtre, comme pure nécessité de fait, c'est-à-dire comme un existant contingent mais que je ne peux pas ne pas éprouver (SARTRE, 1943, p. 483). 49 « Nous avons posé d'abord la question de l'être. Puis, nous retournant sur cette question même, conçue comme un type de conduite humaine, nous l'avons interrogée à son tour. Nous avons alors dû reconnaître que , si la négation n'existait pas, aucune question ne saurait être posée, en particulier celle de l'être. Mais cette négation ellemême, envisagée de plus près, nous a renvoyé au néant comme son origine et son fondement: pour qu'il y ait de la negation dans le monde et pour que nous puissions, par conséquent, nous interroger sur l'être, il faut que le néant soit donné en quelque façon .[...] Mais ce néant intra-mondain, l'être-en-soi ne saurait le produire: la notion d'être comme pleine positivité ne contient pas le néant comme une de ses structures.[...] Reste donc qu'il doit exister un être qui ne saurait être l'en-soi et qui a pour propriété de néantiser le néant , de le supporter de son être, de l'étayer perpétuellement de son existence même, un être par quoi le néant vient aux choses »(SARTRE,1943, p.56-57). 52 interrogação e então, exige-se uma origem para a negação que seja Nada. Assim, chega-se ao homem: "o homem é o ser pelo qual o nada vem ao mundo" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 67). Observe que é uma prova lógica. Sartre parte de três premissas. A primeira, parte da evidência de que o não-Ser surge a partir da interrogação. A segunda, parte da evidência de que a interrogação é uma conduta exclusivamente humana. E a terceira, parte da evidência de que um não-Ser só poderia surgir a partir de um nãoSer50. Para resolver, podemos aplicar a segunda à primeira e chegaremos à conclusão de que o homem origina o não-Ser. Ao aplicarmos essa conclusão à terceira, temos outra conclusão: o homem é um não-ser. A dúvida, a questão, e em seu sentido mais simples, "a pergunta" em Sartre nos conduz à existência do homem, mas não à contemplação de sua essência necessária e a priori, como o Ego Transcendental de Husserl. Conduz-nos a uma existência humana contingente, e, a partir dela, as essências podem ser constituídas biograficamente, a partir do nada que a existência humana é, e rumo ao ser que lhe falta (SARTRE, 1943, 56-80). Lembramos que não-ser em Sartre significa simplesmente a não determinação, já que o ser é sinônimo de determinado. Assim, essa conclusão de que o homem é um não-ser é o fundamento da liberdade do parasi e ao mesmo tempo da necessidade de intencionalidade, escolha e projeção. Assim, retomando a questão sobre se as aparências enganam, observemos que, "a solução que Heidegger anuncia para o esclarecimento dessa questão está na perspectiva da relação com o ente e na relação com o ente especial que somos nós mesmos" (MARQUES, 2003, p. 122), uma vez que busca o sentido mais originário em Aristóteles para mostrar que "perceber é sempre verdadeiro [...] somente descobre e jamais pode encobrir" (HEIDEGGER, 2012, p. 117), ainda que possa acontecer de que o acesso ao percebido não seja suficiente para um desvelamento adequado. Da mesma forma, para Sartre, ainda que ele não admita que consciência seja ente, (a partir da explicitação lógica da prova de Sartre acima, de que o homem é o não ser, o que significa, de fato, que ele não é determinado), o fenômeno 50 A terceira premissa é a mais questionável e que pode colocar em cheque a prova de Sartre, pois se uma premissa for falsa, por mais que o argumento seja válido, não se pode afirmar nada a respeito da conclusão. Considero a afirmação de que o não ser só pode surgir do não ser como sendo a aposta de Sartre. É próprio da filosofia ter o caráter aberto e essa terceira premissa é exatamente o ponto que mantém a teoria sartriana em aberto. Se não se considerar essa premissa, não há como ir adiante. 53 é a relação entre consciência e objeto51. Logo, aparência é algo que depende de ambos: do objeto que possui capacidade de se mostrar de determinados modos e da consciência que é capaz de perceber de determinado modo. Mesmo com denominações diferentes, de fato, a aproximação com Heidegger é maior que a aproximação de Sartre com Husserl. Mas podemos dizer que a importância do objeto, ou seja, que o objeto possui capacidade de se mostrar de determinado modo, ocorre, de fato, para os três filósofos da fenomenologia, até mesmo para Husserl: O conhecimento natural começa com a experiência (Erfahrung) e permanece nos limites da experiência. Na atitude teórica que nós chamamos natural, o horizonte que circunscreve toda espécie e estudo é caracterizado em seu conjunto por uma palavra: o mundo (HUSSERL, 1950, p. 13, tradução nossa)52. Tanto para Husserl quanto para Sartre, o conhecimento depende do mundo e do eu, mas o mundo existe independentemente do eu. Ou seja, embora o conhecimento seja dependente do eu, não se pode deixar de enfatizar a concretude e independência do em-si, o que garantiria uma ruptura em relação ao idealismo tanto para Sartre como para Husserl, contrapondo Salanskis. Assim, ressaltamos que, o Em-si é ser pleno, ou seja, pura positividade, que não depende de uma consciência para existir: Olho esta folha em branco, colocada sobre minha mesa; percebo sua forma, sua cor, sua posição. Essas diferentes qualidades têm características comuns: em primeiro lugar, elas se oferecem ao meu olhar como existências que posso apenas constatar e cujo ser não depende de modo algum do meu capricho. Elas são para mim, não são eu. Mas elas tampouco são outrem, isto é, não dependem de outra consciência. Estão presentes e inertes ao mesmo tempo (SARTRE, 2010a, p.7)53. 51 Para podermos fazer a comparação discutirmos os conceitos de Sartre a partir de sua fonte, reduzimos o conceito de ente heideggeriano ao conceito de objeto (Em-si) em Sartre, e o conceito de ente especial (Dasein) em Heidegger ao conceito de consciência (Para-si) em Sartre. 52 « La connaissance naturelle commence avec l'expérience (Erfahrung) et demeure dans les limites de l'expérience. Dans l'attitude théorique que nous appelons naturelle, l'horizon qui circonscrit toute espèce d'étude est caractérisé dans son ensemble par un mot : le monde ». 53 « Je regarde cette feuille blanche, posée sur ma table ; je perçois sa forme, sa couleur, sa position. Ces différentes qualités ont des caractéristiques communes : d'abord elles se donnent à mon regard comme des existences que je puis seulement constater et dont l'être ne dépend aucunement de mon caprice. Elles sont pour moi, elles ne sont 54 E então, podemos concordar com a responsabilidade epistemológica dada ao para-si, como é defendido por Salanskis, mas não podemos desconsiderar a realidade acessível unicamente pelo fenômeno, como ocorre em Sartre, como parece que o crítico desconsiderou, para poder afirmar que Sartre seria um idealista. Mesmo porque, a responsabilidade epistemológica não é suficiente até mesmo para dizer que Husserl é idealista. A solução é que o que mostra que Husserl não rompeu com o idealismo é o fato da existência do Ego Transcendental de Husserl como algo existente a priori e acessível pela redução transcendental e não pelo fenômeno, e não pela experiência existencialista. Ou seja, não basta simplesmente utilizar o argumento de Sass e sua explicitação de algo a priori em Husserl, para contrapor o principal argumento de Salanskis, pois nesse argumento, Salanskis destaca a questão do conhecimento que, para ele, é semelhante nos dois filósofos em questão. O que de fato diferencia Sartre de Husserl na questão do conhecimento é que em Husserl há algo que a relação fenomênica não pode revelar: o Ego Transcendental, pois ele não pode ser acessado a partir da experiência fenomenológica. Além disso, o Ego Transcendental existe ontologicamente independentemente do objeto. Poderíamos pensar que o para-si teria esse mesmo papel em Sartre, mas isso não ocorre, pois o para-si não é, ele é ausência de ser. Assim, não faz sentido falar, em Sartre, da acessibilidade do para-si. Em contraposição a Husserl, temos que, para Sartre, toda consciência é primeiramente posicional, e depende do objeto para existir, toda consciência inicialmente é consciência de objeto, porque é primeiramente irrefletida. Em Esboço para uma teoria das emoções, Sartre cita como exemplo, que mesmo o medo, é medo de alguma coisa (SARTRE, 2011c, p. 56-57) (SARTRE, 1995, p. 70). Observemos também a crítica que Sartre faz a Husserl: Nós vimos há pouco que Husserl, embora mais sutilmente, cai, no fundo, na mesma questão. Sei perfeitamente que ele reconhece ao Eu uma transcendência especial que não é a do objeto e que se poderia pas moi. Mais elles ne sont pas non plus autrui, c'est-à-dire qu'elles ne dépendent d'aucune spontanéité, ni de la mienne, ni de celle d'une autre conscience. Elles sont présentes et inertes à la fois » (SARTRE, 2012a, p. 1). 55 denominar uma transcendência "por cima". Mas com que direito? E como explicar esse tratamento privilegiado do Eu se não for por preocupações metafísicas ou críticas que nada têm a ver com a fenomenologia? (SARTRE, 2013a, p. 30)54. Aqui, Sartre considera a "metafísica" como sendo a metafísica idealista, já que considera que a fenomenologia quebra com o idealismo, justamente por trazer explicações realistas do mundo, que acessam a estrutura do ser, a partir da relação fenomênica. Mas é lógico que o que ele faz não deixa de ser metafísica. Como apontei anteriormente, (na nota sobre a terceira premissa da prova lógica), a metafísica de Sartre está na aposta de que o não-ser só poderia surgir de um não-ser. Entretanto, essa citação é importante para reafirmar o que estamos tentando mostrar aqui: que concordamos com a aproximação epistemológica de Sartre com Husserl, como é a proposta de Salanskis, mas que isso não faz com que Sartre seja um idealista, porque ele se aproxima e distancia de Husserl justamente contrapondo o idealismo. Ele se aproxima de Husserl para poder afirmar a existência anterior à essência e a realidade do mundo ontologicamente acessível pela relação fenomênica, mas não aceita o Ego Transcendental de Husserl, e afirma o contrário do solipsismo: Sartre afirma a dependência ontológica da consciência em relação aos objetos e que não há algo que possa ser acessado a não ser pelo fenômeno. Todavia, esse estudo nos leva ao outro sentido em que considero que Sartre seja idealista, que diz respeito à transcendência, à projeção, na busca do objeto que não se tem fundamentalmente. A consciência reflexiva pode nos induzir ao erro, advindo desse desejo de ser Em-si, mas por outro lado, pode nos impulsionar para atitudes coerentes, na tentativa de constituição da identidade, o que não considero ser um aspecto negativo, a partir do fundamento da falta de "eu" enquanto objeto, que o homem não tem, mas que o busca. De fato, estou então mergulhado no mundo dos objetos, são eles que constituem a unidade de minhas consciências, que se apresentam com valores, qualidades atrativas e repulsivas, mas eu mesmo desapareci, aniquilei-me. Não há lugar para mim nesse nível, e isso 54 « Nous avons vu tout à l'heure que Husserl, quoi que plus subtilement, tombe au fond sous le même reproche. J'entendes bien qu'il reconnaît au Je une transcendance spéciale qui n'est pas celle de l'objet et qu'on pourrait appeler une transcendance « par en dessus ». Mais de quel droit ? Et comment expliquer ce traitement privilégié du Je si ce n'est par des préoccupations métaphysiques ou critiques qui n'ont rien à faire avec la phénoménologie ? » (SARTRE, 2012b, p.34). 56 não provém de um acaso, de uma falha momentânea da atenção, mas da estrutura própria da consciência (SARTRE, 2013a, p. 29)55. Na verdade, o Ego é objeto e é externo à consciência, é ao mesmo tempo "Je" e "Moi" porque é resultado do que já foi escolhido, é unidade dos estados e das ações (SARTRE, 2013a, p. 37) (SARTRE, 2012b, p. 44). Portanto, ele é passado das escolhas da consciência, e, por conseguinte, facticidade. Ele é constituído a partir da transcendência e não do que seja transcendental. Diferentemente, a consciência é imediata, pois é o momento da decisão, a partir da interpretação do passado, na maneira de não sê-lo, rumo ao projeto futuro. Portanto, o Ego está fora da consciência, porque enquanto o Ego é objeto (Em-si), a consciência é o nada (Para-si). Em resumo, Sartre não sai somente do solipsismo metodológico de Husserl, como afirma Salanskis, mas sai completamente do solipsismo. Se a consciência é intencional, ela é o nada que intenciona o em-si, e que precisa do emsi para existir, e não o contrário como ocorre no solipsismo, em que o pensamento é independente do objeto. Até mesmo para Husserl, não podemos falar de um solipsismo, pois ele também afirma a existência dos objetos independentemente da consciência. O que de fato faz com que Husserl não tenha realizado a ruptura definitiva com o idealismo no âmbito epistemológico, é que, para ele, há algo que é acessível ao conhecimento, mas não pelo fenômeno: o Ego Transcendental é acessível pela redução transcendental. Por outro lado, para Sartre, como a consciência é o não ser, não existe algo inacessível pelo fenômeno. A consciência não é acessível, mas ela não é algo. O fato da consciência "não-ser" para Sartre, o diferencia tanto de Husserl, como de Heidegger. Pois além de não existir o Ego Transcendental, a consciência não é ente. Assim, Sartre é o primeiro realizar a ruptura definitiva com o idealismo. 55 « En fait, je suis alors plongé dans le monde des objets, ce sont eux qui constituent l'unité de mes consciences, qui se présentent avec des valeurs, des qualités attractives et répulsives, mais moi, j'ai disparu, je me suis anéanti. Il n'y a pas de place pour moi à ce niveau, et ceci ne provient pas d'un hasard, d'un défaut momentané d'attention, mais de la structure même de la conscience » (SARTRE, 2012b, p. 32). 57 1.4 Idealismo prático – convergências com Salanskis Prosseguindo, Salanskis aponta outra semelhança entre Sartre e Levinas, no que se refere à retomada do idealismo na fenomenologia. Ele defende que o para si de Sartre e que o autrement qu'être de Levinas poderiam ser entendidos como sendo a mesma coisa, ainda que não fosse fácil detectar qual seria a referência primeira, pois um cita o outro: Sartre de forma indireta e Levinas diretamente (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 390). De acordo com sua hipótese, Sartre teria feito referência indireta à Levinas no texto de conclusão de O ser e o nada: "Em si e para si: esboços metafísicos", mas que o mesmo não quisera propositadamente mencionar Levinas, pois se assim o fizesse, poderia ameaçar a unidade do ser, com estabelecimento de um hiato na cisão do Ser. Ao mesmo tempo, embora Levinas não admitisse que o autrement qu'être fosse a consciência, Salanskis menciona uma passagem em que Levinas, além de atribuir a teoria de Sartre como sendo fundamental à sua, considera que, se o autrement qu'être viesse a ser, ele seria a consciência. Se eu bem entendo essa discussão, parece-me uma retomada à possibilidade de entender o Mundo como sendo o em-si ou o passado de um para-si criador, ou seja, um Deus-consciência, que seria a parte do para-si da vida e do mundo, analogamente ao passado, que é o em-si do para-si do homem. Ainda que essa possibilidade esteja em aberto, é sabido que tanto Sartre quanto Levinas preferem discutir a filosofia como se esse Deus criador e intencional não existisse, e assim também confirma Salanskis: "o projeto dessa totalização 'confessa' que o em si deveria ser originariamente consciência para se ser fundado, para ter quisto se fundar e ser-se fundado, o que não é o caso, que não é a situação" (SALANKIS, 2004, p. 391, tradução nossa)56. Pois ambos fazem a crítica à metafísica e substituem esse componente: Levinas pela ética, Sartre pelo valor, que são produtos do próprio homem, o que é diferente para Heidegger que mantém a abertura e a analogia do ser (pelo menos no segundo Heidegger). Salanskis ainda menciona a síntese do para si e do em si, ele fala do ens causa sui atribuído à divindade (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 390). Contudo, observo que 56 « [...] le projet de cette totalisation 'avoue' que l'en soi devrait être originairement conscience pour s'être fondé, pour avoir voulu se fonder et s'être fondé, ce qui n'est pas le cas, ce qui n'est pas la donne ». 58 Sartre usa a palavra Deus como sinônimo do que ele chama de valor, o em-si-para-si (ver 3.2), aquilo que cria sentido entre o passado, o presente e o futuro, o propósito para o qual o homem se projeta e pelo qual suas ações constituem sua identidade. A identidade, que não é imutável, mas idealizada como imutável, não é buscada necessariamente como um projeto de má-fé. É justamente aqui que considero que a filosofia moral de Sartre é congruente ao que Salanskis chama de egoresponsabilidade, por mais que não exista, em Sartre, a garantia de que o para-si irá ou não deslizar para outro ser, para o qual ele se projeta: "Todavia o projeto corre o risco de ser desviado, [...], pelos instrumentos coletivos; assim a objetivação terminal não corresponde talvez exatamente à escolha original" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 112, tradução nossa)57. Assim sendo, não temos um idealismo, na maneira como essa palavra é entendida classicamente na história da filosofia, mas temos sim, em Sartre, uma idealidade a posteriori. A leitura de seus textos nos chama constantemente à indagação sobre o tipo de projeto que estamos escolhendo. E, não sei se é permitido fazer esta comparação filosoficamente, mas eu arriscaria a comparar isso ao que os religiosos denominam de "chamado de Deus à conversão", mas sem a pressuposição de dogmas, ou de Deus no céu, ou de imposições, ou seja, um chamar-se a uma espécie de conversão pessoal e autêntica, não a partir do transcendental, mas do imanente. De outro lado, o sujeito escapa à empiricidade porque ele escapa a toda facticidade, não sendo isso que ele é e sendo o que ele não é: em razão da universalidade desse escapado, nós reencontramos a abertura infinita, a referência implícita à ideia enquanto isso que não coincide com nenhuma instância (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 396, tradução nossa)58. Em resumo, o que defendo em contraposição à leitura dos textos de Salanskis é precisamente, em primeiro lugar, o fato de que Sartre não retoma ao 57 « Toutefois le projet risque d'être dévié, [...], par les instruments collectifs ; ainsi l'objectivation terminale ne correspond peut-être pas exactement au choix originel ». 58 « D'autre part, le sujet échappe, à l'empiricité parce qu'il échappe à toute facticité, n'étant pas ce qu'il est et étant ce qu'il n'est pas : en raison de l'universalité de cette échappée, nous retrouvons l'ouverture infinitaire, la référence implicite à l'idée en tant que ce qui ne coïncide avec aucune instance ». 59 solipsismo cartesiano. Em segundo lugar, de que a descrição em Sartre tem sustentação fenomenológica, logo, depende do aparecer dos objetos e não somente da capacidade interpretativa dos sujeitos. E, em terceiro lugar, que Sartre em contraposição ao ego transcendental, desenvolve o conceito de identidade em congruência com o Ego-responsabilidade de Salanskis, ainda que em Sartre, possamos encontrar uma responsabilidade mais opressora, pois a escolha desse projeto de identidade seria uma espécie de modelo de escolha que abrisse possibilidade para toda humanidade fazer o mesmo, como desenvolvo em 3.3. Aliás, a diferença disso com a fundamentação metafísica sobre a moral kantiana, é que para Kant, o homem precisa ser entendido como fim em si mesmo (KANT, 2009, p.239, p. 243, p. 245), enquanto que para Sartre, o homem é sempre meio. Se para Kant existe uma prescrição de tratar o homem como fim pelo imperativo categórico, para Sartre, existe uma impossibilidade de realização dessa prescrição. Entretanto, o fato de que o homem é sempre meio para a teoria sartriana explicita uma responsabilidade tão grande ou maior do que a ética kantiana. No reconhecimento, cada um desvela que o Outro tem um projeto fora do seu próprio, o que impede a unidade, a apreensão de sua totalidade, porque cada um vive em sua interioridade absoluta, e usando-se e usando o Outro como meio (SARTRE, 1985, 227). Na medida em que o fim é sempre futuro, o Outro e eu não poderíamos ser fins: O fim é a produção de uma mercadoria, de um objeto de consumo, de uma ferramenta ou a criação de um objeto de arte. [...] Em consequência, na medida onde meu projeto é ultrapassamento do presente para o futuro e de mim mesmo para o mundo, eu me trato sempre como meio e não posso tratar o Outro como um fim (SARTRE, 1985, p. 224, tradução nossa)59. Por isso podemos utilizar essa diferença para contrapor a irresponsabilidade de Sartre, anteriormente mencionada nesse trabalho (1.2), em Salanskis. Se o homem é sempre meio para se atingir seus objetos, esse é mais um argumento que destaca sua responsabilidade em relação ao mundo, pois o homem 59 « La fin, c'est la production d'une marchandise, d'un objet de consommation, d'un outil ou la création d'un objet d'art. [...] En conséquence, dans la mesure où mon projet est dépassement du présent vers l'avenir et de moimême vers le monde, je me traite toujours comme moyen et ne puis traiter l'Autre comme une fin ». 60 se coloca em prática como intermediário responsável para as conquistas dos fins que ele os escolheu. Assim, embora eu discorde de Salanskis sobre a irresponsabilidade em Sartre, meu estudo é congruente sobre a idealidade de Salanskis nos aspectos mais importantes, pois o autor considera que Sartre não reabilita o idealismo, mas que o reativa (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 399). Em tudo isso que seu pensamento teve de afinidade ao modo marxista, Sartre não cessou, entretanto, de pleitear os direitos do real, da matéria, da situação histórica mesma. Sua reivindicação da liberdade em um sentido radical e absoluta que define o para si coexiste com uma visão dessa negatividade como acrescentando somente o caractere metafísico do escolhido ou do quisto como tal a uma determinidade que se difunde desde todas as funções do em si. Mas sobretudo, a liberdade é uma contingência pura que não se apoia sobre nada, não somente sobre nada que seja no sentido do em si, mas sobre nenhum conteúdo que poderia ser um conteúdo da ideia. O idealismo clama que ideias explicitáveis em seu conteúdo têm um papel decisivo nos campos teóricos, práticos e estéticos. A liberdade, em Kant, se conecta à ideia porque ela de início foi apresentada como ideia na primeira crítica. Em Sartre, a liberdade é a contingência sem referência a uma tal "ideia", a contingência nua por assim dizer. A junção com o plano ideal se faria com a referência ao ens causa sui, mas parece representar somente o papel, nós vimos, de indicador da reconciliação impossível das guisas do ser, e não esse da chave da liberdade-contingência (SALANSKIS, 2004, p. 399-400, tradução nossa)60. Embora Sartre não seja um idealista, no sentido tradicional da história da filosofia, ele desenvolve uma filosofia que parte da consciência e da liberdade, e que ao mesmo tempo, é extremamente esperançosa, pois pressupõe a capacidade de mudanças de atitudes a partir da desmistificação da limitação da consciência, ou seja, sobre a explicitação das falsas determinações, e as consequentes possibilidades 60 « Dans tout ce que sa pensée avait d'affine au mode marxiste, Sartre n'a cessé, malgré tout, de plaider les droits du réel, de la matière, de la situation historique même. Sa revendication de la liberté en un sens radicale et absolue qui définit le pour soi coexiste avec une vision de cette négativité comme ajoutant seulement le caractère métaphysique du choisi ou du voulu comme tel à une déterminité qui diffuse depuis tous les postes de l'en soi. Mais surtout, la liberté est une contingence pure qui n s'appuie sur rien, non seulement sur rien que soit au sens de l'en soi, mais sur aucun contenu qui pourrait être un contenu de l'idée. L'idéalisme clame que des idées explicitables dans leur contenu jouent un rôle décisif dans les champs théoriques, pratiques et esthétiques. La liberté, chez Kant, se connecte à l'idée parce qu'elle a d'abord été présentée comme idée dans la première critique. Chez Sartre, la liberté est la contingence sans référence à une telle « idée », la contingence nue en quelque sorte. Le raccord avec le plan idéel se ferait avec le renvoi à l'ens causa sui, mais il paraît jouer seulement le rôle, nous l'avons vu, d'indicateur de la réconciliation impossible des guises de l'être, pas celui de clef de la libertécontingence ». 61 infinitas oriundas do sujeito. Isso é algo extremamente significativo para a história da filosofia, pois esse aspecto faz com que Sartre seja um filósofo existencialista e fenomenológico, que não excede ao plano da experiência e nem ao campo prático, ao mesmo tempo é um "contingencialista" radical e não niilista. Se, por um lado, Sartre desconstrói o absolutismo da maioria das filosofias morais, (pois mostra que não existem valores absolutos para se deduzir a conduta humana, que não existe essência de bem a priori, e que não existem fins de felicidade prontos a serem buscados pela humanidade, ou seja, que não existe um universal a ser descoberto e seguido), por outro lado, sua teoria é um convite à responsabilização particular e do mundo que se quer constituir coletivamente, de acordo com as urgências do tempo presente. Um universal que não é advindo do transcendental, mas constituído pelas escolhas dos homens quaisquer, não pelo fato de ter que ser de determinado modo, mas pelas influências mútuas na multiplicidade das escolhas comuns na averiguação objetiva das necessidades coletivas. Não seria essa a importante síntese na história da filosofia entre o existencial e o universal61? Não é porque não tenho valores fundamentais que não posso elegê-los, e consequentemente, defendê-los para o mundo. Dessa maneira, concordo com Salanskis que seu "idealismo" fez com que suas ideias tivessem "papel decisivo nos campos teóricos, práticos e estéticos", como na citação acima. 1.5 Coerência das obras e a prova do otimismo sartriano pela exigência Essa discussão desperta-nos para outro tipo de problema. Vejamos. Sass (1998) escreve um artigo que discute se existe contradição ou não entre O ser e o nada e Crítica da razão dialética. Nesse texto, sem adentrar nos argumentos, Sass cita que Serge Doubrovsky62 afirma que Sartre abandonou a posição do primeiro para 61 « Je construis l'universel en me choisissant ; je le construis en comprenant le projet de tout autre homme de quelque époque qu'il soit » (SARTRE, 1996, p. 61). 62 "Se a Crítica da Razão dialética está longe de ter tido a visibilidade de O Ser e o Nada; se os comentários detalhados e as reações tumultuosas que os livros de Sartre sempre suscitaram em seu rastro parecem até aqui ter tido impacto; se essa tentativa de síntese entre o marxismo e o existencialismo no interior do marxismo, parece destacar, apesar das vozes do autor, bem mais do solilóquio que do colóquio, isso é essencialmente, nós cremos, porque nós temos no caso um projeto isolado, e isolado pela sua impossibilidade mesma" (DOUBROVSKY, 1961a, p.492, tradução nossa): "Si la Critique de la Raison dialectique est loin d'avoir eu le retentissement de 62 o segundo; que Roger Garaudy considera a possibilidade da continuidade entre as duas obras; e que Colette Audry defende a compatibilidade (SASS, 1998, p. 178). Embora seu artigo não tenha a pretensão de ser conclusivo, como ele mesmo diz, Sass termina com a citação de Sartre em Conferências de Araraquara, em que o filósofo afirma que existe uma diferença entre a formulação do problema nos dois livros, mas não sobre a direção (SASS, 1998, p. 183-184) (SARTRE, 1960, p. 91-93). Leopoldo e Silva (2013a) também afirma a coerência mantida por Sartre desde seus primeiros escritos, pois a base é existencialista histórica que não se separa da situação, do compromisso e da liberdade. E em outro artigo, ele já havia escrito sobre a polêmica entre a continuidade ou quebra entre os livros O ser e o nada e Crítica da razão dialética: Muitos estudiosos de Sartre vêem entre os dois livros uma mudança completa, a ser descrita como o abandono da ontologia em prol da perspectiva antropológica orientada pelo materialismo histórico. Contrariamente a essa interpretação, entendemos que as diferenças entre os dois modos de focalizar a liberdade situam-se na ênfase presente em cada um: no primeiro livro procura-se marcar o caráter originário da liberdade, identificando-a com a consciência e com o Nada do Para-si; no segundo procura-se mostrar que este caráter originário efetiva-se num processo histórico cuja inteligibilidade depende da dialética entre a liberdade inerente ao projeto singular de existir e as determinações objetivas da facticidade (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2004, p. 26). Por outro lado, é interessante observar para a discussão desse capítulo que, Doubrovsky, aquele que afirma a descontinuidade entre as obras, interpreta que Sartre tentou fundar um método a priori e o critica por isso: A inteligibilidade dialética só pode então ser dada a posteriori. Pedir ao marxismo, ao modo de Sartre, para fundar seu método a priori, é, de um ponto de vista marxista, impossível e absurdo, posto que isso é, sob o matiz de uma filosofia da "existência", exigir do pensamento prescrever os modos de aparição do ser e voltar por um desvio à L'Être et le Néant ; si les commentaires détaillés et les réactions tumultueuses que les livres de Sartre ont toujours suscités dans leur sillage semblent jusqu'ici faire défaut ; si cette tentative de synthèse entre le marxisme et l'existentialisme, à l'intérieur du marxisme, paraît relever, malgré les voeux de l'auteur, bien plus du soliloque que du colloque, c'est essentiellement, croyons-nous, parce que nous avons affaire à un projet isolé, et isolé de par son impossibilité même ». 63 dialética idealista, que tinha sido superada" (DOUBROVSKY,1961a, p. 497-498, tradução nossa)63. Observe que, no artigo Sartre, a história e a verdade, Salanskis procura defender a contribuição de Sartre para uma "epistemologia transcendental": Meu partido defendido é com efeito, eu venho chamá-lo, de tentar encontrar em Sartre uma contribuição implícita a uma epistemologia transcendental da sociologia e da história: uma forma de definir a priori o objeto dessas disciplinas explicitando seu sentido para nós (SALANSKIS, 2008, p.1, tradução nossa)64. O que quero explicitar é que a compreensão entre a quebra de coerência entre as obras citadas pode estar relacionada ao sentido em que Sartre pode ser considerado idealista. A questão da necessidade e contingencialidade do valor precisa ser elucidada para esclarecer as duas questões. Isso será discutido nos próximos capítulos, mas farei um resumo por causa da urgência da questão. Em primeiro lugar, não existir valores absolutos, não significa a impossibilidade de elegê-los, ao contrário, em Sartre significa a necessidade de elegêlos. Como o homem é carência e liberdade, ele transcende para uma finalidade (o valor). Essa carência de ser é o que garante a responsabilidade fundamental de minha ação. Além disso, não tenho responsabilidade somente sobre minha vida, mas também sobre o mundo. Não fazer nada para mudar (seja minha vida, seja o mundo) significa adotar valor em conformidade com a situação. Em segundo lugar, não existem valores fundamentais, mas todo valor é fundamento, pelo simples fato de ser "ser", uma finalidade escolhida pelo para-si. Por exemplo, não existe absolutismo sobre ter que viver de tal modo a alcançar longevidade, mas se essa finalidade foi escolhida, então existem os certos e os errados de acordo com ela. Uma gama de exercícios e de hábitos de alimentação são pesquisados com o intuito de alcançar a longevidade. Logo, comer muita gordura e muito açúcar é errado de acordo com essa finalidade. A finalidade de se alcançar 63 « L'intelligibilité dialectique ne peut donc être donnée qu'a posteriori. Demander au marxisme, à la façon de Sartre, de fonder sa méthode a priori, c'est, d'un point de vue marxiste, impossible et absurde, puisque c'est, sous couleur d'une philosophie de l' »existence », demander à la pensée de prescrire les modes d'apparition de l'être et revenir par un détour à la dialectique idéaliste, que l'on avait 'remise sur ses pieds' ». 64 « Mon parti pris est en effet, je viens de le rappeler, d'essayer de trouver chez Sartre une contribution implicite à une épistémologie transcendantale de la sociologie et de l'histoire : une façon de définir a priori l'objet de ces disciplines en explicitant son sens pour nous ». 64 longevidade fundamenta as pesquisas no âmbito da nutrição e da educação física. A partir de um valor escolhido, podemos deduzir juízos, ações e até mesmo outros valores. Para entendermos o sentido prático disso, dou outro exemplo: eu fumo. O cigarro não está de acordo com um hábito para se alcançar a longevidade. Não significa que eu estou errada, no sentido absoluto do termo. Significa que minha atitude de fumar está errada de acordo com a finalidade da longevidade, ou seja, significa que eu não escolhi a longevidade com fim último para mim mesma. O que quero dizer com isso, é que, em O ser e o nada Sartre mostra que não há valores fundamentais, mas que escolher valores é algo necessário a todos os homens. Na Crítica da razão dialética, no Existencialismo é um humanismo e até mesmo no Apelo aos intelectuais65, Sartre mostra os valores que ele escolheu para si e para o mundo. Em outras palavras, sua teoria sobre a autenticidade "exige" dele mesmo que ele seja responsável não só por sua própria escolha, mas também pelas escolhas dos Outros (SARTRE, 1943, p. 598-601) (SARTRE (1996, p. 31). A escolha não possui fundamento, mas não existe homem que viva sem escolher. Ela é necessária, ainda que tal escolha ou outra não possa ser fundamentada externamente. É a liberdade, o próprio fundamento do homem. Assim, nos outros livros, Sartre mostra os valores que ele mesmo escolheu e os comunica para inspirar a humanidade a desenvolver estratégias para alcançá-los. Embora o marxismo não possa ser fundamento ontológico, ele pode perfeitamente ser fundamento antropológico de alguma época. O fundamento ontológico é o existencialismo. Portanto, a liberdade existencialista, o não-ser, que significa não ser determinado, é o fundamento que afirma a inexistência do absolutismo de qualquer valor, ainda que afirme a necessidade de algum valor pela própria característica do para-si. Mas a escolha do valor (de uma finalidade) e as análises de acordo com tal valor é o fundamento de qualquer ciência. Escolher o marxismo como fundamento para a antropologia, não é, de fato, colocar o marxismo como sendo a priori, no sentido absoluto, pois a eleição do marxismo como fundamento é eleição humana, de uma vivência existencial, logo, é a posteriori. Por outro lado, em um sentido mais fraco, podemos dizer que o marxismo pode ser a priori, em um sentido mais fraco, pois quando escolhido como fim último, é o fundamento de 65 Tradução nossa : « plaidoyer pour les intellectuels ». 65 práticas, juízos e de outros valores, em sua dialética com as determinações. Isso se relaciona com a concretude da ideia, com a concretude do valor, que desenvolvemos no item 3.2. Vemos ainda, que os dois conceitos, idealidade e atitude, poderiam ser entendidos como paradigmas diferentes, mas não em Sartre. Por outro lado, não negamos que a escolha de um mundo possa não significar a concretização desse ideal, pois como apontou Leopoldo e Silva, não basta a escolha do para-si, mas o movimento depende da dialética entre a escolha e a situação. Leopoldo e Silva faz outra aproximação entre as obras, divergindo de nossa interpretação sobre o sentido que Sartre poderia ser considerado idealista, ou seja, sobre o idealismo ordinário, o idealismo comum: Até onde podemos acompanhar a reflexão de Sartre, a inteligibilidade da história aproxima-se de uma conclusão pessimista, que não podemos no entanto afirmar, devido ao caráter inacabado da Crítica da Razão Dialética. Pois se a inteligibilidade dialética pode nos mostrar como a práxis se transforma, quando os indivíduos passam da série ao grupo, da alienação e passividade à fusão e liberdade, ela nos mostra também que a fusão se dissipa numa espécie de dialética regressiva em que a fusão das liberdades recai na série das alienações. E tanto quanto possamos saber, isso sempre acontece. Portanto, se a fusão revolucionária das liberdades recíprocas pode representar o ponto mais alto do projeto histórico, esse projeto está destinado ao fracasso e disso se encarrega a própria continuidade da práxis quando tenta reter as conquistas históricas. Uma das maneiras de estabelecer a continuidade, por certo através das diferenças – que isso fique bem claro entre O Ser e o Nada e a Crítica da Razão Dialética é comparando o fracasso necessário do projeto histórico com a paixão inútil do desejo de ser Deus. E assim chegamos ao paradoxo que mereceria ser aprofundado: a ação histórica, e a dialética que a pode compreender, nos indicam, pela afirmação da liberdade e da responsabilidade, a via do compromisso histórico, ou a necessidade da paixão; mas também a falência necessária da esperança histórica, ou a impossibilidade da redenção (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2004, p. 36). Ele nos apresenta outra aproximação entre os dois livros sob o caráter do pessimismo, pela falência da esperança. Entendo que o fato da morte ser a única capaz de dar ao homem aquilo que o homem busca, ou seja, a determinação, e o fato da "fusão das liberdades recíprocas" ser o ápice do projeto histórico, possuem caráter de frustração. 66 Entretanto, contesto o caráter de pessimismo sartriano, utilizando-me do velho método de prova, que é a refutação socrática, em que se pressupõe inicialmente o contrário do que se quer provar, depois, admite-se uma consequência dessa pressuposição e posteriormente mostra-se a falsidade dessa consequência. A conclusão é a negação da primeira pressuposição. Para fazer essa aplicação, primeiramente, consideremos a relação entre pessimismo (P) e inércia (I), pois a expressão de que "não tem jeito" do pessimismo sempre leva à ideia de que "tanto faz" nossas atitudes, isto é, a inércia. Logo, a inércia é deduzida do pessimismo (P→I). Se considerarmos o pessimismo sartriano como verdadeiro, teríamos que admitir a inércia em Sartre: ((P^P→I)→I), o que não se verifica. Inclusive, a inércia é própria do em-si que aparenta a unidade (SARTRE, 1985, p. 162) e não do para-si. E, mesmo considerando a totalidade passiva, em que a necessidade garante, de certa forma, uma inércia, ela pode ser ultrapassada: "E é na totalidade como unidade abstrata de um campo de forças e de tensão que a negação da negação deve se tornar afirmação" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 200, tradução nossa)66 Não sendo inércia, o projeto, para o qual o para-si transcende, fundamento do homem, é propriamente movimento significante: Mas a relação do signo ao significado não pode ser concebida, aqui, na forma de uma significação empírica: o movimento significante – enquanto que a linguagem é por sua vez uma atitude imediata de cada um pela relação a todos e um produto humano – é ele mesmo projeto. Isso significa que o projeto existencial será na palavra que o denotará, não como o significado – que, por princípio, é de fora – mas como seu fundamento original e sua estrutura mesma (SARTRE, 1985, p. 127, tradução nossa)67. Quando Sartre fala da presença recorrente da má-fé na maior parte do comportamento humano, ou quando fala dos limites dos planos revolucionários organizados pelos grupos, na verdade, ele realiza uma espécie de denúncia, de 66 « Et c'est dans la totalité comme unité abstraite d'un champ de forces et de tension que la négation de la négation doit devenir affirmation ». 67 « Mais le rapport du signe au signifié ne peut être conçu, ici, dans la forme d'une signification empirique : le mouvement signifiant – en tant que le langage est à la fois une attitude immédiate de chacun par rapport à tous et un produit humain – est lui-même projet. Cela signifie que le projet existentiel sera dans le mot qui le dénotera, non comme le signifié – qui, par principe, est dehors – mais comme son fondement originel et sa structure même ». 67 tentativa de gerar tensão, com o intuito de abertura de possibilidade de auto percepção e de mudança. Ainda que a inércia seja o caso, Sartre não defende a inércia, ele a contesta. Logo, o pessimismo não pode mesmo ser o caso em Sartre. Para Sartre, são dois os elementos fundamentais para a geração do movimento enquanto atitude: exigência e uma nova ideia. A exigência por causa da tensão, da eliminação da comodidade. No texto Esboços para a Crítica da Razão dialética, Sartre dá como exemplo de "exigência", o patrão que abaixa os salários para minimizar custos. A exigência é o que gera tensão e o que é capaz de os tirar da inércia (SARTRE, 2005, p. 21-22). A ideia porque ela é o si, o fim último do para-si, o projeto criado ou escolhido para o futuro, que é capaz de abrir possibilidades de escolha, sem a qual nenhum estado de sofrimento poderia ser modificado. Na obra O ser e o nada, Sartre considera que para sair da inércia, além da tensão, é preciso ter um "si" buscado: a criação de uma nova ideia que possibilite a modificação dos estados anteriores (SARTRE,2011d, p. 538). E também, em O existencialismo é um humanismo (2010b), Sartre fala da idealidade. Assim, defendo que podemos deduzir das obras sartrianas a necessidade prática da pergunta sobre qual a ideia que se deseja gerar com a constituição de qualquer teoria, ou seja, qual seria a ideia gerada em qualquer escrito capaz de desgovernar algum tipo de inércia. Ao chegar a respostas, poderíamos entender qual é a "exigência" implícita de qualquer tese, de qualquer livro. A ação ou a manutenção de algum estatuto – ou seja, a atitude advinda – é expressão da relevância de qualquer texto. E assim como todas as atitudes da realidade humana, ela pode ser de dois tipos: de má-fé ou autêntica. Retomemos então esses dois projetos para averiguarmos a relação deles com a inércia, pois, ao negarmos a inércia em Sartre, podemos também negar seu caráter pessimista, e logo, afirmar o contrário, sobre qual sentido ele é idealista. O Para-si, que não é ser, mas que quer ser "ser", projeta-se para um ser externo a ele, que não coincide com ele no presente, seja na atitude de má-fé, quando ocorre a confusão entre o que é transcendência e o que é facticidade (mentira para si) (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 94), seja na atitude autêntica, quando ocorre a responsabilização da escolha do ser para o qual se projeta. Mas de qualquer modo, há sempre uma projeção. O projeto. Assim a alienação pode modificar os resultados da ação, mas não sua realidade profunda. Nós recusamos confundir o homem 68 alienado com uma coisa, e a alienação com as leis físicas que regem os condicionamentos da exterioridade. Nós afirmamos a especificidade do ato humano que atravessa o meio social todo conservando as determinações e que transforma o mundo sobre a base das condições dadas. Para nós, o homem se caracteriza antes de tudo pelo ultrapassamento de uma situação, pelo que ele consegue fazer daquilo que fizeram dele, mesmo que ele não se reconheça jamais em sua objetivação (SARTRE, 1985, p. 76, tradução nossa)68. Mesmo quando o para-si decide não alterar nada, ainda assim a escolha é presente, pois ele escolhe a conservação. Entretanto, enquanto que, na atitude de má-fé, a inércia tende a permanecer, visto que a responsabilização das atitudes é jogada para o que é exterior: família, historicidade, situação econômica, condição política, passado; a autenticidade abre caminhos de movimento ou de permanência, de acordo com a satisfação própria do sujeito consigo e com o mundo e de acordo com sua projeção para os sentimentos de orgulho ou vergonha. [...] agir é modificar a figura do mundo, é dispor de meios com vistas a um fim, é produzir um complexo instrumental e organizado de tal ordem que, por uma série de encadeamentos e conexões, a modificação efetuada em um dos elos acarrete modificações em toda a série e, para finalizar, produza um resultado previsto (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 536)69. Para Sartre, o que provoca a ação é a concepção de algo desejável e não o existente. O existente, seja ele fato ou a constatação do sofrimento, não é capaz de gerar qualquer transformação por ele mesmo. O homem que fundamentalmente não tem essência a priori, a constitui com suas atitudes vistas pelos Outros, através de seu projeto (SARTRE, 1996, p.51), de sua biografia. Esse ser externo ao para-si, para o qual ele se projeta, é o valor, ou seja, o em-si-para-si (3.2), que dá unidade entre o 68 « Le projet. Ainsi l'aliénation peut modifier les résultats de l'action mais non sa réalité profonde. Nous refusons de confondre l'homme aliéné avec une chose, et l'aliénation avec les lois physiques qui régissent les conditionnements d'extériorité. Nous affirmons la spécificité de l'acte humain, qui traverse le milieu social tout en conservant les déterminations et qui transforme le monde sur la base de conditions données. Pur nous, l'homme se caractérise avant tout par le dépassement d'une situation, par ce qu'il parvient à faire de ce qu'on a fait de lui, même s'il ne se reconnaît jamais dans son objectivation ». 69 « [...]agir, c'est modifier la figure du monde, c'est disposer des moyens en vue d'une fin, c'est produire un complexe instrumental et organisé tel que, par une série d'enchaînements et de liaisons, la modification apportée à l'un des chaînons amène des modifications dans toute la série et, pour finir, produise un résultat prévu » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 477). 69 passado, o presente e o futuro humano, e que pode gerar o movimento. O valor é uma ideia, e nesse sentido, Sartre é Idealista. Pois é preciso inverter aqui a opinião geral e convir que não é a rigidez de uma situação ou os sofrimentos que ela impõe que constituem motivos para que se conceba outro estado de coisas, no qual tudo sairá melhor para todos; pelo contrário, é a partir do dia em que se pode conceber outro estado de coisas que uma luz nova ilumina nossas penúrias e sofrimentos e decidimos que são insuportáveis (SARTRE,2011d, p. 538). Podemos dizer com nossas palavras que a história, que descreve os fatos, não é suficiente para transformações. Para que mudanças ocorram é necessária a arte, a criação da luz, a concepção de um novo estado de coisas. Assim, também quero mostrar que a própria teoria de Sartre é também uma "luz nova", que "exige" modificação de atitude naquele que entra em contato com sua teoria. Sartre chama o leitor a interrogar-se o tempo inteiro sobre o que ele (o leitor) realmente está escolhendo, e seu descontentamento com a resposta exige a busca dessa "luz nova", que nada mais é que novas ideias70. Retomando, o ser da "nova ideia" não é condição suficiente para sua realização. É preciso os móbeis, que são as condições subjetivas, a vontade própria do indivíduo, e também os motivos, que são as condições objetivas para a realização da nova concepção. Assim, a teoria da autenticidade de Sartre é motivo em dois sentidos, não só como a luz, mas também como a condição objetiva, por causar tensão e por abrir possibilidades práticas, para a realização plena do valor escolhido. É por isso que em Questão de método Sartre critica o marxismo em geral pelas análises deterministas, ao passo que o elogia pela capacidade descritiva, de produção de novas ideias e de possibilidade transformadora a partir da iluminação das ações: O marxismo, no século XIX, é uma tentativa gigantesca não somente de fazer a História mas de apoderar-se dela, prática e teoricamente, unificando o movimento operário e iluminando a ação do proletariado 70 Isso também tem relação com a teoria da linguagem de Austin e com a análise sobre a história de Foucault. 70 pelo conhecimento do processo capitalista e da realidade objetiva dos trabalhadores (SARTRE, 1979, p. 76)71. A iluminação que Sartre cita quando fala do marxismo é justamente a nova ideia que é criada como fim último de seu projeto (ver 3.4). O projeto criado com objetivo claro e definido é fundamento da possibilidade de transformação do para-si e do mundo, não pela imposição de deduções ou essências pré-existentes, mas pela inspiração da vivência, pela simples existência. "Se a existência, de outro lado, precede a essência e nós queremos existir ao mesmo tempo que nós fazemos nossa imagem, essa imagem é legítima para todos e para nossa época inteira" (SARTRE, 1996, p. 32, tradução nossa)72. Mesmo que eu queira agir individualmente, considerando simplesmente o fato imediato e individual, minha atitude é atitude vivida em minha época, ou seja, é possibilidade concretizada. Essa possibilidade de concretização nem sempre é óbvia, é preciso que a vivência dê seu testemunho. Eu poderia querer ser um Robin Hood da época atual, mas posso não saber se isso é realizável, por causa das câmeras de segurança, dos dados interligados pela internet, da repressão policial. Mas, se eu vivesse desse modo, significaria que outros poderiam também viver de tal maneira e que realmente essa escolha seria possível, por isso a legitimidade da imagem mencionada por Sartre em relação a todos. Além do mais, isso está de acordo com os estudos de Hare sobre a linguagem moral, em que toda ação se conecta com uma prescrição, pelo simples fato de ser uma escolha: Se perguntássemos a uma pessoa "Quais são seus princípios morais?" a maneira pela qual poderíamos ter certeza de uma resposta verdadeira seria estudando o que ela faz. Ela pode, logicamente, professar em seu discurso toda sorte de princípios que desconsidera completamente em suas ações; mas, quando estivesse frente a 71 « Le marxisme, au XIXe siècle, est une tentative gigantesque non seulement pour faire l'Histoire mais pour s'emparer d'elle, pratiquement et théoriquement, en unifiant le mouvement ouvrier et en éclairant l'action du prolétariat par la connaissance du processus capitaliste et de la réalité objective des travailleurs » (SARTRE, 1985, p. 74-75). 72 « Si l'existence, d'autre part, précède l'essence et que nous voulions exister en même temps que nous façonnons notre image, cette image est valable pour tous et pour notre époque tout entière ». 71 escolhas ou decisões entre cursos de ação alternativos, entre respostas alternativas à questão "Que devo fazer?", conhecendo todos os fatos relevantes de uma situação, ela revelaria em quais princípios de conduta realmente acredita (HARE, 1996, p. 3). Daquilo que é defendido por Sartre e por Hare, poderíamos dizer que das ações pode-se extrair juízos morais ou prescrições universais para toda a humanidade, pelo simples fato de que juízos morais são prescrições, e de que as prescrições dizem respeito ao modo de agir. Entretanto, há incoerência lógica nessas conclusões. Mostraremos isso e, a seguir, proporemos alguns ajustes na proposta, a fim de atingir a explicitação da coerência do mecanismo da moral, que, na prática, é dialética, e que mantém sua coerência no interior de seus ápices de contraposição. Não usaremos exemplos de Sartre, nem dizemos que esse tipo de proposta de Ética seja a dele, apenas fazemos isso como um tipo de aplicação de seu conceito de projeto, pois, para o próprio autor é preciso criar mecanismos para que não se fuja de sua própria escolha. Primeiramente destaco que Sartre não faz distinção clara sobre juízos nãomorais e juízos morais, como faz Hare, ainda que Hare considere que ambos possuam função lógica comum (HARE, 1996, p. 5). Essa distinção é importante para essa discussão, porque os juízos ligados a valores que não são morais não dizem respeito a conflitos de interesses entre duas ou mais pessoas, ou seja, só afetam àquele que elegeu tal finalidade, não obstante, os valores morais afetam o outro. Explicaremos logo a seguir essa diferença. Não contraditoriamente, valor em Sartre possui seu aspecto de subjetividade (sobre a escolha do para-si) e de objetividade (o si buscado pelo parasi), por isso é um em-si-para-si (como detalharemos em 3.2). Esse aspecto objetivo é a finalidade escolhida. Disso, podemos fazer as distinções entre juízos de valor morais e não morais, não feitas por Sartre. Primeiramente, vejamos um exemplo de juízo não moral, em que não há conflito de interesses, pois não diz respeito a uma escolha que interfira na vida de outra pessoa que não seja aquele que emite o juízo. Posso escolher como finalidade, adquirir um relógio para marcar meu tempo no treino de natação. Logo, se eu me deparar com dois relógios em minha frente, um de ouro e outro à prova d'água, vou escolher o segundo, porque minha finalidade anteriormente escolhida (o valor) foi "um 72 relógio para a natação". Nesse caso podemos dizer que, para essa finalidade, "o relógio à prova d'água é o relógio certo" é verdadeiro, que é um juízo de valor nãomoral. Vejamos outro tipo de exemplo, em que há conflito de interesses entre pessoas. Suponhamos que eu escolha ter uma empresa e explorar trabalhadores, pois meu objetivo é enriquecer. Para essa finalidade, o juízo "explorar é certo" é verdadeiro. Porém, para a finalidade da Ética, que é de não produzir vítimas, o juízo "explorar é certo" é falso. Analisando as duas proposições desse parágrafo, de acordo com essas finalidades distintas, podemos dizer que a exploração para a finalidade do enriquecimento é imoral, já que imoral significa errado de acordo com a Ética. Podemos observar que o funcionamento lógico das análises dos juízos de valores morais e não morais é similar. Contudo, existe incoerência entre a finalidade da exploração e a finalidade da Ética, o que não acontece nos juízos em que não existe conflito de interesses. No caso de juízos não morais, posso dizer que recomendo o relógio à prova d'agua para nadar e o relógio de ouro para passear, independentemente da pessoa, seja para mim, seja para o outro. No caso de juízos morais isso não é possível: não posso dizer de forma coerente, que recomento a exploração e a Ética. Além disso, não posso dizer que recomendo a exploração para se ganhar dinheiro, quando estou na posição do trabalhador, por exemplo. Isso seria incoerente também. É por esse motivo que defendemos a existência de uma supremacia do projeto da Ética sobre os demais, porque diz respeito às relações com o outro, de tal maneira que existe a preocupação em se manter o juízo coerente, com o mesmo valor verdade, independente da posição da pessoa, ou seja, com a impessoalidade, o que Hare chama de universalizabilidade. Os juízos são construídos com uma finalidade em mão dupla: para não produzir vítimas com minhas ações, mas também para não ser vítima das ações do outro. Então, podemos concluir que de valores (finalidades escolhidas pelo parasi) chegaremos à construção de juízos e à realização de ações. Mas, as deduzidas das ações que valem para toda a humanidade são os valores morais, que são oriundos do projeto da Ética. Penso que talvez seja isso que Sartre realmente quisesse expressar, e até mesmo Hare. Pois se escolho e uso a cor roxa hoje, não significa que eu gostaria que todos saíssem na rua de roxo. 73 Por isso, a forma como ambos disseram está equivocada: que daquilo "que ela [pessoa] faz" podemos deduzir prescrições morais. Isso é incoerente, em primeiro lugar, porque nem sempre nossas ações estão vinculadas ao projeto da Ética. Posso praticar uma ação coerente com a Ética, mas não porque tenho princípios, mas por simples coincidência. A única coisa que atitudes minhas dizem sobre minhas escolhas de valor, são sobre os projetos que não escolhi. Por exemplo, se eu exploro o outro, significa que não optei pelo projeto da Ética como fim último. Por outro lado, logicamente, pode ser que eu nunca tenha matado, mas que seja pelo simples fato de que eu nunca tive oportunidade. Embora a atitude de não matar seja coerente com a finalidade da Ética, não significa esse tipo de atitude é decorrente dela, e que ela seja meu projeto escolhido. Além disso, o projeto da Ética exige um grau de coerência maior do que os valores não morais, justamente por causa da abrangência do conflito. Retomando o exemplo, hoje posso ter escolhido o relógio à prova d'água, porque escolhi anteriormente fazer natação, mas amanhã posso escolher o relógio de ouro, porque minha finalidade escolhida para amanhã é um passeio. E, escolher uma finalidade em um dia, não é incoerente com a segunda escolha, além de não significar que eu queira que toda a humanidade escolha a mesma coisa que eu escolhi em determinado dia. Imaginemos o comentário: "nossa, como fulano é incoerente, um dia ele usa relógio à prova d'água e no outro ele usa relógio de ouro". Qualquer pessoa iria estranhar esse comentário, porque o que é incoerente é o próprio comentário e não a pessoa que escolheu coisas distintas em dias diferentes. Isso ocorre, porque os juízos de valores não morais dizem respeito às escolhas particulares. Por outro lado, embora o projeto da Ética seja arbitrário e também uma invenção humana, eu não poderia escolhê-lo em um dia e deixar de escolher no outro dia, ou até mesmo pensar que eu posso escolhê-lo e que os outros não precisam escolhê-lo, sem que meus juízos e atitudes fossem incoerentes. Se eu faço um discurso contra a exploração, mas possuo uma empresa que explora os funcionários, certamente minha atitude tem sido incoerente com o discurso, o que chamamos de discurso vazio, que possui outra finalidade, a de camuflar a imoralidade do pronunciante. Na verdade, de prescrições morais anteriormente escolhidas, podemos deduzir ações. Podemos escrever isso em termos lógicos. Suponhamos que a instância "a" signifique "o projeto da Ética", que a proposição P(x) signifique "escolhi o 74 projeto x" e que Q(x) signifique "agi de acordo com o projeto x". Assim temos que P(a)→Q(a), logo, temos outra formulação análoga: ┐Q(a) → ┐P(a). O movimento é esse: se eu escolher o projeto da Ética, farei o esforço para que todas as minhas ações sejam coerentes a ele. Se agir em conformidade com o projeto, não posso dizer nada sobre minha escolha por esse projeto. Mas, se minhas ações são contrárias às finalidades do projeto, devo admitir que, de fato, não escolhi a Ética, ou seja, assumo minha imoralidade. Por exemplo, imaginemos que eu tenha escolhido o projeto da Ética. No entanto, o valor que eu pago para a diarista é muito inferior ao valor que recebo referente ao dia trabalhado. Dessa maneira, eu percebo uma incoerência, pois a exploração é a minha atitude e ela é incoerente com o projeto de não produzir vítimas. Na vida vivida, não existem incoerências, existem percepções e mudanças de atitudes, ou não. A partir do momento que eu percebo essa incoerência, se eu não modifico minha atitude, significa que eu não tinha realmente escolhido o projeto da Ética. Como defendi em meu mestrado, a lógica, ainda que seja necessária, não é uma ferramenta suficiente para a explicação das mudanças de atitudes a partir dos fatos, no que se refere às situações e atitudes morais. A lógica abarca somente análises estáticas, enquanto que, para esse âmbito, propus uma análise análoga a um programa de computador, que envolve processos. Esse programa de nosso exemplo teria como finalidade a Ética. Entro com dados: de um lado, com minhas atitudes, do outro lado, com os fatos vinculados a essas atitudes. Analiso os fatos sobre sua concordância com a finalidade do programa, se a resposta for sim, o programa é encerrado, caso contrário, ele te oferece a possibilidade de mudar de atitude. Isso seriam os dados processados, a informação gerada (saída). São processos. Dos fatos (os dados), não posso deduzir valores, mas de valores escolhidos (a finalidade do programa) e de análises de informações (vinculação de ações e fatos), posso modificar atitudes (informação, saída do processamento). Às vezes falta o programa, que representa a escolha individual, ou seja, a pessoa não escolhe essa finalidade. Nesse caso, de nada adianta o mecanismo do programa. Mas muitas vezes, falta a análise dos fatos e suas devidas vinculações, por isso a relevância das constatações. Por exemplo, uma pessoa que sempre comeu carne, mas que tem preocupações Éticas. Ou seja, ela escolheu o programa. Depois ela passa a ter acesso aos seguintes dados: Os mamíferos 75 possuem maior capacidade cognitiva que os recém-nascidos, logo, são pessoas, pois o conceito de pessoa está vinculado à memória, identidade, sentimentos e complexidade cerebral, e não ao fato de ser homem, ou ao fato de ser um ser vivo. Além disso, a quantidade de grãos produzidos para alimentar rebanhos suínos e bovinos é suficiente para acabar com a fome do mundo; a sociedade moderna consegue controlar e produzir a reposição da necessidade de proteína dos corpos humanos com outros alimentos, e, por fim, a manutenção de rebanhos suínos e bovinos está associada à manutenção do poder dos latifundiários, contra a propriedade familiar e a distribuição de renda, a favor da utilização dos agrotóxicos e da manutenção das desigualdades sociais. Assim, a execução do programa analisa que o ato de comer carne produz vítimas, que é uma mera afirmação ainda sem nenhuma prescrição. Ao analisar essa conclusão e a finalidade do programa, é percebida uma incoerência entre a análise e a finalidade do programa, logo o programa prescreve uma atitude: parar de comer carne vermelha. E assim, a pessoa modifica sua atitude. Se não modificar, significa que estava só vendo como o programa funciona, mas que não tinha o escolhido, o que significa que ela precisa admitir sua imoralidade. Bem, de qualquer modo, fica claro que de escolhas (projetos) são exigidas atitudes, e não o contrário. E o mais importante, os procedimentos lógicos estão a serviço das escolhas, e não o contrário. Eles podem, inclusive, ser ferramentas auxiliadoras para sairmos da inércia, caso escolhamos o idealismo ordinário. 1.6 Existencial e universal: a vivência imperativa Compreendo que, talvez, por apresentar um sistema racional singular que ultrapasse e integre os modelos vigentes (SARTRE, 1985,p. 40), Sartre defende a ideia de que nossas escolhas devem ser tomadas de tal modo, como se toda a humanidade pudesse também fazer a mesma escolha (SARTRE, 1996, p. 34). Numa época, que é aquela em que nós vivemos, em que a perda de referências nos leva à indiferença, ao relativismo, ao cinismo, pela impossibilidade de identificação de valores individuais, de valores coletivos, talvez a atualidade de Sartre consista exatamente em nos 76 mostrar que a nossa identidade não significa a construção e a fixação de uma imagem de nós mesmos, mas deveria consistir em assumirmos o livre compromisso de uma identificação muito lúcida e muito crítica com a história que nos é dada a viver (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2013b). Poderíamos trocar "história que nos é dada a viver" da citação acima por "história que queremos viver", pois Sartre deseja que tenhamos o compromisso com o futuro e não com o presente. Talvez esse seria o sentido, ainda que a frase pudesse ter um ar bem mais romântico não desejado pelo autor. Vejamos o que fala Sartre: "Compreedeu-se 'Escrever para sua época' como se isso significasse: escrever para seu presente. Mas não: é escrever para um futuro concreto delimitado pelas esperanças, pelas crenças e pelas possibilidades de ação de todos e de cada um" (SARTRE, 1989, p. 33, tradução nossa)73. Nesse sentido, reafirmo Sartre como um filósofo esperançoso, pois a ontologia do fenômeno, em que a aparência revela a essência, liga-se perfeitamente com a atitude aparecida, pois a verdade se revela pela ação (SARTRE, 1989, p. 39), em que o homem só é aquilo que ele faz, a partir da interpretação do outro. O parasi, que não tem essência, que não está acabado, ele a constitui com a sua biografia para o mundo. Por pensar sobre a essência do mundo que ele pode vir a constituir, é que o homem se engaja nos projetos e constitui também a história e a ciência. Escrever uma teoria, assim, é participar de um projeto literário escolhido e inspirador para a prática, fazendo-se e fazendo história. Sartre fala da ferramenta como corpo inerte de mediação (SARTRE, 1985, p.196). Ao meu ver, a teoria, e inclusive, o estudo sobre a Ética, da forma como a conceituamos nesse trabalho, pode ser considerada como constituição de ferramenta para o ultrapassamento da situação, uma vez que "[...] o conhecimento aparece como o desvelamento do campo perceptivo e prático pelo fim, ou seja, pelo não-ser futuro" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 206, tradução nossa)74, um futuro 73 « On a compris : ' Écrire pour son époque' comme si cela signifiait : écrie pour son présent. Mais non : c'est écrire pour un avenir concret délimité par les espérances, les craintes et les possibilités d'action de tous e de chacun ». 74 «[...] la connaissance apparaît comme le dévoilement du champ perceptif et pratique par la fin, c'est-à-dire par le non-être futur ». 77 que não é ainda, mas que está para ser "na unidade prática de uma totalização em curso"(SARTRE, 1985, p. 206, tradução nossa)75. Sartre distingue contemplação de conhecimento, justamente porque esse desvelamento permanece prático. Mas por outro lado, podemos concluir que uma contemplação falada, ou seja, uma descrição pronunciada, não seria uma mera contemplação, pois: "[...] a linguagem é práxis como relação prática de um homem a um outro e a práxis é sempre linguagem (seja ao mentir, seja ao falar a verdade) porque ela não pode se fazer sem se significar" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 212, tradução nossa)76. Com isso, podemos fazer uma aproximação de Sartre com a filosofia da linguagem de Austin (1962), em que todo constatativo (as afirmações) é na verdade um performativo implícito (as ordens), pois, em Sartre, a própria contemplação, se enunciada, é conhecimento, pois seria desvelamento prático. A práxis, com efeito, é uma passagem do objetivo ao objetivo pela interiorização; o projeto como ultrapassamento subjetivo da objetividade para a objetividade, estendido entre as condições objetivas do meio e as estruturas objetivas do campo de possíveis, representa nele mesmo a unidade movente da subjetividade e da objetividade, essas determinações cardinais da atividade. O subjetivo aparece então como um momento necessário do processo objetivo. Para se tornarem as condições reais da práxis, as condições materiais que governam as relações humanas devem ser vividas na particularidade das situações particulares [...]. O que quer dizer ao mesmo tempo, que o vivido enquanto tal encontra seu lugar no resultado, o sentido projetado da ação aparece na realidade do mundo para tomar sua verdade no processo de totalização. Somente o projeto como mediação entre dois momentos de objetividade pode explicar a História, ou seja, a criatividade humana (SARTRE, 1985, p. 80-81, tradução nossa)77. 75 : « [...] dans l'unité pratique d'une totalisation en cours ». 76 « [...] le langage est praxis comme relation pratique d'un homme à un autre et la praxis est toujours langage (qu'elle mente ou qu'elle dise vrai) parce qu'elle ne peut se faire sans se signifier ». 77 "La praxis, en effet, est un passage de l'objectif à l'objectif par l'intériorisation; le projet comme dépassement subjectif de l'objectivité vers l'objectivité, tendu entre les conditions objectives par l'intériorisation ; le projet comme dépassement subjectif de l'objectivité vers l'objectivité, tendu entre les conditions objectives du milieu et les structures objectives du champ des possibles, représente en lui-même l'unité mouvante de la subjectivité et de l'objectivité, ces déterminations cardinales de l'activité. Le subjectif apparaît alors comme un moment nécessaire du processus objectif. Pour devenir des conditions réelles de la praxis, les conditions matérielles qui gouvernent les relations humaines doivent être vécues dans la particularité des situations particulières [...]. Ce qui veut dire à la fois que le vécu en tant que tel trouve sa place dans le résultat et que le sens projeté de l'action apparaît dans la réalité du monde pour prendre sa vérité dans le processus de totalisation. Seul, le projet comme médiation entre deux moments de l'objectivité peut rendre compte de l'Histoire, c'est-à-dire de la créativité humaine ». 78 O homem mostra sua verdade também através da fala, pois ela é concretização objetiva de sua escolha subjetiva, ou seja, a fala é sua criação e sua ação. E através da fala, e da fusão das falas, fazemos história. O fato de que o ápice do processo histórico seja somente a fusão das liberdades recíprocas é tão instável quanto o desejo escorregadio do para-si que se modifica imediatamente após sua realização. Isso decorre do fato de que, séries e grupos, momentos da totalização, estão perpetuamente em curso. Acredito que esse também seja o motivo pelo qual Sartre almeja somente uma solução provisória em Questão do Método e em Crítica da razão dialética (SARTRE, 1985, p. 14-15). A ideia que não é pré-existente, mas que é criada/escolhida, é fundamento do movimento a posteriori, assim a ação de si mesmo vai constituindo sua própria identidade – a essência –, que também não pode ser imposta como modelo, mas ao contrário, pode abrir possibilidades de escolhas ao outrem. E, como Sartre fez a comparação entre a moral e a estética (SARTRE, 1996, p. 64-66), à essa ideia que afeta o outrem a posteriori, podemos chamar de inspiração. Mesmo que o existencialismo seja o contrário do prescritivismo clássico (SARTRE, 1996, p. 102), que seus pressupostos a posteriori não aceitem valores a priori (SARTRE, 1996, p. 64), e que seu método heurístico (SARTRE, 1985, p.104) se contraponha ao dedutivo, a inspiração e o conceito de responsabilidade entendidos em conjunto provocam uma aproximação da prática da filosofia existencialista à ética universal, pois o homem que é livre, é responsável por sua história e por sua cultura. Para concluir esse capítulo, temos que, em resumo, a discussão sobre a essência encontra-se desde a antiguidade e relaciona-se com a questão da verdade. A fenomenologia contesta a metafísica idealista. Vejamos. Para Platão, a essência existe antes do mundo sensível, porque ela está ligada às formas, às ideias préexistentes, ao mundo inteligível. Assim, o mundo sensível é cópia imperfeita das ideias e a essência (a verdade) só pode ser acessada pela razão. Por outro lado, em Aristóteles, a essência existe a partir do sensível. Para Aristóteles, a definição surge com a existência. Enquanto Platão, com o seu racionalismo, funda, de certa forma, o que a história da filosofia costuma chamar de idealismo ontológico; Aristóteles funda o empirismo. Kant fez uma importante síntese: reuniu razão e sentidos, disse que o conhecimento se daria a partir de ambos (fenômeno), mas a essência (sobre como as coisas são verdadeiramente) não seria acessível (númeno). A fenomenologia cria a antítese de Kant. Sartre diz que a verdade está na relação entre consciência e objeto, 79 e que o fenômeno não vela nada, ao contrário, desvela o ser (a verdade). Para a fenomenologia, a essência é o próprio fenômeno. Mas, embora eu entenda a projeção da teoria do fenômeno em Sartre como antítese kantiana, eu também o vejo como constituinte de outra importante síntese, não no âmbito da metafísica, mas no âmbito da ética prática, sobre o existencial e o universal, pois, embora não existam verdades sobre um bem a priori como no idealismo, a verdade se encontra no fazer-se, ou seja, um bem a constituir-se existencialmente, a posteriori, através do fazer-identidade (capítulo 2) e do fazer-universalização (capítulo 3). 80 2 FAZER-IDENTIDADE Identidade e idealidade estão intimamente interligadas. Mencionamos no capítulo anterior que o não se projetar para a identidade impede a vivência de uma finalidade com maior significância e impede a autenticidade, e assim, impede a idealidade a posteriori. Entretanto, percebemos que essa questão não está esgotada, pois a questão da contingencialidade humana é inter-relacionada a todos os principais conceitos sartrianos, que é o que queremos mostrar. A essência do homem não é anterior à existência do homem, pois sua essência, ou até mesmo o próprio homem, estão para serem feitos a partir das vivências. Dessa maneira, Sartre afirma sobre a postura dos intelectuais, que: Contrariamente ao pensamento burguês, ele deve tomar consciência de que o homem não existe. Mas, consequentemente, sabendo que ele não existe ainda como um homem, ele deve apreender, nele e de fora dele – e inversamente – o homem como a fazer (SARTRE, 1972, p. 50, tradução nossa)78. Com isso, o objetivo desse capítulo é discutir em que sentido o homem é contingência e em que sentido ele é necessidade em sua relação com sua identidade. Se ele é totalmente contingente, ele não possui identidade, o que garante a inexistência de um idealismo a priori. Para Sartre, o passado foi constituído contingencialmente, mas necessariamente é um em-si imutável. O para-si é presente das escolhas contingentes, ao mesmo tempo em que é necessidade de identidade. Uma identidade que não existe pronta e acabada, mas que foi se formando no passado e está permanentemente para ser formada no futuro. Dizer que a liberdade é a essência do Para-si é o mesmo que dizer que o Para-si não possui essência a priori. Por outro lado, isso atribui responsabilidade ao Para-si sobre a constituição de sua essência: "Eis o paradoxo sartreano: viver é aceitar a impossibilidade de encontrar a liberdade substantiva e, ao mesmo tempo, permanecer concentrado sobre o processo de criação de si" (MOURA, 2013, p. 83). 78 « Contrairement à la pensée bourgeoise, il doit prendre conscience de ce que l'homme n'existe pas. Mais, du même coup, sachant qu'il n'est pas encore un homme, il doit saisir, en lui et du coup hors de lui – et inversement – l'homme comme à faire ». 81 Disso podemos dizer que, quando não se assume a responsabilidade por nenhum projeto, a atitude é de má-fé, pois a impossibilidade de criação de sentido é afirmada como algo fixado, definido, fora do para-si. Não obstante, quando se escolhe um projeto unicamente pelo fato de ter feito isso anteriormente, na tentativa de constituição de uma identidade, essa atitude também tem característica de má-fé, pois a permanência no projeto, desenvolve-se como se fosse algo dado, como se não pudesse ser diferente. Assim é o projeto de má-fé, que surge na tentativa de mentir para si mesmo sobre o que é escolha e o que é determinação, no intuito de não assumir a responsabilidade de uma ação da qual se é o autor. Logo, para agir autenticamente, o para-si precisa escolher seus projetos, mas ele não pode se manter nesse projeto pelo simples fato de ter um dia escolhido tal projeto. A escolha de tal projeto deve ser constantemente reavaliada e o projeto constantemente escolhido. Eis a dificuldade da constituição da identidade de forma predominantemente autêntica e de entender o que seria a constituição da identidade que não se daria principalmente pela má-fé. Vejamos os motivos dessa dificuldade. 2.1 Má-fé e identidade: dependência da subjetividade para classificação e imperativos implícitos Primeiramente, sobre o conceito específico de má-fé, verificamos que ordinariamente a má-fé é confundida com a "má-fé" jurídica, em que a pessoa age de forma má intencionada. Sabemos que má-fé em Sartre não possui qualquer remissão ao conceito corriqueiro e que a estrutura da má-fé é algo bem específico: "É preciso afirmar a facticidade como sendo transcendência e a transcendência como sendo facticidade, de modo que se possa, no momento que captamos uma, deparar bruscamente com a outra" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 102)79. Um outro aspecto, diz respeito às discussões comuns entre estudantes de Sartre nos congressos em que se comenta que determinadas atitudes, descritas de tal forma, são de má-fé. Um dos pontos que reafirmo aqui é que, se seguirmos a conceituação de Sartre de forma rigorosa, não podemos julgar atitudes específicas, a 79 "Il faut affirmer la facticité comme étant la transcendance et la transcendance comme étant la facticité, de façon qu'on puisse, dans l'instant ou on saisit l'une, se trouver brusquement en face d l'autre" (SARTRE, 1943, p. 91). 82 menos que se conheça o íntimo do sujeito, ou seja, o modo como o sujeito entende e se relaciona com sua atitude. Pois, apenas observando de fora uma atitude específica, não se tem os elementos necessários que permitam julgar a forma com que o sujeito lida com sua atitude, ou seja, não possuímos elementos suficientes para dizer que ele afirma "a facticidade como sendo transcendência" ou vice-versa. Exemplificando, uma pessoa pode esmurrar a outra e essa atitude pode ser autêntica ou de má-fé, a depender de como a pessoa "afirma" sua atitude. Se ela jogar a culpa no externo, dizendo que foi afetada pelo Outro, ou que estava com hormônios alterados, ou que estava usando drogas, ou que não teve uma boa educação familiar, etc., ela afirma "a transcendência como sendo facticidade", e nesse caso, age de máfé. Contudo, se ela afirma que poderia ter tido outras atitudes, mas que escolheu esmurrar a outra pessoa, então ela age de forma autêntica. Vejamos agora o exemplo do próprio Sartre, o mais famoso exemplo sobre a má-fé: o garçom. No capítulo sobre má-fé (SARTRE, 1943, p. 89-102), Sartre descreve a atitude do garçom semelhante a um autômato e a qualifica como atitude de má-fé. Entretanto, no capítulo sobre fazer e ter, ele descreve a mímese da mesma forma que a arte, o esporte e o conhecimento e a coloca no campo da tentativa que o homem tem de ser Deus, do processo criativo, de se assumir como livre (SARTRE, 1943, p. 621-646), que é o projeto de autenticidade. Disso, fica claro que, por hipótese, em seu interior, se o garçom se percebesse como tendo que fazer aqueles movimentos, tendo que acordar em determinado horário, etc., por causa de motivos externos, ele realizaria, de fato, o projeto de má-fé. Mas, se ele imitasse os atos de um "exímio garçom", percebendo sua ação de imitar, do seu livre movimento de imitar, como se fosse um jogo em que as regras foram humanamente inventadas e as obedece, divertindo-se, sem a "seriedade" tão criticada por Sartre, então sua atitude não seria de má-fé. Ou seja, a mesma atitude pode ter sido de má-fé ou autêntica, dependendo exclusivamente do entendimento do para-si a respeito de sua ação. Mas também observamos que essas confusões conceituais ocorrem porque a denominação de má à má-fé, em Sartre, é valorativa e de desaprovação. Ou seja, Sartre rejeita claramente as atitudes de má-fé. Então, quando se observa uma atitude desaprovada pelo filósofo, é comum a utilização pelo leitor do conceito de máfé de forma inapropriada. 83 Para reforçar essa desaprovação, observemos a utilização das palavras com sentidos negativos como "ameaça" e "risco" quando Sartre refere-se à má-fé, no trecho abaixo: Se a má-fé é possível, deve-se a que constitui a ameaça imediata e permanente de todo projeto do ser humano, ao fato de a consciência esconder em seu ser um permanente risco de má-fé. E a origem desse risco é que a consciência, ao mesmo tempo e em seu ser, é o que não é e não é o que é (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 118)80. Em O existencialismo é um humanismo suas palavras são ainda mais duras: Aqueles que encobrem, à guisa de seriedade ou com escusas deterministas, sua total liberdade, eu os chamarei de covardes; e aos que tentarem mostrar que sua existência era necessária, sendo que ela é a própria contingência da aparição do ser humano sobre a terra, a esses os chamarei de asquerosos (SARTRE, 2010b, p. 56)81. Por outro lado, identificamos uma valoração positiva dada por Sartre, na descrição do projeto da autenticidade, que se realiza quando as ações são assumidas como frutos de uma escolha livre, sem atribuições de determinações externas (família, situação histórica, inconsciente, leis ou cultura). Embora esses sentidos prescritivos da autenticidade e da rejeição da máfé em Sartre gerem a possibilidade de uma má interpretação do que seja má-fé, essa valoração cumpre outro papel que julgo bastante importante: a descrição desses dois projetos impulsiona o leitor a assumir a responsabilidade de suas ações, pois a própria descrição dos mesmos é capaz de abrir a possibilidade de responsabilização e mudança de atitude. A descrição dos projetos possui o funcionamento da ideia, do 80 « Si la mauvaise foi est possible, c'est qu'elle est la menace immédiate et permanente de tout projet de l'être humain, c'est que la conscience recèle en son être un risque permanent de mauvaise foi. Et l'origine de ce risque, c'est que la conscience, à la fois et dans son être, est ce qu'elle n'est pas et n'est pas ce qu'elle est »(SARTRE, 1943, p. 106). 81 « Les uns qui se cacheront, par l'esprit de sérieux ou par des excuses déterministes, leur liberté totale, je les appellerai lâches ; les autres qui essaieront de montrer que leur existence était nécessaire, alors qu'elle est la contingence même de l'apparition de l'homme sur la terre, je les appellerai des salauds » (SARTRE, 1996, p. 7071). 84 valor, e isso, não só abre caminhos, como também ordena para a escolha de projetos predominantemente autênticos. É como se o autor tivesse dando a dica ao leitor (sem tornar-se um autor de autoajuda) de que, apesar de tudo, de qualquer situação, por mais difícil que ela possa se apresentar, ela pode ser superada. A princípio, eu observava uma contradição em Sartre. Sartre não considera o absolutismo de nenhum valor. Por outro lado, ele defende implicitamente alguns imperativos de maneira absoluta, anterior a qualquer escolha, que poderiam ser explicitados da seguinte forma: "Não se deve agir com má-fé!" e "Seja autêntico!". Depois percebi que, em um dos sentidos, de que a má-fé é um erro, a palavra erro não tinha um valor moral (de imperativo implícito deduzido do que é certo ou errado moralmente), mas um valor de verdade sobre a descrição de falta de coerência interna, por ser uma mentira. A respeito dessa descrição, não estaria implicada ou implícita a prescrição sobre a atitude autêntica (SARTRE, 2010b, p. 54). Em outro sentido, quando Sartre assume o projeto de autenticidade como sendo seu, ele se permite julgar o Outro moralmente, por divergir de si mesmo. Isso tem a ver com seu processo de engajamento e de inspiração do Outro a respeito de novas possibilidades. Sartre considera que esse projeto de autenticidade pode ser defendido com mais propriedade porque diz respeito à coerência com o fundamento humano (SARTRE, 2010b, p. 55-56). Ou seja, entender essa sutileza – entre o apontamento do erro descritivo com o fator prescritivo da palavra erro, bem como os momentos que Sartre utiliza a descrição ou a prescrição com suas respectivas funções – é tão importante para entender que Sartre não é contraditório, quanto a discussão sobre a contradição ou não de seus livros O ser e o nada e Crítica da razão dialética, discutida no capítulo anterior. Uma coisa é desmistificar o absolutismo dos valores, outra coisa é eleger valores a serem defendidos; e essas duas coisas em conjunto não são contraditórias. Disso, podemos observar Sartre e fazer o mesmo: não é porque não tenho qualquer justificativa para dizer que um valor seja melhor que outro e que ele não pode ser deduzido de algo externo a mim mesma, que não posso criá-lo, imitá-lo, ou defendê-lo. Ao contrário, a partir do momento que opto pelo engajamento, tenho que lutar pela minha liberdade e pela liberdade do Outro, assim como devo tentar concretizar aquilo que inventei. 85 Cada sujeito, no exercício de sua liberdade, inventa a ação e os valores que correspondem à sua escolha. Essa invenção é absolutamente contingente, mas, uma vez assumida a escolha, ela se reveste de um valor universal, como um imperativo. Quando escolho para mim, escolho para todos. Em Sartre a oposição entre o universal e o singular é dialética e isso quer dizer que cada indivíduo singular encarna o universal e não apenas se submete a ele (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2009, p. 112). Além do fato de que a minha escolha abre possibilidades para Outros fazerem o mesmo, também posso entender que o Outro é também um instrumento para que eu realize meu fim, e, por isso, preciso convencê-lo. Para Sartre, não há problema em "usar" o Outro como meio, porque eu mesma sou meio para realizar algum fim. Essa utilização pode ser autêntica ou de má-fé. Diante disso, também podemos observar a alternância do projeto de autenticidade e de má-fé a respeito de algumas descrições nas relações com o Outro, como a descrição sobre o amor e o desejo (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 454-511), em que se percebem as contradições inevitáveis da relação com o Outro. Assim, mesmo com a escolha autêntica por algum projeto, podemos observar a fugacidade da má-fé e da autenticidade na concretização e permanência do mesmo. Embora os projetos de máfé e autenticidade alternem-se indefinidamente, podemos constatar projetos predominantemente de má-fé e projetos predominantemente autênticos. Queremos mostrar que o modo como o para-si se relaciona com o em-si de seu passado e com o ser do futuro diz respeito à qualidade em relação a seu projeto escolhido. 2.2 A questão temporal e os projetos para constituição da identidade Sartre propõe que entendamos a temporalidade (presente, passado e futuro) como "momentos estruturados de uma síntese original" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 158)82, para que possamos a ela atribuir significado sem nos esquecermos da dependência das três dimensões. Para esclarecermos essa conexão, primeiramente, é preciso rever em que medida para Sartre somos e não somos o passado: 82 « des moments structurés d'une synthèse originelle » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 142). 86 Antes de tudo, vejo que o termo 'era' é um modo de ser. Nesse sentido, eu sou meu passado. Não o tenho, eu o sou: aquilo que dizem acerca de um ato que pratiquei ontem ou de um estado de espírito que manifestei não me deixa indiferente: fico magoado ou lisonjeado, reajo ou pouco me importo, sou afetado até a medula. Não me desassocio de meu passado (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 167)83. Sou meu passado quando me entendo como a parte que não pertence à consciência, ainda que ele se relacione com ela (está fora da consciência, é o Ego), como esse fora que não posso modificar e que se difere de meus possíveis: é o emsi. O passado possui ser, pois ele é determinado: ele é a facticidade do para-si. Mas, enquanto consciência, não sou meu passado, pois sou para-si, presente, escolha, transcendência, ou seja, posso me modificar. Embora Leopoldo e Silva tenha afirmado que o para-si "é seu próprio passado, na forma de cristalização do processo de existir" (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2013b, p. 67), Sartre claramente afirma que "À diferença do Passado, que é Em-si, o Presente é Para-si [...] O ser que é presente a [para-si]... não pode, portanto, ser 'Em-si' em repouso; o Em-si não pode ser presente, assim como não pode ser passado: pura e simplesmente é" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 174-175)84, ainda que esse presente seja em um instante infinitesimal: como é próprio do para-si, um nada. Por ser em-si, o passado possui essência a partir da relação fenomênica. Logo, não se pode modificar o passado, porém pode-se modificar seu significado, uma vez que o presente se relaciona com ele na maneira de não sê-lo. É decisão do parasi entender o em-si do passado como intransponível ou não, e assim é decisão do para-si modificar a direção de um novo passado que está sendo constituído. E é nessa medida que, enquanto consciência, não coincido com meu passado (SARTRE, 1943, p. 150-151). "[...] o passado é o que sou sem poder vivê-lo" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 172)85. 83 « Je vois d'abord que le terme « était » est un mode d'être. En ce sens je suis mon passé. Je ne t'ai pas, je le suis: ce qu'on me dit touchant un acte que j'ai fait hier, une humeur que j'ai eue, ne me laisse pas indifférent: je suis blessé ou flatté, je me cabre ou je laisse dire, je suis atteint jusqu'aux moelles. Je ne me désolidarise pas de mon passe » (SARTRE, 1943,p. 150). 84 « A la différence du passé qui est en-soi, le présent est pour-soi. [...] L'être qui est présent à [pour soi]... ne peut donc être en repos 'en-soi', l'en-soi ne peut être présent, pas plus qu'il ne peut être passé : il est, tout simplement » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 156). 85« [...] le passé c'est ce que je suis sans pouvoir le vivre » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 154). 87 Sartre mostra que, para estar presente à, é preciso se relacionar da maneira ontológica de não ser a coisa para a qual se está presente. É preciso estar fora e junto da coisa (SARTRE, 1943, p. 156). "O Presente, pois, só pode ser presença do Para-si ao ser-Em-si" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 175)86. Como o passado é em-si, podemos dizer que o para-si está presente ao passado, assim como está presente aos objetos, na maneira de não sê-lo, mas estando junto a ele a certa distância e a ele impregnado. Estou no mundo, presente ao mundo, na maneira de não ser essa cadeira, não ser esse projeto, não ser esse passado, mesmo que eu me direcione ou me distancie o tempo inteiro do em-si, intencionalmente. O Para-si não pode manter a nadificação sem se determinar como falta de ser. Significa que a nadificação não coincide com uma simples introdução do vazio na consciência. Não foi um ser exterior que expulsou o Em-si da consciência, mas o próprio Para-si é que se determina perpetuamente a não ser Em-si. Significa que só pode fundamentar-se a partir do Em-si e contra o Em-si (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 135).87 O para-si foca e julga seu passado, interpreta-o e escolhe a partir dele. "O passado é o Em-si que sou enquanto ultrapassado" (SARTRE, 2011d, p.171)88. O ser do para-si está "fora de si, adiante e atrás" (SARTRE, 2011d, p.177)89. A partir disso, verificamos que o modo de se relacionar do Para-si com seu passado, ao projetar-se para o futuro, pode definir o tipo de projeto escolhido entre má-fé e autenticidade. 86 « Le présent ne saurait donc être que présence du pour-soi à l'être-en-soi » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 156). 87 « Le pour-soi ne peut soutenir la néantisation sans se déterminer lui-même comme un défaut d'être. Cela signifie que la néantisation ne coïncide pas avec une simple introduction du vide dans la conscience. Un être extérieur n'a pas expulsé l'en-soi de la conscience, mais c'est le pour-soi qui se détermine perpétuellement lui-même à n'être pas l'en-soi. Cela signifie qu'il ne peut se fonder lui-même qu'à partir de l'en-soi et contre l'en-soi »(SARTRE, 1943, p. 121). 88 « Le passé c'est l'en-soi que je suis en tant que dépassé » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 153). 89 « En tant que pour-soi, il a son être hors de lui, devant et derrière » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 159). 88 Por isso, o passado pode, a rigor, ser o objeto visado por um Para-si que queira realizar o valor e escapar à angústia decorrente da perpétua ausência do si. Mas é radicalmente distinto, por essência, do valor: é precisamente o indicativo do qual nenhum imperativo pode ser deduzido; [ele é o fato próprio de cada para-si,] o fato contingente e inalterável que eu era (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 173)90. O para-si pode interpretar o ser atrás (seu em-si, ou seja, seu passado) como determinante de seu futuro, como se o ser atrás fosse todo seu ser, quando ele se projeta para um valor coincidente na descrição com seu passado. Isso é a falsa noção de identidade, em que todas as ações futuras são projetadas de tal modo que a justificativa premeditada é a afirmativa "sou assim", o que é o retrato do projeto da mentira para si mesmo (má-fé) em que se confunde facticidade (passado) com escolha (futuro). Isso é a falsa cristalização de uma personalidade, em que todas as ações se justificam por essa tal cristalização. Esse projeto que qualitativamente é de má-fé, é um projeto que não tem perspectivas de mudanças. Essa cristalização pode ocorrer por justificativas externas ao para-si em diversos âmbitos, exemplos: essencial ("minto, porque nasci mentirosa"), social e econômica ("roubo mesmo, porque nasci pobre"), familiar ("tenho que fazer comida todos os dias porque sou casada"), psicológica ("não sinto prazer porque fui abusada na infância"), histórica ("gosto de dinheiro porque vivo em uma sociedade capitalista"). O ser do futuro é complexo, pois, embora ele não seja em-si (SARTRE, 1943, p. 159) ele é aquele ser para o qual o para-si busca ser em-si, pois o ser do futuro é o conteúdo (o si) daquilo que falta ao para-si (SARTRE, 1943, p. 161). Todas as ações intermediárias que precisam ser realizadas para se alcançar algum estado futuro não possuem sentido sem a finalidade buscada desse estado possível. O futuro é a finalidade, a causalidade invertida, o que ilumina todas as ações do presente (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 179). Logo, na atitude de má-fé, o para-si se relaciona com essa iluminação, como se o passado preenchesse o futuro, ou seja, como se a finalidade que é o futuro fosse fixada pelos acontecimentos do passado: uma finalidade dada e imutável. 90 « C'est pourquoi le passe peut à la rigueur être l'objet visé par un pour-soi qui veut réaliser la valeur et fuir l'angoisse que lui donne la perpétuelle absence du soi. Mais il est radicalement distinct de la valeur par essence: il est précisément l'indicatif dont aucun impératif ne se peut déduire, il est le fait propre de chaque pour-soi, le fait contingent et inaltérable que j'étais » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 155) . 89 Na perspectiva da autenticidade, o ser atrás pode ser interpretado como superável. A consideração de que o passado pode ser ressignificado, por mais que a decisão seja por não transpô-lo, por repeti-lo (exemplos: "sou mentirosa, porque eu quero", "roubo porque gosto", "faço comida todos os dias porque escolhi isso", "não sinto prazer, porque não me permito"), reflete a escolha pelo projeto em que se assume a responsabilidade da ação, em que o lançar-se para o futuro é algo indeterminado. A diferença de postura se dá pela iluminação do ser do futuro em todos os passos presentes, não como se fosse fato certo ou dado, mas como finalidade escolhida. Com isso, mostramos que não é o fato de "permanecer" da mesma forma que se agia no passado que indica que o projeto escolhido foi o de má-fé, mas sim o modo como me relaciono com esse passado e me projeto para o futuro. Novamente, o mesmo tipo de ação, inclusive, a constituição de identidade, pode ser absorvido de duas maneiras diferentes, dependendo unicamente da relação subjetiva do praticante da ação. Essa é uma conclusão importante a respeito do que queremos defender nessa tese, pois posso agir de acordo com o projeto da Ética, como uma atitude de má-fé (pelo idealismo que considera valores a priori) ou de forma autêntica (na busca de um idealismo a posteriori, o idealismo ordinário), isto é, posso constituir uma identidade que permanentemente visa agir de acordo com o que é correto moralmente, e essa constituição pode se produzir de maneira autêntica ou não. Assim, reafirmamos que não é possível julgar se ações são autênticas ou de má-fé quando somos meros observadores, pois o modo de relação com esses aspectos temporais depende da subjetividade. Só podemos classificar entre ação de má-fé ou ação autêntica quando somos os viventes da ação, pois uma mesma ação pode ser considerada de um ou de outro modo, a depender da forma de relação do para-si com seu passado e futuro. Se realizo ações em conformidade com a Ética porque tenho caráter, porque sigo a Deus, porque é a regra, ou simplesmente porque devo, minha atitude é de má-fé. Contudo, se entendo que a Ética é um projeto construído por uma ou mais pessoas e se eu me interesso por investigá-lo e escolhêlo por mim mesma, assumo a contingência de meu passado. O ser atrás é contingente, e a consciência disso é o que garante uma atitude futura autêntica. 90 Mas, precisamente por isso, o passado, que se assemelha ao valor, não é valor. No valor, o Para-si torna-se si transcendendo e fundamentando seu ser; há uma retomada do Em-si pelo si; por esse fato, a contingência do ser cede lugar à necessidade. O passado, ao contrário, é primeiramente Em-si. O para si acha-se sustentado no ser pelo Em-si [sua razão de ser não é mais de ser para-si: é devir em-si] e por isso nos aparece em sua [pura] contingência (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 173)91. Para mostrarmos como a relação do para-si com seu passado e seu futuro diz respeito sobre o tipo de atitude (má-fé e autenticidade), vejamos como Carlos Eduardo Moura (2013) interpreta as três formas de "si" do para-si, utilizadas por Sartre: Pode-se dizer que Sartre utiliza a palavra "si" em três conteúdos na consciência. 1.o) o si espontâneo da consciência pré-reflexiva, o centro da ação e da vida consciente [...]; 2.o) o si da consciência reflexiva, o "Moi" (personalidade, Eu, Ego) enquanto objeto para a consciência (presença) e 3.o) o si como fim, como valor visado pela atividade humana pelo projeto de ser (é o si como busca, desejo) (MOURA, 2013, p. 81). Sublinhemos novamente que no projeto de má-fé há uma tentativa de justificação do presente com os acontecimentos do passado, e eis a confusão entre a transcendência e a facticidade. A má-fé nada mais é do que a tentativa da consciência de se livrar da angústia e da vergonha, ao não querer admitir seu "si" no terceiro sentido descrito por Moura, na tentativa de negar que todas as suas escolhas foram buscadas e podem ser buscadas livremente. Com isso, a meu ver, a consciência tenta assumir que é um em-si, como se ela fosse determinada e sem possibilidades, o que ocasiona uma tentativa de que o "si" no segundo sentido coincida com o "si" no terceiro sentido, pois o que é desejado coincide com a percepção do Ego, que é objeto determinado, passado. A partir disso, defendemos que esse tipo de atitude acontece quando a consciência se envergonha das escolhas feitas até o momento, de modo a querer encobrir essa escolha através da mentira para si mesma. Nesse caso, há também um movimento, mesmo que ele seja o da permanência, que é o da negação 91 « Mais, précisément pour cela, le passé qui ressemble à la valeur n'est pas la valeur. Dans la valeur le pour-soi devient soi en dépassant et en fondant son être, il y a reprise de l'en-soi par le soi ; de ce fait la contingence de l'être cède la place à la nécessité. Le passé, au contraire, est d'abord en soi. Le pour-soi est soutenu à l'être par l'en-soi, sa raison d'être n'être n'est plus d'être pour-soi : il est devenu en-soi et nous apparaît, de ce chef, dans sa pure contingence » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 155). 91 de alternativas. Por isso continua com a denominação de "atitude", entretanto, "de máfé". No entanto, no projeto de autenticidade, a consciência se projeta também para um ser. Porém, esse ser encontra-se no futuro, pois o ser do futuro nunca coincide com a consciência no presente. Referimo-nos ao "si" no terceiro sentido, assumido como desejado, e não como "tendo que ser". Nesse caso, a consciência é capaz de se perceber como detentora do poder de escolha e de ausência de determinação contínua. Para Sartre, isso gera angústia, mas defendemos que a angústia só acontece no momento de transição entre a atitude de má-fé e a de autenticidade, pois é um momento de choque sobre as escolhas feitas até então. Contudo, esse choque poderá ocasionar mudança de atitude, na busca pelo sentimento de orgulho da nova escolha, e cessar a angústia. Isso merece destaque, porque se o sentimento de orgulho não pudesse ser escolhido de forma autêntica, poderíamos inferir que a satisfação pessoal só poderia ser alcançada com a mentira para si, através do encobrimento do que me gera vergonha. Também teríamos que inferir o pessimismo e a má-fé como condição para a felicidade. Meu ser encontra-se no passado e é minha própria biografia, constituída por minha existência e que pode ou não ser interpretada a partir do olhar do Outro, gerando assim essência. Mas a interpretação desse meu passado pelo Outro me causa, no presente, vergonha ou orgulho: incômodo ou bem-estar pessoais que limitam minhas possibilidades. Logo, percebe-se que o projeto de má-fé só existe porque as pessoas se envergonham de suas escolhas diante dos Outros, de tal modo que elas se projetam para a facilidade em atribuir ao que é externo as causas dos acontecimentos. Sobre essa relação com o Outro para a constituição da identidade minha e dele, Sartre afirma: "Assim, descobrimos imediatamente um mundo que chamaremos de intersubjetividade, um mundo em que o homem decide o que ele é e o que os outros são" (SARTRE, 2010b, p. 49)92. Da mesma forma que a essência de um livro depende daquele que o observa, a essência de um homem depende também de um outro homem que o observa. Mas com a ressalva de que o homem não é só sua 92 « Ainsi découvrons-nous tout de suite un monde que nous appellerons l'intersubjectivité, et c'est dans ce monde que l'homme décide ce qu'il est et ce que sont les autres » (SARTRE, 1996, p. 59). 92 essência (que é aquilo que é visto, que aparece ao olhar do Outro), ainda que aquilo que não é visto é a parte responsável pelo que é visto. 2.3 Aparecer, ser e o projeto fundamental Ou seja, mostramos que Sartre traz um novo olhar para o homem, no sentido de consciência, bem diferente do olhar da antropologia, pois o para-si sartriano não pode ser estudado como objeto. A consciência não é objeto, por isso não pode ser observada e descrita, ela é carência e falta de ser. A consciência é questionadora, e o homem enquanto consciência é questionador, pois não tem o que lhe falta. Ele dirige sua pergunta, ou seja, escolhe seu objeto, é livre. Não obstante, o objeto escolhido me dá pistas sobre o sujeito que o escolhe. O homem enquanto para-si escolhe, age e, assim, constitui o objeto de seu passado, o em-si do homem. Pela ação o homem pode ser visto e mostrar significado ao olhar do Outro. Seu passado – o Ego – pode ser visto e descrito, logo, esse sim pode ser objeto da antropologia. A filosofia sartriana é uma filosofia da ação e da responsabilidade: a liberdade garante a possibilidade de agir de forma contingente, sem necessidades fundamentais e determinismos. Congruente a isso, a filosofia sartriana também é uma filosofia que privilegia a aparência, pois ela não engana, mas revela a verdade. Por carecer de sentido e propriedades definidas, o para-si os busca. Mas, esse sentido – a essência – só pode ser dada na aparição, ou seja, na relação fenomênica, quando minhas ações são vistas e fazem papel de objeto nessa relação. Isso garante que a essência do meu eu-objeto – a identidade – não seja fundamentada por mim mesma, mas pelo olhar do Outro. A ação e aparência são os ingredientes fundamentais do "eu", em que tenho responsabilidade sobre minha ação, mas não tenho domínio sobre a percepção do Outro nessa relação de aparição que estabeleço com ele. Quando morro, sou só Passado, e o que resta de mim é aquilo que ficou na percepção alheia: um em-si, imutável, desenhado pelo olhar do Outro e sem mais possibilidades. 93 Deve-se entender com isso que a morte reduz o Para-si-Para-outro ao estado de Para-outro. Do ser de Pedro morto, hoje, eu sou o único responsável, na minha liberdade. E os mortos que não puderam ser salvos e transportados a bordo do passado concreto de um sobrevivente não são passados; eles e seus passados estão aniquilados (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 164)93. Se, por um lado, "'meu passado' é antes de tudo 'meu', ou seja, existe em função de certo ser que eu sou" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 162)94, de outro lado, não tenho domínio da interpretação desse em-si na relação fenomênica, restada na lembrança do Outro. Contudo, se a consciência que não é ser, deseja ser ser, com a morte ela conquista esse feito. É por isso que, sobre a afirmação de que o projeto fundamental do homem seja irrealizável, discordo de Moura: Mas, pela própria liberdade, está ao alcance de todos a possibilidade de apreender a angústia como ilusão (má-fé), revelando o paradoxo característico da realidade humana, a saber, o desejo de realizar uma maneira de existir comparável ao modo de ser das coisas (inércia, estabilidade, identidade) e o esforço para remover as faltas e as carências fazendo cessar as tensões constitutivas da subjetividade sem que, ao mesmo tempo, perca-se a dimensão da liberdade: eis o processo da construção de si visando o em-si-para-si. Diante disso, procurar-se-á caracterizar o homem como falta e estabelecer a relação entre o desejo de ser e o projeto fundamental de si (irrealizável) como estrutura ontológica da realidade humana. [...] Este homem quer fundamentar-se como algo estável e seguro, deseja realizar-se como um em-si-para-si, mas esta tentativa (projeto fundamental) não é mais do que uma ilusão, pois, o si não pode existir senão enquanto significação orientada em direção ao futuro das ações, dos sentimentos e dos pensamentos presentes de um sujeito (MOURA, 2013, p. 79-81). E também de Franklin Leopoldo e Silva: 93 "Il faut entendre par là qu'elle réduit le pour-soi-pour-autrui à l'état de simple pour-autrui. De l'être de Pierre mort, aujourd'hui, je suis seul responsable, dans ma liberté. Et les morts qui n'ont pu être sauvés et transportés à bord du passe concret d 'un survivant, ils ne sont pas passés, mais, eux et leurs passés, ils sont anéantis »(SARTRE, 1943, p. 147). 94 « 'mon' passé est d'abord mien ,c'est-à-dire qu'il existe en fonction d'un certain être que je suis » (SARTRE, 1943, p.145). 94 Em outras palavras, do fato de que temos a liberdade de nos determinar a cada instante da existência não decorre que possamos vir a alcançar uma determinação completa, como se fôssemos capazes de construir aquela essência que não estava originariamente em nós. Nunca seremos inteiramente determinados, nem mesmo por nós mesmos, porque a liberdade é originária e constitutiva – e nunca podemos deixar de ser livres. [...] Se a identidade é a constituição plena da subjetividade na sua totalidade, podemos dizer que em Sartre não existe identidade totalmente constituída, porque o caráter constitutivo do processo impede que se pense a sua totalidade. A realidade humana jamais será uma totalidade idêntica a si, mas sempre um processo de totalização que não atinge o seu ponto final. [..] o desejo fundamental – o desejo de ser – é constitutivamente impossível de se realizar (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2009, p. 108, 112, 113). É na tentativa de constituição de sua essência, que defendemos que o homem busca e preocupa-se com a interpretação de pelo menos uma consciência sobre seu passado, pois essa é a única possibilidade de que sua vida venha a ter sentido e de que ele venha a ter essência, ou seja, de que tenha seu projeto fundamental realizado. Essa busca por sentido, na constituição de sua essência biográfica vista, não deixa de ser uma atitude que pode ser assumida com má-fé, pois existencialmente pode-se justificar suas ações humanas próprias pela visão que o Outro tem ou pode ter, e não por suas eleições próprias. Queremos mostrar com isso, que a constituição do objeto "eu" a partir do olhar do Outro, nem sempre coincide com o modo autêntico do Para-si, mas que, independentemente disso, permite a realização do projeto fundamental, embora entendamos a observação seguinte de Leopoldo e Silva: "a coincidência entre o ser do Para-si e a totalidade é irrealizável" (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2013b, p. 58). Pois, quando o homem realiza seu projeto fundamental (com a morte), em que ele passa a ser totalmente determinado (um "eu" em-si), o para-si deixa de existir ao mesmo tempo em que todas as possibilidades são cessadas. Mas disso não podemos inferir que o projeto fundamental é irrealizável. Ao contrário, se o projeto fundamental humano se realiza com a morte, quando ele se torna somente em-si, se todas as suas atitudes visam à constituição do "eu", então podemos dizer que o homem é um ser-para-amorte95, como em Heidegger. 95 Esse aspecto relaciona-se diretamente com as questões mais relevantes em Sartre, com a responsabilidade e com o valor, pois entender que o desejo fundamental do homem é deixar um significado para o mundo gera a exigência 95 Conforme mencionamos, a consciência não é o "eu". Enquanto a consciência é ausência de ser, (e, por conseguinte, ausência de essência), o "eu" é um ser no mundo (SARTRE, 1966a, p. 13), é objeto externo constituído pela determinação do passado. Todavia, existe relação entre a consciência e a constituição do "eu", ainda que não seja à maneira de simples substrato. O "eu", tradicionalmente aceito como interioridade que dá essencialmente a identidade e o determina, não pode existir. Para Sartre, "não há um eu a habitar minha consciência" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 334). "A tentativa sartriana de negar o 'eu transcendental', através da radicalização do primado da intencionalidade, visa localizar a constituição do ego a partir do seu movimento para fora de si" (SASS, 1999, p. 269). O existencialismo critica logicamente a anteposição da essência em relação à existência. E vale o mesmo para a questão do eu. Para Sartre, não existe um substrato capaz de garantir as propriedades que fazem determinado indivíduo ser ele mesmo. Esse processo é invertido, e a ação é anterior ou pelo menos simultânea à constituição da essência, inclusive do "eu". "A aparência não esconde a essência, mas a revela: ela é a essência. A essência de um existente já não é mais uma virtude embutida no seio deste existente: é a lei manifesta que preside a sucessão de suas aparições" (SARTRE, 2011d, 16). Dessa maneira, o "eu" é constituído como uma somatória de estados de consciência, decisões e ações, que são capazes de serem percebidos e interpretados, ou seja, que aparecem, de tal modo que a essência surge com a finalização das vivências do indivíduo, com a sua biografia vivida e lida. 2.4 O olhar do Outro e a identidade E como a essência é o próprio fenômeno, por ser aparência, ela precisa de uma consciência que a interprete. Esse "eu", conforme retomado, aparece na relação fenomênica como objeto, pois ele não coincide com a consciência. Portanto, é necessária uma consciência que interprete esse objeto "eu": o Outro. O modo como o Outro se apresenta a mim se dá pelo olhar. imediata sobre a questão de qual é esse significado que ele quer deixar. Entretanto, Leopoldo e Silva discorda: "Sartre não aceita que o ser-para-a-morte se configure como estrutura interna da existência, pela simples razão de que a morte não faz parte da experiência de existir (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2009, p. 122). 96 Capto a relação entre o verde e o Outro como uma relação objetiva, mas não posso captar o verde como aparece ao Outro. Assim, de súbito, apareceu um objeto que me roubou o mundo. Tudo está em seu lugar, tudo existe sempre para mim, mas tudo é atravessado por uma fuga invisível e fixa rumo a um objeto novo. A aparição do outro no mundo corresponde, portanto, a um deslizamento fixo de todo o universo, a uma descentralização do mundo que solapa por baixo a centralização que simultaneamente efetuo (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 330)96. O Outro foi capaz de "roubar" inclusive meu "eu": "Eu sou, Para-além de todo conhecimento que posso ter, esse eu que o Outro conhece" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 336). Ele tem mais autoridade na descrição dos atributos constituídos desse euobjeto do que a consciência que o gera. [...] a pessoa está presente à consciência enquanto é objeto para outro. Significa que, de súbito, tenho consciência de mim escapandome de mim mesmo, não enquanto sendo o fundamento de meu próprio nada, mas enquanto tendo meu fundamento fora de mim (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 335-336)97. Se sou vista, sou. E a consciência não é, ela não pode ser observada. Se só posso ser quando sou vista, o que me fundamenta é o Outro, e não eu mesma. Inclusive, apenas posso ter consciência desse "eu", por causa do Outro: "eu me vejo, porque alguém me vê" (SARTRE, 2011d, 335)98. Por isso os sentimentos de vergonha e orgulho são importantes para o "reconhecimento" de identidade desse "eu" que é externo a mim, e que é à maneira do Em-si. 96 « Je saisis la relation du vert à autrui comme un rapport objectif, mais je ne puis saisir le vert comme il apparaît à autrui. Ainsi tout à coup un objet est apparu qui m'a volé le monde. Tout est en place, tout existe toujours pour moi, mais tout est parcouru par une fuite invisible et figée vers un objet nouveau. L'apparition d'autrui dans le monde correspond donc à un glissement figé de tout l'univers, à une décentration du monde qui mine par en dessous la centralisation que j'opère dans le même temps » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 294-295). 97 « [...] la personne est présente à la conscience en tant qu'elle est objet pour autrui. Cela signifie que j'ai tout d'un coup conscience de moi en tant que je m'échappe, non pas en tant que je suis le fondement de mon propre néant, mais en tant que j'ai mon fondement hors de moi » (SARTRE, 1943, p.300). 98 « je me vois parce que on me voit » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 299). 97 A vergonha ou orgulho me revelam o olhar do Outro e, nos confins desse olhar, revelam-me a mim mesmo; são eles que me fazem viver, não conhecer, a situação do ser-visto. Pois bem: a vergonha, como sublinhamos no início deste capítulo, é vergonha de si, é o reconhecimento de que efetivamente sou este objeto que o Outro olha e julga (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 336)99. Vivenciar em contraposição a conhecer: o único capaz de me conhecer é o Outro. Mostro-me, mas não tenho domínio sobre sua interpretação: "[...] o Outro faz uma descrição de meu caráter, não me 'reconheço', e contudo, sei que 'sou eu'. Esse estranho que me apresentam, eu o assumo em seguida, sem que deixe de ser um estranho" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 352)100. Posso até mesmo não concordar com a descrição que fazem de mim, mas assumo o que falam de mim, ou seja, sinto vergonha por assumir que sou eu. "[...] sentir vergonha é estar comprometido com a crença de que não se está sozinho, pois faz parte do próprio conceito a existência de outros como uma estrutura de nossa própria consciência" (DANTO, 1975, p. 86). A partir do olhar do Outro, a vergonha faz com que eu "reconheça" que eu sou esse "eu" objeto, ainda que o "eu consciência" não o seja. O olhar do Outro não só fundamenta o "eu" o solidificando em em-si, como também aliena as possibilidades da consciência. "E o Outro, como olhar, é exatamente isso: minha transcendência transcendida" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 339)101. Ele diz a mim quem sou "eu", bem como me limita às próprias possibilidades dele. Mas, se não existe uma "identidade formal" entre esse "eu" e a consciência, como o Outro pode alienar minhas possibilidades? Sou ausência de ser, e exatamente por isso, eu quero ser "ser", porque quero aquilo que careço. Dessa maneira, o que sou-para-mim é carência e falta, por isso projeto-me rumo a um ser. Essa projeção pode ocorrer de duas formas: uma com o presente se relacionando com o passado, na medida de estar presente ao passado, e outra, com o presente em relação ao 99 C'est la honte ou la fierté qui me révèlent le regard d'autrui et moi-même au bout de ce regard, qui me font vivre, no connaître, la situation de regardé. Or, la honte, nous le notions au début de ce chapitre, est honte de soi, elle est reconnaissance de ce que je suis bien cet objet qu'autrui regarde et juge » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 300). 100 « [...] lorsque autrui me fait une description de mon caractère, je ne me 'reconnais' point et pourtant je sais que « c'est moi ». Cet étranger qu'on me présente je l'assume aussitôt, sans qu'il cesse d'être un étranger » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 314). 101 « Et l'autre, comme regard, n'est que cela : ma transcendance transcendée » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 302). 98 futuro. No primeiro caso, transcendo-me aos objetos através da presença, ou seja, estou presente aos objetos na maneira de não os ser, mas os focando, seja sentindome atraída ou sentindo repulsa. E a segunda maneira de projeção é através da tentativa de alcançar o ser pelo mecanismo da identidade projetada a um objeto no futuro. Propomos a transposição dessa relação entre a consciência e o objeto, para a relação entre o meu ser-para-mim e o ser-para-outro. A consciência escolhe relacionar o ser-para-mim ao ser-para-outro de duas formas. Primeiro, o para-si fica presente ao ser-para-mim e ao ser-para-outro sem a busca da identidade, muitas vezes negando esse eu-objeto gerado a partir do olhar do Outro, ao tentar modificálo, com novas atitudes escolhidas. Embora, outras vezes, na tentativa de utilizar a operação da identidade entre ambos, o para-si projeta-se para o ser-para-outro, ao tentar criar uma coerência entre as escolhas passadas e as futuras. Assim, tenho a compreensão dessa estrutura ontológica; sou responsável por meu ser-Para-outro, mas não seu fundamento; meu ser-Para-outro me aparece, portanto, em forma de algo dado e contingente, pelo qual, todavia, sou responsável, e o Outro fundamenta meu ser na medida em que este ser é na forma do "há" [...] Portanto, na medida em que me desvelo a mim mesmo como responsável por meu ser, reivindico este ser que sou; ou seja, quero recuperá-lo, ou, em termos mais exatos, sou projeto de recuperação de meu ser (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 455)102. Embora eu não seja para-mim esse ser-Para-outro, o para-si escolhe tentar "arrumar"103 esse ser-para-outro, porque apesar do para-si não ter essência, ele quer constituí-la, e por isso, importa-se. Se a única possibilidade de ser do homem se dá pelo olhar do Outro, então ele procura ter o domínio dessa aparição. O ser-para-outro me limita, assim como todo o em-si me limita, à maneira de ser passado e situação. 102« Ainsi ai-je la compréhension de cette structure ontologique ; je suis responsable de mon être-pour-autrui, mais je n'en suis pas le fondement ; il m'apparaît donc sous forme d'un donné contingent dont je suis pourtant responsable, et autrui fonde mon être en tant que cet être est sous la forme du 'il y a' [...] Ainsi, dans la mesure où je me dévoile à moi-même comme responsable de mo être, je revendique cet être que je suis ; c'est-à-dire que je veux le récupérer ou, en termes plus exacts, je suis projet de récupération de mon être » (SARTRE,1943, p. 404). 103 Não posso resistir e deixar de fazer a comparação da tentativa de arrumar o ser que sou eu, mas que me escapa, com os acontecimentos nos perfis do Facebook. É interessante a tentativa de cristalização dos momentos pelos participantes e também as "arrumações", ou seja, as exclusões de postagens depois de retaliações ou comentários desconcertantes. 99 Devo interpretar o ser-para-outro como intransponível ou superável, para realizar minhas escolhas, para projetar-me na tentativa de criar o significado desse eu externo que vivo, mas só o conheço pela reabsorção do Outro. É dessa forma que ganho e tento manipular minha essência a partir da observação que fazem de mim: pela limitação que eu mesma me imponho diante desse olhar, não tendo a opção de ser indiferente a esse ser-para-outro que me é externo. Essa contradição entre minha liberdade e meu aprisionamento voluntário precisamente é descrito por Sartre nas relações com o Outro. Alguns autores pautamse na famosa frase literária de Sartre do livro Entre quatro paredes, "Vocês se lembram: o enxofre, a fogueira, a grelha... Ah! que piada. Sem necessidade de grelha: o inferno, isso é os Outros" (SARTRE, 1947, p. 93, tradução nossa)104 e o criticam pela "universalidade do conflito" (DANTO, 1975, p. 84), como se toda relação para Sartre fosse unicamente de desgaste (COX, 2006, p. 69-70). Entretanto, esses autores não perceberam que o conflito filosófico sartriano é um tipo de conflito específico entre a autenticidade e a má-fé nas relações. O significado do conflito está muito mais relacionado a contradições inevitáveis do que à guerra declarada. Em Sartre, o amor é um sentimento conflituoso, pois quem busca ser amado, deseja a apreensão não de um objeto, mas do Outro enquanto liberdade, ou seja, deseja que o Outro o busque como um objeto último. Esse objeto último é um eu idealizado, que precisa realizar todas as expectativas do Outro. Por outro lado, o que busca ser amado, deseja que o Outro também queira ser amado. Mas, para que isso ocorra, o Outro precisaria desejar a apreensão do "eu" como liberdade. Retrata assim as contradições, observada a exigência de que o "eu" ora precisa ser objeto, ora precisa ser liberdade na relação de amor-desejo (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 454-464) (SARTRE, 1943, p. 404-471). A partir disso, mostramos como os conceitos sartrianos se entrelaçam para a compreensão do homem que não tem essência, mas que constitui sua essência a partir do olhar do Outro, mesmo que essa constituição ocorra de forma conturbada, na dialética entre a transcendência e a facticidade. Essa relação é importante para aplicarmos a teoria de Sartre e defendermos que essa constituição é o que explica o impulso do desejo pelo orgulho como valor e também, que pode inspirar o projeto não necessariamente sartriano, como explicamos no capítulo anterior, mas pessoal da 104 « Vous vous rappelez : le soufre, le bûcher, le gril... Ah ! Quelle plaisanterie. Pas besoin de grill : l'enfer, c'est les Autres ». 100 Ética, como intermediário para o alcance dessa realização pessoal, já que Sartre defende que cada singular de determinada época deve escolher e defender seus projetos, assim como os métodos para alcançá-los. Se, em Sartre, é pelo fenômeno que aparece a essência, e, para que ele ocorra é preciso de um ser que é visto e de uma consciência que interpreta a aparência do ser, então, para a constituição de minha essência, eu preciso ser vista. De acordo com a descrição do filósofo, podemos afirmar que, por um lado, eu fujo do olhar do Outro se considero que poderei sentir vergonha ao ser vista, por outro lado, procuro o olhar de reconhecimento do Outro, quando considero que poderei sentir orgulho de minha própria ação. É assim que o olhar do Outro cerceia minhas possibilidades, pois ele é intermediário a respeito de um sentimento que posso buscar: o orgulho. Ou então, o olhar do Outro é intermediário a respeito de um sentimento que posso rejeitar: a vergonha. Por isso, o "eu" é para-si-para-outro, e o para-si é repleto de possibilidades que muitas vezes são limitadas pela presença ou expectativa alheia. Retomando os conceitos temporais, conforme Sartre, meu passado seria realmente aniquilado quando não seria mais lembrada depois de minha morte. Mas em contraposição a essa expectativa podemos dizer que não temos domínio sobre nossas influências deixadas no mundo. A partir de minha atitude e aparição diante do olhar do Outro, não temos domínio do quanto dela é assimilada, discutida, criticada, reproduzida e replicada no futuro. Da mesma forma que não sou, nem serei capaz de mensurar quantos mortos deixaram suas escolhas como possibilidade de serem escolhidas ou reinventadas por mim, ou seja, o quanto de suas essências (aparições) permanecem no mundo. Dar significação para o mundo pelo olhar do Outro é difundir significado, é criar essência e deixar inspiração. 2.5 O corpo e a identidade Mas não podemos encerrar a discussão da identidade, sem adentrar na questão do corpo em Sartre (SARTRE, 1943, p. 342-400). A primeira dimensão é a do corpo enquanto para si, enquanto extensão da consciência: a mão que escreve, o olho que vê, o corpo que dança. O corpo como intencionalidade. A segunda e a terceira dimensões são as dimensões do corpo em si, o corpo visto por mim e/ou pelo 101 Outro, com a diferença que na terceira dimensão encontram-se as situações em que as manifestações do corpo me escapam: como exemplo, Sartre fala do enrubescer. Portanto, diferentemente, se na terceira e segunda o corpo é em-si, na primeira dimensão, o corpo faz parte do para-si, pois o para-si é totalmente corpo e totalmente consciência. Nessa dimensão, o corpo é o que percebe e aquele pelo qual as coisas são percebidas, ele é a própria intencionalidade. De outra parte, também sobre a primeira dimensão, Sartre diz que o corpo é a determinação do para-si. Mas, toda determinação é em-si, então, como um em-si pode fazer parte do para-si? Discutiremos a contingência e a necessidade, que diz respeito à liberdade e à determinação, em relação ao corpo na primeira dimensão. Essa discussão é uma preparação para a discussão sobre contingência e necessidade no âmbito do valor. Em todo O ser e o nada, a determinação e a liberdade são conceitos abordados de forma relacionada por Sartre. A presença de ser é o que subsidia qualquer determinação e a ausência de ser é o que fundamenta a liberdade. Os objetos e o passado, por serem constituídos de ser, não se alteram por eles mesmos: é preciso de algo externo a eles para modificá-los ou para significá-los novamente, ou seja, existe uma dependência epistemológica dos objetos com relação à consciência105. A consciência, por sua vez, por ser ausência de ser, não é determinada, mas depende do objeto para existir, pois toda consciência é consciência de ser. Assim, a consciência é consciência de passado e é livre para interpretá-lo e superá-lo a partir das condições de possibilidades, por meio das determinações objetivas que possibilitam a chegada aos projetos futuros. Retomamos isso, porque o conceito de corpo não só aparece relacionando os conceitos de determinação e liberdade, como também aparece fazendo parte ora de um, ora de outro, na primeira dimensão do corpo. Sartre, logo de início, tenta desmistificar a intuição comum de que a consciência é separada do corpo. Apesar desse tipo de intuição ocorrer comumente, Sartre diz que só acontece porque tentamos unir o nosso corpo ao corpo do Outro, pois, embora eu seja capaz de perceber claramente que minha consciência é separada do corpo do Outro, reúno todos os corpos e os interpreto como se fossem 105 A dependência epistemológica do objeto em relação à consciência é uma característica do idealismo mas não é suficiente para a denominação. Em Sartre, o significado do objeto depende do para-si, mas a existência do objeto não depende. O significado aparecido na relação fenomênica acessa a estrutura do ser, revela o que já existe independentemente da relação. Por isso Sartre não é idealista e contesta o idealismo. 102 unidos em um mesmo ser, e, por isso, engano-me facilmente de que minha consciência é separada também de meu corpo. Quando ele diz corpo do Outro, ele se refere aos processos fisiológicos, químicos e anatômicos do cérebro, dos quais somente temos acesso a partir do estudo do Outro, mas nunca em nós mesmos. "Não vi e jamais verei meu cérebro, ou minhas glândulas endócrinas. [...] Meu corpo, tal como é para mim, não me aparece no meio do mundo" (SARTRE, 2011d, 385)106. Com isso, ele contrapõe a intuição comum e nos induz a afirmar que, se não podemos dissecar nosso corpo, ou ver nossos órgãos internos, então nosso corpo não é separado de nossa consciência. O corpo é tão nosso ser quanto a consciência, e, portanto, ao modo como ele descreve sobre a primeira dimensão do corpo, ele é também para-si. "O Para-si deve ser todo inteiro corpo e todo inteiro consciência: não poderia ser unido a um corpo" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 388)107. É claro que Sartre admite o corpo também como objeto, como ele descreve na segunda e terceira dimensões, em que o corpo é ser-para-outro. Porém, na primeira dimensão, é mostrado que o corpo tem um modo de ser próprio, assim como a consciência: pois é um modo de ser do para-si: "o para-si é o ser que se determina a existir na medida em que não pode coincidir consigo mesmo" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 127)108. Essa "inconsistência de ser" é o que garante a não determinação e as inúmeras possibilidades do para-si. E, é nesse sentido (ou nessa dimensão) que o corpo não é um objeto (como é revelado nas dimensões relacionadas ao ser-Paraoutro), mas é a "[...] possibilidade vivente de correr, dançar, etc"109 (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 387). Se com meu corpo posso ver, pegar, me deslizar no espaço, então ele é o meu modo próprio de intencionar, isto é, ele é minha própria intenção. Ainda na primeira dimensão, Sartre fala do corpo como "facticidade" do Para-si. O corpo é o modo pelo qual o Para-si necessariamente se compromete com o mundo: é pelo corpo que o Para-si se faz presente ao mundo. Queremos dizer que é pelo corpo que o Para-si se fundamenta nos seres que estão no mundo, pela relação 106 « Je n'ai jamais vu ni ne verrai mon cerveau, ni mes glandes endocrines. Mon corps tel qu'il est pour moi ne m'apparaît pas au milieu du monde » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 342). 107 « C'est tout entier que l'être-pour-soi doit être corps et tout entier qu'il doit être conscience : il ne saurait être uni à un corps » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 344). 108 « Le pour-soi est l'être qui se détermine lui-même à exister en tant qu'il ne peut pas coïncider avec lui-même » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 114). 109 « [...] en tant que possibilité vivante de courir, de danser, etc » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 344). 103 ontológica de síntese, a presença, como já mencionamos, mas que agora fundamentamos: A presença a...é uma relação interna do ser que está presente com os seres aos quais está presente. Em caso algum pode se tratar de simples relação externa de contigüidade. Presença a... significa existência fora de si junto a... Aquilo que pode ser presente a... deve ser de tal modo em seu ser que possa haver neste uma relação de ser com os demais seres. Só posso estar presente a esta cadeira se estiver unido a ela em uma relação ontológica de síntese, se estiver lá, no ser desta cadeira, como não sendo esta cadeira (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 174-175)110. Tomemos, então, a afirmativa: todo conhecimento é posicional (comprometido), dependente do mundo, e isso pode ser entendido como uma necessidade do Para-si. Isso significa que o corpo cria a necessidade do comprometimento do Para-si, e a geração dessa necessidade seria um tipo de determinação que se contrapõe à liberdade fundamental do Para-si. Mas essa necessidade torna-se contingente, em primeiro lugar, porque não sou fundamento de meu ser, e, em segundo lugar, porque é contingente o posicionamento sobre um ponto de vista em meio a tantos outros. "É esta dupla contingência, encerrando uma necessidade, que denominamos facticidade do Para-si" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 391). Enquanto o Em-si (por ser constituído de ser) existe independentemente do Para-si, o Para-si fundamenta-se na relação com o Em-si. O Para-si possui um modo próprio de ser que é a ausência de ser, logo, ele se reafirma na negação, pois é um modo de ser não-sendo os objetos. E é essa negação que garante a liberdade e contingência do Para-si, pois é justamente por não ser, que ele pode, ou seja, que ele possui possibilidades e não é determinado. Por outro lado, é o para-si que dá sentido ao mundo: ele o ordena. Embora o em-si não precise do para-si para existir, ele precisa do para-si para existir com sentido. Entretanto, essa ordenação e sentido são totalmente contingentes. 110 « La présence à... est un rapport interne de l'être qui est présent avec les êtres auxquels il est présent. En aucun cas, il ne peut s'agir de la simple relation externe de contiguïté. La présence à... signifie l'existence hors de soi près de... Ce qui peut être présent à... doit être tel dans son être qui' il y ait en celui-ci un rapport d'être avec les autres êtres. Je ne puis être présent à cette chaise que si je suis uni à elle dans un rapport ontologique de synthèse, que si je suis là-bas dans l'être de cette chaise comme n'étant pas cette chaise » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 156). 104 Esta ordem absolutamente necessária e totalmente injustificável das coisas do mundo, esta ordem que eu mesmo sou, na medida em meu surgimento faz esse mundo existir, e que me escapa, na medida em que não sou fundamento de meu ser nem fundamento de tal ser, esta ordem é o corpo, tal como é em nível do Para-si. Nesse sentido, poderse-ia definir o corpo como a forma contingente que a necessidade de minha contingência assume. Nada mais é do que o Para-si; não se trata de um Em-si no Para-si, pois, neste caso, iria coagular tudo. [...] o corpo-Para-si jamais é um dado que eu possa conhecer: está aí, em qualquer parte, como aquilo que é transcendido; só existe na medida em que dele escapo nadificando-me (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 392)111. Por isso, apesar de parecer paradoxal dizer que o corpo é a facticidade do para-si e também é o próprio para-si, isso não é uma contradição: a determinação própria da facticidade é relacionada à necessidade de comprometimento, ainda que o comprometimento seja contingente, posto que seja comprometimento escolhido: "o corpo é uma característica necessária do Para-si[,] [..] advém necessariamente da natureza do Para-si o fato de que ele seja corpo, isto é, que seu escapar nadificador ao ser seja feito em forma de comprometimento no mundo" (SARTRE, 2011d, p.392). Gary Cox faz uma relação desse modo de ser do corpo na primeira dimensão em Sartre com o ser-no-mundo de Heidegger e diz: "a reivindicação é de que quando a pessoa está no módulo do ser-no-mundo, seu corpo está, de certa forma, invisível a ela, ou pelo menos a pessoa está totalmente alheia ao seu corpo como uma coisa" (COX, 2006, p. 74). Na primeira dimensão, o corpo se funde com a consciência. É pelo corpo que faço minhas escolhas, é o corpo que escolhe. Por isso ele se confunde comigo e é invisível para mim. Cox ainda afirma que "O corpo representa a situação imediata e inescapável do para-si que o para-si perpetuamente supera em direção às situações futuras" (COX, 2006, p. 75). Mas defendemos que, na primeira dimensão, o corpo é a 111« Cet ordre absolument nécessaire et totalement injustifiable des choses du monde, cet ordre que est moi-même en tant que mon surgissement le fait nécessairement exister et qui m'échappe en tant que mon surgissement le fait nécessairement exister et qui m'échappe en tant que mon surgissement le fait nécessairement exister et qui m'échappe en tant que je ne suis ni le fondement de mon être ni le fondement d'un tel être, c'est le corps tel qu'il est sur le plan du pour-soi. En ce sens, on pourrait définir le corps comme la forme contingente que prend la nécessité de ma contingence. Il n'est rien autre que le pour-soi ; il n'est pas un en-soi dans le pour-soi, car alors il figerait tout.[...] le corps-pour-soi n'est jamais un donné que je puisse connaître : il est là, partout comme le dépassé, il n'existe qu'en tant que je lui échappe en me néantisant » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 348). 105 situação do Para-si, e não sua representação. Além disso, não é o para-si que supera o corpo, mas o corpo é o próprio para-si que supera seu passado em direção às situações futuras. Apesar de demonstrar compreensão sobre a invisibilidade do corpo, Cox demonstra não aceitar essa posição juntamente com alguns críticos de Sartre, e dentre eles, Wider (1997). Eles criticam a formulação de Sartre a respeito do alheamento da pessoa em relação ao corpo na primeira dimensão. O argumento é que mesmo quando a pessoa está apenas intencionando ocorrem reações em seu corpo que fazem com que ela o perceba como objeto. Dessa forma, o corpo poderia ser percebido como objeto, a partir das sensações, independentemente da presença do Outro. Ele usa o exemplo que Sartre se utiliza para falar do momento da percepção do corpo, em que o indivíduo que espia pelo buraco da porta e sente inveja, só se apercebe de seu corpo quando ouve passos, pelo sentimento de vergonha. Cox diz: "apesar da inveja não ser diante de alguém, ela revela o corpo de uma pessoa a ela mesma, da mesma forma que a vergonha o faz.[...] todos os estados emocionais revelam o si corporificado" (COX, 2006, p. 80-81). Entretanto, os críticos não levaram em consideração que a consciência emocional é irrefletida. Para Sartre, "a consciência emocional é primeiramente irrefletida e, nesse plano, ela só pode ser consciência dela mesma no modo nãoposicional. A consciência emocional é, em primeiro lugar, consciência do mundo" (SARTRE, 2011c, p.56). Isso significa que, embora meu corpo venha a reagir com as emoções, assim como sinto dor ao espetar meu pé em um espinho, nem todas as emoções me fazem reconhecer o eu objeto que sou, como ocorre no caso da vergonha. Se não é exatamente o outro, é pelo menos a suposição do Outro que faz com que eu me reconheça como esse eu que é somatória de estados de consciências, de sentimentos e ações, isto é, como esse passado em-si, que no agora a consciência não é mais. Mas enquanto corpo que vive (foca, intenciona, é afetado, sente) é totalmente para-si. Não é a vergonha, como simples emoção, que me faz ver meu corpo como objeto. A mudança de dimensão não ocorre propriamente pelo sentimento de vergonha, que é somente uma consequência, mas sim, pela situação originária da vergonha: a presença do Outro, ou a possibilidade da presença, que é dada pelo que me observa. Dessa maneira, acabamos de verificar que a própria dimensão corpórea do para-si remete à constituição da identidade. A presença do Outro afeta meu corpo que 106 sente, que escolhe, que constitui os caracteres. Isso tem relação também com expectativa e frustração. Quando o corpo se mostra em uma atitude diferente da esperada por mim e ao mesmo tempo pelo que o Outro espera de mim, eu me envergonho. Mas essa vergonha não tem relação a uma falha de caráter, porque não existe a possibilidade de julgar o caráter absolutamente, de acordo com Sartre, mas somente a uma frustração de expectativa, que seria a finalidade invertida. Vimos então, que as manifestações do corpo são acidentais, já que toda facticidade é contingente, mas que, por outro lado, há necessidade no que diz respeito ao comprometimento com o mundo, pois é pelo corpo, que o para-si necessariamente se compromete. Dessa maneira, a constituição da identidade se dá através do corpo e de suas dimensões: através do corpo que escolhe, engajado no mundo (primeira dimensão), e por suas aparições ao outro, seja aparecendo da maneira que ele planeja (segunda dimensão), seja aparecendo de maneira não programada (terceira dimensão). O Para-si não tem, mas procura ter domínio sobre a interpretação do outro a respeito de suas aparições, nessa dialética entre facticidade e transcendência, rumo ao valor. 2.6 Comprometimento com o mundo pelo valor Na ciência, com o posicionamento de Darwin, a visão de progresso e de teleologia, interpretados como se a evolução se desenvolvesse para um plano fixo, rumo a uma vontade divina, caiu por terra (STEGMÜLLER, 2012, p. 339). Conforme vimos, com a ética, isso não foi diferente. Em Sartre, como a falta é o fundamento do para-si, todos os valores são mesmo contingentes; ou seja, nenhuma identidade, essência ou estrutura determina qualquer valor individual. Todos os valores são acidentais, o que significa que não existe qualquer justificativa lógica ou transcendental para a escolha de algum valor pelo sujeito. Entrementes, todo indivíduo transcende rumo a algum valor, isto é, todo indivíduo projeta-se para seu próprio valor. Já disse Mészáros, sobre Sartre: A contingência não abre caminho a algum tipo de liberdade mística que emana da subjetividade do intelectual, mas sim a uma 107 necessidade estruturada. O que se dá bem diante de nossos olhos é que o caráter acidental da contingência é transcendido e "metamorfoseado" na necessidade de determinações interiores (MÉSZÁROS, 2012, p. 39). Questionamos a última linha da citação acima de Mészáros. Por um lado, entendemos em um sentido mais amplo, a "necessidade de determinações interiores" como a expressão de que o homem não é determinado por algo externo, mas que ele se determina em direção a algum valor escolhido por ele mesmo, e, nesse sentido, concordamos com o comentador. Contudo, a palavra "interiores" não pode passar despercebida. Porque toda falta é falta de alguma coisa, de um ser que não coincide com o Para-si, mas que o Para-si está para ele no modo da presença. Por isso a fundamentação do Para-si é externa a ele. O externo é necessário à existência do Para-si, de tal modo que não existe consciência que não seja consciência de ser, e que esse ser esteja necessariamente fora. De todas as negações internas, a que penetra mais profundamente no ser e [aquela que] constitui em seu ser o ser ao qual nega, juntamente com o ser negado, é a falta de. Esta falta não pertence à natureza do Em-si, todo positividade. Só aparece no mundo com o surgimento da realidade humana. É unicamente no mundo humano que podem haver faltas. Uma falta pressupõe uma trindade: aquilo que falta, ou o faltante (le manquant); aquilo ao qual falta o que falta, ou o existente; e uma totalidade que foi desagregada pela falta e seria restaurada pela síntese entre o faltante e o existente: o faltado (le manque).[...] Assim, no mundo humano, o ser incompleto que se dá à intuição como faltante é constituído em seu ser pelo faltado – ou seja, por aquilo que ele não é [– no seu ser]; a lua cheia é que confere à lua crescente seu ser como crescente; o que não é [é o que] determina o que é; encontra-se no ser do existente, como correlato de uma transcendência humana, o conduzir-se para fora de si rumo ao ser que ele não é, bem como a seu sentido (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 136-137).112 112 "De toutes les négations internes, celle qui pénètre le plus profondément dans l'être, celle qui constitue dans son l'être l'être dont elle nie avec l'être qu'elle nie, c'est le manque. Ce manque n'appartient pas à la nature de l'en-soi, qui est tout positivité. Il ne paraît dans le monde qu'avec le surgissement de la réalité-humaine. C'est seulement dans le monde humain qu'il peut y avoir des manques. Um manque suppose une trinité: ce qui manque ou manquant, ce à quoi manque ce qui manque ou existant, et une totalité qui a été désagrégée par le manque et qui serait restaurée par la synthèse du manquant et de l'existant: c'est le manqué. [...] Ainsi, dans le monde humain, l'être incomplet qui se livre à l'intuition comme manquant est constitué par le manqué – c'est-à-dire par ce qu'il n'est pas – dans son être; c'est la pleine lune qui confère au croissant de lune son être de croissant; c'est ce qui n'est pas qui détermine ce qui est; il est dans l'être de l'existant, comme corrélatif d'une transcendance humaine, de mener hors de soi jusqu'à l'être qu'il n'est pas comme à son sens" (SARTRE, 1943, p.122-123). 108 Aplicando essa metáfora da lua em relação ao homem sobre a questão temporal, podemos dizer que o existente é o Passado do para-si, sua situação. O para-si é o próprio presente: o faltante. E o futuro é a tentativa de síntese de significância entre o passado e o presente, ou seja, o futuro é o faltado, é o ser buscado do presente, o em-si-para-si. Passado e futuro são os seres externos ao para-si, nessa relação necessária. Tanto o passado quanto o futuro são seres que se relacionam com a ausência de ser, o presente. Entretanto, o ser do passado possui natureza distinta do ser do futuro. O passado é o ser determinado da síntese (o emsi), é a situação do para-si, o que existe independentemente da existência do presente, o que o influencia, mas não o determina, pois foi formado contingencialmente. Por outro lado, o futuro é o ser necessário ao movimento do parasi, não determinado, mas que ilumina os movimentos intermediários do para-si a partir de sua projeção para ele, ou seja, o futuro é o valor. O homem não tem essência, mas quer ter essência. O para-si nunca coincide com o ser para o qual ele se projeta. "Em seu ser, o Para-si é fracasso, porque fundamenta si mesmo apenas enquanto nada" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 139)113. Para não contradizermos com o que dissemos anteriormente, observemos que é um fracasso fundamental, e não relacionado ao pessimismo. É o faltado de todas as faltas, não o faltante. O valor é o si na medida em que este impregna o âmago do Para-si como aquilo para o qual o Para-si é. O valor supremo, rumo ao qual a consciência se transcende a cada instante pelo seu próprio ser, é o ser absoluto do si, com seus caracteres de identidade, pureza, permanência, etc., e na medida em que é fundamento de si. É o que nos permite conceber porque o valor pode ser e não ser ao mesmo tempo. [O valor] É como o sentido e o mais-além de todo transcender, [ele é] o Em-si ausente que impregna o ser-Para-si [...] Significa que a relação entre o valor e o Para-si é de natureza muito particular: o valor é o ser que há de ser enquanto fundamento de seu nada de ser. [...] Portanto há uma total contingência do ser-para-o-valor, que recairá imediatamente sobre toda moral para trespassá-la e torná-la relativa – e, ao mesmo tempo, uma livre e absoluta necessidade (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 144-145)114. 113" Le pour-soi dans son être est échec, parce qu'il n'est fondement que de soi-même en tant que néant" (SARTRE, 1943, p. 125). 114 "Elle est le manqué de tous les manques, non le manquant. La valeur, c'est le soi en tant qu'il hante le coeur du pour-soi comme ce pour quoi il est. La valeur suprême vers quoi la conscience se dépasse à tout instant par son être même, c'est l'être absolu du soi, avec ses caractères d'identité, de pureté, de permanence, etc., et en tant qu'il est fondement de soi. C'est ce qui nous permet de concevoir pourquoi la valeur peut à la fois être et ne pas être. 109 Assim, todo para-si relaciona-se diretamente e necessariamente com o valor, que é o faltado. O valor é a essência buscada pelo homem, é a lua inteira que dá a ele uma síntese entre seu passado e presente. Para além de qualquer determinação, o homem, que é esse não-ser e suas possibilidades é presente e futuro: "[...] em sentido amplo, a realidade humana inclui o Para-si e o valor" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 146)115. É buscando essa síntese que o homem realiza suas ações e se mostra por seus resultados: "Ora, nós vimos que somente o resultado permite apreciar o fim real do agente e, o que é a mesma coisa, o agente ele mesmo. É Madame Bovary que esclarece Flaubert, e não o inverso" (SARTRE,1985, p. 335, Tradução nossa)116. Retomando, temos que, em primeiro lugar, dizer que o valor é necessário ao para-si, não é o mesmo que dizer que existe um valor absoluto, que deve ser seguido por todos. Pois não existe identidade valorativa inerente e pré-existente ao homem. Todos os valores são criações humanas, são finalidades inventadas, e por isso mesmo, não há como legitimar a supremacia de um valor sobre outro. O que supostamente poderia legitimar a escolha de um valor é a escolha singular e subjetiva do para-si, que é arbitrária, ainda que possa ser pressuposta117. Um segundo ponto é que eleger um valor e buscá-lo não significa alcançálo. Muito pelo contrário, pois para Sartre, ao alcançar determinado valor, o desejo se desliza e o valor se desloca para outra finalidade. A falta é o único fundamento de meu ser. A consciência é busca inalcançável de si. Qualquer finalidade inventada e eleita por um para-si, como aquela buscada para dar unidade junto às ações do passado e às possibilidades do futuro, é valor, o objeto de desejo: Elle est comme le sens et l'au-delà de tout dépassement, elle est comme l'en-soi absent qui hante l'être pour soi. [...]Cela signifie que le rapport de la valeur au pour-soi est très particulier : elle est l'être qu'il a à être en tant qu'il est fondement de son néant d'être [...] Il y a donc une totale contingence de l'être-pour-la-valeur, qui reviendra ensuite sur toute la morale, pour la transir et la relativiseret, en même temps, une libre et absolue nécessité" (SARTRE, 1943, p. 130). 115 "la réalité-humaine au sens large enveloppe le pour-soi et la valeur"(SARTRE, 1943, p. 131). 116 « Or, nous avons vu que seul le résultat permet d'apprécier la fin réelle de l'agent et, ce qui revient au même, l'agent lui-même. C'est Madame Bovary qui éclaire Flaubert, et non l'inverse ». 117 Embora não exista nenhum valor absoluto, a filosofia de Sartre é exigente. A responsabilidade de que se é responsável por si e pelo mundo é mais opressora que o absolutismo de qualquer valor (ver 3.3). 110 Todavia, o desejo não é definido somente em relação ao Em-si-causade-si. É também relativo a um existente em bruto e concreto que denominamos comumente objeto do desejo. Este objeto será ora uma fatia de pão, ora um automóvel, ora uma mulher, ora um objeto ainda não realizado e, contudo, definido: como acontece quando o artista deseja criar uma obra de arte. Assim, o desejo exprime, por sua própria estrutura, a relação do homem com um ou vários objetos no mundo; é um dos aspectos do Ser-no-mundo (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 704)118. Dentre tantas finalidades que podem ser criadas e buscadas, posso denominar de Ética uma delas, com sua finalidade inventada bem definida. Isto é, estamos colocando como possibilidade de desejo pessoal, aquilo que sempre fora tratado como transcendental (a priori) por parte da filosofia clássica. Esse é só mais um objeto de desejo, assim como ocorre o desejo por determinado pão, como na citação acima. Se não o tenho em minha mesa, preciso pensar estratégias intermediárias para obtê-lo e poder saboreá-lo. É o mesmo que dizer que tenho como objetivo pessoal a Ética. Isso que fazemos é apenas uma aplicação de um projeto conhecido na teoria sartriana do desejo, para reforçar que o idealismo possibilitado por Sartre é a posteriori. Sartre fala especificamente do tipo de apropriação do conhecer e mostra que a investigação científica é "um empenho de apropriação". Apesar de usar a expressão "verdade descoberta", Sartre a associa ao processo criativo, ao denominar aquele que descobre de "criador e possessor [possuidor]", pois que essa verdade descoberta é para este nada mais que uma face do se revelar de tal forma (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 706) (SARTRE, 1943, p. 623). Posteriormente ele relaciona o conhecimento ao desejo de comer e ao desejo libidinal. Assim, nos é permitido dizer que o desejo pelo conhecimento tem caráter inventivo e emoção arrebatadora. Conhecimento e identidade, dessa forma, estão intimamente relacionados à construção a partir do processo imaginativo, que é o valor. Assim, o valor é imagem contingente, posto que é escolhida arbitrariamente, mas necessária, posto que não existe atitude que não 118 « Toutefois, le désir n'est pas seulement défini par rapport à l'en-soi-cause-de-soi. Il est aussi relatif à un existant brut et concret que l'on nomme couramment l'objet du désir. Cet objet sera tantôt un morceau de pain, tantôt une automobile, tantôt une femme, tantôt un objet non encore réalisé et pourtant défini : comme lorsque l'artiste désire créer une oeuvre d'art. Ainsi le désir exprime par sa structure même le rapport de l'homme avec un ou plusieurs objets dans le monde ; il est un des aspects de l'être-dans-le-monde » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 621-622). 111 seja projeção para o valor. A dialética da identidade ocorre nesse absoluto-relativo de imagem projetada e imagem constituída. Em resumo, nesse capítulo, mostramos a importância dos sentimentos de vergonha e orgulho na constituição da identidade advindos do olhar do Outro, bem como inter-relacionamos isso aos conceitos de má-fé, autenticidade, tempo, corpo e valor. Isso feito, podemos concluir que o inferno são os Outros somente quando eu me envergonho de minhas atitudes, pois nada me impede de constituir uma identidade da qual eu me orgulhe autenticamente, no processo de constituição não só de uma biografia, mas também de um universal que eu possa me orgulhar. 112 3 FAZER-UNIVERSALIZAÇÃO Neste capítulo, pretendo mostrar a similaridade da constituição do universal, com a constituição da identidade, na teoria sartriana. Da mesma forma que o homem não está pronto, mas está para se fazer (SARTRE, 1972, p. 50), é também assim com a universalização: Nesse nível, o intelectual, pelos seus trabalhos de técnico do saber, por seu salário e por seu nível de vida, sem cessar de se designar como pequeno burguês selecionado, deve combater sua classe que, sob a influência da classe dominante, reproduz nele necessariamente uma ideologia burguesa, de pensamentos e sentimentos pequenos burgueses. O intelectual é, portanto, um técnico do universal que se apercebe que, em seu domínio próprio, a universalidade não existe pronta, que ela está perpetuamente por fazer. Um dos grandes perigos que o intelectual deve evitar, se ele quer avançar no seu empreendimento, é de universalizar muito rápido (SARTRE, 1972, p. 49, tradução nossa)119. É possível que os argumentos mais importantes sobre esse assunto já tenham sido tratados nos capítulos anteriores, visto que estão todos intimamente relacionados. Mas gostaríamos de recuperar alguns conceitos a fim de explicitar fundamentalmente que tipo de universalização é criticada por Sartre e que tipo é defendida. Para tanto, é importante destacar a distinção entre a objetividade dos projetos inventados e a subjetividade das invenções. 3.1 Verdade prática Se por um lado, pessoalmente, Sartre não aceita a universalização burguesa, da descrição da abundância e das prescrições capazes de manipular a classe média, para legitimar suas práticas, por outro lado, ele defende tipos de atitudes 119 « A ce niveau, l'intellectuel, sans cesser, par ses travaux de technicien du savoir, par son salaire et par son niveau de vie, de se désigner comme petit-bourgeois sélectionné, doit combattre sa classe qui, sous l'influence de la classe dominante, reproduit en lui nécessairement une idéologie bourgeoise, des pensées et des sentiments petitsbourgeois. L'intellectuel est donc un technicien de l'universel qui s'aperçoit que, dans son domaine propre, l'universalité n'existe pas toute faite, qu'elle est perpétuellement à faire. Un des grands dangers que l'intellectuel doit éviter, s'il veut avancer dans son entreprise, c'est d'universaliser trop vite ». 113 singulares a serem tomadas, de tal modo que toda a humanidade possa também assim fazer. Sartre denuncia o tipo de universalidade "pregada" para favorecer os privilegiados. Com isso ele critica a universalidade do particularismo burguês, pois considera uma contradição com a existência de dois milhões de subalimentados sobre uma população de três milhões (SARTRE, 1972, p. 61). É nesse sentido que Sartre se posiciona a favor da revolução e contra o sistema capitalista, e por isso ele considera o marxismo como insuperável, em seu tempo. As classes exploradas, com efeito, não possuem necessidade de uma ideologia, mas da verdade prática sobre a sociedade. Ou seja, elas não precisam de uma representação mítica delas mesmas; elas têm necessidade de conhecer o mundo para o modificar. Isso significa, por sua vez, que elas reclamam de serem situadas (posto que o conhecimento de uma classe implica aquele de todas as outras e de suas relações de força), de descobrir seus fins orgânicos e a práxis que lhes permitirá alcançá-los (SARTRE, 1972, p. 68, tradução nossa)120. Sartre aponta para o fato de que uma ideia que descreva simplesmente a situação, justificando-a, não resolve o problema. Como ele percebe a necessidade de mudança, ele fala dessa "verdade prática", da ideia do diferente para o qual pode-se direcionar em ação. Em sua época, um período de guerra, de terrorismo, de suspensão de valores, de leis absurdas, ele entendeu que a melhor teoria que poderia possibilitar essa prática era a proposta da revolução marxista, até mesmo com a violência. Mas cada época deve analisar suas situações para verificar aquilo que é mais concretizável, mesmo que sejam processos intermediários. E, considerando que a mudança deve partir do singular para o coletivo, defendo que a investigação sobre a Ética, da forma como está sendo utilizada nesse texto, seria o primeiro passo para transformações universais, pois para Sartre, "uma comunidade fundada sobre uma tomada de consciência" (SARTRE, 1985, p. 349, 120 « Les classes exploitées, en effet, n'ont pas besoin d'une idéologie mais de la vérité pratique sur la société. C'est-à-dire, elles n'ont que faire d'une représentation mythique d'elles-mêmes ; elles ont besoin de connaître le monde pour le changer. Cela signifie à la fois qu'elles réclament d'être situées (puisque la connaissance d'une classe implique celle de toutes les autres et de leurs rapports de force), de découvrir leurs fins organiques et la praxis qui leur permettra de les atteindre ». 114 tradução nossa)121 poderia ultrapassar a violência. Logo, a tomada de consciência coletiva a respeito do que seja uma Ética objetiva é um dos meios para se alcançar uma práxis que possibilite o atingimento dos fins orgânicos que fala Sartre. O projeto da Ética, ainda que tenha a investigação, em seu interior, de forma objetiva e racional, a escolha por ela ocorre de maneira subjetiva. É nesse sentido que se apresenta a possibilidade de uma importante síntese entre a objetividade e a subjetividade na história da filosofia. Essa simbiose possível entre a objetividade e a subjetividade e a dimensão totalizadora da teoria sartriana, fora observada por Mészáros: Desse modo, o movimento e o repouso, o todo e suas partes, o centro e a periferia, o primeiro plano e o plano de fundo, as determinações do passado e as antevisões do futuro convergindo sobre o presente, tudo isso ganha vida na unidade sintética de uma totalização dialética em que a subjetividade e a objetividade se fundem de maneira indissociável (MÉSZÁROS, 2012, p. 45-46). O que ocorre com a Ética, ocorre também com toda a ciência. A partir de uma finalidade eleita, existe uma investigação acerca dos meios para se atingi-la. A investigação é objetiva, já que ela é feita com base em uma finalidade definida. Mas a escolha por essa finalidade é arbitrária, pois, como diz Hume, "um princípio ativo nunca pode estar fundado em um princípio inativo" (HUME, 2009, p. 497). A escolha é um princípio ativo, em que estão embutidos imperativos em seu interior, visto que toda escolha é escolha de valor e carrega implicitamente preferências e decisões, ao passo que as descrições são princípios inativos. Por isso mesmo nenhuma descrição de realidade poderá acarretar escolha. Embora a escolha seja necessária ao para-si, pois todo para-si escolhe, visto que é intenção, não existe fundamentação descritiva para uma ou outra escolha. Todavia, depois que um objeto foi escolhido, posso investigar descrições que possibilitem atingir tal objeto. De fato, jamais poderá ser fundamentado o inverso, ou seja, de princípios ativos, não posso chegar a nenhum princípio inativo. Por exemplo, posso investigar sobre os fatos que poderiam me levar à longevidade (descrições, princípios inativos), com o intuito de viver mais ou com o intuito de abreviar minha vida (escolhas, 121 « [...] une communauté fondée sur un prise de conscience [...] ». 115 princípios ativos). Da mesma forma, a investigação sobre a Ética não garante que os sujeitos vivam de acordo com tal finalidade, mas cria os meios para alcançá-la. Contudo, existem valores predominantes na sociedade, que de tão comuns parecem ser absolutos, por isso os equívocos e a constante associação da ética aos costumes como se esses costumes fossem prescrições descobertas, como se esses costumes não tivessem sido inventados pelo próprio homem. Denominei esse conjunto de expressões sobre o que é certo e errado de forma comum, de acordo com os valores predominantes na cultura, na religião e nas leis, de Moral Ordinária (COLANTONI, 2012), que é a moral tradicional burguesa criticada por Sartre. A distinção entre Moral Ordinária (comum, como as pessoas corriqueiramente entendem) e a Moral Reflexiva (racionalizada, com finalidade definida pela escolha humana, em que os juízos podem ser deduzidos dessa finalidade), ou propriamente o projeto da Ética, é importante para que se desfaçam preconceitos de que os estudos sobre ética sejam relativos e conservadores. Ao contrário, a finalidade clara e definida da Moral Reflexiva permite prescrições que garantem ao máximo as liberdades individuais, o que garante um caráter não repressivo e não controlador, que liberta. Mas claro, a Ética é intolerante e interfere com a rejeição práticas que culminam com a existência de vítimas: os abusos, o preconceito, a falta de tolerância com as diferenças, a limitação dos sujeitos. Afinal, Sartre defende a "luta para a universalização (ou seja, contra a exploração, a opressão, a alienação, as desigualdades, o sacrifício dos trabalhadores ao lucro)" (SARTRE, 1972, p. 68, tradução nossa)122. Trata-se de um universal que se pode defender como um técnico e especialista do saber prático, mas não de um universal como o esforço de um grupo social particularizado para a universalização, como faz a burguesia. Por isso, há exigência da autocrítica perpétua (SARTRE, 1972, p. 70). Novamente sublinho que, Sartre entende que esse fim orgânico, com necessidade de universalização, é também um fim inventado, mas, por ser a finalidade que ele próprio (Sartre) escolheu, e, como imperativos estão embutidos no interior das escolhas, ele o defende. Sartre faz isso justamente por manter a coerência, porque defende que a escolha da finalidade e sua prática é o que gera a essência do homem, 122 « lutte pour l'universalisation (c'est-à-dire contre l'exploitation, l'oppression, l'aliénation, les inégalités, le sacrifice des travailleurs au profit) ». 116 ou seja, a finalidade escolhida e sua práxis diz muito sobre o homem que a escolheu. E é propositadamente dessa maneira que Sartre escolhe ser visto pelo mundo. Assim, esse universal defendido advém do ultrapassamento de sua particularidade, ou seja, por métodos universais (estruturação, dialética, análise histórica) que tratam da singularidade histórica do proletariado, com a exigência da revolução (SARTRE, 1972, p. 68-70). Nunca se trata de um universal organizado, concluído e acabado (SARTRE, 1972, p. 71). E assim, nesse envolvimento com a compreensão da falta de estabilidade, ocorre a possibilidade do intelectual de ser útil, ou seja, a possibilidade que ele contribua para o desenvolvimento da "consciência de classe": É aplicando o método dialético, dele apreendendo o particular através das exigências universais e reduzindo dele o universal a um movimento de uma singularidade para a universalização, que o intelectual, definido como tomada de consciência de sua contradição constitutiva, pode ajudar à constituição da tomada de consciência do proletariado123. Mas Sartre faz a ressalva de que o intelectual deva vivenciar a classe que não é a dele, bem como o movimento, ou seja, ele deve se integrar completamente para posteriormente conseguir apreender a particularidade e as ambições universalizantes, ou seja, as exigências universais do proletariado (SARTRE, 1972, p. 72-73), e ainda tomar as precauções para que não se desenvolva nenhum tipo de ideologia que não pudesse ser questionada (SARTRE, 1972, p. 73). Dessa maneira, seria possível usar o capital-saber dado pela burguesia para a formação de intelectuais orgânicos nas classes menos favorecidas, a recuperação da finalidade e da verdade, a radicalização das atividades buscando o fim da história pela universalização, e a não cristalização de qualquer poder (SARTRE, 1972, p. 74). Destacamos que a consciência do proletariado parte de algo ainda mais singular, a "consciência reflexiva", que Sartre também chama de "consciência moral", como veremos na citação abaixo, capaz de negar valores que são postos pela burguesia como prontos e acabados. 123 « C'est en appliquant la méthode dialectique, en saisissant le particulier à travers les exigences universelles et en réduisant l'universel à un mouvement d'une singularité vers l'universalisation que l'intellectuel, défini comme prise de conscience de sa contradiction constitutive, peut aider à la constitution delà prise de conscience prolétarienne » (SARTRE, 1972, p. 70). 117 Abrimos um parêntese para dizer que consideramos que Sartre poderia ter sido mais claro no trecho a seguir, se ele tivesse feito algum tipo de distinção como a que mencionamos acima, sobre a Moral Ordinária e a Moral Reflexiva. A consciência reflexiva, de fato, posiciona a Erlebnis refletida em sua natureza de falta e, ao mesmo tempo, resgata o valor como sentido inalcançável do faltado. Assim, a consciência reflexiva pode ser chamada, propriamente falando, de consciência moral, uma vez que não pode surgir sem desvelar ao mesmo tempo os valores. Daí que permaneço livre, em minha consciência reflexiva, para dirigir minha atenção aos valores ou para negligenciá-los – exatamente como depende de mim olhar mais particularmente, sobre esta mesa, minha caneta ou meu maço de cigarros. Mas, seja ou não objeto de uma atenção circunstanciada, os valores são (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 146)124. Segundo o próprio Sartre, o ser da consciência nunca coincide com ela no presente e ela se projeta para o ser do futuro. Por isso a consciência é falta e necessita do valor que inventa (o ser do futuro) e cria a unidade entre o tendo sido e o que se planeja. Mas, da forma como está posto na citação, temos a impressão de que Sartre diz que os valores não são necessários, pois poderíamos negá-los, o que seria uma contradição interna do próprio autor. Na verdade, a negação de certos valores significa a afirmação de outros, de tal forma que, certo valor específico pode não ser necessário, mas que, é evidente que algum valor seja necessário, como mostramos anteriormente. Para clarificar, propomos uma nova escrita deste trecho, a partir das definições sugeridas anteriormente. A proposta é de substituição da expressão "consciência moral" por "consciência de valor" e também da expressão "valores" por "Moral Ordinária". Com isso, a ideia ficaria mais clara: a consciência é de valor, e, portanto, somos livres para dirigir nossa atenção ou negligenciar a Moral Ordinária. Desta forma, a necessidade do valor fica preservada, e a negação passa a se relacionar à moral posta e não ao valor escolhido, o que garante uma construção não contraditória e nem ambígua. Em outras palavras, a consciência reflexiva pode ser 124 « La conscience réflexive, en effet, pose l'Erlebnis réfléchie dans sa nature de manque et dégage du même coup la valeur comme le sens hors d'atteinte de ce qui est manqué. Ainsi la conscience réflexive peut-elle être dite, à proprement parler, conscience morale puisqu'elle ne peut surgir sans dévoiler du même coup les valeurs. Il va de soi que je demeure libre , dans ma conscience réflexive, de diriger mon attention sur elles ou de les négliger exactement comme il dépend de moi de regarder plus particulièrement, sur cette table, mon stylo ou mon paquet de tabac. Mais qu'elles soient ou non l'objet d'une attention circonstanciée, elles sont »(SARTRE, 1943, p. 131). 118 chamada de consciência de valor e não de "consciência moral", como no trecho acima, pois nem todo valor é valor moral (que recebe atribuição de valor verdade certo ou errado quando está em acordo ou desacordo com uma finalidade ética). Além disso, não fico livre para negligenciar os valores (pois isso é impossível de acordo com a própria teoria sartriana), mas fico livre para negligenciar os valores que estão postos como padrão (ou seja, isso que chamei de Moral Ordinária). Além do mais, pode-se negar não só valores da sociedade (Moral Ordinária), como também um valor já escolhido anteriormente, ou seja, um valor particular que tenha sido fixado outrora. Mas, no caso da rejeição desse valor de escolha própria, não significa que não se tenha adotado outro valor imediatamente. Justamente o contrário, pois toda escolha é de valor, logo, negar um objetivo significa necessariamente adotar outro valor. Assim, fica esclarecido o texto com a coerência mantida, com a ênfase da necessidade de algum valor e da contingencialidade de qualquer valor. 3.2 A concretude do valor Aliás, pelo fato de podermos observar mudanças de valores, verificamos que a projeção para o valor não determina a atitude. Há permanência da liberdade para se constituir, visto que o valor é análogo ao possível: Ocorre com o possível o mesmo que com o valor: há maior dificuldade em compreender seu ser, posto que é dado como anterior ao ser do qual é possibilidade pura e, no entanto, pelo menos enquanto possível, necessita de um ser (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 148)125. A realização do valor também é análoga à realização do possível. Um valor escolhido está longe de ser realizado, mas se ele foi escolhido é porque existem as condições objetivas necessárias para que ele seja alcançado. 125 « Il en est du possible comme de la valeur: on a la plus grande difficulté à comprendre son être, car il se donne comme antérieur à l'être dont il est la pure possibilité et pourtant, en tant que possible du moins, il faut bien qu'il ait l'être » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 133). 119 Assim, o possível não poderia ser reduzido a uma realidade subjetiva. Também não é anterior ao real ou ao verdadeiro, mas é propriedade concreta de realidades já existentes. Para que a chuva seja possível, é necessário que haja nuvens no céu. Suprimir o ser para estabelecer o possível em sua pureza é uma tentativa absurda; a passagem frequentemente citada do não ser ao ser, passando pelo possível, não corresponde ao real. Decerto, o estado possível ainda não é; mas é estado possível de certo existente que sustenta com seu ser a possibilidade e o não ser de seu estado futuro (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 149-150)126. Para Sartre, o valor, (a ideia, a imagem, o em-si-para-si), da mesma forma que todo possível, enquanto possibilidade é qualidade concreta do existente. E, uma vez que a paixão não é suficiente para a concretização de atitudes, pois que é móbil e o para-si pode decidir negá-la, a ideia singular é necessária. Mencionamos a possibilidade de Sartre ser um idealista, no que diz respeito à constituição da identidade, visto que é preciso uma ideia anterior para a produção da ação biográfica, a respeito do universal (propriedades que fazem algo ser algo) aplicado à singularidade. Entretanto, como verificamos, a ideia é valor, que, por sua vez é possibilidade concreta, logo, está excluída a possibilidade de considerar essa ideia como a priori, no sentido que a priori possui na tradição filosófica, pois, a ideia criada pelo para-si é um existente mundano, cuja essência do "eu" é produzida a partir da escolha vivida (simultaneamente à ideia) e da concretização da ação (a posteriori), pela interpretação do passado constituído a partir dela. A ideia, sendo possibilidade, é também propriedade concreta de realidades existentes, o que impossibilita o estabelecimento de sua pureza absoluta. Portanto, em Sartre, a ideia é um dos seres que falta ao para-si diante de suas possibilidades. Assim como não poderia haver falta no mundo se a mesma não viesse ao mundo por um ser que é sua própria falta, também não poderia 126 « Ainsi, le possible ne saurait se réduire à une réalité subjective. Il n'est pas non plus antérieur au réel ou au vrai. Mais il est une propriété concrète de réalités déjà existantes. Pour que la pluie soit possible, il faut qu'il y ait des nuages au ciel. Supprimer l'être pour établir le possible dans sa pureté est une tentative absurde; la procession souvent citée qui va du non-être à l'être en passant par le possible ne correspond pas au réel. Certes, l'état possible n 'est pas encore; mais c'est l'état possible d'un certain existant qui soutient par son être la possibilité et le nonêtre de son état futur» (SARTRE, 1943, p. 131-132). 120 haver possibilidade no mundo se esta não viesse por um ser que é para si mesmo sua própria possibilidade (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 150)127. Disso podemos inferir que o relativismo é próprio da escolha humana em relação ao valor, e não por causa do valor. A consciência é aquela que dá origem ao não ser no mundo, porque é também não ser. O valor, dá origem à possibilidade, porque ele é possibilidade. Nesse sentido, a consciência relaciona-se com o valor da maneira de não sê-lo, mas querendo sê-lo, pois o valor é o ser que não coincide com a consciência no presente, mas que está adiante, no futuro. O valor, que é a própria síntese entre o passado e o presente do indivíduo, é buscado pelo para-si como se ele fosse capaz de dar ao para-si aquilo que ele não tem: a identidade. Entendemos que a diferença entre consciência e possibilidade é clara. O não-ser (a consciência, o para-si) coincide com o pensamento da negação, a partir da interrogação, ao passo que, a possibilidade não: "[...]a possibilidade não pode, por essência, coincidir com o puro pensamento das possibilidades [...] [Entretanto], a captação do possível como tal pressupõe um transcender original" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 150-151)128. Isso está diretamente relacionado à condição desejante própria do humano: O desejo, como vimos, é falta de ser. Enquanto tal, é diretamente sustentado no ser do qual é falta. Este ser, já vimos, é o Em-si-Parasi, a consciência feita substância, a substância feita causa de si, o Homem-Deus. Assim, o ser da realidade humana não é originariamente uma substância, mas uma relação vivida: os termos dessa relação são o Em-si originário, coagulado em sua contingência e facticidade, e cuja característica essencial consiste no fato de que é, de que existe, e, por outro lado, o Em-si-Para-si, ou valor que representa o Ideal do Em-si contingente e se caracteriza como estando Para-além de toda contingência e toda existência. O homem não é nem um nem outro desses seres, por que não é: o homem é o que não é e não é o que é; constitui a nadificação do Em-si contingente, na medida em que o si mesmo desta nadificação é sua fuga em avanço no rumo do Em-si causa de si. A realidade humana é puro empenho para fazer-se Deus, sem que tal esforço tenha qualquer 127«De même qu'il ne saurait y avoir de manque dans le monde que s'il vient au monde par un être qui est son propre manque, de même il ne saurait y avoir au monde de possibilité, qu'elle ne vienne par un être qui est à soimême sa propre possibilité» (SARTRE, 1943, p. 135). 128 "[...] la possibilité ne peut, par essence, coïncider avec la pure pensée des possibilités[...] [toutefois,] la saisie du possible comme tel suppose un dépassement originel." (SARTRE, 1943, p. 135-136). 121 substrato dado, sem que nada haja a esforçar-se assim. O desejo exprime esse empenho (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 704)129. Poderíamos aqui fazer uma analogia com Aristóteles, em que o motor imóvel é ato puro, estático e também causa de todo movimento. Esse Deus sartriano, o qual o homem se empenha para fazer-se Ele, é tão impessoal quanto o Aristotélico. Sartre não considera de fato a existência de Deus criador e personificado, como a palavra Deus ordinariamente é utilizada. Mas, para entendermos de fato, o que a palavra Deus significa quando Sartre a utiliza, suponhamos que essa existência de Deus criador e personificado existisse. Nesse caso, teríamos que: a) Ele teria que ser o em-si para o qual o homem se direciona, um fim último. Mas, se assim fosse, Deus não poderia ter criado o homem, pois, segundo Sartre, apenas um não-ser poderia originar um não-ser, como já mostramos. Dessa exigência, decorreria que Deus, assim como o homem, seria também falta e possibilidade, o que significaria que ele não se bastaria. Por um lado, justificaria a necessidade da criação, de transcender rumo às suas possibilidades. Suas criaturas faltantes seriam, assim como na Bíblia, "a sua imagem e semelhança". Ele seria, então, b) não-ser, sem substância, sem essência, sem qualidades necessárias, mutante. Observemos que de a) e b) Deus teria que ser e não ser ao mesmo tempo, "eis a questão". Isso, ao invés de contrariar o princípio da não contradição, mostra que Deus seria ao mesmo tempo em-si e para-si, ou seja, o em-si-para-si, propriamente o conceito de valor, em Sartre, o que justifica, de certa forma, a utilização da palavra Deus para designar valor. Um Deus que não é criador, mas que está para ser concretizado a partir da realidade concreta do possível; que não é criador, mas que está para ser, sendo fruto do processo criativo: uma imagem, uma "luz nova". Esse Deus que Sartre menciona é propriamente o valor eleito pela subjetividade, aquilo que dá unidade entre o presente, o passado e o futuro humano. 129 « Le désir est manque d'être, nous l'avons vu. En tant que tel, il est directement porté sur l'être dont il est manque. Cet être, nous l'avons vu, c'est l'en-soi-pour-soi, la conscience devenue substance, la substance devenue cause de soi, l'Homme-Dieu. Ainsi l'être de la réalité-humaine est originellement non une substance mais un rapport vécu : les termes de ce rapport sont l'en-soi originel, figé dans sa contingence et sa facticité et dont la caractéristique essentielle est qu'il est, qu'il existe, et, d'autre part, l'en-soi-pour-soi ou valeur, qui est comme l'idéal de l'en-soi contingent et qui se caractérise comme par delà toute contingence et toute existence. L'homme n'est ni l'un ni l'autre de ces êtres, car il n'est point : il est ce qu'il n'est pas et il n'est pas ce qu'il est, il est la néantisation de l'en-soi contingent en tant que le soi de cette néantisation est sa fuite en avant vers l'en-soi cause de soi. La réalité-humai ne est pur effort pour devenir Dieu, sans qu'il y ait aucun substrat donné de cet effort, sans qu'il y ait rien qui s'efforce ainsi. Le désir exprime cet effort » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 621). 122 À eleição de determinado valor por cada indivíduo poderíamos comparar os deuses singulares, o que a filosofia oriental e os místicos costumam chamar de processo de individuação (apesar das considerações das determinações), ou, mais propriamente, ao Ego Responsabilidade de Salanskis. Ainda que seja minha eleição, não significa que eu não possa defender esse meu deus para os demais. O valor tem um caráter prescritivo. Se elejo um valor, significa que, dentre possibilidades, a atitude relacionada a ele é aquela à qual eu recomendo. Nada impede que eu queira mostrar esse valor aos Outros, não de forma impositiva, mas com o intuito de que os Outros ampliem suas possibilidades de escolha, na esperança de que possam analisar e agir de forma diferente, se for o caso de suas escolhas mudarem. Propriamente, o valor escolhido, é esse deus singular que eu vou a ele e que ele retorna a mim me direcionando, sem a carga personificada da religião, mas com a carga ainda mais opressora. 3.3 Valor e universalidade O valor é a força motriz de qualquer atitude, além disso, sou responsável por mim e pelo mundo. E, ao contrário do que muitos se dão conta, essa conclusão sartriana não se encontra originariamente em O existencialismo é um humanismo (p. 27). Vejamos a citação em O ser e o nada: A conseqüência essencial de nossas observações anteriores é a de que o homem, estando condenado a ser livre, carrega nos ombros o peso do mundo inteiro: é responsável pelo mundo e por si mesmo enquanto maneira de ser. [...] a responsabilidade do Para-si é opressiva (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 678)130. Por isso, assumir a responsabilidade de minha ação é o mesmo que eleger valores que possam ser eleitos por toda a humanidade. Esse é um ponto crucial de 130 « La conséquence essentielle de nos remarques antérieures, c'est que l'homme, étant condamné à être libre, porte le poids du monde tout entier sur ses épaule: il est responsable du monde et de lui-même en tant que manière d'être [...] la responsabilité du pour-soi est accablante» (SARTRE, 1943, p. 598). 123 aproximação de atitude da perspectiva existencial com a universal, ainda que por caminhos distintos. Isto é, por formas completamente diferentes de compreender o mundo, ao final, pode-se chegar ao mesmo tipo de conclusão, a da ação com responsabilização: "Com efeito, não existe um de nossos atos sequer que, criando o homem que queremos ser, não crie ao mesmo tempo uma imagem do homem conforme julgamos que ele deva ser" (SARTRE, 2010b, p.27)131. Essa profunda relação entre a escolha e a prescrição ocorre porque toda escolha é escolha de valor, assim como é característica própria da ética denominada de "prescritivismo universal" (HARE, 2003, p.71), ou "racionalismo" (HARE, 2003, p. 173), ou simplesmente "prescritivismo" (HUDSON, 1970, p. 35). Retomamos aqui os principais aspectos discutidos nesse trabalho e os vincularemos à ação, pois entendemos que o movimento é a consequência mais imediata do fundamento sartriano a respeito do humano: a ausência de ser. Além disso, é pela atitude, que Sartre vincula-se tão fortemente à arte, em uma busca da dramatização filosófica e da universalização dos personagens existenciais. Com isso, podemos eleger com mais propriedade a Ética como projeto inspirador e a utilização da filosofia e da arte para a realização prática desse projeto, em uma nova perspectiva Política. "Sua dimensão como ato na luta contra o mal é que compele o leitor a definir sua própria posição quanto aos temas em foco, e, já que o ato está sempre evidentemente claro nas obras de Sartre, não há quem possa passar por ele com indiferença" (MÉSZÁROS, 2012, p. 22). A responsabilidade impele atos, sejam eles a respeito de mudanças ou permanências. Se percebo a injustiça, a discriminação e a intolerância no mundo e decido não fazer nada para que a situação mude, sou responsável por ela. Os fatos estão dados, mas a interpretação que dou aos fatos como algo superável ou intransponível, bem como o projeto para o qual me lanço a partir dessa interpretação, depende da minha escolha livre, sem qualquer imperativo externo. Sartre diz que a filosofia da alienação de Marx só seria superada quando o regime político e econômico e os homens se modificassem (SARTRE, 1960, p.34-37). Quando ele diz isso, ele está fazendo uma denúncia a respeito da situação, que aliena 131 « En effet, il n'est pas un de nos actes qui, en créant l'homme que nous voulons être, ne crée en même temps une image de l'homme tel que nous estimons qu'il doit être » (SARTRE, 1996, p. 31-32). 124 a condição fundamental humana – a liberdade. Não que o homem deixe de ser livre, pois isso não é possível de acordo com sua teoria, mas, de fato, a alienação limita o homem, como se ele não tivesse possibilidade de escolha. É essa falsa limitação que Sartre contesta e, para contestá-la, ele se apoia em Marx para tal, pois percebe a possibilidade de explicitação da má-fé influenciada pela alienação, ao mesmo tempo compreende uma proposta de vida diferente. Como uma filosofia da liberdade poderá ter expressividade prática (que é sua exigência para que uma filosofia possa ser considerada vigente) se a maior parte dos sujeitos é "produto de seu produto"? É sobre esse aspecto que ele mostra a necessidade de superar a situação de forma prática, para que uma filosofia da liberdade possa se tornar vigente em sua autenticidade. Ou seja, ele cria a ideia de superação para inspirar a diminuição das limitações, o que ele chama de engajamento, mas que poderíamos chamar de comunicação de valor. A partir da concepção negativa da consciência, não se pode mais culpar o exterior pelas frustrações e infelicidades. Por isso, podemos analisar que Sartre age no mundo com sua teoria. O contato com a filosofia sartriana e a explicitação da máfé geram ações novas no mundo, porque as descrições de Sartre chamam a atenção para o projeto da autenticidade, ou seja, as descrições de Sartre não são meras descrições, porque ele chama a atenção para a escolha de cada um. Vejamos o que relembra Sartre, de acordo com Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre, sua filha adotiva, no prefácio de Cadernos para uma moral: A ontologia, escrevia, não saberia formular ela mesma prescrições morais. Ela se ocupa unicamente do que é, e não é possível tirar imperativos de seus indicativos. Ela deixa transpassar, contudo, isso que será uma ética que toma suas responsabilidades em face de uma realidade humana em situação132 (ELKAÏM-SARTRE, 1983a apud SARTRE , 1983, p. 7, tradução nossa). Não se pode mesmo deduzir imperativos de fatos, mas podemos deduzir imperativos de escolhas, e isso faz toda diferença. Os imperativos de Sartre (seja em O existencialismo é um humanismo, seja em Apelo aos intelectuais ou na Crítica da razão dialética) são transcendentes e mundanos, são advindos de uma existência 132 « L'ontologie, écrivait-il, ne saurait formuler elle-même des prescriptions morales. Elle s'occupe uniquement de ce qui est, et il n'est pas possible de tirer des impératifs de ses indicatifs. Elle laisse entrevoir cependant ce que sera une éthique qui prendra ses responsabilités en face d'une réalité humaine en situation ». 125 particular, diante de uma situação vivenciada. Por isso, foram capazes de pelo menos abrir possibilidades. Consequentemente, podemos dizer que sua própria teoria faz papel do que ele mesmo chama de "luz nova". E sendo essa ideia realizável e inspiradora, é capaz de tirar o homem da mesmice. A concepção de um "outro estado de coisas", pela simples descrição, ou seja, uma nova ideia realizável e que ainda não foi realizada é o que "ilumina" uma ação. Por isso a arte tem papel prático na vida do homem: os "mitos", inclusive os que Sartre cria com seus personagens, fazem o homem entrar em contato com mundos novos e possíveis, ainda que ideias não possam ser entendidas como causas isoladas. Nem mesmo motivos e móbeis poderiam ser causas sem a consideração da escolha de determinada ideia pelo próprio não-ser: o Para-si. Assim, viver é prescrever, é criar imperativos, porque viver é um ato de liberdade, de escolha própria. Pois o movimento só é possível para aquele que é livre, e não determinado, aquele que tem ausência de ser e que transcende rumo a esse ser: Assim como o futuro retorna ao presente e ao passado para iluminálos, também é o conjunto de meus projetos que retrocede para conferir ao móbil sua estrutura de móbil. É somente porque escapo ao Em-si nadificando-me rumo às minhas possibilidades que este Em-si pode adquirir valor de motivo ou móbil. Motivos e móbeis só tem sentido no interior de um conjunto projetado que é precisamente um conjunto de não existentes. E este conjunto é, eu mesmo enquanto transcendência, eu mesmo na medida que tenho de ser fora de mim (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 541)133. A ideia é o valor, o em-si-para-si, o possível não realizado ainda. O ser do para-si está na ideia, no futuro, que incita o movimento neste projetar-se. Motivos e móbeis não são as causas das ações, porque a liberdade não possui necessidade lógica. As ações são livres e acidentais, sem causas, por isso motivos e móbeis são apenas as condições, que se tornam condições por causa da ideia escolhida. Assim, aplicamos a teoria de Sartre, nela mesma. Ou seja, concebemos sua teoria como uma ideia, como um valor, que "ilumina" as ações dos leitores. Com 133 « De même que le futur revient sur le présent et le passé pour l'éclairer, de même c'est l'ensemble de mes projets qui revient en arrière pour conférer au mobile sa structure de mobile. C'est seulement parce que j'échappe à en-soi en me néantisant vers mes possibilités que cet en-soi peut prendre valeur de motif ou de mobile. Motifs et mobiles n'ont de sens qu'à l'intérieur d'un ensemble pro-jeté qui est justement un ensemble de non-existants. Et cet ensemble, c'est finalement moi-même comme transcendance, c'est moi en tant que j'ai à être moi-même hors de moi. » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 481). 126 isso, percebe-se claramente que o projeto de autenticidade descrito por Sartre pode ser entendido justamente como uma ideia impulsionadora, que tem a capacidade de despertar aqueles que tomam contato com sua teoria para um tipo de atitude: a vida autêntica. O contato com a teoria sartriana abre as possibilidades do sujeito, pois provoca a explicitação da vergonha de suas escolhas, que passam a ser insuportáveis, quando contrapostas com a ideia de ações pelas quais se pode sentir orgulho. O projeto de autenticidade influencia-nos a agir apenas em conformidade com o que realmente teríamos satisfação em assumir para nós mesmos, ainda que permaneça a espera do olhar de aprovação de algum Outro. Enfatizamos, então, a aproximação do existencial e do universal, no que diz respeito não à forma de conceber o mundo, mas em relação às atitudes: Mas, na verdade, a pergunta que sempre deve ser feita é: 'O que aconteceria se todos agissem do mesmo modo?' E não se tem como escapar desse pensamento inquietante sem uma espécie de má-fé. Aquele que mente e se escusa dizendo que nem todo mundo age assim é alguém que não está bem à vontade com sua consciência, pois o fato de mentir implica um valor universal atribuído à mentira (SARTRE, 2010b, p.29)134. Apesar de Sartre não mencionar Kant, é uma referência certa a ele. Vejamos como Kant enuncia a proposição moral: "nunca devo proceder de outra maneira senão de tal sorte que eu possa também querer que a minha máxima se torne uma lei universal" (KANT, 2009, p. 133). De acordo com Leopoldo e Silva, "O existencialismo sartriano é de um grande rigor moral e está infinitamente afastado de qualquer relativismo" (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2009, p. 113)135. Faço essa comparação, ainda que Kant jamais aceitaria uma análise que pudesse ser circunstancial, e que ele também não admitisse esse tipo de conclusão 134 « Mais en vérité, on doit toujours se demander : qu'arriverait-il si tout le monde en faisait autant ? et on n'échappe à cette pensée inquiétant que par une sorte de mauvaise foi. Celui qui ment et qui s'excuse en déclarant : tout le monde ne fait pas comme ça, est quelqu'un qui est mal à l'aise avec sa conscience, car le fait de mentir implique une valeur universelle attribuée au mensonge » (SARTRE, 1996, p. 34). 135 Embora, como mostramos, não existam valores absolutos, Sartre não é mesmo relativista. O fato de que o homem se fundamenta no nada e que por isso ele sempre se projeta para o ser do valor, impõe a responsabilidade de sua ação para si mesmo, logo, não agir significa estar de acordo com a situação. A explicitação disso para o leitor, exige que ele decida entre permanecer na situação e camuflar sua infelicidade com a mentira para si mesmo, ou então agir na busca da constituição de uma melhor situação. Por isso, Sartre é o filósofo da atitude, enquanto não houver uma satisfação autêntica. 127 advinda das vivências, ou advinda de busca de felicidades individuais ou intermediárias, como é o caso dos imperativos hipotéticos (que são os imperativos intermediários para se atingir determinado fim) (KANT, 2009, p. 189): Todo mundo tem que admitir: que uma lei, se ela deve valer moralmente, isto é, como razão de uma obrigação, tem de trazer consigo necessidade absoluta; que o mandamento: 'não mentirás' de modo algum vale só para homens, não tendo outros seres racionais de fazer caso dele, e assim todas as demais leis morais propriamente ditas; por conseguinte, que não se deve buscar a razão da obrigação na natureza do homem, ou nas circunstâncias do mundo, mas sim, a priori unicamente em conceitos da razão pura, e que todo outro preceito baseado em princípios da mera experiência e até mesmo um preceito de certo modo universal pode certamente se chamar uma regra prática, jamais, porém uma lei prática, na medida em que se apoia em razões empíricas, por uma ínfima parte que seja, quiçá quanto a um único motivo apenas (KANT, 2009, p. 71). Não entraremos na discussão sobre se a denominação correta seja regra prática ou lei. Podemos somente abrir um parêntese para dizer que nesse trabalho estamos chamando de lei, o que Kant chama de regra prática. E, que, além disso, não fazemos essa distinção, pois, a partir do existencialismo, não consideramos que possam existir leis a priori. Foquemos no que Kant diz sobre a necessidade absoluta, e no exemplo que ele dá sobre a mentira. Entrementes, para os neokantianos, como Hare, é admitida a universalização da mentira em casos circunstanciais, pois apesar de admirador de Kant, Hare contesta a compreensão do universal como geral: "[...] os princípios morais não têm de ser tão simples e gerais como Kant parece ter pensado, e podem ainda ser universais, apesar de tudo (HARE, 2003, p. 211). Para Hare, universalização significa somente que o juízo é o mesmo independente de qual é a posição do sujeito na discussão, o que podemos dizer que se relaciona com a necessidade kantiana de que "a vontade de um ser racional tem que ser considerada ao mesmo tempo como legislante, porque, de outro modo, não poderia pensá-los como fins em si mesmos" (KANT, 2009, p. 263). Com isso, em Hare, o universal está ligado somente à independência em relação aos papéis desempenhados para a análise da situação, em contraposição à inclusa necessidade de falta de interesse pessoal de Kant (KANT, 2009, p. 257). Ou seja, enquanto que a universalização em Kant está sempre ligada ao geral, para Hare a universalização pode estar ligada a 128 situações específicas, porque o contrário de universal é a palavra "particular", e não a palavra "específico". Por exemplo, sobre mentir, o juízo que poderia ser universalizável para Kant é "mentir é errado", que é um juízo geral. Kant não aceita especificações como Hare as exige, como por exemplo "é correto mentir em situações em que uma pessoa inocente corre risco de vida". Esse juízo é específico, mas não perde sua universalidade, porque vale quando eu estiver na posição do mentiroso, ou na posição de quem está ouvindo a mentira, ou seja, a impessoalidade é mantida. Por outro lado, se o juízo for "meu ato de mentir sempre é correto, mas o seu não", é um juízo particular, que não seria avaliado como verdadeiro nem por Kant e nem por Hare. Os juízos particulares são contraditórios aos juízos universais. Os juízos específicos são contraditórios aos juízos gerais. Logo, nada impede que tenhamos juízos específicos e universais, como Hare defende. Em Hare, para que uma lei seja universalizável: [...] tenho que querê-la não apenas para a presente situação, na qual tenho o papel que tenho, mas igualmente para todas as situações semelhantes a essa em suas propriedades universais, incluindo aquelas nas quais desempenho todos os outros papéis possíveis. Contudo, não posso querer isso a menos que esteja disposto a suportar o que deveria sofrer em todos aqueles papéis e, é claro, além disso, receber as coisas boas das quais eu deveria usufruir nos outros papéis (HARE, 2003, p. 209). Em outras palavras, apesar de discutir o sentido de universal kantiano, Hare concorda com Kant em não admitir prescrições que sejam particulares, em que o juízo muda dependendo da posição que o "eu" se encontra, quando há uma pessoalidade, ligado a um relativismo. Ambos usam prescrições da lógica modal do tipo LP, que significa "é necessário a proposição P", em que a diferença está apenas na descrição de P: enquanto P pode ser situada (específica) para Hare, P só pode ser geral para Kant. Menciono Hare e mostro suas diferenças com Kant, para sugerir, ainda que de forma tímida, que, assim como Hare, Sartre poderia se autodenominar de neokantiano, se assim ele quisesse. Entretanto, se fôssemos expressar a proposição de Sartre em termos da lógica modal, não usaríamos o operador "necessário" (L), mas sim o operador "possível" (M). Pois, Sartre parte do singular para a abertura do universal. Arriscaríamos misturar a lógica de predicados com a lógica modal para expressar isso assim: ExP(a)→ⱯxMP(x), que significa "se determinado 129 indivíduo viveu isso, então todos podem viver isso também, estando na mesma situação". E o peso da responsabilidade faz o indivíduo se questionar: "quero que essa ação possa mesmo ser escolhida por todos?". Essa é a aproximação em termos lógicos do existencial com o universal, que eu mencionei anteriormente. Também não podemos deixar de dizer que, para Sartre, apesar de não ser uma imposição transcendental, como é em Kant, a escolha por projetos morais é mais fácil para o sujeito, pois esse tipo de escolha geralmente causa orgulho136 e não vergonha nas pessoas, o que, embora ele não mencione, acredito ser referência à Hume: Pois, se toda moralidade se funda na dor ou no prazer gerados pela perspectiva de algum prejuízo ou vantagem que possam resultar de nosso próprio caráter ou do caráter alheio, todos os efeitos da moralidade têm de ser derivados da mesma dor ou prazer – entre eles, as paixões do orgulho e da humildade. A essência mesma da virtude, segundo essa hipótese, é produzir prazer, e a do vício é causar dor. Para suscitar orgulho ou humildade, a virtude e o vício devem fazer parte de nosso caráter. (HUME, 2009, p. 330). Sartre chega à conclusão sobre as atitudes, nem de forma deontológica, como Kant, nem de forma utilitarista, como Hume, mas como resultado de se compreender a consciência como negatividade e plena liberdade. Escolher é agir responsavelmente no mundo, não com uma responsabilidade exigida de fora para dentro, mas no sentido interno, de culpabilidade própria. 3.4 Ideia e realização Existem condições necessárias para a mudança de atitude. Sartre afirma que a falta é condição para toda ação (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 537). Isso ocorre porque a falta (pura negatividade) é sempre falta de alguma coisa, que impulsiona nossas 136 Abrimos um parêntese também para mostrarmos que o próprio Sartre escalou pelo sentimento de orgulho para desenvolver com propriedade sua teoria e enfrentar as dificuldades de seu tempo. Observe a afirmação de Mészáros sobre Sartre: "A articulação da obra de toda sua vida caracteriza-se por um orgulho e dignidade imensos. Pois o que ele poderia ter realizado com humildade em um ambiente hostil?" (MÉSZÁROS, 2012, p. 24). De qualquer modo, é bom dar relevo de que o orgulho do qual estamos tratando é sobre aquele que é antônimo de vergonha e não de simplicidade. 130 ações para essa coisa. Vejamos o que ele diz sobre o que foi necessário para a construção de uma cidade: Criar Constantinopla só pode ser compreendido como ato se, primeiramente, a concepção de uma cidade nova precedeu a própria ação, ou, ao menos, esta concepção tenha servido de tema organizador a todos os trâmites ulteriores (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 537)137. Ou seja, para que a ação ocorra, deve surgir algo "possível desejável e não realizado" (SARTRE, 2011d, p. 537), que deve ser concebido de maneira prévia para que possa se tornar ato. Sartre diz que a força motriz, capaz de provocar transformações, não é a situação (os fatos, o sofrimento), mas a imaginação da mudança. Inclusive, Sartre contesta Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, e até Husserl, no livro A imaginação, e termina por concluir que "[...] a imagem é um certo tipo de consciência. A imagem é um ato e não uma coisa. A imagem é consciência de alguma coisa" (SARTRE, 2010a, p. 137)138. Nesse sentido, a imaginação que é um tipo de imagem apresenta-se como intrínseca à ação, e por isso, a obra de arte, que advém do processo imaginativo, (e por isso também, a literatura), é ação, é consciência singular de desvelamento em direção a um universal, que ao mesmo tempo é retornado como ação a partir de novas imagens na apreensão de outros singulares que a intencionam, ainda que, como na citação abaixo, exista impenetrabilidade da estrutura em relação ao subjetivo, e também que o subjetivo permaneça livre em relação ao objeto intencionado. A partir dessas observações, pode-se afirmar que a obra literária de hoje se dá pela tarefa de manifestar ao mesmo tempo as duas faces do ser-no-mundo; ela deve se fazer ela mesma o desvelamento a si do mundo pela mediação de uma parte singular que a produziu, de tal modo que se apresente o universal por toda parte como o gerador da singularidade e reciprocamente que se apreenda a singularidade como curvatura e limite invisível do universal. Pode-se dizer assim que 137 « Créer Constantinople ne se comprend comme acte que si d'abord la conception d'une ville neuve à précédé l'action elle-même ou si, à tout le moins, cette conception sert de thème organisateur à toutes les démarches ultérieures » (SARTRE, 1943, p. 478). 138« [...] l'image est un certain type de conscience. L'image est un acte et non une chose. L'image est conscience de quelque chose (SARTRE, 2012a , p. 136). 131 a objetividade deve ser detectada a cada página como estrutura fundamental do subjetivo e, inversamente, que a subjetividade deve ser totalmente recuperável como a impenetrabilidade do objetivo (SARTRE, p. 1972, p. 112-113, tradução nossa)139. Também, em relação ao que se escreve, embora a situação afete o escritor, ela não pode determinar aquilo que é escrito, o foco é uma eleição do escritor, sobre o modo de apreensão da vida. Para Sartre, não tem como o escritor não ser afetado pelas contradições no mundo, como a possibilidade de uma guerra nuclear. Porém, ele defende que o escritor não tem necessariamente que escrever sobre essas contradições, mas ao contrário, o recomenda a valorizar o ser-no-mundo vivido. Ou seja, é preciso apreender uma vida que negue a situação em sua autonomia e destacar a singularidade com importância e como forma de resistência. Somente assim ocorre a possibilidade de comunicar o que é impossível de ser dito, precisamente a tensão entre o mundo e o ser-no-mundo (SARTRE, 1972, p. 115-116). Tensão como exigência. Penso que Sartre refere-se principalmente à emoção que é provocada com algumas obras, que são capazes de fazer as pessoas redirecionarem suas vidas. Muitas vezes, a racionalidade de determinado assunto, quando apresentada objetivamente, mostra-se incapaz de produzir imagens de direcionamento prático. Por isso, a arte pode ser instrumentalizada de forma tão poderosa, ao gerar novas possibilidades. A inspiração pode constituir-se como uma forma de fazer política, cujas propostas de modificação não são diretamente para o Estado ou para o sistema, mas sim para o indivíduo, eticamente, que, por sua vez, indiretamente afetaria o coletivo (o universal), não necessariamente com as denúncias, mas com as imagens de possibilidades melhores. Mas é claro que a arte também pode inspirar atitudes a serem rejeitadas, como Sartre intencionou em algumas obras. A denúncia pela arte pode ocorrer a respeito da política ou sobre atitudes particulares. A culpa sentida na vivência emotiva 139 « A partir de ces quelques remarques, on peut affirmer que l'oeuvre littéraire d'aujourd'hui se donne pour tâche de manifester en même temps les deux faces de l'être-dans-le-monde ; elle doit se faire elle-même le dévoilement à soi du monde par la médiation d'une partie singulière qu'il a produite, en sorte qu'on présente l'universel partout comme le générateur de la singularité et réciproquement qu'on saisisse la singularité comme courbure et limite invisible de l'universel. On peut dire aussi que l'objectivité doit être décelée à chaque page comme structure fondamentale du subjectif et, inversement, que la subjectivité doit être partout repérable comme l'impénétrabilité de l'objectif ». 132 da obra pode ser compreendida como um móbil que não determina o sujeito, mas que também o impulsiona para mudanças, sobre a imagem daquilo que não se quer ser: Nestas condições, aquilo de que nos criticam não é, no fundo, nosso pessimismo, mas uma dureza otimista. Se as pessoas nos criticam pelas nossas obras romanescas nas quais descrevemos seres moles, fracos, covardes, e algumas vezes, inclusive, nitidamente ruins, não é apenas porque esses seres sejam moles, fracos, covardes ou maus: pois se, como Zola, declarássemos que eles já nasceram assim, devido à influência do meio, da sociedade, por causa de um determinismo orgânico ou psicológico, as pessoas se sentiriam sossegadas e diriam: pois é, somos assim mesmo, e não há nada que se possa fazer. Mas o existencialista, quando descreve um covarde declara que este covarde é responsável por sua covardia (SARTRE, 2010b, p.44)140. É difícil se deparar com a realidade de que não há nada prévio ou préestabelecido que justifique qualquer ação: gera-se angústia. O filósofo já previa que sua visão de mundo, sobre a responsabilidade das ações mostrada sem seus véus, pudesse ser interpretada como um grande pessimismo. Mas, na verdade, encarar a realidade sem desculpas é o modo otimista que Sartre escolheu por acreditar que as coisas podem ser diferentes. 140 « Dans ces conditions, ce qu'on nous reproche là, ça n'est pas au fond notre pessimisme, mais une dureté optimiste. Si le gens nous reprochent nos oeuvres romanesques dans lesquelles nous décrivons des êtres veules, faibles, lâches et quelquefois même franchement mauvais, ce n'est pas uniquement mauvais, ce n'est pas uniquement parce que ces êtres sont veules, faibles, lâches ou mauvais : car si, comme Zola, nous déclarions qu'ils sont ainsi à cause de l'hérédité, à cause de l'action du milieu, de la société, à cause d'un déterminisme organique ou psychologique, les gens seraient rassurés, ils diraient : voilà, nous sommes comme ça, personne ne peut rien y faire ; mais l'existentialiste, lorsqu'il décrit un lâche, dit que ce lâche est responsable de sa lâcheté » (SARTRE, 1996, p. 54). 133 4 CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS Nesse trabalho, principalmente, procuramos entender os motivos de Sartre ter sido interpretado como um idealista, mesmo ele fazendo crítica ao idealismo. E também os motivos de ter sido interpretado como incoerente, como se houvesse uma ruptura entre O Ser e o Nada e os outros livros: Crítica da Razão Dialética, O existencialismo é um humanismo (e acrescentei Apelo aos Intelectuais, pois segue a mesma linha). Verificamos que a chave de ambas as resposta estava em torno da dependência ontológica da consciência em relação ao ser, e da dependência do ser em relação à consciência. Vejamos. O para-si, que é ausência de ser, tem seu fundamento fora dele mesmo. A dependência ontológica da consciência em relação ao ser para sua existência, faz com que ela se relacione a ele de duas formas: estando presente ao ser e transcendendo a ele. Mas esse ser pode ser de duas maneiras: o em-si, que são os objetos e o passado, e o si do valor. Quando a consciência foca no em-si, temos a relação fenomênica, a aparição, a própria essência das coisas. Assim, a propriedade das coisas que faz com que as coisas sejam as coisas, ou seja, o significado das coisas, depende da consciência para surgir ao mundo. O em-si depende do para-si para ser interpretado, para que surja sua essência, que é a dependência epistemológica, e quer dizer que a existência precede a essência (o que é uma leitura distinta do Prof. Dr. Franklin Leopoldo e Silva). Mas, essa dependência epistemológica não é suficiente para a afirmação do idealismo epistemológico, visto que, a dependência ontológica da consciência em relação ao em-si é anterior e é justamente o que provoca a dependência epistemológica do objeto em relação à consciência. Para Sartre, o mundo existe independentemente da existência humana e sua realidade externa é completamente acessível pela relação fenomênica, ou seja, o fenômeno revela a estrutura do ser. Além disso, sobre o em-si que é meu passado, minhas atitudes vividas, não deixa de existir com minha morte se ele permanece tendo significado para pelo menos uma consciência. De fato, sua realidade pode ser acessada, principalmente se ele foi testemunhado por uma biografia escrita, pelo facebook, por filmagens, ou por qualquer tipo de registro. Inclusive, mostramos que o projeto fundamental do para-si é alcançado com a morte, contrapondo tanto Leopoldo e Silva quanto Moura. 134 Logo, sobre o em-si tanto dos objetos, quanto do passado, Sartre afirma a realidade independente da consciência, e essa realidade pode ser acessada pela consciência, na relação fenomênica. A existência da realidade não depende da consciência, mas desvelamento dessa realidade depende da consciência. Isso é suficiente para contestar o idealismo epistemológico, que admite um em-si inacessível pelo fenômeno, e, portanto, ir de encontro às afirmações do Prof. Dr. Jean-Michel Salanskis sobre o idealismo sartriano. Também é suficiente para contestar o idealismo ontológico, que admite as ideias e as essências a priori e independentes da existência material da realidade. Restou-nos verificar sobre a essência do homem. Quando a consciência intenciona o si do valor, que é o ser que não coincide com ela no presente, somente no futuro, ocorre a atitude. Uma atitude que mantém seu estado atual, ou que o modifica. Mostramos que modificando ou não, não deixa de ser atitude. De forma original, mostramos que independentemente da atitude, mas dependendo do sentimento de responsabilidade do para-si em relação a essa atitude, ela pode ocorrer de duas formas: de maneira autêntica ou de má-fé. E também, independentemente do tipo de atitude, a atitude é ser. Quando ela é vista por uma consciência, acontece a relação fenomênica, aparece significado, a essência. A diferença do que foi descrito no parágrafo anterior (a respeito da essência originada pela relação entre o para-si e o em-si) é que essa essência (entre a consciência e a atitude) é gerada a partir de um ato de um indivíduo. E, o conjunto de estados de ações é o Ego, logo, essa essência é a propriedade que faz o Ego ser tal Ego, ou seja, essa essência é a identidade de responsabilidade de um para-si (aquele que a gerou), mas fundamentada por outro para-si (aquele que viu). O si buscado é criado simultaneamente às possibilidades concretas de existência e a essência vista surge na relação fenomênica, simultaneamente ao ser da atitude. Logo, a essência humana não é independente da existência e isso também é suficiente para contestar o idealismo ontológico. Verificamos também que o valor é a síntese entre o subjetivo e o objetivo, é o em-si-para-si, (o que Sartre chama de Deus). O sujeito escolhe (parte subjetiva) o objeto (parte objetiva), para o qual ele se projeta, que é a finalidade. Mas mostramos também que o para-si é livre de qualquer valor preestabelecido, porque ele é ausência de ser, e somente o que possui ser é determinado. O si para o qual o para-si se projeta é criação própria e livre, sem garantia de cumprimento daquilo que foi proposto. Isso é suficiente para contestar o idealismo ético, em que as ações morais são deduzidas 135 das essências, do imperativo categórico, ou de uma busca pela felicidade suprema (seja por uma ética da eudaimonia aristotélica, seja pelo utilitarismo). Mesmo não sendo idealista epistemológico, ontológico e ético, a teoria Sartriana exige atitude. Isso por causa da responsabilidade advinda desse caráter livre e não determinístico fundamental. Mostramos assim, que é possível constituir a identidade de forma autêntica, uma vez que a qualidade do projeto depende da responsabilidade assumida em relação à atitude, e não propriamente da descrição da atitude. Para reforçarmos isso, apresentamos as relações de projeções em relação aos estados temporais, pois, a consciência pode se projetar para o futuro, de tal maneira a repetir o objeto do passado de forma autêntica, quando ela assume a responsabilidade dessa escolha pela permanência, sem confundir o que é facticidade com o que é projeção. Essa repetição de tipos de atitudes semelhantes, vista e interpretada pelo Outro, é o que constitui a identidade pessoal. Assim, aproximamos a constituição livre da identidade em Sartre com o Ego Responsabilidade de Salanskis, contestando o caráter da irresponsabilidade atribuída por ele ao Sartre. Por outro lado, diferentemente do Ego Responsabilidade de Salanskis, a responsabilidade em Sartre não é uma verdade somente sobre o indivíduo, mas se estende sobre seu conjunto de relações, sobre sua história, sobre seu mundo. E o sentimento de insatisfação somado ao olhar do outro provoca o reconhecimento do para-si com essa identidade que é externa a ele, através do sentimento de vergonha. Uma vergonha capaz de gerar tensão, angústia e exigência de transformação. Dessa maneira, também trazemos uma nova interpretação, de que o olhar do outro, ao invés de limitar minha liberdade, pode estimular novas atitudes, principalmente aquelas atitudes que buscam sentimentos que se contraponham à vergonha, ou seja, aquelas que me trazem sentimento de reconhecimento pelo outro, o orgulho. De forma semelhante em nossa interpretação, o corpo, ao invés de limitar minhas ações, permite que minhas ações sejam engajadas no mundo. Tanto o olhar do outro, quanto o engajamento pelo corpo são exigências de atitude. Entretanto, para que transformações sejam possíveis, Sartre chama a atenção para a necessidade de uma ideia nova, possível e ainda não realizada. Logo, ele nos instiga a idealizar (no sentido comum do termo) sobre o mundo que queremos viver, ao invés de nos conformarmos em lamentações. Isso também mostra que não há ruptura entre as obras, apenas propósitos diferentes. Em O ser e o nada Sartre se propõe a fundamentar a consciência sobre sua ausência de ser e plena liberdade. 136 Embora não existam valores necessários, é necessário escolher valores. Nas demais, Sartre mostra os valores que ele escolheu, não para impor, mas para inspirar outras consciências, o que o aproxima na prática, do idealismo ético, mas, por um método completamente distinto, o método heurístico. Logo, preferimos chamar esse idealismo de idealismo ordinário, comum. E, como cabe a cada um pensar os projetos possíveis de serem realizados em sua própria época, propusemos uma aplicação de um projeto singular, que visa modificações coletivas, pela invenção e utilização do conceito de Ética a respeito de uma finalidade que consideramos ser comum a todas as pesquisas no âmbito da ética, inclusive a respeito da eleição de valores por Sartre, que é a de não produzir vítimas. Ou seja, consideramos o processo dialético das pesquisas em ética na história da filosofia e tentamos realizar uma síntese. Mostramos que essa Ética poderia ser essa ideia nova capaz de iluminar pesquisas para constituição de juízos, bem como para ações dos indivíduos capazes de provocar mudanças significativas, seja pela inspiração, seja pela proposta de constituição de leis, embora compreendemos que na época de Sartre era mais urgente contestar as leis do que fundamentá-las. Além disso, mostramos que a lógica pode ser ferramenta útil para impedir que nos afastemos de nossos próprios propósitos escolhidos, como propõe Sartre. Esse é o resumo esquemático dos pontos principais desse trabalho, mas podemos mostrá-los de maneira diferente. Façamos então, nova tentativa. No âmbito da teoria do conhecimento, poderíamos associar as ideias de Sartre, às ideias aristotélicas que recusam a realidade das formas, das propriedades gerais, como algo independentemente e anterior à realidade sensível. Ou seja, podemos afirmar que Sartre só admitiria o universal in re (na coisa). A diferença é que, para Sartre, o significado depende da consciência. Dessa maneira, a respeito da identidade, no âmbito do singular, por exemplo, isso significa que eu não nasci essa Ana, com todas as características que pudessem definir minha personalidade de maneira pronta e acabada, significa que eu não tenho uma alma, ou qualquer coisa que possa delimitar minhas atitudes dentro de um padrão esperado. Ao contrário, eu constituo essa identidade a partir do olhar do outro. Foi por esse motivo que Sartre se chamou de existencialista, ou seja, por admitir que a existência precede a essência. E, da mesma forma que podemos fazer essa análise sobre a identidade de um particular, em um campo de maior extensão e de menor compreensão, também podemos inferir disso que não existe, por exemplo, 137 o bem puro, advindo de forças divinas ou do cosmo, ou seja, não há nada que possa legitimar uma lei que prescreve algo para os homens, portanto, não existe uma ética a ser procurada e descoberta. Mas, por outro lado, sobre a realidade humana, Sartre afirma que somente uma nova ideia é capaz de provocar a ação141. O que significa que nenhuma constatação de fato, nenhum estado de sofrimento, por mais doloroso que ele seja, é capaz de fazer com que um indivíduo se transforme e transforme seu arredor. Somente uma ideia escolhida não realizada ainda, mas possível, provoca uma ação, logo, somente uma ideia para a qual o para-si transcende produz atitude e, consequentemente, produz as propriedades pessoais que aparecem ao Outro, a essência pessoal, a identidade. Uma nova ideia, que, apesar de não vir de Deus, é criada pelo homem, de tal maneira a possibilitar sua projeção. Nesse caso, poderíamos inferir, de certa forma, que Sartre aceitaria o universal ante rem (anterior à coisa). O que significaria, no âmbito do singular, que eu não nasci com o caráter dessa Ana, mas que eu elegi determinadas características (pela criação ou pela imitação de alguma ideia) e pratiquei ações de acordo com essa eleição a fim de ir me constituindo. Discutimos esses aspectos e suas nuanças, ao longo do texto, para mostrar o motivo pelo qual essa ideia não pode ser considerada ante rem. De fato, mostramos que a ideia pode ser anterior à coisa, mas não anterior à existência. Isso ocorre pelo próprio caráter fenomenológico da teoria de Sartre, uma verdade que se encontra no transcendente (na projeção para o si), mas não no transcendental (a priori). Para o autor, a verdade surge na relação fenomênica, a partir de um objeto (em-si) e uma consciência (para-si). Dessa maneira, a verdade é a aparição de um objeto para uma consciência, e o fenômeno não é aquilo que vela, mas, ao contrário, o que desvela o ser. Se a verdade está na aparição, devo então aparecer ao Outro, através de minhas atitudes, para que a minha verdade se revele ao Outro, ou seja, para que minha identidade possa ir se produzindo. Especificamente, a essência da qual trata Sartre não existe anteriormente, mas aparece na relação fenomênica ao Outro, ou seja, uma essência projetada no 141 O Professor Ms. Silvio Carlos Marinho Ribeiro me contestou dizendo que atualmente, ideias conservadoras provocam ações. Penso que talvez ele se refira ao pedido de prisão do presidente Lula. Mesmo para isso, é preciso uma nova ideia, pois é preciso a ideia do Lula preso, para que se realize o ato da prisão do Lula. Nesse caso, temos um conservadorismo político, mas com uma nova ideia. 138 mundo, e pela ação, constituída. Além disso, essa escolha da pessoa que quero ser relaciona-se intimamente com a minha prescrição de pessoa. Quer dizer que a cada escolha que eu faço, isso diz respeito à abertura de possibilidades no mundo para que Outros me imitem, para que Outros também escolham isso que eu escolhi. Assim, a escolha da minha pessoa sobre as coisas que realmente importam relaciona-se com aquilo que eu penso que toda a humanidade devesse também, portanto, escolher. Isso faz de Sartre, segundo ele mesmo, um humanista. Logo, a questão do universal aplicado à prática sartriana, leva em consideração a capacidade de invenção do homem, que, justamente por ser ausência de ser, possui a possibilidade de se autocriar a partir de sua relação com o Outro. Essa autocriação de características que podem ser descritas, porque podem ser vistas após a ação, relaciona-se também com o universal não no campo ontológico, mas no campo ético e político, pois o caráter descritivo constituído relaciona-se ao caráter prescritivo, sobre o ser humano que eu escolho e sobre o mundo que eu quero viver. Ou seja, pela responsabilidade existencialista, chega-se ao âmbito da ética e em uma de suas mais importantes questões: quais atitudes poderiam ser universalizadas? O diferencial aqui, é que essa universalização não pode ser deduzida do céu inteligível, nem da fé, nem das leis impostas, nem do imperativo categórico, nem do destino, nem das essências. Ao contrário, ela parte da indução heurística, particular e subjetiva e permanece em produção dialética. Em Sartre, cada um é convidado a questionar esse ser que está se constituindo a partir de suas próprias vivências. É o que possibilita a defesa da diversidade, do respeito às diferenças, da proteção da individualidade, mas por outro lado, tem como pressuposto a crença nos diálogos, a esperança de transformação e o otimismo rumo à constituição de um mundo melhor, em que os conflitos podem ser resolvidos. Um niilismo fundamental, mas não determinante do futuro sobre a significância no mundo. Logo, em Sartre, verificamos descrições de realidades infelizes, mas com o objetivo de provocação de mudanças e de novas constituições de significados pelas atitudes. Portanto, o valor em Sartre, o em-si-para-si, nada mais é que a ideia criada e escolhida subjetivamente que permite a constituição da identidade e do mundo, ou seja, a constituição de sentido. E, tanto no âmbito do singular, quanto do coletivo, a essência constituída relaciona-se com a discussão em que sentido a ideia em Sartre é a priori ou a posteriori. 139 Esse modo de perceber e de entender o mundo possui consequências práticas, que se chocaram também com a forma com que Kant concebeu o dever. Se a verdade é a aparição, então ela pode ser constituída com a ação, logo, Sartre procura desmistificar a inércia e toda a crença de que as atitudes precisam necessariamente ser de tal modo. Isso significa que o homem não possui identidade, mas que ele a constitui com suas práticas, dialeticamente em sua projeção para o futuro. Essa projeção ocorre na constituição de um dos dois tipos de projetos: o projeto de má-fé ou o projeto de autenticidade. Com isso, procuramos mostrar como esses projetos se realizam independentemente da ação, mas dependendo somente do modo como o sujeito se relaciona com sua ação. Em outras palavras, uma mesma ação pode ser entendida como pertencente a um ou a outro projeto, de acordo com o sentimento do sujeito em relação à sua prática. Caso o sujeito sinta vergonha de sua ação a chegar ao ponto de mentir para si mesmo e transferir a responsabilidade para aquilo que é externo a ele mesmo, a atitude é de má-fé, e a inércia tende a permanecer. Ao passo que quando o sujeito sente vergonha, assume sua responsabilidade, e pensa em uma nova finalidade, ele intenciona a realização de outras ações, em uma perspectiva de mudança autêntica e da busca do orgulho. Por isso o projeto define o homem, que quando não possui a condição de atingir determinado fim escolhido, age em direção à construção de ferramentas intermediárias que possibilitam o atingimento desse determinado fim. Embora Sartre mostre o erro lógico da má-fé, ele não defende a autenticidade como dever a priori, mas somente como um projeto que ele escolheu. Nesse sentido, o fato de não existir fundamentos pré-existentes não impede que as pessoas procurem mostrar aos Outros o que elas escolheram para elas. Essa inferência garante coerência lógica entre a obra O ser e o nada (onde ele mostra o fundamento de sua teoria, sobre a desmistificação dos valores absolutos) e os outros dois livros Crítica da razão dialética, O existencialismo é um humanismo e Apelo aos intelectuais (onde ele mostra seus valores escolhidos: contra a exploração, a injustiça e a inércia). Defender um valor, sabendo que é um valor inventado e escolhido, em Sartre, diz respeito à escolha de mundo que se quer viver, uma vez que cada consciência é responsável por ele. Por analogia, propomos uma aplicação prática disso a respeito do projeto da Ética, em que foi utilizada uma conceituação própria diferente da sartriana, embora 140 seja coerente com a conceituação de projeto em Sartre. Embora a Ética não exista para ser deduzida ou descoberta, pois todos os juízos devem estar suspensos de acordo com a redução fenomenológica inaugurada por Husserl, ela pode ser reconhecida como projeto inventado, em que de uma finalidade definida, possamos deduzir juízos e ações a serem praticadas. Essas ações e juízos seriam as condições objetivas para se atingir tal finalidade e o que não me possibilita fugir de mim mesma, ou seja, fugir de meu projeto escolhido. O problema de Sartre com a Ética não diz respeito à dedução analítica, mas somente à simples dedução sem que seja explicitado que a finalidade foi criada e escolhida arbitrariamente. Por isso que ele considera a Razão dialética como continuamente se constituindo nesse processo de integração das racionalidades. Da mesma forma, o problema de Sartre não é com a identidade, mas com a identidade que se constitui no projeto de má-fé, como se não houvesse possibilidade de outras vivências, e ao mesmo tempo em que essa suposta impossibilidade fosse ocasionada pela historicidade, ou pelo olhar do Outro, ou pela vivência da infância, ou pela situação social, econômica, política, cultural, etc. Sartre não nega as diversas influências, mas nega que elas sejam pura e simplesmente determinações. São determinações no sentido de que são situações, um em-si do passado, mas não determinam o ser para o qual o para-si se projeta no futuro. Inclusive, para Sartre, como já sublinhamos, o homem não é somente responsável por sua vida, como também pela constituição do mundo que ele vive. Dessa maneira, a responsabilidade em Sartre, como ele mesmo diz, é opressora. Quando a consciência admite a responsabilidade pela constituição de seu passado e pelo passado do mundo, sem se esconder na atitude de má-fé, somado à insatisfação, dois sentimentos são inevitáveis: a vergonha e a angústia. Contudo, percebo que essa angústia, longe de ser um aspecto pessimista em Sartre, é um aspecto positivo, pois mostra que o filósofo compreende a capacidade humana de ação, e, portanto, de mudanças. Se não possuímos identidade, se o mundo não está determinado, isso significa que somos responsáveis por eleger os valores e constituí-los: a identidade e o mundo. Nesse ínterim, o valor em Sartre é o que possibilita o movimento, pois nenhuma constatação de estado das coisas é suficiente para a ação. O sofrimento sem uma ideia para a qual o homem se projeta não é capaz de tirar esse mesmo homem de sua inércia. 141 Também, ao aplicarmos a própria teoria de Sartre nessa conceituação, podemos verificar que ela mesmo é uma nova ideia capaz de fazer ao menos o leitor refletir sobre quais são as novas ideias que ele mesmo deve eleger para modificar seus estados de coisas. Dessa maneira, a teoria sartriana é ideia nova enquanto fim e ideia nova enquanto ferramenta intermediária (motivos) para se alcançar outros fins. Verificamos assim dois importantes movimentos na história da filosofia a partir de Sartre: uma antítese e uma síntese. Primeiro que, como pertencente à corrente fenomenológica, Sartre contesta o idealismo kantiano, de que a verdade, o em-si, não é acessível ao conhecimento. Para Sartre, a verdade está no aparecer que acessa a estrutura do ser. Em segundo lugar, verifica-se em Sartre uma síntese entre o existencial e o universal, no âmbito prático. Não existem valores transcendentais, mas o para-si transcende aos valores escolhidos. Se por um lado, não existem valores necessários, necessários em oposição a acidentais, existe uma necessidade prática da escolha por alguns valores diante de todas as possibilidades, pois toda observação e toda ação é ação de valor, e o valor não é algo que pode ser deduzido, mas sim, ele é sempre inventado ou imitado. A responsabilidade sobre essa escolha é unicamente do para-si, e por isso a teoria sartriana é um convite à reflexão sobre a escolha singular de cada um, pois o projeto escolhido diz muito sobre o homem que o escolheu e sobre o mundo que ele quer viver, porque a atitude desenvolvida a partir do projeto pode inspirar outras ações semelhantes. A qualidade da escolha do para-si relaciona-se subjetivamente com a questão temporal. Estamos presentes aos nossos passados e por isso somos responsáveis por ressignificá-los no presente como passados superáveis ou não, e assim, nos projetarmos para o futuro. A qualidade também se relaciona com o sentimento de vergonha e orgulho diante do Outro, uma vez que a constituição da identidade presume "ser visto". Logo, ela também se relaciona com a questão do corpo, pois é pelo corpo que o homem se compromete com o mundo. Por outro lado, a qualidade da escolha não pode ser apreendida por um olhar objetivo, sem o "depoimento" do sujeito que age. Enquanto que a identidade do "Eu" pode ser descrita objetivamente pelo Outro, com mais autoridade do Outro do que da própria consciência que a constituiu, a qualidade desse desenvolvimento (se é de má-fé ou de forma autêntica) não pode ser observada objetivamente. É a ação que diz sobre o sujeito, não obstante, a identidade desenvolvida diz respeito ao valor escolhido. Assim, objetivamente, podemos falar de outra qualidade da escolha, sem ser sobre a 142 qualidade do projeto em relação à má-fé ou à autenticidade, que para ser analisado, depende exclusivamente da relação subjetiva. O fato de que todo valor escolhido possui a mesma realidade concreta do possível não garante sua realização, mas garante a objetividade do valor e de seus aspectos mundanos e concretos, em oposição ao idealismo tradicional e ao simples subjetivismo. Nesse inventar-se, viver é realizar uma obra-de-arte, porque é ato imaginativo, que cria, elege e age. Por conseguinte, algumas vidas são mais dignas de admiração e respeito, pela beleza constituída. Esse é o valor compreendido na qualidade da inspiração rumo a um universal concreto. 143 CONCLUSÃO Peço licença para escrever essa parte com um estilo usualmente não acadêmico, pois não seria possível expressar tudo que desejo nessa minha conclusão sem ser em um formato mais livre. Aproveito então para fazer um protesto ao caráter limitador do estilo acadêmico, principalmente porque, a partir do existencialismo, verificamos que a constituição de significados, mesmo que sejam coletivos, parte de um ponto singular. Permito-me assim, misturar o conto e a crônica com o estilo acadêmico, pois, como conclusão inicial dessa pesquisa, inferimos que uma conclusão geral só poderia partir de uma conclusão pessoal. Gostaria de sentir orgulho pelo fato de que o contato com a teoria de Sartre transformou minha vida, porque pude repensar meu passado e perceber quais eram as coisas das quais eu me envergonhava, mas que eu insistia em atribuir às situações. Gostaria de me orgulhar de tudo aquilo que fiz para constituir minha identidade: das minhas vivências em geral, do meu contato com os Outros, da autenticidade das minhas escolhas, da responsabilidade nos detalhes, sem mais me cobrar uma postura simplesmente pela reprovação do olhar do Outro, até mesmo por inspirar outro modo de vida às demais pessoas. Mas, apesar das realizações no âmbito pessoal, sinto vergonha da minha falta de ação, sobretudo em relação ao que vem acontecendo no mundo, principalmente na política, afinal, "é o exame das condições efetivas da existência histórica que pode nos esclarecer acerca das possibilidades de ação concreta no processo real da experiência subjetiva e objetiva da história" (LEOPOLDO E SILVA, 2013, p. 32). Na atualidade, não temos dois terços da população com fome, como apontou Sartre sobre o período em que ele viveu, mas, de acordo com a Oxfam 1% da população possui metade da riqueza do planeta. Dessa maneira, apesar de não vivenciarmos o imediatismo do pós-guerra como Sartre vivenciou, a situação não se modificou relevantemente no que diz respeito à distribuição de renda e às relações de força e poder diante do capital. Sabemos que as reformas em geral são contrárias à revolução, posto que elas apenas camuflam a exploração explícita. A exploração é óbvia no sistema capitalista e a camuflagem começa do individual para o geral. Não tenho a pretensão de aprofundar sobre a questão política, social e econômica, mas 144 somente ilustrar com um exemplo que poderíamos classificá-lo como sendo um tipo de situação. Faço então somente uma descrição de forma breve e simples do panorama atual de forma conjectural, bem como suas contradições, partindo das situações microeconômicas para situações macroeconômicas, no parágrafo seguinte. Intelectuais que defendem o fim do sistema, porque são contra a exploração do capital, pagam salários mínimos para suas empregadas domésticas. O homem (seja simples empregado, ou gerente) permite a si mesmo ser controlado pela máquina (a máquina como símbolo da maioria das instituições), a começar pela exigência dela de seleção de mão-de-obra qualificada. Além disso a máquina continua a controlar o tempo das tarefas e do gerenciamento. Empresas constituem o setor de recursos humanos que proporcionam ao trabalhador ginástica laboral, vale alimentação, vale transporte, participação nos lucros e resultados, de tal modo que o trabalhador se sinta como parte da empresa e não reaja aos abusos. O mínimo toma caráter de bondade. A classe média, que não é detentora do capital, se deixa manipular para se sentir burguesa e passa a reafirmar valores capitalistas de exploração de forma universalizada, como as altas taxas de juros e o fim dos benefícios que garantem a subsistência das classes menos favorecidas. Além disso, no Brasil, o Estado garante a continuidade do capitalismo, ao fingir brigar com a classe média, através de suas políticas assistencialistas. Essas políticas assistencialistas garantem a continuidade do sistema, porque diminuem a violência, por manter a população alienada, ignorante de sua verdadeira exploração, e ainda custa menos ao Estado do que o investimento no sistema prisional, visto que, quando as pessoas têm algo a perder, elas são menos violentas. Ao mesmo tempo, o Estado abona impostos das grandes empresas que financiam as campanhas, sob o pretexto da empregabilidade, ao invés da efetivação do imposto progressivo. E assim configuramse questões urgentes de nosso tempo que precisam ser resolvidas: o genocídio indígena e dos favelados, a falta de uma reforma tributária, a falta de uma reforma política, a ainda não legalização das drogas e o envolvimento da polícia no crime organizado, a corrupção na política, a exploração infantil e do trabalho escravo, a violência contra a mulher, a falta de respeito aos animais que possuem capacidades cognitivas desenvolvidas, especialmente os mamíferos. E também os retrocessos: as percas de direitos dos trabalhadores (pensão da viúva, seguro desemprego, previdência, flexibilização da CLT), a assembleia constituída por uma maioria conservadora e preconceituosa, a criação das O.S. para contratação de professores 145 em direção da privatização das instituições de ensino federais e estaduais, a mudança de regime para CLT para empregados dos hospitais escolas, a delimitação do conceito de família excluindo as uniões de pessoas que não são necessariamente constituídas por um homem e uma mulher. Além disso, as questões internacionais estão cada vez mais obscuras, a mídia é cada vez mais manipuladora na tentativa de não deixar claro os verdadeiros interesses dos acordos econômicos (união europeia), políticos (comissão dos direitos humanos, decretação do "estado de emergência") e ambientais (COP21, os chemtrails). Sob o pretexto de salvar o mundo contra o "terrorismo" e a "barbárie" e em favor da "democracia", os Estados Unidos coligado com parte da Europa executam o plano imperialista de dominação mundial. De qualquer modo, as pessoas (o individual e o coletivo) não estão dispostas a pagar o preço da guerra e da revolução. Se, por um lado, a revolução burguesa cortou a cabeça da nobreza na França, não existe até agora organização de massa com a finalidade e com a capacidade de cortar a cabeça da burguesia real (esse 1% que mencionamos). Sartre chegou a defender a violência, mas podemos dizer que ele próprio não estava disposto a pegar em armas. Se o engajamento não ocorre pela guerrilha, o que é factível é a reforma política, econômica, cultural, para ao menos minimizar os danos do sistema. É por isso que acredito que denunciar a situação e suas "particularidades históricas", bem como pensar na modificação das leis, que seria uma "verdade prática" para a sociedade, é coerente com o engajamento sartriano. Por outro lado, sinto-me culpada por não ter essa nova ideia, por não me dedicar suficientemente a constituí-la, por não me apresentar politicamente para efetivar novas propostas. Sartre coloca todo o peso do mundo nas costas de cada indivíduo. E assim eu posso sentir a angústia. Se não faço nada, não é porque eu não posso, é porque eu não quero. Isso é deprimente. Sartre não só me mostra que eu prefiro agir de má-fé ao tentar acreditar que tudo isso não cabe a mim, como também ele exige mudança de postura, por causar tensão. Assim, é através de Sartre que percebo que enquanto eu não agir, a angústia vai me acompanhar. Com isso, não posso deixar de relacionar o que desenvolvi em meu mestrado, com esse trabalho de agora, para pelo menos esboçar uma pretensão futura. 146 Em minha dissertação, eu resgatei o debate sobre a questão da falácia naturalista. Hare é conhecido por sua crítica ao naturalismo ético, por não admitir que valores podem ser implicados de fatos (HARE, 2003, p. 95-117). Entretanto, seus críticos (GEACH, 1967, p. 64-73) (GEACH, 1976, p. 346-348) (SEN,1966) afirmaram que o conceito de superveniência de Hare, comete o mesmo erro que aqueles os quais o autor critica, pois, superveniência em Hare é a relação entre características prescritivas e características descritivas, de tal modo que, ao se prescrever determinada situação com tais e tais características, não se pode não prescrever outra situação que tenha as mesmas características. Um dos críticos, Sen, traduz esse conceito para a forma lógica ┐(C ^ ┐P) (em que C é o conjunto de características descritivas e P é a característica prescritiva), e que pode ser traduzido por C→P, pois ambas as fórmulas possuem a mesma composição da tabela verdade (SEN, 1966, p. 75-79). A partir disso, o próprio Hare em seu livro Moral Thinks aceita ser chamado de descritivista (HARE, 1992, p. 223-224). Se, a partir de sua afirmação, não podemos garantir que ele assume explicitamente que cometeu a falácia naturalista, pelo menos está claro que ele não consegue se defender. Todavia, em meu trabalho de mestrado, mostrei que o conceito de superveniência não pode ser traduzido pela relação de implicação, uma vez que todos os críticos de Hare e o próprio filósofo não tiveram a devida consideração com a escolha primeira na emissão do juízo de valor, especificada no conceito de superveniência de Hare. Assim, eu concluí que de fatos não se pode mesmo deduzir valores, mas que a partir de uma escolha de valor, outras escolhas poderão ser deduzidas, de forma lógica e coerente (COLANTONI, 2010). Embora Sartre não trabalhe diretamente com a filosofia analítica, percebo que o fato de sua teoria desconstruir os valores de forma absoluta, ao passo que ele defende seus valores eleitos por ele mesmo para a humanidade, tem íntima relação com essa conclusão, pois qualquer lei moral parte inicialmente do singular, ou melhor, da escolha singular. Antes de toda dedução, que é o tratamento objetivo, há primeiramente, uma indução, ainda que implícita, relacionada à subjetividade. Retirar o valor de seu absolutismo e do âmbito transcendental e colocá-lo no plano dos projetos comuns não significa desmerecê-lo. Ao contrário, é explicitar que o processo filosófico está na escolha do objeto. Na verdade, o fundamento da liberdade sartriana é o ponto de partida para qualquer projeto, que se contrapõe às determinações da metafísica ou da ética idealista, em que nenhuma finalidade poderia 147 ser escolhida, em que nenhuma ferramenta poderia ser construída para se atingir tal fim. A partir de então, mantendo a coerência com sua teoria, posso eleger o projeto que considero ser o mais importante para todos, e não especificamente o que Sartre escolheu, mesmo porque a situação que ele viveu era diferente da nossa. Em sua época, uma situação de terror, de extrema miséria e injustiça, faz menos sentido querer discutir sobre o cumprimento de acordos, de promessas, ou sobre a proibição do roubo. Mostrar que nenhuma lei possuía legitimidade, com certeza era mais urgente que a criação de um projeto que almejasse ser o fundamento de todas as leis. Se hoje podemos falar sobre a pesquisa Ética e querer que ela seja o fundamento das leis e da política, é porque a situação vivenciada por Sartre, de uma certa forma, foi ultrapassada. Diante da dialética dos objetos da ética na história da filosofia, arriscamos propor uma síntese das invenções dos projetos de ética. Entendemos que esse tipo de projeto não é um projeto comum, em que minha escolha por ele tem como consequência ações somente sobre minha vida, como é o caso dos projetos de educação, de nutrição e de moda. Os projetos éticos e políticos possuem a particularidade de que suas aplicações não envolvem somente a vida de quem os escolheu, mas também a vida do Outro. Assim, quando delimitamos seu objetivo, podemos desenvolver ferramentas que possibilitem o seu atingimento. E objeto escolhido para essa tentativa de síntese dentre os projetos específicos de ética é: garantir a liberdade individual, quando não houver conflito significativo e direto de interesses e, quando não é o caso, ou seja, quando houver conflito direto e significativo de interesses, deduzir juízos de valor imparciais e impessoais (que não dependam de minha posição na situação) que tenha a atribuição de valor verdade "Verdadeiro" quando a palavra correto não estiver associada à situações em que consigo identificar vítimas. Esse seria o nosso projeto Ético. Para clarificar, imaginemos uma situação corriqueira, em que não temos muita dificuldade em analisar, como: em jogos de baralho, no recebimento de troco, ou na formalização de contratos. O juízo "trapacear é correto" não pode ser deduzido da finalidade da Ética, pois ele descreve uma situação em que se consegue identificar a vítima (o trapaceado). Por outro lado, o juízo "não trapacear é correto" recebe valor verdade "Verdadeiro", pois existe conflito de interesses entre o que deseja trapacear e o que poderá ser trapaceado, e a palavra "correto" está associada a uma situação 148 em que se consegue impedir vítimas. Assim, podemos dizer que o juízo "não trapacear é correto", em uma situação simples como um jogo de baralho, é deduzido da finalidade da Ética. Podemos dizer que essa Ética que acabamos de descrever, entendida a partir da concepção sartriana de projeto, é uma regra inventada, mas consideramos que, de certo modo, descreve de forma generalizada a pesquisa ética nas diferentes correntes (deontologia, utilitarismo e eudaimonia, que descrevemos anteriormente), ou seja, podemos dizer que isso é o que elas possuem em comum, ao longo da história da filosofia. Inclusive, de forma ainda mais ampla, como o assunto filosófico diz respeito a tudo que não pode ser comprovado, (pois o que pode ser deduzido e comprovado é ciência e não filosofia), podemos considerar que a filosofia integra um gênero literário, como já havia afirmado Husserl: "A 'ficção' constitui o elemento vital da fenomenologia como de todas as ciências eidéticas; a ficção é a fonte onde se alimenta o conhecimento das 'verdades eternas'" (HUSSERL, 1950, p.227, tradução nossa)142. Complemento então, que esse tipo de literatura que é a filosofia constituise a partir da ficção do plausível, em que o processo imaginativo e a coerência interna são os componentes necessários. E, como toda literatura, a filosofia é capaz de transmitir e eternizar valores singulares e possibilitar a transformação coletiva das vivências rumo a novos objetos, pela partilha desses novos objetos. Já a dedução dos juízos, como é o caso do juízo citado "não trapacear é errado" diz respeito à aplicação de regras filosóficas às situações particulares. Por isso concluímos que investigar se alguma ação específica é certa ou errada de acordo com Kant, Mil, Aristóteles, ou mesmo de acordo com essa regra mais generalizada que denominamos de Ética, faz parte da Ética Prática e não da pesquisa filosófica. "A Ética prática estuda casos específicos, em que é possível a aplicação prática de regras desenvolvidas a partir da Ética normativa" (COLANTONI, p. 30, 2013). Deduzir ações e juízos de finalidades já escolhidos é algo racional, objetivo e lógico, porém isso que tem objeto definido é ciência (Ética Prática) e não filosofia. Por outro lado, é a filosofia que te faz pensar sobre esse objeto (valor), e assim ela abre a possibilidade de que as pessoas o escolham e o vivenciem. 142« [...] la « fiction » constitue l'élément vital de la phénoménologie comme de toutes les sciences éidétiques ; la fiction est la source où s'alimente la connaissance des « vérités éternelles ». 149 De fatos não se pode deduzir valores, como é amplamente difundido na interpretação contemporânea da "Lei de Hume". Logo, de nenhuma constatação podese gerar imperativos ou prescrições, o que é também uma conclusão de Sartre. Entretanto, a partir de valores escolhidos, pode-se deduzir ações e juízos, que são as "ferramentas" sartrianas. E assim, a informação abre possibilidade, pois, sem a pesquisa rigorosa e científica, não é possível a percepção de que certos posicionamentos são contraditórios ao objeto escolhido. A partir de então, podemos relacionar essas ações e juízos com o que Sartre chama de motivos (condições objetivas), e os valores escolhidos às ideias novas em Sartre condição necessária para as mudanças de atitudes. Embora, para a fenomenologia, não existam valores essenciais, a Ética tem seu espaço enquanto constituinte de um projeto existencial que pode ser imaginado, escolhido e defendido de forma predominantemente autêntica. Ou seja, realocamos a ética em outro "lugar": no lugar de uma das múltiplas possibilidades mencionadas por Sartre. Desse modo, podemos destituí-la de um espaço transcendental, para restituí-la no âmbito das escolhas humanas, do que é transcendente. E então faz-se necessário transpor esse estudo para a prática política, visando a constituição de ferramentas para alcançá-la. Anteriormente, tentei iniciar o desenvolvimento na universidade de um projeto que se chamava "democracia direta", que consistia em elaborar mecanismos administrativos e computacionais que permitissem que o eleitor votasse diretamente nos projetos políticos, e não nos representantes políticos. Entretanto, percebi que as atrocidades acontecem independentemente do regime político, pois as opiniões públicas a respeito do que deve ser feito possuem tanta falta de bom senso143 quanto as escolhas de seus representantes. Se hoje tivéssemos um regime monárquico, mas com um rei sensato, não existiriam tantos problemas. Então, o que pode garantir a sensatez de um governo, não é a democracia, mas o fundamento do governo em uma busca constante do bem comum, como é a proposta que descrevi sobre a Ética. Essa proposta não pode ser imposta, mas pode ser desenvolvida seguindo alguns passos. Segue então um esboço desses passos para ações futuras: primeiro passo, a formação de um grupo de pesquisa que possa analisar todas as leis, ou pelo menos 143 Ao comentar sobre isso com minha amiga Marilda Martins Fayad, que faz seu doutorado em Besançon sobre o livro de Sartre O idiota da família, ela me mostrou que Sartre faz uma crítica ao Descartes sobre sua proposição de que o bom senso seria a coisa mais bem distribuída no mundo. Sartre o critica dizendo que o bom senso até se tornou racista: "Le bon sens est devenu raciste" (SARTRE, 1988, p.384). 150 as mais polêmicas, a partir desse objeto, verificando quais estão de acordo com ele. Segundo passo, considerando que conforme Habermas, a verdade é comunicável, realizar práticas de divulgação e propaganda, seja pelas mídias de massa, seja pela arte, sobre os resultados dessa pesquisa. Enquanto os intelectuais manterem o preciosismo e a distância da mídia de massa, a população permanecerá manipulada pela ideologia burguesa, porque hoje ela cumpre mais o papel de formação do que a própria escola. É preciso pensar estratégias de infiltração nesses meios, para uma educação que não manipule, mas que esclareça situações e que permita escolhas. Terceiro passo, pela criação de cursos para políticos e criação de novos projetos de leis coerentes com esse objeto. Se somente uma ideia nova pode nos tirar do estado atual, então a urgência de nosso tempo está em idealizar uma situação melhor. Desse modo, poderiam ser constituídas gradualmente práticas universais, deduzidas de pesquisas sistemáticas, pois se reconhecemos que aquele que se formou em medicina desenvolveu capacidades para discutir sobre a saúde, também temos que reconhecer que aquele que se formou em filosofia desenvolveu capacidades para discutir rigorosamente sobre ética. Isso, sem perder de vista que essas práticas são frutos de uma invenção humana, e que, por isso, sempre poderiam ser avaliadas, contestadas e reformuladas: uma espécie de nova república de Platão continuamente se fazendo, não sobre as deduções (que são racionais), mas sobre a escolha dialética do objeto (a finalidade). Aliás, a escolha do objeto pode ser papel da filosofia, mas a criação de objetos é atividade artística. Precisamos de novas invenções, novas concepções de estados de coisas. Seria interessante que surgissem historiadores artistas, com desenvolvimento de capacidades interpretativas dos fatos do passado, e ao mesmo tempo com capacidade de concepção de ideias, de idealização do mundo. Quando menciono "práticas universais", não me refiro a práticas universais totalitárias, imperialistas, ditatoriais. Muitas vezes os mercenários se apropriam dos discursos filosóficos para a dominação. A proposta é justamente o contrário, distanciar-se do poderio empresarial, da dominação do capital, das consequências das manipulações de massa. Mas, é claro que existe a possibilidade de falhas. Se a racionalidade das leis desenvolvidas a partir da Ética não for capaz de realizar transformações significativas, seria necessário pensar alternativas, que envolvam o singular na totalidade de forma mais efetiva, como existem propostas em andamento que 151 relacionam arte e filosofia, como é o caso da "filosofia pop" pensada pelo Prof. Dr. Charles Feitosa, organizador do Simpósio Utopias. O que importa é o movimento dialético de escolher-me e continuar tentando. Não posso impor ao mundo o que quero, só posso deixar um traço de existência e de significação. Se puder viver eu mesma de acordo com meus projetos, sem fugir de mim mesma, como aponta Sartre, aprendendo-os, ressignificando-os e procurando não desviar deles nos detalhes, isso mostraria que eles são realizáveis, o que já é difícil de atingir. Sobre influenciar o Outro, ainda preciso desenvolver e me impregnar com os ensinamentos de Sartre, principalmente, no que se refere ao prazer sensitivo. Enquanto minhas referências sobre meus projetos não se tornarem estéticas, causarei mais repulsa do que adeptos, pois embora a beleza do bem não ilumine a verdade, como havia sido a formulação de Platão, por outro lado, a beleza aparecida na relação fenomênica inspira os humanos. O idealismo, mesmo o existencialista, ou melhor, a idealidade, sempre teve um quê de ingenuidade, (posto que a possibilidade de frustração seja grande), ao passo que o pessimismo é chique e sedutor. 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Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. 159 ANEXO I: TRADUÇÃO DO TEXTO "Moral e Responsabilidade"[ título original: "Morale et Responsabilité" (SALANSKIS, 2000)] Autor: Jean-Michel Salanskis [Tradução: Ana Gabriela Colantoni e Maria Alma Pedri] Eu desejaria lutar com a tese segundo a qual a responsabilidade "é o valor emergente" do fim do século vinte, ou melhor segundo a qual o princípio de que responsabilidade é o rosto contemporâneo do imperativo ético. Eu não acredito na noção de "ética da responsabilidade", cujo eu compreendo, contudo, a plausibilidade: ela parece corresponder à ideia de uma "moral da liberdade" ou de uma "ética do sujeito", ou seja, que ela parece desenvolver, explicitar ou simplesmente traduzir no campo existencial com palavras mais próximas do afeto e do cotidiano a grande intuição kantiana da Crítica da Razão Prática. Segundo meu sentimento, compreender que a ética não poderia ser uma ética da responsabilidade, é salutar, não só do ponto de vista da moralidade, porque isso nos permite melhor apreender o que a moral espera de nós, mas também do ponto de vista da responsabilidade, pois isso poderia nos conduzir à melhor compreender qual tipo de bem, de felicidade, de benefício, que tipo de realização a responsabilidade é: decaída da posição de tenente da ética, a responsabilidade apareceria com seus atrativos e vantagens próprias. Na verdade, as reflexões críticas a vir deste breve artigo não concernem à noção de "ética da responsabilidade" no absoluto ou na sua generalidade, mas à certa forma de entendê-la: como princípio de "ego-responsabilidade", por antecipar a terminologia que será adotada. Como eu suponho, erroneamente ou com razão, que é a tal princípio que se refere, abertamente ou implicitamente, aqueles que veem na responsabilidade o valor crucial, esta reserva não limita forçosamente a afirmação sustentada no primeiro parágrafo. Dito isso, minha tentativa de chegar ao ponto começa necessariamente de maneira dogmática, por um enunciado rápido disso que a moral requer autenticamente. Eu preciso desta medida para sentenciar sobre a responsabilidade, e minha comunicação a este respeito só poderia ser muito rápida, e provavelmente não satisfatória para mais de um leitor. Este procedimento – não obstante ao déficit argumentativo que ele assume – poderia, portanto, ser suficiente para reabrir um 160 debate vivido como fechado para muita gente, neste caso eu teria alcançado meu propósito. Parece-me então que há três camadas da moralidade, que a época presente permite designar e distinguir. Há a moral da correção. Comportar-se de forma moral, à medida desta primeira camada, consiste simplesmente em respeitar as leis, as regras. Em não roubar, em[não] atravessar o sinal fechado, em não furar fila para obter um bilhete de cinema, sobre declarar ao Estado a soma que se ganha, etc. Esta moral não envolve nenhuma espécie de patos relacional envolvendo os outros, ela é compatível com o maior egoísmo, ou simplesmente, com a maior indiferença pelo outro. Refere-se simplesmente a não transgredir regras que nos concernem. Por que elas nos concernem? Às vezes porque nós somos voluntariamente submissos a elas por contrato, às vezes porque nosso nascimento ou uma tradição predominante em que vivemos impõe. Racionalmente, a autoridade de quase toda lei é contestável, e, de fato, muitos contestam várias leis (pensar, por exemplo, a obrigação de usar o cinto quando se conduz um veículo automotivo). Nós não temos, portanto, dificuldade de distinguir entre pessoas que contestam toda regra porque são visceralmente incapazes de seguir alguma, qualquer que seja, e aquelas que contestam certas regras, mas sabem respeitar infalivelmente uma delas, embora a mesma que recusaram em outro lugar. Aqueles são os seres morais no sentido da moral da correção. Há a moral do respeito. Esta moral intima a estar pronto para acolher e compreender como "solução" – vacilante, inoperante e parcialmente má –ao problema abissal da condição humana de quase todo tipo de estio de vida, da escada de valor, de convicções, de preferências sexuais, de propensões à preguiça, ao amor, à amizade, que eu sei? De não olhar nada do humano como estrangeiro a si, de cultivar uma capacidade de identificação, de empatia, de projeção, que nos permite recuperar uma atitude, um pertencimento, um ato mau mesmo como opção de ordem humana, movimento desempenhado pelo humano para com o humano, possibilidade de um sujeito mortal abandonado a seu desejo sobre uma terra não abençoada. É uma moral cuja obediência é ao mesmo tempo sentimental e intelectual, a compreensão que ela requer é ao mesmo tempo um decifrar motivos e o esboço pelo menos de uma partilha dos sentimentos. Ela não é em todo caso "ativa", aquilo que precisa o humano a sua espera para ser respeitado não é de uma dádiva, de um alívio, de um ato propriamente 161 dito, mas de um ouvido, de um olhar, de uma frase registrando o que ele faz e diz como possível, ele precisa de uma percepção ou de uma qualificação que o integre ao círculo da desordem humana. Não fugir, não se desvia a cabeça, se esforça por compreender e se transpor, tal é, em substância, o imperativo da moral do respeito. Há, enfim, a moral dos socorros. Seu princípio é que outrem valha como aflição, questiono a mim, e dessa forma ao mesmo tempo ilimitado e primitivo (sem que nenhuma justificação seja assunto pertinente). O outrem nunca é, do ponto de vista da ética, aquilo que eu sei ou que eu descrevo, nem mesmo alter ego cujo eu calculo os direitos e a dignidade a partir da analogia que se relata a mim, ele é fragilidade dilacerada do mundo sensível, apelo irrecusável, urgente, ele é aquele que eu devo nutrir, defender, ajudar. Por muito tempo, para sempre pode ser, o conceito e a linguagem desta moral do socorro, nós devemos os atribuir àquele que reinventou um mundo onde nada parece mais incongruente: Emmanuel Levinas. Pois, o ato-tipo da moral do socorro, é a parada de seu carro à vista do motorista acidentado à beira da estrada (e aquele que escreve esta frase tem as maiores dúvidas sobre sua capacidade, em situação, a não preferir a lisa continuação de seu trajeto; isto para dizer que esta moral do socorro nós compreendemos o seu sentido então mesmo que nós a sentimos fora de alcance de nossa medíocre ética). Mas a moral do socorro tem um campo de aplicação infinito, porque todas as aflições concretas do outro podem motivar suas máximas: outrem, em inúmeras situações da existência, anuncia-se a mim como uma necessidade idiota, irredutível, que a moral do socorro proíbe de reduzir por uma análise racional numa terceira pessoa. Salvo que o terceiro intervenha "afinal das contas", ou seja, praticamente, sempre. Mas o ponto de vista da moral do socorro é o ponto de vista diante dos terceiros, e a ideia é que uma moralidade que não compreenderia que neste caso puro originário da epifania do rosto, tudo é devido a outrem, não seria uma verdadeira moralidade. Tais são, pois, as três facetas da moral acessíveis à minha reflexão. Elas são irredutíveis umas às outras, no sentido onde a obediência de uma não dispensa respeito à outra. Nós conhecemos pessoas prestativas, que se inquietam para ajudar, cuidar, reconfortar outrem, mesmo o outrem simplesmente conhecido que não brilhe de nenhum esplendor amigável ou erótico, mas que não respeitam, para quem a nãoconformidade de outrem a tal ou tal esquema habitual é um escândalo imperdoável. Nós conhecemos as pessoas legalistas, para as quais é muito difícil de violar o menor regulamento conhecido por elas, mesmo aquele que elas mesmas promulgaram, mas 162 que o contato com a aflição não abala um segundo. Nós conhecemos pessoas infinitamente respeitosas sobre o que quer que seja a quem possa ser, mas para as quais nenhuma regra não resiste a algum aqui e agora: se a conjuntura contingente chama sua transgressão, a reavaliação que faz prevalecer esta conjuntura é sempre já realizada, e o preceito perturbador esquecido (ele nunca foi memorizado, no fundo, como devendo ser seguido). São elas irredutíveis no princípio: ou seja, pode-se "deduzir" isso que demanda uma do que demanda uma outra? A independência recíproca de três observâncias, alegada agora, parece pleitear contra uma tal redutibilidade filosófica. Se a compreensão profunda do princípio do respeito, por exemplo, incluísse a adesão ao princípio do socorro, a observância do primeiro não a conduziria, ao menos na maioria dos casos, à observância do segundo? Seria ainda permitido, contudo, imaginar que a assunção radical de uma dessas morais desse a chave das duas outras. Esta assunção podendo ser suposta extremamente rara, isso não entraria em contradição com a independência média, estatística das observâncias. Dir-se-ia então, por exemplo, que um verdadeiro respeito, se é querido de qualquer modo como respeito absoluto, infinito, contém o socorro. Eu seria mais levado a crer que a exigência própria de cada uma dessas morais só é compreendida de modo puro, absoluto, adequado, se ela é estritamente distinguida da exigência de cada outra. Um respeito que pretende incluir o socorro não arrisca sempre, por exemplo, a ser um respeito que se desfaz da tarefa do respeito sobre o socorro prestado? Há, portanto, a meu ver, uma unidade das três morais que lhes confere o princípio dos socorros. Este princípio, com efeito, decreta a não-indiferença do homem para com o homem, e a decreta do interior mesmo da situação originária de sua face à face. Ora, parece-me, qualquer que seja sua origem, sua tradição, seu modo de registro e de transmissão, não é nunca outra coisa que uma organização mínima dessa não-indiferença: ela enuncia o que nos é permitido ou interdito se nós rejeitamos a priori carregar uma culpa, se nós queremos a não nocividade de nossas vidas; ou ainda ela nos obriga a uma preocupação geral, abstrata dos outros, que exprime o pagamento do imposto. Da mesma forma, por que precisaria respeitar toda diferença imaginável dos outros sem relação a nós, senão, por um lado, pelo medo de que nosso juízo machuque, e por outro lado, porque nós temos a preocupação 163 pura, incondicional do valor da vidados outros, porque isso conta para nós que o necessário e o possível de cada um seja validado por todos? Por isso que eu compreendo, as três morais têm seu fundamento em um princípio de não indiferença com o qual a moral do socorro não coincide, mas que só ela exprime de modo suficiente para que seja adquirida sem retorno possível. Eu vejo então a unidade da ética na moral do socorro, talvez no próprio princípio da não indiferença, tanto quanto se deixe realmente distinguir. Um como a outra são o que explorou, melhor que eu não saberia fazê-lo e assim como eu o assinalei acima, Emmanuel Levinas. Eu subscrevo então, sobre o plano "fundacional" de certa forma, à sua concepção de moral. Esta adesão não retira nada a irredutibilidade das três observâncias, que eu afirmei agora a pouco, embora a coisa, eu o reconheço, seja um pouco difícil de compreender e admitir. Embora o sentido da moral seja favorável ao socorro, não é certamente verdade que a observância da moral do socorro nos coloca quite com a exigência do respeito ou da lei, mas não é também verdade que a compreensão profunda do socorro conduza ao respeito. A relação fundacional é outra: é que o respeito ou o legalismo perdem sua significação ética se eles não são compreendidos à luz do socorro. O socorro é uma pressuposição necessária do respeito e do legalismo na perspectiva da moralidade, embora ele não seja uma pressuposição prática, e embora estes aqui não se deixem derivar dele. Fico aqui para esta exposição dogmática do sujeito moral, e eu venho à questão da responsabilidade. É claro que se designa hoje, sob esse nome, coisas muito diversas. A etimologia sugere atribuir à palavra o sentido de "disposição para responder", isso que não estaria longe de exprimir a não-indiferença onde eu vejo o fundamento da ética. Aliás, Levinas ele mesmo nomeia frequentemente "responsabilidade por outrem" a atitude ética, aquela do "Eis-me aqui". Parece então entender a responsabilidade no sentido da pura faculdade de responder, embora, acrescentando por outrem, ele introduza outra ideia: ser responsável por outrem, isso seria se substituir ao outrem relativamente a tudo que ele está encarregado. Mas esta análise revela outro sentido da palavra responsabilidade, sem dúvida mais importante no uso contemporâneo: eu sou "responsável" por alguma coisa quando as consequências caem sobre mim, quando sou eu que pago a conta. Esta "responsabilidade" pode ser algo estritamente passivo, que não envolve nenhum comportamento moral no sentido clássico. Assim, 164 diz-se facilmente que um adolescente deve se lançar nas relações sexuais somente quando ele pode as atravessar de modo responsável: isso não quer necessariamente dizer, se é o caso, que ele faça coisas razoáveis – proporcionando o uso do corpo de acordo com a força e com a credibilidade do sentimento por exemplo– mas pode também significar que ele se joga nas ralações que estragam, para assumir esta latejante dilaceração sem culpar quem for. Esse conceito de responsabilidade, em sua versão jurídica, é simplesmente o conceito de imputabilidade. Se meu cachorro estraga os bens de outrem ou machuca o corpo de outrem, eu sou responsável: é a mim que a lei ou a vítima podem levar sobre o plano penal ou civil. Mas há outra noção de responsabilidade, da qual eu suspeito que é aquela à qual o presente é o mais ligado, porque ela tem função, no nosso mundo, de solução ao problema moral. Diz-se que alguém é responsável quando ele cumpre suas promessas ou mais geralmente os seus compromissos, porque, dessa maneira, ele se manifesta como outra coisa diferente de um cata-vento imprevisível, ele demonstra identidade e constância, ele se afirma como alguém que seja referência para si mesmo e para os outros, alguém com quem se pode contar. A responsabilidade seria no fundo uma relação de si a si segundo a qual cada um se obriga a se confirmar no que escolheu como si, a credibilidade da identidade livre aparecendo como a finalidade mesmo da moralidade: a aposta moral seria a construção de um mundo onde cada um é visivelmente e de forma estável o que ele se escolheu. É contra a redução da moralidade a esta noção de responsabilidade que eu quero argumentar. Eu vou então confrontá-la a cada uma das morais, às três dimensões da moralidade que eu esclareci. A responsabilidade como assunção estável de si garante a observância da moral da correção? Nada é menos seguro. O assassino contratado tendo suas referências, não tendo nunca deixado de satisfazer a espera do comanditário de seus "contratos", comporta-se de forma responsável. Ele é uma referência estável para os mafiosos que o recorrem, para sua família na medida em que as ausências as quais o constrange o seu papel são regulares e locais, na medida em que a ele a coloca amparada das necessidades também. Mas ele contraria gravemente a lei penal de seu país – qualquer que seja ele – e na verdade, a lei moral, embora esta última por pouco se deixe identificar. A responsabilidade que nós temos aqui em vista não 165 "prescreve" nada de forma "externa" e "transcendente", ela gera no melhor dos casos uma regularidade cujos sentido e escolha são puramente pessoais e interessados. Ora a moral da correção quer precisamente que saibamos nos curvara regras externas como tais, que nós interpretaríamos como obrigados por contratos sociais que nunca foram contratados. Tentemos deduzir as possibilidades com mais exatidão: o homem responsável no sentido que nós vamos doravante chamar, para evitar toda ambiguidade, o ego-responsabilidade, poderá sem dúvida ser conduzido pelo egoresponsabilidade a se comportar da maneira correta num conjunto de esferas porque convém, do ponto de vista de sua opção principal (ser um bom assassino contratado por exemplo) que ele seja considerado por tal e tal, sob tais e tais aspectos, como um indivíduo correto (que sua vizinhança o veja polidamente a dar licença às pessoas que ele encontra, atravessar na faixa de pedestre, respeitar a proibição de ruído à noite, etc.), seu ego-responsabilidade não o conduz portanto a se mostrar correto em todo contexto e em todos os aspectos, ele tolera mesmo as transgressões mais graves. O fundo do problema é que ele pode ser "ego-responsável" de jogar a carta da impunidade, por exemplo, mas também, na verdade, de transgredir e assumir sua punição: o ego-responsabilidade não sugere de modo algum a executabilidade incondicional da lei. O ego-responsabilidade nos engaja no caminho da moral do respeito? Certamente não, mais uma vez. Poderia ser que todo o conhecimento que eu tenho de que eu sou e no qual entendo persistir ao motivo que meu ego-responsabilidade me aconselhe uma atitude condenável, desconfiada, em todo caso não-compreensiva para com tal jovem drogado ao meu arredor: eu diria, por exemplo, que se eu o uso de outra maneira, eu traio os valores comportamentais que eu cuidadosamente afixei no pequeno mundo conservador de minha existência, ou então eu diria que é na relação de si a si que eu devo à minha "ideologia" segundo a qual a toxicodependência é uma fraqueza e uma demissão, esta atitude imperdoável e fechada para com o jovem drogado, que me levará, por exemplo a não mais considerar uma verdadeira circunstância humana no sentido pleno o interesse que ele tem pela geografia ou a aflição que ele sente consequentemente por causa de uma decepção sentimental. Pode ser, em certos casos, necessário que eu traísse a mim mesmo, ou que eu derrogue ao que tal ou tal espera da estabilidade que ele me conhece encarnar usualmente para que eu entre numa atitude de respeito. 166 O ego-responsabilidade nos conduz à moral do socorro? De novo, eu penso que não é bem assim. É mesmo em relação a esta exigência que a distância é mais evidente. O banhista que trouxe socorro aos jovens escoteiros em excursão marítima com um tempo ameaçador com a aprovação do abade Cottard não se comportou de maneira responsável arriscando – e perdendo – sua vida por tentar os salvar. O abade Cottard, ao contrário, talvez tem no caso adotado uma linha de conduta na qual ele confirmava a orientação geral de sua vida, a relação que estabelecia entre a preocupação da salvação e a preocupação da sobrevivência notavelmente: ele foi "coerente" e mesmo responsável, no sentido em que nem ele nem nenhuma pessoa nunca tinham esperado outra coisa dele. Se se está irritado pelo caráter midiático deste exemplo, se poderá pensar mais simplesmente nos milhares de experiências de nossa vida cotidiana que nós pudemos atravessar, onde aflições, mesmo pequenas, mostram-se sobre a nossa estrada, e onde a moral do socorro nos demanda "largar tudo", particularmente o que nós somos, a imagem que nós oferecemos, a preocupação de continuidade que nos leva e que se tornou nossa mestre, para levar um socorro, seja ele mínimo. Mudar seu percurso de pedestre para dar duas peças a um sem-abrigo contém já um pequeno ferimento de uma derrogação a si (enquanto não se automatizou o comportamento, cujo caso a dificuldade se desloca para qualquer outro socorro "a prestar" não ainda programado). Ter-se-á compreendido que eu sustento: o princípio de egoresponsabilidade não tem nada a ver com a moralidade, ele não realiza nenhuma de suas ambições, ele não abraça seu sentido. Isso não é no fundo surpreendente se se adota a perspectiva sintética sobre a moralidade que é a nossa: se o sentido unitário da moralidade está do lado da moral do socorro, e se o ego-responsabilidade é uma interpretação da responsabilidade que circunscreve dele o ganho em relação de si a si, não se está muito admirado que ele não faça nada para nos harmonizar com as exigências da moralidade. Isso quer dizer, como se pudesse compreendê-lo em particular lendo os nossos exemplos, que nós condenamos o ego-responsabilidade como antimoral egoísta? Nada disso. Nós queríamos sublinhar que a regularidade à qual nos conduz o princípio do ego-responsabilidade está sem parentesco com a moralidade, não a confirma de modo algum de forma necessária. Mas é assim a indiferença do egoresponsabilidade a respeito da moralidade que nós queríamos estabelecer, não a sua repreensibilidade. O assassino contratado pode ser correto em muitos domínios, um 167 indivíduo ego-responsável pode ser respeitoso com as mulheres e com os drogados como tais, mas não com os homossexuais, um sujeito tendenciosamente muito egoresponsável, sinal de previsibilidade por ele mesmo e seus próximos pode-se deixar invadir pelo imperativo do socorro frente a uma aflição por motivos singulares impossíveis de teorizar, prevalece sobre qualquer outra consideração por ele. O que eu queria, contudo, compreender, é qual valor geral se pode consentir ao princípio de ego-responsabilidade, que teria que ser de outro modo ao invés de uma perspectiva moral. Mas desse ponto de vista, a primeira coisa que eu tenho desejo em destacar, é que o princípio de ego-responsabilidade entra em conflito de maneira radical com um aspecto da essência da subjetividade: em outros termos, e embora isso não seja frequentemente observado pelo que eu saiba, pertence de modo essencial a um sujeito de ser irresponsável no sentido do ego-responsabilidade. Encontrar-se-á esta consideração paradoxal, ao simples título disso que a função subjetiva, através do vocábulo ego, está inscrita no nome por nós escolhida sobre o ego-responsabilidade. E é, sem dúvida, por esse motivo que a irresponsabilidade é facilmente negligenciada como estrutura fundamental do sujeito. Se o sujeito é analisado como a substância persistente suportando os acidentes de uma vida pessoal, com efeito, se ele é compreendido de acordo com o que Ricoeur chama de idem, então o ego-responsabilidade aparece como esta tensão do ipse – para continuar na linguagem do próprio Ricoeur – que reconduza um idem plausível: a liberdade radical que é a minha está empregada pelo ego-responsabilidade de uma maneira que cuida, molda e confirma um idem. A tradição fenomenológica francesa, em geral, tem tanto avalizado as teses heideggerianas sobre a subjetividade, que lhe parece que essa nunca tem outro sentido que o de substância, do idem. Toda subversão da estabilidade subjetiva pertenceria por princípio a um fora da subjetividade, demandaria ser lida como índice da perturbação do sujeito para uma alteridade, esta alteridade ainda que alteridade íntima da liberdade, da ipseidade autentica. Mas se nós voltamos a isso que nós sabemos cotidianamente sobre os sujeitos, pela simples "experiências" de nossa existência pessoal, parece-me que nós não podemos tomar em consideração desta compulsão massiva que é em nós a fuga para nós de toda identidade de nós. Um sujeito é uma administração que não deseja prestar conta alguma, mudar de política como um cata-vento e não se fazer lembrar a antiga política para ninguém, abandonar os "canteiros de obra" deixando as pessoas 168 órfãs de sua promessa e até mesmo do seu pensamento. Como sujeitos, nós queremos poder afirmar o amor ao longo dos meses e dos anos para repentinamente cancelá-lo e passar à outra coisa, nós pretendemos alertar nosso arredor sobre a dificuldade que nós temos de fazer nossa atividade e a importância que ela tem para nós, solicitar ajuda ao redor de nós a esse respeito, mas logo em seguida, largar tudo e descrever este trabalho como aquele que nos oprimiu e que outros somente nos forçavam a arrastar como um fardo. No que diz respeito a nossos gostos, culinários, geográficos ou estéticos, nós oscilamos incompreensivelmente da adoração ritual à rejeição exasperada, e desejamos abertamente não estar comprometidos com a atividade sem qualquer coerência. Porque viver, é pelo menos o que nós experimentamos, consiste precisamente a não ser obrigado, a esquecer, a redescobrir constantemente o possível no abandono de toda sedimentação. Em seu[texto] Da evasão, Levinas descrevia, certamente, alguma coisa desta natureza, mas era para ele do ser mesmo – o ser de si por excelência – que o sujeito procurava escapar: eu falo aqui de alguma coisa mais popular e mais viável, que é escapar do seu idem desvalorizando-o não tematicamente (o tematizar, é ainda permanecer seu prisioneiro). Em Sartre também, o sujeito introduz a negatividade no mundo, e se define pela fórmula paradoxal não ser o que ele é e ser o que ele não é: esse destino de negatividade, novamente, é mais universal daquilo que eu tenho em vista, um sujeito fiel ao seu idem acumulado o é ainda, aos olhos de Sartre, sobre o modo do não ser. Os autores deste momento da filosofia me parecem ter vislumbrado a estrutura da irresponsabilidade que eu tento aqui apresentar sem verdadeiramente delimitar ou dizer. Então, o princípio de ego-responsabilidade, é preciso vê-lo, contraria o que aparece em um sentido como a reivindicação característica da subjetividade como tal. Aliás, isso é um motivo pelo qual se pode ter vontade de reprovar esse princípio por seu moralismo obtuso, fechado ao ímpeto existencial dos sujeitos: o que ele recomenda, é uma fidelidade a si, da qual se pressente, a gravidade é inimiga de todo viver autêntico, ao mesmo tempo, sem dúvida, de toda abertura. Cada sujeito, segundo ele, torna-se o austero carcereiro de uma regra nativa que não tem no fundo valor algum a não ser que seja dado no esforço mesmo que ele faz para fazer respeitar (ele mesmo). 169 Portanto, a irresponsabilidade não pode ser reivindicada por si nos termos moralmente aceitáveis. A perspectiva da moral do socorro quer claramente que eu me abstenha de minha variação selvagem e vital se ela machuca outrem, ou melhor, mesmo, eu devo escolher uma constância que me incomoda se ela me permite socorrer outrem. Não mais que o princípio de ego-responsabilidade não nos desobriga da moral, não mais que sua negação não escapa de sua exigência. Pode-se ir mais longe, e sustentar que há, com efeito, um valor do egoresponsabilidade, independentemente do caso onde ele é moralmente requisitado (caso da promessa típica: eu devo ser fiel a mim mesmo cumprindo minha promessa, mas isso não é para satisfazer o ego-responsabilidade, é para não induzir no outro a ferida da decepção). É efetivamente desejável que eu confirme por meus atos as linhas estáveis de mim mesmo, independentemente de toda consideração externa, simplesmente porque eu não tenho a força de viver o ego-irresponsabilidade: qualquer que seja minha compulsão por variar de um direito pessoal absoluto, se eu encadeio, com efeito, momentos incomensuráveis demais, se eu satisfaço a esta compulsão, eu me exponho a graves sofrimentos. Nós não temos os meios do nosso desejo, e uma vida humana não é minimamente possível sem a afirmação teimosa de linhas da estabilidade. O reconhecimento de si como o mesmo a tal ou tal respeito, de modo surpreendente em consideração a este ímpeto irresponsável que eu descrevi agora, propicia grandes e profundos benefícios. O princípio do ego-responsabilidade deve então ser olhado como uma máxima da felicidade e não da moralidade. É preciso encorajar os outros e si à egoresponsabilidade por esse motivo. Na aplicação da moral do respeito, em revanche, nós devemos nos lembrar da "estrutura da irresponsabilidade" que qualifica essencialmente o desejo subjetivo como tal, e não nos surpreender ou nos escandalizar da variação "infinita" do outrem, de acolhê-lo em certa medida como a manifestação pura de sua vida, do jorramento de sua vida. Por último, o princípio de ego-responsabilidade tem, no entanto, um alcance moral, porque, como Kant observava tão justamente, nós devemos aos outros nossa felicidade: vigiar seu equilíbrio e sua satisfação pessoal é o único meio de nos tornar capazes de alguma coisa pelos outros; e de evitar em todo caso os estafar com nossa infelicidade e nossa carência. Tal será então minha conclusão: o princípio do ego-responsabilidade, que não nos torna de alguma maneira quites com a moral no sentido das três dimensões, 170 e que contradiz acertadamente a pulsão irresponsável da vida subjetiva, é uma boa máxima da felicidade, e torna-se como tal, indiretamente, um princípio dotado de um certo valor moral. 171 ANEXO II: TRADUÇÃO DO TEXTO: "Sartre, Levinas e o Idealismo" [título original: "Sartre, Levinas et l'idéalisme" (SALANSKIS,2004)]144 autor: Jean-Michel Salanskis [tradução para o português de Ana Gabriela Colantoni, revisão de sentido Christophe Salgueiro]. Discutir a relação entre a filosofia de J. P. Sartre e a de Levinas deveria ser somente o fardo e o privilégio dos verdadeiros conhecedores de um e de outro, daqueles que, na falta de ter lido tudo o que um e outro escreveram, debruçaram-se sobre seus textos principais. O autor dessa intervenção derroga dessa qualidade, ele disse, e ele pensa que os organizadores do presente encontro sabem disso. Nessas condições, como restaurar uma pertinência mínima, como deixar ao mesmo tempo virtualmente interessante e intelectualmente honesto o que eu vou dizer? Eu acreditei fazer isso circunscrevendo meus propósitos de duas formas: de uma parte, vos propondo uma reflexão comandada por um problema filosófico que é o meu, e que é aquele do idealismo; de outro lado, limitando claramente minha investigação do pensamento de Sartre à obra O ser e o nada. O primeiro elemento supôs reestabelecer um possível interesse no quadro desse encontro com minha intervenção: aqueles que, como vocês, se esforçam em refletir de maneira comparada sobre Sartre e Levinas podem ter qualquer curiosidade a respeito do sentimento que suas obras comunicam a alguém que, como eu, busca refundar ou reabilitar no contexto contemporâneo o idealismo. Pela natureza mesma da questão que eu coloco nos autores, e pela resistência qualificada que eu a eles oponho, eu posso assegurar as iluminações sobre seu pensamento, indiretamente de qualquer modo: as revelações que poderiam resultar de minha leitura teriam ainda que se tornar explícitas e documentadas por especialistas. O segundo elemento limita de algum modo o ponto de vista de introduzir por minha falha de informação em o publicar, cumprindo uma regra do jogo: se ele pode chegar a me conceber como alguém que "conhece Levinas", bastante para 144 Esse texto serviu de base para uma comunicação no quadro de um colóquio sobre "Sartre e Levinas" organizado por P. Cabestan, F. Noudelmannet F. Sebbah em dezembro de 2003 no quadro das atividades do CollègeInternational de Philosophie. 172 poder falar, eu estou muito longe de ser o mesmo em relação a Sartre. Eu vos apresento então a reflexão procedente somente da leitura de O ser e o nada. Mesmo se o que eu vou dizer exige correção em vista de seus outros escritos, meu anúncio vos ajuda em todo caso a efetuar essa correção, e me permite esperar que minha intervenção, na falta de ser ele mesmo conclusivo sobre tal ou tal ponto, pode servir de base de trabalho para outras pesquisas. Eu desejaria, antes de prosseguir e de entrar no cerne do sujeito, completar com o que precede de forma geral sobre a problemática emoldurada do idealismo. Isso que eu chamo de idealismo aqui, é sem dúvida, antes de tudo o idealismo transcendental: eu o entendo pela filosofia a qual insiste sobre a estrutura a priori que o sujeito, como sujeito do conhecimento e, virtualmente, sujeito da ciência, impõe a toda realidade. Essa filosofia que sustenta que os valores do objeto são correlativos a um conteúdo, ou melhor de um procedimento subjetivo, procedimento que nos incumbe de descrever para compreender o que quer que seja que entra no nosso uso do objeto. Esse procedimento subjetivo, no mais, não tem nada de empírico ou de particular, ele tem sempre o peso da lei, e, então, os elementos que ele combina são todos marcados com o selo de idealidade: só se trata, nas operações canônicas intervindo entre elas, de conteúdos supostos invariantes de uma consciência a outra, de uma ocorrência de pensamento ao outro. Toda a descrição de antecipação subjetiva e normativa do ser se faz então em termos desses tipos transcendendo suas ocorrências que são, desde Platão, as ideias. O idealismo transcendental foi inventado por Kant, em um esforço filosófico sublime para colocar a filosofia do conhecimento em acordo e em fase com a revolução metodológica da física que veio a ter lugar. Foi defendido por uma via e numa linguagem absolutamente nova, por Husserl, que, inventando a fenomenologia, voluntariamente a situou na tradição idealista transcendental. Encontra-se que, imediatamente depois da fundação husserliana, ou em parte durante essa fundação mesma, Heidegger usou de todo seu talento para desviar a fenomenologia de uma tal postura idealista. O que quer que seja sua fascinação pelo rigor transcendente, ao abrigo de toda relatividade, associada ao conteúdo lógico, ele acreditou ter investido na missão de reestabelecer em seus direitos e seu esplendor o "mistério do mundo e da vida" (eu retomo quase as palavras de seu biógrafo R Safranski). Ele foi conduzido, assim, a reinterpretar o fenômeno de uma maneira tal que ele teve mais material possível de uma jurisdição transcendental, somando todo valor de realidade a uma 173 estrutura ideal normativa. O deslocamento por ele introduzido situa o originário no mundo e na linguagem, e dedicava a filosofia a uma detecção e uma análise da fenomenalidade do tipo hermenêutico, conservando sempre à facticidade um peso decisivo, impedindo a construção teórica de um polo de procedimento subjetivo, e denunciando a idealidade como superestrutura estável deturpada. Sartre e Levinas me interessam enquanto filósofos que vieram depois de Heidegger, e, de uma certa forma, validam sua contribuição, tornam sua revolução de idealismo husserliano como uma aquisição, um inultrapassável. No entanto, um e outro, parece-me, esforçaram-se para fazer ressurgir certos componentes de idealismo ao sentido onde eu percebo na fenomenologia um novo avanço. Me focalizando sobre alguns problemas específicos, indicados de fato pelas proposições filosóficas fundamentais do pensamento de Levinas, eu gostaria de tentar mostrar sua convergência sobre esse ponto, ao mesmo tempo que a extrema diferença de orientações que eles seguem. Eu me interesso de início, assinalar com toda honra, a figura fenomenológica do outrem. O outrem em Sartre e Levinas Sartre, pode-se dizer, introduziu em O ser e o nada o outrem a partir de um olhar e da vergonha. No conjunto, esses dois momentos fenomenológicos são aqueles a favor dos quais eu tenho valor de objeto para outrem. Eles são preparados por uma descrição da forma que as relações que eu apreendoi entre os objetos de meu universo se desintegram fugindo "para outrem". "Outrem, é o início da fuga permanente das coisas para um termo que eu disse ao mesmo tempo como objeto a uma certa distância de mim, e que me escapa enquanto ele desdobra ao redor dele de suas próprias distâncias". Pode-se voltar à primeira explicitação desse "fenômeno": Certo gramado permanece a 2,20 m dele; mas ele [o gramado] está também ligado a ele, como gramado, em uma relação que transcende a distância e o contém ao mesmo tempo. Embora os dois termos de distância sejam indiferentes, intercambiáveis e em uma relação de reciprocidade, a distância se desdobra a partir do homem que eu vejo e até a grama como o surgimento sintético de uma relação unívocaii. 174 Esse primeiro elemento de descrição volta a registrar aquilo de que outrem é centro intencional ao mesmo título que eu [moi]. Está claro, pode-se dizer, que uma tal descrição não tem ela mesma nenhuma sustentação puramente fenomenológica, intencional. Ele não faz a partir disso que é recebido/vivido/comprovado como tal para eu [moi] que outrem no meu campo visual "seja" um tal centro intencional. Ou melhor, ou ainda, a descrição toma simplesmente ato do que eu presumo que seja assim. Sartre convindo, não o esconde, já que nos dá abertamente o "descentramento" ligado ao outrem como um simples provável: Enfim, ela [esta relação] conserva um puro caráter de probabilidade: a princípio, é provável que este objeto seja um homem; depois, mesmo certo de que ele seja, resta somente a probabilidade de que ele veja o gramado no momento em que eu o percebo (...)iii. A falha fenomenológica do provável, aqui, não é sua diferença com a certeza, reside melhor na sua indexação ontológica e não fenomenológica sobre a existência. A descrição do descentralizamento, da desintegração, é fundada sobre a posição ôntica do outro e de sua percepção no campo do que eu percebo, que ao mesmo tempo, perde seu caractere fenomenológico no sentido husserliano por tornarse capaz de acolher o realia. O que permanece fenomenológico no sentido husserliano, nessa descrição, é a dramatização da desintegração: a palavra desintegração que não se diz com verdade da situação "provável" do outro como centro intencional concorrente do meu, exprime em substância "o que me faz" projetar em um ponto de meu campo perceptivo um poder semelhante ao meu, para o qual em princípio fogem todos os objetos desse campo para encontrar seus fenômenos. A ontologia fenomenológica, até aqui, nos introduziu a experiência do outrem a partir de uma descrição qualificada de minha forma de avaliar no plano fenomenológico uma hipótese ôntica, de reagir a ela por minhas vivências. Ou seja, nós só estamos ainda nos pródromos: "Tudo isso, portanto, não nos faz deixar o terreno onde o outro é objeto"iv. Isso que faz passar a experiência do outro não objeto, é o olhar, é um dizer meu "ser visto" para ele. Sartre começa, antes mesmo de descrever a experiência do olhar, por explicar por que ele nos faz passar a uma tese do outro além do provável: Por que, do mesmo modo que o outrem é por mim-sujeito um objeto provável, eu só posso me descobrir tornando objeto provável para um 175 sujeito certo. Essa revelação só saberia resultar do fato que meu universo é objeto para o objeto-outrem, como se o olhar do outrem, de repente sobre o gramado e sobre os objetos do meio, vinha, seguindo um caminho definido, se instalar sobre mimv. Ainda uma vez, parece-me importante comparar e distinguir esta descrição de uma descrição intencional padrão. É fato referência a um "se descobrir" objeto por outrem, que parece um dado fenomenológico. Mas é logo tirada uma conclusão ontológica: meu sentimento de cair por terra a dignidade ontológica do sujeito criador do mundo é o indício indubitável do outrem, é um fundamento para a posição ontológica do outrem. O argumento lembra aquele da terceira meditação metafísica, que Sartre gosta, porque ele a evoca em outro lugar em O ser e o nada: por produzir um efeito ontológico negativo (minha decadência do sujeito ao objeto) é necessária uma causa tida tanto como peso ontológico que eu dela perco, de qualquer modo. Desta vez a ontologia fenomenológica deduz a ontológica da fenomenológica, ao invés do que nós observávamos no momento. Sem dúvida o conceito de ontologia fenomenológica em Sartre admite como definição a autorização fenomenológica desse tipo de passagem. Mas de tais observações não nos dispensam de nos interessar pelo essencial, e o que é o conteúdo do "se descobrir como objeto" no ser-visto. Sartre começa, a esse respeito por descrever esse ser-visto, que é acolhimento do olhar, como alternativa à percepção propriamente dita, isso que, ao final das contas, se traduz por uma intermitência dos olhos ao olhar e vice-versa: outrem me aparece como olhar exatamente quando seu rosto não me mostra o olho. De outra parte, o olhar não é nem uma qualidade entre outros objetos que faz função de olho, nem a forma total deste objeto, nem uma relação "mundana" que se estabelece entre esse objeto e eu. Bem ao contrário, longe de perceber o olhar sobre os objetos que o manifestam, minha apreensão de um observar que se volta para mim aparece sobre o fundo de destruição dos olhos que "me observam"; se eu apreendo o observar, eu cesso de perceber os olhos: eles estão lá, eles continuarão no campo de minha percepção, como puras apresentações, mas eu não faço uso, eles são neutralizados, fora do jogo, eles não são mais objeto de uma tese, eles permanecem no estado de "colocado fora de circuito" onde se encontra o mundo por uma consciência que efetuava a redução fenomenológica prescrita por Husserlvi. 176 A contraposição olhos-observar é dado como o equivalente da contraposição ativo-passivo, que, no final das contas, determina "ontológicofenomenologicamente" a passagem eu-outrem operando a doação do outro como tal: "É que perceber, é observar, e apreender um observar não é apreender um objeto-observar no mundo (à menos que esse olhar não seja dirigido para nós), é tornar consciência de ser olhado"vii. Está claro que essa descrição manifesta um elemento comum muito importante com aquela da relação ética em Levinas: em Sartre também, o acesso autêntico do outro parece ligado à interrupção da relação de tematização de outrem por mim. É necessário que os olhos, tema intencional para minha percepção, desapareçam em favor da passividade sob o observar para que outrem brilhe, ou comece a brilhar. Acrescentemos, por insistir sobre a força desta conjuntura, que nada de similar, eu creio, não se encontra em Husserl, Heidegger ou Merleu-Ponty. Quais quer observações que problematizam este elemento de aproximação, contudo, parece-me útil. Em primeiro lugar, Levinas não coloca o problema de acesso ao outrem com tal em geral, não retoma "verdadeiramente" o problema da quinta meditação cartesiana como pretende fazer aqui Sartre, ele busca no mais descrever sobre o modo fenomenológico o acesso ao sentido ético, esse que parece fazer uma grande diferença (em outros termos, tanto a leitura de Levinas "esquece" frequentemente esse ponto, quanto há lugar em Levinas para uma outra "recepção" normalmente base de tematização e de conhecimento do outrem, e, eu acrescento, isso permanece verdadeiro ao nível de Autrement qu'être). Em segundo lugar, mas está ligado, a contraposição sartriana guarda alguma coisa de simétrico, exprimido pela categorização ativo/passivo. Eu acesso ao outro quando eu reverto seu estatuto de objeto para mim para tornar objeto para ele no ser olhado. Isso que, bem entendo, permite que se coloque a Sartre a questão de um valor fenomenológico no segundo giro desta inversão ontológica: é necessário que esta inversão seja meu fenômeno para que outrem brilhe. No texto de Sartre: isso que se produz é ainda "apreender um observar". Isso que indica que a máquina tematizante-intencional não pode ser realmente interrompida. O mesmo tipo de objeção, é verdadeiro, é regularmente endereçado à Levinas (é, parece-me, uma objeção separada da família lógica das objeções derridianas). Somente, no último caso, a objeção veio ao preço de ignorar a mudança de registro que acompanha a 177 contraposição eu/outro: se passa, em Levinas, da perceptiva-teórica à demanda e da ontologia à an-ontologia. Em Sartre, onde o que é colocado em jogo parece ser a passagem do sujeito em objeto, sem sair do gesto do ser, a objeção do retorno do sujeito me parece irrepreensível. Em terceiro lugar, e é, novamente, ligado, ligado ao esboço de discussão que precede, pode-se também pedir prestação de contas ao Sartre em relação à fonte husserliana, que ele retoma em superfície o problema. E nessa mesma proporção Sartre faz na primeira passagem citada uma referência à redução fenomenológica. Para Sartre, o estatuto dos olhos quando eu acolho o observar tornam-no naquilo que é "reduzido". Ele interpreta visivelmente esse estatuto como o que é deixado fora de jogo, neutralizado, de quem não faz uso. [Da forma] como eu entendo o texto, eu o julgo ambivalente, ele jorra para mim entre dois valores possíveis. Ou bem esse estado de redução quer dizer simplesmente em Sartre que os olhos passam ao plano reverso, que eles tornam um motivo não circunscrito, não operado, sobre a base da qual a consciência não produz conteúdo noemático de qualquer forma. E, nesse caso, a convocação do modelo da redução não é em última análise pertinente, o fenômeno dos olhos é fenomenalmente de plano reverso, que resulta da redução como todo campo fenomenal, mas não cria, nessa passagem ao plano reverso, o objeto de uma redução particular. Ou bem Sartre quer verdadeiramente dizer que, na experiência do outrem, o corpo do outrem perde a validação da existência, e que ele é somente a perda em um mundo a respeito da qual a "atitude natural " persiste. E, nesse caso, sua descrição torna radicalmente próxima da de Levinas, para quem outrem destotaliza o mundo, se produz junto de mim como suplemento não se deixando integrar ao afresco pela natureza totalizante da tematização. Sartre afirmava com efeito em nossa passagem que, quando eu acolho outrem como observar, eu subtraio seu "substrato" corporal ao ser, ou pelo menos eu o neutralizo sobre o plano ôntico. Mas a análise de Sartre pode reivindicar uma proximidade ainda maior com a de Levinas, se se quer tomar conta do fenômeno da vergonha, a qual nós nos referimos agora. Esse fenômeno, por dizer, Sartre o apresenta como meio de anedota existencial do ciumento que observa pelo buraco da fechadura (isso que faz a pessoa que é ciumenta, eu suponho). Enquanto ele segue a linha desta curiosidade plena de sentido no seio do "projeto" que ele é – o do ciúme – nenhuma diferença valorativa 178 pode surgir entre ele e isso que ele faz, isso que ele faz é o meio anunciado pelo mundo do projeto que ele é, o circuito da subjetividade, a motivação, o meio e o ato é totalmente coincidente ou erradicado na irreflexão, na "consciência de si não tética". Mas se eu venho a me sentir observado em minha espionagem visual (um barulho no corredor induz essa sensação), enquanto a diferença se cruza, eu entro na vivência da vergonha, minha consciência não tética de mim é doravante atravessada pela objetivação de mim sob o olhar do outrem. Esta experiência, longamente descrita, analisada, caracterizada por Sartre, torna-se para ele propriamente a experiência benfeitora do outrem, pelo menos tanto quanto a terminologia fenomenológica pode aqui ser retomada. (E ela quase não pode, Sartre se prende explicitamente em dizer que outrem não é um sentido). Digamos ainda, mais perto de Sartre, que essa experiência é a chave para ele do comparecimento do momento outrem no gesto ontológico começado com o reconhecimento da realidade humana como nadificação. Do ponto de vista que nos interessa, o da comparação com Levinas, tentouse de início reconhecer uma analogia forte na qualificação ética dada à comparação do outrem. Se outrem, em Levinas, vale como interrogação, acusação, e correlativamente, segundo toda aparência, como culpabilidade original para mim, ele vale como vergonha em Sartre. Não é preciso dizer que tanto um como o outro apresentam congruência sobre a comparação do outrem (na ordem fenomenológica ou ontológica) com a insistência ética (eu advenho à vergonha ou à culpabilidade). Mais uma vez, essa proximidade, ou essa analogia, não podem ser negadas e são, eu penso, de uma grande importância (ela sugere que o pensamento de Levinas pode nascer em parte de uma derivação diferencial a partir da de Sartre, da trajetória conceitual da qual ele parece em um sentido mais próximo que do de Husserl ou do de Heidegger). Os fenomenólogos anteriores, com toda evidência, não imaginaram simplesmente a pertinência de uma tal congruência. Mas esse reconhecimento deve ser imediatamente temperado pela compreensão de incomensurabilidade que demora entre as duas aproximações. A gente é conduzida então a fazer as observações seguintes. De início, a vergonha não é a única modalidade dessa irrupção da objetivação sob o observar do outrem na minha consciência irreflexiva: há também o medo e o orgulho. Então, a "qualidade" aparentada à culpabilidade não é necessária no raciocínio da ontologia fenomenológica. Na verdade, ela parece da mesma forma o ser de maneira implícita, se se quer bem ter conta do privilégio que a ela é dado na 179 exposição. No mais, parece que o orgulho seja da mesma forma compreendido por Sartre como um derivado da vergonha, em que o ser observado se volta em uma interpretação onde eu sou causa do que outrem vê. Mas o mais importante é que o elemento revelador da revelação do outrem é uma determinação objetiva de mim, uma predicação psicológica advinda como uma coloração de mim. A experiência do outrem apressa o Eu em mim, faz jorrar um segmento de em si na fluidez de meu escapamento existencial-ek-stático de mim mesmo. E essa precipitação, aparentemente, não pode ela mesma indicar a não ser para a qualificação como si ética do eu que surgiu. O procedimento do conjunto, se nós o devemos descrever, se situa sobre o plano de objetivação, de minha objetivação. Da mesma forma, se eu considero as coisas do lado do outrem, um ponto essencial é para Sartre que outrem se apresenta na vergonha como outrem sujeito, ou seja, como existência. O fundo do argumento é que só um outrem existente e sujeito, só uma liberdade ontologicamente ativa pode me fazer "passar" da fuga existencial à objetividade, isso que a vergonha testemunha. A vergonha funciona, portanto, como "indício" no sentido da primeira pesquisa lógica de Husserl, explicada por Derrida em A voz e o fenômeno. A comparação de outrem é assim a intervenção de um suplemento do ser (outrem como liberdade) operando a conversão ontológica do ego em mim objetivada. Em Levinas ao contrário, outrem não comparece, simplesmente: o rosto perfura ou exaspera o ser. E eu não me encontro colocado ou qualificado diferentemente, a culpabilidade me ordena de forma não ontológica a outrem, eu não mudo de estatuto ou de naipe ontológico, a chamo ou a solicito me afetando a partir do ser externo e sobre o modo do ser externo (como um sentido "a realizar" que nada daquilo que não defende, destituído de força e de substância, tão bem ao de fora quanto de dentro). As descrições parecem em uma certa medida convergir também na ideia de destotalização, que intervém de parte e de outrem, de tal sorte que o enunciado "outrem está além do mundo" é válido nos dois autores. Mas esse além do mundo não tem o mesmo sentido. Sartre pode escrever a passagem seguinte, que desejará, eu o concedo, de entender da maneira levinasiana: 180 "Cada um reconhece, nessa descrição abstrata, essa presença imediata e escaldante do observar do outrem que de repente preenche-se de vergonha. Ao contrário se diz, enquanto eu me experiencio como observado, realiza-se por mim uma presença transmundana de outrem: isso só é enquanto ele está "ao meio" de meu mundo que outrem me observa, mas é enquanto ele vem para o mundo e para mim de toda sua transcendência, é enquanto ele não está separado de mim por alguma distância, por algum objeto do mundo, nem real, nem ideal, por nenhum corpo do mundo, mas unicamente por sua natureza de outrem. Assim, a aparição do observar de outrem não é aparição no mundo: nem no "meu" nem no "de outrem"; e a relação que me uni ao outrem não saberia ser uma relação de exterioridade à interioridade do mundo, mas, pelo observar do outrem, eu faço a experiência concreta que tem um para além do mundo. Outrem me é presente sem nenhum intermediário como uma transcendência que não é a minha. Mas essa presença não é recíproca: é necessário que toda espessura do mundo para que eu seja, eu, presente a outrem. Transcendência onipresente e insaciável, colocada sobre mim sem intermediário enquanto eu sou meu ser-não-revelado, e separado de mim pelo infinito do ser, enquanto eu estou mergulhado por esse observar no seio de um mundo completo com suas distâncias e utensílios: tal é o observar de outrem, quando eu o experiencio de início como observar"viii. Tudo parece assim ser, nessa passagem: outrem para além do mundo, e mesmo a conexão entre transcendência e infinito. Portanto, a situação intelectual é absolutamente diferente. Na descrição de Sartre, eu e outrem são todos dois concebidos como "espacialidades existenciais" no sentido de Heidegger, abrindo o mundo aproximando cada estado desse mundo segundo uma proximidade não métrica: outrem é imediatamente junto das coisas de meu mundo sem distância ou sem essa aproximação. Outrem estando nessa relação intencional primitiva no mundo, nega o espaço que eu poderia a ele atribuir na minha própria abertura do mundo: ele passa para além do mundo enquanto ele é uma "origem do mundo" como eu. Isso é então em nome de uma afinidade intencional com eu promovido em afinidade ontológica que ele "ocorre" para além do mundo. O cinema recente nos oferece uma boa metáfora do outrem sartriano: outrem é como os organizadores do Truman show no filme eponímiaix, um observar "para além" "Transcendência omnipresente e inapreensível, colocada sobre mim sem 181 intermediário", aquele da câmera em ocorrência. O infinito procede da reversão dessa não-distância: se outrem recusa sua situação em meu mundo porque ele visa de todo modo o existente, o aproximando, sua objetivação desse mundo me objetiva nele, minha cruz, e me prega a ele e constitui dessa forma o mundo objetivado onde eu figuro como um tipo de tese separada infinita que se torna exceção e o distingue de mim: ele difere de mim de todo o poder dessa objetivação total onde ele me tem. Para resumir: 1) O para além do mundo de Sartre só é a projeção conceitual do para além intencional conhecido por meu próprio sujeito em minha experiência desse ponto de vista o pensamento de Sartre retoma contrariamente às aparências a noção husserliana de apresentação – esse para além do mundo não é o "fim do mundo", mas sua duplicação conflitual, isso que se trata é uma montagem ontológica a partir do fato intencional elevado ao poder duplo e reunido com ele mesmo. 2) O infinito que assinala outrem associando-se a sua transcendência é o infinito do ser e não o infinito como fora-ser. Isso pode em um sentido se sintetizar observando que o tema da destotalização não é idêntica de um autor para outro: o todo que desfaz o outrem sartriano é o todo de minha captura sobre o ser do mundo, a barreira compreensiva da objetividade para mim; no entanto o todo que desfaz o outrem levinasiano é o todo do sentido objetivo, e mais radicalmente do sentido do estado-do-mundo em geral. Essas duas "valorizações" são elaboradas a partir do mesmo limite, o da minha intencionalidade do mundo, mas o limite em causa vale como limite do meu para Sartre, como limite do mundo como tal para Levinas. Eu acrescentarei a isso que precede um breve elemento de meditação sobre a forma que o sentido da moralidade é envolvido no dado de outrem. O tema da vergonha em Sartre não nos esclarece verdadeiramente até o final a esse respeito, porque, apesar da sugestividade da primeira anedota que nos familiariza com a vergonha – aquela da curiosidade ciumenta e espiã – aparece sem ambiguidade no texto de Sartre que a vergonha não tem realmente um sentido moral para elex. Aliás, essa acepção responde aqui a língua comum, por que a vergonha é uma noção social e não essencialmente moral como a culpabilidade. Mais interessante, e pode ser mais radicalmente instrutivo é o que diz Sartre da maldade. Grosso modo, sua ideia é que o predicado de maldade não pode, por definição, vir a mim de mim mesmo, é necessário a objetivação de mim surgida 182 com outrem para que uma tal fixação seja possível. Essa análise contém, por ver, uma ideia da moralidade, uma versão do sentido da moralidade. Escutem Sartre: Me apreender como mau, por exemplo, isso não poderia ser referido a mim ao que eu sou por mim mesmo, porque eu não sou nem posso ser mal por mim. De início porque eu não sou mais mau, por mim mesmo, do que eu "funcionário" ou "médico". Eu não sou com efeito sobre o modo de não ser isso que eu sou e de ser isso que eu não sou. A qualificação de mau, ao contrário, me caracteriza como um emsi. Depois, porque se eu deveria ser malvado por mim, seria necessário que eu o fosse sobre o modo de ter que ser, ou seja que eu deveria me apreender e me querer como malvado. Mas isso significaria que eu devo me descobrir como querendo isso que me aparece a mim mesmo como o contrário de meu Bem e precisamente porque é o Mal ou o contrário de meu Bem. É necessário então expressamente que eu queira o contrário do que eu quero em um mesmo momento e sob o mesmo relato, ou seja que eu me odeie a mim mesmo enquanto, precisamente, eu sou eu mesmo. E, por realizar plenamente sobre o terreno do para-si essa essência de mau, necessitaria que eu me assumisse como malvado, ou seja que eu me aprove pelo mesmo ato que me faz-me reprovar. Vê-se muito que essa noção de mau não poderia de modo algum tirar sua origem de mim enquanto eu sou eu. E eu teria que bem prosseguir até seus extremos limites o ek-stase, ou a extirpação de mim que me constitui por mim, eu não chegaria jamais a me conferir a maldade nem mesmo a concebê-la por mim se eu sou livre a meus próprios recursos. Isso que eu sou minha extirpação de mim mesmo, eu sou minha própria negação: basta que entre eu e eu, eu seja meu próprio mediador para que toda objetividade desapareçaxi. Em tal desenvolvimento, completamente exemplar, nós vemos de algum modo que a culpabilidade não é estatuto fenomenológico em Sartre. E esse ponto de vista, difere infinitamente de Levinas, que poderia resumir a tônica dizendo que ele confere à culpabilidade um tal estatuto: ele erige a "pseudo-experiência" de outrem em doação fenomenológica originária da culpabilidade, de qualquer modo. Para Sartre, ao contrário, nós vemos que a culpabilidade tem por princípio a objetivação do si: no circuito puro da existencialidade, isso que eu sou se confunde sempre com o que eu tenho sido, e não deveria por esse motivo valer por mau. Tanto é verdadeiro que Sartre identifica o mal a isso que eu coloco como o mal, assim que, simultaneamente, a isso que eu coloco como o que eu não quero. Em seu uso da locução ambígua por um ouvido levinasiano meu bem – significa que é bom para mim ou que vale como o Bem a meus olhos? – ele identifica a priori isso que eu conheço como o bem e isso que eu quero. Ou pelo menos, o deslocamento possibilita 183 pressupor, para Sartre, minha objetivação. Um pouco mais longe ele argumenta que, quando eu chamo os outros de malvados, eu sei bem que eu os degrado em objetos. A experiência do outrem na vergonha, me consagrando como alfinete no mundo por uma "presença a" esse mundo para além dele, como objeção por outrem, abre a porta a uma consideração de mim que me avalia como mau sem que minha existencialidade possa me redimir dissolvendo toda determinação em seu processo. Para remeter essa visão em perspectiva pelo meio de uma comparação que nenhum deles julgarão improvável, a auto-categorização moral põe a Sartre problemas de princípio comparáveis àqueles que aborda Davidson Iorsque, em Ensaio em Ação e Eventos, ele reflete sobre a incontinência da vontade ou acrasia: trata-se de compreender como eu posso decidir o que eu faço contra minha melhor racionalização. Se eu concebo minha ação propriamente humana, em geral, como evento onde minha razão se mostra causa do que eu faço, o conceito de uma tal decisão parece contraditória, ele considera gradualmente "que eu me aprove pelo mesmo ato que me faz reprimir-me", como diz Sartre. Mas se a moralidade consiste na racionalidade ou na racionalização da ação, então as situações de dilema moral e de impotência ética, tradicionalmente evocados pelo ditado Video meliora provoque, deteriora sequor, revelam uma tal paradoxalidade. Sartre e o sub-grupo Nós queremos agora continuar essa confrontação de Sartre e de Levinas abordando um sujeito um pouco diferente, e que é o da "relação no sub-grupo", para designar como eu o faço em Exterminação, lei, Israel, onde seu conceito domina o capítulo consagrado à exterminação. Sartre, com efeito, em uma seção muito longa de O ser e o nada intitulada Meu próximo (p. 554 sq.), vindo a determinadas teses fortemente célebres sobre isso que é o ser ou valor como Judeu, notadamente. Essa meditação se liga àquilo que ele pôde dizer um pouco antes sobre o nós, discutindo a noção heideggeriana de Mitsein, e liberando as figuras do nós-sujeito e do nós-objeto. Sartre, com efeito, rejeita no Mitsein heideggeriano, a ideia de um momento fenomenológico de nós que seria primeiro e fundador em relação ao relacionamento com o outrem. Nós podemos imediatamente observar que um tal movimento, uma tal intenção o homologuem absolutamente a Levinas. Ele também se empenha a elaborar uma fenomenologia onde outrem não deriva do mundo, o Mitsein sendo um aspecto 184 do mundo. Nesse negócio, se minha lembrança de Fenomenologia da percepção está correta, a fronteira passa entre Levinas e Sartre de um lado, Merleau-Ponty (e Heidegger) de outro. Sartre expõe que as experiências típicas libertam o sentido do nós-sujeito e do nós-objeto. Ele começa pelo nós-objeto: aquele que se inicia no momento onde o terceiro se apreendem uma relação de eu com outrem que se revela enquanto constitutivamente simétrico. Sartre toma o exemplo, bem pouco neutro é certo, de uma luta com outrem. Na minha experiência confinada à situação dual, o combate não me estabelece em nenhuma equivalência com outrem, bem ao contrário a alma desse combate é para mim o erro objetivando que me leva outrem em "transcendendo minha transcendência". Mas sob o olhar de terceiros quem transcende o complexo de nosso combate, eu não luto contra o outro desde que, e na medida em que, ele luta contra mim. Eu acesso então no mundo que projeto o terceiro a uma equivalência entre outrem constituinte da situação onde eu intervenho com ele: "Assim isso que eu aprovo é um ser-de-fora onde eu sou organizado com o outro em um todo indissolúvel e objetivo, um todo onde eu não me distingo mais originalmente do outro, mas que eu colaboro, solidariamente com o outro, a constituir. E na medida onde eu assumo por princípio meu ser-de-fora para o terceiro, eu devo assumir paralelamente o ser-de-fora do outro; isso que eu assumo, é a comunidade de equivalência pelo que eu existo engajado em uma forma que eu colaboro como o outro a constituir. Em uma palavra, eu me assumo como engajado de fora no outro e eu assumo o outro como engajado de fora em mim. E é essa assunção fundamental desse engajamento que eu carrego diante de mim sem o apreender, é esse reconhecimento livre de minha responsabilidade enquanto ela inclui a responsabilidade do outro que é prova do nós-objeto"xii. Sartre precisa que o nós-objeto não seja conhecido, nem sentido, nem mesmo simplesmente aprovado, "(...) porque o que é aprovado é a pura situação de solidariedade com o outro. O nós-objeto só se descobre pela assunção que eu faço dessa situação, ou 185 seja, pela necessidade onde eu sou, no sentido de minha liberdade assumida, de assumir também o outro, a causa da reciprocidade interna da situação"xiii. Nós temos dificuldade em encontrar o sentido si específico desse conceito dos anos 50-60, aquele de o assumir. Sartre o distingue de um conhecimento, porque ele corresponde a um movimento pré-teórico da liberdade. O assumir permanece por força, em razão do que é geralmente conhecido da realidade humana, me parece, um gesto de consciência. Então minha liberdade faz o gesto de "colocar em relevo" a reciprocidade resultante da afetação da luz do terceiro à minha situação dual em uma assunção de nós, uma responsabilidade dessa comum alienação. Nós devemos ao mesmo tempo compreender, com efeito, que a entrada do nós-objeto é o cúmulo da desgraça fundamental do para si, e que é o tornar objeto: "É necessário conceber com efeito que originalmente o pertencimento ao nós-objeto é sentido como uma alienação mais radical ainda do para si porque isto não é mais somente obrigado a assumir isso que ele é para outrem, mas ainda uma totalidade que ele não é, não obstante ele faça dele parte integrante (...) aquele que se aprova como constituinte de um nós com os outros homens se sente grudado entre uma infinidade de existências estrangeiras, ele é alienado radicalmente e sem recurso"xiv. Pode-se já comparar essa teoria fenomenológica do nós-objeto com o pensamento de Levinas. É difícil não ter elemento em comum, e que é um tipo de gêneses a partir da ocorrência do terceiro. Em Levinas também, nós somos introduzidos à dimensão coletiva (do direito, da política para além da ética estrita) a partir da intervenção fenomenológica do terceiro. Mas aqui se chega à congruência: o terceiro, em Levinas, me libertava antes da subjugação ética fundamental, me salvando por sua demanda de risco de minha captura exclusiva a serviço do "primeiro outrem". O terceiro, enfim, é origem do que uma linguagem de per-equação de direitos e de exigências deve ser elaborado. O nós que faz seguir a intervenção do terceiro, em Levinas, é sobretudo o nós da liberdade, essa liberdade que Sartre vê como absolutamente negada, por conseguinte que eu me coloco no nós-objeto sob a luz do olhar do terceiro. Essa diferença é em certo tipo clássica, ela opõe a filosofia de Levinas a todas as filosofias da liberdade, se se entende por filosofia que toma a 186 liberdade como um dado subjetivo solipsista original. Ou melhor, para ele a liberdade se revela no duplo contexto de obrigação ética e na medida intersubjetiva da obrigação. Mas Sartre pensa também um nós-sujeito, que se poderia esperar que ele seja menos desesperado pela liberdade nadificada. A experiência do nós-sujeito nos é dada pelo objeto manufaturado, ou, mais geralmente, pela estruturação convencional do mundo, pelos sinais depositados no mundo, que "prescrevem" projetos pré-calibrados, chamando nossa transcendência ek-stática a coincidir localmente com o projeto pelo qual o artefato ou o sinal foi concebido: E se eu deixo canalizar minhas possibilidades pelo utensílio assim constituído, eu me experiencio a mim mesmo como transcendência qualquer: para ir da estação de metrô "Trocadéro" à "Sèvresbabylone", "a gente" troca em "La Motte-Piquet". Esta troca está prevista, indicada sobre os mapas, etc.; se eu troco de linha em MottePiquet, eu sou o "a gente" que trocaxv. Isso se comenta ainda, dando forma a uma experiência do nós-sujeito: (...) mas se essa transcendência indiferenciada projeta seus projetos quaisquer em ligação com outras transcendências experienciadas como presenças reais e igualmente absorvidas nos projetos quaisquer idênticos a meus projetos, então eu realizo meu projeto como um entre mil projetos idênticos projetados por uma mesma transcendência indiferenciada, então eu tenho a experiência de uma transcendência comum e dirigida para um fim único, que eu só sou uma particularização efêmera; eu me insiro na grande corrente humana que, incansavelmente e desde que exista um metrô, flui nos corredores da estação "La Motte-Piquet-Grenellexvi. Sartre se tivesse escrito o livro mais tarde, sem nenhuma dúvida teria identificado o nós-sujeito pelo fluxo de usuários do corredor rolante da estação Châtelet. Quando nós imaginamos essa concepção do nós-sujeito, hoje, nos é difícil de não pensar nas teses derrido-stieglerianas: o fundamento do nós-sujeito, a cada vez, é uma forma canalizante das possibilidades da transcendência existencial, conceito que, em Sartre, embrulha ferramenta e sinal, e que apresenta o caráter essencial de uma marcação espacial, de uma exteriorização originária na qual a 187 transcendência se chama ela mesma sob uma forma "universal". Que se julga por esta passagem: (...) eu aprendo que eu faço parte de um nós pelo mundo. Isso é porque minha experiência do nós-sujeito não implica de forma alguma uma experiência parecida e correlativa nos outros; é porque também ela é tão instável que ela supõe organizações particulares no meio do mundo e desaparece com essas organizações. Na verdade, há no mundo uma comuna de formação que me indica como qualquer; de início todos os utensílios, desde as ferramentas propriamente ditas até os edifícios, com seus elevadores, com sua tubulação de água ou de gás, sua eletricidade, passando pelos meios de transporte, as lojas, etc. Cada fachada, cada vitrine me remete a uma imagem como transcendência indiferenciada. Ainda mais, as relações profissionais e técnicas dos outros comigo me anunciando ainda como qualquer: para o garçom do café, eu sou o consumidor; para o perfurador de tickets, eu sou o usuário do metrô. Enfim o incidente na rua que surge bruscamente perante o terraço do café onde eu me assentei me indica ainda como espectador anônimo e como puro "observar que faz existir esse incidente como um fora". É igualmente o anonimato do espectador que indica a peça de teatro a qual eu assisto ou a exposição de quadro que eu visito. E, certamente, eu me faço qualquer quando eu experimento um sapato ou quando eu abro uma garrafa ou quando eu entro em um elevador ou quando eu rio no teatroxvii. Sartre varre todo o campo do "social" como tal no mundo, do que é atingido ao ensino do "compartilha de cada um por cada um", coisa, forma traçada, sinal ou convenção. Ao mesmo tempo, ele coloca em evidência o que a experiência do nósobjeto é real nesse contexto da pura experiência do universal, de um universal que me subordina enquanto projeto, isso que permanece bastante diferente da ideia forte de um nós onde o outrem se adiciona com o eu sem se dissolver. É bem isso que diz Sartre, que deixa claro que seu conceito de nós-sujeito se anunciado no mundo retorna ao Mtseinde Heidegger, e critica um e outro como pressuposto da experiência do outrem, e por conseguinte inapto para tornar motivo na série fenomenológica. O movimento argumentativo de Sartre é aqui congruente com a orientação de Levinas. À título de comentário lateral, não diretamente pertinente para a avaliação da relação com Levinas, mas que poderia ser se trata de encontrar Levinas e Sartre no que diz respeito ao idealismo em geral, pode-se acrescentar que a "revelação" do qualquer como tal de quem fala Sartre é necessariamente anúncio de uma idealidade, e não é só um exemplo que o confirma: a cada vez, Sartre evoca formas, coisas ou eventos que, no encontro que nós vivemos, nos revelam que o lugar que nos é feito – 188 a existência se projetando que nós somos – é a de uma variável que nós instanciamos. No encontro que nós vivemos, nós encontramos um posto que é o posto de um sujeito fazendo esse encontro, e que, portanto, é forçosamente uma postura, afim de casar com a animação fundamental do para si: essa postura é aprovada como isso que, o ocupando, nos instanciamos. A estrutura tipo-ocorrência é então bem lá, e é à cada vez possível de enunciar o jogo: quando eu estou no café, eu instancio o consumador, mas ao mesmo tempo, o artigo definido revisa aqui a um indivíduo sempre ausente e somente instanciado de uma parte, a um indivíduo que toda a constância ontológica se esgota nessa disposição a ser indiretamente apresentado por uma instância de outra parte, a uma ideia em sumo. Um "idealista levinasiano" como o autor desse artigo imagina que a análise do Mitsein seja faltosa porque ela pretende introduzir outrem quando ela o pressupõe, certamente, mas também que ela seja faltosa porque ela ignora a profundidade da relação da vida humana com a idealidade, que ela revela: não cede ela a esse frisson ou essa ilusão empirista que nos faz crer que a origem concreta do eidos se mostra nesses exemplos? (Isso que é também o que Derrida e Stiegler sugerem, se eu os li bem). Compreendemos, portanto, o menor desses exemplos sem o esquema ideal da instanciação (P(x)→ P(a))? Eu penso sobre essa concepção do nós-sujeito, e eu venho à seção Meu próximo, onde nós encontraremos elementos sobre o sentido que Sartre dá ao ser judeu. O muito longo e apaixonante desenvolvimento ocorrido nessa seção, em um sentido, é mesmo magnetizado de ponta a ponta por essa questão – ontofenomenológica para Sartre – do que é o ser judeu. O problema geral posto é o que aparece com uma "coerção" nativamente oposta à liberdade: as significações objetivas que eu encontro já marcadas no mundo, com as quais meu uso desse mundo deve contar, e que, em certos casos, se declinam ao meu sujeito, de tal tipo que minha liberdade "me" encontra já determinada por elas. Assim que nós nos solicitamos isso que pode significar para nossa "situação" o fato original e contingente de existir em um mundo onde "ele tem" também o outro, o problema assim formulado exige que nós estudemos sucessivamente três camadas de realidade que entram em jogo para constituir minha situação concreta: os utensílios já significantes (a estação, a indicação do caminho de ferro, a obra de arte, os cartazes de mobilização), a significação que eu descubro como já minha (minha nacionalidade, minha raça, meu aspecto físico) 189 e enfim o outro como centro de referência o qual enviam essas significaçõesxviii. O ser-judeu, a gente o compreende, intervirá no lugar da segunda "camada" de realidade, embora nenhuma palavra escolhida para o evocar não convenha realmente. A "resposta" geral de Sartre a isso é sentida como uma dificuldade de sua filosofia da liberdade cuja liberdade, enquanto liberdade em situação, é por essência liberdade que "ultrapassa" um mundo configurado pela liberdade de outrem. Posto isso, é necessário em primeiro lugar notar que essa alienação da situação não representa uma falha interna nem a introdução do dado como resistência bruta na situação tal qual eu a vi. Bem ao contrário, a alienação não é nem uma modificação interna nem uma troca parcial da situação; ela não aparece no curso da temporalização; eu não encontro jamais na situação e ela não é, por consequência, jamais entregue a minha intuição. Mas, em princípio, ela me escapa, ela é exterioridade mesma da situação, ou seja, seu ser-de-fora-parao-outro. Trata-se então de um caractere essencial de toda situação em geral; esse caractere não deveria tratar sobre seu conteúdo, mas ele aceitou e retomou por ele mesmo quem se coloca em situação. Assim, o sentido mesmo de nossa livre escolha é de fazer surgir uma situação que a exprime e que uma característica essencial é do ser alienado, ou seja de existir como forma em si para o outro. Nós não podemos escapar dessa alienação, porque seria absurdo sonhar em existir senão em situaçãoxix. As significações depositadas, oferecidas à minha retomada, são então indicação de um limite externo da liberdade, vindo a se acrescentar a seu limite interno, que é a não-escolha de ter que escolher. E, ao mesmo tempo, esse limite externo é, em primeiro exame ao menos, descrito por Sartre exatamente com ele descreve a face objetiva da situação para a liberdade solipsista do para si: como uma inercia da situação que só o ser que é o seio tanto quanto para o para si, ultrapassando a condição recebida, dá a ele o único sentido seguinte do qual ela é dada-reconhecida. Não há, não obstante, em Sartre, elementos nos permitindo distinguir o que é dado [la donne] da rocha e o que é dado do ser judeu por exemplo, enquanto fator de inevitável alienação da situação da liberdade? Um primeiro elemento interessante é a análise do fato nacional sob o ângulo da técnica. De fato, trata-se simplesmente da retomada disso que nós temos visto a propósito da figura do nós-sujeito: o nós-sujeito é definido em termo da 190 disponibilidade de um esquema prático para a liberdade, tipicamente desenhada ou sedimentada como técnica. Uma tal interpretação técnica de fato nacional é esboçada a propósito do ser-Saboiano [habitante da região Saboia]: Mas ser Saboiano, o que não está simplesmente a habitar os altos vales da Saboia: é, entre mil outras coisas, fazer esqui no inverno, utilizar o esqui como modo de transporte. E, precisamente, é fazer do esqui segundo o método francês, não segundo o da Arlberg ou da Noruega. Mas porque a montanha e os declives nevados só se enfrentam através de uma técnica, é precisamente descobrir o sentido francês dos declives do esqui; conforme, com efeito, utilizar-se-á o método norueguês, mais propício nos declives doces, ou o método francês, mais propício nos declives rudes, um mesmo declive aparecerá como mais rude ou mais doce, exatamente como uma subida aparece como mais ou menos rude ao ciclista, conforme ele se "colocará em média ou em pequena marchaxx. Sartre aplica também esse tipo de análise ao ser-trabalhador, e parece ligar isso que eu chamo de as identidades de sub-grupo às "técnicas de elaboração ou de apropriação do mundo"xxi. Mas, de início, parece que essa aproximação pelo nós-sujeito das filiações identitárias cede à aproximação pelo nós-objeto: É somente reconhecendo a liberdade (qual seja o uso que eles fazem) dos antissemitas e assumindo esse ser-judeu que eu sou para eles, é somente assim que o ser-judeu aparecerá como limite objetivo externo da situação": se ele me agrada, ao contrário, de os considerar como puros objetos, meu ser-judeu desaparece assim para dar lugar à simples consciência de ser livre transcendência inqualificável. Reconhecer os outros e, se eu sou Judeu, assumir meu ser-judeu é a mesma coisaxxii. Aqui, a identidade "resulta" de fato do olhar do outro, mesmo se é através de sua assunção. Essa tese sobre o que é o ser judeu é em outro lugar isso que passou na posteridade, e que resume para a vulgata – que a experiência nos ensina que ela não é sempre de fato faltosa, embora ela seja sem dúvida sempre injusta – a posição sartriana. A pergunta que se põe, em parte em filigrana [pequenos detalhes], sem estar nomeado no texto de Sartre, é a pergunta do conteúdo que daria as identidades 191 de sub-grupo, do estatuto ontológico que convém ao "pertencimento". A interpretação "técnica", na linha do sujeito é sedutora, mas ela coloca um problema a Sartre, que no meu ponto de vista é indiretamente revelado pelo que ele diz da linguagem, em um desenvolvimento interno à nossa seção que trata dela em três compridas partes. O exemplo mesmo da significação recebida que me "mantém" e que eu procuro sem a "constituir" é o pertencimento linguístico. O sentido parece bem não ser puramente e simplesmente isso que eu invento e moldo, porque é muito notadamente o sentido linguístico, e porque, para o emissor nessa modalidade, eu devo me dobrar ao léxico e à gramática de um idioma. No desenvolvimento que ele consagra à questão do sentido linguístico, Sartre se esforça em resistir absolutamente à ideia que uma língua particular "limitaria" nossa liberdade forçosamente a passar pelas unidades prévias, estáveis e não tendo necessidade dela, e pelas regras sintáticas previamente dadas, elas também explícitas e revolucionárias independentemente da liberdade. Para se opor a essa visão, que iguala fortemente o exercício linguístico a um exercício combinatório em um quadro duplamente contingente, Sartre começa por afirmar, à maneira da filosofia analítica, mas, parece, por outras razões, o privilégio da frase: É no interior da frase, com efeito, que a palavra pode receber uma função real de designação; de fora dela, é somente uma função proposicional, quando isso não é uma pura e simples rubrica destinada a agrupar significações absolutamente dísparesxxiii. Para a filosofia analítica, e isso desde Frege, um tal princípio primado da frase vale e é conhecido sob o nome de "príncipe do contexto", enuncia que uma palavra só tem dignificação e valor no contexto de uma frase. No quadro analítico, esse primado se explica em última análise pelo primado dado à verdade: é subentendido e decidido que a verdade devolve razão ao sentido, os sentidos se igualam às condições de verdade: ora o piso onde a linguagem se imobiliza na espera da edificação de verdade é aquela da frase. Para Sartre, a frase é o nível em que se exprime o projeto, e é o que justifica seu privilégio: 192 A unidade verbal sendo a frase significante, isto é um ato construtivo só se concebe por uma transcendência que ultrapassa e nadifica o dado para um fim. Compreende a palavra à luz da frase, é bem exatamente e compreender não importa qual dado a partir da situação, e compreender a situação à luz dos fins originais. Compreender uma frase de meu interlocutor, é, com efeito, compreender o que ele "quer dizer", ou seja casar-se com seu movimento de transcendência, me jogar com ele para os possíveis, para os fins e rever em seguida sobre o conjunto dos meios organizados para os compreender por sua função e seu objetivoxxiv. Assim Sartre sustenta uma concepção holística, recusando, de alguma forma, um determinismo separado a respeito do sentido no "meio" léxico e sintático. Isso significa também a instância sobre a função decisiva do contexto da frase, contexto que é compreendido como aquele do projeto, da transcendência, do ultrapassamento. Ele retoma também visões da linguagem que têm naturalmente nossa simpatia. Tem-se sempre razão em comparar, assim, à visão frege-tarskiano da linguagem, em que os valores mesmo simplesmente denotativos das expressões linguísticas não são realmente especificáveis fora do contexto (mas Rastier diria que o contexto pertinente vai bem além da frase), e então só podem ser imaginados com base em um cálculo ascendente da verdade de maneira abstrata e convencional. Portanto, parece também que a tese sartriana tem algo de antinômico: para que, a partir do apreender de "querer dizer", pode-se regressar para os meios, é necessário que esses meios tenham alguma substância própria. Se a gente quer absolutamente constituir a determinação do sentido, a gente é então mais plausivelmente conduzida a ver como um processo circular do tipo ciclo de Schleiermacher, isso que, ao final das contas, valida em uma certa medida o dar do léxico e da sintática. Mas essa não é nossa discussão principal. O que está em jogo, nós o temos dito, é a compreensão sartriana do nós nacional, ético, mais especificamente mesmo do nós judeu, que o exemplo retoma de maneira obsedante nessa seção, assim como, mais geralmente eu creio, no itinerário de Sartre. A "filosofia da linguagem" de Sartre mencionada agora prova que uma subestrutura técnica será sempre muito "secundária" para exprimir e fixar o pertencimento a seus olhos. Sartre apresenta na verdade os "caracteres" suscetíveis de figurar no programa de uma identidade étnica-nacional como "irrealizável a realizar". Irrealizáveis, eles são, porque eu só poderia atribuí-los a mim concedendo para mim mesmo a capacidade do objeto, ora, como existencialidade, eu não posso jamais (eu 193 sou condenado, lembramos, a não ser o que eu sou). Portanto, eles estão a realizar, porque eles se propõem à minha assunção. (...) para que eles tenham, com efeito, o caractere de irrealizável, é necessário que eles se desvendam a luminosidade de algum projeto "a realizar". E isso é bem, com efeito, o que nós notamos agora a pouco, quando nós mostramos o para si assumindo seu ser-para-outro em e pelo ato mesmo que reconhece a existência do outro. Correlativamente, então, a esse projeto assunção, os irrealizáveis se desvelam como "a realizar". De início, com efeito, a assunção se faz na perspectiva de meu projeto fundamental: eu não me limito a receber passivamente a significação "feiura", "enfermidade", "raça", etc., mas, ao contrário, eu só posso apreender esses caracteres – ao simples título da significação – à luz dos meus fins próprios. É isso que se exprime, mas superando completamente os termos – quando se diz que o fato do ser de uma certa raça pode determinar uma reação de orgulho ou um complexo de inferioridade. De fato, a raça, a enfermidade, a feiura só podem aparecer nos limites de minha própria escolha de inferioridade ou de orgulho; de uma outra maneira se diz, elas só podem aparecer com uma significação que minha liberdade dela confere; isso significa, uma vez mais, que elas são para o outro, mas que elas só podem ser, para mim, se eu as escolher. Essa descrição é aquela de um circuito de imperatividade, que faz passar da condição do nós-objeto à restauração da subjetividade em uma assunção, que permanece oferecida ao outro. A locução "a realizar" diz esta imperatividade, mas Sartre concorda com os próprios termos um pouco mais longe. Observar-se-á ainda que o imperativo tem para ele esse curioso estatuto de ser necessariamente vazio: é meu projeto de assunção que o funde e que escolhe livremente isso que se encontra realizado, então o irrealizável em seu imperativo parece não pré-traçar nulamente a realização assunção que o responde, tudo se passa mesmo como se o imperativo respondesse mais à assunção que o inverso, dele estando como um eco estrutural: "Um a priori que requer meu engajamento para ser, tudo só dependendo desse engajamento e se colocando logo para além de toda tentativa para o realizar, que é então, senão precisamente um imperativo?"xxv. A aprioricidade do imperativo é aqui somente formal, não se pode melhor dizer. Aplicado ao ser-judeu, essa descrição beira o essencial nele voltando as costas: o irrealizável a realizar a condição judeu, isso são os mitsvot, e não o orgulho judeu reativo, claramente subentendido nas citações precedentes. Mas os mitsvot são um conteúdo que se endereça, e sem uma chamada vazia da qual meu projeto conferiria, 194 a cada vez, o seu sentido que lhe convém. Entre o nós-objeto transmitindo sua chamada vazia sob o rosto de uma objetivação sempre inaceitável e o projeto de assunção realizando o irrealizável a sua giza, falta em Sartre o lugar de uma possível inscrição da demanda endereçada a um coletivo: em sua teoria, esse lugar poderia ser aquele do nós-sujeito, caracterizada por uma técnica, uma convenção, uma semiótica, mas nós temos visto que Sartre não utiliza até o final essa possibilidade. A confrontação com Levinas que se impõe, aqui, é aquela que mobiliza o curto artigo "Ser judeu", onde Levinas expõe a identidade judaica sobre um terreno que é um pouco anterior ao terreno sartriano. Nesse texto, Levinas descreve o homem não-judeu como, no final das contas, sempre desprovido de passado. O que é esse homem, com efeito, é o que ele faz, é o ultrapassamento de todo dado de si perpetuamente à obra nele: Levinas pega emprestado de Sartre e de sua linguagem da existencialidade os termos adequados à descrição do homem não-judeu. Depois de ter visitado os conceitos de O ser e o nada, nós compreendemos a reação de Levinas: nada do que é encontrado pelo homem antes dele existir, que isso seja o mundo em sua facticidade ou a intersubjetividade em suas sedimentações e suas técnicas não "conta" verdadeiramente, porque tudo pega sempre para mim o sentido do ultrapassamento do que eu dele sou. Mesmo o lado da oposição inclusive em meu pro-jeto e que eu nomeie minha situação, enquanto ela me "resiste", é a priori relativizada à intenção ou à colocação que eu dele existo. Ora o homem judeu, segundo Levinas, é aquele que é assegurado por um passado de uma consistência superior. Mas para Levinas, esse fato que ele tem realmente um passado, e a gente o compreende sem dificuldade que é necessário, para ter realmente um passado e realmente um próximo, não igualar a priori toda situação à minha projeção dela. Ser judeu, é então ter que conhecer um imperativo que não é o da objetivação indevida dos Judeus sobre o modo de nós-objeto – historicamente evocado por Sartre sob o rosto do antissemitismo – mas que é, em substância, o que o nós-sujeito exerce no lugar dele mesmo. Isso que eu recebo do nós-sujeito, nesse sentido, não é somente uma forma canalizada de meu projeto, um pré-traçado de projeto, mas também uma, das matrizes de atribuição de sentido aos atos, das sugestões endereçadas ao pessoal e ao singular de eu-mesmo para projetar minhas situações seguintes uma certa cor. A ideia de um nós-sujeito que se trama ao nível de legado e interpretação do sentido antes pelo sentido da imposição arbitrária e impessoal das formas técnicas não parece vir de Sartre. Compreende-se então como 195 e porque ele só pode permanecer, em sua abordagem do fato judeu, à margem do que se trata. Portanto, a tradição judaica em geral e Levinas em particular convergem nessa opção em favor da visão do homem como absoluta contingência da liberdade, não é necessário cessar de o ver depois de ter assinalado o ponto cego que vem do ser designado. O homem "pego" na imperatividade ética de Levinas, o Judeu "pego" na imperatividade tradicional de Levinas não é um outro que o para si sempre infinitamente leve de toda situação sua, jamais suscetível de grudar-se em nenhum modo do em si – malgrado que dele tem – de Sartre. Outrem me requer irrecusavelmente e infinitamente na relação ética, ensina Levinas, mas eu sujeito humano eu sou possivelmente Caim, a experiência onde eu aprendo meu assujeitamento é aquela onde eu descubro minha faculdade de negligenciar, abandonar, matar outrem, de zerá-lo devido à minha aventura de "força que vai", cujo eu sou obcecado. A tradição judaica requer o Judeu, e o intima para o comando de uma vida que o repassa pela elaboração milenar do sentido do mundo humano cujos Judeus foram os artesãos e os guardiões, mas os Judeus não permanecendo pelo menos aqueles que podem passar para além de, não sabem dessa demanda ou a ela são absolutamente surdos e indiferentes. Certos midrashim que nós entendemos como antissemitas dizem que a lei foi dada a esse povo porque ele era particularmente rebelde a todo jugo. Eu compreendo melhor sua lição assim: qualquer que seja o encadeamento prático da via e da função de dar sentido às situações que se possa conceber e que possa se estabelecer, nós devemos saber que ela se endereça a uma existencialidade vivente absolutamente rebelde, a um tipo de loucura de negatividade que é o coração da liberdade humana. Levinas e a tradição judaica conhecem então o homem como negador, esse rebelde, esse irresponsável, que tende a desgarrar de todo limite e a reconsiderar tudo o que ele chega segundo a vista ofertada por isso que ele enfatiza. Em Sartre, essa visão conduz a considerar o homem como um tipo de "suplemento ao ser". A última questão que eu quero colocar é a que concerne ao tema levinasiano além do ser: há, quanto a ele, uma convergência entre Sartre e Levinas? Sartre e l'autrement qu'être 196 O ser e o nada se dá por si mesmo como um "ensaio de ontologia fenomenológico". E nós tivemos, ao coração de sublinhar, nisso que precede, que uma tal opção conduz Sartre a não preservar o "solipsismo metodológico" husserliano: na apresentação da experiência originária do outrem, por exemplo, o para si e o outrem estão em uma verdadeira relação de ser, o segundo não se contenta em aparecer ao primeiro para que este lhe confira um sentido de ser. Em tais condições, como poderíamos reconhecer alguma coisa de l'autrement qu'être? A pesquisa sartriana se inscreve de repente na perspectiva de uma totalização ontológica coerente, ela parece dar as costas ao "frisson levinasiano". As coisas, no entanto, me parecem menos unívocas do que eu venho a dizer. Uma primeira razão disso é que a tematização ontológica do para si aplicada desde o início de O ser e o nada não está no fim das contas se estranhando ao solipsismo "epistemológico" de Husserl. O para si é apresentado como "esse" pelo qual a negatividade vem a um mundo inteiramente positivo. Segundo a perspectiva do em si, tudo isso que é é, em terceira pessoa e em uma fixação peremptórica. É mesmo impossível que o que quer que isso seja se distinga e se oponha ao que quer que seja a esse nível. O para si, a realidade humana, introduzem no ser, tudo ao mesmo tempo, a negação e a profundidade. Isso porque o para si nega a todo estado que o cosmo ontológico, em seu conjunto, tome o valor profundo de um espetáculo. Mas essa negatividade radical concerne também isso que deixa extrair da realidade humana e que seria levado a sério como em si: notadamente, toda a dimensão biológica ou psicológica "objetivável" do homem cai de lado do em si, Sartre colocado na ocorrência do extremismo até contar como objetivação petrificada a objetivação literária ela mesma (ele recusa a realidade psicológica de Proust). O para si aparece assim como uma infinitamente magra, frágil ponta de ser, todavia sobre ela todo o fardo de negatividade e autoexcluída por seu gesto negativo infinito de todo compreensível qualquer que ele seja. Estando bem entendido que o ser, para valer como tal, para acender ao nível de ser tal ou tal, de ser averiguado, necessita do pincel negativador proveniente do centro insituável que é o para si. Como responsável universal de toda negatividade, o para si coloca igualmente o como tal do ser. Ele é então colocado por Sartre como um suplemento ao ser, banido por princípio de cada um de seus distritos, quase igual ao não-ser por esse motivo, salvo 197 que ele concentra sobre si o ser do não, e salvo que todo o ser, em falta de passar para a operação negativa única e decisiva desse não, permaneceria órfão de seu como tal, e então, em um sentido, absorveria em insignificância. Reconhece-se então, ao fundo, o solipsismo do ego transcendental e sua responsabilidade epistemológica universal, salvo que, em Sartre, essa relação epistemológica é tida em vista como relação no ser de um suplemento negativo a tudo com esse tudo, que trata no ser a negação a seu respeito. Do mesmo modo, pode-se dizer, como historiador da filosofia, que Sartre sobrepõe Hegel em Husserl, reconstituindo a função solipsista do ego, procedendo em Husserl da epoché, como a função negativa originária instituindo a possível dinâmica do ser, o salvando da insignificância parmenidiana. A questão que nós podemos e devemos nos colocar é então a seguinte: esse para si suplementar é filosoficamente tão diferente do autrement qu'être levinasiano? Eu gostaria, para tentar dar alguns elementos de resposta a essa questão, me apoiar sobre a conclusão de O ser e o nada, intitulado "Em si e para si: esboços metafísicos"xxvi. Nesse texto, com efeito, Sartre coloca ao fundo o problema da relação de seu pensamento com a ideia de autrement qu'être, embora, evidentemente, em razão da ausência de explicitação desse último motivo, só pudesse o fazer de maneira a ele mesmo (e a nós) disfarçada. Para ele, o problema é o da ameaça que pesa sobre a unidade do ser: poder-se-ia, ainda que a distinção colocada anteriormente entre o para si e o em si, enquanto distinção entre dois regimes de ser, arruinar a velha e fundamental "analogia de ser", que assegura que o ser se relaciona da mesma maneira a cada um dos grandes gêneros que o cartografariam: Nós nos perguntamos então se a descoberta de seus dois tipos de Ser não objetivava a estabelecer um hiato cindindo o Ser, como categoria geral pertencida a todos os existentes, em duas regiões incomunicáveis e em alguma das quais a noção de Ser devia estar presa em uma acepção original e singularxxvii. Shalom Rosembergxxviii traça uma filiação de Maïmonide a Levinas a partir da ideia de uma tal ruptura de analogia do Ser: ele observa que, em A guia do Extravio, Maïmonide, embora ele identifique o tetragrama como nome de ser necessário, isso 198 que parece repatriar o que nomeia esse nome no campo ontológico, insiste ao mesmo tempo sobre a ideia que o Ser só se diz de maneira homônima de estados ordinários e desse nomeado exorbitante. Shalom Rosenberg julga então que a possibilidade do pensamento do autrement qu'être é para assim dizer aberto pela declaração desse homônimo, para quebra da analogia do Ser: porque, o que tem o poder de quebrar a analogia do Ser contravém a seu sentido englobante em tal guisa que parece destacar um outro horizonte. Nós teríamos então uma primeira razão, formal de algum tipo, para reatar a filosofia sartriana ao tema do autrement qu'être. Poderia, aliás, acrescentar, para dar a essa primeira observação mais peso, que Heidegger, no conjunto de sua meditação sobre o sentido do Ser – sempre imanente à época de seu retiro/sua doação – não parece, jamais, de seu lado, questionar a analogia do Ser: por além das épocas e dos sentidos, não é necessário dizer que, nele, o Ser permanece o deus exmachina de toda audição sempre no mesmo sentido? Mas voltemos a Sartre. Há uma segunda forma de descobrir uma nota levinasiana nele. É mesmo a mais evidente para uma leitura normalmente "ao primeiro grau". Escutemos com efeito Sartre em nossa passagem: "O para si, com efeito, não é outra coisa que a pura nadificação do em si; ele é como um buraco de Ser no seio do Ser"xxix. "Ser outro que o ser, é ser consciente (de) si em unidade ek-stases temporalizantes"xxx. De tais citações nos provam que Sartre pode, em substância, conceber o para si como destacado de autrement qu'être: isso, embora muito mais, aqui "provém" em seu sentido da desfalecia do ser (é como buraco de Ser que o para si é outro que o ser). Se entende mesmo a tese mais forte que o autrement qu'être só poderia ser consciência: isso que parece, de repente, uma refutação de Levinas. Entretanto esse último, eventualmente concedia sua tese a Sartre, destacando: se autrement qu'être viesse a ser, ele seria consciência. Esse começo de marcação de uma convergência entre Sartre e Levinas pode ainda ser prolongado em um terceiro ponto. Discutindo a fulminante cisão do Ser em si e para si, Sartre avança que o ser mais verdadeiro que o em si e que o para si enquanto sua totalização é já conhecido da ontologia e da metafísica: ele é o ens causa sui, o ser causa de si atribuído à divindade. É aliás, em referência a essa ens causa sui que se "compreende" a emergência do para si "a partir" do em si: o para si 199 é o em si que quer ser causa de si. Mas, de uma parte, como a concepção de ser causa de si envolve o recuo da consciência, necessário ao pensamento que o ser se funda ele mesmo, essa explicação do para si como sintoma do projeto de autofundação de ser não é verdadeiramente uma, ela pressupõe o para si, ela descreve no máximo como o pensamento geral da individuação ontológica (a metafísica, segundo a definição sartriana) compreende a "derivação" do em si. E, de outro lado, a totalidade do em si-para si, totalidade do ens causa sui para a qual o ser tende através do para si, e constitutivamente perdida ou impossível: justamente, o projeto dessa totalização "confessa" que o em si deveria ser originariamente consciência para se ser fundado, para ter quisto se fundar e ser-se fundado, o que não é o caso, que não é a situação. Essa reflexão conduz Sartre à descrição seguinte: É somente se fazendo para-si que o ser poderia aspirar ao ser causa de si. A consciência como nadificação de ser aparece então como um estado de uma progressão para a imanência de uma causalidade, ou seja, para o ser causa de si. Somente a progressão cessa aí por consequência de insuficiência de ser do para si. A temporalização da consciência não é um progresso ascendente para a dignidade da "causa sui", é um desmoronamento de superfície cuja origem é, ao contrário, a impossibilidade de ser causa de si. Assim o ens causa soi permanece como o faltado, a indicação de um ultrapassamento impossível em altura que condiciona, por sua não-existência mesma, o movimento plano da consciência; assim a atração vertical que a lua exerce sobre o oceano tem com efeito o deslocamento horizontal que é a maréxxxi. Nessa passagem exemplar, nós poderemos jogar o jogo de reencontrar todos os termos de uma outra história, levinasiano dessa vez: aquele que reconta que o autrement qu'être ou ainda a bondade, para usar de um nome dado na obra Autrement qu'être, falta de ser, "desvia" o sujeito dela para voltar-lhe a outrem, ou ainda tolera e quer que a demanda anárquica anacrônica inaugurando o eu como responsabilidade se assume unicamente como minha dedicação ou minha devotação ao outrem, como minha condição de garantia inteiramente indexada sobre outrem. O "vertical" eventual de uma relação direta com a bondade se encontra assim ludibriada ou conjurada, para ser "convertida" ou "reconduzida" ao horizontal assujeitamento a outrem. Constatar-se-ia então a mesma rasura da flechada teológica, e o mesmo 200 deslocamento de sua força e de seu sentido sobre o plano de um tornar humano, aquele da liberdade em um caso, aquele da obrigação ética do outro. Não é então contestável que o dispositivo ontológico-metafísico de O ser e o nada ligue-se de fortes e numerosas relações formais ou essenciais com o pensamento de Levinas, fosse isso, aquele do autrement qu'être, que lhe parece, portanto a priori absolutamente próprio em toda a história da filosofia, e que Levinas, aliás, apresenta com tanto respeito como a conversão absoluta, como a coisa judaica "jogada" por ele no elemento grego da filosofia. Isso que permanece a fazer, uma vez recenseados os elementos de convergência, é explicar não obstante como a perspectiva sartriana e a levinasiana permanecem infinitamente distantes em um tal encontro, ou seja ainda, explicar em que Sartre não se engaja verdadeiramente no motivo do autrement qu'être: isso não é, não obstante, da mesma maneira que Heidegger por exemplo, em que há uma explicitação da diferença, da singularidade mesma que deve ser dada em cada caso, e que nós devemos produzir aqui de importância primordial para nós, para deixar claro o que nós devemos à Sartre como também à Levinas. Desse ponto de vista, três observações me parecem necessárias: 1) A visão do para si como suplemento "ontologicamente infinitesimal" conferindo o como tal ao ser permanece diferente à perspectiva do autrement qu'être, bem entendido, na medida onde a relação do para si do ser é marcado em termos lógico-predicativos, que se seja quando essa relação é descrita como negação ou quando ela é descrita como contribuição do como tal (o atributo do complemento do objeto é ainda um atributo). O que é, portanto profundamente homólogo à "visão desde o autrement qu'être" é o pensamento que o ser, sem a profundidade da negação "como tal-isante", é cercado em uma estupidez inerte absoluta, do tipo que não tem mesmo qualidade e estrutura "interna". O pensamento da insignificância do ser em Sartre me parece retornar ao pensamento de neutralidade em Levinas. 2) A quebra da analogia do ser é real em Sartre, ainda que ele tente se desculpar ou se salvar no texto conclusivo que nós viemos a comentar e resumir. Em Heidegger, o estado não se diz no mesmo sentido segundo o qual ele é a realidade ou a existência "de partida", mas toda sua construção filosófica reestabelece a analogia, que se estabelece no final das contas entre a transcendência do Seinund Zeite a abertura do spater Heidegger, mostrando o sendo da realidade como sempre tomado no ek-stático que o Dasein, em tal sorte que o pensamento do ek-stático 201 reestabelece a analogia do Ser. Em Sartre, a cisão do em si e do para si não é feita para uma tal reconciliação. A "síntese proposta" é uma síntese perdida sob os auspícios de um ser pleno (ens causa sui) que não se produz. Mais precisamente, para visar esse ens causa sui que restabeleceria em/para ele a homologia do ser, o em si é obrigado a "cair" no buraco do ser, na fragilidade superficial da infinitesidade subjetiva, situação na qual todo poder de fundação é perdido para ele. O balanço é, portanto, que a analogia permanece quebrada, que ela só pode ter outro estatuto o de tema nostálgico para o para si. É também um motivo de encontro forte entre Sartre e Levinas. 3) Mas a convergência no esquema ternário, o qual a revogação da transcendência consagrando o sujeito à horizontalidade, é enganadora. A revogação concerne, em Sartre, um querer do ser, porque o em si busca sobre-ser em se fundando ele mesmo que tende ao ens cause sui que se revoga, em substância, com todas as contradições performativas que essa frase contém (o em si não pode buscar a sem ser já para si, o ens causa sui não se revoga porque ele não é, o que é para si quem faz a experiência de sua desfalência conforme esse motivo conciliador). Em outros termos, a "condição horizontal", em Sartre, é aquela de um para si em busca do ser. A dinâmica, a história, ao mesmo tempo, são compreendidas em termos da nostalgia radicalmente ontológica do para si. Em contraposição, em Levinas, a referência à horizontalidade em autrement qu'être como motivo: é porque o transcendente da bondade, porque a illéité [imobilidade] não podem ser, se a gente a quer, que o motivo de autrement qu'être nos consagra ao horizontal do outro (a um estado em um desafio que excede o ser). Toda ideia de horizontalidade é então aquela do divórcio com intenção ontológica, aquele que em seus escritos Levinas nomeia de conatusessendi ou interesse. Para essas três observações, eu termino com minha tentativa de comparação e de confrontação dos dois autores a partir de uma leitura de O ser e o nada. Eu venho agora a um propósito mais distante dos textos, e onde eu teria a oportunidade de cruzar o que precede com a forma que eu sinto a situação filosófica contemporânea. Eu vou agora colocar a questão do que Levinas e Sartre trazem, respectivamente, a quem deseja hoje restaurar a corrente idealista na filosofia. O idealismo hoje 202 Meu sentimento com efeito é que nossa paisagem filosófica francesa é profundamente marcada, ao menos desde depois da segunda guerra, por uma vontade obstinada de ruptura com o idealismo. O idealismo, pensa-se, dominou nosso país, seja com a escola kantiana vigorando antes de 1914 e culminando com Brunschvicg, seja com o espiritualismo cristão, que Bergson aparece como o nome mais glorioso. Os filósofos franceses sentiram, eu penso, esse idealismo e esse espiritualismo como profundamente enganador, como não conseguindo a nos fazer crer que ele defenda algo diferente da ordem hierárquica ou da ilusão teológica. Desse ponto de vista, o absurdo sanguinário da primeira guerra e o vergonhoso fracasso da segunda contam para muitas das desqualificações do pensamento cujo se julga que elas estavam sem prezo sobre as urgências do tempo. Para se salvar a eles mesmos de suas infelizes propensões idealista e espiritualista, os filósofos franceses voltaramse para a fenomenologia de um lado, para o marxismo do outro. A fenomenologia estando então de início observada como uma demarcação reestabelecida com a humildade do pensamento, buscando a nada se dar ao que excede a experiência; e o marxismo como, por excelência, o discurso que reafirma o privilégio do plano material, prático, econômico ao final das contas, para a construção de toda inteligibilidade. Um e outro, o marxismo tendo por muito tempo usufruído de uma ampla superioridade, mas a fenomenologia conquistando finalmente sobre o longo termo, deram então lugar às elaborações filosóficas onde se tentava antes tudo desiludir-se de toda restauração de Deus ou da ideia (platônica ou kantiana). O anti-subjetivismo e a celebração da linguagem como elemento incontornável englobado teve as etapas mais recentes desse desencantamento voluntário: o sujeito foi analisado como a recorrência nefasta de Deus, e a linguagem escolhida como a alternativa à ideia, como esse campo de doação e de operação que integra tudo isso sobre o que o idealismo histórico tocou, mas que ele convinha agora de observar como sintoma de nossa facticidade, nossa finitude. É notável que outras opções filosóficas além do marxismo e da fenomenologia partilharam a meta-orientação anti-idealista que nós acabamos de evocar: o "estruturalismo" dos anos sessenta-setenta, retomam em parte a palavra da ordem cavaillesiana de uma filosofia do conceito, ou a filosofia analítica cativada mais tarde por nós em um lugar correspondente em sua importância mundial não foi nada menos defendida contra Deus, a ideia, o sujeito, a consciência, não são menos contraposta, de toda a força inovadora que era a eles, a todo idealismo. 203 Eu não quero dissimular, eu tenho tendência a achar que esse prejulgamento, hoje, é um impedimentum [obstáculo].Acredita-se que muitas das grandes e belas iniciativas foram favorecidas por ele, que conduziam os autores a se interessar ao que era altamente apaixonante e que eles falharam senão – como as patologias cerebrais, as regularidades sociais do gosto, a analogia do espírito com o computador ou o circuito extático da existência – mas eu temo que hoje o mesmo fundamento "ideológico" pode nos fazer permanecer muitas coisas – a irredutibilidade do contínuo, a idealidade do objeto informático-construtivo, a profundidade nãoempírica da linguagem por exemplo –de modo que o desejo de ir adiante de pensar seguindo a dupla linha da invenção e da proximidade com a reconfiguração permanente do real, nos pede antes recompreender a bem fundada orientação idealista: no plano mais geral, o mais etéreo da disputa conceitual radical, a causa anti-idealista não tem outro lugar, jamais ganhou por nenhuma prosa argumentada, os promotores de nossa razão programaticamente "materialista" o sabem bem, e melhor que nós hoje. Sartre e Levinas, todos os dois, me parecem ser de algum modo os autores pelos quais a "resistência idealista" transitou durante a época fortemente pouco favorável que eu acabo de evocar e de descrever sumariamente. Sartre conheceu por esse motivo trinta anos de declínio ou de ocultação: os autores da vaga "estruturalista" colocaram em cena como enganchada à consciência, a práxis ou a história, como "contínua" e como incapaz de compreender o joguete de campeões gramaticais que nós fomos. Tudo isso regressava, eu acredito, ao estigmatizar como "ainda idealista", como reclamando que se compreende o homem a partir de um princípio de antifactualidade radical. Levinas, depois de ter aproveitado da moda de um "pensamento da alteridade" de início percebida como a vanguarda do anti-idealismo, cantando a desapropriação do homem e sua miséria ao olhar de toda infinidade, se vê de bom grado denunciando hoje como autor edificante, fazendo valer a papa do coração no lugar e sítio do pensamento rigoroso, ou bem participando de uma involução teológica da fenomenologia, a condutora a abandonar o princípio da experiênciaxxxii. Tentemos, depois desse propósito de contextualização, comparar nos dois autores, nos lembrando disso que vem a ser dito, sob a relação da reabilitação do idealismo. Que nos trazem de forte e de convincente que pode ser oposto ou préjulgado ao redor? Em qual medida, de início, assumem ser contracorrente nesse sentido? 204 A resposta a essa segunda questão, para começar, deveria ser ponderada: me parece que Sartre buscou amplamente dar garantia ao materialismo marxista, e mesmo, em um segundo tempo, a reconhecer alguma coisa do novo nome do qual a finitude humana se verificava, a estrutura. Ele nadou antes, não sem um certo desconforto pode ser, com a corrente antiteológica anti-idealista. É sobretudo claro a questão do sujeito que sua filosofia resistiu. Se F. Worms tem razão, Satre é aquele que, no momento de 1940 a filosofia francesa, centrada sobre um problema "necessidade ou contingência" que era novo porque ele não acontecia sobre a pressuposição de uma substância metafísica como na época clássica, escolhe a contingência radical. Ainda mais, essa contingência é identificada com a figura do sujeito. O sujeito mantém então uma posição inexpugnável e preenche uma função insubstituível, ele é a única base possível da contingência, sem ser propriamente chamado de base, pois ele só é o é pela forma da negação, originariamente amarrada a ele mesmo nele mesmo. Mas esse sujeito não é puramente acabado, não é puramente factual, empírico, ele envolve alguma coisa da temática idealista: para nos dele manter em um ponto essencial, o sujeito é o qual pelo qual (para quem) o sentido da totalidade vem. O Ser, no estado de em si, falta a esse ponto faculdade relacional e predicativa que ele não diz mesmo valer como o todo de si (ele não tem si). A relação da totalidade do para si é aquela da totalidade-destotalizada, como se diz, mas essa descrição que avaliza o limite da finitude não pode nos fazer esquecer a abertura infinita que foi assumida. De outro lado, o sujeito escapa à empiricidade porque ele escapa a toda facticidade, não sendo isso que ele é e sendo o que ele não é: em razão da universalidade desse escapado, nós reencontramos a abertura infinita, a referência implícita à ideia enquanto isso que não coincide com nenhuma instância. Pode-se acrescentar que Sartre arriscou fazer entrar Deus na economia do pensamento comum. O desenvolvimento final sobre ens causa sui em O ser e o nada, que nós viemos restituir, não é outra coisa que uma definição da existencialidade humana, e mesmo de seu sentido no seio da fresca ontologia, pela nostalgia de Deus. O home é assim interpretado, de qualquer modo, como o signo de inexistência de Deus, e é dessa forma que Sartre nos faz ascender à sua liberdade, à essa prisão do buraco do ser que ele se faz constantemente. Sartre utiliza então o conceito de Deus, o conceito da metafísica clássica, como um operador de compreensão, cessando implicitamente de crer que uma "boa" discussão racional "laica" aberta deve se interdizer expressamente toda menção, todo uso como busca da temática teológica. 205 Isso já é muito. Mas se poderia acrescentar mais coisas. Eu expliquei por alto, por exemplo, como o pensamento do nós sujeito, em Sartre, coloca em evidência o papel de um tipo de idealidade técnica constitutiva a respeito do nós no qual o Eu pode se projetar como ator, apontando a proximidade com Stiegler. Eu suspeito que um estudo paciente encontraria, em Sartre, três numerosos usos da "razão idealista" ao final da compreensão final e fiel do domínio humano. Como avaliar, em comparação a contribuição de Levinas? Ela é, eu creio, considerável. Eu a direi em três rubricas: o sujeito, a ideia, Deus. Sobre o sujeito, Levinas tem logo de início mostrado, nos seus primeiros escritos do autor, e particularmente em Da existência ao existente, que a concepção "clássica" da subjetividade como interioridade cortada do mundo podia ser reencontrada e relegitimada no sentido do léxico e da atitude fenomenológicas novas trazidas por Heidegger, em uma problemática da existência em substância. O fato de deixar de lado o fluxo da consciência como campo fenomenal, para se interessar aos gestos ou momentos fundamentais que compõe a "situação" da existência, não nos força a interpretar esta última essencialmente como projeção, transcendência. Descrevendo a tenebrosa indiferença, o burburinho insignificante do ele tem, depois ahypostase [o que foi situado abaixo] subjetiva, seu aprisionamento e seu escape, são dobra característica para a base, ou experiências como o cansaço e a insônia, que testemunha de alguma forma o "malgrésoi" do ser-ao-mundo, muito largamente desconhecido na ótica heideggeriana. Em breve, Levinas vem dar um sentido sobre o terreno heideggeriano à interioridade subjetiva. Uma tal interioridade, formalmente descrita como anel em O tempo e o outro – mas é necessário ao mesmo tempo compreender o sentido desse anel para relacionar a neutralidade do ser ao presente – é uma peça necessária do grande pensamento da exterioridade que desenvolve em Totalidade e o infinito, como ele chama seu subtítulo. É somente ao "sujeito ateu", organizado para não contar com nada, a não ser contando para si, autossuficiente para a graça da habitação do mundo sob a forma do viver de, que pode chegar à acusação ética. Nota extraordinária se compreende sobre o fundo desse ordinário, e a gente não teria nada compreendido daquilo que há de não edificante em Levinas se a gente esquece seu pensamento mais desenganado que aquele de La Rochefoucauld, porque se abstendo da ironia condenadora, do egoísmo como essência da humanidade. Mas o egoísmo, essa é a subjetividade, essa famosa 206 subjetividade cujos nossos denegridores modernos querem nos dar a honra, como se ela não fosse um partidário e um culminado não dispensável do pensamento, para o que quer verdadeiramente compreender. Em relação à ideia, Levinas revisitou os três grandes autores do idealismo no sentido onde ele é defendido aqui, a saber Platão, Descartes e Kant. Ele vê neles, por detrás a afirmação da ideia, a escolha de reivindicar um para além como outra coisa que conta mais que a aproximação da compreensão, para o sentido. O bem para além da essência de Platão é o sol, fundo de toda ideia, que dá o inteligível ao inteligente. O real se compreende em termos de protótipos jamais identificáveis a suas instâncias no plano ôntico, e seus protótipos unificante em algum tipo de um para-além de todos esses para-além que ordenam a moralidade ao mesmo tempo que esclarece todo conteúdo como o pensamento pode o elaborar. É em todo caso assim que Levinas entende Platão. A ideia de infinito é em Descartes a experiência subjetiva do para-além da subjetividade, do tormento do pensamento conhecido no registro teórico sob a figura do infinito matemático (em as Meditações metafísicas, ele se situa de forma a tornar explícito e remarcavelmente autêntico esse infinito e sua aposta). Levinas prolonga o sentido desse infinito, compreende também sua prova como tormento da consciência moral. A ideia, termo colocado ao final da série da regressão pro-silogística segundo Kant, é também o que toma a posição diretora no registro prático, o que, em um sentido, se vê verificado pela posição da liberdade nesse campo, mas também, o que funciona como medida da razão quando ela quer ser "prática para ela mesma", ou seja, moral. Levinas reconhece em Kant a presença do deôntico sobre o ôntico em matéria moral que ele mesmo coloca adiante, ao mesmo tempo em referência à tradição judaica e ao nome de sua concepção da fundamentação da relação ética, do cara a cara com o rosto. Então Levinas procedeu de fato à coleção novamente dos "dispositivos idealistas", ele buscou apoio perto de todos aqueles que assumiram recorrer à ideia como para-além, para um conjunto de razão que ele reencontra e que ele habilita pelo menos na medida onde ele pode os retomar (ou seja, para ser honesto, esquivando a parte teórica, entretanto presente em três autores: Levinas parece não fazer caso da incontornabilidade da ideia como para-além no registro teórico, ou seja em substância do infinito linguístico e do infinito matemático). 207 No que se trata de Deus enfim, o mérito de Levinas, bem conhecido, é de ter de alguma forma desteologisado Deus. Ele reconstrói Deus como um sentido que "vem da ideia", e cujo nós precisamos absolutamente se nós queremos preservar dos outros sentidos cujo nós sabemos mais imediatamente que nós precisamos de um absoluto. O utilitarismo sendo em matéria uma formulação de superfície: se nós precisamos dele, é puramente e simplesmente, e por bem dizer unicamente, porque essas significações nos requerem. Em substância, nosso falar ético, nossa postura de avaliação moral do mundo, da história e dos eventos, mas também, de alguma forma mais anódino, todo nosso falar em termos de sentido, toda nossa forma de considerar que há em toda mensagem alguma coisa a compreender e a relançar para todo destinatário, o conjunto desses elementos na falta dos quais toda a cultura, incluindo a científica, se desmorona, estão por assim dizer garantidos sobre Deus, se a gente entende Deus como uma nominação de l'autrement qu'être nos consagrando à horizontalidade humana. Levinas inventa novos nomes filosóficos de Deus, que tomam imediatamente uma aura de nome próprio, como a bondade, a illéité [neologismo de Levinas, que remete à responsabilidade naturalmente anárquica do homem], o imemorial, a anárquica, o autrement qu'être, e o que dizem a cada vez sob uma guisa ou sob um outro isso que eu acabo de tentar exprimir: alguma coisa que não tem o estatuto de alguma coisa e que não vale como premissa para pessoa, mas que nos reenvie para as exigências que compõe o sentido para a ordem humana. Pode-se propor uma palavra comparativa, para, verdadeiramente, concluir esse artigo? Em um sentido, nem Sartre nem Levinas, a meus olhos, reabilitaram a postura idealista, nem um nem outro, mais exatamente, verdadeiramente o reativaram. Isso, pode, de início, se constatar ao nível de um efeito de recepção e de imagem sobre o qual nós temos o sentimento, pode estar errado, de ser competente do simples fato que nós pensamos, falamos e lemos hoje, mas isso pode também se dizer em termos conceituais. 1) Em tudo isso que seu pensamento teve de afinidade ao modo marxista, Sartre não cessou, entretanto, de pleitear os direitos do real, da matéria, da situação histórica mesma. Sua reivindicação da liberdade em um sentido radical e absoluta que define o para si coexiste com uma visão dessa negatividade como acrescentando somente o caractere metafísico do escolhido ou do quisto como tal a uma determinidade que se difunde desde todas as funções do em si. Mas sobretudo, a liberdade é uma contingência pura que não se apoia sobre nada, não somente sobre 208 nada que seja no sentido do em si, mas sobre nenhum conteúdo que poderia ser um conteúdo da ideia. O idealismo clama que ideias explicitáveis em seu conteúdo têm um papel decisivo nos campos teóricos, práticos e estéticos. A liberdade, em Kant, se conecta à ideia porque ela de início foi apresentada como ideia na primeira crítica. Em Sartre, a liberdade é a contingencia sem referência a uma tal "ideia", a contingência nua por assim dizer. A junção com o plano ideal se faria com a referência ao ens causa sui, mas parece representar somente o papel, nós vimos, de indicador da reconciliação impossível das guisas do ser, e não esse da chave da liberdadecontingência. Em todo caso, essa consideração não faz parte da exposição principal do para si. 2) Levinas, quanto a ele, passa por assim dizer seu ponto de vista naquilo que ele tem de recalcitrante em contrabando, sob a proteção do pensamento da alteridade. É somente porque seu sujeito e seu Deus brilha do esplendor da alteridade (como outrem e como para além do ser) que a época os tolera e os celebra. Ele exibe, entretanto, oficialmente a ideia, retomando o fio da tradição, de Platão a Kant passando por Descartes, nós vimos. Mas ele exibe somente como ideia prática, moral, ou melhor ele não ousa tirar as consequências no campo teórico, ele se contenta em afirmar, de tempos em tempos, que esse campo ele mesmo deve tudo à intriga ética por ele destacada. Aliás, ele concede ao início da Totalidade e infinito que nós desejamos "não ser tolo da moral", coincidir com a figura hegeliana da bela alma, o que me parece querer dizer: nós devemos encontrar por nossa perspectiva moralizante um apoio não ideal, uma espessura factual. E sua apresentação "fenomenológica" da moralidade em termos do encontro do rosto responde, para a época e para ele também pode ser, a essa pergunta, dando parece à moralidade a dignidade da experiência, dignidade que ela mesma, pela recepção francesa da fenomenologia, salva esta última do idealismo. Fica que tudo aquilo é ultimamente um mal-entendido, no meu sentido: o pensamento de Levinas se compreende bem melhor sob a iluminação idealista. Mas não discutimos mais esse ponto. Minha hipótese, desde o início, é que o pensamento de Levinas como o de Sartre, não pode reencontrar o idealismo sem reassumir o teórico. O teórico é o bastão do idealismo, é no campo teórico que a incontornabilidade e a operatividade do que é para além de toda instância bem que isso seja pensado – a ideia – se deixam apreender em sua pureza, e é sua consideração nesse contexto que a exportação generalizada desses temas tira sua força e sua plausibilidade. 209 Os grandes lugares do pensamento onde a necessidade da referência à ideia se faz sentir são as matemáticas e a linguagem. As matemáticas, porque o objeto que se trata nela tem o rosto da idealidade, o filósofo o mais empirista deve conceder isso de uma maneira ou de outra. A linguagem, porque as unidades de todo tamanho cujo tem comércio em seu seio exemplificam o estatuto da idealidade após a vida a mais cotidiana e a mais ordinária, e porque, claro, para-além desse "nível de base", as configurações e os valores do sentido só se compreendem em termos ideais. Como a linguagem e as matemáticas foram, desde sempre, os pontos de partida e os domínios exemplares para a construção universalizante da filosofia, é particular dela fundando de seu lado sua referência à idealidade que o idealismo pode impor sua perspectiva. O que eu entendo aqui pelo pensamento da idealidade, é, minimamente, o pensamento de tipos que são atualizados por suas instâncias, mas que se distinguem de cada uma delas, e então, nesse sentido, se abstém; e, maximamente, o pensamento temático do infinito que se liga a esse nível mínimo (ele não se trata então de uma "crença" na "existência efetiva" da ideia). Platão, Descartes e Kant, me parece, veem, sabem e dizem o papel da idealidade. Kant o fez acrescentando uma preocupação com uma restituição atenta e respeitosa da experiência humana. Mais do que nunca, o projeto de um novo kantismo levinasiano me parece exigir todos os nossos esforços. Ele é estupendo de compreender, uma vez isso feito que, com todas as dificuldades e as limitações que nós temos registrado ao fio dessa reflexão, Sartre trabalhava à sua maneira, e de constatar em particular a que ponto, em um quadro ontológico-dialético, tem por assim dizer "anunciado" toda a elaboração levinasiana. 210 ANEXO III: TRADUÇÃO DO TEXTO "Sartre, Kant e a serialidade" [título original: "Sartre, Kant et la sérialité" (SALANSKIS, 2005)] Autor: Jean-Michel Salanskis [tradução: Ana Gabriela Colantoni, Correção de sentido: Christophe Salgueiro] Esse artigo é voluntariamente geminado por seu título com "Sartre, Levinas ou o idealismo"1, no qual eu fiz o jogo de uma reflexão sobre a filosofia de Sartre: 1) limitada ao documento de O Ser e o Nada; 2) fundada sobre o emprego dos óculos levinasianos; 3) orientada sobre a aposta da "reconquista" do idealismo no seio da filosofia francesa. Desta vez eu me proponho, de maneira triplamente simétrica: 1) de ler e comentar a Crítica da Razão dialética; 2) de fazer com os óculos epistemológicos e kantianos; 3) e isso tendo em vista a questão antropológica, ou ainda o motivo da intersubjetividade. Eu retenho a noção de serialidade como a noção a esse respeito a mais interessante, a mais forte e a mais sintomática. Ainda uma vez, essa maneira de proceder arrisca ser faltosa do ponto de vista dos "estudos sartrianos": eu tenho todas as chances de não ser justo com Sartre, o avaliando a partir de uma atmosfera ou de critérios exteriores. Mas, como no caso do precedente artigo, eu faço a aposta que um certo renovamento de perspectiva poderia ser por outro lado ganhado de tal modo, e aproveitado por outros autores em estudos mais fidedignos. Eu tratarei de início da vontade sartriana em escrever uma crítica, consequência do motivo da serialidade. A Crítica da Razão dialética é uma crítica? A palavra crítica é uma das palavras a propósito da qual reina um malentendido intencional. Para nossos colegas formados na jovem tradição analítica, a palavra significa exclusivamente discurso que recusa, que demanda, que se vincula para desqualificar o discurso criticado. Por outro lado, para um ouvido continental marcado por Kant, a palavra crítica tomou um outro sentido. Submeter um campo, um conjunto de comportamentos, pensamentos ou discursos ao olhar crítico, isso significa 211 avaliar o domínio a partir de uma distância apropriada, que permite o justificar de uma maneira limitada. Genericamente, ao oriundo da crítica, o conjunto é conservado, ele se encontra mesmo legitimado, mas a operação de avaliação a favor daquele que se chegou a fundar o conjunto é correlativo da determinação de uma área de validade. Só se chega a estabelecer como legítimo o que é criticado em certos limites, de tal modo que a citação ao conjunto em razão de seus limites de validade é um gesto essencial da crítica: esse gesto é o que permanece negativo em uma operação doravante principalmente positiva, posto que é, no fundo, uma operação de legitimação. Escolhendo o título da obra que eu comento, Sartre não poupou em fazer referência kantiana, já que ele empurrou as coisas ao ponto de fazer um tipo de jogo de palavra: o título Crítica da Razão dialética substituindo pura. Melhor dizer que a referência da intenção sartriana à intenção kantiana é clara. Entretanto, é fácil perceber tudo o que, no simples enunciado de um tal empreendimento, constitui (gravemente) problema. Não é duvidoso, para começar, que a Crítica da Razão dialética não tem nenhuma intenção em recusar a razão dialética: de fato, durante todo o livro, o adjetivo dialética funciona como o mais alto cumprimento que se pode endereçar à razão, e, em particular, não se cessa de opor os olhares amplos da razão dialética aos olhares insuficientes e como tais errados da razão analítica. Crítica só pode e só deve então ser entendida em seu sentido kantiano. Mas, justamente, é ainda demais. Se a razão dialética é aquela que nos legou Hegel, a qual ele nos formou, ele está claramente fora da questão do limitar. A ideia que a gente a pode – e deve – preservar o pensamento da totalidade é tipicamente o que Hegel recusa em Kant. O modo dialético da filosofia é oficialmente um modo "holístico" que desfaz as colocações à parte, que desencrava os compartimentos, que recusa que a gente estude de um lado as estruturas subjetivas e de outro a entrada mundana, que a gente conceba a cultura como uma dimensão ontológica substrato da natural e reciprocamente, etc. Mais tecnicamente e centralmente ainda, Kant supôs, na boa ortodoxia hegeliana, ter percebido o jogo contraditório do conceito, e tê-lo nomeado corretamente dialético (transcendental), mas ter quisto a torto confinar esse jogo em um para-além da experiência que equivale à superfluidade ou à inconsistência ontológica. O pensamento dialético hegeliano 212 reestabelece o verdadeiro na matéria reconhecendo na contradição o que é mais real (o devir). Insistimos então sobre isso, para começar, que o projeto de uma crítica da razão dialética, estivesse no sentido kantiano de uma assinação limitante de sua competência, parece à primeira vista um projeto nem sequer impossível, mas insensato. Tal é bem, entretanto, eu creio, o projeto de Sartre, e de sua própria confissão. Tentamos dizer, de maneira sintética, como o que não deveria estar de pé anda apesar de tudo. A principal tese progredida por Sartre é que há um lugar da dialética, um lugar que a dialética é a alma e o modo de conhecimento preferido, e que é o lugar antropológico, entendido como lugar da prática humana. De forma kantiana, apesar de kantiana descalça, ele pensa mesmo que, conforme esse lugar, ou no contexto desse lugar, a dialética pode administrar a prova de sua pertinência, que ela pode se estabelecer no campo daquela questão como seu pensamento legítimo. Como Sartre evita então as objeções que ele não pode faltar de perceber, portando sobre o inadmissível não-holismo de um tal olhar? Em substância, se eu compreendo bem, de duas maneiras: de uma parte, Sartre sustenta que o lugar antropológico é o lugar da totalidade, que o holismo só convém a isso que "é" por essência total ou totalizante, e que é justamente o domínio prático: de outra parte, ele sustenta que a "dialética da natureza", que pretende assumir o ponto de vista totalizante ao respeito do conjunto do real, caia por existir ao mesmo tempo no pecado do dualismo e do idealismo. Para o que é o segundo ponto, o argumento é simples. Ele funda sobre a diferença entre Marx e Hegel, sobre o fato que o primeiro é suposto ter reestabelecido a dialética sobre seus pés a transpondo do contexto idealista ao contexto materialista: "Ora Marx começa por colocar que a existência material é irredutível ao conhecimento, que a práxis transborda o Saber de toda sua eficácia real"1. Mas nessas condições, a afirmação segundo a qual a dialética é a chave absoluta do movimento do Ser em geral só pode ser uma afirmação idealista não dialética, uma afirmação que não emana do movimento daquilo que é causa dela (porque isso que é causa dela é irredutível). Nos termos de Sartre: 213 Mas se o pensamento não é mais o todo, ele assistirá a seu próprio desenvolvimento como uma sucessão empírica de momentos e essa experiência o entregará à vivência como contingência e não como necessidade. Se apreenderia ela a ela mesma como processo dialético, ela só poderia garantir sua descoberta sob a forma de um simples fato. A mais forte razão, nada pode autorizar a decidir a não ser que o movimento de seu objeto se regule sobre seu próprio movimento, a não ser que ela regule seu movimento sobre aquele de seu objeto. Se com efeito o ser material, a práxis e o conhecimento são realidades irredutíveis, não é preciso recorrer à harmonia preestabelecida para conformar seus desenvolvimentos? Em outros termos: se a pesquisa da Verdade deve ser dialética em suas atitudes, como provar sem idealismo que ela reúne o movimento do Ser? [...]1? A conclusão de Sartre é que a afirmação absoluta da dialética da natureza, a afirmação englobante que interpreta o movimento do pensamento como caso particular do movimento universal da substância não pode ser dualista em um sentido bem particular, "dualista porque monista1", não pode promover um "dualismo do Ser e da Verdade1". Com efeito, no impulso dessa afirmação absoluta, o pensamento dialético cessa de poder ser apresentado como "progresso na tomada de consciência1" ou "movimento real da História se desvelando1", de tal modo que: "[...] o pensamento como portador da verdade retoma tudo o que ela perdeu ontologicamente desde o desabamento do idealismo; ele passa à ordem de Nome do Saber"1. Esse raciocínio é bem claro e bem convincente, mas, evidentemente, sua grande falha é que ele parece refutar o marxismo: aquele que se apresenta de fato como materialismo dialético. Ora lembrando o que precede, um tal sintagma aparece como um oximoro, se é verdade que a tomada de posição materialista obriga a restaurar o abismo (kantiano) separando o Ser do pensamento, ou seja a privar a dialética do direito absolutamente fundamental para ela dialetizar sua oposição. Bem evidentemente, Sartre não quer uma tal conclusão, e isso a nós nele faz escapar que deve poder o primeiro ponto, aquilo que dá à dialética o campo antropológico como campo de pertinência. A passagem me parece a seguinte: Sartre não ignora que o pensamento dialético, se ele quer ser dialético, deve abraçar a totalidade ou intervir ao nível da totalidade, deve ser holístico e considerar as oposições como universalmente interconectadas e justificáveis da dialética, nela compreende a dualidade do Ser e do 214 conhecimento que o materialismo impede de dialetizar. A saudação só pode então chegar de um domínio no qual esse holismo prevalece: Ou, para retornar à distinção de o Ser do Conhecer, há dialética se existe, ao menos em um setor ontológico, uma totalização em curso que seja imediatamente acessível a um pensamento que se totaliza sem cessar em sua compreensão mesma da totalização que ela emana e que se faz ela mesma seu objeto1. A ideia é então que a interconexão dialética de tudo é uma lei local. O lugar da dialética não pode ser aquele da totalidade, mas o pressuposto importuno residia na identificação do todo do Ser da totalidade cuja dialética precisou como campo. A totalidade não é toda, ela é ao contrário um domínio extremamente particular. De fato, a totalidade não é realmente a medida e a conveniência da dialética que sob a figura da totalização, não pode se tratar de uma totalidade já atravessada do movimento, e mesmo a práxis, uma totalidade se fazendo ou sendo feito. Enfim, para que esse campo acolha em clausura o conhecimento, é necessário que a consciência adira à totalização em curso, é necessário que o lugar da dialética integre a reflexividade (que nesse lugar o pensamento se faça seu próprio objeto). Tudo isso, a citação precedente o diz. O que resta estabelecer a Sartre, é a existência de um tal lugar, e de tal maneira que ele não seja "encontrado" como uma contingência não dialética de uma parte, que sua inteligibilidade apareça como promessa e necessária segundo a perspectiva dialética de outro lado. A demanda de Sartre, é que o lugar antropológico da dialética se revela em sua efetividade a partir de um tipo de necessidade: Mas os caracteres fundamentais da Razão dialética – se ela deve ser originalmente apreendida através das relações humanas – implicam que ela se livre da experiência apodítica em sua inteligibilidade mesma. Não se trata de constatar sua existência, mas, sem descoberta empírica, de aprovar essa existência através de sua inteligibilidade1. 215 Pode-se defender Sartre sob uma tal declaração: seja em protesto da "sua inteligibilidade" pressupondo já a existência das relações humanas, sua experiência, e que então há forçosamente um suporte empírico da revelação que ele fala; seja notando que o pedido que ele faz equivale à postulação de um argumento ontológico válido para o tema da dialética, que a existência deve decorrer do desdobramento de seu conceito em sua inteligibilidade. Mas ele nos interessa mais em compreender como se realiza na obra Crítica da Razão dialética esse caractere não inventado do domínio antropológico como lugar da dialética. E a resposta seria em meu sentido o seguinte: de um lado o domínio da vida, da consciência e das relações humanas é "fenomenologicamente" primeiro, nós não podemos jamais negar que nós partimos dele: de outro lado – mas é em um sentido a mesma coisa – Sartre enxerta toda simplesmente sua reflexão sobre aquela de o Ser e o Nada, que tinha bem descoberto a realidade humana como totalidade-destotalizada, ou seja, como totalização. Ele escreve assim, no momento de engajar sua longa "justificação" da dialética pela falta na clareza da inteligibilidade dialética do lugar antropológico, se dando de tal modo o ponto de partida o mais natural que seja: [...] não haveria mesmo um esboço de totalização parcial se o indivíduo não estivesse por si mesmo totalizando. Toda a dialética histórica repousa sobre a práxis individual enquanto aquela que é já dialética, ou seja, na medida onde a ação é por ela mesma ultrapassamento negador de uma contradição, determinação de uma totalização presente ao nome de uma totalidade futura, trabalho real e eficaz da matéria1. A ideia é então que nós somos já engajados na totalização como práxis individuais, de tal modos que a dialética é seu domínio se descobrindo em sua necessidade a partir desse ponto de partida que é às vezes o ponto de partida clássico de toda uma corrente da filosofia (o sujeito) e o ponto de partida do itinerário de Sartre (com O Ser e o Nada). Esse ponto de partida é uma vez ainda solicitado em sua função de esboço por Sartre na Crítica da Razão dialética: ele começa um caminho a partir da práxis individual, que vai o conduzir à prática-inerte depois ao grupo, depois à luta de classes, para resumir o trajeto (que, ele mesmo, só fez preludiar a verdadeira realização que seria a reconstituição da inteligibilidade da história). 216 Isso que precede nos mostra como Sartre pode pretender permanecer na inspiração dialética nela o procurando uma fiada "regional". Mas se pode ir mais longe na incorporação à Kant refletindo sobre o que Sartre entende por a falta em evidência da inteligibilidade do campo antropológico sobre o modo dialético, falta em evidência que vale ao mesmo tempo como justificação da dialética em sua pertinência enfim desvelada. Isto me conduz a examinar a maneira que Sartre cruza o debate clássico da antropologia filosófica: este da "partilha dilteliana". Sartre, me parece, retém a dialética hegeliana marxista uma teoria do sentido compatível com o primeiro jato fenomenológico de seu pensamento, e em termos do qual nós devemos compreender a longa pesquisa sobre a prática humana, social, política e histórica vindo em seguida. Pode-se começar por notar que ele toca algumas palavras do assunto ao fim da seção "Crítica da experiência crítica", quando ele trata da relação entre compreensão e intelecção. A citação seguinte carrega testemunho da referência a Dilthey: "De fato costumou-se opor a intelecção (reservada às demarcas da Razão analítica) à compreensão (que reencontrar-se-iam somente nas ciências humanas)"1. O que dele pensa Sartre já foi desvelado mais acima: "Com efeito, a compreensão não é outra que a translucidade da práxis a ela mesma, seja o que ela produz, nela se constituindo, suas próprias luzes, seja ela se reencontrando na práxis do outro"1. Mas a intelecção das ciências da natureza, para ele, não é uma. A razão analítica que enuncia uma necessidade governando dados naturais tomado sem exterioridade não devolve o real permeável à práxis racional: segundo as palavras de Sartre, ela faz melhor a prova, enunciando uma tal necessidade, de "impossibilidade de pensar a exterioridade1". Se bem que para Sartre, a compreensão é uma espécie de intelecção. De modo que quando ele escreve que ele conservará "a palavra 'compreensível' para designar toda práxis (de um indivíduo ou de um grupo) intencional1", é também a inteligibilidade que ele define. Essa concepção da compreensão ou da inteligibilidade – ligada a uma recusa da inteligibilidade psico-matemático-lógica, visivelmente – é ao fim das contas solidária de uma concepção do sentido, e é a que nós queremos chegar em nosso aparato sobre uma outra passagem. 217 Trata-se, todo simplesmente, da passagem de Questões do método onde Sartre desenvolve e argumenta o que vem do ser elevado, a saber a ligação entre compreensão e práxis. Citemos de início o anúncio de sua tese: Para apreender o sentido de uma conduta humana, é necessário dispor do que os psiquiatras e os historiadores, alemães têm nomeado "compreensão". Mas ele não se trata lá nem de um dom particular, nem de uma faculdade especial da intuição: esse conhecimento é simplesmente o movimento dialético que explica o ato por sua significação terminal a partir de suas condições de partida1. Tese que Sartre justifica amparando sobre o exemplo de um homem que vai abrir uma janela em um aposento onde ele discute com vários outros. Sartre analisa a situação insistindo sobre o ultrapassamento competente da situação que é o gesto do homem: ele traça um caminho oferecido pela espacialidade hodológica do aposento, aciona o dispositivo técnico de abertura da janela como lhe convém, me vela a mim que estou em sua companhia uma percepção de calor – que talvez eu aprovava confusamente – como sua motivação, seu sonho ele mesmo como tal ou tal (por exemplo eficiente e colocado), etc. Mas tudo aquilo só é o desdobramento do reconhecimento do agir intencional como tal. Compreende, isso é apreender sob o ângulo do projeto, da práxis, da intencionalidade ativa, e essa compreensão se declina de vez de forma progressiva (eu situo cada momento como etapa para o fim, o resultado) e regressivo (eu apreendo a ação como ação em a concebendo em termos de motivação). Esse discurso é propriamente um discurso sobre a significação em geral. Sartre prolonga o propósito comentando a maneira que o cinema utiliza a mostra de objetos residuais de uma ação para significar. Citamos ainda uma passagem bem longa: Porque nós somos homens e porque nós vivemos no mundo dos homens, do trabalho e dos conflitos, todos os objetos que nos circulam são signos. Eles indicam por eles mesmos seu modo de emprego e mascaram quase nada o projeto real daqueles que os fizeram tais por nós e que se endereçam a nós através deles; mas sua ordenação particular em tal ou tal circunstância nos evoca uma ação singular, um 218 projeto, um acontecimento. O cinema usou tanto uma ação de assim proceder que ele o transformou num clichê: mostra-se um jantar que começa e depois se corta; algumas horas mais tarde, no aposento solitário, copos derrubados; garrafas vazias, bitucas de cigarro recobrindo o chão indicam por eles mesmos que os convidados estão embriagados. Assim as significações vêm do homem e de seu projeto, mas elas se inscrevem em todos os lugares nas coisas e na ordem das coisas. Tudo, a todo instante, é sempre significante e as significações nos revelam homens e relações entre homens através das estruturas de nossa sociedade. Mas essas significações só nos aparecem na medida onde nós somos nós mesmos significantes. Nossa compreensão do outro não é jamais contemplativa: isso só é um momento de nossa práxis, uma maneira de viver, na luta ou na conivência, a relação concreta e humana que nós ligamos a ele1. Onde aparece bem que o apontamento sartriano supôs restituir razão do estatuto do signo e do efeito de sentido em geral (elevado ao universal) posto que "Tudo, a todo instante, é sempre significante"). Essa concepção do sentido envolve também a tese que "nós somos nós-mesmos significantes", e essa é aliás por onde passa notadamente a significação em geral. Essa visão é aquilo que nos esclarece o melhor sobre isso a que procede Sartre em toda a pesquisa da Crítica da Razão dialética. A exposição do domínio das relações humanas como lugar de pertinência da razão dialética não é com efeito realmente uma exposição dialética, na medida onde ela não equivale ao percurso de uma gênese, gênese que poderia se reinterpretar em seguida como aventura do conceito. Há um tipo de aparência de um tal desenrolamento, posto que Sartre parece engendrar o grupo em seguida a luta de classes em seguida a história, mas, como ele não dissimula nada, a aposta é aquela do desimpedimento da inteligibilidade. Toda a Crítica da Razão dialética entende fazer prova do sentido da região antropológica, a prova que esta região é atravessada de sentido. E segundo o critério adotado, segundo a concepção do sentido que vem a ser indicado, isso regressa a reintegrar o conjunto do que se mistura, dispersa-se e reúne-se no campo humano à "forma de inteligibilidade" da práxis humana, ou seja da práxis individual. Tal é bem o movimento constante de sua pesquisa: ele descreve, de qualquer forma mesmo a experiência comum, a documentação social ou histórica, o que se passa, as configurações e entidades que se montam, e ele se pergunta em seguida em qual medida se pode dizer, determinar, cumprir, aprovar sua inteligibilidade, ou seja repercorrer a gênese na perspectiva apenas significante da 219 práxis: é o que vale como reencontro dialético, como prova do que a razão dialética é capaz de assumir o elemento de gênese implicado. Eu acrescentarei a isso que um tal trabalho pode a meu sentido ser contado como trabalho crítico no sentido kantiano. Para se convencer, é necessário, como eu o sugiro em Sens et philosophie du sens1, considerar o criticismo kantiano como o momento filosófico onde se esboça a virada da filosofia do ser (que é a metafísica) a uma filosofia do sentido. Kant não se prende em determinar a chave conceitual do real e da verdade, do bom e da moralidade, do belo e do estético pressupondo que em cada caso há um ser estável subjacente que chega a restituir adequadamente. Ele empreende melhor, de maneira regressiva, compreender a significação para nós da ciência, da moralidade e da estética, de explicitar nossa forma de nos relacionar à alguma coisa que nós nomeamos entidade natural no modo de dizer a verdade, nossa forma de agir de acordo com as máximas de tal modo que nossos atos nos aparecem como satisfazendo à moralidade, conjugar o exercício de nossas faculdades a propósito de uma pré-sensação sensível de tal tipo que nós nos damos no direito de a ele atribuir o predicado de beleza. Sua pesquisa sobre a verdade, o justo e a beleza nas três críticas aparece então como uma pesquisa sobre o sentido do objeto natural da ciência, da moralidade ou da beleza, deslocada por relação à intenção metafísica de compreender ou capturar o ser, do bom ou do belo em si. Em particular, na Crítica da razão pura, que fixa a regra inventando o olhar crítico, prende-se a explicitar as condições de possibilidade de experiência, fundando toda determinação verídica de um objeto ao seio dessa experiência, fundando toda determinação verídica de um objeto ao seio dessa experiência. Isso volta a descrever aquela disposição coletiva de nossos poderes subjetivos "espera" os dados da sensibilidade em vista da falta em perspectiva de objetos a submeter aos predicados que a eles retornam a priori. Em outros termos, o sentido do objeto do conhecimento, que o caracteriza como tal, é de ser uma síntese do diverso sensível intuído no espaço e no tempo e alfinetado pelo conceito (na situação a priori radical, pelas categorias). A atitude kantiana institui no mesmo movimento uma noção específica do sentido: o sentido de um objeto, é a relação à seguinte a qual nós o antecipamos, o apontamos, é a qualidade perspectiva de nossa relação a ele, a flecha que vai, de nós, até e a ele. Husserl retoma de algum modo o projeto crítico o redefinido como aquele de um inventário dos sentidos de objetos: os objetos se dividem em categorias de objetos, definindo "regiões" que compartilham o mundo para nós. A cada região pode 220 ser associado um protocolo de doação dos objetos da região: é segundo certas configurações de vivências e não de outras que nós arranjamos nos fenômenos afim de apontar um objeto perceptivo, psicológico, histórico ou matemático. A noção de sentido permanece a mesma: um sentido de objeto é uma modalidade intencional, uma forma de se relacionar ao objeto mediante e em termos de nossas vivências. Husserl diz explicitamente que o sentido é o intencionado como tal: um sentido de maçã é uma maçã enquanto intenção. Então, isso seria tanto cumprir a obra crítico-transcendental, de um certo modo, quanto declinar o sentido que possuem em princípio as realidades do campo antropológico para nós, sentido ao nome do qual nós os classificamos nesse campo, e que deve ser tomado em conta quando nós buscamos a em seguida os conhecer. E, de um lado, é bem isso que faz Sartre. Ele herda do conceito husserliano de sentido, e o conserva a certos respeitos o reconvertendo à práxis: o sentido não é mais exatamente nossa flecha de intenção, mas nossa flecha de agir. A perspectiva sobre os objetos em causa que dá a ele seu sentido é aquela da ação suportando esses objetivos em vista de um resultado. A dupla agir-resultado suplanta a dupla intencionalidade-objeto. De um lado, é a terminologia husserliana que é assim confirmada, posto que em as Pesquisas lógicas, Husserl utilizava ato como sinônimo de intenção. E, embora ele recuse nessa época a leitura "acional" da vida intencional1, ele não tem dúvida que a análise intencional husserliana desdobra e descreve um tipo de proto-atividade da intenção pela qual passa o sentido de todas as coisas aos olhos da fenomenologia transcendental. Conduzindo toda coisa, toda configuração, toda formação do campo antropológico a um agir conforme ao projeto do qual essa coisa, configuração ou formação surge, Sartre não libera o sentido da região antropológica, exatamente conforme a via e a prescrição crítico-transcendental? Se nós devemos responder positivamente, isso desvelaria o livro como crítica de outra forma e mais profundamente que parece indicar o título. Crítica ao sentido da constituição de uma região e não ao sentido da limitação da razão dialética. Mas em termos kantianos, é sempre lembrando à razão o sentido dos objetos que asseguram que ele a limita e que ela a protege da metafísica: a metafísica se define como a tentativa de pensar e conhecer de forma não trivial os objetos independentemente de todos sentidos (objetos a propósito dos quais não está especificada nossa maneira de nos relacionar a eles a priori). 221 Entretanto, nossa análise é ainda insuficiente. Dois pontos produzem dificuldade, ou melhor distinguem profundamente a atitude sartriana e a atitude críticotranscendental. Primeiramente, nós passamos sob silêncio até que aqui o caractere especular do "tratamento de região" do qual se entrega Sartre. A região em causa, em efeito, é precisamente aquela da práxis: as relações humanas dão lugar à história, é exatamente o mundo que sai da práxis. Por consequência, se a questão do sentido de toda coisa é aquele de sua integração ao circuito ou ao esquema da práxis, o tratamento regional de Sartre não é nada do outro que a conexão da práxis em suas obras ao esquema ou ao circuito ele mesmo. A elucidação regional sartriana tem alguma coisa de essencialmente redundante ou especular que faz exceção à atitude crítica entendida de maneira kanti-husserliana: nessa atitude como ela tem lugar de forma canônica, um sentido é liberado que reúne sob seu governo os objetos da região em causa, e não dos elementos ressaltados dos sentidos. A conexão da práxis em suas obras ao circuito ou esquema da práxis parece corresponder a alguma coisa como a imagem do sentido disso que é doador de sentido ou da obra do sentido por excelência, de tal modo que a função "teórica" do sentido a respeito de um campo de objeto que ele reagrupa, que ele estabelece propriamente em sua unidade explorável e conhecível, se encontra pode ser impedido ou relegado ao atrasado-plano pela elucidação sartriana. Em segundo lugar, mas é evidentemente a outra face da mesma dificuldade, Sartre, a certo respeito, não declina o sentido dos objetos antropológicos, não o explicita, não busca exatamente o qualificar, como convém em uma pesquisa transcendental para a qual nada conta tanto quanto dizer em sua qualidade e sua especificidade a relação à qual fato lei para os objetos da região. Isso que faz melhor Sartre, como nós o temos lembrado, é percorrer as formações sucessivas que caracterizam o mundo sócio histórico em sua riqueza e sua complexidade, afim de mostrar a cada vez que as estruturas e entidades que intervêm são inteligíveis (e isso se faz os ligando ao circuito projetivo da práxis). Por consequência, Sartre não busca responder à questão "Qual é o sentido das configurações antropológicas?", mas sim a questão "As configurações antropológicas tem sentido?". E mesmo, essa questão deve ser compreendida unicamente na antecipação de uma resposta positiva. Sartre não cessa de mostrar que as configurações antropológicas têm sentido, são inteligíveis, reencontrando a seu propósito e elas o encaminhando da práxis, sempre 222 de início obscurecido pelo processo de alienação e da coisificação que a tendência analítica e positiva da razão é bem incapaz de conjurar, posto que ela concede o essencial que é a estabilização objetiva: pior, ela a quer, em vista de conhecer os objetos. Com a problemática e a perspectiva da alienação, a razão dialética se encontra engajada em uma tarefa que não pode ser a elucidação do sentido de uma região, porque ela quer restituir seu sentido aos elementos cujo ela trata dele os salvando da coagulação objetiva melhor que localizar uma multiplicidade objetiva sob o esclarecimento do sentido que a ele dá acesso. Tal seria então a conclusão provisória de nossa reflexão, de início centrada sobre a relação com a postura crítica de um livro que muito evidentemente chama a essa postura "contra" a postura dialética que ele entende, entretanto, não abandonar. Contudo, não iremos relançar o problema, não mais no plano metodológico, mas tomando em conta o que Sartre faz na Crítica da Razão dialética, as análises e os ensinamentos que lá se encontram de fato, independentemente da forma ou do estilo que Sartre quis os dar. E desse ponto de vista, eu serei tentado numa primeira aproximação encontrar um motivo, no livro, que faz exceção a isso que eu venho dizer: é aquele da serialidade. Pode ser, com efeito, negar que Sartre, na obra, introduz a serialidade como o que através do qual, isso para o qual nos são dadas as entidades tendo nome coletivo? Não há toda aparência que com o conteúdo conceitual da serialidade, Sartre elucida de forma qualitativa o sentido desses objetos essenciais à disciplina sociológica e às ciências sociais em geral que são as coletivas? Isso é o que então eu vou discutir na segunda parte. A serialidade: uma chave matemática? A palavra serialidade designa um certo modo de ser do coletivo, a qual são opostas muitas outras ao longo da Crítica da Razão dialética: assim o grupo em fusão ou a organização. O privilégio desse modo é que ele é o primeiro: depois da exposição da figura do prático-inerte, que coloca em jogo, certamente, o nível social já, a reconstrução inteligível de Sartre fecha a análise da práxis na perspectiva dominante do indivíduo para abordar as formações coletivas, e a primeira a ser colocada em cena é aquela que denomina a palavra serialidade. 223 À primeira vista, esse termo designa uma certa estrutura constituindo o fato coletivo como tal. Ela é originalmente apresentada a partir do exemplo do coletivo daqueles que esperam um ônibus no bulevar Saint-Germain. Sartre imagina que os viajantes "regulam" o acesso ao ônibus esperado pela tomada de números de ordem atribuindo a cada um uma fila, fixando as prioridades relativas. O coletivo serial é, em substância, aquele dos sujeitos não tendo outra relação mútua que aquela dita por sua fila. Mas Sartre generaliza a aplicação da denominação serial aos casos onde uma tal ordenação não é absolutamente dada. Assim, o coletivo daqueles que escutam um debate ou um discurso de dirigente político pela rádio é também dito serial. Observa-se no mais que Sartre pensa a serialidade realmente a partir da noção de série, ao ponto de falar também da razão da série, de recorrência serial e de fuga serial. Não se pode então evitar de pensar nas noções matemáticas de série aritmética ou geométrica. A razão é definida nesse contexto como a que governa a passagem do termo de fila n ao termo seguinte (un+1=un+r, acrescenta-se a razão; ou um+1=qun, multiplica-se pela razão). A palavra recorrência designa o processo seguinte o qual os objetos ou as verdades sobre os objetos são engendrados um seguido do outro. E a palavra fuga evoca o fato de tender para o infinito, que se associa à série como o problema genericamente colocado a seu sujeito. Como a série é uma sequência que se toma em consideração as somas parciais, esse problema de "convergência" tornase aqui aquele de saber se se pode "adicionar" a totalidade infinita dos termos. Esse último elemento autoriza, em um sentido à primeira vista metafórica, a tomar a série como noção determinando um coletivo. Eu sou grato à Emmanuel Barot pela ideia de tomar às séries essa linguagem matemática1. Em sua tese, ele analisa notadamente remontando à ideia hegeliana da falsa multiplicidade aritmética, falsa porque não conceitual: cada elemento lá é simplesmente justaposto com cada outro, fixado e imóvel em sua identidade de tal modo que nenhuma relação constituinte do que é não pode ser entretido pelo outro como um outro. A multiplicidade aritmética é privada de conceito, ela só tem pelo operador de repetição que, por definição, não exprime nada de qualitativo. Desejou-se então compreender que a serialidade é a forma de ser conjunto da humanidade segundo a qual os humanos são também tão pouco conjunto quanto os termos de uma série, ou que os números inteiros no seio da progressão aritmética originária que é N. Esse primeiro nível de sentido me parece bem apresentando e operando no pensamento de Sartre, mas é necessário ir mais longe 224 e tentar compreender o que ele vê como a recorrência no coletivo humano submisso à forma serial: uma multiplicidade serial por definição, tem sua identidade no modo de recorrência, conforme a qual ela se engendra. O caso que não é de repente ordinal é a esse respeito o mais interessante. Concentremo-nos então sobre o exemplo da escuta de um discurso político no rádio, por uma pluralidade psiquicamente discreta do ouvinte: o conjunto daqueles que recebem a mensagem não é ao mesmo tempo atravessada pela relação de reciprocidade de interlocução imediatamente disponíveis. Um elemento característico importante, e que Sartre, na sequência do livro, apresenta mais uma vez como fonte de serialidade a priori, é que o instante fundador do coletivo dos ouvintes está situado em alteridade e em transcendência, que é, de qualquer modo, o Outro que evoca os evocados. Mas a estrutura de serialidade consiste mais precisamente naquela que, para Sartre, essa função de alteridade se potencializa e se reporta no horizontal do pseudoaparecimento: ele descreve como eu posso entender o discurso por causa do ponto de vista do caminho fácil que ele vai encontrar (que ele está encontrando, de fato) para o assentimento de ouvintes não previstos, e mesmo, ir até a me dispor imaginariamente em um comportamento de refutação no seio de um diálogo com eles. A estrutura autoritária radiante desde o Outro da transmissão rádio me constitui, enquanto ouvinte, como outro relativamente a uma figura padrão do ouvinte, ou seja, em um sentido como outro de todos aqueles cujo eu sou: mais genericamente, eu sou conduzido a considerar-constituir as identidades medianas, padrão, "totalizações laterais" do ouvinte atomizado-disperso. Ou, embora eu não esteja certo que Sartre o pensa e o diga1, esse gênero de constituição intencional de meus semelhantes por mim é virtualmente iterável ao infinito: eu posso, assim, dispor-me contra o coletivo imaginado por mim como um daqueles que estão combatendo imaginariamente junto de cada ouvinte a mensagem retransmitida, e reagir como outro dessa nova figura, e assim em seguida, sem limite. Eu penso que é esse gênero de "estrutura das possibilidades" acrescentando essencialmente sobre os modos de apontamentos de cada um por cada através das totalizações consideradas "lógicas" que motiva Sartre quando ele opta para o termo de serialidade. A serialidade caracteriza então um lugar coletivo que passa pelos procedimentos "horizontais" de apontamento indefinidamente reiteráveis. A "razão" da série é sempre dessa espécie: ela reside em um poder de constituição como outro pelo eu de todos os outros (e desse fato de mim-mesmo) pelo princípio reiterável. A 225 reiteração fornece nessas condições a possibilidade de um aprofundamento e de uma complicação indefinida, de direito infinito, da trama intencional animando e atravessando o coletivo. É esse horizonte que é necessário à evocação por Sartre da fuga serial. Naturalmente, essa pintura da serialidade está ligada em Sartre a toda uma paleta de elementos que o levam a conferir um valor negativo. A recorrência interna à série – interpretada por mim em termos de reiterabilidade de um modo intencional – é assim correlata: 1) com o contexto principalmente importuno da raridade; 2) com a posição transcendente de um centro autoritário impessoal; 3) com a passividade e a impotência de toda práxis situada na série, emboscada nela; 4) com o "mal" essencial da alienação, que reside no retorno da relação de força entre a liberdade prática e a coisa aberta em favor dessa última (a serialidade me "vem" da coisa social, práxis coagulada em aplicação de autoridade). Então, não é possível, em uma atitude fiel ao movimento da filosofia de Sartre, descontextualizar a forma da serialidade, em particular esquecendo essa carga negativa. A serialidade é notadamente o que é chamado a ser ultrapassado em e pela prática constitutiva do grupo em fusão. A questão da práxis é aqui determinante: o coletivo serial é deficiente do ponto de vista do sentido, ele só lhe retoma uma inteligibilidade mutilada ou insatisfatória, porque o coletivo não tem valor como o que cada um faz ou como expressão da fusão dos princípios de inteligibilidade que são as práxis. Enquanto caracterizável por uma forma abstrata e por um conjunto de limites recebidos, não emanam do projeto como tais, ela é a figura de uma coletividade não ágil de um ser-junto não fazendo realmente sentido até o final. O que vem agora é então infiel, preparado de qualquer modo por leve força do relatório que precede. Eu gostaria: 1) enumerar algumas visões do coletivo fortemente congruentes com o motivo da serialidade, tomados em outros autores sem ter como alvo Sartre a um primeiro nível; 2) concluir que esse motivo é um bom candidato à identificação do sentido determinante da região fenomenológica do social, um resultado anexável à epistemologia intencional das ciências sociais; 3) enfim, observar que, em Sartre ele mesmo, esse ponto se verifica nisso que a serialidade não é em verdade jamais ultrapassada. Eu começo pelo primeiro ponto. Eu tenho o sentimento de ter lido pelo menos três outros textos que apresentam a trama intersubjetiva segundo o "esquema" da serialidade, ou pelo menos de maneira bem próxima. Esses textos vêm de autores 226 fortemente díspares: Brouwer, Husserl e Levinas. Se eu acrescento que na leitura proposta por Kripke do estatuto do compartilhamento da regra em Wittgenstein eu acredito reencontrar de novo a mesma forma, isso que funda suficientemente a presunção que existe na ocorrência um núcleo filosófico de mais alta importância. Brower termina por fazer dessa forma ou com esse esquema quando quis objetar a hipótese de uma intersubjetividade racional. Em sua querela com o formalismo, ele lhe interessa por rejeitar toda aproximação do objeto matemático que o faria depender de uma comunidade de espírito, garantia desse objeto ao mesmo tempo que da razão. Seu argumento é que se tinha uma intersubjetividade racional, necessitaria associar a todo par (r, s) de sujeitos uma concepção Mrs da subjetividade radical inexpugnável de s por r: essa primeira hipótese é já fortemente pouco plausível por Brouwer, ela vai bem contra a evidência da singularidade das consciências. Mas para além, era necessário assim supor que cada sujeito r é capaz de dar sentido à concepção Mstem uma nova concepção Mr (st), concepção que tematiza a apreensão por r da apreensão por s de t como fração do espírito. Não é preciso, eu penso, prosseguir. Para Brouwer, uma intersubjetividade racional autêntica envolveria necessariamente, como um tipo de riqueza ou de sentido a ele imanente, toda a profundidade engendrada por essa regressão ao infinito. Ele conclui que não há intersubjetividade racional1. A gente é evidentemente tentada a o retrucar que o simples fato de que ele teria julgado dever argumentar esse ponto o contradiz, provando que ele situou sua confiança na universalidade do argumento lógico. E, em verdade, a paixão com a qual Brouwer defendeu seus pontos de vista intuicionistas contra Hilbert durante os anos não se compreende nunca à luz de uma tal constatação derrotista. Mas aqui é um ponto da história do pensamento de Brouwer, e nós não lá chegaremos então. Husserl entra numa exposição parecida no volume que foi constituído depois dele e batizado Ideen III. No apêndice I, no parágrafo 1 (nas páginas 119-112 da edição original, e nas páginas 127-132 da tradução francesa), encontra-se um raciocínio formal suposto expor à maneira cujo acede-se fenomenologicamente às entidades humanas, conexões motivadas de corpos e de alma. O dispositivo coloca em jogo as fontes puras da fenomenalidade In – Um seguido de Ego marcados por um índice n – e conduz à notação Lm(n) designando a apreensão desde Im do corpo animando do indivíduo da posição n. A operação da apresentação consiste então na homologação do dado Lm(n) com o dado íntimo Lm(m), que eu vi como animação de 227 meu corpo Lm por minha alma Smn, alma de n fenomenologicamente imputado desde m. Eu não continuarei a descrição e o jogo da notação. Husserl deve liberar a partir dessas entidades fenomenológicas de verdadeiras entidades objetivas, compartilhadas entre os centros da consciência: um corpo Ln unidade de todos os Lm(n) quando m varia, uma alma Sn unidade de todos os Smn. Mas isso supõe, por exemplo, que desde meu posto m eu concebo as aparições Lp(n) de Ln desde o posto p como variante ao grau de circunstâncias de uma forma que se deduz variações Lm(p) do corpo ligado ao posto p por mim. Interfere então aqui, já, um jogo de três postos dos sistemas de aparição, então veja bem que ele esboça somente a complexidade virtualmente infinita do rodapé filosófico cruzado da concordância. Husserl não evoca em detalhe esse labirinto, mas ele me parece clarear que a descrição de tais níveis protocolares de sentido de trama intersubjetiva é implicitamente programada no que ele empreendeu. Enfim Levinas, em uma de suas lições talmúdicas (intitulada O Pacto), comenta uma passagem de Talmud descrevendo o "pacto" entre Deus e Israel da doação da lei, e desmultiplica o número de suas ocorrências: o pacto não teve lugar uma vez, mas ele teve lugar tantas vezes quanto há níveis de responsabilidade susceptíveis de ser inventariados e distinguidos na doação da lei. De início, há tantos dons da lei quanto indivíduos do povo presentes no momento solene da assunção em comum disto: tudo se passa como se houvesse uma decisão, um balanceamento em favor da lei e do mundo que ela quer ao nível de cada consciência, e como se cada um desses balanceamentos, em direito irredutível a cada outro, fosse uma ocorrência do pacto. Mas Levinas comenta que é necessário também contar com as responsabilidades mais profundas ligadas à situação face a face generalizada que é aquela do povo nesse momento solene: cada um balança sob o olhar de cada outro, e é uma qualidade de ocorrência do pacto que o indivíduo p o amarre sob o olhar do indivíduo q. A esse confronto se associa um modo e uma qualidade de responsabilidade absolutamente especifica, faz parte de minha aceitação da lei se eu sou p que eu o ajude a consentir sob o olhar de q, ou bem faz parte da responsabilidade de q que ele é responsável da responsabilidade que eu, p, eu tomo aceitando. Assim, conclui Levinas, a responsabilidade que se envolve na conclusão do pacto é infinita em direito, ela se agrava sempre ao longo dos procedimentos de seu redobramento que o ser-aparência procura1. 228 Eu acrescentarei, para memória, que Kripke esboça uma descrição similar do que significa aderir a uma regra em um coletivo humano em Wittgenstein: cada um aplica a regra cegamente, sem dispor de um critério final satisfazendo o que é deliberado em cada um dos casos futuros concebíveis, mas ele o faz na intenção de aplicar a regra como cada outro membro do grupo, ele se expõe pelo avanço e se implica pelo avanço nos juízos cruzados do tipo "o indivíduo i julga que o indivíduo j aplica a regra como o indivíduo k", e assim por diante. Notamos em outro lugar que esses dois últimos exemplos têm uma analogia bem próxima em Sartre ele-mesmo, na descrição que ele dá do juramento, pelo qual o grupo em fusão se engaja no momento organizacional. Meu sentimento é que a convergência dessas análises, narrativas ou descrições, segundo a maneira cujo se quer as entender, testemunha o que, para todos os autores tocados, o que faz o critério do sentido de um coletivo humano, é a disponibilidade desse aprofundamento recorrente e formal: do que Sartre chamaria de a fuga serial, atestando a forma da serialidade. Poder-se-ia arriscar a conclusão que entre todos os autores citados emerge a figura convincente de um transcendental da região do social: o que nós pensamos como entidade ou realidade do tipo social, e a propósito do que nós prosseguimos um tipo de conhecimento – aquele das ciências sociais – é tudo o que envolve uma tal trama racional, é tudo o que é atravessado pela lógica da serialidade. Essa resposta teria entre outro o interesse e a vantagem de responder de forma judiciosa à antonímia do individualismo metodológico, que desfaz completamente o social no plano ontológico, e do ponto de vista de Durkheim, que parece o endurecer em uma transcendência injustificável: ela dá, de qualquer modo, da posição "intencional" entidades do tipo durkheimiano um critério que envolve a infinidade de maneira potencial e não atual. Se eu tenho razão sobre esse assunto, então necessitava concluir que sobre um ponto ao menos, Sartre cumpriu de fato na Crítica da Razão dialética o trabalho crítico no sentido mais clássico, no sentido kantiano que ele concerneu sobre o plano transcendental o domínio antropológico, ou, por o dizer alternativamente em termos husserlianos, que ele liberou um sentido regional do social, ao invés de se limitar, como nós dissemos acima, a percorrer as "frases" do mundo social e histórico em seu único objetivo de encontrar sentidos os ligando à práxis, a estabelecer a inteligibilidade do que compõe nosso mundo humano sem se interrogar sobre as qualidades do sentido intervindo nessa inteligibilidade. 229 Eu creio em uma tal concessão com efeito necessária, eu penso que há bem na Crítica da Razão dialética uma pesquisa transcendental liberando a serialidade como determinante do sentido do social, mas minha apresentação anterior das coisas não é totalmente equivocada, se se quer bem ver que Sartre resiste tendencialmente à explicitação de seu próprio resultado. Isto, entretanto, permanece como implicado, virtualmente operando, nas configurações estudadas ao longo do livro. Nós iremos mostrar qual maneira ele retoma ou poderia retomar: 1) na descrição do grupo em fusão; 2) na descrição do grupo organizado; 3) na descrição da ação dos grupos soberanos sobre os coletivos seriais que eles manipulam. O que eu penso com o ponto 2), é notadamente a passagem onde Sartre apresenta oficialmente a noção de estrutura, enquanto ela se associa naturalmente ao grupo organizado, e em proveito para o debate com Lévi-Strauss das relações de parentesco ao meio de + ou -: cada união marital é codificada por + ou – segundo o que ela resulta da aquisição pela tribo A de uma fêmea da tribo B ou do dom de uma fêmea a essa mesma tribo. Por conseguinte, um par de crianças de tais casamentos, se se aceita que o símbolo se herda, se deixa notar ++, +-, -+ ou --, e Lévi-Strauss justifica a interdição de casar dos casais do tipo ++ ou -- : de tais uniões conservariam tal qual o crédito ou ao débito ao lugar de o equilibrar. Um aspecto dessa codificação é que ela permite, por interação da noção a grandeza da profundidade da genealogia, associar aos rebentos dos casamentos sucessivos – a supor que eles sejam todos permitidos – um vetor simbólico termina vinculando os + e os – que "colocam" os sujeitos relativamente ao crédito e ao débito. Poder-se-ia então reter a análise estrutural simplesmente aqui: que um valor do crédito-débito a propósito do conjunto de fêmeas se deixasse prosseguir de maneira serial no seio do conjunto social, valor que dá conta de sua forma de se complicar e de se aprofundar seguindo a filiação. E poder-se-ia lá ver um tipo de confirmação, levada pelo estudo etnológico, do transcendental serial que nós liberamos. Mas isso não é o que retém Sartre e isso não é a discussão que ele conduz: para ele, a questão é de saber se a estrutura mostra ou revela a inteligibilidade do social para ele mesmo, ou pelo menos para a soma do poder prático e reflexivo humano implicado no social. E, na medida onde o estruturalismo apresenta os tratados formais da estrutura como agir sem consciência e sem projeto, a resposta é fortemente negativa segundo o critério de Sartre. Mas ele tenta "salvar" o estruturalismo mostrando que atrás da opacidade coagulada do sistema das posições estruturais, uma práxis coletiva, um projeto, pode ser 230 encontrado, restituindo a inteligibilidade, o sentido: essencialmente aqui que as liberdades se nadificam ou se restringem livremente segundo os créditos ou os débitos reconhecidos, e aqui que os interditos lévi-strausianos exprimem um projeto da etnia sobre ela mesma, uma intenção de "a abertura" de sua reprodução. Não se pode tão pouco dizer que ele celebra o que eu apresento como seu trabalho transcendental, nem que ele aproveita simplesmente uma ocasião de confirmar a pertinência disso. O ponto 3), concernente ao grupo em fusão, é talvez o mais significativo: o grupo em fusão é introduzido como o ultrapassamento da serialidade, mas como um ultrapassamento que é também acesso ao sentido desde o não-sentido. O grupo em fusão é imaginado como inundado de sentido tanto quanto o coletivo serial dele é privado. O grupo em fusão, é propriamente a inteligibilidade tendo sua fonte na práxis fazendo retorno, e se reapropriando integralmente o fantasma do ser-conjunto que oferece somente a serialidade. A obra do grupo em fusão é então em princípio o arrancamento do coletivo da serialidade. Observa-se, contudo, que: segundo isso que ensina explicitamente Sartre, a operação constituinte essencial do grupo em fusão provém do terceiro. Em substância, tem-se um primeiro momento dual, onde dois sujeitos se reencontram ou se reúnem no grupo, na corrente da fuga dela, na esquina de uma rua. Cada um vê o outro como o 99o que o faz ele mesmo centésimo. Nesse momento, não verdadeiramente dual, mas mais universalmente dual, Sartre passa àquele onde o terceiro "unifica" não tanto os pares suscetíveis de ser cobrados sobre o grupo, mas simplesmente o meio a ele acessível do grupo, e ele os unifica como atores em sua reciprocidade múltipla da mesma ação que ele: seu "projeto" ultrapassando ao respeito dos outros coincide com aquele seguinte a dinâmica da qual aqueles se reúnem e se encaram. Assim então, ao lugar que a lei intencional de intervenção do terceiro seja a objetivação de uma guerra dual da objetivação, como é o caso em O Ser e o Nada, uma lei de inteligibilidade quer que o terceiro se identifique à e se projete em as práxis convergentes que ele aborda, desde e segundo o movimento de sua própria práxis: a distância de objetivação se retorna somente nisso que o terceiro toma a postura da regulação, vindo a conceber sua intervenção como aquela que prescreve a práxis, enunciando fins ou meios circunstanciais universalmente compartilhados ou compartilháveis, capazes de funcionar como palavras de ordem. Sartre descreve no fim das contas, como resultado do jogo dessas apreensões pelos terceiros, uma estrutura de ubiquidade do grupo em fusão: em cada lugar prático do grupo (em cada 231 indivíduo membro), é a práxis do grupo inteiro que se atualiza ou se reflete, o aqui e o em todos os lugares tornam-se sinônimos. Tão sugestiva quanto seja essa descrição, ela não pode apagar, me parece, de um tipo de momento implícito do raciocínio: entre a situação estritamente ternária, e aquela onde os terceiros são relacionados ao grupo, se deixou mediatizar por ele e mediatizam cada outro terceiro e o grupo, não é necessário interpolar a interação, a uma profundidade indefinida, do ato pelo qual o terceiro se projeta como covisando o fim de dois membros de uma reciprocidade prática elementar? Poder-se-ia de novo dar uma notação simbólica a essa interação em aprofundar da partilha do fim na ação seguindo a acumulação de uma célula de base de reconhecimento-ação. E me parece que nós precisamos de uma tal fuga serial para compreender a ubiquidade fusional e a rotação "indiferente" das posturas reguladoras do terceiro: é ao nível dessa fuga que o grupo toma sua consistência "social". Não se pode, eu creio, ir de outro modo para uma razão que Sartre ele mesmo coloca adiante, muito mais longe no livro: o grupo, em não importa qual de suas figuras, não é jamais um hiperorganismo. De tal modo que a noção de prática coletiva, a transposição ao coletivo da estrutura do projeto, permanece irremediavelmente metafórica. Mas de repente, o que regula as condições de emprego metafórico, da transposição, é fortemente o que vale para nós como critério a priori da entidade social como tal: e segundo Sartre, que ele o explicita em tais termos ou não, me parece que a forma da serialidade é o que é sempre apresentada para sustentar as diversas linguagens metafóricas da práxis coletiva. Em resumo: a questão da inteligibilidade do social seria, na Crítica da Razão dialética, sempre conforme a relação a uma inteligibilidade do objeto como social garantida pela forma da serialidade. Eu gostaria agora de prolongar essa reflexão me colocando de novo a questão da relação do empreendimento sartriano à atitude crítica. Conclusão Pode-se entrar no problema cujo eu gostaria de debater em conclusão formulando uma objeção a respeito do papel do critério transcendental que eu tenho jogado à serialidade. Essa objeção é muito simples: o esquema da série, da recorrência, da razão presta conta da iteração e globalmente um esquema matemático 232 e é a tal título que Sartre toma como não exprimindo a inteligibilidade própria a uma multiplicidade humana. Isso seria em todo caso um bom motivo para que Sartre, se ao seu bel-prazer, recusar nossa leitura. Mas para além, podemos verdadeiramente apresentar como característica a priori do social uma tal forma matemática essencialmente inumana? A essa objeção, a resposta é evidentemente a seguinte, que consiste em dizer um implícito de nosso discurso, cujo nós reconhecemos que estava difícil de manter um nível implícito: a "recorrência" da série que tece o social deve proceder seguindo uma relação "tipicamente humana". Isso é somente no caso onde os humanos usam gestos que para assim dizer os apartam deles mesmos de maneira iterativa e serial entre eles que uma entidade social surge de pleno direito. A "matéria" ética – supondo que eu chamo ética o campo do humano e da relação humana (não é isso perto do que etos quer dizer1 ?) – é tão necessário ao serial quanto à forma serial. No exemplo levinasiano, a relação que sofre a exponenciação serial é a relação de responsabilidade para (o engajamento de) outrem. No exemplo kripkaneano, é a relação de juízo quanto à legalidade do comportamento de outrem. No exemplo husserliano, é a relação intencional característica da consciência (cuja apresentação empática é um caso particular). No exemplo brouweriano, é diretamente a relação de reconhecimento do outro intelecto como tal. Essa enumeração prova, além disso, que as relações mobilizadas nesses diversos discursos ou montagens entretém uma forte afinidade: há um importante degrau de superposição entre eles. Mas é verdade que uma tal consideração permanece impossível à Sartre, em razão de uma separação regional o qual todo seu pensamento subscreveu na Crítica da Razão dialética, uma separação que seu livro contribui para estabelecer, é necessário mesmo dizer. Essa separação, do tipo dilteliana, distingue domínio da natureza e razão analítica de um lado, e domínio antropológico e razão dialética do outro. Sartre derroga certamente à Hegel, à um nível de radicalidade que nós não saberíamos subestimar, pronunciando tal separação, o verdadeiro holismo dialético quer que o conceito seja sobretudo o mesmo entre esses campos, só se opõe a ele mesmo pelo intermédio de momentos, reconciliados nos processos. Mas ao mesmo tempo, ele pega emprestado de Hegel a visão da multiplicidade matemática como profundamente destituída de toda relação interna, de toda ligação de Inter definição e de coconstituição: as entidades matemáticas são puramente justapostas, sejam elas aritméticas ou geométricas. 233 A tese sustentada nesse artigo é então, no entanto, como eu tinha a impressão – tão bizarra quanto pudesse parecer – de a aprender ao menos por parte de Sartre, a multiplicidade social autêntica, originária, se define em termos de uma forma matemática de multiplicidade. Todo o problema é então de saber se uma forma elucidada pela razão analítica é autorizada a caracterizar as entidades da região antropológica. Como podemos permanecer toleráveis a essa posição? Seria necessário de início marcar que ela não tem todo o sentido de um anexo do domínio antropológico à razão naturalista. Nós não dizemos que a noção matemática do serial permite conhecer e controlar a realidade social, mas, de forma mais fenomenológica, que ela cria critério para nós quanto à apreensão das entidades como sociais (sem que se pudesse os identificar como hiperorganismo). Certamente, o princípio geral do pensamento transcendental que, se esse ponto é adquirido, toda ciência do social se deixa informar até um certo ponto por esse modo de doação do objeto. Mas isso não vai até pedir no detalhe um tratamento do social que o reduza à forma da serialidade. Já, nós vimos que o tipo de relação que sofre a exponenciação serial conta assim, por exemplo. Mas se pode descrever a um nível perfeitamente qualitativo, e notadamente interpretativo, uma entidade social atravessada pela serialidade, da mesma forma que se pode descrever as entidades matemáticas, as configurações, os problemas e as dinâmicas das quais elas dão lugar de maneira não matemática1. Mais profundamente ainda, a codificação a priori da entidade social que nós propomos é uma codificação pela matemática e pela física: nós não sugerimos tomar as multiplicidades sociais como sistemas dinâmicos dos quais é necessário aplicar as boas equações de estado (o que é, por uma parte, a aproximação da economia neoclássica, ou do que populariza uma visão conexionista do social). Ora, na matemática, a relação fundamental é uma relação intencional colocando o objeto, que é sempre de alguma parte uma relação humana desengajada do ser, onde se busca apontar o objeto de uma forma tal qual, sendo reduzido ao originário da partilha humana dele, ele é mais sólido e estável que qualquer objeto empírico. Não é necessário então conceder a Hegel que a multiplicidade matemática, e singularmente a multiplicidade serial originária dos inteiros naturais, seja uma multiplicidade privada do pensamento. Essa "série aritmética de razão um" exprime, em sua recorrência, a potencialidade da relação intencional construtiva a mais simples: ela é então ligada 234 ao mistério kantiano do duplo valor do Eu penso (liberdade-espontaneidade, fonte do juízo). Na matemática – diferentemente do que se produz na física –, o que se engaja nas construções fantásticas da objetividade – ao menos a objetividade construtiva – é um tipo de núcleo prático ou de função de liberdade1. Resta-me simplesmente dizer uma última palavra sobre Sartre e Kant. Todas as precisões que nós queremos dar, para justificar Sartre contra ele mesmo quanto a uma perspectiva extrata dele, exige retomar aos topoi fundamentais do pensamento transcendental inaugurada por Kant: é necessário interrogar a diferença entre matemática e física (assim como de sua irmã, a diferença entre matemática e lógica), é necessário retomar sobre o problema da distinção regional que preside a posição do domínio natural, distinção a qual a determinação análoga de um domínio antropológico, social ou histórico, que só pode tomar emprestado das luzes. Mas fazer isso, não é em um sentido, simplesmente, levar a sério o título da Crítica da Razão dialética? 235 ANEXO IV: TRADUÇÃO DO TEXTO "Sartre, a história e a verdade" [título original: "Sartre, l'histoire et la vérité" (SALANSKIS, 2008)] Autor: Jean-Michel Salanskis Tradução de Ana Gabriela Colantoni O trabalho que eu exponho aqui é simplesmente a continuação daquele que tratava meu artigo "Sartre, Kant e a serialidade". Eu pretendo então prolongar a confrontação de Sartre com Kant. Eu parto do princípio que nós devemos ler a Crítica da razão dialética seguindo a indicação do "jogo de palavras" do título melhor que escutando literalmente o dito do texto: o que pleiteia Sartre em seus escritos, até o fim, é com efeito que ele se empregue em justificar e colocar em prática a razão dialética, demonstrando em particular sua superioridade sobre a razão analítica. Mas o que ele faz, e em verdade não pode deixar de fazer em razão da intenção que seu título confessa e que sua atitude confirma, é avaliar desde um posto "crítico" ao sentido kantiano o direito de um certo uso da razão (pela relação às pretensões de um outro uso com efeito). Eu tentei na intervenção que eu evoquei mostrar como Sartre não se instalava na "totalidade" que se impunha de si para uma aproximação verdadeiramente dialética, mas se ligava melhor lhe encontrar um lugar legítimo, ou seja pela força a desmentir para ela o sentido "absoluto" de totalidade. Eu continuo na presente reflexão a buscar captar um ensinamento transcendental no escrito sartriano. A hipótese que me vem então ao espírito é que, da mesma maneira que no primeiro tomo da Crítica da razão dialética, eu acreditei perceber uma caracterização transcendental do social em termos da serialidade, também há talvez, a partir do documento do segundo tomo da mesma obra, um ensinamento transcendental sobre o sentido da história, eu pretendo por lá, sobre a doação da história como tal, a colher. Isso dito, parece-me necessário ir até o fim de uma tal interrogação "epistemológica" de Sartre examinando qual concepção de verdade ele ligava o conjunto de sua reflexão sobre a inteligibilidade do social e do histórico. Meu partido defendido é com efeito, eu venho o chamar, de tentar encontrar em Sartre uma contribuição implícita a uma epistemologia transcendental da sociologia e da história: uma forma de definir a priori o objeto dessas disciplinas explicitando seu sentido para nós. Mas o campo epistemológico é a ele também o teatro de afrontamentos filosóficos 236 radicais, o conflito maior tendo oposto ao vigésimo século uma epistemologia neokantiana minoritária a uma epistemologia "analítica" herdeira de Frege através de Carnap. Essas duas escolas de epistemologia, cujo debate permanece um lugar replicante da filosofia contemporânea, lugar de uma dificuldade inextricável e de uma riqueza de pensamento inesgotável, se rasgando eminentemente ao redor da verdade: isso não é a mesma fórmula ou o mesmo esquema da verdade do qual se adere de parte e de outra. Ou melhor, porque isso está quase a se situar de um dos lados da alternativa que diz as coisas do tipo, há debate entre as duas escolas sobre a questão de saber se elas se referenciam à mesma ideia de verdade. É então ainda uma maneira de testar o valor de nossas análises "transcendentalizado" Sartre que de ir ver se sua concepção da verdade é compatível com o campo epistemológico ao qual nós o ligamos. Para colocar essa questão, nós no s apoiaremos sobre Crítica da razão dialética, claro, mas nós chamaremos também ao ensaio Verdade e existência, no qual Sartre ressalta a partir de "Da essência da verdade" de Heidegger. A trajetória que será seguida agora comporta em verdade três etapas. 1) De início, nós retornaremos sobre o ensinamento de nosso precedente artigo, identificando em Sartre uma determinação do sentido do social em termos do conceito de serialidade. Nós acreditamos com efeito que, no segundo volume da Crítica da razão dialética, Sartre oferece os elementos corroborativos para nossa leitura, e nós queremos divulga-lo. 2) Em seguida, nós buscaremos dizer o que caracteriza para Sartre a dimensão histórica como tal, o que é suscetível em sua aproximação de criar critério para o acesso ao histórico, para dar objetividade histórica. 3) Enfim, nós iniciaremos a reflexão sobre o tema da verdade, sobre a apropriação sartriana desse termo e sobre a maneira que lhe convém de a situar ao seio do "grande" debate epistemológico evocado agora. Retorno sobre o social e a serialidade Nós sustentamos que Sartre tem, sob o nome de serialidade, liberado uma figura suscetível de fazer critério para o reconhecimento do fato social como tal. Para além da ideia que, no contexto da serialidade, cada um recebe seu lugar do outro – ideia que, com efeito, aparta ela da filosofia da negatividade e da alienação – Sartre 237 concebe a serialidade como um tipo de intencionalidade "do homem ao homem" tendo um poder de iteração segundo o entrecruzamento mesmo da intersubjetividade. Eu tinha então feito duas observações ao apoio da tese segundo a qual a serialidade nesse sentido podia ser tomada como a doação mesma do social: 1) muitos outros autores liberaram essa forma como característica da intersubjetividade, nas perspectivas todas de fato incomensuráveis entre elas e a de Sartre (Brouwer, Husserl, Kripke, Levinas); 2) ao longo do primeiro volume da Crítica da razão dialética, constata-se que a serialidade retoma em cada figura proposta do social, naquele do grupo em fusão e da organização por exemplo, não somente como o que essas figuras ultrapassam, mas como o que elas ilustram, de onde elas tiram seu teor e sua força. Eu gostaria agora de destacar dois índices, no texto do segundo volume, que vão no mesmo sentido: os empregos por Sartre do pensamento da serialidade onde isto parece bem exprimir o social como tal. O primeiro dentre eles corresponde a uma conclusão surpreendente da "metáfora" matemática. Veja a passagem: Mas pode-se dizer que o soberano totaliza a série já que se define como a unidade fugitiva ou giratória da destotalização? Isso depende do que se percebe por "totalizar": se a gente deve entender por isso que o governante dissolve a inércia para unir os Outros em um grupo juramentado, naturalmente que essa tentativa – perigosa para o poder – é a priori descartada, salvo sob sua forma mistificante (e sob uma outra forma – bem secundária – que nós examinaremos logo). De fato, essa totalização real teria para efeito de mudar um inerte alavancar uma comunidade forjando sua própria soberaneidade. Mas se nós consideramos as palavras utilizadas pelos governantes: as passas, a opinião, o povo, os trabalhadores, etc., nós constatamos imediatamente que são escolhas por causa de sua significação ambígua; na medida onde esses vocábulos são realidades materiais e inertes cujo o sentido faz a unidade sintética, eles parecem se relacionar aos objetos totalizados; mas a ação que os utiliza e os ultrapassa desvela ao mesmo tempo que eles se referem às desordens mediadas pela matéria inanimada. Somente, essa ambiguidade é reveladora: a série é totalizada pela soberania à maneira cuja o matemático totaliza as recorrências aritméticas pela noção de número transfinito. Esses números são um ultrapassamento prático nesse sentido que eles se definem, no fundo, pelo conjunto das operações que os permitem de fazer. E como o ultrapassamento conserva o ultrapassado, a modalidade prática das operações sobre os transfinitos é determinada pelas estruturas reais da série. Pelas mídias de massa, o governo se endereça nas séries explicitamente visadas como tais e sua atividade visa a obter um resultado global pela transformação da serialidade em estéreo-condicionamento. Assim a totalização só aparece à origem e ao fim do processo: à origem, já que 238 o movimento propagado é o objeto de um projeto sintético que o relaciona à totalidade do campo prático; ao fim, já que, no caso de um sucesso, a série se objetivará em um resultado totalizável: por exemplo esse coletivo – os operários que trabalham nos altos fornos – terá produzido, se a gente soube manusear, dez milhões de toneladas de fonte ao fim do plano quinquenal1 Sartre, então, compreende a relação das diretivas emanando da direção do Partido comunista em direção do proletariado russo sobre o modelo da totalização das "recorrências aritméticas pela noção de número transfinito". Isso é de certa maneira o que, segundo ele, "o soberano totaliza a série". A nova metáfora é coerente com a primeira, por isso que é bem ao nome do modelo da "recorrência aritmética" que Sartre escolhe a palavra série e dela introduz a noção no primeiro volume. Aqui, Sartre evoca à carta o procedimento de união que tem lugar na teoria dos conjuntos: a passagem da "recorrência aritmética" ao conjunto w ou ao cardinal aleph0 corresponde exatamente à passagem da simples "fuga" construtiva {0, 1, 2,3,...,n, ...} à totalidade conjuntural pressuposta cercar exatamente os itens que a eles surgissem e eles somente. Então, a um primeiro nível, o que é dito é que a direção do PCUS reúne a serialidade proletária. Isso confirma que o ponto de vista da serialidade compreende a coisa social antes que ela seja institucionalizada, simbolizada, idealizada: a gente tem bem o caso a isso que seria uma variante d "interacionismo" em termos do debate epistemológico da sociologia. Sobre o caráter "aberto", não ainda assinado da serialidade como tal, notar também a passagem "já que ela se define como a unidade fugitiva ou giratória da destotalização" da primeira frase. Nessa passagem, a gente tem fortemente a impressão que a palavra série qualifica o estado bruto e fundamental da socialidade para Sartre: mesmo unicamente a socialidade "capitalista", já que ele aplica aqui o motivo a uma situação que ele não é absolutamente pronto a homologar ao capitalista, e ele o diz nos próprios termos de outros direitos. Bem entendido, o estatuto da serialidade é sempre oposta a um estatuto do grupo ou do verdadeiro grupo melhor, cujo o protótipo é fixado por sua evocação do grupo em fusão no primeiro volume: grupo que acrescenta uma certa unificação na convergência da práxis dele a ele, se compreendendo os uns os outros como tais e se reconhecendo como cotélicos em seu seio (mesmo esse processo da fusão, entretanto, teríamos observado, obedece à forma serial). Na passagem, o estatuto do verdadeiro grupo é mencionado, quando Sartre considera uma melhor reunião da série proletária: "essa totalização real teria para efeito de mudar um inerte alavancar em uma comunidade 239 forjando sua própria soberaneidade". Mas ao fundo, tais análises confirmam elas também, a sua maneira, que é a série e a série somente que cria critérios para o social em Sartre: a questão do "verdadeiro grupo" define para ele o debate político sobre o social, que pressupõe o social. Ou ainda, o verdadeiro grupo corresponderia a um social ideal que é o social limite, mais social que todo social: o conjunto não se contentaria de a ele "projetar" segundo a potência iterativa da relação humana, mas alcançaria a se recompreender como esse movimento de projeção mesmo. Se, entre o efetivo observável e esse social limite, a relação é como aquela das leis iterativas aos conjuntos infinitos de Cantor, então a lição é tanto a social quanto se dá como serialidade. Para Sartre, eu imagino, a instância do "grupo em fusão" é um tipo de apresentação do transfinito impossível de a recompreender compartilhada (transfinito que a burocracia soviética não faz agir no lugar de uma fusão para ela). Mas esse mito possui uma vantagem ao meu ponto de vista o estatuto estrangeiro de só ter sua força à proporção do fato que a gente não acredita nele. Desde que ele tenha uma última atitude a fazer: Sartre vê também que ele não precisa tomar a série em sua substancialidade o transfinito do PCUS, depende a sua maneira a situação da maneira "construtivista" Ele insiste sobre o fato que, ao fim das contas, a totalização só funciona à margem do processo serial, ela se situa a sua origem como diretiva e à chegada como expressa no resultado quantificável do trabalho: é o que relaciona a longa última frase ("Assim a totalização só aparece à origem e ao fim do processo: à origem, já que o movimento propagado é objeto de um projeto sintético que a relação à totalidade do campo prático; ao fim, já que, no caso de uma vitória, a série se objetivará em um resultado totalizável: por exemplo esse coletivo – os operários que trabalham nos altos fornos – terá produzido, se a gente soube manusear, dez milhões de toneladas de fonte ao fim do plano quinquenal"). É bem uma forma de justificar matematicamente as 3entidades cantorianas infinitas: elas servem de ponto de passagem e postos perspectivos cara a cara da multiplicidade dos fatos ou operações finitárias. A totalização do serial é a certo respeito auxiliar, ela deve ser "remergulhada" no processo serial (do trabalho aqui). Meu segundo índice será bem mais breve e, curiosamente, "psicológico". Discutindo sobre o Terror stalinista, Sartre escreve: 240 (...) de outra parte a singularização nacional – como desconfiança do estrangeiro e dos intelectuais – compreende nela mesma, enquanto replicante sobre si, os elementos dessa atitude social: a suspeita. A suspeita, como regra serial, exige o quanto antes seu contrário, o homem que está acima de toda suspeita: a ele só ele será permitido escapar à ronda dos suspeitos"1. Aqui, isso que é marcante, é o percurso de contração/expansão/contração. Se parte de um motivo global, aquele da singularização nacional da URSS na situação da "revolução cercada". "Engendra-se" a partir dele isso que poderia ser um afeto psicológico pessoal: a suspeita. A expressão "atitude social" não o nomeia ou o nomeia apenas ao nível individual (um todo bem pequeno se é verdade que as atitudes são nativamente o fato das pessoas). Mas que a gente seja passado pelo pessoal, que ele tenha tido contração, se reflete a meu sentido na formulação que segue, que cria estado de suspeita como "regra serial", e conduz, a um novo termo global enquanto que universal, o homem excluído de toda suspeita. A suspeita como regra serial, com efeito, é a suspeita como modalidade intencional se serializando, exatamente segundo o esquema geral que nós temos liberado: a suspeita dela se iterando e se aprofundando do homem ao homem (A suspeita B enquanto ele suspeita C, D não se deixa de ter a aparência inocente de A suspeitando a autenticidade da suspeita de C por B, etc.) fato do social ao sentido da serialidade. E o homem acima de tudo suspeito é um novo gênero de adição totalizante, comparável a esse respeito à intervenção transfinita do caso precedente. O que me interessa aqui é que Sartre considera imediatamente as categorias de uma psicologia como fazendo sociedade pela serialidade, sem ter precisado de passar por uma teoria qualquer que seja da alienação: mesmo sem o nível mínimo de alienação que é, nele, a mediação dos atos humanos pelas ferramentas-coisas. A ideia da serialidade funciona como uma concepção positiva e fundamental da socialidade. De uma socialidade que, a gente a vê bem no exemplo, não será em geral boa: e é certamente um valor desta aproximação do social como tal que permite uma apreciação negativa tanto quanto positiva do social (ao lugar que, como em uma certa filiação marxista, o social seja um sinônimo do bem). Isso é bastante para esse complemento ao precedente trabalho, eu inicio doravante o segundo tema: aquela da história. 241 Sentido do histórico como tal? É natural buscar nesse segundo volume um ensinamento sobre o sentido do histórico como tal, por conseguinte o subtítulo que eu analiso, a gente o diz, é "A inteligibilidade da História". Mas nós sabemos também a dificuldade que nós encontramos, a mesma que nosso estudo do primeiro volume: Sartre se coloca em princípio e oficialmente uma outra questão da qual nós buscamos nele uma resposta. Ele se pergunta sob qual condição a história pode ascender à "inteligibilidade", pode tornar uma história sentida; e não seguindo qual sentido nós compreendemos originariamente a história como tal. Da mesma forma que ele buscava como, segundo qual procedimento o social pode fazer sentido, pode advir como social carregado de sentido, e não o que condiciona nosso reconhecimento do social como tal. Como nós temos visto, isso deixa ou replica que o ter do sentido ou não é mensurado para ele pelo critério do religamento com a práxis: por conseguinte eu posso descreve alguma coisa em termos de uma práxis prosseguindo seus fins, eu estou no elemento do sentido; se ao contrário, esse que eu descrevi só se deixa apresentar como seja, como necessidade externa ao fazer, então eu estou no não-sentido. Por consequência, conforme a história, Sartre vai conduzir exatamente o mesmo tipo de pesquisa, ditada pela mesma fonte: tratar-se-á de examinar em qual medida pode-se compreender o processo da história como processo da práxis, liberando eo ipso uma figura dessa história como sentida, que nós fazemos então ascender à inteligibilidade da história. Minha esperança é de alcançar, no entanto a detectar isso que diz Sartre uma forma ou as significações que para ele funcionam como característica do histórico como tal, se bem que, necessariamente, Sartre não os acentua a esse título. À entrada desse segundo volume, a gente tentou de início por um primeiro candidato: o conflito. A gente mergulhou a entrada do jogo, com efeito, nas fascinantes descrições motivadas pela situação de um combate de boxe, espetáculo pagante unindo ao redor dele um público. Sartre descreveu o combate de boxe como uma singularidade sobrecarregada de significação social: ao redor do combate de boxe gravita toda uma configuração social histórica, ao limite a luta de classes do momento 242 se encarna nele. Sugere-se quando Sartre entendeu a famosa frase de Marx ("A história de toda sociedade até nossos dias é a história de lutas de classe"). E o pensamento pode vir que ele o interpretou como dizendo: isso que faz a história história é a luta que a tende, que ela é gestante. A ideia, ao fundo, remonta ao "polemos, pai de toda coisa" de Heráclito: a luta, a guerra o conflito seriam o princípio da vida antes que o ser, sob a forma particular da luta de classes, aquele da história. Bem entendido, quando se remonta também longe, é em uma perspectiva ontológica e não transcendental que a luta ou o conflito estão colocados anteriormente. O enunciado de Marx, a leitura ontológica é, da mesma forma, a mais provável, como o indica formalmente, em superfície, o emprego mesmo do verbo ser/estar. Mas Sartre poderia ter sido sensível ao "choque ao contrário" do ensinamento ontológico marxista: por conseguinte Marx tinha enunciado que a luta (de classes) era o ser da história, aqueles que tem recebido essa doutrina tem podido adotar o conflito como critério da história. E Sartre ele mesmo poderia funcionar sobre um tal critério. Entretanto, na verdade, ele parece, evocando o combate de boxe, e, para além, todos os conflitos da história, aprovar uma inquietude estritamente incompatível com nossa hipótese. Ele escreve assim: "Em particular, qual poderia ser a unidade histórica de uma sociedade cortada pelas lutas de classe?"1 Em outros termos, é pressuposto, é incontornável, é inultrapassável, que a história se diz da totalidade da sociedade: histórico é um predicado totalizante do social, é ao menos o que parece se afirmar. Os homens podem estar divididos em seus destinos, opostos segundo diversos reagrupamentos em suas lutas, a história só poderá, contudo lhes lembrar à um nível que os reúnem. Esse não é então o conflito que significa o histórico como tal, ou, pelo menos, ele não poderia se tratar do conflito enquanto ele "abre" sobre uma totalização. Pode-se tentar, de início, colocar à prova essa primeira percepção tomando em conta as análises que vem mais longe no volume. Sartre encara de início a divisão interna de uma "organização" (conceito do primeiro volume, que designa um estado do social proveniente do grupo em fusão através da primeira degradação que constitui o grupo juramentado). Em seu seio, dois subgrupos entram em conflito porque cada um pretende restituir o outro inútil, a cumprir a função pela relação a qual o outro, sendo colocado em atraso, tendo mal assumido a realidade em sua prática, está rendido ao desfalecimento. Ele tenta 243 mostrar que a dinâmica conflitual que dela resulta, mesmo nas formas autoritárias ou hediondas que se pode imaginar por ela – como o decreto vindo da soma da organização dando a favor a um dos dois subgrupos, ou, no pior, a liquidação psíquica de um pelo outro – permanece "inteligível", no sentido onde se pode dizer que através dela, a organização se retoma ela mesma para si, a melhorar sua estrutura dela a corrigindo. Pode-se inserir as práxis que se entrechocam em uma práxis superior, conforme a qual seu combate aparece como uma forma adaptativa. Ele comenta em seguida longamente o caso do conflito de Stalin e Trotsky, e, para além do "desvio" stalinista, como ele o designa, curiosamente, de maneira bem trotskista (a interpretação do stalinismo como "degenerescência" que não remente nada por causa do genus do socialismo estando por excelência o fato do trotskismo): curiosamente porque Sartre tenta a todo preço evitar de "tomar posição" simplesmente para o trotskismo. Esse conflito é mais ou outra coisa que o conflito de duas frações do comunismo para o mesmo lugar, conflito que se racionalizaria como acesso racional do comunismo em seu conjunto a uma estrutura hierárquica sem duplicação. Trata-se na verdade de um conflito entre duas orientações, entre duas compreensões da situação em URSS depois da revolução e do futuro aberto depois de Lenine. Trotsky exprime a visão que a revolução só pode se salvar como revolução, como acesso autêntico da classe operária ao poder – ao controle do mundo e de seu destino – se fazendo revolução internacional. Stalin exprime a visão que a revolução é ameaçada e assimila pelo mundo exterior, que a realização "democrática" nela é no imediato impossível em razão do subdesenvolvimento do proletariado e do atraso geral, de tal modo que a única via ofertada é aquela da réplica, do "socialismo em um só país". O esforço argumentativo de Sartre é, por conseguinte, de sustentar: 1) as "projeções" de Trotsky e de Stalin, suas linhas incompatíveis, correspondendo de fato a duas facetas da "verdade histórica", e que cada um no fundo estaria pronto a reconhecer o que o outro acentua, o qual ele se identifica; de tal modo que, em seu conflito, ao limite, a pintura completa da situação e de seu devir se encontra se dividindo, se expõe de maneira contraditória; 2) que o poder pessoal pavoroso de Stalin, resultado histórico da discórdia, se bem que ele se deixa compreender como autotraição do socialismo, vale também como totalização da história soviética, e não dela continua menos, por lá, de lhe procurar sua inteligibilidade. Essa longa reflexão desemboca sobre a figura da totalização desenvolvendo: Sartre entende por aquilo 244 uma totalização da qual tudo retoma, uma totalização que capita todo fato e aspecto da prática histórica e de suas contrapartidas subjetivas, e pela qual, então, todo elemento da práxis social se apresenta como relativo a todo outro, dependendo de todo outro. A insistência sobre essa noção de totalidade de envolvimento é tal que se é fortemente tentado de entender que é a totalização em direção de uma tal totalidade que assinala o fato histórico como tal. Uma tal leitura estando coerente com o índice tomado um pouco alto a partir de uma citação isolada. Antes de interrogar mais adiante a "totalização de envolvimento" como critério possível do histórico como tal, buscando simultaneamente bem precisar o que isso desejaria dizer, o que significaria um tal critério se ele pudesse ser retomado, marcamos uma pausa, a fim de insistir sobre o caractere à primeira vista extremamente "violento" de nosso atual esforço interpretativo. Historicismo e sentido do histórico De qual direito, com efeito, perguntar a uma filosofia historicista sua "opinião" sobre o sentido do histórico como tal? Não se separa todo historicismo de considerar o "acontecimento" histórico como o fundo do ser, como isso em que nós somos tomados, e que por essa razão não suscita nenhum problema de sentido e de reconhecimento? A constatação historicista é uma constatação ontológica ou metafísica, exigindo do filósofo antes mesmo que ele se submete à evidência de um "envolvimento" de todo fato e de tudo dado pela história. A história ou a historicidade não são para o historicismo coisas a propósito dos quais há dúvida, ou cujo registro precisou de critério, ou cujo sentido para nós faz questão: elas são as evidências primitivas que nos englobam antes mesmo que nós nos religamos a elas. A tese historicista é antes, de tudo tomar, uma significação que se apreende somente pelo jogo conjugado de sua e de nossa historicidade: eu compreendo um sentido que esteja apreendendo o percurso segundo o qual ele se exprime, e acompanhando por mim através de seu passado de qualquer modo. Um historicismo, em sumo, parece o sumo início enquanto tal faltar de todo recuo de princípio a respeito da coisa histórica, recuo que o permitia se colocar o problema do sentido do objeto histórico da mesma maneira que se coloca o problema do sentido do objeto espaço-temporal em vista de uma 245 epistemologia da física, a qual o sentido do objeto matemático em vista de uma epistemologia da matemática. Se a filosofia de Sartre, em razão das ligações que ela mantém com os pensamentos de Hegel e de Marx, é um historicismo, então nossa pesquisa pode parecer desqualificada a priori. Mas se perguntará também: quais são as cartas de nobreza, ou mais simplesmente os documentos de credibilidade para uma tal pesquisa, independentemente do caractere impróprio do contexto historicista para ele? Eu, dele citaria dois, em parte semelhantes embora não sejam da mesma ordem. De início, há uma tese participando de um tipo de "epistemologia do sentido comum": a tese enunciando que a história começa com a escrita. Essa tese é comum: eu me lembro de tê-la por minha parte apreendido numa classe de sexto ano, no momento de passar da evocação das idades paleolíticas e neolíticas às idades históricas. A descontinuidade que nos faz sair da descrição proto-histórica das sociedades neolíticas para chegar à história da Mesopotâmia e do Egito antigo é aquela da invenção da escritura. A história começa com os tabletes cuneiformes e as estelas hieroglíficas. O estudo dos anos -2000/-3000 na Bretanha é proto-histórico, aquele dos anos -3000/-3500 no país da Suméria é histórico. Essa epistemologia é "do sentido comum" ao sentido onde ela não é filosófica, mas ela é douta do mesmo modo: ela faz parte do que a comunidade dos historiadores ela mesma encontra a dizer sobre a circunscrição para ela de seu objeto, ao menos em vista do ensino secundário. Segundo documento: a resposta dada pelo pai da fenomenologia à questão que eu coloco (questão que é a sua, é bem ele que interroga pelo princípio de toda ciência quanto ao sentido do objeto que ela se dá). Para Husserl então. Se Sartre Guarda uma ligação com a fenomenologia, mesmo ainda quando ele escreve Crítica da razão dialética, essa resposta poderia possuir uma certa pertinência pela relação a isso que ele diz. A resposta em recurso, a gente a diz, é dada na obra póstuma A origem da geometria. Husserl a formula a fim de rejeitar a pretensão dos historiadores à se empoderar da tarefa arqueológica por ele assinalada à fenomenologia: aquela que deve assumir a Rückfrage que interroga a origem do sentido dos materiais teóricos disponíveis. De onde nós vimos o sentido geométrico que pretende "aceitar" (como a 246 luva de um desafio) as produções matemáticas geométricas contemporâneas? Husserl nega que esta arqueologia pudesse se deixar reconstruir "em" a dimensão histórica, a partir dos testemunhos, documentos e vestígios que nós dispomos nessa dimensão em os datando. Ele nega que a história, como disciplina constituída, tenha um direito de olhar sobre a arqueologia fenomenológica no sentido onde ele está a definindo. E seu argumento essencial é que uma tal arqueologia abre verdadeiramente de maneira originária a dimensão histórica: ela não desenvolve seus ensinamentos no seio da objetividade dela, ela lhe procura o sentido legítimo todas as objetivações históricas ulteriores. Em outros termos, o que funda nossa convicção de um "passado" de humanidade a decifrar e descrever, onde maior parte das explicações mesmo, é a Rückfrage ela-mesma, suscitada pelo menor sedimento cultural. Nós temos ao redor de nós objetos ou documentos vestígios da Sinngebung humana, e nós somos em seguida levados a os interrogar para desdobrar o sentido que se é investido neles. A posição mesma dessa questão e o esforço para lhe responder abrem o passado como dimensão, desenha o esquema de uma sucessão até nós em uma profundidade, que se autoriza e que move em seguida a pesquisa propriamente histórica. Vê-se então que na linha desse raciocínio visando emancipar a arqueologia fenomenológica da disciplina histórica, Husserl caracterizou nosso acesso à história e ao histórico: tem o sentido do histórico o que informa o sentido sedimentado da cultura. Destaca da história tudo o que contribui ao empilhamento diretamente experimentado da coisa cultural. A relação entre o que diz Husserl e o critério mais comum da escritura se compreende: a escritura pode ser compreendida como o modo por excelência da sedimentação. É porque nós podemos garantir pelo escrito os Sinngebungen da humanidade que elas são disponíveis em um empilhamento sedimentar: entretanto, ele está claro que a sedimentação não se opera sobre esse único modo, é necessário contar também com o conjunto de artefato ocasionando os objetos do mundo comum cujo fala Hannah Arendt: esses objetos cuja estabilidade fez mundo de maneira compartilhável pelos homens ao longo de suas vidas e da sucessão de suas gerações. A proto-história tenta reunir as modalidades discursivas da história a partir desse único modo de sedimentação. Permanece que, no caso da história propriamente dita, o dispositivo comporta uma especularidade à evidência essencial: a dimensão histórica aberta pela de-sedimentação corresponde a uma prática histórica da sedimentação 247 na escritura, prática que confia e manda o que vive a humanidade a todo futuro dela mesma, segundo um gesto que se poderia batizar messiânico à Derrida. Então, uma questão feita de fato se ele tem alguma coisa como um critério do histórico em Sartre comparável àquele que deu Husserl, e isso apesar do fato que o filão da filosofia historicista onde ele se insere parece numa primeira abordagem proibir a formulação de um tal critério, tornando impossível ao fundo a tomada de recuo a respeito da história, a dúvida quanto à doação do histórico. A história "de fora construtivo do de dentro" Voltemos à Sartre e à última hipótese que nós fizemos, segundo o qual o traço propriamente histórico seria a emergência da totalidade do envolvimento enquanto tal: as coisas humanas adquiririam o modo histórico se agregando a uma totalidade de envolvimento. Isso queria então dizer que a práxis, no ordinário de seu exercício transformador, transportaria o objeto a partir da subjetividade projetiva, não seria já histórico por ele mesmo: não seria suficiente agir, trabalhar, lutar mesmo para fazer a história. Em termos arendtianos novamente: a dimensão da obra ou da fabricação não seria suficiente para a história. Acrescentamos que Sartre parece bem com efeito, se se julga segundo as notas esboçando o fim não redigido do volume II, em considerar a práxis como não suficiente para a história. Isso se marca de várias maneiras, que eu sinto como convergentes, mas necessitaria de uma análise e de um trabalho bem mais aprofundado para bem o mostrar. Na descrição que ele faz do evento histórico, ele sublinha o valor da intrusão externa desse último, do choque não imediatamente acionado em uma elaboração, um envolvimento: "Assim o evento histórico aparece como o exterior transformado do interior à interioridade, mas sem ação necessária do exterior sobre a exterioridade (práxisviolência) e sem fato imediato de interiorização. O evento vem como um ladrão"1. Ou então, refletindo sobre o progresso, ele opõe sentido e significação, o sentido sendo "o que é vivido em interioridade" (p. 411), e a significação se ligando nos fatores globais da explicação histórica. A história aparece então de novo como ligada à passagem a um plano que ultrapassa o simples exercício prático. Veja uma outra formulação: 248 "Mas ao mesmo tempo que prática, o sentido transborda o agente: ele tem rigor dialético que escapa. Eu fiz a História, como todo mundo, mas eu não a sou: se ela tem um sentido, é enquanto ela é"1. O mais recente sintagma sendo comentado como segue: A História tem um sentido? Mas "ter", é absurdo. De fato: a) A História, se ela existe, é a possibilidade permanente de um sentido para a vida humana. b) O sentido é a possibilidade permanente para o homem presente que exista uma História1. O b), a rigor, contradiria a definição do sentido dado ao final da obra, que reconduz a perspectiva do sentido àquela da finalidade e do projeto. Aqui, o sentido parece subordinado à História, que permanece marcada como a sua maneira transprático, como ser para além do fazer humano sempre individual. É que a função de a) e de b) é de ligar ao futuro teológico pessoal o plano da história com suas significações, de fazer aqui simultaneamente o horizonte e o recurso de lá. Talvez mais significativo ainda é o envolvimento denominado "A história é essencial ao homem?", questão à qual Sartre responde brutalmente Não (p. 454). A ideia de Sartre me parece ser que fora da história o homem é puro deslizamento de alteridade, não retém ou capta nenhuma essência: seu fazer projetando o expulsa de toda condição assinalável. Mas pela história ele herda um fora interiorizado-assumido no qual procede um ser-em-si tematizável, afixável, reivindicado. O exemplo de Sartre, muito assombroso a um tal ponto, é o ser-judeu, que ele vê bem que ele transcende a pura célula formal do se fazer do "organismo prático". A resistência do fato judeu à dissolução no gesto de autoultrapassamento do homem como projeto e práxis corresponde então a isso que se pode aqui chamar a transcendência da história. "Assim a História aparece como de fora constitutivo do de dentro a título de acaso indecifrável e entretanto assumido"1. O elemento histórico é esse pelo qual o ultrapassamento no qual está engajado o homem toma o estatuto de síntese heterogênea. A história leva o excedente que transmuta as linhas práticas em linhas afetadas de descontinuidade. E essa propriedade é a mesma que institui a cumulatividade global. O ultrapassamento é histórico antes que simplesmente prático na medida onde vale sobre o fundo do conjunto de um passado do tipo "levado em conta". O acúmulo 249 temporal e o alargamento coletivo ilimitado são o que funda a estranheza a retomar em cada futuro da história, se eu entendo bem. Tudo aqui nos faz ao mesmo tempo melhor entender que a totalização funciona como critério da historicidade: a referência à totalidade é para Sartre o que distingue a história da práxis individual, ou formal, o que a favor do qual podem se introduzir tanto a consagração quanto a descontinuidade autodesqualificante. Daí a necessidade, para aprofundar ainda um pouco mais e também, melhor o problema, de retornar ao exame filosófico por Sartre da noção de totalização de envolvimento. Eu queria aqui explorar uma longa passagem surpreendente em primeira leitura, passando pelo intermediário de uma experiência de pensamento colocando em jogo um extraterrestre. Sartre reflete sobre o sentido e o ser da totalização de envolvimento. Para cercar esse último, ele imagina um marciano ou um venusiano que toma conhecimento do exterior de todo o campo intersubjetivo-histórico da humanidade, e que ele vê como processo cósmico, como justaposição de exis verificáveis: que ignora absolutamente as torrentes de sentido que se afetam a esse campo para nós no interno, e não os relaciona jamais, do ponto de vista do sentido, que a sua cultura de marciano ou de venusiano. A possibilidade mesmo do observar do extra-terrestre assinala a pertinência necessária, exprimindo a limitação da ontologia, de uma objetivação completamente externa de intersubjetividade a mais englobante. Não é então "totalização de envolvimento" que pode se reduzir a uma camada objetiva-ontológica compreendendo da exterioridade a partir de índices semelhantes àqueles do marciano. Sartre se emprega com efeito a recomendar uma visão dual da totalização de envolvimento, compartilhada entre essa imagem cósmica externa e uma figura "intencional-interna", aquela de reunir cada prática individual com "plano da história", e pela qual ela se aprova como afetada-informada. Citemos rapidamente duas passagens onde se formula essa visão dual, longamente desenvolvida por Sartre. A primeira: (...) o ser transcendendo a História, é o ser-em-si assimilando, sem modificar a estrutura teleológica dele, o ser-para-si da interioridade, tornando o ser-em-si desse ser-para-si, na medida mesma onde toda ação humana – que ela seja individual ou comum – qualquer que seja os participantes e a consciência que eles têm de seus atos, de sua significação na interioridade do campo prático, tão breve quanto seja, na interioridade, sua estrutura de reflexão sobre ela mesma, deve 250 finalmente afundar na idealidade, no sonho, no epifenomenismo ou se produzir na exterioridade (e como produto da exterioridade) na solidão absoluta do ser-sem-testemunho, com suas estruturas imanentes e reflexivas1. A segunda: "A totalização compreende interioridade dela, é a práxis-processo; mas quando se a encara como o ser-em-si contendo dele mesmo seu ser-para-si, ela torna – enquanto objeto vazio de nosso alvo – o que nós chamamos de processo-práxis"1. Acrescentamos simplesmente as observações seguintes. Essa determinação dual é a resposta sartriana à questão do tipo de ser que volta à totalização de envolvimento, o contexto é bastante claro nisso, e ela é ao mesmo tempo a chave do que Sartre pensa como mais propriamente a História, embora o testemunho dele em outro lugar na nossa primeira citação. Nós estamos confirmados então na ideia que a "totalização de envolvimento" caracteriza a História ou o histórico para Sartre. Mas isso não é suficiente para fazer da noção um critério fenomenológico: ou ainda, não está claro que, por lá, Sartre fixa o sentido do histórico "para nós". É que, de fato, se eu o li bem, a totalização de envolvimento não é tanto isso o que nós reconhecemos o histórico, o sentido que nós pegamos emprestado a isso que nós mantemos para histórico ou encaramos como histórico, mas a História ela mesma como tema ontológico, em seu ser. E o ensinamento de Sartre, quanto à experiência nossa desse ser, é cindida. O lado da interioridade da História, o lado práxis-processo, é por definição experimentado ao menos, aprovado ao melhor, na medida onde a práxis individual se insere com seu tour finalizante na totalização de envolvimento. Mas o lado da exterioridade, o lado processo-práxis, é ao contrário por definição não experimentado, não percebido, não aprovado (é necessário convocar o extraterrestre para ele tomar um estatuto fenomenal). Sartre diz de modo bem forte que a História se situa naquilo que a ação humana entra no ser-sem-testemunho do plano cósmico. Para ser mais completo, nós devemos dizer aqui que ele prevê da mesma forma uma experiência negativa da transcendência cósmica da história para além de nossa estrutura prática (a favor, notadamente, de uma análise da morte). Poder-se-ia compartilhar as coisas, dizendo que a efetividade cósmica da História não pertence ao sentido (para nós) do histórico. Não restaria, como sentido 251 do histórico, que o referencia da experiência prático-finalizada a seu horizonte de totalização interna, como nós o temos de repente suspeitado. Mas me parece que essa avaliação refletirá imperfeitamente o ponto de vista de Sartre. De uma certa forma, para ele, o escapamento da História assombra também a face práxis-processo, a face nossa ou fenomenal. É o que parece na descrição aqui da intrusão da História na práxis individual como de fora: não se trata então de ser-em-si cósmico do campo intersubjetivo, mas bem do nó de significações globais que se ganha de mim, que meu encaminhamento prático assume, ao ponto que ele só pode tomar sentido pela relação a essa fonte envolvente. No fim das contas, a experiência da história e do histórico, parece, em Sartre, ser sempre, e de maneira essencial, experiência de um escapamento e de um excesso em relação a uma célula prático-subjetiva que ele não cessa jamais de afirmar a esse respeito a prioridade e a suficiência. Referência à totalidade e ao escapamento: tais seriam os dois elementos que assinalam a história como tal em Sartre. Mas nós os concebemos melhor se nós colocamos o problema no contexto da concepção da verdade quanto à história sustentada por Sartre: um estatuto transcendental do histórico se reconhece ao que ele determina a priori a verdade possível do juízo sobre o que é de ordem histórica, tal é a lei de bronze do transcendental em geral. Nós iremos de fato examinar a questão da verdade histórica em Sartre no contexto de sua concepção da verdade em geral. Verdade histórica, verdade, projeto Se exprimindo sobre a verdade histórica, Sartre recusa, a um primeiro nível, a ideia de uma autonomização do objeto que levaria a uma "dessituação" do conhecer, para retomar sua linguagem. Uma tal "dessituação" acontecendo seja quando a objetividade científica está tomada como natureza não-humana, chamando um deciframento em termos de leis estrangeiras à prática humana, seja quando o historiador se concebe como desimplicada do que descreve, e ele toma seu objeto histórico como uma frase acabada que a significação é estabelecida em uma eternidade, ao abrigo de toda compreensão alterante. De sumo início, essa concepção, colocando a codependência do historiador e da coisa histórica, parece induzira um relativismo: a verdade do tema 252 histórico é o que nós construímos e não o que se impõe a nós como o ser. Sartre se defende de uma tal consequência nos termos seguintes: "Essa ligação de dependência não implica, não o vimos, um relativismo ontológico: precisamente porque ele se tratava de ações humanas, a realidade prática de cada um escapava pelo princípio ao outro. Ou melhor, nós podíamos afirmar essa autonomia ontológica e por consequência a irredutibilidade do Ser ao ser-conhecido enquanto o objeto do conhecimento se temporalizando ao interior de um conjunto social mais vasto enquanto o definia-se unicamente pelas coordenadas humanas, ou seja, como sendo na sua realidade objetiva e em sua autonomia uma simples determinação e uma encarnação singularizante da temporalização em curso, ou seja, da totalização de envolvimento"1. Para Sartre ele mesmo, essa resposta não é suficiente, pela simples razão que ele refere o problema à totalização de envolvimento ele mesmo: o que permanece o conhecimento histórico objetivo é a obrigação imanente de uma intersubjetividade englobante onde figuram ao mesmo tempo o objeto histórico e o historiador. Tudo depende então do grau de "realidade" duro e resistente dessa intersubjetividade ela mesma. E nós vimos que Sartre se satisfazia em considerar isto em última análise como dual, como participando do ser-sem-testemunho na dispersão cósmica ao mesmo tempo que ela tem sua percentagem e sua posição na prática humana. É nessa medida que ele estima escapar do perigo de identificar realismo e humanismo (segundo suas palavras de novo). Notemos em todo caso que, no contexto dessa discussão, Sartre parece aderir à ideia que a verdade deve ser protegida do relativismo, o que significa que ela requer um certo realismo: ao fim das contas, Sartre autentifica, segundo toda aparência, o esquema adequacionista da verdade, segundo a qual os juízos verdadeiros são aqueles que correspondem a um real sobre o qual eles não têm nenhum poder. Esse ponto sendo um daqueles que podem parecer litígio dele no contexto de uma filosofia "dialética", ele está evidentemente importando de o marcar. Por conseguinte, na apresentação que dá Sartre da objetividade do historiador, tem-se o sentimento que ela a ele vem de um fora que o engloba: é o ser da intersubjetividade englobante que assina como "verdadeira" a descrição pelo historiador de seu tema histórico; é a partir dela que ele torna compreensível que o tratamento do tema pelo historiador "responde" ao tema ao sentido da interação. Para o dizer simplesmente, pode-se perguntar se uma tal concepção difere do que a 253 filosofia analítica contemporânea chama de "teoria causal da referência": recordamos que, segundo esse ponto de vista, o que funda a referencialidade dos nomes, em substância e para resumir ao excesso o pensamento em causa, é o fato que eles são empregados para designar suas nominata ao seio de uma história causal comum, que mantém a ligação entre real e nomes. Ora, o que parece fazer falta em uma tal reconstrução epistemológica, é o momento onde o real se prova ou vale como tal tornando isso que se liga em verdade a seu sujeito e para ele: uma concepção racionalista da verdade fiel à exigência inclusa na noção não quer que a oposição ontológica do real se faça valer diretamente à primeira pessoa do discurso do conhecimento, ao lugar de poder somente ser apreendido ao segundo tour em uma perspectiva englobante, em terceira pessoa? O real deve "pesar" em um pseudodiálogo do ser e do conhecimento. Para discutir justamente o problema, é necessário evocar aqui uma outra passagem de nosso segundo volume, onde Sartre expõe a consubstancialidade de fazer e de conhecer. Isso exposto parece residir o fundo de seu pensamento sobre o problema da verdade. A frase seguinte resume, eu creio, a concepção de Sartre: "Conhecer é criar posto que o conhecimento é uma determinação do Ser sobre a base da categoria prática da unidade: de fato, a unidade da experiência humana é na verdade unificação prática das multiplicidades interiores no campo"1. Para Sartre, o conhecimento é conhecimento do objeto, e o objeto aparece ao ser tanto quanto ele banha nele, quanto o ser em sua independência ontológica dele é o material, mas ele pertence ao conhecimento, ou seja, à prática embora ele só seja posto por uma unificação. Ora as unificações são os atos, são nossos atos. Sartre concebe aqui um perfazer continuado do fazer e do conhecer, e homologa aprofundando a fabricação do objeto "aberto" com a síntese categorial do objeto "conhecido". Essa homologação começa para ele na matemática: Sartre se refere à Liard, que insiste sobre a função de um ato gerador para dar sua unidade e sua identidade a uma figura geométrica, a partir de e acima de sua infinidade de divisões internas. Ao qual se acrescentará que, segundo ele, e se eu compreendo bem, a prática unificante começa na passividade, no movimento incontrolável e natural da biologia sensorial por exemplo. Dizemos que a visão sartriana tem aqui seu lado cognitivo. O fazer que está implicado no conhecer e que dele é uma parte essencial não é somente um fazer de alto nível, categorial ou ideal, ele é também e ao mesmo tempo um fazer biológico ou o fazer da fabricação operária. 254 Em todo caso, para Sartre, a prova da realidade inclusa no conhecer é a prova comportada pelo fazer. Se meu saber carrega sobre o real e se colide com ele em sua independência, é porque ela supera tanto em fazer a dispersão quanto seja a forma característica do ser. A questão colocada toda hora pode evidentemente ser colocada novamente: essa forma de oposição ao real, à primeira pessoa dessa vez na linha de um discurso em terceira pessoa, é uma oposição racional, pela qual pode passar a autorretificação da verdade? Eu posso acrescentar ao que precede um comentário que tentará redizer e recolocar as coisas pela relação à concepção heideggeriana da verdade, que impressionou Sartre ao ponto que de ele escrever um texto a retomando a sua conta para a readaptar e a domesticar (verdade e existência). Nesse curto ensaio, que merecia análises bem mais detalhadas, e a consideração de outros aspectos, eu fixo para as necessidades da presente discussão somente dois elementos. Primeiro, a forma cujo Sartre retoma o motivo heideggeriano do desvelamento nele fazendo subir um deslocamento prático. Em seu artigo "A essência da verdade", sabe-se, Heidegger começa por destacar que, na verdade, trata-se de uma conformidade (do discurso ao real para a verdade de juízo, da coisa a sua essência nos empregos como "um verdadeiro marinheiro"); mas é para prosseguir remontando a uma medida da verdade em montante da conformidade, do lado do desvelamento, termo que não outro que a tradução da alèteia grega. De tal modo, a verdade é reconduzida ao evento da revelação, pela qual a intriga do juízo onde a orientação da coisa para a qual ela teria que se conformar são dadas ou preparadas. Da verdade como relação intelectual ou epistêmica, é-se reconduzido à essência da verdade, que se assegura ao polo ontológico. Sartre entende tudo isso, e, aparentemente, dele regozija-se ou dele apropria-se: ele religa tão radicalmente quanto Heidegger a verdade ao desvelamento. Mas o desvelamento é doravante o agir do esclarecimento do em si pelo para si, pela realidade humana: "Assim a verdade é temporalização do Ser tal qual ele é como o absolutosujeito ele confere um desvelamento progressivo como nova dimensão de ser"1. Vê-se bem a diferença com o esquema de Heidegger: para esse último, o desvelamento é o fato do ser, a estrutura da manifestação é anônima e primeira em relação ao Dasein. Ao inverso, em Sartre, o em si é por ele mesmo incapaz da verdade, incapaz da luz pressuposta em toda verdade, ele pertence por ele mesmo à 255 "noite sem data". É necessária a distância nadificadora levada pelo para si para que o desvelamento se opere. Retomemos que, até lá, Sartre parece conservar o que eu chamaria da "distância vericitativa", a diferença entre o mundo e um fora-mundo, que me parece absolutamente necessária a toda concepção da verdade respeitosa de sua exigência (uma pretensão à verdade não é uma se ela não é um tipo de aposta para o mundo desde o fora-mundo). Ao mesmo tempo, nós vemos já que o desvelamento que fala Sartre, função central da verdade, é o conjunto tomado em uma história: as expressões de verdade subjetiva se fixam nos enunciados, tomando assim a suficiência e a estabilidade do em si, que são então chamados a umas retomadas e a uns deslocamentos em uma história. E isso tanto mais quanto Sartre pensa os enunciados de verdades como endereçados, como "dados" aos homens outros ou segundo o que os prosseguem sobre eles. De um lado, Sartre identifica o esclarecimento da verdade pela realidade humana como a dimensão do projeto ela mesmo, como o fato da liberdade. Reencontra-se então a "colusão" do conhecer e do fazer, do teórico e do prático, já reencontrado no segundo volume da Crítica da razão dialética. O segundo elemento que eu gostaria de acentuar é a concepção do erro que vai com esse pensamento da verdade. O erro é para Sartre o movimento mesmo da verificação da verdade no projeto e o agir enquanto ele encalha. Para esclarecer o em si e saber, eu devo projetar, antecipar: inserir em última análise um comportamento verificante no ser, que o explora e se confirma ou se desconfirma nele. O risco do erro é então na verdade, e o erro se produzirá como decepção verificante ou como abstenção verificante: eu produzo também o erro para a área imensa desse inverso no qual eu não envio minhas antecipações verificantes. O erro é assim encarado por Sartre, se eu o compreendo bem, como inerente ao famoso comportamento da avestruz. Cada demissão de minha liberdade, pelo efeito do qual eu não assumo em meu brilho verificando uma parte do mundo, constitui o erro. Mas essa concepção de erro é ela também imediatamente engajada, na perspectiva histórica: a verdade é, em seu fundo, "proporcional" a uma totalização seguindo o comportamento verificante que está sempre se fazendo em uma história da verdade. Essa última não sendo somente a história da ciência, mas também aquela da humanidade (ponto por onde Sartre, de fato, converge com Heidegger). 256 Quais são as consequências desses novos elementos sobre a concepção sartriana da prova racional de um lado, sobre a determinação implícita de um sentido da história como tal do outro lado? Isso que nós compreendemos de início, é que a verdade está ligada ao esquema de sua totalização em curso, ou seja, segundo o que nós temos visto, ao que assina a história como tal em Sartre. Em sua ligação epistemológica mesmo ao risco do erro, a verdade é engajada em uma "obra" verificante que faz história, que é a história mesma em um sentido. Em segundo lugar, nós compreendemos que a prova racional da verdade se identifica para Sartre ao reencontro do real na práxis. Sartre cita na página 51 James: "A verdade do pudim, é de ser comido". É o ponto que nos faz duvidar que ele tinha prova racional: na medida onde ela supõe, parece, que os objetos se opõe como "sendo o caso" melhor que como tendo agido. Que eles sejam provas como tendo agido, seja talvez isto necessário, mas não suficiente: ele não pertence ao conceito de agir que eu registre isso sobre o que meu agir final como objeto (isso era, em verdade, o conteúdo da doutrina heideggeriana da Zuhandenheit). Mas, em terceiro lugar, parece-me que nós devemos ver também que, para Sartre, o engajamento originário da verdade no desenvolvimento histórico se exprime ainda eminentemente nisso que minha verdade será englobada e prescrita pela verdade futura. Citemo-lo: "A liberdade deve assumir uma herança, ela deixa que ela faça uma herança, ela não diz nem o que será legítima esta herança, nem o que farão dessas heranças, nem o que serão essas heranças. Ela não diz nem se ela esperará seu fim, nem se seu fim atacado não se destruirá dela mesma. Mas é na perspectiva desse risco e dessa ignorância que ela se historializa e desvela o Ser em Verdade"1. Todo o fim de verdade e existência é marcado pelo problema da retomada de nossas verdades pelas gerações futuras. Sartre tenta definir e manter uma verdade da época filosoficamente resistente à sua anulação na Verdade das totalizações ulteriores. O que dá lugar à conclusão: "Não se pretendendo viver com meus netos, eu os impeço de me julgar com seus parâmetros". Entretanto, segundo o que eu acreditei compreender em Sartre e de Sartre, o endereço da verdade e a verdade futura pertencem essencialmente à verdade. A indexação sobre a totalização em curso não é justamente o que a distingue de uma 257 pura relação de ação-reação ao real, como vai o fazer stricto sensu? O que faz que o pedaço de rocha que eu estudo cientificamente se oponha a mim de maneira racional, é que ele não vale somente como seu reagir atual a tal ou tal aspecto de meu fazer, mas para pesquisa da reação "totalizada" a priori que se envolve nele: é numa tal perspectiva que eu me ligo ao conhecimento de sua verdade. E, da mesma forma, sabemos bem que nós não podemos impedir a história epistemologicamente de ser "recorrente", ou seja precisamente de julgar os avós com os parâmetros dos netos. Eu gostaria justamente, a título de último esforço de pensamento para as concepções de Sartre, insistir sobre o que uma tal formulação envolve: ela traduz a relação entre a verdade cujo eu sou hoje capaz e a verdade mais englobante a vir como uma relação do homem presente ao homem futuro. Relação que, em seu princípio, tem duas faces: de um lado, o homem presente dá sua verdade ao homem futuro (é o sentido da objetivação no enunciado segundo Sartre); de outro lado, o homem futuro engloba e eventualmente aniquila em sua retomada a verdade do homem passado. Eu não posso me impedir de pensar aqui em Frantz, em "Os sequestros de Altona", que dialoga com os caranguejos do século XXX, para tentar justificar o seu. Me parece que a prova racional da verdade, em Sartre, é essa relação dissimétrica entre o homem presente e o homem futuro, ao menos como a confrontação com o objeto. Ou pelo menos, o horizonte de totalização, que especifica a relação de agir como "liberando" uma relação racional ao sendo, assim que nós acabamos de o sugerir, depende dessa dupla relação, da retomada da verdade ao homem do futuro, e da herança da verdade do homem do passado. Mas não poderia, então, considerar esse elemento como um componente do que caracteriza o histórico como tal, enquanto a verdade (posto que Sartre os acopla)? Dir-se-ia então que a "totalização" que assina o histórico ou a historicidade é uma totalização "para o homem" e "desde o homem": ela é articulação de dívida e de dom. Sartre teria assim colocado o dedo sobre uma estrutura ética da historicidade, estrutura que é bem isso através do que a história nos é dada como tal. Ele acrescentaria no critério de a Rückfrage de Husserl, que cobre a dimensão da dívida, isso do futuro e do dom. E seu pensamento, a esse respeito, se inscreveria no conjunto das compreensões dos destinos da história. 258 i Cf. Sartre, J.P., 1943, L'être et le néant, Paris, Gallimard, p. 229. ii Cf. loc. cit., p. 293. iii Cf. loc. cit., p. 294. ivCf. loc. cit., p. 295. vCf. loc. cit., p. 296. vi Cf. loc. cit., p. 297. vii Cf. loc. cit., p. 298. viiiCf. loc. cit., p. 309. ixThe Truman Show (1998), do diretor australiano Peter Weir, conta a história de um herói cuja vida é o tema central de uma emissão de tele-realidade: todo seu ambiente é constituído de atores e sua aldeia é um cena. Entendendo progressivamente a falsidade desse mundo, ele termina por pesquisar os limites e encontrar, para além destes, os organizadores do show. x "A vergonha pura não é umsentimento de ser tal ou tal objeto repreensível mas, em geral, de ser um objeto, ou seja de me reconhecer nesse ser degradado, dependente e imóvel que eu sou para outrem"; O ser e o nado, p. 328. xiCf. loc. cit., p. 313. xiiCf. loc. cit., p. 458. xiiiCf. loc. cit., p. 458. xivCf. loc. cit., p. 459. xvCf. loc. cit., p. 464. xviCf. loc. cit., p. 465. xviiCf. loc. cit., p. 466. xviiiCf. loc. cit., p. 554-555. xixCf. loc. cit., p. 570. xxCf. loc. cit., p. 558. xxiCf. loc. cit., p. 558. xxiiCf. loc. cit., p. 571. xxiiiCf. loc. cit., p. 559. xxivCf. loc. cit., p. 560. xxvCf. loc. cit., p. 574. xxviCf. loc. cit., p. 665-676. xxviiCf. loc. cit., p. 665. xxviii Filósofo e especialista dos estudos judeus professor na Universidade hebraica de Jerusalém; co-organizador, com J. Hansel, do colóquio "Levinas e a política" que aconteceu em Jerusalém em Junho de 2003. xxixCf. loc. cit., p. 665. xxxCf. loc. cit., p. 666. xxxiCf. loc. cit., p. 668. xxxii Eu penso isso no artigo famoso de D. Janicaud, "A virada teológica da fenomenologia francesa", republicado como livro em 1991 para as Edições de l'Éclat.

Théories causales de la référence pour les noms propres Nicolae Sfetcu 13.03.2020 Sfetcu, Nicolae, « Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres », SetThings (13 mars 2020), MultiMedia Publishing (ISBN : 978-606-033-345-6), DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18713.77921, URL = https://www.setthings.com/fr/e-books/theories-causalesde-la-reference-pour-les-noms-propres/ Email: [email protected] Cet article est sous licence Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International. Pour voir une copie de cette licence, visitez http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/. Une traduction de : Sfetcu, Nicolae, « Teorii cauzale ale referinței pentru nume proprii », SetThings (7 iulie 2019), DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.23906.89289, ISBN: 978-606-033-233-6, URL = https://www.setthings.com/ro/e-books/teorii-cauzale-ale-referintei-pentru-nume-proprii/ Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 2 Abstract Je souligne et compare les principales théories causales de la référence pour les noms propres et propose une nouvelle approche basée sur l'analogie de la chaîne des blocs de la technologie de blockchain et la théorie narrative de Paul Ricoeur. Après une brève Introduction dans laquelle sont passés en revue les types de propositions du concept de mondes possibles et une vue d'ensemble de la théorie dans La théorie causale de la référence, je présente la théorie causale initiale de la référence proposée par Saul Kripke, puis deux théories causales hybrides développées par Gareth Evans et Michael Devitt. Dans la section Blockchain et l'arbre causal de la référence je présente mon idée de développer une nouvelle théorie causale de la référence pour les noms propres à l'aide d'un arbre causal de la référence. Dans les Conclusions, je parle du développement ultérieur des modes dont les termes de référence pourraient faire référence à certains objets et individus, les principales critiques des théories causales et des suggestions pour un développement futur. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 3 Introduction John Stuart Mill a soutenu que les noms peuvent être divisés en deux types : connotatifs et non-connotatifs. Les noms propres sont les seuls noms d'objets qui n'ont pas de connotation et n'ont pas de sens strict. (Mill 1882) John Searle soutient que chaque nom propre est associé à un ensemble de descriptions qui déterminent la référence. Ainsi, le nom dénote indirectement. (John R. Searle 1958) Saul Kripke critique la vision frégéenne de Searle, arguant que les noms sont directement liés à leur nominatum, et que leurs noms sont des désignateurs rigides assurant le même individu dans tous les mondes possibles. Kripke étend cette idée à des types de choses naturels : humains, chiens, or, eau, qui ne seraient pas descriptifs, mais directement dénotatifs. (S. Kripke 1980) Plus tard, Hilary Putnam est arrivée à la même conclusion. (Putnam 1973) Gareth Evans présente sa propre vision, distinguant deux types de théories descriptives : une théorie de ce qu'un locuteur dénote par un nom, et une théorie de ce qu'un nom se désigne. (Evans 1982) Plus tard, Searle revient en se défendant contre les critiques de Kripke, introduisant les concepts de « contenu intentionnel » et de « statut intentionnel ». Dans leurs définitions et arguments, les philosophes ont utilisé le concept de mondes possibles, avec le monde réel comme l'un des nombreux mondes possibles. Chaque sentence est vraie ou fausse, dans tous les mondes possibles. Ainsi, nous avons de vraies sentences (celles qui sont vraies dans le monde réel), fausses (qui sont fausses dans le monde réel), possibles (celles qui sont vraies dans au moins un monde possible), impossibles (ou nécessairement de fausses sentences, ceux qui ne sont pas vrais dans aucun monde possible), nécessairement vrais (ceux qui sont vrais dans tous les mondes possibles) et contingents (ceux qui sont vrais dans certains mondes possibles et faux dans d'autres). Saul Kripke a introduit pour la première fois une Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 4 sémantique de logique modale dans laquelle une sentence possible est vraie dans au moins un monde possible, et une sentence nécessaire est vraie dans tous les mondes possibles. 1. La théorie causale de la référence Les théories descriptives ont tenté d'éliminer certaines contradictions logiques si les noms étaient considérés comme des descriptions définitives. Kripke a rejeté la validité de ces théories descriptives en faisant valoir qu'aucune description unique de l'identité n'était nécessaire, les descriptions d'identification peuvent être utilisées même si la référence n'a pas été correctement identifiée, et une description (par opposition à un nom) ne peut pas fonctionner comme un indicateur rigide. Par la suite, les théories descriptives ont étendu cette idée de la description définie à un ensemble de descriptions ou à une moyenne pondérée de ces descriptions. Les théories causales de la référence décrivent comment les termes acquièrent des références spécifiques (en particulier les termes logiques, les noms propres et les termes naturels) sur la base de preuves. Dans le cas des noms, une théorie causale de la référence suppose que 1) le référent du nom est fixé par une désignation originale (appelée par Saul Kripke « baptême initial »), après quoi le nom devient un désignateur rigide de cet objet ; 2) le nom est ensuite transmis à la communication via une chaîne causale. Saul Kripke et Hilary Putnam ont proposé d'étendre la théorie causale aux termes naturels. En général, les théories causales de la référence peuvent être classées en théories causaleshistoriques de la référence (version originale), représentées en particulier par Keith Donnellan (Donnellan 1972) et Saul Kripke, (S. A. Kripke 1979) avec l'idée d'une chaîne causale-historique (Cumming 2016) et les théories causales-descriptives de la référence (Psillos 1999) développées Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 5 par David Lewis (Lewis 1984) sur l'idée qu'il doit y avoir un système descriptif minimal comme intermédiaire dans les relations causales entre le locuteur et l'objet. La principale critique de la théorie causale était que la communication entre les différents utilisateurs du nom est insuffisante à expliquer. Louis deRosset a souligné les principales différences entre les théories descriptives et causales-historiques : (deRosset 2011) • Théories descriptives --Théories causales-historiques • Les informations personnelles aident à déterminer la référence du nom --Peu importe les informations, seule la position historique détermine la référence du nom • Vous ne pouvez pas être massivement mal informé sur le référent de nom --Vous pouvez être massivement mal informé sur le référent de nom • Vous ne pouvez pas vraiment être insuffisamment informé sur le référent du nom de telles situations sont des cas de déférence --Vous pouvez être insuffisamment informé sur le référent du nom • Si vous êtes insuffisamment informé mais utilisez toujours un nom pour une personne en particulier, vous devez penser à vos propres mots. --Si vous êtes insuffisamment informé mais utilisez toujours un nom pour une personne en particulier, vous n'avez pas besoin de penser à vos propres mots. 2. Saul Kripke Depuis les années 1960, Kripke a été une figure centrale dans un certain nombre de domaines liés à la logique mathématique, la philosophie du langage, la philosophie mathématique, la métaphysique, l'épistémologie et la théorie des ensembles. Il a eu des contributions influentes et originales à la logique, en particulier la logique modale, et la philosophie analytique, avec une Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 6 sémantique de logique modale impliquant des mondes possibles, maintenant appelée sémantique de Kripke. (Fodor 2004)(Fodor 2004) Il a développé l'argument selon lequel la nécessité est une notion « métaphysique », qui doit être séparée de la notion épistémique a priori, et qu'il existe des vérités nécessaires qui sont des vérités a posteriori, telles que « cette eau est H2O ». Dans Naming and Necessity, Kripke a proposé une théorie causale de la référence selon laquelle un nom se réfère à un objet en vertu d'une connexion causale avec l'objet, médiatisée par les communautés de locuteurs. Il déclare également que les noms propres, contrairement à la plupart des descriptions, sont des désignations rigides (le nom propre fait référence à l'objet nommé dans tout monde possible dans lequel l'objet existe). (S. Kripke 1980) Les idées de Naming and Necessity ont évolué au fil du temps, se développant sur la base de recherches formelles antérieures en théorie des modèles pour la logique modale, basées sur le principe leibnizien d'identité des indiscernables. Kripke déclare que les descriptions ne peuvent pas être considérées comme des définitions des noms, ni leurs références, ni leurs significations. Kripke introduit ainsi le terme « désignateur rigide » pour quelque chose qui désigne le même objet dans tous les mondes possibles, et prétend que les noms propres sont des noms rigides. L'existence d'un désignateur rigide n'implique pas que l'objet existe dans un monde possible. Cela suppose simplement que dans les mondes où le désignateur existe, c'est le même objet. Kripke énumère et commence à discuter les six thèses de la théorie descriptive des noms, mettant en évidence une condition (non-circularité) nécessaire pour satisfaire ces thèses : « Pour toute théorie réussie, l'expression n'a pas à être circulaire. Les propriétés utilisées pour voter ne doivent pas impliquer elles-mêmes la notion de référence de telle manière qu'elle soit finalement impossible à éliminer. » Il rejette la théorie selon laquelle le référent d'un nom doit être identifié par un procès de jugement dans lequel les descriptions sont comparées ou évaluées. Afin d'éviter la circularité, la Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 7 description identificatrice, bien qu'elle ne doive pas inclure une auto-référence, peut inclure une référence à la référence de quelqu'un d'autre (une référence peut emprunter d'une autre référence son authentification). Ainsi, Kripke esquisse une théorie causale de la référence : un nom se propage comme une chaîne à travers des mots entre les gens. La chaîne commence lorsqu'un enfant reçoit le nom et les parents commencent à parler de l'enfant en utilisant ce nom. À l'autre extrémité, il pourrait y avoir une personne qui ne l'a jamais rencontrée et qui ne connaît certainement pas le chemin suivi par la chaîne des noms pour l'atteindre. De l'avis de Kripke, il existe un lien depuis le « baptême » initial, mais les détails ne sont pas clairs. Contrairement à Strawson qui impose l'exigence selon laquelle le locuteur doit savoir de qui il a reçu la référence, (P. F. Strawson 1950) la théorie de Kripke n'impose pas une telle exigence : ce qui est pertinent n'est pas la façon dont le locuteur pense qu'il a reçu la référence, mais la chaîne de communication actuelle. La référence, pour Kripke, dépend non seulement de ce que nous pensons de nom propre, mais aussi de la communauté, de l'histoire de la façon dont le nom est repris par le locuteur et d'autres questions similaires. Pour une telle théorie, les résultats sont quelque peu différents dans le cas d'un homme célèbre que d'un homme ordinaire. Fondamentalement, selon Kripke, il y a un « baptême » initial dans lequel l'objet peut être nommé par ostentation ou la référence du nom peut être fixée par une description. Lorsqu'une personne communique le nom à d'autres, le destinataire doit avoir l'intention, lors de son utilisation, d'attribuer la même référence. Kripke admet qu'il y a des cas où les descriptions font réellement référence, mais elles ne sont pas synonymes du nom. Le référent des noms est généralement déterminé par une série de liens de causalité entre les personnes qui ont utilisé le nom, et lorsque le référent d'un nom est Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 8 déterminé par une propriété attribuée à cette chose, la connexion est contingente, plutôt que nécessaire ou essentielle. Kripke met en évidence la situation dans laquelle le locuteur a des opinions erronées sur une personne, auquel cas la référence est déterminée par le fait que le locuteur est membre d'une communauté de locuteurs utilisant le nom, qui a été transmis par la tradition d'un lien à un autre. Le rôle des propriétés identifiables de manière unique, dans de nombreux cas de désignation, n'est que de définir une référence, par certains indices contingents. Cette théorie causale de la référence peut entraîner plusieurs problèmes : il peut y avoir des noms qui ne se réfèrent pas, la chaîne peut être interrompue, un changement de référence peut se produire, etc. En outre, Kripke n'a pas suffisamment expliqué ce qui constitue un « lien » de la chaîne. Selon Kripke, la signification d'un nom est l'objet auquel il se réfère, et le référent d'un nom est déterminé par un lien de causalité entre une sorte de « baptême » et des déclarations ultérieures. Il reconnaît ainsi la possibilité de propriétés sémantiques supplémentaires pour les phrases contenant des noms, pouvant ainsi expliquer pourquoi deux noms qui se réfèrent à la même personne peut donner différentes valeurs de vérité dans les phrases sur les croyances. Plus tard, dans l'article A Puzzle about Belief, Kripke semble s'opposer à cette possibilité. (S. A. Kripke 1979) Son argument serait que deux noms qui se réfèrent au même objet mais ont des propriétés sémantiques différentes devraient expliquer pourquoi les noms co-référentiels se comportent différemment dans les phrases sur les différentes croyances. Kripke prétend que cela démontre que l'attribution de propriétés sémantiques supplémentaires aux noms n'explique pas ce qui est prévu. Kripke esquisse une image causale des noms avec deux composantes : la fixation de référence et l'emprunt de référence. (Devitt and Sterelny 1999) La fixation de la référence d'un Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 9 nom est obtenue grâce à un « baptême initial ». La référence est fixée à un objet par une personne présente, par ostentation ou par description. Par la suite, le nom se propage à travers le prêt de référence, à travers une « chaîne de communication causale », se répandant dans la communauté. La chaîne doit être conservée au moins aussi longtemps que les personnes qui entendent le nom identifient la référence au même objet qu'elles ont entendu. Kripke fournit des exemples où sa théorie ne semble pas échouer, comme dans le cas des changements de référence d'une personne qui existait à un personnage fictif. La chaîne de référence causale peut inclure une personne qui n'a jamais rencontré la personne référencée et ne sait pas quel chemin la chaîne a suivi pour l'atteindre. Dans l'exemple du célèbre physicien américain Richard Feynman, « Même s'il ne se souvient plus de qui il a entendu de Feynman ou de qui a entendu parler de Feynman. Il sait que Feynman est un physicien célèbre. Un certain passage dans la communication qui se réfère finalement à l'homme lui-même [Feynman] il arrive à l'orateur puis il se réfère à Feynman même s'il ne peut pas l'identifier de manière unique. (...) [Il pourrait] avoir du mal à faire la distinction entre Gell-Mann et Feynman. Donc, il n'a pas besoin de savoir ces choses, mais une chaîne de communication a été établie qui va jusqu'à Feynman lui-même, en raison de l'appartenance à une communauté qui a passé le nom d'une connexion à une autre ». (S. Kripke 1980, 91) Malheureusement, Kripke ne fournit pas trop de détails clairs, tels que ce qui constitue un « lien » de la chaîne. En outre, la théorie de Kripke génère également des problèmes, tels que l'existence de noms qui ne font pas référence à de vraies personnes, ou la possibilité que la chaîne puisse se briser, ou qu'un changement de référence se produise en cours de route, comme dans le cas de Madagascar analysé par Gareth Evans. (Evans and Altham 1973) John Searle, dans Proper Names and Intentionality, (John Rogers Searle 1982) critique la théorie de Kripke: l'explication de l'introduction du nom dans le baptême est, en fait, descriptive; la chaîne causale externe n'atteint pas l'objet, seulement au baptême de l'objet, qui peut ou non avoir une connexion causale externe avec l'objet; nous pouvons introduire un nom par description Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 10 et l'utiliser comme référence, même en tant que « désignateur rigide », et les entités abstraites avec leurs noms propres sont incapables d'initier des chaînes causales physiques; la chaîne causale n'est pas « pure », elle inclut le contenu intellectuel associé à chaque utilisation d'un nom. Sa conclusion est que l'image de la chaîne de causalité de Kripke n'offre aucune condition suffisante, ni aucune condition nécessaire. L'erreur d'une telle théorie causale serait qu'elle va au-delà de l'analogie entre référence et perception explicitement développée par Donnellan. (Donnellan 1974) 3. Gareth Evans Gareth Evans, dans The Causal Theory of Names, a déclaré que la théorie causale de la référence doit être élargie pour inclure ce qu'il appelle des « bases multiples ». Après le baptême initial, l'utilisation du nom en présence de la personne peut, dans les bonnes circonstances, être considérée comme renforçant le nom dans son référent. Pour ceux qui sont en contact direct avec la personne, la référence pour l'expression du nom est résolue au moyen d'une chaîne causale qui inclut les personnes qui l'ont connue lors du « baptême », ou en indexant la personne au nom au moment de la communication. La chaîne causale peut se poursuivre à travers une série d'utilisations référentielles du nom tout au long de la vie de la personne. En cas de confusion, le changement de nom d'un référent peut se produire. (Evans and Altham 1973) Selon Evans, la théorie causale dans sa variante initiale permet que, quelle que soit la distance ou l'obscurité du lien de causalité entre l'utilisation d'un nom propre et l'objet auquel il est fait référence initialement, la référence est conservée. La théorie ignore ainsi le contexte en recourant à des « tours de magie », et ne peut donc pas expliquer les changements de référence. Evans est d'accord avec Kripke pour rejeter la théorie descriptive de la référence, (S. Kripke 1980) arguant qu'un sujet peut penser à un objet particulier en raison de l'existence d'une relation contextuelle avec lui ; mais il remet en question l'image cryptique en acceptant l'idée qu'un nom Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 11 peut changer sa référence au fil du temps et en arguant qu'un simple lien de causalité est insuffisant pour se référer. Plus tard, dans The Varieties of Reference, (Evans 1982) il adopte le principe de Frege « pas de référence, pas de pensée » (une phrase contenant un nom sans référence n'a pas de valeur de vérité et n'exprime pas une pensée); (Frege 1892) ainsi la fonction sémantique d'un nom est de se référer à un objet, à l'exclusion des noms dénués de sens mais non référentiels. Mais, contrairement à Frege, il fait appel à l'assimilation par Frege de « l'utilisation de noms vides avec les utilisations fictives du langage qui expriment les sens prétendus ou les « pensées prétendues » ». (Borchert 2006) Pour Evans, les termes singuliers (y compris ceux qui incluent des pronoms démonstratifs) sont conformes au principe « pas de référence, pas de pensée », les appelant « russelliens ». Evans rejette la thèse solide (que les conditions théoriques de la description sont suffisantes) en acceptant la thèse plus faible selon laquelle une identification descriptive est requise pour le nom. Il voit ainsi la théorie de la description indifférenciée comme l'expression de deux idées. « (a) la dénotation d'un nom est déterminée par ce que les locuteurs entendent faire référence à l'utilisation du nom « (b) l'objet qu'un locuteur a l'intention de nommer en utilisant un nom est celui qui satisfait ou correspond à la plupart des descriptions qui composent le groupe d'informations que le locuteur a associé avec le nom. » (Evans and Altham 1973) Avec (a) il y a des problèmes d'interprétation au niveau micro, mais dans le nom, comme pour les autres expressions du langage, ce que cela signifie dépend de la façon dont nous les utilisons. (b) c'est le vrai problème : le référent prévu d'une utilisation régulière d'un nom par un locuteur ne peut pas être un élément isolé causal à la communauté et à la culture de l'utilisateur ; mais « la relation causale importante se situe entre les états et les faits de cet élément et l'ensemble Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 12 d'informations du locuteur, et non entre l'élément nommé avec un nom et son utilisation contemporaine par le locuteur. » (Evans and Altham 1973) La dénomination d'un nom dans la communauté dépendra d'une manière complexe de ce à quoi ceux qui utilisent ce terme entendent faire référence (« le référent prévu »). Evans tente d'éliminer le problème de l'ambiguïté en utilisant une notion indéfinie de référence du locuteur par des prêts de la théorie de la communication. Nous acquérons nos connaissances et formons nos croyances dans le processus de collecte d'informations par le biais d'une interaction causale avec un objet particulier qui fait partie d'une longue chaîne causale. Les légendes et l'imagination peuvent ajouter de nouveaux éléments. Une identification incorrecte peut différencier la source d'information considérée de la vraie. Il s'avère qu'un ensemble d'informations peut contenir des éléments provenant de différentes sources, pouvant atteindre un élément dominant appartenant à une source différente de celle d'origine. Un locuteur se réfère, finalement, à l'élément dominant dans l'ensemble d'informations associé. Dans ce contexte, Evans propose la définition suivante : « « NP » est un nom de x s'il y a une communauté C « 1. Où l'on sait que les membres de la communauté ont dans leur répertoire la procédure d'utilisation de « NP » pour se référer à x (avec l'intention de se référer à x); « 2. Le succès du référencement dans tout cas spécial qui devait être basé sur la connaissance commune entre le locuteur et l'auditeur que « NP » était utilisé pour faire référence à x par les membres de la communauté, et non après une connaissance commune de la satisfaction par les prédicats intégrés dans « NP ». » Ainsi, Evans fait la distinction entre l'utilisation sur la base de ce que nous savons et l'utilisation sur d'autres bases, distinguant ainsi « le fonctionnement référentiel des noms, qui peuvent être des descriptions grammaticales, de ceux des descriptions ». (Evans and Altham 1973) Les intentions seules ne sont pas suffisantes pour qu'un nom obtienne une dénotation, mais sans intentions claires, il peut ne pas y avoir de connaissance commune requise pour la pratique. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 13 Les conditions d'Evans sont plus strictes que celles de Kripke, éliminant sa « magie ». Afin de permettre au nom de pouvoir changer sa dénotation, Evans propose un complément à la définition ci-dessus avec un nouveau terme, déférentiel (concernant les individus ou groupes de personnes étendant l'usage des expressions dans une communauté). Evans propose divers arguments pour montrer que la théorie de Kripke ne correspond pas à notre pratique d'utilisation des noms: la détermination contextuelle de qui c'est est important, sauf pour la théorie causale, (Bhowmick 2015, 194) on peut utiliser le nom sans être nécessairement causal lié à d'autres utilisateurs du nom, il y a la possibilité d'une approche unifiée pour toutes les façons d'éliminer l'ambiguïté du discours, le changement de référence n'est pas pris en compte par la théorie causale de la référence. En conclusion, Evans ne prétend pas que la théorie causale est erronée ; il essaie simplement de l'adapter à l'utilisation des noms de personnes dans des circonstances ordinaires. Gareth Evans déclare qu'il peut y avoir de grandes différences entre la compréhension des « producteurs » (personnes associant des noms à la reconnaissance de la personne) et des « consommateurs » (qui, selon Evans, « ne sont pas en mesure d'injecter de nouvelles informations dans la pratique, mais doivent être fondés sur la collecte d'informations auprès des producteurs. (Evans 1982)) des déclarations de noms propres. Selon Sikander Iamil, les accepteurs sont de vrais acteurs dans l'utilisation des noms propres, en utilisant le nom d'un référent spécifique basé sur les informations reçues d'autres locuteurs. Mais il y a un possibilité de déformation des informations reçues, car les noms propres ne sont pas renforcés, après la nomination, que par leur utilisation par les accepteurs : « La signification du nom propre est assurée par sa correspondance immédiate avec un certain objet. Par conséquent, un nom propre et un référent doivent être aller ensemble ; penser à l'un mènera à l'autre ... tout locuteur peut utiliser un nom sans même le comprendre, ce Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 14 qui signifie simplement comprendre l'objet correspondant, à savoir du référent. Mais la désinformation peut contaminer la pensée du locuteur sur le référent du nom. » (Jamil 2011) Evans soutient que « la pleine compréhension de l'utilisation d'un nom nécessite que le référent du nom soit un objet de la pensée du sujet ». (Evans 1982) Ainsi, les noms propres dépendent de la foi, des pensées et des intentions des utilisateurs. Un seul producteur présente des arguments solides en raison de sa connaissance initiale du nom. Le consommateur ne connaît le référent que sur la base des informations fournies par le producteur. Plus un nom est souvent utilisé par les locuteurs, plus il se renforce dans l'esprit des locuteurs, le rendant de plus en plus authentique. S'il s'agit d'un nom avec des référents différents dans deux réseaux de communication distincts, des informations supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour une identification correcte lorsque les informations passent d'un réseau à l'autre. Un problème particulier se pose dans le cas d'une communauté qui fonctionne comme un système d'information fermé mais perméable. Dans un tel système fermé, un nom peut être déformé (intentionnellement ou non), résultant en plusieurs noms propres pour le même référent qui peuvent fonctionner en parallèle, se chevauchant parfois dans la communication entre différents réseaux. Cette distorsion peut prendre la forme de la diffusion de « fausses nouvelles », ou peut être utilisée intentionnellement dans les procédures de diffamation contre une personne ou un groupe de personnes, ou même dans la propagande de l'État. Dans un tel cas, le cadre de saisie de référence par nom proposé par Kripke lors du baptême initial (S. Kripke 1980) ne s'applique plus. Cette distorsion ne se produira pas lorsque le principe récursif proposé par Saul Kripke est appliqué, selon lequel celui qui a établi la référence au baptême initial stipule des pratiques dans Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 15 l'utilisation des noms propres, et les consommateurs utiliseront le nom à cet égard, appelant à une utilisation spécifique identique à celle proposé par celui qui a nommé. Le changement de référence n'est pas possible selon les théories descriptives. Les théories causales initiales ne posent pas le problème du changement de référence. Gareth Evans considère l'importance du changement de référence, possible même à partir du baptême initial, bien que changer la référence de nom propre soit beaucoup plus difficile que dans le cas des termes naturels, donnant l'exemple de Madagascar. (Evans and Altham 1973) Evans a soutenu que le porteur d'un nom propre, utilisé par une communauté de locuteurs, est la principale source de causalité des informations que les membres de la communauté associent au nom. Imogen Dickie voit la suggestion d'Evans comme une avancée majeure, mais qui soulève quelques problèmes. (Dickie 2011) Dickie prend le « nom propre » comme terme naturel de type sémantique standard ou implicite, pour lequel aucun paramètre supplémentaire n'est requis. Cette assertion permet d'utiliser les noms propres d'autres manières (par exemple, pour communiquer sur des objets autres que leurs porteurs) selon les scénarios. Dickie conclut qu'Evans a raison de dire que le nom propre a une structure essentiellement asymétrique, attribuant un rôle privilégié à un groupe central de locuteurs. Mais Evans a tort de dire que les producteurs sont importants pour établir une pratique basée sur le nom, suggérant que le rôle des producteurs est d'assurer la domination, mais cela n'implique pas la transmission exacte des informations. Les consommateurs sont des participants actifs. Selon Evans, l'état mental du locuteur est important pour déterminer la référence. Pour lui, l'origine causale d'un nom n'est pas importante dans la référence ; un objet tire un nom du fait qu'il est la principale source de causalité des informations associées à un nom. (Bhowmick 2015, 195) Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 16 Mais, éliminant la nécessité du baptême initial, la théorie d'Evans soulève deux objections : le problème qua et le problème de la source causale incorrecte. Le problème qua compte de l'exemple du chat « Trump » qui était en fait un pot de fleur. D'un point de vue intuitif, il semble que l'utilisation de ce nom ne fasse référence à rien, c'est un nom vide. Il s'ensuit qu'un référencement réussi nécessite que l'individu initiant l'utilisation d'un nom ait au moins une notion correcte de l'objet auquel il se réfère. Le problème de la source causale incorrecte se pose lorsque le référent n'est plus lié à un nom par des individus qui étaient en présence de l'objet. 4. Michael Devitt Michael Devitt développe une théorie causale hybride des noms propres non vides et des certains termes singuliers qui leur ressemblent sémantiquement. Il considère que l'utilisation d'un nom désigne un objet non pas en raison des différentes informations que nous connaissons, mais par un réseau causal qui part des premières utilisations du nom pour désigner l'objet, à travers un « prêt de référence » à partir des utilisations précédentes. (Devitt 1981) Après la « cérémonie » de dénomination initiale, pour utiliser ce nom, un locuteur doit déjà avoir la capacité d'utiliser des noms (« un état mental qui est amené dans une langue par la perception d'une cérémonie de dénomination ... capable de produire (en partie) certains types de discours »). Les premières utilisations sont liées causalement à l'objet, puis transmises à travers une chaîne causale appelée par Devitt « chaîne d », à partir de « dénomination ». La capacité permet l'utilisation du nom dans une prédication ordinaire. Mais, contrairement aux théories descriptives, il n'est pas nécessaire pour une personne d'avoir un ensemble substantiel de croyances qui impliquent le nom. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 17 Les chaînes causales liées entre elles forment le réseau causal d'un type de nom. Il peut y avoir plusieurs chaînes d sur lesquelles est basée l'utilisation d'un nom par une personne, et un réseau causal basé sur son symbole formé à partir de l'union de tous ces réseaux individuels. Devitt introduit le terme « jeton de nom » qui désigne l'objet sur lequel la chaîne d sous-jacente est fondée. Chaque fois que nous entendons un nom utilisé, nous devons l'associer à une capacité. La bonne compréhension de l'utilisation d'un nom ambigu repose principalement sur le contexte (externe) des indices, généralement représenté par un guide fiable en termes de locuteur. Les indices obtenus à partir du contexte dépendent beaucoup de ce que nous croyons déjà, en particulier à propos du locuteur (ce que nous pensons que le locuteur peut désigner par ce nom, et ce que nous pensons qu'il pense que nous pouvons désigner à travers lui et ce qu'il pense que nous savons de ses compétences de désignation). Un autre indice important pour interpréter un jeton de nom est le prédicat utilisé avec lui. Dans le cas d'un contexte ambigu, nous pouvons demander à l'orateur de nous faire part de ses intentions. La chaîne d commence par la perception de l'objet. Les cas évidents sont ceux de la « perception face à face » de l'objet. Le lien entre un jeton de nom et son objet peut être médiatisé par une description. Si cette connexion doit être une chaîne ad-hoc, elle est descriptive. Selon Devitt, la référence croisée est un exemple de la façon dont un jeton peut dépendre de sa référence d'un autre. Dans sa théorie du prêt de référence, un type de dépendance analogue est l'ensemble de la plupart des jetons à terme unique. De plus, si un objet est sélectionné par une description attributive à son nom, le nom résultant sera attribué et l'objet n'est pas impliqué dans le réseau causal pour ce terme au début du réseau, mais peut l'être plus tard. Sinon, le réseau devient ancré dans l'objet et un nom attributif devient désignatif. L'enracinement permet à une théorie causale d'expliquer le changement de référence et certaines erreurs et malentendus. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 18 Un nom peut être indirectement basé sur son objet, sur certains types de représentations de l'objet. Devitt indique qu'un jeton de nom désigne un objet si et seulement si le nom de base est une chaîne basée sur un objet. Les chaînes d se composent de trois types de liens différents : les points qui relient la chaîne à un objet, les capacités à désigner et la communication dans laquelle les compétences sont transmises ou renforcées (prêt de référence). Une personne peut perdre la capacité de désigner un objet lorsqu'elle cesse d'avoir des pensées qui incluent les jetons ancrés dans l'objet. Une association entre description et nom consiste à conserver les croyances que l'utilisateur exprimerait à l'aide de noms et de descriptions. Mais toutes les pensées ne sont pas des croyances. Un problème qui peut survenir est lorsque les chaînes causales du terme peuvent être mises à la terre dans plusieurs objets, ou non mises à la terre dans aucun objet. Ou, plus de capacités, et donc plus de réseaux, peuvent jouer un rôle dans la production d'un terme de désignation. De plus, les malentendus peuvent entraîner l'implication de plusieurs objets dans un réseau causal. Les enracinements jouent un rôle pivot dans la théorie de Devitt, représentant le lien final entre tous les noms (de désignation) et le monde. Dans le cas d'un changement de désignation, il y a deux possibilités : l'ancien nom continue de coexister avec le nouveau, ou non. Cette possibilité permet une explication plausible de la transition progressive d'une convention de dénomination à une autre. Pour qu'un changement de désignation ait lieu, un réseau initialement mis à la terre dans un objet doit l'être dans un autre. L'objet doit être de la même catégorie plus générale. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 19 Dans le cas de plusieurs réseaux, la similitude entre eux est une question de degré, résultant en différentes notions de synonymie qui peuvent être définies en termes de similitude. Deux réseaux deviennent plus similaires s'ils sont mis à la terre dans le même objet. Bien que la plupart des noms soient conceptuels, certains sont attributifs, respectivement un réseau est basé sur un objet à travers une description. Les chaînes d sont basées sur certaines notions qui restent largement inexpliquées ; la notion de perception d'un objet n'est pas suffisamment claire ; comme dans le cas des notions de pensée et de la notion de cause. L'idée de base de la théorie causale de l'enracinement de Devitt est que le nom est introduit dans une nomination formelle ou informelle, en présence de l'objet. La perception doit être causale. Un témoin de la nomination aura la capacité sémantique d'utiliser le nom pour désigner l'objet en vertu du lien de causalité ; la perception de l'objet a déterminé les pensées qui ont conduit à l'utilisation du nom. La théorie causale du prêt de référence suppose que les personnes qui ne sont pas témoins de la nomination acquièrent la capacité sémantique de ces témoins, ce qui est également un processus causal perceptuel. Le nom est utilisé dans la communication. Les auditeurs peuvent acquérir la possibilité d'utiliser le nom pour désigner l'objet en vertu de chaînes causales qui relient l'objet, la dénomination et l'utilisateur à travers la discussion. Un nom a à la fois une référence et une signification. La signification d'un nom est une propriété particulière du nom, désignant son porteur par un certain type de lien de causalité entre le nom et le porteur. Les aspects de la réalité que nous devons appeler pour expliquer la référence sont suffisants pour le sens. La référence d'un nom est déterminée par les chaînes causales appropriées, et donc par sa signification. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 20 La théorie développée par Devitt partage avec les théories descriptives la capacité de rendre compte de certaines particularités du langage naturel : stimulus indépendant (la chaîne causale dont dépend son utilisation ne nécessite pas la présence de l'objet); arbitraire et indépendant de l'environnement (n'importe quel symbole de n'importe quel environnement peut être placé dans la relation causale appropriée avec l'objet); et donc il faut l'apprendre. Contrairement aux théories descriptives, cette théorie peut également expliquer l'apparente abstinence des noms propres. De plus, selon Devitt, elle évite les problèmes de la théorie descriptive, elle peut résoudre le problème des déclarations d'identité, elle promet une explication des liens finaux entre la langue et le monde, et l'explication concernant la causalité semble être naturaliste. Devitt conclut que la théorie causale des noms ne peut pas être une théorie « purement causale » ; il doit s'agir d'une théorie « descriptive-causale », pour qu'un nom soit associé à une description dans une mise à la terre, apparaissant ainsi comme un élément descriptif dans la caractérisation d'une chaîne d. Dans la fixation de la référence, un nom N est ostensiblement introduit lors d'un événement contraignant en présence d'un objet qui deviendra désormais le référent. La capacité de se référer est un état mental qui contient un ensemble de pensées (croyances, désirs ou espoirs) qui sont fondées sur le référent et associées au nom. Dans le prêt de référence, les personnes présentes lors de la nomination initiale diffusent aux autres la capacité de se référer par le biais de la communication. Pour affiner la notion de fixation des références, Devitt utilise plusieurs fondements (groundings), basant un nom sur un objet tout comme la dénomination initiale. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 21 La théorie de Devitt traite avec succès le problème de qua, stipulant que celui qui ancre le nom doit percevoir à la fois l'objet et la pensée de l'objet sous un terme général correct. Un certain degré de correspondance est requis pour qu'un initiateur d'un nom obtienne un nom dans un objet. En ce qui concerne la source causale incorrecte, la théorie de Devitt fournit également une réponse intuitive. Devitt et Evans estiment que Kripke (S. Kripke 1980) est allé trop loin en niant les éléments descriptifs. Les pensées associées au nom ont un rôle de référence. Mais je suis d'accord avec Kripke que le nom fait référence en vertu d'une relation causale. Mais bien qu'Evans (Evans and Altham 1973) pense que les baptêmes initiaux ne jouent aucun rôle dans la référence, générant le problème de qua et le problème de source causale incorrecte, Devitt a accepté l'idée que la nomination est essentielle, mais qu'il n'y a rien de nécessaire dans la nomination initiale. Grâce à plusieurs enracinements, il évite le problème du changement de référence dû à l'erreur, sans avoir à éliminer la fixation de référence comme élément essentiel de la théorie des noms. De plus, Devitt parvient à éviter le problème de la source de la causalité incorrecte parce que le nom ne peut se référer que s'il est lié à l'objet par la perception directe, et le problème stipulant que ceux qui atterrissent doivent avoir la croyance correcte de l'objet sous un terme générique. 5. Blockchain et l'arbre causal de la référence Dans un article précédent, The Philosophy of blockchain technology Ontologies, (Sfetcu 2019) j'ai parlé de l'application de la théorie narrative de Paul Ricoeur dans le développement d'une ontologie de la technologie blockchain. (Ricoeur 1990) Dans cette section, j'ai l'intention de mettre en évidence l'idée d'une analogie entre la technologie blockchain et les théories causales de la Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 22 référence. Dans la mesure où la poursuite de l'élaboration de cette idée se révélera viable, je vais essayer de développer une théorie basée sur cette analogie. Blockchain, (The Economist 2015) (Morris 2016) (Popper 2017) est une chaîne de blocs en croissance constante (Brito and Castillo 2016) (Trottier [2013] 2018) qui contient des enregistrements appelés blocs, qui communiquent entre eux par le biais de messages. (The Economist 2015) Nous pouvons considérer un bloc comme une certaine phrase. La phrase n'est considérée que si elle inclut la référence, car dans une blockchain, un bloc doit contenir les données de transaction. Chaque bloc / phrase contient un horodatage et les données de la transaction. Les données de la transaction peuvent être considérées ici comme analogues à la référence, qui relie un nom à un objet. Tout comme dans une blockchain, une transaction est initiée par un mineur et la chaîne causale part de lui, dans une théorie causale il y a un initiateur qui donne le nom et établit la référence entre nom et objet dans un processus (baptême initial). La blockchain est conçue comme « un registre ouvert et distribué qui peut enregistrer les transactions entre deux parties de manière efficace et de manière vérifiable et permanente », (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017) en utilisant un réseau peer-to-peer. La transaction est la nomination initiale (baptême, selon Kripke (S. Kripke 1980)), et le réseau peer-to-peer représente le système de communication bilatéral entre deux noeuds de la chaîne de blocs, respectivement deux utilisateurs d'une communauté. Après l'enregistrement des données (acceptation de la référence), les données / référence dans un bloc / phrase donné ne peuvent pas être modifiées rétroactivement sans changer toutes les données / référence dans tous les blocs / phrases inclus dans cette chaîne, ce qui nécessite le consentement du réseau (des noeuds de la chaîne, des utilisateurs dans le cas de la théorie causale). Contrairement à la blockchain, où la communication en bloc est effectuée uniquement entre deux noeuds, et donc une chaîne chronologique est formée, dans le cas d'une Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 23 communication de référence communautaire peut être effectuée d'un utilisateur à plusieurs utilisateurs simultanément, qui peuvent ensuite transmettre la référence, ici nous pouvons en fait parler d'un système d'arbres, un arbre causal de la référence. Dans la blockchain, en même temps que la transmission des données, d'autres informations supplémentaires peuvent être transmises, mais l'acceptation n'est faite que pour les données de transaction, les informations supplémentaires donnent des détails sur les transactions mais ne comptent pas sur l'acceptation. Dans cette potentielle théorie causale, des informations supplémentaires (descriptions) peuvent être transmises simultanément avec la référence, mais celles-ci ne sont pas prises en compte lors de l'acceptation de la référence par les autres utilisateurs. De ce point de vue, une telle théorie d'un arbre causal de la référence accepte plutôt l'idée de Saul Kripke, (S. Kripke 1980) que dans une théorie causale les descriptions n'ont pas d'importance. Si les descriptions sont destinées à être incluses dans l'arbre de référence causal et que certaines de ces descriptions sont modifiées, disparaissent ou ajoutées au fil du temps, un système d'horodatage peut être imaginé pour enregistrer les changements. Une idée serait, selon Tom Gruber dans l'article Sur les principes de conception des ontologies utilisées pour l'échange de connaissances, (Gruber 2008) que les descriptions peuvent être assimilées à l'ontologie en tant que terme technique dans le domaine de l'informatique : « Une ontologie est une description (en tant que spécification formelle d'un programme) de concepts et de relations qui peuvent exister formellement pour un agent ou une communauté d'agents. Cette définition est compatible avec l'utilisation de l'ontologie comme un ensemble de définitions conceptuelles, mais plus généralement. Et c'est un sens différent du mot que son utilisation en philosophie. » Une telle théorie causale devient ainsi, comme la blockchain, un système sécurisé et distribué avec une tolérance élevée aux erreurs. (Raval 2016) Chaque accepteur d'une référence mémorise ainsi la connexion entre le nom et l'objet, et éventuellement les autres informations complémentaires (descriptions, attributs). L'arbre causal Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 24 n'est propagé que par les utilisateurs qui ont accepté la référence (accepteurs), et ceux-ci peuvent à leur tour transmettre la référence à d'autres membres de la communauté dans les discussions ultérieures, qui peuvent également devenir des accepteurs lorsqu'ils acceptent la référence. Chaque noeud / membre d'une communauté peut initier une nouvelle transaction / peut nommer un objet par un baptême initial, qui est le point de départ d'une nouvelle chaîne / arbre dans la mesure où il est accepté par d'autres noeuds / membres. Les communautés qui incluent l'arbre de référence causal peuvent être ouvertes (peuvent inclure de nouveaux membres acceptant la référence établie), fermées (la référence est transmise uniquement entre les membres actuels de la communauté dans le cas de groupes ésotériques, par exemple, ou de références considérées comme secrètes), ou perméable, lorsque la référence n'est transmise en dehors de la communauté que dans des conditions particulières. Si l'un des noeuds / membres a, pour le nom accepté, une autre référence, ou modifie (intentionnellement ou non) la référence acceptée pour ce nom, une nouvelle branche est formée pour la nouvelle référence, mais pas dans le même plan que la référence acceptée avec le consentement des autres utilisateurs. C'est le cas d'un changement de référence dans les théories causales. Cela conduit à un arbre de référence causal tridimensionnel, et la nouvelle branche est le baptême initial de la nouvelle référence. Si cette nouvelle référence est acceptée par d'autres membres, elle est transmise de manière causale à travers l'arbre bidimensionnel nouvellement formé, parallèle à l'arbre dimensionnel déjà existant dont il est issu. Pour plus d'arbres à deux dimensions qui font partie d'un arbre à trois dimensions, l'arbre à deux dimensions le plus développé devient l'arbre principal à deux dimensions de l'arbre à trois dimensions (le cas d'un nom faisant référence à une personne célèbre). Les autres arbres composants bidimensionnels deviennent des arbres secondaires. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 25 Une telle théorie peut être interprétée comme le résultat d'une notation syntaxique dans un champ de référence, basée sur la théorie narrative développée par Paul Ricoeur dans Time and Narrative. (Ricoeur 1988) Pour Paul Ricoeur, il y a un ordre et une structure de l'histoire transmis à travers la narration de l'histoire, sinon l'histoire serait inintelligible. Mais les événements et les faits de cette histoire racontée perturbent l'ordre dominant et le réorganisent. Ricoeur a examiné plusieurs formes différentes de discours étendu, à commencer par le discours métaphorique. Le discours narratif est l'une des formes étudiées par Ricoeur, (Pellauer and Dauenhauer 2002) configurant des concepts hétérogènes qui identifient les actions à un moment où une chose se produit non seulement après autre chose, mais aussi à cause de quelque chose d'autre dans une narration ou une histoire qui peut être suivi. Il remodèle les événements physiques en événements narratifs, qui ont du sens car ils racontent ce qui se passe dans une narration ou une histoire. Les narrations sont toujours une synthèse des concepts hétérogènes qui façonnent les épisodes de l'histoire. Dans Time and Narrative, Ricoeur a souligné l'importance de l'idée d'une identité narrative. (Ricoeur 1988) L'argument de Ricoeur concernant l'individualisation se poursuit par une succession d'étapes. Il part de la philosophie du langage et du problème de l'identification de la référence aux personnes en tant qu'individus eux-mêmes, et pas seulement des choses. Cela conduit à considérer le sujet parlant comme un agent, en passant par la sémantique de l'action que Ricoeur avait apprise de la philosophie analytique. Conclusions Kripke était conscient qu'il peut y avoir plusieurs utilisations différentes pour un nom, qui sont utilisées dans différents contextes (avec des références différentes). (S. Kripke 1980) Lors du baptême initial, un nom peut être accompagné d'une description. Mais Kripke considère que cette Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 26 description ne définit qu'une référence et n'est pas synonyme du nom auquel elle est associée. Pour cette raison, Searle critique la théorie causale. Selon Sikander Iamil, les contextes dans lesquels les déclarations sont faites sont également importants pour identifier et déterminer les références. Donald Davidson essaie de diviser la théorie de la signification en deux méthodes, la méthode des blocs de construction (les propositions les plus simples forment les plus complexes) et la méthode holistique (en commençant par des phrases complexes puis en analysant ses composants). La première méthode n'est pas une approche pragmatique, tandis que la seconde ne peut servir qu'à comprendre les composants, mais la valeur sémantique de la phrase peut être déformée. (Jamil 2011) Pour la théorie de la signification par la méthode des blocs de construction de Davidson, la théorie causale n'a aucune valeur pragmatique. Eliot Michaelson et Marga Reimer envisagent quatre façons distinctes dont les termes de référence pourraient se référer à certains objets et individus dans le monde : (Michaelson and Reimer 2019) 1. Modèle descriptif : les mots sont associés à un contenu descriptif pour identifier un référent spécifique ; 2. Modèle causal : les mots sont associés aux chaînes causales à partir d'un « baptême » initial du référent ; 3. Modèle de caractère : les mots sont associés à des règles de référence communes, qui impliquent les éléments répétables du contexte, identifiant le référent à partir de ces éléments ; 4. Modèle intentionnaliste : les mots sont utilisés intentionnellement pour désigner certains objets, dans le cadre d'actions intentionnelles complexes visant certains référents. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 27 Parmi ceux-ci, trois modèles de référence sont fondamentaux dans la métasémantique des termes référentiels : le modèle descriptif, le modèle de chaîne causale et le modèle de caractère. Les deux derniers, grâce à l'hybridation, peuvent aider à clarifier des aspects importants de la théorie indexicale des noms. Kaplan propose que le contexte, en plus de l'orateur, du lieu, de l'heure, etc., inclue l'individu le plus important portant un nom donné. (Kaplan 2006) Mais il semble toujours difficile d'utiliser le nom pour désigner la personne la plus importante de ce nom dans un contexte. De plus, accepter ce type de théorie indexicale implique de renoncer à certains des avantages de la théorie causale, y compris la simplicité, et le fait que nous n'enverrions plus de noms pour les choses, juste la référence au porteur le plus important de ce nom dans un certain contexte. La théorie causale peut être considérée comme un cas particulier de la théorie des caractères, dans laquelle des termes tels que les noms et les règles sont expliqués dans une chaîne causale. La théorie causale propose des façons de penser un objet en transmettant un nom. Ici, la communication est simple, à condition que le nom soit reconnu à une certaine occasion. Mais la théorie causale est un modèle de référence non expansionniste, généralement utilisé uniquement pour la référence aux noms. Il devra permettre l'existence d'autres types de relations afin d'établir la référence et pour d'autres types de termes et différentes utilisations du même terme. En ce qui concerne la théorie narrative, certains chercheurs considèrent la narration comme une capacité cognitive instrumentale ou un instrument linguistique, tandis que d'autres le considèrent comme une catégorie ontologique liée à la façon dont les gens sont dans le monde (Meretoja 2014, 89) ou comprennent la vie humaine elle-même comme ayant un caractère narratif. (MacIntyre 2007, 114) Une autre division théorique concernant le rôle de la narration existe entre Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 28 une tradition empirique dénonçant la narration comme concept philosophique fondamental (G. Strawson 2004) et une tradition herméneutique rejetant l'idée d'une expérience immédiate des narrations et soutient que toutes les représentations du monde social humain sont médiées par l'interprétation linguistique humaine, (Taylor 1971, 4) que la subjectivité est toujours médiée par le langage, les signes, les symboles et les textes. (Meretoja 2014, 96) David Kaplan suggère que la méthode herméneutique de Ricoeur, ainsi que l'analyse du cercle herméneutique entre l'expérience humaine et la narration, peuvent enrichir l'analyse du contexte en incluant des notions de médiation linguistique et sociale. (Kaplan 2006, 43–44) La référence est généralement interprétée comme une relation entre le langage et la réalité, mais W.V.O. Quine soutient qu'il est intrinsèquement indéterminé ou « impénétrable », c'est-àdire que nous ne pouvons pas déterminer ce que cela signifie. (Quine 1960) Un problème discuté par Peter Unger (Unger 1980) et Geach (Geach 1962) est que pour de nombreux objets physiques, il existe plusieurs candidats pour être le référent d'un terme référentiel singulier. Sans moyen de sélectionner l'un d'entre eux, nous pouvons nous demander dans quelle mesure ils peuvent être référencés. Donald Davidson est encore plus radical. (Davidson 1977) Il soutient que la référence est une notion théoriquement irrationnelle, inutile dans une théorie sémantique ou une théorie de sens strict et littéral. Son argument est qu'aucune explication de référence substantielle n'est possible. De plus, les théories déflationnistes de la référence affirment qu'il n'y a rien de plus dans le concept de référence qu'est capturé par les circonstances d'une mécanisme tel que : 'a' se réfère à a. (Field 2001) Mais, malgré tous les problèmes mis en évidence, la nature de la relation entre le langage et la réalité continue d'être l'une des plus discutées et débattues dans la philosophie du langage. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 29 Bibliografie Bhowmick, Nilanjan. 2015. "Handout on Evans on Causal Theory of Names." https://www.academia.edu/11923751/Handout_on_Evans_on_Causal_Theory_of_Names . Borchert, Donald M. 2006. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2nd Edition. Vol. 3. Thomson Gale. Brito, Jerry, and Andrea Castillo. 2016. Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers. 2 edition. Arlington, Virginia: Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Cumming, Sam. 2016. "Names." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/names/. Davidson, Donald. 1977. "Reality Without Reference." Dialectica 31 (3–4): 247–258. deRosset, Louis. 2011. "The Causal-Historical Theory of Reference." http://www.uvm.edu/~lderosse/courses/nnn/caus_theor.pdf. Devitt, Michael. 1981. Designation. Columbia University Press. Devitt, Michael, and Kim Sterelny. 1999. Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. MIT Press. Dickie, Imogen. 2011. "How Proper Names Refer." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111: 43–78. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41331541. Donnellan, Keith S. 1972. "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions." In Semantics of Natural Language, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, 356–79. Synthese Library. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_10. ---. 1974. "Speaking of Nothing." Philosophical Review 83 (1): 3–31. Evans, Gareth. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Clarendon Press. Evans, Gareth, and J. E. J. Altham. 1973. "The Causal Theory of Names." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 47: 187–225. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106912. Field, Hartry. 2001. Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press. Fodor, Jerry. 2004. "Water's Water Everywhere." London Review of Books, October 21, 2004. https://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n20/jerry-fodor/waters-water-everywhere. Frege, Gottlob. 1892. "On Sense and Reference." http://www.scu.edu.tw/philos/98class/Peng/05.pdf. Geach, P. T. 1962. Reference and Generality. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gruber, Tom. 2008. "Ontology." 2008. http://tomgruber.org/writing/ontology-definition2007.htm. Iansiti, Marco, and Karim R. Lakhani. 2017. "The Truth About Blockchain." Harvard Business Review, 2017. https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain. Jamil, Sikander. 2011. "A Critical Stud of the Theories of Proper Names with Special Reference to Saul Kripke." Kaplan, David M. 2006. "Paul Ricoeur and the Philosophy of Technology." Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 16 (1/2): 42–56. https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2006.182. Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press. Kripke, Saul A. 1979. "A Puzzle About Belief." In Meaning and Use, edited by A. Margalit, 239–83. Reidel. Lewis, David. 1984. "Putnam's Paradox." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3): 221–236. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 2007. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Third Edition. University of Notre Dame Press. https://muse.jhu.edu/book/52441. Nicolae Sfetcu : Théories causales de référence pour les noms propres 30 Meretoja, Hanna. 2014. "Narrative and Human Existence: Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics." New Literary History 45 (1): 89–109. https://doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2014.0001. Michaelson, Eliot, and Marga Reimer. 2019. "Reference." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/reference/. Mill, John Stuart. 1882. "A System of Logic." 1882. https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/system_of_logic/. Morris, David Z. 2016. "Leaderless, Blockchain-Based Venture Capital Fund Raises $100 Million, And Counting." Fortune. 2016. http://fortune.com/2016/05/15/leaderlessblockchain-vc-fund/. Pellauer, David, and Bernard Dauenhauer. 2002. "Paul Ricoeur." https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ricoeur/. Popper, Nathaniel. 2017. "A Venture Fund With Plenty of Virtual Capital, but No Capitalist." The New York Times, 2017, sec. Business. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/business/dealbook/crypto-ether-bitcoincurrency.html. Psillos, Stathis. 1999. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. Routledge. Putnam, Hilary. 1973. "Meaning and Reference." The Journal of Philosophy 70 (19): 699–711. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025079. Quine, W. V. O. 1960. Word & Object. MIT Press. Raval, Siraj. 2016. Decentralized Applications: Harnessing Bitcoin's Blockchain Technology. O'Reilly Media, Inc. Ricoeur, Paul. 1988. "Time and Narrative, Volume 3, Ricoeur, Blamey, Pellauer." 1988. https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/T/bo3711629.html. ---. 1990. Time and Narrative, Volume 1. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. 1 edition. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Searle, John R. 1958. "Proper Names." Mind 67 (266): 166–73. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108. Searle, John Rogers. 1982. "Proper Names and Intentionality." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (3): 205–225. Sfetcu, Nicolae. 2019. Filosofia tehnologiei blockchain Ontologii. MultiMedia Publishing. http://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.25492.35204. Strawson, Galen. 2004. "Against Narrativity." Ratio 17 (4): 428–452. Strawson, P. F. 1950. "On Referring." Mind 59 (235): 320–344. Taylor, Charles. 1971. "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man." The Review of Metaphysics 25 (1): 3–51. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20125928. The Economist. 2015. "The Great Chain of Being Sure about Things." The Economist, 2015. https://www.economist.com/briefing/2015/10/31/the-great-chain-of-being-sure-aboutthings. Trottier, Leo. (2013) 2018. Historical Repository of Satoshi Nakamoto's Original Bitcoin. C++. https://github.com/trottier/original-bitcoin. Unger, Peter. 1980. "The Problem of the Many." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1): 411–468.

© 2017 BY THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION ISSN 2155-9708 Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy NEWSLETTER | The American Philosophical Association VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 SPRING 2017 SPRING 2017 VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 FROM THE EDITOR Carlos Alberto Sánchez CALLS FOR SUBMISSIONS DISCUSSION José-Antonio Orosco The Solace of Mexican Philosophy in the Age of Trump Susana Nuccetelli Repealing Obamacare: An Injustice to Hispanics José Jorge Mendoza Latinx and the Future of Whiteness in American Democracy ESSAYS L. Sebastian Purcell Winner, APA Prize in Latin American Thought: Eudaimonia and Neltiliztli: Aristotle and the Aztecs on the Good Life Manuel Bolom Pale, edited and translated by Carlos Alberto Sánchez Tsotsil Epistemology: An Intangible Inheritance Mario Teodoro Ramírez, translated by Carlos Alberto Sánchez Luis Villoro: Universal Mexican Philosopher Django Runyan In Search of the Philosophical Impulse: Zea and the Greeks CONTRIBUTOR BIOS Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy CARLOS ALBERTO SÁNCHEZ, EDITOR VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 | SPRING 2017 APA NEWSLETTER ON FROM THE EDITOR Carlos Alberto Sánchez SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY Although the present issue of the newsletter is not arranged around a singular theme-something we have done in the past-the issue is, nonetheless, a special issue. Included here is the winner of the 2016 APA's Essay Prize in Latin American Thought, L. Sebastian Purcell; two papers by contemporary Mexican philosophers, Mario Teodoro Ramírez and Manuel Bolom Pale, writing on Luis Villoro and Indigenous Tsotsil philosophy, respectively; and, more relevant to our current political situation, three discussion pieces by three established members of the Hispanic/ Latinx philosophical community in the U.S., José-Antonio Orosco, Susana Nuccetelli, and José Jorge Mendoza. We begin with our discussion pieces: in the first, JoséAntonio Orosco reflects on what the election of Donald J. Trump to the presidency of the United States means for us. In the second, Susana Nuccetelli argues against the Trump administration's vow to repeal the Affordable Care Act (a.k.a., Obamacare). She writes that "no morally acceptable reason" can justify the repeal. In the final discussion piece, José Jorge Mendoza reflects on the future of Whiteness in American democracy in the context of the election of Donald Trump. He argues that, unlike the common opinion, and as the 2016 election showed, Whiteness will figure out a way to coopt certain sectors of the Latinx electorate so as to preserve its supremacy. While the current political landscape might provoke its fair share of existential dread, especially amongst us Hispanics/Latinx, it's safe to say that we will continue with the important work of diversifying and enriching the philosophical curriculum for future generations. A case in point is Sebastian Purcell's prize-winning essay, which places Aztec philosophy in a very fruitful conversation with Aristotle. Sebastian Purcell considers the Aztec conception of the good life, neltiliztli. According to Purcell, "like Aristotelian eudaimonia or 'flourishing,' the Aztec understanding of neltiliztli functioned to justify concerns about action guidance, and so was conceptually prior to an account of the right. Unlike the Aristotelian conception, however, they did not hold that there was an internal relation between pleasure and the good life, understood as neltiliztli. The implications suggest that the Aztecs had a sort of virtue ethics, which has so far gone unrecognized in any study of Aztec philosophy." Deepening our connection to the Mexican indigenous philosophical tradition, the essay by Manuel Bolom Pale, translated here for the first time, introduces the concept of Tsotsil epistemology. Bolom Pale, himself Maya tostsil from the region of Chiapas, defines and explains certain terms in Tsotsil cultural life that seek to capture significant philosophical insights. These insights, in turn, are meant to structure Tsotsil cultural, religious, and political life while, simultaneously, serving as guides for the construction of Tsotsil subjectivity. From Michoacán, Mario Teodoro Ramírez gives us an authoritative philosophical portrait of the great Mexican philosopher Luis Villoro. Ramírez, who oversees the Institute of Philosophical Investigations "Luis Villoro" at the Universidad Michoacána San Nicolas, accesses the vast archive at his disposal to provide an outline of Villoro's many and significant contributions to philosophy, ethics, and politics. This essay is also translated here for the first time. In the final paper, Django Runyan reflects on Leopoldo Zea's connections to the Greeks, to the origins of philosophy itself. Runyan finds in Zea a deep appreciation of philosophy's roots and an almost obsessive impulse to return to those roots. In all, the present issue of the newsletter aims both to connect us to the immediacy of our current social anxieties (in the Discussion section) and to remind us about the important work yet to be done in the history of our own philosophy. That is, it exemplifies those two impulses that characterize our calling as Latinx philosophers in the Americas: the impulse to advocate and be activists for causes that matter to our community, and the impulse for rigorous research into our own traditions. CALLS FOR SUBMISSIONS 2017 ESSAY PRIZE IN LATIN AMERICAN THOUGHT The APA Committee on Hispanics cordially invites submissions for the 2017 Essay Prize in Latin American Thought, which is awarded to the author of the best unpublished, English-language, philosophical essay in Latin American philosophy/thought. The purpose of this prize is to encourage fruitful work in this area. Eligible essays must contain original arguments and broach philosophical topics clearly related to the specific experiences of Hispanic Americans and Latinos. The winning essay will be published in this newsletter. APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY A cash prize accompanies the award along with the opportunity to present the prize-winning essay at an upcoming divisional meeting. Information regarding submissions can be found at http://www.apaonline. org/?latin_american. Please consider submitting your work and encourage colleagues or students to do the same. Feel free to pass this information along to anyone who may be interested. The submission deadline is June 5, 2017. The committee is also soliciting papers or panel suggestions for next year's APA three divisional meetings. The deadline for APA Eastern meeting committee session requests is rapidly approaching, so please send any ideas to Grant Silva ([email protected]), who will relay these suggestions to the rest of the committee. FALL 2017 NEWSLETTER The APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy is accepting contributions for the fall 2017 issue. Our readers are encouraged to submit original work on any topic related to Hispanic/Latino thought, broadly construed. We publish original, scholarly treatments, as well as reflections, book reviews, and interviews. Please prepare articles for anonymous review. All submissions should be accompanied by a short biographical summary of the author. Electronic submissions are preferred. All submissions should be limited to 5,000 words (twenty double-spaced pages) and must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language and The Chicago Manual of Style formatting. All articles submitted to the newsletter undergo anonymous review by members of the Committee on Hispanics. BOOK REVIEWS Book reviews in any area of Hispanic/Latino philosophy, broadly construed, are welcome. Submissions should be accompanied by a short biographical summary of the author. Book reviews may be short (500 words) or long (1,500 words). Electronic submissions are preferred. DEADLINES Deadline for spring issue is November 15. Authors should expect a decision by January 15. Deadline for the fall issue is April 15. Authors should expect a decision by June 15. Please send all articles, book reviews, queries, comments, or suggestions electronically to the editor, Carlos Alberto Sánchez, at [email protected], or by post: Department of Philosophy San Jose State University One Washington Sq. San Jose, CA 95192-0096 FORMATTING GUIDELINES The APA Newsletters adhere to The Chicago Manual of Style. Use as little formatting as possible. Details like page numbers, headers, footers, and columns will be added later. Use tabs instead of multiple spaces for indenting. Use italics instead of underlining. Use an "em dash" (-) instead of a double hyphen (--). Use endnotes instead of footnotes. Examples of proper endnote style: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 90. See Sally Haslanger, "Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?" Noûs 34 (2000): 31–55. DISCUSSION The Solace of Mexican Philosophy in the Age of Trump José-Antonio Orosco OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY In Mexico Profundo, or Deep Mexico, Mexican anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil Batalla argued that the lives and experiences of ordinary Mexicans living in rural areas and poor urban neighborhoods in Mexican cities continue to be rooted in Mesoamerican civilizations. Their understandings of work, community obligation, health, time, and harmonious coexistence, he maintained, form a connection to indigenous folkways that go back to preColumbian societies. Most Mexicans may not recognize these habits, or themselves, as indigenous, especially since the Mexican state has gone to great lengths to "deIndianize" Mexican national identity.1 But the everyday experiences of many Mexican people are shaped by these much older cultures and practices lying deep underneath the modern ways of life. I was thinking about Mexican thinkers such as Bonfil, as well as other Mexican philosophers, when I walked to the university the day after the Trump electoral victory. My first appointment that day was with a Chicanx student who explained, in an emotionally tired voice, that she had been up all night with her parents who were trying to determine what sorts of work they might be able to find if they were deported back to Mexico. I saw some of my colleagues in the hallways and later learned that a few of them had broken down crying in front of their classes. A Muslim student, later in the day, told me he had been on the phone with friends all night, gauging their fear; one of them admitted to him that calls to suicide hotlines were overwhelming some centers in the area and they were having to put people on hold. After my class on Latin American philosophy in the afternoon, an African-American student came to my office and admitted he was deeply worried about what his younger sibling was going to do growing up in this environment. Throughout the whole day, my social media feeds filled up with friends expressing amazement, disgust, and the feeling that they did not understand their country anymore. The work of José Vasconcelos helped me not to be shocked. In his 1925 work The Cosmic Race, he described what he considered to be the main cultural differences between North and Latin America-the profound U.S. and the profound Latin America, particularly Mexico. He argued if you wanted to understand the modern history of these two Americas, you have to go back and look at the differences in their modes of settler colonialism. These formative PAGE 2 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY experiences created deep grooves and patterns into the culture and political development of the two societies that continue to shape the habits and practices of modern life. In North America, according to Vasconcelos, the white settlers envisioned the continent as a utopia for themselves, a place to venerate the accomplishments of English culture, and proceeded to exclude or exterminate nonwhite populations. In the North you found "the confessed or tacit intention of cleaning the earth of Indians, Mongolians [sic], or Blacks, for the greater glory and fortune of the Whites."2 This vision of white utopia propelled the extension of the United States all the way across the West. It also grounded legislation that excluded Asians from immigrating or from most civic life in places like California, propped up the Jim Crow segregation in the South, and the Juan Crow segregation in the Southwest that Vasconcelos directly experienced while he attended high school in Eagle Pass, Texas. He surmised: "The English kept on mixing only with the whites and annihilated the natives. Even today, they continue to annihilate them in a sordid and economic fight, more efficient yet than armed conquest."3 Terrance MacMullan's work, Habits of Whiteness, corroborates Vasconcelos's view that North American white supremacy originates in the colonial experience of the United States.4 MacMullan points to the Bacon Rebellion of 1676 as the catalyst moment in which Europeans started to think of themselves as "white" with special privileges in civil society. When poor frontier farmers revolted against the landed plantation gentry, the latter responded by promulgating new laws that established a white identity and limited the liberties of those classified as non-white, namely, Native Americans and Africans. Thus, the richer plantation owners were able to reduce dissatisfaction with their regime by convincing the poorer farmers and white indentured servants that they all actually formed a natural community of interest around their racial identity and that African slaves and Native Americans were the real threats to their well-being. For Vasconcelos, what distinguished Latin America from the Northern settler colonialism was the way in which racial integration and miscegenation had become more acceptable in Spanish society. White supremacy still reigned, but the particular features of social and political life made the development of a variety of mixed racial identities possible (indeed, during the Spanish and Portuguese colonial period, places like Mexico and Brazil recognized hundreds of possible racial identities and combinations).5 Founding figures in Latin American independence during the nineteenth century, from Simón Bolívar and José Morelos, all recognized that Latin American republics would have to contend with multi-racial identity and the abolition of race-based slavery and caste in order to succeed and be stable.6 Vasconcelos did not believe that race-based discrimination had been eliminated in Latin America, but merely that the image of a white utopia never took root as deeply as it did in the North. What made me think of Vasconcelos in the context of the Trump victory is that he identified white supremacy as part of the profound United States-that is, as part of the deep tendencies that lie underneath modern society in North America. According to Vasconcelos, the United States has learned very well how to develop over time the practices and institutional policies of exclusion, marginalization, and eradication of non-white peoples; these are the ready-to- hand tools that are reached for in moments of fear and crisis for white Americans. Trump's campaign reached deep into los estadounidos profundo-the deep white supremacist toolbox. Voting data reveals that, overwhelmingly, a majority of white people- men and women, rural and suburban, educated and noneducated alike-felt called to defend a society that Trump described as under attack by Mexicans, Muslims, and urban Blacks. Despite his misogyny and promises to undo reproductive rights, most white women felt summoned to protect that deep United States vision now in ways they did not just eight or even four years ago when they turned out for a Black president. This is not to say that all white people, or even the majority of white people who voted for Trump, have particular racial animus toward non-white people. I think what Vasconcelos would say is that these voters heeded the dogwhistle of white supremacy-the appeal to return to center and to keep menacing peoples at bay- that lies deep in U.S. culture and is turned on when times are uncertain in order to solidify a certain power base. And it is this part of Vasconcelos's analysis that keeps me from paralyzing despair. It means that what happened with the Trump victory should not be understood as something new, something unexpected, or strangely out of place. It is something profoundly American. That doesn't mean it isn't something to worry about, and that some groups shouldn't now worry about their safety and security; but it is a reaction that has happened time and time again in U.S. history from the very beginning of our founding. To think that the habits of whiteness were eradicated with a decade-long Civil Rights movement and that eight years of a Black president have ushered us into a post-racial society is to naïvely underestimate los estadounidos profundo. Vasconcelos offered a way forward. The Cosmic Race is an attempt to sketch an alternative to the white utopia of the United States: a cosmopolitan world in which our racial categories would no longer work because there would be so much interbreeding that the ordinary person would be profoundly mixed. It would be a place in which each person would see a part of themselves in others, racially speaking, and parts of others in themselves. Racism would become an irrational kind of self-hatred. The new religion of such a community would be based in faith that emphasized love and compassion for one another. The politics would be socialist-a world in which everyone had an ability to participate in decisions, and goods are distributed according to need. There are many problems with Vasconcelos's utopia of the Cosmic Race. The history and politics of racial mixing in Mexico and the rest of Latin American is fraught with lingering effects of racism toward indigenous and African populations. Vasconcelos glosses over these events in order to sharpen his contrast between North and Latin America. And he doesn't offer very much in terms of institution SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 3 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY building-beyond hand waving at love and socialism, he doesn't say much about what kinds of structures need to be put in place to build a world that stands up to the power of the white supremacist utopia. But what Vasconcelos aspires to is thinking about the history and politics of race in the Americas in order to develop radical alternatives and possibilities, ones that respect and esteem the kind of racial mixing that was despised, and even made illegal in the United States in 1925. He wanted to imagine a utopia of elation, erotic attraction, and passion in which people would "feel towards the world an emotion so intense that the movement of things adopts rhythms of joy."7 I think he calls on us not to despair in the face of white supremacy with its fears, stupidity, and its ugliness, but to envision a beautiful world of playful togetherness and sympathy amid our differences as we struggle for a better world of social justice. Indeed, this kind of attitude is one that motivates the social and political philosophy of several Latin American theorists, including Ignacio Ellecuria, with his notion of "fiesta" as an alternative to capitalist consumerism, and Graciela Hierro's conception of "pleasure" as an alternative to the patriarchal fascination with control and death.8 Vasconcelos's project reminds us that social organizing is not just a dry, practical matter of political pragmatism. Radical imagining, writing, and theory building is also organizing work that makes another world possible. As the science fiction author Ursula K. LeGuin said upon her being awarded the National Book Award in 2014: "Hard times are coming, when we'll be wanting the voices of writers who can see alternatives to how we life now, can see through our fear stricken society and its obsessive technologies to other ways of being and even imagine real grounds for hope. . . . We live in capitalism, its power seems inescapable-but then, so did the divine right of kinds. Any human power can be resisted and changed by human beings. Resistance and change often begin in art. Very often in our art, the arts of words."9 NOTES 1. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, Mexico Profundo: Reclaiming a Civilization, trans. Phillip A. Dennis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 41–58. 2. Jose Vasconcelos, The Cosmic Race: A Bilingual Edition, trans. Didier T. Jaen (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 19. 3. Ibid., 18. 4. Terrance MacMullan, Habits of Whiteness: A Pragmatist Reconstruction (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 25–42. 5. Kevin Terraciano, "Indigenous Peoples in Colonial Spanish American Society," in A Companion to Latin American History, ed. Thomas H. Holloway (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2011), 136–39. 6. See Simon Bolivar, "The Jaimaca Letter," in Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Elizabeth Millan Zaibert (New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), 63–66; and Jose Maria Morelos, "Sentiments of the Nation," in Mexican History: A Primary Source Reader, ed. Nora E. Jaffrey, Edward Osowski, and Susie Porter (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), 184–87. 7. Vasconcelos, The Cosmic Race, 29–30. 8. See Ignacio Ellacuria, "Utopia and Prophecy in Latin America," in Towards a Society that Serves Its People: The Intellectual Contribution of El Salvador's Murdered Jesuits, ed. John Hassett and Hugh Lacy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1991), 62; Graciela Hierro, "Gender and Power," trans. Ivan Marquez, Hypatia 9, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 173–83. 9. Ursula K. LeGuin, "Ursula K. Le Guin's Speech at the National Book Awards: 'Books Aren't Just Commodities'," The Guardian, November 20, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/ nov/20/ursula-k-le-guin-national-book-awards-speech Repealing Obamacare: An Injustice to Hispanics Susana Nuccetelli ST. CLOUD STATE UNIVERSITY On January 13, 2017, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives approved by a 227–196 vote the formation of committees charged with preparing legislation to repeal the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), in a move regarded as the first step in one of Donald Trump's key policies during his presidential campaign. In spite of grand language to the contrary, as shown here, the move targets those PPACA mandates that have broadened access to a decent minimum of health care, mostly for individuals from low socioeconomic status and/or underrepresented groups, including Hispanics. I argue that no morally acceptable reason can justify the narrowing of health-care benefits for these groups. SOME FACTS ABOUT OBAMACARE AND HEALTH- CARE COVERAGE FOR HISPANICS IN THE U.S. Medicine is increasingly making possible services for which there is great demand but also limited availability and high cost. Under these circumstances, the moral question of what counts as a fair distribution of health- care resources is particularly pressing for societies with the means to provide access to "a decent minimum" coverage for all. Many countries, including some in the developing world, do provide such access for their residents. They include most European countries as well as Australia, Canada, Cuba, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, and Taiwan. Their approaches to financing and organizing universal access vary from a single-payer system of health care administered by a health authority and funded by taxes (in, e.g., Australia, Britain, and Canada) to multipayer systems (in, e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). By contrast, the U.S. long stood alone among developed nations in failing to ensure a decent minimum of health care for its residents. Only in 2010 did it conform to the emerging standard among industrialized nations by adopting a multi-payer system with the enactment of the PPACA, known informally as "Obamacare" or "ACA." Initially, some ACA critics charged that it was unconstitutional, but that objection was largely put to rest in 2012 by the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet the public debate over health-care reform in the U.S. continued beyond 2010, as shown by the House's resolution designed to repeal some of its provisions. Although it is still unclear which ones are being targeted, "radical" ACA mandates include that PAGE 4 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY 1) Every (authorized) resident must either be insured or pay a special tax. 2) Exchanges to buy insurance, in part subsidized, are made available. 3) Medicaid, an existing insurance program for economically disadvantaged workers that is funded from both federal and state sources, is expanded. 4) Insurers remove annual and lifetime caps on coverage, offer coverage to all, eliminating discrimination on the basis of age, sex, or pre- existing condition, and eliminate some co-pays on services such as preventive screening and reduce other co-pays. 5) Employers either "play or pay." These provisions have expanded significantly the number of people with health coverage in the United States. By 2014, the number of uninsured residents in America had fallen about 5 percent, according to the RAND Corporation, the Commonwealth Fund, the Gallup Poll, and the Urban Institute.1 As a result of the ACA, about 20 million people gained health coverage, a considerable number given that in 2010 there were 50 million uninsured in the U.S.2 According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the ACA's impact on Hispanics is evident: • Approximately 8 in 10 gained access to a decent minimum of health care because of the ACA mandates (2) and (3) above-together with the Children's Health Insurance Plan. • Four million adults gained health-care coverage • The uninsured rate dropped 11.3 percent (from 41.8 percent to 30.5 percent) • About 35 percent of Hispanic patients relying on Community Health Centers for their health care gained access to them because of the ACA investment of $11 billion in those centers.3 True, the number of uninsured Hispanics went from 29 percent in 2013 to 40 percent in 2016, at a rate higher than any other underrepresented group.4 But since unauthorized immigrants, among whom Hispanics are more numerous proportionally, are included in these numbers, the data only points to the injustice of providing access to a decent minimum of health care only to authorized residents-a flaw affecting many systems of universal coverage.5 As a result, the data does not undermine the conclusion that the ACA amounted to moral progress given the reasons to be considered next. FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE An influential account of moral obligation in bioethics contends that people have a positive right to health care. Accordingly, society has a duty to provide universal coverage, and that duty may be defeated or overridden only by (i) more stringent moral obligations, such as other obligations of justice or respect for persons; or (ii) practical considerations concerning society's means, whether financial or technical. In Norman Daniels's Fair Equality of Opportunity account, this conclusion follows directly from the application of Rawls's principles of justice to health care.6 Roughly, according to Rawls, when bargaining behind the veil of ignorance about society's basic structure, the contractors would choose to distribute primary social goods fairly for the self-advancement of all individuals. Among the sets of such goods is "freedom of movement and choice of occupations against a background of diverse opportunities." Daniels regards health care as derivative from this set of goods because of the special value of health. People who have, as a result of injury or disease, lost "species-normal functioning" are deprived of a Fair Equality of Opportunity for self- advancement.7 Physical and mental impairments reduce individual opportunity relative to what's normal range of opportunity for members of the species. Given this account, the following argument supports a right to health care for all: 1) If justice in health care requires protecting fair equality of opportunity, then there is a right to health care for all. 2) Justice in health care does require protecting fair equality of opportunity. 3) Therefore, there is a right to health care for all. This right may, however, be overridden when society lacks the appropriate resources.8 But affluent nations such as the U.S. do have the means, and therefore, the prima facie obligation to promote fairness of opportunity by taking the steps necessary for prevention and treatment of disease for all. Since, as shown by the above list of facts, the ACA is a step in that direction; therefore, unless the current plan to repeal it comes without an appropriate replacement, it should be condemned as a moral injustice. A PLURALISTIC GROUND FOR THE ACA Furthermore, the moral obligation to provide universal access to a decent minimum of health care may exist even if there is no right to health care. On Allen E. Buchanan's Pluralistic Account, since the category of human rights is a contested one in political theory, a more plausible strategy for universal access relies on multiple reasons. First, affluent societies must provide such coverage for all because they owe compensation to the victims of past wrongdoing. Historic injustice creates a duty of reparation to make fair restitution to victims. In the U.S., the grievances of racial and ethnic minorities and other underrepresented groups justify the provision of a decent minimum of care for all as a fair restitution. Second, some prudential considerations support the same claim: they concern emergency room costs for uninsured people from low-income groups, and the consequences for labor force's productivity (and defense personnel's fitness) of lacking appropriate care. Third, humanitarian reasons concerning SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 5 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY avoidance and prevention of harm recommend access to a decent minimum of health care for all. LIBERTARIAN PRINCIPLES FOR REPEALING THE ACA Rawlsian and Pluralistic accounts suggest that limiting access to a decent minimum of health care on the basis of income or racial and ethnic identity is a serious moral injustice. What moral reasons, if any, might justify the current plan to repeal the ACA? Bioethicist H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., for example, has invoked libertarian principles to argue that "A basic human secular moral right to health care does not exist-not even to a 'decent minimum of health care'."9 After all, in order to fund health- care coverage for all, the government would have to use its coercive power for collecting and redistributing the needed financial resources. But that violates people's negative rights to liberty and property, for it requires the government to (i) coercively take their property through taxation, and (ii) regulate a health-care system, thereby limiting individual free choice in health care. From the libertarian perspective, this is a deeply unjust arrangement that conflicts with a free-market system of health care where services are delivered according to ability to pay, through the private, voluntary purchase of insurance by individuals or groups. In fact, libertarians often emphasize the difference between negative and positive rights, doubting the very existence of positive rights and arguing that only negative rights have correlative duties, because they are easily fulfilled just by doing nothing. But such claims are misleading since it is not exactly true that duties of forbearance are easier to fulfill. At the very least, they require governments to keep criminal law systems, revenue services, police departments, military forces, and other protective branches. Other libertarian objections to the ACA focus on its failure in securing (i) consumer choice, (ii) quality care, and (iii) cost containment. Yet objection (i) is weak because the ACA does not render private financing of extra levels of health care incompatible with universal access to a decent minimum for all: those who have the means to purchase extra levels can do so. Objections (ii) and (iii) are empirical claims that remain unconfirmed by data gathered so far. In fact, a close look at the annual averages of health-care costs per capita in Canada and the U.S. since 2010 does point to the superiority of Canada's system,10 which is not exactly what those seeking the ACA repeal have in mind. In the absence of better arguments justifying such a repeal, I submit that any restrictions to the already limited scope of the ACA amounts to a serious injustice that should be condemned on moral grounds.11 NOTES 1. Troy Higgs et al., "Is the Affordable Care Act Working?" The New York Times, October 26, 2014. 2. See Norman Daniels, "Justice and Access to Health Care," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed Zalta, 2008/2013, accessed 4/22/2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice- healthcareaccess/; see also Margot Sanger-Katz, "The Biggest Changes Obamacare Made, and Those That May Disappear," The New York Times January 13, 2017, accessed 1/13/2017, https:// www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/upshot/the-biggest-changes- obamacare-made-and-those-that-may-disappear.html?_r=0 3. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), "The ACA Is Working for the Latino Community," July 21, 2016, accessed January 14, 2017, https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and- features/fact-sheets/aca-working-latino-community/ HHS 2016... Data about the ACA role in expanding healthcare coverage for Hispanics also include: 8.8 million Hispanics with private health insurance now have access to preventive services like mammograms, cervical cancer screenings, or flu shots with no co-pay or deductible; 913,000 Hispanic adults between the ages of 19 and 26 who would have been uninsured now have coverage under their parents' plan; 4.2 million Hispanics (ages 18–64) gained health insurance coverage, lowering the uninsured rate among Latinos by 7.7 percentage points. 4. Gillian Mohney and Amber Robison, "More Hispanics Uninsured Despite Obamacare Gains, Report Says," ABC News, August 18, 2016, accessed November 3, 2016, http://abcnews. go.com/Health/hispanics-uninsured-obamacare-gains-report/ story?id=41482778 5. As in other multi-payer or single-payer systems, unauthorized immigrants, who amount to approximately 12 million people in U.S. at present, are left out of "universal" coverage. 6. Norman Daniels, "Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, no. 2 (1981): 146–79; also Daniels, "Justice and Access to Health Care." 7. Daniels, "Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice." 8. Daniels, "Fair Equality of Opportunity and Decent Minimums: A Reply to Buchanan"; also see Allen E. Buchanan, "The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13, no. 1 (1984): 55–78. Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no. 1 (1985): 106–10. 9. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "Rights to Health Care, Social Justice, and Fairness in Health Care Allocations: Frustrations in the Face of Finitude," Chapter 8 in Foundations of Bioethics, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 336. 10. Raisa Deber, "Health Care Reform: Lessons from Canada," American Journal of Public Health 93, no. 1 (2003): 20–24. 11. I would like to thank Gary Seay for his comments on this paper, and for allowing me to use ideas first discussed while co-writing our Engaging Bioethics: An Introduction with Case Studies (Routledge, 2017). Latinx and the Future of Whiteness in American Democracy José Jorge Mendoza UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS LOWELL INTRODUCTION For Americans on the left of the political spectrum, there are not many positive takeaways from the 2016 presidential election. However, one potential silver lining could be the dramatic increase in the Latinx vote. This increase gave Hillary Clinton a rather easy victory in Nevada, a state that many pundits had considered a toss-up going into Election Day, and made usually solid republican states, such as Arizona and Georgia, a lot more competitive than they had been in recent elections. The increase in the Latinx vote is also the reason Clinton was able to hold on to the state of Virginia, a state which on election night was much closer than polls had predicted. Those of us on the left of the political spectrum might be tempted to take comfort in this and might even tell ourselves that despite the disappointing result, the future of progressive politics in America remains bright and this is in no small part thanks to the browning of America. PAGE 6 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY At one level this makes a lot of sense. Latinx are the fastest growing minority group in the United States, so much so that by around 2050 it is estimated that Latinx will comprise almost a quarter of the U.S. population. This will make Latinx not only the largest minority group in the U.S., but also the driving force behind the U.S. becoming a minority-majority country. In other words, it is estimated that by around 2050 the U.S. will be a country in which more than 50 percent of its citizenry will be nonwhite.1 The leadership in both the Republican and Democratic parties agree that this change in demographics could forever alter the American political landscape. This is because Republican candidates rarely get above 30 percent of any minority group's vote and this lack of appeal among minority groups has made Republican politicians accustomed to winning elections by capturing a sizeable majority of the majority (i.e., winning 55 percent or more of the white vote). Given the oncoming demographic changes, which will be driven primarily by the growing Latinx community, it would stand to reason that Republican candidates will find it increasingly difficult to continue their current electoral strategy and expect to win national elections. In this respect, the state of Florida might seem like a strange outlier. Ever since the infamous 2000 presidential election, Florida has been a very closely contested state and this year was no different. Back in 2000, Latino/as made up approximately one sixth (15 percent) of that state's population. Sixteen years and four presidential elections later, Latino/as now comprise almost a quarter (25 percent) of the state's population. Given what was just outlined above, it should stand to reason that in this year's election Florida should have been a fairly reliable Democratic state. Instead, Donald Trump carried the state by nearly two percentage points! So is the case of Florida merely a hiccup in the forward march of progressive American politics, or does it actually foretell something else? In this essay I want to suggest, following the work of critical race theorists such as Ian Hany López and Derrick Bell, that Florida is not an aberration but instead provides us with an underappreciated insight into American "whiteness" that should trouble progressives who optimistically believe that we are merely living through the final throes of white supremacy. Whiteness, as most race theorists have noted, is neither fixed, essential, nor bounded. In other words, whiteness can and does change depending on context. We also know from past experience that in order to obtain or maintain a dominant position-even and especially in democratic political communities-whites have resorted to either eliminating (e.g., genocide) or isolating (e.g., apartheid and segregation) any threatening non-white group(s). There is no doubt that these sorts of strategies continue in the U.S. today, as is evident from everything from calls for stricter immigration enforcement focused primarily on keeping certain kinds of immigrants out, to the gerrymandering of congressional districts and voter ID laws whose real aim is to suppress or dilute the non-white vote. What is less discussed, however, is a third strategy that can and has been deployed when these other two strategies have proven insufficient. When a sizeable majority of the majority in a multi-racial democracy is no longer enough to guarantee electoral victory, that majority group (in this case whites) have also historically shown themselves amenable to expanding the boundaries of whiteness and coopting key segments of the non-white population. By "key" segments here I do not mean most or even many, but just enough nonwhites and only those whose inclusion into whiteness would require the least amount of change or dilution. What I am suggesting in this essay is that Trump's election, and especially his win in a state like Florida, is in fact signaling a change in American whiteness but not the kind of change that some progressives might have been hoping for.2 What the results of this past election seem to show is that certain segments of the Latinx population (e.g., the Cuban community in Florida3) are and will continue to be coopted into whiteness. To be clear, this offer to be included into whiteness is not open to all Latinx, but to just enough to both keep whites as a perpetual majority and only to those Latinx whose inclusion would require the least amount of change or dilution to our current conception of whiteness. In other words, a state like Florida is not so much an aberration or outlier in our current political climate as it is a harbinger of American whiteness to come and of Latinx role in it. SPACE TRADERS REVISITED Recently, Ian Haney López has popularized the phrase "dog-whistle politics."4 This phrase refers to a strategy for winning democratic elections in societies with a large white majority. The underlying premise of dog-whistle politics is that most whites are still willing to vote, oftentimes even against their own better economic interests, for candidates that affirm their fears, anxieties, and prejudices about nonwhites. Given the political climate in the U.S., where at least since the end of Civil Rights Movement racist, nativist, and even xenophobic appeals have been considered politically out-of-bounds, candidates have had to signal their sympathy for white supremacy in more coded language. In an anonymous interview given in 1981, Republican Party strategist Lee Atwater infamously outlined how this coded appeal to white voters worked for Richard Nixon in his 1968 presidential campaign, a campaign whose methods have come to be collectively known as the "Southern Strategy." You start in 1954 by saying "Nigger, nigger, nigger." By 1968 you can't say "Nigger." That hurts you. It backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states rights and all that stuff and you get so abstract. Now you talk about cutting taxes and these things you're talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that's part of it. I'm not saying that. But I'm saying that if it is getting that abstract and that coded, we are doing away with the racial problem one way or the other. Obviously sitting around saying we want to cut taxes and we want this, is a lot more abstract than even the busing thing and a hell of a lot more abstract than nigger nigger.5 Haney López's principle claim is that despite Barack Obama's electoral victory in 2008 and his subsequent reelection in 2012, dog-whistle politics remain alive and SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 7 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY well in American politics. Nowhere is this claim more evident than in Donald Trump's recent election-where Trump blew the dog whistle so loudly that his racist message became audible to even the most racially tonedeaf of Republicans like Mitt Romney. The result of this was that Trump won almost 58 percent of the white vote, but in turn lost nearly 75 percent of the non-white vote- an outcome that is consistent with traditional uses of dog whistle politics. Despite the pommeling Trump took among non-white voters, Trump was still able to win the election because nonwhites comprised only about 25 percent of the electorate. In other words, Trump could afford to lose a super-majority of the non-white vote because a substantial (although not necessarily super) majority of the white vote was still enough to win a national election in the U.S. The effectiveness of dog-whistle politics is not only clear to those of us on the political left, but has also been clear to many on the far-right who for years have openly implored Republican candidates to use this strategy more.6 Even if all of this is true, would it not also follow that as nonwhites become a larger percentage of the electorate- as is expected to happen in the near future, thanks largely to the growing number of Latinx-the less likely it will be that dog-whistle politics will remain effective and, in fact, might backfire and come to haunt the Republican party for decades?7 Furthermore, is this not also what most reasonable Republicans (i.e., the non-far-right conservatives) also believe and why so many of them have been so dismayed with the recent Trump phenomenon?8 The short answer to these sorts of questions is yes, but only if we assume that American whiteness in 2050 will look the same as it does today. I want to suggest that we have good reasons to believe that this assumption will not hold up. Instead, I believe that for the foreseeable future white supremacy will continue to play the pivotal role it has been playing in American politics, and it will do so because of (and not in spite of) the changing nature of American whiteness. This is a conclusion that I think is not only consistent with but also follows naturally from the work of renowned legal scholar Derrick Bell.9 In perhaps his most well-known work, "The Space Traders," Bell poignantly articulates both his "permanence of racism" and "interest convergence" theories.10 In this piece, Bell recounts a science-fiction story about visitors from outer space that come to Earth and offer the American people marvelous gifts which will solve most of their pressing domestic concerns in exchange for every Black American. In the story the majority of Americans accept this bargain with the space traders and once again show themselves willing to sacrifice the lives of Blacks when it is in their best interests to do so-despite their professed abhorrence of racism. The point Bell is trying to make with this story is that the view most of us have of "racial progress" in the U.S. can be a dangerous illusion. It can lull us-especially us good progressives-into thinking that racial justice in America has a forward bent to it, which can at times be slowed but never stopped. Bell does not necessarily deny that in some ways things have gotten better for Blacks in America. Slavery, after all, is abolished and segregation is no longer legally permissible. Still, he wants to emphasize that racism is a permanent feature of U.S. society (i.e., not an aberration) and that what might look like forward progress has really been just a collection of historical moments where the interests of a significant number of whites just happened to converge with those of Blacks. The concessions that Blacks have been granted with the help of a majority of white Americans (e.g., Civil Rights legislation) has been the result not of moral persuasion (i.e., not out of the better selves of whites) but because of interest convergence (e.g., when Jim Crow segregation became a liability in the context of the Cold War). When those interests are no longer aligned, when they diverge as they do in the story of the Space Traders, whites have and will continue to take those concessions back and then some. The Space Traders story, with its underlining themes about the permanence of racism and interest convergence theory, can help us understand what happened with states like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. The simple truth of the matter is that Clinton lost the election because she could not hold on to these three usually reliable Democratic states. These states were considered so "in the bag" that she hardly campaigned in those states. Some pundits have argued that the tipping point in those states, the white working class that has traditionally voted Democratic, voted for Trump this time around because they had grown tired of how the new globalized economy was negatively impacting them. Most of these voters have come to believe that both Democrats and Republicans are committed to promoting the kinds of trade policies that have driven down their wages and, in many cases, eliminated their jobs altogether. A vote for Trump represented for them a break with the current status quo and a harkening back to better days.11 In other words, their vote for Trump was motivated more by economic fears than by a desire for white supremacy. To a large degree I think that something like this account is ultimately correct, and I don't mean to downplay these causes or to claim that most working-class whites are racists. But let us also remember that in the Space Trader story, most whites who voted to make the trade were not living in the best of circumstances nor were they necessarily racist either. Bell's point is that they made the trade not so much because they hated Blacks, but because of what the aliens promised to give in return. Trump, much like the aliens, promised to "make America great again," and it makes sense why this appeals to many good-hearted people. The problem is that there is an underside to this bargain, which someone has to pay for. Trump promised to make places like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania great again, but only in exchange for further ostracizing nonwhites. It is a very small consolation to nonwhites that most of the white working-class who voted for Trump might have been repulsed rather than attracted by his racism. The only thing that really matters is that they went ahead and made the trade anyway. When their interests no longer aligned with those of nonwhites, no amount of moral exhortations were strong enough to get them to vote against white supremacy. Let us now retell the Space Traders story, except this time let us imagine that it is 2050 and that demographic changes have occurred as they have been predicted to PAGE 8 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY occur. America is now a minority-majority country and the visitors from space ask Americans to sacrifice all nonwhites in exchange for marvelous gifts that will solve their most pressing domestic problems. Keep in mind that in this scenario, members of groups who in 2016 were considered nonwhite (e.g., Black, Asian, Latin, Middle Eastern, and Native Americans) now collectively outnumber members of the group that in 2016 would have been considered white. It would seem reasonable to predict today, taking a good progressive view about the future, that in 2050 there would not be the numbers to make such a trade-in fact, nonwhites could probably band together and make a trade in exchange for whites. This hopeful view of the future, however, rests on the assumption that whiteness in 2050 will look a lot like it does today. This is an assumption that I find faulty for at least two reasons. First, American whiteness was not the same in 1950 as it was in 1850, so why assume that it will look the same in 2050? Second, Latinx are not a homogenous racial bloc and if given the opportunity, many Latinx would probably jump at the chance of being white.12 If this is so, then there is good reason to be suspicious that mere demographic changes will be enough to ensure that in the future nonwhites no longer get "space traded" by whites. AMERICAN WHITENESS American whiteness and American democracy have always been closely aligned. This history can be traced all the way back to the initial exclusion of Blacks and Native Americans from U.S. citizenship and thereby the vote. It also extends to the various efforts that were and continue to be made to suppress their vote even after they were granted U.S. citizenship. Similarly, Asians for a long time were denied the opportunity to become naturalized U.S. citizens because from 1790 until 1943, naturalized U.S. citizenship was reserved exclusively for whites. So while Black, Asian, and Native Americans have historically been the exemplars of non-whiteness in the U.S., American whiteness has itself never been a definitive or fixed concept. For a long time, American whiteness was reserved exclusively for people of Northern European descent and even then only to certain segments of Northern Europe, so Irish and Polish were initially denied full white status. The worry that U.S. elections might be decided contrary to the will of the majority of whites began to arise sometime in the mid-1800s-well before Blacks, Asians, or Native Americans could become citizens-and it led to the creation of the now infamous Know-Nothing Party. The majority of people who joined the Know-Nothing party did not come from very wealthy or elite backgrounds. In fact, a lot like the populist movements we see today, its members came largely from lowerand working-class backgrounds. The platform of this party was based around nativism and, in particular, an opposition to Catholic immigration. The worry about Catholic immigrants was that they were coming in droves and were bringing with them a subversive religion. The fear was that Catholics planned to have as many children as they could in order to eventually have the numbers necessary to vote in a government that would be more loyal to the Vatican than to the U.S. constitution. For this reason, the modus operandi of the Know-Nothing Party was to do everything in its power to prevent Catholics (which came to be associated with both Irish and "Latin" European immigrants) from obtaining any political post and also deny them jobs, arguing that American business owners had a patriotic duty to employ only true Americans. They were also certain that Catholics were already trying to rig elections by having non-citizens vote. Know-Nothing activists would therefore stand watch at polling stations during elections, and this would often lead to violent confrontations. By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the worry about Northern Europeans losing their majority status went from a fringe conspiracy theory to a mainstream crisis. This concern was exemplified in the writings of people like Madison Grant, who in 1916 wrote the widely influential book The Passing of the Great Race. In that book Grant argued that the founding race of the United States, the Nordic race, was heading towards extinction because of various factors, none of which was more pressing than the continued immigration of inferior races into the United States, especially of the Alpine (i.e., Eastern Europeans) and Mediterranean (i.e., Southern Europe) races.13 The initial reaction to this threat was to try to keep out non-Northern Europeans through immigration restrictions. This was the reason U.S. immigration policy was radically changed in 1924, adding quotas for the first time on Southern and Eastern European immigrants. This, however, did not solve the supposed problem. Immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe continued at a much higher rate than immigration from Northern Europe. Eventually, the solution that was settled upon was to expand the notion of American whiteness and include Southern and Eastern Europeans, who at least were closer to embodying American whiteness than Blacks, Asians, or Native Americans (as a kind of aside, it is also around this time that Arabs came to be legally classified as "white" in the United States14). The usual reason cited for how and why Southern and Eastern Europeans came to be included in American whiteness is the advent of World War II. As the story goes, the utter hypocrisy of morally condemning fascists who held a similar racial ideology as we did, coupled with the need for a united American front to fight European fascism, provided to be too much. American whiteness had to be expanded, and this project of expanding American whiteness was not much of a secret. It was made explicit in projects that we can still see today, such as the award winning short film The House I Live In. In that film, Frank Sinatra stars as himself and makes the case to a group of multi-ethnic young boys (all of whom we would today consider white) that they should not let their differences in religion or nationality divide them because at the end of the day they were all Americans who stood up against everything fascism represents. By the end of WWII various immigration reforms were passed, removing various immigration restrictions and adopting instead policies that put Southern and Eastern Europeans on par with Northern Europeans. SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 9 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY The result was that by 1950, American whiteness was no longer what it had been in 1850. If whiteness had not undergone this change, America would have already been considered a minority-majority country. In fact, this is what gets covered over in the assimilationist claim that America has always been a "nation of immigrants." A claim that for most of its history was, in fact, used as a derisive slur about oncoming demographic changes.15 The fact is that American whiteness changed and while this change had dramatic effects that reshuffled the electoral map, the basic structure of American democracy-where a sizable majority of the white majority was sufficient to carry the day-remained the same. In a way, Latinx might today be playing a similar role as Southern and Eastern Europeans did in the early part of the twentieth century. Even as their continued migration is currently decried, thirty years from now certain segments of the Latinx population might seamlessly come to be seen as just another part of the white melting pot. CONCLUSION In short, it's not clear that changing demographics alone will be enough to sever the link between white supremacy and American democracy. White supremacy has shown that it is not only willing to resort to the elimination and isolation of nonwhites, but that it is also willing to expand and recruit from certain segments of the non-white population if that is what is necessary for it to maintain its dominant position. By doing so it will ensure that political decisions continue to be made by a significant majority of the majority and, even more troubling, that dog-whistle politics will remain an effective political tool for the foreseeable future. NOTES 1. Pew Research Center, "Projected U.S. Population by Race and Hispanic Origin, 2015–2065, with and without Immigrants Entering 2015–2065" September 24, 2015, accessed December 26, 2016, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/modern- immigration-wave-brings-59-million-to-u-s-driving-population- growth-and-change-through-2065/ph_2015-09-28_immigration- through-2065-a2-06/ 2. See, for example, Linda Martín Alcoff, The Future of Whiteness (Malden, MA: Polity, 2015). 3. Jens Manuel Krogstad and Antonio Flores, "Unlike Other Latinos, About Half of Cuban Voters in Florida Backed Trump," Pew Research Center, November 16, 2015, accessed December 26, 2016, http:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/15/unlike-other-latinos- about-half-of-cuban-voters-in-florida-backed-trump/ 4. Ian Haney López, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class (New York: Oxford University Press; 2014). 5. Quoted in Andrew Rosenthal, "Lee Atwater's 'Southern Strategy' Interview" New York Times, November 14, 2012, accessed November 25, 2016, http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes. com/2012/11/14/lee-atwaters-southern-strategy-interview/?_r=0 6. For example, see Ann Coulter, Adios, America: The Left's Plan to Turn Our Country into a Third World Hellhole (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2015). 7. For example, see Peter Beinart, "The Republican Party's White Strategy: Embracing White Nativism in the 1990s Turned the California GOP into a Permanent Minority. The Same Story May Now Be Repeating Itself Nationally," The Atlantic July/August 2016, accessed December 26, 2016, https://www.theatlantic. com/magazine/archive/2016/07/the-white-strategy/485612/ 8. For example, see Ellen Carmichael, "Minority Outreach: The GOP Must Do Better," National Review, February 10, 2016, accessed January 19, 2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/ article/431069/minority-outreach-gop-must-do-better 9. As an aside, there are disturbingly few philosophers who take the work of Derrick Bell as seriously as it deserves to be taken up. One notable exception is Tommy J. Curry. See Tommy J. Curry, "Saved By the Bell: Derrick Bell's Racial Realism as Pedagogy," Ohio Valley Philosophical Studies in Education 39 (2008): 35–46; and "From Rousseau's Theory of Natural Equality to Firmin's Resistance to the Historical Inequality of Races," CLR James Journal 15, no. 1 (2009): 135–63. 10. Derrick Bell, "The Space Traders," in Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism, 158–200 (New York: Basic Books, 1993). 11. For example, see Alexia Fernández Campbell, "One Reason the Rust Belt Turned Red: A Republican-Led Battle to Weaken Labor Unions May Have Helped Trump Win in Several Democratic Bastions in the Midwest," The Atlantic, November 14, 2016, accessed January 19, 2017, http://www.theatlantic.com/ business/archive/2016/11/one-reason-the-rust-belt-turned- red/507611/ 12. For a satirical parallel, see George Samuel Schuyler, Black No More: Being an Account of the Strange and Wonderful Workings of Science in the Land of the Free, A. D. 1933–1940 (New York: The Macaulay Company, 1931). 13. Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race: The Racial Basis of European History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922). 14. Khaled A. Beydoun, "Boxed In: Reclassification of Arab Americans on the U.S. Census as Progress or Peril?" Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 47, no. 693 (2016): 706–08. 15. See Donna R. Gabaccia, "Nations of Immigrants: Do Words Matter?" The Pluralist 5, no. 3 (2010): 5–31. ESSAYS Eudaimonia and Neltiliztli: Aristotle and the Aztecs on the Good Life1 L. Sebastian Purcell STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT CORTLAND 1. EUDAIMONIA AND NELTILIZTLI How shall we live? What sort of life would it be best to lead? Does that life entail obligations to other people? If so, which? These, briefly, are the questions at the heart of ethical philosophy. The first two, concerning the best sort of life, address the topic of the good. The latter, concerning our obligations to others, address the right. Among many of the philosophers of classical Greek antiquity, including Plato and Aristotle, questions concerning the good were understood to be conceptually prior to those of the right. They held, in short, that one needed to know what kind of life one sought to lead before one could raise questions about what sorts of obligations followed. The best life, they maintained, was the happy or flourishing one-a life of eudaimonia.2 They considered, moreover, the skillful leading of such a life to be a virtuous one, and that is why this form of ethics has been called a eudaemonist virtue ethics. What the present essay argues is that the pre-Columbian Aztecs, or more properly the Nahuas, the people who spoke Nahuatl in pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, held a view about ethical philosophy that is similar to Aristotle's. They held to PAGE 10 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY a conception of the good life, which they called neltiliztli, and they maintained that understanding its character was conceptually prior to questions about rightness. What this thesis suggests is that they also held to a form of virtue ethics, though one different from the eudaemonist sort that Aristotle and Plato championed. Since neltiliztli means rootedness, one might call it a rooted virtue ethics. One consequence of this thesis is that it articulates an alternative understanding of the good life which, while similar to Aristotle's eudaimonia in the way it guides our thinking about right action, raises a new problem for ethical philosophy: Just how closely linked is pleasure (hēdonē) to the good life? There is a similarity here with the fundamental ethical problem of classical antiquity, which asked whether virtue was sufficient for happiness (eudaimonia). Yet the focus of the present problem centers not on virtue's relation to the good life, but on just what counts as a good life in the first place. Can one really have a conception of the good life that does not have any internal relation to elevated or positive emotional states (hēdonē)? The Nahuas would have us believe that we can and must, at least for any life led on what they called our "slippery" earth. A second consequence is that this essay makes some strides in filling a gap in comparative philosophy. The Nahuas are finally beginning to receive philosophic attention among Anglophone scholars, but this work has so far tended to focus on their metaphysical views.3 This is generally true even among Spanish-speaking scholars, who have been better in addressing the Nahuas philosophically.4 The present essay, then, moves some direction in developing our understanding of Nahua philosophy by articulating their conception of the good life.5 Since the matter at hand is rather complicated, I begin with the features of eudaimonia and neltiliztli as the highest end. 2. THE HIGHEST END There are two key features of the good life which have a reasonable parallel in Aztec and Aristotelian thought, namely, that the good life is the highest end of action, and that this highest end may be spelled out by its relation to the human condition. On this last point, however, Aristotle differs somewhat from the Aztec approach since he relates eudaimonia to the human function (ergon), while the Aztecs draw their reasoning from a wider characterization of what life is like on our earth, on what they called tlalticpac. Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics (N.E.) rather (in) famously by making a case for the good as the highest or ultimate aim of our actions as follows: Every art and every inquiry, and similarly, every action [praxis] and every decision [proairēsis] is thought to aim at some good; hence men have expressed themselves well in declaring the good to be that at which all things aim. But there appears to be a difference among the ends; for some are activities, others are products apart from [the activities which produce] them.6 The quality of the reasoning at stake in this passage has been the source of scholarly controversy. Just because every inquiry, action, and decision aim at some good, it does not follow that the good is that at which all things aim. This would be a little like arguing that all roads lead somewhere, so all roads lead to the same place. Piecing together what Aristotle intended, then, has occupied scholars for some time. With respect to the controversy, briefly, it seems that two points clarify what Aristotle had in mind. First, recall that Aristotle's method for ethics is to find "a view [that] will be most in harmony with the phenomena."7 To do this, he begins from a piece of reputable wisdom, an endoxa,8 and then proceeds to tease through possible implications to arrive at a better statement.9 In this case the endoxa is the statement: "hence men have expressed themselves well in declaring the good to be that at which all things aim." What the rest of the passage is meant to do, even if it is not fully complete, is to bridge the gap between the first observation, as a premise, and the endoxa, as a conclusion. In brief, the argument he develops runs thus: [1] If the goods of each (inquiry, action, etc.) are hierarchically ordered (and they are), [2] And if goods do not go on to infinity (which would be absurd), [3] Then there is a highest good. The conclusion, [3], is the highest good at which "all" things aim in the opening line.10 Since Aristotle, a little later, identifies the highest good with eudaimonia, what the opening argument suggests is that the good life is that sense of happiness that emerges when one considers one's life as a whole, when one considers the ordered relation among one's goals and hierarchizes them.11 While a variety of commentators have noted that Aristotle does not quite complete this argument in the opening passages of the N.E., they tend to agree that this is the sort of argument he intends to make.12 If that is so, the real difficulty is not the quality of the inference from the premises to the conclusion but the soundness of [1]. It is not clear that all of our goods are hierarchically ordered. Aristotle makes his argument by analogy to the sciences, and while it is true that they may be hierarchized, individual human aims often are not. Aristotle even acknowledges this much in accounting for the different sorts of pleasures that are sought.13 It turns out, then, that some sort of skill will be necessary to manage this relation-and this, in brief, is the purpose of the virtues: those excellent qualities of character than enable a person to live her life well. Still, there is disagreement concerning just what that highest end should be, and in the first book of the N.E., Aristotle proposes to settle the matter by appealing to the proper activity or function (ergon) of human beings. He writes: If, indeed, the function of humans is the soul's performance according to reason, or not without reason, and if we acknowledge that the function of an individual is also that of a good individual in a generic way, just as is the case with a lyre player and a good lyre player, and so on for all the SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 11 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY others without qualification . . . if it is thus, then the human good would be the soul's performance according to virtue, and if there are many virtues, according to the best and most complete.14 Given the way that Aristotle loads in premises to his argument, mostly here marked by ellipses, it is not surprising that the grounds for his claim have also been the subject of some rather intense philosophic scrutiny. The core of his reasoning, without addressing much of the metaphysical backdrop behind it, appears to turn on the thesis that to be is to be good. Expressed differently, he holds that to be a thing of a certain kind, say a lyre player or a bicycle, or whatever else, is to be a good lyre player, or a good bicycle, or a good anything else.15 For example, if my bicycle were to be damaged, so that its wheel were bent slightly, it would ride poorly. As a result, it would be a worse bicycle. If the bicycle were to lose its chain, then it would resemble something closer to a scooter. Were it to lose its wheels altogether, then it would cease to be a bicycle and would, rather, be only a bicycle frame. What goes for bicycles, other objects, and practices also goes for humans. The human function is to make use of reason, understood in a broad sense (i.e., as logos). Activities, insofar as they are properly human, thus make use of logos. To be a good human, by the same reasoning, is thus to be one who leads a life by means of logos, or at least not without it. To the extent that one fails to use logos, one leads a bad or vicious human life. In sum, the good human life is the one which exhibits human excellences or virtues. The bad one is that which exhibits human vices. Since this understanding articulates (some of) what it means to lead a human life at all, it establishes a basic set of conditions for our highest human aim, for eudaimonia. We are obligated to pursue it, if we should seek to lead a human life at all. This argument settles the dispute concerning happiness by establishing objective conditions for all human pursuits. Finally, and to connect these points to one of Aristotle's arguments in Book 10 of the N.E., it is only by pursuing this sort of life that we can enjoy human pleasures at all. For the Nahuas, just as for Aristotle, it is the human condition that limits and enables one to pursue the best sort of life. Unlike Aristotle, for the Nahuas it is the character of our circumstances as humans on earth that primarily determines this condition, not a property of what we are as animal beings, like logos. For the Nahuas, our lives are ones led on earth, on tlalticpac. This place has three pertinent characteristics which set the conditions for the sort of life that we can hope to lead. It is, first of all, a slippery place. This point is amply recorded in extant Nahua texts. For example, the sixth volume of Florentine Codex (F.C.) has a catalogue of common sayings. There we read the following one: Slippery, slick is the earth. It is the same as the one mentioned Perhaps at one time one was of good life; later he fell into some wrong, as if he had slipped in the mud.16 The "one mentioned" is the saying which is listed just above in the codex, which reads: How is this? Look well to thyself, thou fish of gold. It is said at this time: if one some time ago lived a good life [and] later fell onto some [other one]-perhaps he took a paramour, or he knocked someone down so that he took sick or even died; and for that he was thrust into jail: so at that time it is said: "How is this? Look well to thyself, thou fish of gold."17 A few observations are in order. A first is that the range of things that are slippery (tlaalahui) includes the sorts of actions that we might commonly include in the ethical, because they are under our volition, and those that are not, because we have little or no control over them. We would say that taking a paramour is a choice, while knocking someone over, by tripping for example, is a bad outcome, but pardonable because out of our control. Yet these are descriptions of our condition on earth, and their point seems to be that regardless of individual choice, this is just the sort of place where we can expect these lapses. We may have to go to jail as a result, so that appeal to the condition of tlalticpac is not exculpatory, but it is descriptive of the general character of our human lives. A second point is that the slipperiness of tlalticpac, then, is not something that one can hope to avoid by reasoning well. One does not slip through an Aristotelian hamartia, an error in the practical syllogism of one's reasoning.18 Rather, this is just the sort of place in which one is prone to slip, where lapses in judgment will occur. The ideal for one's life, as a result (and third), cannot be one that includes no errors, no lapses in judgment. Purity in this place cannot be the goal after which we strive asymptotically. Rather, it must be the sort of ideal that recognizes that these slips occur, and yet manages them as well as possible. A second feature of our human condition, life on tlalticpac, is that it is transitory. Again, this point of view is well attested in extant texts, yet no one is a better spokesman on this point than Nezahualcoyotl. In a work of poetic philosophy entitled "Ma zan moquetzacan, nicnihuan! / My friends, stand up!" he writes the following (this is the piece in its entirety). My friends, stand up! The princes have become destitute, I am Nezahualcoyotl, I am a Singer, head of macaw. Grasp your flowers and your fan. With them go out to dance! You are my child, you are Yoyontzin. Take your chocolate, flower of the cacao tree, may you drink all of it! Do the dance, do the song! Not here is our house, not here do we live, you also will have to go away.19 PAGE 12 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY The character of this piece cannot but strike one as of a similar character as 1 Corinthians 15:32, "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die." Still, the context is much wider in Nahua thought. For Nezahualcoyotl, in fact, this is the basic problem of our existence (and not merely the slipperiness of our lives). For not only is it true that our lives are ephemeral, but it is also the case that even the structure of the cosmos is ephemeral in character. The fifth age, the one with a sun of motion, is one which, like the previous four, will sometime pass. These considerations lead one to the third feature of life on tlalticpac, namely, that it is far from clear that it is a happy place. As part of an extended poem, Nezahualcoyotl writes: Is it true that we are happy, that we live on earth? It is not certain that we live and have come on earth to be happy. We are all sorely lacking. Is there any who does not suffer here, next to the people?20 For Nezahualcoyotl's own work these considerations led him to seek the only sort of stability and eternity for which one can hope, namely, that to be found in philosophicalpoetic reflection, in the composition of "flower and song." For the Nahua's broader ethical outlook (more below), these reflections supply the reason why the pursuit of happiness is not something that they thought could be a suitable objective for one's life's plan. The transitory and slippery character of life on tlalticpac would make elevated emotional states, i.e., "happiness," a foolhardy goal. The general aim of Nahua ethics, then, is not happiness but to achieve rootedness (neltilitztli) on tlalticpac. To support the idea textually, it will be helpful to have in mind a linguistic point. Should one like to form a new word in Nahuatl, the language is well equipped with the capacity for compounding, much as ancient Greek was. Yet one may also make use of what Angel Maria Garibay has called a "difrasismo," which is the expression of one idea in two words.21 Examples in English might be "with blood and fire," or "against wind and tide." This sort of expression was extremely common in Nahuatl, and one must be careful to catch the metaphorical meaning at work. For if taken literally, the meaning of a difrasismo is almost totally lost. One of the commonest of these in a philosophic context is the phrase in xochi in cuicatl, which, translated literally, means "with flower and song," but taken metaphorically means something like "poetry." Returning to the discussion of rootedness, I would like to examine the short piece "Flower and Song / Xochi Cuicatl," found in the Cantares Mexicanos, which was composed and recited before a meeting of wise men and poets in the house of Tecayehautzin. The question at stake in the piece is how to achieve some sort of permanence. Lord Ayocuan is said to be acquainted with Life Giver, one of the names for the single being of existence, teotl. Invoking and recalling the lord, the suggestion of the piece is that it is by creating "flower and song" that one finds this permanence. We read the author's realization that this (poetic creation) must be the answer to the transitoriness of life on tlalticpac in the following lines: So this is how that lord, the vaunted one, comes creating them. Yes, with plume like bracelet beads he pleases the only-being. Is that what pleases the Life Giver? Is that the only truth [nelli] on earth [tlalticpac]?22 So the author comes to the conclusion that by writing flower-song, especially the type that addresses the greater problems of our human existence, one is best able to find "truth" on the slippery earth.23 What matters for ethical purposes is obscured in the English translation. The phrase "aço tle nelli in tlalticpac" is best translated as "Is that the only truth on earth?" But the word nelli is related to nelhuáyotl, which is a root or base.24 The metaphorical idea behind the Nahua understanding of "truth," then, is that it is a matter of being rooted like a tree, as opposed to sliding about on our slippery earth. The goal, the solution to our human problems, then, is to find rootedness, which as an abstract substantive would be expressed in Nahuatl as neltiliztli. An important point here is that the context of the poem makes clear that one is to find rootedness in the only being of existence, in teotl. Just as is the case with Aristotle's function argument, there is equally a metaphysical backdrop to the Nahua account of the good life. The Nahuas were pantheists of a sort and took our world to be an expression of the single fundamental being of existence. A rooted life, then, is not only our highest end, but carries a similar normative force. One ought to seek rootedness not only on prudential grounds, but because rootedness is the way that one truly is given our circumstances. The philosophic poem "Flower and Song" provides one source of evidence for the normative similarity between Aristotle and the Nahua understanding of the good life. For additional textual evidence, one might turn to the tenth volume of the F.C., which addresses "the people" of the Nahua culture. There one finds descriptions of persons at work in socially recognized roles. The codex author Bernadino de Sahagún is responsible for asking what the good and bad forms of each is, e.g., asking, What is a good feather worker? What is a bad one? So one cannot say that the Nahuas would have formulated the matters explicitly in terms of good and bad. What one can note is that in their responses, one finds their general understanding of how approval and disapprobation were allotted in each case, and how they reasoned about what ought to be. In describing an adult nobleman, we read the following: The good [qualli] middle-aged man is a doer, a worker [who is] agile, active, solicitous. The bad [tlaueliloc] middle-aged man is lazy, negligent, slothful, indolent, sluggish, idle, languid, a lump of flesh [quitlatzcopic], a lump of flesh with two eyes [cuitlatzcocopictli], a thief.25 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 13 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY Similar statements are found throughout the F.C. so that one can be certain that this sort of language is not isolated. The suggestion is double. First, good adult men are those who perform their duties and roles well, while the bad ones are indolent. Second, bad adult men hardly resemble men at all. They become, rather, mere lumps of flesh. Stated otherwise, there are conditions for leading a life in a human community, and should one not observe them, one tends towards not leading a human life at all. To bring all these points together, one might write that Aristotle and the Aztecs both held to a conception of the good life as one that is the highest aim one could have, or, more aptly, live out. They differed in the grounds they provided for their views. Aristotle's argument turns on a thesis about the function (ergon) of a human being, while the Nahuas held that one should aim for rootedness as (i) a reasonable response to our circumstances on earth, and as (ii) a basic condition for leading a life in the human community as part of teotl. What needs to be clarified now is how exactly this understanding of the good life could guide our actions. 3. VIRTUE AND ACTION GUIDANCE To spell out how their accounts are action guiding, one must broach two questions. First, Aristotle's eudaimonia is clearly linked to his discussion of excellence, arētē, but this close link between neltiliztli and excellence has not been shown for the Nahuas. While the above shows that they had an understanding of the human good which supports this line of reasoning, is there a Nahuatl word or phrase that serves roughly the same role as arētē, and is it connected to an account of rootedness? Second, even though the above shows that the Nahuas had a conception of the good life, it does not show that neltiliztli functioned in the way required. Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill both had conceptions of the good life, but neither was a virtue ethicist. How do we know that neltiliztli functions like Aristotle's eudaimonia and not the summum bonum for Kant and Mill? I begin with the matter of "virtue." In some ways the topic is difficult because of the abundance of possible terms available. One should recall that arētē in Greek is derived from the god Ares, and in Homeric times the word meant primarily nobility and strength on the battlefield. Over the following several hundred years of recorded Greek texts, one finds the term slowly changing from a quality of character primarily focused on competitive activities to one focused on cooperative ones-ones that foster life in the city state (polis). Plato and Aristotle, moreover, played a significant role in this change, rather willfully adapting common terms to their purposes.26 "Virtue" or "human excellence," in short, did not spring from Zeus' head fully armored, but was a concept developed over the course of several centuries among the Greeks. One should be wary, then, of finding an exact equivalent in other cultures. Additionally, one should not expect the Nahuas to have only one such term just because Hellenistic philosophers ultimately settled on one. In the Confucian tradition, for example, one finds two words used for "virtue," namely, de and ren.27 It might turn out that the Nahuas had more than one term. The proposal that I venture here is that there is one broad phrase for excellence, and that there may be further, more specific terms for excellence available in other ways, just as de is the broad term for virtue in the Confucian tradition, and ren the more specific term focused on human relations.28 To begin, in Nahuatl, as in Greek, there are several words for the good, the noble, and the beautiful. Generally, the most broadly used term for "good" is "qualli," and I have indicated it in brackets in above quoted texts.29 The root of the word derives from the verb qua, which means to eat. The general idea indicated, then, is that something is good because assimilable, edible in a way that will aid in one's flourishing. Another common word is yectli, which is something good because it is straight. Likely the best translation for yectli, then, is rectitude. The Nahuas also made use of a difrasismo with these two words as components: in qualli in yectli, meaning, too literally, "with goodness and straightness."30 My suggestion is that this is the Nahua way of expressing "excellence." In the tenth volume of the F.C., for example, one finds a description of the "good" daughter which reads: ichpuchtli in iectli in qualli, in qualli ichpuchtli, which might be translated as "the excellent daughter, the good daughter."31 In this passage, one also finds an explicit connection between excellence, so understood, and the good life as rootedness. Since the matter is critical, I provide a word-by- word translation and commentary in the table below. yn tecuheuh yn ichpuchtli One's daughter [who is] This is a phrase indicating the whole idea of a daughter in her relation both to a male and female speaker. quiztica, macitica, vel, unspoiled, perfect, good, These terms are all difficult to translate, because Christianity had already influenced the meaning of the words. Yet, none of them in Nahuatl have a fundamental connection to Christian understanding of virginity. nelli, rooted, Dibble and Anderson omit this word in translation, as it fits poorly with the Christianized interpretation of the Nahuatl description.32 It is the root of neltiliztli. ichpuchtli in iectli in qualli, [who is] the excellent daughter, There is no sentence break in the Nahuatl, so the idea is continued: the rooted daughter is the excellent one ... in qualli ichpuchtli . . .33 the good daughter ... the good one, et cetera. PAGE 14 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY One here finds a description of the "good" daughter as one who is rooted, who is leading the best life possible, and one who is excellent in doing so. The passage is a difficult one to analyze and translate because some Christian influence was present at the time that it was recorded, but it does indicate that the Nahuas thought to connect virtue (in yectli in qualli) and rootedness (neltiliztli). The best life available on earth, in short, is one that is performed excellently. I turn now to the question whether the Nahuas understood the good life in the way required for a virtue ethics. One may begin by recalling what is distinctive about eudaimonia as it functions for action-guiding purposes. For eudaimonists generally, action guidance follows from the priority of the good to the right. This is to say that in the order of justification, one appeals to a conception of the good first, and then concludes to a judgment of right action. A eudaemonist, then, might argue that one ought not cheat on one's partner, or that cheating on one's partner is morally wrong, because it harms her by inhibiting her flourishing. For a modern philosopher who holds to the priority of the right to the good, as Kantian deontologists do, moral wrongness functions in a premise to one's conclusion. One ought not cheat on one's partner because it is morally wrong, and one can discern this moral wrongness by appeal to an independent test, like the categorical imperative procedure.34 If this difference in the order of justification is what distinguishes Aristotle from Kant on the good, then what distinguishes Aristotle from Mill on the good? Utilitarian consequentialists also appeal to a conception of the good, say, a maximum of average utility, in order to determine whether an action is right. How is Aristotle, or the eudaemonist generally, different? To answer this question, one is returned to an untranslatable point in the second line of the N.E., since it is there where Aristotle introduces an important qualification about the character of the highest good as an end. He writes: "But there appears to be a difference among the ends; for some are activities, others are products apart from [the activities which produce] them."35 In writing this, Aristotle distinguishes between two sorts of activities: ta erga (productions) and hai energeiai (performances/ activities).36 Productive actions are of the sort that yield a product apart from the action, such as a potter's vase. Performance actions are those that are actions (erga) in (en) themselves; the doing constitutes what they are. They are like a dance or a jazz solo. Importantly for Aristotle, the highest end, eudaimonia, is a performance. This means that he is thinking of it in a fundamentally different way than a utilitarian would. To clarify, in the opening lines of Utilitarianism Mill writes: "All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and color from the end to which they are subservient."37 Happiness, as Mill understands it, then, is the product of acting in such a way as to promote the happiness of the greatest number. For Aristotle, by contrast, eudaimonia is not conceived of as a product, the end result of action, but the performance of living one's own life well. It is your life performed well, not a set of mental states. As a result, it would be incoherent to speak of maximizing this sort of happiness, apart from living it better-with more virtue. Did the Nahuas think of neltiliztli as Aristotle thought of eudaimonia? One may answer in the affirmative for two reasons. First, in no extant literature is there a discussion of an independent test for assessing right action, so they did not think of it in the way that Kant does. Second, if one looks to their analysis of good and bad performance of social roles, one sees that they justify assessment by appealing to a harm or help rendered. For example, here is how the philosopher, or tlamatini, is described in volume ten of the F.C.: The good [qualli] tlamatini is a physician, a person of trust, a counselor; an instructor worthy of confidence, deserving of credibility, deserving of faith; a teacher. He is an advisor, a counselor, a good example; a teacher of prudence, of discretion; a light, a guide who lays out one's path, who goes accompanying one. . . . The bad [amo qualli] tlamatini is a stupid physician, silly, decrepit, pretending to be a person of trust, a counselor, advised. . . . [He is] a soothsayer, a deluder, he deceives, confounds, causes ills, leads into evil.38 What one notes in this description is the way in which a person performs her social role, the quality of her contribution to the community, is the source of praise or blame. The bad [amo qualli] philosopher specifically causes ill, both to the person counseled, and to the community at large. The good [qualli] philosopher is he who is a light and a mirror for his patients and the community. Assessments of right action, then, follow from an understanding of what it means to lead a good human and communal life. I think it clear, then, that the Nahuas reasoned about the good and the right in the same sort of way as eudaemonists do. 4. WAYS OF LIFE At this point one might have some further pertinent questions. Aristotle's understanding of eudaimonia is connected to a way of life, the contemplative, and a program for general living. To what extent is something like this present in the Nahuatl understanding of neltiliztli? The answer, I think, distances the Nahuas from Aristotle, since the Nahuas do advocate for two (or more) approaches to rootedness, but they have no notion that is like the Greek bios. Beginning with Aristotle, much of the picture for his understanding of eudaimonia emerges from the foregoing. Each of us leads her life by organizing and deliberating about her ends. This is not something that happens easily, and so it requires skill, virtue (arētē), to perform such organizing well. Moreover, Aristotle tells us that the way that we lead our lives as humans, the way that we enjoy human Eudaimonia, is to employ logos, to employ reason broadly understood.39 The special virtue of logos for ethics is, of course, prudence, phronēsis. And it is phronēsis which acts in consort with the other virtues to enable each of us to live well, to lead a eudaimon life. None of this, however, tells us what sits at the top of the telic hierarchy. Is it just anything we could choose? SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 15 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY Aristotle's answer is somewhat elliptical, but it looks as though he suggests that what sits at the top of the telic hierarchy is a way of life, a bios. He writes: For three ways of life stand out most; the one just mentioned [i.e., of pleasure], the political, and third, the theoretical [theōrētikos]. The many appear to be quite slavish in deciding [proairoumenoi] on a way of life [bion] fit for livestock, but their argument has support on account of the many of means who share the sentiments of Sardanapalus. The refined, on the other hand, and those of action decide on a life of honor; for the life [biou] of politics has nearly this end [telos].40 In this passage Aristotle gives a few brief rebuttals to the life of pleasure, and that aimed at honor, though he waits until book 10 to provide a full defense of the life of contemplation. What matters for the present is what Aristotle's comments suggest for the structure of eudaimonia, namely, that a bios is decided on as an end (telos). This is not the same, however, as choosing a particular outcome, or set of outcomes. For a way of life is a characteristic way of choosing and ordering one's ends so that their performance is of a typical kind. At the top of our telic hierarchy, then, is not a final goal, but a way of life.41 And Aristotle later argues (in book 10) that only one such way of life, that typified by theoretical contemplation, is suitable to humans as a complete goal.42 There is an additional point which proves helpful for a comparison with the Nahua conception of the good life. One of the reasons Aristotle so hastily dismisses the life of pleasure is that he identifies it with one that is fit for livestock, boskēmatōn-literally for fattened animals. Implicit in Aristotle's language is a distinction between a way of life, bios, and mere life, zoē. In the opening passages of his Politics,43 Aristotle distinguishes between a natural tendency, like procreation, which he does not think is the result of a decision (proairēsis), a natural union, like a household, which is an association to meet the needs of daily life, and a state, which "exists for the sake of living well."44 While humans also lead a life of zoē, one of satisfying those necessities like eating, we also decide on certain goals for the sake of living well. When we engage in activities or practices (like music and dance) for these latter ends, we are leading a way of life, a bios. This is why it is a sort of category error, for Aristotle, to decide on a way of life that would be co-extensive with the activities needed for mere survival. It also means that eudaimonia ultimately concerns the performance of one's life by organizing ends that are chosen above and beyond necessities. The specification of which way of life is best for Aristotle has been a source of controversy, not because it is unclear, but because scholars have been puzzled in trying to explain the compatibility of the intellectualist account of eudaimonia, in book 10, with the comprehensive account that is articulated in the rest of the N.E.45 I shall not here try to provide my own sense of the compatibility of these two accounts in Aristotle. Rather, I would like to note that the Nahuas also seem to give an account of the good life that is in some ways split between a comprehensive and an intellectualist approach. Yet, because they do not make use of anything like bios as a concept, they do not have a similar tension. To understand why the Nahuas may have this advantage, it might be helpful to recall that neltiliztli is recommended both on prudential grounds and on the grounds that one takes root in teotl, the way things are. So that if one is to lead a life in a human community, one must lead a rooted life. Surveying the existing literature and anthropological record, one finds that for the Nahuas one's life appears to take root at four related levels: in one's body, in one's psyche, in one's community by social rites and role, and in teotl. Rootedness in one's body was made possible by participating in a number of practices. The Nahuas held that the body serves as a temporary location for three forces which animate us: tonalli, which resides in the head and provides the energy needed for growth; teyolia, which resides in the heart and provides memory, emotion, and knowledge; and ihiyotl, which resides in the liver and provides passion, bravery, hatred, and love, among others.46 Anthropologists have recovered many figurines posed in ways that look like yoga poses; they include, for example, a position almost exactly similar to the lotus position. From the description of the body and its movements, one gathers that a regular practice of yoga-like movements was thought to help balance or root some of our bodily energies. An additional way in which one sought a rooted life was in one's psyche-bearing in mind that the difference between psyche and body was not nearly as sharp as our current understanding. The point in this regard is that if one learns to assume an identity, a certain kind of personhood, one gains rootedness. For example, in the Hueheutlatolli, the Discourses of the Elders, one finds a congratulatory speech in which the elders discourse with the new bride and groom, new owners of a face and heart. The groom, for example, responds to the elders, stating, Ye have shown me favor, ye have inclined your hearts [amoiollotzin]; on my behalf ye have suffered affliction. I shall inflict sickness on you, on your face [temuxtli].47 In this case the face (ixtli) and heart (yollotl) together indicate the whole person, one's character. The groom's responses address both facets of the elder's personality. In marriage, likewise, the elders bind the couple together as a new identity, by tying the man's cape to the woman's skirt, and speak both to their faces and their hearts. The suggestion is that in such a way they gain personhood, a way by which they will stand here on the slippery place. Character virtues, then, primarily find their place at this level in facilitating the acquisition and maintenance of one's "face and heart," one's character. Yet, these points already slide over into rootedness in the community, the third level of rootedness. For the bride and groom are not only bound together, but bound within and before the community. Participation in one's community, then, was carried out in festivals and social rites of various PAGE 16 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY sorts. In the marriage ceremony described, for example, the fathers, mothers, grandparents, and related family members all have specific roles to play. It was, moreover, the role of the tlamatinimê, the philosophers, to foster the acquisition of a face through counseling, and the goal of education to teach young Nahua children the dispositions that would sustain healthy judgment. One's character, then, enabled one to execute the offices of one's social role well, but these not only had more specific demands, they also served the purpose of training or habituating one into that character. A final way to achieve rootedness was in teotl directly. The three dimensions of rootedness just discussed are, of course, ways to be rooted in teotl, but in an indirect sort of way. The Nahuas appeared to have held that there were also a few other, more direct, ways to be rooted in teotl. In the above quoted passage from "Flower and Song," the specific answer given to achieve rootedness is to compose philosophic poetry. This is not too distant from Aristotle's insistence on the life of the mind. In some of the more mystical passages, it appears that some thought the use of hallucinogenic substances was perhaps another way. Any of these ways, though, were thought to be ways to make something of beauty of our short time on tlalticpac. At this point, one might wonder how the Nahuas are not saddled with the same sort of difficulty that faces Aristotle. Rootedness appears to have both a comprehensive meaning, and an intellectualist one, reserved for those who can compose flower and song. In response, I think the problem is at least not so acute among the Nahuas. A bios, to recall, has two important features. First, it is a characteristic way of choosing among our goals and ordering them in the telic hierarchy of our life's plan. This is the sense in which it sits atop that hierarchy. Second, it is a form of life that is chosen above and beyond the necessities of zoē. While the Nahuas did have various social roles, which in the case of a philosopher, or physician, might be counted as a characteristic way of choosing among ends, they did not distinguish such ways as something distinct from the necessities of mere living. All people, then, were to aim for rootedness at the levels of mind, psyche, and community. It just turns out that for some people, participation in the community also afforded the possibility for a more direct rootedness. The philosophers, for example, found rootedness in their communities, in part, by composing "flower and song," which just happened to be a direct way of finding rootedness on tlalticpac. The ways are complementary among the Nahuas, then, rather than exclusionary, as they appear to be in Aristotle. 5. MORAL MOTIVATION While the discussion concerning ways of life (bioi) highlights one difference between Aristotle and the Nahuas on the good life that might count in favor of the Nahuas' view, another related topic might pose a challenge for it. That topic concerns the role of pleasure, hēdonē, or elevated emotional states for the good life. The specific difficulty is that by retaining a connection between pleasure and the good life, Aristotle also solves an important problem for moral motivation. To the question, why should we be good? Aristotle can answer: because it is more enjoyable than not being good. If the Nahuas do not retain this connection, then it would appear that they lose this advantage. In response, one might begin by recalling the grounds for Aristotle's argument in the N.E.48 For Aristotle, pleasure perfects, in the sense of completes, the performance of eudaimonia as an "end which supervenes like the bloom of youth to those in the prime of their lives."49 If it is not a constitutive or essential component of eudaimonia, then it is internally related as its completed form. The reason for this is that eudaimonia spells out what it means to lead a life as a human, as opposed to the life of a beast or angel. This life must make use of logos in some way, and it is ultimately led in the company of others (as the arguments in Aristotle's Politics makes clear). The pleasure that follows for this life, as a result, is a properly human pleasure, and this is the only way to achieve it. While misfortune may intervene, as Aristotle's discussion of Priam suggests, even in those tragic cases "the beautiful shines through."50 Only by living well could Priam have had human happiness anyway. Should fortune favor us, moreover, then our lives enjoy not only happiness, eudaimonia, but blessedness, makaria.51 For the Nahuas, life of tlalticpac has no similar perfection. The good life, understood as neltilitztli, bears only an accidental relation to elevated emotional states, to one sense of hēdonē. Composing flower-song, or uniting one's face and heart, makes for a better and more beautiful, if still transient existence. It is better and more beautiful, finally, because it is ultimately one rooted in teotl, in the way things are through their changes. While it is too much for the Nahuas to think that pleasure is more than an incidental feature of our life's performance, one nevertheless has reasons to act for it that are distinct from prudential or dutiful considerations. This is why the rooted life ought to be considered a conception of "the good life," and why the Nahuas do not face a problem concerning moral motivation. The argument so far has reviewed some of the many roles and rites at work in Nahua culture. What one sees in these descriptions is that the feather-worker acts out of a passion for his craft. The philosopher acts for a love of wisdom. And mothers and fathers act out of love for their children. These reasons-namely, passions and loves-are neither prudential nor dutiful, and yet they provide us with reasons for acting. They are, moreover, some of the more common motivations that we have for undertaking action. Seeking to leading a rooted life, then, ultimately means that one is seeking to lead a worthwhile life. Even if pleasure is incidental to this way of life, one still has the greater bulk of reasons to pursue it. 6. CLARIFICATIONS The present argument has so far established a number of points of agreement and noted a few differences between Aristotle's conception of the good life and that of the Nahuas. Yet, I must now pause to clarify two points regarding the analysis of Nahua understanding of neltiliztli specifically. I pose these points as objections and supply responses in order to clarify the nature of the claims so far made. SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 17 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY A first concern might run as follows. Does the present analysis of neltiliztli cohere with broader Nahua conceptions? For example, in the popular religious beliefs of the Nahuas, mothers who died in childbirth went to the heavens of the afterlife. Their understanding of rewards and punishments, then, seems to be rather fatalistic. How is this religious understanding compatible with the account so far outlined, in which deliberation about ends, or at least highest ends, seems to play so central a role? Two distinctions could aid in answering this question. One concerns the difference between neltiliztli, which is a conception of the good life here on tlalticpac, and whatever rewards were thought to follow in the afterlife. It is true that in common religious belief, warriors who fell in battle (in specific ways) and women who died in childbirth were both thought to go to Tamoanchan. But they would not, then, be leading lives on tlalticpac. There is nothing incompatible between the idea of leading a rooted life on tlalticpac, and that of receiving rewards in the afterlife on account of a very specific occurrence. What seems to be at stake in the question is a broader sense of justice that would obtain between actions performed in this life and rewards in the afterlife. Yet it is not clear to me that the Nahuas held to such a (Christian) view. In broaching religious beliefs, however, one is led to a second pertinent distinction. The second distinction concerns the character of the present study. My goal, unlike that of anthropologists, has not been to reconstruct the general understanding of the good life among ordinary Nahuas. Philosophers of classical antiquity look to understand specific philosophic claims among the Greeks and Romans, and so they do not try to make their arguments consistent with wider cultural notions like miasmic contamination. I do likewise here, and so have prescinded from a consideration of the broader Nahua understanding of tlazolli, which is remarkably like the Greek miasma in certain respects. We have evidence that the elders and tlamatinimê (plural of tlamatini, i.e., "philosopher") often did break with ordinary understandings. Nezahualcoyotl, for example, openly wonders whether there is an afterlife, or if it is only a comforting fable. In a philosophic poem entitled "I Am Sad," he writes: I am sad, I grieve I, lord Nezahualcoyotl. With flowers and with songs I remember the princes, Those who went away, Tezozomoctzin, and that one Cuacuahtzin. Do they truly live, There Where-in-Someway-One-Exists?52 Nezahualcoyotl is in these lines clearly expressing doubt about life in a place after death. It must be a place where one in some, non-fleshy way exists? This doubt in the afterlife, further, explains Nezahualcoyotl's ongoing preoccupation with death, since he is little comforted by the ordinary stories. In brief, the philosophers and elders53 broke with established religious beliefs in their recorded writings, and so it would seem unreasonable to criticize the present philosophic study for not conforming to the religious beliefs of other segments of the population. An additional concern is that in presenting neltiliztli in relation to Aristotelian eudaimonism, I have shaped the Nahua claims in a way that is too "individualist," especially in my focus on action guidance and the search for the good life. How does that square with the broader, more sociocentric, understanding of the Nahua culture that anthropologists have described? In response, one notes that "individualism" and "sociocentrism" are slippery terms. What I hope to have shown is that the Nahuas were in two specific ways more "sociocentric" than Aristotle. This is the case, first, in the multi-leveled way in which one achieves rootedness. While I believe that Aristotle is often misunderstood in contemporary scholarship as focusing exclusively on the individual pursuit of happiness, the Nahua emphasis on finding rootedness through one's specific social role in the community adds a social dimension that is not present in Aristotle's account. Indeed, a greater part of action guidance for the Nahuas turns on how well one executes the offices of one's social role, and this is strikingly different from Aristotle's focus on excellences that any human should develop. Second, the way that social rites and practices were thought to be an essential part of character formation finds no parallel in Aristotle. He nowhere discusses character formation by way of participating in social rites, but the Nahuas do often rather elaborately. The above excerpts are taken from exhortations by elders for youths engaged in just these rites. In these two ways, then, I believe that the Nahuas were more community oriented, or "sociocentric," than was Aristotle. There is another sense, however, in which it might be thought that the Nahuas were more "sociocentric" than Aristotle. They might be thought to have held to a sense of ethical life that is socio-holist. On such an understanding, the Nahuas would have held that the fundamental unit of moral concern was the community and not the individual. If this is right, then the present development of neltiliztli, especially in those sections concerning action guidance, would be true, but rather misleading. In response, I do not think it accurate to claim that the Nahuas held that the fundamental unit of moral concern was the community, rather than the individual. In the texts reviewed above, various agents are criticized for harming other people directly, and not for harming the community by way of harming individual people. The texts themselves, then, conflict with this interpretation. Moreover, socio- holism is problematic from a philosophic point of view,54 and so I think it counts toward the greater cogency of their position that the tlamatinimê were not inclined to support it. 7. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS The present essay hopes to have taken a first step toward serious philosophic reflection on the ethical understanding of the good life, neltiliztli, among the Nahuas. Their conception is in many ways like Aristotle's understanding of eudaimonia. What one seeks in life, they held, is a response PAGE 18 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY to the basic conditions of life on tlalticpac is rootedness. What one seeks in choosing ends that are above mere necessities, Aristotle held, is eudaimonia. For the Nahuas philosophical poetry provides the best kind of answer, the best rootedness, in response to the slipperiness of tlalticpac, since flower and song outlast and are more beautiful than other transient creations. For Aristotle, the life of theoretical contemplation is that which is best suited to an animal which leads its life by means of logos. For both, however, this best way of life is related to the broader aim of living well in other activities, which require excellent qualities of character (i.e., virtues) to achieve. Finally, in both cases, right action is assessed by appealing to a conception of what is good, how one flourishes, which is thus justificationally prior to a conception of the right. At the end of these reflections, then, one is presented with two different articulations of the good life. Most of us, I would venture, would like to believe that pleasure is somehow internally connected to the best performance of our life's act on the world's stage. Yet we also recognize that perhaps this may be but much hopeful thinking. Nor is it clear, moreover, that this sort of difference is one that can be resolved simply by an analysis of concepts. Aristotle and the Aztecs each have a different preferred sense of "pleasure," and so different understandings of its relation to the good life. Which sense is better for ethical purposes is not a matter which could be resolved only by looking to the meanings of the terms under consideration. Rather, it must take its measure from the broader coherence of the ethical theories as a whole, and their respective abilities to illuminate our moral lives. The present reflection on the Aztecs, as a result, highlights less a problem for resolution than a problem of the human condition. It challenges us, moreover, to question the received (Western) wisdom about the good life. And we should be better for it, whether, as Aristotle contends, because it will bring us pleasure in perfecting our activities as beings possessing logos, or whether, as the Nahuas held, that it makes a more beautiful pattern of our activities on the slippery earth. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Versions of this essay were presented at the Trans-American Experience conference at the University of Oregon in Eugene (2015), and the Latinx Philosophy conference at Columbia University in New York City (2016). I would like to thank many members of both audiences, as well as the anonymous reviewers for the Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy, for the helpful feedback on the ideas developed here. NOTES 1. Winner of the 2016 APA Prize in Latin American Thought. Versions of this essay were presented at the Trans-American Experience conference at the University of Oregon in Eugene (2015), and the Latinx Philosophy conference at Columbia University in New York City (2016). I would like to thank many members of both audiences, as well as the anonymous reviewers for the Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy, for the helpful feedback on the ideas developed here. 2. Aristotle identifies eudaimonia, or "happiness," with the highest aim in The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, rev. ed., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), at 1095a15–20. As a note, translations of Aristotle are my own. 3. I have in mind especially James Maffie's Aztec Philosophy: Understanding a World in Motion (Boulder: Colorado University Press, 2014). Maffie has, in his entry "Aztec Philosophy" for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/ aztec/ (last accessed September 30, 2016), provided what is likely the most philosophic overview of Aztec ethics. His purpose there, however, was much broader. 4. In this respect, I have in mind especially Miguel León-Portilla's La filosofía náhuatl: Estudiada en sus fuentes con un nuevo apéndice, new ed., prologue by Angel María Garibay K. (Mexico City: UNAM, 2001 [1956]). The present essay is much indebted to some of the remarks León-Portilla makes in this book. I have also profited greatly from his Aztec Thought and Culture: A Study of the Ancient Nahuatl Mind, trans. Jack Emory Davis (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963). 5. Of course, anthropologists and art historians have long been interested in Nahuatl ethics, but their concern is rather with what might be called an analysis of cultural mores. Two pieces in English that have been particularly influential for the present essay are Louise M. Burkhart's The Slippery Earth: Nahua-Christian Moral Dialogue in Sixteenth-Century Mexico (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1989) and Pete Sigal's The Flower and the Scorpion: Sexuality and Ritual in Early Nahua Culture (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011). In the former case, one learns to be cautious of Castilian influences and interpolations, even in the construction of Sahagun's Florentine Codex, on which much of the present essay relies. In the latter, one comes to recognize the rather tendentious approach to (especially) sexual ethics one finds presented in almost any recorded work, including the Florentine Codex. Alfredo López Austin's Cuerpo humano e ideología: Las concepciones de los antiguos Nahuas, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Mexico City, UNAM, 1984), has also proven helpful for understanding the general Nahua worldview, though the implications of his study are more immediate, I think, for Nahua metaphysics. 6. N.E., 1094a. 7. Ibid., 1235b. 8. Ibid., 1145b. 9. Richard Kraut has a fine review and assessment of Aristotle's method in ethics in "How to Justify Ethical Propositions: Aristotle's Method," in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut, 76–95 (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2006). 10. Technically, it cannot be that at which all things aim, since inanimate things do not aim at anything. The sense seems to be restricted to human agents. This portion of the argument is taken from (and developed) in my essay "Natural Goodness and the Normativity Challenge: Happiness Across Cultures," American Catholic Philosophical Association 87 (2013): 183–94. 11. N.E., 1095a. 12. C.D.C. Reeve, for example, has a line-by-line analysis of the opening passages of the N.E. and comes to just this conclusion. See especially chapter seven of his Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Daniel Russell comes to a similar conclusion in his Happiness for Humans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 13. N.E., 1099a. 14. Ibid., 1098a. 15. I have explored this metaphysical backdrop at length in my "Natural Goodness and the Normativity Challenge: Happiness Across Cultures." 16. Bernadino de Sahagún, The Florentine Codex: General History of the Things of New Spain, ed. and trans. Charles E. Dibble and Arthur J. O. Anderson, 12 vols. (New Mexico: University of Santa Fe, 1969), Vol. 6, 228. Translation modified. 17. Ibid., Vol. 6, 228. 18. For a fuller development of the practical syllogism for Aristotle, see Paula Gottleib's "The Practical Syllogism," in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut, 218– 33 (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2006). 19. One may find the Nahuatl transcription in Ballads of the Lords of New Spain: The Codex Romances de los señores de Nueva España, transcription and translation by John Bierhorst (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), fols. 3v.-4r. The translation quoted, however, is Miguel León-Portilla's in Fifteen Poets of the Aztec World (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 92. León-Portilla's text also includes the Nahuatl to accompany each translation. Bierhorst's interpretation of Aztec culture is rather SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 19 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY widely disputed, and his translations tendentiously support his position, so that I have entirely avoided using his translations and, when necessary, have translated the texts myself. For a review of the difficulties with Bierhorst's "ghost songs" hypothesis, see León-Portilla's response in the "Introduction" to his Fifteen Poets of the Aztec World, especially pages 41–44. 20. For the Nahuatl transcription, see Ballads of the Lords of New Spain, fols. 21 r.-22 v. The translation is from Fifteen Poets of the Aztec World, 91. 21. Angel María Garibay, Llave del Náhuatl, Colección de Torzos Clásicos con Gramática y Vocabulario, para utilidad de los Principiantes (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Press, 1981), 112. 22. One may find the original Nahuatl in Cantares Mexicanos: Songs of the Aztecs, transcription and translation by John Bierhorst (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), fol. 9v. The translation, for the above noted reason, is substantially modified. 23. An important implication of this point, but which I cannot develop at length here, is that the Nahuatl sense of "truth" is rather different from a correspondence theory of truth-something which I've often thought to be Aristotle's stance on truth. For the Nahuas, one not only comes to know the truth, but most fundamentally comes to live the truth. 24. Rémi Siméon's Diccionario de lengua Nahuatl o Mexicana, 2nd ed., trans. Josefina Oliva De Coll (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1981) reads: "nelhuayo adj. Provisto de raíces, que tiene raíces. R. nelhuayotl." 25. Florentine Codex, vol. 10, 11. Translation modified. 26. This topic has long been the subject of study among classicists. While Werner Jaeger develops this thesis to some extent, I have in mind the patient argument which A. W. H. Adkins develops in his Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the End of the Fifth Century (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1972). The whole of the book is devoted to supporting the points just made. 27. For the specifics on the Confucian tradition on virtue as de and ren, see chapter one of Jiyuan Yu's The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue (New York: Routledge Press, 2007). 28. Following Lopez Austin, in The Human Body and Ideology: Concepts of the Ancient Nahuas, trans B. Ortiz de Montellano and T. Ortiz de Montellano (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), 189, another possible candidate would be the "upright man," tlacamelahuac. This term derives from tlacatl, meaning human, and melauacayotl, meaning rectitude or making something straight. The term, however, likely had a more specific sense. I tend to think it a closer candidate for Aristotle's phronimos. Another possible candidate is tlaçoyotl, which is sometimes translated as "excellence." Yet this term derives from tlaçotli, which means valuable or expensive, and so is more likely a term for inherent worth, or (better) highest worth. 29. In what follows, it may be helpful to bear in mind that Nahuatl does not have a standard orthography, though current scholarship tends to use a modified Franciscan lexigraphy. The F.C. in particular tends to make non-standard use even from one line to the next. One should bear in mind, then, that "i" and "y" are often substitutes, and "j" and "i" are as well. In the F.C., the existence of glottal stops and breathers is most commonly indicated with an "h." 30. In fact, the "-ness," indicating an abstractive substantive in English, is not present in the Nahuatl. I added it for the purposes of readability. 31. Florentine Codex, vol. 10, 2. These translations are my own. Dibble and Anderson render the entire phrase as "the good daughter." 32. To be fair to Dibble and Anderson, one purpose of their translation was to stay in contact with the insights that informed the Spanish which Sahagun rendered in his original transcription, but without translating through Spanish to English. If Sahagún interpreted the Nahuatl in a specific way, then their task was to make that known in English as well. My goals are different ones. 33. Florentine Codex, vol. 10, 2. Translation is my own. 34. Of all the authors that make this contrast, John Rawls is likely the clearest. For his account of the categorical imperative procedure and its difference from the categorical imperative itself, see his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), especially chapter ten on the categorical imperative. He makes the contrast between orders of justification in A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., 24–30 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 35. N.E., 1094a. 36. "ta men gar eisin energiai, ta de par' autas erga tina" (1094a2-3). 37. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. George Sher (New York: Hackett Press, 2001), 2. 38. Florentine Codex, vol. 10, 29-30. Translation modified. 39. N.E., 1098a. 40. Ibid., 1095b. 41. This approach to the organization of our preferences, so that (1) eudaimonia is the skillful (i.e., excellent) management of our telic hierarchy, and (2) a way of life is what sits atop the hierarchy would appear to enable Aristotle to avoid the sorts of concern Larry Temkin raises in Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). A key objection Temkin raises is that our preferences cannot be demonstrated to be strictly transitive, so that preference orders (and so equivalence relations) cannot be said to obtain for our preferences. This spells trouble for informed preference consequentialists and anyone who agrees broadly with John Rawls' descriptive account of the good in part three of A Theory of Justice. Aristotle's conception of the good, if the above is correct, would appear to allow him to avoid this sort of concern, since a bios requires only a characteristic way of putting goals in relation to each other, and not anything like even a partial preference order. The matter, clearly, is more complex than can be addressed here, but I thought it worth noting that Aristotle's approach may avoid a number of modern headaches concerning the good. 42. This is Aristotle's argument in the Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a10- 178a10. 43. Aristotle, Aristotelis Politica, ed. W. D. Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957). 44. Ibid., 1252b. 45. For a taste of the controversy, see Thomas Nagel's criticism in "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 7–14 (Berkely: University of California Press, 1980), and J. L. Ackrill's tentative reply in "Aristotle on Eudaimonia" in the same volume Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, 15–33. 46. These points have been made at length in Lopez Austin's work as well as David Carrasco's Religions of Mesoamerica: Cosmivision and Ceremonial Centers (San Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers, 1990). 47. Florentine Codex, vol. 6, 127. Translation modified. Incidentally, this phrase, which looks to be an insult, is a compliment in Nahua culture. One "balances" one's wishes of good fortune with bad fortune in order to wish another well. The section ends, for example, by welcoming the new couple into the society by telling them that they are abandoned. The statements read: "for it is our way of doing things on earth (in tlalticpac); for no one is concerned with anyone; for we have already abandoned thee. Take heed of this," 132–33. Translation modified. 48. The present discussion makes use of points that Aristotle develops in books 1 and 10 of the N.E., but for the sake of clarity, I have omitted Aristotle's distinct discussion of pleasure in book 7. I do not think the present argument turns on the difference between pleasure understood as an uninterrupted activity, as one largely finds it in book 7, and pleasure as a sort of perfection of our other activities. See Julia Annas' essay, "Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 285–99 for an account that reconciles Aristotle's various statements on this topic. 49. N.E., 1174b. 50. Ibid., 1100b. 51. Ibid., 1099b. PAGE 20 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY 52. Cantares Mexicanos, fols. 25r and v. Translation is slightly modified for readability from Miguel León-Portilla's in Fifteen Poets of the Aztec World, 93. 53. I write "philosophers and elders" to indicate the possibility that these were distinct groups, though they likely were not. 54. I think the problems are well-known. Yet, to be a little more specific, a principle problem facing any morally "holist" account of action guidance is that forms of fascism come to be readily supportable. If the community is the ultimate unit of moral concern, then the sacrifice of an individual is of no more consequence than the sacrifice of a gangrenous finger to save the life of the individual (maybe even less so). Tsotsil Epistemology: An Intangible Inheritance Manuel Bolom Pale Edited and translated by Carlos Alberto Sánchez When we think that reality is constructed, what we are doing is considering a space needing of conquest. –Hugo Zemelman INTRODUCTION In what follows, I will reflect on originary peoples [pueblos originarios]. Specifically, my reflections will focus on the thought, cosmovision, and philosophy of the Tsotsil peoples of Huixtán, Chiapas. The main objective of this work is to propose arguments that will allow us to better understand the postures and forms of resistance that characterize the thought of these people, as well as their communal practices, their principles, enunciations, and sayings, so as to open up the possibility of reconsidering our own reality, especially in the realm of education. Authors such as Leopoldo Zea, Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, Arturo Escobar, Edgardo Lander, Francisco López Segrera, Hugo Zemelman, Boaventura Sousa Santos y Daniel Carlos Gutiérrez Rohán share as a common theme the advent of a new Latin American thinking; however, it is not my objective to take up the critical apparatus of these authors, but rather, what interests us here is to show that there are other forms of thinking and other points of departure that can be found outside [established] theory and external to academic philosophies, namely, the philosophical practices of originary peoples. In our study, we have decided to look at thought, experience, and knowledge from the standpoint of the specific philosophical practices of the Tsotsil, risking, of course, that we have involuntarily situated ourselves in the myopic vision of our own perspective. Affirming "our own perspective" means that we also accept the existence of "other" perspectives; even if it is just in the act of indicating this or that, we present ourselves with every judgment of comparison, and we make distinctions because there are certainly things about us that we recognize but would rather not. For this reason, we must distinguish, in the construction of knowledge, between thought and practice. The study of thought requires vigilance and, simultaneously, the capacity to admire. Thus, we are allowed to contemplate the otherness of the indigenous given that the myth of homogeneity has been, finally, demolished. This is significant since in the past the problem has always been the negation of indigenous knowledge, brought about by the need to legitimate the paradigms of the great theorists, and has also made it so that other, more urgent things in relation to thought have to be kept out of consideration. Thus, in what follows we aim to see past a fissure, with critical eyes, toward the thought of originary peoples, namely, the thought of the Tsotsil. With the Tsotsil, knowledge is constructed in accordance with certain categories that point to the profundity of their historical thinking in relation to practice. This means that practice has a lot to do with the construction of subjects; as such, the objective of this text will be to undertake an approximation of a Tsotsil philosophy in order to reflect on the different perspectives that this philosophy takes and, thus, broaden our own sociocultural historical horizon. For this reason, and as we go, we will introduce certain concepts that will allow us to reflect on diverse philosophical categories, such as p'ij, p'ij o'ntonal, pasel, ich'el ta muk' o na'el. P'IJ The concept of p'ij has several layers. We'll mention just a few in what follows. To begin with, we should mention that p'ij refers to something that is found in its fullness, complete, and mature [íntegro, completo y maduro]. In one linguistic variation, the peoples of San Juan Chamula call it bij; however, both roots can be traced specifically to a numerical root in the tsetsal language referring to things or objects which are circular. Moreover, bij is the capacity of the subject to fulfill himself as subject, or a subject that has the necessary qualities to live in the community.1 This implies a moment in which the subject becomes complete, something that may not have much to do with the way in which this completeness comes about, but which is, rather, about an analogy between knowledge and the capacities of the subject, for instance, with dialogue, which has its beginning and its end, slikeb and slajeb,2 referring to a circling around a conversation. These two elements have to do with Mayan numbering practices. Furthermore, the person who is p'ij has knowledge, is wise, manages wisdom [sabiduría]; we could say that this person is a person who knows about life, a person with common knowledge. Outlines of what will eventually become knowledge are manifested in dreams (vaech); dreamers then project these outlines in conversation [plática] and coexistence as a form of sharing. Much of what these outlines become, these knowledges, are not going to be written in texts, but will remain at the level of dialogue, in the construction of possible worlds, in which dreams constitute a pre- comprehension and pre-construction of reality and of the world; moreover, this is knowledge that must be put into practice-elders say that words have ch'ulel, they contribute to the constitution of subjectivity. Concepts for reality and constitution are but schemas or frameworks that subjects construct on an individual, SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 21 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY familial, and community basis and point to a complexity of interconnections, a complexity that has neither a center or a simple multiplicity of centers, but a species of interpenetration which is continuous and all encompassing. The concept of p'ij, vaechil transmits, to a certain extent, the idea of an epistemological rapture in the very same concept of knowledge. Preconstruction is what grounds the composition of the relationship of knowledges; what is given in it are the structural, symbolic, and temporal aspects that make possible the construction of the relationships of thought. Dreams (vaech) are an anticipation of what is to come; in this sense, through dreams the relationship is announced, which is like prophesy since through dreams the future configuration of life is made present and evident. Dreams are thus a medium about which one can learn and which can be shared, and having been shared can allow others to prepare; it is something real; it is not fictitious; it is as the prophesy of a future life. This is possible because actions lead to ends and motives in regards to that which one anticipates and in regards to why one anticipates. The conceptualization of doings (pasel) and of cultural horizons demonstrate a typology of schemes. Every conceptualization has within it certain symbolic forms, which are cultural processes that articulate experiences. Ultimately, it is the horizon of human labor that allows for the possibility of comprehending and narrating a world bridging two realities: one is the reality of dreams and the other is what is commonly thought as the real. Both parts make up living reality, and those knowledge schemes are what make possible our understanding of these two realities as unified, tied in the same knot. The configuration of that other reality which is dreaming (vaechil, meaning cricket sleep, from vay, to sleep, and chil, cricket) mirrors real action; in this way, dreaming provides an articulated temporal narrative that connects the reality of dreaming and the reality which is lived. Dreaming lends evidence to a possible world, and reality is where the result is executed in the form of schematic construction; the construction of the schema is the synthesis of both realities. Thus, a significant totality is generated in which events are interweaved into practice. This totality is made obvious in those elements of the schema that serve as points of narrative creation, which, in turn, evidences the encounter between word and communion. The events of both dimensions become facts and actions in the schema. Because of that schema, narratives relate those events that are foundational to the culture. This circularity is represented in the idea of the spiral or the snail [caracol], which is posited as a principle for chan, which refers to the idea of an end that appears as a beginning, insofar as chanubtasel-p'ijubtasel. This principle is rooted in the initial conditions that make it possible, and so the beginning appears as a recapitulation of an entire life or of an entire experience, just as a beginning, and that beginning can be the end of another stage. In that beginning there is a particular configuration of thought. Those two encounters, or knots, of knowledge generate a new seed wherein the beginning is what is given and established, but comes together with an innovation in thinking; that thinking is being itself. When we speak about a new seed, we refer to the creation of a narrative scheme or schema which is, on the one hand, a process of the creative imagination and, on the other hand, a historical process, an aspect of paradigms grounded on a community's tradition. The construction of a schema for communal thought is product of the imagination, life, and praxis, in such a way that the schema presents a certain dynamism as a consequence of a socialcultural and historical deployment. Tradition consists in once again narrating an entire practice or an entire experience laid out in history and innovation; in this way, tradition, being itself an ontological truth, remains the same in spite of change and innovation through slikeb and slajeb. The experiences of dreams and of life are configured in dialogue; dreaming and living represent the duality of real world and possible world projected in narrative: here we have the construction of thinking. The narrator organizes a sense and, simultenously, reconfigures reality. This happens when the narrator takes as his point of departure a lived experience that he is familiar with or when he interprets a fact; interpretation forcefully summons the imaginary, which makes the individual represent within himself a specific form, in such a way that the narrator configures the context from his own schemes, generated from the experiences of his own life. As such, the construction of thought, through the word, and through communal education, are plotted as labor made possible by the unity of circumstance and subject. This is why narrative only comes alive in the act of sharing. To understand always implies interpretation, and all interpretation and application begins with a pre- understanding. At work in understanding, there is always an idea of what one wants to understand, and what one wants to understand is rooted in the situation of the one who interprets; that is, I understand the other from my understanding of his horizon, and I understand the horizon of the other from an understanding of mine. P'IJIL O'NTONAL Sk'an chi jlo'ilaj xchi'uk ti kontontike is part of a profound reflection undertaken in order to understand oneself as subject, and it implies dialogue with one's heart in order to know one's self. Kaibetik sk'op ti ko'ntontike is to listen to the suggestions of the heart. As such, to think with one's heart is important to Tsotsil culture. P'ijil jol o'nton refers to the intellect or the capacities of one's head and heart, but the connection between thoughts and emotions has to do with the way of being tsotsil. Lek o'ntonal kerem refers to a child with a good heart and is also a synonym of learning. Jamal yo'nton refers to an open heart, that is, to the existence of a disposition to know or to learn. Sna' yo'nton means that one's heart knows, but also that one's heart remembers. T'abesel ta o'ntonal, vulesel ta o'ntonal refers to a return to the heart. The heart is that which carries p'ijilal, that wisdom that distinguishes persons from other types of living beings; it must be developed by all individuals following . . . the directions of one's life (or following the guidelines given by day of one's birth). When a person fails to act in accordance PAGE 22 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY with the directives of his p'ijilal, it is said that he has no heart, that he is incomplete (mu ts'akaluk), or, simply, that he has no head nor heart. The heart is the intermediary for the relation between the individual and the world. In this sense, we consider as fundamental that the person utilize her heart in the business of everyday, that is, that the person must analyze, reflect, and corroborate her social practices before making any decision. Thus it is said that the heart, in relation with the head (jol), fulfills an important role for the group to which one belongs because it allows individuals to think for themselves, that they understand their environment and their relations with others. The formation of the Tsotsil individual is constructed, moreover, on the basis of a vital principle, which is the heart in relation with the ch'ulel, that is, with his interior, his being, his heart, his center, and his nucleus. That vital principle which is the heart is perceived as a specific place for thought to take place, but also for the emotions, as is alo ti k'usi xchi ti avo'ntone ("say what your heart thinks or feels"), which is an expression of feelings, what identifies and knows your heart; on the basis of this expression, certain other feelings are identified which are derived from personal, familiar, communal, or social situations or problems. Ja' ti k'usi chai ti avo'ntone ("what my heart feels") and ja' ti k'usi tsnop ti a vo'ntone ("what your heart thinks") are expressions used to manifest the emotive state and certain types of feelings and sensations of p'ijilal. Moreover, the heart is where the cognitive, emotive, and sensational processes take place, those that express the experiences of the Tsotsil people in accordance with their own reality. It is clear that whoever educates must be aware of the proper way of understanding the world that surrounds him in order to be part of it, that is, to be p'ij in the heart of a culture or society. For that reason, preparing the youth means to allow them to take ownership of themselves, to have them be responsible in the culture, that they are capable of lending life to their word, that they are capable of self-criticism. They must listen to their parents and to the words left behind by their elders; that is, it is not about listening to words divinely dictated, but rather to those words spoken which are the product of actual experience and self reflection. In this way, children are educated so that they may be capable of dialogue with their heart, so that they may be owners of only one heart. There are three great imperatives related to one's speaking with one's heart. They are: • Lo'ilajan xchi'uk ti avo'ntone. • K'opojan xchi'uk ti avo'ntone. • Chi'no ta lo'il xchi'uk avo'nton. These imperatives constitute the manner in which one must educate and develop oneself in order to understand the word of the heart. Lo'ilajan xchi'uk ti avo'ntone means to dialogue with one's heart; it is a way of talking with one's heart. K'opojan is dialogue itself and ch'ino refers to bringing one's heart to a conversation with others. When we speak of reflection, thought, dialogue, or ideas, we refer to a thinking from the heart, to that speaking with oneself, to being with oneself in the act of dialogue; this is why we speak of unfolding oneself, since that is the way to understanding. Analyzing each one of these concepts would take some time, since about each one of them a book could be written. But the central idea is that understanding each concept awakens the heart, as well as the individual's social conscience. Each expression tells us how to behave in some determinate context-individual, familiar, or communal-and each word, each proclamation, aims to attach itself to thought and to the heart so that one is able to reflect the wisdom of totilme'iletik, bankilal, jnitvanej, jam k'opetik, those who open dialogues. . . . All of this makes possible that the heart is not lost. The heart is forged by the word and the chanubtasel, p'ijubtasel, which is the only action capable of forming the human heart and of orienting it in accordance with the desires of the community, since only through chanubtasel, p'ijubtasel does each man and each woman give meaning to their lives, a meaning that goes beyond the meaning given in everyday existence. Yut o'ntonal refers to a place within the heart, which is a type of sacred place for wisdom. The heart is characterized by its capacity to think and to live- what my heart says, ja' ti k'usi chal ti ko'ntone. The heart has its word, it speaks its own tongue, in a murmur that is unintelligible but magnificent. . . . [W]hat the heart dictates is what words express so that words become but a part, a vibrant thing, rhythmic and sonorous that . . . refers to the soul and those feelings of which it speaks. There are words that violently strike and there are words that lovingly embrace, hard and terse words, some acidic, others sweet, others bitter, others poisonous. That is the way of the heart, and the word that is spoken is the profound ancestral word that is deposited in our heart. Previous words watch over us, they educate us, and in naming them the elements appear. Some condition us through time; others change from one episteme to another according to the expressions of our hearts, giving them the possibility to understand and name our world. Nicolas Bolom tells us, sk'an xch'ani jutuk ti ko'ntontike (to silence the heart is a primordial act) because the word is born from silence given that the intellect is able to feel non-verbally (ak'o snijan sba ti avo'ntone yu'un chchan). It thus appears that silence is really communicative when it is contrasted with speaking. As such the word that comes from the heart's education is not lazy, idle, or empty, but it knows what it wants to say or express; it is consciousness and ch'ulel and it goes together with other human attitudes. Moreover, it is impassioned and rebellious since it is not written on paper but is read in the heart. We can ask ourselves why the words are so jealously guarded in the heart, and perhaps our answer will be that learning requires a perfect silence in order to speak; it is a means to return to the origin, to the first principle, to the slikeb of what is expressed. In the originary language, abstract ideas are frequently expressed through the use of the word heart (o'ntonal), as such, some fundamental existential expressions emanate from it. SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 23 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY OJTIKINEL IN RELATION WITH NA'EL Ojtikinel and na'el are verbs that have great significance in the Tsotsil language. The first means to be acquainted with [conocer]. If the child is acquainted with something, it is because he adopts a manner of being and knowing in which he can identity any other kind of knowing and how it applies to everyday life. That is, ojtikinel implies an approach to the real from a place of dynamic complexity; this is because the space is made up of a system of relations between multiple communal subjects. This is why the child must dutifully confront the equilibriums or disequilibriums between different faculties that make up the subject, giving importance to intuition and imagination, as well as will, over analytic and synthetic cognition and relating specialized cognition with cognition in general. The second verb, na'el, has to do with knowledge and memory. Na'el means to know, but it also means to be, knowing how to be, and knowing how to do. It suggests that whoever thinks must live in accordance with his context and is at the same time recalling knowledge. . . . This verb is never separated from ojtikinel. Both concepts relate and complement each other because when the child is acquainted with or knows, then he is becoming complete even if he lacks ch'ulel (consciousness). Appreciating acquaintance and knowledge, k'uxubinel ti ojtikinele xchi'uk ti sna'ele, is extremely important since it constitutes the genealogy (slikeb) of all that has been known and confronted. If these are not appreciated, this means that they do not form part of one's thought, one's practice, and one's being in Tsotsil life. What has been said refers to the formative resources available to Tsotsil individuals as they seek to develop themselves in an integral fashion so as to adequately participate in their society. As such, elders (totil-me'iletik) propose various value concepts of great importance that determine the character and personality, signified by sna'el snopel, spasel, and, consequently, the form of comportment in society and with nature. These concepts or values are • J-abtel: a person with initiative, solidarity, economic power, and hard working. • P'ijilal: a person with wisdom, good thoughts, and respectful. • Jtak'ivanej, j-al mantal: a person with strength of mind and spirit, capable of addressing others with wisdom and philosophy. • Chanel: a person that learns new things daily. These four values, concepts, or principles are significant because they not only have to do with the comportment and behavior of human beings but also with nature. For the raising of children, different interrelated aspects of Tsotsil culture intervene. These are k'el bail, k'an bail, tak'iel, as grounds of personal and social identity; ich'bail ta muk' ta p'ijubtasel, which makes possible the transmission and generation of spiritual and religious cognitions; and k'otesbel yo'nton, ak'bel yil, as the forms themselves of education and formation, aspects that are developed in the process of socializating individuals into Tsotsil culture. The main instrument for the transmission of these values is language, which allows sharing the symbolic universes of culture itself. NOTES 1. A subject who is responsible, that knows how to work, that has initiative, that has principles that accord with the context in which he finds himself, that has the reflexive capacity to participate in an assembly. In the case of women, that she knows how to sow, prepare meals . . . take care of fowl, garden, and knows how to care for the children, etc. 2. Slikeb is the beginning, but it is not numerical. Rather, it is represented by the figure of a snail, a seed, or a flower. Each one of these elements is fundamental: the snail represents the beginning or the end, and in iconography is used in Maya's numbering practices; the seed represents the birth of all being and the flower represents the beginning for the fruit or the seed. This means that Mayan thought is cyclical, but not infinite, as it is limited in its numbering to 1 to 20. Tsotsil thought is likewise organized into units of 20. Luis Villoro: Universal Mexican Philosopher Mario-Teodoro Ramírez Translated by Carlos Alberto Sánchez INTRODUCTION Luis Villoro, the most important philosophical figure of contemporary Mexico,1 was born on November 3, 1922, and died on March 5, 2014. He began his academic and intellectual activity in the late 1940s in the context of the impact produced by the Mexican Revolution of 1910 in all areas of national life. Along with other young philosophers- Leopoldo Zea, Emilio Uranga, Jorge Portilla-Villoro helped to found el grupo Hiperión, which sought to apply to the national situation the ideas of the European philosophical currents in vogue at the time, in particular, historicism and existentialism.2 Overall, the group set out to philosophically think the Mexican problem and produced, in its brief existence (1948–1952), some of the most significant essays in Mexican philosophy of the twentieth century, e.g., Emilio Uranga's "Analysis of Mexican Being,"3 or the "Phenomenology of Relajo" by Jorge Portilla.4 Villoro published two books in this time: Great Moments of the Indigenismo in Mexico (1950),5 and The Ideological Process of the Revolution of Independence of 1952,6 which showed a sophisticated and original combination of philosophical talents and historical skill. Villoro is clear that the question about Mexican being should be answered on historical-critical grounds and not purely on conceptual or philosophical grounds or in a psychological or sociological manner. However, dissatisfied with certain derivations and nationalist/ideological questions opened up by Hyperion, Villoro refrains from these issues and sets out to seek, or better yet, build a philosophical conception appropriate to PAGE 24 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY his own worries and purposes. He thus undertakes some valuable reflections on Eastern philosophy, Husserlian phenomenology, modern philosophy (Descartes, in particular), analytical philosophy, Marxism, philosophy of culture, etc., which give him theoretical tools that allow him to work and contribute to issues in such diverse philosophical disciplines as philosophical anthropology, epistemology, the critique of ideology, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and others. But beyond specific issues, trends, and doctrines, Villoro was and wanted to be primarily a philosopher, that is, someone who intended to think the totality of existence in its complexity and in its realization. He had the ability and interest to deal with universal themes, to dedicate the rigor that the philosophical discipline requires, and yet he also had the sensitivity to address the problems of his concrete historical and social reality, i.e., the Mexican reality. In the tension between the universal and the particular-a string that stretches across the entirety of twentieth century Mexican philosophy-Villoro was able to situate himself in the realm of the "concrete," that is, the universal-individual or the particular-universal, where there was no denying any of these two poles. The task was not, for the Mexican philosopher, to simply find a "dialectical solution" to the universal-particular dilemma but, moreover, to know how to move intelligently and with sensitivity from one pole to another, from one dimension to another. The conception that Villoro deploys onto the relationship between culture and values better allows us to understand his notion of the meaning and place of philosophical practice (which is also a varlorative practice). As a matter of principle, regarding the nature of value, the Mexican philosopher questions both the universalist conception as well as the particularistic conception, that is, both the position that values are simply universal as well as the position that holds that values are relative to a context or are particular, historically and geographically situated in a world.7 For Villoro there is no direct apprehension of values, rather values are mediated by culture, by the specific cultural world in which the human subject unfolds and properly exists.8 This because, and we can propose this by our account, values are not concepts or formal definitions that can be grasped by a purely intellectual process. Values are qualities that are said of objects, events, or people and are understood-valued [valorados]-in the context of a specific socio-cultural world. However, this does not mean that values as such are something "particular," that every culture has its own distinctive set of values, and thus that the cultures are incomparable or incommensurable in their axiological conceptions. What is unique is the way we apprehend and understand values, not values as such. Now, if there is no direct apprehension of values, then there is no "universal culture," which is the most questionable assumption of axiological universalism leading to that vice that we call ethnocentrism, and, more precisely, "Eurocentrism" as the assumption that European culture (and Western-modern, in general) is the "universal culture," the culture that does not need a culturally mediated apprehension of values-which is simply a contradiction and, therefore, allows itself the right to impose its conception to other cultures. According to Villoro, "axiological universalism" is an ideology that legitimates domination. But "value relativism" is not the solution, as it disarms cultures of their critical-rational capacity: that is, if all cultures are "equal," then we have no basis to criticize the dominant, hegemonic, or ethnocentric cultures. For our philosopher both are true: values are indeed universal, but there is no universal culture; each particular culture is a way of apprehending, understanding, and realizing universal values. Thus, there is no incommensurability between cultures, which are all, in their complex diversity, pointing one way or another to those values. To the extent that every culture is capable of apprehending values (universal values), every culture has the ability to transcend its closed particularity and be open to the Other, to separate it. Certainly, a culture can deny that openness and stay in a self-affirmation of identity, but this means precisely that culture refuses universal values, i.e., the value. A culture thus ends up denying itself, ceases to be, properly, culture. This implies, and Villoro holds this to be the case, that the essential dimension of what we call "culture" consists of evaluative possibilities (autonomy, authenticity, meaning, effectiveness9). Each culture is a way of valuing, or making values: justice, freedom, equality, dignity, solidarity, truth, beauty, etc., and, simultaneously, values are nothing and signify nothing-they have no worth-but only to the extent in which they are realized, in which they are brought to bear on the living space of their social-practical application. We can now define the Villorian conception of philosophical activity.10 We can say that for him there is no universal philosophy but merely a particular access which culturally mediates the philosophical universal. But it is just not about making philosophy which is "particular" philosophy, identified with a specific context and peculiar features, alienated from the major themes of universal thought. But neither is it about denying any reference to the particular, identified only with an abstract and general philosophical activity, which is the same for everyone. What our particularity determines is the way we treat philosophical universality: the order of importance of the topics, the meaning or nuance we give them, the consequences we draw from our treatment, and the context to which we direct our theoretical and philosophical contributions. We bow to the universal while not denying our uniqueness but deepening ourselves in it, radically thinking its conditions and essential features, and noting that these are not contrary or too distant to our ends or to what every thinking human being posits for herself anywhere in the world. For Villoro, to philosophize is to build that space of "concreteness" where the universal and the particular, far from opposing each other, resonate with each other and configure a thinking that, as universal, continues to show signs of socio-cultural particularity, and being particular continues to open horizons and vectors of universal significance. This mutual determination, this movement of double reversibility, is what constitutes the form of philosophical practice that Villoro exercises and somehow constitutes a reference or even a model for philosophers in Mexico and elsewhere. SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 25 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY On the basis of this relationship between universality and particularity, we can now explain what we consider the three basic philosophical contributions of Luis Villoro: 1) the epistemological contribution, as a theory of the plurality of knowledge; 2) the ethical contribution as a political philosophy of the community from the experience of the indigenous peoples of Mexico; and 3) the metaphysical or ontological contribution, as anticipation of current philosophical realism, both a new and old philosophical and universal perspective. 1. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION As we said a moment ago, Villoro conceives philosophy as an essential and integral activity. His activity as a philosopher is not exhausted by any philosophical discipline or assignment to any current or doctrine of thought. Villoro is not thinking theories or philosophies but reality as such and the problems it poses. Philosophy is not an end in itself but a means to understand what there is and how to act and live in the world. Philosophy has a telos that points beyond itself, is not thinking for the sake of pure thinking. From this perspective we must locate the important theory of knowledge that our philosopher develops and presents in his book Creer, Saber, Conocer.11 We want to make clear, first, that Villoro's aim is not to construct a theory of knowledge per se, but it must be understood in the context of questions posed by his overall philosophical quest. The problem Villoro raises as the basis for his project, and considering the Mexican context of his reflection, is whether we can have an adequate theory of the relationship between knowledge and practical-social life, or, more generally, between thought and life, between reason and praxis. That is, can we have a rational practical or philosophically oriented life? Can knowledge help us live better, allowing us to overcome violence, domination, injustice? This point is what allows us to observe that the specific contribution to the theory of knowledge that Villoro makes is found in the third epistemological category he analyzes, "conocer," i.e., personal knowledge and wisdom.12 Somehow Villoro believes that the tradition of the theory of knowledge has forgotten or ignored that third possibility of knowledge, focusing solely on the analysis of the first two: belief (belief, ideology) and knowledge (valid belief, science), and forcing us to choose between one or the other: social practice can only be either ideological, based on a more or less valid ideology, although insufficiently rational, or scientific, founded on a scientific and technical know-how, on the knowledge of experts and a purely methodicalobjective rationality. None of these options is acceptable to Villoro, as both have had questionable and disastrous consequences in the world of practical life. It's worth noting those definitions that our philosopher provides for those epistemic terms that give title to his book. He understands "creer" (belief) as a disposition of the subject to behave in a certain way under the assumption that something is the case. This assumption, "the belief," can be justified on motives or reasons that the subject can claim. The motives are purely subjective motives for belief and can refer to desires, interests, conveniences, emotional states, or convictions which are religions or of some other kind; negatively put, these are conditions of the belief that have no objective and rational basis. On the contrary, the reasons for a belief are the arguments that an individual can give in order to hold it. As such, the belief becomes a "saber" (knowing) when the reasons that support it have a character of objectively and are methodically supported. The reasons affirm that the object of belief is the case and, therefore, that it exists regardless of what the particular subject creates. Villoro states that the "objectively reasonable reasons" are those that a particular epistemic community assumes as accepted according to the epistemological criteria governing the community. In this way we can explain the intersubjective character that, for Villoro, scientific knowledge possesses. As for the definition of "conocer," it is important to note the fundamental difference between it and creer (belief) and saber (knowing). While the latter epistemic functions refer to the world of beliefs, "el conocer" refers to a reality as it is apprehended through personal and lived experience. "Conocer" is to have an experience of the thing or situation; it is knowledge about the entity and its real qualities. In Spanish, there is a big difference between saying "conozco a Carlos" ["I know Carlos"] and saying "I believe Carlos is michoacano" or "I know Carlos is michoacano." The first formula expresses knowledge that can be justified on real experiences or data or evidence to realize that this experience is real. The second formula is based on grounds or probable reasons, more or less certain (other beliefs, certain assumptions), while the third formula is based on reasons that are considered objectively valid (his birth certificate, his identity card, or other objective) tests. It can even be the case that it can express the third but not the first formula; for example, I can say "sé quién es Donald Trump pero no lo conozco"-"I know who Donald Trump is but I do not know him" (or want to know him). Thus, it is clear that "conocer" (familiar knowledge) constitutes a kind of knowledge which is original and irreducible to the other types. "Conocer" refers to all the forms of knowledge we have of reality or of the human world through those experiences that cannot be reduced either to ideology or science. This includes not only personal knowledge, but also interpersonal knowledge, aesthetic knowledge, emotional knowledge (religion as a form of experience and not as ideological doctrine), and ethical-axiological knowledge (i.e., understanding of values). According to Villoro, "conocer" can be formed into a set of consistent concepts and shared communally, which is what is designated by the term "wisdom," which is not mere belief or mere knowledge, but a way of being and living. Says our philosopher, "A scientist is not necessarily a wise man. For a sage it is not one who applies theories, but applies lessons learned from life experiences."13 Now, in the same way that ideology can refer, albeit vaguely or extrinsically, to a certain group or social class, and that scientific knowledge is held in the rules and procedures of an epistemic community, wisdom refers to what the Mexican philosopher calls "sapiential communities," or better yet, we could name them on our own terms as "cultural communities," i.e., a set of subjects that concretely and experientially share in certain knoweldges, PAGE 26 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY experiences, values, ways of acting and living, of feeling, etc. Thus we have, for example, a community of artists, or teachers, a professional community or a religious community; finally, an ethnic community or one that exists in a particular geographical area and shares a common tradition of ideas, values, and social practices, such as the indigenous peoples of Mexico. For Villoro, knowledge (sabiduría) constitutes a form of self-knowledge (conocimiento) and also possesses a kind of specific rationality that lies in the notion that beliefs (convictions) of knowledge (sabiduría) are founded on real praxis or, more precisely, on the consistency between the subject that believes and thinks and that which that subjects makes or lives. Although this consistency may be the subject of theoretical justification, it is usually a practical "justification"; that is, it is shown in action, in the work or behavior of an individual. Naturally, this requires the existence of other individuals who can testify to that justification. Finally, with respect to modern epistemological discussion, Villoro proposes an alternative: to recover and observe the value of wisdom (sabiduría) as a specific and fundamental form of human knowledge and the exercise of human reason. Against those visions that reduce reason to its scientific form and which leave for practical life the dominion of non-rational, ideological forms of thinking, the Mexican philosopher finds that the possibility for human life lies elsewhere, in another place, in another dimension: it lies in a rationality that is rooted, vitalistic and practical, and communitarian. In general, Villoro sees wisdom (sabiduria), as a form of thinking that is different from both science and ideology, the alternative for social and human life.14 2. THE ETHICAL CONTRIBUTION A turn or change of perspective occurs in the intellectual trajectory of Villoro sometime in the early 1990s. This shift consisted, in line with the same preoccupation with praxis and the vital existential dimension, in his passing from an epistemological critique of ideology and a general proposal for the living of life under rational-epistemic parameters to a political critique of ideology and the more specific proposal of ethically grounding social praxis. In the same way that we find in philosophical thought and wisdom an alternative to the ideology-science dichotomy, in the practical field we can find an alternative to the dichotomy between ideological morality and rationalist utopianism: that is precisely the alternative of ethical thinking. This ethical-political trajectory is best reflected in Villoro's Power and Value.15 In that book our philosopher deals with various issues of ethical theory and political philosophy; both are treated under the hypothesis that both issues should be closely linked. To think ethically in political terms and to think politically in ethical terms is the proposition that allows us to overcome the impasses of both a pure ethical theory (and its inveterate idealism) and a pure political theory (and its incorrigible pragmatism). Between the ideological idealism of established morality and the immorality of a policy subject to power one finds, according to Villoro, a double mediation between ethics and politics: an ethics that is not as such if it does not position itself in the matter of its own socially effective realization and a politics that is a sign of a human failure if it does not allow itself to be guided by ethical values. Ethics-that is, a life according to basic and universal values-is only plausible if it arises in the social context and in the struggle for the common good, that is, if it knows to link itself with a commitment to political praxis, to rationally coordinated social action. At the same time, political life suffering from a lack of ethical guidelines is reduced to a mere mechanism for the reproduction of social order and loses all critical and emancipatory possibility. For Villoro there is no purely "individual" ethics, but rather all ethical commitment involves a commitment to others. And there is no political or relevant collective social action without the assumption of values and ethical principles. Starting from the question into the possibility of an ethically oriented social life, according to the universal values of freedom, autonomy, equality, and, particularly, as the value of solidarity justice, Villoro engages in a critical analysis of the forms of socio-political organization or state in which they have existed. He discusses three types: the State for Order, the State for Freedom, and the State for Equality.16 The first is the form that prioritizes the value of order (security, survival of the social group, etc.) and operates under the principle of the subjection of individuals and social groups to an autonomous power that supposedly guarantees the smooth running of society. The second type of state, which is a product of modern revolutions, aims to ensure individual rights and the exercise of freedoms; it sets limits to authoritarian forms of the State for Order. The third type of state, which actually is a complement of the second, is the state that seeks to guarantee social or collective rights under the purpose of achieving greater and fairer equality and adequate conditions of life for all its members. Villoro considers the three types of states as having been unable to create a just, free, harmonious, and creative social life. This is because the nature of the state is to become a structure of domination on the social body, i.e., to abide by politics that always subordinates values to power, social life to the interests of class or group. In general, Villoro questions the various modern political ideologies. Neither liberalism nor socialism, neither nationalism nor social democratic approaches are attractive, not only in relation to the particular conditions of Mexico but also in terms of a universal conception of justice. Therefore, Villoro proposed to interpret and assume the perspective of indigenous groups in our country, particularly those of Chiapas indigenous groups organized around the EZLN and that came to the world's attention in 1994. The indigenous political philosophy (Zapatista) that Villoro reclaims is structured around the following principles or normative ideals: a) the construction of social life guided by ethical principles, where power is subjected to value; b) the practice of direct and participatory democracy, which monitors and prevents that political representation alienates itself from the community by positioning itself as a separate power "over" the community (this is the Zapatista principle of "govern by obeying"); c) the freely assumed priority (an area on which the critical spirit of Villoro is highlighted) of the community over the individual, SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 27 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY namely, the questioning of the forms of egoistic and anti- social individualism that characterizes modernity, but also of authoritative and taxing forms of social integration; d) the recognition of the values of cultural tradition as a source of meaning for contemporary life, a respectful relationship with nature, and a holistic and decentered conception of the sacred as a meaning for life in its totality, as universal communion of all beings.17 Hence, Villoro finds in the indigenous world an alternative, a political-cultural-ethical model, with which to address disorders and insufficiencies of modern society. We must clarify two important points: 1) the Mexican philosopher also argues that we should not abandon the valuable achievements of modernity, as the scientific spirit when it is well understood, that is, without dogmatism and reductionism, the defense of freedom and the value of Individual freedom (without the excesses of selfish, and even nihilistic, individualism); 2) also Villoro is aware that the ethical and political indigenous model cannot be simplistically extrapolated to modern life: rather, it's about taking its principles as guidelines concerning social and political transformation in our own time. In any event, what we must change is our perception and appreciation of indigenous cultures under a generously multicultural perspective. Beyond the recognition of the rights of indigenous communities, we must also, and perhaps this is the most important point, be willing to learn from indigenous thought and practice, to see what they can teach us. 3. THE METAPHYSICAL CONTRIBUTION Along with the great philosophical issues to which we have referred, i.e., the epistemological, ethical, and political, Villoro was also interested in the ultimate questions about the meaning of existence, the Self, the Holy, the Divine, etc.18 He expressed this interest in a somewhat lateral and discreet way, which he framed within the broad outlines of twentieth-century thought-analytic philosophy, phenomenology, Marxism. Our author was aware that his theological-philosophical, metaphysical, and ontological interests had no place (and would not be well regarded) under those theoretical paradigms, which all coincide in rejecting metaphysics and assuming some form of atheism. However, the recent crisis in the theoretical paradigms noted above as well as the emergence of new philosophical conceptions proposed so far in this century, as the ontological turn of speculative realism, can retrieve and assess the metaphysical intuitions of Villoro and allows us to give them a fair and essential place in the whole of his thought. First, we must recall the ontological realism that Villoro maintained as the ultimate thesis in his theory of knowledge. Against epistemologies of a formalist pragmatic kind, that is, against the assumption that the analysis of the processes of knowledge exhausts any ontological question or, in other words, against the assumption that epistemology eliminates the need for Ontology, Villoro points in Creer, saber, conocer that the assumption that there is a reality independent of the subject and its frameworks of knowledge is a condition for the possibility of objectivity and the truth of knowledge. "The existence of a reality independent of the subject," explains Villoro, "onto which judgments can be adapted, is the only rational explanation, both of the coincidence of the objective justifications of a plurality of subjects, as the progress of knowledge itself."19 However, hesitant to return to any metaphysical thought in the classic mode (as dogmatic and unfounded), Villoro cannot find the theoretical means to support his assertion of the primacy of reality and the possibility of an ontology. In his last essay "On Truth,"20 he stretches, we believe fruitlessly, phenomenological conceptions and linguistic pragmatics to seek to justify the classical definition of truth as "correspondence" or a reference to a trans-subjective reality. Regardless of the issues of method, it is clear that our philosopher refuses to believe any "idealistic" position, but at the same time never settles on overly restrictive guidelines of analytic philosophy and ideological scientism, so that his reflection in some way points to speculative realism (which also opposes both the idealism and the empiricist or positivist realism) which has recently been proposed by various thinkers such as Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, and Markus Gabriel.21 Clearly, Villoro is aware that an ontological-realism stance is needed in order to escape the skeptical and relativistic implications of modern and postmodernthought.Inthe search for this stance he found the mystical path as the possibility of accessing a completely other reality, absolutely other, with respect to the human subject and all its determinants and relativities. Thus, in his writings on philosophy of religion, Villoro advocates a holistic conception of the divine as silent and irreducible to any conceptualization or religiousideological or intellectual fixation. Although he does not take a definitive position on the issue, it is understood that there is no rational way to the Divine, only a mystical way. We believe this position can be problematized. Similarly to Wittgenstein, the Mexican philosopher also finds a way to "talk about that which cannot be spoken." His conception of the Divine is grounded, in fact, in a phenomenologicalrational reflection rather than a purely emotional posture, one that is simply irrational. In his beautiful text "The Blue Mosque,"22 Villoro presents more than a theoretical discussion about God and the sacred but a description of a mystical experience in the first person, that is, the experience that Villoro himself says he had while visiting the famous church in Istanbul. Now, this does not rule out the possibility of a metaphysical discourse (ontological-rational) about the Divine and, in general, on the existence of an absolute reality beyond human determinations. This possibility of a criticalrational discourse about God (or the idea of God) is what new realism has proposed in this century, particularly in the version of the French thinker Quentin Meillassoux. What this author proposes is the possibility of a (logical-speculative) rational demonstration of the existence of a reality-in-itself independently of consciousness and human life, that is, one that is absolute.23 This route would not be inconsistent with the defense of rationality Villoro assumes in his philosophy, though it would certainly force the opening of the discussion about the possibility of metaphysical, ontological, and speculative thought in the sphere of Mexican philosophy and Latin American philosophy in general. PAGE 28 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY In some ways, the epistemological position of analytic philosophy or the ideological-political currents in Latin American thought generally have demonstrated their insufficiency and incapacity to respond to the real necessities of life and thought in our countries, where philosophy normally lies between the form of thought which is totally alien to our concrete realities or a form of thought strongly committed to these realities but grounded on strong ideological positions which are at times simplistic and merely schematic. The general lack of interest in Latin American philosophers, in their accounts of the basic philosophical questions of metaphysics or ontology, is revealed as an inability of our philosophies to rationally justify an understanding of reality and an orientation for reliable and effectively binding praxis in our communities. We believe, finally, that while our philosophy does not come to deal directly with basic metaphysical questions, the project of an autonomous and creative Mexican and Latin American philosophy will remain pending, in regards to its effective implementation. The line opened by the rigorous, consistent, and systematic philosophical elaboration of Villoro can be taken up and developed, certainly, under new contexts and new provisions, and according to new theoretical and practical-social challenges. NOTES 1. Cf. Mario Teodoro Ramírez, La razón del otro. Estudios sobre el pensamiento de Luis Villoro, México: UNAM, 2010. 2. Luis Villoro, "Génesis y proyecto del existencialismo en México," Filosofía y Letras 18, no. 36 (1994): 233–44. 3. Cf. Emilio Uranga, Análisis del ser del mexicano (Guanajuato: Gobierno del Estado, 1990). 4. Cf, Jorge Portilla, Fenomenología del relajo, México: FCE, 1984. In English, see Carlos Alberto Sánchez, The Suspension of Seriousness: On the Phenomenology of Jorge Portilla (Albany, NY: SUNY Press). 5. Luis Villoro, Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México (México: El Colegio de México, 1950). 6. Luis Villoro, El proceso ideológico de la Revolución de Independencia (México: UNAM, 1953). 7. Luis Villoro, El poder y el valor. Fundamentos de una ética política (México: FCE, 1997). 8. Luis Villoro, "Sobre relativismo cultural y universalismo ético," en Id., Estado plural, pluralidad de culturas (México: Paidós/UNAM, 1998), 141–54. 9. Villoro, "Aproximaciones a una ética de la cultura," 109–40. 10. This is laid out in a polemical, yet respectful, exchange with Leopoldo Zea, a significant figure in Latin American philosophy and proponent of a specifically Latin American philosophy. Cf. Luis Villoro, "Leopoldo Zea: la posibilidad de una filosofía latinoamericana," en Id., En México, entre libros. Pensadores del siglo XX (México: FCE, 1995), 90–118. 11. Luis Villoro, Creer, saber, conocer (México: Siglo XXI, 1982). Translated into English as Belief, Personal and Propositional Knowledge, trans. David Sosa and Douglas McDermid (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998). 12. Ibid. See especially Ch. 9: "Conocer y saber," 197–221. 13. Ibid., 226. 14. Ibid., chapter 10, Tipos de conocimiento, 226. 15. Cf. Luis Villoro, El poder y el valor, op. cit. 16. Op. cit. See especially Cuarta parte. La asociación política, 251 y ss. 17. Op. cit., chapter 16, La comunidad, 359 y ss. 18. Cf. Luis Villoro, Vislumbres de lo otro. Ensayos de filosofía de la religión (México: Verdehalago/El Colegio Nacional, 2006). 19. Villoro, Creer, saber, conocer, 195. 20. Luis Villoro, "Verdad," en Id. (compilador), El conocimiento. Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de Filosofía, vol. 20 (Madrid: Trotta, 1999), 213–32. 21. Cf. Mario Teodoro Ramírez (coordinador), El nuevo realismo. La filosofía del siglo XXI (México: Siglo XXI, 2016). 22. Villoro, "La mezquita azul," incluida en: Id., Vislumbres de lo otro, op. cit., 49–86. 23. Cf. Quentin Meillassoux, After finitude. An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (New York: Bloomsbury, 2008). In Search of the Philosophical Impulse: Zea and the Greeks Django Runyan SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY The preoccupation with identity in the philosophy of Leopoldo Zea is part of a greater set of concerns in Latin American philosophy in general. However, the issues that Zea raises and the emergence of Latin American philosophy give way to questions about philosophy as a whole. In this paper I will examine some of the issues that Zea opens up in relation to the larger philosophical project. One particular passage from Zea will instigate this investigation and serve as a call to go back to the origins of Western philosophy. Throughout what follows I will examine the very possibility of philosophy in light of Zea's observations, and I will attempt to show how Zea is closer to the spirit of the original philosophical impulse that drove the Greeks and, from there, examine the possibilities and questions this raises for the future of philosophy based on Zea's thought. Philosophy begins with a question-the authentic philosophical question begins in wonderment; any theory or treatise will always be an extension of this initial questioning. And so we have reached an era where perhaps our new, authentic sense of wonderment will be in relation to this question, "What is philosophy?"-What are the key terms of this investigation?-wonderment, question, authenticity, and philosophy. The nature of this paper is such that the definition of these terms are preliminary and that we remember that we want them to remain preliminary-tools for opening what we search for, attempting to remain humble about hasty assertions. So I begin in brief with these definitions, of which I acknowledge their malleability: • Wonderment – The space that opens before the question, the sense of awe at one's own ignorance. • Question – The notion of a question is also tied to authenticity, but part of the question of the question is this: Do I remember to keep the question? That is, does the question remain pressing, urgent, or is it easily satisfied or clouded out by existing theories? SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 29 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY Does the history of philosophy sometimes prevent the emergence of original questioning? • Authenticity – Here I define what is authentic, as that expression which is truly one's own, with the understanding of all conditioning and circumstances that influence what is one's own. • Philosophy – philosophy will be, for now, intimately related to these other terms; perhaps for now, we will say that it is a search for wisdom that begins from the knowledge of the lack of that wisdom. With these terms loosely established, I hope to come to a deeper understanding of them through the investigation that follows. In one of Zea's earliest articles, he concerns himself with the identity of Latin American culture and Latin American philosophy. In a key passage in this article, Zea's affirmation of Latin American philosophy reveals a unique insight into what drives the philosophical impulse. Zea says that for Latin American philosophy to exist, it needs a Latin American culture from which to derive its content. So, Latin American philosophy will exist if we can affirm Latin American culture. But he goes on to say, "the formulation and attempt to solve this problem, apart from the affirmative or negative character of the answer, are already Latin American philosophy, since they are an attempt to answer affirmatively or negatively a Latin American question."1 What is exciting about Zea's idea is that in attempting to ground philosophy in culture, he is actually grounding philosophy first, and grounding it universally. He reveals that the very method of questioning brings philosophy into existence. Here it is not yet philosophy based on tradition; it is philosophy as an essential human concern. Zea does not go on to clarify this idea precisely, but it brings many questions about the nature of philosophy to the foreground. First, there is a novelty to this expression; Zea writes as if he were the first person to discover himself doing philosophy. He can't deny that it is philosophy because he is asking a philosophical question, a question about identity. It is the unique historical point in which Zea and Latin American philosophy exist that reveals a question that is fundamentally essential, that has an urgency and authenticity to it that at the same time stands to remind the larger philosophical enterprise of the importance of the question. In a sense, Zea is showing himself and his predecessors to be in the tradition of those pre-Socratics who had reached an impasse in their inquiry that could not be addressed by myth alone. These first philosophers began on totally new ground, from a place of wonder, as Aristotle famously said of them, "It is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize. . . . And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant . . . therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they pursued science in order to know . . ." (Arist. Met. 1.2,982b10-20).2 Aristotle here says that "men both now begin and at first began to philosophize . . ." What makes Zea unique in this regard? I argue that the spirit of Zea's questioning is closer to that initial impulse of the pre-Socratics, that it has a similar urgency, spontaneity, and newness to it. While, obviously, the starting points of concern for the pre-Socratics and Latin American philosophy are different, the spirit of their beginnings have strong similarities. Although the Greeks already had a rich history, there was no written precedence for philosophy, for these questions that initially centered on cosmology. For Latin American philosophy, as Zea portrays it, the crisis in European culture, to which Latin American culture had always been so entangled, now found itself in a completely new situation. This situation, of no longer being able to rely on European culture while at the same time not having a firm identity without it, made the task of philosophizing more authentically attached to the questions it was asking. So in this way the question itself, while not resolving the issue of identity nonetheless reveals an identity. In stopping to appreciate that the questioning is itself philosophy, Zea is giving a piece to Latin American identity: to be Latin American will be, at some level, to be intimately engaged with this question of identity. All of our key terms have come into play and been expanded by Zea's thought. For Aristotle, the pre-Socratics were able to be open to these new philosophical ideas, to this sense of wonder, because they were able to be at leisure.3 For Zea, the circumstance for wonderment arises from crisis. In both cases something of the old cultural guideposts begs to be shed so that the emerging questions can find light. In both cases the old is not destroyed but assimilated. This sense of wonderment seeks independence but must acknowledge the ground on which it stands-the circumstances of its arising. Thus, Xenophanes can now look to the existing cultural norms established by the mythological poets and say, "Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all things that are blameworthy and disgraceful for men: stealing, committing adultery, deceiving each other [F 17]," and propose a new possibility, "One God, greatest among gods and men, not at all like to mortals in body nor in thought [F 35]."4 This new independent thought takes stock of the circumstances and yet boldly attempts a new and independent proposition. For Zea, a similar approach arises in dealing with the influence of Europe and the possibility of a Latin American identity, the cultural framework of Latin America is, for Zea, inherited from Europe, and he says, To become disengaged from it would be to become disengaged from the heart of our personality. We can no more deny that culture than we can deny our parents. And just as we have a personality that makes us distinct from our parents without having to deny them, we should also be able to have a cultural personality without having to deny the culture of which we are children. To be aware of our true relations with European culture eliminates our sense of inferiority and gives us instead a sense of responsibility. This is the feeling that animates the Latin American man today. He feels that he has "come of age," and, as any other man who reaches maturity, he acknowledges that he has a past that he does not need to deny, just PAGE 30 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY as no one is ashamed of having a childhood. The Latin American man knows himself to be the heir of Western culture and now demands a place in it.5 Thus, having seen the importance of assimilating European culture, Zea can assert his new proposition about Latin American philosophy in its particular circumstances and as part of the larger philosophical project. Latin American philosophy will contribute to the philosophical issues of its own culture while at the same time contributing to the universal issues of European philosophy the issues of "being, knowledge, space, time, God, life, death, etc."6 So, just as the unique circumstances of the Pre-Socratics allowed for a plurality of contributions as to the workings of the Universe and was born out of this sense of wonder, so too do these remarkable ideas of Zea's propose a future wherein a plurality of cultures that have at once assimilated and outgrown the dominant philosophies might renew philosophy itself and restore philosophy as an essentially universally human impulse. Before I pursue the implications for the future of philosophy based on Zea's insights, I want to continue with this comparison to the Greek tradition and look at how Zea defines philosophy and how philosophy came to be defined in practice by Socrates. In their respective approaches to philosophy, there are two ideas that link Zea with Socrates. These are the concepts of "lack" and of "search," which I will return to after broadly laying out Zea's conception of philosophy. In Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought, Ofelia Schutte summarizes Zea's conception of philosophy. Philosophy is, for Zea, the highest expression and the foundation for culture. Philosophy serves the purpose of supplying lasting meaning to the lives of human beings given the constantly changing circumstances of everyday life. Where the varied expressions of culture attempt to supply meaning in a given social situation, for Zea, Schutte says, "philosophy represents the highest level of this attempt because it tries to offer not only an enduring but a universal representation of the meaning of human existence. Through philosophy a culture acquires a type of self-consciousness, that is to say, philosophy is the most significant cultural instrument through which an individual or a people can acquire self-knowledge."7 Philosophy will be that which gives meaning to the historical person who is always changing in the struggles of her own circumstances. Philosophy, in short, pushes beyond the current moment to provide something lasting. Schutte continues: "Zea may be interpreted to mean that where there is a lack of ideals that give meaning to life beyond the mere 'living for the day,' the conditions for culture (as well as for philosophy) are lacking."8 The ideas of the philosopher, no matter how abstract, are meant to serve everyday reality. With each ensuing crisis of cultural values, philosophy stands ready to fill the need for new values. Medieval philosophy yielded revelation to modernity and reason, and the crisis in Europe, Zea believes, will force reason to yield to new values also. But philosophy will always be grounded in the particular, and claims to universality will have to contend with this fact. But Zea believes that Western reason "has tried to affirm itself in abstraction from this cultural mark."9 Universality will happen historically, it will be arrived at by a collective accounting of "particular perspectives."10 What Schutte's summary highlights is the problem of contemporary philosophy, a problem of hegemony. What I argue, in contrasting Zea's views with the Greeks, is that there was a greater plurality of views and of discourse in the Greek era than we tend to recognize and that in keeping with Zea's conception we ought to remember that, as abstract as our Greek philosophers may have been, it was always with an eye to bringing those ideas back to a grounding of ethics and public life. As it has been said a million times over, for the Greeks, philosophy was first and foremost a way of life. Furthermore, I would suggest that it is not the Greeks who are responsible for the hegemony that philosophy finds itself in today; they were merely the source that was exploited. The Greeks did exactly what Zea asks of philosophy: where there was a lack of ideas to supply the culture with enduring meaning, the philosophers came to the fore and gave rich ideas which, at least on the ethical level, we are still hard pressed to contend with today in an era that sees a rise in the study of Aristotelian virtue ethics and is only beginning to revamp the ethical theories of Stoicism. We can see Zea's concept of creating new value when the cosmological views of the pre-Socratics would be found useful but lacking as Plato and Socrates give way to "the ethical turn," and just when philosophy had begun to become too "theoretical," the Roman era makes an even stronger turn in the practical direction with the Stoics and the Pyhrronian Skeptics. Returning to the theme of "lack" and "search," what Zea has been showing us all along is that philosophy begins from this sense of lack. The crisis in European culture and the question of Latin America's cultural and philosophical identity reveal a "lack," an emptiness which creates the aforementioned wonderment, the conditions for seeking a solution. Philosophy, then, begins when this wonderment is addressed by a question, and this is the "search." In Zea's description it will be the continuing "search" for giving meaning to the human conditions and addressing the need for new values in times of social crisis. And what about Socrates? Beginning with Socrates' portrayal in the Apology, we come back to one of the most oft repeated stories in philosophy, Socrates' search for the wisest man in Athens. Here we can see Zea's conception of philosophy played out in the individual. Being told by Chaerephon that the Oracle at Delphi has proclaimed Socrates the wisest man in Athens, Socrates is brought to this wonderment we are investigating and searches the city only to find that all those who proclaim knowledge do not really know what they claim. Socrates is thrown back on himself and proclaims in relationship to his interlocutors, he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know" (Plato, Apology 21d-e).11 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 31 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY Now, I know we have all heard this story a thousand times, but it bears repeating here as we try to discover both what is unique about the spirit of Zea's questioning and in appreciating the very nature of an authentic philosophical question. Here Socrates might help us in registering what can make this impulse authentic, and it is in his appreciation of his own "lack." This "lack" is what will instigate him to harass his fellow citizens and engage them in philosophy. Part of the goal of this paper is to remove Greek philosophy from its assumed position as the source of our current hegemonic philosophical system. Part of doing that is to be reminded of the lucidity of Greek thought. The fact is that Plato's dialogues do not typically end with concrete assertions but rather in aporia, where the very process of questioning is always highlighted above and beyond any proposed theory. This fits well with Zea's notion of particular historical perspectives coming together to form agreed upon universality. Plato does not demand allegiance in his dialogues but rather searches for universals that might apply to human needs. Most of the Socratic dialogues pursue a particular virtue but never pin down a specific definition of that virtue. Instead, we are led to a greater appreciation of pursuing the "search." Where Socrates gives us a universal, it is in a return to appreciating the question of which he seems to be the only one not to lose sight of-the question itself, that we should pursue it with vigor, this is universal for Socrates. Heidegger uses Socrates when declaring that our most thought-provoking thought is that "we are still not thinking," and that what gives us food for thought is at the same time drawing away from us, which somehow makes it near to us, and he says, Once we are so related to what withdraws, we are drawing into what withdraws, into the enigmatic and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal. Whenever man is properly drawing that way, he is thinking-even though he may still be far away from what withdraws, even though the withdrawal may remain as veiled as ever. All through his life and right into his death, Socrates did nothing else than place himself into this draft, this current, and maintain himself in it. This is why he is the purest thinker of the West. This is why he wrote nothing. For anyone who begins to write out of thoughtfulness must inevitably be like those people who run to seek refuge from any draft too strong for them. An as yet hidden history still keeps the secret why all great Western thinkers after Socrates, with all their greatness, had to be such fugitives.12 Heidegger's mysterious quote might here help in this exploration of an authentic philosophical question. If I read him correctly, I think Heidegger's interpretation of Socrates shows a man who feels and appreciates this "lack" to such a degree that even resorting to the written word is a retreat, a refuge from the philosophical "search." And in the search for cultural identity Zea, in relation to this question, has revealed both the difficulty and the necessity of staying with this question. It seems, for Zea, to be a call that cannot be ignored. The "lack" and the "search" are maintained all the way through. I have thus far examined Zea and the origins of the philosophical impulse, but what can we gleam from him for the future of philosophy and the pressing question that faces us today: What is philosophy? We have touched on the issue of hegemony in philosophy, and this issue becomes apparent when we look at the debate between Zea and the Peruvian philosopher Augusto Salazar Bondy. Bondy will draw some fundamentally opposed ideas about Latin American philosophy in contrast to Zea. Where Zea finds the use of poetry, maxims, aphorisms, etc., in the history of Western philosophy to be legitimate forms of philosophical discourse, Bondy, trained in the analytic tradition, believes that philosophy is a technical and specialized field which should not be confused with poetry or literature. Bondy does not believe that Latin America has produced a significant philosophy and that the cause of this is imperialism. For Bondy, philosophy should be "of a cultural product expressing the life of the community in a rational form."13 Culture is connected to communities, and a culture can be either genuinely authentic or defective. An underdeveloped culture will not completely respond to the needs of its community. What marks a culture as defective is when it wrongly appreciates inauthentic works as authentic philosophy. He uses three criteria for authenticity: originality, authenticity, and peculiarity. In accord with this criteria, any work that is repetitive, imitative, or peculiar will be inauthentic. So, for Bondy, since the history of Latin American philosophy meets the criteria of inauthentic, it is defective. We see again the connection between cultural identity and the possibility of a Latin American philosophy: because Latin America is an alienated culture, it lacks identity; because it lacks an authentic cultural identity, it cannot produce a genuine philosophy. Bondy proposes a "philosophy of liberation" as the way towards an authentic Latin American philosophy. In order for Latin American and Third World countries to produce their own philosophy, they have to break free from underdevelopment and domination. This new philosophy will begin from this place of liberation.14 Bondy has added to the conversation of Latin American identity and philosophy and put forth some issues that cannot be ignored. What Zea has offered us is a new way of thinking about what philosophy can be from where we are standing. The question that seems hard to avoid with Bondy is this question of the hegemony of philosophy and his entrenchment within the hegemony. In all that came before this section, we have been searching for the authentic philosophical impulse. In bringing the Greeks into this picture, the aim has been to see if we can unearth what made this philosophy possible in the first place. The Greeks, like the Chinese and Indian philosophers of the ancient world, existed in a historical time and place, and in that place they felt a "lack"; this "lack" itself brought philosophy into being. Why should the contemporary philosopher or a philosopher such as Zea be deprived of philosophy when philosophy has never needed ideal circumstances for its existence but, rather, has always thrived precisely in the recognition of what it is lacking? PAGE 32 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY The lack could be whatever is pertinent to the philosopher and his circumstances; for the pre-Socratics, it was the lack of understanding of the Universe, for Plato and Socrates it was the recognition of the lack of wisdom that lead to the search for it, and for Zea, it is the lack of a coherent cultural identity that drives his "search." The notion that philosophy must adhere to strict principles of a profession and skill that Bondy wants to push does several things: one, it removes philosophy from the public and keeps it locked in academia, which betrays the notion of the philosophical impulse; it delays and therefore denies human beings existing in the world-right here, today-the possibility of philosophy until some ideal state has been reached. The hegemony of philosophy begins when a history of philosophy becomes a doctrine of how philosophy ought to be applied and thereby denies fresh voices and new thought. I did not return to the origins of philosophy in the spirit of nostalgia, but to see if we might unearth what made philosophy new, when it was new. By contrast, this might be exactly what is standing in the way of a future philosophy or even a "now" philosophy: the search for an authentic question is being drowned by an adherence to philosophical doctrine that rather demands interesting reactions to pre-existing ideas. This should not mean that we be rid of the past but that we assimilate it and build from our own unique perspective and questions. The idea of contrasting Zea's philosophy with Greek philosophy comes from the following: [Those who question whether there has been any philosophy in Latin America] forget that in the history of philosophy they want to turn into a model [of philosophizing] . . . [one may find] not only the systems of Plato and Aristotle but the poems of Parmenides, the maxims of Marcus Aurelius, the thoughts of Epicurus, Pascal, and many others. In short, there are forms of philosophizing that are expressed just as much in ordered systems as in a maxim, a poem, an essay, a play, or a novel.15 It is interesting that but for Pascal, all of Zea's examples of the plurality of philosophical approaches come from the Greeks, from the very beginning of philosophy. In taking Zea's approach beyond Latin America, we can wonder if the hope it gives to this discipline is to prepare it for the inevitable loosening of the rigidity of the current hegemonic position. If it can prepare us to better appreciate philosophers from other nations, our own banished philosophers of the recent past, it might cause us to reflect on the possibility that the adherence to this hegemonic philosophy has colonized the colonizer. The notion of Western philosophy done in a particular manner has deprived philosophy of new insights, of its own independent identity, and of the value of other insights. What I hope to have added to this conversation is an appreciation of an authentic philosophical impulse and the need to retain that impulse in our philosophical thinking. NOTES 1. Leopoldo Zea, "The Actual Function of Philosophy in Latin America," in Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century: The Human Condition, Values, and the Search for Identity, ed. Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert and Jorge J. E. Gracia, 358–59 (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2004). 2. Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001). 3. Ibid. 4. Daniel W. Graham, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 109–11. 5. Leopoldo Zea, "The Actual Function of Philosophy in Latin America," 364. 6. Ibid. 7. Ofelia Schutte, Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 91. 8. Ibid., 92. 9. Ibid., 92–93. 10. Ibid. 11. Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), 21. 12. Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco, 1993), 381–82. 13. Schutte, Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought, 98. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 104. CONTRIBUTOR BIOS Manuel Bolom Pale is Maya tsotsil, born in Jocosic, Huixtán, Chiapas. He earned his degrees at the Universidad Maya and the Instituto de Estudios de Posgrado. He is a writer, translator, and researcher. He is the recipient of Chiapas' Prize in Indigenous Art (2016) and the Medal of Academic Merit (2016). He has published several books, including Y el bolom dice... (2004), Pueblos y palabras (2005), Pat O'tan (2008), K'anel, funciones y representaciones sociales en Huixtán, Chiapas (2010), and Sueños de pájaro (2015). He is currently professor and coordinator for the Department of Social Services for the Intercultural University of Chiapas. He is a member of the Mexican Philosophical Association, Red América Latina y el Caribe (ALEC), Red de Etnoecologia y Biodiversidad de Saberes, and La Nueva Escuela Chiapaneca. José Jorge Mendoza is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Lowell and is co-editor of Radical Philosophy Review. His areas of specialization are in moral and political philosophy, philosophy of race, and Latin American philosophy. He is also the author of The Moral and Political Philosophy of Immigration: Liberty, Security, and Equality (2017). SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER 2 PAGE 33 APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY Susana Nuccetelli is professor of philosophy at St. Cloud State University in Minnesota. Her articles in ethics, philosophy of language, and Latin American philosophy have appeared in many edited volumes and journals. She is the author of Latin American Thought: Philosophical Problems and Arguments (Westview Press, 2002); with Gary Seay, of Engaging Bioethics: An Introduction with Case Studies (Routledge 2017), and How to Think Logically (2e, Pearson, 2012). José-Antonio Orosco is associate professor of philosophy at Oregon State University in Corvallis, Oregon. He received his B.A. in philosophy from Reed College (1992) and Ph.D in philosophy from the University of California, Riverside (2002). His areas of specialization are in social and political philosophy (focusing on democratic theory, social movements, and peace and nonviolence studies), philosophy of the Americas (North and South), and issues in multiculturalism and immigration. He is also interested in theories of anarchism and utopian/ dystopian political thought. He is the author of Toppling the Melting Pot: Immigration and Multiculturalism in American Pragmatism (Indiana University Press, 2016) and Cesar Chavez and the Common Sense of Nonviolence (University of New Mexico Press, 2008). L. Sebastian Purcell is an assistant professor of philosophy at the State University of New York at Cortland. His work centers on moral, political, and Latin American philosophy. In his contemporary scholarship, he is concerned with articulating the insights from the tradition of Liberation philosophy for global and environmental justice. In his ancient and comparative scholarship, he focuses on virtue ethics and the related approaches Aristotle and the Aztecs take. Mario-Teodoro Ramírez received his doctoral degree from UNAM. He is currently professor-investigator at the Universidad Michoacana, in Morelia (México). He has served as president of the Mexican Philosophical Association (2012–2014). He has written countless Works on Mexican philosophy. On Luis Villoro he has published: Humanismo para una nueva época. Nuevos ensayos sobre el pensamiento de Luis Villoro, México: Siglo XXI, 2011; La razón del otro. Estudios sobre el pensamiento de Luis Villoro, México: UNAM, 2010. Como coordinador y co-autor: Luis Villoro: pensamiento y vida. Homenaje en sus 90 años, México: Siglo XXI, 2014. Django Israel Runyan received his M.A. in philosophy from San Jose State University in 2016. His work is focused on ancient Eastern and Western philosophy. He is currently enjoying a "gap" year in China, after which he plans to pursue his doctoral studies in ancient philosophy. PAGE 34 SPRING 2017 | VOLUME 16 | NUMBER

PB September 2016 The Heart of Acharya Ramanuja 53 Freud rejects all metaphysics. Are we not tired of having everything deconstructed without ever understanding what Logos is? Who amongst us will say that our lives are like onions with no inner meaning and there is an eternal slippage of meaning? Scruton knows and proves that the early and popular Derrida and his acolytes are wrong-we need more of Scruton than of Of Grammatology. Unlike what is found on the Internet about this book and Scruton generally; Scruton is a theologian of the caliber of Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, and Jürgen Moltmann. Scruton is a theologian since he speaks of standing 'on the edge of a mystery' which is the God of the Covenant (185). Philosophers know it all; only a theologian is moved by music, God and 'Our relation to God ... as an intentional ... relation' (188). Scruton mercifully avoids being plebeian without being difficult. Dense writers are only dense. Arthur Schopenhauer haunts this book. But Scruton has not explicitly mentioned him anywhere. Subhasis Chattopadhyay Alternative Standpoints: A Tribute to Kalidas Bhattacharyya Edited by Madhumita Chattopadhyay D K Printworld (P) Ltd, 'Vedasri', F–395 , Sudarshan Park Near esi Hospital New Delhi 110015 . www.dkprintworld.com. 2015. xxii + 258 pp. pb. 900. isbn 9788192570297. rank Kermode gestured towards the sense of an ending. That which has a finality is neither art nor philosophy. The genius of Maitreyee Datta is to end her analysis of-Kalidas Bhattacharyya's understanding of self within Yogachara Buddhist concepts of self (140–51) in this festschrift with 'Perhaps ... I feel' (151). The subjectivity involved in doing philosophy is best illustrated by this admission to interiority; the phenomenological turn which certainly influences Datta and of course, Kalidas Bhattacharyya. Husserl is everywhere in this volume, but is only mentioned twice in the book, other than once in the index. For example, in Goutam Biswas's chapter on Kalidas Bhattacharyya's aesthetic ideas (159–75), we have an explication of feeling of feelings, emotions fluctuating between the individual mind and the sublation of that mind into the universal mind (171). If one attends seminars in the humanities, one hears of Derrida, Lacan, Alain Badiou, and of the subaltern studies' group ad nauseam. It is as if Indian philosophers have no place in learned discussions. Of late one hears of Giorgio Agamben and Martha Nussbaum. Nary a word on Indian thinkers who might be used to foreground disciplines as diverse as literature, political science, and film studies. It is akin to blasphemy to have no reference to American and Continental philosophers in an international symposium, say on, immigration or the rise of religious extremism. Yet Kalidas Bhattacharyya's understanding of Anek anta Vada is unknown to most. Western savants do not care to understand that cosmopolitanism is a Hindu concept; neither a Jain concept nor is it a Greek concept as is mistakenly taught in classrooms worldwide and mentioned on the Internet. Tara Chatterjee's Anekanta Vedanta (112–24) should be read by English literature scholars first since they are the ones who hardly know that they are mistaking as Western, concepts which Indian doyens of modern philosophy have already written on. How many Masters' and post-Masters' English-literature students know of Kalidas Bhattacharya's monograph on Indian cosmopolitanism published in 1982? It is the sad state of Indian studies-literary and philosophical-today that while Western scholars acknowledge the contributions of the likes of Kalidas Bhattacharyya and Bimal Krishna Matilal, Indian academics are ignorant of them. Madhumita Chattopadhyay has done a great service to Indian and world letters by editing this volume. Hopefully, Indian lovers of all things First World will now wake up and refer students to this book. It is time that we stop grinding Anita Desai and Manju Kapur under the millstones of Julia Kristeva and bell hooks in the name of appearing avant garde. Kalidas Bhattacharyya can provide the requisite hermeneutical lens; if only one has the sense to read him. May be, in the future the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Jadavpur University, will bring out a similar volume on Bimal Krishna Matilal. Subhasis Chattopadhyay F

Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «MetaJfsica» RAFAEL RAMÓN GuERRERo 1. INTRODUCCIÓN Desterrada de la filosofía' y rechazada su posibilidad como ciencia, la metafísica ha sido considerada como paradigma de los grandes errores del pasado que deben ser evitados. Sin embargo, después de compartir la idea del fin de la metafísica y de radicalizar la tesis hasta sus últimas consecuencias, Heidegger, cuando señaló el olvido del ser, ha destacado su importancia y ha puesto de relieve el papel desempeñado por la ontología medieval en la discusión del problema del ser como ámbito de la metafísica. El filósofo alemán ha inspirado, con ello, notables estudios consagrados al examen de esa ciencia maldita. Un número considerable de estos estudios está dedicado a figuras de ese gran período metafísico por excelencia, la Edad Media. En este período histórico, el quehacer metafísico estuvo vinculado, paradójicamente, a la lógica y a la filosofía del lenguaje, y consistió fundamentalmente en poner de manifiesto la noción del ser a partir del discurso que lo dice. Desde el principio de la Edad Media se plantearon algunos problemas metafísicos, cuyo origen tiene que ver con San Agustín y su cristianización de la enseñanza platdnica del ser que verdaderamente es2. Pero hasta que nofueron recibidos tres grandes textos, la metafísica medieval no se desarrolló totalmente, planteándose entonces tres principales cuestiones: la posibilidad de esta ciencia, si es accesible a un espíritu finito, y la definición del proyecto metafísico. Los tres grandes textos a que me refiero fueron la Metafisica aristotélica, la Filosofia Primera o Ciencia Divina de Avicena y el Gran Comentario a la Metafisica de Averroes 'Cfr. J. Habermas: NachmetaphyÉches flenken. Philosophische Aufsátze, Franckfurt, Suhrkamp, 1988. 2 Cfr. A. Dempf: MetaJlsica de la Edad Media, Madrid, Ed. Gredos, ¡957, Pp. 29 ss. 275 276 Rafael Ramón Guerrero Dejando ahora el problema que planteanlos episodios por los que atravesó el texto de la Metajtsica, desde sus orígenes hasta su llegada al mundo islámico, lo que me interesa es subrayar que la lecturade Aristóteles hecha por los filósofos en el Islam señaló el camino que habría de seguir el pensanliento metafísico en la Edad Media latina. Por ello, me parece que es útil y valioso estudiar la metafísica Árabe, modelada sobre el texto de Aristóteles, leído, interpretado y comentado de manera distinta por los autores árabes. Junto con el sistema neoplatónico, permitió edificar los pilares fundamentales sobre los que se estructuré, en general, el pensamiento filosófico en e] Islam3. La obra de Aristóteles fue traducida en la primera mitad del siglo ix por Ustál o Eustacio, de manera que pudo ser utilizada y glosada por al-Kindt en su obra Sobre la FilosoiTa Primera4. Fue leída por los otros filósofos del Is1am, después de que se realizaran nuevas versiones de la misma. Pero no se contentaron con leer sólo la obra de Aristóteles, sino que buscaron primeroy tradujeron después algunos comentarios griegos, con la esperanza, quizá, de encontrar en ellos ayuda para comprender el texto aristotélico, por el carácter aporético que la obra presenta. En la tradición manuscrita árabe no se conserva de la Metajisica un texto independiente, sino solamente el que acompaña al Tafstr o Gran Comentario de Averroes5, en donde se sirve de una sola versión árabe, la de Ustál, salvo para el libro A, para el que usa la versión de Naztf b. Aymán, aunque recurre en algunos pasajes a las otras versiones, señalando que alguna de ellas es mejor que la que le sirve de base. Faltan ahí, sin embargo, los libros K, M y N, además de la primera parte de A, libro éste que figura como II, pues como primero establece el libro a6. Sobre el lugar de la Metafls¡ca en el mundo árabe, cfr. L Madkour: «La métaphysique en terre d'Islamo, Mélanges Instituí d'Études Orientales (MIDEO>, 7 (1962-63) 21-34. 5. Gómez Nogales: «La proyección histórica de la Metaffsica de Aristóteles en el mundo árabe», Pensamiento. 35 (1979) 347-378. R. Ramón Guerrero: «Notasobre la presencia del libro Lambda de la Metaftsica de Aristóteles en el mundo árabe», La Ciudad de Dios, 198 (1985> 117-121. A. Martin: «La Me<tajphysique. Tradition syriaque et arabe», sv. «Aristote de Stagire», Dictionnaire des phflosoNws antiguas, ptlblié sous la direction de R. Goulet, París, Ed. du CNRS., vol. 1, 1989, PP. 528-534 Ed. porM. Abu Rida: Rasáflal-fOndf al-falsafijya, El Cairo, 1950. Trad. castellanaenR. Ramón Guerrero E. Tornero Poveda: Obras filosojicas de al-Kind¡, Madrid, Ed. Coloquio, 1986. Averroes: Tafstr md bad al-labia, ed. M. Bouyges, Eeirut, Imprimerie Catholique, 4 vols., 1938-1952. Hay ediciones parciales de la versión árabe del libro Lambda en A. A. AI-Affli: «An ancient Arabic translationof the book A of the Metaphysics of Aristotle», Bulletin of Ihe FacultyofArtsofthe Univers¡tyofEgpt, 5(1937) 89-138, yenA. BADAWI:Aristz2 -inda ¡-aral,, El Cairo, Ed. al-Nabda, 1947, Pp. 3-11. ~ Cfr. R. Walzer: «On the Arabic versionsof book A,a andA of the Aristotles Metaphysics», en Oree/e mio Arable, Oxford, Bruno Cassirer, 1962, PP. 114-128. P. Thillet: «Remarqueset notes critiques sur les traductions arabes du livre A de la Métaphysique d'Auistote», Actes du Congrt,s de Lyon 1958, París, Les Eches Lettres, 1960, Pp. 114-125. Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al 1/bm lambda de la «MetaJtsica» 277 La noticia más importante sobre la obra en el mundo árabe es la que nos transmite Abú l-Farã ibn al-Nadtm <936-988/998> en su obra Fihrist («Catálogo»)', compuesta hacia el año 988. La información que nos proporciona es copiada, con escasas variantes, por Vamál al-Din ibn al-Qifti (1172-1248> en su Ta'rtj a1-hu~~' («Historia de los sabios»>8. El texto de la narraciónes el siguiente9: Discurso acerca del Libro de las Letras'0. Es conocido por «Las cosas divinas»" El orden de este libro coincide con el orden de las letras griegas. El primero es el "a" pequeña. Lo tradujo Isháq. De él existe hasta la letra M. Tradujo esta letra Abú Zakariyyá' Yahyá b. 'Adt. En griego existe la letra N con el comentario de Alejandro12. Estas letras las tradujo UstM para alKind?, y él tiene una información sobre eso'3. Abñ Bi~r Matta tradujo al árabe el libro Lám (A>, que es la undécima letra, con el comentario de Alejandro14. Hnayn b. Isháq tradujo al siriaco este mismo libro. Temistio comenté el libro Um~. Abú Bi~r Matta lo tradujo con el comentario de Ternistio. Lo ha traducido ~mli. lshñq Ii Hnayn tradujo un cierto número de libras. Siriano comenté el libro "B". Ha aparecido en árabe'6. Lo he visto escritcP del puño y letra de Yahyá b. 'Adi en el catálogo de sus fl<>~» 18 Como se deduce de su simple lectura, este texto está lleno de dificultades, puesto que carece de orden y de claridad, como ya señalara M. Steinschneider en 1893 al analizarlo19. ¿Leyeron los árabes doce o trece libros? ¿Cuántos traductores tuvo la Metajisica? ¿Quiénes tradujeron toda la obra y quiénes sólo parte de ella? ¿Qué comentarios conocieron? ¿Los conocieron completos o incompletos? Estas y otras muchas interrogantes plantean estos textos. Deben ser objeto de una profunda investigación. Aquí sólo quiero de11cm al-Nadim: 1<11db al-flhrist, El Cairo, al-Matba'a al-Rahméniyya, 1348/1929. 8 Ibn aI-Qifti: Ta '4/ al-hukamá', ed. dulius Lippert, Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903. Cfr. E. E. Peters: Aristoteles Arabia. The Oriental Translations aná Commentaries on Ihe aristotelian Corpus, Leiden, 3. Brill, 1968, PP. 49-52. lO Es una de las denominaciones de la Metafisica entre los árabes, por la numeración alfabética de cada uno de los libros quela componen. Ibn al-Qiftl comienza conel título siguiente: 1<11db al-fláhiyyát, «Libro de las cosas divinas», que es otra de las denominaciones usuales, la que traduce el término griego Teologlá. "Ibn al-Qifti comienza: «Es conocido por "Las Letras" y por "Metafísica"». 2 En lbn al-Qifti falta«con el comentario de Alejandro». 3 Quizá la obra Sobre la Filosoita Primera, ala que me he referido antes. " EnIbn al-Qifti falta también «con el comentario de Alejandro». '~ Ibn al-Qifti añade «también». ~ Falta esta frase en fljn aJ-Qifti. Enlbn al-Qiftl: «La descripción de esto la ha puesto en árabe Yahyá b. 'Adi». '« Ibn al-Nadim: Oc., p. 352, 11-19. Ibn al-Qifti: O. c., PP. 41,21-42,6. '~' M. Steinschneider: Die arabtschen Oberseizungen aus dem griechischen, reimp. Orar, Akademische Druck, 1960 § 35:111. Die Metaphysik, p. 66. 278 Rafael Ramón Guerrero jar constancia de estas dificultades, algunas de las cuales han pretendido ser resueltas por A. Badawi en la introducción a su edición de algunos textos de Aristóteles en árabe~ 2. AVERIIOES 'y Lx METAflsIcA DE ARISTÓTELES Personalidad muy controvertida, el cordobés Abó l-WalId ibn Ru~d (1126-1198> fue jurista, médico, filósofo y cadí de Sevilla y de Córdoba21, cargo que en la tradición musulmana implica una estrecha relación entre lo jurídico y lo religioso, lo cual puede chocar con la idea de la autonomía de la investigación filosófica que expone en algunas de sus obras. Esto es quizá lo que explica la diversidad de interpretaciones que de su pensamiento se han dado desde la Edad Media, pues, desde las condenas del obispo Esteban Tempier en 1277, Averroes no gozó de buena prensa en el mundo europeo. Poco a poco se fue formando, en tomo al año 1300, la leyenda de su incredulidad, que paulatinamente se fue extendiendo a toda la filosofía árabe22, y que no ha dejado de estar vigente hasta casi nuestros días. El pensamiento metafísico del cordobés, ah igual que el de sus predecesores al-F~rábi y Avicena, debe mucho a los teólogos islámicos, en concreto al gran pensador persa Abú Hániid al-Gazált, Algazel (1058-1111), en cuya obra el cordobés se encontró con una reflexión metafísica auténtica, poderosa y matizada, que habla sabido dar ah Kalám ortodoxo la forma de una tealogia filosófica, capaz de enfrentarse con la genuina filosofía griegã, y que le sirvió, basándose en argumentos de naturaleza filosófica, para lanzar una dura invectiva contra los filósofos musulmanes orientales, especialmente, contra ah-FárMi y Avicena, Contra este ataque que sufrió la filosofía porparte de Algazel reaccionó Averroes, quien supo leer a Aristóteles en profundidad y alcanzar a veces el sentido exacto de sus ideas; quien supo distinguir elementos platónicos y neoplatónicos atribuidos a Aristóteles en la tradición musulmana; y quien elevó a Aristóteles a la categoría del más grande de todos los filósofos, cuyo pensamiento estrictamente racional debía ser restitul- ~" A. Badawi: O. c., introducción, PP. <12) - (15). Cfr. también A. I3adawi La transnusszon de la phñosophie grecque au monde arabe, París, J. Vrin, 1968, pp. 82-83. 21 Cfr. Cruz Hernández: AbU-l-WaEd il,n Rjdd (Averroes). Vida, ol,ra, pensamiento, influencia, Córdoba, Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Córdoba, 1986. Cfr. J. Puig: «El pensamiento de Averroes en su contexto personal y social», Miscelánea de Estudios Aral,esyHebraicos, 38(1989-1991) 303-324. ~ dr. E. Renan: Averro4s et l'averroysme. Essai historique, París, Michel Uvy, LibrairesÉditeurs, 1852, deuxiéme édition revue et augmenté, 1861, p. 278. 23 CIr. R. Amaldez: «La pensée religleuse d'Averroés. 1. La doctrine de la création dans le Taháfut», en Studia Islamita, 7 (1957> p. 99. Reimpresiónen Aspects de la pensde musulmane, París, 1. Vrin, 1987, p. 251. Averroes: el «Proemlo» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «MetaffMca» 279 do en toda su pureza. Esto provocó el fin de la filosofía en el Islam. La posición de Averroes como término de una tradición de pensamiento es significativa por dos razones. Primero, porque su meditación se desarrolló dentro de lo que sus predecesores en esa tradición hablan realizado. Segundo, porque su influencia se ejerció sobre una tradición ajena a su cultura. Pero no es el momento aquí de ocuparse de lo que Averroes representó dentro de ambas tradiciones. Para la Edad Media latina, Averroes fue el «Comentador» de Aristóteles por antonomasia. Y, aunque hoy podemos decir que esta denominación no hace justicia al verdadero Ibn Ru~d, sin embargo es indudable que su papel esencial en la historia de la filosofía ha sido el de intérprete del pensamiento aristotélico. ¿Conoceríamos hoy a Averroes de no haber sido por sus comentarios? En el mundo árabe fue de inmediato olvidado. Y el mundo occidental latino se sirvió fundamentalmente de él en tanto que comentador, pues, aparte de unas pocas obras especialmente médicas, ¿qué otros textos de Averroes fueron usados por medievales y renacentistas? De la relación de Averroes con Aristóteleses de donde hay que partir para comprender el verdadero sentido del pensamiento original del filósofo cordobés, puesto que el significado de sus otras obras está estrechamente vinculado a esta cuestión. Incluso podría decirse que el mismo Averroes fue consciente de la importancia que tenía el ocuparse de Aristóteles, cuando en diversos pasajes parece mostrarse convencido de la superioridad del pensamiento del filósofo griego sobre el de todos los demás, hastael punto de sentir por él una admiración casi supersticiosa, como dijera E. RenanS. ~ fascinación, de la que Averroesda muestras en muchos textos, tuvo como resultado un hecho cierto e indudable: haber dedicado un esfuerzo extraordinarioa la comprensión del pensamiento aristotélico. Y este esfuerzose ha expresado en los, ah menos en cinco casos~, tres tipos de comentarios, o lecturas como prefiere llamarlos M. Cruz Hemández~. Se trata de los flawámz, los compendios o resúmenes; los tal4fis, las exposiciones o paráfrasis; y, en fin, los verdaderos comentarios o taNrát. No todos ellos se conservan en su original árabe, sino sólo algunos; otros en versión hebrea y otros en su traducción latina27. O. c., p. 4. ~ Los tres tipos de comentarios tuvieron como objeto los siguientes libros de Azistñteles: Analíticos Posteriores, Física, Sol,re el cielo, Sol,re el alma yMetafisica. ~ M. Cruz Hernández: «El sentido de las tres lecturas de Aristóteles por Averroes», en Rendiconfl della AccademiaNaá,nale dei Lincel, 28(1974) 567-585. 27 Cfr. H. Gaje: «Averroes a]s Aristoteleskonnnentator», Zeitschnfi dar Deutschen Morgenland&hen Gesellschaft, 114<1964) 59-65. Th-A. Druart: «Averroes: me Conunentatorandthe Conunentators», Aristotle br late Antiquity, cd. hy L. 1'. Schrenk, Washington, The Catiholic UniversityPress, 1994, Pp. 184-202. M. Cruz Hernández: «Los limites del aristotelismo de lbn RuAd», en MultipleAvenvés, Actes du Cofloque International oi-ganisé á 1'occasion du 850' anniversaire de la naissance d'Averroés, París, septembre 1976, éd. préparée par 3. Jolivet, París, 280 Rafael Ramón Guerrero La Metafisica fue una de las pocas obras del filósofo griego «leída» por tres veces por Averroes y de la que se conservan las tres lecturas, aunque nos falte el original árabe del tãfis. Es decir, primero Averroes la expuso en un Compendio (compuesto hacia el año 1l59)~. dividido en cuatro secciones, que no reflejan las divisiones tradicionales de la obra de Aristóteles29. Después, reahizó una Exposición (en 1 l74)~. Y, finalmente, compuso el Gran comentario o Tafsir (hacia el año 11 9O)~'. En el Compendio raramente cita el texto de la obra de Aristóteles, pues su estructura es independendiente, al tratar sistemáticamente algunos problemas metafísicos desde un punto de vista Les Belles Lettres, 1978, Pp. 129-155. 5. Gómez Nogales: «Bibliografía sobre las obras de Averroes», en Multiple Averrõs, pp. 351-387. Cfr. también A. Badawi: «Averrõs facesu tQxte qu'hl conimente», Multiple Averroés, PP. 59-90; Ch. Butterworth: «La valeur philosophique des cominentaires dAverroés sur Aristote», MultipleAverroés, PP. 117-126. A. Martínez Lorca: «Ibn Rugd como historiador de la filosofía» Bulletin of tite Faculty ofArts, 54(1992)101-120. ~ Ediciones y traducciones: 1) JKitdb mci bad al-tabla, ed. Mustafá AI-Kabbani, El Cairo, ca. 1903. Basada en esta edición es la traducción alemanade Max Horten: Die Met.~~hysik des Averroes (+1198), Halle an der Saale, Max Niemeyer, 1912; reprint, Frankfurt axn Main, Minerva, 1966. 2) Averroes: Compendio de Metafisica, texto árabe con traduccióny notas de Carlos Quirós Rodríguez, Madrid, Imprenta de Estanislao Maestre, 1919. La segunda versión alemana está basada en el texto de El Cairo y en la edición de Quirós; es la traducción de Simon van den Bergh: Die Epitome der Metapitysik des Averroes, úbersetzt und mit einer Einkitung und Erláuterungen versehen, Leiden, J. Brill, 1924; reprint, 1970. 3) Rasá 11 b. Ru&d, Haydarabad, 1947. 4) Tãts <sic) mci bad al-tabla, ed. UjmAn Amin, El Cairo, 1958. Sobre las fechas de composición de las obras de Averroes, cfr. M. Alonso: Teología de Averroes. (Estudios y documentos), Madrid-Granada, C.S.IXL, 1947, cap. ~v,PP. 51-98. 2¶j Cfr. Th. -A. Druart: «Averroes: The Commentator and the Conimentators», Añstotle in Late Antiq-uity, edited by Lawrence P. Schrenk, Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1994. PP. 184-202. «> De este taUis no se conserva el origina] árabe. La versión hebrea fue señalada por 5. Munk: Mélanges de pitilosopitiejuive el arabe. París, A. Franck Librairie, 1859, p. 435; noticia recogida por E. Renan en la segunda edición de su Averrots et 1 averrolsme, p. 63. La existencia de varios manuscritos de estaversión hebrea, debida al parecer a Calonymos Ii Calonymos, está atestiguada porel editor del Gran Comentario, M. Bouyges: Notice, en Averroes: Tafsfr md bid al-tablat, tome y, 1, Beirut, Dar el-Machreq, 1952. PP. XCVII-XCVIII. Ha sido editada parcialmente en Averroes: Pera/dmtni-tokh ha-Be ur ita-emtsa i (.. -) [Chapíen fi-orn tite «Middle Commentary» ofAM al-Walld lbn Rushd on tite Physics ami Metapitysics ofAristotlr¿ in tite traslation ofKalonymos ben Kalony,nosj, Jerusalem, l-lebrew University Faculty of Humajilties-Departrnent ofJewish Philosophy and Kabbalah, 1975Existe versión latina de los siete primeros libros, interrumpida por la muerte del traductor, editada en Artstotelts. - Metaphysicoram Líberprimas fcaps. ¡-4) ramAverrois Cordubensis expositione media... Ubrí, a cap. 5 librí phmi cd medium Ubrum septimum, Venetiis, apud Cominuin de Indino, 1560. Aunque es presentada como traducida del árabe por el cretense Elia del Medigo [sobre este personaje, cfr. J. Puig: «Continuidad medieval en el Renacimiento: el caso de Elia del Medigo», La Ciudad de Dios, 206<1993) 47-64], sin embargo está realizada sobre la versión hebrea antes mencionada, cir. M. l3ouyges: Notice, pp. LXXXI-LXXXII. Cfr. 5. Gómez Nogales: «Bibliografía», p. 368. Cfr. M. Cruz Hernández: Abú-l-Walld, p. 394. :31 Edición de M. Bouyges citada. Sobre las distintas ediciones de las obras de Averroes, el artículo más reciente es el de Philipp W. Rosemann: «Averroes: A catalogue of editions and scholarlywritings from 1821 onwards», Bu//clin de Vitilosopitie Mddiévale, 30 (1988) 153-221 Averroes: el «Pfl,enzio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metafisica» 281 aristotélico. En la Exposición sigue de cerca el texto aristotélico, pero sin citarlo in extenso, siendo por ello difícil descubrir qué versión tenía delante. Y en el Tafs$r copia el texto completo de la traducción árabede Metafisica, por lo que es de sumo interés para el establecimiento crítico del texto aristotélico; lo divide en trescientos treinta y tres «textos» con sus correspondientes comentarios, en los <pie analiza el contenido, realiza sus propias observaciones y lleva a cabo comparaciones con otros comentaristas, dando muestras de conocer una rica documentación. Al explicar la obra aristotélica en sus tres variantes, Averroes no pretendía en modo alguno mostrar su oposición a Aristóteles, como había hecho Avicena, sino que su intención era simplemente clarificar y explicitar en sus consecuencias una filosofíaformulada a veces de modo muy oscuro. Pero, ah hacerlo así, expuso tesis de origen no aristotélico, como ha mostrado 3. Jolivet32. Esto es lo que sucede, por ejemplo, respecto al objeto de la metafísica. Como aristotélico, Averroes no parece apartarse, en sus comentarios, de la usual clasificación de las ciencias formulada o implicada en los textos que tiene delante, ni en sus comentarios ni en sus obras originales. Aceptando la triple división de las ciencias especulativas en física, matemática y metafísica33, Averroes no busca una nueva definición de la metafísica, ni siquiera llega a proponer un nuevo objeto de ella. Acepta la definición aristotélica: es el estudio del ser en tanto que ser. Pero lo que sí va a hacer es plantearel problema de descubrir el significado de estas palabras de Aristóteles, porque tarea de la metafísica es también ocuparse de las palabras. En efecto, esta ciencia vena sobre el estudio de ciertas palabras, como dice al comienzo de su comentario al libro A de la Mctafisica, donde leemos lo siguiente: Su objetivo en este libro (A> es distinguir los significados de las palabras según los sentidos que sehan de considerar en esta ciencia. Son ellos los que en esta ciencia ocupan el lugar que entre las artes tiene el objeto de este arte. Estas palabras son aquellas que se dicen de modos diferentes por relación a una sola cosã'. El análisis de los términos forma parte de la metafísica, en donde tienen un sentido analógico. En las otras ciencias, las palabras -unívocas- son los ~ Cfr. J. Jolivet: «Divergences entrela Métaphysique d'libn RuAd et d'Aristote», Arabica, 29 (1982) pp. 225-226. ~ Averroes: Compendio Met., pp. 6-7; trad. PP. 5-6. ~ Averroes: Tafstr Metajisica, V,com. 1, p. 475, 2-5. Texto latino en el tomo VIII de la edición de 1562: Aristotelis Metaphysicorum librÉ Xliii cumAverrois Cordubensis br eosdem Commeniariis, Venetiis apud Iunctas, 1562, fol. lOOv 1: «Intendit iii hoc tractatu distinguere signiflcationes nominum secundmn intentiones consyderandas in hac scientia. Et onmia ista nomina dicuntur secundumn relationem ad unuin quid modis diversis». 282 Rafael Ramón Guerrero signos inmediatos de los objetos de experiencia o de nociones generales; en cambio, en metafísica son signos, pero su significado no puede ser reemplazado por ningún otro, ni siquiera por el Uno absoluto, que es un simple postulado indeterminado por relación a la multiplicidad de los seres concretos. Por ello, la metafísica debe referirse a la diversidad fundamental de los seres según las diez categorías, en las que el ser se da siempre. El examen del ser lleva a Averroes, como antes a Aristóteles, a comprenderio como substancia (oi'aLa, ¿Qawhar). Pero Averroes entiende que este ser del que se ocupa la metafísica es la realidad que existe con independencia de lamente, porlo cual la metafísica ha de interesarse por la substancia, porque es la única categoría que existe independientemente de las demás, y por sus principios y causas: Alejandro dice: Como su objetivo en esta disciplina es tratar del ser en tanto que ser y de sus principios y causas, puesto que ya ha puesto en claro que la sabiduría y la filosofía primera sólo investigan estos dos <objetos> y ha mostrado en el libro precedente que la substanciaes el ser verdaderamente real y la causa de lo demás, comienza este libro buscando los principios del ser que es la substancia. Yo digo: sus palabras «la investigación versa sobre la substancia, pues lo que se busca son las causas y los principios de la substancia» quieren decir que la investigación en este libro versa sobre la substancia, es decir, sobre sus principios. Es probable que quiera decir que en esta ciencia la investigaciónprincipalmente versa sobre la substanciay sus principiostm. Ésta es otra razón por la que también la investigación debe tratar sobre la substancia, excluyendo las otras categorías, pues, si la substancia se pone aparte de las otras cosas, ninguna de ellas existe en absoluto; ellas sólo existen para la substancia. Ejemplo de esto es que ni de la cualidad ni de los movimientos se dice que existen absolutamente, pues de ellos sólo se dice que existen como cualidades y que existen como movimientos, no que existan absolutamente. A saber, el movimiento es movimiento de algo y la cualidad es cualidad de algo, pero la substancia no es substancia de algo. El ser propia y absolutamente es la substancia; las otras categorías existen por relacióntm. La Metafísica estudia la substancia como primera realidad entre los seres y, entonces, ha de establecer que la causa de la substancia móvil es la substancia inmóvil, el Primer Motor, cuya existencia ya ha demostrado el físico («pues la física muestra la existencia de la substancia eterna, y esto al final del <libro> octavo de la Ftsica»ff , con lo que, en definitiva, la metafísica será el '~ TafstrMet., XII, mm. 1, p. 1406. ~«]bidem, PP. 1414-1415. ~' ¡bidem, p. 1422. Avermes: el «hvemlo» de su Comentafo al libro lambda de la «Metaffsica» 283 estudio de Dios en tanto que substancia eterna. Nos encontramos así conuna nueva visión onto-teo-lógica de la metafísica en el mundo árabe. Pero a ella se ha llegado por un camino completamente opuesto al de Avicena: éste alcanzaba de manera apriórica la idea de Dios como el ser Necesario que hindanienta todo ser. Averroes, al contrario, llega a partir de la vía empírica aristotélica, afirmando la prioridad gnoseológica de la substancia sensible, desde la que hay que elevarse hasta sus principios y causas. De aquí que, tanibién al contrario que en Avicena, la F~ica es ciencia preliminar y necesaria para la Metafísica; ésta, a suvez, completa el conocimiento que en aquélla se había iniciado. 3. EL PRÓLoGo DE AvEifiloEs AL LIBRO A DE LAMetafisica El libro A de la Metafl'sica ha sido considerado desde siempre como la cima del pensamiento metafísico de Aristóte1es~. Desde antiguo se le ha visto como el libro teológico por excelencia, aquel en el que Aristóteles resuelve el problema de Dios en su filosoifa. Porque, en efecto, en este libro Aristóteles plantea la cuestión de Dios como substancia inmóvil, de cómo esta substanda inmóvil es Primer Motor de un movimiento celeste eterno y cuál es la naturaleza de esta substancia. Sobre el contenido teológico de este libro, conviene recordar el texto de al-FárAbi en su pequeño escrito titulado Maqála fi agrád al-ha/dm fi ladi maqála mm al-kitáb al-mawsi2m bi-i-hurt2f <«Sobre los objetivos del Filósofo en cada uno de los tratados del libro que es conocidó por <Libro de> las Letras»)~, donde nos dice lo siguiente: Nuestra intención en esta obra es indicar el objetivo <garad) que enciena el libro de Aristóteles conocido por Metafisica, y las partes principales que contiene, puesto que muchos hombres han prejuzgado que el contenido y el tenor de este libro es tratar del Creador Altísimo, del intelecto, del alma y de las restantes cosas referentes a ellos, y que la metafísica y la ciencia del Tawhid~ son una y la misma. Por eso encontramos que la mayoría de los que la estudian se confunden y se equivocan, puesto que vemos que la mayor parte del discurso que hay en ese libro carece de ese objetivo; al contra38 Cfr. W.-D. Ross: Arist4teles, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1957, p. 256. ~ Edición en F. Dieterici:A¿farabVsphilosophischenAbhandlungen, Leiden, J. ful, 1890, PP. 34-38. Traducción alemana F. Dieterici: Ãfarabi ~sphilosophischen Abhandlungen aus den arabtschen lDbersetz, Leiden, J. Brin, 1892, Pp. 54-60. Traducción espaí¶ola en R. Ramón Guerrero: tAI-Fárábíy la "Metafísica" de Aristóteles», La Ciudad de Dios, 196(1983>211-240, trad. en PP. 236-240. Trad. francesa Th.-A. Druajt iLe traitá d'al-Farabi Sur lesbuts de la 'Mdtaphysique' d'Aristote», en Bulletin de Philosõhie Mddi4vale, 24(1982> 38-43. En la tradiciónde las ciencias religiosas islámicas, ésta es la ciencia que estudia la «urnadad, de Dios. 284 Rafael Ramón Guerrero rio, sólo encontramos en él un discursoconcerniente a este objetivo en el tratado undécimo, aquelsobre el que está el signo «L~A'. Recientemente, Rémi Brague ha evocado brevemente cómo la mayoría de los lectores antiguos y medievales del libro A se han interesado por cuestiones relativas a Dios, aunque no todos ellos se hayan centrado en la concepción aristotélica de Dios como «pensamiento del pensamiento»42. No es de extrañar, pues, la importancia que Averroes concede a este libro de la Metajisica, no sólo por la familiaridad con que lo ha tratado la historia textual y hermenéutica anterior, sino también por su mismo contenido, porque en él encuentra Averroes argumentos y ocasiones para solucionar desde su propia perspectiva, pero apoyándose en Aristóteles, algunos de los problemas a los que se ha enfrentado a lo largo de su trayectoria filosófica: el de la demostración de la existencia de Dios, el de su causalidad eficiente, o el de la creación o eternidad del mundo, una de las cuestiones que más le han ocupado en su crítica a Mgazel43. Este interés es quizá el que explica el Proemio o Prólogo que Averroes antepuso a su comentario al libro A. Como nos muestra, de modo muy resumido, la comprensión que él mismo alcanzó de la Metafisica, este Proemio se convierte en una especie de introduccióngeneral a toda la obra y le sirve, además, para expresar la relación que el libro A mantiene con los otros libros de la obra aristotélica. El texto del Tafs$r a la Metafisica fue traducido al latín, probablemente en el decenio de 1230 a 1240, por Miguel Escoto'1«. Pero, sorprendentemente, el Proemio no se encuentra en esta versión, cuya editio princeps se realizó en Padua en 1473. Cuando el Proemio apareció traducido -a partir del hebreo- e impreso independientemente del comentario a comienzos del siglo x\#, fue considerado como obra de sus traductores: el antes citado Elias del Medigo (+1493), que pudo haberlo traducido dos veces, una para Pico della Mirandola y otra para el Cardenal Grirnani; Pablo de Ricci o Israelita " Edición árabe citada, p. 34; trad. esp. cit., p. 237. 42 R. Brague: «Le destin de la "Pensée de la Pensée" desorigines au débutdu Moyen Age», La question de Dieu selon Aristote et Hegel, publié sous la direction de Th. De Koninck et O. Planty-Bonjour, París, PIJE, 1991, PP. 153-tSe. ~ Sobre esta última polémica, cfr. M. Allard: «Le rationalisme d'Averroés d'aprés une étude sur la création», Bulletin d'Études Orientales, 14 (1952-1954) 7-59. ~ Cfr. M. Cruz Hernández: «La primera recepción del pensamiento de Ibn Ru~d (Averoes>», Azalea, 1 (1985) 11-32; '«El problema cronológico de las primeras citas de Averroes por los escolásticos latinos», Homenaje al J1⁄2fDa,t Cabanelas Rodríguez, 0KM., con matizo de su LXX aniversario, Granada, Universidad de Granada Departamento de Estudios Semíticos, 1987, vol. 1, Pp. 253-270. ~ Averois in duodecimum metaphisice prohemium, Mediolaro, apud Leonardmn Vegium, 1511. Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metafisica» 285 <+1541); y Jacobo Mantino <+1549>~. Sin embargo, hoy no parecen existir dudas sobre la autenticidad del texto, considerándose como escrito origina] de Averroes47.El origen de este Proemio puede estar en el comentario de Alejandro de Afrodisia al libro A de MetaJtsica, como parece deducirse de una atenta lectura del texto, sobre todo por la designación por medio de letras que se hace de los libros de la Metafisica por no corresponder la enumeración que aquí se hace con la que establece Averroes en otros pasajes y en su mismo comentario'~W No obstante, Averroes sólo pone en boca de Alejandro un parágrafo al comienzo y luego él mismo hace observaciones personales49. El Proemio, que ocupa las páginas 1393-1405 de la edición árabe de Bouyges, nos informa de las intenciones de Averroes: porsu gran amor a la metafísica y por su deseo de conocerla y enseñarla, ha decidido exponer de manera resumida las doctrinas de Aristóteles para facilitar su estudio a quienes no se dedican por entero a los libros de Aristóteles y para que sirva de vademecum a quienes ya están familiarizados con ellos5Q En el preámbulo anuncia la existencia de un comentario de Alejandro, que únicamente ocupa unos dos tercios del libro, y de otro completo de Ternistio. Siguiendo la doctrina aristotélica de que la verdad sólo se consigue tras el esfuerzo conjunto de los hombres a lo largo de los tiempos51, Averroes reconoce el amplio uso que hace de estos dos comentarios, copiando -afor- ~ Cfr. Al Bouyges: No&e, pp. LXXVlly LXXIX. A4. I3ouyges: «La Mclaphysique <fAristote chez les Latins du XIIP si&le: connurent-ils le Prooemium d'Averroés (-4-1198) á son commnentaire du Livee Lasn-Larnbda?., Revuedu Moyen Age LatÍn, 4 (1948) 279-281 Las versiones de los dos últimos traductores aparecen editadas por vez prineñ en la edición de los comentarios de Averroes de Venecia en 1550-1552; luego, se vuelven a publicar en la edición de 1572-76, vol. VIII, fols. 286-290. Cfr. F. E. Crai~z: «Editions of the Latin Aristotie accompanied by the Commentazies of Averroes», en Pkilosophy ami Hwnanism. Renalssance Essays in Honor ofPaul OskarKristeller, ed. by E. Mahoney, Leiden,J. EdIl, 1976, Pp. 116-128. ~ Cfr. M. Bouyges: Notice, pp. CXI-CXII. 48 ibÍdem, pp. CLIII-CLIV: en el Comentario de Alejandro las letras que designan los libros habrían sido leídas como numerales griegos, confundiendo las letras. Cír. también Tafsir, vol. III, p. [691n. 1. ~" Sobre la Mación de este Proemio con Alejandro, cfr. Ja introducción de Charles Genequand a su versión inglesa: Ibn Rushd s Metãhysics. A Transiation with Introduction of Dm Rushd's Comnientary oir Aristoties Metaphysics, Book LArn, Leiden, J. Brilí, 1984, PP. 7-9. (Mr. también la versión francesa de Aubert Martin: Averroes: Graná Commentaire de la «Mdtaphysique» d'Aristote (Tafs$r md bad at-tabtat> Livre Lam-Lambda, traduit st annotá, París, Les Belles Lettres, 1984, p. 25, nota 2. y cfr. la resefia de D. Gutas a la versión inglesa en Der Islam, 64, 1 <1987> 122-126. ~ Ed. dL, p. 1405:9; ed. latina, fol. 290 B-C en la versión de Pablo Israelita, y fol. 290 F en la de Jacobo Mantino. ~' Ya al-Kindi había glosado en su obra Sobre la FilosoJifa Primera el pasaje aristotélico de Metafisica, II, 1, 993b 11-19, hablando de la empresa colectiva que supone conseguir la verdad. (ir. el texto de al-Kindi en R. Ramón E. Tornero: Obras filosóficas de al-HináL pp. 47-48. 286 Rafael Ramón Guerrero tunadamente- sus textos, discutiendo con sus autores y aceptando, corngiendo o rechazando sus ideas y exposiciones. Evoca la afirmación de Alejandro de que el libro A es la conclusión de la disciplina metafísica, el remate final de los demás libros de laobra aristotAlica. En éstos, Aristóteles sólo plantea o resuelve dificultades, mientras que en el libro A se ocupa de los principios del ser en tanto que ser y de los principios de la substancia primera. Averroes nos indica así que para él, para Alejandro y, quizá también, para Aristóteles, la metafísica tiene como último objetivo (al-gaya al-maqsUda) la substancia primera. Además, parece estar sosteniendo que no hay esfera del ser ni del discurso que pueda darse como separada del resto del set2. Y, al resumir los libros de la Metaffsica, comenzando, según la tradición árabe, por el libro A, da la impresión de que para él -quizá también para Alejandro- toda laobra está presididapor una unidad de contenido, que se manifiesta plenamente en el libro A. Por eso, por el interés que este texto tiene para comprender cómo vio Averroes la Metajtsica de Aristóteles, me ha parecido oportuno ofrecer aquí su versión castellana, que realizo sobre el texto árabe editado por M. Bouyges, cuya pagmación reproduzco entre corchetes. THAnucclóN [1393] Ubrõ designado por la letra Lám, de los libros de MetaffiicaM. Digo: No se encuentra ningún comentariõ ni exposicióñ sobre los libros de esta ciencia57, ni de Alejandroni de los comentadores posteriores, salvo sobre este libro <Lám>. Hemos encontrado, en efecto, un comentario de Alejandro sobre unos dos tercios del libro y una exposición completa, según 52 Cfr. A. Ivry: «Averroes and the West: The Eirst Encounter/Nonencounter», A Stringht Path. Studies in Medieval Philosophy ami Culture, Essays in honor of Arthur Hyman, Washington, TheCatholic lJniversity Press, 198'), p. 155. ~ Traduzco por «libro» el término árabe maqála, que propiamente significa «tratado». En cambio, traduzco el término kitdb, que es el que de suyo significa «libro», por «tratado». ~ La denominación aquí empleada para designar el título del libro es Má luid al-tabla («lo que está después de la Física»>. Sobre los distintos nombres usados en árabe para el término «metafísica», cfr. M. Bouyges: Notre, pp. CXXIV-CXXVII. 5. Gómez Nogales: "La proyección histórica de la Metafisica de Aristóteles, especialmente en el mundo árabe», Pensamiento, 35 (1979> Pp. 356-358. ~ Términoárabe: tafsfr. ~«Término árabe: t¿411s. ~' A saber, la metafísica. Siempre que Averroes dice «esta ciencia» o «esta disciplina», se refiere ala metafísica. Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de lo «MetaJtsica» 287 el sentidõ, de Temistio59. Me ha parecido que lo mejor es exponer resumidaniente lo que dice Alejandro, parágrafo por parágrafo, con la mayor claridad y concisión que nos sea posible. [1394] Y hemos ofrecido las cosas que sobre ello Temistio ha añadido y puesto en duda, y de este modo mencionaremos también lo que nosotros hemos añadido y puesto en duda. Decimos: Alejandro comienza declarando que la afirmación de quienes sostieneñ que este libro, el libro L~m, es el último de esta disciplina es una afirmación correcta; pues, en efecto, de los demás libros que escribió sobre esta ciencia, unos contienen los problemas que deben ser resueltos en esta ciencia después de haber sido planteados; en otros se resuelven estos problemas -es lo que hace en los libros que siguen a éste-, y en otros trata de las cosas que pertenecen al ser en tanto que set1. En este libro <Lárn> trata de los principios del ser en tanto que ser y de los principios de la substancia primera, que es el límite de la realidad: explica que existe una cierta substancia de esta clase y qué es esta substancia; exponer esta substancia es el objetivo final de esta disciplina. En efecto, en los dos libros que siguen a éste62, <Aristóteles> no explica nada sobre [1395] el objetivo primero <de la metafísica), ni confirma en ellos nada perteneciente a su propia opinión sobre esto; sólo contienen la réplica a las afirmaciones de quienes sostienen que los principios de los seres son las ideas y los números. <Alejandro> dice: de estas cosas~ ya ~« La expresión usada aquí, alá 1-ma tul, quiere decir que Temistio sigue en su exposición el sentido de Aristóteles, por oposición a otra expresión, alá l-lafz, que significa «literalmente», «al pie de la letra», que es el tipo de comentario queAverroes hará, según confiesa en el párrafo final de este proemio, p. 1405:14. Cfr. M. Bouyges, ed. del Tafifr vol. III, índex Alphab4tiques, p. 296, s. y. ,n«índ. ~ Sobre el Tc4jis de Temistio, cfr. M Bouyges: Notre, pp. CXXXII-CXXXIII. A. Badawt en su Arista bid al-arab, edita en laspáginas 12-21 un fragmento de un comentario (=arh)de Temistio al libro A, que comienza en el capítulo sexto de la obra aristotélica, y, en las páginas 329-333, el comentario al capituloprimero y la mitad del segundo. Cfr. A. Badawi: «Averroés face au texte qu'il commente» p. 68. AI-Fárábi, en su citada Maqálafi agrád, pone de manifiesto lo mismo: «Entre los antiguos no se encuentra ningún comentario a este libro de suyo propio, tal comolos hay para los otros libros; solamente el libro A tiene uno incompleto de Alejandro y otro completo de Temistio», ed. cit., p. 34; trad. esp. cit., p. 237. ~" El lenguaje de Averroes es de un estilo muy árido. M. Bouyges pone como ejemplode su extrema sequedad y pobreza de lenguaje esta frase, en la que en una sola línea encontramos por cuatro veces palabras pertenecientes a la raíz q-w-l: naqúlu, qála, qawl, qálá (decimos, dijo, dicho, dijeron), cfr. Notre, p. XVIII, n. 1. ~' Para designar el ser, Averroes suele utilizar dos términos casi sinónimos: mawflled y hawiyya, dr. trad. franc. A. Martin, p. 27, n. 8. ~ Los libros M (XIII) y N (XIV). Aunque estos libros no fueron comentados por Averroes, quizá por razones de edad, sin embargo alude repetidamente aellos. 63 Traduzco aquí el difícil ténnino nuiná por «cosas», en el sentido general de «asuntos», pues el término griego ~rágma («cosa»), usadopor Aristóteles en variospasajes, fue vertido por los traductores árabes precisamente por inaná y por fa ji; cfr. H. A. Wolfson: The philosophy of theKalám, (Zainbridge (Masa>, Harvard UniversityPress, 1976, p. 115 y notas 11 y 12. Sobre 288 Rafael Ramón Guerrero ha tratado <Aristóteles> en el libro designado por el Alif grande, que es el segundo de los libros de este tratadoM; luego se ocupa exclusivamente de ellas en estos dos últimos libros. <Alejandro> añade: de lo que manifiesta al comienzo de su libro Y¶m~ y en otros pasajes se puede inferir que este libro <Lárn> es el último en el quetrata de esta ciencia. Esto es lo esencialM de las palabras iniciales de Alejandro a este libro. Lo que dice para comprendet7 elcontenido de los restantes libros que tratan sobre esta ciencia es unamera posibiidad~; quizá este pasaje sea el más digno de su exposición. Nosotros decimos: Puesto que esta disciplina estudia el ser en tanto que ser y puesto que esto exige considerar los principios del ser en tanto que ser y las cosas que le siguen necesariamente69 -porque toda disciplina teórica solamente incluye estos dos géneros de conocimiento-, esta disciplina se divide primeramente en dos partes; y, puesto que [1396]los Antiguos han sostenido opiniones falsas sobre los principios de los seres que requieren una rehitación, se sigue que esto es como la tercera parte de esta disciplina. Así, las partes primeras de este tratado70 sontres: una parte sobre el ser en tanto que ser, otra sobre lo que sigue necesariamente al ser en tanto que ser, y otra sobre las falsas opiniones que se han sostenido acerca de los principios del ser. Y puesto que también toda disciplina teórica se divide en dos géneros de investigación: el primero es aquel que incluye el método de investigación de esta disciplina, la exposición de las causas, dónde comienza y dónde termina y cómo se han de usar las definiciones en ella -y esto es lo que se llama lógica propia de esta disciplina-; y el segundo es el conocimiento de lo que esta disciplina contiene; entonces esta ciencia se divide también primeramente en dos partes: una parte lógica, propia de ella, y una parte que incluye aquel conocimiento que se busca en ella. Hay, por consiguiente, dos grandes partes, una de las cuales se divide en tres; así, las partes de esta ciencia son cuatro. Mas, como esta disciplina también se ocupa dc refutar a aquellosque rechazan la investigación y reniegan de sus principios, ésta será como una la dificultad en traducir este término, cfr. M. Horten: «Was bedeutet mnWná als philosophischer Terminus?S, en ZDMG, 64(1910)391-396. ~' Sobre esteorden de los libros A y a, cfr. la nota 13, p. 29 de la versión de A. Martin. ~ El libro 1' (IV). Quizá se refiera a 1003 a26-27, como anota Genequand, p. 62, n. 6. «« Cfr. la reseñaya citada de Dimitri Gutas a la versión inglesa. Leo según la variante de 13, señalada en nota marginal, tafahhum en lugar de la lectura taflrim del texto. ~ Es decir, es algo ambiguo. Leo la variante de 13, ihtimál, en lugar de la lectura del texto, ipinál. <~ La expresión al-umUral-idhiqa no se encuentra en la versión árabe de Metaffsica. Una expresión muy similar utiliza Ayicena: «El objeto primero de estaciencia es el ser en tanto queser, y lo que se ha de buscar son las cosas que le siguen necesariamente (al-untúr alIad talhaqu-huft, Al-S~fá'. AJ-Iláhíyyát, ed. M. Y. Moussa, S. Punya et 5. Zayed, El Cairo, Organisation Générale des ImprimeriesGouvernamentales, 1960, p. 13:12-13. "' En árabe, al-kitáb, es decir, el conjunto de los libros de la Metajtsica. Averroes: el «Proemio»de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metaffsica» 289 quinta parte. Y, además, en tanto que estudia las clases de los seres y una de estas ciases son los seres [1397]propios del pensamiento, es necesario también que investigue los principios de esta clase de seres y que elimine las falsas opiniones que sobre ellos se han emitido. Y cuando Aristóteles estudia estos géneros, elige el mejor orden para la enseñanza7'En el libro primero, el señalado con la letra Ahí pequeña72, comienza dando a conocer hasta qué punto es difícil y es fácil esta ciencia y haciendo saber que lo que cada individuo comprende de ella, por poco que sea, alcanza un gran valor cuando se reúne <todo ellos'3. Como es un deber del metafísico'4 dar ténnino, por medio de esta ciencia, a la investigación acerca de las causas -puesto que ellas son lo buscado respecto de los seres-, <Aristóteles> expone en este libro, después del comienzo que hemos mencionado, que las causas son limitadas <en número>. Luego lo termina dando a conocerlas más importantes causas del error que están en los asuntos teóricos y, en particular, en las causas <mismas>: son las opiniones falsas que la gente ha inventado y establecido como si fueran ley75 para las cosas teóricas. Como el estudio de las causas requiere que se den a conocer cuántos son sus géneros primeros y lo que han dicho quienes han tratado esto con anterioridad, empieza el libro señalado con la letra Ahí grande76 informando de lo que los Antiguos comprendieron acerca de los géneros [1398]primeros de las causas y explica que son cuatro. Da como argumento de ello el que, si se considera atentamente lo que dijeron sobre las causas, no se va más allá de cuatro causas. Menciona luego sus opiniones acerca de las causas de los seres, en particular entre ellos la de los metafísicos~, no la de los físicos, porque ya habla hecho esto en la Física. Ellos son quienes dijeron que los principios son los <principios> matemáticos y los números; en este libro sólo los rebate has- ~' Averroes muestra aquí su admiración por la manera en que Aristóteles organiza las materias estudiadas en la Metaffiica. Al final de este Proemio insistirá en el excelente orden en que están dispuestos los libros de la Metafisica. ~ El libro II,~. '~ Como he dicho antes, al-Kindi reconoció la exigencia metodológica aristotélica de sernrsedelasaportaciones de los predecesores. Averroes también confiesael deber de conocer al pensanjiento de los antiguos, en actitud que, comoseñala A. Martin, representa un argumento para favorecer el desarrollo de la filosofía en el Islam. ~ Literalmente dice «el que practica estaciencia». A partir de ahora Jo traduciré por «el metafísico>,. '~ El término utilizado aquí es <aifa, el usual para designar la Ley en el Islam, por lo que, incluso, podría ser interpretado aquí como «ley religiosa>. ~ El libro A, es decir, el primero de la Metaffsica, segundo para Averroes. ~ Usa aquí el término al-ilOhiyy&n, que, como ya he señalado, hace referencia a una de las denominaciones que en el mundo árabe se dio a la Metafísica: al-1láht~át. Parece aludir a los pitagóricos, por la referencia que hace a las matemáticasy alos números, cfr. Met., 1, 5, 985 b Ss.; pero también puede englobar bajo esta denominación a los platónicos. 290 Rafael Ramón Guerrero tacierto punto; deja una refutación completa para los dos libros siguientes a Lám, es decir, los libros Mini y Nún78. Puesto que toda investigación científica sólo llega a completarse cuando previamente se han conocido los argumentos dialécticos, los afirmativos y los negativos -porque cuando no se han planteado apodas acerca de algo no se sabe qué valor tiene aquello cuyo conocimiento se ha alcanzado después de ignorarlo, ni qué valor tiene aquello cuyo conocimiento pasa desapercibido antes de conocerlo-, <Aristóteles> piensa que la mejor propedéutica consiste en poner aparte en un solo libro el estudio de los problemas de esta ciencia y su investigación por los argumentos dialécticos que plantean aporías sobre cada uno de sus problemas; y, luego, en los restantes libros de este tratado, ponerse a resolver las apodas que surgen en esta ciencia. Hace esto en el tercer libro de este tratado, el señalado por la letra Bá'79. Necesariamente este [1399] libro sigue a los libros primero y segundo y precede a los demás libros80. Sigue a los dos primeros libros porque, como en ellos, también lo que hay en él lo establece el arte de la dialéctica, es decir, que hay cuatro causas y que cada género de ellas no procede hasta el infinito. Que precede a los siguientes libros es evidente, porque los libros que lesiguen sólo contienen una de estas dos cosas: o la solución de las apodas mencionadas en este libro <tercero>, o el conocimiento de cosas que son necesanas para resolver las apodas mencionadas en este libro. Como las apodas mencionadas en este libro son de dos clases: aporías concernientes a la manera de investigar en esta ciencia y aporías sobre los problemas que en ella hay, lo primero que debe hacer quien emprende la investigación apodíctica en esta ciencia es conocer previamente la solución de estas aporías, porque al conocerlas estará en perfectas condiciones para la investigación apodíctica en esta ciencia, y por este modo de investigar podrá discernir la disciplina llamada Sabiduría81. Opina <Aristóteles> que se debe comenzar en primer lugar por resolver las aporías que hay respecto al método de investigación de esta disciplina. Además, puesto que la investigación sólo es correcta cuando [1400]se reconocen las primeras premisas, cree también que es necesario hablar primeramente de quienes refutan estas premisas y rechazan la investigación. Considera estas dos cosas82 en un solo libroylo pone a continuación del libro Bá', el señalado por la letra Yiiñ. Este libro 78 Ubros cuyo comentario no realizó Averroes, aunque sí tuvo conocimiento de ellos, directo o indirecto, por las diversas referencias que a ellos hace. Cir. Bouyges: Notice, p. CXIII. '~ El libro III, 13. ~'> Insiste asíen el perfecto orden que Aristóteles estableció entrelos libros de la Metajisica. SI El término hikma fue usadopor los traductores para verter el término ao4ta. Los filósofos árabes lo usaron comosin&iinio de «filosofía». Las dos versiones latinas lo traducenpor sufientia, fol. 288 r E. ~ Vuelvo a traducir el término maná por «cosas». ~ El libro IV, 1'. Az,wnves: el «Proemio»de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Aletafisica» 291 contiene dos géneros <de asuntos>: uno es la lógica propia de esta ciencia, y el otro es el establecimiento del primer principio entre aquellos que tenemos por naturaleza, es decir, el anterior a todos ellos: la enunciación de que la afirmación y la negación no se dan conjuntamente y a la vez54, porque éste esel principio de la investigación, y por eso todo aquel que rechace este principio no podrá argumentar correctamente ni enunciar lo afirmativo ni lo negativo. Una vez que ha terminado este asunto en este libro, piensa que debe seguir a este libro la exposición pormenorizada de los significados que tienen los términos usados en esta ciencia. Cree que la mejor propedéutica estratarlos por separado en un solo libro; esto es lo que hace en el libro Dál85, que colocó tras el libro Mm y que antecede a los otros libros, porque quien se propone demostrar cualquier problema comienza explicando el nombre que se aplica a ese problema, si expresa múltiples significados, y especialmente el que se dice por analogía. Tales son los problemas propios de esta ciencia, [1401] puesto que el nombre del ser sólo se predica por analogía, según lo que expone en esta ciencia. Cuando hubo completado su objetivo en este libro, tenía que examinar las cosas buscadasM en esta ciencia, a saber, el conocimiento de las causas de los seres87. Las clases de los seres son tres: el ser que es por accidente, el que está en el alma y el que está fuera del alma. Piensa que es necesario comenzar primero por dar a conocer las clases de estos seres y que aquel al que se tiende en primer lugar con esta indagación es, entre las clases de los seres, el que está fuera del almã. Examina esta noción en el libro que sigue a DM, Y, ~ Es el principio de no-contradicción, aquel que Aristóteles califica comoel más seguro de todos los principios porque no es posible engaflarse sobre él: «Es imposible que un mismo atribulo pertenezca y no pertenezca en un mismo tiempo a la misma cosa», o, con otraformulación, «es imposible que una cosa sea y no sea ala vez», cfr. Mee., IV, 3. ~ El libro V, A. ~ En árabe, al-a<yá al-matlúba. Avicena en su Metafisixa distingue entre el objeto (mawdu) de una ciencia y lo buscado (matlñb) en esa ciencia, cfr. 'ni articulo 'El objeto de la metafísica según Avicena», en prensa. ~' El término que usaaquí es huzviyyát. En esta frase, Martin suprime en su traducción, PP. 36-37, el término «causas». Sin embargo, parece que ha de mantenerse, puesto que el texto anstotélico del libro VI comienza de la siguiente manera: «Buscamos los principios y las causas de los seres», 1025 b 3. Las dos versiones latinas lo conservan: «de causis entiwn perquirere» y «quae suní causae entium». ~ Por la complejidad del texto árabe, no estoy seguro de haber atinado en la versión exacta de esta frase. Genequand traduce así, p. 63: «and to state that Ihe kind of being which is the primaz-y ami of bis investigaban is thaI wbich is outside Ihe soul». Martin lo hace de la siguiente manera, p. 37: «Et c'est á quoi tendent d'abord par celle rechercheceux qul expliquent les <differents> espéces d'étres qui sant exterieurs ~ láme». Las traducciones latinas de este pasaje se hallan en el folio 288v E, folio en el queprecisamente el nombre del traductor que encabeza las columnas está invertido; Paulo Israelita traduce: «el quod ex entium generibuspotioii intendone perquiritur esse ipsum, cui extra aninuun inventio est». Y Jacobo Mantino lo hace así: «el patefacere quod opus erat primo investigare de ea, quod esíextra aniinanm». 292 Rafael Ramón Guerrero puesto que su investigación en este libro trata de discernir del ser verdaderamente real el ser que es por accidente y el que está en el alma -y esto no puede hacerla sino quien sabe que esta disciplina es la que investiga todas las clases de los seres en tanto que ~es-, menciona al comienzo de este libro lo que ya ha explicado en el libro YlIll, no para repetirlo sino para recordarlo: a saber, que esta disciplina es la que investiga el ser en tanto que ser y que es distinta de la Física y de las Matemáticas. Da a conocer esto por medios distintos de los anteriores. Hace todo esto en el libro que sigue a DaI, [1402] en el que explica los términos; se trata del libro Ha'89, situado tras el libro DaI. También era necesario que antepusiera este libro a los que le siguen y que fuera a continuación de los que le precedenoo. Y, puesto que es claro para él que el ser por accidente y el ser mental91 son imperfectos y que el ser que esta ciencia pretende investigar es el ser real que existe fuera del alma, comienza a investigar después este ser. Puesto que la substancia es el principio de este ser, empieza a indagar cuáles son los principios de la substancia. Comienza por los principios de la substancia generable y corruptible. Muestra que son la forma y la materia92. Establece el modo de saber93 que las formas son substancias por las definiciones; es decir, una vez que ha explicado que las definiciones designan, en las substancias sensibles, lo que es substancia por relación a ellas y que designan las formas, resulta de ello que las formas son substancias; que ellas y la cosa de la que son forma son una y la misma cosa; que por eso los accidentes no son substancias; y, en fin, que no es necesario, para conocer las cosas, introducir Formas separadas distintas de las formas <sensibles>, porque lo que designan las definiciones de las cosas son las cosas mismas94. Igualmente explica también que esta substancia generable y corruptible sólo se genera de otra substancia [1403] generable y corruptible, semejante a ella en el género y en la especie; que lo que se engendra y se corrompe es la cosa compuesta de forma y materia; que 89 O El libro VI, E. 00 Otra vez expresa el perfecto orden que Aristóteles estableció en los libros de la Metaftsifa. 91 Literalmente dice «el que está en el pensamiento» (ti l:fikr). 92 Sobre la materia en Averroes, cfr. R. Ramón: «Sobre el concepto de materia en Averroes. A propósito de la 'izquierda aristotélica' en la filosofía árabe», en Al encuentro de A verroes, edición de A. Martínez Lorca, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 1993, pp. 71-92. 93 Israelita no traduce esta expresión, mientras que Mantino la vierte así: «tradidit viam ad sciendum...», fol. 289 D. 94 Sigo aquí la lectura del ffis., en vez del texto establecido por Bouyges, quien introduce el término gayr, «distinto de», sin dar razón de ello. Tanto Genequand como Martin conservan la lectura de gayr. Sin embargo, si se acepta este término, la traducción quedaría de la siguiente manera: «lo que designan las definiciones de las cosas es distinto de las cosas mismas», cuando líneas más arriba ha dicho que las definiciones designan las formas y que las formas y la cosa de la que son formas son una y la misma cosa. La traducción latina de Mantino se ajusta al texto del ms.: «id quod significat definitio rerum, sunt ipsae res», f. 289 r E. Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metaflsica» 293 las fonnas no son generables ni corruptibles sino por accidente, y que por ello las Fonnas platónicas no son imprescindibles para <explicar> la generación, si es que existen; me refiero a las Fonnas separadas de las que habla Platón. Explica también que los universales no son substancias que existan fuera del alma, aunque designen substancias; y que las fonnas son substancias no a la manera de elemento ni en tanto que compuestas de elementos, sino como una tercera substancia. Investiga de manera profunda la diferencia entre las dos substancias, expone luego las divisiones de las substancias primeras y distingue las partes de las fonnas de las partes de la materia. T 000 esto lo hace en el libro Waw y en el Zay95. Tras haber examinado, en estos dos libros, los principios de la substancia sensible, generable y corruptible, opina que después de esto debe ponerse a investigar las propiedades generales que siguen al ser en tanto que seroo. Estudia la potencia y el acto en primer lugar, los pone en relación con los principios en ellas y muestra que el acto es anterior a la potencia. Esto está en el libro Ija '97, situado tras el libro Zay. Luego, en el libro que le sigue, el Ta '98, estudia el uno y lo múltiple, lo idéntico99, lo semejante, lo contrario y otras propiedades generales que siguen al ser en tanto que ser. [1404] Después, en el libro Ya'lOO, trata del movimiento y del infinito, porque el metafísico los estudia desde un aspecto distinto del físico. Y, puesto que después de este libro se propone tratar de los principios de la substancia primera sensiblelOl, y éste es su objetivolO2 primero en esta ciencia, ya que es el fin pretendido por él, recuerda al comienzo de este libro, es decir, de Ya', 95 Es decir, Vil, Z, y VIII, H. Sobre la no coincidencia entre estas letras árabes Y las griegas, véase lo que he indicado antes en la introducción a la traducción. Cfr. Bouyges: Notice, p. CLIV y Martín, p. 39, nota 50. 00 En árabe, al-lawahiq al-'amma li-l-mawyUd bi-ma huwa mawyUd, Avicena emplea la expresión al-umur al-latí' tl!lhaqu-hu bi-ma huwa mawyUd, «las cosas que le siguen necesariamente en tanto que SeD), Al-Sifli'. al-flahiyyat, p. 13:13. 97 El libro IX, el 0 griego, 98 Libro X, el 1 griego. 99 Literalmente «él es él», La expresión al-huwa huwa para designar «lo idéntico», «lo mismo» aparece ya en los primeros gramáticos árabes y era muy frecuente en los traductores, cfr. p, 40, nota 57, de la traducción de A. Martín. 100 Libro XI, el K griego. La referencia que Averroes hace aquí a este libro prueba que este prólogo depende del comentario de Alejandro, porque, como dice más adelante, no llegó a conocer este libro. Sobre la ausencia de este libro en el mundo árabe, cfr. Bouyges: Notice, p, CU. Peters: Aristoteles Arabus, p. 49. 101 Es lo que hará en el libro A, lo que confinna que este libro Y§ es el libro K. 102 El término árabe usado aquí, qasd, significa «intención, objetivo, propósito», procedente de la raíz q-s-d, «tender a, dirigirse, proponerse», por lo que no parece correcta la versión de Martín que traduce así: «c'est la l'objet premier de la Métaphysique», lo que da lugar a confundir el objetivo o propósito (qasd) con el sujeto u objeto de una ciencia (mawdu'). Los dos traductores latinos lo vierten como propositum, fol. 289 v 1 M. 294 Rafael Ramón Guerrero todas las apodas que ha mencionado en el libro Há' y, de manera resumida, la solución ya alcanzada en los libros precedentes. También recuerda brevemente los absurdos que se siguen de rechazar los principios del conocimientoEsto es lo que encontramos respecto alorden de los libros que nos han llegado y que están antes del libro L~m. Conforme al orden de las letras, no hemos hallado el libro KM ni ha llegado hasta nosotros. El libro 1Am es el que vamos a comentar detalladamente. Su propósito primero en él es dar a conocer los principios de la substancia primera sensible; sin embargo, en su inicio, comienza exponiendo los principios de todas las substancias de manera absoluta, empezando por los principios de la substancia generable y corruptible y recordando lo que sobre esto ha explicado en los libros Wáw y Záy103; a continuación, expone los principios de la substancia primera y muestra que ésta es substancia y de cuántas maneras es principio. [1405]Cuando ha terminado de <exponer> su opinión sobre el principio del Todo'04, vuelve a rebatir lo que dijeron sus predecesores acerca de los principios de la substancia, Y esto lo hace en dos libros, el Mim y el Nún. De esta exposición ha quedado claro lo que contiene cada uno de los libros de esta ciencia, atribuidos a Aristóteles; que han seguido el mejor orden <posible> en la clasiflcación y que en ellos nada se aplica sin clasificación ni sin orden, como hemos encontrado que afirma Nicolás de Damasco105 en su libro, y que por eso ha elegido, según afirma, un orden mejor para exponer esta ciencia. Nosotros, pornuestro amor a esta cienciay por nuestro deseo de conocerla y enseñarla, hemos expuesto la doctrina de este hombre'~ sobre esta ciencia, para que sea de más fácil acceso a quienes no se dedican porentero al es- '~ Wáw y Záy según la denominación del comentario de Alejandro; es decir, Z y H, VII y VIII. '~" El Todo o Universo, al-huil. Existe en árabe un tratato, atribuido aAlejandro de Afrodisia, titulado FI mabádi' al-kull («Sobre los principios del Todo»), editado por A. Badawi en su Aristú bzda l-arab, PP. 253-277, traducido al francés por el mismo A. Badawi en su La trans- ,nission de laphilosophie grecqueau monde arabe> Paris, 1 Vm, 1968, PP. 121-139. Este tratado es conocidopor Averroes, puesto que lo cita en su Taháfid al-Taháffit, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, Imprinierie Catholique, 1930, p. 421:13-14y p. 495:7. '«> Averroes utilizó un Resumen (Muitasar)de la Metafisica compuestopor Nicolás de Damasco, peripatético del siglo ¡. Se conservan fragmentos de su obra Sobre la filosoita de Art Idtejes, a la que posiblemente perteneciera el resumen aprovechado por Averroes en su TajAfr principalmente en tas páginas 843-850. Clv. p. 42, nota 68 de la versión de Martin. Cfr. U. 1. Orossaart LuloIs: ¿Vicolaus Damascenus. On Ole Philosophy ofAñstotZe. Fragments of the First Five Books Transíated from the Syriac with an Introduction and Commentary, Leiden, J. Brifl, 1965; 2.> ed., 1969. "~ La expresión «este bombre» puede designar a Alejandro, como sobreentiende Genequand, p. 65, o a Aristóteles, como lee Martin, p 42 Averroes: el «Pi-oe,nio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metaffsica» 295 tudio de los libros de Aristóteles, y para que esto sea como un prontuario para quienes se han ocupado de los libros de Aristóteles. Comencemos pidiendo ayuda a Dios, al Dador de inteligencia y sabiduría, para nuestro propósito de comentar literalmente este libro, puesto que, por la gracia de Dios, hemos terminado este objetivo en los libros precedentes según nuestras posibilidades.

Journal of Philosophy of Life Vol.7, No.1 (July 2017):160-179 How Human Life Could be Unintended but Meaningful A Reply to Tartaglia Brooke Alan Trisel* Abstract The question "What is the meaning of life?" is longstanding and important, but has been shunned by philosophers for decades. Instead, contemporary philosophers have focused on other questions, such as "What gives meaning to the life of a person?" According to James Tartaglia, this research on "meaning in life" is shallow and pointless. He urges philosophers to redirect their attention back to the fundamental question about "meaning of life." Tartaglia argues that humanity was not created for a purpose and, therefore, is meaningless. He assumes that humanity could not be meaningful unless we were created for a purpose. I will outline a different way that humanity could become meaningful. In addition, I will explain how the research on "meaning in life" is important for understanding how humanity could become meaningful. 1. Introduction We live our lives, expending great effort to remain alive and achieve our goals, without knowing whether human life is meaningful. Laypeople often assume that philosophers seek to answer the question "What is the meaning of life?"1 Actually, only a small number of philosophers give attention to questions about the meaning of life.2 And when they reflect on these questions, they typically do so from a theistic perspective – a view that many people no longer find credible. I will examine these questions from a naturalistic perspective. In recent years, there has been a growing interest among philosophers in the topic of meaningfulness. However, instead of focusing on the traditional questions about meaning of life that preoccupied existentialists, contemporary philosophers strive to explain what gives meaning to the life of a person. They refer to this latter topic as "meaning in life" to distinguish it from questions about the "meaning of human life" in general. Susan Wolf and Thaddeus Metz – leading * Independent scholar. Email: triselba[a]cs.com. ** I would like to thank Editor-in-chief Masahiro Morioka for inviting me to contribute to this issue. 1 Laypeople often also assume that philosophy is "all about" the meaning of life. Tartaglia (2016b) argues for this view. 2 See, for example, Cottingham (2003), Cooper (2005), and Seachris (2009). 161 figures in this research – have each proposed a theory of meaning in life.3 These theories support objective naturalism – the view that one accrues meaning in one's life by engaging with inherently valuable and natural, mind-independent goods. James Tartaglia is harshly critical of this work by these philosophers. He contends that this research is shallow,4 pointless,5 and can be misleading.6 He argues that there is nothing philosophical about identifying what makes a person's life more meaningful.7 He seems to think that one can find this in a self-help book. Regarding the topic of meaningfulness, Tartaglia claims that there is only one truly important question: "[W]hat are we here for?"8 This focus on "meaning in life" has diverted our attention from this question, he argues. Tartaglia acknowledges that there is meaning in life – what he refers to as "social meaning." However, he argues that human life was not created for a purpose and, therefore, is meaningless. "Life" can refer to a human being or all of humanity, which can lead to confusion in this debate about meaningfulness. Take, for example, the title of Tartaglia's book: Philosophy in a Meaningless Life. With this title, some potential readers might assume that the book is about the life of a person. However, in reading the book, it quickly becomes clear that Tartaglia is referring to human life, as a whole. As with "life," "humanity" can be thought of in multiple ways. Humanity can be conceived as a whole or as the many individuals that make up the whole.9 These two different metaphysical conceptions of humanity give rise to two different ways of thinking about how humanity could be meaningful. With the traditional, holistic account of meaning of life, a meaning of life is conceived as a meaning that is possessed by humanity, as a whole. There is, however, an alternative, individualistic conception of meaning of life that I will outline. By engaging with inherently valuable and natural goods, it adds meaning to our individual lives, which in turn adds meaning to humanity from the "bottom-up," as I will hypothesize.10 3 See Wolf (2010) and Metz (2013). 4 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 4. 5 Ibid., p. 16. 6 Tartaglia (2015), p. 98 and (2016a), p. 1. 7 Tartaglia (2015), pp. 95, 102 and (2016a), pp. 4, 16. See Metz (2016a) for his response to the criticisms by Tartaglia and others. 8 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 2. 9 I will use the terms "humanity" and "human life" interchangeably. 10 I initially discussed this view in Trisel (2016). I further develop this view in this paper. 162 In the next section, I will provide an overview of Tartaglia's nihilism. Many people, including Tartaglia, assume that humanity could not be meaningful unless we were created for a purpose. In section three, I will seek to demonstrate that this assumption is false. Then, in section four, I will compare the holistic and individualistic accounts of how humanity could be meaningful and will point out some problems with Tartaglia's holistic account. In section five, I will advocate for the individualistic account. In addition, I will explain how the research on "meaning in life" is important for understanding how humanity could become meaningful. 2. An Overview of Tartaglia's Nihilism In the social framework in which we live our lives, there are pre-existing traditions, organizations, and fields of endeavor that one can join, as Tartaglia indicates.11 Our individual activities can be meaningful because they are situated within the context of meaning provided by the social framework. Likewise, for human life, as a whole, to be meaningful, it must exist within a wider context of meaning, Tartaglia argues. Tartaglia claims that the physical universe does not provide life with a context of meaning. Therefore, he contends that a "transcendent context of meaning" is necessary for life to be meaningful.12 Tartaglia hypothesizes that consciousness transcends the objective world. If true, this opens up a possibility that reality transcends the physical universe, he argues.13 Tartaglia indicates that if humanity were created for a purpose by a transcendent context of meaning, "We might be here to do something, and so discovering the reason might persuade us to change our lives."14 Alternatively, "the meaning of our lives might consist in being valuable, rather than having the capacity for doing something valuable."15 However, he later concludes, "even if the physical universe does exist within a transcendent context, there is no reason this should be a context of meaning, or one in which human life has an overall purpose. All this is possible, but possibility is cheap."16 11 Tartaglia (2016a), pp. 22-23. 12 Ibid., p. 48. 13 Ibid., pp. 10-11, 85-86. 14 Ibid., p. 2. 15 Ibid., p. 2. 16 Ibid., p. 52 (emphasis in original). 163 Despite its negative connotations, Tartaglia adopts "nihilism" as the name for his view that human life is meaningless.17 Contrary to some nihilists, Tartaglia does not deny that there are values or objective truths. In fact, he claims that existential nihilism is an objective truth.18 Within the social framework, people pursue various goals such as to graduate from college, get married, and have children, but these goals are nothing more than "socially constructed impositions upon life . . . ," Tartaglia argues. 19 Although our goals can seem like absolute imperatives, when we step outside of the social framework, we see that every human goal is "optional and ultimately pointless," according to Tartaglia.20 Tartaglia expresses admiration for the religious-based way in which John Cottingham and Joshua Seachris have analyzed questions about life's meaning.21 In contrast, Tartaglia does not discuss the characteristics of his envisioned "transcendent context of meaning" or use the words "God" or "transcendent being." Rather, he tries to distance his view from theistic accounts of transcendence. For example, he argues, "there is no need to associate transcendence with religious meaning . . . ."22 The transcendent context of meaning, as imagined by Tartaglia, has the ability to create the universe and human life for a purpose. To have this ability, it would be necessary for the "transcendent context of meaning" to think, plan, and have a goal(s). Thus, although Tartaglia does not mention "God" or a "transcendent being," I will sometimes refer to his envisioned "transcendent context of meaning" as a "transcendent being." Tartaglia's argument that life is meaningless, in the absence of a transcendent context of meaning, is similar to the argument made by some theists, such as William Lane Craig, who contend that life without God would be meaningless.23 However, unlike Craig, Tartaglia does not think that nihilism is "bad."24 He thinks it is just a "neutral fact."25 Tartaglia is adamant that nihilism will not lead 17 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 18 Ibid., pp. 57-60. 19 Ibid., p. 23. 20 Ibid., p. 27. 21 Ibid., on p. 19, Tartaglia discusses Cottingham (2003) and Seachris (2013a). 22 Ibid., p. 170. 23 See Craig (2000). 24 Tartaglia (2016a), pp. 5-6. Another difference between the views of Tartaglia and Craig is that Craig maintains that God and personal immortality are both necessary for life to be meaningful. Tartaglia does not discuss personal immortality. 25 Ibid., p. ix. 164 us to give up on, or care less about, our projects, activities, and relationships because when we realize there is no purpose of life, we will then step back into the social framework and reengage with our goals.26 3. Why Transcendence is Unnecessary for Humanity to be Meaningful Tartaglia argues that the famous question, "What is the meaning of life?" boils down to the question "[W]hat are we here for?"27 I disagree. This latter question is too narrowly focused to serve as a guide in our search for a meaning of life. As philosophers have long recognized, there is an amalgam of questions about meaning of life, including the question "What makes life valuable?"28 This latter question holds out the possibility that human life could be meaningful and valuable regardless of whether it was created for a purpose. The universe does not exist for a purpose and, therefore, human life does not exist within a wider, context of meaning, Tartaglia contends. Tartaglia uses the phrase "context of meaning," in an overly narrow way, to mean a context that has a purpose. As I will argue, the universe provides human life with a context of meaning despite whether the universe was created for a purpose or is inherently purposeful. By comparing the universe to other contexts that would be unsupportive of leading meaningful lives, as I will do, it becomes clear that the universe provides human life with a context of meaning. There are different ways that a context could be unsupportive of human flourishing. First, there might be a zero probability that intelligent life would originate in the context. Second, the context might be habitable to intelligent life, but the nature of that context might prevent one from engaging in meaning-conferring activities. For example, the species might have to spend all of its time searching for food and shelter and have no time left for meaningful activities. Alternatively, the species might have time to create things of value, such as artwork, but these things might disintegrate as soon as they are created. We naturally emerged in this universe and it unknowingly nourishes and sustains us. Although the things we create do not last forever, they generally last 26 Ibid., pp. 43, 175. In contrast, Kahane (2016) argues that belief in nihilism would have detrimental consequences. 27 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 28 See, for example, Hepburn (2000), pp. 261-276. For more discussion about the "amalgam thesis," see Seachris (2013b), pp. 9-10. 165 long enough for them to enrich our lives. The universe has given rise to some intrinsically valuable goods. Goods often mentioned by objectivists include knowledge, autonomy, loving relationships, achievements, and excellence. By pursuing and promoting these and other goods, it adds meaning to our lives, and does so regardless of whether there is a transcendent context of meaning. Early in his book, Tartaglia argues that a transcendent context of meaning is necessary for life to be meaningful. Later, he adds a new requirement that this transcendent context of meaning be a "final context," which is a context that "does not depend for its existence upon another, wider context."29 He contends that this is not an overly strong requirement. Unless the context is final, we could disengage from a purpose for which life was created, which would make it merely an optional pursuit within life instead of something that is constitutive of life, according to Tartaglia. He indicates that the purpose "would have to be something that determines the significance of our behaviour whether we like it or not . . . it would be like a game we could not stop playing."30 Under these conditions, it becomes difficult to see how we could have free will. Even if the purpose was not worth our efforts or evil, we could not stop implementing it. If the purpose would have to "determine the significance" of our behavior, as Tartaglia indicates, does this mean that we could not make any decisions on our own? Alternatively, does it mean that we could make some decisions, but that these decisions could be overridden? For example, if you want to spend time with a loved one, could the purpose or transcendent being override your decision and force you to do something else instead? As Robert Nozick indicated, "Without free will we seem diminished, merely the playthings of external causes. Our value seems undercut."31 Kurt Baier, in a well-known lecture, argued that having a purpose imposed upon us by a superior being would be degrading. He writes, "If . . . I ask a man . . . 'What is your purpose?' I am insulting him. I might as well have asked, 'What are you for?' Such questions reduce him to the level of a gadget, a domestic animal, or perhaps a slave."32 In response, Metz has argued that it would not necessarily be disrespectful for God to have assigned human life a purpose.33 If God assigned 29 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 49. 30 Ibid., p. 49. 31 Nozick (1981), p. 2. See also discussion by Fischer (2005). 32 Baier (2000), p. 120. 33 Metz (2000), pp. 297-300 and (2013), pp. 102-103. 166 the purpose as a request rather than a command, then this need not be degrading. I believe this is correct. However, having a purpose imposed upon us in the controlling way that Tartaglia envisions would be degrading. Tartaglia compares a meaning of life to the possibility of achieving checkmate in chess. He seems disappointed that human life does not have a purpose, as does a game of chess. Under the conditions that Tartaglia claims are necessary for life to be meaningful, human beings would be like the pawns in the game of chess. Even if we achieved the purpose for which we were created, because our actions were predetermined, or at least heavily influenced, this achievement would not be our own. Rather, it would be an achievement by the transcendent being. Some people feel threatened by the thought that life arose through chance. For example, Craig argues that, if the universe and humanity arose through chance, "Man is just a lump of slime that evolved into rationality."34 If life originated by chance, this suggests that life was unintended and that it was contingent, meaning that there was a possibility it might never have come into existence. Craig and Tartaglia falsely assume that being created for a purpose by a transcendent being is the only way that humanity could be meaningful. There is, however, another pathway by which humanity could be meaningful. By engaging with the intrinsically valuable goods in the universe, it adds meaning to our individual lives, which in turn adds meaning to humanity. Tartaglia acknowledges that our individual lives are "contingently valuable." He writes, "For although our nature is not intrinsically valuable, we value many things, including ourselves. We might not have done so, so this value is not essential to what we are, or to the other things we value."35 He laments that value "does not flow inevitably from our nature . . . ."36 Tartaglia assumes that if there were a transcendent context of meaning, and if this context explained why we exist, that this would somehow make human life inevitably valuable. However, this is a false assumption because even if human life were created for a worthy purpose by a transcendent being, human life would still be contingently valuable because the transcendent being could have decided not to create us.37 Why do some people want human life to have been inevitable? They think that being inevitable would make life valuable, but this is not necessarily true. 34 Craig (2000), p. 45. Tartaglia (2016a) discusses contingency on p. 50. 35 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 6. 36 Ibid., p. 6. 37 For earlier discussion about contingency, see Trisel (2012b) and Metz (2013), pp. 83-84. Seachris (2013a, p. 609) acknowledges that humanity is contingent from the perspective of Christianity. 167 Consider, for example, bedbugs – an insect that feeds on blood. Even if the universe was non-contingent, such as being infinitely old, and it was inevitable that bedbugs would arise in this universe, bedbugs would still not be valuable. Early in his book, Tartaglia asserts that the hypothesis of a transcendent meaning is "worthy of faith,"38 but later he discards this hypothesis because it is too remote of a possibility to be taken seriously.39 There is an additional reason to reject the hypothesis that humanity was created by a transcendent being to "do something." If humanity had been created to carry out a purpose, our role would have been revealed to us long ago. It would be self-defeating for a transcendent being to give humanity a role in carrying out a purpose, but then not reveal our role to us.40 This would be like a person creating a business and hiring workers, but then failing to tell them the mission of the business and their role. It is the stuff of comedy to imagine these workers being bored to tears, while the business owner sobs loudly after learning that the business is losing money. Of course, no competent owner of a business would fail to tell the workers what they were hired "to do" because failing to provide this essential information would be selfdefeating. To sum up this section, the universe provides human life with a context of meaning by having given rise to intelligent life, by unknowingly sustaining us, and by containing intrinsically valuable goods. By engaging with these goods, it adds meaning to our individual lives and to humanity. This outcome occurs regardless of whether the universe and humanity were created for a purpose by a transcendent context of meaning. Not only is a transcendent purpose unnecessary for our lives to be meaningful, the one envisioned by Tartaglia would be degrading. In response, Tartaglia will likely argue that I have not addressed the questions about "meaning of life," but have only shown that our individual lives can be meaningful something he does not dispute. Tartaglia wants us to focus on the question "What is the meaning of life?" where "life" refers to "humanity." But to know whether humanity is, or can be, meaningful, we must first answer the fundamental question of "What is humanity?" The answer to this question might seem obvious, which likely explains why the question has not been explored. However, as I hope to show in the next section, the answer to this question is not obvious, and is one of the keys for unlocking the mystery of whether human life 38 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 53. 39 Ibid., pp. 169-184. 40 I provide a more detailed version of this argument in Trisel (2012a). 168 is, or can be, meaningful. 4. What is Humanity? – Holism versus Individualism Bertrand Russell made a distinction between a class as a whole and a class as many. For example, we can think of a navy as a whole or as many sailors, as he indicated.41 As I will argue, we can also think of "humanity" as one or many. More specifically, Tartaglia (and most other people I suspect) thinks of humanity as a whole a perspective I will refer to as holism. We can also conceive of humanity as the many, individual human beings that make up the whole – a perspective I will refer to as individualism. Before exploring the question "What is humanity?" it will be helpful to start with a discussion of a group that is easier to understand – the New York Yankees (hereafter "Yankees"). If we imagine we are watching a Yankees baseball game, we see the individual players, bats, and ball. It is uncontroversial that these concrete objects exist. But does the Yankees, as a group, also exist?42 Some proponents of ontological individualism deny that groups exist.43 Thus, they will deny that the Yankees, as a group, won the World Series in 2009. Many philosophers believe in the reality of groups. Even if we assume that the Yankees, as a group, exist, there are two different ways of explaining their achievement of winning the World Series. Methodological holists will argue that this group achievement was more than the sum of the achievements by the individual players because of the synergistic effects of the players working together. In contrast, proponents of methodological individualism will maintain that this achievement was nothing more than the sum of the individual achievements. Individuals can have rights, be blameworthy or praiseworthy, and be bearers of meaning. Can groups do the same? There has been extensive analysis of whether groups can have rights and be blameworthy, but there has been very little discussion about whether groups can be praiseworthy and meaningful. Do human beings constitute a group? If so, what type of group is it? Katherine 41 Russell (1903), p. 68. Ritchie (2013, p. 258) makes the case that a group, like a class, can be thought of as one or many. 42 For further discussion, see Ritchie (2013) . 43 Other proponents of ontological individualism acknowledge that groups exist, but maintain that groups and other social phenomena are exhaustively determined by properties or facts about individuals. 169 Ritchie outlines various criteria for determining what qualifies as a "social group."44 Some of these criteria include that a social group can be located in space and time and have different members at different times. Because other objects, such as trees, also meet most of the criteria she specifies, Ritchie adds the requirement that the members intended to form the group. In a later article, Ritchie distinguishes between "organized" and "unorganized" social groups. Whereas the members of organized social groups, such as committees, need to cooperate to achieve the goal(s) of the group, the members of unorganized social groups, such as racial and gender groups, "do not need to intend to cooperate or act in concord with other members of the group."45 One might try to argue that all human beings have shared intentions and, therefore, qualify as an "organized social group." This argument, however, would be a stretch. Unlike the members of organized social groups, not all human beings have a shared goal. Indeed, some people have conflicting goals. It seems plausible that human beings constitute an "unorganized social group." Another option would be to conceive of human beings in the same way as biologists as a species. But this might not get us very far in understanding the ontology of humanity because it leads to another, unresolved question: "What is a species and how do you distinguish one species from another?"46 Because there is vigorous debate about the ontological status of social groups and species, more work will be needed to determine whether human beings make up a group and, if so, what type of group it is. I raise these questions about the ontology of humanity, and hope others will join me in exploring them, because addressing these questions is necessary for understanding whether it makes sense to think that humanity could be meaningful. In what follows, I will assume that human beings are an "unorganized social group" and that such a group can be a bearer of meaning. Tartaglia thinks of a meaning of life as a meaning that is possessed by humanity, as a whole.47 If we think of "humanity," not in the traditional holistic way, but as the many individuals that comprise the group, it reveals a different way that humanity could become meaningful. As I will argue, when individuals accrue meaning in their lives, by, for example, making intellectual or moral 44 Ritchie (2013), pp. 258-260. 45 Ritchie (2015), pp. 313-314. 46 For further discussion about this question, see Ereshefsky (2016). 47 Targalia (2016a), p. 54. 170 achievements, this also adds meaning to humanity. As more individual lives become meaningful, there is a corresponding increase in the meaning of human life. Irving Singer made a few comments suggesting that he also believed that humanity could become meaningful through the efforts of individual human beings. He writes: "To the extent that life becomes meaningful in this accumulative way, its total meaning is increased."48 The two perspectives of how humanity could be meaningful are as follows. Meaning of Life – Holism: A meaning of life is a meaning possessed by humanity, as a group, rather than by individual human beings. Meaning of Life – Individualism: A meaning of life is a meaning that humanity accrues as individual human beings engage with intrinsically valuable goods. This meaning is equal to the sum of the meaning in the lives of individual human beings. There could be holistic or individualistic versions of supernaturalism 49 and naturalism. For example, with the traditional view of supernaturalistic holism (as I will call it), God assigns the same purpose(s) to everyone. In contrast, Jacob Affolter suggests that God could assign each person a unique purpose.50 He does not argue that these unique purposes need to be related. Affolter's view exemplifies supernaturalistic individualism. In the next section, I will seek to support a naturalistic and individualistic account of meaning of life, which I will call "naturalistic individualism." Before doing so, I will point out some problems that arise with Tartaglia's version of supernaturalistic holism. According to Tartaglia, "if you ask about the meaning of life, the answer will apply to everybody . . . ."51 When thinking about whether humanity was created for a purpose, we must keep in mind that "humanity" is not something that exists independently of human beings. Rather, humanity is comprised of individual human beings. Furthermore, the members of humanity are not static, but change over time, as new human beings are born and existing human beings die. With this in mind, suppose that a transcendent being created 48 Singer (1996), p. 42. See also pp. 44-45. 49 For more discussion about supernaturalism, see Metz (2013), pp. 77-118. 50 Affolter (2007), p. 453. 51 Tartaglia (2015), p. 93. See also (2016a), p. 7. 171 the universe and wanted to see if intelligent life could be created from matter. The transcendent being successfully created the first two human beings – a man and a woman. Let us also suppose that these two individuals were not created to "do something" and that the transcendent being was indifferent to whether they had children. These two individuals lived for 60 years and had many children who, in turn, had additional offspring. After 200,000 years, humanity consisted of seven billion people, let us suppose. To state it formally: At t1, humanity was comprised of two members who were created for a purpose by a transcendent being. At t200,000, humanity was comprised of seven billion members who were not created for a purpose by a transcendent being. Tartaglia claims that whether human life is meaningful will apply to "everybody," but in the above scenario, where only the first two members of humanity were created for a purpose by a transcendent being, it is unclear that this is true. Is humanity, as a whole, meaningful or meaningless in this scenario? It would be helpful if Tartaglia would let us know the answer to this question. In the following different scenario, suppose that a transcendent being created all human beings to "do something." Suppose also that this transcendent being made our role clear to us, but that only 20% of people contributed toward implementing the purpose. The remaining 80% of human beings disregarded the purpose and spent all their time watching television. In this scenario, where only 20% of people contribute, is humanity meaningful or meaningless? If humanity is meaningless, what level of participation by human beings would be required for humanity to be meaningful? Would 51% of human beings have to contribute to the purpose or would the percentage have to be 80% or 100%? Where do you draw the line and how do you defend, in a non-arbitrary way, where it is drawn? At first, the holistic account might seem appealing because of its simplicity at conceiving of human life, as a whole, as either possessing or lacking meaning. However, as shown by the preceding thought experiment, this simplicity quickly disappears as we think more deeply about what humanity is and how human beings, with our freedom and diverse interests, would carry out an assigned purpose. Tartaglia might respond that the above situation would not happen because human beings would be unable to disengage from the purpose (in the 172 scenario he envisions). But if our actions are predetermined, or everyone is forced to implement this purpose, it then becomes difficult to see how this would confer meaning on humanity. 5. Researching Meaning of Life from the Bottom-up In discussing "What is philosophy?" Tartaglia contends that philosophy was originally motivated by questions of ontology and enframement; "we wanted to know what exists and why it exists."52 He uses the word "enframement" to mean being situated within a context of meaning. In recounting the history of philosophy, Tartaglia argues that to determine whether there is a meaning of life, "a natural place to start is with the ontological question of whether there are any gods to provide a wider framework within which human life exists."53 This "top-down" approach, as I will call it, to researching questions about meaning of life has proven to be unsuccessful. For thousands of years, there has been speculation and discussion about gods and transcendence, yet human beings have made little progress in understanding the questions about meaning of life. Instead of continuing the top-down approach to researching the topic of meaning of life, we would be better served with a new, bottom-up approach. From the perspective of naturalistic individualism, the source of life's meaning is not a supernatural being, but the interaction between individual human beings and intrinsically valuable, natural goods. By explaining what gives meaning to the life of a person, the philosophical and psychological research that has been conducted during the last thirty years provides a good starting point for a bottomup approach to researching meaning of life. Besides continuing this research on "meaning in life," an additional necessary step for a bottom-up approach would be to determine whether the meaning that we accrue in our individual lives can serve as a foundation for making humanity meaningful, as I hypothesize. With naturalistic individualism, the extent to which humanity is meaningful equals the sum of the meaning in the lives of individual human beings. For this proposed account to be plausible, (1) meaning must be measurable; (2) meaning must be comparable among individuals; (3) human beings must constitute a group; and (4) this type of group must be capable of being a bearer of meaning. If meaning cannot be measured, then of course it cannot be aggregated. If 52 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 71. 53 Ibid., p. 71. 173 meaning is measurable, but not comparable among individuals, then it could be aggregated, but the aggregate number would be unintelligible it would be like adding apples and oranges. Finally, if meaning is measurable and comparable, but human beings do not make up a group, or are a group but this group is not a bearer of meaning, then the aggregate number would not represent the extent to which humanity is meaningful. Rather, it would simply be the sum of the meaning in our individual lives. Similarly, if there are no "nations" in this world, but only persons, it would be inappropriate to conclude that the sum of the wealth of persons in a particular geographic area reflects the wealth of a given "nation." There is debate about which metric(s) we should use to assess the quality of our lives. Recently, researchers have begun to measure "subjective well-being" in addition to, or sometimes instead of, happiness. For example, although the World Happiness Report contains happiness in the title, it is a report about "subjective well-being," as the report acknowledges. The report compares the degree of subjective well-being by country.54 In this study, the primary question to measure well-being is as follows. Imagine a ladder with 10 possible steps, with the bottom step representing the worst possible life for you and the top step representing the best possible life for you. "On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?"55 The data source for this "life ladder" question is the Gallup World Poll. Gallup conducts this poll in more than 160 countries that include 99% of the world's adult population. They select a representative sample of about 1,000 individuals from each country so that the results will be generalizable to the various countries. Amitai Etzioni argues that happiness and subjective well-being are inferior measures because they fail to take into account whether people are living up to their moral responsibilities. 56 In response, Metz makes the case that meaningfulness should be included as one of the metrics for appraising a society because it is not reducible to happiness or morality.57 But is meaningfulness something that we can measure and compare? To reflect on the preceding question, it might be helpful to list the different aspects that are involved in measuring subjective well-being, as I will do in the 54 See Helliwell (2015), p. 26. 55 A discussion of the survey methodology can be found in the "Statistical Appendix" at <http://worldhappiness.report/ed/2015/> or at <http://www.gallup.com/178667/gallup-world-pollwork.aspx>. 56 Etzioni (2016). 57 Metz (2016b). 174 table below, and then to think about these aspects as they relate to meaningfulness. First, we can ask, "Who is being evaluated?" With the Gallup World Poll, those being evaluated include the respondents to the survey and each country. Although Gallup conducts the interviews, the respondents rate their own subjective wellbeing. Thus, these are internal or self-evaluations of well-being, rather than an external evaluation of the participants in the study.58 If Gallup were to ask the question, "Is your life going well?" this question would have only two possible answers: "yes" and "no." It would be a binary variable. Rather, their "life ladder" question reflects the assumption that there are degrees of well-being. Thus, they treat well-being as an ordinal variable. Aspects of Measuring Subjective Well-Being Who is Being Evaluated? Individual Respondents to the Survey and the Countries in Which They Reside Who Performs the Evaluation? Self-Evaluation Type of Measure Subjective Is the Measure Binary or Ordinal? "Life ladder" question is ordinal Measuring meaningfulness is more controversial than measuring happiness or subjective well-being. There is debate about what meaning is, whether it is objective or subjective, and whether meaning is something that is present or absent or whether there are degrees of meaningfulness. There is also debate about how meaningfulness should be measured, namely whether it should be measured internally or externally. Metz, with his "fundamentality theory," hypothesizes that one's life is more meaningful, the more that one orients one's rationality toward fundamental conditions of human existence.59 Some critics of this theory, including Masahiro Morioka, deny that there are degrees of meaningfulness and that it is possible to make interpersonal comparisons of meaning. Morioka has proposed an internalist account of meaning in life. He argues that the question about meaning in life is often asked in the following way, "does my life like this have any meaning at 58 See Helliwell (2015, pp. 17-20) for discussion about why they measure well-being internally rather than externally. 59 Metz (2013). 175 all?"60 He contends that this question has only two possible responses ("yes" and "no") and can be answered only by the person who asks the question. Even if meaning is binary and not objective, it would still be possible to make some interpersonal comparisons of meaningfulness. For example, one could calculate the number and percent of people living in a country who self-report that their lives are meaningful. However, because these individuals might have different conceptions of "meaningfulness," these results would be less useful, from a policymaking perspective, than they would be if meaning were objective. If we knew whether meaning was objective (as I believe) or subjective, it would help to determine how we should measure meaningfulness. For example, if meaning is purely subjective, then the person being evaluated would be in the best position to know whether his or her life is meaningful. Alternatively, if meaning is objective, then one could be mistaken about whether one's life is meaningful. Consequently, this would lend support to those philosophers who think meaningfulness should be measured using mind-independent, external standards. Tartaglia argues that there are four different notions of "meaning" and that meaningfulness is culturally specific.61 Unless there is a way of resolving these disputes about the nature of "meaning," this will pose a serious threat to the prospect of measuring meaningfulness. Because we are at an early stage of analyzing what it means to say that a person's life is meaningful, I remain hopeful that we will be able to work through these issues. If it turns out that meaning is objective, measurable, and comparable among individuals, then it would be possible to aggregate this meaning and to have confidence that the aggregate number is intelligible. Moreover, if human beings constitute an "unorganized social group," and this type of group can be a bearer of meaning, then the sum of the meaning in our individual lives would represent the extent to which humanity is meaningful. One way that critics will challenge these claims is by attempting to raise doubt that an "unorganized social group" could be meaningful. That human beings constitute an unorganized social group does not mean there is no cooperation among human beings. Rather, it only means that not all members of humanity have a shared goal. However, many human beings do have shared goals, such as the teams of scientists who are researching a cure for cancer. Let us compare two 60 Morioka (2015), p. 55. 61 Tartaglia (2015), pp. 103-106. See also Tartaglia (2016a), p. 14. 176 scenarios. The first scenario reflects the current state of our lives. The second scenario reflects our current lives with the following changes: human beings have discovered how life originated, have attained an understanding of how consciousness arises in human beings, and have recently discovered a cure for all types of cancer. Even if human beings are an "unorganized social group," it seems to make sense to say that humanity is more meaningful in the second scenario than in the first. I suspect that Tartaglia will be unconvinced that accruing meaning in our individual lives can provide a foundation for making humanity meaningful. He will likely maintain that humanity is meaningless no matter what we do in our lives. Tartaglia's claim that humanity is meaningless is based on the hidden assumption that human beings make up a group and that this group had the potential to be meaningful (if it had been created for a purpose by a transcendent being). If human beings do not make up a group that has the potential to be meaningful, then claiming that "humanity" is "meaningful" or "meaningless" would be nonsensical. Furthermore, under these conditions, it would be irrational for anyone to worry that "humanity" is meaningless. Let us now return to discussing naturalistic individualism. I will conclude this section by responding to a potential, different criticism of this proposed account of meaning of life. One might argue that this account implies that we should maximize the meaning of human life. This account leads, a critic will argue, to the counterintuitive conclusion that we should create billions upon billions of future people, even if their lives would only have a tiny amount of meaning in them. Because the meaning of human life is an aggregation of the meaning in the lives of human beings, creating vast numbers of new human beings would make humanity much more meaningful than it currently is. However, this conclusion is repugnant because the lives of these new persons might only have a negligible amount of meaning in them.62 The universe, as a context of meaning, unknowingly supports our desire to lead meaningful lives, but this support will collapse if we create too many people. 62 See Parfit (1984) for the original formulation of the "Repugnant Conclusion." He begins by stating the "Impersonal Average Principle," which is, "If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which people's lives go, on average, best" (p. 386). He then considers a Hedonistic and a nonHedonistic version of this principle. He expresses the non-Hedonistic version in terms of maximizing "the quality of lives." In contrast, I discuss maximizing the meaning in our lives. The concept of a "quality life" is more encompassing than that of a "meaningful life," and takes into account a number of factors including the amount of meaning and happiness in that life. 177 Creating vast numbers of new people might make humanity more meaningful in the short run, but it would have counterproductive and devastating long-term consequences. It would deplete and overwhelm the biosphere and likely result in the extinction of humanity and many other forms of life. Thus, if we were to pursue the goal of maximizing the meaning of human life, it would need to be balanced against the goal of preserving the biosphere. There is an alternative, better way of making humanity more meaningful that does not involve creating vast numbers of future people. By supporting and encouraging existing human beings to engage with intrinsically valuable goods, it can help them to realize their potential and lead meaningful lives, which in turn will enhance the meaning of human life. 6. Conclusion Because the topic of "meaning of life," in recent years, has been overshadowed by discussion about "meaning in life," I found it refreshing to read Tartaglia's works. I disagree, however, with his top-down and narrow approach for researching the topic of meaning of life and with his conclusion that human life is meaningless. Like Tartaglia, I do not think that life was created for a purpose. However, lacking an assigned purpose would not necessarily render human life meaningless because there is at least one other way that human life could become meaningful. I have pointed out two conceptions of humanity, one that focuses on the group, as a whole, and one that focuses on the "many human beings" that comprise the group. By conceiving of humanity in the individualistic way, and combining this individualism with objective naturalism, it reveals a pathway by which humanity could become meaningful. It is through the efforts of individuals that a sports team, university, nation, or other group is successful. Similarly, it is through the efforts of individuals that humanity could become meaningful. Finally, I have responded to Tartaglia's claim that the research on "meaning in life" is trivial by explaining how this research is related to understanding how humanity could become meaningful. This research is important not only for explaining what gives meaning to the life of a person, but for the larger reason of explaining what we, as individuals, can do to make humanity meaningful. 178 References Affolter, Jacob (2007). "Human Nature as God's Purpose," Religious Studies 43(4): 443-455. Baier, Kurt (2000). "The Meaning of Life," in Meaning of Life, E. D. Klemke (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 101-132. Cooper, David (2005). "Life and Meaning," Ratio 18(2): 125-137. Cottingham, John (2003). On the Meaning of Life. London: Routledge. Craig, William Lane (2000). 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"Could God's Purpose be the Source of Life's Meaning?" Religious Studies 36(3): 293-313. Metz, Thaddeus (2013). Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Metz, Thaddeus (2016a). "Assessing Lives, Giving Supernaturalism Its Due, and Capturing Naturalism: Reply to 13 Critics of Meaning in Life," Journal of Philosophy of Life 5(3): 228-278. Metz, Thaddeus (2016b). "Meaning in Life as the Right Metric," Society 53(3): 294-296. Morioka, Masahiro (2015). "Is Meaning in Life Comparable?: From the Viewpoint of 'The Heart of Meaning in Life'," Journal of Philosophy of Life (5)3: 5-65. Nozick, Robert (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard 179 University Press. Parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ritchie, Katherine (2013). "What are Groups?" Philosophical Studies 166(2): 257-272. Ritchie, Katherine (2015). "The Metaphysics of Social Groups," Philosophy Compass 10(5): 310-321. Russell, Bertrand (1903). Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seachris, Joshua (2009). "The Meaning of Life as Narrative: A New Proposal for Interpreting Philosophy's 'Primary' Question," Philo 12(1): 5-23. Seachris, Joshua (2013a). "The Sub Specie Aeternitatis Perspective and Normative Evaluations of Life's Meaningfulness: A Closer Look," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16(3): 605-620. Seachris, Joshua (2013b). "General Introduction," in Exploring the Meaning of Life: An Anthology and Guide, Joshua Seachris (ed.), Oxford: WileyBlackwell, pp. 1-20. Singer, Irving (1996). Meaning in Life, Volume 1: The Creation of Value. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Tartaglia, James (2015). "Metz's Quest for the Holy Grail," Journal of Philosophy of Life 5(3): 90-111. Tartaglia, James (2016a). Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A System of Nihilism, Consciousness and Reality. London: Bloomsbury. Tartaglia, James (2016b). "Is Philosophy All About the Meaning of Life?" 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Leaps of Knowledge1 0 Introduction This paper considers two unpopular philosophical claims. One is that doxastic voluntarism, the view that agents can, at least sometimes, choose what they believe, is true.2 The other is that strict evidentialism, the view that all reasons for belief are evidential reasons, is false. I do not aim to defend either view, but rather to show that, if defensible, they are consistent with two commonly held views in epistemology and the psychology of belief: that the aim of belief is either truth or knowledge and that this aim plays a central role in setting the norms of belief. A difficulty in discussing doxastic voluntarism is that its falsehood is commonly taken as a datum.3 There is an influential body of work suggesting that it is a conceptual truth that beliefs are involuntary. My own view is that whether or not beliefs can be formed voluntarily is an empirical rather than a conceptual question, but that is not a matter that I care to take up here. This paper will assume, for the sake of argument, that doxastic voluntarism is in all relevant senses possible. There is a parallel difficulty in discussing strict evidentialism (henceforth just 'evidentialism'). As with the falsehood of doxastic voluntarism, the truth of evidentialism is also commonly accepted as a datum, indeed as a conceptual truth.4 I have argued in some detail elsewhere that 1 1 This paper has been greatly improved by comments from Timothy Chan, Fritz-Anton Fritzon, Olav Gjelsvik, Mikkel Gerkin, Jessica Pepp, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Wlodek Rabinowicz, and audiences at the the University of Copenhagen and at the Lund University Philosophical Society. I also wish to thank especially the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature at the University of Oslo, owing to whose generous support in the form of a visiting fellowship I was able to develop this paper. 2 The classic modern discussion of doxastic voluntarism is Williams (1973). 3 See Hookway (2000), Kelly (2002), and Shah (2006) . 4 See Parfit (2001), Skorupski (forthcoming). evidentialism is not a conceptual truth and may not just be assumed as a datum.5 I shall not revisit the matter here. For the purposes of this paper, it will suffice to treat the truth of evidentialism as an open question. Preliminaries now set aside, in this paper I shall argue that both a limited doxastic voluntarism and anti-evidentialism are consistent with the claims mentioned above: that the aim of belief is truth or knowledge and that this aim plays an important role in norm-setting for beliefs. More cautiously, I shall argue that limited doxastic voluntarism is (or would be) a useful capacity for agents concerned with truth tracking to possess, and that having it would confer some straightforward benefits of both an epistemic and non-epistemic variety to an agent concerned with truth tracking. 1 Unstable beliefs with single and multiple fixed points There is considerable debate about how to interpret claims of the form: the aim of belief is truth or the aim of belief is knowledge.6 I shall understand these aims as pertaining to particular beliefs rather than to an agent's complete belief set. A sketchy, but intuitive, way of understanding belief 's having the aim of truth or knowledge is this: belief 's regulatory mechanisms are primarily geared towards truth tracking (or towards truth tracking in the right way for the knowledge aim), and a belief 's role in our cognitive architecture is to provide an accurate representation of its objects. Even in this sketchy account of belief 's having the aim of truth or knowledge, there is much to quibble with and still more left out, but I shall not attempt further elaboration here. One might propose a variety of cognitive mechanisms for belief acquisition and change. The default assumption in writings about theoretical reason is that agents (or perhaps wellfunctioning agents) modify their doxastic states in response to changes in perceived evidence. 2 5 See Reisner (2007), Reisner (2008), and Reisner (2009). 6 See Velleman (2000), Wedgwood (2002). This process is involuntary, although voluntary psychological activity (e.g. theoretical deliberation), may trigger the involuntary changes. In ordinary cases, in which we as a matter of course trust our senses, our beliefs change as we encounter new stimuli. The tree outside my window that appeared to be an aspen in the gloaming now appears to be a sugar maple in the clear sun. These changes in appearance automatically trigger changes in my belief about what kind of tree I have been looking at. For beliefs that we arrive at as the result of reasoning, belief change is triggered when we take ourselves to have sufficient evidence for the proposition about which we are reasoning. I may initially have no view about who the greatest quarterback of all time is, but on researching the statistics and news archives, I take myself to have sufficient evidence that it is John Elway. Taking oneself to have evidence need not be a conscious process nor entail any particular belief about evidence. Taking oneself to have sufficient evidence for a proposition that one did not already believe normally triggers the formation of a new belief. This is an attractive model of cognitive regulation, but it is inapplicable to some circumstances. It is on these that I shall focus. The first circumstances of interest are those in which an agent has an unstable belief with either a single fixed point or multiple fixed points. Let us consider an example of each: 1.1 The Numbers game with a single fixed point7 Alice has volunteered to participate in a psychology experiment at her university. The experiment uses a new and absolutely flawless mind-reading machine. The parameters of the experiment are known and understood fully by Alice. Alice is attached to the mind-reading machine, which is in turn attached to a large visual display that is within Alice's view. When the machine is turned on, Alice will be asked to 3 7 This example is adapted from Reisner (2007). predict what number will appear in 20 seconds time on the display. That number will be determined by a function of what Alice believes the number will in fact be. In particular, the function is 1/2n + 1, where n is the number that Alice believes will appear on the screen. If Alice changes her mind, the machine resets and will display the new number (according to the function) in 20 second time from when Alice changes her mind. Finally, if Alice has no belief about which number will appear on the display, the number 16 will appear, unless Alice develops a belief about what number will appear prior to the number 16's appearing. In that case, the clock will reset and the 1/2n + 1 formula will become operative. Alice appears to be in a pickle if she has any belief but that the number will be 2. Other beliefs will lead her to a new belief and are thus unstable. Suppose that she believes that the number will be 100. She knows that belief will cause the display to display 51, leading her to believe that the number will be 51. She knows that her new belief will cause the number to be 26.5, leading her to believe that it will be 26.5, and so on. If she believes that the number on the display is 2, however, her belief will be stable, true, and she will have perfect evidence that the number will be 2, given her other knowledge. 1.2 The numbers game with multiple fixed points This experiment is the same as the numbers game with a single fixed point, save that the function that determines what number appears on the screen is more complicated. If n is greater than or equal to 0, then the formula remains 1/2n + 1. But, if n is less than 0, it is 1/2n -1. In the modified experiment, Alice knows and understands the modification. 1.3 The single fixed-point numbers games and evidence In the first version of the numbers game, there is a single fixed point: 2. The only belief that Alice can have that will be true (and also not self-undermining given her other knowledge) is that the number on the screen will be 2. This raises three interesting questions. The first is whether, and if so why, Alice ought to believe that the number on the screen will be 2. The 4 second is whether she can believe that the number on the screen will be 2. The third is if she can believe it, how can she believe it. In answering the first question, the first thing to note is that if Alice ought to believe that the number will be 2, it is not on account of evidence in any very direct way. To see why, some stipulations are required. Let us suppose that Alice lacks a brute disposition to form stable beliefs and that she also lacks a brute disposition to believe that she has a disposition towards stable beliefs. Let us also suppose that Alice is not self-deluding such that she can get herself to believe there is evidence when it is plainly lacking. To have evidence that the number on the screen will be 2, given her other knowledge, Alice would need to have evidence that she will believe that the number will be 2. Absent brute dispositions of the kind ruled out by the above stipulations, it is difficult to see where this evidence would come from. Alice arrives at the experiment lacking the belief that the number will be 2. She can reason her way to a conditional claim, namely that if she believes the number that will appear on the display will be 2, it will be 2. Conditionals are not evidence for their own antecedents, so this new piece of information will not provide evidence that Alice will believe that the number on the screen will be 2. To the extent that Alice's cognitive regulatory mechanism for belief is sensitive to her evidence, Alice will not come to believe that the number will be 2. Indeed, naïve reasoning leads Alice down a very difficult path. As seems likely, she will have no view about what number will appear on the display, when she starts the experiment. She knows that this will cause the number on the display to be 16. If she comes to believe on that basis that the number will be 16, that new belief will cause the number to be 9. Her arithmetic reasoning will lead her to the conclusion that the number will, as a result of her new belief, actually be 5.5, and so on. Eventually Alice's mathematical reasoning capacity will be exhausted if she keeps on, and presumably she will cease to have a belief, leading, as she will know, to the number on the display's being 16. This will lead to her believing that the number will be 16, and the cycle will repeat. 5 Alice will not have evidence on a simple probabilistic view about evidence: p is evidence for q just in case the probability of q given p is higher than the probability of q given not p.8 Perhaps some more sophisticated account of evidence would allow for the following: p is evidence for q if p entails that any belief but q will be false.9 On this view, p would be the facts (or Alice's knowledge) about the numbers game; q would be that the number will be 2. This more sophisticated view about evidence provides an answer to the first question. Alice does have a reason to believe that the number will be 2, and that is because she has evidence for it. It also provides an answer to the second and third questions. Alice can believe that the number will be 2, and she can do so because she is sensitive to her evidence. 1.4 The multiple fixed-point numbers game and evidence The same considerations, mutatis mutandis, apply to the multiple fixed-point numbers game as apply to the single fixed-point numbers game, when working with the simple view of evidence. This is not the case when working with the sophisticated view of evidence. In the multiple-fixed point numbers game, there are two fixed points: 2 and -2. Thus, it is not true of 2 that one will have a false belief unless one believes it, and the same goes for -2. The sophisticated account of evidence does not even yield that one has evidence that the number will be either 2 or -2. Alice's beliefs will be false unless she believes that it will be 2 or -2 (the scope of the belief is B(2 v -2)). Holding in place the supposition that she has no brute dispositions to believe one way or the other, or brute dispositions to believe that she will believe one way or the other, Alice cannot have evidence for any belief in the multiple fixed-point numbers game. 2 Believing absent evidence 6 8 See Harman (1999). 9 This has been suggested to me in response to the original discussion of the single fixed-point numbers game in Reisner (2007). I do not endorse this view, but I have no interesting argument against it. If the sole regulatory mechanism of belief formation is sensitivity to evidence, then Alice could not form the belief that the number will be 2 in the single fixed-point numbers game, if what she is in fact sensitive to is evidence of the simple kind. If she is sensitive to the complex kind of evidence, then she can form her belief based on evidence. Neither the simple nor the more sophisticated accounts of evidence would trigger a belief that the number will be 2 or the belief that the number will be -2 in the multiple fixed-point version of the numbers game. In these cases, Alice cannot believe that the number will be 2 (or believe that it will be -2), if the only cognitive regulatory mechanism for belief formation is sensitivity to evidence. Someone wishing to defend the view that Alice can believe that the number will be 2 in the single fixed-point numbers game has various non-evidential regulatory options at his disposal for explaining how. I shall briefly canvas two of them, but more of the same style may be possible. The first of these is what I shall call the 'stability proposal': C1. Stability: Absent any other regulatory considerations, an agent's beliefs are sensitive to stability. In cases for which there is a single fixed point, stability regulation may be sufficient to form a belief. In the single fixed-point numbers game, that belief would be 2.10 Here is a second proposal: C2. Knowledge: An agent can, and sometimes does, believe something when she knows (or has a very high confidence) that it will be true, if she believes it.11 I do not intend to discuss the plausibility of either the stability proposal or the knowledge proposal as cognitive regulatory mechanisms, but I do wish to highlight an important feature of them both. In the single fixed-point numbers game, the stability proposal and knowledge proposal would both yield the fixed-point solution. If, when confronted with epistemic 7 10 I discuss the stability proposal in more detail in Reisner (2007). 11 The knowledge proposal is also discussed in more detail in Reisner (2007). environments in which (simple) evidence was lacking, one's beliefs were formed by stability or by knowledge, one could still form all of one's beliefs without choosing. To put things another way: stability and knowledge would lead to the stable belief in an agent for whom all belief formation was involuntary. These mechanisms are not sufficient for forming a stable belief, absent the capacity to voluntarily choose beliefs, for the multiple fixed-point numbers game. It is easy to see why for both stability and for knowledge. In the case of stability, there is ex hypothesi more than one stable belief. Thus, a cognitive regulatory mechanism that selected for stability would have its choice underdetermined. Exactly the same is true for knowledge. In the multiple fixed-point numbers game, Alice knows that her belief will be true, if believed, when the contents of that belief are that the number on the display will be 2, and also when they are that the number on the screen will be -2. Underdetermination is the death of involuntary belief forming mechanisms.12 Within the range of cases to which stability or knowledge apply, an agent who possessed a limited capacity to choose her beliefs would be able to arrive at one of the fixed points. She could choose either 2 or -2. If stability or knowledge restricted the membership of her belief choice set, her cognitive regulatory mechanism would still in an important sense be truth governed. Only true beliefs would (and could) be acquired and held in the multiple fixed-point numbers game and other scenarios with the same basic structure. I shall return to this point in §4. 3 Non-evidential reasons for belief We can distinguish between two broad classes of normative reasons for belief: evidential and non-evidential.13 It will be useful to have working definitions of each: 8 12 Strictly speaking, one could start rigging up more elaborate cognitive models. When encountering multiple fixed-point scenarios, an agent's cognitive regulatory mechanism could have a randomiser that arbitrarily selects one of the options. This addition strikes me as ad hoc. 13 See Reisner (2009) for an extended discussion of the difference and Reisner (2008) for a discussion of how evidential and non-evidential reasons for belief can be weighed against each other. R1. Evidential reasons for belief: Fact f is an evidential reason for agent a to believe b just in case f is evidence14 for the contents of b. and R2. Non-evidential reasons for belief: Fact f is a non-evidential reason for agent a to believe b just in case f is a reason for a to believe b and f is not evidence for the contents of b. R1 is designed to ensure that reasons for belief are present or absent at the same time and in the same ways as evidence. I am hoping to capture the views of strict evidentialists15 in doing so, because 'normative reason for belief ' is a term of art. I doubt that there is a properly intuitive notion to capture. R2 is designed to capture any reason for belief that is not an evidential reason. This leaves open the question of whether there are non-evidential reasons for belief. I have argued that there are elsewhere,16 but here I am assuming that there are nonevidential reasons for belief for the sake of argument. If R1 is correct, then whether there are evidential reasons for belief in the single fixed-point numbers game depends wholly on whether one accepts the simple or the complex account of evidence. Neither the simple nor the complex account of evidence will deliver an evidential reason for belief in the multiple fixed-point numbers game. This is because the presence (or absence) of an evidential reason for belief is entirely parasitic on the presence (or absence) of evidence. As discussed in §1.4, no evidence is available to Alice in the multiple fixed-point numbers game. A normative version of both stability and knowledge delivers reasons for belief in both the single and multiple fixed-point numbers games. I shall only discuss the multiple fixed-point numbers game here for the sake of economy, but the same considerations apply mutatis mutandis in the 9 14 If one thinks that evidence is relative to an agent, then this can be expressed as 'evidence for a'. For a thorough discussion of evidence and theoretical reasons, see Skorupski (forthcoming). 15 See Kelly (2002), Parfit (2001), Shah (2006) and Skroupski (forthcoming) as examples. 16 See Reisner (2007), Reisner (2008), and Reisner (2009). single fixed-point version, save that the reasons are unique in the single fixed-point case (because there is a single fixed point). A first attempt at a normative version of stability and knowledge is: R3. Normative stability: Fact f is a reason for agent a to believe b if f makes it the case that b is a stable belief for a. and R4. Normative knowledge: Fact f is a reason for agent a to believe b if f makes it the case that a knows that b will be true, if a believes b. As they stand, neither R3 nor R4 is very plausible as an account of a type of normative reason for belief. A modified version of R4 can salvage normative knowledge, but for reasons that I shall presently explain, normative stability is more difficult to preserve. The benefits of having stable beliefs depend on the context. One could generate evil demon cases in which one is either rewarded or punished for having stable beliefs. They are of no special interest here. Outside of evil demon cases, and more earthly cousins, most of the benefits derived from having stable beliefs are in the conservation of cognitive resources. Provided that the topic of the belief is of no great moment (as in the example in this paper), an unending cycle of reasoning is a waste of mental energy, not to mention time. Stability is no guarantor of truth, and in cases in which the stable beliefs are the true ones, one suspects that the reason giving force of stability is merely derivative from the reason giving force of truth.17 Thus, I tentatively conclude that the fact that a belief would be stable is unlikely to have nonderivative reason-giving force. Cases in which being a stable belief provides a reason are cases in which there is already some other more basic reason-giving consideration. 10 17 For an interesting discussion of the way that truth crowds out other epistemic considerations, see Pritchard (forthcoming). Normative knowledge, on the other hand, has inherent plausibility. Its inherent plausibility comes from an assumption set out in §0, namely that the aim of belief plays a role in setting the norms of belief. This requires elaboration. In this paper, our working understanding of what it is for belief to aim at truth is that the cognitive regulatory mechanisms for the formation of individual beliefs are geared towards tracking truth. We may modify our understanding of the aim of belief if we take the aim to be knowledge, including appropriate riders concerning an agent's being appropriately epistemically situated.18 If one allows that belief 's constitutive aims play a role in setting the norms for belief, then one expects at least some of the normative reasons for belief to be concerned with arriving at the truth. This is vague. A precise way of understanding it is offered by strict evidentialism: all reasons for belief are evidential reasons.19 A more ecumenical evidentialist can offer the weaker position: insofar as the aim of belief is truth, some normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons.20 Evidence, however, does not exhaust the ways in which the aim of belief might set truth-tracking belief norms. To see why, consider the numbers game example. In the multiple fixed-point numbers game, Alice knows that if she believes that the number that will appear on the display is 2, then that number will be 2. Thus, Alice knows that she will acquire a true belief if she comes to believe that the number on the display will be 2. For the reasons discussed in §1.4, Alice lacks evidence that the number on the display will be 2, but she is guaranteed that if she forms the belief that it will be, then she will have acquired a new true belief. 11 18 See Williamson (2002) for an extended discussion of the idea that belief aims at knowledge. The notion of being well situated is much more difficult to spell out than one might expect and is problematic. For a concise discussion, see Blöme-Tillmann (2007). 19 See Adler (2002) 20 See Steglich-Petersen (2009) for more discussion on the relationship between the aim of belief and our reasons. Acquiring this new belief is consistent with the aims of her cognitive regulatory mechanisms for believing. She aims at having her individual beliefs come out true, and it is only by believing that the number on the display will be 2, or by believing that the number on the display will be -2, that she will have beliefs that she knows will be true. Indeed, she knows that all other beliefs will be false. Her beliefs are guaranteed to fail to track the truth, unless she forms the belief that the number on the display will be 2, or unless she forms the belief that the number on the display will be -2. If we take the aim of belief (and the concomitant goals of her cognitive regulatory mechanism) seriously as setting norms for belief, there is a reason to believe that the number will be 2, or to believe that the number will be -2. At first blush, this appears to commend R4, the principle that I earlier said was flawed: R4. Normative knowledge: Fact f is a reason for agent a to believe b if f makes it the case that a knows that b will be true, if a believes b. It does not. R4 gets things wrong by being too permissive. Here is a counter-example. Suppose that Alex is perfectly reliable about predicting his own behaviour. Alex knows that if he believes that he will drop an anvil on his foot, he will in fact drop an anvil on his foot. Alex knows this because his beliefs about his own behaviour are perfectly reliable indicators. Nonetheless, it is clearly wrong to say that these facts about Alex jointly give Alex a reason to believe that he will in fact drop an anvil on his foot. What is the difference between Alex's case and Alice's earlier on? Alice's belief causes its own truth, whereas Alex's belief is perfect evidence of its own truth. Alex's coming to believe that he will drop an anvil on his foot will not cause him to drop an anvil on his foot. Rather, some disposition to perform a particular action, let us say, causes Alex to believe that he will perform that particular action. This points the way to a less permissive version of normative knowledge: R4*. Normative knowledge: Fact f is a reason for agent a to believe b if f makes it the case that a knows that b will be true, if a's believing b causes b to be true. 12 The difference between R4 and R4* is in the last clause. An agent's belief must cause itself to be true ('cause' should be interpreted loosely here) in order for there to be a reason for the agent to have that belief. One might still worry about R4*, owing to a view in the philosophy of action, cognitivism,21 which holds that intentions are special cases of beliefs about what one will do. In combination with R4*, cognitivism appears to lead to the conclusion that we have a great many reasons to believe that we will act in certain ways, since having the intention to φ under favourable circumstances causes one to φ. Nonetheless, cognitivism should not be treated as a source of concern for R4*, as any account of reasons for intending according to the cognitivist understanding must exempt intention-beliefs from having the aim of truth as understood here. Normative knowledge as spelled out in R4* is consistent with the pair of views that the aim of belief is truth or knowledge and that the aim of belief plays a role in setting the norms for belief. In cases like the multiple fixed-point numbers game, where evidential norms do not help an agent track the truth, normative knowledge is not only consistent with this pair of views, but suggested by them. Normative knowledge entails the falsehood of strict evidentialism. Strict evidentialism may yet be true, but it is not because it is the sole norm of belief that is consistent with the aim of belief 's being truth or knowledge. 4 Knowledge, normative knowledge, and doxastic voluntarism Normative knowledge, if true, is sufficient in the single fixed-point numbers game to determine what Alice ought to believe, because there is only one belief that satisfies the conditions as set out in R4*. The non-normative cognitive regulatory mechanism, knowledge, is sufficient, ceteris paribus, in the single fixed-point version of the numbers game to determine what Alice will believe. This can be seen by spelling out knowledge more precisely: 13 21 See Setiya (2007) and Velleman (2000a) for discussions of cognitivism. See Langton (2004) for worries about cognitivism. C2* Knowledge: Absent evidence, an agent can and sometimes does form a belief when she knows that having that belief will cause it to be true. If we accept the simple view about evidence, then in the single fixed-point numbers game, Alice lacks evidence. Ex hypothesi, the belief regulatory mechanism that is available to her is knowledge, which selects the only available belief that satisfied C2*, the belief that the number on the display will be -2. Neither knowledge nor normative knowledge are sufficient in these ways in scenarios that have the form of the multiple fixed-point numbers game. This is because there is no unique solution to the multiple fixed-point numbers game. On the cognitive regulatory side, knowledge is left with more than one belief to choose from. On the normative side, normative knowledge provides reasons of equal strength for more than one belief. That knowledge and normative knowledge suffice and fail to suffice for their respective purposes in the same scenarios is unsurprising. One way of understanding knowledge is as being a special case of a general cognitive regulatory mechanism: C3 Reasons: Under normal circumstances, agents involuntarily form beliefs in response to what they take to be their epistemic reasons. C3 is phrased subjectively in order to avoid mysteries about how external epistemic reasons could play a direct causal role in belief formation. It is also designed to be neutral about what an agent can take to be an epistemic reason. Two constraints on how to understand C3 must be introduced. The first is that taking is not meant itself to be a reflective or conscious process. Agents need not possess the concept of a reason or be able to articulate the considerations on which a belief is formed. This restriction runs contrary to much of the current thought about what it is to be a reason, which holds that for something to be taken as a reason, an agent must be able to articulate it in some way, at least retrospectively, if asked. Current thought may be correct, 14 although I suspect it is not. My weaker condition does not preclude instances of taking to be a reason that meet the stronger and more popular condition. I offer the weaker condition to focus on an idea that I believe enjoys broad consensus. That idea is that cognitive regulatory mechanisms, or at least rational ones, are sensitive to what an agent takes to be her reasons. What counts as being taken as a reason need not be settled here. The second constraint is that 'epistemic' must be understood in some reasonable way. Epistemic reasons cannot be pragmatic reasons (although the same fact could in some circumstances be both an epistemic and pragmatic reason) for belief. I suggest that we understand epistemic reasons as non-evidential reasons that are nonetheless truth-concerned. It strikes me as implausible to suppose that most agents are working with a sophisticated theory of what an epistemic reason is, but barring some interesting further beliefs,22 they do not take the fact that it would be a great thing if p were true to suggest that p is in fact true. With these constraints on board, reasons covers the more common circumstance in which an agent forms beliefs in response to her (apparent) evidence. Knowledge is just a special case of reasons. Because evidence-based belief formation is the normal circumstance, accepting reasons makes doxastic involuntarism an especially attractive view about belief formation. This is because given an evidential state, e, and a proposition, p, an agent will have one of three clear and mutually exclusive kinds of reasons: a reason to believe p, a reason to disbelieve p, or a reason to suspend judgement about p. Because these three kinds of reasons are mutually exclusive, according to reasons a well-functioning cognitive regulatory mechanism will always be able to determine a single doxastic state for an agent based on what she takes to be her evidence. Being able to form beliefs voluntarily would therefore be either superfluous or would go against the norms set by the aim of belief. It would be superfluous if the agent chose the evidentially recommended belief state, because reasons already would ensure that she forms that belief state. It would go against the norms set by the aim of belief if the agent chose a belief state other than that recommended by the evidence, as doing so would violate the norm set by the aim of belief that belief be truth tracking. 15 22 E.g. perhaps a Panglossian believes that because this is the best of all possible worlds, the fact that something would be the best state-of-affairs is a reason to believe that it is the actual state-of-affairs. The situation is different when we turn to the multiple fixed-point numbers game. Here, neither knowledge nor normative knowledge provides a unique solution. There is, by normative knowledge, equally good reason to believe that the number on the display will be 2 and to believe that the number on the display will be -2.23 Knowledge, lacking a unique solution, also does not have a determinate answer as to which belief to form. In essence, this is a case in which there are no epistemic reasons that favour believing 2 over -2 or vice-versa. And, it is also a case in which there is no epistemic reason to suspend judgement, because the rules of the numbers game are set up so as to ensure that suspending judgement is unreasonable. Despite this being the state of affairs, the only way to track truth is to believe one of 2 or -2. Because the rules and operation of the numbers game are transparent to its players, they cannot (or ought not, at any rate) to take themselves to have a reason to believe 2 over -2 or vice-versa. Tracking truth dictates that they believe one or the other, but not either one in particular. This case is a kind of doxastic Buridan's Ass. To avoid starvation, a hungry donkey must choose one of the two bales of hay despite not being able to form a rational prejudice for one over the other. In cases of action, we assume this is possible. The donkey, or rather his human counterparts, has a psychological capacity to choose when the reasons for favouring one choice over another are exhausted. This capacity for brute choice is sometimes regarded as extrarational. If it is, it is nonetheless a precondition of one's ability to satisfy rational requirements of the form: choose a or b. In the multiple fixed-point numbers game, a capacity to choose a belief would be required for a non-self-deluding agent to meet her requirement to track the truth. If we suppose that the right way to understand normative knowledge is that an agent has a reason, or (more strongly) is required either to believe 2 or to believe -2,24 then an agent must arrive at one of those two 16 23 Note that normative knowledge does not generate a reason to believe (2 v -2). Having this disjunctive belief will not cause it to be true that the number on the display will be 2 v -2. 24 To avoid confusion about scope: Reason (B2 v B-2). beliefs despite having no epistemic prejudice for one over the other. No sound theoretical reasoning will lead to one belief over the other. Some capacity for spontaneous belief formation is required; most plausibly this would be a capacity to choose what to believe. As I am not seeking to defend the possibility of doxastic voluntarism, let me make it clear that 'most plausibly' is not intended to convey unrestricted plausibility. If doxastic voluntarism is impossible or highly improbable, then the issues raised by the multiple fixed-point number game do constitute, as far as I can see, an independent argument for doxastic voluntarism. Rather, if doxastic voluntarism is possible in the relevant senses and not wholly implausible, it looks like the right cognitive capacity for this job. The upshot is that doxastic voluntarism, if possible, is useful for a truth-tracking agent, at least in these limited circumstances. Indeed, it is more than useful. It looks like the best way for an agent to securely track the truth in cases where knowledge and normative knowledge apply. This very limited kind of doxastic voluntarism is consistent with the view that the aim of belief is truth (or knowledge) and that the aim of belief plays a role in setting the norms of belief. 5 Leaps of knowledge: from instability to a fixed point and from one fixed point to another It is possible now to give a more precise account of the sort of doxastic voluntarism that is consistent with, and possibly commended by, the view that the aim of belief is truth and that this aim sets some of the norms of belief. This is a limited kind of doxastic voluntarism, one that not only tracks truth, but ensures knowledge: D1 Voluntarism: An agent can choose her belief just in case three conditions are met. A. Evidence does not issue a relevant requirement (either for a belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgement). B. The agent knows that her having the belief will cause the belief to be true. C. Normative knowledge does not issue a reason for just a single belief. 17 Voluntarism as spelled out in D1 allows for doxastic choice in cases in which the agent is in a position to make a leap of knowledge. It does not permit an agent to make a leap of faith. An agent can only choose a belief that she knows will be true, if believed, not one about which the evidence is merely indecisive. One may therefore think of the kind of doxastic voluntarism that is consistent with the aim of belief 's being truth or knowledge as 'leap-of-knowledge' voluntarism, as opposed to the much stronger 'leap-of-faith' voluntarism that is often the target of doxastic involuntarists. Whether or not we have leap-of-knowledge voluntaristic capacities seems to me to be an empirical question. If our cognitive regulatory systems have evolved under pressures to track truth, it at least seems possible, given the epistemic utility of being able to choose beliefs in some circumstances, that human cognitive regulatory mechanisms have evolved with a limited capacity to choose beliefs. One of the limits on our capacity to choose beliefs according to voluntarism as spelled out in D1 is an implied trumping rule concerning the operation of our cognitive regulatory mechanisms. This appears in clause A) of D1. An agent can only choose her beliefs when what to believe is not settled by evidence (or apparent evidence). On the normative side, normative knowledge is only relevant when evidential reasons are lacking. On the psychological side, knowledge is only operative when evidential regulatory mechanisms are not relevant. In the multiple fixed-point numbers game, evidence has no role to play on either the normative or the psychological side. There are other cases in which this is not so. It is interesting to consider them, suspending clause A) for the moment. 5.1 The power of positive thinking25 Consider the following situation. Robert visits an internist for his annual physical examination. He receives a phone call from his physician later in the week with some unsettling news. 18 25 This section's name is borrowed from Harman (1999) Robert has a rare and dangerous illness that is connected to his brain states. Improbably, it is connected in particular to brain states that encode beliefs about this specific illness. Patients who believe that they will recover from the illness always do. Patients who believe that they will not recover from the illness never recover. And, patients who have no view about the matter never recover. These outcomes have been shown by extensive research, Robert is truthfully advised, to be caused by the brain states that encode beliefs about the illness.26 Having been told this, Robert will realise that he is in a bad way. Not having felt ill or ever having heard of this illness prior to his visit to the doctor, Robert had no belief about whether he would recover from this illness. He now has very strong evidence that his lack of belief will cause him not to recover. This leads him to form the belief that he will not recover, which is itself further and self-sustaining evidence that he will not recover. Of course, if Robert were to come to believe that he will recover, he in fact would. That belief would become evidence for itself and would cause itself to be true. 5.2 Pragmatic encroachment and leaps of knowledge Voluntarism as spelled out under D1 rules out the possibility of Robert's choosing to believe that he will get better. This is only because of clause A). In cases like the power of positive belief, a direct change in one's belief would also be a leap of knowledge. There are two fixed points for Robert: believing he will recover and believing that he will not recover. Suspending judgement, once he has been informed of his diagnosis and the nature of the disease, is unstable. If agents can at least choose their beliefs in the limited way allowed by voluntarism, are there any grounds for thinking that perhaps a slightly less restrictive version of doxastic voluntarism that would allow Robert to change his belief directly might be the case? This depends on one's reaction to two questions. 19 26 One can also produce evil demon variants of this example. The first question is whether leaps of knowledge from fixed point to fixed point are possible under any circumstances. If not, then Robert will need to seek out a hypnotist or find some other indirect way to effect a change in his belief. The second question is under what conditions a fixed point to fixed point leap can occur, if it is possible at all. I suggest, tentatively, that if one can make a leap of knowledge from one fixed point to another, it is because of a weak kind of pragmatic encroachment. Let us return briefly to the multiple fixed-point numbers game to see the case for this weak kind of pragmatic encroachment. In a slight modification to the original example, the rules as set out previously still apply, but now Alice will win a prize if she believes that the number on the display will be -2, but she will not win the prize if she believes that it will be 2. From an epistemic point of view, nothing has changed in this modified version over the original. If Alice's cognitive regulatory mechanisms are governed solely by truth-tracking considerations, and reasons are only truth-concerned, changing the pragmatic inducements will affect neither the psychological nor the normative balance sheet. Nonetheless, it does not seem unreasonable to think that Alice, with her capacity to choose which number she believes will appear on the display, would choose -2 in order to win the prize. If we grant her even this limited doxastic voluntarism, she will have the ability to make some choices on a pragmatic basis. Her ability to do so will be consistent with the view that epistemic considerations are completely dominant, both psychologically and normatively, in belief formation. This modified version of the multiple fixed-point numbers game and the power of positive thinking are both cases in which there are multiple fixed points that differ with respect to pragmatic inducements. In the modified multiple fixed-point numbers game, it seems likely that if Alice has any ability to choose her beliefs at all, she will have the ability to do so taking pragmatic inducements into account. This particular instance of weak pragmatic encroachment does not come at an alethic cost. It is in alethic cost that the power of positive thinking example differs importantly. In order to make a direct change in his beliefs, Robert's choice would have to override the evidential 20 considerations. This would undermine the lexical dominance of (apparent) evidence in determining belief states implied by clause A). How high a cost would it be? There is no straightforward answer. It is not clear to me that anything about the aim of belief requires that evidence take priority in cases in which knowledge (suitably modified to remove the stipulation that evidence is dominant) could apply. Knowledge is motivated by an interest in tracking-truth and gaining knowledge, just as evidential belief regulation is. At the same time, there is a difference in the degree of pragmatic encroachment between the power of positive thinking and the multiple fixed-point numbers game. The former has a larger pragmatic encroachment, because there is an epistemic consideration, evidence, to which one can appeal to determine which fixed point to settle on. There is none in the latter. Thus, pragmatic considerations can do more work in the former case than in the latter, moving from mere, and optional, tiebreakers to considerations that can override properly epistemic cognitive regulatory mechanisms. 6 Conclusion I have argued in this paper that a limited version of doxastic voluntarism is consistent with and perhaps suggested by the suppositions that the aim of belief is truth or knowledge and that the aim of belief plays a role in setting the norms for belief. That is the most solid conclusion of this paper. A less solid conclusion is that a limited pragmatic encroachment on cognitive regulation remains consistent with the aim of belief 's being truth or knowledge in the modified multiple fixed-point numbers game and cases with a similar structure. That is to say, in those cases in which one is moving from unstable beliefs to a stable one. I have also considered cases in which an agent is at a fixed point, but has other fixed points available. The example discussed in this paper is the power of positive thinking. I have argued that any plausibility of accepting a degree of pragmatic encroachment in the multiple fixed-point numbers game case does not automatically carry over to these fixed point to fixed point cases. Further, accepting that an 21 agent has a limited capacity to choose her beliefs in the multiple fixed-point numbers game does not imply that she has that capacity when she already has a belief that is a fixed point. The reason why the two kinds of cases are different both with respect to pragmatic encroachment and doxastic voluntarism is that an agent who starts at a fixed point already possesses evidence that her belief is true. Thus, while consistent with the aim of having individual beliefs track truth (or having them become knowledge), doxastic voluntarism is not required for truth-tracking or knowledge acquisition. I have also argued that strict evidentialism is not required by the aim of belief 's being truth or knowledge and the aim of belief 's playing a role in setting the norms of belief. I have argued in the past27 that philosophers who try to connect strict evidentialism with doxastic involuntarism are mistaken. That claim was too strong. Doxastic involuntarism is unproblematically consistent with the aim of belief 's being truth or knowledge, if strict evidentialism is true. If strict evidentialism is false, doxastic involuntarism may leave us short of living up to the aim of belief. 22 27 Reisner (2009) Works Cited Adler, J. (2002) Belief 's Own Ethics. Cambridge: Bradford Books. Blome-Tillmann, M. (2007). The folly of trying to define knowledge. Analysis 67, 214-219. Harman, G. (1999) Rationality. In Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (pp. 9-45). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hookway, C. (2000). Epistemic norms and theoretical deliberation. In J. Dancy (Ed.) Normativity (pp. 60-77). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Kelly, T. (2002). The rationality of belief and some other propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophical Research, 110, 163-196. Langton, R. (2004) Intention as faith. In H. Steward and J. Hyman (Eds.) Action and Agency (pp. 243-258). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parfit, D. (2001) Reasons and rationality. In D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Petersson, and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (Eds.) Exploring Practical Rationality (pp. 17-39). Aldershot: Ashgate. Pritchard, D. (forthcoming). The swamping problem. In A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen (Eds.) Reasons for Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reisner, A. (2007). Evidentialism and the numbers game. Theoria, 73, 304-316. Reisner, A. (2008). Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief. Philosophical Studies, 138, 17-27. Reisner, A. (2009). The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reason problem. Philosophical Studies, 145, 257-272. Setiya, K. (2007). Cognitivism about instrumental reason. Ethics 117, 649-673. Steglich-Petersen, A. (2009). Weighing the aim of belief. Philosophical Studies, 145, 395-405. 23 Shah, N. (2006). A new argument for evidentialism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481-498. Skorupski, J. (forthcoming). The domain of reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Velleman, D. (2000). On the aim of belief. In The Possibility of Practical Reason (pp. 244-282). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Velleman, D. (2000a). The guise of the good. In The Possibility of Practical Reason (pp. 99-122). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Wedgwood, R. (2002). The aim of belief. Philosophical perspectives 16, 267-297. Williams, B. (1973). Deciding to believe. In Problems of the Self (pp. 136-151). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williamson, T. (2002). Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24

Minimalism and the Limits of Warranted Assertability Maneuvers* BLAKE ROEBER University of Notre Dame Abstract: Contextualists and pragmatists agree that knowledge-denying sentences are contextually variable, in the sense that a knowledge-denying sentence might semantically express a false proposition in one context and a true proposition in another context, without any change in the properties traditionally viewed as necessary for knowledge. Minimalists deny both pragmatism and contextualism, and maintain that knowledge-denying sentences are not contextually variable. To defend their view from cases like DeRose and Stanley's high stakes bank case, minimalists like Patrick Rysiew, Jessica Brown, and Wayne Davis forward "warranted assertability maneuvers." The basic idea is that some knowledge-denying sentence seems contextually variable because we mistake what a speaker pragmatically conveys by uttering that sentence for what she literally says by uttering that sentence. In this paper, I raise problems for the warranted assertability maneuvers of Rysiew, Brown, and Davis, and then present a warranted assertability maneuver that should succeed if any warranted assertability maneuver will succeed. I then show how my warranted assertability maneuver fails, and how the problem with my warranted assertability maneuver generalizes to pragmatic responses in general. The upshot of my argument is that, in order to defend their view from cases like DeRose and Stanley's high stakes bank case, minimalists must prioritize the epistemological question whether the subjects in those cases know over linguistic questions about the pragmatics of various knowledge-denying sentences. Suppose that you go from a situation where it doesn't matter much whether p is true to a situation where it matters a lot whether p is true. Does this change in your practical interests change the strength of epistemic position required for you to know that p, or the strength of epistemic position required for you to semantically express a true proposition by uttering the sentence 'I know that p'? The pragmatic encroachment debate pits pragmatists against contextualists, and purist invariantists against both of them. By 'pragmatism,' I mean the view that knowledge depends at least in part on our practical interests, in the sense that a mere difference in practical interests can entail a difference in knowledge.1 If pragmatism is true, there will be pairs of cases that differ only insofar as some stipulated difference in practical interests requires that they differ, and where, as a result of just this difference in practical * Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft in Episteme. 1 See, for example, Fantl and McGrath (2002), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Ganson (2008), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Weatherson (2012), Ross and Schroeder (2014), and the portions of Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005) that are explicitly about knowledge and practical interests. 2 interests, a difference in knowledge follows. Contextualism, in contrast, is a theory about the word 'knows.' According to contextualism, the word 'knows' can semantically express different properties or relations in different contexts of utterance, and a sentence containing the word 'knows' can therefore semantically express different propositions in different contexts of utterance.2 Contextualism entails that, if you and I occupy different contexts when we utter some sentence of the form 'S knows that p,' you might semantically express a true proposition while I semantically express a false proposition, even if we utter this sentence at exactly the same time.3 What motivates contextualism and pragmatism, respectively? Contextualism evolved as both a solution to the "skeptical problem" (DeRose 1995) and an explanation of our intuitions about the knowledge ascriptions and denials in cases like the following. Low Stakes: Rachel and Keith are driving home on Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank to deposit their paychecks, but, as they approach it, they notice that the lines inside are very long. Although they generally like to deposit their paychecks as soon as possible, it's not especially important in this case that they deposit their checks right away, so Keith suggests that they drive straight home and deposit their checks tomorrow morning. Rachel says, "Maybe the bank won't be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays." Keith replies, "No, I know it will be open. I stop in at the bank every Saturday. It's open until noon." High Stakes: Rachel and Keith are approaching their bank on Friday afternoon, as in Low Stakes, and they notice the long lines. Keith again suggests that they go straight home and return to deposit their paychecks tomorrow morning, explaining that he stops at the bank every Saturday morning and that it's open until noon. But in this case, Rachel and Keith have just written a very large and important check. If their paychecks are not deposited before Monday morning, the important check they wrote will bounce, leaving them in a terrible situation. The bank isn't open on Sunday. Rachel reminds Keith of these facts. She then says, "What if our bank discontinued its Saturday hours since your last visit? Do 2 See, for example, Cohen (1988), DeRose (1995), and Lewis (1996). 3 The label 'pragmatism' comes from Fantl and McGrath (2009). Though perhaps misleading, it does allow us to easily distinguish between the pragmatist thesis that knowledge depends at least in part on our practical interests and the invariantist thesis that the word 'knows' does not express different properties or relations in different contexts of utterance. (The more popular labels 'subject-sensitive invariantism' and 'interest-relative invariantism' both lack this desirable feature.) 3 you know that it will be open tomorrow?" Remaining just as confident as he was before that the bank will be open, Keith replies, "Well, no, I don't know that the bank will be open. We had better stop and deposit the checks now."4 While contextualism evolved as an explanation of our intuitions about the knowledge attributions and denials in cases like these, pragmatism evolved as a solution to the lottery paradox and as a competing explanation of our intuitions about cases like Low and High Stakes.5 So, while pragmatism and contextualism are logically consistent- pragmatists might be right about knowledge while contextualists are right about the word 'knows'-pragmatism and contextualism are standardly viewed as rivals.6 Neither contextualism nor pragmatism is universally accepted among epistemologists, however. Where 'purism' names the denial of pragmatism, and 'invariantism' names the denial of contextualism, many epistemologists are purist invariantists. Purist invariantism entails (a) that Keith knows that the bank will be open in both Low Stakes and High Stakes if he knows that the bank will be open in either case, and (b) that Keith would semantically express a true proposition by uttering the sentence 'I know that the bank will be open' in both cases if he would semantically express a true proposition by uttering this sentence in either case. But (a) and (b) are consistent with any level of skepticism, and many purist invariantists aren't sufficiently skeptical to deny that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Low Stakes.7 Where 'moderate purist invariantism' names purist invariantism in conjunction with the proposition that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Low Stakes, many epistemologists are moderate purist invariantists. Since moderate purist invariantists think we can get by in our epistemological theorizing without the contextualist thesis that 'knows' can express different properties in different contexts of utterance and the pragmatist thesis that knowledge depends at least in part on our practical interests, I will call moderate purist invariantism, simply, 'minimalism.' This paper concerns a specific attempt to defend minimalism from the contextualist or pragmatist conclusions that some epistemologists have wanted to draw from Low Stakes and High Stakes, and other similar cases. In Low Stakes, Keith utters the sentence 'I know that the bank will be open,' and then, in High Stakes, he utters the sentence 'I don't know that the bank will be open.' Call these sentences 'K' and '¬K,' respectively. 4 These cases are slight modifications of the cases in DeRose (1992), p. 913. 5 See Hawthorne (2004, pp. 2-3) for the lottery paradox. Stanley (2005) contains the paradigm pragmatist treatment of High Stakes. 6 This is not an accident. Contextualism and pragmatism clearly are rivals in at least the sense that contextualists and pragmatists can't both be right about all of the purported motivations for accepting their respective views. 7 As we will see below, Wayne Davis is an exception. 4 Minimalists think that Keith says something false by uttering ¬K in High Stakes. Pragmatists and contextualists think that he says something true by uttering ¬K in High Stakes. Everyone agrees that Keith appears to say something true by uttering ¬K in High Stakes, at least prima facie.8 The disagreement concerns the correct explanation of this appearance. As Jeff King and Jason Stanley note (2007, p. 134), a tempting minimalist explanation takes the form of the following "warranted assertability maneuver" (or 'WAM' for short): Keith appears to say something true by uttering ¬K in High Stakes because (a) he pragmatically conveys something true by uttering ¬K in High Stakes and (b) we mistake the proposition that he pragmatically conveys by uttering ¬K in High Stakes for what he says by uttering ¬K in High Stakes.9 In this paper, I argue that WAMs are insufficient for defending minimalism from cases like High Stakes. Thus, I argue, defending minimalism from cases like High Stakes will require adopting a different strategy. In §§1-4, I discuss the WAMs defended by Patrick Rysiew, Jessica Brown, and Wayne Davis, and show why minimalists might be dissatisfied with each of them. In §5, I present my own WAM and suggest that it will succeed if any WAM will succeed. In §6, however, I argue that even my improved WAM must fail. The upshot of my argument will be that, in order to defend minimalism from High Stakes and similar cases, minimalists must prioritize the properly epistemological question whether Keith knows that the bank will be open over linguistic questions about what Keith pragmatically conveys by uttering the sentence 'I don't know that the bank will be open.' 1. The Rysiew/Brown WAM According to Patrick Rysiew (2001), 'knows' is not a context sensitive word. It semantically expresses the same properties and relations in every context of utterance. As 8 Like others, I stipulatively define 'says' so that the proposition one semantically expresses by uttering a sentence in a context is identical to what one says by uttering that sentence in that context. 9 Note that, according to the variety of WAM responsible for the moniker 'warranted assertability maneuver,' we think Keith says something true by uttering ¬K in High Stakes because we mistake the warrant he has for asserting ¬K for the truth of the proposition that he asserts by uttering ¬K. Since it is implausible that we are mistaking the warrant that Keith has for asserting ¬K for the truth of the proposition that he asserts that he asserts by uttering ¬K, I will ignore this variety of WAM. From here forward, I will assume that, if we are mistaking anything at all, we are mistaking a true proposition pragmatically conveyed by some utterance for what is said by that utterance. 5 a result, by uttering ¬K in any context, Keith would semantically express the proposition that he doesn't know that the bank will be open (p. 487). Rysiew endorses a relevant alternatives semantics for the word 'knows.' On his view, an utterance of 'S knows that p' expresses a truth only if S can rule out all of the relevant ¬p alternatives, where a relevant ¬p alternative is a scenario where p is false that is likely to obtain (pp. 487-8). In High Stakes, since Keith can rule out all the likely scenarios where the bank will not be open, and since Keith satisfies all of the other necessary conditions for knowing, Rysiew thinks that Keith says something false by uttering ¬K. But an irrelevant alternative may become salient in a context, and Rysiew thinks that an instance of 'I know that p' uttered in such a context would implicate that the speaker can rule out this irrelevant alternative (p. 490). When Rachel mentions the possibility that the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours, she makes this possibility salient. Given the evidence currently in Keith's possession, Keith cannot rule this possibility out. Since it is unlikely that the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours, however, this alternative is irrelevant, so it doesn't count against Keith's knowing. Thus, says Rysiew, even though Keith knows that the bank will be open, he cannot felicitously utter K. For if he did, he would implicate that he can rule out the possibility that the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours (p. 490). Since Keith knows that he cannot rule this possibility out, he utters ¬K instead, and thereby implicates that he cannot rule out the possibility that the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours. Because the proposition that Keith cannot rule out the possibility that the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours is both true and easily mistaken for what Keith says by uttering ¬K, says Rysiew, it is tempting to think that Keith says something true by uttering ¬K (p. 492). This is the gist of Rysiew's WAM. According to Jessica Brown, however, Rysiew's WAM fails to account for Keith's practical interests (2006, pp. 421-3). Suppose that you take yourself to know that p in a situation where it doesn't matter whether p, and suppose that I mention some distant but un-eliminable scenario in which ¬p. According to Brown (p. 423), it would be perfectly appropriate for you to dismiss the scenario as unlikely and continue to insist that you know that p. Similarly, thinks Brown, in Low Stakes (where it doesn't matter when Keith and Rachel go to the bank), Keith could have felicitously uttered K in an exchange like the following. ... Rachel raises the possibility that their bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours and then asks Keith whether he knows that the bank will be open tomorrow. Keith responds, "Yeah, I do know that the bank will be open 6 tomorrow. It's so unlikely that it has discontinued its Saturday hours since my last visit that we needn't worry about that possibility." Even though Keith points out that their bank has almost certainly not changed its Saturday hours, the possibility that it has is still salient. Since Keith can't rule this possibility out, Rysiew's view predicts that Keith's utterance of K isn't felicitous. According to Brown, however, it is felicitous. Brown thinks Rysiew's account is at least on the right track, though, so she attempts to develop his account to capture the impact of practical interests on our intuitions about Keith's utterance of ¬K in High Stakes. To do this, Brown starts with Grice's Maxim of Relation (1989, p. 32) and his well-known example of the motorist who tells the pedestrian that she is running out of gas. In Grice's example, the pedestrian utters the sentence 'there is a garage nearby' and thereby implicates that there is an open garage nearby. The scenario that Brown imagines differs slightly from Grice's. In Brown's scenario, there is only one garage nearby and the pedestrian knows that this garage is closed, so she utters the sentence 'there is no garage nearby.' Brown thinks that, just as the pedestrian in Grice's petrol example implicates that there is an open garage nearby by uttering just 'there is a garage nearby,' the pedestrian in her example implicates that there is not an open garage nearby by uttering just, 'there is no garage nearby.' According to Brown, "[w]hile this utterance is literally false, it pragmatically conveys the true claim that there is no open garage nearby" (p. 425). Brown thinks that an utterance of K or ¬K in High Stakes would, respectively, be analogous to an utterance of 'there is a garage nearby' or 'there is no garage nearby' in her petrol scenario (p. 426). In High Stakes, Keith would have implicated a false proposition by uttering K. By uttering ¬K instead, he thereby implicated a true proposition. Which proposition, exactly? In High Stakes, the salience of Keith's practical situation makes it clear that Keith needs to be in a very strong epistemic position with respect to the proposition that the bank will be open on Saturday. According to Brown, had Keith uttered K in High Stakes, this is exactly what he would have implicated. More specifically, says Brown, he would have implicated that his belief that the bank will be open matches the facts out to the nearest world in which the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours. Let 'm' name the proposition that Keith's belief that the bank will be open matches the facts out to the nearest world in which the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours. Since Keith uttered ¬K instead of K, says Brown, he implicated ¬m instead of m. And since ¬m is true, he implicated a true proposition by uttering ¬K in High Stakes. Finally, says Brown, when we read High Stakes and consider Keith's utterance of ¬K, his utterance seems true because it 7 conversationally implicates that ¬m, and we mistake ¬m for what Keith says by uttering ¬K (p. 424). 2. A Worry about the Generality of the Rysiew/Brown WAM Brown's development of Rysiew's WAM does seem like an improvement, since it captures the impact of Keith's practical interests on our intuitions about High Stakes. It is clear that we might improve on both WAMs, however. Consider the following revision of High Stakes, which focuses solely on Keith's practical interests. Unlike the original version of High Stakes, this version does not mention the possibility that the bank has discontinued its Saturday hours since Keith's last visit. Practical High Stakes: Rachel and Keith are driving home on Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank to deposit their paychecks, but as they approach it they notice that the lines inside are very long. Keith suggests that they go straight home and return to deposit their paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that he stops at the bank every Saturday morning and that it's open until noon. But in this case, Rachel and Keith have just written a very large and important check. If their paychecks are not deposited before Monday morning, the important check they wrote will bounce, leaving them in a terrible situation. The bank isn't open on Sunday, and Rachel reminds Keith of this fact. She then says, "It will be completely disastrous for us if we go home now and the bank isn't open tomorrow. Do you know that it will be open tomorrow?" Remaining just as confident as he was before that the bank will be open tomorrow, Keith replies, "Well, no, I don't know that the bank will be open tomorrow. We had better stop and deposit the checks now." Just as Keith appears to say something true by uttering ¬K in the original version of High Stakes, he appears to say something true by uttering ¬K in this version of High Stakes. But in this version of High Stakes, nobody mentions any specific reason why the bank might not be open on Saturday, including the possibility that the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours. In fact we can stipulate that, in Practical High Stakes, neither Keith nor Rachel considers the possibility that the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours, and we can also stipulate that, in Practical High Stakes, whatever specific reasons they are considering, they aren't considering any of the same reasons. Giving these stipulations, we cannot explain why Keith seems to say something true by 8 uttering ¬K in Practical High Stakes in terms of anything as specific as the possibility that the bank has recently discontinued its Saturday hours. Since Rysiew's and Brown's WAMs are just this specific, they don't explain why Keith seems to say something true by uttering ¬K in Practical High Stakes. To explain why Keith seems to say something true by uttering ¬K in Practical High Stakes, we need a more general WAM than the WAMs forwarded by Rysiew and Brown. 3. A WAM with General Application While it is clear enough how Rysiew and Brown could revise their WAMs to meet this need, Wayne Davis's WAM is sufficiently general as it stands, with literally no need for revision. According to Davis (2007, p. 414), knowledge is "completely and nondefectively justified true belief," where a completely justified belief must be "either selfevident or based on evidence sufficient to establish its truth." For Davis, establishing the truth of a proposition is no easy task. Keith's evidence that the bank will be open doesn't establish the truth of the proposition that the bank will be open, for example, since "there are too many very real possibilities that [he] cannot rule out: that the bank changed its hours since [he] last checked, that an unexpected thunderstorm would lead to a massive power outage, and so on" (p. 414). Since the proposition that the bank will be open is not self-evident, and since Davis thinks that Keith's evidence doesn't establish the truth of this proposition, Davis agrees with pragmatists and contextualists that Keith says something true by uttering ¬K in High Stakes, and he disagrees with them about Low Stakes. According to Davis, Keith says something false by uttering K in Low Stakes. To handle our intuition that Keith says something true by uttering K in Low Stakes, Davis then develops a WAM according to which, by uttering K in Low Stakes, Keith implicates that he is close enough to knowing for present purposes. On Davis's view, Keith's utterance of ¬K in High Stakes and his utterance of K in Low Stakes are respectively analogous to Kim's utterances of the sentences 'the coffee is all gone' and 'no, there may be enough for you' in the case below (p. 406). Coffee: Kim takes time out from studying to make a cup of coffee. When the scoop comes up empty, she yells to Jerome, ''the coffee is all gone!'' Eric hears Kim yell this. After telling her that he needs a few coffee grounds for his science project, he then asks whether the coffee is really all gone. Kim responds without embarrassment, ''no, there may be enough for you.'' 9 On Davis's view, Kim said something true when she uttered the sentence 'no, there may be enough for you,' but something false when she uttered the sentence 'the coffee is all gone.' She implicated that the coffee is close enough to being all gone for present purposes, however, and this is true. The reason she appeared to say something true by uttering 'the coffee is all gone,' on Davis's view, is that she implicated something true by uttering this sentence (p. 407). According to Davis, we should say roughly the same thing about Keith's utterance of K in Low Stakes. Since Keith does not know that the bank will be open in Low Stakes, Keith says something false by uttering K in Low Stakes. But Keith is close enough to knowing for present purposes, and this is what he implicates by uttering K in Low Stakes. The reason Keith appears to say something true by uttering K in Low Stakes, says Davis, is that he implicates something true and we mistake the true proposition that he implicates for what he says by uttering K in Low Stakes (p. 408). Now, as should be obvious, minimalists cannot rely on this WAM for defending their view from Low and High Stakes, since minimalism maintains that Keith says something true by uttering K in Low Stakes. According to Davis, however, minimalists can simply revise his account of knowledge to develop a similar WAM for High Stakes. With a more permissive account of knowledge, says Davis, minimalists can maintain that Keith says something false by uttering ¬K in High Stakes (since he does know that the bank will be open), but implicates the true proposition that, for present purposes, he is too close to not knowing that the bank will be open. According to Davis, minimalists can then explain why Keith seems to say something true by uttering ¬K in High Stakes by insisting that we mistake what Keith implicates by uttering ¬K in High Stakes for what he says by uttering ¬K in High Stakes (p. 414). 4. A Possible Dissatisfaction with Davis's WAM Davis's WAM seems preferable to Rysiew's WAM and Brown's WAM in at least one respect. In both High Stakes and Practical High Stakes, Rachel and Keith are deciding whether they should wait in line to deposit their checks Friday evening, or go straight home and deposit them Saturday morning. In both cases, deciding whether they should wait in line or go straight home is the sole purpose of their conversation. According to the WAM that Davis outlines, in High Stakes, Keith implicates that, for present purposes, he is too close to not knowing that the bank will be open. If Keith implicates this in High Stakes, he surely also implicates this in Practical High Stakes, since High Stakes and Practical High Stakes are identical with respect to the purpose of Rachel and Keith's conversation. So Davis's proposed WAM seems to work just as well for Practical 10 High Stakes as High Stakes. I find Davis's WAM slightly dissatisfying for a different reason, however-a reason that I think counts against Brown's WAM, but not Rysiew's WAM. As we noted above, when minimalists say that Keith implicates something true in High Stakes, and when they say that we mistake what Keith implicates in High Stakes for what he says in High Stakes, they are talking about conversational implicatures. According to a view often associated with Grice (1989), however, conversational implicatures are always explicitly cancellable. Call this 'the strong Gricean view.'10 I find the strong Gricean view implausible, but some philosophers do not, and, if the strong Gricean view is correct, then Brown's WAM and Davis's WAM both rely on false claims.11 Again, consider the conversation that Grice gives us in his well-known petrol example. Motorist: I'm running out of gas. Is there a garage nearby? Pedestrian: Yeah, there is a garage nearby-right around the corner. In this conversation, the pedestrian utters 'there is a garage nearby' and thereby implicates that there is an open garage nearby. Had the garage been closed, however, the pedestrian could have explicitly cancelled this implicature by adding 'but it is closed.' That is, had the pedestrian uttered 'yeah, there is a garage nearby-but it is closed,' she would have successfully conveyed to the motorist that there is a garage nearby without conveying to the motorist that there is an open garage nearby. Now, as we saw above, Brown takes it for granted that, because the pedestrian implicates that there is an open garage nearby by uttering just 'there is a garage nearby,' the pedestrian would have implicated that there is not an open garage nearby had she 10 I call this the strong Gricean view because it is arguable that Grice only endorses a weaker claim. Consider the difference between SC and WC below. (SC) A putative conversational implicature is a genuine conversational implicature only if it is both explicitly and contextually cancellable. (WC) A putative conversational implicature is a genuine conversational implicature only if it is either explicitly or contextually cancellable. As an anonymous referee has helpfully brought to my attention, there are defensible interpretations of Grice on which Grice only endorses WC. This is important because only the stronger principle (SC) says that explicit cancellability is a necessary condition on genuine conversational implicature. 11 See Davis (1998) and Bach (2006) for cases where someone plausibly conversationally implicates something that is an obvious entailment of what is said. 11 uttered just 'there is no garage nearby.' If the strong Gricean view is correct, however, then Brown is mistaken, since the proposition that there is no open garage nearby is not explicit cancellable. Consider the following answers that the pedestrian might have given to the motorist. A1: No, there's no garage nearby, but there is an open garage nearby. A2: No, there's no garage nearby, but I am not saying that there is no open garage nearby. When the pedestrian utters 'there is no garage nearby,' she thereby communicates to the motorist that there is no open garage nearby. But if the strong Gricean view is correct, she does not conversationally implicate that there is no open garage nearby, since, downstream from an utterance of 'there is no garage nearby,' the proposition that there is no open garage nearby is not explicitly cancellable. As A1 and A2 show us, once the pedestrian has uttered 'there is no garage nearby,' it is not (in Grice's words) admissible for the pedestrian to add that there is an open garage nearby, or that she is not saying that there is no open garage nearby, or anything like that. So, if the strong Gricean view is correct, then Brown is mistaken when she says that the pedestrian's utterance of 'there is no garage nearby' implicates the true proposition that there is no open garage nearby. If she is mistaken about this, however, then Davis is also mistaken when he says that, by uttering 'the coffee is all gone' in his coffee case, Kim implicates that the coffee is close enough to being all gone for the purpose of making coffee. As Davis himself notes, just as the pedestrian cannot utter the sentence 'there is no garage nearby' and then admissibly add that there is an open garage nearby, Kim cannot utter 'the coffee is all gone' and then admissibly add that there is enough left to make coffee (p. 411). So, both Brown's WAM and Davis's WAM rely on claims that turn out false if the strong Gricean view is correct. As I said above, I doubt that the strong Gricean view is correct. Instead of rehearsing the arguments against the strong Gricean view, however, I want to provide a WAM that succeeds whether or not the strong Gricean view is correct. In the next section, I present a WAM that is both sufficiently general and immune to whatever worries might arise from the strong Gricean view. This WAM should satisfy both philosophers who accept the strong Gricean view and philosophers who reject it. 12 5. A Sufficiently General, Explicitly Cancellable WAM Return once again to Grice's petrol case. In that case, the pedestrian utters 'there is a garage nearby' and thereby implicates that there is an open garage nearby. What explains this implicature? According to Grice's Cooperative Principle, the pedestrian must make her conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the conversation in which she is engaged (1989, p. 26). According to Grice's Maxim of Relation, the pedestrian must make her conversational contribution relevant (p. 27). The pedestrian does not seem to be flouting the Maxim of Relation when she tells the motorist that there is a garage nearby, and we have no reason to think that she is being uncooperative by telling the motorist just that there is a garage nearby. Yet the pedestrian must regard her own utterance as irrelevant if she does not think that the nearby garage is open. After all, the motorist obviously needs to buy gas, and the pedestrian (we may presume) knows that a closed garage is useless for this purpose. So, preserving the assumption that the pedestrian is observing the Cooperative Principle requires assuming that the pedestrian believes that the nearby garage is open. This (according to Grice) is why the pedestrian implicates that there is an open garage nearby by uttering just 'there is a garage nearby' (p. 32). If this is why the pedestrian implicates that there is an open garage nearby by uttering 'there is a garage nearby,' however, then it seems that the pedestrian also implicates that the motorist can get gas somewhere nearby by uttering 'there is a garage nearby.' Just as the pedestrian must regard her utterance as irrelevant if she does not think that the nearby garage is open, she must regard her utterance as irrelevant if she does not think that the motorist can get gas somewhere nearby. After all, the pedestrian knows that the motorist is running out of gas. Preserving the assumption that the pedestrian is observing the Cooperative Principle requires assuming both that the pedestrian believes that the nearby garage is open and that the pedestrian believes that the motorist can get gas somewhere nearby. So, by uttering 'there is a garage nearby,' the pedestrian implicates both that there is an open garage nearby and that the motorist can get gas somewhere nearby. Now consider the following conversation where the pedestrian gives a negative answer to the motorist's question. Motorist: I'm running out of gas. Is there a garage nearby? Pedestrian: No, there's no garage nearby. The nearest one's in Sleetmute. 13 As we saw above, if the strong Gricean view is correct and all conversational implicatures are explicitly cancellable, then the pedestrian does not conversationally implicate that there is no open garage nearby when she utters 'there is no garage nearby.' Plausibly, however, even if the strong Gricean view is correct, the pedestrian does implicate that the motorist cannot get gas anywhere nearby when she utters 'there is no garage nearby.' First, just as preserving the assumption that the pedestrian is observing the Cooperative Principle in Grice's original petrol case requires assuming that the pedestrian believes that the nearby garage is open, preserving the assumption that the pedestrian is observing the Cooperative Principle in this case requires assuming that the pedestrian believes that the motorist cannot get gas anywhere nearby. Second, the suggestion that the pedestrian implicates that the motorist cannot get gas anywhere nearby easily passes the explicit cancellability test. Consider the following conversation. Motorist: I'm running out of gas. Is there a garage nearby? Pedestrian: No, there's no garage nearby, but there is a place nearby where you can get gas. They sell it out at the airfield. It would be perfectly admissible for the pedestrian to utter 'there is no garage nearby' and then add that there is a place nearby where the motorist can get gas. By uttering 'there is no garage nearby, but there is a place nearby where you can get gas,' the pedestrian successfully conveys to the motorist that there is no garage nearby without conveying to the motorist she cannot get gas anywhere nearby. Her reply to the motorist is perfectly felicitous. The proposition that the motorist cannot get gas anywhere nearby seems just as much an explicitly cancellable implicatum of the pedestrian's utterance of 'there is no garage nearby' as the proposition that there is an open garage nearby seems to be an explicitly cancellable implicatum of the pedestrian's utterance of 'there is a garage nearby.' Now consider the suggestion that, by uttering ¬K in High Stakes, Keith implicates that Rachel and Keith cannot reasonably go straight home. As we noted above, Rachel's sole purpose in questioning Keith is to determine the best course of action, and it is transparent what she means to accomplish by asking Keith if he knows that the bank will be open. Just as the motorist asks the pedestrian if there is a garage nearby to find out whether she can get gas nearby, Rachel asks Keith if he knows that the bank will be open to find out whether they can reasonably go straight home. (Conditional on the proposition that the bank will be open, going straight home is clearly the best course of 14 action.) Given this, however, minimalists can point out that, just as preserving the assumption that the pedestrian is observing the Cooperative Principle in Grice's original petrol case requires assuming that the pedestrian believes that the nearby garage is open, preserving the assumption that Keith is observing the Cooperative Principle in High Stakes requires assuming that Keith believes that he and Rachel cannot reasonably go straight home. This similarity motivates the claim that, by uttering ¬K in High Stakes, Keith implicates that Rachel and Keith cannot reasonably go straight home. Is this purported implicature explicitly cancellable, then? Yes, for consider the following alternative ending to High Stakes. ... If their paychecks are not deposited before Monday morning, the important check they wrote will bounce, leaving them in a terrible situation. The bank isn't open on Sunday. Rachel reminds Keith of these facts. She then says, "What if our bank discontinued its Saturday hours since your last visit? Do you know that it will be open?" Remaining just as confident as he was before that the bank will be open, Keith replies, "Well, no, I don't know that the bank will be open, but we can still reasonably go straight home. I know the president of the bank. If the bank is closed tomorrow, I will give her a call and she will let us deposit the checks anyway." It seems perfectly admissible for Keith to utter 'I don't know that the bank will be open' to Rachel and then add that they can still reasonably go straight home, so the suggestion that Keith implicates that they cannot reasonably go straight home by uttering ¬K passes Grice's explicit cancelability test. Here, then, is the proposed WAM. By uttering ¬K, Keith pragmatically conveys that he and Rachel cannot reasonably go straight home. Keith seems to say something true by uttering ¬K because he and Rachel cannot reasonably go straight home and we mistake the proposition that they cannot reasonably go straight home for what Keith says by uttering ¬K in High Stakes. Of course, this WAM works just as well for Practical High Stakes as for High Stakes, since it is sensitive to the decision-theoretic nature of both cases. So, to the strong Gricean, or to anyone who thinks the strong Gricean view is even plausible, this WAM will seem a clear improvement over Rysiew's WAM, Brown's WAM, and Davis's WAM. If any WAM will put minimalists in good position to defend their view from High Stakes, this one should. 15 6. The Limits of WAMs (Gricean or Otherwise) Sadly, I don't think minimalists can defend their view from High Stakes with my WAM or with any other WAM. In §2, we saw that there is little point in responding to High Stakes with a particular WAM if that WAM cannot handle a slight revision of High Stakes. My WAM and Davis's WAM can both handle revisions of High Stakes like Practical High Stakes, so they have at least that advantage over less general WAMs. But consider the following revision of High Stakes, which is analogous to Fantl and McGrath's high-stakes train case (2002, pp. 67-8), Schroeder's high-stakes bank case (2012, pp. 266-7), Weatherson's high-stakes music case (2012, pp. 82-3), and Ross and Schroeder's high-stakes sandwich case (2014, p. 261), in that it doesn't involve a single utterance of any knowledge-ascribing or knowledge-denying sentence. Silent High Stakes: Keith is driving to the bank on Friday afternoon when he notices the long lines. He knows that the bank has been open every previous Saturday, but he also knows that there will be disastrous consequences if he fails to deposit his paycheck before Sunday. Given the quality of Keith's evidence that the bank will open, balanced against the severe consequences that Keith knows will follow if he fails to deposit his paycheck before Sunday, Keith cannot rationally go straight home. Yet Keith knows that, conditional on the bank's being open, going straight home is the best of his available options. Just like Fantl and McGrath's high-stakes train case, Schroeder's high-stakes bank case, Weatherson's high-stakes music case, and Ross and Schroeder's high-stakes sandwich case, Silent High Stakes involves no utterance of 'knows' or any relevantly related word. Yet many philosophers would have the exactly same response to Silent High Stakes as they have to the other "silent" cases in the pragmatic encroachment literature: they would conclude that, in Silent High Stakes, Keith's belief that the bank will be open must fail to satisfy some necessary condition for knowledge. Some of these philosophers would conclude that Keith's belief falls short of knowledge because they find it prima facie intuitive that Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes. Others would conclude that Keith's belief falls short of knowledge because they see that this conclusion follows from principles that they find independently plausible, such as Fantl and McGrath's Knowledge-Justification Principle (2009, p. 66).12 Indeed, even many minimalist would 12 To give a few more examples, Hawthorne and Stanley's Knowledge-Reasons Principle (2008), and Ross and Schroeder's Knowledge-Action Principle (2014) both entail that Keith does not know that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes. Also, assuming that one cannot know that p if one cannot believe that p except by 16 admit some attraction (at least prima facie) to the proposition that Keith fails some necessary condition for knowledge in Silent High Stakes, perhaps because they feel the initial pull of the case, or perhaps because they appreciate the motivation for accepting the relevant principles.13 Minimalists interested in responding to High Stakes with just a WAM now have a problem. Keith's belief that the bank will be open falls short of knowledge in Silent High Stakes just in case it also falls short of knowledge in the original version of High Stakes, since, by hypothesis, there is no epistemically relevant difference between Keith's belief that the bank will be open in High Stakes and his belief that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes. The intuitions and principles that motivate the conclusion that Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes therefore provide just as much motivation for the conclusion that he lacks knowledge in High Stakes. But there is no Gricean story to tell about Silent High Stakes. There is no way to apply the concepts, distinctions and principles familiar from Grice to this case. Keith does not utter K or ¬K in Silent High Stakes, or even mentally token K or ¬K in this version of the case, so Gricean considerations gain no purchase here. And the same goes for the sentences 'Keith knows that the bank will be open' and 'Keith does not know that the bank will be open.' These sentences make no appearance in Silent High Stakes. Of course, philosophers who find it plausible that Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes might mentally token one or both of these sentences as they consider the case, or even utter these sentences out loud. But are we supposed to think that, when these philosophers utter or mentally token the sentence 'Keith does not know that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes,' they thereby implicate to themselves some true proposition that they then mistake for what they would say by uttering 'Keith does not know that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes,' and that this is why they find it plausible that Keith's belief that the bank will be open fails some necessary condition for knowledge in Silent High Stakes? This suggestion seems implausible. Surely, very few philosophers would arrive at the belief that Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes this way. So it seems doubtful that minimalists can adequately argue that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes by relying on solely the principles and distinctions familiar from Grice. Since Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes only if he also lacks knowledge in High Stakes, it seems equally doubtful that minimalists can adequately argue that Keith knows being irrationally over-confident that p, Ganson's (2008) and Weatherson's (2012) theories of belief both entail that Keith does not know that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes. 13 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that I point this out. 17 that the bank will be open in High Stakes by relying on solely the principles and distinctions familiar from Grice.14 And the problem here isn't just with Gricean pragmatics. The problem generalizes. I have focused exclusively on Grice because the most plausible extant WAM's all rely exclusively on Gricean considerations. But everything I say about Grice in this context applies to the entire field of pragmatics. As Korta and Perry note (2012, p. 1), while semantics deals with the properties of types of expressions, pragmatics deals with the properties of specific utterances. This is what distinguishes pragmatics from semantics. Since nobody utters anything in Silent High Stakes, minimalists who want to rely on pragmatic considerations in response to Silent High Stakes must focus on some utterance that is not part of the case itself-either some imaginary utterance of ¬K by Keith in Silent High Stakes, or some real or imaginary utterance of the sentence 'Keith doesn't know that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes' by the reader herself (or perhaps by someone in her vicinity). Now, plausibly, someone might read Silent High Stakes, imagine herself uttering the sentence 'Keith doesn't know that the bank will be open' in response to Silent High Stakes, think to herself that this would be a perfectly appropriate way to respond to the case, and, on the basis of the apparent propriety of this response, conclude that Keith does not know that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes. If I happen to arrive at the conclusion that Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes this way, minimalists might be able to tell some story according to which (a) the imaginary utterance would be appropriate because, in the imagined context, it pragmatically conveys something true, and (b) I am mislead about Silent High Stakes because I am mistaking the true proposition that my imaginary utterance would pragmatically convey for what I would say by uttering the sentence 'Keith doesn't know that the bank will be open' in the imagined context. The problem is, even if this story happens to work for my conviction that Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes, many philosophers will arrive at the conclusion that Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes without evaluating any real or imaginary utterance of any sentence. As I stated above, many philosophers will simply find it prima facie intuitive that Keith's belief that the bank will be open fails some necessary condition for knowledge in Silent High Stakes, and others will note that this conclusion follows 14 I do not mean to suggest that, in general, it is impossible to implicate things to ourselves by mentally tokening sentences. As Jason Stanley has pointed out in conversation, if I know that it's raining and it's obvious to me that I know that it's raining, it would be odd for me to think to myself 'it might be raining.' I don't want to rule out the possibility that the correct explanation here is at least in part that, by thinking to myself 'it might be raining,' I would implicate to myself that I don't know whether it is raining. 18 from principles that they find independently plausible. As Brown and Gerken point out (2013, pp. 7-8), neither the intuition that Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes nor the derivation of this conclusion from some pragmatist-friendly principle must proceed through any evaluation of any real or imaginary utterance of anything. But this means that we haven't simply found a limitation in the work that Gricean considerations can do for minimalists. The entire field of pragmatics seems incapable of supplying sufficient resources for defending minimalism from cases like Silent High Stakes. And since Keith lacks knowledge in Silent High Stakes only if he also lacks knowledge in High Stakes, it seems that the field of pragmatics cannot supply adequate resources for defending minimalism from cases like High Stakes. Thus, minimalists cannot successfully defend their view from cases like High Stakes by relying solely on WAMs. 7. Conclusion If minimalists cannot successfully defend their view from cases like High Stakes by relying solely on WAMs, how should minimalists respond to cases like High Stakes? I believe they should prioritize the epistemological question whether the subjects in those cases know over linguistic questions about what is pragmatically conveyed by utterances of the relevant knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences. As we just saw, even if minimalists can successfully argue that Keith pragmatically conveys something true by uttering ¬K in High Stakes, this victory will be useless for convincing many philosophers that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes. To address the sensibilities of these philosophers, minimalists must take a stand on the necessary conditions for knowledge and argue that, in Silent High Stakes, Keith's belief that the bank will be open meets all of them. A successful argument here will require at least two things. First, it will require a successful argument for the conclusion that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes.15 Second, it will require an adequate explanation of the fact that, at least initially, Keith seemed to lack knowledge in Silent High Stakes. Suppose, then, that minimalists acquire both a convincing argument for the conclusion that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes and a satisfactory explanation of the initial appearance to the contrary. In this case, what residual need will minimalists have for a WAM? 15 Among other things, these arguments will have to cast sufficient doubt on the pragmatist-friendly principles defended in Fantl and McGrath (2002), Ganson (2008), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Weatherson (2012), Schroeder (2012), and Ross and Schroeder (2014). 19 Minimalists formulated WAMs because they needed to explain why Keith seemed to say something true by uttering the sentence 'I don't know that the bank will be open' in High Stakes. But supposing that minimalists now have both convincing arguments that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes and an adequate explanation of the fact that, at least initially, Keith seemed to lack knowledge in Silent High Stakes, why can't minimalists simply rely on an argument like the one below? "Now that it's clear that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes, and clear that, if Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes, he also knows that the bank will be open in High Stakes, Keith doesn't seem to say something true by uttering the sentence 'I don't know that the bank will be open' in High Stakes. The reason Keith initially seemed to say something true by uttering this sentence in High Stakes is simply that, before we had all of the relevant considerations in view, he seemed to lack knowledge in High Stakes. And the explanation for this fact is the same as the explanation for the fact that, before we had all of the relevant considerations in view, he seemed to lack knowledge in Silent High Stakes-which is identical to High Stakes on every relevant epistemic dimension. The explanation is that ... ." Assuming that minimalists have convincing arguments for the conclusion that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes and a satisfactory explanation for why Keith initial seemed to lack knowledge in Silent High Stakes, I see no reason why this line of reasoning should be unconvincing. But this line of reasoning will not involve a WAM, since it will appeal only to the considerations that explain Silent High Stakes. So it seems that, if minimalists can acquire convincing arguments for the conclusion that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes and a satisfactory explanation for why Keith initial seemed to lack knowledge in Silent High Stakes, they will have no further need for a WAM.16 * * * 16 Of course, the reason Davis will not need a WAM to respond to High Stakes or Silent High Stakes is that he isn't a minimalist. On his view, Keith seems to lack knowledge in High Stakes and Silent High Stakes because he does lack knowledge in those cases (since his belief isn't completely justified, as noted above). If Davis faces a challenge analogous to the challenge facing Rysiew, Brown, and other minimalists forwarding WAMs, this challenge will arise from silent versions of the relevant low stakes cases, not from Silent High Stakes or any analogous case. 20 It seems a mistake to expend resources on something that you won't need once you acquire some other thing that you can't get by without. If you can't get by without a computer, for example, and if, having a computer, you won't need a typewriter, you shouldn't waste resources on a typewriter. As we have seen, minimalists can't get by without (a) convincing arguments for the conclusion that Keith knows that the bank will be open in Silent High Stakes and (b) a satisfactory explanation for why Keith initially seemed to lack knowledge in Silent High Stakes. But, once minimalists have these things, responding to High Stakes will not require a WAM. The upshot is that, at best, WAMs will play an insignificant role in any adequate minimalist response to High Stakes. Of course, there is nothing special about High Stakes. The same lesson applies to all of the high-stakes cases in the literature that involve knowledge ascriptions or denials. WAMs will play an insignificant role in any adequate minimalist response to any of these cases. Questions about the pragmatics of knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences are interesting in their own right, so I don't want to suggest that Rysiew, Brown, Davis, and I have wasted our time by asking how pragmatic considerations bear on utterances such as Keith's utterance of ¬K in High Stakes. But I do want to insist that, in response to cases like High Stakes, minimalists should turn their attention away from questions about the implicatures produced by utterances of the relevant sentences and, instead, prioritize the properly epistemological question whether the subjects in those cases know.17 References Bach, Kent (2006). "The Top 10 Misconceptions about Implicature," in Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning, Betty Birner and Gregory Ward, Eds. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing), pp. 21-30. Blome-Tillmann (2008), "Conversational Implicature and the Cancellability Test," Analysis, Vol. 68, No. 2: pp. 156-160. Brown, Jessica (2006). "Contextualism and Warranted Assertability Manoeuvers," Philosophical Studies, Vol. 130: pp. 407-35. 17 Thanks to Matt Benton, Lisa Miracchi, Ernest Sosa, Kurt Sylvan, and an anonymous referee for helpful conversation and comments on this paper. 21 Brown, Jessica and Mikkel Gerken (2013). 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